So far, Hezbollah has sufficed with tame condemnations of the Israeli strikes—unusual for the typically verbally bellicose group. In one instance, an anonymous alleged official said Hezbollah “will not initiate its own attack” against Israel. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s more passionate official statements expressed solidarity with Iran, but fell far short of declaring hostilities.

Secretary-General Naim Qassem sounded like he was awaiting Iranian orders. “We in Hezbollah,” he wrote, “support the Islamic Republic of Iran’s rights and it stances, and in every step and procedure it takes to defend itself and its choices.”

Hezbollah is holding its fire—verbally and physically—because it is operating under unprecedented constraints. The group never possessed conventional parity with Israel, but the anticipated destructiveness of its massive arsenal could at least create a deterrent “balance of terror” with its Israeli enemies. However, during their recent war, Israel wiped out Hezbollah’s senior-most political and military leadership and a significant portion of its strategic arsenal. This has considerably degraded Hezbollah’s ability to mount a serious attack, let alone restart the conflict and prosecute it to a stalemate—the group’s definition of victory. Hezbollah, which has barely begun to mend these deep Israeli-inflicted wounds, must also now contend with near-daily Israeli strikes on its remaining assets and personnel.

Meanwhile, domestic considerations are also impacting Hezbollah’s calculus—and will also affect Iran’s decision on whether and how to activate its formerly most powerful proxy. In September of 2024, Arab Barometer found that 70 percent of Lebanese view Hezbollah negatively. After the war, their calls for the group’s disarmament forced Hezbollah into a dialogue with President Joseph Aoun over its arsenal. These domestic conditions are far from ideal for the group. But Lebanese displeasure remains passive, and Aoun has adopted a conciliatory and unhurried approach to these talks, even making important concessions to Hezbollah on the critical post-war reconstruction file. If matters remain unchanged, they afford the group a good chance of reconstituting its strength over time. But dragging Lebanon into another destructive war not its own, mere months out from the end of the last one, could torpedo talks with Aoun and leave Hezbollah exposed to increased and intensified public anger.

If this anger seeps into Hezbollah’s Lebanese Shiite support base, the group would be facing an existential crisis. This segment of the Lebanese population has borne the brunt of all the group’s war, including the one it provoked with Israel on October 8, 2023. Utilizing propaganda to spin the war as a necessary preemption of imminent Israeli aggression and post-bellum stop-gap measures—like housing its displaced supporters in prefabricated homes—Hezbollah has been able to largely retain pre-war levels of Lebanese Shiite support. At the very least, the group has delayed a massive Shiite defection until the group can regain its footing and return to keeping them in its orbit through its traditional carrot-and-stick approach.

But only a small portion of Hezbollah’s Shiite support base is comprised of hardened Khomeinist ideologues. The rest back the group for pragmatic reasons, particularly its promise to improve their lives and collective standing inside Lebanon while protecting them from foreign threats—namely, Israel. Their patience with the group’s ideological adventures, which already brought ruin upon them for the sake of the Palestinians, is therefore not infinite.

Now, Hezbollah is promising to rebuild their homes and villages, directly or through funding from the Lebanese state. If Hezbollah instead pulls Lebanese Shiites into an Israeli-Iranian war, then whatever latent anger may be bubbling beneath their apparent placidity could very well erupt. Hezbollah could then lose the critical social support, and resulting political influence, that has long shielded the group from any attempts by the Lebanese state or army to restrain or disarm it for fear of provoking a civil war.

But Hezbollah is ultimately a self-described extension of the Islamic Republic of Iran, notwithstanding the group’s presence in Lebanon and the weight of Lebanese dynamics on its decisions. Tehran’s priorities, then, will determine the organization’s next moves.

The Iranian regime is a messianist theocracy. It is motivated by an eschatological end-goal, namely, replacing the international liberal order, which Tehran and its proxies view as inherently unjust, with the global rule of the returned Twelfth Shiite Imam, the Mahdi. This objective, more important to Iran than its preparatory steps of destroying Israel and weakening the United States, is irrational from a secular or external perspective. But to Iran’s leaders, it is the logical conclusion of their belief system, and they believe it depends on the survival of the Khomeinist regime and its revolutionary exports. Far from being the “mad mullahs” of popular imagination, they are pursuing this destructive goal with calculated pragmatism.

Therefore, unlike similarly motivated actors like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Iran participates in the global system it hates. Rather than war against that system and risk its own destruction, Tehran instead simultaneously advances its goals and grows its strength while undermining it from within. Iran therefore creates durable alliances, builds relationships, and engages in diplomatic initiatives that would have been anathema to an actor like ISIS. This contributes to the regime’s longevity and durability , and makes it a significantly more dangerous Western adversary.

This pragmatic mindset will dictate both Iran’s next steps and its instructions to its proxies, including Hezbollah. Tehran, then, is unlikely to activate what remains of its proxies and their capabilities unless it feels Israel’s strikes are intentionally or incidentally jeopardizing the regime’s survival. Such an activation would serve as a desperate effort to force the Israelis to desist, or to inflict as much harm as possible upon their Zionist adversaries before succumbing.

But, as far as can be told, Israel is not pursuing regime change. Jerusalem’s stated goal is to degrade Iran’s nuclear weapons program and damage or destroy its ability to produce ballistic missiles. While this will certainly weaken the regime, including domestically, it will not bring about its demise absent any unintended consequences. Rather than unnecessarily risk Hezbollah’s demise between Israeli retaliation and Lebanese ire, Iran is therefore likely to leave its recovering primary proxy in reserve: to advance post-war reconstruction efforts that will placate Lebanese Shiites, retain their support, and provide the group a pathway to regeneration and the resumption its role as an active Iranian regional asset.

David Daoud is senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. Follow him on X @DavidADaoud.

The post Why Hezbollah is unlikely to engage in the Israel-Iran war—for now appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2. How effective has Israel been in dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities?

First, the Israeli operation’s objective was not defined as a complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program. Even before its Friday attack, it was clear that Israel has a relatively limited ability to destroy nuclear capabilities without active participation from the United States. Israel can, however, significantly delay Iran’s nuclear program (by at least a year), mainly by striking facilities—starting with Natanz—assassinating nuclear scientists who represent a key bottleneck in the program, and damaging additional sites. Nevertheless, without striking the enrichment facility at Fordow, which likely would require US participation, Iran’s nuclear program cannot be destroyed, only significantly delayed.

As for Iran’s willingness to move forward with its nuclear program, the attack may, paradoxically, encourage Iran to break out toward a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, making such a decision at this time, especially in view of the intensive Israeli Air Force activity over Iran and Israel’s deep intelligence penetration into Iran’s nuclear program, would be extremely dangerous for Iran and might even motivate Washington to directly join the campaign. Therefore, Iran may prefer to avoid a nuclear breakout—at least at this stage—and instead consider this option in the future.

—Raz Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.

3. How forcefully has Tehran responded, and what has the impact been?

I think we are seeing that Iran’s bark is worse than its bite. Israel’s military and intelligence superiority over the Islamic Republic has overwhelmed and severely weakened the regime through decapitations, degradation of its armed forces, and damage to its nuclear program. Iran cannot compete with the surgical and lethal precision with which Israel is mounting its campaign. Israel’s leadership likely factored in the damage to the home front when making the decision to strike Iran so aggressively, and that speaks to the confidence the Israeli defense establishment has in its ability to manage and counter Iranian retaliation.

The one area I am most concerned about is the prospect of Tehran activating contingency operations targeting Israeli and Jewish interests abroad via terrorism. Iran may also consider targeting the energy interests of US partners in the Arab world as a means of extracting economic pain for these Israeli attacks. Tehran may likewise turn to cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. But in the end, Iran will face supply constraints, and we’re already seeing missiles being lobbed at Israel in more limited quantities, likely to preserve capacity.

—Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research specialties include Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

4. What are the the environmental and health concerns from attacks on nuclear facilities?

Attacks on nuclear facilities carry the grave threat of significant impacts on health and the environment. In its June 13 statement following Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that “at present, the competent Iranian authorities have confirmed that the Natanz enrichment site has been impacted and that there are no elevated radiation levels.” On June 14, the IAEA said there was also no change in offsite radiation at the Esfahan site, where four buildings, including a uranium conversion facility and a fuel plate fabrication plant, had been hit in the attacks from Israel.

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. 

5. How has the IAEA responded, and are there restrictions around striking nuclear facilities under international law? 

The IAEA has responded to Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear sites by reiterating its stance that “nuclear facilities must never be attacked regardless of the context or circumstances.” The IAEA’s General Conference has published resolutions noting that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency.” Whether Iran’s nuclear facilities were devoted solely to peaceful use is unclear, but regardless, attacks against any type of nuclear facility set a dangerous precedent and make it increasingly difficult to pull back from conflict.

—Jennifer T. Gordon

6. How aligned, or not, are Washington and Jerusalem?

Trump’s administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government are closely aligned on goals, but less aligned on means. They both share the goals of wanting to prevent the Islamic Republic from ever having a nuclear weapon. They share the goal of Hamas being permanently removed from power in Gaza, and for Hezbollah to have far less power in Lebanon than it does now.

On means, Trump wanted to avoid war—he wants to be a peace-through-strength president, and he has people talking in one ear about supporting Israel and the other about staying clear of Middle East wars. Netanyahu sees a narrow window to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat and does not believe that the Iranian regime will ever agree to the kind of deal Trump wants. For Netanyahu, war now was the only option.

The other important dynamic is that both Trump and Netanyahu believe they have a unique destiny to lead their nations at this hour—but both leaders face a public that is deeply divided about the wisdom of their policy choices. Both are gamblers and will double down when they are convinced they are right. It is inconceivable, therefore, that Trump would ever pressure Netanyahu to end the war short of what it will take to assure Israel’s security.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Negotiations between the United States and Iran have displayed a significant divide between Washington and it’s ally Israel.

Iran Israel

7. Has the conflict tanked the likelihood of achieving a US nuclear deal with Iran?

The nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran seemed to have reached an impasse prior to the launch of Israeli strikes, with Washington insisting that Iran must give up enrichment and Tehran, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, insisting that Iran would never give this up. The breadth of Israeli military strikes against Iran, spanning key parts of its nuclear infrastructure, senior military officials and nuclear scientists, ballistic missile stockpiles, and more recently energy infrastructure, probably are read in Iran as aimed at regime change, and make it more likely that Tehran will consider a nuclear breakout rather than a compromise in negotiations. That said, Iran may believe it can exploit Trump’s public calls for an end to the fighting and a return to the negotiating table by hinting at concessions that would get the United States to press Israel to stand down, at least temporarily. So a nuclear deal seems remote—but an Iranian negotiating ploy to try to ensure regime survival could be in the cards.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former US national intelligence officer for the Near East.

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Iran Middle East

8. Has Washington’s force posture in the Middle East shifted since Friday, and what does this tell us about potential US involvement?

Since Thursday, the Pentagon has approved significant force posture changes for US Central Command (CENTCOM). These changes include a large deployment of KC-135/KC-46 aerial refueling tankers. Depending on the numbers of tankers involved, this could be one of the largest peacetime tanker movements in history. The USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group’s deployment was extended in the Middle East. Also, the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group is moving to the CENTCOM region for overlapping carrier presence. European Command has the USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) now repositioned in the Eastern Mediterranean to contribute air defense support to Israel. 

These publicly observable movements may not be the only force posture additions in the Middle East. What these changes portend is that the United States is giving itself flexible military options. This means that Washington can contribute to Israel’s operational tempo of attacks through air-to-air refueling. The United States can also increase its ability to respond through any ground-based US Air Force fighters as well as the aircraft from two carrier strike groups. Finally, this means the United States is increasing its defensive presence to contribute to the air defense of Israel.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa.

9. What does the response of Iran’s regional proxies tell us?

Iran’s regional proxies have been significantly weakened. Hamas has been decimated. Hezbollah has been badly degraded to the point where there have been public reports about its wariness of getting drawn into this conflict between Israel and Iran. Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is gone. The Houthis retain a capability to strike Israel, but are not a strategic threat. The Iraqi Shiite militias also have resources. But the Islamic Republic’s proxy and partner network is a shell of its former self.

—Jason M. Brodsky

10. How could this impact Palestinians in Gaza?

The prevalent fear in Gaza is that an Israel-Iran war will distract from the already significantly dimmed light on the ongoing starvation and slaughter of civilians in the Palestinian enclave. There is also concern that war may lead to even more impunity and an escalation of Israeli bombardment in Gaza. Some people in Gaza that I’ve spoken with are terrified at the level of chaos the Iran strikes could bring—namely, the potential of this conflict spreading further across the region such that it will result in an even more prolonged war inside Gaza. However, some believe, or maybe hope, that this will help at least end this phase of the nightmare, although they don’t really know exactly what an “end” looks like.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

Hamas undoubtedly imagines that an Israeli-Iranian war may strategically relieve some of the pressure on the Islamist group in the Gaza Strip, as the Israeli military reallocates intelligence and kinetic strike capabilities to the new theater.

Still, Israel will likely maintain a steady tempo of bombardment and ground operations against suspected Hamas targets in Gaza, as it has since the initiation of hostilities with Tehran. The new war is unlikely to prove beneficial to Hamas in any tactical or geostrategic way. In fact, in the medium term, Hamas’s regional posture will be further degraded by the weakening of its chief backer and supporter in Tehran.

Many Palestinians in Gaza have been subtly or even openly gloating about Iran’s woes, holding Tehran directly responsible for the destruction of their lives through Hamas and the network of anti-Israel terror organizations that served it. Though it may have limited tactical impact in the near term, the weakening or possible collapse of the Iranian regime will be a positive development for the prospects of Gaza’s rejuvenation and regeneration after the war, as well as peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

 —Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse.

11. Could this war benefit or harm Russia, and how is Moscow navigating both sides?

Russia could potentially benefit from the Israel-Iran conflict, by US attention and support being redirected from Ukraine to Israel, and by the rise in oil prices which provide Moscow with greater resources to fund its war against Ukraine. If the Israel-Iran conflict ends quickly, though, these benefits may not last long. The recent phone call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which both called for an end to the Israel-Iran conflict, also furthers Putin’s aim of increasing Russian cooperation with Washington despite the war in Ukraine continuing.

But, as some Russian commentators have noted, the Israel-Iran conflict also involves the risk of regime collapse in Iran. Like in Syria, this would mean the downfall of a longstanding government that had cooperated closely with Moscow, and Russia having to compete with others for influence with the new authorities emerging in Iran afterward, whatever they might be. With Russia preoccupied by its war against Ukraine, however, Putin would not be in a strong position to do this.

Thus, while the Israel-Iran conflict provides some benefits to Russia, it also poses serious risks for it as well. Putin’s calls to end the Israel-Iran conflict through diplomatic means, then, undoubtedly reflect what he really wants to see happen. Yet even if the conflict does end through (as Putin wants) joint Russian-American mediation efforts, it could result in Iran being more cooperative with the United States than it has been in the past.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

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China Conflict

12. Could this war benefit or harm China, and how is Beijing navigating both sides?

China condemned Israel’s attack and has called on both sides to de-escalate. Nevertheless, Beijing almost certainly sees an opportunity to promote itself as a responsible actor, and even a potential mediator, in the crisis. A wider, regional conflict would raise China’s risk-to-benefit calculus as it would threaten its regional economic, namely energy, interests. As such, China would welcome Washington reining in Israel and resuming talks with Iran. China will also be quick to amplify US failings, real or not, if the situation deteriorates as part of its broader campaign to undermine the United States’ global position and influence. 

—Gabriel “Gabo” Alvarado is a former nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. He currently works at Nisos. 

13. What weapons have Israel and Iran deployed so far?

From June 13-16, Israel flew F-35I, F-15I, and F-16 aircraft to conduct hundreds of airstrikes using GBU-28 bunker busters, Rampage missiles, and precision munitions against Iranian nuclear facilities, military leadership, and critical infrastructure. Iran retaliated with hundreds of ballistic missiles from its arsenal. Iran‘s attacks include Fattah hypersonic missiles, Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, and other missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to target Israel in “Operation Severe Punishment.”

—Daniel E. Mouton

14. What are the nuclear counter-proliferation implications of the conflict? 

The counter-proliferation implications of this conflict are noteworthy. The IAEA on June 12 declared Iran non-compliant with Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations for the first time in twenty years. Iran responded by announcing a third uranium enrichment site and threatening NPT withdrawal. While Israel may have destroyed Natanz’s above-ground enrichment plant, the crisis runs the risk of paradoxically accelerating proliferation risks. If this conflict does not fully eliminate the current and future threat of Iranian proliferation, Iran’s irreversible knowledge of the enrichment cycle means that it can simply rebuild and do so with a greater desire to succeed next time.

—Daniel E. Mouton

15. What Iranian oil and gas facilities has Israel targeted, and does this have an impact on the wider fallout?

Israel appears to have successfully hit two natural gas processing facilities in Phase Fourteen of the South Pars gas field, forcing Iran to suspend operations there. Iran’s natural gas production is consumed domestically due to significant sanctions on exporting natural gas. Israeli strikes also hit a major fuel depot and an oil refinery near Tehran. These are significant hits because Iran’s energy situation was already precarious, with parts of the country experiencing planned blackouts due to electricity shortages. Without consistent access to fuel, Iranians living in Tehran cannot evacuate. If Israel takes out additional domestic energy sites around Iran, the potential for the country to simply fall apart is very high. Without fuel, food cannot be transported to cities. Without electricity and running water, illness will proliferate and people will die.

At the same time, Israel has not gone after oil production facilities or Kharg Island, where 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports are loaded onto tankers. This leaves Iran’s role in the global oil market relatively unchanged, keeping China satisfied and oil prices under control. If Israel does attack Iran’s oil production or export sites, the entire paradigm will change. As senior official Javad Larijani recently said, if Iran’s oil facilities are severely damaged, Tehran won’t let any country in the region use its own oil.

—Ellen R. Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.

16. What is the Strait of Hormuz, and why does it matter if Tehran closes it?

Most oil market watchers think this conflict is a direct threat to the Strait of Hormuz, a very narrow waterway that leads out of the Persian Gulf. Oil tankers loading oil from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, parts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran must pass through this chokepoint to exit the Gulf. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s seaborne crude oil exports travel through the Strait of Hormuz. It is very narrow, rocky, and only deep enough for oil tankers to navigate in certain places. The current traffic patterns for the Strait have ships traveling through Iranian waters to enter and exit the Gulf.

Iran may be able to block ships using ships and missiles launched from the shore, though this would only be temporary as the traffic pattern can be rerouted around Iranian waters. It would take some time, and there would be a period of dislocation during which oil prices would spike, but it could be done. However, Iran will only directly threaten the security of ships in the Persian Gulf if it has nothing to lose. Since Iran continues to export oil and condensate, and needs to continue to do so to fund its operations, it is extremely unlikely that it will take action to hamper or halt any ship traffic into or out of the Persian Gulf.

—Ellen R. Wald

17. What dynamics is the Iranian regime grappling with domestically, and how will this impact the conflict? 

At this stage, the Iranian regime appears to be maintaining its unity, resolve, and stability, and is closing ranks in the face of an external threat. The anger of the Iranian public, whose hostility toward the regime is well known, has grown due to the authorities’ failure to provide security and protect their people. Nevertheless, it seems that at this moment, the public’s attitude is influenced largely by images of civilians injured and damage to residential neighborhoods in Tehran from Israeli Air Force attacks. This could contribute (at least for now) to a strengthening of national solidarity and a rally-around-the-flag effect. Nevertheless, the continued Israeli military efforts may, over time, weaken the regime’s security, intelligence, and governmental structures, as well as its ability to deal with internal challenges, which could, in the future, pave the way for undermining its stability.

—Raz Zimmt

18. How is the Iranian public responding? 

With the caveat that my sources are limited, I’m seeing a range of responses from the Iranian people. Regime supporters, who are now a small minority, are predictably outraged at Israel and support the Islamic Republic’s retaliatory strikes. Most Iranians at this point oppose their regime, and there’s little love lost for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders whom Israel killed. However, many Iranians are expressing sorrow for the innocent civilians killed in the Israeli strikes, particularly those who died when Israel struck residential apartment buildings in Tehran. For Iranians who lived through the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the strikes have also stirred up traumatic memories of bombs raining down on Tehran during that war.

It’s important to note that a lot of Iranians, including those who oppose their government, have complicated feelings about the country’s nuclear program. Many feel that Iran has a right like any other country to have a nuclear program for energy purposes. Yet the idea of developing a nuclear weapon is controversial, with many opposing nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons. The Iranian people also overwhelmingly do not want war. The majority at this point want to see the end of the Islamic Republic and its replacement with a democratic system grounded in human rights and peace.

Mostly, I’ve seen the Iranian people express a lot of anger at their own government for the current situation. They’ve pointed out how there was no warning from the government, no air raid sirens or any other alert, before the Israeli strikes hit. Instead, the strikes hit residential buildings in the early hours of the morning as the people inside slept, oblivious to the danger headed toward them. The public is angry, but not surprised, that the Islamic Republic did not protect its own people. They’ve suffered a lot already, and they are fearful, worried, and angry that many more innocent Iranians are likely to suffer in the conflict to come, especially if things escalate into all-out war.

—Kelly J. Shannon is a historian and visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project Working Group.

19. How is the Israeli public responding?

Most of the Israeli public supports the government’s action and sees the launch of strikes as necessary considering the claims that Iran is dangerously close to a nuclear bomb. Meanwhile the public is giving credit to the government in the campaign, despite the severe casualties on the Israeli home front.

—Danny Citrinowicz

20. Where do we go from here?

Israel’s broad-based assault on Iran’s nuclear and governmental infrastructure and Tehran’s massive missile barrages against Israeli civilians have raised the stakes sky-high for both countries, making it hard to engineer a cease-fire. Israeli officials continue to say that they have many more targets to strike, as they broaden their campaign beyond nuclear installations, top military officials, ballistic missile launch pads, and stockpiles to Iran’s energy infrastructure and government buildings in Tehran. 

When asked by an interviewer if Israel is seeking regime change in Iran, Netanyahu said that regime change could be the result of Israel’s actions because “the Iran regime is very weak.” Israel, at a minimum, wants to do enough damage to Iran’s nuclear program that Tehran cannot reconstitute it for the foreseeable future or race to get a nuclear weapon.

Iranian leaders seem to calculate they must continue to show they can inflict punishment on Israel or risk further losing credibility in the eyes of Iranians and perhaps face significant unrest from their population, many of whom have turned against the ruling clerics.  

Trump may be the wild card here depending on whether he wants to let the two sides “fight it out,” or if he decides to press Israel to wind down its attacks and Iran to return to nuclear negotiations. Given that a nuclear deal in which Iran gives up enrichment is unlikely, even if a temporary halt to the fighting is achieved, Israel will keep Iran in its crosshairs and conflict between the two countries will dominate Trump’s Middle East agenda for the forseeable future.

—Alan Pino

The post Twenty questions (and expert answers) on the Israel-Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the past two decades, China’s maritime strategy has evolved from its early, and main, focus on coastal defense to also include far-seas operations. This shift aimed at securing sea lanes critical to energy imports, safeguarding market access, and shaping global maritime norms aligned with its national interests. To this end, China has sought to build global maritime power by leveraging its investments in a vast network of commercial port infrastructure, which has assumed an increasing prominent role in its broader security posture. In parallel, Beijing has significantly invested in expanding the PLAN capabilities and fleet, aiming to transform it into a force capable of sustain power projection far beyond China’s immediate periphery.

The quest for global basing

As China’s overseas commercial interests have expanded, so has its naval footprint. Beijing has sought access and facilities, particularly along Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) routes, leveraging infrastructure investments to advance military reach.

The opening of China’s first overseas military installation in Djibouti in 2017 marked the start of this effort. Notably, the PLAN has been active in the waters off the Horn of Africa since the late 2000s, when Beijing established an independent naval escort taskforce (NEFT) to combat Somali pirates. While the piracy threat has gradually subsided since the mid-2010s, the PLAN has kept a regular naval presence in the region, completing about fourty-seven rotational deployments.

A blend of economic, geopolitical, and strategic interests anchors the PLAN to this maritime region. These include securing energy and trade routes vital to China’s economic system, as well as monitoring Western naval forces en route from the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific (Beijing’s main theater of interest).

Capable of housing up to two thousand troops and supporting major naval platforms, the Djibouti base has fuel, weapons, and equipment storage facilities, including an 1,300 foot airstrip. Besides, a base expansion project added a one thousand foot dual-side berth in 2020, making it suitable for aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. Though officially focused on supporting non-combat tasks (refueling, resupply, and crew rest) of the NEFT, the periodic presence of amphibious ships and attack submarines signals its expeditionary utility.

China is also suspected of operating a facility at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, officially reopened in April after a three-year, Chinese-sponsored upgrade. The base features infrastructure for high-tonnage warships and lies near the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Despite Cambodian denials of a permanent Chinese military presence, the scale of Chinese involvement and naval activity suggests otherwise.

Commonalities between the Djibouti and Ream naval facilities illustrate three key priorities for a Chinese military foothold in the Gulf region. First, easy access to maritime chokepoints vital to China’s economic and geopolitical interests. Second, the capacity to accommodate big warships and provide advanced fleet support services. Third, a host country sympathetic to China’s foreign policy, or at least willing to engage in a balancing act between Washington and Beijing.

A Gulf military foothold

Strategically positioned near critical global shipping corridors, serviced by modern port infrastructure, and eager to diversify security partners beyond conventional Western interlocutors, most of the Gulf Arab countries meet China’s needs for military expansion. While each Gulf country offers different capabilities, recent developments suggest Chinese planners would find the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Oman the most suitable for a Chinese naval base.

The UAE

In 2021, US intelligence flagged suspicious Chinese activity at Khalifa Port, Abu Dhabi’s main container terminal, raising alarms about potential military construction. Although the UAE halted the project under US diplomatic pressure. But in a 2023report, The Washington Post, citing top-secret US intelligence documents leaked earlier that year, reported that construction at the suspected Chinese military facility may have resumed. The report did not confirm whether the activity was explicitly military in nature, nor did it provide evidence of continued progress beyond that point.

Since then, there have been no publicly available indications that Chinese military construction is ongoing at the site. Given the strong likelihood that any resumed activity would trigger renewed US pressure, the absence of further disclosures may suggest that the project remains dormant or under close scrutiny.

Beijing’s interest in Khalifa Port is rooted in both commercial and strategic considerations. It is a critical Belt and Road Initiative node, with major Chinese firms involved in port logistics and infrastructure, and Chinese enterprises invested in adjacent industrial zones. Strategically, the port offers China a vantage point for monitoring maritime trade routes and Western military activity. Located under fifty miles from Jebel Ali Port—where the US Navy makes calls for goodwill visits and replenishment—and al-Dhafra Air Base, which hosts US and French forces, Khalifa provides tactical intelligence value.

If Chinese ambitions at Khalifa stall, Fujairah may offer an alternative. As a major bunkering and anchorage hub with direct access to open waters, thus bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz, Fujairah is strategically appealing. While no public evidence links China to military ambitions there, the port’s capacity to host large warships makes it a potential candidate. However, similar concerns over US sensitivities would factor into Emirati decision-making.

From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, balancing is key. While the UAE seeks to benefit from Chinese investment—especially in logistics and advanced technology—it is acutely aware of the risks such ties pose to its decades-long security partnership with the United States. Abu Dhabi still depends on Washington’s defense guarantees, arms sales, and intelligence cooperation. Any move perceived by the United States as enabling Chinese military access could jeopardize this relationship. As such, the Emirati leadership appears to be walking a careful line, welcoming Chinese commercial ventures but pulling back when such projects threaten to encroach on sensitive security domains.

Oman

Oman also figures prominently in Beijing’s strategic calculus. In 2023, US intelligence alerted former President Joe Biden’s administration to China’s possible plans to establish a military presence in the sultanate. Following Beijing’s established model, seen in Djibouti, of using commercial investment to lay the groundwork for military access, the port of Duqm emerged as a likely candidate. A 2016 agreement between China and Oman granted a fifty-year lease to co-develop the China-Oman Industrial Park, backed by over ten billion dollars in Chinese investments. While several notable initiatives within the park have been launched in recent years, the overall development remains incomplete, with many key projects still underway. Despite these mixed results, the port remains central to China’s long-term economic footprint.

Despite Duqm’s potential, Chinese naval activity suggests Salalah may be the preferred option. Oman’s largest and busiest port, Salalah, handled over 3.3 million twenty foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2024 and features deep-water berths capable of hosting large naval vessels. While China lacks a commercial presence there, its navy has regularly used Salalah for resupply and port calls since 2009 as part of its Gulf of Aden counter-piracy operations. The Type 054A frigate Honghe most recently  made a five-day stop at Salalah for logistical resupply and crew rest.

Oman’s foreign policy approach is shaped by its decades-long tradition of neutrality and quiet diplomacy. While Oman is eager to attract Chinese investment to boost its struggling economy, it is also wary of provoking tensions with the United States, a longstanding security interlocutor. Though less dependent on Washington than Abu Dhabi, Muscat is unlikely to allow Chinese military basing that could imperil its role as a neutral regional broker. Instead, it may prefer to offer logistical access without formal basing commitments.

Limited security gains

From the Gulf’s perspective, allowing PLAN access is less about direct military benefits and more about strategic diversification. Chinese basing arrangements could facilitate arms sales and tech transfers aligned with Gulf military-industrial ambitions.

However, the security payoff is limited. During the Houthi anti-shipping campaign, China declined to play an active security role. Rather than joining Western-led efforts to protect Red Sea shipping lanes, Beijing reportedly secured Iranian mediation to avoid Houthi attacks on Chinese vessels. This hands-off approach included suspected passive support: neutral stances at the United Nations, exports of dual-use components, and provision of satellite data potentially used to target US naval assets.

US pushback

The main obstacle to Chinese military basing in the Gulf is US opposition. Both Abu Dhabi and Muscat are integral to the US defense network, with extensive American military assets stationed in the region.

As US-China strategic competition deepens, Washington is unlikely to tolerate a PLAN facility near its forces. Such a presence would facilitate intelligence collection, enable gray zone tactics, and increase operational risks for US assets. Although Chinese bases are unlikely to serve as launchpads for offensive operations in the Middle East at present, the intelligence risks alone justify US resistance. A future shift in Chinese doctrine could make these installations more assertive tools of power projection.

For now, US diplomacy has prevented a Chinese military foothold, as demonstrated by the Khalifa Port incident. Yet the strategic logic behind Beijing’s efforts persists, especially as Gulf states seek broader partnerships. This tension will remain a central issue in US regional diplomacy. Still, host countries control what basing access entails. Washington might engage Gulf partners to establish red lines on PLAN activities, ensuring that a possible Chinese military installation remains below a certain threat threshold for US troops. This could be achieved by preventing the construction of infrastructure and the deployment of Chinese military equipment (high-tonnage warships, advanced air defense systems, and combat aircraft) necessary to project and sustain power in wartime. However, given the intelligence dimension and growing concerns about dual-use technology transfers and espionage, even minimal Chinese military presence may prove unacceptable.

President Donald Trump’s recent visit to the Gulf, including a prominent stop in the UAE, reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to close coordination with regional allies in strategic sectors, such as AI and defense. The proposed AI data campus in the UAE, alongside the intention to establish a comprehensive US-UAE Major Defense Partnership and procurement deals for CH-47F Chinook helicopters and F-16 components, speaks volumes about Washington’s strong willingness to counter Beijing’s growing regional influence. These commitments signal a US strategy aimed at reinforcing economic and military ties with its Gulf partners, thereby dissuading them from letting China establish a regional military footprint, even if it takes the form of lower-tier logistics facility.

An unchanging status quo

Despite growing Chinese naval activity, Gulf states appear reluctant to risk fallout from overt alignment with China. The frictions around Khalifa Port underscore the political cost of appearing to choose sides in the intensifying US-China rivalry.

In the short to medium term, China will likely continue a more discreet approach, favoring “de facto” facilities like Salalah and presenting its maritime posture as benign and commercially driven. Meanwhile, Beijing will deepen ties with regional states through soft military diplomacy and economic integration, avoiding direct confrontation with entrenched Western partnerships.

However, given persistent threats closer to home in the Indo-Pacific, China is unlikely to divert substantial military resources to the Gulf until it feels confident in securing its regional ambitions in Asia. Thus, while the Gulf remains central to China’s long-term maritime aspirations, its near-term military footprint is likely to stay limited, incremental, and calibrated to avoid triggering decisive Western pushback.

Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a researcher who focuses on the security affairs of the Gulf region. He is also an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. Follow him on X: @mazz_Leonardo.

The post China’s basing quest in the Gulf: Pipe dream or strategic reality? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Israel’s operation came as US-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s advancing nuclear program seemed to have reached an impasse and just after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Tehran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So how might Iranian forces respond? What will this mean for Israel, Iran’s nuclear program, the US-Israel relationship, and a region already experiencing great upheaval? Below, Atlantic Council experts shed light on what happened and what to expect next.

This article will be updated as additional expert contributions come in. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future 

Daniel B. Shapiro: Iran has never looked weaker

Shalom Lipner: Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

Landon Derentz: Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

Matt Kroenig: An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

Richard LeBaron: The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Diana Rayes: Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

R. Clarke Cooper: Iran apparently was given two choices

Daniel E. Mouton: This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

Kirsten Fontenrose: Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Mark N. Katz: Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue

Perrihan Al-Riffai: This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy

Ellen Wald: Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk 

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza? 

Ariel Ezrahi: Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war 

Nicholas Blanford: Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

Sarah Zaaimi: Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

Thomas Warrick: It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Rachel Whitlark: Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Emily Milliken: Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Joze Pelayo: Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response

Yaseen Rashed: Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future

The questions after Israel’s sweeping strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear sites outnumber the answers. In particular, there are four key questions whose answers will help determine the trajectory of the Middle East and perhaps beyond—not only over the coming weeks, but potentially for the coming years:

1. What is the scale of Israeli military operations in Iran?

Israel’s focus now is on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as undermining Iran’s command and control and military leadership, with the goal of trying to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response (which started last night with Tehran launching one hundred drones). The Israelis are going to continue strikes for at least the coming days. The expectation is that they will go after key Iranian nuclear infrastructure to delay Iran’s timeline to a nuclear bomb, even if Israel on its own cannot fully eliminate Iran’s pathway to one.  

But is the scale of the attacks to come so large and diverse that Israel’s end goal is not only crippling Iran’s nuclear program but fomenting regime change? The targets Israel chooses will help determine the answer to that question, but a warning is also warranted. For years, many in Israel have insisted that regime change in Iran would prompt a new and better day—that nothing could be worse than the current theocratic regime. Iran is indeed led by a terrible autocracy that has undermined the growth of the country and tremendously hurt its own people. But history tells us it can always be worse. What is likely to follow a theocratic Iranian government is not democracy but Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–istan. Such a government is likely, at least initially, to be much more hardline than the current one. In such a case, Israel might find itself in a perpetual, ongoing, and far more intense war that is no longer in the shadows, as it has been for years.

Continue reading here:

New Atlanticist

Jun 13, 2025

After Israel’s strikes on Iran, these four questions could determine the Middle East’s future

By Jonathan Panikoff

The trajectory of the Middle East could be determined by how just a few critical questions are answered the coming days and weeks.

Iran Israel

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Iran has never looked weaker

Israel’s stunning, multifaceted strike against Iranian nuclear, ballistic missile, and regime leadership targets has thrown much into chaos: Iran’s ability to project power, Trump’s nuclear diplomacy, and US-Israel regional coordination.

Israel’s strikes lay bare the depth of Iran’s miscalculation following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. Tehran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and its key regional ally, the Assad regime in Syria, lie in ruins. Iran’s own state-to-state attacks against Israel in April and October 2024 produced little damage, while Iran suffered significantly from Israel’s October response.

Now, with that taboo also in the dustbin of history, Israel demonstrated its full penetration of Iran, and ability to wreak havoc across the Iranian system. Iran has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully will be tested.

But the story does not end here. Israel pledges additional attacks, but Iran will now be supremely motivated to sprint to a nuclear breakout at hardened, underground facilities. The United States will surely assist Israel with defense against any Iranian retaliation. But Trump’s dream of a diplomatic resolution that ends Iranian enrichment appears dead. More likely, the US president will be faced with a decision on whether to use the United States’ unique capabilities to destroy Tehran’s underground nuclear facilities and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. The decision will split his advisers and political base, amid accusations, and perhaps his own misgivings, that Netanyahu is attempting to drag him into war.

The repercussions on trust and coordination in the US-Israel relationship could be long lasting, with implications for future rounds of conflict with Iran, negotiations on the next US-Israel military assistance agreement, and the wind-down to the war in Gaza. An ‘America first’ president, and an ‘Israel first’ prime minister, who have each made fateful decisions with minimal consultation or taking each other’s interests into account, will coexist uneasily for as many more months and years as they both serve.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

JERUSALEM—Years of speculation over the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities ended at approximately 3:30 a.m. (Israel time) on Friday when first reports of explosions in Tehran began to circulate.

The timing of the Israeli operation—which was authorized after Israel’s leadership concluded that the Islamic Republic was on the threshold of a dangerous breakthrough in its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability—took advantage of a rapidly shrinking window for military action, before relevant Iranian infrastructure became too advanced or well-protected. Trump’s declaration on Thursday that “I don’t want to say [an attack] is imminent,” together with expectations that Israel would stand down until (at least) after this weekend’s planned US-Iran talks in Oman, narrowed the opportunity for any element of surprise.

Israel’s initial targets have covered a wide spectrum, including, reportedly, multiple nuclear and other installations, as well as senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel’s intent is not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, but also to undermine its potential to inflict retaliatory harm on Israel and defend against subsequent waves of Israel’s offensive.

The degree of Israeli coordination with the Trump administration will be pivotal to how this crisis unfolds. Rubio’s cryptic statement that “Israel advised us that they believe this action was necessary for its self-defense” does not clarify the extent of US (dis)agreement with that determination, or exactly what prior warning Israel may have supplied to the White House. Notwithstanding, and despite Rubio’s clarification that “we are not involved in strikes against Iran,” Iranian threats to exact a heavy price from both Israel and the United States will thrust the latter into the eye of the storm. Forthcoming decisions by the White House on the contours of US engagement will have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to persist with this campaign.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

The Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may be reverberating across global energy markets, but the tremors are far more restrained than the stakes might have suggested. Brent crude rose more than 10 percent, yet the per-barrel price remains below eighty dollars, well short of crisis levels. The moment underscores how strategic foresight in energy policy can shape the contours of geopolitical risk in the world’s most volatile corridors.

While headlines are focused on missiles and centrifuges, a quieter story lies in the market conditions that made such a strike politically viable. Israel’s actions benefited from the political leeway made possible by Trump’s efforts to “bring down the cost of oil.” It’s not to say the strike wouldn’t have happened otherwise, but—as shown during Trump’s first term—when energy markets can shield consumers from the worst effects of a supply disruption, policymakers have far greater latitude to escalate.

In 2018, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose “maximum pressure” was rooted in a belief that oil markets could absorb the shock. Internal White House analysis forecasted only modest price increases, with US production gains and global spare capacity acting as a buffer. Crucially, while the Strait of Hormuz has long symbolized energy risk, it was—and remains—unlikely to be closed. Iran needs the revenue. This gave the Trump administration confidence to confront Iran without fear of major energy disruption.

Israel’s strike today reinforces that view, operating in an energy environment shaped by the same strategic logic. Oil doesn’t need to stay cheap forever—just long enough to change the geopolitical equation. Trump’s push to keep prices low may have done more than remake global energy flows—it may have helped lay the groundwork for a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

—Landon Derentz is senior director and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council and director for Middle Eastern and African affairs at the US Department of Energy.

An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

As I wrote more than a decade ago, this was inevitable.  

There were only three possible outcomes in the decades-long battle over Tehran’s nuclear aspirations: allow Iran to go nuclear, negotiate a permanent deal, or military action. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. A permanent deal is highly unlikely—as former US President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal proved. So, military action is the only viable option left.  

There are three key facilities for Iran’s nuclear opponents to destroy: Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. A US strike would have been more effective as it could have meaningfully degraded all of Iran’s key nuclear facilities, while Israel can destroy the above-ground facilities. The underground facilities are difficult, but don’t count Israel out. No one would have predicted it could take out Hezbollah with walkie talkies last year. Did Israel conduct commando raids or other creative attacks on the underground facilities? If so, this will meaningfully set back Iran’s nuclear program.  

As for the question of likely retaliation—Iran has few good options. Its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies are degraded, and Israel’s Iron Dome can demonstrably defend against missile and drone attacks. Iran is also afraid of a wider war, though those fears are misguided. This will de-escalate quickly, like Trump’s strike on Qassem Soleimani during his first term. The key questions are: What will happen in the coming weeks and months? Does Iran rebuild? Does Israel mow the grass? Or does Iran decide that it is not worth it to spend decades, and billions of dollars, and only have a pile of rubble to show for it? 

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military facilities was in direct defiance of Trump’s call for caution and negotiation. The United States has been seeking a negotiated solution—one that was not supported by Netanyahu’s government.  

The question now is not whether, but how, the United States will be dragged into a war it doesn’t want, and that Gulf states fear. Iranian retaliation directly against Israel will not translate into non-involvement from Washington, as Israel will then be drawn into a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation—requiring US military supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic cover.  

So far, there is no evidence that Gulf states looked the other way as Israel used their airspace for the attacks, and this won’t be very difficult to confirm or deny.  

Then the question becomes how to protect US troops in the region and how to come to the aid of Guif friends. Given the Trump administration’s close ties to the Gulf, as well as Trump’s personal admiration for certain Gulf leaders, the region will expect the US administration to provide any help they request.  

—Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Kuwait and a former deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Israel. 

Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

Just as corners of the Middle East were experiencing some semblance of stability, such as in parts of Syria and Lebanon, this latest escalation has the potential to reverse the region’s recent fragile gains. Beyond the immediate political and military consequences, the most profound impacts will be felt by civilians, particularly those already in humanitarian crises. 

A prolonged disruption in regional commerce and air travel, alongside rising fuel and food prices, will hit displaced populations, host communities, and those living under the poverty line the hardest. In Syria, where around 90 percent of the population lives in poverty, any shock to commodity prices or aid delivery will be devastating. In Lebanon and Jordan, already overstretched in hosting among the world’s highest refugee populations, the economic fallout may further strain public services and deepen social tensions. 

Meanwhile, the risk of environmental damage or public health crises from military action, including oil spills, water contamination, or infrastructure damage, could pose grave risks to civilians in both the Gulf and Iran. These are not theoretical concerns—they are real threats to food security, access to care, and basic human dignity for millions. 

The United States has a responsibility to act in ways that reduce harm, avoid a full-scale regional war, and protect civilian lives. That means using its leverage not to escalate but to contain the conflict, pressing all parties, including allies, to prioritize diplomacy over devastation. Failure to do so will not only ignite another war in the region, but it will also exacerbate existing circumstances for fragile communities across the region. 

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Iran apparently was given two choices

The Israeli preemptive strike is likely to disrupt Iran’s immediate capacity to develop a nuclear weapons program. However, it remains uncertain whether such an action will effectively deter the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions. 

The Iranian regime appears to have been given two choices: abandon its nuclear aspirations or face a lack of intervention from the Trump administration if Israel decided to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Israel may have advocated for an earlier attack window, while the United States likely attempted to apply diplomatic measures. When diplomacy failed, the United States understandably announced an ordered departure for US embassy staff in Baghdad, while other US diplomatic posts in the region were placed on stand-by for ordered departure. 

Regardless of when the Trump administration became aware that the Israeli strike was imminent, questions remain: Will this unilateral action by Israel sufficiently deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions? How might the regime in Tehran respond? And how will the United States and the Gulf states seek to contain further conflict in the region? 

What is immediately clear is that economic and security conditions in the Middle East have become more volatile.  

—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State. 

This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

The start of what is likely to be a multi-day series of Israeli strikes across Iran is an unprecedented exchange in a long history of attacks between the regional rivals. Most importantly, Israel is going alone against Iran. In previous instances, the United States and Israel maintained regular communication and a coordinated defense posture. This coordination was spectacularly successful in the defense of Israel—including in both April and October 2024, which saw unbelievably low casualties and damage in light of the hundreds of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles fired against Israel.  

This time is different. Trump’s pursuit of Iran nuclear negotiations has created skepticism in Israel. The unilateral nature of US negotiations and the removal of the Trump administration’s pro-Israel proponents, such as former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and former Deputy Special Presidential Envoy Morgan Ortagus, could have only escalated this tension with Israel. These moves came alongside Trump’s avoidance of an Israel stop during his recent visit to the Middle East, as well as Netanyahu’s Oval Office visit in April, where he left empty handed on both tariff relief and Iran. 

The beginning of unilateral Israeli strikes is a sign that the country feels that it must take action to ensure its own security. Regardless of what led Israel to take this step, it is likely to further exacerbate any preexisting tensions between Israel and the United States.

Finally, Iran will now feel obligated to respond. Depending on the degree of damage that Israel has inflicted, Iran may respond in a way that broadens the conflict and creates collateral damage elsewhere in the region. How this will end is an unknown, but as has been the case in the past, a speedier ending is likely to depend on the United States.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Among the many lessons to be drawn from this operation is one about the importance of speaking truth to power. The IRGC makes a practice of minimizing its vulnerabilities in reports to senior leadership. Leaked IRGC documents from the past several years revealed overstatements of capability and omissions of setbacks, perhaps intended to deflect questions about the bang for the buck in their budget. Recently the IRGC was reassuring political leadership that its air defenses could withstand an Israeli strike. This may have contributed to Tehran’s decision to refrain from making a deal with the United States before Trump’s two-month timeline elapsed. This resulted in Israel’s assessment that diplomacy has failed and strikes were necessary. The generals behind those white lies were the first targets.

But now comes the expected retaliation. And the big question is: Will the states in the Middle East participate in Israel’s defense as before? As nuclear talks went nowhere, both Iran and the United States wanted to know, leading to tug-of-war diplomacy in the Arab world.

The United States wants Arab states to turn on missile and drone detection and mitigation systems and look out for munitions launched from Iran toward Israel, while Iran wants Arab states to consider looking the other way if it stages retaliatory strikes that cross Arab airspace. Arab states have a logical reason to rebuff Iran’s request. Munitions flown into a country’s airspace without coordination with its capital are violations of sovereignty and a threat to its people and infrastructure. Taking them down is such a no-brainer that the United States would likely conclude that any munitions not reported or mitigated by Arab states were intentionally ignored. Neither the United States nor its Arab partners want that kind of tension to arise.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue 

Just as on previous occasions when Israeli forces attacked Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself, Moscow does not seem willing to defend its ally in Tehran. The Russian statement issued Friday was critical of Israel but gave no indication that Russia will take concrete actions against it or in support of Iran. Instead, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for all parties to exercise restraint and prevent further escalation. Most remarkably, the last sentence of the statement noted that “we would like to remind you of the US’s readiness to hold another round of negotiations with Iran on the Iranian nuclear program in Oman.” In other words, Moscow itself seems to be calling on the Trump administration to resolve the situation instead of promoting Russia for the lead role in this. 

Moscow’s less than fulsome support (so far) for Iran must be causing renewed doubts in Tehran about what Iran is getting from Moscow in return for Iranian support to its war against Ukraine. On the other hand, there is nobody else Iran can turn to who would give it greater support in responding to Israel. Despite Iran’s threats about targeting American forces in the Gulf region, working with the Trump administration may be Iran’s best hope for restraining Israel. The Russian Foreign Ministry itself seems to be suggesting this. 

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government. 

This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy 

Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites—resulting in the death of senior IRGC commanders—sparked immediate volatility in global energy markets. Brent crude jumped up as much as 14 percent intraday, briefly peaking at $78.50 before settling around $75, marking the sharpest spike since early 2022. While previous shocks during the Israel-Gaza war faded due to resilient oil infrastructure and global oversupply, this escalation is different: an oil exporter is now under direct attack. 

Markets are pricing in a heightened geopolitical risk premium, especially amid Iran’s threat to disrupt oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries nearly 20 percent of global crude. If Iran’s oil infrastructure is damaged or tanker routes are disrupted, Brent could surge to $120–$130 per barrel. Though OPEC+ could ease some pressure, market uncertainty remains high. 

At the same time, US tariff policies are weighing on global demand. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 0.5 percent drop in global growth in 2025 due to ongoing trade tensions. This could counteract some of the supply-driven price spikes. However, if the United States joins the conflict—especially if nuclear talks collapse—the risk of sustained stagflation rises, threatening an already fragile global economy. 

—Perrihan Al-Riffai is a nonresident senior fellow with the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. 

Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk

As Israeli jets attacked targets across Iran early Friday morning in the Middle East, oil futures started rising. Oil benchmarks initially rose 6 percent, then 9 percent and up to 11 percent as the scope of the attacks widened. Oil prices generally spike in response to any conflict in the Middle East, even when neither of the parties involved are major oil suppliers. In this case, Iran is a significant oil supplier, Israel is not.  
 
The reality is that the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf (about 20 percent of global seaborne oil shipments) is not materially at risk after Israel’s strikes, and it is unlikely to come under threat from Iran. That’s because of a few reasons: One, Israel isn’t targeting Iran’s oil production and export sites, so Iran derives no net benefit if it prevents Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Qatari or Bahraini oil from leaving the Persian Gulf. Two, should Tehran attempt to block Arab oil exports, its own oil exports would, in turn, be blocked. Iran can only benefit from stopping others from exporting if Tehran has no capacity to export oil itself. And three, Iran can’t stop traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for any significant amount of time because sea traffic can be rerouted around Iranian waters if necessary. 
 
China, which purchases most of Iran’s crude oil, does not want to see the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf impeded. While China doesn’t have the naval capacity in the Persian Gulf to ensure this, it has become such a significant trading partner of Iran’s, that Iran cannot afford to see its trade with China disrupted. China is Iran’s largest customer and a significant customer of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. China will use the full weight of its economic power to ensure that oil from all Persian Gulf exporters to Asia is not disrupted. 
  
Due to the severity of this attack, and the paradigm shift in diplomatic and nuclear relations that will result, oil prices may not retreat as quickly as they have after previous attacks. Much depends on when, how and against whom Iran retaliates. Regardless, it is important to remember that this is not the oil market of the 1990s and early 2000s. The market is well supplied from a variety of producers, with plenty of spare capacity should the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) choose to employ it. The United States is not beholden to foreign oil producers and its foreign policy should reflect that. 
 
—Ellen Wald, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting. She is the author of “Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power,” a book on the history and strategy of Aramco and Saudi Arabia. 

How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza? 

The large-scale and devastating Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran have opened a new chapter in the post-October 7 Middle East world. In addition to the kinetic damage that they have caused, the strikes are a clear indication that Tehran was proceeding with acquiring enough technology and materials to procure a nuclear weapon, which would have changed the entirety of the Middle East’s security and geopolitical architecture.  

Critically, there is the question of how these strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas and factions that are supported by the IRGC. Will Israel assassinate the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leadership in Tehran, along with other terror operatives? Will the attacks distract from Gaza, or provide the Israeli military with an opportunity to expand its assault on the Strip without international scrutiny? 

Another dimension of the Iranian ladder of escalation is what happens in the West Bank, which is under the fragile control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli military occupation. Does the IRGC have assets in the West Bank that it can activate to sow some chaos against the PA, in hopes of starting skirmishes with the Israel Defense Forces? Are there assets inside Israel who could engage in a targeted terror attack? 

Regardless of the rhetoric, and while this is a serious escalation, it is unlikely, at least for now, that the wave of Israeli airstrikes will result in a massive, global, or even regional war like many have been warning for years. This is due to the fact that Arab countries, the United States, and even Israel want to be measured and deploy strategies to avoid a regional conflagration that leads to massive death and destruction.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse. 

Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war

The Iranian regime is a group of dead men walking. Iran’s reign of terror both internally and externally has been a destructive and destabilizing force since the Islamic Revolution, supporting terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Diplomatic efforts over the years to stall Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons have not been a resounding success so far. Hence the recent Israeli attack does not come as a surprise.  

That said, millions of Israelis distrust Netanyahu’s motivations and actions, whether as a peacetime or especially as a wartime prime minister. The Gaza war is a case in point. He appears to be prime minister bent on saving his own skin, aka saving his extreme right coalition to avoid facing trial for corruption and being held accountable for his government’s failure in connection with the October 7 attacks. He has done so at the clear expense of his country’s national security and democracy, as there is consensus among Israel’s security top brass and indeed the country that as prime minister Netanyahu needs to take responsibility. Netanyahu’s relations with Trump, the European Union, and most of the Middle East are at an all-time low, and there is unprecedented polarization within Israel stemming from Netanyahu’s divisive and inciting policies. This is not encouraging, to say the least, in this situation. 

One only hopes that the United States, working with its sensible Middle Eastern allies such as the United Arab Emirates, will help to bring a sensible outcome to this explosive time. 

—Ariel Ezrahi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Programs, the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, and the head of the Energy Transition Sub-Committee for MENA2050. He also works in the climate finance space.

Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

With Israel launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities and related assets, many eyes are turning toward Lebanon to see if Hezbollah will respond on behalf of its patron. For now, however, Hezbollah is likely to adopt a policy of restraint, and the Iranians may not call upon its proxy to strike back. 

Until the recent fourteen-month war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese group was seen as a vital component of Iran’s deterrence architecture against the possibility of an attack on Iran’s nuclear program and on the regime itself. However, even before the latest war between Hezbollah and Israel, there were no guarantees that if Iran was struck by Israel, the United States, or a combination of the two that Tehran would call upon Hezbollah to respond with a punishing barrage of precision-guided missiles against targets across Israel.

That decision—whether or not to trigger a Hezbollah response—would have likely been based on the scale of the damage in Iran, and whether it posed an existential threat to the regime. If the Iranians calculated that the attack was survivable, then a Hezbollah response would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Instead, Hezbollah would be held in reserve for the day the Iranians really needed it. That same calculus applies now, but with the added factor that Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been so degraded by the recent war that it no longer poses the same level of threat toward Israel. In addition, there is a strong sentiment of anger and frustration within the rank and file against Iran for, as they perceive it, letting Hezbollah down during the recent war by refusing to allow it to employ the full gamut of its military might to inflict real pain on the Israeli home front. 

That mood of resentment may have been on subtle display during the recent visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who reportedly held a frosty meeting with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem, and was accompanied by two relatively junior party lawmakers while paying his respects to the tomb of late Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.

For now, domestic calculations will likely help stay Hezbollah’s hand. However, that restraint could falter if the Israeli strikes against Iran continue and pose a direct threat to the regime. 

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

JERUSALEM—Despite the early signs of an imminent strike, with US regional embassies and military facilities evacuating a number of their staff, our plane landed in busy and bustling Ben Gurion airport undeterred by the news of a potential pre-emptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and leadership.

Just hours ago, senior experts and a US official at a Jerusalem dinner seemed optimistic that nothing out of the ordinary would occur and that the week’s developments represented a mere tactical escalation amid important nuclear talks. Analysts familiar with Israeli politics jokingly noted that if anything serious were to happen between Iran and Israel, it would need to be after next week due to Netanyahu’s son’s upcoming wedding. We later came to understand that the United States might have overestimated its capacity to deter their Israeli counterparts.

At 3:00 a.m. the peaceful Jerusalem ancient city walls were suddenly disturbed by piercing alarms calling everyone to take shelter in the nearest safe space. Our security team informed us that Israel had initiated a unilateral strike on Iran and that the United States was given a heads up about the events of the night. Sources reported that the Israeli war cabinet was gathering to discuss a Gaza cease-fire and hostage deal, and were surprised to discover that it was a briefing on the attacks. Some of them were sworn in writing to secrecy.

As we stand now, the mood in Israel is dug in for a long-haul operation to disable the capabilities of what they call the “head of the octopus,” after cutting many of its tentacles in Gaza, Beirut, and Damascus last year. Israel called thousands of its reservists back to duty, and Jerusalem is preparing for a potentially consequential retaliation from Tehran, as initial reports reveal substantial losses among the Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists.

The Mullah regime’s response might not come immediately, as we witnessed with the 2024 events. Tehran will have to rally its defense systems after being drastically diminished, and now also face a crisis of leadership amid tonight’s high-level targets.

The United States, however, clearly tried to distance itself from the attacks and focused on prioritizing the safety and security of US facilities and personnel in the Middle East, although signaling a deadlock in US-Iranian nuclear talks. President Donald Trump is faced today with a crucial dilemma of either further decoupling from Israel and confirming US isolationism, or seizing a moment of weakness among Iran and its proxies by supporting Israeli ambitions to annihilate an enemy at the source.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She is also the center’s deputy director for communications, overseeing strategic communications, editorial agenda, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts.

It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Israel’s strikes against Iranian command, nuclear, and military sites were not a warning shot. They were intended to start a change as decisive against the Iranian regime as Israel’s 2024 campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Importantly, Israel has no postwar plan for Iran beyond ending an existential nuclear threat. Israel should have thought this through months ago, but it really needs to think now about its post-war strategy. Regime change will not happen after an aerial campaign, no matter how effective. However much the IRGC was weakened by Israel’s strikes, including the reported death of senior IRGC military leaders, Tehran is still strong and coherent enough to prevent a popular “color” revolution. Regime change efforts from the United States and others elsewhere in the world should be a cautionary example of how hard this would be.

Israel is going to have to sustain a homeland defense strategy and keep striking nuclear, missile, and drone facilities in Iran. It also needs to develop, or work with the United States to develop, a workable strategy that gets Iran to end its nuclear threat to Israel. This will not be easy, and it will involve serious tradeoffs by Israel’s leaders, including how to end the war in Gaza on terms that will keep Hamas from coming back into power while giving the Palestinians a path toward reconstruction, dignity, and peace.

The best thing the United States can do now is to redouble its efforts to get a durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. Such a peace will require greater contributions by the United States, Arab allies, and Israel than anyone has been willing to make until now.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Early reporting suggests that the ongoing Israeli attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, has multiple, complementary goals. Israel appears to be aiming to cripple Iranian nuclear capacity and degrade Iranian retaliatory capabilities. To achieve these ends, Israel is conducting a combined air and intelligence operation to target nuclear installations, ballistic missile and air-defense sites, and key personnel in both the nuclear and military command structures.

We can understand this multipronged effort as targeting multiple threats to Israel’s security. First, successive Israeli prime ministers have described an Iranian adversary armed with nuclear weapons as an existential threat to Israel. As Netanyahu described in a video statement as the attacks were underway, the operation targeted both the Natanz enrichment facility (among others) and leading Iranian nuclear scientists. Targeting both the facilities and the key scientists should degrade and delay Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Israel also sought to limit Iranian retaliatory capabilities by attacking ballistic missile and drone installations, as well as key individuals in the military command structure, including General Hossein Salami, the chief of the IRGC, and Gholam Ali Rashid, the deputy commander of the Iranian armed forces. There may be a third, larger goal beyond degrading Iran’s nuclear and retaliatory capacity: regime decapitation. Indeed, beyond targeting the nuclear infrastructure, the expansive attacks against the military forces and the IRGC could be suggestive of a larger regime-level goal.

Especially as events continue to unfold, it is difficult to determine operational success. Nevertheless, we can expect Israeli leaders to define success as delaying Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade uranium or advance to nuclear weapons, which Israel is likely to have achieved through damaging and destroying critical nuclear infrastructure and killing senior scientists. Further, to the extent that an eventual Iranian retaliation is limited because of Israel’s attack on key military sites and personnel or blunted by Israel’s own defenses, such developments may signify another layer of success. Of course, it is difficult to know exactly what an Iranian attack might have looked like had Israel not targeted key military facilities during this strike and earlier attacks on Iranian air defenses in 2024.

—Rachel Whitlark is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Israeli strikes on Iran risk provoking a response from Yemen’s Houthi rebels and potentially upending last month’s bilateral cease-fire agreement between the United States and the Houthis. While the Trump administration made it clear that the strike was a unilateral action by Israel, the Houthis could perceive the United States as complicit, as the rebels often conflate Israeli and US actions in their public messaging. Adding to those concerns, earlier this week a Houthi source threatened to retaliate if the United States or Israel struck Iran, following reports that American nonessential personnel and family members were being evacuated throughout the Middle East. 

Moreover, the Houthis have been playing a more prominent role in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” since the October 7 attacks, particularly as other proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah faced leadership losses and setbacks. For the group, renewed confrontation could be an opportunity to reinforce its position within Iran’s network of allies and proxies and claim a major propaganda win—even if it means the end of the cease-fire with the United States. 

While the Trump administration’s “Operation Rough Rider” imposed meaningful damage on the group, the Houthis have proven their resilience and ability to adapt in the face of continued strikes. They may also calculate that the Trump administration’s decision to pursue a cease-fire is a sign of limited appetite to re-engage in Yemen, especially given that “Operation Rough Rider” cost more than one billion dollars in a month and failed to degrade the Houthis, who have continued strikes on Israeli territory. 

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. 

Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response 

Gulf States—mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have no appetite for a regional war that involves Iran and would rather not be put in a place to choose between Israel and Iran. Their economic visions hinge on regional stability and on striking a balance to protect their interests, both economic and political. While their emerging role as mediators has enhanced their geopolitical role and diplomatic leverage, that role—now at risk—depends on stability for trust-building purposes when dealing with an actor like Iran.  

Under the Trump administration, Gulf states have taken the front seat in driving the new regional order. However, Israel’s strikes, following the IAEA’s strongest rebuke in twenty years and Iran’s announcement of a third uranium site, seem to have temporarily disrupted the Gulf capitals’ preferred approach for diplomacy and placed them now in the crossfire for retaliation.  

The Trump administration must rally its Gulf allies for an emergency meeting to coordinate a response aimed at preserving any diplomatic gains made so far. Oman, as a trusted intermediary, could be in a good place to lower the temperature and lobby Tehran against attacking Gulf capitals and US assets in the region—especially since Washington had no role in the attack. While this escalation carries serious risks, Israel’s attacks seem to have focused on the IRGC, which is responsible for continuously pursuing a destabilizing influence across the Levant and the Gulf and targeting US service members—making the IRGC a legitimate target. However, failure to deescalate would risk a broader regional conflict, the collapse of the Gulf-led peace process, the destabilization of global energy markets, and further disruption of key navigation routes in the Red Sea.  

—Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran demonstrates a continued invocation of its Begin Doctrine—its long-standing policy of pre-emptively striking nuclear facilities and weapons of mass destruction. Named after Israel’s former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine was first created in 1981 during Operation Opera when Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in a targeted attack.

Similar to Netanyahu today, Begin carried out the strike without US approval. Many feared an escalation if former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were to retaliate, however, at the time, Saddam was already embroiled in a war with Iran and could not afford to respond.

Israel applied the doctrine again in 2007 when it covertly destroyed Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in an operation it did not publicly acknowledge until 2018. Responding to the strike, then-President Bashar al-Assad denied the existence of the site entirely to avoid domestic and regional pressure to retaliate.

Now, for the third time, Israel appears to be invoking the doctrine, this time against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure, again without Washington. But unlike prior episodes, Iran is expected to retaliate, and likely with far greater intensity than previous strikes in April and October 2024—especially if Iran’s regional proxies join its retaliation to overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome.

All eyes now turn to Muscat, where US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is still scheduled to meet with Iranian negotiators this weekend in what could be the final round of nuclear talks. The outlook for any deal appears bleak following the strikes. Should negotiations collapse, the region could face an escalation unlike anything seen in decades.

—Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.

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In this context, the absence of DDR programs emerges as one of the most pressing challenges. The need for such programs remains critical to ensuring stability, preventing renewed unrest or a slide into violence, and providing adequate protection for all Syrian communities, most notably the Alawite community, which faces particularly delicate circumstances following the mass demobilization of military personnel from within its ranks. DDR efforts would also play a key role in creating a safe environment for the return of refugees.

Activating DDR programs has become an urgent necessity in light of lifting sanctions and renewed international momentum to support stability in Syria. These programs are critical to addressing the fragile conditions of communities that have long depended on military structures for their livelihoods and collective identity, chief among them the Alawite community. Without fair and sustainable institutional solutions, the risk of relapse into rebellion or renewed violence remains high, undermining prospects for national reconciliation.

Alawites: From army to militia

The Alawite community—the Syrian minority group to which the Assad family belonged— formed the backbone of the military and security apparatus under the former regime. With its collapse, hundreds of thousands of soldiers—most of them Alawite—were demobilized without being offered alternative pathways, particularly amid a deteriorating economic situation and the near-total absence of employment opportunities.

The transitional government limited its response to conducting settlement processes and disarming light and medium weapons, leaving the heavy ones on the battlefields, without establishing a comprehensive institutional framework capable of absorbing the large number of demobilized personnel, or providing them with viable alternatives to prevent their descent into armed violence—an undertaking that, even if politically desired, currently lies beyond the government’s capacity.

Moreover, some former Alawite officers and commanders established armed militias that launched violent operations in early March 2025. These actions triggered retaliatory violence, resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians—including Alawites, Sunnis, and others from Syria’s coastal communities—as well as hundreds of security and military personnel. The clashes have entrenched a persistent state of insecurity that continues to this day.

While the regime’s remnant leaders may be driven by their own motives—such as evading transitional justice and exploiting sectarian rhetoric to portray themselves as protectors of the Alawite community against the transitional government—the absence of DDR programs continues to fuel these militias with new recruits. This dynamic has turned the situation into a pattern of intermittent rebellion and has opened the door for regional actors like Iran to intervene and exacerbate instability. Lasting stability in Alawite-majority areas—and elsewhere—will remain out of reach unless sustainable solutions are introduced to economically and socially reintegrate these individuals into the fabric of the new state.

DDR programs as a pathway to stability

Amid growing international openness and willingness to support Syria’s stabilization, DDR programs stand out as essential pillars for building lasting peace. Their value lies in their capacity to curb the proliferation of weapons and reduce the risk of internal conflict, particularly in areas that have experienced sectarian or tribal tensions. They help address the root causes of conflict by offering former combatants viable alternative pathways.

Similar programs were backed by the UN’s Development Program (UNDP) in Liberia and Colombia based on United Nations (UN)- integrated DDR standards (IDDRS). Implemented in parallel with a transitional justice process, these programs serve as a foundational mechanism. For example, in Colombia and Liberia, DDR served as a structured mechanism to transition combatants to civilian life. Comparable DDR programs in Liberia, Colombia, and South Sudan have demonstrated the importance of linking disarmament with social reintegration in reducing long-term conflict risks.

In line with these existing international standards, DDR programs follow a clear sequence: voluntary or mandatory disarmament, vocational and social rehabilitation, and eventual reintegration into civilian life or institutional structures. Their importance lies in their ability to reduce the likelihood of renewed violence, particularly in areas that have experienced sectarian tensions, such as Syria’s coastal region.

In the Syrian context, the issue of demobilized fighters from the Alawite community and others within a unified national framework helps foster trust among Syria’s diverse components, ensuring that no group feels targeted based on its political or sectarian background. These programs would also demonstrate the transitional government’s seriousness in addressing security and humanitarian concerns, laying the groundwork for attracting international support and securing the funding necessary to implement development and reconstruction plans.

The impact of DDR extends beyond internal stabilization; it also serves as a gateway to creating a secure environment that can rebuild refugee confidence in the safety of return. In doing so, it helps reposition Syria as a safe country, capable of reintegrating its citizens, both inside and abroad, under dignified and voluntary conditions.

A new opportunity, and and an urgent task

With the end of Western sanctions on Syria and the return of external support to the state-building process, the transitional government now faces a rare opportunity to address the imbalances of the post-conflict period. However, this international opening does not automatically guarantee stability unless accompanied by serious domestic measures, chief among them, the launch of DDR programs.

The current challenge is not only the lack of funding but also the absence of operational structures capable of absorbing such programs, weak institutional coordination, and growing security risks posed by uncontrollable local forces from the remnants of the regime or civil groups with a revolutionary background. In this context, DDR programs become a central tool not only for restoring security but also for rebuilding trust between the state and society and paving the way for genuine national reintegration.

Although the Western-led international community continues to stress the importance of protecting minority communities in Syria, particularly the Alawites, the core challenge now lies not only in the lifting of international restrictions but in the transitional government’s ability to translate that commitment into effective policy. Without creating institutional and economic environments capable of absorbing demobilized fighters and reintegrating them into society, protection efforts will remain vulnerable to failure, and stability will remain fragile, regardless of available resources or declared intentions. In this space, the government’s seriousness about rebuilding the state will be truly tested.

A “collaborative fund” as a practical solution

With international willingness to support Syria’s stabilization now in place, the need arises for establishing a “Collaborative Support Fund” dedicated to financing DDR programs, similar to models implemented in Iraq, Sudan, Gaza, and others. This fund would operate under the direct supervision of the Syrian government and in partnership with neutral third parties. It would aim to manage financial resources for DDR programs transparently and efficiently, ensuring their use in the rehabilitation and economic and social reintegration of former combatants, including marginalized groups such as demobilized Alawite fighters who may fall outside the scope of transitional justice mechanisms.

A portion of the fund could also be allocated to support other conflict-affected groups, such as wounded opposition fighters, thereby promoting balanced justice and contributing to repairing Syria’s social fabric. This mechanism would also create a broader space for partnership, allowing both Arab and Western countries to contribute within an integrated framework subject to international oversight, thus minimizing the risk of political manipulation or misuse of funds.

In this context, Arab states—particularly those in the Gulf—could be crucial in filling key funding and technical gaps, especially as many have adopted more open positions toward the new Syrian administration. The Gulf states have previously contributed to stabilization funds in Yemen and Iraq, offering a precedent for such involvement in Syria’s DDR efforts. With their considerable financial capabilities and accumulated experience, Arab countries are well-positioned to serve as active partners in funding DDR programs. However, the success of this role will remain contingent on close coordination with the wider international community.

Stability hanging in the balance

Syria cannot fully turn the page on its conflict unless realistic guarantees are put in place to prevent the resurgence of violence or the drift of demobilized fighters toward rebellion. As such, the post-Assad reconstruction process cannot be completed without fundamentally addressing a set of sensitive issues, chief among them the sanctions regime and the critical role of DDR programs in laying the foundations for stability and ensuring the protection of minority groups, both as a domestic imperative and an international responsibility.

However, DDR programs are not a silver bullet despite their strategic importance. Their success depends on a supportive political, economic, and social environment, ensuring sustainability. This requires an integrated framework of transitional justice, economic revitalization, and inclusive participation by all societal components in shaping the country’s future. Without such coherence, DDR initiatives risk failure, co-optation, or losing their intended role as tools for building trust and long-term stability.

The current opportunity—bolstered by broad international support—must not be wasted. Failure to activate these pathways would represent a serious setback for Syria’s future, potentially reopening the door to renewed conflict and the resurgence of extremism. Conversely, if the transitional government succeeds in operationalizing DDR programs and mobilizing international support to rehabilitate society and kickstart development, it could mark a pivotal turning point in Syria’s modern history. In doing so, the country would be able to protect and advance minority rights within a new state that exercises its authority fairly and equitably under the principles of citizenship, just like for all other Syrians. This would pave the way for a renewed social contract through which Syrians can once again believe in their homeland and a shared, hopeful future.

Muhsen al-Mustafa is a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies. He can be found on X @MuhsenAlmustafa.

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The project aims to revive long-defunct transport routes—once important arteries of Soviet-era trade—that were severed after Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders with Armenia in 1991 and 1993, respectively, thereby isolating it. Restoring these routes would reconnect Armenia with its neighbors and link broader corridors from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea and from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, facilitating trade between major economies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. For both the United States and Israel, supporting this initiative offers a strategic opportunity to enhance regional stability, expand economic influence, and counterbalance adversarial powers like Iran, Russia, and China.

This vision, however, ultimately depends on the successful conclusion of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which remains stalled largely due to Azerbaijan’s shifting and escalating demands—including calls for constitutional amendments and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group—despite diplomatic consensus over the treaty text and Armenia’s expressed readiness to sign it. Another major underlying issue is Azerbaijan’s insistence on an extraterritorial so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect it to its exclave Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, but bypassing all Armenian oversight, customs, and security. Armenia, while supportive of connectivity, unequivocally rejects any surrender of sovereignty over its territory.

Nevertheless, Crossroads of Peace still offers Baku significant economic and geopolitical benefits. By reconnecting regional transport networks, including access to Turkey through Armenian territory under Armenian jurisdiction, Azerbaijan could achieve many of its logistical objectives without the contentious demand for a sovereign corridor. This cooperative model would provide Baku with more trade routes to Nakhchivan and beyond, while also gaining international legitimacy and investment through a mutually beneficial and multilateral framework.

Why engagement serves US interests

The entry of US President Donald Trump’s second administration offers an opportune moment for the United States, and potentially Israel, to play an active role in securing a high-profile peace agreement by pushing Azerbaijan to sign the treaty with Armenia. While brokering such a deal would be a diplomatic win in itself, its real payoff lies in unlocking the Crossroads of Peace and thereby delivering meaningful strategic and commercial gains.

By facilitating new trade routes through a Western-friendly, post-conflict South Caucasus, the United States could establish a firmer presence in a region it has long neglected, challenge the dominance of rival powers, and generate economic returns through infrastructure partnerships and transit revenue.

For Washington, the Eurasian transport network represents a unique opportunity to establish a foothold in a region vital to global trade and geopolitics. It offers a Western-aligned alternative to transport networks increasingly dominated by Russia and China while opening the door to US commercial participation in logistics, infrastructure, and technology. 

The Eurasian transport network, comprising mainly the Northern Corridor, Middle Corridor, and International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), moves millions of tons of freight worth billions of dollars each year. These corridors, which cut across Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, are economic battlegrounds where Moscow and Beijing seek to maintain influence, and the West attempts to create alternatives to Russian and Chinese-controlled infrastructure. In this fiercely contested region, controlling trade routes means shaping the future balance of economic and geopolitical power.

Despite the strategic importance of these corridors, the United States currently has a very limited regional presence and lacks an integrated strategy or infrastructure footprint, offering only modest support limited to diplomatic engagement and technical assistance for the Middle Corridor, led by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. However, this corridor faces significant challenges, including limited infrastructure capacity, high costs, and a lack of integration, which undermine its efficiency and deter large-scale, reliable trade flows. It is also partially aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with parts of the Middle Corridor physically overlapping with and increasingly integrated into the BRI, drawing it into Beijing’s sphere of influence.

China’s growing interest and investment in the Middle Corridor thus further complicates its appeal for Western stakeholders. Chinese influence is now poised to grow even further with the Anaklia Port—a deep-sea project in Georgia—having been awarded to a Chinese-led consortium. Meanwhile, most freight still flows through Russia via the Northern Corridor, maintaining Moscow’s dominance over Eurasian transport. The INSTC—connecting India, Iran, Russia, and Europe—offers some diversification, but it presents “double trouble” for Washington’s involvement by relying heavily on both Iranian and Russian networks, two countries under sweeping US sanctions.

From a purely economic standpoint, the potential of Crossroads of Peace is substantial. Much of Eurasia’s overland trade currently bypasses Armenia, relying instead on Georgia’s politically sensitive routes and the broader Middle Corridor. Diversifying transit through Armenia would strengthen regional connectivity and unlock new channels for investment, trade, and employment. By investing early in Crossroads of Peace, the United States can counterbalance Moscow and Beijing’s regional footprints while creating entry points for American firms in sectors such as construction, energy, digital infrastructure, and logistics. While comprehensive feasibility studies have yet to be publicly released, the Armenian government has indicated that the project could generate significant economic returns by restoring dormant transit infrastructure and linking key regional corridors. Institutions like the Asian Development Bank have expressed support, and the US-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter highlights the initiative as a priority area for cooperation.

Moreover, given the Trump administration’s emphasis on economic partnerships and tangible returns, Armenia’s proposal aligns well as a concrete opportunity to advance US financial interests. Infrastructure projects, particularly railways and highways, could generate significant returns through tolls, tariffs, and transit fees, benefiting US investors, US-backed development institutions, and potentially the US federal government if linked to initiatives like an External Revenue Service.

However, the precise mechanisms through which the United States would realize these returns—such as specific investment structures, revenue-sharing agreements, or operational roles—require further elaboration. Detailed financial modeling and bilateral agreements would be necessary to quantify and actualize these benefits. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) could help drive this effort by providing early-stage support and risk mitigation for targeted investments in Crossroads of Peace that lay the groundwork for a sustainable US economic footprint across the South Caucasus. This approach would also dovetail with Trump’s broader ambitions to fund government expenditures through foreign-derived revenue rather than domestic taxation. Investing in Crossroads of Peace could therefore fit neatly into this vision, turning geopolitics into a profitable enterprise benefiting the American taxpayer.

The potential for this initiative to succeed under US sponsorship could redefine Washington’s legacy in the South Caucasus and position the Trump administration as the indispensable peace broker in a region historically dominated by rival powers. Given Trump’s record of bold diplomatic efforts, from Ukraine-Russia negotiations to mediation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo—conflicts still far from resolution—brokering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be a comparatively easy win. It would take little more than a decisive push from Trump to “close the deal” and get Azerbaijan to sign onto terms it has already effectively agreed to, delivering a swift and tangible diplomatic victory.

Why engagement serves Israeli interests

Israel, too, has strong incentives to support the finalization of peace and the development of Armenia’s transit ambitions. Azerbaijan is a close Israeli ally, particularly in terms of energy and security cooperation. Helping to solidify peace with Armenia could deepen these ties while promoting broader regional stability. With trade between Israel and Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, growing rapidly under the Abraham Accords, Israel could benefit from overland corridors like Crossroads of Peace that improve access to Persian Gulf markets, bypass Iran, and create new logistics, infrastructure, and technology cooperation opportunities. This would enhance Israel’s economic outreach and reduce its exposure to Tehran’s influence in regional supply chains.

Additionally, Israel has historic and cultural ties with Armenia, notably through the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem, home to one of the oldest continuous Armenian diasporas in the world. A peaceful, economically integrated South Caucasus could open new avenues for Israeli trade, diplomacy, and investment across the region.

Furthermore, a secure peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly reduce Armenia’s dependence on Iran, which has become one of its few trade and energy lifelines due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s pragmatic relationship with Iran stems more from necessity than ideological alignment. Opening new trade routes through Azerbaijan and Turkey would enable Armenia to break this dependence and accelerate its Westward pivot.

This shift would directly serve Israel’s interests by further isolating Iran economically while allowing Israel to maintain its foothold in Azerbaijan as a counterweight to Iranian threats. Armenia remains one of Iran’s few accessible and expanding trade partners, with Iranian exports to Armenia reaching nearly 600 million dollars in 2023, including petroleum gas, iron, and other industrial goods. The two countries also maintain strategic energy exchanges—notably under a “Gas for Electricity” agreement—and Armenia is Iran’s only direct link to the Eurasian Economic Union. Reducing Armenia’s dependence on Iran through regional normalization would therefore help close a critical commercial and geopolitical corridor for Tehran. At the same time, a more connected and less Iran-dependent Armenia—at peace with its neighbors and increasingly aligned on common regional security concerns—could adopt a more collaborative stance toward Israel’s interests. Turkish officials have made clear, however, that normalization with Azerbaijan is a necessary precondition for reopening the Turkey-Armenia border.

To this end, leveraging Azerbaijan’s growing interest in joining the Abraham Accords could be instrumental. Although Baku has long maintained strong security and energy relations with Israel, formalizing those relations within the Abraham Accords would significantly elevate its international standing. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff recently indicated that Armenia, too, could be a candidate for future accession—a development that would further reinforce a regional climate of normalization, mutual recognition, and cooperation. Building on this momentum, US-Israeli joint mediation could help encourage Azerbaijan to soften its stance toward Armenia, facilitating the conclusion of a peace agreement that respects Armenia’s sovereignty while satisfying Azerbaijan’s strategic objectives.

Seizing the opportunity

Finalizing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers Washington and Jerusalem a rare chance to tilt the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical yet contested regions. Investing in this moment and helping to overcome the last obstacles to a peace deal—through targeted diplomacy, infrastructure support, and principled mediation—can help secure new trade corridors, weaken adversaries, and build lasting influence at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace is not merely a reconstruction project but a strategic gateway to a more stable, prosperous, and Western-aligned South Caucasus.

That said, a Westward pivot is not without geopolitical risks. Armenia’s deep historical ties with Russia and Iran could make this realignment contentious, especially if viewed as a zero-sum loss by Moscow or Tehran. To mitigate this, the United States and its allies should pair their investment and mediation efforts with clear security and economic guarantees to Armenia, ranging from energy diversification and trade facilitation to defense cooperation and institutional integration. Framing Crossroads of Peace as a shared regional gain, rather than a Western encroachment, will be essential to ensuring its sustainability.

But this opportunity will not remain open for long. It must be seized now.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations.

* The views expressed herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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The Syrian president’s diplomatic visits to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Jordan, France, and Turkey seemed auspicious and held promising potential. However, his potential in-person attendance at the Arab Summit in person was the center of some controversy.

Baghdad’s position on the rapid developments in Syria is split between two camps: The official government and that of the powerful non-state actors.

The Iraqi government’s initial response to Syria was cautious, including the closure of border crossings and the deployment of troops to the 630-kilometer border with Syria. But Baghdad slowly shifted towards a more pragmatic approach and eventually sent its officials on formal visits to Syria, in a move that acknowledged the legitimacy of the new regime. These efforts culminated with the Iraqi prime minister’s April meeting with al-Sharaa in Doha, where he extended a formal invitation to the Arab Summit, which Baghdad hosted in mid-May.

Alternatively, Iran-affiliates in Iraq have vocally opposed such normalization efforts. Over fifty members of the Iraqi parliament, many of whom have close ties to the Shiite Coordination Framework, signed a petition to reject al-Sharaa’s Baghdad visit, and parliament member Mustafa Sanad even organized a protest against his presence at the summit. Additionally, militia leaders such as Qais al-Khazaali and Abu Ali al-Askari, who command militia groups that were active in Syria until recently, posted direct threats on their X accounts towards the Syrian president. Media platforms with Iranian affiliations have been working in parallel with politicians to promote a disinformation campaign about al-Sharaa’s criminal record in Iraq, by issuing fake documents and tampered proof of incarceration.

Iraqi militias have a long history of hostility towards some of the Sunni militant groups with which al-Sharaa was involved in previous years. These Islamist Jihadist groups rose to power in Iraq in 2014 and took over one third of Iraqi territories, subsequently the liberation of these areas was a lengthy and costly process for the Iraqis. Iraqi militias continue to use the same justification for their military intervention in Syria in the past years, which is the need to “protect” holy Shiite sites, and continue to insist that it remains a pressing issue even under the new regime.

Quiet hostilities and alliance of necessity

Under Baathist control, Syria had longstanding grievances with Iraq. Before the spark of turmoil in Syria, for example, Iraq’s former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had accused Assad of sending militants and terrorists into the country. But economic ties, in part due to the movement of 1.2 million Iraqi refugees into Syria during the early aughts, softened hostilities. During this period, economic trade between Syria and Iraq reached its peak at four billion US dollars annually. At the time, 60 percent of Iraq’s imports came from Syria.

But this dynamic shifted drastically after 2011 with the eruption of the Arab Spring and the anti-Assad uprising in Syria. Iran seized the opportunity to broker a new relationship between the two countries, where political and security interests were tied and emphasized, and sectarian fault lines were deliberately exploited. Iraqi militias, along with Iranian forces and the Assad regime, took part in suppressing the rebels’ seizure of Syrian cities during these years. Over fifteen Iraqi militias, with just over 75,000 fighters, were estimated to have participated in battles in Syria over thirteen years. In parallel, Iraqi territories provided a safe land corridor for Iranian reinforcement and personnel traveling to Syria, and three domestic drug trafficking corridors from Syria and Iran to neighboring countries.

Economic relations endured despite the security shakeup. Even after 2011, Iraq continued to import agricultural products from Syria in addition to food, textiles, plastic goods, medicine, and many other commodities. Syrian products comprised 80 percent of Iraqi markets; however, this percentage declined to only 5 percent after December 2024.

The new reality and future prospects

Iraq underutilized its agricultural capacity for years and depended on Syria for food security. By solidifying economic relations with the new Syria through trade agreements, transportation infrastructure, and meaningful investments, Iraq can further multiply the fruits of cooperation and guarantee water, food, and fuel security. 

Since the historic overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, Baghdad has sent three delegations with high-profile officials to meet with officials from the new government in Damascus.

The latest, in April, held the highest significance and marked the new Iraqi pragmatist approach to the recent developments with its neighbor. It included more specialized Iraqi officials like the head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, along with representatives from the Department of Border Enforcement, the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Oil.

This delegation directly addressed economic interests in Syria, most notably the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline. Iraq currently exports oil through Basra Sea ports, land, and the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. However, resuming operations on a direct pipeline to the Mediterranean would result in substantial economic gains, increasing Iraq’s oil export capacity by 300,000 Bpd. Negotiating access for Iraq to the Syrian Mediterranean ports will diversify Iraq’s options in trade and the global supply chain. It will also decrease the costs of importing European goods and commodities to Iraq and other parts of the region.

Meanwhile, as the West slowly opens up to the new Syrian government, Iraq should also take part in the country’s efforts to rebuild as an influential neighbor. Iraq’s energy sector, in particular, is an institutionalized and mature one, and Iraq’s national oil companies can offer their investments in Syria’s natural resources. Iran’s power decline in the region not only left a political vacuum but also an economic one, too. And as Tehran’s expenditures in Syria ranged from thirty billion US dollars to above fifty billion dollars, and Iranian investments worth hundreds of millions of dollars were under construction at the time of regime change.

Additionally, Iraq hosts between 800 thousand to a million foreign workers, many of whom transfer their earnings in dollars back to their home countries— mostly southeast Asia—draining eight billion US dollars of foreign currency. Baghdad now has a golden opportunity to strengthen both its economy and regional ties by facilitating the legal entry and employment of Syrian workers into the private sector. As a source of affordable and skilled labor, Syrian workers can help meet domestic labor demands in the private sector, while their earnings, reinvested into the Syrian economy, can further deepen economic interdependence between the two countries.

The security question

However, stability must come first before economic prosperity.

While the international discourse is focused on minority rights and power-sharing guarantees, Iraq and Syria have a deeper understanding of the security challenges that are unique to them. The Iraqi-Syrian border witnessed the rise and fall of extremist groups that were behind some of the deadliest conflicts for civilians in recent years. The Iraqi government failed for years to secure the porous border with Syria and control illicit economic activities that thrived on the vulnerable periphery. Furthermore, the northern parts of both countries have suffered spillover effects of conflict between their neighbor, Turkey, and Kurdish rebel groups.

After the global coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS) successfully defeated the militant group, al-Hol prison and similar camps isolated ISIS families and the remnants from their surrounding populations. This ended up dragging many innocent civilians into these enclosures, including three thousand missing Yazidi women and girls who are believed to be entrapped in this camp and whose situation remains a pressing issue. Moreover, two thousand Assadist soldiers fled to Iraq in the first few hours of the regime’s fall, and were later returned to Syria by the Iraqi authorities.

Such incidents are likely to continue in Syria’s transitional period and can only be combated through cooperation with Iraq. Lastly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s explicit comments about dividing Syria into four administrations to establish a so-called ‘David’s Corridor’ pose a direct threat to Iraq’s border integrity and internal security. Iraq—among other regional actors—must establish a joint approach to refute this hollow and short-sighted political agenda. A fragmented Syria risks becoming a persistent epicenter of regional instability.

Policy recommendations for the Iraqi government

At this turning point in the region’s history, Iraq has a rare opportunity to start a new chapter with Syria.

Welcoming the Syrian president in Baghdad to the Arab Summit could have served as the first practical step towards a new relationship, but this was not achieved due to continuous militia intimidation.  The threats made by non-state actors resulted in the withdrawals and cancellations of many heads of state from the summit, including al-Sharaa, and instead sent low-level delegations. The Iraqi government should implement mechanisms to regulate and hold accountable militias and other non-state actors whose public positions contradict official state policy and risk undermining Iraq’s diplomatic relations.

Opening effective channels of communication between the Iraqi and Syrian governments will be critical in efforts to stabilize and normalize. The Iraqi government should continue with regular, high-profile official visits to Syria. This will ensure Iraq’s input in critical and strategic decisions faced by the Syrian government and guarantee a seat at the transition table.

These communications should be inclusive beyond government officials and extend to civil society, local communities, and tribal or religious leaders. In the midst of the current storm of misinformation and disinformation around the situation in Syria, granular relationships will help local communities adapt and respond to rapid transitions, especially with population movement and voluntary return of refugees.

To truly deepen a partnership between the two countries, Iraq should also work closely with the new Syrian regime to establish a high-level security cooperation, including immediate investments in border crossings and towns, to prevent the resurgence of extremist groups and smuggling activities across the joint border. These areas were neglected and under non-state actors’ control for years, and government takeover will mean a regulated, taxed, and monitored movement of goods and travelers.

And to enable prosperity after ensuring security, Baghdad should continue to identify economic opportunities and solidify them with memoranda of understanding, trade agreements, and investment deals. In the six months since the regime change in Syria, there has been a significant investment momentum and capital interest from regional and international actors. Therefore, supporting the Syrian-Iraqi business council has become a pressing necessity, as the efforts to rebuild Syria are mounting through direct foreign investments, as the Syrian economy recovers after lifting the sanctions. Feedback from businessmen on both sides will provide input on market gaps, demand potential, stakeholder engagement, industry trends, and trade dynamics. All of which can be used as a blueprint for economic cooperation.

Part of this picture should include Baghdad legalizing the status of Syrians who wish to stay in Iraq as part of the labor force. Iraq’s Ministry of Labor should create a legal framework to incentivize Syrian skilled workers’ employment in the Iraqi private sector. Doing so will curb the influx of undocumented and unregulated immigrant workers from outside the region, limit foreign currency outflow, and meet the private sector employment needs.

Over the past thirteen years, Iraq’s role in Syria has been marked by hardship and complexity. Now, the current Iraqi administration holds the opportunity to turn a new page and help shape a future defined by peace and regional cooperation.

Shermine Serbest is an Iraqi researcher and international relations analyst. She leads many data-focused projects covering Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East, focusing on misinformation and disinformation and the political economy.

The post Why Iraq should build bridges with its ‘new’ neighbor, Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May, the Lebanese concluded country-wide municipal and mayoral elections—their first in nine years—on the heels of Joseph Aoun filling Beirut’s two-year presidential vacancy, and an uncharacteristically speedy appointment of a prime minister and cabinet.

Mere momentum should not be equated with long-term progress towards stabilization, particularly with respect to Hezbollah’s disarmament. The municipal election results did not demonstrate the prominent militant group’s outright dominance over Lebanon’s Shiites. However, Hezbollah nevertheless retains preponderant popularity among them and influence over their electoral and political choices. However, as Hezbollah dubbed them, these elections were a “promotional event” for the real prize: the May 2026 legislative elections. If the group can then expand upon its recent electoral success, and if Aoun’s interminable dialogue with Hezbollah over its arms ever becomes serious,  then it can leverage its popular and political weight to steer those discussions toward an outcome allowing it to retain its arms.

Unpacking the results

Hezbollah boasts that its sweep of the municipal and mayoral elections in Beirut, Baalbek-Hermel, and south Lebanon was a virtually unmitigated “tsunami.”

At face value, the group’s claims are true.  In south Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South Governorates, Hezbollah’s joint electoral list with the Amal Party, dubbed the “Development and Loyalty” list, ran unconstested and won 109 of 272 municipalities by default. In some municipalities, this victory was due to overwhelming local support for Amal and Hezbollah, and in others, to pressure from those parties forcing opponents to withdraw their candidacy or forgo running altogether.

The Amal-Hezbollah lists also took the overwhelming majority of the remaining municipalities, where the elections came down to a contest, with the exception of a handful of seats. But even there, the self-described Amal-Hezbollah Shiite Duo largely did not lose out to outright ideological opponents, apart from Amal’s loss of two municipal seats in Deir Al Zahrani to the Communist Party. Instead, in many cases, the group lost to familial or clan lists, otherwise seemingly neutral on the question of Hezbollah’s private arsenal.

In the Sidon District’s Zrarieh, for example, Development and Loyalty won only six of the fifteen contested seats against the opposition, development-focused “Build It Together” list.  But opposition figure Riad al-Asaad—who has previously bemoaned American-led attempts to weaken Hezbollah as “an Israeli goal” and who backed Build It Together— insisted that “competition [with Hezbollah] isn’t over the choice of resistance, but development.”

These successes replicated earlier wins in the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, which witnessed significantly higher voter turnout over the last municipal elections in 2016. Here, Development and Loyalty won all eighty municipalities—twenty-eight by default, twenty-nine through electoral contests, and twenty-two where independent pro-Hezbollah lists competed with each other. In many cases here as well, the Amal-Hezbollah list faced off against ostensible independents, but who were nevertheless ideologically aligned with Hezbollah, as in Bednayel, where Development and Loyalty confronted the explicitly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty to the Resistance” list, or in Brital, where the Hezbollah-Amal backed “Brital Families” list faced openly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty and Development” list.

For example, Hezbollah-backed candidates swept the municipal council after a hard-fought electoral battle in the city of Baalbek. But voting numbers painted a more complex picture: of 37,142 eligible voters—22,573 of whom are Shiites—a range of 11,674-12,199 voted for Development and Loyalty, while the political opposition list “My City Baalbek” garnered 5,258-5,802 votes. The latter only attracted four hundred to 790 Shiites, compared with 11,290 Shiites for Development and Loyalty, demonstrating the continued loyalty of Hezbollah’s sectarian base. Meanwhile, Hezbollah increased its inroads into Baalbek’s Sunni population, drawing close to 1500 of their votes, and widened its victory margin over My City Baalbek from the 2016 municipal elections.

But these results, good as they are, were far from the unmitigated success that Hezbollah’s propaganda organs sought to spin. In a main Hezbollah stronghold like the city of Baalbek, the group should consider its victory margin too close for comfort, especially as voter turnout in the city itself, in sharp contrast to the District and Governorate level, stood at approximately 47.2 percent generally, and 53.51 percent among Shiites specifically. This was higher than 2016’s level of 44 percent turnout of 31,510 eligible voters. However, it was still low considering the group’s great efforts to encourage its base’s participation in an election painted as a referendum on Hezbollah’s arms and existence, occurring at a historical inflection point for Lebanon.

The electoral battles in the more populous South Lebanon and Nabatieh Governorates offered a starker warning to the group. These areas collectively witnessed similarly depressed voting levels—36.94 percent overall (43.17 percent in South Lebanon and 36.65 percent in Nabatieh) compared to 48.15 percent in 2016. Hezbollah’s results were also spottier at face value, with opposing lists, if not outright ideological opponents, making deeper inroads among the electorate despite ultimately failing to unseat the Hezbollah-Amal Duo.

The apathy factor

One plausible explanation is that Hezbollah has lost at least some of its ability to mobilize its loyal masses. This could stem, from, as some have alleged, growing Shiite discontent with the party, particularly over instigating the recent ruinous war with Israel—which could portend a massive backlash against Hezbollah coupled with sizable defections from its base’s ranks. But the materialization of this scenario depends on a complex set of currently absent factors, particularly the existence of a credible and unified Shiite opposition, with the means and ability to deliver on these people’s needs, and thus attract this alleged silent anti-Hezbollah majority.

It is more plausible that the depressed voter turnout had nothing to do with Hezbollah. After all, the silent—and allegedly anti-Hezbollah—majority of Lebanese southerners didn’t go out and vote for the group’s opponents either. They stayed home.

Therefore, rather than a silent vote against Hezbollah, their abstention seems to have stemmed from overall Lebanese political disillusionment and loss of hope in the system’s ability to bring about change, leading to complacency. In September of 2024, for example, Arab Barometer found 76 percent of all Lebanese “uninterested in politics,” while 45 percent described themselves as highly apathetic. Two years prior, 65 percent of Lebanese had even said they didn’t care if their country remained a democracy—more accurately, a procedural democracy—as long as it “can maintain order and stability.” 

Political apathy isn’t ideal for Hezbollah. But a Shiite population as politically quiescent and disinterested as the rest of the Lebanese would not undermine the group’s political power, and is thus preferable to an actively hostile one. This, coupled with other factors, like fear of being caught in the midst of Israel’s ongoing military actions that escalated in the days preceding the election, and the difficulty of traveling to south Lebanon for voters displaced by the recent war, could have also impacted voter turnout.

Delayed disarmament

The municipal elections were the last in several significant, post-war milestones during which Hezbollah needed to demonstrate that it remains the primary political and social representative of Lebanese Shiites. But this victory is fragile, delaying, for now, he group’s disarmament, despite the calls for such action gaining increasing momentum.  But delaying that prospect does not eliminate it altogether. That specter will continue to haunt Hezbollah unless and until it can expand its municipal election successes come 2026’s parliamentary plebiscite—sweeping all seats it contests while denying Shiite opposition figures any electoral victories, drive up the voting rate among its supporters, and broaden its share of the popular vote. It’s a tall order, but Hezbollah has long proven itself a learning organization, and it will use all the carrots and sticks at its disposal to achieve that result. Here, a combination of delivering on post-war reconstruction of predominantly Shiite areas damaged during the recent war with Israel, while cowing potential opponents with threats, legal action, and actual force, will prove critical to the group’s chances of success.

The question is, will its opponents likewise learn from their mistakes and failure to challenge the group’s Shiite hegemony at a time when they allege its sway over that sect is at its weakest ever—or will they once again rest on the laurels of their empty slogans and symbolic or imaginary triumphs, leaving the “Party of God” to once again be the victors?

David Daoud was a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a research analyst on Hezbollah and Lebanon at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

The post What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This was his third visit to Saudi Arabia as prime minister, and the focus was on enhancing a relationship that has grown significantly in recent years.  Modi first went to the Kingdom in 2016 and then again in 2019, when the bilateral Strategic Partnership Council was established.  This mechanism has been used to facilitate approximately fifty deals, including construction, telecommunications, and tech projects, and to establish a joint committee to bring one hundred billion dollars of Saudi investments into India. 

With rising tensions between India and Pakistan, paired with the Israel war’s continuing destruction of Gaza, it’s natural that talk of India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations has been muted lately.  However, the depth of Indian-Gulf relations, combined with recent momentum behind these partnerships, creates a strong foundation for increased India-Middle East integration over the coming decades.  

Asia–Gulf relations: Not just China

When we talk about Asia-Gulf relations, China tends to get the lion’s share of the attention.  India, however, is a major Gulf actor.  The non-resident Indian population in GCC countries reached nine million in 2024, accounting for 25 percent of Indian expatriates globally.  There are longstanding social, cultural, religious, and family connections between the people of the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia, and this familiarity supports growing political, economic, and increasingly strategic cooperation.

In contrast, China remains an important partner but one with fewer tangible cultural ties. It is perceived as a more transactional actor, whereas India is deeply enmeshed in the social fabric of the Gulf. 

The importance of these people-to-people connections gets augmented by the substantial economic relations.  India’s GDP hit 3.56 trillion dollars in 2023, up from 2.68 trillion dollars in 2020, and is expected to grow by 6.5 percent in 2024.  As a result, it consumes a lot more energy, and it is now the world’s third-largest consumer of oil, behind China and the United States.  The Gulf countries, naturally, play a significant role in India’s energy security.  Of the top five commodities exporters to India, the UAE is number one, Saudi Arabia is number two, and Iraq is number four.  The volume of trade is significant.  In 2023, India imported just under 103 billion dollars from the GCC, Iran, and Iraq, and exported 57 billion dollars, making it one of the most important trade partners for the Gulf. 

India’s footprint on the Arabian Peninsula

Lesser noticed are the growing strategic relations and the formalized development of bilateral mechanisms.  New Delhi and Riyadh signed a 2014 defense cooperation agreement, which allowed for “shared use and exchange of defense-related information, military training and education, as well as cooperation in areas varying from hydrography and security to logistics.”  Since then, there have been regular joint army, naval, and air force joint exercises, and a Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation has held six rounds of meetings.  On April 23-24, the Indian Army and Royal Saudi Land Forces held the first round of Army-to-Army Staff Talks to discuss strengthening defence ties. 

Oman has even denser security ties to India, signing a military protocol agreement in 1972 and a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation in 2005.  During a 2018 visit to Muscat, Modi signed an access agreement for the Indian Navy to use Duqm port for logistics, support, and maintenance. 

The UAE is also ramping up defense and security relations with India. During an official visit to India last month, Minister of Defence Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum built upon existing security-related mechanisms to formalize cooperation between their coast guards and defence industries.  The readout from their meeting stated that “the two sides agreed that defence cooperation should be scaled up to match the progress in trade and business.”

This is part of what is really India’s most highly developed Middle East relationship.  With dramatic effects, it signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the UAE in 2022.  Bilateral trade in goods was 43.3 billion dollars in 2020 and is projected to surpass one hundred billion dollars this year.  The Emirates see India as an important feature of their drive to diversify international partnerships and their domestic economy.  Cooperation with India supports tech, skilled, and unskilled manpower, food, and medicine. 

Importantly, cooperation comes without the same kinds of geopolitical complications inherent in working with China.  According to an observer I recently spoke with, the only impediment to deeper India-UAE ties is the institutional capacity to keep pace with the demand for implementing and overseeing the wide range of projects that both sides want to pursue—the two governments need to develop more personnel to steer the bilateral relationship.  

This is to say that India is present in the Gulf with a depth and breadth that is not always realized from outside the region. India is becoming more confident in its role as a global actor with interests and influence beyond South Asia, and regional perceptions are shifting, with Gulf countries looking at New Delhi as a consequential partner on a growing set of issues.

The IMEC factor

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is perhaps the most interesting manifestation of this burgeoning regional partnership. 

Announced during the G20 summit in September 2023, IMEC is a proposed set of projects that would link India, the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Europe.  China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was defined early as a set of corridors, so naturally, many see IMEC as a response to the BRI.  It does share the underlying logic of connecting markets and supply chains, but has a narrower focus.  Fairly or unfairly, BRI quickly became a buzzword for nearly everything in Chinese foreign policy.  IMEC, on the other hand, looks to build upon mostly existing physical infrastructure to develop three “connectivity verticals”: transport, digital, and energy.  The Arabian Peninsula is a central node in this, linking the Arabian Sea via rail networks to Israel’s Haifa Port on the Mediterranean, ultimately reaching the European market. 

Within the GCC, this is a very attractive idea that aligns with country-specific “Vision” development plans.  One of the most alluring futures that Gulf leaders plan for is a post-hydrocarbon economic model where new industries, fueled by foreign direct investment and partnerships with leading global technology companies, create jobs and political stability.  IMEC is seen as an ambitious set of projects that can contribute to this. 

While IMEC has strong support from India and most Gulf governments, progress on some elements of the corridor could face challenges in the immediate term, given tensions in the Middle East, particularly transport links between Saudi Arabia and Israel.  When IMEC was unveiled, the idea of Saudi Arabia connecting to Haifa via Jordan was increasingly plausible.  After nineteen months of brutal war in Gaza, the political costs have risen significantly for Riyadh.  Government and business leaders see tremendous potential in IMEC connectivity, but are intensely aware that public perceptions of Israel have hardened throughout the war. Still, other transport, digital, and energy elements of IMEC are viable in the current environment and continue to enjoy strong support from Indian, Gulf, and European partners. Beyond IMEC, we can expect to see more projects that address bilateral concerns, like energy and food security or tech cooperation, as Gulf countries find ways to increase engagement with India.

Opportunities for the United States

With GCC-US relations at a high point following President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi, Qatar, and the UAE, growing momentum in GCC-India relations is in Washington’s interests as well.  An Indo-Pacific partner with a deep presence in the Gulf makes a more competitive environment for China, while supporting GCC efforts to build more dynamic and sustainable economies. 

With overlapping interests in energy security, maritime stability, and economic diversification, the US, India, and GCC should consider institutionalizing cooperation, such as a multilateral platform to enhance policy coordination, increase trust, and create a channel for project planning and strategic alignment.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi.

The post India-Gulf relations are muted—but mobilizing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet despite Saied’s apparent opposition to joining the Abraham Accords, his decision in November 2023 to halt the Tunisian parliament’s controversial bill criminalizing normalizing ties with Israel provided a glimpse into the president’s cost-benefit analysis over measures that could alienate the West completely. It signaled an opening, even if a very narrow one, that the possibility of Tunisian—Israel rapprochement might not be as far-fetched as experts predict, and that even a rogue actor like Saied sees the benefits in joining a Westernized coalition during times of war.  Yet in the long run, especially after the war in Gaza, Tunisia’s historical openness to the West might present an opportunity to advance normalization between the two countries.

Stubborn challenges: Israel and Tunisia’s rocky relations

Israel and Tunisia do not currently maintain any kind of formal relations, but this has not always been the case.

Beginning in the 1950s, under former Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, limited ties developed between the two countries. These included informal connections and meetings between politicians from both sides, initiated by diplomats from each country. The relationship served mutual interests—Israel sought recognition from an Arab state, while Tunisia aimed to secure support for its development, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Consequently, in the nineties, Tunisia and Israel established low-level diplomatic relations (culminating in the opening of “interest sections” in each other’s countries, serving as de facto embassies), making the relations between the countries formal.  

However, the Palestinian issue has long been a central element of Tunisia’s foreign policy, causing attrition between Israeli and Tunisian diplomatic relations. Tunis has long expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and their struggle for self-determination and has historically defended the two-state solution. More importantly, Tunisia hosted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters from 1982 to 1993 after Yasser Arafat was forced to flee Beirut, Lebanon, then under siege by the Israelis during the first Israel-Lebanon War. Tunis hosted the PLO headquarters until the Oslo Accords, when it relocated to Gaza and the West Bank.  

This period helped cement closeness between Tunisians to the Palestinian cause, a sentiment further solidified by Israel’s deadly aerial attack on Hammam Chot on the PLO headquarters in 1985, killing a number of civilians and causing further resentment among Tunisians. Tunisians never forgave Israel for what they perceived to be an illegal incursion on their territory.

In 2000, with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in Israel and Palestine, relations between Israel and Tunisia entered a period of further crisis, leading to the suspension of official ties. While the relationship had deteriorated significantly already, the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians rendered diplomatic efforts virtually impossible.

A continuation of the deteriorating relations underpinned the decades that followed. During Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution, Israel remained on the fence about improving ties with the new political forces, fearing the rise of an anti-Israel posture. Meanwhile, the Tunisians passed a new Constitution in 2014, underscoring its commitment to the Palestinian cause, and open letters signed by academics and researchers calling for criminalizing ties with Israel circulated among political forces.

Under Saied’s current rule, these tensions have escalated significantly, including when he rejected Israel’s 1948 borders and called for the “full liberation of Palestine,” while avoiding any overt condemnation of Hamas after its October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. On some occasions, Saied adopted an overtly antisemitic posture, accusing “the Zionists” of plotting the deadly 2023 floods in  Libya that killed some four thousand people, a trope linked to the long-held antisemitic prejudice that Jews somehow control the world. His remarks sparked outrage across Israeli media.  

Tunisia’s foreign policy has recently shifted markedly into a more anti-Western stance, cozying up to Iran in the process.

In May 2024, Saied visited Tehran to pay respects to the late President Ebrahim Raisi, marking the first-ever visit of a Tunisian president to  Iran. That same month, rumors swirled in Italian and French news outlets of unusual air movements by Russian aircraft in the coastal city of Djerba, raising eyebrows at a potential Tunisia-Russian alignment. In August of the same year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tunis for the second time in over a year, pledging to help the country grapple with its wheat drought.

Why would Tunisia choose to normalize ties with Israel?

But there is even historical precedent to disrupt this trend.

Historically, Tunisia has tended to align more with the West than with the broader Arab world. However, its geographic location has made it essential to maintain strong relations with neighboring countries, particularly Algeria and Libya. While Tunisia has strategic interests in its ties with Algeria, especially in the areas of energy, trade, and finance, former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali sought to moderate the country’s financial connections to Arab countries and aimed to avoid the kind of reliance on crude oil revenues seen in other Arab states in the region.

Beyond the more apparent economic and trade incentives for Tunisia to normalize relations with Israel, Tunis could also gain from reigniting this closer alignment with the West, particularly as Iran and Russia, with whom it has recently signaled an openness to closer ties, face mounting setbacks that may force them to turn inward. Both Moscow and Tehran have faced major setbacks on the international stage. The former is dealing with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and an exorbitant number of human losses, and the latter is temporarily retreating after receiving a significant blow from Israel during the ongoing regional war between Israel and Iranian proxies. Tunisia is far from being a strategic priority for either power, and these setbacks should worry Tunisia, which might be left on its own to deal with an increasing migration threat from sub-Saharan Africa and an impending economic crisis.  

Another factor that might lead Tunisia to normalize ties with Israel is the potential for hedging between regional powers. Tunisia is particularly susceptible to external influences from countries with greater international stature, particularly when looking at its ongoing relationship with Algeria. Algeria, for its part, has steadily been courting Tunisia by supporting Tunis economically and politically, including a 2022 grant worth 200 million dollars from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to help with the country’s struggling economy, and offering leniency and cheaper prices on electricity and gas from the Transmed pipeline. Tunisia, grappling with high public debt and stagnant growth, and with the economy desperately reeling since the Covid-19 pandemic, has had little choice other than to accept Algeria’s offerings. Algeria’s rationale for influencing Tunisia stems from a need to counter perceived external Western interference—exacerbated by the signing of the Abraham Accords between its regional rival Morocco and Israel—which has heightened its sense of isolation and vulnerability.

Normalizing ties with Israel could allow Tunisia to hedge between regional powers to avoid full alignment with Algeria and maximize its personal gains. It would reduce Tunis’ risk of overdependence on Algeria, and limit the risk of collateral damage should the relationship sour and challenges emerge for Algeria itself.

Israel’s interest

Normalization between Israel and Tunisia could offer Israel several potential advantages. These include contributing to regional stability and peace, expanding international recognition and support, and possibly encouraging other countries to engage more openly with Israel. Additionally, normalization could pave the way for stronger ties in trade, tourism, and investments, especially in the field of agriculture and irrigation. It would also promote Israeli legitimacy in the region, reducing international efforts to isolate it, increasing its international standing, and opening new business opportunities in Arab markets.

From a strategic perspective, improved relations with Tunisia might also help limit Tunisia’s cooperation with countries hostile to Israel, such as Algeria, Libya, and Iran. It could even reduce the potential for renewed activity by terrorist groups operating in or from the region.

That said, many of these benefits are not unique to Tunisia—they reflect the broader advantages Israel could gain from normalizing relations with any additional Arab country.

Threats and pathways to improvement

On the other hand, normalizing with Israel poses a severe threat to Tunisia, which Saied may not be apt to overlook. Firstly, it will inevitably fracture its relationship with Algeria, alienating Tunis’ primary economic backer. Algeria has had no qualms in stressing its disdain for the Abraham Accords, recently reiterating its historic backing of a full Palestinian state, the support of which is enshrined in its constitution. Algeria would certainly take it personally and would do everything in its power to retaliate, including rescinding its economic partnership, nullifying diplomatic ties, and reinstating tighter controls on late payments.

Secondly, Saied will face severe internal backlash. Tunisians have been at the forefront of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the likes of which the country has not witnessed since the 2011 revolution. In a time when Saied is tightening control over the country, he still understands the importance of maintaining public support, and normalizing ties with Israel may pit the population against him, lessening his power and legitimacy.  

While Israel perceives normalization with Tunisia as naturally beneficial, the same cannot be said in reverse, and normalization between the two does not seem feasible as long as the war in Gaza continues.

If the West wished to see normalization between these two countries prevail, it would have to provide Tunis with significant concessions. These could take the form of economic support through International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with fewer austerity measures, or simple economic bailout packages with few strings attached.

However, such a decision carries significant risks, namely the potential erosion of the IMF’s credibility and legitimacy on the international stage. Additionally, the West, particularly the United States, can seek to leverage its ongoing military partnership with Tunisia to retain strategic influence.  This could involve conditioning Tunisian aid to agreements such as the obligation to maintain secrecy over military knowledge and capabilities, especially when dealing with enemies such as Iran. This could restrict Tunisia’s movement while placing greater value on Washington’s ongoing support.

Normalization between Arab countries and Israel is still a top foreign policy agenda for US President Donald Trump’s administration. While Israel’s war rages on in Gaza, Trump has made no secret of his wish to see Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords, a feat which will undoubtedly help him reach his objective of becoming the peacemaker of the century.

While the potential for these two countries to normalize may seem farfetched, there are many strategic benefits for both that go beyond what meets the eye. Analysts may do well to keep an eye out for potential signs of rapprochement, as even small shifts may signal deeper political changes in the region.

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post Beyond the gridlock: The case for Tunisia-Israel normalization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since Assad’s December ousting, Syrians have struggled to sift the truth from fake claims about security incidents across the country and to find accurate information about local and central government decisions.

Under the Assad regime, all official media were state-run, overtly political, and heavily censored. Most Syrians instead relied on Facebook to obtain local news and avoid censorship. But since the regime’s collapse, many Syrians have struggled to keep up with current events, official decrees, and local news. Absent any clear official new channels, most Syrians turned to social media to fill the information void. This reliance on social media has predictably resulted in rampant misinformation and disinformation across the country. The flood of unverified news has been exploited by foreign actors as well, further exacerbating sectarian conflict and fears.

Nowhere is this more impactful than in Syria’s Alawite-majority coast—the minority group to which the Assad family belongs. These communities have, since December 8, relied on social media to both raise awareness of and look for sectarian crimes committed by civilians and security forces affiliated with the new government. But this ecosystem was immediately flooded with false and misleading claims of massacres and international intervention, bolstered by real events and confusing statements by the transitional authorities. All of this fueled panic and confusion even before the March 6 insurgent uprising and Alawite massacres that killed more than 1600 security forces and Sunni and Alawite civilians. Without access to a consistent stream of reliable news, Syrians of all sects have adopted divergent narratives of major security events and struggle to understand the diplomatic positions of foreign countries or assess their own security status in their regions. This uncertainty also extends to all details of the transitional, and now interim, government’s policies and security forces.

Utilizing two weeks of fieldwork across the coast and consistent monitoring and analysis of Syrian social media before and after the fall of the regime, this report provides anecdotal evidence of the issues and effects of the information ecosystem in Syria. This research followed a more loosely structured two weeks of fieldwork in the same areas in mid-February. Through this, three common themes of information sharing have emerged:

1. Social media dominates the information ecosystem, from rumor mills to international misinformation campaigns.
2. Locals and officials have utilized WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages to fill the communication void, but they have still failed to create clear lines of official communication.
3. The media void has fueled fear, hatred, and sparked instability over security uncertainty. Parallel narratives of the current security situation have created further sectarian divisions.

“The biggest problem is Facebook”

In the nearly two decades since Facebook’s creation, the social media platform has evolved into thousands of community, group, and celebrity pages that often compete for followers and daily traffic. Facebook’s algorithms often promote these high-traffic, generic ‘news’ pages over more accurate, smaller-traffic local news pages, flooding Syrians with unverified clickbait-style news.

Facebook has for years been Syria’s dominant social media and news platform, a crucial medium for sharing information about and calling attention to crimes occurring in their communities. Misinformation was widespread from the revolution’s earliest days in 2011, and similar trends were quickly apparent in the chaos of the regime’s collapse.

For example, local Salamiyah community pages quoted a General Security official on May 8, saying, “We urge our fellow citizens to exercise caution and refrain from engaging with any fake accounts or pages and to rely only on the official channels issued by the Ministry of Interior to disseminate security news and information.”

When asked how locals along Syria’s Alawite-majority coast accessed news about their region, the response was a resounding accordance of: “social media.”

Each governorate, village, and even neighborhood has experienced the fall of the regime and developments differently. Local news, perhaps even more so than national news, carries important implications for local safety, access to services, and impacts on daily life. For instance, information about the violence perpetrated by both the insurgents and the pro-government factions on March 6 became vital for survival, but fake claims muddied real events as everyone turned to social media for answers.

For many Alawites, all of these claims were taken together to prove the extent of a “genocide” against them in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. But as the fake claims were disproven, they became evidence for many Sunnis that the real deaths of Alawite civilians and crimes by pro-government forces must have also been faked. As a result, the two communities today have completely separate narratives of that week, and many attempts at interfaith dialogues since have devolved into debates over the basic facts.

One woman in Latakia put it simply: “The biggest problem is Facebook,” she told us.

The media environment in March was a microcosm of how fake news had been used since Assad’s downfall to push divergent realities between the pro and anti-new government communities. But this misinformation goes beyond local initiatives and rumors.

Recent investigations by the BBC, Arabi Post, Verify-Sy, and the German Marshall Fund have also underscored the role of foreign media campaigns backed by Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah to push sectarian narratives and fake news onlinee, including the rumors that Maher al-Assad was returning to the coast with the Russian army at his back, ready to reclaim Syria.

And as real violence against Alawites escalated in Homs in January and February, this disinformation ensured that Alawites in other areas like Latakia and Tartous, which had not seen any considerable violations, remained confused and terrified about their future safety. Promises from pro-Assad Alawite networks of an imminent international intervention by the United States, France, Israel, or the United Nations to either reassert Assad in Damascus or carve out an “Alawite Coastal State” were used to widen support for the growing anti-Damascus insurgent movement, culminating in widespread support or neutrality for the insurgent attacks in March.

A Christian businessman from Safita recalled the Maher rumor, pointing to the Alawite villages surrounding the city: “That night you could hear gunfire from every village here, they all believed he was returning and celebrated.” Other locals told the authors at the time how their Facebook feed had suddenly become full of Alawites threatening revenge on coastal Sunnis for opposing Assad. As a local from a village outside Tartous recalled, when the rumors began, gunshots were heard throughout the Khirbet al-Mazzah region, convincing the local General Security forces that they would soon come under attack. As the confusion threatened to escalate into armed conflict, Alawites in the village sheltered the security forces in their homes until the morning, ensuring the area remained calm.

Struggling official channels of communication

These social media rumors and foreign media campaigns spread fear and confusion across Syria’s minority regions by exploiting both the real sectarian violations and the government’s lack of official news channels. For its part, the new government has made some initial attempts to spread information about municipal news, but still struggles greatly at relaying clear security-related statements or establishing effective two-way communication channels so locals can clarify rumors.

The  Tartous and Latakia Governorate Facebook pages, which were formed in mid-December 2024 and appear to be run by government employees, regularly post updates of meetings and activities conducted across the governorate. Yet these pages have relatively few followers, are overshadowed by much higher traffic privately-run pages, and do not resolve the fears of those who already distrust the government. The majority of people, when asked where they get official government news from, made no mention of such pages, instead relying on word of mouth and their own online networks.

It all leads to one question. As a Christian in Safita asked, “Who represents the government?”

Official communication for security issues is even more opaque.

While there is one official Ministry of Interior page, for example, there are dozens of Facebook pages that claim to represent the General Security Services, with no way to discern any of their affiliations.

Regardless, a single Ministry of Interior page does not address the vast majority of Syrians’ needs: detailed and up-to-date information on security issues. This is not just a problem of clear government communication, but also a lack of two-way communication, allowing locals to check rumors or events witnessed in their towns.

To address this, local officials in the cities of Latakia and Tartous created multiple WhatsApp groups to directly connect their communities to security and administrative officials on security developments.

A business owner in Latakia city who was among the first invited to the group claimed the system “was very useful in the early days of the new administration because of the rise in crime.” Residents will text in reports about robberies or suspicious activity, and security forces will respond in a timelier manner than when using phone lines, which he claimed were always busy. These groups have also become a central means for regional officials to disseminate news.

However, in Tartous, a female activist stated that the WhatsApp groups were almost entirely composed of men and were capped at four hundred people. As she wasn’t included in that limit, she would have to reach out to others to get information from or to the channel. The business owner from Latakia also voiced concerns about the size of the group, saying that some people were clogging the chat with non-security-related comments and would then have to be removed from the group by moderators.

While this approach improves some communication, many criticize this improvised system: “Why is an official decree distributed in a WhatsApp channel?” asks a Sunni activist in Tartous.

Confusion about official policies of the government, such as the settlement process for ex-regime soldiers, rules around civil society, curfews, and checkpoints, has forced many to lie low and wait anxiously for clarity. As a priest in Suqlabiyah stated, locals come to him with questions about what makes a war criminal: “There is confusion about who is going to be detained or killed.”

The rift between realities

In Latakia, some Sunnis who spoke with the authors were unsure what to think about the news of the massacres on the coast. They don’t know or perhaps don’t want to know if civilians were killed. Meanwhile, in Baniyas, many survivors argue that there were no insurgents in the city, but rather it began with a government-sanctioned slaughter. These conflicting realities continue to be fought online, but the Facebook quarrels have real-life consequences.

During the long years of Syria’s civil war, many regions became isolated and rooted in their local realities of struggle. As al-Sharaa’s forces seized the country, many were optimistic, though they knew little of his government in Idlib. However, as the new government settled in and in light of the violence on the coast and elsewhere, the initial hope has faded into distrust and confusion. Those interviewed had more questions than answers about the various security forces and their origins, the factions from the north, life in Idlib under al-Sharaa’s militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the ideology of the current government, and the conditions in nearby governorates.

Officials are deeply aware of this—one security officer in Qadmus told us that “combatting fear is a major issue.”

This uncertainty about the future has heightened sectarianism based on the regime’s careful weaponization of Syria’s demographic makeup. Fear of military checkpoints has further isolated many Alawites, while Facebook rumors about roving foreign fighters and factions committing daily crimes against Alawites have prevented most from engaging with local security officials. Distrust in the government, in hand with their resounding silence on the specifics of the events of March 6, has left Syrians to piece together their own narratives, further separating the country into distinct realities.

Reconstructing the Syrian information ecosystem

Breaking Syria from Facebook’s grasp will not be easy or quick. However, the Syrian authorities and international organizations can take several steps to help begin the process.

First, ensuring that the March 6 Investigation Committee releases an accurate and uncensored report on the events of that week will go a long way towards bridging a trust gap between the Sunni and Alawite narratives, as most Sunnis who denied the deaths of Alawite civilians also told the authors that they would accept whatever conclusion the committee came to.

Second, expanding civil communication networks will help foster more accurate and effective local news systems. This can include both word-of-mouth via civil councils that engage with local officials, as well as local journalists on Facebook. Expanding these systems requires funding support from the international community and clear authorization from Damascus to ensure local civil networks do not face any risk of legal troubles.

Third, expanding official government media channels to include local security announcements, such as curfews, deployments, and patrols, and, importantly, addressing any violations or crimes rumored to have been committed by security forces.

Lastly, international organizations should increase funding for local media outlets, especially those engaged in fact-checking and who demonstrate professional standards in what they share. Helping existing journalists organize into new institutions with websites outside of Facebook will further bolster their credibility and reach.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

The post Sectarianism, social media, and Syria’s information blackhole appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The park is set to be developed with Abu Dhabi-based Miral on Yas Island. It will be Disney’s seventh global resort, its first new resort in over fifteen years, and its most technologically advanced. Positioned within a four-hour flight of one-third of the world’s population, including markets in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the park represents more than a commercial expansion—this is no simple tale of castles, rides, and performances.

As Disney CEO Robert A. Iger noted, the park will be “authentically Disney and distinctly Emirati”.

Disneyland Abu Dhabi is best understood as a strategic milestone in the United Arab Emirates’ soft power playbook: a carefully choreographed effort to rebrand the country’s global image and elevate its influence through culture, education, and international partnerships, rather than through coercive means. The UAE seeks to downplay its reputation as “Little Sparta,” known for throwing its weight around in the region in places like Yemen, where the UAE’s military role is blamed for heightening divisions in that country and prolonging the civil war. It also signals deepening ties with the United States, projecting trust amid shifting regional alliances.

Soft power by design

The concept of “soft power”, coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, refers to a nation’s ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion. It’s about shaping preferences by “winning hearts and minds”. In the twenty-first century, culture, branding, and narrative have become as critical to international influence as military assets or economic might.

The UAE was one of the first Gulf countries to recognize this shift and institutionalize it. In 2017, it launched a national Soft Power Strategy aimed at enhancing the country’s reputation and extending its influence overseas. The strategy outlined a comprehensive approach, leveraging economic success, cultural heritage, humanitarian aid, and a commitment to tolerance to construct an appealing and recognizable national brand.

“Our goal is to engrain the UAE’s position in the world, and in people’s hearts”, explained H.H. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed at the strategy’s unveiling.

Few initiatives embody this strategy as vividly as Disneyland Abu Dhabi.

The UAE’s leadership sees cultural infrastructure not merely as a tourism booster but as a pillar of national soft power. Hosting a Disney park sends a clear message: The UAE is safe, modern, and family-friendly, trusted enough to house one of the world’s most iconic entertainment institutions.

This blending of Disney magic with local Emirati culture speaks to the UAE’s strategic intent to localize Western symbols of culture while showcasing its own heritage. The location is no accident either: Yas Island is already home to big-name theme parks: Warner Bros. World, Ferrari World, and SeaWorld Abu Dhabi.

Beyond oil: A new national brand

Behind the soft power lies a very concrete strategic imperative: economic diversification. Like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE faces a future in which oil revenues alone can no longer sustain national growth. However, it has moved earlier and more decisively in its effort to transition from a hydrocarbon economy to one based on knowledge and services.

Expanding the leisure and tourism sectors is central to that vision. These sectors attract foreign income, create jobs, and strengthen non-oil sectors. The UAE has identified tourism and the creative economy as key pillars for a sustainable future, and Disneyland ticks all those boxes.

These projects also have a domestic dimension as instruments of legitimacy. For the Emirati leadership, ventures like Disneyland help reinforce a social contract at home: the ruling family delivers ever-greater prosperity, pride, and global recognition, and in return, the public acquiesces to their unelected governance.

In that sense, Disneyland is not just an economic asset, but a tool of statecraft.

Building a cultural hub: From Louvre to Disneyland

Over the past decade, the UAE has transformed a once-empty stretch of sand into a “branded entertainment Mecca”. Disneyland Abu Dhabi is the latest addition to a growing portfolio of landmarks that position the country as a global hub for arts, dialogue, and innovation.

The 2017 opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi, the first Louvre outside France, marked a milestone in cultural diplomacy, made possible by Emirati funding and a landmark agreement with Paris. Nearby, the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, set to be the largest of its kind, is under construction, further anchoring Saadiyat Island’s status as a beacon of global art tourism.

The UAE has also positioned itself as a crossroads of religious and cultural dialogue. In 2019, during the country’s “Year of Tolerance”, Abu Dhabi hosted Pope Francis for a historic mass. In 2023, it inaugurated the Abrahamic Family House, a single complex housing a mosque, church, and synagogue. Dubai’s Expo 2020, which drew over twenty-four million visits and brought together 192 countries under the theme “Connecting Minds, Creating the Future”, further reinforced the UAE’s brand as a meeting point of civilizations and ideas.

These projects also carry implicit diplomatic weight. Hosting globally recognized institutions strengthens bilateral relationships and signals strategic alignment. The French government’s support for the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the US presence through NYU Abu Dhabi endorses the Emirati vision and its capacity to serve as a trusted cultural and knowledge partner.

US-Emirati relations: trust and verify

The arrival of Disneyland in Abu Dhabi carries symbolic weight for US-UAE relations. For decades, the UAE has been one of Washington’s closest regional partners, hosting US troops and welcoming major US investments.

Yet the relationship has faced moments of strain. In 2021, former US President Joe Biden’s administration paused a $23 billion arms deal, including F-35 fighter jets, citing concerns about the UAE’s role in Yemen and its growing ties with China, particularly through Huawei’s 5G technology. In response, Emirati officials questioned US reliability and reportedly explored Chinese defense alternatives.

Still, both countries have taken steps to reaffirm trust. In September 2024, Biden designated the UAE a “Major Defense Partner”, a title previously granted only to India. The move signaled renewed strategic alignment and paved the way for closer cooperation on advanced technology and security.

In this context, Disney’s expansion into the Emirates carries significance beyond business. A flagship American brand is staking its future on the UAE as a stable and profitable partner. This is a soft power gesture that strengthens cultural ties and introduces a new generation of visitors to an American-inflected vision of the Gulf. Ultimately, it underscores that enduring alliances are built not only on shared interests but also on shared experiences.

A contest of charisma

Abu Dhabi’s Disney deal doesn’t occur in a vacuum; it’s part of a wider regional race for soft power among the Gulf’s wealthiest monarchies: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

Just as Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project positions the Kingdom as a futuristic Disneyland, Abu Dhabi anchors the UAE’s claim to cultural openness and tourism supremacy.

Qatar has long leveraged its global media platforms, most notably Al Jazeera, alongside its major investments in sports diplomacy, including the landmark 2022 FIFA World Cup, to project a narrative of innovation to global audiences. Saudi Arabia, under the banner of “Vision 2030”, is undergoing a rapid soft power transformation of its own, emphasizing heritage tourism, mega-projects like NEOM and Qiddiya, and the hosting of international cultural and sporting events to reshape its image and diversify its economy.

What sets the UAE apart is the early institutionalization and coherence of its soft power strategy. Qatar’s media strategy often amplifies contentious political narratives and maintains affiliations with radical movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and Saudi Arabia’s reforms are very much ventures in progress. The UAE, on the other hand, has adopted a non-confrontational, globally inclusive narrative. Its soft power posturing is framed around these non-confrontational values: tolerance, intercultural dialogue, and sustainability, making its image more relatable and exportable to international audiences. Crucially, the UAE aims not only to attract attention but to project long-term reliability, a prized trait in an increasingly volatile region.

The results are telling: according to the 2025 Brand Finance index, the UAE ranks 10th globally in soft power, well ahead of Saudi Arabia and Qatar and even surpassing several global powers such as Russia and South Korea. More than mere rivalry, this signals a broader Gulf rebranding trend—one in which soft power is no longer a luxury but a strategic necessity for geopolitical resilience in the post-oil era.

Risks and realities

Of course, not everything is enchanted.

Theme parks in the Gulf have historically underperformed financially, and Disneyland’s presence won’t erase expected concerns over labor conditions in the UAE, particularly with regard to migrant workers, who make up 88 percent of the country’s population. Critics may accuse Disney of whitewashing this reality, echoing similar debates about its operations in China.

But soft power doesn’t require perfection; it requires attraction, and few countries have embraced this insight as effectively as the UAE.

Whether this strategy will yield enduring geopolitical “happily ever afters” remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: in a region often defined by hard power rivalries, Abu Dhabi has chosen to compete through visibility, credibility, and imagination.

And who better than Mickey Mouse to help carry that message?

Amit Yarom is an incoming graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a foreign policy expert and researcher, specializing in the Arabian Gulf.

The post Mickey goes to the Gulf: The UAE’s wish upon a soft power star appeared first on Atlantic Council.

And since the collapse of the January 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, Jordanian officials like King Abdullah II and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi have issued several inflammatory comments about Israel and rejected suggestions to relocate Palestinians from Gaza to neighboring countries.  

Yet, on a military and intelligence level, cooperation continues to thrive. In April 2024, Jordan, in coordination with the United States, assisted in the downing of many of the more than three hundred missiles and drones that Iran and its proxies launched at targets in Israel. French Rafale fighter jets also intercepted some of those weapons at Amman’s request. This support came amid reports from an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked news agency that Iran had threatened Jordan that it would become a target if it cooperated with Israel again. 

Two months later, Jordan—along with officials from Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—met in Manama with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff General Hertzi Halevi and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Erik Kurilla to discuss regional security cooperation. Israeli and Jordanian officials have continued to meet secretly to discuss shared security concerns, including the fallout of the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Israel’s ensuing military campaign there.  

Continued imperative for cooperation 

Amman has calculated that diplomatic moves such as withdrawing from the water-for-energy deal will help to appease its population—more than 50 percent of which identifies as Palestinian—without fundamentally altering Jordan’s longstanding security arrangement with Israel.  

Israel-Jordan relations long predate the signing of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in 1994, but the dynamic has especially evolved in the years since that normalization. That includes intelligence sharing, security assistance, and even some weapon deliveries—like Israel’s 2015 transfer to Jordan of sixteen decommissioned AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, aimed at bolstering the Kingdom’s capacity to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) and other insurgents from neighboring Iraq and Syria. The relationship also has benefits outside of the military and security realm, with Israel giving Jordan access to more than one hundred million cubic meters of water per year and a substantial amount of natural gas. Additionally, Jordan’s cooperation is viewed as a critical motivator for the United States to provide the small Arab country with $1.45 billion annually in aid.  

At the same time, Jordan’s relationship with Israel is crucial in its efforts to curb rising Iranian influence in the country, which has been escalating over the past year and a half. Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen have repeatedly violated Jordanian airspace to launch drone attacks on Israel, and there have been several instances of US and Jordanian authorities thwarting Iranian attempts to smuggle arms into the country. Those weapons shipments have included Claymore mines, C4 and Semtex explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, and 107mm Katyusha rockets, with at least some of them destined for the West Bank, according to reports from Jordanian sources.

The frequent gun and drug smuggling has become such a concern for the Israeli government that in May, it approved a five-year $1.4 billion plan to secure the border with Jordan that would include increased IDF presence in the area, and a 425-kilometer high-tech border fence that would run from Hamat Gader in Israel’s north to the Samar Sands, north of Eilat. In Israel’s official statement about the plan, they cited that it comes in response to the heightened number of infiltrations and weapons smuggling from the border.  

The issue of Iranian presence in Jordan could soon balloon. Tehran could see the Jordanian government’s recent decision to declare the Muslim Brotherhood—and even the promotion of its ideology—illegal as a prime opportunity to expand its foothold in the country and possibly offset some of its losses from the decimation of Hamas’ military capabilities and leadership, the elimination of top Hezbollah military and political leaders, including longtime Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria. Even prior to the decision, reports indicated that Iran was trying to recruit young, radicalized members of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood. This was evidenced in May 2024 by Jordanian authorities foiling a plot to smuggle weapons from Iran-backed militias in Syria to a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood for use in undisclosed acts of sabotage and a statement in April 2024 made by the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah that the group intends to supply twelve thousand Jordanians with rockets and explosives to fight against Israel. 

Even with all these threats, Jordanian leadership recognizes that widespread domestic unrest over Amman being seen as too supportive of Israel could ignite existing discontent over the struggling Jordanian economy and several unpopular socio-economic policies, potentially leading to an uprising. Fears of such an outcome are particularly raw, given accusations in 2021 that King Abdullah II’s younger brother, popular former Crown Prince Hamzah bin Hussein, was involved in a potential effort to overthrow the government.

The King knows that he must balance the important security and economic support he receives from Jerusalem with mounting domestic pressure to sever relations. However, maintaining this partnership will only get more difficult if the war in Gaza drags on and potentially escalates, which seems likely after Israel’s security cabinet approved a new comprehensive plan on May 5th to intensify its offensive against Hamas and occupy Gaza.  

Policy recommendations 

To preserve and even deepen the Israeli-Jordanian partnership in this volatile context, both sides should pursue cooperation that is largely out of the public eye but still provides strategic value.  

For example, while Jordan waits for its long-requested Patriot missile batteries from the United States, Israel could quietly augment Jordanian air defenses by deploying an Iron Dome or even an Arrow 3 system near the Israel-Jordan border. The move would provide critical coverage from Iranian-backed drone and missile threats over joint Israel-Jordan airspace while also avoiding triggering the domestic backlash that would come with these systems being deployed within Jordanian territory.

Second, both countries should formalize intelligence coordination in areas of counter-smuggling, cyber defense, and early-warning capabilities. Such cooperation could mean establishing joint intelligence cells or data-sharing platforms where Israeli, Jordanian, and American officials can share information and insights in real time, allowing them to better anticipate and respond to security threats.

Third, both countries should build on Jordan’s role in the existing Israel-Gulf land bridge, a land route between the Gulf and Israel’s seaports meant to allow for exporting goods from Asia to Europe via Israel, by expanding infrastructure and regulatory coordination. To reduce the blowback from such projects, which are inherently more visible and politically sensitive, they should be integrated into broader multilateral initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or a regional railway network. These projects could significantly strengthen Jordan’s struggling economy, which would in turn help the government manage mounting domestic pressure and increase the durability of its partnerships in the region.  

Finally, Israel and Jordan could work to revive the Israel-Jordan-UAE water-for-energy deal by involving other parties like the European Union, United Nations, or World Bank. Involving multilateral actors could help dilute the public perception of direct Israeli involvement, thereby easing domestic political sensitivities in Amman and increasing the deal’s viability. These steps would not only enhance regional stability and strengthen the existing Israel-Jordan relationship but also help King Abdullah II navigate mounting domestic unrest, economic strain, and regional security threats in an increasingly volatile Middle East. 

Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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The May 12 assassination of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, prominent leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), triggered large-scale urban confrontations between rival armed factions, but this came as no surprise. The escalation occurred against the backdrop of powerful semi-state armed factions, duplicated executive and legislative institutions alive long past their mandate, an absent judiciary, a nationwide economic crisis, and pervasive corruption. Coalitions formed on the basis of affiliations to the Government of National Unity (GNU) on one side, and Special Deterrence Force (SDF) on the other, drew in militants from Tripoli and beyond, bringing to light grievances and mistrust accumulated over years of fluid, ever-changing, short-term security arrangements and international neglect.

Indeed, the notion that the dual status quo could endure since the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement between the military factions of the then-Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Benghazi-based Libyan Arab Armed Forces of Khalifa Haftar, with its multiplied leaders unchecked, can no longer hold in public discourse.

Countrywide divisions are also resurfacing as Tripoli grapples with its own, with chaos in Libya’s capital creating an ideal battleground for those seeking to achieve nationwide domination through military means.

Beyond the ballot box

Currently envisaged solutions to Libya’s crisis feel like a band-aid on a gunshot wound. Crisis appears to be brewing as tensions deepen and fears mount of further violent escalation in urban areas. The United Nations and the Presidency Council launched a truce committee to negotiate a local ceasefire and interim security arrangements in Tripoli, whose influence over peace enforcement in practice is, however, limited at best. At the same time, the House of Representatives, whose members were last elected in 2014 and have long overstayed their mandate, seized the opportunity of undermining the also-entrenched GNU and launched its own process for forming yet another executive.

The international push for elections in 2021 was seen as the most promising avenue towards stability. However, as the ballot box was never opened, the profound depth of Libya’s legitimacy crisis across all existing executive and legislative institutions perdures today. Indeed, no single individual or institution in Libya would be able to meaningfully bring the country to elections without due process and international backing. What’s more, any attempt at the implementation of new political arrangements amid the current escalation risks resulting in more violence, including towards civilians. Peace enforcement, therefore, rises to the front as the utmost imperative for the international community in the short term, while paving the way for a complete political overhaul in the medium term.

While it’s clear that an international agreement is needed to support Libyans in reversing current negative trends and overall escalation, no single external actor can be a viable mediator without multilateral backing. While in other contexts, the United Nations could consider deploying an international peacekeeping mission, permanent members’ interests at the Security Council amid changing Mediterranean geopolitics would likely lead to a deadlock and the use of veto power(s) for such an initiative. A way out of the current institutional blockage—Libyan and multilateral—must therefore rely on other pathways to multilateral cooperation.

With the United Nations gridlocked and unilateral interventions only deepening Libya’s divides, the question of who, if anyone, could credibly enforce peace looms large. Egypt, despite its strategic clout and dual membership in the African Union and League of Arab States, is too closely aligned with eastern factions to lead. Turkey is disqualified on similar grounds, its deep entrenchment in Tripoli rendering it a partisan actor, despite recent meetings suggesting a possible rapprochement with Eastern factions. While symbolically inclusive, the Union for the Mediterranean lacks both Libya’s full participation and any enforcement teeth. The European Union, though equipped with resources, remains hamstrung by internal divisions and a migration-centric agenda. Meanwhile, the Security Working Group—gathering key Western and regional actors—has political weight but no mandate. As Libya’s instability never stays within its borders, its African and European neighbors remain most exposed to renewed spillovers, while none of the major external backers, from Russia to Turkey, ultimately benefit from continued escalation.

Breaking the stalemate

This begs the question: What might peace enforcement look like in Libya’s current politico-security landscape? The question is complex, given the internationalized nature of interest-based politics hampering Libya’s stability.

Given these limitations, few paths can be deemed viable for the weeks ahead. For the proponents of traditional multilateral approaches to peacebuilding, the most viable path forward may lie in a time-bound African Union-led initiative, co-endorsed by the League of Arab States, and supported by a coordinated diplomatic and operational role for the European Union and Egypt. The Security Working Group could serve as the core forum where such a framework is negotiated and designed, leveraging its existing membership and political clout. A hybrid mechanism of this kind, though likely to require extensive negotiations in its inception, could prove successful in beginning to reverse escalation and lay the groundwork for a more durable political—and peace—process.

For the proponents of rapid bilateral solutions, another path could be relying on a smaller coalition of involved States to intervene with the goal of keeping peace. A riskier but faster-to-deploy setup could for instance involve the likes of Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and a southern European State—one that is agreeable to the United States—in an interim entente of influence over Libyan stakeholders (and spoilers), each deterring them from further escalation until a new political process takes form.

While constraints faced may hamper its effectiveness, the United Nations and its support mission must remain central in any process, as the holders of Libya’s peace negotiations and guarantors of international legitimacy. Indeed, while both paths proposed may help break the current stalemate (albeit with different risk levels), they must be designed as a bridge, not an alternative, to a reinvigorated UN-led political track. Given the financial strain the UN system has faced in recent months, the proposed interim models could offer a much-needed breathing space to reassess, alongside key partners, the trajectory and structure of the process ahead.

Ultimately, Libyans must define the terms of their political future, which will require more than elections alone. With all major political institutions mired in crisis, a renewed approach could involve sequencing parliamentary elections first, under a model in which executive authority is shaped by parliamentary legitimacy. A technocratic, legitimacy-grounded constitution-writing process could then follow. Crucially, a new oversight phase must be introduced—one that is multilateral, time-bound, and rooted in local ownership—to shield the process from spoilers, prevent backroom power grabs, and guarantee that implementation matches intent. Only then can a political transition begin to gain the resilience Libya so urgently needs.

Karim Mezran is a Resident Senior Fellow and director of the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Roberta Maggi is an Associate Fellow at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO).

The post Beyond ceasefires: Reimagining stability and engagement in Libya appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He added, “the Golden Age of the Middle East can proceed right alongside of us.”

With vast sovereign wealth funds and fast centralized leadership for quick decision-making, the Gulf—primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—has become the most attractive foreign partners for the US president.

Trump’s 2025 visit follows a familiar pattern compared to his first term, where he also began his first major diplomatic visit in Riyadh. But this time, the trip’s reach and scope expanded to much broader horizons. Unlike his first Gulf trip in 2017, where the majority of the deals focused on defense, this visit signaled a realignment centered on tech-forward partnerships and putting the Gulf at the core of a new kind of relationship driven by economic return and shared strategic concerns (preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and countering its regional influence, preserving regional stability, and securing energy markets and maritime routes, among others).

The trip also reflects a more intentional US pivot to the Gulf, especially given the key role the region can play in the technological world, the next battlefront between the United States and China. In the president’s global hierarchy, the Gulf is the new business frontier.

This pivot by the US president, in lieu of anchoring US strategy in traditional alliances such as the United Kingdom or Israel, suggests a new alignment with resource-rich, stable partners who can offer transactional stability in governance and significant return on investments.

This US “Golden Age” for the Gulf is one rooted in strategic utility, equal footing, high-stakes deals, and fewer strings. This Trump doctrine focuses more on regional return-on-investment and less on democratization. This resonates more with Gulf leaders’ preferences and acknowledges their agency as architects for the region’s future, not just clients.

Paired with the optics and symbolism of skipping Israel, Trump’s approach could signal a more pragmatic regional posturing that no longer places Israel at the center of Washington’s regional relations when it doesn’t serve US interests. Gulf capitals no longer serve as bases to project US power, but as strategic anchors in Washington’s foreign policy goals.

Tech-forward trade at the frontline of US-China competition

The visit’s focus on technology deals, contrasted against the defense focus of Trump’s 2017 trip, demonstrates this evolving US-Gulf dynamic and Washington’s increased effort to combat Beijing’s economic and trade encroachment in the region.

The US is rapidly adjusting to the post-unipolar world where China gains more influence, and competition for markets and strategic alliances is at full speed. Over the past few years, China has evolved from a technology importer into a global digital power, with state-backed tech giants such as Huawei, ZTE, and Alibaba Cloud rapidly expanding their digital footprint across the Gulf—including in critical infrastructure such as 5G networks and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled surveillance systems. Via its “Digital Silk Road” initiative, Beijing has offered Gulf countries technological solutions at the scale, speed, and turnkey financing they need.

China’s rapid advance in the Gulf reflects its broader ambitions to shape regional tech norms and digital governance frameworks. The embedding of Chinese platforms and systems into Gulf digital infrastructure poses long-term security challenges to further cooperation with the United States.

If Washington wants to compete with Beijing on emerging technologies, it is right to realign its Gulf strategy. The region is prioritizing its own artificial intelligence ambitions with its post-oil development agenda, and would be among the first to experience Washington’s burgeoning tech diplomacy and competition with Beijing.

Gulf leaders, for their part, will need to decide how to move forward with this upgraded partnership with Washington vis-à-vis China. They are likely to continue hedging to get the best deals from both countries.

Qatar’s positioning from major non-NATO ally to strategic partner?

Trump’s stop in Qatar—the first state visit by a US president to Doha—was an important recognition of the tiny Gulf country’s strategic positioning as a bridge across regional ideological divides, for example, when dealing with the Taliban. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also strategic partners in the region, and US presidents have visited them on multiple occasions, the visit to Doha marked a turning point in how the United States sees and engages Qatar.

The visit also highlighted the tiny country’s efforts to elevate its profile by gifting a Boeing 747 intended for the Air Force One fleet—a made-for-headlines move that underscored Qatar’s desire to make waves.”

Trump’s Doha stop indeed facilitated the signing of significant deals, such as Qatar Airways’ purchase of 210 wide-body jets from Boeing aircraft, valued at approximately $96 billion—the largest in the company’s history, and defense agreements totaling nearly three billion dollars. The purchase lifted Boeing out of a significant crisis—not only helping one of the most iconic US manufacturers, but also reinforcing the administration’s narrative that its foreign deals can directly support US jobs and industries while keeping American-made aircraft competitive in the global stage.  

Qatar’s decision to invest an additional ten billion dollars in Al Udeid, the largest US military hub in the Middle East, announced during Trump’s visit underscores the base’s strategic value to Qatar’s security and highlights it as a US ally that shares the burden of regional security with Washington—unlike other US partners, like in Europe, that Trump has accused of being defense free-riders.

The view from the Gulf

Regional analysts and the media have largely framed Trump’s visit as a reset to US foreign policy in the Middle East and a redefinition of regional leadership—one increasingly directed from Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi.

Badr al-Saif, an assistant professor of history at Kuwait University, argues that the region welcomes the current shift away from legacy alignments with the Gulf.

 “To those in the Gulf who thought that the only way to America was through Israel, now we see an opening where we can go directly to the States,” he told The Wall Street Journal.

Mohammed Baharoon, Director General of the Dubai-based think tank B’huth, adds, “Trump sees in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) what China, India, and others are seeing there, which is its role as a mega connector.”

Hasan Alhasan of the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes that the Gulf states “have managed to use their role as mediators to position themselves as indispensable partners for Trump’s political agenda.”

The message coming out of the region seems to be consistent: the Gulf is no longer a side player—it is now helping set and lead the agenda in the Middle East. This is also a reflection that most Gulf states want to shape regional and global dynamics (via sovereign wealth fund diplomacy, for example), seeing themselves as independent middle powers capable of carrying out complex diplomatic initiatives with full ownership, after decades of having external powers shape their geopolitical dynamics and mostly being hubs of power projection and support.

Is “America’s Golden Age” Gulf-aligned?

Given their strategic geography, significant financial resources, relatively permissive regulatory environments, and massive energy surpluses, Gulf states are likely to continue leading the way in becoming hubs for AI and emerging technologies. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, for example, are just a six to eight-hour flight from 80 percent of the world population, with over 170 million passengers each year transiting through their capitals.

The Gulf’s ability to deploy capital is poised to be a key in powering US AI infrastructure as energy demand is set to surge, and the Trump administration’s prioritization of the US-Gulf partnership should be commended.

The Trump administration is clearly signaling that it is not bound to traditional alliances. In this new world, Gulf states are emerging as key economic and political players in the region and internationally, vital to technology development as well as the US-China rivalry. Against this emerging backdrop, Washington has positioned itself accordingly.

Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, where he manages the China-Middle East and the US-Gulf security cooperation portfolios. 

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At first glance, the ongoing Israeli intervention in Syria appears fundamentally different from Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israel’s Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982 was fundamentally reactive, while its stated motives today in Syria are largely preventative.

Yet, beneath the surface, the parallels are striking and warrant careful consideration to anticipate the long-term implications of Israel’s latest regional military venture. Reflecting upon Israel’s 1982 military venture in Lebanon offers essential insights for shaping its current strategy in Syria. Indeed, Israeli policymakers must reconsider their current path, shifting from a purely military-centric approach toward a more nuanced strategy combining diplomatic foresight, restraint, and targeted political engagement.

Preventive versus reactive war

Israel launched its 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon in response to escalating rocket and guerrilla attacks by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) against Israeli territory. This direct threat provided Israel a clear justification for military action, aiming explicitly to disrupt and dismantle the operational bases from which the PLO was attacking.

In Syria today, no factions have recently launched cross-border attacks against Israel, nor have local military actors significantly threatened Israeli territory from Syrian soil. Yet Netanyahu’s administration justifies its ongoing campaign by highlighting the risk posed by abandoned military assets left by Bashar al-Assad’s collapsed regime, arsenals potentially accessible to the current Syrian caretaker government led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Thus, the strategic calculus behind Israel’s intervention aims to eliminate perceived future threats, project military strength, and proactively establish strategic depth.

The acquisition and control of strategic territorial assets represent another similarity between Israel’s past actions in Lebanon and its current operations in Syria, and the distinction between a preventive versus a reactive strategic calculus is blurred. In 1982, Israel sought control of key military and geographic assets such as Beaufort Castle, from where rocket attacks were previously launched, and the Litani River, a natural boundary enhancing its defensive position. Israel intended to create a buffer zone to insulate its northern territory from future aggression, ultimately holding southern Lebanon for nearly eighteen years before withdrawing under sustained pressure from Hezbollah.

Similarly, today, Israel is asserting its dominance over the demilitarized zones established under the 1974 ceasefire agreement and over the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, critical for its strategic oversight of Damascus. This high terrain offers invaluable surveillance advantages, enabling early detection of threats deep within Syrian territory. Given this strategic value, it is difficult to imagine Israel relinquishing control over such a significant asset without immense international or domestic pressures, a scenario reminiscent of southern Lebanon.

Yet, substantial differences exist between the operations, notably regarding military engagement. Israel’s 1982 invasion was primarily ground-based, characterized by intense urban warfare and heavy casualties, with 670 Israeli soldiers lost. Israel today enjoys unrivaled air superiority over Syrian airspace. This advantage allows the Israeli Air Force to neutralize any targets swiftly and precisely, avoiding direct engagement and minimizing casualties. Consequently, Israel currently operates with considerable strategic flexibility, unpressured by immediate military confrontation.

However, it is essential to note that Israel’s deliberate containment of its military engagement reflects a calculated choice rather than necessity. It currently faces no pressing ground threats within Syria that could justify escalation. This approach explains Israel’s adamant opposition to any significant redeployment of Syrian military forces or allied militias in Daraa, Suweida, and Quneitra. Any significant shift on the ground could force Israel into a more direct, costly ground campaign, fundamentally altering its military doctrine in Syria.

The challenge of allies and local dynamics

A critical dimension of Israel’s military intervention in Lebanon in the eighties was its alignment with local factions—namely, its support of Maronite Christians. This was exemplified by its backing of Bashir Gemayel’s presidential bid and the creation of proxy militias, such as the South Lebanon Army (SLA). However, Lebanon’s fragmented sectarian environment proved to be significantly more intricate than initially anticipated. The assassination of Bashir Gemayel highlighted the inherent risks and unintended consequences associated with Israel’s local alliances in adversary environments and serves as a cautionary example of the potential pitfalls Israel faces when pursuing similar alignments in Syria. Israel has engaged with the Druze community in southwestern Syria, aiming to establish a strategic buffer against potential threats. Yet, this policy has inadvertently heightened the vulnerability of the Druze community and notably contributed to perceptions of the group as a national adversary.

By contrast, Syria’s sectarian dynamics are more nuanced and resistant to such simplification. Although sectarian identities remain influential, the fragmentation and internal complexities within communities such as the Druze and Sunni populations complicate Israel’s attempts at forming reliable proxy relationships. While the Druze community of southern Syria, for example, is central to Israel’s declared narrative of protecting minorities, deep internal divisions render any potential alignment with Israel highly controversial and internally divisive.

Unlike in Lebanon, where Palestinians constituted an external and universally opposed actor within specific communities, Israel’s supposed adversaries in Syria represent indigenous social forces deeply embedded in the country’s fabric. Therefore, any sectarian or communal proxy strategy risks amplifying internal Syrian tensions without providing Israel a stable, long-term security advantage.

Another central feature of Israel’s 1982 Lebanon invasion was the clearly defined regional rivalry with Syria, which at the time acted as the primary regional opponent supporting Lebanese factions hostile to Israel. Syrian influence, bolstered indirectly by Iranian and Soviet backing, significantly impacted Israel’s strategic calculations, turning southern Lebanon into a complex geopolitical battleground.

Simultaneously, Iran’s role in post-Assad Syria today, although diminished, remains an essential factor to consider. Israel and Iran, despite deep-seated antagonism, paradoxically share an interest in preventing the consolidation of a centralized, Islamist-led government in Damascus. For Israel, the fear revolves around a potential “October 7” scenario, while for Iran, the objective is to maintain enough influence through instability to prevent a complete regional realignment toward Sunni-majority states such as Turkey and the Gulf. This overlapping interest inadvertently risks reviving Iranian influence in a chaotic, fragmented Syrian landscape, repeating precisely the scenario Israel aims to avoid.

The Turkey factor

While the direct Iranian military threat in Syria has significantly receded post-Assad, a new and perhaps more formidable actor has emerged, Turkey.

Unlike Syria’s indirect and often proxy-driven engagement in Lebanon, Turkey possesses advanced NATO-standard military capabilities, political sophistication, and clear strategic objectives aiming at regional leadership rather than mere disruption.

Crucially, Turkey’s policy contrasts sharply with the role Syria historically played in Lebanon. Syria aimed to weaken the Lebanese central authority, foster fragmentation, and exert dominance through local proxies. Turkey, conversely, has consistently supported efforts toward state centralization and governance restoration in post-Assad Syria, irrespective of the ruling faction. Ankara’s involvement focuses not on fostering factionalism but rather on strengthening the institutional and territorial integrity of the Syrian state, seeking stability rather than chaos. This difference significantly reshapes Israel’s strategic landscape.

Nevertheless, despite aiming to seek stability, the Turkish approach still presents complex geopolitical challenges for Israel. Ankara’s increased presence and potential influence in southern Syria could gradually complicate Israel’s air operations or limit its freedom of maneuver. Yet, notably, Turkey has so far avoided direct confrontation or escalation with Israel, favoring cautious diplomacy. This signals that while Israel must manage its military intervention carefully, Ankara’s current policy posture suggests that Turkish-Israeli relations will remain tense yet controlled, characterized more by rivalry than open conflict.

Long-term implications and historical lessons

First and foremost, Israel should approach its involvement in southern Syria with extreme caution regarding any form of prolonged military presence. History has shown repeatedly that indefinite occupation, even if initially limited, creates conditions ripe for resentment, insurgency, and protracted instability.

Despite the undeniable short-term military and intelligence advantages gained from occupying strategic territories, the Israeli presence risks gradually transforming from a stabilizing factor into a source of enduring hostility. This scenario mirrors precisely the Israeli experience in southern Lebanon, where the extended occupation cultivated resentment among the local population, ultimately empowering militant factions such as Hezbollah, who capitalized on Israel’s strategic vulnerabilities.

Indeed, Israel’s long-term security interests are better served by allowing the establishment of a stable government in Syria, even if led by factions or entities ideologically distinct from its traditional preferences. The emergence of coherent, accountable authorities capable of providing basic governance and security is paramount to preventing the re-emergence of violent extremism and cross-border threats. Although politically challenging, Israel must acknowledge that sustained stability and security along its northern frontier hinge significantly on Syria’s internal coherence rather than on Israeli military dominance alone. This shift requires a pragmatic willingness to tolerate credible governance frameworks in Syria that can effectively secure territory and limit extremist influence. Israel should militarily disengage and instead work through diplomatic initiatives and a credible peace-making process.

Moreover, effective stabilization in Syria demands comprehensive diplomatic coordination with regional and international stakeholders—primarily Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United States, and European allies. Historically, Israel has often preferred unilateral action or limited coordination, believing it more directly serves its immediate security concerns. However, this narrow approach risks isolating Israel diplomatically and escalating unintended regional tensions. A cooperative regional diplomatic strategy can create a favorable geopolitical environment and align regional stakeholders behind common objectives of stability.

Such a strategy could involve Israel engaging discreetly with regional counterparts through informal track II diplomacy dialogues mediated by neutral third parties, notably leveraging its strategic relationship with the United States. Despite existing geopolitical competition, engaging proactively with Turkey is especially critical given Ankara’s growing regional influence and significant military capabilities. Specifically, Israel could initiate security-focused talks with Turkey through US-brokered dialogues to manage mutual security concerns, establish protocols to prevent unintended military escalations, and explore shared interests in limiting Iranian influence and extremist threats.

Another crucial dimension of Israel’s strategic recalibration involves carefully managing Syria’s sectarian and communal landscape. Israel must avoid the temptation to exploit sectarian divisions, as these efforts invariably foster internal conflicts and deepen societal fragmentation. Attempts to manipulate these internal divisions may provide short-term tactical advantages but will likely yield adverse long-term consequences, undermining regional security and stability. Instead, Israeli policymakers should adopt a policy of cautious neutrality toward sectarian dynamics rather than fueling further communal polarization.

Finally, Israel must grapple proactively with the underlying geopolitical threat of a potential Iranian resurgence within Syria, particularly in scenarios characterized by chronic instability. The historical experience in Lebanon vividly illustrates how a perceived power vacuum, often exacerbated by military intervention, can be skillfully exploited by external actors like Iran. Therefore, Israel’s strategic posture must include diplomatic initiatives to reduce the conditions that could enable Iranian influence to grow indirectly in Syria.

Direct military deterrence against Iranian proxies is necessary but insufficient. Instead, Israel could support multilateral frameworks involving the United States, Europe, and Arab states to negotiate mechanisms that restrict the flow of funds and arms to Iranian-backed militias in Syria. Additionally, Israel could advocate for targeted international sanctions explicitly aimed at Iranian entities involved in destabilizing activities within Syria, rather than broader sanctions affecting civilians. Such policies would help curtail Iran’s regional influence without exacerbating humanitarian crises or fueling further instability.

Ultimately, Israeli policymakers face a critical strategic choice in Syria, informed by historical lessons from Lebanon’s troubled legacy. Reliance primarily on military solutions has historically produced limited and often counterproductive results. Conversely, a strategy that incorporates comprehensive diplomatic engagement and nuanced political maneuvering has far greater potential for establishing lasting stability and enhancing Israel’s long-term security interests. Israel now stands at a pivotal juncture, either repeating past strategic missteps or boldly charting a more measured course.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. 

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President Donald Trump this month announced a halt to US airstrikes against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, claiming the group “capitulated” and would cease targeting American vessels and Red Sea traffic.      

But a Washington victory lap now, after more than fifty straight days of preemptive military force against the Iran-backed terror group, would be premature. After all, no ceasefire is born of a political vacuum. Senior Iranian officials who were involved in the Omani-mediated ceasefire swayed the Houthis to cease attacking US assets, revealing Tehran’s continued command and control over its proxy’s strategic decisions rather than any genuine Houthi concession.

While presented as a US-Houthi agreement, the ceasefire is consistent with a well-established pattern by Iran: directing proxies to dial violence up or down as strategic circumstances demand, all while benefiting from the perception of these groups being autonomous, as long seen in the cases of  Lebanese Hezbollah or Shiite militias in Iraq. This duplicitous approach, extending a diplomatic handshake while concealing the knife of proxy warfare, is precisely how Iran extends its influence beyond its actual capabilities.

Over the past decade, Iran has become the Houthis’ most important foreign backer, providing them with missiles, drones, and other military-grade components. Additionally, Tehran aides Houthi sanctions-busting and illicit revenue generation efforts. Through the Houthis, Iran has put state-level military capabilities into the hands of a non-state actor in Yemen.

However, Washington’s relentless airstrikes have decimated Houthi military infrastructure since launching in March, targeting missile depots, command nodes, and radar systems on a scale not seen in Yemen since the early days of Saudi Arabia’s 2015 intervention. US officials say their forces have struck over a thousand targets in just seven weeks.

Tehran is buying time

For the Islamic Republic, preserving assets and living to fight another day is something of an art form. Tehran is cognizant of growing vulnerabilities at home and abroad, and is offering tactical concessions to create the impression of a “win” for its adversaries, particularly in Trump’s Washington. For instance, during the Vienna nuclear talks, Iranian officials repeatedly stated they had shown “tactical flexibility on technical points” while maintaining “core red lines.” Iran’s foreign minister insisted that the country’s strategic objectives remained intact. This pattern mirrors Iran’s behavior during the 2015 nuclear deal, where it accepted temporary limits on its nuclear program but refused to negotiate over its ballistic missile arsenal or regional proxy networks. This approach allows Tehran to benefit from diplomatic engagement, even short-term ceasefires, without altering its core security objectives.

Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi officially announced the US-Houthi agreement as a means to ensure “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia immediately welcomed the truce as a step toward “a comprehensive political solution to the Yemeni crisis” that could ensure “security and stability for Yemen and the wider region.”

But behind Riyadh’s endorsement lies war fatigue against an Iranian proxy, and the challenge of navigating often-conflicting US-Middle East policy priorities across four presidential administrations. After nearly a decade of Houthi conflict and no meaningful military victory, Saudi Arabia moved from contestation to containment. In 2023, it even restored diplomatic ties with the Houthis’ patron, the Islamic Republic, signaling a broader strategic retreat. Therefore, what began in 2015 as a campaign to dislodge and disarm the Houthis has ended with quiet disengagement and a more potent Houthi threat on the Kingdom’s doorstep. Iran, meanwhile, pursued a strategy of endurance rather than dominance, arming and advising its proxies at low cost while watching Saudi Arabia bleed resources and legitimacy. Each year the conflict dragged on, Tehran’s model of indirect warfare gained ground. Tehran, therefore, never really needed to win; it just needed to outlast Riyadh.

Critically, the new Omani-mediated ceasefire’s timing aligns perfectly with another Omani diplomatic endeavor in the region: indirect nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States. According to sources cited by CNN, the Houthi ceasefire “aimed at building momentum for nuclear deal talks with Iran.”

By being the driving force behind the Houthi ceasefire, Tehran can frame its regional weakness as goodwill, thereby strengthening its case for something in return. This tactic is not new. In 2022, as former US President Joe Biden’s administration pursued renewed nuclear talks, rocket and drone attacks on US assets in Iraq dropped sharply. Biden cited the lull as evidence of regional stability, even as senior Iranian officials, including IRGC commander Esmail Qaani, made repeated visits to Iraq to manage militia activity and shape political outcomes. The timing suggests Tehran used a tactical pause in proxy activity to support its diplomatic goals, without altering its core posture.

This calculated diplomatic maneuver also seemingly comes in response to the Trump administration’s escalating maximum pressure campaign. This month, the US president demanded an immediate end to “all purchases of Iranian oil, or petrochemical products,” and later, he sanctioned an independent refinery in China processing Iranian crude oil. Trump has recently insisted on “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, a position bolstered by his hawkish fellow Republicans in the US Congress. 

Beyond using the ceasefire to generate leverage, Tehran faces the more immediate priority of preventing the collapse of its Houthi proxy. The Houthi insurgency in Yemen, including the 2015 takeover of the capital Sana’a, provided Iran a low-cost opportunity to deepen its footprint in the Arabian Peninsula, offset its regional rival Saudi Arabia, and expand the scope of maritime harassment from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

This diplomatic intervention follows Iran’s established approach in Lebanon in 2024, where it sought a ceasefire for Hezbollah when Israel’s military campaign imposed defeat after defeat on the Iran-backed terror group. With Hamas flattened in Gaza, much of Hezbollah’s leadership crippled, and the loss of Iran’s sole state partner in the Middle East with Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria, Tehran cannot afford to lose another leg of its so-called “Axis of Resistance.”

Israel: The deliberate exception

While the Houthis ostensibly negotiated directly with the United States through Omani intermediaries to get a reprieve from the relentless strikes, Tehran’s fingerprints are evident in the selective scope of the agreement. The ceasefire specifically excludes Israel, with the Houthis’ chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, explicitly stating that it “does not address operations against Israel in any way.” This surgical separation of US     and Israeli security aligns perfectly with Iran’s regional strategy of isolating Israel while reducing direct pressure on its proxy network, but also with the Houthis’ own narrative of resistance, in which attacks on Israel serve a distinct ideological and symbolic purpose.

This carve-out proved especially useful in mid-May when they issued direct threats against the Israeli port city of Haifa, maintaining pressure on Israel while staying technically within the bounds of their agreement with Washington. Such targeted provocations highlight the fundamental problem with partial regional ceasefires—they merely redirect rather than resolve hostilities, allowing Iran’s proxy network to strategically focus its aggression while creating the illusion of diplomatic progress.

Moreover, Tehran may be looking to press on a cleavage that already exists between Washington and Jerusalem on regional security priorities. For example, while Washington was seeking an off-ramp, Israel escalated its military campaign, striking Houthi targets, Yemen’s power facilities, and destroying Sanaa’s international airport. The Houthis’ declaration of an “aerial blockade” against Israel just two days before finalizing the US ceasefire similarly signals this calculated pivot, abandoning maritime attacks on Washington’s interests while intensifying focus on Israeli targets.

Ceasefire as a tactical advantage for the Houthis

For the Houthis, ceasefires are less an end to conflict than extensions of it by other means. Like in past truces, pauses allow for regrouping, recruitment, and rearmament—often with more lethal outcomes. The illusion of calm often precedes a sharper escalation.

During the previous ceasefire with Saudi Arabia, for example, the Houthis unveiled advanced military hardware from Iran during parades, some of which they later used in attacks from November 2023 onward. This ceasefire gives the Houthis crucial time to recover and rearm, while allowing Tehran to preserve its last effective pressure point on the Arabian Peninsula and on another strategic chokepoint, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea.

Iran’s dual “knife and a handshake” strategy has repeatedly proven effective. The Houthis may have temporarily suspended their attacks on US vessels, but Tehran has neither abandoned its regional ambitions nor its determination to drive wedges between the United States and its allies. This calculated maneuver serves as a stark reminder that apparent de-escalation often masks preparation for future conflict.

If Washington and its regional partners want to blunt Tehran’s influence, they must stop treating tactical pauses as strategic breakthroughs. Iran’s proxies do not need sustained battlefield victories to succeed—only time, space, and plausible deniability. Meaningful pushback requires more than just airstrikes or ceasefire diplomacy. It demands a coordinated strategy that recognizes the interconnectedness of Iran’s proxy network and denies it the ability to regroup under the cover of de-escalation. Anything less risks repeating the same pattern: temporary quiet, followed by deeper entrenchment.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is a Senior Analyst at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies.

Behnam Ben Taleblu is the senior director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC.

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Israel has many concerns about what happens in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, not least of which are about Turkey’s growing influence and efforts to establish a military presence there. Netanyahu and Erdogan have a long list of grievances against one another, and relations between Turkey and Israel are at perhaps their lowest point in history.

But Netanyahu has a chance to turn tactical challenges into strategic opportunities, rather than continuing the fool’s errand of trying to shape Turkey’s role in Syrian affairs through military force. The Israeli prime minister should take Trump up on his offer to help Israel and Turkey figure out how to “get along.”

In recent weeks, Azerbaijan has facilitated at least two meetings between Turkey and Israel to discuss their respective interests in Syria, which should be applauded. As a country that has diplomatic relations with both countries, Azerbaijan is uniquely able to mediate between Israel and Turkey. However, Azerbaijan is particularly close to Turkey and has its own interests in Syria, particularly with respect to energy resources and economic partnerships.

Trump advertised his willingness to mediate between Israel and Turkey while sitting alongside Netanyahu in the Oval Office during his April visit to Washington. As Israel and Turkey compete for influence in Syria, in dramatically different ways and for different reasons, a Turkey-Israel detente is a deal Trump would be wise to support, particularly for the sake of stability in Syria.

Israel and Turkey’s rollercoaster relationship

Turkey and Israel have a complicated history. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, and it recognized the Palestinian state in 1988. Israel and Turkey, however, kept their bilateral relationship fairly quiet until the 1990s. The decade saw both positive and negative regional shifts that allowed the two to deepen diplomatic, security, and economic relations, including:  former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait, the rise of Kurdish separatist and Islamic fundamentalist movements, Turkish tensions with Greece over the Aegean islets, and the 1993 Oslo Accords. But tensions began to rise in the early 2000s with the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the onset of the second intifada, and Erdogan’s rise to power. They severed, however, after the 2009-2010 Israel-Gaza war, and the Israeli interception of the Turkish Mavi Marmara flotilla bound for Gaza in 2010. Bilateral relations have never returned to pre-2010 levels.

Today, there is no love lost between Erdogan and Netanyahu, but Syria presents a good excuse to try to mend ties. With Turkey seeking to establish a military presence in Syria, and Ankara’s ongoing support for interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, Turkey and Israel are now also effectively neighbors. Both Erdogan and Netanyahu also fancy themselves friends of Trump and want to stay on the right side of his ledger.

Incentives to get along in Syria

According to Turkish and Israeli officials, the two countries have created a deconfliction mechanism for their Syria operations—a communication channel aimed at avoiding unintentional military clashes between Turkish and Israeli forces there. This is a smart and operationally essential move. But given the current tenor of relations between Turkey and Israel, more than just deconfliction will be needed to prevent escalation between the two countries, particularly if Israel continues to conduct airstrikes deep in Syria and Turkey establishes a consistent presence there. 

When Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015, Israel understood that it needed to both avoid an accidental military escalation with Moscow by deconflicting its military operations against Iranian-backed militias there, as well as strengthen its diplomatic relationship with Russia to maintain an open communication channel with its then-new “neighbor.” During the following year, Netanyahu met Russian President Vladimir Putin at least four times—more frequently than he met any other head of state. 

With the fall of the Assad regime, Israel faces a whole new set of challenges in Syria.

Assad was no friend of Israel, but during his tenure, Israel had gotten comfortable with a relatively predictable, if risky, status quo. When al-Sharaa assumed power, everything became uncertain. For the first time in decades, the leader of Syria did not consider Israel an enemy state. Al-Sharaa even clearly stated he had no interest in picking a fight with Syria’s “neighbors,” including Israel. 

On the other hand, as Israelis are quick to remind anybody who mentions al-Sharaa’s name, he was previously known under the nom de guerre Mohammed Abu al-Jolani and has Islamist roots as a former member of al-Qaeda and leader of the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Israel fears he may one day want to reclaim his namesake, the Golan Heights. So far, al-Sharaa has mostly said all the right things as he tries to stabilize and rebuild a governance structure in Syria, despite numerous impediments. But Israel is understandably skeptical and fearful of Syria’s new leadership and environment.  

Still reeling from the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks in the south and Hezbollah strikes in the north, Israel has taken a forward-leaning military approach in Syria that seems to be focused on pushing threats away from its borders, flexing its military muscle to make its presence and capabilities known, and trying to keep Turkey out. Rather than keeping to its own side of the Syrian border and protecting Israeli sovereign land in all the ways Israel has long known how to do, Israel maintains outposts along the Syrian side of the border and has repeatedly conducted airstrikes within Syria. As Israel’s military engagement in Syria has expanded, Israel has gotten the Syrians’ attention and again made itself an enemy. 

How can the US help 

It was apparent from the statement Netanyahu released upon his return home from Washington that he and Trump have a different view of Turkey in Syria.

Israel would prefer minimal Turkish influence, while Trump has repeatedly publicly expressed high praise for Erdogan and applauded him for Turkey’s role in overturning the Assad regime. It seems clear that the United States will not be helping Israel push Turkey out of Syria. Still enmeshed in Ukraine, it seems unlikely Russia would do much, either, to advocate for its own expanded engagement in Syria. 

Trump prefers not to start or get involved in wars, and his administration has cut off the majority of foreign assistance to traditional US partners, particularly to support civil society, governance building, educational programs, and other elements of US soft power. 

For better or worse, it is unlikely that Trump would seek to get involved in Syria’s internal affairs or al-Sharaa’s efforts to rebuild the Syrian state. 

But Trump likes making deals, and he seeks to expand the Abraham Accords and achieve Saudi-Israel normalization. 

For the sake of both of those goals, Washington should be concerned that Syria is given a chance to become a stable, secure, and prosperous country, without external actors like Turkey and Israel using Syrian territory to fight their own battles. President Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh and announcement that Washington will remove sanctions on Syria reflect that he understands Syria’s stability and prosperity are in his interest, too. Trump may even have his sights on achieving Syria-Israel normalization, but that is still at least a ways off. Working toward Turkey-Israel detente in Syria would be a good place to start. 

Washington’s mediation between Turkey and Israel in Syria also has uniquely bipartisan Congressional support, notably from Republican Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch and Democratic Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen. 

In April, the committee leaders sent a letter to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and  Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent urging the Trump administration to remove barriers to US engagement with Syria. The bipartisan senators noted that the “growing competition between Israel and Türkiye over Syria’s trajectory […] may threaten American interests,” and urged the administration “to move quickly to mediate between our allies.”

Trump’s unpredictable and often unconstrained approach to decision-making confers him a certain amount of leverage. His bellicose nature and broader regional interests, combined with Israeli and Turkish interest in avoiding a direct military confrontation, might be just enough to force the right Israeli and Turkish officials into a room together to figure out how to get along.

The US president could also encourage both parties to take a constructive role in helping Syria to stabilize and rebuild. Al-Sharaa knows Syria needs external support, but he has also made clear that he will not pledge allegiance to any one benefactor or tolerate external manipulation. Trump should be telling Turkey to let al-Sharaa lead in the Turkey-Syria relationship, and he should be pressuring Netanyahu to hold fire and give diplomacy a chance, with Turkey in the near term, and then maybe eventually also with Syria. 

None of this is easy, and Trump has already set out to negotiate a number of foreign policy deals, very few of which have come to fruition. But this one is worth the shot—and would be a meaningful win if achieved. 

Rachel Brandenburg is the Washington Managing Director and Senior Fellow at the Israel Policy Forum, and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for New American Security.

The post Could Trump be ‘mediator-in-chief’ for Turkey and Israel in Syria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to Al Wasat, witnesses reported intense gunfire at the Tikbali military camp, located in southern Tripoli near the Abu Salim district—Ghnewa’s traditional stronghold—where streets were reportedly deserted during the fighting. Other sources based in Tripoli indicated that al-Kikli was killed in a targeted ambush, suggesting a deliberate effort to remove him from the country’s complex military landscape.

In the aftermath of the clashes, the Ministry of Defense under the Government of National Unity (GNU) announced that it had assumed “full” control over the Abu Salim area. By the morning of May 13, the ministry confirmed it had also secured all SSA headquarters and had issued directives to implement a broader plan aimed at restoring security and stability.

GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah addressed the developments in a statement on X, extending congratulations to the Ministries of Interior and Defense, along with the army and police. He characterized the events as “a decisive step toward ending irregular groups,” asserting that the outcome “confirms that the legitimate institutions are capable of protecting the nation and preserving the dignity of its citizens.” He added that the operation reinforces the principle that “there is no place in Libya except for state institutions and no authority except that of the law.”

A push for power consolidation

Al-Kikli’s killing is reportedly part of a broader effort by these brigades to eliminate influential militia leaders and consolidate control over Tripoli under forces fully loyal to the GNU prime minister. According to Libyan sources, Hamza and Zoubi had been planning this campaign for some time. The original strategy was allegedly set to begin in April, targeting another major Tripoli militia—Abdulrauf Kara’s Special Deterrence Forces (SDF, or Radaa), which controls Mitiga Airport. However, the operation was delayed. The SDF was also the group responsible for kidnapping Hamza in 2023, an event that triggered one of the most severe outbreaks of violence in Tripoli since the October 2020 ceasefire.

Al-Kikli was targeted after escalating tensions by attacking the Libyan Post Telecommunications and Information Technology Company (LPTIC)—considered the most important state-owned enterprise in Libya after the National Oil Corporation (NOC). He and his men were accused of kidnapping and shooting the newly appointed chairman of the board, Salaheddin Elnajih, an appointee of Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah.

In early April, following Elnajih’s appointment, Prime Minister Dbeibah underscored “the importance of full and orderly disclosure of all revenues and profits of the company” and called for “adherence to financial transparency in order to strengthen the trust of the State and citizens in the performance of public institutions.” Elnajih, in turn, denounced what he described as a “systematic campaign targeting the company,” and affirmed his “full commitment to respecting the Prime Minister’s directives on disclosure and transparency.”

Both of the groups involved are nominally aligned with the GNU. The 444^th Combat Brigade is commanded by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, appointed Director of Military Intelligence by Dbeibah in 2023. The 111th Reinforced Brigade, formerly known as the 301 Brigade, is led by Abdussalam al-Zoubi of Misrata. These two brigades were subsequently tasked with securing control over the contested area.

Al-Kikli in the crosshairs: Long brewing tensions

After the kidnapping, military authorities reportedly demanded the handover of those responsible. Al-Kikli’s refusal to comply elevated him to the top of the target list—not only for Zoubi and Dbeibah but also for several Misratan factions with increasing stakes in consolidating state authority.

Al-Kikli had shown little interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement. This led to the ambush: he was reportedly called in under the pretense of holding talks—something that had occurred numerous times in the past—but was instead killed.

Commenting on this operation, General Hamza stated: “Three hours were enough to complete a precise operation […] against the most brutal criminal forces in the country since 2011.”

This development must also be viewed within the context of persistent intra-Misratan rivalries, with Abdussalam al-Zoubi particularly focused on safeguarding his own position. Acting preemptively, General Hamza and Zoubi eliminated “Ghnewa”, seized all SSA bases, and consolidated their military presence.

Escalations and endurance: Looming questions on what’s to come

In the aftermath, questions remain over how the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF) and remnants of the SSA will respond.

There had been speculation about a possible negotiated deal. With Dbeibah, Hamza, and Zoubi currently holding the advantage, they may seek to pressure the SDF into accepting the terms of a potential surrender, possibly offering immunity or concessions in exchange for relinquishing control over Mitiga Airport.

However, according to images and reports emerging from Tripoli, the 444th Brigade launched an attack on Kara’s SDF on the evening of May 13, provoking a violent response from the Madkhalite-aligned militia.

This marks a significant development, highlighting a key distinction between the SDF and other Tripoli-based armed groups. The SDF is not a typical militia: it is a radical Islamist Madkhalite formation that follows the teachings of Saudi theologian Rabee al-Madkhali. Although Madkhalism is generally considered a politically quietist and ultraconservative branch of Salafism, the SDF has carved out a distinct identity, opposing both General Khalifa Haftar and Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

This ideological foundation has contributed to the SDF’s greater resilience and internal cohesion compared to more transactional or criminally driven militias. By contrast, the SSA under al-Kikli functioned primarily as a criminal network. With his killing, the group is likely to be replaced by a younger, still locally embedded but likely more radical figure. But in the short term, the SDF has been effectively sidelined.

Meanwhile, social media footage indicated the arrival of armed groups from other parts of western Libya—such as Zawiya and Warshefana—seemingly mobilizing in support of Kara’s faction. This type of fragmentation and shifting alliance-building is emblematic of intra-militia conflict dynamics in Libya since 2014.

After several hours of intense fighting, international agencies reported that a temporary truce had been reached. Whether it will hold remains uncertain.

The fate of Ghnewa’s fighters

Against this backdrop, another dimension warrants attention: While Tripoli’s militias may become politically irrelevant following the elimination of their leaders, they have historically played key roles in local territorial control. Though widely labeled as “criminal organizations,” these groups often functioned as de facto police forces, maintaining a tenuous form of order by deterring rival factions. In contrast, the forces led by General Hamza and Abdussalam al-Zoubi are highly militarized and not particularly suited for routine policing or neighborhood-level governance.

A major question now concerns the fate of Ghnewa’s remaining fighters. Will they—especially those born and raised in Abu Salim, an area with deep symbolic resonance due to former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s notorious political prison—accept the new power structure? Or will they regroup under new, potentially more radical leadership and attempt to reassert control over their traditional strongholds?

The coming days will be critical in determining whether this assassination signals the beginning of a new chapter in Libya’s civil conflict or merely remains an isolated episode of political violence.

On Libyan social media, Ghnewa has also been accused of involvement in a broader network linked to Khalifa Haftar and the United Arab Emirates, allegedly working to undermine Tripoli’s leadership. However, such allegations are not new. During Haftar’s failed 2019 offensive against the capital, similar claims circulated—suggesting Ghnewa was preparing to flee with funds provided by Haftar—though these reports were never substantiated.

As previously noted, Dbeibah has expressed satisfaction with the recent military action. The assassination of Ghnewa and the dismantling of the SSA represent a significant step in his broader effort to centralize power. Yet while al-Kikli may have been the most powerful militia leader in Tripoli, extending this campaign to openly confront Kara’s SDF poses a much greater challenge, as demonstrated by the clashes on May 14.

Kara’s group, rooted in a Madkhalite Islamist ideology, appears to possess a more robust organizational structure than al-Kikli’s SSA, which more closely resembled a traditional criminal enterprise with limited ideological coherence. Moreover, recent events suggest the SDF has a greater capacity to mobilize support from other anti-Dbeibah elements across Tripolitania—something al-Kikli was unable to do, in part because the ambush that killed him came unexpectedly.

There is also a broader strategic implication for Dbeibah, who remains officially an interim leader. The removal of al-Kikli eliminates one of the final obstacles to General Hamza’s and his ally Zoubi’s rising influence.

Hamza, in particular, has recently expanded his political and diplomatic footprint, leading high-level military and intelligence delegations to Turkey, Algeria, and even Syria. These moves suggest he may now be positioning himself for a larger leadership role in Libya, potentially setting the stage for future tensions with his current political allies. Indeed, the web is full of images of Dbeibah alongside Ghnewa together, when they were close. As such, this strengthening of Hamza might represent a different, longer-term problem for Dbeibah.

Some regional observers have even speculated: could Hamza emerge as Libya’s own version of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the new Syrian leader? The contexts are very different, but in situations like these, direct control over armed groups can make a decisive difference. Dbeibah is leveraging both his networks and economic power to strengthen and permanently centralize his authority, but it is far from certain that this will be enough to comfortably stay in power.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and a resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

Dario Cristiani is a political risk consultant and an associate fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali global actors program in Rome. He is also a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, working on Italian foreign policy, the Mediterranean and global politics. 

The post The killing of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli may be a turning point for Libya appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Earlier this week, US President Donald Trump made headlines by stating what many Iranians have known for years: a corrupt “water mafia” has looted the nation’s resources while its leaders have “managed to turn fertile farmland into dry deserts.” He underscored the regime’s role in fueling the crisis, declaring that “their corrupt water mafia—it’s called the water mafia—causes droughts and empty riverbeds. They get rich, but don’t let the people have any of it.”

For millions of Iranians displaced by environmental degradation and water scarcity, it was the first time a sitting US president openly echoed what whistleblowers and environmental advocates have been shouting for decades.

The term “water mafia” has been used by Iranian journalists, scientists, and activists for more than a decade to describe a powerful and politically connected network responsible for pushing ecologically catastrophic megaprojects. These actors thrive on opacity, benefiting from unchecked dam-building, wasteful water transfers, and the relentless overextraction of groundwater, often under the guise of development and national security. Trump’s remarks may have been blunt, but they captured the essence of the crisis: Iran is not just running out of water, it is being robbed of it.

The aftermath of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal offered a clear warning. Billions of dollars flowed back into Iran, yet no serious reforms followed. Instead, environmental destruction accelerated. Expensive dam-building and ill-conceived water transfer projects continued unchecked, groundwater depletion worsened, and land subsidence spread across critical plains. Agricultural practices remained wasteful, and environmental priorities were ignored.

In the Islamic Republic, the reflexive belief that crises can be drowned in money has repeatedly backfired. Over the past four decades—particularly since the Iran-Iraq War—financial windfalls without transparency, accountability, or public participation have fueled corruption, exacerbated environmental damage, and triggered deeper social unrest. Funds intended for resilience and renewal have instead bankrolled inefficient megaprojects, enriching politically connected contractors while pushing the country’s ecosystems closer to collapse.

Parliament and oversight bodies have long been reduced to hollow institutions, offering little more than a façade of accountability. Public dissent—especially from provinces ravaged by water scarcity—has been met with suppression, not solutions. Now, with the prospect of ongoing US negotiations delivering some sanctions relief, the economic arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, stands ready to tighten its grip. Under the banners of “development” and “poverty alleviation,” it will likely expand its empire of megaprojects—ventures that, without environmental safeguards or transparency, have consistently deepened corruption, entrenched inefficiency, and accelerated environmental collapse.

Widespread corruption and lack of oversight

Water governance in Iran is tightly controlled by the Supreme Water Council—a body that exists more as a rubber stamp for elite interests than a forum for sustainable planning. Dominated by the Ministry of Energy, with the president or vice president merely present in name, the council has consistently prioritized unsustainable development over ecological integrity. In practice, it has functioned as a front for the water mafia—an entrenched network of bureaucrats, contractors, and cronies whose goal is profit, not preservation.

The Ministry of Agriculture, as the largest water consumer, is a major influencer within this council. Civil society and non-governmental organizations are almost entirely excluded from decision-making, and local stakeholders lack the ability to prevent resource destruction. The Department of Environment, while occasionally voicing concerns, has been reduced to a ceremonial role.

Most large-scale water projects in recent decades have either bypassed environmental permits or obtained them under pressure, often through compromised processes involving firms with direct ties to the water mafia. In cases where local courts attempted to intervene, rulings were ignored or overruled by higher judicial officials loyal to political interests. Environmental defenders and whistleblowers who challenge these projects face intense security pressures, harassment, and, in many cases, exile.

Powerful consulting firms, many of which have long benefited from insider connections, have greenlit projects that have devastated entire ecosystems, displacing upstream communities, triggering deforestation, damaging cultural heritage sites, salinizing rivers, depleting aquifers, and contributing to widespread land subsidence in urban and agricultural zones alike. From Tehran to Isfahan, cities are literally sinking under the weight of institutional negligence. These aren’t development projects—they’re environmental crimes disguised as infrastructure. And if sanctions are lifted and new capital flows into the system without strict oversight, the water mafia will seize the opportunity to expand its empire, accelerating Iran’s ecological collapse.

IRGC involvement

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), through its Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, has become Iran’s largest and most politically untouchable contractor, positioned squarely at the center of what many now call the “water mafia.” This deeply entrenched network includes senior officials within the Ministry of Energy, politically favored consultants, and powerful construction and engineering firms. Shielded by military influence and judicial complicity, they operate with near-total impunity. Whenever a major dam or inter-basin water transfer project is launched, Khatam is either directly involved or quietly profiting through layers of subcontractors. Although sanctions have constrained some of its operations in recent years, the IRGC has routinely sidestepped these limits by deploying a spiderweb of front companies to keep cash and construction flowing behind the scenes.

Any future sanctions relief would give Khatam and the broader IRGC-industrial complex even greater control over state development budgets, further emboldening the water mafia. Since its post-1989 transformation, engineered by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and sanctioned by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Khatam has overseen disastrous megaprojects.

Those include the Karkheh and  Gotvand dams, which have inflicted irreversible ecological damage across Khuzestan. Its inter-basin water transfer schemes, including the Garm-Siri project, not only jeopardize domestic water security but risk igniting future disputes with Iraq over shared river systems. Far from alleviating Iran’s water crisis, the JCPOA-era influx of capital largely served to reinforce the very machinery driving the collapse.

Lack of environmental impact assessment

Today, major multinational projects funded by international loans typically require rigorous Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) to ensure that long-term benefits outweigh ecological and social costs. In Iran, however, EIAs have become a hollow formality. They are often conducted by firms with vested interests in project execution, many of them closely tied to the water mafia. There is little to no independent review, and virtually no public scrutiny.

In many cases, projects begin without any assessment at all. Only after public outrage or activist pressure do authorities scramble to produce retroactive EIAs—by then, the damage is often done. The Gotvand Dam remains one of the most damning examples: its post-construction mismanagement of saline layers in the reservoir has created a chronic, man-made disaster.

Then there’s Lake Urmia—once the largest lake in the Middle East, now a stark reminder of systemic mismanagement. Over forty dams and multiple diversion tunnels throttled its inflows, all while upstream expansion of water-intensive crops like sugar beets continued unchecked. Climate variability may have accelerated the decline, but the collapse was largely engineered. Today, it’s exposed salt flats that feed dust storms that damage farmland, corrode infrastructure, and pose serious public health risks across the region.

Despite the efforts of environmental activists and a handful of parliamentary investigations, Iran’s annual budget continues to greenlight hundreds of new projects without proper assessments, many pushed through by consulting firms and contractors aligned with the water mafia. Without strict environmental conditionalities and oversight, sanctions relief will only accelerate this destructive trajectory, handing more capital to those who profit from ecological collapse.

More recently, the water mafia has set its sights on large-scale seawater desalination projects—particularly along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman—without seriously accounting for the massive carbon footprint or the ecological harm to already stressed marine ecosystems. These projects are not only energy-intensive and environmentally hazardous, but the plan to pump desalinated water to central Iran comes with astronomical upfront and long-term maintenance costs. For the water mafia, however, it’s a goldmine: billions in unaccountable contracts, minimal oversight, and endless opportunities for profit—another expensive illusion sold as a solution.

The absence of a comprehensive plan

Countries facing severe water scarcity have developed innovative governance models that Iran could learn from—not by copying policies wholesale, but by embracing their core principles.

After enduring the Millennium Drought, Australia implemented the Murray–Darling Basin Plan, establishing basin-level governance and water trading systems to balance ecological sustainability with agricultural needs. Singapore, lacking natural freshwater sources, has become a global leader in integrated water management through its “Four National Taps” strategy, which includes water catchment, desalination, imported water, and wastewater recycling (NEWater). Spain utilizes river basin councils (Confederaciones Hidrográficas) that involve stakeholders from various sectors in decentralized water decision-making. Israel, situated in one of the world’s most arid regions, has achieved a high level of water security through a mix of technological innovation and strict efficiency standards, including the reuse of over 85 percent of its wastewater for agriculture.  

These models share a commitment to transparency, adaptability, and inclusive governance—qualities that are currently lacking in Iran’s centralized and opaque water management system. For Iran to address its escalating water crisis, it must shift from supply-centric megaprojects to participatory and sustainable resource management.

The billion-dollar question: What should be done?

With sanctions relief, poor water governance, inefficient management, and structural corruption will not disappear. Scientists like Kaveh Madani, head of the United Nations University’s Institute for Water, Environment and Health, believe that Iran has become a water-bankrupt nation due to misguided policies, weak governance, and decades of poor management. Even if billions of dollars are released, absent a genuine will for reform, these resources will merely accelerate the execution of costly, unnecessary, and environmentally damaging projects.

A system resistant to methodical review and structural rebuilding will only collapse faster when flooded with money. The core problem lies in decision-making behind closed doors, the exclusion of public participation, and neglect of environmental imperatives.

To change course, Iran needs immediate, transparent, and measurable actions:

• Halt all projects lacking legitimate environmental assessments.
• Mandate the public release of water resource data and project budgeting details.
• Reform budget allocation laws to prevent the approval of scientifically unjustified projects.
• Establish an independent national body composed of experts, academics, farmers, and civil society actors to oversee and redefine macro water policies.
• Pilot participatory governance models in critical watersheds to lay the groundwork for institutional learning and environmental democracy.

Ultimately, drafting a comprehensive, sustainable national water plan—regularly reviewed and adapted—is crucial for restoring balance to Iran’s fragile environment. As long as policymaking focuses on “increasing water supply at any cost” rather than preserving and optimizing resources, every newly injected dollar will only deepen the crisis, not resolve it.

Nik Kowsar is an Iranian-American journalist and water issues analyst based in Washington, DC. He produces and hosts a weekly TV program on Iran’s water crisis. He is also known for his past work as a political cartoonist.

The post Feeding the ‘water mafia’: Sanctions relief and Iran’s water crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a social media post published on Truth Social last month, Trump wrote, “American ships, both military and commercial, should be allowed to travel free of charge through the Panama and Suez Canals.” He added that he had asked US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to immediately take care of this situation.

In exchange, Trump offered the US bombing campaign against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. The US air strikes on Houthi targets are intended to halt attacks by the group on Red Sea shipping, which began shortly after the eruption of the Gaza war in November 2023.

Said Sadek, a political analyst specializing in Middle East affairs, told me that Trump’s comments signal “a shift in US-Egyptian relations,” which he described as being “at their lowest ebb in decades.”  

He added, “They also mark a stark reversal in roles as the United States has traditionally provided Egypt with economic assistance and military aid in exchange for Israel’s security; it is now demanding payback from its longtime Middle Eastern ally.”   

Over the past year and a half, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have caused a major disruption in maritime traffic, putting additional strain on Egypt’s faltering economy. Suez Canal revenues have been slashed by over 60 percent as a result of the attacks, meant as a deterrent against Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip. Waiving the fees of US vessels—which reportedly account for about 10 to 20 percent of the vital waterway’s traffic—would deal a fresh blow to the Suez Canal Authority’s already-diminished finances and hence, the state’s coffers at a time when Egypt is experiencing a foreign currency crunch.

While there has been no official response to Trump’s controversial demand for free access to the Suez Canal, the call has sparked outrage among Egyptian commentators and legislators. In a post published on his X account, Mostafa Bakry, a pro-government journalist and member of parliament, slammed Trump’s proposal as “blackmail.” He suggested that Trump’s remarks were likely in retaliation for Cairo’s rejection of the US president’s plan to relocate Palestinians into Egypt and Jordan—a move that Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has warned would seriously threaten regional stability and prompt a resurgence in radical Islamist groups.

Adding insult to injury, Trump also claimed that the Suez Canal would not exist without the United States—an allegation that drew backlash from Egyptian analysts and academics who perceived it as a challenge to Cairo’s sovereignty over the canal. In a televised interview broadcast on the Egyptian satellite channel “Ten,” Aly el-din Hilal, a professor of political science at Cairo University, slammed Trump’s comments as “confrontational” and “void of historical truths.” Hilal reminded that the Suez Canal, officially inaugurated in 1869, was dug by Egyptians at a time when the United States was emerging from the Civil War.

The construction of the Canal—a key trade route between Africa and Asia—was overseen by the Compagnie de Suez, established by French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps for that specific purpose.  

Sadek attributed Washington’s growing frustration with Cairo to the latter’s refusal to bow under US pressure to participate in the US-led aerial campaign against the Houthis. The Egyptian leadership has insisted that the maritime threat would dissipate once a ceasefire comes into effect in Gaza.

Cairo is “skeptical that the US and British bombardment of Houthi infrastructure in Yemen will achieve its desired goal of deterring Houthi attacks despite US claims that its operations in Yemen are weakening the Houthis’ military capabilities,” Sadek noted.

The latest Houthi attack targeting Israel on May 4, when a missile landed near Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, causing its closure for several hours, has reinforced Cairo’s perception that the US-led campaign against the rebel group in Yemen has failed to destroy or weaken the latter’s capabilities. On May 26, Trump announced a pause in the military operation against the Houthis after the group reportedly told the United States that it didn’t want to fight anymore.

Relations between the United States and Egypt soured after Trump threatened to cut aid to Egypt and Jordan if the two longtime US allies rejected his displacement plan. The threats prompted President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to call off a visit to the United States that had been scheduled for February 18.

The fact that Trump’s Middle East visit does not include a stop in Egypt also signals a widening rift between Washington and Cairo. Trump’s tour in the region will take him to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Already, the regional tour has delivered a 142 billion dollar arms deal with Riyadh, and the landmark announcement of the US lifting its Syria sanctions. Reports have also emerged that Saudi Arabia is considering offering the United States a military base on the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir, further igniting tensions in Cairo. A US base there would enable Washington to keep a watchful eye over arms smuggling from Iran to Lebanon and Gaza, but it would undermine Egypt’s sovereignty over the Suez Canal.        

In a video broadcast on the  BBC Arabic channel, Samir Farag, a senior strategist on Egypt’s Security and Defense Advisory Board, dismissed the rumors as “a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy aimed at fueling tensions between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Egypt and the United States on the other,” insisting that there is no talk about a US base on the islands.

Farag also downplayed the dispute between Egypt and the United States, telling me that negotiations were underway between Cairo and Washington to iron out any differences.  

That said, Cairo has been cozying up to US archrival China in recent weeks. The first joint military drills between the air forces of Egypt and China, conducted in Egyptian airspace from April 19 to early May, signaled the strengthening of security cooperation between the two countries. Some analysts suggest that the joint military training was intended to send a message to the United States that Cairo has other options.

“Should Trump carry out his threat of slashing military aid and economic assistance to Egypt, Cairo would turn elsewhere for support,” Sadek said, adding that it was likely a tactic aimed at securing US military aid or persuading Washington to lift its restrictions on modernizing Egypt’s air force.  

While Cairo has made no secret of its strategy to diversify Egypt’s defense procurement, it appears to have grown increasingly frustrated with US limitations on upgrading its F-16 fleet.

Egypt’s State Information Service flaunted a video of Chinese J-10C fighter jets and Y-20 transport aircraft on its official Facebook page as the joint military exercises were taking place—a tell-tale sign perhaps of Egypt’s ambitions to bolster its air defense capabilities. The US Defense Department reneged on Trump’s promise to sell F-36 stealth fighters to Egypt in August 2024. Sadek argued that the US is cautious not to allow Egypt to purchase advanced fighter jets, “as this would undermine Israel’s military prowess.” If there is any truth to some media reports that an arms deal between Egypt and China that includes the sale of J-10Cs may be in the pipeline, the move would likely exacerbate tensions between the United States and Egypt and perhaps even risk the imposition of US sanctions on Egypt.

Sadek insists that Cairo does not seek confrontation with the United States and is keen on maintaining peace with Israel. While this is likely true, Washington’s latest string of provocations is testing Cairo’s patience.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative focusing on Egypt, economics, energy, water access, and women’s issues. She works in Egypt as a freelance journalist who contributes mainly to CNN’s Inside Africa and CNN’s digital platform. 

The post Choppy waters: Egypt’s waning patience with President Trump appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.  

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.  

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Qutaiba Idlbi: This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region 

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable\

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK 

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere   

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses. 

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence. 

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations. 

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace. 

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria. 

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions. 

Going forward, there are three things to watch:   

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation. 

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future. 

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December. 

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists. 

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding 

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity. 

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions. 

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land. 

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.   

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications. 

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders 

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors. 

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.” 

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention. 

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening. 

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security. 

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.  

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.  

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.  

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state. 

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development. 

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country. 

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise. 

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran.  The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria. 

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination. 
 
—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate. 

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. 

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division. 

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable 

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.” 

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.” 

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.  

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.  

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.  

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts. 

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center. 

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians. 

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria. 

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal. 

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation. 

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs. 

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood. 

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory. 

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria. 

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. 

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.   

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life. 

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.  

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough. 

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians. 

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed. 

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses. 

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community. 

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in. 

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries.  

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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For more than two months now, nothing has entered Gaza. Not a single grain of rice or bag of flour. The only thing standing between Gaza’s 2.2 million starving people on the brink of famine and three thousand trucks packed with humanitarian aid is Israel.

“It’s a humanitarian catastrophe. Catastrophe on the true meaning of the world. We never could have ever imagined this.”

The voice note comes from one of the social workers assisting with the International Aid Network for Relief and Assistance, my non-profit organization that works in Gaza.

“We had been distributing rice, a serving of rice just to try to ease the hunger in the bellies of the children at the camps we work in,” she continues.

“But we had to stop now because there’s no rice left.”

I am not disclosing the names of those quoted, due to safety concerns in the aftermath of Israel’s targeting of humanitarian aid workers. Although even with the precaution of anonymity, one colleague remarked: “Israel knows who we all are anyway.”

It has been more than two months since Israel broke the ceasefire deal, resumed its bombing campaign of Gaza, and declared that no aid would enter the Strip. Well before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Israel controlled everything that entered or exited Gaza, even at the Rafah crossing at its border with Egypt.

The Israeli cabinet has started deliberations on resuming aid operations but under a framework that would “by-pass Hamas”, which would perhaps make sense if Hamas controlled the aid, only it doesn’t.

I have been to Gaza four times since the launch of the war in Gaza, on humanitarian missions with INARA, and would have gone on my fifth mission in February had Israel not denied me entry. I am hardly the only one, there has in fact been a troubling increase in denials of humanitarians and medics on missions to Gaza over the last three months.

I have been to warehouses, out in the field on distributions, and in sector meetings. Israel has long maintained that humanitarian aid entering Gaza is “controlled by Hamas.” The humanitarian community has categorically stated over and over that Hamas does not control the aid, despite allegations that the militant group has stolen some of it. But it is worth noting that if Hamas has been stealing or hoarding aid, it’s not from humanitarian organizations’ warehouses or distribution points.

This framework and its mechanisms would see private security contractors, or the military, establish “Israeli hubs” for distribution. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) issued a statement on behalf of all its partners slamming this plan.

“It is dangerous, driving civilians into militarized zones to collect rations, threatening lives, including those of humanitarian workers, while further entrenching forced displacement,” UNOCHA said in a statement.

“Humanitarian action responds to people’s needs, wherever they are.”

Most of us have set up distribution points close to the communities we serve, or, similar to our work at  INARA, we deliver directly into the camps we work with. The population of Gaza is not mobile. Cars and buses don’t function; there is no fuel. People have to walk or take donkey carts to get anywhere. It’s not logical to expect someone to walk hours to get to a set distribution point in an active military zone and then haul an up to fifty-kilogram food parcel back to their tent.

Even assuming that someone was able to get the food box back to their tent, what are they supposed to cook with? Gaza has gone without cooking gas for months People try to gather wood, some are even burning books and trash to light a fire to cook on, but they are often unable to source enough. This is why functional community kitchens is so critical, but we have no idea how or if they will even be supplied.

But this is not a battle space that is ruled by logic. Equally ludicrous is Israel’s claim that “there is plenty of food in Gaza.”

There isn’t. The World Food Program does not state that its warehouses are empty, bakeries do not shut down, and children do not claw at scraps of food at the bottom of a pot when food is plentiful. What has been distributed to community kitchens will be depleted in the next few days.

It is no secret that Israel has weaponized humanitarian aid to ostensibly pressure Hamas, and the government itself has stated that it’s basically enforcing a “starve or surrender” policy.

Rule 53 of International Humanitarian Law specifically states, “The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited.”

Israel is countering this by citing Article 23, which states that consignments may be prevented if there are concerns they may not reach their intended target or benefit the enemy. This is again based on the false premise that Hamas controls the aid. If this were the case, aid organizations like ours would have been unable to deliver assistance when Israel was permitting entry. We especially would not have been able to deliver during the ceasefire, when Hamas re-emerged onto Gaza’s streets.

There already is an International Criminal Court warrant, issued back in November of last year, for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which includes among the alleged crimes “the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.”

Last week, the International Court of Justice began its deliberations on Israel’s restrictions on aid and aid operations at the request of the UN General Assembly. The deliberations will likely take months. Israel boycotted the sessions and called the whole thing a “circus”.

Israel recently rejected a Hamas offer of a five-year deal that would see it cede political power, countering with a forty-five-day ceasefire proposal and the provision that Hamas agree to disarm, which Hamas in turn rejected.

While ceasefire talks sputter, Israel is doubling down. The government just approved a “conquest” plan to expand its operations in Gaza, calling up additional tens of thousands of reservists, and enraging the Israeli population, who are growing increasingly incensed with their government’s refusal to do what it takes to get back to a ceasefire that will see the remaining hostages released. Tens of thousands of Israelis have been demonstrating on a regular basis, demanding that their government not continue to endanger the hostages’ lives.

For Palestinians, time is running out— a warning that has been echoed at some of the highest ranks of international organizations, including the World Health Organization.

“We are breaking the bodies and minds of the children of Gaza. We are starving the children of Gaza. We are complicit,” Deputy Director General Michael Ryan told reporters at the WHO’s headquarters. “It’s an abomination .”

When I speak to Palestinians in Gaza, I hear the strain in their voices—the subtle tremors as they fight not to crack under mounting hunger after a year and a half of military bombardment.

“Arwa,” they say. “I don’t want to be a number.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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The primary objective of the Abu Dhabi trip was to restore confidence with the Emiratis after a decade marked by political tensions. From Beirut’s standpoint, the UAE remains a major trade partner, making it a much-needed destination to garner support for Lebanon’s reconstruction, five years after the collapse of its financial system and a few months after the latest Hezbollah-Israel war. The UAE is also the second Gulf destination for the Lebanese diaspora after Saudi Arabia, hosting about ninety thousand Lebanese citizens.

The outcome of Aoun’s visit was modest and reflected that Abu Dhabi remains cautious. Both countries issued a joint statement announcing the end of a travel ban to Lebanon, which the UAE imposed after Hezbollah joined Hamas in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel that launched the war in Gaza. The two governments will also convene a bilateral business council to discuss potential investments. Meanwhile, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development will send a team to Beirut to assess the opportunities for joint projects, and the UAE’s “Knowledge Exchange Office” is planning to support government reforms.

Despite these deliverables, Abu Dhabi refrained from announcing an investment package or an aid program with Lebanon. There was also no statement regarding the UAE’s financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or the exploration of Lebanon’s gas field—two topics where Lebanon hoped for significant decisions.

Overall, Aoun’s visit aimed to rebuild trust but did not yet confirm the Emirati return to Lebanon. Aoun faced similar challenges in Riyadh, leaving Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman without a financial commitment. He was more successful during his trip to Doha when the Qatari government announced the renewal of a sixty-million-dollar grant to cover the salaries of the Lebanese Army.

The UAE’s cautious stance regarding Lebanon stems from the desire within Abu Dhabi’s policy circles to assess Aoun’s ability to effect change. This assessment will ultimately influence how much political and financial capital Abu Dhabi is prepared to invest in him, and more broadly, the country.

To be sure, Aoun’s profile is appealing to the Emiratis. The former commander of the LAF became head of state after his election last January, following a three-year institutional crisis that left Lebanon without a president. With the new Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Aoun represents arguably the best chance Lebanon has had in years to tackle its chronic issues, such as dismantling the paramilitary forces of Hezbollah and combating the corruption that plunged the country into one of the worst financial crises in modern times in 2019.

If successful, Aoun and the new government could become major strategic partners of Abu Dhabi in the Levant. The fact that the Emirates maintain close contacts with Israel could also benefit Aoun in sending messages to the Netanyahu government to allow space—and time—for the Lebanese government to carry out the transfer of power in the south from Hezbollah to the LAF, a primary condition of the ceasefire with Israel and United Nations resolution 1701.

Strengthening the LAF is crucial for reducing Iranian influence within the country and preventing a resumption of war with Israel. A robust Lebanese army is also essential for border security, especially to tackle any clashes arising from neighboring Syria, where the new ruler, Ahmed al-Sharaa, struggles to control sectarian violence.

However, five months into Aoun’s presidency, the situation regarding Hezbollah’s disarmament and the reconstruction efforts has not changed dramatically. In mid-April, Aoun announced, “Hezbollah’s weapons will be withdrawn (…) in 2025.”

But he quickly added that Beirut wants “to withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons, but we do not want to ignite a civil war.”

Like past Lebanese leaders, Aoun does not want to precipitate an internal conflict between Hezbollah combatants and regular soldiers. Memories of Hezbollah taking to the streets of Beirut and occupying the city center in 2008, after the government of then-Prime Minister Fouad Siniora tried to shut down Hezbollah’s private communication network, remain fresh in people’s minds.

In an interview with the Abu Dhabi-based newspaper The National, Aoun suggested that fighters from the Party of God could join the LAF if they agreed to lay down their arms.

Aoun’s message may be encouraging, but for Gulf decision-makers and their Western counterparts, it sounds similar to previous ones they have heard before, including after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and following the previous Hezbollah-Israel war in 2006.

For a long time, the UAE and Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in supporting the Lebanese economy. Riyadh was also meant to finance the LAF, until the Kingdom withdrew from the support plan in 2016 over concerns that Hezbollah’s influence within the army compromised the deal. Since then, Gulf investments in Lebanon have decreased, and Gulf tourists who used to flock to fancy hotels on Beirut’s corniche have left.

Unfortunately, without significant support from external partners, the Lebanese government cannot initiate the country’s reconstruction. Lebanon’s infrastructure is in disarray, from its electricity services to its health sector. Earlier this year, the World Bank estimated that reconstruction after the 2024 war requires an investment of eleven billion dollars—for context, the Lebanese state currently operates with a budget of three billion dollars. The World Bank is offering to provide a $250 million loan for the first tranche of the reconstruction, but the rest must come from elsewhere.

Severely weakened by the last Israeli operation, Hezbollah is also unable to fund the reconstruction. However, its leaders can still rally their Shia supporters who are frustrated by the state’s dereliction of duty. The longer the government takes to rebuild the country, the more difficult it will be to maintain the population’s support, giving the militant group more time to regroup and rearm. Furthermore, if Hezbollah’s military presence persists, Israel might find it necessary to resume its air and ground operations in Lebanon.

Ultimately, this presents Aoun with a catch-twenty-two: Lebanon needs the diplomatic and financial support of Gulf states like the UAE to marginalize Hezbollah and improve its economy. However, potential Gulf supporters in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are reluctant to invest without evidence showing that Aoun and the government can deliver, starting with disarming Hezbollah.

If Abu Dhabi and other Gulf states hesitate to invest in Aoun and the Lebanese government, the latter may need to take a bolder approach and raise its stakes against Hezbollah. 

Jean-Loup Samaan is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.

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Although the Abraham Accords were initially agreements over Israeli-Arab normalization, these pacts have since transcended Arab borders into a high-profile forum that can incorporate Muslim countries committed to shared values of tolerance, peace, and prosperity.

For Azerbaijan, the Accords could provide a path to expanded security cooperation against Iranian threats and, if pursued in coordination with Kazakhstan, progress towards its goal of becoming a bridge to Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, the Accords could help the country reduce its economic dependence on Russia and China at a time when such dependence is proving to be a liability.

Building on a strong foundation

Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan already enjoy strong diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, with both countries remaining the top two suppliers of oil to the Jewish state.

Kazakhstan enjoys strong ties with Israel and the Jewish diaspora. Astana also already benefits from advanced Israeli agriculture, medical, water, and security technology. The Abraham Accords provide an opportunity to further deepen security and economic cooperation and expand beyond the primarily bilateral nature of relations with Israel.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has already taken steps to expand the Abraham Accords. Earlier this year, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s top advisor, Hikmet Hajiev, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed Baku joining the Accords, according to diplomats familiar with the discussion. Mukhtar Mammadov, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Israel, later met with the Knesset co-chairs of the Abraham Accords Caucus. In a Knesset session, Israeli parliamentarians pushed for expanding the accords to Azerbaijan as well as helping bring it closer to the United States.

Nestled in the rugged Caucasus Mountains, the Republic of Azerbaijan is one of only a handful of Shia-majority countries in the world. The 2020 Abraham Accords include the Sunni-majority nations of the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Sudan, and Kosovo. If Azerbaijan joins the Accords, then it would become only the second Shia-majority country to join after Bahrain.

The added value of the Abraham Accords

Joining the Abraham Accords would provide a number of additional benefits to both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, while also helping Israel and the United States strengthen their engagement with the Turkic world.

Located between Russia, China, and Iran, Central Asia is a tough neighborhood. To survive, Central Asian countries must adopt a strategy of “multi-vectoralism,” an arcane political science term for balanced relations with the surrounding heavyweights without becoming too beholden to one set of interests. Cooperation with a major global player like the United States is a valuable tool for such a strategy, and the Abraham Accords provide a potential path towards cooperation with the United States. Central Asian nations have also grouped together into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) to cooperate on energy, defense, and other key issues.

Azerbaijan prioritizes strengthening security cooperation with major powers. It’s the only country that shares borders with Iran and Russia, arguably two of the region’s most aggressive countries. Additionally, for over thirty years, Baku was locked into a conflict with Armenia over the separatist territory of Karabakh. Both Russia and Iran exploited this conflict to pressure Azerbaijan.

With the expanded security cooperation focus for the existing Abraham Accords countries, this could serve as a highly valuable tool for Azerbaijan.

Baku shares some of Israel’s concerns with Iranian aggression. Tehran has often threatened Azerbaijan, including support for an ethnic Azerbaijani Khomeinist proxy terrorist group and backing Armenia in the conflict over Karabakh. In past years, Baku has partnered with both Israel and Turkey to deter Iran by holding counter-exercises and importing high-tech weapons. Publicly reaffirming Azerbaijani commitments to the Abraham Accords would better integrate Azerbaijan into a greater US-led coalition to protect its interests against an assertive Iran. At the same time, Washington and its Arab partners would gain a staunch ally on Iran’s borders that holds significant soft relations and influence over Iran’s 30 million Azerbaijani minority.

Kazakhstan, on the other hand, prioritizes expanding economic cooperation. The landlocked country seeks to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on its more powerful neighbors.

Kazakhstan could leverage joining the Accords to increase cooperation with both Israel and the United States, particularly on improved access to Israeli and American technology. Through the Accords, Israel would be the perfect conduit for closer relations between the global economy and the largest, continually growing economy in Central Asia. Astana’s GDP is an impressive  $262 billion and has the potential to reach double-digit growth in the coming years.

Although Kazakhstan has made significant progress toward diversifying commercial partnerships, its largest trade partners are still Russia and China. In 2023, Beijing surpassed Moscow in this category. Economic relations with Russia have been particularly problematic in recent years. In 2022, days after President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited Baku as part of Kazakhstani efforts to explore alternative transit corridors to Russia for oil exports, a malfunction occurred on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) carrying Kazakhstani oil to Europe through Russia. More malfunctions occurred later on and were accompanied by rumors that the “accidents” were actually Moscow punishing Astana for not expressing support for its invasion of Ukraine. As noted by Azerbaijani Political Commentator Ahmed Alili, “Russia uses such methods to pressure its neighbors.” Both accidents led to a 10 percent drop in oil exports for Astana.

The Ukraine war has directly impacted Kazakhstani oil exports, which rely on transport through Russia. Last year, Moscow warned Astana that oil sent to Germany would be shut off over a payment impasse due to fears from Poland’s state-run pipeline operator, or PERN, of violating Western sanctions. Most recently, Ukrainian drone attacks on CPC pipelines inside Russia have threatened 30 percent of Kazakhstani oil exports. Between Russian pressure and the consequences of Russian international relations, extensive economic reliance on Moscow is proving to be an enduring vulnerability for Kazakhstan.

Should Kazakhstan join the Abraham Accords, it could also lead to closer cooperation with the United States on exporting its energy and critical minerals along the Middle Corridor, a transit route that travels westward through Azerbaijan, bypassing both Russia and Iran. If it received significant investment from backers like the United States and Europe, then the Middle Corridor could provide Kazakhstan with a safe alternative for its oil exports. For Europe, energy and mineral exports would provide an alternative to Russian energy flows.

U.S. investment in the Middle Corridor and related projects could provide strategic benefits to the United States as well: Astana holds the keys to some of the largest global reserves of critical and rare-earth metals. This includes uranium, lithium, copper, manganese, tantalum, etc. As President Donald Trump seeks to reduce reliance on Chinese rare minerals, Kazakhstan could become an ideal source of production for the global market that could be systematically integrated into emerging refinery and enrichment supply chains.

Finally, Washington may find that the Abraham Accords provide a more effective foothold in Kazakhstan and the general region. Past US efforts to expand its influence in Central Asia have been impeded by inconsistent prioritization of the region, combined with tensions over whether Washington’s approach should emphasize democracy and human rights or employ a more overtly counter-Russia or counter-China strategy.

Turkic connection

Azerbaijan’s joining the Abraham Accords could help facilitate Kazakhstan’s participation and expand the benefits to both countries. A crucial part of Baku’s foreign policy has been the better integration of the Turkic world. Aliyev has called such integration a top priority as he forges close ties with Astana and other Central Asian nations. Azerbaijan seeks to become a “bridge to Central Asia” through Turkic cooperation,” says Director of the Baku-based Topchubashov Center, Rusif Huseynov. Joining the Abraham Accords and integrating Kazakhstan into the framework is a powerful step in that direction.

In 2022, Tokayev presented Aliyev with the Order of the Golden Eagle, Kazakhstan’s highest honor recognizing service to the country. In 2023, both presidents created an interstate council to further multifaceted cooperation. At the same meeting, ministers and senior officials from both countries signed Memoranda of Understanding on cooperation in diverse fields, including information, science, culture, and business. Azerbaijan finds Kazakhstan strategically crucial as it is the region’s largest, richest, and most stable country. Kazakhstan is eager to work with Azerbaijan to establish alternative routes for energy exports and economic diversification.

Such collaboration puts Azerbaijan in a key position to help bring Kazakhstan into the Abraham Accords. As Israeli experts Zeev Khanin and Alex Grinberg at Bar Ilan University’s Begin Sadat Center noted, “Azerbaijan’s unique conceptual and practical experience in Muslim-Jewish cooperation can be leveraged to expand the Abraham Accords to Muslim countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.”

If Azerbaijan were to formally ratify the Abraham Accords first, it could be the first of a larger movement across the Turkic world to publicly deepen relations with Israel and, by extension, the United States. Baku is the key to post-Soviet Turkic states that fit the criteria as pro-US Muslim countries devoted to tolerance and peace, while also serving an important function within strategic US interests. Should Kazakhstan follow Azerbaijan’s lead, it could significantly enhance US and Israeli influence in the region.

Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a research fellow at the Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program at Bar Ilan University’s Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

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Trump may have some other deals in mind. It should come as no surprise that his first three foreign stops (save his trip to Rome for Pope Francis’ funeral) are in countries where the Trump Organization, run by his sons Eric and Donald Trump, Jr., is advancing major real estate projects, including a high-rise tower in Jeddah, a luxury hotel in Dubai, and a golf course and villa complex in Qatar.

But that does not mean that Trump should not be pursuing diplomatic breakthroughs.

The biggest opportunity remains expansion of the Abraham Accords, a signature achievement of Trump’s first term—and Washington’s sights are particularly set on Saudi Arabia. Throughout the second half of former President Joe Biden’s administration, including after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel that launched the war in Gaza, the United States and Saudi Arabia conducted intensive negotiations on a series of agreements intended to foster Saudi-Israeli normalization. These pacts were not finalized, but were within reach. The two most important were a mutual defense treaty and a civil nuclear energy agreement—both high-priority items for the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman.

Questions now hover over the viability of both those agreements. Trump prefers to avoid new Middle East entanglements, and faces pressures from corners of his administration who favor prioritizing deployments in the Indo-Pacific as a means of checking China. This may make the US president reluctant to sign a binding treaty that would commit Washington to maintain certain forces in the region, and the ability to surge others when needed, to help defend the Kingdom.

The Saudis, on the other hand, may ask a different question: considering Trump’s lack of enthusiasm toward existing US treaty allies in NATO, how valuable would such an alliance be? A separate concern is whether Trump, with his scorched earth governing style, could win the votes of fifteen or more Democratic Senators needed to ratify a treaty.

During Secretary of Energy Chris Wright’s visit to the Gulf in April, he said the United States and Saudi Arabia are “on the pathway” to a civil nuclear energy deal. Riyadh has sought an agreement to allow uranium enrichment to take place on its soil for use in civilian energy, but exclusively under US control to ensure it is not diverted to weapons use. But as nuclear talks between the United States and Iran inch forward, the Saudis may pause before alighting on an agreement that puts them at a disadvantage to Iran. The US-Iran talks very much hinge on the question of enrichment—Iran insists on retaining that ability, and the United States has left unsettled whether it firmly demands an end to all enrichment.

But the toughest question is, can Saudi Arabia proceed with normalization with Israel while the war in Gaza remains so unsettled, especially as Israel prepares for an expanded military operation in the enclave? For a Crown Prince who is popular with his people for making Saudi Arabia a more open society, he still tries to be attentive to the public mood, which includes concern for Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Perhaps this is why US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff hinted that there may be forthcoming announcements on trying to expand the Abraham Accords, but the target timetable for progress is 2026. Trump should use this trip not to clinch normalization, but to keep the momentum towards it alive.

The unsettled war in Gaza remains a bottleneck, slowing progress toward other regional goals. The fault lies with Hamas, which brutally launched the war 19 months ago and still refuses to release the fifty-nine remaining Israeli hostages, including between 21 and 24 who are still alive. However, Trump has missed opportunities to change direction, as well. He could have pushed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to continue with Phase Two of the ceasefire and hostage deal signed in January. That would have bought a longer period of calm, created space for diplomatic progress, brought all living hostages back to their families, and allowed a surge of humanitarian aid to enter Gaza—no aid has entered Gaza since the ceasefire collapsed in early March. It still would have left the unsettled and necessary task of removing Hamas from power in Gaza, whether through renewed Israeli military action or the active participation of Arab states. While Phase Two may not be viable immediately, Trump can helpfully signal to all parties that he is no longer pursuing a Gaza Riviera plan that involves the complete evacuation of Palestinians from Gaza. That would steer back toward working with Arab states to develop a more realistic plan to end the war with hostages released, Hamas removed from power, and Gaza rebuilt for Palestinians prepared to live peacefully alongside Israel.

Trump’s other two stops are relevant here. Netanyahu has proposed another partial ceasefire and hostage deal: ten to twelve live hostages for six weeks of ceasefire. The Israeli cabinet has approved an expanded operation in Gaza, which they say will begin if there is no ceasefire agreed by the end of Trump’s trip. Hamas rejects the partial deal, holding out for Phase Two, which would include an “end of conflict” declaration. Trump should insist that Qatar, a key mediator that has hosted Hamas’s external leadership, pressure the militant group to accept the partial deal. That would buy valuable time before a campaign commences that will cost the lives of Israeli hostages, Israeli soldiers, and Palestinian civilians, and may result in Israel’s full reoccupation of Gaza, which would place a heavy burden on efforts to expand the Abraham Accords. It would also enable the administration to set up a new Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, with Gulf funding, to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians safely, while keeping it out of Hamas’ hands.

In Abu Dhabi, Trump can seek support from the UAE—with perhaps the most capable Arab military—to contribute to an Arab stabilization force that could provide security in Gaza after Hamas’ removal. In all three of these well-resourced capitals, Trump should explore an Arab and Turkish-led and -financed effort to pressure Hamas leaders and fighters to leave Gaza and facilitate their departure to distant locales—the only prospect to remove Hamas from power by non-military means.

In the Middle East, the biggest deals are about more than money. Trump should use his time there to keep his eye on bigger prizes: a deal to bring all hostages home, renewed humanitarian aid to Gaza, the removal of Hamas from power, and advancing toward eventual Israeli-Saudi normalization.

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as Washington’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

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The new government has inherited the aftermath of more than five decades of authoritarian rule, compounded by the devastating consequences of nearly fourteen years of armed conflict. In addition, Syria continues to grapple with the impact of harsh international sanctions, which were imposed in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread human rights violations. These challenges have rendered Syria a fragile state, with its institutions on the verge of total collapse.

However, the fall of the dictatorial regime and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to begin rebuilding state institutions. Whether this new Damascus can seize this opportunity relies on four key pillars: achieving security and political stability, fostering inclusive political participation, establishing justice as a precondition for sustainable peace, and lifting sanctions to prevent the resurgence of violence.

The first pillar: Security and political stability

A deeply fragile security landscape, shaped by two major challenges, hinders Syria’s progress toward stability.

The first challenge is that the regions outside of the new Syrian government’s control, particularly the Jazira region of Eastern Syria—the provinces of Hasakah, Raqqa, and the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor—are currently under the authority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In March 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement outlining the integration of the SDF into the institutions of the newly formed Syrian state. However, the agreement remains vague in its provisions and lacks a concrete timeline for implementation.

Subsequently, it is imperative that the international coalition—led by the United States, which still maintains military presence in Syria—plays a proactive role in facilitating the agreement’s execution. This involves applying political pressure and actively sponsoring dialogue between the parties to foster mutual understanding and avoid any potential military confrontation.

Nevertheless, spoilers are working to derail any potential agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF. Among them is the hardline faction within the SDF, primarily composed of foreign cadres affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They oppose the agreement because its implementation would significantly diminish their influence, including restoring Damascus’s authority over oil and gas sites currently under SDF control. The shift would also undermine the influence of prominent SDF warlords, many of whom are PKK affiliates wielding unchecked authority.

Consequently, they have sought to escalate tensions and resist cooperating with the new administration, as seen with the SDF’s recent crackdown on civilians who displayed the new Syrian national flag. Moreover, according to human rights organizations, the SDF arrested 93 civilians in March 2025, including seven children.

The second challenge is Israel’s incessant military operations, which pose grave risks for Syria, the region, and Israel itself.

Fragmentation of the Syrian state could invite renewed foreign interference, particularly from Iran, which may view Syria’s weakened and divided state as a strategic opportunity to expand its influence.

But for Israel, the military campaign in Syria serves an objective of systematic destruction of Syrian military infrastructure to prevent the rebuilding of a functional defense apparatus. This also assists Israel in implementing a new regional security landscape, aimed at obstructing stabilization efforts through continued airstrikes and ground incursions.

Change in this calculus must come through pressure. The international community—particularly the European Union, Arab states, and the United States—must exert more meaningful and sustained diplomatic efforts to halt Israel’s military actions if they want to achieve sustainable peace in Syria.

The second pillar: Inclusive political participation

In Syria, decades of exclusion and sectarian domination under the al-Assad regime dismantled social cohesion and eroded political trust. It will be crucial to establish a political system that ensures genuine participation for all societal components—political, sectarian, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations. Such a system must provide for the equitable distribution of political and administrative influence through effective participatory mechanisms.

While the new Syrian administration has launched a national dialogue and appointed a qualified government, political participation must go beyond surface-level representation. Participatory governance must be the foundation for rebuilding state institutions. Any political exclusion or power monopolization risks driving certain groups toward disengagement or opposition, transforming them from constructive participants into potential nemeses of the political process.

Achieving this requires pursuing two complementary paths: both a top-down and a bottom-up approach.

The top-down model necessitates that the government lead by initiating structured and transparent programs that facilitate political inclusion. This includes continuing the national dialogue on foundational issues like transitional justice, constitutional reform, state structure, the political system, and foreign relations. These dialogues must be inclusive and truly representative of Syria’s diverse fabric.
Notably, Syrian public opinion demonstrates clear rejection of sectarian-based systems, favoring instead frameworks rooted in civil representation and citizenship. The new Syrian government must treat all Syrians as individual citizens, rather than as members of religious or ethnic groups, and anchoring national discourse in the concept of citizenship is fundamental.

Equally vital is the bottom-up role of civil society in advancing political transition and decision-making. Civil society should be granted the necessary space to operate freely, reflecting Syrian societal dynamics and avoiding inflaming social sensitivities. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of exiled Syrian civil actors, who—during the war—demonstrated a clear willingness to engage politically. According to the literature, these initiatives reveal strong potential for grassroots engagement. Building on these experiences is crucial for forming a cohesive, credible civil society capable of playing a constructive role in stabilization and institutional rebuilding.

The third pillar: Transitional justice

Transitional justice is pivotal for achieving sustainable peace in Syria. After more than a decade of violent conflict—fueled by an authoritarian regime responsible for killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions—there is growing consensus that any political settlement that neglects Syrians’ demands for accountability will neither end the violence, nor enable legitimate and stable state building.

Lack of transitional justice fosters a culture of impunity and fuels the risk of renewed violence, driven by cycles of personal and collective vengeance. As numerous studies have shown, accountability goes beyond a legal or ethical imperative—it is a structural requirement for achieving long-term stability and peace.

It also includes a social and moral process that must begin with public acknowledgment of the suffering endured by victims and their families throughout the 14-year war. Such acknowledgment lays the groundwork for reparations and paves the way for meaningful national reconciliation, helping to move beyond nearly half a century of repression and violence.

The literature on conflict and transitional justice highlights the importance of context-specific approaches. In Syria, this means that transitional justice must be rooted in the aspirations of Syrians, particularly survivors of violence, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Empirical research on Syrian refugee communities abroad confirms that many see justice as essential to achieving sustainable peace.

Therefore, the new government needs to initiate a transparent and credible transitional justice process supported by the international community. This process must include well-defined implementation mechanisms aligned with international legal standards and grounded in justice and human rights principles. Moreover, it should avoid transplanting external justice models, as approaches that are not adapted to Syria’s social and political context may reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions rather than heal them.

This effort demands sincere political will, robust institutional frameworks, and the active participation of a broad range of actors, including human rights and legal organizations, civil society groups, and local communities. Furthermore, sustained support from international institutions, particularly the United Nations, is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the transitional justice process.

The fourth pillar: Lifting sanctions

In the wake of the regime’s collapse, lifting sanctions has become paramount to achieving two core objectives. First, enabling the reconstruction of state institutions. And second, alleviating the profound economic suffering endured by the Syrian civilian population.

The continuation of sanctions severely impedes stabilization and early recovery efforts. Without access to financial and material resources, the state remains incapable of delivering basic services, perpetuating Syria’s status as a fragile state. This vacuum risks fostering environments conducive to radicalization and renewed violence, which could destabilize Syria and the broader region.

Years of economic isolation have induced severe shortages in basic goods, rampant inflation, record unemployment, and a dramatic depreciation of the Syrian pound. These conditions have exacerbated poverty and social disintegration, undermining any prospect for national reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Economic sanctions against Syria are exceedingly complex. Following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread violence against civilians.

US sanctions have proven to be the most stringent, as they are open-ended with no built-in expiration, unlike EU sanctions, which are subject to annual renewal. Additionally, US sanctions on Syria predate the 2011 uprising, tracing back to 1979 when Washington designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The most expansive US sanctions to date were imposed after 2011, culminating in the Caesar Act, which significantly intensified financial and economic restrictions on the regime and its affiliates.

While reports have surfaced indicating that the United States has outlined certain conditions for sanction relief—such as addressing the issue of foreign fighters—it is imperative that the new Syrian administration prioritize meaningful internal reforms. These reforms should include guaranteeing fundamental rights, refraining from suppressing individual freedoms, enhancing transparency, and reinforcing the rule of law. Commitment to these principles will likely prove more effective in building international confidence than focusing solely on foreign policy overtures.

Rebuilding Syrian state institutions in the post-Assad era requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach integrating security and political stability, inclusive political participation, transitional justice, and sustained efforts to lift economic sanctions. Achieving this requires the support of both international actors and local stakeholders to ensure sustainable peace and stability.

Mahmood Alhosain is a PhD candidate in Conflict and Peace Studies in the political science department at Radboud University. His areas of interest focus on: Post-conflict studies, development, and deconstruction.

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With growing instability in North Africa and the Sahel, and intensified geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean, the United States, Morocco, and Israel have an opportunity to spearhead a forward-looking joint investment fund and coordination forum that would transform diplomacy into durable infrastructure that delivers on tangible results.

Jointly governed by Morocco, Israel, and the United States, this fund would both directly and jointly coordinate finance strategic projects in energy, digital infrastructure, advanced industrial, and regional security. An instrument like this would be a perfect marriage between US financial and political convening power, Morocco’s industrial platforms, and Israel’s innovation ecosystem to collectively enhance competitiveness, create jobs, and secure regional supply chains. For a Washington calling on partners to stand up, establishing a fund would help empower the three countries to support long-term regional stability and collective prosperity that both showcases and deepens the benefits derived from the Abraham Accords. 

The problem and the solution for an alliance without strategic leverage

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel has opened a new era of cooperation. Politically and economically, signs of rapprochement are evident: increasing bilateral visits, sectoral agreements, business initiatives, and emerging technological partnerships. Yet this momentum remains fragile, fragmented, and incomplete.

Without a shared mechanism, cooperation between Morocco and Israel remains vulnerable to political fluctuations, lacks visibility for long-term investors, and fails to reach the scale needed to reshape regional dynamics. While isolated successes exist—such as joint innovation programs or sectoral agreements—they remain disconnected and difficult to replicate. A structured platform would allow the three parties to consolidate trust, pool resources, and define common priorities across security, energy, industry, and technology. This is a major missed opportunity to move beyond ad-hoc engagements at a time of rapid transformation across the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, while strategic challenges are proliferating, particularly from instability in the Sahel, increased geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean, and rising migration pressure toward Europe.

A convening forum and trilateral investment fund, jointly governed by Morocco, Israel, and the United States, would be an effective tool to give the strategic alliance deeper geopolitical weight. This central body would be tasked with coordinating disparate lines of effort across each country’s respective public and private sectors and providing direct financing for high-impact strategic projects in key divisions, including energy, critical infrastructure, industrial transformation, security technologies, defense industry, maritime industry, and logistics innovation.

The forum would be designed not as a development aid mechanism but rather as a sovereign investment tool that could generate measurable returns. Its operational model would be based on shared governance between the three states, including having representatives from the private sector and diaspora communities, and a rigorous, transparent selection of projects based on economic viability, strategic relevance, as well as clear investment return for the forum’s backers.

What the United States gains through a trilateral fund

As global power dynamics continue to shift, the United States must go beyond supporting traditional bilateral alliances and reimagine its most important growing strategic partnerships, as with Israel and Morocco. Intentionally curated regional platforms are capable of producing tangible and lasting outcomes that would also reliably return real value from investments. Therefore, the proposed trilateral investment forum would constitute an important innovation in both regional Mediterranean policy for the United States and offer important lessons for new mechanisms for US engagement that combine traditional diplomacy, economic strategy, and direct returns on mutual interests.

The model would ensure that the United States improves its long-term standing through a durable, coherent, transparent, and scalable architecture. This fund is especially timely and relevant for three primary reasons.

First, the fund would serve as a counterweight to the growing influence of rival powers—namely, China, Russia, and Iran. All three players are advancing their agendas across North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean through major investments in infrastructure, energy, ports, and security. If designed with proper financial resources, this proposed trilateral forum would provide a credible alternative for financing and competitive projects that would promote US interests and support local innovation ecosystems.

Second, the fund would deliver value that would help publicize the “normalization dividend” that was expected from the Abraham Accords. Five years after their signing, few concrete mechanisms have emerged to convert diplomatic momentum into long-term economic prosperity, largely due to the absence of a standard operational vehicle to coordinate and scale projects. Since the Accords were signed, most engagement has remained bilateral and unstructured, often driven by individual ministries, private actors, or external partners without a shared vision or platform. Moreover, in the absence of a dedicated fund or permanent forum, many successful initiatives—particularly in business, innovation, and security—remain under the radar and disconnected from broader strategic messaging. A trilateral forum could lay a model that could support the overall expansion of the Abraham Accords, demonstrating Washington’s ability to support strategic and enduring projects with key regional partners, advancing regional security and prosperity.  

And third, the fund would give the United States a results-driven tool of influence and a mechanism to return value to the American taxpayer. Unlike one-off aid programs or broad diplomatic commitments, this fund could generate measurable benefits, including local job creation, inclusion of American companies in regional initiatives through the requirement for US primes, growth in trilateral trade, and supply chain security, all while integrating American partners into the overall ecosystem of the Abraham Accords.

Roadmap and success indicators

The implementation of the trilateral investment fund should follow a three-pronged and phased implementation strategy, with the ultimate goal of achieving a well-structured governance architecture and a clear remit for the new body:

1. The initial phase focused on political agreement and framework design, including trilateral deliberations on the working level across all three parties.
2. The secondary phase focused on deploying high-impact pilot projects in priority sectors, potentially through the Development Finance Corporation or other appropriate funding mechanisms.
3. The final long-term structuring phase aimed at scaling the mechanism and embedding it within an enduring institutional architecture, such as a jointly governed trilateral fund.

To ensure credibility and effectiveness, the fund must deliver measurable outcomes based on clear criteria, including economic impact (mobilized investment, job creation, industrial upgrading), tangible strategic alignment (political engagement, intergovernmental coordination, diplomatic returns), and proven replicability (ability to adapt the model to other regional cooperation frameworks).

A new trilateral forum that delivers on the promise of the Abraham Accords is a unique opportunity to support American engagement in an area of critical geopolitical importance.  By aligning capital, innovation, and market access, this forum would not only reinforce the foundations of the Abraham Accords but also project a stabilizing influence across the Afro-Mediterranean space at a time of intense competition and uncertainty. It would offer the United States a modern, agile, and measurable tool of engagement that would competitively address the core sovereignty, security, and economic concerns its partners face in the Global South.

Aïssa Christophe Agostini is a strategic economic advisor and founder of Prosper Atlas, a consulting firm focused on trilateral partnerships between the United States, Israel, and Morocco.

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Should the officials return to negotiations, Washington must acknowledge the ideological motivations underpinning Iran’s nuclear ambitions beyond enrichment levels, centrifuge counts, and sunset clauses.

What US President Donald Trump’s administration might overlook is that Iran’s nuclear program is not simply about energy or military deterrence—it is a tool for advancing a revolutionary ideology. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has operated along two strategic tracks: exporting its Shia revolutionary doctrine and establishing influence through networks like the “Axis of Resistance.” This expansion is not limited to the Middle East—it includes initiatives in Africa and Latin America, where Iran quietly builds ideological and military infrastructure.

At the core of this ideology is an enduring hostility toward the United States and an obsession with the destruction of Israel. This hostility has been cultivated, promoted, and practiced by both Supreme Leaders, beginning with Rouhollah Khomeini’s Friday prayer pulpit in Jamaran to Ali Khamenei’s headquarters in Pasteur and millions of social media followers. After forty-six years of its existence, we have also seen that all presidents within the regime—reformists as well as hardliners alike—have adhered to these tenets of the revolution.

The regime sees both countries not just as geopolitical threats, but as ideological antitheses. The United States, “the Great Satan,” symbolizes liberal democracy, capitalism, religious pluralism, and gender equality. Israel, “the Little Satan,” presents a unique and intolerable affront: a sovereign Jewish state thriving in the heart of what hardliners see as Islamic land.

For Iran’s leadership, Israel is not merely a rival; it is the primary obstacle to their ideological vision of regional domination. As Khomeini declared and Khamenei later invoked, the position on Israel is tantamount to a cancerous tumor that must be eradicated. The Jewish state’s very existence undermines their belief in a historical and religious destiny that dates back to the Islamic conquests of the seventh century.

Western negotiators cannot dismiss the regime’s rhetoric. For decades, paired chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” have echoed across Iranian political, educational, and religious institutions. Famously, the regime erected a public billboard with a clock counting down to the destruction of Israel. Even during what was supposed to be friendlier times, post-Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the heels of the nuclear agreement, Khamenei declared that Israel would not exist in 25 years and triggered an eruption of “death to America chants” among hundreds of his disciples.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic may change its behavior toward the West, but as they keep reminding the world, their intentions remain constant. Khamenei relented and in a shift of policy which can be explained as “taqiyyah” (religious dissimulation),  permitted negotiations with the Trump administration.

But his enduring defiance of Washington was apparent, declaring that “the difference between the Iranian nation and others is that it has the courage to say the truth that America is an aggressor, a liar, a deceiver … therefore, it says “death to America,” but others do not have the courage to state these facts.”  

It’s imperative that the United States does not regard Supreme Leader Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons as an insurance policy. While fatwas are powerful religious principles for adherents of Islam, they are reversible, and Tehran has a track record in the use of deception and religious justifications for such strategic reversals.

History has demonstrated the malleability of fatwas and how they can undermine any agreement based on their supposed permanence. Just recently, Khamenei reversed his long-standing opposition to negotiations with the United States—an unfathomable decision for a leader who has been outspokenly enraged by the first Trump administration’s alleged involvement in the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani.

The concepts of taqiyyah and “khod’eh” (strategic deceit) are deeply embedded in the regime’s political playbook and play a role in this malleability. These tools allow the regime to maintain flexibility in negotiations and justify sudden policy shifts with religious cover.

Khomeini favored “khod’eh” back in 1978, when, from exile, he made glorious promises to the citizens: “The future government of Iran will be a democratic government in which religion has no role in government.” Later, he confessed that this and other promises were all “khod’eh.”

Khamenei, on the other hand, favors taqiyyah. In a 2001 Friday prayer, Khamenei clearly stated that “taqiyyah is one of our religious principles; where a Muslim’s life or the interests of Islam are at risk, taqiyyah must be practiced.” By allowing nuclear negotiations, Khamenei has certainly put this policy into practice and shifted Tehran’s political positions regarding the West.

Western analysts must also examine the inconsistencies in Iran’s domestic energy strategy, raising questions about the declared civilian purpose of their nuclear development. Despite being a top global exporter of oil and gas, Iran regularly experiences power shortages. If nuclear energy were truly intended for peaceful, civilian use, we would expect to see investments that alleviate domestic needs. Instead, the regime channels resources into expanding nuclear infrastructure with ambiguous or secretive intent.

Ultimately, the defining question missing from nuclear negotiations across both Democratic and Republican administrations is not about centrifuge counts, enrichment levels, or the range of missiles. Nor is it about whether Iran will have the means to carry out a nuclear attack against Israel.

The central question for US negotiators is intent: Is the Islamic Republic willing to renounce its dangerous objective of eliminating Israel? Can it ever recognize Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign, Jewish state?

So far, every signal—from public rhetoric to foreign policy strategy—suggests the answer is no. Until Western leaders are willing to confront this reality, any agreement based on technical constraints, rather than ideological transformation, will be both fragile and dangerously naïve.

Marjan Keypour Greenblatt is an advisory board member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project and New Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI) and the founder and director of the Alliance for Rights of All Minorities (ARAM).

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For Beijing, its real battle starts on the economic front via the Islamic Republic proxies, where control of vital maritime corridors potentially yields greater advantages than any negotiated trade agreement.

This strategic calculation is reflected in China’s official messaging. Xinhua News Agency portrays the crisis as revealing “United States’ impotence” against “non-traditional opponents like the Houthis” while claiming US military intervention has “only triggered more resistance” and exposed “the decline of US economic influence and the gradual disintegration of its alliance system.” Behind this rhetoric lies a clear economic imperative: transit the Red Sea. For Beijing, preserving freedom of movement in this corridor is non-negotiable. While overall shipping traffic through the Red Sea has plunged by nearly 70 percent since attacks began, the proportion of China-linked tonnage has surged, a silent testament to the effectiveness of the arrangement.

The impact on European economies has been severe. Major European shipping companies have been forced to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This creates an artificial competitive advantage for Chinese goods, which continue to flow unimpeded through the Red Sea corridor while European competitors face delays and higher expenses. German and French manufacturers are already reporting supply chain disruptions and lost market share to Chinese competitors, a tangible economic victory for Beijing, which was achieved primarily through proxy conflict rather than direct trade competition with the United States.

This arrangement goes beyond short-term tactical cooperation. US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms provide evidence that Beijing’s technological and logistical support has strengthened Houthi capabilities and created advantages for Chinese maritime interests. Multiple Chinese companies, including Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports among others, have been sanctioned for supplying dual-use components that bolster the Houthis’ missile and UAV capabilities. Beijing may not be firing missiles, but it supplies the parts, the software, and the satellite eyes that help aim them.

China’s technological and diplomatic support network

In April 2025, the United States sanctioned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Ltd. (CGSTL) for providing satellite imagery to Yemen’s Houthis that enabled precise strikes on US naval assets in the Red Sea. CGSTL had previously been sanctioned in 2023 for providing battlefield intelligence during its military operations in Ukraine, establishing a pattern of the company acting as a de facto intelligence asset for US adversaries. But CGSTL is no ordinary company, embedded within the Chinese Academy of Sciences and backed by Jilin’s provincial government, it exemplifies China’s military-civil fusion policy, functioning more as an extension of Beijing’s intelligence apparatus than an independent enterprise. Despite Washington’s repeated warnings, Beijing has maintained a posture of strategic denial: providing the tools of war while feigning neutrality and taking no visible corrective action.

The technology pipeline from China to the Houthi forces represents a sophisticated approach to proxy warfare. The New York Times documented Chinese-origin hydrogen fuel cells recovered from Houthi drones used in shipping attacks, which extended flight range and reduced detectability. Perhaps most damning was the interception of 800 drone propellers with Chinese identifiers at the Omani border, the same model identified in UAVs used by the Houthis, Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq, and Russian-backed forces in Ukraine. Rather than shipping complete weapons systems, China exports the critical components, guidance modules, propulsion systems, and power supplies, allowing non-state actors to wage asymmetric warfare while Beijing maintains plausible deniability through intermediaries like online vendors operating through Chinese e-commerce platforms.

Iran gains leverage, China gains reach

China’s support for Iran strategically allows Beijing to reach its objectives without direct involvement or accountability. In January 2025, two Iranian ships carried over one thousand tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, an essential ingredient for solid missile fuel. That’s enough to manufacture around 260 medium-range missiles. While China has supplied missile technology to Iran for decades, the scale and visibility of these shipments signal a strategic expansion in the partnership despite China’s denial of involvement.    

The implications ripple across the region. As Iran’s missile program grows, so does its capacity to arm and sustain proxy groups like the Houthis in Yemen. These groups don’t need long-range missiles; they need enhanced UAVs, better targeting systems, and reliable supply chains, all of which have visibly improved. China doesn’t have to arm the Houthis directly. Strengthening Iran enables a regional network that quietly serves Chinese interests by keeping the United States entangled in costly, low-return conflicts.

The quiet alignment between Beijing and Tehran came into sharper focus on April 26, 2025, when a large explosion hit the Bandar Abbas port. While Iranian officials denied importing missile fuel, private security company Ambrey confirmed the port had received these chemicals from China in March. Around the same time as the satellite company sanctions, Washington also targeted companies involved with the Tinos I, a Panama-flagged tanker that secretly carried Iranian oil to China. This operation was backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, creating a two-way street: Iran gets money for its oil, and China gets both fuel and influence. 

China’s strategic ambiguity and dual narrative

Beijing has perfected a two-track approach to the Red Sea crisis. Publicly, Chinese officials initially avoided condemning Houthi attacks, instead calling vaguely for “relevant parties” to play “constructive” roles in maintaining stability. Only as international pressure mounted did China’s United Nations representatives acknowledge Houthi disruption of trade, while Chinese vessels continued receiving preferential treatment through Houthi waters.

This calculated ambiguity extends to social media, where Chinese users openly celebrate Houthi attacks on Western interests, with one boldly stating: “I want to see news of American and British warships being blown up,” sentiments mirroring earlier support for forces opposing Western interests in Ukraine and Gaza.

China’s approach is strategically precise: Beijing doesn’t want Houthi forces to either triumph completely or collapse. It needs them to be active and disruptive, just enough to keep US naval resources tied up while Chinese ships sail through relatively unimpeded. Every Houthi missile that doesn’t target a Chinese vessel becomes a tax on American presence, a stress test for global shipping, and a demonstration of how much disruption Western powers can absorb before retreating or escalating.

The Russia-China-Iran nexus

This alignment is now formalized through strategic coordination. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s strategic visits to Moscow and Beijing ahead of each US negotiation round in April 2025 reveal a deliberate synchronization of diplomatic positions. Their March 2025 trilateral talks in Beijing produced a unified stance against Western pressure, with China proposing alternatives directly challenging US positions.

Beyond diplomacy, Russia could potentially take custody of Iran’s highly-enriched uranium in future deals, providing technical cover for Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Chinese firms supply the dual-use technologies empowering Iran’s proxies, including the Houthis. The same drone components documented in Houthi arsenals have appeared in Ukraine, following an identical playbook of low-cost attrition, proxy warfare, and Western hesitation.

This alliance continues to deepen, as evidenced by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent twenty-year strategic partnership with Iran in April 2025.  While China supplies technology and Iran manages proxies, Russia provides diplomatic cover and international legitimacy, creating a sophisticated system for reshaping regional power dynamics without direct confrontation, while securing preferential maritime passage for Chinese vessels.

Business first, influence follows

Beijing’s approach to the Houthis represents calculated and deliberate statecraft, not opportunistic coincidence. The Houthi movement now operates with Chinese satellite technology that they could never independently develop, and launches strikes using guidance systems built from Chinese electronics. Washington can sanction individual companies, but unless it confronts the triangulated relationship between China, Iran, and regional proxies, it will always be playing catch-up as Chinese vessels continue to navigate contested waters with relative security.

If Washington truly wants to win its economic competition with China, it should focus less on tariffs and more on territorial contestation, pushing China out of strategic regions like the Red Sea, where physical presence, not paper restrictions, determines the future of markets. This requires building stronger strategic relationships with European allies, who are being courted now by China against the United States, who are suffering the economic consequences of this crisis, and who have shared interests in preserving free navigation through vital maritime corridors.

Equally important is engaging with the Yemeni people themselves, who are tired of being manipulated by international powers and feel unheard in discussions about their country’s future. Any sustainable solution must address their legitimate grievances rather than treating Yemen merely as a venue for great power competition.

Ultimately, Washington must understand that Yemen is no longer a peripheral conflict. It is a live demonstration of how China converts commercial access into strategic leverage, curating conflict, denying responsibility, and watching as US power is bled by a thousand proxy cuts. Meanwhile, while American policymakers debate whether the Houthis are even worth worrying about, Beijing is busy carving safe lanes for its ships and weaponizing instability to tilt global trade in its favor. And as Chinese netizens jubilantly salute the Houthis online, Beijing’s calculated gambit in the Red Sea will continue to yield dividends that no trade negotiation could ever deliver.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is a Senior Analyst with the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies and a Board Member of Peace Track Initiative. She can be found on X at @YemeniFatima.

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Strong words from the US president, directing a clear message to a strategic threat in the Middle East that the advancement of its nuclear program would evoke severe repercussions.

Except, these are not words directed towards the regime in Iran by President Donald Trump. These are the words of then-President George W. Bush in a 2001 communique to Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. That bid to end Tripoli’s nuclear program would ultimately prove successful, and in 2003, Gaddafi voluntarily renounced the program and gave up the country’s stockpile of chemical and biological weapons.

Twenty-one years later, the nuclear disarmament of Libya serves as a model for the United States, one that Trump seeks to replicate in current negotiations with the Islamic Republic.

Senator Tom Cotton, the third-ranking Republican in the US legislature and chair of the intelligence committee, said in April that Trump “prefers a deal [with Iran] like Libya cut with the United States in 2003.” Just a week later during a high-stakes White House visit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told reporters that he wants to see a full disarmament of Iran, adding that “if it can be done diplomatically, in a full way,  the way it was done in Libya, I think that would be a good thing.”

Replicating key strategies employed in the Libyan case example could offer US negotiators the opportunity to fully realize the nuclear disarmament of Iran. After all, both Libya and Iran congruently developed and grew their nuclear programs in an attempt to establish deterrence against the Western bloc, especially towards the end of the Cold War and the era of nonalignment. To similarly reach a deal with the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program, the Trump administration must understand and draw on the lessons learned from Libya’s disarmament.

Negotiations amid shifting geopolitical dynamics

Gaddafi’s pan-Arab dreams of becoming a regional hegemon fizzled out by the 1990s, and by 1998, he announced Libya’s withdrawal from the Arab League, solidifying his international isolation. As Gaddafi started to feel the noose of sanctions and a no-fly zone tightening, he used the country’s nuclear program as a bargaining chip in his rapprochement with the West.

In this context—not too dissimilar to Iran today—Libya began negotiations with the United States amid a shift in the region’s balance of power. Libya participated in direct nuclear talks at the beginning of 2003, as Washington was still grappling with the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. At the time, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell was already building international support for Washington’s military action against Iraq, citing Saddam Hussein’s intention to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as a casus belli. As the weeks passed and the US invasion ensued, Gaddafi saw the toppling of Hussein as an example of what could be done to him in Libya. Just six days after US forces captured Hussein, Gaddafi renounced Libya’s nuclear program.

Like Gaddafi in 2001, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is beginning direct negotiations with the United States nearly a year and a half after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel that launched the war in Gaza. Like Gaddafi, Khamenei has grown increasingly alienated amid the collapse of Tehran’s proxy and alliance network.

With Hezbollah decimated in Lebanon, Hamas incapacitated in Gaza, and Bashar al-Assad ousted in Syria, the Islamic Republic is leveraging its nuclear program to negotiate a favorable future to solidify its regime’s survival. Coupled with President Trump’s return to “maximum pressure” against the regime, the Ayatollah seems to be heeding US threats of direct military action, just as Gaddafi did in 2001.

Khamenei understands that, with limited military and political access, cutting a deal with Washington is the only way forward without risking the regime’s survival.

A diverging outlook for the future

While Republican leaders advocate using the Libya case as a model in current nuclear negotiations with Iran, it’s important to remember that Tehran’s political calculus today is fundamentally different than Tripoli’s was some twenty years ago. In entering negotiations with the United States, Libya envisioned a future shaped by shifting values and priorities that diverged significantly from the path the Islamic Republic is currently pursuing.

By the late 1990s, Gaddafi was already grooming his second-born, Saif al-Islam, to become the country’s next leader. Al-Islam began representing the country in high-level negotiations with the United Kingdom over the Lockerbie case in the late 1990s, and later with the United States over the nuclear disarmament issue. In these negotiations, al-Islam laid out a different vision for the country’s future, one that was in direct opposition to his father’s. He wanted to open Libya up to the West and attract investment and development projects, just as other oil-rich Gulf states have successfully modeled. During negotiations, al-Islam’s opportunistic pragmatism steered the country away from his father’s ideological commitments, which only plundered the country, leaving him and his regime’s survival at stake. It was through this forward-focused vision that Libya was willing to voluntarily give up its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief and closer ties with the West.

In contrast, Iranian negotiators lack that evolved vision for the future. They represent the interests of an increasingly senile Ayatollah without a clear vision for the future of his country. Unlike al-Islam, Tehran’s leadership is not interested in ameliorating its political and international posturing; instead, their sole motivation lies in regime preservation. In negotiations, Iranian negotiators will likely try to ensure that the regime maintains some access to enrichment capabilities to preserve the perception of projected power. This will give US negotiators little “wiggle room” to convince Iran to fully give up its nuclear program, unlike in Libya which was willing to completely abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for a reproachment with the West. Already, Trump’s negotiation team, led by Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff seems to be flip-flopping on its red lines for negotiations to accommodate Iran’s position, ranging from full disarmament to limited enrichment.

Furthermore, Iran lacks the trust Libyan negotiators had in guarantees made by the United States and the international community. This perception of trust is evidenced in al-Islam’s 2003 interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, where he relayed that “America has committed itself to defend us” in exchange for Libya’s disarmament, adding that “agreements on military and security cooperation” would follow suit after signing the agreement. Yet as the years passed, Libya grew increasingly skeptical of US guarantees and the promise of sanctions relief. In a 2005 interview, Gaddafi told CNN’s Jonathan Mann that he “doesn’t think America fulfilled its commitments and pledges vis-a-vis Libya,” adding that “Libya has not been rewarded for the good service that it did for world peace.”

Twenty years later, Iran seems to have learned from Libya’s example to remain skeptical of US guarantees, including the promise of sanctions relief and the preservation of their nuclear program short of weaponization. Moreover, Trump’s 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), even after multiple International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports confirmed Iran’s compliance with the agreement, has only reinforced hardliners’ narrative that the United States cannot be trusted. In fact, in the wake of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, the Islamic Republic weakened moderates and reformists within Iran who had initially supported the deal, like President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Additionally, the domestic conditions that allowed Gaddafi to accept the deal without risking his projection of strength lie in the public transparency, or lack thereof, of Libya’s nuclear program. When Gaddafi gave up his stockpiles and centrifuges, little was known about the scale of Tripoli’s enrichment and nuclear development. The IAEA found out only after the signing of the deal that Libya was enriching weapons-grade uranium up to 80 percent. This posturing allowed Gaddafi to maneuver on his ideological commitment to anti-Western resistance. On the other hand, Iran has been very vocal about their country’s nuclear program and has leveraged the program to promote and export the Islamic revolution’s ideology in the region. Because of this, Iranian negotiators will have less of an incentive to fully disarm the nuclear program as they risk weakening the Islamic Republic’s projection of power in the region.

The way forward

Still, there’s an opportunity for US negotiators to “seal the deal” on Iran’s nuclear program and replicate the success of Libya’s disarmament. While both regimes remain self-interested in preserving their power, it will be up to Iran to follow Gaddafi’s example in giving up its reliance on advanced weapons development and a network of proxies to carry out its political bargaining. Without an evolved vision for the country’s future, one that reflects the political will of Iranians, any deal risks being spoiled by a change of administration or Iranian leadership.

Drawing on the Libya example, US negotiators will need to work to influence the regime’s cost-benefit analysis, one that signals to the Ayatollah that his nuclear program is in direct opposition to the longevity of his regime, just as it had done with Gaddafi. Doing so will depend heavily on establishing trust and including ironclad security guarantees for US interests, as well as sanctions relief for Iran. Already, Trump has signaled his intent to follow through on his threat of direct military action by positioning six B-2 bombers, roughly 30 percent of the US Air Force’s stealth bomber fleet, on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, in a direct show of willingness to act militarily against Tehran.

In the meantime, Trump has given an explicit two-month deadline to reach an agreement on the nuclear issue. While the Libya deal took nearly three times as long, negotiators now have the opportunity to reshape the strategic balance of power in the region, one in favor of peace, security, and prosperity. Still, the US administration must understand that Libya’s disarmament was the exception, not the standard. Threading the needle between both cases is what could allow negotiators the opportunity to replicate Libya’s success.

Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya analyst.  

The post From Tripoli to Tehran: Lessons from Libya in US-Iran nuclear talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Amid reports that President Donald Trump and Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa will meet during Trump’s scheduled May visit to Saudi Arabia, the future of the two new governments’ uneasy relationship should be coming more into focus.

Currently, ideological differences, sanctions, and on-again-off-again tariffs suggest that US policymakers do not share Damascus’s interest in developing US-Syrian economic and security partnerships. If this is the case, the United States would be balking at a generational opportunity to assert American interests in the Middle East. However, if Washington deepens its economic and security engagements with the new Syrian government, the United States could realize historic opportunities to limit Chinese and Russian influence in the Middle East and enfeeble the Iranian Axis of Resistance for years to come.

Better us than them

Without a clear horizon for lifting sanctions and avoiding future tariffs, al-Sharaa’s government is likely to turn to other nations to develop future partnerships, starting with China and Russia.

A bipartisan group of Washington lawmakers has said as much. In mid-February, Republican Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch warned that limited or no American engagement with the new Syrian government would provide an opening for Russia and Iran to wield substantial influence in Syria again. Likewise, Democratic Senator Jacky Rosen said that the United States cannot allow China and Russia to swoop in and assert their regional interests over the United States.

In the case of China, Jonathan Fulton and Michael Schuman of the Atlantic Council described President Xi Jinping’s recent effort to expand Chinese political, economic, and cultural power in the Middle East as “a campaign to remake the world order and roll back American hegemony.” Not contesting its efforts to expand its influence into Syria would be a major misstep for Washington.

While bolstered Chinese-Syrian relations pose a long-term threat to American influence in the Middle East, Russian presence in Syria poses a more immediate threat to regional stability and US interests.

Russian President Vladimir Putin had been the longstanding economic and security guarantor of the Assad family, thereby ensuring the former regime would do nothing to upset their Russian patrons. Despite the rise of a new government, Russian military presence remains, and presumably, Moscow would be interested in maintaining its clientelist relationship with Damascus. This should be deeply concerning for Washington, particularly as Russian-Iranian ties deepen.

But at least so far, enduring sanctions coupled with Trump’s briefly imposed 41 percent tariff on Syria have been unfortunate early signals that Washington’s interest in developing economic relations with post-Bashar al-Assad Damascus is yet to emerge. This posture lacks foresight—investing in Syria as it recovers from a decade of civil war, corruption, and mismanagement may not yield immediate fruit for Washington, but could certainly support its long-term regional interests.

Chiefly, an additional economically stable regional partner, in gratitude to American assistance rather than indebted to Chinese and Russian patronage, would better position the United States to promote regional security and integration while countering Iranian influence.

By lifting sanctions and tariffs and encouraging private investments into the Syrian economy, the United States could offer Damascus a compelling alternative to Chinese and Russian partnerships. Ultimately, crowding China and Russia out of the new Syria would present the United States a generational opportunity that it should be remiss to pass upon.

Don’t be a dumb Axis

The Iranian Axis of Resistance has never been weaker. Syria will be key to keeping it that way.

During the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime, Iran lost a key strategic ally and the unfettered ability to use Syrian territory to support its destabilizing proxy activities. But Tehran’s regional misfortunes did not end there. Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon have diminished Iran’s capacity to use Hamas and Hezbollah as immediate threats to American regional interests. Even in Iraq, Iran-backed militias have scaled back their strikes on American and Israeli targets, perhaps signaling their fear of drawing Washington’s ire that has recently been directed towards the Houthis in Yemen.

Although this new security landscape favors the United States and its regional allies for the time being, don’t expect it to last, at least not without American encouragement.

Washington’s course of action will play a significant hand in whether the Iranian Axis of Resistance remains weak, and US strategy should include support for Syrian efforts to remove remnants of Tehran’s proxy activity. It seems, at least, that the United States has an ally in al-Shara to those ends, who in interviews has said Iran’s proxies “fuel instability” and pose “a strategic threat to the entire region.”

To find an immediate area for American and Syrian security collaboration, US policymakers should look to the Syrian-Lebanese border, which has been the site of extensive smuggling networks operated by drug cartels and the Iranian-Hezbollah axis.

For decades, these networks existed to enrich, arm, and provide manpower for Iranian regional proxies. From Lebanon to Syria, diesel fuel and the amphetamine narcotic Captagon flowed. From Syria to Lebanon, smugglers trafficked humans and weapons. However, with American logistical and military support, Syrian and Lebanese forces could effectively shut down these illicit smuggling networks, disrupting supply lines crucial to the survival of Iran’s regional proxies, curtailing the harmful Captagon trade, and limiting Iranian support to destabilizing groups.

But opportunities for US-Syrian collaboration could flourish well beyond the Syrian-Lebanese border. With a continued US military presence in Syria, Washington could develop a sustained security partnership with Damascus to eliminate Iranian proxy activity that occurs in and passes through Syria.

However, if the United States does not act, Iranian proxy activity could persist and accelerate. For example, if sustained, Captagon flows would continue to fund violent, destabilizing groups. Weapons and manpower would flow to Hezbollah and other groups in Lebanon and potentially find new homes in Syria, where the central government’s securitization is lacking. In the extreme, these outcomes could produce pockets of lawlessness in Syria, test the endurance of the new Syrian government, and even lead to its collapse.

Washington balking today would dramatically increase the likelihood of these adverse outcomes materializing. Consequently, the chaos and instability emanating from a collapsing state would suck the United States back into Syria. US policymakers should engage Damascus now, when the Iranian Axis of Resistance is at its weakest, rather than in a decade when Iran has again turned Syria into a hotbed of chaos for which they can exploit.

Luke Wagner is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

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Israeli troops are occupying five hills on or close to the border and using fire to prevent anyone from approaching too close to the Blue Line, the United Nations term for Lebanon’s southern frontier. That includes residents of border villages who are looking to rebuild homes shattered by the recent war. Israel has been employing drones and helicopters to attack prefabricated structures that have been erected on the rubble of houses in border villages, later claiming that it had destroyed “Hezbollah infrastructure”.

The view from the Blue Line

If anywhere in south Lebanon demonstrates the scale of the destruction inflicted on Lebanon during the recent 14-month war and its aftermath, it is Kfar Kila, a border village scattered over a hill opposite the Israeli town of Metulla. Kfar Kila, formerly home to more than 14,000 residents, has, to all intents and purposes, almost literally been wiped off the map.

“It was systematic destruction,” says Lieutenant Javier Sola Gomez, a Spanish platoon commander with the United Nations peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL. He added that no residents have returned to the village to live. “If anyone goes too close to the Blue Line, the Israelis fire warning shots at them.”

I know Kfar Kila well, having driven through it countless times for more than a quarter century. Yet moving on patrol through the village with UNIFIL, it was difficult to place exactly where we were at any given moment.

Barely a building still stands intact in the village. Most buildings have been reduced to sad piles of crushed cinder blocks, smashed reinforced concrete, shattered red tiles, and strewn with the humdrum household detritus of mattresses, sheets, broken furniture, plastic sheets, and paper. The few houses that remain standing are all damaged, some simply skeletal frames with no walls, others pockmarked with holes from tank rounds and blackened from fire. Even trees, including centuries-old olive groves, have been uprooted, cut down, or bulldozed. The scale of the damage is staggering—most of it having occurred after a November 27 ceasefire, when Israeli troops used dynamite and bulldozers to flatten what was not destroyed during the war.

Amid the destruction and the near-daily assassinations of suspected Hezbollah personnel by out-of-sight Israeli drones, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers are moving through the UNIFIL area of operations—also known as the South Litani Sector (SLS)—to locate and remove Hezbollah’s weapons and infrastructure in accordance with the ceasefire agreement. The agreement called for the deployment of ten thousand soldiers into South Lebanon, a significant commitment for the undermanned and under-resourced military. So far, an additional 1,500 soldiers have been dispatched to the south, bringing the total to six thousand, while another four thousand are being recruited and trained.

Hezbollah appears to have tacitly accepted yielding an area to the LAF that, before the recent war, it had manned with countless small military bases discreetly tucked into valleys and woods, underground bunker networks, firing ranges, and observation posts along the Blue Line. One of the more spectacular facilities handed to the LAF is the massive underground missile bunker located in a valley between the villages of Aitit and Jwaya. The bunker, dubbed by Hezbollah Imad-4 (inferring that there are at least three other similar facilities elsewhere), was featured in a propaganda video in August 2024 in which trucks loaded with missiles trundled through tunnels accompanied by uniformed fighters on motorcycles.

The LAF has conducted more than 5,500 searches in the SLS since the ceasefire commenced, three thousand independently and 2,500 alongside UNIFIL peacekeepers, LAF Commander General Rudolph Haykel told the Lebanese government on April 17. The LAF receives information on Hezbollah military locations from UNIFIL and from the US-led Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism, known as the “Mechanism”. UNIFIL has been collating Hezbollah sites, or what it dubs “locations of interest”, for years, but was usually unable to visit them before the war. The other primary source of information for the LAF on Hezbollah sites is from the Mechanism, which receives the intelligence from Israel via the United States. According to internal UNIFIL statistics, the LAF has inspected 50 percent of locations passed on by UNIFIL and 72 percent of sites delivered by the Mechanism. A senior UNIFIL source commended the LAF for their efforts, especially given the manpower shortages, and said that the gap between LAF searches and identified sites will narrow as the number of unvisited locations in the SLS dries up.

The “resistance priority” in the crosshairs

The LAF deployment into the SLS and dismantling of Hezbollah military sites is seen as the opening step in a broader goal of disarming the Iran-backed group so that it reverts to a political and social organization only. Since taking office in January, President Joseph Aoun has repeatedly declared that only the Lebanese state should have the right to bear arms, implying that Hezbollah and other militant groups (mainly Palestinian factions) would have to surrender their weapons.

In a recent interview with the Qatari daily The New Arab, Aoun said he wished to make 2025 the “year of the state monopoly on arms.”

“The decision has been made to place all weapons under the state. The execution will happen through dialogue, which I believe must be bilateral between the presidency and Hezbollah,” he added.

Hezbollah officials have repeatedly stated that the organization is willing to discuss the fate of its arms in the context of a national defense strategy, but not until Israel has withdrawn from Lebanese territory, ceased its attacks against Hezbollah, and has released the prisoners it captured during the recent war. Lately, however, senior Hezbollah officials, including its leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, have adopted a tougher line, rejecting the notion of disarming altogether.

“We will not allow anyone to disarm Hezbollah or the Resistance because Hezbollah and the Resistance are one and the same. The very notion of disarmament must be removed from our vocabulary. We will not let anyone strip the Resistance of its weapons—these arms are the backbone of the Resistance,” Qassem said in a speech on April 18.

“We will confront anyone who attacks the Resistance or works to disarm it—regardless of whether they are Israel, America, or their collaborators.”

If Hezbollah refuses to disarm, Lebanon will face increasing pressure from the US which could jeopardize the critical financial assistance program to the LAF, and further dampen any hopes of securing international funding to not only repair the damage of the latest war but also to help Lebanon climb its way out of the current economic slump. Israel, which has not stopped attacking Hezbollah targets since the ceasefire in November, would almost certainly escalate its attacks, possibly to the extent of resuming the war, such is the extent to which Hezbollah’s deterrence has been shattered against its traditional enemy. Few Lebanese outside the Shia community would have much sympathy for Hezbollah if it continued to cling to its arms, especially if it triggered a renewed conflict with Israel.

On the other hand, the dilemma facing Hezbollah is what would remain of the organization if it were to surrender its weapons and dismantle the Islamic Resistance. Hezbollah has a formidable social welfare apparatus, including hospitals, clinics, and schools, as well as a potent parliamentary presence and seats in government—all of which have helped extend its domestic influence and bind its Shia constituency to the party over the years. But its military component—what Hezbollah calls the “resistance priority”—is the beating heart of the organization and its core raison d’être.

After all, when Hezbollah was established in 1982, it was not with the intention of opening schools and hospitals to improve the education and health of Lebanon’s Shia community. It was founded to resist the then-Israeli occupation of Lebanon as a precursor to the more ideological goal of eradicating Israel and restoring Palestine to the Palestinians. Hezbollah is fundamentally an ideologically-driven military entity. From Iran’s perspective, Hezbollah has been a useful source of deterrence against the possibility of Israel launching an attack against its nuclear facilities, and as a force enabler to extend Tehran’s influence across the Middle East.

The Iran factor

In the unlikely event that Hezbollah voluntarily yielded its weapons to the Lebanese state, it would lose its value to Iran. Tehran would probably conclude that there was no longer any point in channeling funds to its Lebanese proxy if Hezbollah intended to limit its activities to domestic politics. Although Hezbollah has its own revenue sources, they are almost certainly too limited to cover the enormous costs of running its social welfare apparatus and paying salaries. If no other external source of funding can be found, presumably the schools and hospitals would close, with tens of thousands of employees and fighters losing their jobs and sources of income. The LAF may be able to absorb some fighters, but certainly not all the estimated fifty thousand to seventy thousand combatants that make up the Islamic Resistance. The result could see Hezbollah becoming a hollowed-out shell of its former self.

The key decision maker as to whether Hezbollah disarms or not is Iran. It is unclear so far if Iran’s policy toward Hezbollah will change in light of the recent war. If Iran decides that Hezbollah must be rebuilt, the challenge would be enormous, especially as Syria, which was once a vital geo-strategic lynchpin linking Iran to Hezbollah, has fallen into the hands of its Sunni Islamist opponents.

Israel, certainly, will not stand by quietly as Hezbollah reorganizes and rearms. On the other hand, Iran may conclude that Hezbollah can no longer serve as a factor of deterrence against Israel, which significantly reduces its utility to Tehran. In such an event, Hezbollah’s value would be limited to winning concessions from the US in exchange for agreeing to see its Lebanese partner disarmed. Therefore, a disarmament process could ultimately result in a Hezbollah in name only, with a few lawmakers in parliament, a couple of seats in government, and surrounded by political opponents who brim with schadenfreude at the decline of the once seemingly invincible Hezbollah. Not a particularly palatable outcome for the party’s leadership.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria. He is an acknowledged expert on Lebanese Hezbollah. Blanford is a Beirut-based consultant and a defense and security correspondent for IHS/Jane’s.

The post Dispatch from the UN Blue Line: Israel’s ‘systematic destruction’ in Lebanon appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The massive reinforcement of Washington’s regional military presence,  and threats from senior officials that Tehran will face serious consequences if it does not completely dismantle its own nuclear program, indicated to Israel that the United States is serious about implementing military force and intends to attack Iran, or at least back up an Israeli attack.

However, Trump’s statement of intent to open nuclear negotiations with Iran in his meeting with Netanyahu last month caught the Israeli government by surprise. Moreover, after the rounds of talks between Tehran and Washington, it is clear that both parties are indeed interested in reaching an agreement. In the background, it seems that the US has given up its basic demand for dismantling the enrichment sites in Tehran and is content with restrictions on the existing program.

These negotiations with Iran have displayed a significant divide between Washington and its ally Israel, one that also sits at the center of Netanyahu’s staunch opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal achieved under former president Barack Obama. From the Israeli perspective, the nuclear program is indeed a problem, but the solution lies not only in attacking Tehran’s nuclear sites but in changing the regime. Nothing threatens Israel more at present than such an agreement, even one that would significantly reduce Tehran’s ability to develop a nuclear bomb, because it would deal a severe blow to the Israeli desire to see the Iranian regime fall.

Netanyahu sent his own envoys several times to meet with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and his team to dissuade them from negotiating a deal, but those efforts failed.

From Washington’s perspective, it is vital to limit Iran’s nuclear program so that it cannot produce nuclear weapons. This has been the primary—if not the only—goal of the United States, across both Democratic and Republican administrations with respect to Iran, not outright regime change.

This divide with the Israelis is mirrored with respect to the sanctions regime against Tehran. In Israel’s view, the sanctions are a means to achieve regime change there, while Washington has sought designations as a point of leverage in the nuclear field.

Therefore, even if the talks between Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi will indeed conclude in a “good” agreement: one that will prevent Iran from having a bomb by limiting Iran’s enrichment capacity to 3.67 percent without sunset clause, force Tehran to export its current stock of enriched material, and require it to dismantle its advanced centrifuges and accept close and meaningful oversight “without exit clauses,” Israel will see this agreement as a dangerous one.

That is not only because it is a deal that will not include restrictions on other components of the Iranian threat, such as its missile array or its support for its proxies throughout the Middle East, but mainly because it will strengthen the current regime in Tehran—including the significant economic relief that the regime will receive, as well as the renewed political legitimacy following an agreement with Washington. In addition, the economic improvement in Tehran will allow its leadership to upgrade its security system and even increase support for its proxies deployed in the Middle East. In the Israeli view, the “golden opportunity” to topple the regime, given its weakness, will disappear.

Further, a nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington further diminishes already dwindling Israeli leverage with the new US administration. Israel will have great difficulty taking military action against Iran after a nuclear agreement with the United States.

Even at the political level in Israel, there is a consensus regarding the need for an attack on Iran.  Netanyahu, who cannot afford to be bypassed by the opposition leaders who also present an extreme position regarding Iran, cannot be perceived as supporting the deal, even if secretly he thinks differently The proof that Israel does not really want a deal with Iran concerns its demand for the implementation of the “Libyan model” in the Iranian context, that is, the dismantling of all enrichment infrastructure in Iran. As the US administration also knows, this position is a red line in Tehran’s eyes, and there is no chance that Tehran will accept it. Israel may be hoping that the administration will adopt this position with the understanding that Iran will not accept it, thus opening the way for examining “other options” in dealing with the Iranian program.

In the background, there is a more fundamental gap between Israel and the United States, and this concerns the question of the Iranian regime’s ambitions for its nuclear program, as well as the effectiveness of non-kinetic moves to deal with Tehran’s nuclear program. The Israeli Prime Minister’s assumption and claim that Tehran seeks to produce a nuclear bomb have been rejected time and again by US intelligence officials, who do not accept this claim and emphasize that there is no evidence that the Iranian leader has decided to build nuclear weapons. Moreover, while Netanyahu hails the actions Israel took to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons, US intelligence has claimed several times that the actions Israel took not only prevented Iran from making progress on the nuclear issue but also, in many ways, advanced Tehran in its enrichment program in an unprecedented way.

This gap is significant because it is the basis that leads the US administration to seriously examine the diplomatic option, especially since American intelligence estimates that an attack on Iran would mean a regional war, contrary to various assessments in Israel that are based on Tehran’s current weakness, and its inability to respond significantly to any attack.  The fact that Iran is certainly weak today, in light of the weakening of its proxies and the results of the October 26 Israeli attacks, is accurate. US intelligence, however, asserts that the regime still has enough capabilities to attack US forces in the Middle East, which could lead the region into a broad campaign.

The bottom line is that Israel is expected to oppose any agreement with Iran, even one that would distance it from the option to produce a nuclear weapon.  Because in Jerusalem’s view, the nuclear issue is only part of a set of problems, and the current window of time should be used to act to overthrow the Iranian regime. Unfortunately for Israel, it is doubtful whether the US administration is at that point, and this gap could cause serious tension between Washington and Jerusalem. As negotiations stand, it is questionable whether Israel can do anything about it.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Citrinowicz is also a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies.

The post Why Israel will resist any US-Iran nuclear deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Understandably, many have focused on his policy and posture toward the state of Israel.

His final address on Easter Sunday was a capstone in a track record of advocacy for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, including strong and direct statements. “Dramatic and deplorable” is how he described the living conditions in Gaza. The brutal massacre of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces, which came almost at the conclusion of his Pontificate, had quite publicly saddened and pained him in a deep way.

Pundits and commentators have been quick in pointing out the silence coming from the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since his death. President Isaac Herzog delivered a few comments, nice and positive, even if not particularly warm. The relationship between the first modern non-European Pope and the state of Israel has been contentious indeed.

The vocal standing behind the Palestinian plight—including multiple sermons on Gaza and near-daily calls with Gaza’s Christian leaders through the war—was the success of Franciscan values over a part of the Catholic Church which would have preferred a more nuanced, if not entirely favorable, position towards Israel.

Further, influential personalities like Monsignor Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the patriarch of Jerusalem, who offered himself in exchange for Hamas’s Israeli hostages in the aftermath of October 7, are a living testament to Pope Francis’ posture of opposition to the occupation of the Arab lands in Palestine.

But his legacy in the Middle East extends beyond Palestine. Bergoglio exerted influence in quite a few areas across the region.

Pope Francis exercised pressure on the European powers regarding the tragedy of the civil war in Syria and the horrors unleashed by the Islamic State. The concurrent efforts by the Church to protect and save as many members of the Church of the Levant as possible are noticeable and much appreciated—albeit not always successful.

In the wider Levant, his stance was coherently against the extremists of the Islamic State, the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and other similar organizations—whom he always saw as a danger to his vision of brotherly intent to take care of the world’s marginalized.

He was widely liked in the Emirates, with whom Pope Bergoglio understood the importance of positive relationships despite the abysmal record of the small emirates confederation in human rights and respect for pluralism. He understood the potential for success in diplomacy, negotiation, and public support that could arise for the Church if it sided with the Emiratis and their projection of growing global influence.

To summarize, Pope Francis’ policy in the Middle East and North Africa has been characterized by a wise combination of value-based policies and convenient stances, in line with the scope of the objectives the Pope set for his pastoral mission. 

However, the region is very diverse: ethnically, socially, culturally, and, obviously, religiously. This diversity—despite the frequent skirmishes and conflicts it has played a hand in sowing—has always been understood as the wealth of the region.  Trying to find a common denominator in reactions to Pope Francis’s policies, let alone the expectations of the new Pontiff, is difficult to define without risk of distorting the varied perspectives from the diverse threads of the region’s canopy.

It is possible to say that, at the popular level, the importance of the Catholic Pope is not as significant as in other parts of the world. After all, there are very few Catholics left in the Middle East.

Moving forward, answering the question of who constitutes the ruling elites of the Middle East—namely, those who hold political power and, in some cases, represent religious authority—is crucial to understanding regional expectations of the new Pope. 

For the region’s ruling elites, the Church’s spiritual component matters less, and its influence holds significance only as a political force. In this respect, the Church and its 2.2 billion followers become a heavyweight geopolitical actor, and as such, they treat it.

And there are indeed secular movements at play, particularly with respect to a growing conservatism among Catholics in Western world powers like the United States.

In the West, there is an ascent of right-wing movements that Pope Francis fiercely fought against, including populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia.  But these emerging movements may be more in line with some of the region’s ruling powers.

Regional leaders, building on alliances with the new administration in Washington, for example, may indeed hope for the election of a conservative Pope, who could become an ally in maintaining and defending the values that Middle Eastern elites share with conservatives in the West.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

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To domestically develop their space sectors, both Gulf states have looked elsewhere for help, with the most significant collaborations coming from the United States, Russia, and China.

If Washington wants to ensure that Russia-China-Gulf space partnerships don’t outweigh US-Gulf cooperation, it needs to effectively court the UAE and Saudi Arabia, leveraging partnerships with both the public and private sectors to participate in this pursuit.

UAE and KSA set their sights on space

Much like the UAE itself, its space sector is young. Established in 2014, the UAE Space Agency (UAESA) was created to promote and invest in the country’s role in space. The UAE became the first Arab nation to send an astronaut to the International Space Station (ISS) in 2019 and has since developed institutions, such as the National Space Academy, National Space Fund, and Space Economic Zones, to advance space research, technology, and commercial activities. In addition, UAESA has carried out several missions, including the Emirates Lunar Mission, Emirates Mission to the Asteroid Belt, and Emirates Mars Mission. The Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre (MBRSC) was also created in 2006, becoming a prominent scientific and technological hub regarding the UAE space industry. These initiatives support the UAE’s broader vision of becoming a leader on the global stage and align with its goals of diversification.

Even younger is the Saudi Space Agency (SSA), which was founded in 2018. Its objectives are very similar to those of UAESA and align with Saudi Vision 2030: to drive innovation, foster collaboration, and position Saudi Arabia as a leader in the international space economy and on the global stage. In 2023, SSA sent two Saudi astronauts, including the first female, to the ISS along with the creation of the first sustainable Human Space Flight program. Despite these developments, Saudi Arabia still lags behind its regional competitors and global powers and has a long way to go if it wants to contend in the space sector. Collaboration can help the Kingdom achieve this progress.

These efforts align with a broader vision.

The historically oil-based economies in the Gulf have prioritized diversification and political elevation in the emerging multi-polar world order. Both countries have invested in non-oil sectors to build a knowledge-based and sustainable economy.

In addition to developing alternative revenue streams, both countries are looking to amplify their geopolitical influence, and these investments signal a desire to play a role both in the region and beyond.

Specifically, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have prioritized balancing relations between Eastern and Western powers, focusing on maintaining neutrality in global conflicts, which is reflected in their space industries.

A strong US-Gulf partnership

The United States has been collaborating with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia on their space industries, but further cooperation is needed to solidify Washington’s competitive leadership.

At a foundational level, the UAE and the United States signed the Artemis Accords in 2020, which outlined a set of principles on space exploration cooperation. Saudi Arabia joined the Accords in 2022 and further strengthened its partnership with NASA in 2024 through an extensive framework. Both countries signing onto the Accords signifies a desire to boost their geopolitical influence and compete with major global players.

Washington should focus on strengthening NASA’s relationships with UAESA and SSA beyond signed agreements through increased collaboration on astronaut training, future space policy discussions, and joint missions. For example, Saudi Arabia sent two of its astronauts to the ISS on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from a NASA space center.

Collaboration between the UAE and the US has been much more extensive. Specifically, the UAE hosted the Abu Dhabi Space Debate in 2024, focusing on key topics in the space industry, and invited US officials and businesspeople to share ideas and gain valuable insights. The two countries also collaborated on the assembly of the UAE’s landmark Hope Probe mission to Mars, trained astronauts together in the United States, and conducted experiments simulating Mars to advance space medicine and technology.

This collaboration with the United States, one of the most advanced countries regarding the space sector, signals a push for greater influence in space. More recently, MBRSC announced in 2024 that it would be operating an airlock and contributing engineering support for Gateway, the first space station to orbit the Moon. In return, NASA offered the UAE an opportunity to fly an Emirati astronaut to Gateway on a future Artemis mission.

The private sector can also play a key role in this cooperation, as US firms operating in the space and technology sectors can engage both countries’ space agencies and private sectors through joint ventures, collaborative research, and technology sharing. While US-Gulf private sector collaboration exists, it requires further expansion. For example, Axiom Space, an American corporation, and Burjeel Holdings PLC, an Emirati firm, are combining to undertake scientific research and test new technologies in space. In addition, Marlan Space, a UAE-based firm, and Loft Orbital, an American corporation, created Orbitworks as a joint venture, which became the Middle East’s first commercial satellite integrator. These private collaborations highlight the significance of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s commitment to further engagement on the global stage, as the private sector is also becoming increasingly involved.

These engagements, ranging from astronaut training, signed agreements, joint missions, and space policy dialogues, provide Washington with four main opportunities.

Strategic and security advantages are a critical gain for the United States, as building upon this space partnership will improve Washington’s influence in the region and fortify defense and intelligence cooperation. In addition, US President Donald Trump has consistently viewed the UAE and Saudi Arabia as business partners, and these countries’ investments in space will continue to foster collaboration with US aerospace companies, helping lead to job creation, research funding, and technology exports. This involvement also generates technological and scientific benefits for the United States, as these joint missions, satellite programs, and research initiatives will expand the country’s space capabilities. This innovation will accelerate due to the partnership with the UAE and Saudi Arabia while simultaneously creating shared costs and risks. Finally, diplomacy in the space sector will foster a stronger connection between the United States and the two Gulf states, furthering Washington’s soft power and reinforcing these long-term alliances.

Turning to Russia and China for space collaboration

Russia and China are increasingly becoming Washington’s competitors in engaging the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s space ambitions.

In 2021, Saudi astronauts trained in Moscow for a potential joint mission, while the UAE’s first astronaut, Hazzaa AlMansoori, reached the ISS in 2019 aboard a Russian Soyuz after training in Moscow. The UAE has also hosted Roscosmos officials at major space events, reinforcing its commitment to collaboration.

China, for its part, is in talks with the Saudis on satellite software transfer. In 2018, Saudi Arabia contributed an optical camera to Beijing’s lunar relay satellite. The UAE joined China’s International Lunar Research Station the same year, and in 2023, Chinese firm, Origin Space, launched a joint research and development center in Abu Dhabi. A planned UAE rover on China’s Chang’e-7 mission was canceled due to US export controls, highlighting intensifying global space competition as Washington seeks to curb Beijing and Moscow’s influence.

As the world becomes increasingly multipolar, China and Russia are actively ramping up efforts to counter US influence in the Middle East and North Africa. By fortifying its relationship with the Gulf, the United States could work to build on a vital partnership, especially regarding space. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested in their space programs, and Russia and China have made significant efforts to deepen their relationships by emphasizing their commitment to these programs.  

By engaging with both the UAE and KSA in space collaboration, Washington can continue to maintain its geopolitical foothold while simultaneously hindering Russian and Chinese ambitions to expand their regional influence. If the United States fails to engage regarding space, Russia and China will step up to fill this vacuum and pull the UAE and Saudi Arabia away from the West. This would allow both regional powers to reap the benefits of the scientific and economic advances resulting from space collaboration with the Gulf, and further reduce US influence both in space and on the ground.

The United States must counterbalance this cooperation by engaging both Gulf states through public and private sector collaboration, reinforcing its commitment to their space ambitions, economic growth, and global influence. As Washington’s influence changes on a multipolar world stage, it’s clear that space collaboration has all-too-earthly impacts.

Isabella Torre is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. She is a senior at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service studying global business and Arabic.

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Tariffs will not be the focus of this article, though they are rightly what nearly everyone is thinking about at the moment. The extensive tariff action taken by Trump this month spared the Gulf states from the highest new duties, but other Middle East and North African countries were hit with steep tariffs. The tariffs are likely to have two kinds of impacts. The first may take the form of collateral damage if there is reduced demand for oil due to a recession or slower global growth. The second impact could be on countries like Jordan, which may be hit with high tariffs it cannot absorb, and may potentially need to find new markets. For more analysis on the tariff impacts, check out insights from my Atlantic Council colleagues here.

Welcoming investment and business deals

President Trump’s transactional nature and desire for more investment in the United States play to the strengths of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has the fourth largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, behind Norway’s and two from China. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) is the world’s sixth-largest sovereign wealth fund. With these financial resources, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the means to make major investments, or at least promise them.

In January, during his first phone call with Trump after the inauguration, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman pledged $600 billion in investments and trade over four years. Soon afterwards, Trump said: “I’ll be asking the Crown Prince, who’s a fantastic guy, to round it out to around 1 trillion.” It remains unclear whether the Saudis will increase their pledge, especially at a time when low oil prices are constraining domestic spending at the heart of Riyadh’s Vision 2030 economic diversification efforts. It is also unclear whether the $600 billion pledged will be used to purchase US weapons, invest further in US companies or entities, such as the Professional Golfers’ Association of America (PGA), or something else.

The UAE had a similar strategy when Sheikh Tahnoon, the UAE National Security Advisor and brother of UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, visited Washington in March. During the visit, the UAE announced a $1.4 trillion investment pledge over ten years. The statement of planned investments does not list the dollar amount per item and includes partnerships with US companies on Artificial Intelligence, data centers, energy, and critical minerals. Some of these deals were previously announced.

One intriguing UAE investment promise is a new aluminum smelter in the United States, which would be “the first in thirty-five years” and would “nearly double US domestic aluminum production.” The United States is the UAE’s top buyer of aluminum, and the UAE is the second-largest supplier of aluminum to the United States. The twenty-five percent tariffs Trump imposed on aluminum in March could be behind the UAE’s decision to consider investing in a US-based smelter to avoid paying these new taxes. In Guinea, the UAE owns and operates a bauxite mine, which provides the raw material for aluminum, so presumably the UAE would import raw materials into the United States for use in the smelter. Given the new Trump tariffs, it is unclear if the smelter would be economically viable and would be pursued.

A key trade and investment issue to watch is whether the Trump administration classifies Saudi Arabia and the UAE as Tier One countries when it comes to high-tech chip purchases, which would give them essentially unlimited access, according to rules the Biden administration announced in January. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are currently in the Tier Two category, so they have more access to chips than countries like China in the lowest tier, but their access is still constrained. This was an issue Sheikh Tahnoon raised during his March visit to Washington, and Microsoft, which has partnered with both Saudi and Emirati entities, has called on the Trump administration to give these countries more access to chips. There is likely to be more industry and foreign government pressure on this front, especially as more restrictions are placed on China.

Related to the issue of chips’ access is whether the UAE and Saudi Arabia will hedge their technology bets and try to continue partnerships with China on AI and other high-tech projects. Or, will they choose or be pressured to keep China out of supply chains, hardware, and software that Washington sees as a national security threat, perhaps in exchange for more access to cutting-edge US chips?

Conflict mediation

In his first term, Trump chose Saudi Arabia for his first official visit as commander-in-chief. That landmark visit in 2017 delivered a $110 billion arms deal, which experts noted primarily consisted of previously agreed-upon sales. Before announcing he would attend the funeral of Pope Francis as his first foreign trip this term, Trump had planned to visit the Kingdom first during a regional trip this spring. As he explained in March, “I am going to Saudi Arabia. Normally, you would go to the UK first…I said I will go if you put up a trillion dollars to American companies…They agreed to do that. So I am gonna be going there.”

But this time around, the visit to Saudi Arabia is not just about financial investment. Another sort of deal-making is also taking place.

Saudi Arabia has taken on a new international diplomacy role by hosting several rounds of direct US-Russia talks, as well as meetings with Ukraine, in an attempt to help achieve a ceasefire. Riyadh has also offered to host a Trump-Putin meeting.

Saudi Arabia is well-placed to play this role as its leadership has both the trust of Trump personally—via significant financial ties to Trump’s businesses and family—as well as a solid rapport with Russia since the Kingdom has been a “fence sitter,” refusing to participate in United States and Europe-led efforts to isolate Russia in punishment for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Saudi Arabia has also given humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

The Saudi approach to Russia is part of its preference to hedge its bets and prevent being pigeonholed into the United States-led camp to the extent possible. This suits the Kingdom’s economic and security interests, as it keeps its options open. Hosting talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine also helps raise Saudi Arabia’s global profile and cast it in a positive light as a peacemaker.

It is telling that Trump likewise plans to visit Qatar and the UAE on his first foreign trip of his second term. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has the financial means to make significant foreign investment in the United States. The UAE is also playing a global mediation role: it recently passed a letter from Trump to Iran’s Supreme Leader pushing for negotiations within two months. As for Qatar, it continues to play a key role working with the United States and Israel to seek a negotiated ceasefire in Gaza.

Keeping a lid on national security risks

Trump does not want the United States to get involved in long, faraway wars. Neither do the majority of Americans. However, many past US presidents have been forced to focus on the Middle East, whether they wanted to or not. The following list of hot spots underscores the policy challenges the Trump administration faces. So far, Trump and his team are simultaneously using and threatening force to try to keep a lid on conflict.

Iran: As of this writing, the Trump administration has held two rounds of negotiations with the Iranians, with plans for more. However, within Trump’s senior team, there are competing views about whether Iran’s nuclear program should be completely dismantled (as US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for) or subject to a “verification program” (as Trump’s top negotiator, Steve Witkoff, has said). Moreover, looming over the efforts to achieve a nuclear deal is the US president’s threat that if one is not achieved, there will “be bombing the likes of which they [the Iranians] have never seen before.” Which approach will win out: negotiations, or military action (with or without Israeli support)? Iran has signaled openness to indirect talks hosted by Oman but has also threatened to pursue nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States. So far, there is no talk of including the issue of Iran’s support for groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah in the negotiations.

The Houthis: Will the Trump administration’s new military campaign succeed in ending the Houthis’ capability and desire to attack targets in the Red Sea? Or will this military operation drag on at great cost to the United States, yielding no change in Houthi behavior? The United States has used over two hundred million dollars in munitions in just three weeks, and some military planners are worried that the amount of weapons being used is cutting into supplies that could be needed for other global contingencies. The Houthis have survived several other military campaigns by the Saudis, Emiratis, and the United States over the years, and they enjoy significant asymmetric advantages such as cheap, two thousand dollar drones and geography that allows them to quickly disperse and hide in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, especially since many of their weapons are easy to move. On the other hand, if the US campaign begins to succeed or cause real pain to the Houthis, will they seek to pressure the United States by attacking Saudi Arabia or the UAE?

Israel-Gaza: Before coming into office, Trump and his team pushed hard for a ceasefire alongside former president Joe Biden’s outgoing administration, and they achieved one. However, there now seems to be less focus on ending the devastating conflict. Trump’s threat in February to Hamas to release the hostages or “all hell is going to break out” has, in practice, meant Israel restarting the war and blocking humanitarian aid from entering Gaza. Without an alternative to Hamas rule, the militant group may hang on and continue to fight as an insurgency, replenishing its ranks by recruiting desperate people. The Israeli Defense Forces could potentially be mired in Gaza for months if not years, and the remaining living hostages may die if there is no ceasefire. Some experts also warn that the IDF may face a morale crisis, with some reservists already refusing to serve because they do not support the war. Although the conflict in Gaza is not likely to spill over to other parts of the region, if the war grinds on over the short and medium term, this likely would prevent a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which would thwart a key foreign policy achievement desired by the Trump administration.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a senior director at international affairs consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

* The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. 

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Historically, Russia has never been a major player in the Gulf defense market. Due to their security arrangements and the associated operational demands, Gulf armed forces remain heavily anchored in the Western orbit. As a result, their rulers procure most of their platforms from the United States, the United Kingdom, or France.

However, the high visibility of Moscow’s arms manufacturers at the event in Abu Dhabi fueled speculation among policy pundits and industry watchers that Russia’s defense industry might be on the brink of a breakthrough in the Arabian Peninsula. At first glance, the geopolitical landscape appears favorable. It would follow Washington’s push under President Donald Trump’s administration for an end to the Ukraine war and, as a result, the potential lifting of economic sanctions against the Russian economy.

From the Gulf standpoint, the Russia-Ukraine war was always a Western issue that did not impact their security interests. Countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE carefully avoided Western sanctions on Russia and maintained a neutral position similar to India’s. This led many Russian businesses to relocate to Dubai to escape international sanctions or military conscription. It also allowed Riyadh to convene several negotiations between Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow. Under those circumstances, as prospects for de-escalation grow, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could also be tempted to turn to Russian companies for arms transfers.

Such speculations are not new: Saudi Arabia contemplated procuring the S-400 air defense system a decade ago. In 2017, the UAE announced, during another IDEX meeting, that it would jointly develop a fighter jet with Russia’s Rostec. At that time, Russia held a prestigious image among the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Gulf militaries studied Russia’s “hybrid” strategy in the 2014 Crimea annexation as a textbook operation. A year later, the Russian air campaign in support of the now-ousted Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad embodied the bold and decisive move to defend a Middle Eastern ally that Gulf leaders bitterly expected from the United States. In that context, Russia was seen in the Gulf as a strong global power and a credible option to diversify Gulf defense procurement away from Washington. Notably, around that same time, Washington’s NATO ally Turkey was also on its way to procure the S-400 system.

Even so, none of those prospects materialized into concrete military cooperation between Russia and the Gulf states. Riyadh never bought the S-400, and the Russian Emirati project of a joint fighter jet merely disappeared from the radar.

Today, the context is even less favorable for the Russian defense industry than it was a decade ago. The Ukraine war eroded the positive perception that Russian companies might have enjoyed back then. From the Gulf perspective, the issue is not about Russia’s motivation for its invasion of Ukraine but about the poor performance of its armed forces on the battlefield. Indeed, the prestige that Crimea garnered in 2014 or the Syrian air campaign in 2015 is gone. This is true, especially in three domains that are closely monitored by Gulf decision-makers: firepower, air operations, and cyber defense.

By the fall of 2022, six months into the conflict, Russia had depleted 60 percent of its precision-missile arsenal. Not only was the result on the battlefield inconclusive, but the Russian industry has also struggled to resupply the armed forces. The Russian air force, which looked indomitable during the 2015 intervention in Syria, has displayed an inability to decisively support ground troops in making breakthroughs against Ukrainian soldiers. According to the 2025 International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance, by the end of 2024, Russia had “lost at least thirty-one Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback fighter ground-attack aircraft out of a pre-war strength of 124 aircraft”.

Meanwhile, while Russia’s information campaign during the 2014 operation in Crimea was pivotal in ensuring the swift takeover of the region, cyberattacks this time have had a limited strategic impact. Ukraine proved to be better prepared to detect them and also able to launch its own cyberattacks against Russia.

Even the prestige of Russia’s S-400, arguably one of the most advanced systems in the world of air defense, has suffered. Several times, Ukraine has been able to destroy S-400 batteries using its fleet of missiles and drones. It is worth noting that in one case, Ukrainians did so with ATACMS, United States-made ballistic missiles that have been in service for the past forty years.

Admittedly, Russian forces did adapt amid the initial setbacks on the battlefield. But their endurance appears to be more an effect of mass—the sheer volume of Russian troops—than their tactical prowess. Furthermore, Russia compensated for its shortcomings in firepower by turning to Iran for resupplies. As a result, Russian air attacks on Ukraine in the past two years have used Iranian ballistic missiles and UAVs. Moscow’s increased reliance on the Islamic Republic demonstrates the diminished prestige of its defense industry. It is unlikely that Gulf states will be convinced to turn to Moscow in this sector.

In addition to the consequences of this poor performance, the Russian defense industry will struggle to remain competitive in the Gulf due to various pressures on its supply chain. First, the Ukraine war remains the focus of the Russian war economy, and its defense companies have been urged to prioritize the troops’ needs. This means their ability to develop and produce supplies for international partners is severely reduced. Such demands on the Russian defense industry are also compounded by Western economic sanctions that constrain Moscow’s access to some subcomponents of its systems and complicate the ability of companies to produce.

At the global level, those factors explain the severe reduction in Russia’s arms exports in the past five years. Russia, a traditional major player in the global defense market, saw its arms exports drop by 64 percent in the past five years. For instance, Russian industries have struggled to deliver supplies ordered by India, one of its traditional clients. Russia remains the primary supplier of the Indian Armed Forces. However, while Moscow supplied 55 percent of India’s arms imports between 2015 and 2019, this share fell to 36 percent between 2020 and 2024. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi might not change its diplomatic stance regarding the Ukraine war, but it is already turning to other suppliers (primarily France, Israel, and the United States) for its armed forces. Given the close ties between India and the Gulf states, this is certainly something that the UAE or Saudi Arabia are taking stock of.

Eventually, this underlines the gap between Gulf political statements on Russia and the reality of their limited military cooperation with Moscow. The high visibility of Russian arms producers in Gulf defense events like IDEX might suggest otherwise. But time and time again, Gulf states have contemplated procuring Moscow’s platforms before backtracking themselves. This is unlikely to change, no matter what happens with the ongoing negotiations over the Ukraine war.

Jean-Loup Samaan is a senior non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council‘s Scowcroft Middle East Initiative and a research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.

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As landmark negotiations unfold between the government in Tehran and the new administration of US President Donald Trump, the prospect of a new US-brokered agreement with Iran could serve as a turning point—not merely another iteration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but a wider strategy encompassing nuclear compliance, regional de-escalation, and energy collaboration. Such a deal would reframe negotiations from an exclusive focus on uranium enrichment and arms controls to a broader architecture centered on commerce, infrastructure, and regional integration.

If implemented with foresight, transparency, and inclusive governance, establishing a regional gas corridor could transform the Middle East’s fractured geopolitics into a system of mutual benefit.

Mapping a “Gas Peace Corridor”

At the center of such opportunity is South Pars, Iran’s share of the world’s largest natural gas field. Straddling the maritime border with Qatar, where it’s known as the North Dome—South Pars, holds an estimated 14 trillion cubic meters of gas and eighteen billion barrels of condensate. That’s more than forty percent of Iran’s proven gas reserves and nearly eight percent of the world’s total.

Despite this immense resource, South Pars remains significantly underutilized due to international sanctions, underinvestment, and outdated infrastructure. Although Tehran launched a seven billion dollar initiative in March 2025 to sustain pressure levels in the aging field, the scale of South Pars demands much more: international partnerships, modern technology, and access to global markets.

This is where diplomacy and energy intersect.

Under this framework, Iran would commit to placing its nuclear energy program under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, curbing support for regional proxies, and opening its natural gas sector to foreign investment. In return, Tehran could gain access to up to $120 billion in frozen assets, kickstart its economy, and begin exporting gas at scale to neighboring countries and Europe.

The blueprint envisions a “Gas Peace Corridor,” serving as the primary conduit for this transformation—connecting Iran’s South Pars field through Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean, with links extending into Turkey and the European grid.

An Iranian pivot from military to markets

Iran, for its part, stands to gain enormously. Home to the second-largest proven gas reserves in the world, second only to Russia, Tehran has long been isolated from the global energy economy. Its domestic sector suffers from inefficiencies, periodic blackouts, and reliance on unsustainable subsidies. Despite sitting atop the world’s second-largest proven gas reserves—33.8 trillion cubic meters—Iran struggles with domestic shortages. In winter 2023–2024, peak demand exceeded 800 million cubic meters per day, while supply hovered around 700 mcm/d, leading to rolling blackouts and industrial shutdowns. A foreign investment–backed development of South Pars would allow Iran to rebalance domestic demand and redirect surplus toward exports, reducing pressure on internal subsidies that cost the government an estimated $63 billion annually.

A strategic pivot away from militarization toward markets would allow Tehran to modernize its energy infrastructure, reenter global trade networks, and redefine its international image. A successful transition from isolation to integration could open Iranian markets to US and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) investment, expand regional trade, and reduce the economic rationale for military adventurism.

This would mirror and modernize the long-dormant Iran–Iraq–Syria pipeline, also known as the Friendship Pipeline, which was initially proposed in 2011 but was derailed by civil war, sanctions, and political resistance. Today, with the region searching for stability and energy markets desperate for alternatives to Russian gas, the geopolitical logic of that project is stronger than ever. A re-imagined peace corridor would also be an economic lifeline to post-conflict states and a bridge between long-divided regional powers.

In economic terms, transit revenues and associated infrastructure investments could inject billions of dollars annually into transit countries like Iraq and Syria, serving as a stabilizing force amid reconstruction efforts.

Global opportunity

This corridor has clear benefits for the West, too.

For Washington, backing such an initiative could reassert US leadership in a region where its influence has waned. If designed, financed, and operated by US and allied firms, the pipeline could generate significant long-term returns through tariffs, service contracts, and equity stakes, embedding American business interests into the region’s energy future.

Once fully operational, the Gas Peace Pipeline could transport up to one billion cubic meters of natural gas (bcm) annually, equivalent to nearly one-fifth of Europe’s current import needs. Such capacity could rival existing corridors like the Nord Stream system and significantly bolster Europe’s energy diversity and resilience.

At its peak, Russian gas accounted for over 40 percent of the European Union’s imports; even after sanctions and supply disruptions, the continent remains vulnerable to shortages and price fluctuations. By enabling the flow of Middle Eastern gas, particularly from a reserve as vast as South Pars, Europe could stabilize prices, reduce dependency on Russian supply, and align with its climate goals by replacing coal and oil with cleaner-burning gas.

Expanding gas exports from South Pars also aligns with the EU Green Deal and global net-zero ambitions, with the potential to displace an estimated 100–150 million tons of CO₂ emissions annually, particularly by substituting coal in power generation across Europe, Asia, and Africa. Natural gas emits approximately fifty to sixty percent less CO₂ than coal per unit of energy produced.

The war in Ukraine and subsequent energy crisis underscored the fragility of relying on a single dominant supplier. South Pars gas, transported through a modern regional pipeline system, would offer a reliable alternative, especially since Europe’s gas demand is projected to remain significant well into the 2030s. By aligning with this Middle Eastern initiative, the EU could secure long-term supply agreements while promoting cleaner alternatives to coal in countries like Poland and Germany, thereby supporting its own decarbonization strategy.

In March 2024, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) released its Global Gas Outlook 2050, forecasting a 34 percent rise in global natural gas demand. Meanwhile, Europe, with approximately ninety percent of its consumption sourced from imports, would benefit from a diversified and secure energy supply at a time when energy geopolitics returns to the forefront.

Yet this vision also carries risks. Russia is unlikely to welcome a pipeline that competes for its most critical market. Moscow may respond by deepening ties with Tehran or by fostering instability in key transit zones to derail the project. Conversely, the deal could pressure Russia diplomatically, creating leverage for Washington and its allies in negotiations over Ukraine and broader European security.

A regionally stabilizing force

Turkey, already a key energy transit hub, would gain geopolitical capital as the linchpin between the Middle East and Europe. Hosting a major leg of the gas corridor would increase its negotiating leverage with both Brussels and Washington, particularly on contentious issues like NATO expansion and regional security. It would also deepen Turkey’s economic ties with Iraq and Iran, strengthening its regional position at a time of multipolar competition.

The gas peace pipeline would also serve as a stabilizing force for Syria and Lebanon—both economically and in terms of security—under the joint guarantee of the United States and Iran, whose cooperation would be anchored in their investment agreement. Syrian reconstruction efforts could be jump-started by pipeline development and transit revenues, gradually shifting the country from battleground to bridge. For Iraq, with its central geography and ties to both Tehran and the West, this project could accelerate its emergence as a regional energy corridor.

The GCC would also stand to benefit. Joint ventures in Iranian gas development would allow the GCC to diversify their portfolios, export routes, and hedge against volatility in oil markets. Economically, such cooperation would foster interdependence, while politically, it could cool long-standing rivalries.  The political dividends for all stakeholders, including Turkey and Qatar, would be no less significant than the commercial ones. Regionally, the project could foster greater cohesion and economic integration in the Middle East. Internationally, it would offer Europe a viable alternative to Russian gas, reinforcing energy security across the continent.

The broader regional effects would also be notable. Reduced Iranian support for groups like the Houthis could de-escalate the conflict in Yemen, increasing security in the Bab al-Mandab Strait—a vital chokepoint for global shipping. Jordan and Lebanon could gain access to affordable energy, easing economic crises and supporting development goals.

The pathway forward lies not in reviving failed doctrines of containment or conflict, but in embracing a pragmatic doctrine of peace and commerce. Energy, in this vision, is not merely a commodity—it is a diplomatic instrument, a stabilizer, and a platform for cooperation.

Rather than trench lines and warships, the region could be connected by pipelines and trade routes. Rather than exporting instability, it could export energy and opportunity. And rather than cycling through confrontation, regional powers—under the facilitation of the United States, and in alignment with European interests—could craft a new era where shared prosperity becomes the foundation of durable peace.

Energy talks, while unconventional, mirror the kind of transactional diplomacy that characterized the Trump administration’s foreign policy, focused on tangible economic outcomes and energy price relief for American consumers. While the stakes of energy diplomacy are high, so is the potential for a lasting impact—economically, strategically, and diplomatically. The convergence of energy needs, geopolitical shifts, and strategic opportunity makes this not only feasible but urgent. What is required now is leadership—bold, strategic, and clear-eyed enough to see that the path to peace may run through a pipeline.

Luay al-Khatteeb is the former Minister of Electricity in Iraq and a member of Iraq’s Federal Energy Council. He can be found on X @AL_Khatteeb.

The post Gas diplomacy: A blueprint for Middle East peace and global energy security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Previously, the US Treasury Department sanctioned MS-13 as a Transnational Criminal Organization under Executive Order 13581. The Trump administration similarly designated Foxtrot, which has been used by Iranian intelligence, under the same authority last month.

This should lay the groundwork for Washington to respond to an increasingly aggressive Iran, which has rallied more extraterritorial operations in both the United States and Europe, using a network of criminal gangs.

The statutory criteria for the Secretary of State to designate FTOs are as follows: it must be a foreign organization; the organization must engage in terrorist activity or retain the capability and intent to do so; and it must threaten the security of US nationals or the national security of the United States.

Washington and its allies should capitalize on the momentum from the Trump administration’s increased designations and begin sanctioning these criminal networks as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Iran’s expanding criminal gang network

Tehran has long offered a safe harbor and a platform for dangerous organized criminal syndicates to plot assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage around the world. These partnerships with criminal gangs are often flexible, offering plausible deniability for Tehran’s attempts to silence its foes, especially in the West.

In a recently unearthed interview with Mohsen Rafighdoost, the former cabinet minister in charge of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the 1980s, he admitted the regime employed the Basque separatist movement to carry out killings on its behalf in Europe. Both Iran’s Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC retain relationships with these organizations, which are non-Iranian and have access to the United States and Europe in ways that the Iranian regime itself lacks.

These groups include the Mocro-Mafia, which engages in murder-for-hire and drug trafficking across Europe. The organization was implicated in the attempted killing of Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a Spanish politician and former member of the European Parliament. Last year, the Mocro-Mafia’s leader, Riduoan Taghi, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his campaign of violence in the Netherlands, including the murder of an Iranian in Amsterdam. There is evidence that Taghi visited Iran multiple times to engage with the regime and was arrested in Dubai, from where he was plotting killings for Tehran.

Others include the Foxtrot Network, a criminal gang in Sweden that was responsible for an attack on the Israeli embassy on behalf of Iran’s Intelligence Ministry. There exists another such gang active in Sweden and beyond, Rumba, which enlisted a 14-year-old boy to engage in a shooting targeting the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. Iran was also behind that episode. Rumba is led by Ismail Abdo.

Thieves-in-Law, an eastern European organized criminal enterprise, schemed to assassinate journalist and activist Masih Alinejad on behalf of the Iranian government in New York. Two of its operatives were convicted in U.S. federal court last month for this crime. The IRGC has also employed the Hell’s Angels gang to commit arson attacks against synagogues in Germany, as well as the attempted murder of an Iranian defector living in Maryland. A leader of the Hell’s Angels, Ramin Yektaparast, found refuge in Iran until he was killed there in 2024. Narcotics trafficker Naji Ibrahim Sharifi-Zindashti, whom Iran’s Intelligence Ministry has contracted, has also used his network to enlist Hell’s Angels for similar Iranian extraterritorial operations. The Irish Kinahan Organized Crime Group likewise has links to Iran, which is thought to have afforded shelter for its leader.

The case for US FTO designations

The entities listed above are foreign organizations given their operations, predominantly throughout Europe. There are some questions as to the cohesiveness of some of the groups as formal organizations, but in cases where they exist, the Trump administration should sanction them as such.

These organizations also engage in “terrorist activity,” as defined by US law. Under the legal definition, “terrorist activity” can mean “assassination.” Given the long history of the Islamic Republic’s use of these criminal gangs, which engaged in both attempted and actual assassinations—for example, Thieves-in-Law—they have participated in terrorist activity. In the US State Department’s designation of Cártel de Sinaloa as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it also cited its use of “violence to murder, kidnap, and intimidate civilians, government officials, and journalists.” Organizations like Hell’s Angels, Foxtrot, and Rumba have done the same, with attacks against Israel’s embassies in Europe, which were geared to threaten government officials there. Incidents of arson against synagogues in Germany—in which Hell’s Angels was implicated—also fall into this category.

Lastly, the Islamic Republic’s roving extraterritorial gangs undoubtedly threaten the security of US nationals or US national security. The documented history of their targeting of American citizens—for example Masih Alinejad—make them an acute threat. Their ability to penetrate U.S. soil also positions them as a risk to American national security, as successive Worldwide Threat Assessments produced by the US intelligence community have highlighted Iran’s commitment “to its decade-long effort to develop surrogate networks inside the United States” for violence.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in his January confirmation hearing that Iranian surrogate groups “have long planned contingencies for attacks” against the American homeland. Should Washington and/or Israel decide to launch military operations to destroy Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran could potentially respond by activating these terrorist contingency plans, in part because they would camouflage Iranian complicity via use of non-Iranian criminal gangs to avoid the very US military escalation against Tehran that the Islamic Republic seeks to keep away from. This would enable the system to thread the needle in responding to such a US strike while attempting to duck a direct confrontation with the American military.

This very architecture, using criminal gangs, necessitates their designation as FTOs. The sanction would further reduce the space such groups have to operate on US soil, especially by criminalizing the provision of material support or resources to them. It would also pressure US allies and partners to sanction them under their respective national authorities. Trump has been creative in designating international cartels as FTOs. He should apply the same standard to those criminal syndicates under the tutelage of the Iranian intelligence services.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research specialties include Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

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What’s at stake is not merely Iraqi domestic politics, but a significant US foreign policy success story in a region where such achievements have proven elusive.

Washington’s Iraq success story at risk

The first Trump administration, in power between 2017 and 2021, inherited a troubled Iraq—but that landscape has changed with a rather remarkable turnaround for the US president’s second term.

Against considerable odds, Iraq has built functioning democratic institutions that regularly transfer power through elections. The country’s US-designed Supreme Court, however imperfect and controversial, has peacefully resolved complex political disputes that would have triggered violence in many neighboring states. Perhaps most impressive has been the unprecedented cooperation among traditionally adversarial Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders, enabling peaceful resolution of longstanding Baghdad-Erbil disputes that previously threatened territorial integrity. Iraq has improved its foreign policy both regionally and globally, playing a positive role in bridging relations between Iran and the Arab world.

Despite internal and foreign pressure, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani successfully navigated the delicate balance between Washington and Tehran. In part due to his own building of a unified front in Iraq, paired with regular, direct talks with the previous US administration under former president Joe Biden, al-Sudani prevented Iraq from being dragged into the region’s intensifying Iran-Israel conflicts.

These political achievements rest on a foundation of economic revival. Banking sector reforms, coordinated with the US Treasury and JP Morgan, have dramatically reduced money laundering and illicit cash transfers that once funded extremist groups and corrupt networks. Infrastructure development has transformed Baghdad’s urban landscape, while high oil prices have replenished national reserves. In 2024, Iraq conducted its first successful national census since 1987—an extraordinary administrative achievement that provides the demographic basis for fair electoral district allocation. The security situation has stabilized to the point that Iraq no longer dominates international headlines for terrorist attacks or sectarian violence. These gains directly serve American strategic interests while providing a powerful counternarrative to claims of US foreign policy failure in the Middle East.

Mixed signals from Capitol Hill versus the White House

A dangerous communication gap has emerged that threatens this progress. Since Trump took office in January 2025, a story of US “demand” to Baghdad to dismantle PMF dominated national attention in Iraq. al-Sudani has stated his government has received no formal demands from Washington regarding the PMF’s future. Yet simultaneously, Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq has claimed that the United States has discussed PMF dissolution directly with Tehran—not Baghdad. This contradiction creates an untenable position for Iraqi leaders.

Adding to the complication is the bipartisan “Free Iraq From Iran Act” in the US Congress, spearheaded by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson and Democrat Jimmy Panetta, which sets sights on “irreversibly” dismantling all “Iran-backed puppet militias in Iraq,” including the PMF.

Iraqi leaders who experienced Washington’s regime change war that stemmed from Congressional action view such legislation as a potential harbinger of future policy. When congressional initiatives explicitly call for “PMF dismantling” without distinguishing between Iranian-influenced elements and the broader security apparatus, Baghdad’s political class understandably approaches this with historical caution. Trump administration officials have not made any public statement to confirm or distance the White House from the Congressional bill. Therefore, many Iraqis interpret forceful PMF dismantling as an attempt to end Shia majority rule, contrasting with the Trump administration’s stance against regime change while simultaneously refusing to tolerate Iranian proxies threatening US and allied interests. This apparent contradiction has created significant confusion between Baghdad and Washington.

This diplomatic ambiguity bears troubling resemblance to April Glaspie’s unintentional “green light” to Saddam Hussein before the 1990 Kuwait invasion, where imprecise communication was interpreted as tacit approval. Without clear, direct messaging, Iraqi officials are left to interpret US intentions through competing channels, creating conditions for strategic miscalculation.

The PMF reality

The PMF emerged from necessity in June 2014 when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured Mosul, and Iraq’s conventional military collapsed. What began as an emergency security measure gained extraordinary legitimacy through battlefield sacrifice and effectiveness against a genocidal enemy. Today’s PMF is a complex institution that defies simple categorization.

While Tehran has indeed exploited the PMF framework to embed limited units of proxy forces, treating the entire 250,000-member organization as a monolithic Iranian asset fundamentally misunderstands Iraqi reality. The overwhelming majority of PMF personnel are ordinary Iraqis who answered Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call to defend their homeland when state forces failed. These soldiers report to Baghdad, not Tehran, and provide economic support to approximately 1.25 million Iraqis in southern provinces where poverty rates reach over twenty-five percent.

Even prominent Shia political figures within the Coordination Framework coalition privately oppose Iran’s control over certain armed factions but recognize the broader institution’s legitimacy among their constituents. PMF members and their families represent significant voting blocs in Shia-majority provinces—a political reality no elected Iraqi official can ignore. The challenge lies in distinguishing Iranian-influenced elements without destabilizing Iraq’s fragile security architecture or triggering mass unemployment among trained fighters, repeating the deadly mistake of dismantling Sunni Awakening units by former prime minister Nouri al-Malki.

The parliamentary impasse threatening elections

Iraq’s parliament now finds itself deadlocked over two competing bills concerning the legal status and future of PMF.

A government-sponsored bill would institutionalize PMF units within Iraq’s formal military structure under direct prime ministerial command—strengthening Baghdad’s authority while preserving the force’s symbolic importance to communities that sacrificed to defeat ISIS.

An alternative bill from the PMF Commission seeks financial independence through investments and companies, potentially creating a state-within-a-state similar to models seen in Iran and Lebanon. The second bill does not have majority support even among Shia blocs, let alone Kurds and Sunnis. The message from the United States seems to be vague and generic by objecting PMF bill altogether but offers no alternative.

Parliamentary sessions have halted amid this disagreement, creating collateral damage for electoral preparations. The Council of Ministers has set November 11, 2025, for parliamentary elections, but this requires lawmakers to pass a new electoral law within weeks. Iraq’s Supreme Court has ruled that parliament cannot extend beyond its four-year term, creating a constitutional deadline that cannot be ignored without democratic backsliding.

The paralysis threatens both Iraq’s constitutional timeline and its security gains. The Shia blocs cannot afford to abandon the PMF bill without an acceptable alternative. Doing that under pressure will be seen as an abandonment of PMF which will have devastating consequences on street and for the upcoming elections. If elections are delayed due to failure to pass enabling legislation, the resulting legitimacy crisis could reignite street protests and potentially draw the Sadrist movement back into confrontational politics. This constitutional uncertainty creates openings for precisely the destabilizing forces the United States aims to counter.

Washington’s strategic interests in Iraq’s stability

Iraq stands as a crucial American ally in a volatile region, hosting thousands of US troops and receiving hundreds of millions in security assistance. It serves as a strategic counterbalance to Iranian influence while representing a rare case of democratic development in the Middle East. The current policy confusion threatens these advantages while undermining America’s credibility as a reliable partner.

Rather than freeing Iraq from Iranian influence, rejecting PMF institutionalization wholesale could trigger widespread instability. Attempting to disband 250,000 armed personnel would not only risk civil unrest but create security vacuums exploitable by extremist groups or Iranian-backed militias operating outside state control. The most likely outcome would be weakened Iraqi government authority—precisely opposite the stated US objective of strengthening Baghdad against Tehran’s influence.

The way forward

For the Trump administration to preserve Washington’s investment in Iraq while effectively countering Iranian influence, it must direct clear, consistent communication to Baghdad. This means explicitly distinguishing between legitimate Iraqi security services and Iranian-controlled “resistance” factions, while supporting Iraqi-led efforts to bring all armed groups under state authority.

The White House should clarify whether the bipartisan “Free Iraq From Iran” bill reflects the Trump administration’s policy, recognizing how Iraqi leaders interpret such signals. Supporting Iraq’s constitutional timeline means backing timely elections while avoiding actions that could delay democratic processes. Rather than demanding wholesale PMF dissolution—which risks triggering civil conflict—the administration should leverage Washington’s strong bilateral relationship to encourage gradual integration of nationalist elements into conventional security forces, while isolating Iranian proxies.

Iraq’s stability represents a remarkable US foreign policy achievement amid regional turmoil. By speaking directly to Baghdad with messaging that respects Iraqi sovereignty while addressing legitimate security concerns, Washington can safeguard its investment while advancing regional stability. The alternative—policy ambiguity that undercuts Iraqi institutions—would represent a strategic gift to US adversaries in the region.

The path forward lies not in sweeping demands that ignore Iraqi realities, but in nuanced diplomacy that distinguishes between Iran’s proxies and Iraq’s legitimate security needs. The United States’ substantial investment in Iraq’s future demands nothing less.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021. He is also president and co-founder of the US Iraq Advisory Group. 

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For months, economists and analysts warned of this trajectory. Their forecasts were not based on abstract models but on daily observations: rising inflation, widening budget shortfalls, and the quiet disappearance of public oversight.

The Central Bank of Libya (CBL), long reticent, has now joined that chorus with a rare and public statement. Its warnings are stark: In 2024, the Government of National Unity spent over 109 billion Libyan dinars (LYD), while the parallel government in the east accrued more than forty-nine billion in off-budget obligations. Neither figure reflects coordination or restraint—just the actions of officials either ignorant of or indifferent to the consequences of unchecked spending.

Bracing for financial chaos

Both ledgers lay bare the scale of state capture and fiscal chaos. Alongside these warnings, the CBL also amended the official exchange rate, raising it to 5.48 LYD to the dollar while retaining its fifteen percent surcharge on foreign currency purchases. Framed as a technical adjustment, the move is a stopgap—an attempt to accommodate political excess within a shrinking monetary space. It underscores a deeper truth: Libya’s financial institutions are no longer guiding the economy. They are bracing against its unraveling.

Superficially, Libya still functions. Oil, at least in practice, is still exported. Salaries, though often late, are eventually deposited in the accounts of the country’s bloated public-sector employees.

But beneath the surface, the economy is disassembling. The black-market exchange rate has climbed to 7.8 LYD to the dollar within forty-eight hours of the CBL’s decree, a warranted vote of no confidence in Libya’s fiscal and monetary custodians. Institutions that once stabilized the system—through budgetary checks, revenue cycle audits, regulated foreign exchange, or centralized oversight—have been hollowed out or deactivated. What remains is an economy run on improvisation, backroom deals, and political convenience.

Looking back, the architecture of corruption has evolved in stages. First came the scramble for what Muammar Gaddafi had monopolized the allocation of: budget lines, salary schemes, and procurement deals. Later, transitional authorities waged fights over who wrote those allocations—to control the institutions and the budget pens. Today, that logic has culminated in the complete distortion of the allocation process itself. Libya’s economic crisis is no longer just about who benefits. It is about how benefit is manufactured.

An innovative system of corruption

Over the past several years, opaque and improvised mechanisms have steadily replaced formal revenue channels. At first, these workarounds were viewed as a tolerable compromise—a necessary price for preserving a fragile calm and avoiding renewed conflict. But what was once seen as a temporary accommodation has metastasized into a full-blown system of economic governance, one in which accountability is absent and discretion is unchecked. Crude-for-fuel barter deals, once framed as a pragmatic workaround, have become routine, sidestepping the national budget and brokered through opaque channels with no public oversight. They routinely bypass the national budget entirely and were often negotiated through informal brokers with transnational networks and no public scrutiny. Though the National Oil Corporation (NOC) has pledged to end crude-for-fuel swaps by March 2025, these deals are already being eclipsed by more elaborate and opaque arrangements—the latest evolution in Libya’s system of innovative corruption.

One of the most illustrative examples is Arkenu, a Benghazi-based company originally established for geological research but now repurposed as a vehicle for shadow oil exports. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts, Arkenu is operated by actors aligned with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar and serves as a financial conduit for eastern military and political interests. In 2024 alone, Arkenu independently exported approximately $460 million worth of crude oil under a GNU-approved deal, absent any transparent bidding, auditing, or publication of terms. As of 2025, it remains active—continuing to lift crude monthly from the National Oil Corporation—and sits at the center of an emerging system in which state-linked assets are repurposed to fund political actors outside formal channels.

The role of armed groups

Meanwhile, armed groups have entrenched themselves deeper into the infrastructure of Libya’s energy economy. In both east and west, militias have embedded themselves in utilities such as the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL), where operational choices are influenced more by kleptocratic leverage than by institutional standards. Between 2022 and 2024, an estimated 1.125 million tons of diesel—allocated theoretically for power generation—were illicitly exported from Benghazi’s old harbor. These exports were facilitated through inflated supply requests issued via GECOL, the obstruction of audits, and threats of violence against oversight bodies.

The NOC, too, has been drawn into this vortex. Crony contracting has allowed politically connected firms to secure procurement deals and operational privileges, eroding the firewall between national resource management and elite patronage. This dynamic accelerated following the 2022 appointment of Farhat Bengdara as NOC chairman in a power-sharing arrangement between the GNU and eastern authorities. Though intended to ease executive tensions, the move entrenched political influence over the corporation’s operations. Bengdara’s abrupt resignation in early 2025 did not reverse this trajectory. Instead, his tenure left a lasting imprint: a politicized NOC, increasingly leveraged for factional gain rather than safeguarding Libya’s oil wealth.

This erosion of institutional neutrality has a fiscal analog in Libya’s monetary policy, where political imperatives now override sound economic management. At the core of the dysfunction lies the unchecked expansion of the money supply. Independent estimates suggest that the volume of money in circulation now exceeds 170 billion LYD—a level of liquidity that far outpaces productive output or revenue generation. But the deeper concern lies not in the quantity itself, but in how much of it has been manufactured ex nihilo.

Digital monetary creation—the injection of funds into the economy without any corresponding revenue or production—has become the fallback of a political order unwilling to curb spending or enforce discipline. The predictable result has been a cascading erosion of the LYD’s value, a surge in inflation, and a growing public mistrust in the state’s ability to steward its financial future. As foreign reserves shrink and black-market rates spike, Libya’s monetary system is no longer a stabilizing force; it is a mirror of its dysfunction. To call this mismanagement is too generous. This is structural predation, a system designed both to fail and extract. Public wealth is scarcely channeled into services or national development. It is captured, funneled through kleptocratic networks, and increasingly siphoned through untraceable contracts and offshore accounts.

Avenues of reform

Addressing this collapse requires more than fiscal prudence. It demands political realignment. Libya’s economic institutions must be recentered as sites of national governance, not tools of factional financing. The institutions that govern oil revenues, control disbursement, and oversee procurement must be protected, reformed, and in many cases rebuilt, not just with new laws, but with new incentives, protections, and public visibility.

A credible reform strategy must begin with mandatory public disclosure of all oil contracts, real-time publication of state spending, and a ban on off-budget arrangements. Procurement must be regulated through transparent, competitive systems. Revenue distribution must be guided by transparency, equity, and public oversight—not by decentralization for its own sake, nor by external stewardship. Reform must strengthen national institutions while ensuring that public funds reach intended sectors and communities through accountable, legally grounded mechanisms. These are not just technocratic ideals. They are prerequisites for legitimacy and recovery.

International actors—donors, multilateral institutions, and diplomatic envoys—must stop treating Libya’s economic collapse as a mere byproduct of its political fragmentation. Stability manufactured atop corruption is not stability at all. While much emphasis is placed on unifying the government, doing so without reforming its fiscal architecture would merely centralize corruption under a single executive. That may deliver temporary coherence, but it will not constitute progress. In fact, it risks consolidating the very networks that have driven economic ruin. Libya does need a single budget and a unified executive—but one subject to strict and enforceable guardrails on how public money is spent, disclosed, and audited. External engagement must support this principle. Anything less only subsidizes the continuation of state capture under a new administrative label.

Libya is not doomed to economic failure. But its current trajectory is unsustainable—not solely because the price of the oil barrel dropped, but because the political will to govern with integrity has long since evaporated. Recovery will require confrontation, not consensus. And it must begin with reclaiming the institutions that were designed to serve the public, not those who profit from its decline. Tinkering with technical levers like the exchange rate may buy time. But when such adjustments are used to sustain elite corruption rather than correct structural imbalances, they do not stabilize, they provoke. If this continues, the next phase of Libya’s crisis will not be quiet erosion. It will be public revolt.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council where he advises on US and European policies toward North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on Libya’s conflict.

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The group’s more cautious posturing demonstrates Hezbollah knows it’s in no condition to fight.

This reality presents Hezbollah with a dilemma. Meaningfully responding to either Israel’s renewed military effort in Gaza or its continued attacks in Lebanon would invite war upon Lebanon again, mooting its quest for reconstruction aid and risking heightened Lebanese, and more critically Shia, dissatisfaction. But acquiescence, though it may currently be the more prudent choice for the group, also carries the risk of exposing its weakness and inability to confront the Israelis. This, too, risks siphoning Shia support.

To navigate this dilemma, Hezbollah is falling back on propaganda organs to spin its difficult situation positively.

Impact of war with Israel

During the year-long war, Israel decimated large parts of the group’s arsenal and wiped out its best military commanders and top political leadership. Both Bashar al-Assad’s downfall in Syria and US President Donald Trump’s rise in Washington have severely restricted Hezbollah’s paths to regeneration. Meanwhile, within Lebanon, the group must now contend with a population and politicians restive from an unnecessary war and calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament—rumblings that, if they spread into its Shia base, could threaten the group’s demise.

Squeezed as it is, Hezbollah is not currently aiming to rebuild enough strength to fight Israel nor to dominate Lebanon outright. Instead, the group is focused on the more achievable goal of navigating its current—largely self-imposed—predicament and surviving. Retaining its massive support among Lebanese Shias will prove critical to this objective, deterring any potential hostile moves by Hezbollah’s political opponents or the Lebanese government.

But retaining its supporters will depend on Hezbollah securing the reconstruction of the Shia community’s homes and properties destroyed in the recent war with Israel. The group will also need to demonstrate to its base that it maintains the ability to deter Israel and defeat it in battle—an image Hezbollah cultivated over decades and which acts as the basis of much of its popular support.

While both tasks will pose challenges for the group, the latter will be more difficult. Back in November, the Israelis forced Hezbollah to abandon its promise to continue attacking Israel until a cease-fire was achieved in the Gaza Strip, just two months after Hezbollah’s late Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had directly challenged Jerusalem to try to make his group back down. Hezbollah’s inaction as the fighting resumes in the Palestinian enclave undoubtedly highlights this capitulation—especially coupled with the group’s passivity while Israel’s air force continues to regularly target Hezbollah assets and kill its operatives and commanders with impunity throughout Lebanon.

Spinning the narrative: Hezobllah’s save-face

Hezbollah’s face-saving narrative rests, first and foremost, in its claim of victory over Israel in the recent war. This is based on three assertions.

The first assertion seeks to demonstrate that Hezbollah had to initiate attacks against Israel on October 8, 2023. The group thus claims it was preempting an imminent and unprovoked Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At once, this exonerates Hezbollah from provoking an unnecessary war with the Israelis over a foreign conflict amid near-total Lebanese economic collapse and paints Israel as the aggressor. Having thus positioned itself once again as Lebanon’s defender, the group’s narrative then heavily exaggerates both the odds confronting Hezbollah and Israel’s war goals—claiming the Israelis, with unlimited US and European backing, sought to utterly destroy Hezbollah, reach Beirut, and dominate Lebanon. Israel’s failure to achieve those goals is then taken as proof of the group’s success.

From there, Hezbollah claims its decision to agree to a unilateral cease-fire came “from a position of strength,” in Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s words—a concession to the requests of the Lebanese state, to spare the Lebanese people further suffering at the hands of the “murderous” Israelis, rather than caving to Israel’s military pressure. Qassem has thus repeatedly stressed that it was only natural for Hezbollah to accept the November 27, 2024, Lebanon-Israel cease-fire deal because it never sought to start a war.

“We opened a support front,” he said in a recent interview, “but support fronts don’t lead to war . . . that was an Israeli decision,” inverting the role of aggressor and victim.

While that portion of Hezbollah’s narrative is meant to neatly package past events, the group has also developed an elaborate explanation for its persistent hold of fire despite continued Israeli operations. On Lebanon, the group insists it is motivated by the same sense of national responsibility that led it to accept the cease-fire deal, and not weakness. National responsibility, Hezbollah’s officials claim, now demands the group give diplomacy and the Lebanese State the chance to deal with the Israeli threat—while caveating with threats that its patience is not infinite.

As its inaction relates to the Palestinians, Hezbollah’s narrative has endlessly emphasized the group’s sacrifices to date on behalf of the “resistance” and the people in Gaza. During and after the war, the group stressed that its south Lebanon support front had bogged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) down, slowing its advance in the Gaza Strip and blunting the worst impact of its war effort—even as Hezbollah somewhat contradictorily insisted that Israel was exterminating Gaza’s population.

In any case, Hezbollah insisted that agreeing to the November 27, 2024 cease-fire deal only meant the group would—in Qassem’s words—continue to “support Palestine in different forms” rather than stop altogether. Hezbollah did this in past years by arming and training militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operating inside Israel to carry out their own attacks or by facilitating operations against the Israelis by the Lebanon-based franchises of these groups. This allowed Hezbollah to maintain pressure on Israel, bleed out the IDF, and demonstrate its continued commitment to the Palestinian cause, while also maintaining enough plausible deniability to avoid proportionate Israeli retribution.

But now Hezbollah’s direct link to Palestinian groups in Israel has been cut off both by Assad’s downfall in Syria and the IDF’s continued occupation of five strategic points in south Lebanon. Meanwhile, unless diplomatic pressure can halt their strikes in Lebanon, the Israelis are set on aggressively enforcing new rules of engagement with Hezbollah that would deprive the group of its old ability to hide behind anonymous actors or third parties. In recent weeks alone, Israel responded forcefully to anonymous rocket fire from Hezbollah-controlled areas of south Lebanon and assassinated high-ranking Hezbollah commander Hassan Ali Badeer in Beirut on claims he helped Hamas plan a mass-casualty attack against Israelis abroad.

Despite these odds, Hezbollah still possesses the one advantage that has given its narratives traction in the past. The group, after all, is seeking to convince an audience that is half converted, in a broad sense, and half held captive by fear of the organization—rather than the buy-in of skeptics or open adversaries. But it is premature to rule on Hezbollah’s chances of success this time. Facts are, after all, unforgiving by their very nature. This time, the harsh reality—that Israel decisively defeated and critically weakened the group—may be too obvious and overwhelming for Hezbollah’s sophisticated propaganda organs to claim that the “Party of God” has once again emerged victorious.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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The timing, need, and opportunity may never be more compelling. And, arguably, a military option is more feasible now than at any time in recent decades. 

Trump has set a sixty-day target to reach a deal. The Iranians will be adept at extending that timeline. But if negotiations peter out and the looming reimposition of sanctions—the snapback—occurs, with an Iranian response, Washington will reach a crisis. For Trump, that will be the point of decision over escalation. 

Stubborn gaps 

If and when talks get serious, the two sides will face major gaps. Trump is seeking a tougher deal than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  

His aims include fully dismantling Tehran’s nuclear program. Such a dismantling would require the removal and destruction of its enrichment capability, including recently installed advanced centrifuges; the export of all but a token amount of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile; and intrusive international inspections of all declared nuclear sites and undeclared sites in perpetuity with no sunsets. 

Based on all Iranian behavior in previous rounds of negotiations, there is no reason to believe Tehran would agree to these terms. Iran has for decades worked to assemble an industrial nuclear program, which the regime believes to be key to its survival. The notion that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at age eighty-five and nearing the end of his rule, would agree to give it all up is implausible. 

If, somehow, Iran did show openness to a full dismantlement, it would surely insist on major sanctions relief in exchange. Iranian leaders could only justify accepting what they would see as humiliating terms on the nuclear program if it would bring dramatic economic relief to their people. 

But US sanctions against Iran encompass a wide range of goals beyond its nuclear program. Designations include constraints on Iran’s ballistic missile program, its proliferation or acquisition of advanced military equipment, Tehran’s vast terrorist proxy network (including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen), and its human rights abuses. Some of these sanctions, such as those contained in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, could only be removed through legislation. There is scant appetite in the US Congress for this level of sanctions relief against a long-time adversary.  

Meanwhile, a deadline looms in October for the snapback of sanctions against Iran that were suspended when it signed the JCPOA. After Trump withdrew from the deal during his first term in 2018, Iran began to violate the agreement’s terms, installing centrifuges and enriching uranium beyond the prescribed amounts.

The remaining members of the deal, which include the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, may initiate the snapback of pre-JCPOA sanctions, which no member of the United Nations Security Council can veto.  

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM), aimed at imposing “maximum pressure” on Iran, calls for working with the United States’ European partners to implement the snapback, and the initial diplomatic moves to trigger this process must take place by late summer. 

Potential outcomes 

Given these challenges, three options are likely to emerge from the negotiations: One, a limited deal that does not fundamentally dismantle Iran’s program, but buys some time; two, no deal, the deadline approaching, and the imposition of snapback sanctions, leading to a crisis; and three, a military strike against the nuclear program. 

There is precedent for the limited deal option. In 2013, Iran agreed to the Joint Plan of Action, which provided limited sanctions relief in exchange for Iran freezing certain aspects of its nuclear program and modestly (and reversibly) downgrading others. A “less-for-less” deal of this type could conceivably kick the can down the road, relieving Trump or Khamenei from having to make a fateful decision. It could include a new United Nations Security Council Resolution extending the snapback timeline.  

But now, Iran’s program is at such an advanced stage that a freeze would still leave it capable of breaking out at a time of its choosing. By all estimations, Iran sits on the threshold of nuclear breakout—the ability to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium to assemble a nuclear device. In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had tripled its stockpile of sixty percent enriched uranium in just three months and now possessed enough—if enriched to ninety percent—to manufacture several weapons. Meanwhile, reports persist that Iranian scientists, without a clear direction from the supreme leader, are conducting research that would shorten the path to building a nuclear weapon, if they are ever ordered to do so. In the face of these realities, a limited deal would be at odds with the urgency Trump has repeatedly conveyed to address Iran’s nuclear program in a definitive way. 

Passing the deadline with no resolution would allow a very precarious situation to persist. If there is no progress in negotiations, the United States and its European partners are unlikely to let the snapback deadline pass without restoring sanctions. But Iran has countered that if snapback occurs, it will retaliate, perhaps by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which would mean the end of IAEA inspections) or, conceivably, by taking steps toward a breakout it has until now foregone. The situation would linger on an even sharper knife’s edge than it does today. 

That leaves a military strike, which could be executed by the United States, Israel, or the two in combination, perhaps even with the support of others. Whatever limited chance there is for success in negotiations, it will depend on Iran perceiving a credible military threat—and the willingness to use it.  

Trump and his team have said clearly that dealing with the problem militarily is the only option if negotiations fail, but showing is more persuasive than telling. The deployment of B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia in late March is a useful example. Those aircraft have reportedly been used in operations against the Houthis in Yemen, as they were on a previous round of strikes against the Houthis in October 2024. But US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth suggested Iran must consider that this highly capable aircraft and the heavy payloads it can carry could also be employed against their nuclear sites. 

The logic of a military strike 

There are two key reasons why the military option may be more imminent now than in the last decades of the Tehan-Washington standoff.  

The first is the result of Israel’s retaliatory strikes against Iran on October 26, 2024. Using capabilities Iran had not previously seen and had no means to detect or intercept, Israel did more than just strike its targets. It struck a psychological blow against Tehran, leaving Iran aware that it was highly vulnerable to additional strikes and had a significantly reduced ability to protect key locations, including nuclear sites. 

Second, Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah in the fall of 2024 eliminates a major response option Iran had long counted on to deter an Israeli or US strike and to retaliate if it ever came. By all accounts—prior to the war in Gaza that began with the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023—Hezbollah possessed well over one hundred thousand rockets and missiles it could use to target Israel. The stockpile included several thousand with precision guidance that could target strategic sites and major population centers, numerically overwhelming Israel’s air defenses. Once Israel completed a significant weakening of Hamas in Gaza, it turned to the north. Using precise intelligence gathered over many years, Israel eliminated the vast majority of Hezbollah’s advanced weapons before they were even prepared for launch. The result is that, for the first time in years, Israel no longer needs to fear a massive Hezbollah missile barrage as a response to operations against Iran. That Iranian deterrent is gone. 

The United States could choose to strike alone, intending to set back Tehran’s nuclear program for a meaningful period of time. As that decision point is still some time off, current deployments do not necessarily reflect the assets that would be employed in such a strike. But the news that a second carrier strike group is arriving in the region to supplement the one currently engaged in counter-Houthi strikes demonstrates the US military’s capability to flow a variety of assets to the region to prepare for a range of contingencies. 

Alternatively, Trump could signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he does not object to an Israeli strike—a so-called green light. Israel would almost certainly need to operate in areas that are in proximity to US forces, so some degree of coordination or deconfliction would be necessary. As it demonstrated in its October 2024 strikes, Israel has significant capabilities—not identical to Washington’s, but meaningful and perhaps surprising. The United States and Israel would have to agree on the goal of such an operation and assess Israel’s ability to achieve it. 

The most effective option may be a combined US-Israeli operation. Israel’s integration into US Central Command over the past four years has significantly upgraded the interoperability of US and Israeli forces. Following the strong defense support the United States provided to Israel since the October 7 attacks, military-to-military trust is at an all-time high. A combined strike that divides up key tasks, maximizing each country’s unique capabilities, might achieve the most significant setback of the Iranian nuclear program and, importantly, limit Iran’s ability and incentive to respond. Trump suggested he may see an Israeli-led attack, in which the United States participates, as the most likely scenario. 

Any such military operation comes with risk and the need for Washington to protect its regional forces, allies, and partners—including Israel and the Gulf states. Already, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Qalibaf threatened that Iran would attack US forces and their host nations in the Gulf in response to a US strike.  

Iran possesses a large arsenal of ballistic missiles with the range to reach those locations. And Iran previously made the reckless decision—twice—to attack Israel directly from Iran. So a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities requires defensive preparations, including buttressed air defenses. Some of these preparations will be visible and may indeed have a deterrent effect on Iran, or, in the best case, help produce eleventh-hour concessions that might make it possible to avoid the strike entirely. But having made the decision to strike, leaders have to be prepared to follow through if necessary. 

Deterrence strategies 

There are additional ways to deter or limit Iranian retaliation. Trump might communicate in negotiations that the goal of the operation is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but that if Iran responds and there are significant US or allied casualties, additional strikes could target the stability of the regime or its energy infrastructure. Iran has long envisioned a nuclear option as a potential guarantor of regime stability. But with that option removed, Khamenei might opt for standing down in exchange for sparing his regime and its economic foundations. 

Iran has the knowledge to reconstitute any nuclear assets that are damaged or destroyed. Estimations of how long it would take Iran to do so are generally based on the time needed to carry out physical reconstruction and do not fully take into account political, economic, or deterrence barriers to doing so.  

A successful military operation might buy considerably more time than one thinks. Even so, the United States should only undertake such an operation if it is prepared to potentially repeat it. Planners must realistically scope the force posture required in the Middle East to keep that option available and consider how doing so affects US commitments in other theaters, particularly the Indo-Pacific. 

Military action must always be undertaken with full awareness of the tactical and strategic risks involved. But to achieve the goal he has set with Iran, Trump may find that the moment has come. 

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He has previously served as Washington’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel. 

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Trump’s demand for a negotiated settlement comes with a fast-approaching deadline reportedly set for mid-May 2025, with a secondary time limit set for mid-August, tied to the expiration of the 2015 nuclear deal’s provisions.

This ticking clock is no bluff. It aligns with a political and military strategy that maximizes US leverage. The Trump administration has synchronized its “maximum pressure” campaign—reimposing sanctions and targeting Iran’s oil exports—with a military posture that leaves no room for misinterpretation. Unlike his first term, where maximum pressure failed to bring Iran to the table, the current context is different: Iran’s economy is reeling, its proxies are broken, and its defenses are compromised. The stars have aligned in a way they haven’t before, giving Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu both the will and the means to act decisively if Iran refuses.
 
The US military presence in the Middle East has escalated significantly due to the campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and the looming showdown over Iran’s nuclear program. Washington’s ramped-up deployments suggest both aims of deterring and preparing for potential strikes. Two carrier strike groups, including the USS Carl Vinson, are now positioned in the region, alongside additional fighter squadrons and B-2 stealth bombers stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, additional fighter aircraft, and missile defense systems deployed in strategic locations for the United States across the Middle East.

These assets, capable of delivering precision strikes deep into Iranian territory, are not merely symbolic. The B-2s are particularly designed to penetrate advanced air defenses and target hardened facilities, precisely the kind housing Iran’s nuclear program. The missile defense systems deployed by the United States are meant to stave off retaliatory strikes from Iran against targets in the region. This isn’t just the Trump administration posturing— it’s the build up of a very viable military option.

Compounding Iran’s predicament is the decimation of its proxy network, a cornerstone of its regional influence and deterrence strategy. Hamas, once a potent thorn in Israel’s side, has been reduced to a shadow of its former self following Israel’s relentless military campaign in Gaza after the Palestinian militant group’s October 7, 2023 attacks. Hezbollah, Iran’s most formidable ally in Lebanon, has similarly been battered, its missile stockpiles depleted and leadership crippled by Israeli operations. The December 2024 fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria has further severed Iran’s land bridge to Hezbollah, leaving its Axis of Resistance in tatters.

These losses strip Iran of its ability to wage asymmetric warfare against US or Israeli forces, a tactic it has long relied upon to offset its conventional military weaknesses. Without these proxies, Iran’s strategic depth is shallow, exposing it to direct retaliation with little buffer. 

The destruction of Iran’s S-300 air defense systems by Israel in October 2024 has left the country even more defenseless. The S-300, a Russian-supplied system, was Iran’s most advanced shield against aerial attacks, intended to protect key nuclear and military sites. Its obliteration—demonstrated by Israel’s ability to strike with impunity—means US or Israeli bombers could face minimal resistance penetrating Iranian airspace. Iran’s remaining defenses, largely outdated or domestically produced, are no match for stealth technology or the overwhelming firepower now arrayed against it. This vulnerability transforms Trump’s threats from rhetoric into a credible promise of devastation, as Iran’s nuclear facilities lie naked before US and allied air forces. 

For Iran to ignore this demand would be to bet on its ability to withstand a military onslaught it is ill-equipped to repel. Tehran’s leadership may cling to ideological defiance or hope for diplomatic stalling, but the reality is stark: its nuclear program, enriched to near-weapons-grade levels, is a red line for both the United States and Israel, and the latter has already shown its willingness to strike. With Trump signaling openness to talks but readiness for war—“negotiate or face bombing the likes of which they’ve never seen”— Iran risks not just the loss of its nuclear ambitions but the decimation of its military and economic infrastructure. The regime’s survival hinges on recognizing this unprecedented alignment of forces and choosing pragmatism over pride. To do otherwise is to invite ruin.

To underscore the seriousness of the issue and cooperation with Israel on the matter, Trump stated, just days before the United States is set to begin negotiations with Tehran, that Israel would be the “leader” of a potential military strike against Iran if it doesn’t give up its nuclear weapons program. He also said that Iran would be in “great danger” if the talks were “unsuccessful.” When asked if that meant military action, Trump confirmed and said “if necessary, absolutely . . . If it requires military, we’re going to have military.” 

The Israeli government supports Trump’s attempts to negotiate a settlement. Netanyahu supports a disarmament model in which the United States would oversee the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, similar to how it did in Libya in 2003. But Netanyahu has still expressed skepticism about a potential deal, saying “I think that would be a good thing.” 

“But whatever happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons,” he added. The comment appears to leave room for Israel to maneuver in the event a US deal is unfavorable. 

If the United States and Iran reach a deal that fails to satisfy security needs from the Israeli government’s perspective, then Israel could still act alone. As such, the best outcome is a deal that satisfies security concerns for all parties, though it will be difficult domestically for the regime in Tehran to capitulate to Washington’s position of total and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. Failure to do so could have significant consequences with global implications.  

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the Initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He is currently a principal and industry director at Providence Consulting Group for aerospace, defense, and high-tech electronics.

The post Iran is at an unprecedented crossroads over its nuclear program appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While Iran may have repositioned some personnel as the Telegraph claims, there is no credible evidence of pulling back support from the Houthis or a wholesale “abandonment.” Tehran still has its ambassador in Sanaa who advises the Houthis and maintains a significant covert operational presence in Yemen through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), specifically its Quds Force. Moreover, General Abdul Reza Shahlai, a senior Quds Force commander who has been active in Yemen since at least 2011–2012, serves on the Houthis’ Jihadis council. The IRGC’s presence in Yemen is linked to its so-called “6000 branch,” which oversees operations across the Arabian Peninsula.

The “abandonment” narrative is not an isolated distortion. In Iraq, the recent Reuters reporting suggests militias might disarm, but mentions they’re considering “turning the groups into political parties and integrating them into the Iraqi armed forces”—effectively institutionalizing rather than diminishing their influence. It’s part of a broader choreography of plausible deniability that Iran has perfected across the region. In Syria, its presence was labeled “advisory” as it built entrenched military outposts. In Iraq, it blurred the line between state and militia. In Yemen, the illusion has matured: Iran no longer needs to defend its role. Others do it for them. 

Tehran’s alleged storyline by this anonymous source is likely a leak to test reactions, meant to simultaneously accomplish three key goals: it gives the US administration a symbolic win, creates space for Iran to maneuver for sanctions relief and its nuclear ambitions without concessions, and sends a message to international observers that it is capable of restraint. It’s not nearly anywhere near surrender and acknowledgment of Iran’s limits with its proxies; it’s simply diplomacy by the headline.

The Houthi-Iran dynamic

When confronted with the Telegraph article, a senior Houthi official mocked the idea that Iran had ever deployed personnel to Yemen. Houthi foreign minister Jamal Amer explicitly stated to Reuters that “Iran is not interfering in our decision, but what is happening is that it mediates sometimes.” There was no mention of Iranian withdrawal of support, only continued alignment within Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” network. For the Houthis, who boast of their role in that axis, admitting dependence would signal weakness. Denying the premise reinforces a fiction that serves both sides.

Ironically, Tehran has long claimed it plays no direct role in Yemen, a position that strains credulity given the Houthis’ advanced weaponry, military training, and tightly aligned messaging. Just this March, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei asserted the Houthis act independently while simultaneously embracing them as core members of the “Axis of Resistance.” With Iran deliberately obscuring its operational control and coordination, the Houthis’ proxy status has become a geopolitical Rorschach test, revealing more about observers’ biases than the facts on the ground. This calculated ambiguity is not a bug but a feature of Iran’s regional strategy.

For close observers of Yemen-Iran dynamics, one of the most persistent fictions has been the idea that Tehran attempts to restrain the Houthis. This narrative, repeated by Western officials and analysts alike, casts the Houthis as impulsive or unruly, as if they were acting against Iran’s advice rather than as part of its regional architecture. It’s an unsubstantiated claim, but a deeply useful one. It builds the myth of Houthi autonomy while shielding Iran from the consequences of its alignment.

A “victory” for Trump? The danger of misreading strategic signals

Trump’s approach seems to have generated new calculations in Tehran. After the president ordered “decisive and powerful military action” against Houthi targets in Yemen in March 2025, warning that “Hell will rain down” if attacks continued, Iranian officials responded with their characteristic mix of defiance and caution. This escalatory rhetoric, coupled with the Trump administration’s “more aggressive approach” that targets a broader range of Houthi assets and personnel, has created strategic pressure that Iran struggles to counter. While Tehran publicly maintains a posture of defiance, any attempt to withdraw IRGC personnel from Yemen simply suggests a reluctance to expose high-value assets to US firepower.

Iranian state media portrays Trump as an impulsive, unstrategic figure whose actions are driven by ego and spectacle rather than coherent policy. He is depicted as lacking both military and political understanding, engaging in reckless interventions not out of strength, but out of bluster and desperation. As such, the “abandonment” narrative hands him a neatly packaged win, potentially reducing pressure on Tehran and its proxies. But the notion that Iran abandoned the Houthis without restraining them exposes the dishonesty of Tehran’s position. Trump has said he will hold Iran responsible for “every shot fired by the Houthis,” making a simple withdrawal meaningless. A real disengagement would require Iran to stop Houthi attacks. Instead, Tehran seeks credit for restraint while allowing its proxy to continue. It cannot have things both ways.

Despite this logical contradiction, the misinformation campaign has gained traction in media circles, with many uncritically repeating the abandonment narrative while Iran maintains operational support for Houthi forces.

The new proxy consortium: Russia, China, and Iran.

While much has been made of Tehran’s supposed withdrawal, equally important is understanding what’s filling the perceived vacuum. Growing Russian and Chinese influence offers the Houthis alternative channels of support that complement, rather than replace, Iran’s backing. Reports indicate increasing cooperation with Moscow, including Russian military experts in Sanaa advising on weapons and targeting.

China, with economic stakes in the Red Sea through its Belt and Road Initiative, maintains a diplomatic balance, calling for de-escalation while positioning as a mediator. Rather than a pivot away from Iran, these ties reflect a Houthi diversification strategy, creating a more complex web of support that’s harder for the United States to disrupt.

Instead of seeing this as a zero-sum game between Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing, one might consider how these powers complement each other: Iran offers ideological cohesion, media support, and a commanding role; Russia, military expertise and diplomatic cover; China, economic depth and global legitimacy.

This complementary support structure is evident in the material flows to Houthi territory. In March 2025, Yemeni authorities intercepted eight hundred Chinese drone propellers en route to the Houthis through the Sarfayt border crossing with Oman in a route long exploited by the IRGC throughout the Yemeni conflict. Earlier, in August 2024, officials also seized Chinese-manufactured hydrogen fuel cells, a technology that enables drones to fly higher, longer, and with greater precision. Analysts suggest these enhanced drones could identify targets over one hundred miles away, dramatically increasing the Houthis’ strike range.

Meanwhile, China and Russia have quietly secured safe passage through the Red Sea, a privilege not extended to most other countries, whose vessels remain subject to Houthi attacks.

Perhaps more revealing, on March 22, 2025, Moscow-based influencers and pro-government Chinese personalities were spotted in Sanaa, attending a solidarity conference with Palestine at the Houthis’ invitation. Their presence was not incidental, it was a signal of a growing diplomatic alignment between these powers, and a carefully staged one at that.

What we’re witnessing in Yemen’s north is an expansion and sophistication of the Houthi support network. The emerging trilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China, in this nearly overt fashion, is a strategic investment in the Middle East that these countries are making for the long-term future and stability of their authoritarian power. 

All this gives the Houthis an advantage as they manage a complex web of like-minded alliances, each bringing complementary resources: Iranian ideological alignment and strong geopolitical backing, Russian military expertise, and Chinese economic and technological capabilities. This model of distributed sponsorship may well represent the future of proxy warfare in the region, creating redundancy, resilience, and expanded capability while diffusing attribution and accountability.

What next?

Meanwhile, Iran’s strategic ambiguity conceals mounting anxiety over Trump’s unpredictability and stated hostility toward the regime. When US forces  struck Houthi positions in March, IRGC Commander Salami issued contradictory statements, threatening “decisive and destructive” responses while disclaiming control over his Yemeni proxies. As usual, this reveals how Iran projects strength rhetorically while carefully avoiding any direct confrontation that might imperil regime survival.

This delicate balancing act has become increasingly difficult as Iran’s gray zone strategy has collapsed under the weight of its own economic dysfunction and political disarray. Facing economic pressure at home and the decimation of regional allies like Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran cannot afford direct confrontation with the United States, yet cannot abandon its proxy strategy without losing face. The “abandonment” narrative gives Iran a face-saving offramp, appearing to respond to US pressure while preserving its most critical strategic assets and influence.

For Washington, it’s not just easy to stop Iran without disassociating from the risks that could befall the entire region. The former president Ronald Reagan’s doctrine of countering adversarial influence with sustained presence and alliance-building has long since eroded. Despite the Trump administration’s firm stance on Iran through the 2015 nuclear deal withdrawal and maximum pressure campaign, Tehran has managed to leverage the subsequent policy shifts between administrations to expand its regional influence through proxies like the Houthis, who now effectively control critical maritime chokepoints and threaten global shipping lanes with minimal consequences.

Rather than interpreting Iran’s narrative shift as a break, we might see it as a manufactured contradiction, a disfigured present that invites misreading while preserving power. What looks like restraint is often just a symbolic resolution in place of strategic change. This is not disengagement. It’s tactical storytelling.

And the story’s working.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is a Senior Analyst with the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies and a Board Member of Peace Track Initiative. She can be found on X at @YemeniFatima.

The post No, Iran didn’t abandon the Houthis. It just wants Trump to think so.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“The Secretary reiterated that the United States recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and supports Morocco’s serious, credible, and realistic Autonomy Proposal as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute,” reads the statement issued by the State Department after the visit. Nevertheless, one obstacle persists: Dismantling the obsolete and dysfunctional United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

This time, the United States went further by urging the parties to engage in discussions without delay, stating that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the only acceptable framework for dialogue. Rubio even stepped up to offer to facilitate the process, signaling that the only way out of this fifty-year colonial impasse may be outside the United Nations and its legacy of failure to secure a sustainable solution for the Sahraoui people.

A mission without a mandate

As its name stipulates, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara was initially established in 1991 by Security Council resolution 690 to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the mission failed to deliver on its mandate and only served to maintain a state of paralysis throughout the years. It is essential to clarify that while the MINURSO monitors the ceasefire, which still holds for nearly thirty-five years between Morocco and the Polisario Front separatists, it is in no way an active peacekeeping mission, and Morocco continues to administer de facto over 80 percent of the Western Saharan disputed territories since the Spanish exit in 1975. MINURSO staff remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020 to open trade routes with Mauritania.

Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Secretary-General envoy to Western Sahara, was set for defeat from the start. Since 2022, de Mistura has felt out of place in a fast-moving international context, shifting in favor of Morocco.

First, the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in conjunction with re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel in December 2020, knocking down the chessboard in a fragile geopolitical context where MINURSO had maintained the status quo between Morocco and Algeria.

Then came the coup de grace by the two former colonizers of Morocco and Western Sahara, who are at the source of the current superfluous borders, when Spain sided with Morocco in 2022. France followed in 2024, and over twenty-nine countries decided to open diplomatic representations in Western Sahara as a sign of support for the Moroccan stance.

The Italian diplomat himself indicated in October 2024 his intention to step down, alluding to his inability to mediate between a Morocco emboldened by overwhelming international support and an Algeria obstinate in supporting the mirage of Sahraoui self-determination until the very end. In his latest faux pas, Staffan de Mistura proposed the partition of Western Sahara, suggesting that the envoy and the MINURSO are neocolonial instruments from the past, wasting a sixty-one million dollar annual budget, funded in majority by the United States.

Another flagrant example of MINURSO’s irrelevance is how the disputed Western Sahara borders have been, for decades, uncharted territories for terrorist activities from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and, more recently, a fertile ground for Iranian and Russian influence. Besides gathering intel and filing situation reports, the Mission has done very little to address the flourishing drug and human trafficking business in the disputed territories, leaving this task to the Moroccan and Algerian military.

The diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subject to corruption and reselling in open markets like Nouadhibou in Northern Mauritania.

The impracticality of a Sahraoui referendum

Several founding myths surround the Western Sahara file, making a referendum a preposterous and impractical solution—a reality that Western allies like the United States started grasping in recent years.

Contrary to other conflicts, where Indigenous people claim the right to self-determination based on their distinct cultural identity, the Saharaoui people are not native to North Africa. The Arab tribes of Beni Hassan, who trace their ancestry to the Yemeni tribe of Maqil, started moving westward to the Maghreb around the thirteenth century, invited by the Almohad empire of Morocco that needed to reinforce its rule by balancing the Amazigh tribe with the Arab warrior populations. If anything, the Hassani people were the ones who pushed the Indigenous Amazigh tribal confederation of Sanhaja out of the Sahara after the massacre of Char Bouba War in the seventeenth century.

The Hassani people today are transnational communities inhabiting large sections of Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara—hence the impossibility of carrying out a census of who gets to participate in a referendum. To complicate things further for the MINURSO, the Alaouite sultan Moulay Ismail had established the “Guich System”, a feudal system where these very Hassani tribes were used to counter Amazigh rebellions in exchange for land up to the nineteenth century. The descendants of these fighters still live around the capital, Rabat, Marrakech, and Sidi Kacem, and still assert their Sahraoui roots.

In the Moroccan-administered portion of the territory, the central state had additionally provided generous incentives, including double salaries and subsidized gas and essential subsistence items, since the seventies for those willing to relocate to the Sahara, and two generations at least have been in the disputed land. Even in the five refugee camps in Algeria, where about 173,600 individuals still live, it is extremely hard to determine who is a Saharaoui and who came to Tindouf as a result of a multitude of other conflicts in the Sahel. Due to all these complexities, the MINORSO has consistently failed since its establishment to come up with voter lists that would be acceptable to all parties, thereby nullifying the prospects of a referendum and the relevance of a UN Mission entrusted to organize it.

What many Sahraoui people want

In a recent field study in July 2024 to Dakhla, Laayoun, and Boujdour, I covered nearly four hundred miles and spoke to dozens of civil society activists, journalists, officials, and ordinary Sahraoui people from my own tribesmen of Oulad Dlim. Most interviewees in the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara (about 1.1 million inhabitants according to the September 2024 census) expressed extreme fatigue from five decades of conflict and a desire for normality and prosperity. They seemed more hopeful for a sustainable resolution through the Moroccan federal advanced regionalization plan proposed in 2006, which preserves their cultural identity and gives them sovereignty over local governance and natural resources under the Moroccan flag.

It was interesting to observe the shift in the Moroccan strategy toward the Sahara conflict, transcending the purely security approach under Driss al-Basri in the 1990s, beating and arresting demonstrators, to a vision focusing on regional development, a dynamic tourism sector, and the looming hope of the $1.2 billion Dakhla Atlantic harbor megaproject—the cornerstone of the kingdom’s Atlantic Initiative. This recent economic boom made some interlocutors confident in the future, although many stated that Morocco hasn’t provided any details of how the autonomy plan will work in practice and how much control they will have over their natural resources. It’s important to note that the research didn’t include Sahrawis in the camps, who may remain attached to self-determination after five decades on a different trajectory.

For the past thirty-four years, MINURSO has consistently deceived the Sahrawi people by failing to deliver on its mission, promoting a laissez-faire culture, and holding hundreds of thousands hostage to complicated geopolitical calculus. Now, the time is up, and the Sahrawi communities can no longer afford another fifty years of political stalemate. The parties to the conflict, along with US and trans-Atlantic allies, will need to defund, dismantle, and terminate it so the autonomy plan can start taking shape.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan said that “borders are not just lines on a map; they are a reflection of power dynamics,” and today’s dynamics are calling for greater accountability for UN programs like the MINURSO and for out-of-the-box decisive solutions under Trump’s leadership.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on the Western Sahara conflict. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

The post Why it’s time to terminate the UN’s dysfunctional mission in Western Sahara appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Child marriage, and specifically the marriage of young girls to adult men, remains a long-standing problem in many parts of Iraq, even when forbidden under law. Tribal and religious leaders perform marriages outside the formal legal system, making it difficult for authorities to monitor or prevent child marriages. In areas stricken with poverty, conflict, and displacement, families are pushed to marry off their daughters as a means of economic survival or protection.

The original proposed text of the new amendments permitted the marriage of girls from the age of nine in certain circumstances, depending on religious interpretations, and granted religious authorities increased power over family matters, including marriage, divorce, and child custody. Proponents of those amendments, primarily conservative Shiite lawmakers, defended the changes as better aligning the law with Islamic principles and reducing Western influence on Iraqi culture.

Iraqi women’s rights activists protested that the amendments effectively “legalise child rape”, and constitute a dramatic rollback in the rights and protections previously guaranteed to women and children under Iraqi law. Their advocacy and pressure appear to have limited the amendments’ harm by retaining provisions for the minimum age of marriage, child custody, and polygamy.

Under the final text of amendments, which entered into force in February, Muslim couples concluding a marriage contract must elect whether the contract—which specifies right and obligations as regards marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance—is to be governed under the 1959 Personal Status Law or a Personal Status Code (mudawana), the latter to be developed by the Shia Ja’afari school of Islamic jurisprudence. For marriage contracts concluded and registered before the law’s effective date, either party may submit a request to the Personal Status Court to apply rulings of the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence. If parties in a family dispute disagree on whether to apply the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school in cases of divorce, the court will apply the choice of the husband.

The amendments also stipulate that the Shiite Endowment Scientific Council, with the assistance of judges and legal experts and in coordination with the State Council, shall develop a code of personal status based on the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence, and submit it to the parliament within four months of the code’s effective date. This code must comply with existing provisions, including those of the 1959 Law, which sets the minimum age of marriage, with exceptions allowing marriage from the age of 15 with a judge’s permission and depending on the child’s “maturity and physical capacity.”

The Iraqi government issued a statement indicating that the amendments came at the request of the citizens represented by the Shiite component in the parliament. Baghdad also clarified that, under the new law, the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school of jurisprudence apply exclusively to Shiite Iraqis and do not apply to the Sunni Muslims in Iraq.

While there have been some elements of relief that the Iraq parliament has pulled back from legalizing child marriage, the situation remains dynamic, with ongoing discussions concerning the implications of the amendments and the development of the new personal status code, applicable only to the Shia community.

Without enforcement of the law, the Iraqi government is continuing to fail in its duty to protect the rights of its most vulnerable citizens. Girl brides often have little power within their marriages and are less likely to complete their education or be employed, undermining their opportunities for personal and financial autonomy. If divorced or abandoned by their husbands, they have little to equip themselves with to escape cycles of poverty.

Many so-called early marriages constitute de facto forced marriages. Forced marriage is a violation in itself and is also the site of numerous other abuses, including sustained sexual and physical violence. For young girls, pregnancy and childbirth may come with numerous health consequences. According to the World Health Organization, pregnancy and childbirth complications are a leading cause of death among adolescent girls worldwide. Boys who are subjected to early and/or forced marriages are also harmed. Forced to become breadwinners in adolescence, boys suffer curtailed education and career prospects.

The attempts to roll back the rights of women and girls, and the Government’s empowerment of religious authorities to govern people’s personal affairs, underscore the urgent need to support Iraqi human rights activists, and women and children’s rights activists in particular. With Iraq receding from the international headlines and as US humanitarian aid cuts increase the fragility of human rights work, there is a danger that Iraq’s most vulnerable are being left behind.

Sareta Ashraph is a senior legal advisor for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. 

The post Legalizing child marriage in Iraq: Stepping back from the brink appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Paired with recent successive losses of other Iran proxies’ leadership, it may seem that the Houthis’ demise is a foregone conclusion. However, such an assumption underestimates the Houthis’ resilience, strategic adaptability, and deep-rooted influence within Yemen.

The challenges of targeting the rebels require recognition from the Trump administration that a purely military approach will not achieve Washington’s goal of “complete annihilation.”

Washington last week took a rather significant step to expand its anti-Houthi crackdowns beyond military force, announcing sanctions targeting two Russia-based Afghan brothers who assisted Sa’id al-Jamal in orchestrating shipments of stolen Ukrainian grain from Crimea to Yemen. However, the Trump administration’s Houthi strategy will require a more nuanced approach that deepens these non-military components.

The Trump administration should employ a multi-pronged strategy, combining increased intelligence operations on the ground, intensified naval interdictions, and robust regional diplomacy to pressure external actors, particularly Russia and China, from bolstering the group’s capabilities through economic incentives like sanctions relief or threats of increased tariffs.

Houthi resilience

Despite a forceful military intervention from the Saudi-led international coalition against the group since their 2014 takeover of the capital in Sanaa, the Houthis have maintained, and expanded, their control in Yemen. The once small rebel group has evolved into a formidable military force, with emerging international support helping to enable their expanding maritime threats.

One of the greatest challenges in eliminating the Houthis lies in neutralizing their leadership, particularly their charismatic leader Abdel Malik al-Houthi, who has played a vital role in the organization since ascending as their leader in 2004.

Unlike other Iran-backed organizations, the Houthis have a dynastic structure and are highly centralized around al-Houthi and his family. The loss of al-Houthi would be a major blow to the organization, especially given that the lack of a clear successor would likely mean the group would need to focus on quelling internal rivalries instead of operations. But taking al-Houthi out will be a tall order.

Gaps in US strategy: hard and soft power tactics

The United States’ ability to track al-Houthi is likely hindered by limited intelligence on the ground in Yemen. This reality was echoed early last year when the US had difficulty assessing the success of its operations and the group’s full arsenal due to a lack of intelligence. Without a reliable presence or informant network, targeting such a well-hidden leader will prove challenging.

Combatting Houthi messaging around the military campaign requires a nuanced approach, too: the rebels have leveraged the damage to vital infrastructure and civilian casualties from the airstrikes for their own propaganda.

Finally, to keep the Houthis from popping up again, the United States would have to sever the group’s means of resupplying, especially from its international partners. Efforts to cut off weapons deliveries from the Houthis’ primary backers, Tehran, have been inconsistent. Due to factors like shifting regional priorities and a desire to avoid escalation with Iran, US naval efforts to seize Iranian weapons shipments to the group have ebbed and flowed in recent years.

At the same time, Iranian efforts to evade detection through tactics like using decoy boats, transferring arms while at sea, and disguising shipments as fishing boats or hiding them on civilian cargo ships also make interception more difficult. In fact, only an estimated 20 Iranian smuggling vessels were intercepted between 2015 and 2024.

During that time, the Houthis announced several concerning new technologies that appeared to be at least partially of Iranian origin, including a missile they claim can reach hypersonic speeds and a number of attack drones.

In order to sustainably cut off Iranian shipments, the United States will need to increase its naval patrols in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden while also working to collaborate with Gulf allies to choke off smuggling routes and equip the Yemeni Coast Guard with advanced radar technologies and patrol boats that would allow them to be more effective in the long term.

Evolving landscape

Even if the US were able to cut off Iran’s shipments to the rebel group, the Houthis are seeking to diversify their partners beyond Iran and its network of degraded allies and proxies in the region.

For instance, reports from August indicate that Russian military intelligence officers are now operating in Houthi-controlled areas, providing the group with important technical assistance. There are also allegations of a ten-million-dollar Russian small arms sale to the Houthis, and credible claims that Moscow provided the group with targeting data for their maritime operations and is considering selling the group advanced anti-ship missiles.

Expanding ties between the Houthis and Beijing could also allow them to reconstitute. For instance, US intelligence sources claim that China is providing the rebels with advanced components and guidance equipment for their weapons in exchange for immunity for Chinese-flagged ships operating in the Red Sea. 

Given the Houthis’ demonstrable resilience, this requires expanding intelligence-sharing agreements with regional allies, deploying advanced surveillance technologies to track illicit arms shipments, and working closely with Gulf partners to enhance maritime security.

Washington must also prioritize strengthening the internationally recognized Yemeni government, also known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), both militarily and through projects that would improve its governance and economic stability. These efforts could include securing partnerships to revitalize Yemen’s oil and gas production and distribution, as well as technical expertise to improve the PLC’s fiscal management and public sector accountability. This, coupled with security training for PLC-affiliated forces like the Yemeni coast guard, would help the PLC establish a credible alternative to Houthi rule while also fostering local governance structures and tribal alliances that can erode the Houthis’ support base from within.

While military action can weaken the Yemeni rebels in the short term, effectively degrading and eventually eliminating the group will require the PLC to govern effectively, regain legitimacy, and offer a viable alternative for Yemenis currently under Houthi control. The Trump administration must keep these ends in mind as it formulates its Houthi strategy.

Emily Milliken is the Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

The post Can Donald Trump “completely annihilate” the Houthis in Yemen? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Some MENA countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey, are facing the “base rate” of 10 percent.

Still, there are some regional surprises in the execution of this long-promised plan. US ally Jordan, for example, was hit with a 20 percent rate despite a longstanding free trade agreement with Washington. Israel saw a 17 percent tariff rate despite its moves to mitigate such actions earlier this week, and as its US-supported war in Gaza endures.

Our Middle East Programs experts weigh in on this pivotal moment for the global economy, and what it means for the Middle East region already facing a groundswell of destabilizing threats.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Racha Helwa: The exporter-importer divide, and more intra-MENA trade

Jonathan Panikoff: Middle East allies can’t escape Trump tariffs

Inwook Kim: Down-line risks to Gulf oil economies

Sarah Zaaimi: Tariffs may hinder Morocco’s EV battery ambitions

Ahmed Tabaqchali: Business as usual for Iraq

Emilia Pierce: Uncertainty for MENA entrepreneurs

The exporter-importer divide, and more intra-MENA trade

While aimed at major economies like China and the EU, these measures are indirectly pressuring MENA economies via higher import costs, potential trade diversion, and energy market volatility. The region faces a complex mix of risks, based on two categories: the Gulf oil exporters and the import-reliant economies of North Africa and the Levant.

Gulf oil exporters are closely watching global demand and price movements. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE find their direct trade with the U.S. only modestly affected—each was hit with a ten percent US tariff on goods, but energy exports like crude oil are exempt. The bigger concern is indirect. Fears of a trade war-fueled recession have already driven oil prices down; Brent’s steep drop below $75 reflects worries that slower Chinese and European growth could sap oil demand​. A sustained downturn would squeeze Gulf revenues and widen fiscal deficits. Saudi Arabia, for instance, needs oil near $96 per barrel to balance its 2024 budget​, well above current prices. The IMF estimates the UAE’s breakeven price around $57​ lower, but still a concern if prices slide further. Paradoxically, the threat of US tariffs on Russian oil could present an upside: if buyers like India and China divert purchases from sanctioned Russian crude, Gulf producers might gain market share.

For MENA’s oil-importing economies, the tariffs pose a different set of challenges. Higher energy prices (if Russian oil is effectively curtailed) would strain their trade balances and stoke inflation. Jordan actually benefited from cheaper oil last year—its current account deficit shrank to 3.7% of GDP in 2023 amid lower fuel import costs​. That trend could reverse if crude prices rebound, enlarging deficits for Jordan and Morocco and pressuring government finances. Egypt, the most populous Arab nation, is especially vulnerable. It depends on imported fuel and wheat, and any supply chain disruption or commodity price spike quickly feeds into consumer prices​.

On the export side, US tariffs on autos and other goods could dent manufacturing and trade linkages. Morocco, for example, has become a major automotive exporter, and while it mainly serves Europe, a broader slowdown or trade diversion could indirectly hit its factories and suppliers. Egyptian textiles and apparel, and Jordanian pharmaceutical and garment exports, now face an extra ten to twenty percent duty entering the US​, eroding their competitiveness unless they can pivot to other markets.

Many MENA countries are also joining new blocs—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt have all pursued closer ties with BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank—to reduce reliance on the Western-centric trade system. In the face of US protectionism, we can expect a broader trade realignment: more South-South commerce, renewed free trade talks with Europe or Africa, and regional initiatives to boost intra-MENA trade.

—Racha Helwa is a senior economist and the Director of the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Middle East allies can’t escape Trump’s tariffs

It turns out that what President Trump announced yesterday aren’t reciprocal tariffs at all. As others have pointed out, the administration simply calculated the US trade deficit with each country and divided that by the country’s exports to the US. The result is the new tariff rate for each country. In doing so, the President is seemingly ignoring the nuances of existing free trade agreements, and ironically, of actual foreign tariffs, placing higher tariffs on countries like Jordan with whom the US has fewer barriers, and lower tariffs on countries such as Egypt, which has higher barriers.

Many of the GCC countries will be relieved that energy is exempted from the new US tariffs, but many GCC countries’ currencies – including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE – are pegged to the dollar. As a result, while they may escape the primary implications of tariffs in the energy sector, an increase in US inflation will have a direct secondary impact on GCC countries (and Jordan, which also pegs to the dollar), as well. Add to that the potential for a global trade war would almost certainly undermine global energy demand. Most GCC states are still dependent on energy exports as their primary source of revenue. And a country like Saudi Arabia—which is already struggling with lower oil prices than needed to hit its breakeven point (the price of oil required for the Kingdom to balance its budget), let alone to fully fund Vision 2030 projects—is at risk of seeing a contraction in its GDP if such a trade war is bad enough.

In about six weeks, President Trump is scheduled to head to the Gulf on his first foreign trip of his second term. With both the UAE and Saudi Arabia having committed to investing at least $1 trillion into the US economy over the next decade, perhaps there will be greater leverage and opportunity to negotiate with President Trump. However, Arab energy producers are going to be impacted by the tariffs, even if not directly. And even closer allies, such as Israel, which removed all tariffs on US goods ahead of President Trump’s announcement, are facing a seventeen percent tariff. As a result, Israeli leaders will now have to expend significant time and energy to convince the administration to reconsider it, which risks distracting them from the country’s more pressing challenges, including the 59 Israelis still held hostage by Hamas, the war in Gaza, and the looming threat from Iran. 

President Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs” are hitting both allies and adversaries across the world, and Middle East countries, which sought to preempt being impacted by them through promises of investment and removal of their own tariffs, are no exception.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the Director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center.

Downline risks to Gulf oil economies

If Trump’s tariffs remain in place for the foreseeable future, one of their most disruptive effects would come from a commodity that the MENA region barely exports to the United States—oil. In 2024, the United States imported 715,000 barrels per day (BPD) from the Persian Gulf, accounting for less than ten percent of its total oil imports (8.42 million BPD) or less than three percent of the region’s total production of 30.36 million BPD recorded in 2023. In fact, energy imports are exempt from Trump’s sweeping tariffs, ostensibly making oil one of the few commodities left unscathed on “Liberation Day”.

However, Trump’s tariffs will have profound implications on the global oil trade and, consequently, the MENA’s oil-dependent economies. Tariffs generally dampen market demand by raising consumption cost and introducing uncertainty about the future. US tariffs are likely to weaken the world’s consumption, which in turn would reduce oil demand. As a result, oil prices would decline, dealing a blow to the region’s oil producers.

If history is any guide, a prolonged oil price slump could destabilize the oil economies, with mounting fiscal pressure, potentially leading to reduced public spending. Tariffs are, however, never a one-sided affair; they are an interactive and back-and-forth game. The next move by the region’s oil producers—leveraging their market power—should be closely watched, as the interplay between US tariffs and their response will shape how these evolving challenges unfold.

—Inwook Kim is a nonresident fellow with the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. He is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul. He specializes in the history and geopolitics of oil, the politics of alliances, and international security. 

Tariffs may hinder Morocco’s EV battery ambitions

The ten percent US tariff and the upcoming higher tariffs on cars and car parts imposed on Moroccan exports represent a significant setback for the kingdom’s ambitions in the electric vehicle (EV) battery industry. Morocco has been the only African country to have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Washington since 2004 and has developed a growth strategy betting on free access to US and European Union markets, with which it has standing FTAs. 

Morocco has been assertively positioning itself as one of the major contenders in the Electric Vehicle (EV) space, thanks to its abundant lithium iron phosphate resources and its ambitious aeronautics and automotive industry. Rabat had vowed that EV batteries will represent 60 percent of its car exports or some 600,000 “Made in Morocco EVs” by 2030. 

The country also teamed up with China in November of last year to override US-imposed tariffs on Beijing by investing in a $1.3 Billion Electric Battery Gigafactory in Kenitra, which is poised to become a major hub for battery production, aiming at an output of 20 GWh of lithium-ion batteries and cathode materials and the creation of approximately 2,300 jobs, just for its first phase. The gigafactory targeted mainly the growing electric car market in the US. It had already created discontent among Morocco’s US partners at the time, who were seeking to find ways to halt the Moroccan Chinese circumvention.

While many analysts may see the baseline ten percent tariffs imposed on Rabat as an opportunity for the country to become the mecca for foreign industrialists from countries like China, India, and European Union countries hit by higher rates to use the kingdom as a new center for their activities destined for the US, in reality, a lot of uncertainty prevails about how the tariffs will work in practice and which sectors they will impact the most.

Morocco and other MENA countries with active FTAs with the US, like Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, and Israel, all face uncertainty over their trade partnership statuses. They will all have to figure out what this new wave of tariffs means to their economic interests with Washington and probably start negotiating with the administration new legal frameworks for trade moving forward. 

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa, focusing on Morocco at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

Business as usual for Iraq, but …

The impact of President Trump’s reciprocal tariffs on Iraq is effectively zero. Almost all of Iraq’s exports to the US are oil, which are exempt from reciprocal tariffs. Iraq follows the principle of reciprocity in its bilateral relationship, however, it is unlikely that it would impose a reciprocal tariff of 39 percent on imports from the United States in the era of maximum pressure on Iran, in particular as it relates to the revocations of waivers to import electricity from Iran, and potentially gas. Thus, it would be business as usual for the US-Iraq trade relationship, which was valued at about $9.1 billion in 2024.

However, the impact for Iraq would be indirect and felt through lower oil prices, which result from lower demand for oil and hence lower prices due to the risk posed to world economic growth from US tariffs and potential counter tariffs.

—Ahmed Tabaqchali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years’ experience in the US and MENA markets, and the Chief Strategist of the AFC Iraq Fund.

Uncertainty for MENA entrepreneurs

These new tariffs will have particularly serious consequences for developing economies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including long-term impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the region.

In many ways, SMEs are the backbone of MENA economies. They are a vital source of job creation and innovation, and many of these businesses are looking beyond their domestic markets and aiming to scale both regionally and globally. US tariffs and the reciprocal tariffs that will almost certainly follow will increase the cost of raw materials, disrupt supply chains, and create market volatility that can severely undercut their growth potential.

More than just higher prices, these policies introduce unpredictability that makes it difficult to plan, invest, and build long-term partnerships. For SMEs already operating on thin margins, this could be the difference between expansion and collapse, particularly for businesses founded and run by already marginalized groups like women and youth that often do not have social and financial safety nets to fall back on. The widespread failure of SMEs would have a multitude of adverse effects, including higher unemployment rates, making it harder for non-GCC countries to transition toward more knowledge-based economies.

While the impacts on individual MENA economies will depend on a wide array of factors such as their level of integration with global supply chains, their dependence on oil, and their trade relationship with the US, the region’s economic prospects are deeply tied to other equally important and more long-term priorities of development, peace, and stability. Economic opportunity is one of the most powerful antidotes to instability and unrest. When people can build dignified livelihoods and envision a future for themselves, they are less vulnerable to extremist recruitment and political disillusionment. Regional governments and international partners have recognized this, investing in economic empowerment and entrepreneurship as critical pathways to inclusive growth and resilience. Policies that restrict global market access or create economic uncertainty or create barriers to new economic opportunity can undo years of progress.

Sustained, inclusive growth in the MENA region is bolstered by open markets, predictable rules, and support for entrepreneurs driving change from the ground up. Anything less undermines the shared goals of prosperity and security.

—Emilia Pierce is the deputy director of operations and finance for the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. Pierce has focused on human rights and community development in post-conflict and fragile environments throughout her career.

The post Experts React: No MENA ally or adversary unscathed by Trump tariffs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But despite a convenient loss of interest by Taliban rulers, who have been in power-consolidation mode ever since their Kabul takeover, the prospect for practical intra-Afghan talks is not dead. 

In fact, February saw a blitz of conferences from the highly diversified Afghan diaspora and more moderate voices representing Afghan civil society. There are also signs of renewed interest on the part of the United Nations in adopting a more comprehensive trust-building approach rather than single-item agendas as a precondition for wider engagement and recognition.

Paired with a new US administration at the helm, which appears willing to break from diplomatic norms to drive results—as recently seen in the case of back-channel facilitations leading to the release of two American detainees in Kabul—there is a renewed urgency in achieving a streamlined vision for a dialogue framework. 

The international community now has an opportunity to pursue a two-track policy of ad hoc engagement on issues that are of interest to key stakeholders, while supporting a UN-led effort to address key recommendations as part of Security Council resolutions 2721 and 2777.

A fractioned diaspora, emerging talks

A slew of Afghan dialogues have emerged in recent months. The focus of the talks is as expansive as the diverse range of perspectives participating in them, and they address devastating cuts in humanitarian funding, deteriorating economic and environmental conditions, new regime restrictions on female education, and a lack of recognition compounded by governance weaknesses.  

On the diaspora side, three factions emerge. One, those who oppose any type of engagement, under any circumstances, involving the Taliban. This group is subdivided into those who support a military option using force to bring about radical change, and those who favor sanctions and the isolation of the current regime. Two, those who favor nonviolent engagement, but with softer conditions or practical objectives that would bring about policy reform or modifications, but also minimize the economic impact felt by more than 90 percent of the population as a result of sanctions and aid cutoff. The range of expectations within this group varies from lifting bans on female education and work to improving governance and widening political participation. And three, Taliban supporters and defenders—in much smaller numbers—who see no harm and generally agree with the regime’s policies.

Several intra-Afghan initiatives took place in February across various Afghan and international centers. A “dialogue forum” held in Istanbul brought together a number of former officials as well as diaspora and Kabul-based civil society participants. They expected Taliban de facto government members or associates to attend the event, but none were present. Two other meetings took place in Qatar. Among them, the Afghanistan Future Thought Forum (AFTF), involving regime sympathizers, civil society and non-Taliban Afghans, held its 10th session in Doha, during which pressing issues such as the evolving regional and international scene, women and girls’ access to education and health, and livelihood and ecological challenges facing Afghans, were discussed.

Another gathering sponsored by the National Resistance Front was held in Vienna. At this gathering, anti-Taliban figures from the republic era and diaspora representatives discussed adopting a program to pursue armed resistance while simultaneously bringing like-minded fractious groupings under a single umbrella.

Two cross-continental structured dialogue groups, the Salaam Center for Dialogue based in the US and the Intra-Afghan Dialogue in Australia, are among active groups merging research and dialogue facilitation methods with external expertise aimed at studying root causes of conflict and bridging the divide between civil societies and other stakeholders inside and outside Afghanistan. Another group, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, held a pro-democracy event in Madrid that included opposition figures and select foreign commentators focusing, mainly, on a post-Taliban future.

Other forms of sporadic interactive online chats involve former factional party members and remnants of 1980s and 1990s-era mujahideen groups, primarily based in Turkey, the Gulf States, and Western countries, and ad hoc groups of human rights and ethno-political advocates. Most of the former factional platforms are divided between the idea of fighting the Taliban and the desire to pursue power-sharing negotiations—an idea shunned by the ruling faction in Kabul.

While the primary objective of these gatherings is ostensibly to serve as discussion hubs, some act as ad hoc think tanks or advocacy movements. Notably, a few of these initiatives are for the first time trying to adopt a comprehensive approach to dialogue by bringing together individuals from diverse backgrounds, both men and women, from Afghanistan and beyond. None of these platforms claim explicit political affiliation with current or former governments, highlighting their independent or semi-impartial nature. Furthermore, the majority of these initiatives rely on external funding to meet their logistical needs, highlighting the importance of external support in sustaining these dialogues. 

Inside Afghanistan: Taliban posturing and limited dissent

Since their return to power, the resurgent Taliban have characterized the pre-August 2021 talks as suspended due to the collapse of the “republic”,  instead encouraging non-political talks within the country. They have at times tolerated a minimal level of Afghan participation on platforms that denounce violence and focus on soft political agendas, either on technical matters or as part of non-confrontational, civil society-led dialogues.

Intra-Taliban dissent—a potent subject—also has its own modalities and limitations, as recently demonstrated by the distancing of several high-ranking officials who are critical of policy strands on female education and more engagement. Despite a government-run commission set up to receive ex-officials who opt to return to the country, serious consultations on improving governance standards or using technocrats have yet to be formalized.

Suffice it to say that it is now evident that some Taliban favor female access to education and are not opposed to preliminary trust-building consultations with other Afghans, while another grouping – smaller yet influential – opposes lifting education curbs or any interaction that might lead to more serious talks on a participatory system or restructuring the existing governance model. 

Non-Taliban Afghans inside Afghanistan bring a diversity of views, too. While politically muted and non-provocative criticism of certain policies —particularly those concerning women’s access to education and employment, salaries and pensions, and economic hardship—is tolerated to some extent in public or in the media, the space for overt political dissent within the country has shrunk.

There are also reports of small-scale, non-political civil society interactions taking place in Afghanistan itself, yet media outlets underreport these.

Enduring challenges

A significant gap exists in the absence of an umbrella organization capable of bridging the two divergent paths of diplomatic and nonviolent engagement versus conflict. Partisanship in academia, the media, and advocacy movements highlights the complex interplay between research and activism.

The polarization of approaches and diversity of views has also made it more difficult for international intermediaries such as the UN to pursue a path that ties Afghan dialogues to intra-Afghan talks on governance and fundamental rights. 

Following the Security Council’s March debates on Afghanistan, the UN-sponsored Doha process plans to consider all issues dividing the current de facto Afghan regime and the international community as valid talking points for an Afghan roadmap as suggested in UN resolutions 2721 and 2777.

The UN process will need to make use of structured trust-building thematic engagement as a precursor to addressing legitimacy and normalization objectives. Some agenda-driven diaspora groups are opposed to UN efforts seeking consensus on a roadmap, while others see it as a credible option to negotiate on reforms and prevent further isolation and impoverishment of the country. 

Looking at the evolving intra-Afghan landscape, it’s apparent that the diversity of platforms, networks, and agendas that drive advocacy and dialogue processes face ideological, political, representation, structural, and funding challenges. Some also offer lessons-learned opportunities for addressing pressing issues, connecting diverse communities, and engaging in results-oriented exchanges that build trust and seek common ground. They are, nonetheless, valuable tools and incubators of thoughts and ideas at a time when both the international community and the Afghan population are looking for practical answers and solutions to the country’s five decades-long ordeal. How Washington, the UN, and especially, the de facto regime make use of the intra-Afghan opportunities will depend on political will and strategic foresight.

Omar Samad is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He is also the founder and president of Silkroad Consulting, LLC. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Samad was a senior Afghan expert in residence with the Center for Conflict Management at the US Institute of Peace from January 2012 to January 2013. He also served as Ambassador of Afghanistan to France from 2009 to 2011 and Ambassador to Canada from 2004 to 2009.

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Removing the natural gas waiver, however, would have a more significant impact as it accounts for more than forty percent of the total supply. By making Iranian energy more costly, the United States hopes to incentivize Iraq to diversify its energy sources and reduce its dependency on Iran, a goal that the Iraqi government has long delayed despite being aware of its necessity.

The view from Baghdad by Ahmed Tabaqchali

Iraq’s power conundrum is essentially a large gap between supply and demand.  

2023 estimates suggest that supply satisfies 82 per cent of demand, but almost forty per cent of generated electricity is lost during the transmission and distribution phases from an aging infrastructure, reducing supply to an estimated 53 percent of demand.  

Moreover, high population growth and infrastructure recovery after decades of war are exacerbating this gap as power demand growth outpaces supply growth.

Iran’s first electricity exports in 2004, followed by its natural gas exports in 2017, have been crucial in addressing Iraq’s chronic electricity shortages. Starting with a 1 percent share of electricity supply in 2004, it reached a peak of about 41 percent in 2020. That share declined to about 31 percent in 2023, and it is projected to decline further in 2024.

Iraq is facing a coming summer demand surge that threatens to significantly exacerbate this shortage, paired with the loss of Iranian electricity, and potentially gas. Tehran will blame this on US President Donald Trump’s administration, but a significant loss of gas exports would have happened anyway this summer as Iran itself is forecast to have its own electricity crisis. 

For Baghdad, diversifying its energy sources is critical to ensure a reliable supply. In other words, achieving energy security is not simply replacing current Iranian electricity and gas exports, but diversifying sources so Tehran’s exports become one of many sources, which in the process removes its, and any other supplier’s, leverage over Iraq.

This is a long-term process that demands significant investments across Iraq’s whole power infrastructure, including power plants that generate electricity, its transmission system that delivers electricity to population centres, and distribution networks that then ship this electricity to end users.  

This opens significant, multi-year collaboration and investment opportunities for Iraq, its neighbours and its international stakeholders, especially the United States. 

The first arena includes electricity imports from Baghdad’s neighbors, such as from Jordan  , the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) and close to home from Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The second is increasing gas supply sources like the expansion plans of Basra Gas Company and the Total Energies deal, developing untapped gas fields, and KRI gas potential through a resolution of the long-standing conflict over the development of the country’s oil and gas resources along the lines proposed by KRG and the Government of Iraq in 2023. Alos, the import of piped gas from Turkmenistan, and the import of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) from either Qatar or the United States which in turns required significant infrastructure development. The third and fourth areas are to upgrade its transmission systems distribution grids, both responsible for the up forty percent of losses of the electricity generated.

Thus, embarking on joint long-term investments in the above areas is a win-win strategy for Iraq, its neighbors, and its international stakeholders. 

The view from Washington by Anthony Pfaff

Ending the waiver on Iranian electricity imports, but not natural gas, is a smart strategic move for Iraq. 

Removing these waivers is part of the Trump administration’s effort to impose “maximum pressure” on Iran. But the funds Iraq paid for Iranian electricity never directly reached Tehran—their use was proscribed but for limited categories of humanitarian trade overseen by the Treasury Department pursuant to the procedures in place since Trump’s first term in office. Still, these waivers enabled Iraq’s dependency on Iran for its energy needs, which may have made sense when ISIS was the primary threat to Iraq’s stability; however, it may not now, as that threat has receded and Iran’s threat to regional stability becomes more urgent.  

The first Trump administration reimposed sanctions on Iranian energy exports in 2018 after withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that restricted Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to develop nuclear weapons. To prevent destabilizing the Iraqi economy, the U.S. has granted waivers to the Iraqi government, allowing them to import Iranian electricity and gas to meet their short-term energy needs. Former president Joe Biden’s administration extended these waivers, requiring funds paid to Iran to go to accounts that could be monitored and used only for humanitarian purposes. As a condition for the waivers, the United States pushed Iraq towards its own energy self-sufficiency, including through agreements with French and Qatari energy companies and ongoing work to connect Iraq’s energy grid to the GCC’s. 

Iraq may not need much incentive to diversify, especially considering the impending summer shortage. Even though the gas waiver remains intact, Iraq is already seeking to diversify its natural gas supply. That includes a deal with Turkmenistan, though the fact that its gas would travel through pipes going through Iran has limited its effectiveness. Baghdad has also sought agreements with Qatar and Oman to import natural gas, and recently signed an agreement allowing integration into the GCC electric grid, which will provide an additional 3.94 terawatt-hours of electricity. In fact, in a recent phone call with US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani reportedly underscored Iraq’s ambition to become energy independent and interest in greater involvement by Western and US energy companies.

By leaving the gas waiver intact, the United States ensures that Iraq can mitigate any resulting energy crisis, while giving Baghdad the flexibility it needs to pursue energy diversification without risking social instability or exacerbating the country’s energy shortages. Whether removing just one sanction will facilitate this transition will depend on Iraq’s Western and GCC partners increasing energy investment and cooperation while also enabling Iraq to endure any backlash from Iran or its proxies.  

Despite concerns that decreasing Iraq’s access to any energy sources, especially during the summer in an election year, could increase instability, the removal of the electricity waiver can be a prudent measure for Washington to encourage both Iraq’s self-sufficiency and its Arab partners to support Iraq’s ultimate independence from Iran.  It is in Washington’s interest, together with removing the waiver, to do whatever it can to help support those ongoing trends.

 Impacts, and a way forward 

 The immediate effect of the loss of waivers to import electricity and potentially natural gas is almost zero, as Iran effectively halted its exports in late 2024, diverting its gas exports to its own domestic market.  

Such diversions occurred a few times in the last few years, as a consequence of the negative cumulative effects of years of mismanagement, irrational consumption, and underinvestment in an aging infrastructure made worse by sanctions. However, this time, it’s much worse than any prior year, as Iran had rolling power blackouts across the country from November 2024, and natural gas was diverted from electricity generation to home heating to stave off social unrest. 

But ending the waiver on Iranian electricity imports, while preserving the natural gas waiver, allows Iraq to break free from Iranian energy dominance at a manageable pace, reducing risks to its energy security and fostering regional cooperation. Meanwhile, it signals to Iran and the world that the United States remains committed to countering Iranian influence but in a way that prioritizes stability and pragmatic solutions. This measured approach is a necessary step in Iraq’s path toward energy independence, national sovereignty, and long-term prosperity. 

Despite Iraq’s willingness, budgetary constraints can significantly hinder its efforts to diversify its energy sources. The government’s fiscal challenges are primarily due to its heavy reliance on oil revenues, which constitute approximately 90 percent of state income. A decline in global oil prices has exacerbated this issue, leading to reduced national income and fiscal pressures. In response, the Iraqi government has increased public spending, particularly on salaries and pensions, which account for over 40 percent of the budget, to maintain social stability.  

This allocation limits funds available for infrastructure projects, including those aimed at energy diversification. Given that limited funds increase the likelihood of Iraq not living up to its financial commitments, foreign investors will disincentivize investing in projects to diversify and stabilize Iraq’s energy sources. So, without a finalized budget, the allocation of funds for these critical projects remains uncertain, delaying progress and perpetuating Iraq’s dependence on limited energy sources. 

Another potential challenge is Iran-backed militias who smuggle Iraqi oil, diverting it from power generation. Given these interests, the political parties backing these militias may take action in parliament that impedes Iraq’s ability to diversify. Moreover, as Iran feels less secure due to the combination of regional setbacks, increasing Iraqi independence, and economic pressure due to sanctions, these militias may become more disruptive and further impede diversification by, if nothing else, making foreign investment too costly.  

Given the budgetary, political, and security challenges described above, it is less clear whether Iraq can achieve energy diversity on its own. To alleviate those challenges, Iraq’s Western partners can facilitate this transition by taking the following steps:  

•  Condition Cooperation. As the US nudges Iraq towards energy diversification, it should condition any concessions or other support on continued investment in domestic energy infrastructure, renewable energy sources, and alternative regional partners, such as leaving the gas waiver intact.  

• Encourage Regional Cooperation and Energy Alternatives. As described above, Iraq has been seeking new partnerships with the West as well as countries like Qatar, Oman, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to provide alternative energy sources through electricity imports or investment in infrastructure projects. However, Iraq’s inconsistent payment record, coupled with expectations that there will be budget shortfalls in the near future, may limit interest, impeding Iraq’s transition to independence. Iraq’s partners may need to consider investment guarantees to sustain that investment.  

• Contain Backlash. US pressure and Iraqi cooperation will likely place Iran in a position where it must disrupt Iraqi energy diversity or lose influence. While Iran-backed militias may play a role, Iran will also utilize political and economic means that could have unexpected impacts that may be difficult for the Iraqi government to manage. Efforts to make Iraq resilient should also be part of a comprehensive policy to incentivize its energy diversification efforts. 

Despite these diversification efforts, Iraq’s way forward is clear: continue increasing effective investment in energy infrastructure while diversifying its energy suppliers so that it is not dependent on any one supplier. Improving energy efficiency can also help speed up Iraq’s transition to energy independence.  

Ahmed Tabaqchali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years of experience in the US and MENA markets and is the chief strategist at the AFC Iraq Fund.

C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the research professor for the Military Profession and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA. A retired Army colonel and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for the Middle East and North Africa, Pfaff recently served as director for Iraq on the National Security Council staff. 

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But the round is set to occur against the backdrop of a decade-old stalemate between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Since 2014, the warring factions have failed to agree on a pathway for national elections and a political reconciliation process. 

The crisis is one that the US and Italy may be uniquely postured, and incentivized, to quell. 

Absent a thawing of that frozen stalemate, Tripoli is unlikely to attract an influx of energy investment. Even more, the stalemate risks plunging Libya into a deeper web of maligned foreign intervention. Both Washington and Rome could leverage their global positions to combat the country’s rabid kleptocracy and facilitate a Libyan-led technocratic political process. The carrot, of course, for this US-Italian stewardship is the opportunity for greater cooperation in countering Russia and China’s growing ambitions in Libya.  

Libya’s volatile energy output 

Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar—who is also a US citizen—has held a monopoly over national energy resources for nearly a decade, bringing increased volatility to the country’s oil production. He has demonstrably leveraged his monopoly to negotiate arms deals and grow his access to a foreign support network. A recent Telegraph report uncovered a deal between Haftar and China where the latter reportedly shipped one billion dollars in Wing Loong military drones in exchange for crude oil. Haftar used the arms shipment to further project his power, by using United Nations-affiliated officials to facilitate it, in direct violation of the 2011 UN arms embargo. The move further signaled his rejection of any UN-facilitated process that could threaten his access to power.

As the stalemate stands, there is no guarantee for potential investors that Haftar or his affiliated militias will not force a shutdown of exploration or production. The bidding on the country’s largest petroleum reserves, the Sirte Basin, is largely under the control of Haftar’s LNA. It’s hard to imagine any company winning the exploration rights without buy-in from Haftar’s camp in exchange for security guarantees. Haftar could then leverage the exploration findings—if proven to be promising—to negotiate more favorable drilling approval and production plan contracts, growing his consolidation of the country’s shared institutions as defined by the 2020 ceasefire agreement. This could further open the door for increased foreign intervention in the country as both the GNU and Haftar have continued to leverage existing international partnerships to bolster their grip on the country’s wealthy energy resources.  

That includes an increasing closeness with Russia as Moscow pivots from Syria in the aftermath of the ousting of Bashar al-Assad. Such coziness portends that Haftar is likely to seek Russian and Chinese investment in the Libyan energy sector over Europe or the US. Already, in July 2024, Haftar signed a deal with Russian Railways Company to develop a railway connecting Sirte to Benghazi, a route critical to resupplying LNA weapons as well as shipping oil for export. Coupled with his smuggling of Russian oil into Europe, Haftar and Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrate a keenness to collaborate and circumnavigate existing sanctions on Russian energy resources.  

Russia could ensure that its oil continues to be sold while Haftar would bank on Russia’s security backing to negotiate a more favorable role in the country’s future. By working with Russia and China, Haftar is more poised to use the contracts to retain his access to illegal arms shipments in exchange for oil. With little international oversight, he may seek to use the upcoming public tender as an opportunity to gain influence with maligned foreign actors and solidify his grip on power. 

Investment opportunities amid growing foreign ambitions 

At the end of 2024, the NOC defied global expectations and increased its production to an eleven-year high of 1.422 million barrels per day (BPD). By attracting investment, Libya hopes to repair existing refineries and work with international companies to re-establish its pre-war production output. Libya’s oil minister, Khalifa Abdulsadek, told Reuters in January that the country needs three to four billion dollars in foreign investment to reach a 1.6 million BPD output.

This has already raised some eyebrows among energy investors, and Libya is increasingly considered a hub of investment opportunity with promises of reforms and greater transparency. As Haftar continues to cozy up to China and Russia in search of weapon sales, the GNU has grown closer to Turkey. In 2019, they established an exclusive economic zone between the two countries. The GNU also signed a deal in January with Turkey to grow its cooperation in the renewable energy sector, and has attracted investment interest from Ankara’s state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). 

At the 2025 Libya Energy & Economic Summit held in Tripoli, General Manager of TPAO Ahmet Turkoglu indicated Turkey’s readiness to invest in the country’s energy sector, telling reporters “We are here because we see great potential. I am sure Libya will achieve much more,” specifically referring to offshore fields as part of a 2019 Memorandum of Understanding. 

Turkey’s ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean are neither secret nor uncontroversial. Similar to signing its fate with Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Turkey placed its bets on Tripoli’s GNU in hopes of solidifying its ambitions to become a regional hegemon. Paired with Ankara’s growing involvement in facilitating Israel-Hamas negotiations, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing a regional chess game, one that has already proved successful in Syria and in its initial 2020 intervention in Libya. By growing investments in energy projects in Libya, Turkey seeks to gain influence in the country’s economic and political recovery. 

Renewing US-Italian engagement in Libya  

Any international reengagement on Libya short of a clear US role in facilitating an agreement risks plunging the country into a deeper web of maligned foreign intervention and spoiling development potential. 

US President Donald Trump, along with his transatlantic ally and personal friend Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, are key international players in Libya. Only their absence and lack of diplomatic engagement allowed Russia and China to expand their operations there. By leading the facilitation of a renewed political process, the US and Italy could benefit from securing exploration contracts for the country’s energy resources, assist Europe in meeting its energy needs, while ensuring that Libyans get the democracy they have wanted since 2011. 

Italy is already developing a framework that Trump could assist in—positioning itself to become Europe’s energy hub, helping to facilitate the sale and transport of oil and gas from Africa to the rest of the continent as it pivots from Russian natural resources. Meloni’s “Mattei Plan”, named after Italian oil giant Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi’s (ENI) founder Enrico Mattei, could help Italy achieve its ambitions in becoming Europe’s main energy broker, and Libya could prove to be a helpful provider of the key to that opportunity. 

Tripoli’s energy potential remains untapped. It could offer Italy and wider Europe cheaper production rates and a higher quality of “sweet crude” oil compared to its neighbors.  

Italy’s investments in Libya have been relatively limited amid concerns about government instability. Rome has pursued energy contracts with other North African energy partners like Tunisia’s ELMED interconnector and Algeria’s Sonatrach. However, ENI has already resumed drilling in areas of the Ghadames basin late last year after a nearly ten-year hiatus, signaling its willingness to invest in  Libya’s energy potential. Furthermore, its proximity to Italy could also provide cheaper transport rates, making Libya a highly attractive energy investment partner for Italy. 

Meloni knows that without a clear political solution in sight for Libya, there is a significant risk in any investments in the country’s energy sector. Both the HoR and the GNU have failed to achieve their mandate of getting the country to elections, and have lost legitimacy for many Libyans after years of disengagement in determining their country’s future.  

The US and Italy could help a new political process by sanctioning Libya’s kleptocrats, who have stalled a solution at the cost of Libyan lives. Their participation and inclusion in any political process should be limited as they risk spoiling the process in exchange for a future role in the country. The US and Italy may instead focus on engaging the country’s civil society and array of economic and political experts in Libya and abroad, to head a transitional process with clearly defined mandates, deadlines, and limitations on power to help get the country towards elections. 

This renewed process would have to include negotiations over Haftar’s future role in the country, a subject for which no one has more leverage to bring the military leader to the table than the United States, considering his citizenship there and continued assets in the greater Washington area. Haftar also established a friendly working relationship with President Trump from his first term in office, which could allow the Trump administration an unprecedented opportunity to negotiate on Libya with Haftar’s camp.  

There is additional appeal in Libya for Trump, as the country is an important member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Earlier this year, the US president said he would demand that OPEC bring down the cost of oil, blaming high prices on the Russia-Ukraine war.  

Tripoli could assist in cutting oil costs by increasing and stabilizing production output. Libya’s acting oil and gas minister, Khalifa Abdulsadek, has already signaled his goal of increasing production from 1.5 million to 2 million BPD by December 2025. Oil production has already recovered and increased in recent months, and by attracting investments, the country’s energy sector could rebound to its pre-2011 output. By diversifying foreign investment in the country away from maligned foreign actors like China and Russia, who have spoiled the peace process in pursuit of their own interests, Libya could ensure investors greater transparency and compliance with international regulations, including the existing arms embargo. However, this cannot be achieved through the current status quo. It’s time for a renewed US-Italian engagement on Libya in search of innovative solutions to its prolonged stalemate. 

Trump has already proven he is not afraid to think “out of the box” on foreign affairs during his second term, a posture that could help clinch a deal to end the stalemate. From his attempts in facilitating a ceasefire in Ukraine, to imposing strict tariffs on Canada and Mexico, the US president is interjecting a new strong-armed approach to global issues that could reignite a post-Benghazi attack dormancy on US engagement. Nine years after he used the 2012 terrorist attack as a campaign issue against Hillary Clinton, Trump now has an opportunity to rewrite the fate of Washington’s mission in Libya and bring about a much-needed “win” in the region.  

Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.  

The post ​Libya’s political deadlock endures. There is a case for Trump and Meloni to challenge the status quo. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The historic development has many benefits for Turkey, but Ankara has two contrasting visions for this new Syria. One envisions a stabilized and independent (albeit militarily weak) country, while the other envisions a Syria that would function as a Turkish protectorate state.

Both visions share the need for a reunified Syria with a centralized regime, but they differ substantially in the means to, and motives for, that end. However, one of these options—the vision of Syria as a forward base for Turkey—brings with it a particularly enhanced risk of regional concerns and inter-state instability. At this fragile moment, all actors now involved in negotiations with Damascus over reconstruction would be wise to push for a more independent Syria.

Turkey as a strategic hub

In one vision, Syria becomes a safe transit point for trade and energy routes, with Turkey as a hub from the Gulf states to Europe. This vision can only translate into a reality if Syria secures desperately needed foreign investment and reconstruction. For that investment to take place, Damascus is tasked with appealing to different regional and international actors.

Syria cannot be seen as leaning too much on Turkey, nor can it be seen as presenting a new threat to neighboring states. Israel is concerned about the emerging regime in Syria because of the Jihadist background of some of its members. It is trying to advance through political channels and military actions a demand that Syria be demilitarized south of Damascus.

While Israel’s demands may seem far-reaching, they do indicate that, following the surprise attack of October 7, 2023, Israel is far less willing to take any chances regarding worrying developments from its neighbors.

Risks of a more ambitious Ankara

Turkey’s second, dueling vision is more ambitious, pursuing Syria as a forward post and part of Ankara’s exclusive zone of interest. As Erdogan stated, “the events in Syria remind us that Turkey is bigger than Turkey itself.” This vision includes erecting Turkish bases within the country. Reports of defense discussions between Ankara and the new regime, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, in Damascus seem to suggest Ankara has its eye on using Syrian territory to strengthen its defense. Indeed, Turkey has significant security concerns in Syria, ranging from jihadist and Kurdish terror threats on its borders to domestic concerns over refugees and its own Kurdish minority.

For a view from Turkey, read more by Ömer Özkizilcik

MENASource

Apr 1, 2025

Israel is making a miscalculation in southern Syria. Here is why.

By Ömer Özkizilcik

Israel’s approach in southern Syria risks deepening sectarian divisions, eroding the Druze community’s standin, and fueling broader instability.

Conflict Defense Policy

As the situation in Syria presents a direct threat, there is more willingness in Turkey to cover the financial costs to deal with it. This was very much the situation in the areas Turkey took control of within Syria since its first operation in northern Syria in 2016, after which Turkey had invested money in reconstruction and supplying basic services.

Hence, Turkey, with Qatar’s help, may be willing to pay the price for at least partial reconstruction of Syria. This would be a boon for Turkish construction companies, and even if the Turkish government partly funded it, it could have positive economic trickle-down effects.

Still, there are risks in this strategy, namely from regional actors in the Middle East becoming skeptical of why Ankara would pursue a front post in Syria. The larger Turkish deployments become, and especially if Turkey builds bases in southern Syria, the more concern it will raise—posing the risk that the wider region isolates Ankara, as was the case in 2019-2020.

A future for Syrian stability

Turkey is weighing where to place its bets between these options in Syria. This indecision can explain the contrast between Ankara’s more careful and more adventurous moves regarding the new government in Damascus.

It should be stressed that Turkey would only be persuaded to support the more independent Syria scenario if it ensures Damascus gets significant amounts of financial assistance, and if Washington makes it clear to Ankara that  building Turkish bases cannot be tolerated by Israel and other regional players such as Saudi Arabia, and hence should be averted.

Turkey has already built forward base capabilities in places such as northern Cyprus and Qatar, and expanding its military presence in Syria will create what some have termed “Turkey’s full moon,” a would-be regional threat after the weakening of the Iranian-led “Shiite crescent.”

Syrian people, after all their suffering during the civil war, deserve a secure environment to rebuild. Giving Syria to Turkey will harm such a prospect.

Gallia Lindenstrauss is a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and co-editor of the Institute’s journal Strategic Assessment.

The post The only viable solution: an independent Syria, not a Turkish protectorate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But this is a miscalculation that disregards the region’s demographics and political realities. Israel selectively engages with certain Druze factions in Suwayda while sidelining the predominantly Sunni Arab populations of Daraa and Quneitra. The Israeli aim is to keep Syria as a weak state, divided into autonomous zones drawn along ethnic lines, and to prevent the new Syrian government from uniting Syria. 

Within this approach, the Druze and Syria’s south could be Syria’s canary in a coal mine. If the minority group ends up with an autonomous zone, this would set a precedent for other Syrian communities. Other minorities, including the Alawites on Syria’s coast, the Kurds on the Turkish-Syrian border, the Turkmen living in northern Aleppo and Latakia, and the Ismailis in central Syria, might have similar demands. These demands initially appear to be in Israel’s interest as Israel sees a divided Syria as being in the interest of its regional ambitions.

These demands align with Israel’s strategic outlook, as Israel sees a divided Syria as advancing its regional ambitions. However, while Israel has historically pursued the “alliance of minorities“ doctrine—aligning with non-Sunni groups to counterbalance dominant Arab nationalist and Islamist forces—sectarian fragmentation in Syria would invite external meddling and exacerbate internal conflicts, as seen in Iraq and Lebanon. A divided Syria could create long-term instability rather than peace. A weak Damascus would open the space for Iran to reassert its influence and for jihadist organizations to gain ground, potentially forcing Israel to confront a more chaotic and unpredictable security landscape.

Adding to these, Israel’s approach in southern Syria risks deepening sectarian divisions, eroding the Druze community’s standing within Syria, and fueling broader instability. By engaging with select Druze factions while ignoring the political realities of the region, Israel may inadvertently push the Druze closer to Damascus and weaken their negotiating position in Syria’s post-war settlement.

Syria’s South and the Druze

Southern Syria comprises three key regions: Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra. Suwayda is the only governorate where Druze form a majority, whereas Daraa and Quneitra remain overwhelmingly Sunni Arab. Any foreign involvement that overlooks these demographic distinctions risks fueling internal divisions. Within the Druze community itself, there is no unified political stance. The community is divided along religious, military, and tribal lines.

The religious leadership of the Syrian Druze is split between three figures who hold the title of Sheikh al-Aql. Sheikh Hikmat Hajeri is a reformist advocating for a secular and decentralized Syria. Sheikh Hannawi remains politically neutral but rejects any separate political governance system for the Druze and rejects becoming a ‘tool in foreign hands’. At the same time, Sheikh Jarbuwa has historically maintained loyalty to Bashar al-Assad, but insiders argue that his loyalty was to Damascus, not the regime. Given this dynamic, the new Syrian leadership may seek a similar arrangement with Sheikh Jarbuwa to counterbalance Sheikh Hajeri’s influence.

The fragmentation of the Druze community extends to its military groups. The most powerful militia, Rijal al-Karama, has resisted both the Assad regime and foreign interference. Its spokesperson, Bassem Abu Fakhr, openly rejected Netanyahu’s offer of protection. Another militia, Liwa Jabal, operates less politically but has voiced strong opposition to Israeli meddling and emphasized Druze loyalty to Syria’s unity. Although a relatively small faction, Rijal al-Sheikh al-Karama, led by Layt al-Baloush—the son of Rijal al-Karama’s founding leader—carries significant political weight due to his religious status. Another key figure, Sulaiman Abdelbaki, leads Ahrar al-Jabal and holds a religious position as well.

The issue of integrating Druze militias into the Syrian army remains contentious. While Druze factions prefer to maintain nominal independence until elections are held, the Syrian government insists on disbanding all armed groups to consolidate state authority and prevent another cycle of civil conflict. As a compromise, the Minister of Defense has proposed granting Druze soldiers a special status, allowing them to serve in Druze-majority areas and exempting them from ideological training.

Israel positioning itself as protector of the Druze

Israel claims to shield the Druze from an imagined threat posed by the new Syrian government. The reality on the ground contradicts Israeli claims—Damascus has not engaged in hostile rhetoric. Except for an escalation of violence in Jaramana between government forces and Druze militias that was labelled by Druze leaders as “a personal dispute that developed unexpectedly“, there were no aggressive actions taken against the Druze. Druze representatives have repeatedly met with Ahmed al-Shara and participated in the National Dialogue Conference, demonstrating that they do not view the new government as a threat.

Despite this, Netanyahu has called for the demilitarization of Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra, reinforcing Israel’s opposition to any Syrian military presence in the region. Israel’s stance is further complicated by the presence of a Druze community within its own borders, many of whom serve in the Israeli military and maintain familial ties with Druze in Syria. These cross-border connections add a layer of complexity to Israel’s engagement with Syria’s Druze.

For a view from Israel, read more by Gallia Lindenstrauss

MENASource

Apr 1, 2025

The only viable solution: an independent Syria, not a Turkish protectorate

By Gallia Lindenstrauss

After a risky bet on the Syrian opposition, Turkey is weighing where to place its bets between dueling visions for the new Syria.

Middle East Security & Defense

Following the announcement, the Israeli air force bombed positions inside southern Syria, prompting a Druze religious delegation to visit al-Shara expressing solidarity against foreign interventions. A more senior visit by Sheikh Hannawi and Sheikh Jarbuwa was cancelled over objection by Sheikh Hajari.

In 2018, the Druze couldn’t count on Israeli military support when ISIS killed over 250 Druze civilians in a single attack in Suwayda.

Coinciding with Netanyahu’s announcement was the formation of the Suwayda Military Council, a militia that claims to protect Suwayda from threats and seeks recognition as part of a future Syrian military structure. The name and flag are clearly inspired by the Military Councils of US Central Command (CENTCOM’s) local partner against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Though currently very small in size, the Suwayda Military Council could grow if it secures funding to attract economically struggling Druze youth.

Beyond military and diplomatic engagement, Israel may also be leveraging economic incentives to gain influence over the Druze. A recent proposal suggests granting work permits to Syrian Druze to work in the Golan Heights with daily wage offers of seventy-five to one hundred dollars. This is a sizable amount considering that public sector workers in Syria earned around twenty-five dollars per month. While this initiative appears economically in nature, its potential consequences could be strategic. If implemented, it could deepen the divide between Druze and Sunni Arabs, subtly shift the demographics of the Golan Heights, and encourage Druze migration to Israeli-controlled areas. 

Backlash against Israeli interference

Israel’s narrative of protecting the Druze has sparked resistance rather than support. Anti-Israel protests have erupted across southern Syria, including in Suwayda, where Sunni Arabs and Druze reject foreign interference in their affairs. In response, the Syrian government has reinforced ties with key Druze figures and military factions, countering Israel’s messaging. Sulaiman Abdelbaki publicly stated his rejection of any external intervention into internal Syrian affairs.

Beyond Syria, regional actors have also raised concerns. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt—long-time critic of Israel—has criticized Netanyahu’s policies, warning that “the free Syrians must be cautious of the plots of Israel.“ His public statements reflect a broader skepticism among Druze leaders about Israel’s intentions.

Ahmed al-Shara’s victory against Netanyahu

Recent events in Jaramana, a Druze town just outside Damascus, illustrate the limits of Israel’s strategy. Following an incident in which Syrian General Security personnel were killed in Jaramana, minor clashes erupted between Syrian security forces and local Druze militias. Netanyahu seized on the situation, declaring Israel’s willingness to intervene in Jaramana to protect the Druze.

However, his rhetoric quickly lost credibility when Rijal al-Karama and Rijal al-Sheikh al-Karama deployed forces from Suwayda to Jaramana. Layt al-Baloush, playing a key mediating role, successfully brokered a resolution between the Druze community and the Syrian government. He later announced that the clashes stemmed from a personal dispute and reaffirmed that the Druze reject any Israeli guardianship. Also, the local Druze dignitaries in Jaramana echoed this sentiment, rejecting any Israeli intervention, further undercutting Netanyahu.

In a symbolic move, Syrian military convoys entering Jaramana waived the Druze flag, signaling respect for the community’s identity and further undermining Israeli narratives. Ahmed al-Shara emerged from the incident as a leader capable of resolving disputes with the Druze, bolstering his domestic legitimacy and discrediting Netanyahu’s portrayal of the Syrian government as a threat.

By working with Druze leaders who reject Israeli involvement, while benefiting from anti-Israel sentiment among the Sunni Arab populations of Daraa and Quneitra, al-Shara may gradually dismantle Israel’s vision of a divided Syria.

Consequently, al-Shara negotiated an agreement with the armed Druze factions and leading Druze figures, a mechanism to recruit Druze policemen from Suwayda to operate in Suwayda in the name of the Syrian state. Even though recruitment began, Sheikh Hajari opposed the agreement, which foresaw the full integration of Suwayda into Syria.

A defining moment

For Syrians in general, the Israeli ambitions are of serious concern. Exactly when most Syrians hoped that their 14-year struggle to topple the Assad regime ended and that they would be able to rebuild Syria, Israel positioned itself as a spoiler. The Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Druze and southern Syria may torpedo Syria’s security, which is essential for the return of Syrian refugees.

If Israel succeeds in persuading the Druze to oppose Damascus and disengage from the political transition, the consequences could reverberate for decades. Israel has allocated significant financial resources—up to one billion dollars—to strengthen its influence over the Druze community. If parts of the Druze leadership align with Israel against Syria’s territorial integrity, the community risks political and social isolation both within Syria and across the region. Such a move would not only weaken their position in Syria’s future but could also strain relations with their counterparts in Lebanon and the broader Arab world, where they may be perceived as complicit in foreign interference.

Conversely, the choices made by Druze leaders will determine whether they become a force for national cohesion or a source of further fragmentation. If the Druze prioritize integration within Syria and seek an arrangement through dialogue with Damascus rather than external actors, they could emerge as key stakeholders in the country’s unity and stability. Their engagement in the political process would not only reinforce Syria’s territorial integrity but also position them as champions of national reconciliation.

To either end, it appears that most Druze leaders are wary of the stakes.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs analyst.

The post Israel is making a miscalculation in southern Syria. Here is why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union were, for much of the conflict, essential tools of confrontation against Assad’s brutal regime. In many ways, they achieved what they were designed to do: Economically isolate Assad, drain his capacity to wage war, and signal moral condemnation over the use of chemical weapons, barrel bombs, and starvation sieges.

But those sanctions did more than they were intended to. They distorted the Syrian economy, fueling black markets and war profiteering. They crushed the legitimate private sector while empowering regime-linked oligarchs who knew how to maneuver in shadow economies. The regime’s marginalization pushed everyday Syrians into lives of dependency and informal labor. The very people who had resisted Assad’s rule were often the ones most deeply hurt by the West’s economic measures.

That exclusion from the global economy continues even with Assad gone, and a new fragile post-war landscape takes shape. While HTS carries the burden of its militant past, banks still refuse to process payments in the country. Traders cannot legally import goods. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) face near-impossible hurdles in transferring funds. Perhaps most crucially, Syrian entrepreneurs with the skill, ambition, and potential to rebuild the country from the bottom up are locked out of formal financial systems.

The United States and its European allies face an acute dilemma. How can one provide economic breathing space for Syrians recovering from war while entrusting HTS to lead a peaceful transition toward democracy? But ultimately, the conversation must shift. The goal of Western sanctions can no longer be regime change. That phase of the conflict is over. The new objective must be to encourage rule-based governance, strengthen institutional accountability, and support the emergence of a Syrian private sector capable of rebuilding from within.

Understanding Reality

Policymakers must first understand the landscape as it is, not as it was. HTS, for all its controversial history, is not a monolith. While some of its constituencies remain ideological, its civilian administration is professionalizing.

Despite international skepticism, the HTS is exercising its mandate. Taxes are collected, roads are repaired, schools and clinics—though under-resourced—are open. Syrians who once fled from Assad’s prisons now live under this emergent system, trying to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of catastrophe. However, they do so under the weight of a sanctions regime still calibrated to punish Damascus.

The caretaker government employs technocrats, often educated Syrians who returned from exile or emerged from the underground to take up posts in local government. Some of them were activists, teachers, and doctors. Many have no commitment or deep-seated belief in HTS’s original ideology but are instead actively claiming their right to promote inclusivity and transparency.

These technocratic layers of governance, often shielded from international engagement by the political label attached to HTS, offer a potential entry point for the US and EU. Reimagined sanctions policy could focus on creating controlled exceptions through which vetted individuals, organizations, and financial institutions could operate without breaching counter-terrorism laws.

Critically, this approach requires distinguishing between individual and sectoral sanctions. There is a broad Western consensus that individuals involved in war crimes, terrorism, or systemic corruption should continue to face personal sanctions. These measures serve justice and set international norms. However, considering the current political vacuum, sectoral sanctions, particularly those targeting finance, energy, and trade, may need to be revisited.

Continuing to restrict the country from accessing banking systems or foreign investment does not hurt the remnants of the regime. It hurts the civilians whose resilience and determination may be Syria’s best chance at recovery. Indeed, the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has shrunk by 53 percent during the last decade, and estimates suggest an 84 percent collapse in economic activity over the same period. As a result, living standards have plummeted, with over 90 percent of Syrians now living below the poverty line, and over half the workforce is jobless. Sanctions on the finance sector stifle the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, the return of educated diaspora Syrians, and the efforts of NGOs seeking to establish long-term programming beyond emergency aid.

Some European states are already exploring more flexible models. Positive engagement has already begun around sanctions waivers tied to specific humanitarian or reconstruction benchmarks. The United States, however, has been more cautious. Washington’s legal frameworks around terrorism designations make it extremely difficult to authorize even limited engagement with any form of administration. Nevertheless, the United States must recognize that a blanket refusal to adapt will not prevent extremism. On the contrary, it may reinforce it by deepening isolation, empowering illicit actors, and leaving local populations with no stake in peaceful recovery.

Recalibrating Sanctions

To understand what a recalibrated sanctions regime might look like, one must begin with the Syrian economy itself: fragmented, fragile, and highly informal. Years of conflict, corruption, and isolation have left Syria’s financial infrastructure in ruins. Even simple transactions such as importing medical supplies, purchasing raw materials, or sending remittances are plagued by complexity and risk. Families rely on hawala networks and informal money changers, which operate without oversight and often without transparency. This opacity is not just a logistical problem; it is a political and a security one. It allows the rise of shadow actors who profit from black-market transactions and exert quiet but corrosive influence over the country’s economic life.

In this environment, sanctions do more than isolate governments. They reshape incentives. When access to legitimate finance is blocked, the most adaptable actors are often less committed to transparency or reform.

What if that could change? The answer lies in creating controlled, conditional pathways for financial engagement—ones that reward compliance with international standards rather than the ability to evade oversight. Such a model would not be without precedent. For instance, after the United States-led invasion of Iraq, the international community worked with the new government to build financial compliance institutions from scratch. In Afghanistan, similar efforts were made—albeit with mixed results—to create banking systems that could handle foreign aid and attract private investment.

In Syria, rather than attempting to rebuild a national financial system in one sweep, policymakers can begin with targeted engagement with existing national banks by granting them conditional access to correspondent banking relationships, provided they submit to third-party auditing, implement robust anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) controls, and maintain clear separation from sanctioned individuals or entities.

With the proper technical, legal, and political support, Syrian banks could quickly evolve into compliant, transparent vehicles for economic recovery. They could receive remittances from the Syrian diaspora, finance small business growth, and facilitate humanitarian payments in ways that reduce dependence on unregulated cash networks.

Regaining Autonomy

The same principle applies to the private sector more broadly. One of the tragedies of the Syrian war has been the hollowing out of the country’s entrepreneurial class. Once the lifeblood of cities like Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, Syria’s small and medium-sized enterprises have either been destroyed, driven into exile, or absorbed by corrupt networks. Those who remained suffered from a lack of capital and the risk of being sanctioned.

Yet, it is precisely this group that holds the key to long-term stability. They provide jobs, generate tax revenue, support social cohesion, and offer an alternative to armed factions and foreign aid dependency. If given a chance, they can rebuild Syria from the ground up. However, they cannot do so under the current sanctions regime.

Creating space for private sector revival does not mean lifting all restrictions. It means introducing flexibility and nuance. For example, European or regional institutions could establish special economic licensing schemes for Syrian diaspora investors seeking to support family businesses in the country. Risk insurance and credit guarantees could be offered to entrepreneurs operating in designated zones, provided they register with vetted local chambers of commerce and adhere to basic financial disclosure standards. Donor governments could fund business incubators and vocational training centers, ensuring they remain independent of political interference. In each case, engagement would be conditional, monitored, and reversible, but it would still exist. And that alone would mark a profound shift in Syria’s post-war economic landscape.

Moving Forward

Western policymakers must be clear: engagement is not a reward. It steers a fragile, fractured post-conflict society toward rules, norms, and institutions that serve its people rather than its rulers. Sanctions must remain part of this toolkit but must evolve, just as Syria has.

If the international community is serious about fostering peace and stability in Syria after Assad, then it must resist the temptation to rely on inaction. Sanctions, for all their symbolic power, were never designed to manage a fragile post-conflict transition. For the United States and Europe, the time has come to draft a sanctions strategy that responds to the realities on the ground rather than the ghosts of the past. This does not mean abandoning accountability or engaging unquestioningly with a controversial authority like HTS. It means stepping out of the binary mindset that has long shaped Syria policy, in which sanctions were maintained as part of an elusive grand bargain.

The United States, with its more profound financial influence and global reach, has a particular responsibility to lead with nuance. Syria is no longer a primary theater of strategic interest for Washington, but the consequences of failure there—radicalization, renewed displacement, and regional destabilization—remain very real. The US can play a pivotal role in shaping the next chapter of Syria’s recovery by shifting its approach from maximum pressure to calibrated influence.

After half a century of Assad rule and over a decade of civil war, Syrians need space to breathe, build, and imagine futures not dictated by ideology or fear. This space will not be created by withdrawing international pressure but by redirecting it toward the building blocks of governance, the pillars of economic life, and the local actors who have kept communities alive even as the world turned away.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. As a French Syrian researcher, he specializes in political and war economy, particularly in the context of Syria. 

The post Western sanctions against Damascus must evolve—Just as Syria has appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Öcalan’s call to disband the PKK came after two months of negotiations involving key players from Turkey, northeast Syria (NES), and the KRI. This has marked a watershed moment, signaling a willingness for dialogue not only within Kurdish ranks but also with Ankara. The political elite in the KRI has rallied behind Öcalan’s message, with prominent figures like Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), expressing optimism that this could catalyze a genuine peace process.

Among the immediate challenges is the Turkish government’s ongoing military operations against the PKK in the KRI and NES. While the PKK has declared a unilateral ceasefire, the situation remains precarious. The PKK insists that meaningful progress hinges on a face-to-face meeting with Öcalan, jeopardizing the ceasefire framework. This ambiguity reflects historical precedents of failed ceasefires that have left both the PKK, recognized by Turkey and some other countries as a terrorist organization, and Turkish forces skeptical of one another’s intentions. What will happen to Turkey’s expanded network of military bases?

Moreover, as political leaders in the KRI express their hope for a unified Kurdish front and the end of hostilities, the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains a critical factor, despite the new developments. On March 10, Mazloum Abdi and Interim President Ahmed Al Sharaa signed an agreement stipulating the integration of civil and military institutions in Northeast Syria within the institutions of the Syrian state, to be implemented by the end of 2025. The deal recognizes Kurds, who make up about 10 percent of the population, as an indigenous community of the Syrian state and guarantees them political and constitutional rights. The deal gives away around 30 percent of Kurdish-controlled areas at the borders with Iraq and Turkey under the control of the central government. The deal has given the power to the central government to gain its territorial control, political influence, and financial recovery, while granting Damascus access to the oil and gas revenues in NES.

While the agreement was welcomed by some of the international community and Syrians, still some Kurds, Assyrians, and Druze of Syria unwelcomed the development, fearing for their rights to be dismissed, the Kurdish disunity contradicts the ongoing meetings in Erbil to encourage a one-voice approach to dealing with the central government. The question now is to what extent this deal will help with stopping Turkish attacks in NES and foster the ceasefire deal between the PKK and Turkey regionally. Despite Öcalan’s plea, SDF commanders clearly distinguish their operations from those of the PKK, indicating that disarmament for them is contingent upon Turkey’s cessation of attacks against Kurdish positions in Syria. The intricate relationship between the PKK and SDF adds another layer of complexity to peace negotiations, particularly as the Turkish government often lumps both groups together in its security rhetoric.

The PKK’s future will depend on the results of key questions about disarmament logistics. How will fighters safely lay down their arms despite enduring volatility, particularly in places like the Qandil Mountains – PKK’s headquarters in the KRI? More crucially, what legal protections will be established to ensure that PKK fighters are not pursued or punished after they disarm? While the KRG expresses its desire for a peaceful transition, the absence of a comprehensive legal framework could serve as a formidable barrier to successfully executing peace agreements.

Simultaneously, the ongoing conflict in Sinjar presents further complications. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement aimed to restore stability and allow for the return of displaced residents, yet the presence of PKK fighters has triggered repeated military strikes by Turkey, complicating the implementation of this agreement. The assumption that a reduction in hostilities could allow for the PKK withdrawal from Sinjar to their bases in the Qandil Mountains illustrates the interconnectedness of local conflicts and broader peace processes—a delicate dance undermined by mistrust and geopolitical rivalries.

In conclusion, Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament heralds an encouraging shift toward peace among Kurdish factions. Yet, the complexities of reintegrating PKK fighters, navigating the nuanced dynamics of the Syrian conflict, and addressing Turkish military activity pose significant hurdles. A successful transition to peace hinges on ongoing dialogue, the establishment of protective legal frameworks, and cooperative agreements that resonate with all parties, particularly Turkey, Iraq’s federal government, the KRG, and Syrian Kurdish groups. As the KRI rallies around a vision of stability, the success of this appeal will ultimately depend on the commitment of all involved to transcend historical grievances and forge a shared path towards peace.

Hanar Marouf is a 2020 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and a political officer at the British Consulate General in Erbil, Iraq. She has a PhD in politics and international relations, focusing on Iran’s influence in the Middle East, particularly as it relates to the case of Iraq. She is an expert in Iraq’s politics regionally and internationally. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the position of the UK government.

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The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief, but the US withdrawal in 2018 during President Donald Trump’s first term prompted Tehran to resume uranium enrichment, leveraging it to pressure the West for economic concessions.

By September 2024, reports indicated Iran had amassed enough enriched uranium for multiple nuclear devices if further processed, amplifying its strategic leverage and creating uncertainty for potential aggressors. Alongside its nuclear pursuits, Iran employs proxy forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen to project power indirectly. These groups conduct attacks with plausible deniability, enhancing Iran’s regional deterrence while shielding it from direct retaliation. Hezbollah’s clashes with Israel and Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea exemplify this approach, reinforcing Iran’s influence without risking open conflict.

Israel has recently intensified its military efforts to counter these threats, targeting Iran’s proxies and defenses with significant impact. Israel’s war in Gaza, sparked by Hamas-led attacks in October 2023, has inflicted heavy losses on the militant group, with estimates of over 17,000 fighters killed by August 2024, though the group remains active and engaged in ceasefire talks as of early 2025. Similarly, Israel’s intensifying campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon has included strategic sabotage operations and precision strikes that killed key leaders like Hassan Nasrallah, severely degrading the group’s military capabilities and displacing millions across the Lebanon-Israel border.

While these operations have weakened Hamas and Hezbollah, their complete elimination as deterrents is contested. Ongoing skirmishes suggest resilience despite setbacks. Israel has also struck Iran’s integrated air defense systems, targeting S-300 missile batteries and radar installations around critical energy sites. These strikes have increased Iran’s vulnerability to future Israeli airstrikes. That said, enduring uncertainties over Tehran’s capacity to repair or adapt its defenses complicate the regional power balance.

Trump has reiterated his firm stance against Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, echoing his 2020 declaration that “as long as I am president, Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.” While favoring a negotiated settlement, Trump has not ruled out military force, a position mirrored by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long advocated a hardline approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In response, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has rejected negotiations under what he terms US “bullying,” stating that Tehran “will definitely not accept their expectations,” deepening the diplomatic impasse.

This standoff raises the risk of escalation, particularly if military action targets Iran’s nuclear facilities. Should such an attack occur, Iran might retaliate through transnational terrorism including the use of sleeper cells, targeting US assets in the region—such as the US Fifth fleet stationed in Bahrain—or Israeli and Jewish interests abroad, as it did with the 1994 Buenos Aires synagogue bombing orchestrated via Hezbollah. Such escalations would be in addition to the risk of potential attacks against US forces stationed in Iraq and Syria.

Iran’s history of supporting terrorist groups and its recent audacity—evidenced by assassination plots on US soil, including one against Trump during his re-election campaign—suggests a willingness to escalate if provoked. The November 2024 indictment of three individuals linked to Iran for plotting Trump’s assassination underscores this growing threat, with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noting Tehran’s increasing boldness.

The United States and its regional allies face a pressing need to counter these threats proactively, given Iran’s demonstrated capacity for transnational attacks and its network of sleeper cells. Enhanced counterintelligence efforts are critical to identify and neutralize plots before they materialize, particularly in vulnerable locations like Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet. Intelligence sharing with allies, bolstered by surveillance of suspected operatives, could thwart attacks similar to those Iran has executed or attempted in the past. The recent foiling of assassination plots by the FBI highlights the effectiveness of such measures, but Iran’s persistence—coupled with its weakened regional position after Israel’s strikes—demands sustained vigilance.

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and leads the Initiative’s Counterterrorism Project, which is designed to examine the future of global terrorism threats and counterterrorism efforts.

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“In an hour, you won’t see anyone on the street,” said one of the young men. “They’ll be staying in their homes when the fighting resumes.”

Smashed glass lay scattered over the sidewalk and streets of this town on the border with Syria. Nearby, the wall of a building was pockmarked by shrapnel from an exploding 107mm Katyusha rocket, while further up the street a house continued to smolder after a direct hit the previous day.

Qasr has been the scene of bloody clashes in recent days. Local Shia tribesmen have battled an assortment of Sunni jihadist militias and the new Syrian security forces dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the one-time al-Qaeda-linked group previously led by Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Tensions have been running high along this remote and highly porous stretch of the border since the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December. The area has long been a conduit for smugglers—diesel fuel, solar panels, and the amphetamine narcotic Captagon, from Lebanon to Syria, and weapons and people from Syria to Lebanon.

Those operations have significantly increased since Assad’s downfall and the resulting loss of security control on the Syrian side of the border, sources with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) told me.

In January, HTS-led security forces – what Syria’s new rulers euphemistically name the “Syrian army” – mounted an operation in the area, in what Damascus described as an anti-smuggling campaign.

But the smuggling gangs have grown more assertive, using armed force to defend themselves and averting LAF interception by bulldozing new trails across the more rugged and remote parts of the border. The Syrian security forces have demonstrated a very limited interest in assisting in smuggling crackdowns on their side of the border, only focusing on the area facing Qasr, where smuggling by Lebanese Shias occurs.

Other Sunni-populated areas along the border where smuggling also proliferates have been left untouched by the Syrian security forces. On the other side of the border, opposite Qasr, several villages have been populated for hundreds of years by Shias who have Lebanese citizenship. The operations have made evident that Damascus’s claimed anti-smuggling drive not only sought to prevent Shias from benefiting from the illegal practice but also to drive Lebanese Shias out of their homes and back across the border.

“We saw that [HTS] were mobilizing and knew they were coming for us,” said Ali Jaafar, who lived in Akkum, a small village lying one mile north of the border with Lebanon.

The Jaafars are a heavily armed tribe and can muster some 25,000 gunmen. Ali Jaafar said he and his fellow tribal fighters, joined by the Zeaiter, Dandash, and Nasreddine clans, staged several ambushes against the Syrian forces, killing over 40 of them. He claimed —citing both testimonies from detained fighters and identification documents found on the bodies of killed fighters—that most of the fighters on the other side were non-Arabs, including Chechens, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, and Afghans.

However, the Lebanese tribal fighters could not hold out for long. In late February, Ali Jaafar and other residents of Akkum and neighboring villages were forced to flee with their families across the border into Lebanon. The Syrian security forces entered the villages, allegedly looted and burned homes and desecrated mosques and Husseiniyahs, Shia meeting halls.

Hezbollah, which has a strong presence in northern Bekaa, stayed out of the fighting.

“Hezbollah advised us to leave our homes immediately because we would not be able to defend them and they said they would not come to our assistance,” Ali Jaafar said. “They told us they would only intervene if the Syrians entered Lebanon.”

The latest round of fighting began on March 16 when a group of HTS militants sneaked into Lebanon to steal some sheep. The shepherd, who was armed, killed two of the would-be sheep rustlers with rifle fire and wounded a third.

The Syrian government released a statement claiming that Hezbollah had entered Syria, kidnapped “Syrian soldiers” and brought them back into Lebanon before executing them. Hezbollah denied any involvement in the incident. On the ground, Syrian militants—presumed to be HTS-led security forces initially—opened fire indiscriminately against Qasr, launching 107mm rockets and employing 23mm anti-aircraft guns in a flat trajectory, killing a 15-year-old Lebanese civilian. The LAF returned fire with 155mm artillery guns toward the Syrian sources of fire. The LAF also deployed a Cessna aircraft to attack targets in Syria with Hellfire missiles, several sources close to the LAF told me. A LAF position under construction just east of Qasr was hit by a rocket, causing some damage but no casualties.

A Western diplomat in Beirut wryly noted to me that, within 24 hours, a criminal incident of attempted sheep rustling had escalated into a situation in which the army of one state was firing at the military of another state.

The fighting even saw the use of AT-14 Spriggan anti-tank missiles, popularly known in Lebanon by its Russian name, Kornet. One video purportedly showed a Kornet missile striking a building on the Syrian side of the border as a reporter was speaking into his phone. The use of Kornet missiles led many to conclude that Hezbollah must have been participating in the fighting. However, the Jaafar clan has had an unknown number of Kornet missile launchers in its substantial arsenal for several years. Many Jaafars once fought alongside Syrian Alawites in a pro-Assad militia called the Homs Defense Shield, which was supported by Russia. Although the militia was dissolved before Assad’s ouster, the Jaafars were able to retain some of the Kornet missiles.

“The Russians taught me how to fire the Kornet,” Ali Jaafar said, adding that he had recently attempted, without success, to purchase more Kornet missiles on the Syrian black market.

Nevertheless, some Hezbollah fighters took part in the clashes but under the flags of their respective tribes, not under the yellow party banner. The Bekaa Valley is known as the “Barracks of Hezbollah” and is the source of much of the party’s recruitment.

On the evening of March 17, Syrian security forces, backed by Syrian jihadist militias who had arrived from other areas, overran the border village of Hawsh Sayyed Ali, forcing residents to flee. Hawsh Sayyed Ali lies inside Syria, but its population has been predominantly Lebanese for decades. The joint border between Lebanon and Syria has never been appropriately delineated and demarcated, and consequently, there are several areas where Lebanese and Syrian maps have wholly different interpretations of the boundary’s path.

Contacts between Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa and his Syrian counterpart helped ease the tensions, leading to the withdrawal of Syrian militants, but not before they torched several homes before departing. The LAF deployed into the village, uncovered an arms depot during a sweep of the area, and confiscated the contents. The depot probably belonged to Hezbollah rather than the tribes. Hawsh Sayyed Ali was an important clandestine cross-border Main Supply Route for Hezbollah. The LAF’s removal of the weapons led to a video sweeping the internet showing a handful of Hezbollah supporters jeering a passing column of LAF troops in Hawsh Sayyed Ali, calling them “traitors” and yelling slogans of loyalty to former party chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in September 2024. Hezbollah likely staged the videoed display of anger toward the LAF, as anti-LAF sentiment is not generally felt by the tribes that live in the area. The incident underlines the complex environment in which the LAF operates in the northern Bekaa.

The latest clashes demonstrate the deep ideological hostility felt by Syria’s new rulers toward Shias, Hezbollah in particular, because of its history of military intervention in defense of the Assad regime. Shia and Christian communities in the northern Bekaa express deep concern that HTS and/or other Sunni jihadist groups will stage incursions into Lebanon, either hit-and-run raids to exact revenge or attempts to drive residents from their homes in proximity to the border. While those fears may persist among Lebanese residents, it is unlikely that Damascus will conduct a policy of violent harassment along Syria’s border with Lebanon. However, continued provocations by rogue Syria-based actors remain a threat, particularly if the security situation destabilizes further in Syria, underlining the importance of the Lebanese and Syrian governments engaging in close coordination and cooperation to maintain calm along their joint border.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Blanford covers the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria. He is an acknowledged expert on Lebanese Hezbollah, particularly the organization’s evolving military activities, which have remained a focus of his work for two decades. Blanford is a Beirut-based consultant and a defense and security correspondent for IHS/Jane’s.

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The prime minister summoned Bar earlier this week to inform him of his impending dismissal. Israel’s cabinet was expected to vote on that proposal during a meeting slated for Wednesday evening. Bar’s removal after a showdown with Netanyahu risks destabilizing the Shin Bet—whose core mission includes “the defense of the state of Israel, its institutions and its democratic governance”—and also undermining social cohesion within the country, just as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have resumed their offensive in Gaza. A dangerous ripple effect could ensue at a moment of growing regional tension.

Netanyahu cited his compounded lack of confidence in Bar’s performance as the reason for the termination, but circumstances surrounding their feud and its consequences are considerably more tangled.

Assuming the prime minister prevails, Bar’s departure would be the latest in a growing list of senior Israeli leaders to prematurely depart their posts after working at the helm on that fateful October day. That includes, most recently, the exit of (now former) IDF chief-of-staff Herzi Halevi earlier this month. Their mea culpas stand in stark contrast to Netanyahu’s refusal to accept similar responsibility for that catastrophe.

As he has purposefully deflected blame onto a host of others, Netanyahu has blocked attempts to convene an official inquest into the failings of Israel’s Gaza posture and rejected widespread calls of the Israeli public for him to seek a renewed mandate for his governance. His evasiveness is not coincidental. Polls indicate that an overwhelming majority of Israelis wish for the creation of a state commission of inquiry—and, more conclusively, for the prime minister to acknowledge his own culpability and step down from the premiership. Meanwhile, Netanyahu is neutralizing proverbial gatekeepers, clearing the road for him to appoint their successors and consolidate his power.

In the particular case of Bar, Netanyahu’s dissatisfaction appears traceable also to a series of incriminating charges—against figures in the prime minister’s close orbit—being scrutinized by the Shin Bet. Netanyahu aides are suspected of, among other things, leaking classified documents to foreign media and engaging in parallel consulting work for the Qatari regime. (To date, the prime minister himself has not been formally implicated.) Bar infuriated Netanyahu further when the findings of the Shin Bet’s October 7 probe pointed accusatory fingers not only in-house but also at questionable policy choices of Israel’s executive branch.

The exact timing of Bar’s firing was triggered evidently by a March 13 interview in which his predecessor, Nadav Argaman, warned that he would disclose privileged information pertaining to Netanyahu if “the prime minister has decided to act against the law,” leading Netanyahu to accuse both Argaman and Bar of trying to blackmail him. By Netanyahu’s logic, these incidents all speak to an orchestrated campaign by stewards of Israel’s bureaucracy to eject him and his right-wing allies from office.

Pushback against the prime minister’s gambit was swift. Bar railed stridently against what he deemed Netanyahu’s “expectation of a duty of personal loyalty” and clarified that he intends to remain at his post until the hostages are returned and several “sensitive” investigations are completed. Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara—the “certified interpreter of the law for state entities”—wrote to Netanyahu that Bar cannot be discharged “until the factual and legal basis underlying [the] decision is fully examined, as well as [the prime minister’s] authority to address the matter at this time,” expressing concern that the process “may be tainted by illegality and conflict of interest.”

In the next act, Netanyahu responded to the attorney-general on March 17 that she—rather than he—is abusing authority by interfering with his plans to replace Bar. The prime minister contended additionally that the alleged connections of his confidants to Qatar came under review, conspicuously, only after he resolved to sack the Shin Bet chief. Bar’s fate will be settled almost surely through appeals to the High Court of Justice, but a constitutional crisis looms: Bar has vowed to comply with the law, but Netanyahu’s open disdain for Supreme Court President Isaac Amit could put them all on an ominous collision course.

Protestors are rallying to prevent Bar’s ouster, but their impact is uncertain. Earlier demonstrations—and the efforts of a feckless Knesset opposition—have not significantly impeded the Netanyahu government from pursuing its ambitious agenda, which includes the passage of a controversial budget, changes to the judicial system, and an exemption from the military draft for the ultra-Orthodox Jewish population. In fact, moves to force out both Bar and Baharav-Miara—whom Justice Minister Yariv Levin is angling to fire as well—together with the resumption of IDF maneuvers in Gaza facilitated the recent return of Itamar Ben-Gvir’s faction to the prime minister’s coalition, expanding his margin of safety.

What will have a definite impact, however, is a dubious and untimely management turnover at the Shin Bet. The selection of a new leadership cohort under a cloud of suspicion threatens to cast the organization into turmoil in the midst of active warfare on “seven fronts.” These are not normal times. Forfeiting the experience Bar has accumulated and the relationships he has cultivated will amount to an operational deficit. 

The learning curve of Bar’s successor—particularly if the nominee comes from outside the agency—could be precariously steep, presenting a severe risk for Israel (and beyond) precisely when the conflict with the Palestinians is escalating once again. Any resulting dysfunction, which would affect the execution of Israel’s security measures, will impair prospects for advancing regional calm and normalization in the near term.

The appointment of a new director by a decidedly unpopular government has also raised fears that Israel’s formidable domestic intelligence capabilities might be employed inappropriately against the prime minister’s detractors. Amid other challenges to Israel’s liberal character, this turn of events could further erode the country’s standing within the international community.

Inspired reportedly by the campaign of US President Donald Trump—whose disruptive rhetoric he is emulating closely—to slot loyalists into key administration positions, Netanyahu is poised to continue purging Israel’s professional ranks. In instances where his plans are thwarted, he will fall back undoubtedly on claims of a “deep state” conspiracy to subvert democracy. Meanwhile, Israelis will continue to debate the legitimacy of the prime minister’s motives.

Ultimately, it will prove untenable for Bar to remain at his post by sole virtue of a court order. His tenure—as that of former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, from whose initial termination Netanyahu backtracked in March 2023, only to follow through in November 2024—is living on borrowed time.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Lipner served seven consecutive Israeli premiers over a quarter-century at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where his areas of core expertise included foreign policy, public diplomacy and communications, and Jewish communal affairs.

The post Netanyahu’s Shin Bet shakeup moves Israel closer to chaos appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This analysis draws on my conversations with members of these groups as well as HTS leadership over the past several years as a consultant with the International Crisis Group and an independent researcher. The people I spoke with were granted anonymity given the tenuous security situation in the country and their ongoing political work.

There are legitimate reasons for worry, specifically about the future of the Alawite community. In March, Alawite insurgents linked to the former regime launched a coordinated attack against security forces. Government forces, independent armed factions, and Sunni vigilantes mobilized in response, engaging in nearly four days of mass executions, killing more than six hundred Alawite civilians and detained insurgents. The insurgency by ex-regime elements is still ongoing. 

This violence and the state’s inability to control both its own forces and the independent forces has reignited fears over minorities’ safety, but these devastating events should not be viewed as indicative of the fate of other minorities. The violence is rooted in the fact that, over Syria’s brutal civil war, Alawite men formed the core of the regime’s fighting forces and intelligence apparatus and that the Alawite sect has come to be linked to the regime via both Assad’s policies and Sunni extremist narratives. These political and social dynamics do not apply to other minority groups. 

For the other minority groups, there are positive indications that they will be included in post-Assad Syria. Even before entering Damascus, HTS had been reaching out to Syria’s minorities in Idlib for sensitive, but successful, diplomatic engagement for five years. Christian leaders in Idlib told me in a meeting in 2022 that HTS had consistently reached out to them, first through senior religious figures and then through dedicated political attachés. HTS appointed these individuals—and thus engaged with these communities—directly, rather than through the Syrian Salvation Government that HTS and other opposition groups had formed to administer Idlib. These political attachés came to serve as advocates for the local communities, representing their demands to the Salvation Government and HTS security forces.

Through this, Christians in rural Idlib gradually regained control over their homes and farms and restarted public prayers. Additionally, security forces halted attacks on Christian communities. The engagement process was long and arduous, and, as HTS leaders told me in 2022, early on they were fearful that they’d face backlash from hardliners and populists in Idlib. However, as the years passed and the Christian community grew ever more integrated into Idlib’s society and the local government, HTS’s fears gradually ebbed. 

Growing from this experience, HTS engaged with Syrian community and diaspora leaders just days into its final military offensive in late 2024. This diplomatic offensive helped ensure that HTS could sweep through Syria without taking many minority regions by force. The discussions, which took place primarily during the first week of December last year, resulted in a particularly strong relationship between HTS and Syria’s Christian and Ismaili minorities and also ushered in a new era of relations with groups previously seen as close to the regime.

A diplomatic offensive, from Nubl and Zahraa . . .

For example, the collapse of the regime in Aleppo in November last year spread panic through the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa—once lynchpins of the regime’s defensive lines. Local Facebook pages claimed that two thousand Shia civilians had fled their homes, seeking shelter first in Aleppo and then in the town of Safira, where Hezbollah and Iran had built a strong militia network. By December 1, Safira came under at least partial opposition control, and regime forces abandoned the displaced people, resulting in widespread panic on Facebook over the fate of the civilians. On December 2, negotiations officially began between HTS and leaders from the displaced community to return them to their homes in Nubl and Zahraa, according to what an individual who facilitated the talks told me.

The negotiations began after members of the displaced community were able to reach one political activist living abroad, who told me that he helped establish a line to HTS’s political bureau and helped mediate. This initial experience quickly evolved into a small, multi-sect organization of activists representing a range of communities still under Assad’s rule—particularly the Ismaili-dominated cities of Masyaf and Salamiyah—all eager to assist in the peaceful handing over of their communities. 

. . . to eastern Hama

This diplomatic approach expanded as HTS advanced on northern Hama. The city of Salamiyah, lying east of Hama, played a crucial role in the regime’s defense as it hosted the headquarters of several important regime militias operating in the countryside. But it also had a vibrant revolutionary movement dating back to the 1980s, particularly led by its Ismaili majority. “Ismailis have always opposed the regime,” one Ismaili activist told me, “but we work through political and civil means, not arms.” Salamiyah is also home to the Syrian National Ismaili Council, which supports and guides the Ismaili community across Syria. These factors opened the door to negotiations with HTS.

I spent several days in Salamiyah in early February, meeting with National Ismaili Council leader Rania Qasim and other security and civil society officials in discussions about the negotiations and resulting relations with HTS. According to Qasim, on December 2, HTS’s political bureau contacted her to initiate talks. The talks were led by Qasim and a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation, an international Ismaili humanitarian organization. The negotiations also included a coordination committee formed by the Ismaili Council’s Emergency Operations Center. Qasim told me that she and the other leaders of the negotiations saw themselves as participating in such talks on behalf of all communities across the Salamiyah region, not just Ismailis.

According to Qasim, the discussion focused on the fate of regime fighters in the region and on how HTS would enter the city of Salamiyah. The council, according to the people I spoke with, refused to provide cover for any criminals in the city, agreeing instead to HTS’s general taswiya (settlement) policy—employed nationally after the fall of Assad—that saw a grace period for all armed men to turn in their weapons and receive temporary civilian identification documents, but it did not provide them with blanket amnesty. In return, it was agreed that pro-regime fighters would lay down their weapons while HTS units simply drove through the main street on their way south to Homs. The coordination committee also agreed it would send a delegation to the outskirts of Salamiyah to meet the HTS convoy and escort them through the city.

These negotiations marked a significant first step in HTS’s relationship with the Ismaili community in Salamiyah. According to Qasim, the council spent the three-day negotiation repeatedly announcing to Salamiyah residents, “the council and the community will not fight; if you want to fight, it will be your own decision.” This message was carried even to some of the most infamous Alawite villages, such as Sabburah, where two pro-revolution Alawite ex-political detainees then worked within their village to ensure the local fighters agreed to lay down their weapons. Yet the Ismaili Council itself has never been affiliated with any armed faction and had no communication with regime military leaders; Qasim emphasized that at no point did they negotiate with or on behalf of any armed regime faction.

Instead, HTS leaders had to trust that the Ismaili Council had the influence needed to pacify the regime militias and ensure HTS’s safe entry into the city and surrounding villages. In fact, there was only one small skirmish—in the village of Tal Khaznah, on the road south to Homs—but otherwise, the handover of eastern Hama on December 4 was peaceful, local security officials and members of the Ismaili Council told me. According to Ismaili leaders in Salamiyah and Tartous, the Assad regime responded to these rapid negotiations by sending security officials to the Ismaili Council in Tartous and threatening them, telling them that their relatives in Salamiyah were “traitors.” However, the regime collapsed before these officials could follow through on any threats. 

I was told that throughout this three-day negotiation period, other negotiations also took place on a more individual basis. Opposition fighters from both HTS and other factions who were from Salamiyah had begun reaching out to friends and families in their villages. One young commander remembered calling his family as his unit approached eastern Hama and asking them to connect him with the village’s mukhtar, telling me, “why would I want to risk fighting my father or brother?” He now leads a general security detachment in the countryside around his mixed-sect village, where he sees himself as bound to protect all locals no matter their sect.

The handover of the Salamiyah region was only the beginning of talks between HTS and the Ismaili Council, according to the Ismaili leaders I spoke with. The national council oversees seven regional branches, including ones in Tartous and Masyaf. With the regime still in control of western Syria, the Ismaili Council began negotiating on behalf of communities there. For its part, HTS ended its operations on the Masyaf front the same day it liberated Hama city, pausing its westward advance at the edge of the Ismaili- and Alawite-inhabited foothills. Ismaili leaders also told me that they began to share their positive experiences engaging with HTS with their contacts in the heavily pro-regime Christian towns of Muhradeh and Suqaylabiyah, which had ceased fighting but remained besieged by HTS. Those towns quickly concluded their own negotiations, which saw the peaceful entry of HTS units.

A foundation for a new Syria

The initial negotiations appear to have laid a strong foundation of trust that has extended beyond Salamiyah. According to the head of the Tartous Ismaili Council, HTS’s local military official met with the council the day after entering Tartous. The council was then invited to a general meeting between local representatives and HTS officials, was given a new line of communication with HTS’s political representative, and finally was welcomed to meetings with the new administrator of Tartous governorate. All of this evolved over just ten days. As one Ismaili official in Tartous described it to me, “It seems that the new government truly respects and has a special relationship with the Ismaili community. This came as a huge shock because we had never spoken with them before and had the same fears as the Alawites until December.” 

HTS’s diplomatic offensive demonstrates the leadership’s political approach, which evolved over years of engaging with the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. HTS leaders had justified these new policies to me years ago as a political necessity for one day governing a country as diverse as Syria and for legitimizing the movement among minority communities who only knew of the organization from its days as an al-Qaeda affiliate, then called Nusra Front. This understanding that Syria cannot be ruled as an Islamist Sunni country (but instead must be led as a country of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds) has begun to shape the post-Assad era—at least at a local administration and security level. 

The initial Salamiyah negotiations laid a strong foundation of cooperation that has continued to grow, ensuring the Ismailis across Syria “feel confident we will be fully represented in the constitutional process,” as a leader from the Tartous office told me. In Salamiyah, the Ismaili Council now plays a central role in the region’s administration, facilitating civil-political engagement, running a volunteer security force to assist local police, and hosting a security committee consisting of both civilian and military representatives to address security gaps and any violations committed by government forces. 

Such relations have grown even stronger in the coastal city of Qadmus. According to two local Ismaili activists I spoke with, a small Ismaili volunteer force has been supporting the undermanned government police forces in Qadmus since December. Government forces have even provided these volunteers with small arms, while a new Ismaili-run local council has worked closely with the regime-era mukhtar—also an Ismaili—to coordinate services and administration with the HTS-appointed regional director. The council has also engaged in outreach with the Alawite villages around Qadmus, serving as a bridge between the new local administration and the Alawites.

Despite these efforts, their close relationship with the new government has made the Ismailis in Qadmus a prime target for pro-Assad Alawites, who killed two Ismaili security volunteers in late February and an Ismaili Council member and two government police officers on March 6. When the March uprising began, the Ismailis tried to protect the government forces in the town, eventually negotiating for their safe exit from the area after being besieged by insurgents. However, as a result, they faced widespread threats—by Alawites both in person and over WhatsApp—for “siding with the government,” local residents told me. Security forces eventually peacefully reentered Qadmus, and according to the locals I spoke with, the experience has only strengthened their ties with Damascus. Many Ismaili men have now volunteered to support government security forces, with at least some applying to become official security officers. Meanwhile, local security officials are discussing extending salaries to the entire volunteer force. Despite the events of the past week, the city’s local council continues to serve as an intermediary between local security forces and the Alawite villages, as the former works to negotiate the handover of weapons and wanted criminals. 

Meanwhile, Christian civil society leaders in Syria’s tense coastal region also described a strong working relationship with local HTS-appointed administrators and security officials. Although they still have concerns centered on basic services, the economy, and the constitutional process, several activists and local Christian leaders told me in February that they did not fear direct attacks from the new government but rather worried about being caught in the growing violence between Alawites and government forces. Christian leaders across Syria were among the first men engaged by pro-opposition security forces in the days after Assad’s fall, with Facebook pages publishing pictures of meetings between military and political leaders and religious figures in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. As the violence on the coast escalated in March, the head of Aleppo’s Catholic community, Bishop Hanna Jallouf, reiterated the importance of a united Syria, affirmed the good treatment of Christians across the country, and called for a continuation of efforts to fully integrate all minorities into the political process.

These new interfaith and civil-centric networks and relationships will play a central role in shaping post-Assad Syria. However, the new government should do more to engage and empower groups such as the Ismaili and the Christian communities. It should do so both on a local and an international level, by working with groups such as the Aga Khan Foundation (to give Ismailis assurances) and even the Vatican (to do the same with Christians). Such efforts would help expand the local trust built with these groups into genuine representation in Damascus and would give real reason for optimism about the future of Syria’s minorities.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project.

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Iraq’s reluctance: Historical baggage and regional politics

Iraq’s reluctance to engage with Damascus in the aftermath of the HTS-led overthrow of Assad in December is complicated by Baghdad’s past alliance with the ousted regime, bolstered by mutual interests in countering mostly Sunni radical opposition forces.

For decades, Syria-Iraq relations have been marked by diplomatic cuts and tensions, despite both nations adopting Baathist ideology under Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. After 2003, the Assad regime refused to recognize Iraq’s new government and was accused of facilitating jihadists crossing into Iraq to join al-Qaeda. However, in 2011, things changed when then-president Bashar al-Assad lost control over large swaths of Syrian territory to opposition groups. The resulting vacuum was exploited by ISIS, which seized a third of Iraq in 2014. This triggered a costly three-year war for Iraq, supported by billions in US aid, to reclaim its land.

A significant number of Iraqi Shia militia units, often operating under Iranian command, fought alongside Assad’s forces against groups like HTS and ISIS, forging deep operational ties. Assad’s fall, widely perceived as a setback for Iran and its “Axis of Resistance,” has left Iraq’s policy toward Syria in disarray. Iran’s influence in Baghdad, coupled with the presence of Iraqi militias once active in Syria, complicates any swift pivot to recognizing interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government.

Adding to this reluctance is a lingering legal and moral quandary: Iraq still holds an arrest warrant against al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Muhammed al-Joulani, for his past affiliations with al-Qaeda and alleged involvement in attacks that killed Iraqis. Iraqi policymakers are, therefore, skeptical of al-Sharaa’s transformation on the world stage into a pragmatic statesman. Since Assad’s ousting, Baghdad has cut oil supplies to Syria, postponed a proposed visit by Syria’s foreign minister over objections from Shia politicians, and kept its two major border crossings with Syria—vital for trade and security—nonfunctional. The deployment of Iraq’s largest border patrol since the 2017 liberation of Mosul signals heightened caution rather than cooperation.

Baghdad discreetly hosted Syria’s foreign minister last week, in an unannounced and unprecedented visit for a foreign minister of a neighboring country that caused significant backlash Shia figures disapproval. While discussions included Baghdad’s concerns over Shia shrines and the protection of Alawite communities, the primary focus was establishing border security cooperation. However, achieving meaningful progress in this area requires intensive diplomatic engagement that neither side appears capable of sustaining independently at present.

In recent days, unknown armed groups have targeted Syrian workers in Iraq who shared or showed support for Syria’s new ruler, al-Sharaa, on their social media profiles. Iraqi security forces arrested some others for posting content that endorsed Damascus’ security forces actions in Syria’s coastal cities, which reportedly led to the killing of hundreds of Alawite civilians. Iraqi law charges any affiliation with al-Sharaa under Article 4 of its anti-terrorism law.

Yet, this stance is not uniform across Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has taken a pragmatic approach, endorsing the new Syrian leadership and playing a key role in bridging gaps between al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leader Mazloum Abdi. Kurdish leaders, including the KRG president and prime minister, have met Syria’s foreign minister in Europe, signaling support for the peace deal. Iraq has been represented primarily through its Kurdish-led foreign ministry at regional meetings on Syria, and Iraqi Sunnis, too, have expressed sympathy for Damascus’s new rulers.

But Baghdad’s federal government has maintained a distance, showing little inclination to normalize relations. Only a brief visit by the intelligence chief to Damascus yielded no tangible progress.

Regional endorsements and divisions

The new Syrian government has garnered broad regional support, with endorsements from the Gulf states, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. These nations, seeking stability in Syria, have welcomed the HTS-led administration as a potential partner in rebuilding and securing the region. Europe took the lead in normalizing relations with Damascus’s new government.

However, the United States has yet to formulate its official diplomatic position, although its military has coordinated with new Syrian security forces to counter ISIS. Following the deal with SDF, Washington now possesses a reliable and strong partner within the new Syrian government, at least for security and counterterrorism operations. However, Israel and Iraq stand apart, refusing to accept the leadership change in Damascus. Israel’s concerns likely stem from HTS’s Islamist roots and its potential ties to groups hostile to Israeli interests, while Iraq’s reluctance is driven by the aforementioned historical and political factors. Israel launched military operations into southern Syria in a bid to demilitarize Damascus’ defense capabilities along its border. Iraq, on the other hand, refuses to reopen its border crossing, and flights between Baghdad and Damascus have stopped.

Security cooperation at risk: the ISIS factor

The stakes of Iraq’s hesitation are high, particularly regarding security cooperation against ISIS, which remains a potent threat along the Iraq-Syria border—a fragile region ripe for exploitation. Normalizing relations with Damascus, starting with joint military cooperation at the border could bolster joint efforts to secure this porous frontier, where thousands of Iraqi ISIS affiliates languish in SDF-controlled prisons and camps like Al-Hol in Syria’s northeast. A coordinated approach could prevent the group from capitalizing on any power vacuum in a divided Syria, a scenario that previously saw ISIS seize a third of Iraq in 2014, triggering a costly three-year war and billions in US aid to reclaim lost territory.

Baghdad’s current standoffishness, however, risks the opposite. Without formal engagement, intelligence sharing and border coordination remain stymied, potentially allowing ISIS to regroup. The United States stands to lose ground in its long-standing campaign against the group if tensions between Baghdad and Damascus persist, especially considering Washington’s significant military partnerships with both the Iraqi army and SDF. The peace deal’s promise of extending US influence on the HTS-led government via the SDF strengthens internal security, but to achieve long-term cross-border security, Syria needs Iraq as a reliable partner.

Mediating a Fragile Triangle

The United States emerges as the linchpin in this delicate equation. Having quietly engineered the HTS-SDF accord—evidenced by the American Chinooks ferrying Abdi to Damascus—the United States now has a reliable partner in Syria’s new military, thanks to the deal’s integration of the SDF into Syria’s defense framework. Coupled with its formal alliance with Baghdad, this positions the United States to bridge the gap between the two nations. Washington holds leverage over both capitals: Iraq relies on US military support and seeks to avoid sanctions, while Syria’s new government needs international legitimacy and reconstruction aid, both contingent on US goodwill.

Washington could press Baghdad to move beyond historical grievances and engage Damascus, emphasizing the shared threat of ISIS. Facilitating dialogue—perhaps through joint military coordination at border crossings—would align with US strategic interests in stabilizing the region and safeguarding its investment in the anti-ISIS coalition. Simultaneously, the United States could encourage Damascus to address Iraq’s concerns, such as resolving the status of Iraqi detainees and preventing anti-Alawite sentiment, to build trust.

A Path Forward

The HTS-SDF peace deal offers a rare opportunity for regional stability, but Iraq’s refusal to engage Damascus risks squandering its potential. Caught between historical loyalties and contemporary realities, Baghdad’s indecision threatens security cooperation at a critical juncture. The United States, with its military footprint and diplomatic clout, must step in to bridge this divide, leveraging its partnerships with both Syria’s new military and Baghdad to align the two nations against ISIS. Failure to act could see the region slide back into the chaos that once empowered extremists—a cost neither Iraq, Syria, nor the United States can afford.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021. When he was elected in 2018, he became the youngest Iraqi member of parliament at the age of thirty-four.

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But the Trump administration risks falling into a US pattern dating back to the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism, opting for short-sighted military action at the expense of constructing a sustainable plan for Yemen. Multiple US administrations have neglected the conflict’s complexities, leading to failure in executing an enduring strategy that protects Washington’s interests in Yemen and the wider region. Yemen’s many overlapping conflicts and dire humanitarian conditions will not be resolved by US military action, which will likely further institutionalize war, weapons flows, foreign interference, fragmentation, weak governance, and humanitarian catastrophe.

Origins of Yemen’s conflict

The Republic of Yemen—created in 1990 via the merging of the tribal northern Yemen Arab Republic and the Marxist southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen—has never been a unitary country, society, or people. Despite its long history, predating the 7th-century revelation of Islam by some two millennia, Yemen has rarely been governed by a single political authority. Even before civil war broke out between the internationally recognized—and Saudi-backed—Yemeni government and Ansar Allah (Partisans of God) in 2014, Yemen was plagued by chronic violence, insecurity, and poverty. The Iran-supported Houthis are only one of many challenges to regional security that emerge from Yemen to defy the US vision of a peaceful, productive, and integrated Middle East. Other challenges include franchises of the two most violent Sunni extremist groups, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, as well as a variety of other armed groups fighting within Yemen in an effort to shape its uncertain future. The Republic of Yemen government in Sana’a had only tenuous control over many parts of the country that are under the sway of tribal groups or other armed elements, including secessionists, terrorists, and religious extremists.

Nonetheless, Ansar Allah, which emerged in the 1990s, remains the most persistent threat in the region. It was a thorn in the side of the Sana’a government, fighting no less than six wars against the regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. When Saleh stepped down after the 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Yemen, Ansar Allah’s Houthi leaders made their bid for political power. In 2015, they forced Saleh’s successor, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, first out of Sana’a and later into exile in Saudi Arabia. The current Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council—Hadi’s ostensible successor—still operates out of Riyadh. The Houthis continue to play a central role in Yemen’s ongoing conflicts and have expanded their attacks beyond Yemen, as Trump noted. The 2023 edition of the US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism reported that the Yemeni government “controlled about two-thirds of Yemen’s territory, but between 60 percent and 70 percent of the country’s population lived in Houthi-controlled areas.”

Regional consequences

Yemen—forming one side of the Bab el-Mandeb strait—is a highly strategic ground overlooking the entry/exit point of the Red Sea, which facilitates the Houthi attacks against global shipping routes. Further, the multitude of conflicts and armed actors are threatening neighbors, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributing to the Houthis’ gaining Iranian support in 2012. As Asher Orkaby noted, “Yemen’s instability is simultaneously a threat to Saudi Arabia and a source of potential strategic benefit to Iran.” Ansar Allaheven collaborated closely with Lebanese Hezbollah to refine its military and governance structures. Consequently, with US assistance, the Arabian Peninsula powers intervened to shape the Yemeni battlefield in their favor. Further, its attacks against Israel, in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza, have elicited Israeli retaliation, as its attacks on Red Sea shipping have elicited US retaliation. US competitors, Russia and China, have also begun taking advantage of the openings the various Yemeni conflicts present.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched an aerial assault on northern Yemen with as much as $200 million per day in weapons expenditure. The UAE also intervened in Yemen, seeking to overturn Houthi rule by sponsoring anti-Houthi militias. Consequently, Yemeni civilians—victimized by the overlapping conflicts—are paying a staggering humanitarian price. Seeking to end the war’s negative consequences in 2021, then-President Joe Biden announced an end to US support for Saudi Arabia’s air campaign, declaring that “this war has to end.”

The negative impact of international military intervention in Yemen is exemplified by the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist movement backed by the UAE. Although the group has often clashed with other Yemeni militias, in 2023, it joined other southern factions in calling for the restoration of South Yemen with its pre-1990 borders, a clear sign that actors like the UAE will pursue their own interests at the expense of a unified Yemeni state. The UAE also supports a western Yemeni group known as the Joint Forces, led by a nephew of former President Saleh, which also skirmishes with the Houthis.

By November 2024, the Houthis were also receiving extensive support from Russia, “which apparently sees the Yemeni group as an instrument through which to retaliate for and deter Western support for Ukraine.” A Wall Street Journal report in October revealed that the Kremlin provided the Houthis with targeting data for its strikes against commercial shipping in the Red Sea—perhaps in exchange for free passage for Russian vessels, as well as Yemeni youth, to serve as cannon fodder in Russia’s war in Ukraine. China has also provided the Houthis with missiles in exchange for leaving its ships alone. The Houthis have also sought to establish warmer relations with Sunni jihadist groups, including their Yemeni rival al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Shabaab in Somalia, alliances that help the Houthis tighten their stranglehold on the Bab al-Mandeb.

The toxic mix of factional violence, weak governance, and external powers interfering to protect their geopolitical interests has led to overwhelming humanitarian costs in Yemen. Indeed, upwards of 60% of the more than 377,000 people who have perished in the conflict died from non-military causes, according to the United Nations. An additional four and a half million are internally displaced, and 18.2 million depend on humanitarian assistance, according to the UN Refugee Agency, aid which has been scaled back in the past couple of years. Moreover, the designation of Ansar Allah as an FTO requires a review of US assistance programs in Yemen and directs the termination of projects, grants, and contracts with entities found to have made payments to Houthi entities or to have insufficiently documented Houthi abuses.

Inadequate US strategy

The US military approach in Yemen is essentially a two-pronged strategy: seeking to degrade terrorist external operations while strengthening local capacity to tackle destabilizing insurgencies.

First, the US has relied heavily on its drone program for tactical counterterrorism missions in Yemen, launching over three hundred drone strikes in an effort to keep al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at bay. These strikes have killed up to 150 civilians and over one thousand confirmed militants, according to one monitor. The drone strike program has proven effective at countering international terrorism but less effective at resolving insurgencies in target countries. Alternatives to the drone program pose different risks; in the January 2017 Yakla raid, for example, when a joint US-UAE special operations raid attempted to capture AQAP leader Qasim al-Raymi, between ten and thirty civilians were killed in the raid, including an American citizen, as well as several AQAP fighters and Navy SEAL William Owens. Al-Raymi was not found but would later be killed in a US airstrike.

The second prong of this strategy has involved support to local actors, primarily the Yemeni government, to strengthen their capacity to conduct counterterrorism. According to the Security Assistance Monitor, this support for Yemen topped $850 million. While preventing the US military from being forced to deploy to Yemen, the approach made support contingent on counterterrorism successes, not much-needed reforms. “This approach tends to undermine the political and social alternatives that foster better governance and political participation,” former Yemeni diplomat Mustafa Naji wrote, criticizing the strategy. “In Yemen specifically, the American approach prioritized combating terrorism and piracy in the Gulf of Aden… but…overlooked the priorities of the people on the ground.” Ultimately, it proved relatively ineffective. The State Department’s most recent Country Report on Terrorism notes that the Yemeni government “cooperated with the US government on counterterrorism efforts but could not fully enforce [counter-terrorism] measures or consistently lead multilateral efforts because of instability, violence, and degraded capabilities.”

The attacks against the Houthis and their designation as an FTO may damage the group but will not help Yemen’s political leaders build consensus. As Peter Salisbury and Michael Wahid Hanna wrote in Foreign Policy “designations deepen political polarization, foster incentives for non-designated groups to pursue maximalist demands, and make third-party mediation, vital to resolving conflicts through political settlements, harder at times by criminalizing even limited contact with designated groups.”

Yemen is now effectively a failed state where the causes and potential solutions of conflict are immensely complex, and those complexities have frustrated US policymakers and sent the country to the bottom rung of America’s foreign policy priorities. The civil war provides the backdrop for Yemen’s many plagues—seemingly irreconcilable opponents, weak governance, terrorism, external interference, and a humanitarian crisis—each of which poses major threats to its stability and ensures it will likely remain a significant challenge for Western and regional policymakers.

Indeed, the conflict in Yemen has thrived in large part because of US and other Western ignorance and missteps. As Allison Minor wrote for the Brookings Institution last year, the failure to prevent war was in large part due to “Insufficient high-level attention and bandwidth dedicated to Yemen even during periods of crisis… undermining decisive US policy action.” For Trump, his transactional approach to solving problems may be frustrated by actors who are benefitting from the status quo, many of which are beyond US influence.

Although the front lines of Yemen’s conflict are “frozen,” according to several monitors, the deadlock is leading to an awkward, if informal, partition—a north governed by the Houthis and a south governed by secessionist elements who oppose them. However, as Gregory Johnsen notes, partition wouldn’t “be the end of the war in the South. Instead, in all likelihood, it will spawn a new round of fighting.” Hans Grundberg, the UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, said in July that “The only way to move forward in Yemen is to find mutually acceptable solutions through dialogue and negotiation.” While that prospect is easier said than done, the United States is not even engaged in such an effort. In fact, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has made clear that his concerns about the Yemeni conflict only extend to countering threats to Washington’s interests in the region. As he put it in last weekend’s appearance on Fox News, “we don’t care what happens in the Yemeni civil war.”

Jacob Ware is a research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and DeSales University, and the co-author of God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America.

Amir Asmar is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council and an adjunct professor of Middle East geopolitical issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

The views expressed are the authors’ and do not imply endorsement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other US Government agency.

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This agreement comes after the historic call by the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan for the dissolution of the PKK and all of its groups. After the Turkish nationalist leader Devlet Bahceli launched the initiative, the conflict between Turkey and the PKK is as close to an end as ever before. Ankara sees the agreement, signed on March 11, 2025, in Damascus, as a critical step towards this goal.

The most significant takeaway for Turkey is that it signals the formal end of the statehood project in northeastern Syria under the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The YPG is the Syrian branch of the PKK, a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. By signing this deal, Mazloum Abdi has essentially conceded the collapse of the autonomous administration project. The absence of any reference to an autonomous region in the agreement and the fact that Abdi was addressed solely by name rather than his military title further reinforce this perspective.

Ambiguities that warrant caution

Despite the positive signals, two critical ambiguities within the agreement require scrutiny. The first pertains to the wording of Article 4, which states that all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria will be “integrated” into the Syrian state.

The SDF initially demanded to join the Syrian army as a separate bloc, which led to a stalemate in the negotiations. Sources in Damascus told the author that the SDF won’t join as a separate bloc but that it will be dissolved, and its members will join the army individually. An interview by Mazloum Abdi indicates the same. The SDF has also accepted another key Turkish demand: for non-Syrian PKK cadres to leave Syria.

However, certain SDF-affiliated voices are presenting an alternative reading, claiming that the SDF will retain its organizational structure while merely operating under the Syrian state’s framework. This contradiction suggests that some within the SDF may not be on board with the agreement or that the ambiguity in the agreement may cause disagreements in the future. Conflicting narratives such as these increase the risk of potential for non-compliance or future renegotiations.

The second major uncertainty lies in Article 8, which outlines a transition period for implementing the agreement, stating that a commission will oversee its execution by the end of the year. An eight-person committee has already been established. This prolonged timeline introduces risks, including potential backtracking by the SDF or external interference by third-party actors seeking to derail the process. The nine-month implementation period provides ample opportunity for complications to arise, whether due to internal resistance within the SDF, sabotage attempts by foreign powers, or operational difficulties in fully integrating SDF-controlled institutions into the Syrian state.

Strategic implications for Turkey

Syria has been a key in Turkey’s approach to the PKK, and from Ankara’s perspective, the agreement represents an opportunity. It aligns with Ankara’s goal of preventing the establishment of a semi-independent PKK entity on its southern border. But more importantly, the agreement furthers the Turkish strategy to convince the PKK to dissolve itself and end the terror threat towards Turkey.

On February 27, 2025 the imprisoned leader of the PKK made a historic call for the dissolution of the group. Following this call, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire and stated its readiness to discuss its dissolution. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEP) in Turkey has been a critical mediator during the process and fully supports the initiative. The last time Turkey tried a peace process with the PKK, it ended miserably with an escalation of violence inside cities in Turkey’s southeast.  Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey tried a negotiated settlement with the PKK. This time, Turkey is acting differently.

This time, the Turkish counter-terrorism operations are not halted, and Ankara’s approach is that of a government victory against the PKK. The rationale is clear: the PKK’s strategy failed. Turkish military operations succeeded in eliminating all guerilla capabilities of the PKK inside Turkey, ended the PKK’s ability to infiltrate into Turkey via Iraqi Kurdistan, and cornered the PKK’s branch in Syria.

Geopolitical shifts in the Middle East elevate the Turkish position dramatically. The YPG-dominated SDF lost all of its territories on the western side of the Euphrates River and faces huge pressure in a post-Bashar al-Assad Syria. The SDF no longer receives Russian military protection or Iranian weapon supplies and no longer has an Assad regime to cooperate with against Turkey. Turkey now has an ally in Damascus and has managed to gain the support of Arab and European states for Syria.

The only remaining support the SDF enjoys is the US support against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)and the Israeli strategy to divide Syria along sectarian and ethnic lines. Despite Israeli rhetoric, Israel is unlikely to support the SDF in a meaningful way and antagonize Turkey. The United States, under the administration of President Donald Trump, is unlikely to remain in Syria. To avoid a military operation by Turkey in a post-withdrawal scenario, the United States has reportedly pushed the SDF to reach an agreement with Damascus. The Trump administration only really cares about the ISIS angle. Knowing this, Turkey formed a security cooperation with Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria to take over the anti-ISIS mission from the US-led international coalition. It was no coincidence that the SDF agreed to sign a deal with the interim Syrian authorities after the summit in Amman. It was unimaginable a year ago, but the Turkish and American approaches to SDF are currently overlapping.

From the domestic level to geopolitics, all stars appear to be aligned for Ankara. By allowing the PKK and affiliates to engage in legal politics in Turkey and Syria, Turkish decision-makers are very close to achieving a historic gain. The four-decade-long conflict may end.

That being said, the uncertainties surrounding the implementation necessitate continued vigilance. The most critical factor for Turkey is how the Syrian regime will handle the military integration of SDF forces. If the SDF leadership retains operational autonomy under the Syrian army’s banner, it could pose a continued security threat to Turkey. Turkey is not a party to the agreement, meaning it retains full flexibility in responding to any unfavorable developments.

Turkey’s strategy moving forward

Given the historic opportunity and the uncertainties, Turkey will adopt a three-layered strategy to ensure the implementation of the agreement aligns with its national security interests. First, Ankara will maintain its military pressure in northeastern Syria to deter any backtracking by the SDF. The Turkish government has consistently emphasized its readiness to intervene militarily in Syria if necessary, and this agreement does not alter that stance. The continuity of Turkish airstrikes against the SDF and the PKK are a reflection of this stance.

Second, Turkey will actively engage in diplomatic talks with Damascus and Washington to ensure that the agreement leads to a complete dissolution of the SDF’s military structure rather than a superficial rebranding. Back-channel diplomacy between Turkey and the United States, as well as American pressure on the SDF, was particularly essential in making this agreement possible. The American role will remain integral for the upcoming 9-month-long implementation phase.

Third, the PKK’s ultimate decision and action will be essential in shaping the agreement’s implementation. Therefore, the implementation phase in Syria will strongly depend on domestic Turkish political developments. The current narrative on a Turkish-Kurdish alliance is essential for the deal in Syria to continue. Furthermore, the PKK cadres in the Qandil Mountains in Iraq and Iran could reject Öcalan’s call. Even if the PKK accepts to dissolve itself, the process to do so remains unknown. Turkey’s approach to Syria’s northeast will be in sync with the developments regarding the PKK’s central and Turkish domestic politics.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs analyst. 

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Mohammad Abdulsalam, the chief Houthi spokesperson once courted by Western diplomats as a potential peace negotiator, was one of the seven individuals the US designated, along with six other high-ranking Houthi leaders.  Abdulsalam has been quietly traveling to Moscow in his capacity as a spokesperson for the Houthi militia and under the guise of his position as a mediator for Yemen’s conflict, strengthening a relationship that benefits both the Houthis and the Kremlin.

The US sanctions specifically focus on individuals involved in weapons procurement and smuggling operations, directly addressing the group’s regionally threatening military capabilities. The targeting of Moscow-linked Houthi figures is the clearest indication yet that the group’s relationship with Russia is no longer just a matter of convenience but a calculated military alliance. These sanctions expose a supply chain of instability through a transnational weapons pipeline linking Tehran, Sanaa, and Moscow in a web of illicit arms transfers that goes beyond the Houthis’ ideological fanfare or mere opportunism.  

For a movement that once claimed to be “independent,” the Houthis have instead become a tool of foreign powers, shifting from an Iranian proxy to a Kremlin asset. Russia, isolated by its war in Ukraine, recognized the Houthis’ potential as a pressure point against the West. Tehran and Moscow have long understood that armed non-state actors, when properly equipped, can shape global conflicts as effectively as standing armies. The FTO’s treasury designation’s focus on relations with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Russia makes it clear that the Houthis are not the architects of their own rise, but merely instruments in a much larger geopolitical contest.

Yemen’s internationally recognized government welcomed the FTO designation, after years of advocacy against the previous Biden administration’s 2021 reversal of the Houthis’ terrorist status. For many Yemenis, both within the country and across the diaspora, the FTO designation represents a long-overdue recognition of reality that the West has consistently overlooked: that the Houthis are not interested in peace.

Yemeni communities have directly experienced Houthi brutality firsthand, from forced child recruitment and arbitrary detentions to systemic kidnapping of aid workers and torture of political opponents.  But they also recognize that the complicated Houthi ties with Tehran and Russia, along with Houthis’ threat on the Red Sea, is roping Yemen into conflicts that could deepen their misery and present serious implications for Yemen’s future.

Throughout Yemen’s conflict, global discourse in international media largely centered on Saudi Arabia’s military involvement in Yemen and the humanitarian crisis it created, stifling serious debate on long-term strategy and security. Many analysts downplayed Houthis’ deepening ties with Iran and Russia, overstated Houthis’ autonomy, dangerously underestimating Tehran and Moscow’s encroaching influence. As Western policymakers looked elsewhere, the Houthis quietly evolved into a strategic force empowered to execute operations with severe global consequences.

From negotiating table to Kremlin asset

The Houthi military trade with Russia involves both imports and exports, according to the Treasury.  Washington’s intelligence confirms that Russia’s foreign military agency, the GRU, is now operating in Houthi-controlled Sana’a under the guise of humanitarian aid, providing technical assistance that enhances Houthi military operations. Furthermore, there are reports linking renowned Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout to weapons smuggling operations benefiting the Houthis. This relationship has evolved from opportunistic exchanges to direct military collaboration, with the Kremlin reportedly assisting with data tracking systems that enhance the Houthis’ maritime targeting capabilities in the Red Sea.

While the Houthis have long exploited Yemen’s war economy, profiting from everything from fuel smuggling to extortion, recent intelligence reveals an even more insidious revenue stream. According to the US Treasury Department, Houthi operative and ‘major general’ Abdulwali Abdoh Hasan Al-Jabri ran a human smuggling network, recruiting Yemeni civilians to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

This revelation exposes a new dimension of the Houthi-Russia relationship, one that extends beyond weapons and into human capital. A Zaydi Shia jihadi group funneling cannon fodder to an ostensibly secular dictatorship exemplifies the moral bankruptcy of both parties. By mid-2024, Houthi rebels had funneled thousands of Yemenis into Russian military training camps under false pretenses. Many recruits believed they were signing up for construction jobs at two thousand dollars a month, a cruel deception that transforms the Houthis from mere terrorists into something more contemptible: traffickers in human misery, directly serving Russian military interests.

What is truly troubling, however, is that the same Houthi representatives engaged in this human trafficking to Russia — Abdulsalam, Ali Muhammad Muhsin Salih Al-Hadi, and Mahdi Mohammed Hussein Al-Mashat—had previously postured as dealmakers during the 2018 Stockholm Agreement negotiations that saw significant victories for the rebel faction. This pattern exposes not just Houthi duplicity, but the international community’s weakness: a preference for celebrating photo-op diplomacy over demanding verifiable commitments. The Stockholm talks didn’t deliver peace but a tactical pause that was so eagerly misread by Western mediators desperate for any sign of progress in Yemen.    

Strategic maritime selectivity 

The US Treasury has confirmed that the Houthis deliberately target Western shipping while ensuring safe passage for Russian and Chinese vessels, an arrangement they have openly acknowledged. This pattern of selective targeting is not incidental but strategic. As General Michael Kurilla, the commander of US Central Command, testified before Congress last year, Iran, Russia, and China are actively reshaping the regional order at the West’s expense, using asymmetric actors like the Houthis to apply pressure. Their coordination with Moscow and Beijing to shield Russian and Chinese vessels while attacking US and allied shipping underscores this geopolitical alignment. According to the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi has directly communicated with Russian and Chinese officials to secure this arrangement.

This maritime strategy is part of the broader Russian-Iranian realignment that accelerated after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Moscow abandoned neutrality, aligning with Iran while strengthening military and intelligence ties with its proxies, aided by IRGC-supplied drones. The Kremlin’s radar tracking technology has since sharpened the Houthis’ ability to identify and target vessels in the Red Sea with precision, further embedding them in an axis designed to weaken Western influence over global trade.

Russia also notably provided the Houthis with support in the diplomatic arena: In 2015, Moscow abstained from United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2216, which imposed an arms embargo on the Houthis. By refusing to back it, Russia kept the Houthis politically viable as a strategic bargaining chip, ensuring they remained a useful counterweight in regional power dynamics while preserving its own leverage in Yemen’s conflict. Moreover, when a UN panel of experts, including American analyst Gregory Johnsen, later exposed clear violations of that embargo, Russia went on the offensive, discrediting the findings, blocking enforcement, and vetoing Johnsen’s reappointment.

Yet, even as Moscow and Tehran expanded their influence, Western policymakers still clung to the idea that the Houthis were just another regional insurgency, rather than a weaponized proxy in an emerging anti-Western axis. Even in the months leading up to October 7, 2023, there was still cautious optimism about Houthi engagement in negotiations with the UN Envoy, Hans Grundberg, expressing optimism about things moving “in the right direction.” And while this illusion has now collapsed, the international community is left scrambling for a response, with the UN still incapable of protecting its own staff kidnapped by the Houthis, let alone solve Yemen’s decade-long crisis.    

For these reasons, Washington’s renewed terrorist designation sends an important message in acknowledging the geopolitical problem in the Red Sea, but it comes a little too late. If the United States continues to pursue engagement on outdated terms, it will once again be outmaneuvered by a group that answers not to Yemen’s interests, but to Tehran’s and Moscow’s. The question now is whether Washington will finally catch up to reality, or whether it will repeat the mistakes that let the Houthis rise in the first place.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is a Senior Analyst with the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies and a Board Member of Peace Track Initiative. She can be found on X at @YemeniFatima.

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The return of “maximum pressure” is coming at the right time. Iran’s economy is extremely vulnerable. The global oil market’s fundamentals are relatively soft, as strong global supply growth keeps pace with moderating oil demand growth, driving Brent crude futures below seventy dollars per barrel for the first time since September 2024. Furthermore, nearly all of Iran’s 1.6 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil and condensate exports go to a single buyer, China. This means the conditions are ripe for dealing Tehran a crippling blow. 

Removing most of those volumes from the market would come at a time of relatively high spare production capacity in Saudi Arabia and other members of the oil-producing group OPEC+. The estimated 5–6 mb/d of spare capacity (production held off the market due to output cuts) in these countries is more than enough to offset the loss of Iranian barrels. Moreover, the loss of billions of dollars in oil revenues, in addition to the Israeli military’s deterrence, would make it nearly impossible for Tehran to rebuild its smoldering Axis of Resistance and leaves the regime more vulnerable to internal dissent and international pressure.

Current global oil market conditions provide a unique opportunity to escalate pressure on Iran without causing undue harm to consumers or US allies. First, strong production growth from the United States, Canada, Brazil, and other non-OPEC+ countries and tepid demand growth have loosened global oil markets, meaning that there are reduced risks for both US consumers and the administration. Expectations from forecasters such as the International Energy Agency continue to see the market in surplus this year. Saudi-led OPEC+ has been forced to cut supply multiple times since the beginning of 2023 to stabilize prices, and while the group announced it will proceed with its plan to return barrels to the market beginning in April, it reiterated that the “gradual increase may be paused or reversed subject to market conditions.” 

As a result of the conservative production approach since 2023, OPEC+ has built up enough spare capacity to offset a sharp reduction in Iranian exports. While Washington may need to work with Riyadh to convince it to ramp up production more quickly than currently planned, the buffer can insulate consumers from potential price spikes, reducing political risks for the administration.

Second, removing Iranian barrels from the equation may help the United States avoid a harmful price collapse. Oversupply is not just a problem for Iran and other oil-producing countries—it also threatens US oil producers, which require moderately higher prices to sustain production growth and generate returns. A collapse in oil prices—as seen in 2014 and 2020—would disproportionately hurt US energy interests. By removing Iranian barrels from the market, the United States could help stabilize prices, protect its domestic oil industry, and weaken Iran all at once.

Third, Iran’s oil sector is dilapidated. Prior to the reimposition of oil sanctions in 2018, Iran’s crude oil production capacity was around 3.8 mb/d for decades. Over time, that number has fallen due to sanctions and underinvestment. In December 2024, Iran’s Ministry of Oil released a report on the status of the country’s oil sector, noting it would require three billion dollars of investment to recover the 0.4 mb/d of capacity it has lost since 2018. The ministry also admitted that if trends persist, production could decrease to 2.75 mb/d by 2028. At current rates, Iran may have to choose between meeting domestic demand and sustaining exports (and thus maintaining export revenues) as early as 2026.

Finally, disrupting Iran’s energy sector is not just about economics—it’s also about leveraging an effective tool to achieve broader strategic goals. An energy-focused maximum pressure campaign could heighten economic challenges for Iran, potentially amplifying domestic dissent. Tehran will have to divert resources from its destabilizing activities, such as its nuclear program and support for regional proxies, and make real concessions or risk further escalation.

Trump’s return to the presidency presents a historic opportunity to reset the United States’ approach to Iran. Oil markets are soft, and Iran is more vulnerable than it has been in decades. By turning off the taps, the United States can deliver a decisive blow to Iran’s ambitions and set the stage for a more stable and secure future.

Scott Modell is the chief executive officer of Rapidan Energy Group.

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Trump indeed should take a close look at the Arab plan as a starting point for negotiations, as there is no other realistic plan on the table. Trump’s proposal for forced displacement is counterproductive; a group of 144 Democrats in the US House of Representatives pointed out that Trump’s plan undermines the United States’ principled moral position. Trump’s plan also threatens the long-standing peace between Egypt and Israel, according to Egyptian officials. But beyond the fact that the Egyptian plan is the only realistic one on the table, it is still in the United States’ interest to embrace a version of this plan, because it is politically and financially affordable for Washington.

The Egyptian plan, swiftly endorsed by Arab leaders last week, allows Palestinians to remain in the Gaza Strip while reconstruction takes place. Such reconstruction includes three phases: interim measures (six months), which would include the clearing of damage and initial construction overseen by a group of Palestinian technocrats paving the way for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza; reconstruction (two years), which would involve building additional housing and restoring services such as water and electricity; and governance (three years), which would see industrial zones built and would ensure that the technocratic committee has oversight over aid and governance.

The plan’s $53 billion price tag would be sourced from international organizations and investments. In calling for a group of Palestinian technocrats to manage the reconstruction, and for the Palestinian Authority to eventually lead Gaza, the plan stresses Palestinian ownership of the process. The Arab leaders who have backed the plan have committed to making their case for this plan internationally and for hosting an international conference in Cairo in April dedicated to Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction, in cooperation with Palestinians and the United Nations.  

On the other hand, Trump’s plan neglects the Palestinians, echoing policies and plans he released during his first term. But the Palestinian question remains pivotal in the Middle East and can’t be disregarded in favor of broader regional peace that doesn’t include the Palestinians. Trump’s Gaza plan also fails to answer many questions about the logistics of moving two million Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip (likely against their will) and about strategies for the countries that will receive them and how to secure Arab cooperation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian plan answers critical questions, specifically ones about Gaza’s political future (one without Hamas in power).

The Trump administration would benefit from supporting the Egyptian plan. Throughout his campaign and initial months in office, Trump has vowed to bring peace to the Middle East; backing the Egyptian plan would enable him to keep his word. Any attempted forced removal of Palestinians from Gaza, as implied by the Trump plan, would likely lead to armed resistance—and a return to war. That war would be costly for the United States, at a time when the Trump administration has prioritized reducing the government’s expenditures. The resumption of war would likely lead to more US aid to Israel: Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel received at least twelve billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This estimation doesn’t include the cost of the US military operations in the wider Middle East (including around the Red Sea) or any economic assistance to Israel. Trump’s plan would be costly morally, politically, and financially, not only for the United States, but any other party that would cooperate to implement this plan. Given that the White House has said that the United States won’t pay for this plan, it will be challenging to find partners to fund it. 

Witkoff’s comments on the Egyptian plan last week reflected two main sticking points for the Trump administration. The first is the timeline. While the Egyptian plan outlined reconstruction that would take place over five years without displacing Gazans, Witkoff suggested a longer period between ten and fifteen years and reiterated the administration’s concerns that the Strip would be uninhabitable during that time. A joint technical committee of engineers from Gaza and other parties could help resolve this issue by recommending what is possible in terms of the reconstruction timeline and process. The second point is the future of Hamas. Witkoff has concerns about the future of Hamas as a militant group. The Egyptian plan did not deal with this point, but it did suggest a political process in Gaza that results in the return of the Palestinian Authority. US officials should engage with different Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, as they did with Hamas. This may carry the promise of a long-term security arrangement in parallel with a political horizon to settle this conflict.    

Israel also dismissed the plan last week, arguing that it “fails to address the realities of the situation,” in a statement that focused on the political and security future of Gaza. Although the Egyptian plan emphasizes the Palestinian ownership of this process, it does overlap with Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s vision for Egypt to assume responsibility of Gaza for eight to fifteen years. That echoes an Israeli request from 2005—when Israel said it disengaged from Gaza—to no longer bear responsibility for the Gaza Strip. With the Egyptian plan, Arab countries have taken a leadership role that will likely amount to taking de facto responsibility of Gaza, even if the Palestinian Authority is in power.   

The Egyptian plan offers a base to secure many parties’ interests and create the required regional stability to buy time for diplomacy. US backing would help in the implementation of the plan and in addressing threats to the plan such as the resumption of war in Gaza, tensions resulting from the Israeli military operations in the West Bank, Israeli rejection of Palestinian power in Gaza after the war ends, and Israeli refusal of a Palestinian state. Trump should support the Egyptian plan or at least engage with it, both for the plan’s political and financial benefits and also for regional peace.

Ahmed Nabil is an adjunct lecturer at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University.

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What women have faced in Syria

Women’s rights in Syria have been neglected for decades. Before the Syrian revolution in 2011, any legal frameworks that offered women rights, privileges, and titles were symbolic and did not translate into meaningful social or political empowerment. These laws and policies were largely superficial, serving more as “window dressing” to give the appearance of progress while women’s actual roles and opportunities were limited in practice. Bashar al-Assad rose to power and led a regime that excluded and discriminated against women.

As the conflict ensued, women in Syria faced increasingly dire conditions. Over 90 percent of Syrians are estimated to be living under the poverty line, and women bear the brunt of this economic crisis. Mariam Jalabi, one of the founders of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement (which advocates for the participation of women in decision-making bodies) told us: “We cannot talk about women’s rights without first talking about human rights . . . A Syrian woman does not have food on her table, her children are not in school, she doesn’t have access to proper healthcare.” These issues are compounded by Syria’s economic collapse, which has increased gender-based violence, child marriage, child labor, and sexual exploitation.

The conflict’s gendered impact is evident in the experiences of female heads of households—the widows and wives of the hundreds of thousands killed, disappeared, or missing in Syria—many of whom are still seeking justice. The patriarchal nature of Syrian society and the Assad regime’s failure to make meaningful legal reforms (specifically regarding citizenship, personal status, property, and the penal code) put women at a disadvantage in providing for their families or making key decisions.

The window of opportunity is limited

Post-conflict contexts provide a unique opportunity for women to take on greater roles in political, economic, and social spheres as existing gender hierarchies get upended. As one study notes, peace processes pave the way for institutional reform and new strategies that promote gender equality. However, as this study also points out, these opportunities for meaningful advancements in women’s empowerment are often time-limited, and substantial effort may be needed to maintain commitment to furthering these advancements.

Syria’s civil society, both inside the country and in the diaspora, has grown stronger and has collected wisdom over years of operating under oppressive, authoritarian rule. Despite hardship, this resilient civil society has continued to adapt, organize, and advocate for a better future and has the potential to steer Syria, including its new leadership, toward a more inclusive, democratic future. This has set a foundation for swift action to promote gender equality during this pivotal but fleeting period.

But still, if matters related to gender parity are continuously postponed—whether until a constitution is solidified or lasting peace is secured—opportunities for equality may be lost.

The women shaping Syria’s future

The Syrian interim government has made some progress. It appointed several women to high-level positions, including Maysaa Sabreen, head of Syria’s Central Bank (the first woman to ever serve the role); Aisha al-Dibs, head of the newly established Women’s Affairs Office; and Muhsina al-Mahithawi, the first female governor of Suwaida.

These women have an opportunity to assert the legitimacy of women as valuable actors in social and political spaces. Their appointments also serve as key indicators of progress, which is being monitored closely by international governments and organizations, including the United States, European Union, and United Nations (UN), in advance of fully lifting sanctions, among other steps towards stabilization in Syria.

While these appointments are significant, questions remain about whether they are genuine efforts or symbolic gestures. For example, statements from officials (including al-Dibs and government spokesperson Obaida Arnaout) and the appointment of Minister of Justice Shadi al-Waisi, who has a controversial track record with respect to women, have been perceived as dismissive of the demands of Syrian women across the country. Syrians were quick to condemn these statements and say they did not reflect priorities for Syria’s future.

But in another sign of progress, ahead of the February Syrian National Dialogue Conference on the country’s political future, the interim government appointed a preparatory committee to set standards for the talks. The committee of seven included two women: Hind Kabawat (one of the authors of this piece) and Houda Attasi.

Kabawat and Attasi led the mediation team and organized thematic sessions within the broader dialogue, with a clear focus on securing the participation of women from across Syrian society, including professionals such as judges, lawyers, and politicians; artists such as writers and actresses; civil-society leaders; women living in displacement camps; mothers of detainees; and others. This included efforts to ensure that there were minimum quotas for women’s participation, set at 30 percent, for each defined category of participant (i.e. politicians, civil society representatives, human-rights activists, and intellectuals). In reality, this quota was not met (it was closer to 25 percent), in part because various religious groups and tribes have little to no female representation in their leadership.

Some attendees expressed concerns about the conference’s inclusivity, particularly of minority women. While invitations were sent out to members of the Yazidi and Kurdish minorities ahead of the conference—and Druze, Kurdish, and Christian men and women participated—there was indeed not a lot of time for Syrians, particularly those in the diaspora, to travel to Damascus to attend in person. In addition, some women participants also expressed concern about a lack of clarity from the interim government on how it would guarantee that the conference’s recommendations would be carried out after the talks; these women called for the implementation of an accountability mechanism.

Nevertheless, the Syrian National Dialogue Conference still marked a significant moment, seeing as over two hundred women participated in the National Dialogue Conference following decades of low women’s participation in Syrian governance and politics. In addition, over ten thousand Syrians from around the world contributed through an online questionnaire, 40 percent of whom were women. The conference’s final statement, which was presented by Attasi, included calls for transitional justice, peace, and respecting women’s rights and role in Syria’s future. These calls were inspired by the requests of women attendees and organizations such as the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, the Syrian Feminist Lobby, and TASTAKEL, who participated in the dialogue.

Jalabi, who was formerly the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s representative to the UN, reflected on some of the criticisms currently facing the interim government: “Part of our job as active citizens is engaging actively with the current government. As Syrians, we can always expect better from our government. Syrian women . . . we want to be a part of high-level decision making, and not just in the abstract.”

What to do now

It is critical for women to be involved in transitional justice and constitutional reform processes in Syria. This can be enabled by several actors, including the interim government, international stakeholders, and, primarily, Syrian women themselves. 

The international community, particularly the United States and the European Union, should accelerate sanctions relief for Syria. Doing so will help the Syrian government improve women’s rights and revitalize the country’s ailing economy, which has been greatly affected by sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Sanctions relief would allow women and their families to achieve a “normal” life and secure the resources needed to rebuild the country. Bottom line: If the international community wants to support the women of Syria, the priority should be sanctions relief.

Additionally, the international community should firmly call for Syria to shape a system of governance that includes women. There is precedent for this: For example, UN Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2467 (2019) call on countries to prioritize the participation of women and the incorporation of gender perspectives in peace and justice processes.

The Syrian interim government must take proactive measures to ensure that women, particularly from minority communities, are represented in future National Dialogue Conferences and all high-level political dialogues. The interim government must ensure that at least 30 percent of representatives in decision-making bodies are women, as was achieved by the UN-facilitated Syrian Constitutional Committee in 2019. Establishing a new Women’s Affairs Office, while important, should not allow the isolation of women’s issues from broader governance. Instead, the office should ensure that such issues are considered in national policies. In essence, Syrian women need to be represented in all levels of government.

Syrian organizations that advocate for women’s participation in decision making should continue to cultivate strategic alliances and broad coalitions, including with regional and international actors, to promote gender equality and peacebuilding.

Furthermore, these organizations should work to further establish solidarity among women. That is essential for the long-term success of any effort to build a more inclusive and democratic Syria. Women working collectively, and without competition, with close alignment in visions and values, can drive efforts to bridge divides (across classes, locations, and sects) that have previously hindered Syria’s sociopolitical progress.

Syrian women’s organizations must work to reframe the debate on gender equality, highlighting that it is not just a fundamental right but also a critical component of a more inclusive and just society. In appealing to the interim government, Syrian women can show how progress in achieving gender equality can enhance the government’s image and reputation. This approach can help mitigate the backlash that has been seen in other post-conflict transitions.

Both women’s organizations and the interim government should together incentivize higher levels of representation by women in Syria’s decision-making bodies and processes. They should work together to ensure the quality and effectiveness of women’s roles, not just the quantity of those roles, in order to ultimately erase deeply ingrained gender stereotypes that undermine the legitimacy of women’s political participation.

While some progress has been made, the Syrian interim government, with support from the international community, must follow with concrete actions to advance women’s rights in Syria. Empowering women will not only benefit Syria in the short term but also set the country on a trajectory toward an inclusive and sustainable future.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Hind Kabawat is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the director of interfaith peacebuilding at the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution at the George Mason University Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

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Hezbollah desperately needed a lifeline to secure its future in Lebanon. The massive turnout to Nasrallah’s funeral on February 23 may have provided one, deterring Beirut from either seizing its arms or undermining its domestic standing.

Hezbollah derives its domestic strength—and its longstanding immunity from disarmament or restraint by the Lebanese government—not through force of arms alone but through widespread popularity among Lebanese Shiites, Lebanon’s likely largest and fastest-growing sect. In Lebanon’s May 2022 parliamentary elections, the group garnered 356,000 of the 1.8 million votes cast—the most of any party by approximately 150,000 votes. Polls from January and September of 2024 showed that between 89 percent and 93 percent of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah.

This extensive support reflects the group’s “Nation of Hezbollah” model of membership, first articulated in its foundational 1985 Open Letter, which prioritized a party’s “responsiveness with the masses” over territorial control. As a result, Hezbollah developed a broad, flexible concept of membership to attract as much support as possible. 

This served a pragmatic purpose. Gaining Shiite support at all granted Hezbollah domestic legitimacy and secured its place in Lebanon’s sectarian-power sharing system. The larger that support, the more influence Hezbollah had within that sectarian system—and therefore adopting a membership model designed to maximize support was vital.

Road to reconstruction

Popular support will also prove critical to Hezbollah achieving its post-war priorities, the first of which is retaining its arms. In his December 5 speech, the group’s new Secretary-General Naim Qassem bowed to reality and the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, agreeing that “the presence of armed individuals and the resistance’s weapons” would be “banned south of the Litani River”—amounting to a tactical withdrawal from most of south Lebanon. However, Qassem and the rest of Hezbollah have insisted that the agreement does not apply north of the Litani, meaning that the question of Hezbollah’s arms in the rest of Lebanon must be resolved through Lebanese consensus and dialogue on a national defense strategy. 

Hezbollah’s other, equally important priority is ensuring that post-war reconstruction funds reach its battered community. Qassem insisted that this must also be the Lebanese government’s priority, after ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Seeking to shifting the onus of reconstruction—and the potential backlash if aid does not materialize—from Hezbollah squarely to the Lebanese state, Qassem stated that Beirut had a “responsibility” to “attract donations or call for [aid] conferences or rely on [help] from [foreign] countries” for reconstruction. 

Securing these two priorities is of existential importance for Hezbollah as they are essential to regain whatever trust Shiites lost in the group for inviting the recent war with Israel. Without its arms, the group could no longer claim to be “The Resistance.” After all, that image is the basis of much of Hezbollah’s appeal, and it also serves as its justification for retaining the figurative stick it uses—often as a last resort—to deter hostile action within Lebanon and, more vitally, dissent from within the Shiite community. 

As for reconstruction, Iran has allegedly been channeling funds to its main regional instrument—one billion dollars the day after the ceasefire went into effect. However, that’s a pittance compared to the estimated eight billion to eleven billion dollars in war damage. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s access to Iranian coffers has been complicated by a combination of Assad’s downfall and Israeli threats, which led Beirut to temporarily clamp down on Hezbollah’s alternate funding route through Hariri International Airport by, for example, seizing cash shipments. If reconstruction aid does not materialize, Hezbollah will likely face an unprecedented eruption of anger from within its own support base. 

Numbers game

Enter Nasrallah’s funeral, the purpose of which, as Qassem stated, was not only an outpouring of grief but also a domestic show of force. Vast attendance was therefore necessary. 

Turnout numbers varied. Citing event organizers, Al-Jadeed and the Lebanese National News Agency offered a slightly implausible preliminary estimate of 1.4 million people, while Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International reported “hundreds of thousands” both in Camille Chamoun Stadium, Lebanon’s largest sports arena where the funeral began, “and surrounding areas.” Meanwhile, Reuters estimated one million attendees based on an unnamed “Lebanese security source,” anonymous Hezbollah sources told AFP that the event drew “around 800,000” participants, and a Lebanese official speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press put the number at 450,000. The newspaper Al-Joumhouria claimed that 200,000 people from the Beqaa valley alone had headed to Beirut to participate in the funeral.

The final say on turnout, however, goes to the Beirut-based research and consultancy firm Information International. It dismissed both the inflated 1.4 million figure provided by the funeral organizers and the minimal estimate of a 200,000-person turnout, calling the latter “very low” and illogical, “given nearly 40 percent of attendees were in the stadium.” Instead, they estimated that 700,000 to 900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s funeral, with “no more than 15,000” of them coming from abroad, “based on [Hariri International Airport’s] daily activities.”

For comparison, the February 16, 2005, funeral of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri attracted around 150,000 people.

Arms control

Hezbollah’s gambit, it would therefore appear, paid off—seemingly rebutting claims that the war and its effects had drained the group of a critical mass of supporters and left it domestically vulnerable. But that turnout now also serves to forestall any potential action by Lebanese authorities, who are already wavering on reining in the group. Both the ostensibly sovereigntist President Joseph Aoun and longtime ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have accepted Hezbollah’s position on resolving the question of its arms.

This is also likely to critically impact Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who has already made concessions to Hezbollah while forming his cabinet—Lebanon’s real executive authority—in recognition of the country’s political realities. Salam, if his government and its policy statement win a parliamentary vote of confidence, will hold the premiership until Lebanon’s May 2026 parliamentary elections, when his government will dissolve by operation of law. Meanwhile, Salam has a long list of vital tasks to accomplish during his short term in office, including steering Lebanon through economic recovery, repairing and upgrading the country’s dilapidated infrastructure, enacting political and judicial reforms, and overseeing post-war reconstruction. These would be monumental tasks in a functioning state. In Lebanon, accomplishing them will require all hands on deck and avoiding political infighting. 

With the numbers it brought out on February 23, Hezbollah can threaten the premier with—at a minimum—obstructionism if the group senses his government is moving against its arms or withholding or conditioning reconstruction aid to areas under its control. At worst, clashing with a Hezbollah that has retained pre-war levels of Shiite support could risk igniting a civil war.

Most Shiites who support Hezbollah are not unwavering Khomeinists. They back the group for practical reasons: its extensive social-clientelist network, the protection from external threats they believe Hezbollah’s private arsenal provides, and the domestic dignity and equality the traditionally disenfranchised sect derives from the group’s domestic political weight. But the relationship between party and population isn’t entirely transactional. Hezbollah has spent decades building an emotional symbiosis between the two—one that has remained relatively unchallenged by Shiite opposition alternatives, whose already small numbers are disunited and lack resources.

By bringing the community out to Nasrallah’s funeral in the hundreds of thousands, Hezbollah sent a message to its domestic opponents and the government: An attack on Hezbollah is an attack on the Shiites writ large. That doesn’t mean Hezbollah’s survival is absolutely guaranteed. But it has now, to Lebanon’s and the region’s misfortune, created a bridgehead that it can widen—over years, perhaps decades, and quite likely in fits and starts—to ensure it remains a fixture in Lebanon’s future.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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After having withdrawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term, Trump has since expressed an interest in a negotiated settlement with Tehran. But with all deals, the details matter. And while it is true that the Trump administration has not yet given its blessing to Israel for military strikes against Iran—as US intelligence reportedly portends—it was unrealistic to expect such a move from Trump as the opening act of his presidency. Trump needed time to build his team, formulate a policy, and secure international legitimacy and support for military action should it become necessary. The third task requires leaving open a lane for diplomacy to make it possible to blame Tehran should negotiations fail and to secure political support from US allies and partners.

Right now, signs indicate that the United States and Iran are headed towards confrontation, not a successful diplomatic outcome.

The Islamic Republic has not yet softened its position on the nuclear file, even after being weakened by a series of killings of leaders across its proxy network and by the degrading of a chunk of its air defenses and missile capacities. While Iranian decisionmakers have recognized the reality that the 2015 text of the JCPOA is long dead, they have clung to the vision of resurrecting a new deal premised on the basic bargain of temporary nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, using the JCPOA as a reference point or framework. 

Some Iranian officials have taken to the airwaves to hint that there may be willingness to discuss nonnuclear concerns, but those who are the real decisionmakers on these issues—the supreme leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have shunned talks over its missile and drone programs and other regional files. Their stances speak louder than the propagandists trying to give an impression to Western constituencies and others that such fundamental change is possible. History has shown that it is not.

In February, the supreme leader himself delivered public remarks warning against negotiations with the Trump administration: “One shall not negotiate with a government like this,” he said. “Negotiating is unwise, unintelligent, not honorable.” Already this has triggered hardened rhetoric from Iranian officials, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had previously made more conciliatory comments towards the Trump administration. Since Khamenei’s speech, the Pezeshkian administration has experienced further headwinds with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as well as the resignation of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, who has long been seen as the face of the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the United States.

But Khamenei’s warning last month was not the sweeping ban he laid down in September 2019, when he said, “the policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian nation is of little importance, and all the officials in the Islamic Republic unanimously believe that there will be no negotiations at any level with the United States.” The Islamic Republic under Khamenei will likely never truly walk away completely from the negotiating table, as its political weaponization is a valuable tool to buy time for the regime and divide the United States from within and from its allies. This does not necessarily mean there will be direct and public diplomacy with the Trump administration at this juncture. However, Khamenei’s latest comments seem to leave some room for diplomacy in that they do not necessarily rule out indirect discussions. Such discussions could take place through various channels of communication that Tehran has long maintained with Washington, including through Arab regional interlocutors and European governments. Russia has also reportedly agreed to serve as an intermediary. Still, the obstacles are significant.

For now, on substance, Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But US officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran as long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program. The US secretary of state hinted at a similar demand, noting that in the past, “efforts that Iran has undertaken diplomatically have been only about how to extend the time frame” for its nuclear program and to continue to enrich, sponsor terrorism, build long-range weapons, and “sow instability throughout the region.” 

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) included related pledges, vowing to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” NSPM-2 also employed mandatory language stating that the US ambassador to the United Nations will “work with key allies to complete the snapback”—or restoration—”of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” This language evokes past US demands for zero enrichment or reprocessing in Iran, which the first Trump administration endorsed. Triggering snapback would also restore previous UN Security Council resolutions, inked before the 2015 JCPOA, which included demands for Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities . . . and work on all heavy-water related projects.”

NSPM-2 likewise declared that it is US policy that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles,” among other measures to counter Iran’s malign behavior beyond its nuclear program. These US positions are reminiscent of the 2003 Libya disarmament deal, in which the country pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear, and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, this is a fundamentally different paradigm from the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent purity and did not touch its missile program.

In fact, Iran’s supreme leader has warned that US officials “intend to systematically reduce Iran’s nuclear facilities, similar to how they did with a North African country”—a hint at Libya—”ultimately leading to the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry.” In 2011, Khamenei (referring to Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi) said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’” He added, “Look where we are, and in what position they are now.” In 2023, after talks about reviving the JCPOA stalled, Khamenei reiterated that “there is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” 

Despite forty-six years of failed diplomacy, outside observers have been insisting Iran is ripe for a durable diplomatic arrangement with the United States. Some supporters of negotiations with Iran have also been wishcasting that Trump suddenly adopted the Obama administration’s Iran policy based on an overreading of the new president’s rhetoric and the absence of certain officials, such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who took a hardline stance, from the policymaking process. But this is a false narrative, one that even some Islamic Republic officials like to promote while arguing that Trump was suckered into an Iran policy that was not his own, despite him expressing disapproval of the JCPOA during his first presidential campaign, well before his national security team was assembled.

There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics and Iran’s military and security apparatus. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

The post The stage is set for a US-Iran showdown—not a deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To be sure, it is difficult to determine the king’s exact level of support (as Jordanian authorities prohibit polls on Abdullah’s approval ratings). But Abdullah has faced a wave of domestic criticism in recent years. Unemployment stands at 21 percent. As the Gaza war death toll soared last year, Jordanians hit the streets, assailing the government for not annulling the country’s peace treaty with Israel. In 2021, Abdullah’s half-brother—former Crown Prince Hamzah bin Al Hussein—accused Jordanian leaders of corruption and “incompetence.” He was placed under house arrest in a string of detentions reportedly related to a coup plot, but Hamzah has denied wrongdoing. 

In this challenging context, Trump called for Jordan to admit large numbers of Gazans as part of his plan to “take over” the Gaza Strip. On February 11, Abdullah met with Trump in Washington, marking the first White House visit by an Arab head of state during the current US administration. In response to Trump’s proposal, the king offered to admit two thousand ill Gazan children to Jordanian hospitals for treatment. Abdullah’s overture amounted to accepting less than 0.1 percent of Gaza’s 2.1 million residents and was far from what Trump envisions. After the meeting, the Hashemite ruler posted on social media that he opposed the displacement of Palestinians. The next day, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi reiterated that Gazans should not be transferred to the Hashemite kingdom. 

Abdullah’s rejection of Trump’s plan won overwhelming domestic approval. Tens of thousands of Jordanians lined the Amman streets on February 13, welcoming the king home and backing his Gaza stance. Citizens carried large banners with pictures of Abdullah and slogans opposing the displacement of Palestinians. Amer Shobaki, a Jordanian analyst and staunch supporter of Palestinian rights, thanked the king for his “firm and courageous stance in preserving Jordan’s stability.”

The Jordanian support for Abdullah’s stance transcended the lines that frequently divide the kingdom. Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who make up an estimated 50 to 60 percent of the country’s population, appreciated that the king would not participate in a plan that would empty Gaza’s population and weaken the Palestinian national movement. East Bankers—Jordanians whose roots descend from the eastern side of the Jordan River—have no interest in the Hashemite kingdom absorbing an additional wave of Palestinians and further diluting their political power.

Abdullah’s rejection of Trump’s plan harkens back to populist moves by the late King Hussein. In 1991, Hussein assailed the Gulf War and took a pro-Iraq stance—despite an appeal by US President George H.W. Bush for a statement from the Jordanian leader conveying understanding of the US position. The move won widespread support among Jordanians for defending a fellow Arab state against Western powers. Thirty-five years earlier, Hussein expelled British Lieutenant General John Glubb (who at the time led the Arab Legion) to limit foreign influence over the kingdom, which many Jordanians applauded. Like his beloved father, Abdullah benefited domestically from standing up to a Western power in defense of Arab interests.

Trump’s Gaza plan has offered Abdullah an opportunity to more vocally support the Palestinian cause, a challenge for the sixty-three-year-old leader since the Gaza war erupted. Amnesty International reported that Jordanian security forces arrested over one thousand individuals at pro-Gaza protests in late 2023. In April 2024, Jordan’s Air Force shot down Iranian drones fired at Israel, with Amman insisting it was defending the security of Jordanians. Despite Hamas military spokesman Abu Obadiah’s calls for “resistance” from Jordan against Israel, Abdullah refused to open an additional front against the Jewish state, likely in part as an effort to prevent Israeli strikes against the Hashemite kingdom.

Even after Abdullah ruled out the absorption of hundreds of thousands of Gazans, Trump still praised the Hashemite leader. “King Abdullah is one of the true great leaders of the world,” Trump announced in a February 12 message to the Jordanian public. “He’s got a wonderful heart. He loves you so much.” While Trump had warned on February 10 that the fate of Jordan’s nearly $1.5 billion annual assistance package may be linked to the kingdom’s absorption of Gazans, after Abdullah’s White House visit, Trump suggested that he would no longer use aid as a threat.