1. The G7 did not release a joint communiqué

The absence of a joint communiqué at this week’s G7 summit starkly illustrates the deepening policy divisions among leaders of the world’s most powerful economies. While policymakers debate what the G7 can accomplish amid growing US-European tensions, a more fundamental question has emerged: Is the G7 itself equipped to address today’s complex geopolitical landscape? 

The summit exposed significant rifts between G7 members and the United States on critical international issues. Trump’s assertion that ejecting Russia from the former Group of Eight (G8) was a strategic mistake amplified tensions over Russia’s war in Ukraine. While the G7 did endorse a statement calling for “de-escalation of hostilities, including a ceasefire in Gaza,” watered down statements like this underscore the challenges in achieving consensus. These parallel conflicts reveal not only internal G7 divisions but also the growing disconnect between G7 positions and broader global sentiment, especially when it comes to Israel and Gaza.  

The lead-up to the Kananaskis summit highlighted another critical question: Can the G7 remain relevant while excluding major global players? Pressure from G7 leaders ultimately compelled Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to extend an invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite ongoing diplomatic tensions over last year’s killing of a Khalistani separatist in British Columbia. This last-minute inclusion underscores an emerging reality—as one of the world’s largest economies, a crucial node in global supply chains, and a key player in Indo-Pacific security, India’s absence from major G7 discussions would render many outcomes meaningless. 

Perhaps most troubling is the weakening of the shared democratic values that supposedly bind the G7 together. The transatlantic relationship faces unprecedented strain as the Republican Party, under the leadership of Trump and Vice President JD Vance, increasingly views liberal European societies through a harsh cultural lens. While the United States frames China as the primary geopolitical challenge of its time, today’s Republican Party often sees European societies as equally divergent from American values and interests. This ideological drift threatens the very foundation upon which the G7 was built. 

These developments raise existential questions about the G7’s future relevance. A forum designed for the world’s democratic economic powerhouses now struggles to produce basic agreements, while excluding nations essential to global stability and prosperity. Today, the G7 risks becoming an increasingly irrelevant talking shop, much like the United Nations Security Council, unable to address many of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. 

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

***

Trouble was brewing even before Trump’s early departure from the leaders’ summit on Monday evening and the absence of a communiqué on Tuesday. Trump’s trade policy had already effectively resulted in a G6+1—a coalesced European, Canadian, and Japanese front against the United States. But the fracture in the G7 has only become more evident this week. At the time of its formation fifty years ago, the group was created as a channel for economic coordination between the world’s largest economies. In recent years, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia had energized the G7, which had functioned as the hub for sanctions coordination and strategizing on supporting Ukraine. This energizing, and in some ways defining, achievement of the G7 in the past decade was put into question by Trump’s assertion on Monday that Russia should be brought back into the G8 fold, laying bare the misalignment between him and the other leaders. 

There are issues that could have possibly aligned G7 leaders, such as responding to Chinese economic influence, including Beijing’s manufacturing overcapacity. But what ultimately binds the group and makes it different from the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations Security Council is broad agreement on democratic values, free and open markets, and a belief in working together with allies. A fracturing G7 puts these foundational tenets under scrutiny. Trump’s early departure also snubbed partners beyond the G7; India and Mexico were looking forward to their respective bilateral meetings that could have furthered trade negotiations.  

It’s clear that on its fiftieth anniversary, the G7 is in the middle of a geopolitical crisis, as the Israel-Iran conflict plays out, and an existential crisis, exacerbated by the United States’ strained relationship with the rest of the group. What lies ahead as France will take on the presidency in 2026, and whether the G6+1 break will continue, depends on how much value Washington sees in collaborating with its closest allies on economic issues. 

—Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the GeoEconomics Center.  

2. Trump did not meet with Ukraine’s president

Trump did himself no favors at the G7 Summit toward his goal of achieving a durable peace in Ukraine. Trump has set out a tough approach to achieve that peace. He has asked for serious concessions from both Ukraine and Russia and said that he would exert pressure on the side(s) blocking progress. Since then, Ukraine has accepted every proposal Trump has offered since mid-March, and Russia has rejected them all except for one that it violated immediately. It is clear which side is obstructionist.   

Trump had an excellent chance to use the G7 Summit to put needed pressure on the Kremlin. The G7 was poised to lower the price cap for a barrel of Russian oil from sixty dollars to forty-five dollars, which would put pressure on the Russian oil revenues enabling its aggression in Ukraine. But the United States vetoed the proposal last week—Trump’s first gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin at this G7 Summit.   

The second gift came after his arrival in Canada. The US president repeated his criticism of the G7 for kicking Russia out of the group because of its conquest and “annexation” of Crimea in 2014. (Trump had done the same in his first term.) Since Putin is blocking his peace efforts, why would Trump provide this offering to the Russian dictator at this time? It is also true that by departing the summit early to deal with the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, Trump missed a planned side meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. No harm, no foul there, but achieving a real peace in Ukraine will remain a distant wish if the White House continues to treat the aggressor to bouquets. 

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine. 

3. Trump did not meet with Mexico’s president

After much anticipation, the first face-to-face meeting between Trump and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum did not take place due to the US president’s early departure. Perhaps unexpectedly, the leaders have had an amicable and constructive relationship so far, with mutual praise often being shared between the two and at least seven phone calls taking place since Trump’s election in 2024.  

The meeting in Kananaskis, however, would have offered neutral ground for both leaders to further discuss the actions Sheinbaum has taken to address US security concerns while also addressing the thornier aspects of the bilateral relationship. This includes Mexico’s refusal to accept the involvement of US troops in its strategy against the illegal drug trade and cartels. It also includes Mexico’s concern about a proposed 3.5 percent tax on remittances currently moving through the US Senate. (Remittances to Mexico represent roughly 3.7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.)  

A three amigos-style meeting of Trump, Sheinbaum, and Carney was off the table even before the summit. But the presence of all three newly minted North American leaders and their confirmed bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the G7 Summit had nonetheless raised hopes across the region that a tangible agenda to discuss next steps for the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be set. Now, just over a year before the sunset clause is activated in July 2026, the private sector across all three countries will be left craving certainty about the future of the trade deal, especially against the current backdrop of continuously changing trade conditions and recently doubled steel and aluminum tariffs.  

So what comes next? US-Mexico communication lines remain open. Mexico has an ally in Christopher Landau, a US deputy secretary of state and a former US ambassador to Mexico who met with Sheinbaum last week. The United States should now continue to signal its willingness to engage with Mexico to find solutions to shared challenges by setting a date for Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s announced visit and pave the way for a Trump–Sheinbaum tête-à-tête.  

—Valeria Villarreal is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. No momentum was generated going into the NATO Summit

The G7 presents two cautionary tales for next week’s NATO Summit in The Hague. First, if Zelenskyy’s presence at the G7 contributed to Trump’s early departure, then this would serve as a reminder for NATO allies to tread lightly on signaling too much support for Ukraine in The Hague at the risk of alienating the US administration. Second, Trump’s comments in Canada suggesting that Russia should rejoin the G8 are also a warning to NATO. While allied leaders were already unlikely to raise costs on Russia at the summit for its ongoing war in Ukraine, Trump’s comments highlight that even tough language on Russia in the expected summit communiqué could exacerbate tensions while Trump is in The Hague.  

Ignoring the threats Russia poses to the Alliance and the importance of maintaining support for Ukraine comes with different (and I would argue more problematic) risks. But if NATO’s goal in The Hague is to project Alliance unity and avoid a dust-up with Trump, then the Alliance should stay focused on securing a new defense spending pledge and go home. All the hard work, for better or for worse, will fall after the summit. 

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.

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Global Energy Forum

The ninth Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum will be held June 17 and 18 in Washington, DC. Please check back regularly for updates on our programming.

As the 2025 Global Energy Forum convened on Tuesday in Washington, DC, just blocks away at the White House, national security officials were mulling over the US response to the war between Israel and Iran.  

“Right now, Iran has a choice,” Brett McGurk, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former White House coordinator for the Middle East region, said at the Forum.  

“The White House offered a deal to Iran about six weeks ago . . . Iran not only did not really respond to that; it actually escalated its nuclear program in the face of this,” McGurk said, pointing to activities at the Fordow nuclear site. 

For McGurk, if Iran accepts the nuclear deal, “this crisis would be over.” But if it doesn’t, it would be “looking at the possibility of a US strike on Fordow.”

When it comes to escalation in the Middle East, Helima Croft—global head of commodity strategy and MENA research at RBC Capital and a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors—said that “the risk of this spilling over into energy is low. But it’s not zero.”  

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by William F. Wechsler, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, where Croft and McGurk also talked about the United States’ response options and the region’s future.

The objectives 

• McGurk said that if he were in the Situation Room, he would list three objectives for the commander in chief: The first is to protect Americans and defend Israel—which would involve “surging defense interceptors.” The second is to “contain this to Israel and Iran” and “avoid a broader regional escalation.” The third, McGurk explained, is to work with Israel on succeeding in their objectives: “dismantlement of the nuclear program and the missile program.” 

• McGurk said that what happens in the next week “is potentially quite decisive,” because it could weaken Iran’s influence in the region. That, he said, would set “conditions for a much more peaceful, integrated Middle East that we all want.” 

• “You talk about a decisive historical period: We’re living in it,” he said. 

The options

• McGurk said that a military response has previously had “massive risk” associated with it, but “Iran has made a series of fateful strategic miscalculations” since October 7, 2023, reducing those risks. 

• One such risk was the possibility of retaliation from an Iranian proxy group, such as Hezbollah; but that is “no longer a threat,” McGurk said, with Hezbollah indicating that it does not want to be involved in this latest exchange of strikes. 

• Another risk was Iran’s air defense, including its use of Russian air defense systems, but that risk has faded as “Israel has complete air supremacy” over Iran. “So the window of availability for a military option is now very open,” McGurk said. 

• He added that he could see the US administration using the threat of this military option to “try to get a deal.” But if that deal does not come to fruition, “then we have to be prepared to actually do the strike,” McGurk added. “And I think you do have to back it up.” 

• “The worst case here would be to leave Iran with that Fordow [site] and ten cascades [of advanced centrifuges] intact,” McGurk said. “So it’s a deal or it’s a military strike.”

The impact

• Croft said that the market is “very sanguine” about the energy risks associated with the conflict. “We have ample supply on the market right now,” she noted.  

• If the United States decides to launch an attack on Fordow, Croft said, there would be “a little pop” in prices. But the bigger concern among market players is whether Iran plans to “internationalize” the costs of this war, such as by rallying its proxy groups in targeting tankers and shipping corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz. 

• That could yield some temporary disruption. “I don’t think the market would be prepared for the export infrastructure being struck,” she said. 

• She added that there is also concern “about risks to other countries’ energy facilities where they may not have taken the necessary steps to fortify those facilities.” 

• Until the war inflicts a massive impact on oil supply, Croft said she would not expect a “preemptive surge” of barrels from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). “They are already unwinding a voluntary cut,” she said. “OPEC has made it pretty clear: They’re not going to fill a gap in the market until one emerges.” 

• Croft added that there is much at stake in achieving a stable, prosperous Middle East region, as governments continue to build more resilient societies and to diversify their economies. “Having a stable security environment is so important for the millions of young people in the region whose futures really rest on everything that these governments are trying to undertake,” she said. 

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the Atlantic Council’s editorial team. 

Editor’s note: RBC Capital Markets is a sponsor of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. More information on Forum sponsors can be found here. 

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The White House has tied potential tariff relief to the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers identified in the Office of the US Trade Representative’s 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE Report). While the administration’s plan may be a well-intentioned attempt to increase US exports to the region in general, it overlooks a critical reality: Many of the so-called “barriers” are rooted in complex legal systems that cannot be easily dismantled without legislative or judicial processes. Pressuring countries to enact sweeping reforms in uncertain political environments could destabilize fragile democracies and weaken strategic partnerships, particularly at a time of growing global competition.

Profitable economic relationships

Despite ongoing challenges, Latin America has proven to be a successful economic partner for the United States. Washington enjoys trade surpluses with most Latin American countries that have existing agreements. According to US Census Bureau data, in 2024, US exports to CAFTA-DR nations totaled $47 billion, compared to $36.6 billion in imports.

Several examples illustrate this point. Colombia has consistently posted a surplus in industrial goods since 2012, driven by exports of machinery, vehicles, agrochemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Very recently, the United States has gained a trade surplus in agricultural goods with Colombia. Peru and Chile are also vital markets for US technology, medical equipment, and engineering services, due to their dynamic mining and agricultural sectors.

Moreover, many larger US companies have made significant investments across Latin America—investments made viable by the legal certainty that free trade agreements provide. 

Complexity, not obstructionism

It is worth zeroing in on the “barriers” the White House aims to remove. The 2025 NTE Report outlines a variety of trade “barriers,” ranging from health policies to customs procedures. Yet many of these are embedded in domestic legal frameworks and cannot be removed through executive fiat. In Colombia, for example, lifting certain phytosanitary restrictions requires prior consultation with indigenous communities, as mandated by the country’s constitutional court. In the Dominican Republic, altering labeling or certification norms requires legislative action. In Honduras, reforms to intellectual property laws must pass through cumbersome legislatures facing intense social scrutiny.

These legal and institutional realities should not be viewed as roadblocks but as features of functioning democracies. The United States expecting immediate compliance is not only unrealistic; it risks backfiring.

Still, there are areas where progress can be swift and impactful. Many Latin American governments are already working to streamline health registration processes, modernize customs systems, and improve transparency in public procurement. For instance, Peru’s National Customs Superintendency has digitized import procedures, significantly reducing clearance times. Guatemala’s Ministry of Economy has pushed for regulatory alignment with international food safety standards, boosting trade efficiency.

These efforts reflect a clear political will to cooperate and offer the Office of the US Trade Representative a path to pursue measurable outcomes without demanding sweeping structural reforms upfront. Furthermore, these efforts are a clear message that FTA partners in the region are facilitating trade with the United States by avoiding unnecessary red tape procedures while also complying with WTO standards.

A strategic imperative: Latin America vs. Southeast Asia

Meanwhile, Southeast Asia is emerging as a strong competitor for US investment, bolstered by market-friendly reforms and frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Vietnam, Thailand, and other countries in the region are actively positioning themselves as preferred US trade partners in that part of the world, but with the caveat that none of them currently has an FTA with the United States.

There is no doubt, however, that China is wielding its geopolitical influence to use neighboring countries to export its goods to Latin America. From there, China takes advantage of the current network of trade pacts in Latin America to distort the rules of play of many products covered under FTAs. The triangulation of goods from third countries can often circumvent proper country-of-origin rules, undermine trade facilitation efforts in the region, and contribute to unfair trade practices.

US trade partners in Central and South America cannot afford to fall behind. The region’s comparative advantages—geographical proximity, shared legal traditions, integrated supply chains, and democratic values—are unmatched. Unlike Southeast Asia, Latin America shares a common geopolitical space with the United States, in addition to their shared economic security interests.

It is time for US stakeholders to fully recognize the strategic value of Latin American partners. Providing support for viable reforms, offering technical cooperation, and showing flexibility in tariff negotiations can help ease current trade tensions and solidify the US presence in a region where China is seeking to expand its influence.

Thankfully, an appropriate framework for institutional trade cooperation is already in place. These agreements don’t require reinvention—only thoughtful adjustment. To give one clear example, free trade commissions established under free trade agreements—such as CAFTA-DR and the free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru—play a critical role in ensuring adherence to agreed commitments and resolving disputes effectively and diplomatically. These bilateral committees, which offer the possibility of engaging separately in previous consultations with the private sector, provide a structured forum for addressing trade issues, implementing dispute resolution mechanisms, and updating the technical provisions of agreements as trade dynamics evolve.

Under CAFTA-DR, the committees have helped resolve disputes concerning agricultural market access and rules of origin. In the case of Colombia, the committee has facilitated dialogue on labor practices and sanitary barriers affecting US agricultural exports. With Peru, the committee has been instrumental in addressing environmental concerns, particularly those related to illegal logging.

By providing an institutionalized channel for engagement, these bodies help prevent diplomatic tensions and foster mutually beneficial outcomes, thereby enhancing stability and predictability in trade relations. The United States should look to make the most of these important committees.

In an increasingly fragmented global landscape, deepening ties with existing partners is the most direct and effective path to advancing US economic security and strategic interests. The best way to foster sustainable growth for US exports to the region is for the United States to seek predictable rules of engagement with its trading partners in the Western Hemisphere.

Enrique Millán-Mejía is a senior fellow for economic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He previously served as a senior trade and investment diplomat of the government of Colombia to the United States between 2014 and 2021.

The post What should Trump do next on trade? Optimize existing US trade agreements in Central and South America. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Energy Forum

The ninth Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum will be held June 17 and 18 in Washington, DC. Please check back regularly for updates on our programming.

For Sultan Al Jaber, the United Arab Emirates’ minister of industry and advanced technology, the race to establish artificial-intelligence (AI) supremacy is “essentially an energy play.”

Al Jaber, who is also the head of national oil company ADNOC and the renewable energy company Masdar, spoke at the opening of the 2025 Global Energy Forum, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

“The race for AI is not just about code . . . it’s about gigawatts,” he said, explaining that one query on ChatGPT uses ten times as much energy as a Google search.

“Over the next five years, the US alone will need anywhere between 50 and 150 gigawatts of new installed capacity,” Al Jaber noted. “Meeting this demand is not just a technical challenge,” but a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity, he added.

At the same time, Al Jaber noted that AI can help “unlock its own energy challenge,” by helping energy grids optimize their efficiency and power generation.

Below are more highlights from his remarks, which also touched upon energy policy reforms and the widening conflict across the Middle East.

An engine of peace

• Speaking as the conflict between Israel and Iran continues to escalate, Al Jaber called upon “all parties” to “show restraint.” He also pushed for “peace over provocation, calm over confrontation, and progress through partnership—and only partnership.”
• “Moments like these remind us that energy is not just the engine of progress,” he said. “It is a cornerstone of peace, stability, and ensuring prosperity.”

Shift into hyperdrive

• Meeting AI’s energy demand, Al Jaber argued, will require a “systemwide shift” that brings the energy, technology, finance, and policy sectors “in sync.”
• It will also require an effort to “hyperscale” energy, by creating a “reliable base load” of energy sources such as gas, renewables backed by energy storage, and nuclear breakthroughs, Al Jaber said.
• He added that such an effort would also require placing a “pragmatic pause” on the early retirement of existing power plants, to help ensure constant supply while energy leaders work to bring nuclear back into the mainstream.

Power to the people

• “Power generation is only half of the story, though,” Al Jaber said. “Getting the power to the end user is the other half, and . . . it’s the more complex part of that equation.”
• He added that solving the equation—updating the energy grid in the United States—would require “an investment surge” of $300 billion annually. “You can’t run tomorrow’s technology on yesterday’s grid,” he added.
• Al Jaber announced that ADNOC would be increasing its US energy investments, issued through ADNOC’s XRG arm, from $70 billion to $440 billion over the next ten years. “The United States is not just a priority. It is more of an investment imperative,” he said.
• But beyond investment, policy can also help, he added, pointing to measures that de-risk capital investments and fast-track permitting.

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the Atlantic Council’s editorial team.

Editor’s note: ADNOC and XRG are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. More information on Forum sponsors can be found here.

Watch the event

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July 1 will mark a dozen years since Croatia joined the the European Union (EU), the most recent country to do so. In the years after Croatia’s accession, the bloc’s eastern enlargement process stalled almost entirely. The EU’s enthusiasm for admitting new members waned, driven by rising anti-EU sentiment within member states and fears that further expansion could strain the bloc’s already burdened consensus-based decision-making. Meanwhile, democratic backsliding and disputes between candidate countries further undermined their cases for accession.

Then in 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived the geopolitical imperative for enlargement in Brussels by highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to “gray zones.” Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia swiftly advanced along their accession paths, and hopes were somewhat revived in the six countries of the Western Balkans.

While Montenegro is the most advanced in accession negotiations today, Albania is also capitalizing on this new enlargement momentum. On May 11, Albania held parliamentary elections in which the Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won its fourth consecutive mandate, promising EU membership by 2030. After gaining EU candidate status in 2013 and waiting over a decade for the next formal step, Albania and the EU have been on an unprecedented roll since October 2024. Over the span of several months, the EU opened four clusters of negotiation chapters with Albania—covering twenty-four out of thirty-three chapters—and may open the remaining ones by the end of June. The opening of chapters signals that Albania has met initial EU benchmarks in those policy areas and will now negotiate to close the chapters—which aim to align Albanian laws, institutions, and practices with EU law.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.  

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards. 

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the weekend, new details emerged about how the share is intended to work, provoking some comparisons with nationalization schemes in other countries. Below, Sarah Bauerle Danzman, a resident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, delves into where exactly this deal lands between free enterprise and state control—and what it might mean for other US businesses.  

1. What is a “golden share”?

A golden share typically refers to a special class of ownership stake in a publicly traded company reserved for a government. The golden share confers substantial shareholder rights that would otherwise be atypical given the size of the ownership position.  

For instance, the Brazilian government has a golden share in Embraer, its national aviation champion, that amounts to an approximately 5 percent equity stake in the previously state-owned company. The arrangement also provides the government substantial governance rights, such as the ability to direct the company’s strategic director or veto a takeover or joint-venture arrangement involving the company.

The United Kingdom has used golden-share arrangements extensively to retain influence over strategically important companies, such as BAE (a major defense contractor) and NATS (its air traffic control provider) after they were privatized.  

Reporting suggests that the US government’s golden share is in US Steel rather than in Nippon Steel. This distinction is important because it means that the US government’s formal influence over Nippon will only relate to its US business (called US Steel) and not to its business operations in other locations. By tying the golden share to US Steel, the US government has also ensured that it will be able to fully control any future sale of the company. 

2. Does this deal amount to the nationalization of US Steel?

The golden share is “noneconomic,” meaning that it did not require the US government to make an investment in the company, and it also does not provide the United States with an equity stake in the company. This means that the US government will not be earning an economic return on its share, nor would it be eligible to accrue dividends. Additionally, the United States is not going to be involved in the day-to-day operations of US Steel. Because of this, and because the United States is not taking equity stakes away from owners, this is not a nationalization. 

However, the golden share gives the US government an extraordinary amount of control over the company. The company’s governance documents will outline the areas of strategic and operational decision making over which the US president will now have veto authority. US Steel may not be state-owned, but it is certainly now controlled by the US government.  

3. How will it be enforced?

The golden share will require presidential approval for a range of strategic and operational decisions, including capital allocation and investment decisions. Plainly, Nippon has agreed to an arrangement in which it would need to seek presidential approval if market conditions changed, and it decided it could not fulfill its commitment to invest another fourteen billion dollars into US operations over the next several years.  

This raises several questions: How will these requirements be enforced? What if Nippon reduced investments even without presidential approval? How would the US government compel Nippon to increase investments to its promised amount? The enforcement options of the US government are relatively weak here, especially if Nippon finds itself in a fragile economic position. A golden share gives the government substantial strategic control on the cheap, but the US government may find that some elements of its authority would be hard to enforce in a soft economy. 

4. What wider implications could this have for US businesses?

A golden share reduces the economic value of the company for other investors, even if the government only takes a “noneconomic” position. That is because the government is reducing the ability of equity shareholders to control the strategic and operational decision making of the company, which could generate costs and inefficiencies for the corporation. If golden shares were ubiquitous, then financing costs would increase and the attractiveness of the United States and US businesses as investment opportunities would decline. 

5. How can the US government mitigate these concerns?

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, known as CFIUS, and the president should release more guidance as quickly as possible to make clear the circumstances under which CFIUS would seek to mitigate national security risks through a golden-share arrangement. These should be very rare cases, and the government should make clear its commitment to restraint. Otherwise, what is to stop the US government from always taking a golden share in any cross-border merger of interest? 

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As the Trump administration navigates this chapter, the key will be to contain and defuse the situation as the regional players sort through the changed landscape. De-escalation in the near term is not a foregone conclusion. It will require heavy lifting from the US military, which remains indispensable in times of crisis.

Details of the battle damage are still emerging, and Israel, Iran, and the United States do not yet fully know what these attacks mean for Iran’s defensive and counter-strike capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives may not be static: As he sees additional opportunities to set back Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, his campaign may expand and go on far longer, as was the case in the operations against Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran may be on its back foot, but it will likely be compelled to respond with its remaining capabilities, as it began to do over the weekend with its waves of missile strikes across Israel.

Usually, the United States has greater leverage and sway with its allies and partners than its adversaries, born from the military, economic, and diplomatic threads that each ally can pull to compel the other toward an outcome. In this friendly tug-of-war over national interests, the heavyweight United States pulls toward its preferred outcomes. However, in the unique case of Israel, the smaller partner may outpace US efforts to de-escalate if additional deliberate steps are not taken. 

Washington does have some leverage over a weakened Tehran. Iran does not want an all-out war with the United States. For this reason, Iran has historically relied on its proxy network of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shia militia groups for indirect and small-scale attacks on US forces and interests. This helps explain why Israel wants to link arms with the United States now, signaling to Iran that an attack on Israel is an attack on the United States. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian officials have played along, stating that the United States is complicit. That may be directed toward Iranian domestic audiences—and a warning for the United States to rein in Israel. 

Regardless of Iranian intent, the situation requires the US military to be in position to defend and respond to Iranian aggression. How then should the White House manage this spiral of escalation to avoid a wider regional war? Five initial steps are needed. 

1. Set the theater to defend US forces and Israel

The United States should continue to set the theater for Iranian responses—and it should telegraph how it is doing so. Ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean, more interceptors for air defense systems across the region, and additional air power in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean island Diego Garcia will position the US military for defending US forces and Israel, as well as providing options to strike Iran if necessary. Forces that have been deployed for extended periods should be backfilled with ready forces, and additional units can be placed on prepare-to-deploy orders. The force movements and heightened alert status, combined with clear messaging, can communicate to Iran that the price of attacking the United States is extraordinarily high, particularly given Iran’s significantly degraded proxy network and air defenses. Internally, there should be a conditions-based approach to redeploying the forces once the situation settles down.

The United States must also continue to help defend Israel itself, which is the clearest path to stabilizing the region. Surging additional US capabilities into the theater may embolden Israel to launch additional strikes on Iran, but the greater risk is not being in position to defend against attacks on US forces and blunt Iran’s subsequent attacks on Israel. 

2. Move from authorized departures to ordered departures

The White House should accelerate what it put in motion through voluntary departures from State Department facilities last week by moving to ordered departures at those same locations. Temporarily reducing the number of nonemergency personnel and dependents can reduce the demands on US forces to defend and evacuate those locations later. It also signals to the region that the price of escalation is a diminished US presence, which many US partners do not want, and it provides an incentive for these partners to work toward de-escalation.  

3. Refresh the plans for noncombatant evacuations (NEOs) from Israel and Jordan

The NEO plans have been refreshed repeatedly since October 7, 2023, though the in-extremis conditions that would precipitate large-scale evacuations have never been met. These worst-case scenario plans should be dusted off again, and US government officials should discuss internally what the trip wires would be to execute the NEOs, such as commercial airports losing functionality. The United States should also discuss NEO plans with allies and partners, who often expect assistance with their evacuations but too often do not communicate their assumptions about US assistance until late in the game. 

4. Prepare to strike Iran if Iran attacks the United States

The United States will need to strike forcefully if Iran does attack US forces or bases. To that end, the US military should refresh and expand response options that would exploit Iran’s newest vulnerabilities, such as military sites that are now without adequate air defenses or exposed headquarters that serve as nerve centers for IRGC operations. The Trump administration can choose how and when it responds, and some of the steps taken to set the theater for defense will help facilitate going on the offensive. 

5. Pace the crises across time and space

Any administration can only juggle a handful of crises at any given time. The Trump administration should consider which departments have comparative advantages in navigating which crises, given the finite bandwidth of senior leaders and high-demand US forces. The US military is uniquely and singularly manned, trained, and equipped to reduce the chance of a larger regional war that could have devastating human and economic costs for the United States—and the entire region. The White House should therefore prioritize de-escalating quickly in order to focus on other theaters and priorities. 

With steady, cool-headed leadership at this heated moment, the United States can reduce the possibility of a wider regional war that could spin out of control.

Caroline Zier is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She has over fifteen years of experience in national security and defense at the Department of Defense, most recently serving as the deputy chief of staff to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

The post How the US can reduce the risk of wider war in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Trump administration has launched an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act into the impact of semiconductor imports on national security, a step toward imposing tariffs. But if it moves ahead with tariffs on all semiconductor imports, the United States would raise hardware costs for US AI firms, punish important partners such as Mexico and Taiwan, and lower prices for Chinese competitors. Tariffs targeted at China have their uses in the US-China tech competition, but they shouldn’t be applied haphazardly to US allies and partners.

Semiconductors and dual-use imports

Today, the United States and like-minded allies and partners are competing with China in AI, or what AI entrepreneur Dario Amodei and former US Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger have described as possibly “the most powerful and strategic technology in history.” AI-related imports enable US AI companies to access cost-effective inputs and continue to outpace Chinese competitors. Since AI is an emergent technology with such large potential utility and consequences, it would be a mistake to allow China to define the rules of engagement.

Components are a key cost driver for training AI models. Key AI-related component imports include processing units, such as graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs), and printed circuit assemblies (PCAs), all of which could be targeted by Section 232 tariffs. GPUS are one of the most popular computing technologies to run AI models due to their ability to train massive models and speed up inference at scale; they’re also used on board autonomous vehicles. Similarly, PCAs are critical because they house and interconnect critical components like GPUs, CPUs, memory, and networking chips inside servers and data center infrastructure. AI is a critical source of demand, although chips and printed circuits are also used by a variety of non-AI applications, including cars, computers, washing machines, routers, etc. Imports of processing units and PCAs have surged in recent months due to both AI-driven demand and companies seeking to get out ahead of tariffs.

PCA unit imports have more than quintupled since 2021, with no productivity changes to explain the jump—pointing to greater hardware needs. Consequently, if PCA prices rise due to tariffs, the US AI buildout could slow.

Two economies are prominent partners of dual-use technology, with both military and civilian applications, for the US AI sector. The first, Taiwan, not only ships leading-edge GPUs to the United States, but the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company has committed to investing a cumulative $165 billion in the US tech sector. The second, Mexico, is the largest single aggregate supplier to the United States of GPUs and CPUs, as well as PCAs, by value. Tariffs on semiconductor inputs would punish US partners while limiting the access of US firms to the global market.

Indeed, hardware is a significant cost driver for US AI. Researchers for Epoch AI and Stanford University have found that AI accelerator chips and other server component costs comprise about half of all costs for training and experiments of machine language models. Moreover, building AI models is highly capital intensive: hyperscalers committed $200 billion in twelve-month trailing capital expenditures in 2024; Morgan Stanley projects hyperscaler capital expenditures could reach as high as $300 billion in 2025. Significantly, since hardware acquisition costs are “one to two orders of magnitude higher than amortized costs,” higher prices via tariffs could deter new AI entrants, slow adoption, and stymie dynamism. 

Unintended tariff consequences on the Chinese tech sector

While heavy tariffs would harm the US tech sector, they are unlikely to impede China in the AI race. In fact, tariffs could indirectly encourage tech transfer to China by pushing other countries, especially in Southeast Asia, to work more closely with Beijing. In mid-April, after US President Donald Trump’s announcement of global “reciprocal” tariffs and the subsequent ninety-day pause, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, saying he would “safeguard the multilateral trading system.” China left these meetings with several memorandums of understanding on investment and trade, including a call to increase AI cooperation with Malaysia.

The mention of AI cooperation was striking and potentially significant. Export controls of US-designed semiconductors to China have been leaky: There is some evidence of GPU transshipment to China through Southeast Asia, notably Malaysia. The Wall Street Journal also reports that Chinese engineers are using Malaysian data centers to train AI models. Meanwhile, the export of GPUs and other computer hardware containing semiconductors from Taiwan to Malaysia reached $307 million in April (more than half the value of the same exports for all of 2024). Remarkably, Taiwan’s GPU and CPU exports to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) hit a record high in April—surpassing exports to the United States by value for the first time on record.

The increase in Taiwan’s semiconductor exports to ASEAN does not, by itself, demonstrate transshipment to China: Malaysia is becoming an increasingly popular spot for international data centers because of the country’s cheap real estate and its proximity to Singapore. It’s possible that the GPUs and CPUs were consumed in the domestic market. Still, it’s worth noting that recent data center entrants in Malaysia include Chinese firms. If US tariffs make countries like Malaysia more willing to work with China, that could increase the risk of US export controls being violated.

 If not tariffs, then what?

Given that non-China tariffs appear likely to harm the US tech sector and could strengthen Chinese tech firms via technology leakage, US policymakers should consider alternative tools.

The United States has been able to slow the Chinese tech sector by imposing a series of bipartisan export controls that limit Beijing’s access to high-end semiconductors. Last month, the Bureau of Industry and Security rescinded the AI Diffusion Rule, which strengthened chip-related exports. Some criticize the framework for casting too wide of a net, while others hold that export controls are a crucial economic statecraft tool for protecting US national security interests and preventing technological acquisition by strategic rivals.

Export controls are vital and necessary, but they are not a silver bullet. To outcompete China, the United States must strengthen its own capabilities, including by incentivizing manufacturing and know-how in semiconductors and other strategic technologies. This is precisely the rationale for the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act, which was signed into law in August 2022. Tariffs alone do not provide enough support to incentivize foreign investment and domestic capacity in chip technologies. While Congress and the White House should make adjustments to the CHIPS and Science Act where appropriate, the program’s overall aims should be maintained.

No one should be unclear on the stakes, amid the global race toward artificial general intelligence (AGI)—or artificial intelligence equal to or exceeding human capabilities. Whether the race is a sprint, a marathon, or something else entirely, the technology’s productivity gains will likely prove sizable. AGI also holds obvious potential risks, but it is in the United States’ best interest to be at the forefront of setting standards and developing the regulatory environment. Accordingly, it is important for the United States to maximize its chances of obtaining this technology and integrating it before China does by securing vital, high-end semiconductors ahead of its rival.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative. He also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

Jessie Yin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. This article reflects their own personal opinions.

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By fusing years of intelligence preparation with special operations capabilities, Israel achieved strategic surprise and devastating effect against Iran’s nuclear program and military leadership despite months and years of mounting tensions. The operation offers critical lessons for Western military planners facing similar challenges with peer competitors who possess advanced air defenses, nuclear ambitions, and totalitarian control.

Of course, Friday’s Israeli strike on Iran occurred under relatively favorable conditions—already degraded air defenses, neutralized proxies, and no existing nuclear deterrent—complicating direct comparisons to potential preemptive strikes on true US peers such as Russia or China. Still, the concepts retain value worth exploring as Western militaries seek unconventional options to address emerging threats.

Anatomy of a surprise

Israel’s Mossad spy agency had smuggled weapons into Iran ahead of Friday’s strikes, establishing a base of operations from which it remotely launched explosive-laden drones and positioning short-range, precision weapons near critical surface-to-air missile systems. This multiyear preparation enabled what Israeli officials describe as a coordinated campaign targeting Iran’s main enrichment facility in Natanz, its nuclear scientists and military leaders, and parts of its ballistic missile program with devastating precision.

This three-pronged approach demonstrates sophisticated planning that Western intelligence and special operations forces (SOF) should study carefully. First, Mossad commando units deployed precision-guided weapons systems near Iranian surface-to-air missile installations, which activated immediately preceding Israeli Air Force strikes to drop Tehran’s defenses at a critical juncture. Second, specialized equipment and munitions were clandestinely emplaced across Iran to carry out the full range of attacks that achieved the effective decapitation of Iran’s military leadership. Third, explosive drone bases were established deep in Iranian territory to target Iran’s offensive missile systems at strategic sites to deny Tehran an immediate response capability.

The power of pre-positioned munitions

The most striking aspect of Operation Rising Lion was Israel’s ability to achieve tactical surprise through pre-positioned assets rather than relying solely on standoff weapons or penetrating strikes. According to Israeli security sources, Mossad operatives established drone and missile bases “in the open, not far from Iran’s air defense systems” and used vehicle-based weapons platforms throughout the country. This approach allowed over two hundred Israeli aircraft to drop more than 330 munitions on some one hundred targets during the opening strikes while facing degraded air defenses.

The strategic logic parallels successful special operations from previous conflicts. As I wrote recently about Ukraine’s experience against Russia, the core tenets of deep special operations remain constant: “the element of surprise achieved through operational security and misdirection; the targeting of high-value, lightly defended assets in the enemy’s rear areas; and the psychological impact that far exceeds the tactical damage inflicted.” Israel’s pre-positioning strategy enabled all three simultaneously.

Decapitation through intelligence fusion

The operation successfully eliminated Iran’s top military leadership, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Hossein Salami, Chief of Staff Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, Emergency Forces Commander Gholam Rashid, and several nuclear scientists. This represents one of the most successful decapitation strikes in modern warfare, demonstrating how intelligence preparation can enable surgical targeting of command structures.

The targeting methodology reflects years of intelligence preparation. Israeli officials compiled detailed intelligence dossiers on senior Iranian defense officials and nuclear scientists, enabling precise targeted assassinations while conducting a coordinated campaign to neutralize Iran’s strategic missile array through airstrikes and deep-cover operations. This holistic approach—combining human intelligence, technical collection, and operational preparation—offers a template for future operations against peer adversaries.

Asymmetric air-defense suppression

Perhaps the most operationally significant aspect was Israel’s innovative approach to suppressing Iranian air defenses. Rather than relying solely on conventional airborne Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses missions, Israel used pre-positioned systems to launch precision strikes simultaneously toward designated targets with remarkable accuracy. It deployed advanced technologies mounted on vehicles that completely destroyed Iranian air-defense targets at the onset of the attack.

This approach enabled Israeli planes to achieve air superiority and freedom of maneuver during subsequent waves of the operation. The methodology demonstrates how special operations can create windows of vulnerability in sophisticated air defense networks that conventional forces can then exploit. As the West looks at China’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities across the Western Pacific, SOF could pursue similar approaches to prevent Beijing from isolating Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines with long-range antiaircraft systems.

The element of strategic surprise

The operation’s most remarkable feat may be that it achieved strategic surprise despite widespread expectations of Israeli action. Multiple reports over recent days suggested that US officials believed Israel could be preparing to strike Iran, with American personnel evacuated from the region and diplomatic warnings about potential mass casualty events. Yet Iran appeared unprepared for the scale and coordination of the actual attack.

This suggests that strategic surprise in modern warfare depends less on concealing intentions than on concealing capabilities and timing. Israel’s years-long preparation phase enabled operational surprise even when strategic intentions were evident to all parties. As an Israeli security official told the Times of Israel, the mission relied on “groundbreaking thinking, bold planning and surgical operation of advanced technologies, special forces and agents operating in the heart of Iran while evading the eyes of local intelligence.”

Specifically, Western defense planners should carry forward six lessons.

1. The operation demonstrates how long-term intelligence-SOF fusion can serve deterrent functions while providing robust options if deterrence fails. Israel’s ability to pre-position assets and develop detailed targeting packages likely influenced Iranian decision-making for years before the actual strike. When deterrence ultimately failed, these preparations enabled decisive action rather than graduated escalation.
2. The use of technologies ranging from precision-guided missiles to explosive-laden drones and vehicle-based weapons platforms demonstrates how modern capabilities can enhance rather than replace classical special operations principles. Ukraine’s recent “Operation Spiderweb” similarly shows how, as I wrote recently, “technological evolution from Lewes bombs to precision drones masks deeper continuities in special operations thinking.” SOF must continue to innovate to provide options for strategic surprise.
3. Israel’s strikes provide a model for how intelligence services and SOF, through prior operational preparation, can provide robust options for national leadership. This confidence appears grounded in extensive preparation and multiple redundant capabilities that enabled coordinated strikes across multiple Iranian nuclear facilities while simultaneously targeting military command structures.
4. Western nations should prioritize intelligence-SOF fusion capabilities that enable long-term operational preparation in potential conflict zones. This requires sustained investment in human intelligence capabilities, technical collection systems, and special operations units trained for extended autonomous operations in denied areas.
5. Israel’s early success despite obvious tensions suggests that operational security remains achievable even under intense scrutiny. The effort relied on close coordination between the Israel Defense Forces and the Mossad intelligence agency over multiple years, indicating that compartmentalization and operational discipline can preserve surprise even in highly monitored environments.
6. This operation tests the value of preemption. If Iran’s counterattacks fail to deliver a major impact, Israel’s attack could show how well-prepared preemptive action can end conflicts on favorable terms rather than beginning them. By targeting Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and military leadership simultaneously, Israel appears to have degraded Iran’s ability to sustain prolonged conflict while achieving its core security objectives.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration that the operation would continue “for as many days as it takes to remove this threat” suggests confidence in sustained capabilities rather than one-off strikes. While Tehran retaliated Friday with drones and missiles that killed three people and caused dozens of Israeli injuries, it remains to be seen just how effective its responses will be in light of the regime’s severely degraded capabilities.

Operation Rising Lion represents the evolution of modern special operations principles established during World War II and refined through decades of irregular warfare. The integration of multiyear intelligence preparation, pre-positioned capabilities, and coordinated targeting demonstrates how democratic nations can achieve strategic surprise against peer adversaries even in highly scrutinized security environments.

For Western military planners, the operation offers both inspiration and instruction. The challenge lies not in replicating Israeli capabilities but in developing equivalent intelligence-SOF fusion that provides national leadership with robust options across the spectrum of conflict. Unlike Iran, both China and Russia possess large, survivable nuclear arsenals, which introduces significant escalation risks to any decapitation strike or preemptive action, even if conventional thresholds are initially observed. As tensions with peer competitors continue to mount, the ability to achieve strategic surprise through patient preparation rather than reactive escalation may prove decisive.

The Greek warriors who hid away in the Trojan Horse before springing forth to storm the gates of Troy would recognize the operational logic, if not the technology, used by today’s special operators. Strategic surprise through careful preparation, audacious execution, and clear purpose remains the foundation of effective special operations. Israel’s achievement lies in demonstrating how these timeless principles can be adapted to counter twenty-first-century threats while providing templates for democratic nations facing similar challenges with authoritarian adversaries.

The lesson for future irregular warfare is clear: When facing peer adversaries with advanced capabilities and nuclear ambitions, patient intelligence preparation combined with innovative special operations can achieve effects that conventional deterrence alone cannot guarantee. The investment in such capabilities may prove the difference between managing conflict and winning it decisively.

Doug Livermore is the director of engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, national director for external communications at the Special Forces Association, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. He is a former senior government civilian, intelligence officer, and contractor in various roles at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Army.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

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It’s not always the weeks with the most activity that reveal the most. After several consecutive weeks of news-making developments in Russia’s war in Ukraine, this past week seemed quieter. Yet upon closer inspection, it did feature some public musings by US President Donald Trump that sadly suggest a certain unwillingness to confront a painful reality. It also saw the administration decide to redirect a shipment of thousands of counter-drone missiles that were originally intended for Ukraine. Taken together, these rhetorical and policy choices only encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue his war of conquest and make it harder for Trump to reach his stated goal of establishing a durable peace in Ukraine.   

The painful reality is that the Kremlin does not want peace in Ukraine. It wants, as former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said publicly, victory. The proof, of course, is that Russia has rejected multiple Trump peace proposals that Ukraine has accepted. Confronted by this, as early as April 24, Trump has acknowledged that Putin might be stalling and said then, and again on April 27, that he would know in “two weeks” if that were so and, if so, he would put some form of pressure on Russia. 

Trump has been talking about a two-week deadline for nearly two months and has said on several occasions over this period that he might have to impose sanctions. Yet he continues to dither. Why does he keep bringing up sanctions if he is not acting on his threats to impose them? The obvious answer is that he is under regular criticism—including from Republicans in Congress—for not living up to his stated promise to achieve a stable peace by putting pressure on the side obstructing progress. Members of both parties in the Senate for nearly three months have been working on a major sanctions bill against Russia. It now has eighty-four cosponsors, which means that a large majority of Republican senators are on board. House Speaker Mike Johnson is also an advocate. In the past two weeks, Trump has asked the Republican senators both to weaken the bill’s provisions and to delay its introduction. They are still heeding his request, but impatience is growing, as evidenced by a June 12 statement from US Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC), the bill’s original sponsor. Trump’s posturing—floating the idea of sanctions even while he refrains from imposing them—helps the White House manage this pressure, but this can continue indefinitely.

Trump’s public musings on Russia also betray his unwillingness to take the strong steps that might persuade Putin to seriously negotiate. Last week, Trump characterized Russia and Ukraine as two brawling boys, rather than as aggressor and victim. This week, he said that he thought it strange that many American observers have a positive view of Japan and Germany, whom the United States fought in World War II, and a negative view of Russia, a US ally in that war—with no reference to Russia’s savage aggression in Ukraine or to the fact that Moscow considers the United States its principal adversary. 

As the latest two-week deadline passed this week with the Kremlin still firmly opposed to US peace proposals, Trump commented that Putin does not care about the human costs of war, but added that he was frustrated by both Russia and Ukraine.

While the president postures inconsistently, his administration is making decisions that disadvantage Ukraine. A case in point is the Defense Department’s decision to divert US counter-drone weapons from Ukraine to the Middle East. This decision was likely not taken with the goal of weakening Ukraine, but that was certainly the result. Such a decision can only be taken because the administration is not operating on the common-sense understanding that if it wants a durable peace in Ukraine, it must make it much harder for Putin to seize more of the country.

The Trump administration’s position in the preparation for the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in the coming days also highlights its peculiar interest in accommodating the Kremlin. The G7’s members have decided not to release a joint communiqué, unlike last year, in part, I suspect, because previous G7 statements have included sharp criticism of Kremlin aggression. The White House, meanwhile, has avoided language critical of the Kremlin since February in the G7, NATO, and the United Nations. 

Trump’s concessions to Russia on this language, his efforts to obscure the perception that Russia alone is blocking his peace initiative, and the decision to take weapons away from Ukraine have not made the Kremlin more reasonable. These measures only encourage Putin to expect that the United States will detach itself from Ukraine and that a Russian victory awaits. The Biden administration’s weakness in Afghanistan invited Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Trump promised peace through strength. When will he start to deliver?

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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1. What is the scale of Israeli military operations in Iran?

Israel’s focus now is on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as undermining Iran’s command and control and military leadership, with the goal of trying to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response (which started last night with Tehran launching one hundred drones). The Israelis are going to continue strikes for at least the coming days. The expectation is that they will go after key Iranian nuclear infrastructure to delay Iran’s timeline to a nuclear bomb, even if Israel on its own cannot fully eliminate Iran’s pathway to one.  

But is the scale of the attacks to come so large and diverse that Israel’s end goal is not only crippling Iran’s nuclear program but fomenting regime change? The targets Israel chooses will help determine the answer to that question, but a warning is also warranted. For years, many in Israel have insisted that regime change in Iran would prompt a new and better day—that nothing could be worse than the current theocratic regime. Iran is indeed led by a terrible autocracy that has undermined the growth of the country and tremendously hurt its own people. But history tells us it can always be worse. What is likely to follow a theocratic Iranian government is not democracy but Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–istan. Such a government is likely, at least initially, to be much more hardline than the current one. In such a case, Israel might find itself in a perpetual, ongoing, and far more intense war that is no longer in the shadows, as it has been for years.

2. What shape does Iran’s response take? 

The United States, in a statement issued by Rubio, went out of its way to disclaim any responsibility related to Israel’s attack. Iran’s defense minister threatened US interests in the region just a couple days ago. The potential for these strikes helped prompt the evacuations of US personnel earlier this week.

Hardliners in Iran, however, continue to see little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem. And Iranian officials overnight said they “held the US responsible.” Yet striking US interests would probably result in the United States joining Israel in offensive military strikes against Iran. It’s possible that US defensive support to Israel, which is almost certain to be provided to help mitigate Iranian retaliation, could be enough to be interpreted by Tehran as the United States getting involved.

But imagine that Iran doesn’t attack US interests or those of Gulf allies, stays solely focused on Israel (with the help of proxies such as Iraqi Shia militias, the Houthis, and eventually maybe Hezbollah, though the group is signaling it will not get involved), and unleashes asymmetric attacks against Israeli and Jewish sites across the globe. In such a scenario, the Trump administration will likely come under pressure to help Israel destroy some sites associated with Iran’s nuclear program, such as the heavily fortified Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Some national security traditionalists in the United States will view this as a once-in-a-generation opportunity, while those with more isolationist tendencies in the Trump administration and on the left will argue for the opposite approach. 

3. How does Iran approach its nuclear program over the long term? 

US President Donald Trump used social media on Friday morning to try to prompt Iran to reflect on the overnight strikes and cut a deal “before there is nothing left.” But these developments, including the killing of multiple senior Iranian officials, are more likely to prompt Iran to try to rush for a bomb. One of the more overlooked data points on Thursday was that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted for the first time in twenty years that Iran was not in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Israel may have assessed that Iran was “racing” toward a bomb and viewed the IAEA decision as the diplomatic side of the same coin as its own military strikes. Iran, however, may determine that the Israeli strikes mean time is up for the regime to decide whether to obtain a bomb, if it hasn’t made that decision already. The conclusion could be that it can no longer sit on the proverbial nuclear fence, and that it has to rush for a bomb or risk never having one. 

This may seem counterintuitive at a time when Israeli strikes are raining down on Iran because of its nuclear program. But just as Israel views Iran with a nuclear weapon as an existential threat, for many Iranian leaders an Iran without a nuclear weapon (or the potential to have one) is an existential threat to the survival of the regime itself. Many Iranian leaders believe that a nuclear weapon ultimately provides them stability and protection, just as it has for North Korea in their view. 

4. What exactly did the US know about the impending strikes?

This is a question for the long term. But depending on the answer, it might be the one that prompts a fundamental change in the US-Israel relationship. For weeks, Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to strike Iran. Only in the last few days did the president acknowledge that negotiations with Iran were not on a positive track and that an Israeli strike “could very well happen.” Israeli sources are claiming this morning that there was more coordination with and support from Trump than is publicly known, and that the Trump administration was part of the ruse and disinformation campaign before the strikes; US officials haven’t yet backed up that claim.

If the US president knew about the strikes and conveyed that he wouldn’t support them but also wouldn’t stop Israel from carrying them out, then his decision to acquiesce to Jerusalem’s decision to strike is unlikely to alter the long-term relationship between the two countries. But if the Israelis warned Trump that they were going to strike (hence the evacuation of Americans), the US president told the Israelis not to, and the Israelis went ahead with the plan anyway, then we may look back at Thursday as the evening in which the US-Israel relationship permanently shifted. Trump has long had a poor relationship with Netanyahu, which was on display in recent months through the US president’s decisions to impose tariffs on Israel, cut a separate deal with the Houthis in Yemen, take an approach to Syria that Israel opposed, and, of course, negotiate with Iran. A shift in the traditional US-Israel relationship might be a tectonic change for many in Washington, DC. But for Trump, it might just be yet another transactional decision.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

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We will all learn these answers soon enough. In the meantime, we shouldn’t lose sight of what we already do know—or at least what we already can surmise with high confidence.

We know that given the nature of its regime, Iran cannot be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon or to continue to blackmail the world with its capacity to break out and acquire such weapons. This should not be a controversial position, as it has been the consistent policy of every US president for decades, all of whom have threatened to use military force to enforce that policy if other options failed. Indeed, the argument for such a strike has become much stronger over the past year. Four years ago, US President Joe Biden took office prioritizing negotiations with Iran, and four months ago US President Donald Trump decided to do the same. But in each case, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei chose not to effectively reciprocate, an unpardonable strategic miscalculation no matter how frustrated he was by Trump’s first-term decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal negotiated by US President Barack Obama. Instead, Iran chose to ignore previously established red lines and directly attack Israel with hundreds of projectiles—twice. It also tried to assassinate Trump and many former members of his administration after they left office—actions that never received the serious attention and response that they deserved. An Iranian regime that makes these decisions can never be allowed to be a nuclear power.

We know as well that Iran will respond militarily to Israel’s strikes, notwithstanding the diminishment of its proxies and the likely disruption of key elements of its command-and-control mechanisms. Iran typically prefers to wait to retaliate at the time and place of its choosing. But as Israel’s campaign continues, Tehran will feel pressure to respond quickly, as evidenced already by its initial volley of drones last night. The Israelis know this, so they will try to preemptively eliminate Iranian capabilities to respond militarily. Iran’s reaction likely will include both direct attacks on Israel and retaliation via its remaining proxy groups. However, the obedience of some of those proxies is in question given current circumstances. This conclusion is reinforced by early reports that Hezbollah may be reluctant to follow Iran into another war with Israel.

We also can surmise that US policies have been confused—or, at the very least, have sent unhelpfully confusing messages. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu clearly have been unaligned on Iran since the beginning of the second Trump administration, as was evident by Trump’s humiliating treatment of Netanyahu at their more recent Oval Office meeting, the glaring absence of a stop by Trump in Israel during the US president’s recent visit to the region, and the more recent firings of US national security personnel who were perceived to favor a military option against Iran. And yet it seems fair to conclude that Trump decided not to give Bibi a clear “red light” in advance of Netanyahu’s decision to use force against Iran. We should assume that Israeli leaders would have interpreted the absence of an American red light as a de facto green light. We similarly should assume that Israeli leaders would have perceived US actions on Wednesday to protect American personnel as US acquiescence to Israeli agency. But then after the Israeli strikes, while Israeli officials were touting their “full and complete coordination with the Americans,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement explicitly distanced the United States from Israel and implicitly called into question the US commitment to defending its partners in the region, both through omission of a mention of that commitment and by only referring to the priority of protecting Americans. Adding to the inconsistency in US messaging, Trump followed Rubio by deeming the strike “excellent”—only to then use social media to urge Iran to make a deal. 

And finally, we have long known that it would be more effective, both militarily and diplomatically, for the United States rather than Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear program. The US possesses both platforms and weapons that Israel lacks, including those potentially most useful for the particular targets in Israel’s crosshairs. And while few Arab governments have any real sympathy for the regime in Tehran, they likely will be angered by Israeli unilateralism, worried about the predictable negative reactions of their populations, and especially anxious about Iranian responses that could put them on the front lines of a war they didn’t start. No matter how many distancing statements the US State Department issues, many in the region will associate the United States with Israel’s actions and ascribe a share of blame to Washington for any negative outcomes.  

Given what we know, what should we now expect next? It’s always risky to make predictions, especially at such an early stage. But it’s hard to believe that Iran will forgo a robust military response, and it is nearly impossible to believe that the Trump administration won’t seek to equal the effectiveness of the Biden administration in coordinating with regional partners to help defend against that response. As compared with previous tense moments—after the US killing of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in 2020 or during the direct Iranian strikes on Israel in 2024, for instance—I would be surprised if Tehran prioritizes what it perceives to be nonescalatory responses. Even if it does, the risk of miscalculation is high. And even if Iran believes its actions aren’t escalatory, it is not certain that Israel or the United States would share that perception.  

Furthermore, countless war games over the years have identified many ways in which the United States could be pulled into such a conflict. Potential attacks that kill US personnel, conducted either directly by Iran or through its proxies, is only the most obvious trigger. For instance, if Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities turn out to be militarily ineffective and instead provide Tehran with an excuse to race toward developing nuclear weapons, then US officials may conclude that their only option is to use military force to prevent this worst-case scenario.  

Trump has long signaled his strong objection to the United States becoming involved in another war in the Middle East. He also has repeatedly stressed the importance of the strong relationship between Israel and the United States. It would be deeply ironic if his second term becomes defined by a United States once again at war the Middle East, compounded by divisions between the United States and Israel. At times like these there is no substitute for Washington exercising decisive leadership, rather than waiting to be at the mercy of decisions made by others.

William F. Wechsler is the senior director for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.  His last position in the US government was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism.

The post Unknowns, knowns, and early predictions about Israel’s strikes against Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Israel’s operation came as US-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s advancing nuclear program seemed to have reached an impasse and just after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Tehran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So how might Iranian forces respond? What will this mean for Israel, Iran’s nuclear program, the US-Israel relationship, and a region already experiencing great upheaval? Below, Atlantic Council experts shed light on what happened and what to expect next.

This article will be updated as additional expert contributions come in. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future 

Daniel B. Shapiro: Iran has never looked weaker

Shalom Lipner: Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

Landon Derentz: Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

Matt Kroenig: An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

Richard LeBaron: The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Diana Rayes: Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

R. Clarke Cooper: Iran apparently was given two choices

Daniel E. Mouton: This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

Kirsten Fontenrose: Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Mark N. Katz: Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue

Perrihan Al-Riffai: This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy

Ellen Wald: Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk 

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza? 

Ariel Ezrahi: Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war 

Nicholas Blanford: Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

Sarah Zaaimi: Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

Thomas Warrick: It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Rachel Whitlark: Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Emily Milliken: Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Joze Pelayo: Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response

Yaseen Rashed: Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future

The questions after Israel’s sweeping strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear sites outnumber the answers. In particular, there are four key questions whose answers will help determine the trajectory of the Middle East and perhaps beyond—not only over the coming weeks, but potentially for the coming years:

1. What is the scale of Israeli military operations in Iran?

Israel’s focus now is on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as undermining Iran’s command and control and military leadership, with the goal of trying to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response (which started last night with Tehran launching one hundred drones). The Israelis are going to continue strikes for at least the coming days. The expectation is that they will go after key Iranian nuclear infrastructure to delay Iran’s timeline to a nuclear bomb, even if Israel on its own cannot fully eliminate Iran’s pathway to one.  

But is the scale of the attacks to come so large and diverse that Israel’s end goal is not only crippling Iran’s nuclear program but fomenting regime change? The targets Israel chooses will help determine the answer to that question, but a warning is also warranted. For years, many in Israel have insisted that regime change in Iran would prompt a new and better day—that nothing could be worse than the current theocratic regime. Iran is indeed led by a terrible autocracy that has undermined the growth of the country and tremendously hurt its own people. But history tells us it can always be worse. What is likely to follow a theocratic Iranian government is not democracy but Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–istan. Such a government is likely, at least initially, to be much more hardline than the current one. In such a case, Israel might find itself in a perpetual, ongoing, and far more intense war that is no longer in the shadows, as it has been for years.

Continue reading here:

New Atlanticist

Jun 13, 2025

After Israel’s strikes on Iran, these four questions could determine the Middle East’s future

By Jonathan Panikoff

The trajectory of the Middle East could be determined by how just a few critical questions are answered the coming days and weeks.

Iran Israel

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Iran has never looked weaker

Israel’s stunning, multifaceted strike against Iranian nuclear, ballistic missile, and regime leadership targets has thrown much into chaos: Iran’s ability to project power, Trump’s nuclear diplomacy, and US-Israel regional coordination.

Israel’s strikes lay bare the depth of Iran’s miscalculation following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. Tehran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and its key regional ally, the Assad regime in Syria, lie in ruins. Iran’s own state-to-state attacks against Israel in April and October 2024 produced little damage, while Iran suffered significantly from Israel’s October response.

Now, with that taboo also in the dustbin of history, Israel demonstrated its full penetration of Iran, and ability to wreak havoc across the Iranian system. Iran has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully will be tested.

But the story does not end here. Israel pledges additional attacks, but Iran will now be supremely motivated to sprint to a nuclear breakout at hardened, underground facilities. The United States will surely assist Israel with defense against any Iranian retaliation. But Trump’s dream of a diplomatic resolution that ends Iranian enrichment appears dead. More likely, the US president will be faced with a decision on whether to use the United States’ unique capabilities to destroy Tehran’s underground nuclear facilities and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. The decision will split his advisers and political base, amid accusations, and perhaps his own misgivings, that Netanyahu is attempting to drag him into war.

The repercussions on trust and coordination in the US-Israel relationship could be long lasting, with implications for future rounds of conflict with Iran, negotiations on the next US-Israel military assistance agreement, and the wind-down to the war in Gaza. An ‘America first’ president, and an ‘Israel first’ prime minister, who have each made fateful decisions with minimal consultation or taking each other’s interests into account, will coexist uneasily for as many more months and years as they both serve.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

JERUSALEM—Years of speculation over the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities ended at approximately 3:30 a.m. (Israel time) on Friday when first reports of explosions in Tehran began to circulate.

The timing of the Israeli operation—which was authorized after Israel’s leadership concluded that the Islamic Republic was on the threshold of a dangerous breakthrough in its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability—took advantage of a rapidly shrinking window for military action, before relevant Iranian infrastructure became too advanced or well-protected. Trump’s declaration on Thursday that “I don’t want to say [an attack] is imminent,” together with expectations that Israel would stand down until (at least) after this weekend’s planned US-Iran talks in Oman, narrowed the opportunity for any element of surprise.

Israel’s initial targets have covered a wide spectrum, including, reportedly, multiple nuclear and other installations, as well as senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel’s intent is not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, but also to undermine its potential to inflict retaliatory harm on Israel and defend against subsequent waves of Israel’s offensive.

The degree of Israeli coordination with the Trump administration will be pivotal to how this crisis unfolds. Rubio’s cryptic statement that “Israel advised us that they believe this action was necessary for its self-defense” does not clarify the extent of US (dis)agreement with that determination, or exactly what prior warning Israel may have supplied to the White House. Notwithstanding, and despite Rubio’s clarification that “we are not involved in strikes against Iran,” Iranian threats to exact a heavy price from both Israel and the United States will thrust the latter into the eye of the storm. Forthcoming decisions by the White House on the contours of US engagement will have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to persist with this campaign.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

The Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may be reverberating across global energy markets, but the tremors are far more restrained than the stakes might have suggested. Brent crude rose more than 10 percent, yet the per-barrel price remains below eighty dollars, well short of crisis levels. The moment underscores how strategic foresight in energy policy can shape the contours of geopolitical risk in the world’s most volatile corridors.

While headlines are focused on missiles and centrifuges, a quieter story lies in the market conditions that made such a strike politically viable. Israel’s actions benefited from the political leeway made possible by Trump’s efforts to “bring down the cost of oil.” It’s not to say the strike wouldn’t have happened otherwise, but—as shown during Trump’s first term—when energy markets can shield consumers from the worst effects of a supply disruption, policymakers have far greater latitude to escalate.

In 2018, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose “maximum pressure” was rooted in a belief that oil markets could absorb the shock. Internal White House analysis forecasted only modest price increases, with US production gains and global spare capacity acting as a buffer. Crucially, while the Strait of Hormuz has long symbolized energy risk, it was—and remains—unlikely to be closed. Iran needs the revenue. This gave the Trump administration confidence to confront Iran without fear of major energy disruption.

Israel’s strike today reinforces that view, operating in an energy environment shaped by the same strategic logic. Oil doesn’t need to stay cheap forever—just long enough to change the geopolitical equation. Trump’s push to keep prices low may have done more than remake global energy flows—it may have helped lay the groundwork for a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

—Landon Derentz is senior director and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council and director for Middle Eastern and African affairs at the US Department of Energy.

An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

As I wrote more than a decade ago, this was inevitable.  

There were only three possible outcomes in the decades-long battle over Tehran’s nuclear aspirations: allow Iran to go nuclear, negotiate a permanent deal, or military action. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. A permanent deal is highly unlikely—as former US President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal proved. So, military action is the only viable option left.  

There are three key facilities for Iran’s nuclear opponents to destroy: Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. A US strike would have been more effective as it could have meaningfully degraded all of Iran’s key nuclear facilities, while Israel can destroy the above-ground facilities. The underground facilities are difficult, but don’t count Israel out. No one would have predicted it could take out Hezbollah with walkie talkies last year. Did Israel conduct commando raids or other creative attacks on the underground facilities? If so, this will meaningfully set back Iran’s nuclear program.  

As for the question of likely retaliation—Iran has few good options. Its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies are degraded, and Israel’s Iron Dome can demonstrably defend against missile and drone attacks. Iran is also afraid of a wider war, though those fears are misguided. This will de-escalate quickly, like Trump’s strike on Qassem Soleimani during his first term. The key questions are: What will happen in the coming weeks and months? Does Iran rebuild? Does Israel mow the grass? Or does Iran decide that it is not worth it to spend decades, and billions of dollars, and only have a pile of rubble to show for it? 

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military facilities was in direct defiance of Trump’s call for caution and negotiation. The United States has been seeking a negotiated solution—one that was not supported by Netanyahu’s government.  

The question now is not whether, but how, the United States will be dragged into a war it doesn’t want, and that Gulf states fear. Iranian retaliation directly against Israel will not translate into non-involvement from Washington, as Israel will then be drawn into a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation—requiring US military supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic cover.  

So far, there is no evidence that Gulf states looked the other way as Israel used their airspace for the attacks, and this won’t be very difficult to confirm or deny.  

Then the question becomes how to protect US troops in the region and how to come to the aid of Guif friends. Given the Trump administration’s close ties to the Gulf, as well as Trump’s personal admiration for certain Gulf leaders, the region will expect the US administration to provide any help they request.  

—Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Kuwait and a former deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Israel. 

Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

Just as corners of the Middle East were experiencing some semblance of stability, such as in parts of Syria and Lebanon, this latest escalation has the potential to reverse the region’s recent fragile gains. Beyond the immediate political and military consequences, the most profound impacts will be felt by civilians, particularly those already in humanitarian crises. 

A prolonged disruption in regional commerce and air travel, alongside rising fuel and food prices, will hit displaced populations, host communities, and those living under the poverty line the hardest. In Syria, where around 90 percent of the population lives in poverty, any shock to commodity prices or aid delivery will be devastating. In Lebanon and Jordan, already overstretched in hosting among the world’s highest refugee populations, the economic fallout may further strain public services and deepen social tensions. 

Meanwhile, the risk of environmental damage or public health crises from military action, including oil spills, water contamination, or infrastructure damage, could pose grave risks to civilians in both the Gulf and Iran. These are not theoretical concerns—they are real threats to food security, access to care, and basic human dignity for millions. 

The United States has a responsibility to act in ways that reduce harm, avoid a full-scale regional war, and protect civilian lives. That means using its leverage not to escalate but to contain the conflict, pressing all parties, including allies, to prioritize diplomacy over devastation. Failure to do so will not only ignite another war in the region, but it will also exacerbate existing circumstances for fragile communities across the region. 

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Iran apparently was given two choices

The Israeli preemptive strike is likely to disrupt Iran’s immediate capacity to develop a nuclear weapons program. However, it remains uncertain whether such an action will effectively deter the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions. 

The Iranian regime appears to have been given two choices: abandon its nuclear aspirations or face a lack of intervention from the Trump administration if Israel decided to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Israel may have advocated for an earlier attack window, while the United States likely attempted to apply diplomatic measures. When diplomacy failed, the United States understandably announced an ordered departure for US embassy staff in Baghdad, while other US diplomatic posts in the region were placed on stand-by for ordered departure. 

Regardless of when the Trump administration became aware that the Israeli strike was imminent, questions remain: Will this unilateral action by Israel sufficiently deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions? How might the regime in Tehran respond? And how will the United States and the Gulf states seek to contain further conflict in the region? 

What is immediately clear is that economic and security conditions in the Middle East have become more volatile.  

—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State. 

This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

The start of what is likely to be a multi-day series of Israeli strikes across Iran is an unprecedented exchange in a long history of attacks between the regional rivals. Most importantly, Israel is going alone against Iran. In previous instances, the United States and Israel maintained regular communication and a coordinated defense posture. This coordination was spectacularly successful in the defense of Israel—including in both April and October 2024, which saw unbelievably low casualties and damage in light of the hundreds of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles fired against Israel.  

This time is different. Trump’s pursuit of Iran nuclear negotiations has created skepticism in Israel. The unilateral nature of US negotiations and the removal of the Trump administration’s pro-Israel proponents, such as former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and former Deputy Special Presidential Envoy Morgan Ortagus, could have only escalated this tension with Israel. These moves came alongside Trump’s avoidance of an Israel stop during his recent visit to the Middle East, as well as Netanyahu’s Oval Office visit in April, where he left empty handed on both tariff relief and Iran. 

The beginning of unilateral Israeli strikes is a sign that the country feels that it must take action to ensure its own security. Regardless of what led Israel to take this step, it is likely to further exacerbate any preexisting tensions between Israel and the United States.

Finally, Iran will now feel obligated to respond. Depending on the degree of damage that Israel has inflicted, Iran may respond in a way that broadens the conflict and creates collateral damage elsewhere in the region. How this will end is an unknown, but as has been the case in the past, a speedier ending is likely to depend on the United States.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Among the many lessons to be drawn from this operation is one about the importance of speaking truth to power. The IRGC makes a practice of minimizing its vulnerabilities in reports to senior leadership. Leaked IRGC documents from the past several years revealed overstatements of capability and omissions of setbacks, perhaps intended to deflect questions about the bang for the buck in their budget. Recently the IRGC was reassuring political leadership that its air defenses could withstand an Israeli strike. This may have contributed to Tehran’s decision to refrain from making a deal with the United States before Trump’s two-month timeline elapsed. This resulted in Israel’s assessment that diplomacy has failed and strikes were necessary. The generals behind those white lies were the first targets.

But now comes the expected retaliation. And the big question is: Will the states in the Middle East participate in Israel’s defense as before? As nuclear talks went nowhere, both Iran and the United States wanted to know, leading to tug-of-war diplomacy in the Arab world.

The United States wants Arab states to turn on missile and drone detection and mitigation systems and look out for munitions launched from Iran toward Israel, while Iran wants Arab states to consider looking the other way if it stages retaliatory strikes that cross Arab airspace. Arab states have a logical reason to rebuff Iran’s request. Munitions flown into a country’s airspace without coordination with its capital are violations of sovereignty and a threat to its people and infrastructure. Taking them down is such a no-brainer that the United States would likely conclude that any munitions not reported or mitigated by Arab states were intentionally ignored. Neither the United States nor its Arab partners want that kind of tension to arise.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue 

Just as on previous occasions when Israeli forces attacked Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself, Moscow does not seem willing to defend its ally in Tehran. The Russian statement issued Friday was critical of Israel but gave no indication that Russia will take concrete actions against it or in support of Iran. Instead, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for all parties to exercise restraint and prevent further escalation. Most remarkably, the last sentence of the statement noted that “we would like to remind you of the US’s readiness to hold another round of negotiations with Iran on the Iranian nuclear program in Oman.” In other words, Moscow itself seems to be calling on the Trump administration to resolve the situation instead of promoting Russia for the lead role in this. 

Moscow’s less than fulsome support (so far) for Iran must be causing renewed doubts in Tehran about what Iran is getting from Moscow in return for Iranian support to its war against Ukraine. On the other hand, there is nobody else Iran can turn to who would give it greater support in responding to Israel. Despite Iran’s threats about targeting American forces in the Gulf region, working with the Trump administration may be Iran’s best hope for restraining Israel. The Russian Foreign Ministry itself seems to be suggesting this. 

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government. 

This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy 

Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites—resulting in the death of senior IRGC commanders—sparked immediate volatility in global energy markets. Brent crude jumped up as much as 14 percent intraday, briefly peaking at $78.50 before settling around $75, marking the sharpest spike since early 2022. While previous shocks during the Israel-Gaza war faded due to resilient oil infrastructure and global oversupply, this escalation is different: an oil exporter is now under direct attack. 

Markets are pricing in a heightened geopolitical risk premium, especially amid Iran’s threat to disrupt oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries nearly 20 percent of global crude. If Iran’s oil infrastructure is damaged or tanker routes are disrupted, Brent could surge to $120–$130 per barrel. Though OPEC+ could ease some pressure, market uncertainty remains high. 

At the same time, US tariff policies are weighing on global demand. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 0.5 percent drop in global growth in 2025 due to ongoing trade tensions. This could counteract some of the supply-driven price spikes. However, if the United States joins the conflict—especially if nuclear talks collapse—the risk of sustained stagflation rises, threatening an already fragile global economy. 

—Perrihan Al-Riffai is a nonresident senior fellow with the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. 

Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk

As Israeli jets attacked targets across Iran early Friday morning in the Middle East, oil futures started rising. Oil benchmarks initially rose 6 percent, then 9 percent and up to 11 percent as the scope of the attacks widened. Oil prices generally spike in response to any conflict in the Middle East, even when neither of the parties involved are major oil suppliers. In this case, Iran is a significant oil supplier, Israel is not.  
 
The reality is that the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf (about 20 percent of global seaborne oil shipments) is not materially at risk after Israel’s strikes, and it is unlikely to come under threat from Iran. That’s because of a few reasons: One, Israel isn’t targeting Iran’s oil production and export sites, so Iran derives no net benefit if it prevents Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Qatari or Bahraini oil from leaving the Persian Gulf. Two, should Tehran attempt to block Arab oil exports, its own oil exports would, in turn, be blocked. Iran can only benefit from stopping others from exporting if Tehran has no capacity to export oil itself. And three, Iran can’t stop traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for any significant amount of time because sea traffic can be rerouted around Iranian waters if necessary. 
 
China, which purchases most of Iran’s crude oil, does not want to see the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf impeded. While China doesn’t have the naval capacity in the Persian Gulf to ensure this, it has become such a significant trading partner of Iran’s, that Iran cannot afford to see its trade with China disrupted. China is Iran’s largest customer and a significant customer of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. China will use the full weight of its economic power to ensure that oil from all Persian Gulf exporters to Asia is not disrupted. 
  
Due to the severity of this attack, and the paradigm shift in diplomatic and nuclear relations that will result, oil prices may not retreat as quickly as they have after previous attacks. Much depends on when, how and against whom Iran retaliates. Regardless, it is important to remember that this is not the oil market of the 1990s and early 2000s. The market is well supplied from a variety of producers, with plenty of spare capacity should the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) choose to employ it. The United States is not beholden to foreign oil producers and its foreign policy should reflect that. 
 
—Ellen Wald, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting. She is the author of “Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power,” a book on the history and strategy of Aramco and Saudi Arabia. 

How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza? 

The large-scale and devastating Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran have opened a new chapter in the post-October 7 Middle East world. In addition to the kinetic damage that they have caused, the strikes are a clear indication that Tehran was proceeding with acquiring enough technology and materials to procure a nuclear weapon, which would have changed the entirety of the Middle East’s security and geopolitical architecture.  

Critically, there is the question of how these strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas and factions that are supported by the IRGC. Will Israel assassinate the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leadership in Tehran, along with other terror operatives? Will the attacks distract from Gaza, or provide the Israeli military with an opportunity to expand its assault on the Strip without international scrutiny? 

Another dimension of the Iranian ladder of escalation is what happens in the West Bank, which is under the fragile control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli military occupation. Does the IRGC have assets in the West Bank that it can activate to sow some chaos against the PA, in hopes of starting skirmishes with the Israel Defense Forces? Are there assets inside Israel who could engage in a targeted terror attack? 

Regardless of the rhetoric, and while this is a serious escalation, it is unlikely, at least for now, that the wave of Israeli airstrikes will result in a massive, global, or even regional war like many have been warning for years. This is due to the fact that Arab countries, the United States, and even Israel want to be measured and deploy strategies to avoid a regional conflagration that leads to massive death and destruction.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse. 

Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war

The Iranian regime is a group of dead men walking. Iran’s reign of terror both internally and externally has been a destructive and destabilizing force since the Islamic Revolution, supporting terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Diplomatic efforts over the years to stall Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons have not been a resounding success so far. Hence the recent Israeli attack does not come as a surprise.  

That said, millions of Israelis distrust Netanyahu’s motivations and actions, whether as a peacetime or especially as a wartime prime minister. The Gaza war is a case in point. He appears to be prime minister bent on saving his own skin, aka saving his extreme right coalition to avoid facing trial for corruption and being held accountable for his government’s failure in connection with the October 7 attacks. He has done so at the clear expense of his country’s national security and democracy, as there is consensus among Israel’s security top brass and indeed the country that as prime minister Netanyahu needs to take responsibility. Netanyahu’s relations with Trump, the European Union, and most of the Middle East are at an all-time low, and there is unprecedented polarization within Israel stemming from Netanyahu’s divisive and inciting policies. This is not encouraging, to say the least, in this situation. 

One only hopes that the United States, working with its sensible Middle Eastern allies such as the United Arab Emirates, will help to bring a sensible outcome to this explosive time. 

—Ariel Ezrahi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Programs, the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, and the head of the Energy Transition Sub-Committee for MENA2050. He also works in the climate finance space.

Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

With Israel launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities and related assets, many eyes are turning toward Lebanon to see if Hezbollah will respond on behalf of its patron. For now, however, Hezbollah is likely to adopt a policy of restraint, and the Iranians may not call upon its proxy to strike back. 

Until the recent fourteen-month war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese group was seen as a vital component of Iran’s deterrence architecture against the possibility of an attack on Iran’s nuclear program and on the regime itself. However, even before the latest war between Hezbollah and Israel, there were no guarantees that if Iran was struck by Israel, the United States, or a combination of the two that Tehran would call upon Hezbollah to respond with a punishing barrage of precision-guided missiles against targets across Israel.

That decision—whether or not to trigger a Hezbollah response—would have likely been based on the scale of the damage in Iran, and whether it posed an existential threat to the regime. If the Iranians calculated that the attack was survivable, then a Hezbollah response would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Instead, Hezbollah would be held in reserve for the day the Iranians really needed it. That same calculus applies now, but with the added factor that Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been so degraded by the recent war that it no longer poses the same level of threat toward Israel. In addition, there is a strong sentiment of anger and frustration within the rank and file against Iran for, as they perceive it, letting Hezbollah down during the recent war by refusing to allow it to employ the full gamut of its military might to inflict real pain on the Israeli home front. 

That mood of resentment may have been on subtle display during the recent visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who reportedly held a frosty meeting with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem, and was accompanied by two relatively junior party lawmakers while paying his respects to the tomb of late Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.

For now, domestic calculations will likely help stay Hezbollah’s hand. However, that restraint could falter if the Israeli strikes against Iran continue and pose a direct threat to the regime. 

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

JERUSALEM—Despite the early signs of an imminent strike, with US regional embassies and military facilities evacuating a number of their staff, our plane landed in busy and bustling Ben Gurion airport undeterred by the news of a potential pre-emptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and leadership.

Just hours ago, senior experts and a US official at a Jerusalem dinner seemed optimistic that nothing out of the ordinary would occur and that the week’s developments represented a mere tactical escalation amid important nuclear talks. Analysts familiar with Israeli politics jokingly noted that if anything serious were to happen between Iran and Israel, it would need to be after next week due to Netanyahu’s son’s upcoming wedding. We later came to understand that the United States might have overestimated its capacity to deter their Israeli counterparts.

At 3:00 a.m. the peaceful Jerusalem ancient city walls were suddenly disturbed by piercing alarms calling everyone to take shelter in the nearest safe space. Our security team informed us that Israel had initiated a unilateral strike on Iran and that the United States was given a heads up about the events of the night. Sources reported that the Israeli war cabinet was gathering to discuss a Gaza cease-fire and hostage deal, and were surprised to discover that it was a briefing on the attacks. Some of them were sworn in writing to secrecy.

As we stand now, the mood in Israel is dug in for a long-haul operation to disable the capabilities of what they call the “head of the octopus,” after cutting many of its tentacles in Gaza, Beirut, and Damascus last year. Israel called thousands of its reservists back to duty, and Jerusalem is preparing for a potentially consequential retaliation from Tehran, as initial reports reveal substantial losses among the Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists.

The Mullah regime’s response might not come immediately, as we witnessed with the 2024 events. Tehran will have to rally its defense systems after being drastically diminished, and now also face a crisis of leadership amid tonight’s high-level targets.

The United States, however, clearly tried to distance itself from the attacks and focused on prioritizing the safety and security of US facilities and personnel in the Middle East, although signaling a deadlock in US-Iranian nuclear talks. President Donald Trump is faced today with a crucial dilemma of either further decoupling from Israel and confirming US isolationism, or seizing a moment of weakness among Iran and its proxies by supporting Israeli ambitions to annihilate an enemy at the source.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She is also the center’s deputy director for communications, overseeing strategic communications, editorial agenda, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts.

It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Israel’s strikes against Iranian command, nuclear, and military sites were not a warning shot. They were intended to start a change as decisive against the Iranian regime as Israel’s 2024 campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Importantly, Israel has no postwar plan for Iran beyond ending an existential nuclear threat. Israel should have thought this through months ago, but it really needs to think now about its post-war strategy. Regime change will not happen after an aerial campaign, no matter how effective. However much the IRGC was weakened by Israel’s strikes, including the reported death of senior IRGC military leaders, Tehran is still strong and coherent enough to prevent a popular “color” revolution. Regime change efforts from the United States and others elsewhere in the world should be a cautionary example of how hard this would be.

Israel is going to have to sustain a homeland defense strategy and keep striking nuclear, missile, and drone facilities in Iran. It also needs to develop, or work with the United States to develop, a workable strategy that gets Iran to end its nuclear threat to Israel. This will not be easy, and it will involve serious tradeoffs by Israel’s leaders, including how to end the war in Gaza on terms that will keep Hamas from coming back into power while giving the Palestinians a path toward reconstruction, dignity, and peace.

The best thing the United States can do now is to redouble its efforts to get a durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. Such a peace will require greater contributions by the United States, Arab allies, and Israel than anyone has been willing to make until now.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Early reporting suggests that the ongoing Israeli attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, has multiple, complementary goals. Israel appears to be aiming to cripple Iranian nuclear capacity and degrade Iranian retaliatory capabilities. To achieve these ends, Israel is conducting a combined air and intelligence operation to target nuclear installations, ballistic missile and air-defense sites, and key personnel in both the nuclear and military command structures.

We can understand this multipronged effort as targeting multiple threats to Israel’s security. First, successive Israeli prime ministers have described an Iranian adversary armed with nuclear weapons as an existential threat to Israel. As Netanyahu described in a video statement as the attacks were underway, the operation targeted both the Natanz enrichment facility (among others) and leading Iranian nuclear scientists. Targeting both the facilities and the key scientists should degrade and delay Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Israel also sought to limit Iranian retaliatory capabilities by attacking ballistic missile and drone installations, as well as key individuals in the military command structure, including General Hossein Salami, the chief of the IRGC, and Gholam Ali Rashid, the deputy commander of the Iranian armed forces. There may be a third, larger goal beyond degrading Iran’s nuclear and retaliatory capacity: regime decapitation. Indeed, beyond targeting the nuclear infrastructure, the expansive attacks against the military forces and the IRGC could be suggestive of a larger regime-level goal.

Especially as events continue to unfold, it is difficult to determine operational success. Nevertheless, we can expect Israeli leaders to define success as delaying Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade uranium or advance to nuclear weapons, which Israel is likely to have achieved through damaging and destroying critical nuclear infrastructure and killing senior scientists. Further, to the extent that an eventual Iranian retaliation is limited because of Israel’s attack on key military sites and personnel or blunted by Israel’s own defenses, such developments may signify another layer of success. Of course, it is difficult to know exactly what an Iranian attack might have looked like had Israel not targeted key military facilities during this strike and earlier attacks on Iranian air defenses in 2024.

—Rachel Whitlark is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Israeli strikes on Iran risk provoking a response from Yemen’s Houthi rebels and potentially upending last month’s bilateral cease-fire agreement between the United States and the Houthis. While the Trump administration made it clear that the strike was a unilateral action by Israel, the Houthis could perceive the United States as complicit, as the rebels often conflate Israeli and US actions in their public messaging. Adding to those concerns, earlier this week a Houthi source threatened to retaliate if the United States or Israel struck Iran, following reports that American nonessential personnel and family members were being evacuated throughout the Middle East. 

Moreover, the Houthis have been playing a more prominent role in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” since the October 7 attacks, particularly as other proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah faced leadership losses and setbacks. For the group, renewed confrontation could be an opportunity to reinforce its position within Iran’s network of allies and proxies and claim a major propaganda win—even if it means the end of the cease-fire with the United States. 

While the Trump administration’s “Operation Rough Rider” imposed meaningful damage on the group, the Houthis have proven their resilience and ability to adapt in the face of continued strikes. They may also calculate that the Trump administration’s decision to pursue a cease-fire is a sign of limited appetite to re-engage in Yemen, especially given that “Operation Rough Rider” cost more than one billion dollars in a month and failed to degrade the Houthis, who have continued strikes on Israeli territory. 

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. 

Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response 

Gulf States—mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have no appetite for a regional war that involves Iran and would rather not be put in a place to choose between Israel and Iran. Their economic visions hinge on regional stability and on striking a balance to protect their interests, both economic and political. While their emerging role as mediators has enhanced their geopolitical role and diplomatic leverage, that role—now at risk—depends on stability for trust-building purposes when dealing with an actor like Iran.  

Under the Trump administration, Gulf states have taken the front seat in driving the new regional order. However, Israel’s strikes, following the IAEA’s strongest rebuke in twenty years and Iran’s announcement of a third uranium site, seem to have temporarily disrupted the Gulf capitals’ preferred approach for diplomacy and placed them now in the crossfire for retaliation.  

The Trump administration must rally its Gulf allies for an emergency meeting to coordinate a response aimed at preserving any diplomatic gains made so far. Oman, as a trusted intermediary, could be in a good place to lower the temperature and lobby Tehran against attacking Gulf capitals and US assets in the region—especially since Washington had no role in the attack. While this escalation carries serious risks, Israel’s attacks seem to have focused on the IRGC, which is responsible for continuously pursuing a destabilizing influence across the Levant and the Gulf and targeting US service members—making the IRGC a legitimate target. However, failure to deescalate would risk a broader regional conflict, the collapse of the Gulf-led peace process, the destabilization of global energy markets, and further disruption of key navigation routes in the Red Sea.  

—Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran demonstrates a continued invocation of its Begin Doctrine—its long-standing policy of pre-emptively striking nuclear facilities and weapons of mass destruction. Named after Israel’s former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine was first created in 1981 during Operation Opera when Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in a targeted attack.

Similar to Netanyahu today, Begin carried out the strike without US approval. Many feared an escalation if former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were to retaliate, however, at the time, Saddam was already embroiled in a war with Iran and could not afford to respond.

Israel applied the doctrine again in 2007 when it covertly destroyed Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in an operation it did not publicly acknowledge until 2018. Responding to the strike, then-President Bashar al-Assad denied the existence of the site entirely to avoid domestic and regional pressure to retaliate.

Now, for the third time, Israel appears to be invoking the doctrine, this time against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure, again without Washington. But unlike prior episodes, Iran is expected to retaliate, and likely with far greater intensity than previous strikes in April and October 2024—especially if Iran’s regional proxies join its retaliation to overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome.

All eyes now turn to Muscat, where US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is still scheduled to meet with Iranian negotiators this weekend in what could be the final round of nuclear talks. The outlook for any deal appears bleak following the strikes. Should negotiations collapse, the region could face an escalation unlike anything seen in decades.

—Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.

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Here’s a look inside the numbers that will frame the summit.

The G7 was formed fifty years ago so the world’s advanced-economy democracies could align on shared economic and geopolitical challenges. But what happens when the cause of instability is coming from inside the G7? That’s the question confronting the leaders as they assemble this week in Kananaskis. 

US President Donald Trump is still getting to know some of his new colleagues, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, and the summit’s host, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. Trump will try to coordinate the group against China’s economic coercion. But the rest of the leaders may turn back to Trump and say that this kind of coordination, which is at the heart of why the G7 works, would be easier if he weren’t imposing tariffs on his allies. The chart above shows the friction points heading into one of the most consequential G7 summits in the organization’s history.

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

Originally created as an economic coordination body, the G7 began to put foreign policy and national security on its agenda in the 1980s, as the Soviet Union’s political influence was waning. Soon after, Russia attended its first G7 Summit as a guest in 1991, formally joined in 1998, creating the Group of Eight (G8), and then was suspended in 2014 due to its annexation of Crimea. 

In the years since, new geopolitical rivals have entered the fray: Since the COVID-19 pandemic, G7 summits and declarations have attempted to address China’s role in the global economy. Last year’s leaders’ communiqué was especially harsh on China—which was mentioned twenty-nine times—on everything from its material support to Russia’s war against Ukraine to Beijing’s malicious cyber activities. But China was once a guest at the forum, first joining in this capacity in 2003.

Other members of the G7+5, an unofficial grouping of large emerging markets—India, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa—have been invited as guests in recent years. If that sounds familiar, it is because India, Brazil, and South Africa, along with Russia and China, are the founding members of the BRICS group of emerging economies, which some would consider a representation of the geopolitical and economic competition the G7 faces today. 

This year, Australia, Ukraine, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and India were invited to attend as guests. These invitations are a signal of broad alignment among the G7 and its guests. These invitations demonstrate the importance of the guests’ economic might on the global stage, even though India has shifted away from the G7 quite significantly in the last fifty years, as seen in the graph above. In 1992, when Russia first attended the G7 as a guest, its gross domestic product (GDP) was less than 1 percent of the world’s GDP, and the combined economies of the five founding BRICS countries made up less than 9 percent of global GDP. At the time, the G7 represented 63 percent of the world’s GDP. Today, the G7’s share is now 44 percent of the world’s GDP and the founding BRICS members’ share has more than doubled to almost 25 percent. 

—Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

In 2024, G7 countries attracted over 80 percent of global private artificial intelligence (AI) investments, led primarily by the United States. In ten years, private AI investments have grown almost fifteen-fold. This month, the US Department of Commerce rebranded its AI Safety Institute as the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI)—shifting away from an emphasis on “safety” and toward promoting rapid commercial development.

Carney has said that he plans to put AI at the top of his agenda at the upcoming G7 Leaders’ Summit. He has been a long-standing advocate of AI—dating back to his 2018 presentation on AI and the global economy while he was governor of the Bank of England.

But while the United States leads in AI innovation and investment, Europe continues to set the pace on regulation, and China strategically develops its own AI models. All this leaves Canada asking where it fits in.

That may be why Carney hopes to lead on this issue. The G7 presidency offers Canada a unique opportunity to convene democracies to work together on AI. Rather than trying to outspend the United States or out-regulate Europe, Canada can focus on building connections—creating shared standards, developing trusted public-private data hubs, coordinating strategic investments, and outlining guidelines for common learning and collaboration across borders.

—Alisha Chhangani is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Ten years after the first G6 meeting took place in France, another landmark meeting took place at the Plaza Hotel in New York, in September 1985. At the meeting, then US Treasury Secretary James Baker convinced his counterparts from West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan to support a significant devaluation of the US dollar—what became known as the Plaza Accord.

Today, the dollar’s value relative to its G7 counterparts is on the rise again, fueled by tight monetary policy and expansionary fiscal spending. Although the current appreciation is milder than the surge seen in the early 1980s, the Trump administration may use the G7 Summit to raise concerns about the burden of being the world’s reserve currency, especially when it comes to export competitiveness. In late 2024, the current chair of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, Stephen Miran, proposed a “Mar-a-Lago Accord” as an updated version of the Plaza Accord, though no real progress on this is apparent. Moreover, this time a key global player is absent from the conversation—China.

—Bart Piasecki is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The finance ministers and central bank governors of the G7 already held their meeting last month in the Canadian Rockies, emerging with a consensus on tackling “excessive imbalances” and nonmarket policies. While the G7’s finance ministers and central bank governors’ communiqué didn’t call out China by name, it’s clear that’s who they were referring to. Simultaneously, the US-UK trade deal called for the United Kingdom to meet US requirements on the security of supply chains, which infuriated Beijing.

Washington wants coordinated economic security partnerships to help counter China and encourage more investment in the United States. But the United States has been calling for allies to divest from China for a while now. In response, G7 counterparts could point to the data above and ask: How much more do we need to give?

Over the past five years, nearly every G7 country, with the exception of Canada, has scaled down their investments in China and scaled up their investments in the United States. For example, Japan has reduced foreign direct investment in China by 60 percent over the past decade, including shuttering a major Honda plant in Guangzhou. Meanwhile, the Japanese carmaker pledged to put $300 million into a plant outside of Columbus, Ohio. This has been the trend as the United States’ G7 partners reassess their economic dependencies on China. But amid ongoing trade wars, how much are they willing to coordinate more closely with the United States?

—Jessie Yin is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Foreign aid, or official development assistance (ODA), from G7 countries dropped sharply in 2024, and early projections through 2025 and 2026 suggest even steeper declines ahead for most nations. The United States has exhibited the most drastic retreat, following the effective dismantling of the US Agency for International Development. But European countries have also scaled back development budgets and are redirecting funds toward defense and domestic economic issues. While ODA briefly surged in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, that uptick masked a longer-term downward trend in traditional development funding as a percentage of G7 countries’ economies.

Most G7 nations have failed for years to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Target 17.2, which called for allocating 0.7 percent of gross national income to ODA. As of 2024, none of them has reached this benchmark. This retreat is particularly troubling given today’s fractured geopolitical and economic landscape. In such times, investing in global partnerships and life-saving aid through ODA is not just a moral imperative—it’s also a strategic one.

—Lize de Kruijf is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative. 

A major focus heading into the G7 Summit will be how Carney handles his latest meeting with Trump. The two managed to have a cordial meeting in May, and Carney’s announcement this week that Canada will increase its defense spending could help to placate Trump, who has long complained about Canada’s lagging defense spending.

But Canada is also looking beyond its southern neighbor. Carney has invited the leaders of Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia to join him in Alberta. Under former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Canada’s relationships with both Saudi Arabia and India reached diplomatic low points. By inviting these leaders, Carney is demonstrating a willingness to reengage partners. In no area is Carney more likely to pursue new partnerships than in the defense sector. Canada stated its desire to join the ReArm Europe Initiative and has signed a major deal for an Australian radar system. Expect Carney to seek new partners as Canada rebuilds its defense capacity, potentially with some of the countries invited to this year’s G7.

—Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Canada’s hosting of the G7 Summit in Alberta carries exceptional significance amid escalating tensions with the United States. Trump’s attendance, which will mark his first G7 Summit since 2019, signals renewed engagement with Canada. This could spark talks on renegotiating the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) ahead of the trade deal’s first joint review in July 2026. The timing of the G7 Summit coincides with heightened Canadian nationalism and intense public focus on Canada-US relations, particularly around tariff disputes affecting sectors such as steel.

The Trump-Carney relationship differs markedly from previous dynamics between Trudeau and Trump, potentially enabling more productive G7 cooperation when US foreign policy dominates global conversations. The trilateral presence of Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, Trump, and Carney creates an opportunity for preliminary USMCA discussions. However, critical questions emerge: Will Mexico and Canada align against the Trump administration? Will Canada prioritize repairing bilateral US relations over Mexico-Canada ties? The summit’s outcome is likely to significantly shape hemispheric trade relationships and regional diplomatic strategies.

—Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Caribbean Initiative.

Sophia Busch, Ella Wiss Mencke, Ethan Garcia, and Miguel Sanders contributed to the data visualizations in this article. The data visualization titled “US jobs rely on Mexico and Canada more than any other trade partner” originally appeared in an article by Sophia Busch published on January 16, 2025.

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Why is Carney calling for changes now? 

Speaking at the University of Toronto, Carney described the current era as a “hinge moment” in Canada’s history. As “threats from a more dangerous and divided world are unraveling the rules-based international order,” Carney is doing what many leaders of all political stripes in Canada have pledged and failed to do—increase military and defense spending. 

Recognizing the increasingly volatile international security environment that Canada finds itself in, Carney announced sweeping plans for the government of Canada to increase its defense spending to the NATO target of 2 percent of its GDP by March 2026, ahead of the goal set by the government of former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Canada’s lagging defense spending has long drawn the ire of the United States and other NATO allies and served as a target for US President Donald Trump earlier this year. Carney likely timed this announcement for this weekend’s G7 Summit, during which Trump will travel to Alberta, and in advance of the NATO Summit in the Hague later this month. 

Aside from addressing short-term priorities with this month’s summitry, Carney also framed his announcement around the threats to Canada at this moment in history, stating, “a new imperialism threatens. Middle powers must compete for interests and attention, knowing that if they’re not at the table, they’re on the menu.”

What exactly is Canada doing on defense spending? 

Canada currently spends 1.37 percent of its GDP on defense, but the low spending numbers do not tell the full story of Canada’s defense woes. Ottawa only has one operational submarine, out of four, and only half of the Canada’s maritime and land vehicles are operational. 

Questions surround Canada’s ability to ramp up its domestic defense production at a scale needed to meet Carney’s new goals. The equipment used by the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada’s broader defense production as a whole are closely integrated with the United States. Despite this, Carney has pledged to diversify future defense spending away from an overreliance on the United States and look towards new partners, including Europe, as well as boosting its own capacity for domestic production.

Where will this increased spending go? 

In fiscal year 2025-26 alone, the Carney government will invest an additional $6.5 billion across the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Communications Security Establishment (Canada’s signals intelligence agency). The Canadian government aims to increase the number of full-time armed forces members and reservists alongside investing in the civilian workforce. Part of the spending increase will also come from moving the oversight of Canadian Coast Guard from the Ministries of Fisheries and Oceans to the DND. The investment strategy calls for further modernizing Canada’s military capabilities with a focus on the Arctic, such as Canada’s recent acquisition of a new over-the horizon radar system from Australia. To further Canada’s domestic defense production and innovation, the government plans to establish BOREALIS, the Bureau of Research, Engineering, and Advanced Leadership in Science, which will focus on focus on furthering research in frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

How should the United States view Canada’s plans? 

Washington has already welcomed Ottawa’s announcement, with US Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra posting on X that the plan is “an important step toward strengthening the Alliance and reinforcing our shared security.” However, a key part of Carney’s strategy is to diversify Canada’s defense investments and partnerships away from the United States. The purchase of the JORN radar system from Australia was Canberra’s biggest ever defense export and took the United States by surprise. Ottawa is considering bids from both South Korea and a joint German and Norwegian bid to purchase new submarines. Canada’s planned purchase of eighty-eight F-35 fighter jets from the United States is also being reconsidered, with the DND now potentially looking toward European suppliers. 

While Washington will welcome Ottawa’s clear, if long-delayed, commitment to investing in its national defense and security, the era when Canada buys heavily from the United States is likely over. As Carney stated, “it is time for Canada to chart its own path and assert itself on the international stage,” and Washington should not take for granted its potential role in Canada’s defense future.

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Citing the 2023 Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (SPC), the nuclear experts in this “consensus” camp posit that there is broad support for a host of actions regarding the future of the US nuclear arsenal. In their telling, this includes support for delivering the full existing nuclear modernization program, increasing warhead capacity within the legacy and the modernized nuclear force, and further adding both nonstrategic and strategic capabilities to the future force. These experts call for Washington to dispense with another policy review and start implementing the actions.

Many within the nuclear policy community, both Republican and Democrat, see this as a moment of agreement and resolve. In August 2024, former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Vipin Narang said that the United States’ “current nuclear force posture and plan[ned] modernization program is necessary but may well be insufficient in the coming years.” However, it is not clear that the Trump administration, Pentagon policymakers, or the American people in general have bought into a commitment for additional nuclear capabilities.

Put me in the camp that believes more nuclear capabilities are needed—both in terms of quality and quantity. The United States and the West face a revisionist Russia that is a peer nuclear power, as well as a China that seeks to displace the United States as the leading world power and is on the path to equaling or exceeding the size of the US deployed nuclear force. Moreover, Washington cannot sleep on Pyongyang, which is continuing its nuclear buildup, posing unique deterrence challenges to the United States, South Korea, and the region.

It is imperative that those outside of the nuclear expert community understand why the United States needs new or different nuclear forces to confront these threats. First, any crisis or conflict with either Russia or China will immediately put the United States at risk of strategic deterrence failure against one and potential opportunistic aggression from the other. Second, to credibly deter an adversary from nuclear escalation, the United States needs more flexibility in its available responses than it has with its current and anticipated nuclear arsenal. Third, with the expected growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, the United States will need sufficient capabilities, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to continue to simultaneously deter Russia and China in the decades to come.

This is not the first time the United States has had to consider significant new nuclear investments. When US President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, a perceived decline in US strategic capabilities relative to the Soviets led him to announce—and then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to develop—a comprehensive plan to revitalize the entire strategic deterrent force. But there was little doubt at that time that the Reagan administration was intent on expanding US nuclear capabilities based on presidential campaign rhetoric and the administration’s early actions. 

How broad is the new consensus?

The Trump administration has so far not indicated that it supports significant new nuclear investments. Although complying with congressional direction to pursue a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), the Trump administration has not publicly advocated for expanding the existing nuclear modernization program of record. In February, US President Donald Trump said “There’s no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons. We already have so many.” And in March, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said, “So what we need to do now is just modernize. We don’t need to grow our nuclear stockpile but modernize our weapons.” Moreover, the pending presidential budget request is flat for the base defense budget. Any uptick in funding would likely come from the so-called reconciliation bill, which is more likely to be a one-off spending increase than the sustained support needed over years for new nuclear capabilities.

Moreover, it is not clear that nonnuclear experts and decision makers support the nuclear consensus. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission generally endorsed the findings of the SPC in a July 2024 report, stating that “it is existential for U.S. national security that [the nuclear] modernization programs continue at pace to preserve the strategic deterrent.” However, not only did the commission not endorse additional nuclear capabilities, it stated that the modernization effort should not “come at the expense of modernizing and expanding the Navy and Air Force conventional forces.”

Perhaps the biggest hurdle to the new consensus is the fact that most Department of Defense (DoD) officials with responsibility for Pentagon strategy, force development, and budget decisions are generally not steeped in nuclear deterrence issues. These officials are less likely than many nuclear experts to see the risk of two simultaneous or near-simultaneous nuclear wars as realistic. They also tend to believe that the United States already has enough nuclear capabilities to deter multiple adversaries. Some may see any increase in US nuclear capabilities as license for Russia and China to further grow their forces, and many simply prioritize modernizing, expanding, and diversifying the nation’s nonnuclear capabilities.

When budgets are tight and it comes time to spend the next incremental dollar on military capabilities, one cannot count on the nuclear consensus to guarantee that it will be spent on new nuclear capabilities. Strengthening nuclear deterrence, therefore, will require convincing officials responsible for strategy, force development and budget decisions across the US government of the risk of nuclear deterrence failure and the need to prioritize, as appropriate, nuclear over nonnuclear expenditures.

Making the case

Three overlapping audiences must be convinced. First, there are nonnuclear strategists in the Pentagon and those who have primary responsibility for formulating the DoD’s annual budget requests, particularly the military services. Second is the Office of Management and Budget, which sets administration funding priorities. Third, there are senior administration leaders, including the secretary of defense and the president.

Arguments familiar to nuclear strategists must be recalibrated to convince these decision makers of the need for additional investment in nuclear capabilities critical to the United States’ overall deterrence and defense posture. To reach these audiences, nuclear experts should focus on three core arguments.

1. Nuclear weapons have a critical role from the start of a crisis

The first use of nuclear weapons, in the words of renowned strategist Herman Kahn, “is likely to be less for the purpose of destroying the other’s military forces or handicapping its operations” than to influence adversary decision makers. Thus, nuclear escalation will be a concern from the moment Washington confronts a nuclear-armed adversary in a crisis or conflict. Since any conflict between the United States and either Russia or China will most likely grow from a regional spark, their perceived stake in the conflict will likely be existential from the moment it begins. Both nations have developed doctrines and capabilities to match their anticipated stake in a regional conflict, including nuclear capabilities. They recognize that, when war comes, defeat along their periphery could be devastating to the future viability of their polity. Thus, from the conflict’s inception, nuclear capabilities are on the table. US leaders need to recognize this, as US success in conventional conflict will tempt adversary escalation, potentially earlier than anticipated.

2. The nuclear arsenal underpins the US ability to conduct conventional operations

If an adversary is tempted to escalate its way out of a failed or failing conventional conflict, it is critical that the president have at his disposal forces that provide him the tools needed to deter such behavior. To quote a phrase attributed to Victor Mikhailov, a senior official in the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons program during the Cold War, “Russia has a nuclear scalpel for every military problem in Europe.” As described in the SPC Report, such diverse nuclear capabilities offer “options to deter adversaries, control the escalation of potential hostilities, and counter U.S. and allied conventional forces.” The United States needs a similarly flexible—though not identical—toolkit so that the president has the ability to credibly and effectively deter Russia (or China, which is expanding its own nuclear surgical kit) from using one of their nuclear scalpels. And, if deterrence does fail, the president needs flexible tools to restore deterrence without making a general nuclear exchange inevitable. 

The United States does not have that flexibility today—nor is it likely to have it once the nuclear modernization program is complete, even with the eventual deployment of SLCM-N. This should matter to nonnuclear strategists, as the goal is to deter adversary nuclear employment in the first instance and, if deterrence fails, to expeditiously restore deterrence in a way that preserves for regional commanders the freedom of action necessary to prosecute their conventional plans to a successful conclusion. Said another way, nuclear weapons underpin the United States’ ability to successfully conduct conventional operations. 

3. China’s growing nuclear arsenal changes what the US needs

In a face-off against one nuclear-armed peer, there is a risk that the second will take advantage of a distracted United States to pursue its own regional objectives through military aggression. Should this occur, the United States will be faced with the challenge of simultaneously deterring two adversaries from conducting strategic attacks against the homeland during a time of war—adversaries whose forces pose an existential threat to the United States. As long as damage limitation and imposing intolerable costs remain central tenets of US nuclear strategy, the United States must maintain a credible capability to hold at risk what Russia and China value most, including their strategic forces. 

But the United States’ ability to do so is on track to dissipate due to the growth of China’s arsenal and the fact that the number of US weapons available for counterforce targeting in the 2030s and 2040s is likely to be smaller than it is today. With a reduced ability to credibly deter adversary attacks on the US homeland, US decision makers may be hesitant to rigorously defend US global interests against nuclear-backed conventional threats, rendering any future US conventional superiority chimerical.

Each of these arguments demonstrates the importance of nuclear forces that are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient to enable freedom of military action in a confrontation with a peer nuclear-armed adversary in the coming decades. Such a nuclear force is not what the United States fields today, and it is not the force that Washington will have when the currently planned modernization program is complete. To get there, more and different US nuclear capabilities are needed, which will require convincing the broader defense community of the importance of additional nuclear investments.

Paul Amato is the former director for nuclear deterrence policy in the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy. He is a retired Marine infantry officer with twenty-eight years of active and reserve service. Before his government service, he was a practicing lawyer in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own.

The post Many nuclear experts agree that the US needs new capabilities. Now they need to convince the Pentagon. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. What impact would this proposal have on the Nord Stream gas pipelines? 

This package could put the final nail in Nord Stream 2’s coffin, providing a much overdue, decisive vision for the future of Russian pipeline flows to Europe. Ending this zombie project debate once and for all also sends a clear message to global liquefied natural gas producers, which may be hesitant to expand partnerships with the European buyers as long as a relapse to Russian gas dependence is a possibility. This checkmate move from the European Commission still needs approval from EU member states, as well as watertight language on sanctions implementation to prevent caveats or exemptions. Moreover, the Commissions’s bold action on Nord Stream 2 brings the Commission’s Roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy closer to reality, just as the roadmap’s legislative proposals are expected later this month.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

***

The proposal is a welcome one to put an end to the questions about the restarting of the pipelines. The proposed rules would ban any EU operator from doing direct or indirect transactions for Nord Stream 1 or 2, making the operation of the pipelines impossible. More importantly, the proposal would end any rumors or quiet discussions around the future of the pipeline and shows the seriousness, at least in the Commission, around achieving energy independence from Russia. “There is no return to the past,” von der Leyen declared during Tuesday’s announcement. 

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

***

After nearly two static decades of Germany’s Gazpromphilic foreign policy, and statements emerging in recent weeks from German politicians from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) indicating openness to a revival of Nord Stream, today’s EU announcement of Nord Stream sanctions is nothing short of astonishing. That’s because it amounts to a de facto approval by new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Since assuming the Chancellery, Merz has taken steps toward a true Zeitenwende that were lacking in Germany since that political approach to Russia had been first announced by his predecessor Olaf Scholz, with Merz stating clearly and resolutely in late May that under his leadership, the German government will “do everything to ensure that Nord Stream 2 cannot be put back into operation.” 
 
Merz doubled down on this rhetoric while sitting next to US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office last week, declaring Nord Stream to have been “a mistake.” Saying this next to Trump is especially important given recent reports that a US-based investor has sought to lobby the Trump administration to drop sanctions on Nord Stream to allow for American ownership of the pipelines. According to the investor, this move is an attempt to supposedly achieve the “de-Russification” of the projects—despite the logical incoherence of how such infrastructure could ever be truly “de-Russified” if it were still delivering Russian gas. 
 
If the EU is able to successfully get this sanctions package through the gauntlet of member state ratification—no small task with the likes of Hungary and Slovakia waiting in the wings to go to bat for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s energy interests in Brussels—it will be a major step toward finally ending Russia’s energy grip over European political and security interests. 
 
—Benjamin L. Schmitt is a senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Kleinman Center for Energy Policy and Perry World House. 

2. How much would lowering the oil price cap from $60 to $45 hurt Russia’s economy? 

That depends on how effectively the new price cap would be enforced and where the general price of crude would fluctuate. The impact would probably be significant but not as big as it would be if the United States could find a way to limit third-country purchases of Russian oil, either through US Senator Lindsey Graham’s bill or in another (and more practical) form. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland. 

***

Russia still relies on revenue from oil exports, so lowering the price cap could negatively affect how much money they can bring in. However, the price cap has been very difficult to enforce. In response to the price cap, Russia developed an expansive shadow fleet to export its oil, which created an additional challenge for Western sanctions enforcement authorities.  

That said, lowering the price cap would be welcome considering the price of Brent Crude as of today, $67.24 per barrel, which is very close to the $60 price cap. When the price cap first went into effect in 2022, the price of oil was over $100 per barrel. Reducing the price cap is an acknowledgement that oil prices have dropped considerably since it was first introduced and reflects a commitment to restrict Russia’s ability to generate revenue. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

3. What else is in this sanctions package? 

The most interesting aspect of this package is the “transaction ban” on “financial operators in third countries that finance trade to Russia, in circumvention of sanctions.” That sounds a lot like secondary sanctions, which historically have been controversial in the EU. If this passes, it could significantly strengthen EU sanctions by extending their reach. 

—Kimberly Donovan

4. What are the chances of this proposal moving forward? 

It’s worth keeping in mind that this is still just a proposal, and there is a long way to go before it is finalized. These sanctions proposals require the unanimous support of the EU’s twenty-seven member states, which, in and of itself, is no simple process of negotiations. The proposal will likely face two immediate hurdles from the likes of Hungary and Slovakia, whose respective leaders have delayed or played spoiler on the previous efforts for political leverage until their demands were met. However, the fact that there have been seventeen successful rounds of sanctions in the past suggests that solutions, however messy, incomplete, or last-minute, are possible. There is an important transatlantic angle as well. The EU wants to move together with the United States on Russia. So European holdouts will certainly not want to be seen as roadblocks should the Trump administration decide, for example, to push for further sanctions on Russia. 

—Jörn Fleck 

***

I don’t know how much has been vetted with Hungary nor what kind of pressure the Commission is prepared to put on Budapest if it attempts to block the proposal. But the Commission seems serious about ramping up pressure and announcing steps before the G7 Summit, where they will have a chance to obtain Japanese and Canadian support, and thus to present the United States with some decisions. 

—Daniel Fried  

***

Brussels seems optimistic that the eighteenth sanctions package will pass. However, aspects of the sanctions package will need G7 support. This includes the proposal to reduce the price cap, which is why the Commission understandably announced the proposal in advance of G7 meetings this coming weekend in Canada. Further, support from Washington or lack thereof could sway how countries such as Hungary and Slovakia vote on the sanctions package. 

—Kimberly Donovan

5. How might Washington react to this proposal? 

That is a big question, and I can’t give a reliable answer. The European leaders at the G7 will have a chance to convince Trump that it is his own plan to end the war that the EU is backing, and that the United States ought to go all in to that end and agree to pressure Russia. But Trump, despite edging up toward imposing additional costs on Russia, has not yet done so, despite multiple opportunities and provocations from Putin. 

—Daniel Fried  

***

It’s unclear how Trump himself will react to the proposal. But what the US president should see in this proposal is a Europe that is a willing and serious partner. The administration has made clear that it expects Europe to step up for its own security and for Ukraine’s. This is part of Europe’s response to do just that. European leaders have been united on pushing for action on Russia given Moscow’s continued intransigence on cease-fire talks and devastating attacks on Ukraine. This proposal is another indication that Europe is putting real ideas on the table to boost US and Ukrainian leverage with Putin. 

—Jörn Fleck 

***

Members of Congress may welcome this package, as the spirit is consistent with the bill Graham introduced to get Putin to the negotiating table. However, we’ll have to wait and see how Trump reacts considering the stalled cease-fire talks and escalating violence on the battlefield. 

—Kimberly Donovan

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The Abraham Accords—one of the signature foreign policy accomplishments of the first Trump administration—provide a valuable platform for harnessing these trends. But to achieve a more stable and prosperous Middle East consistent with the vision US President Donald Trump recently outlined in Riyadh, the accords must be adapted and strengthened. The United States and its partners cannot simply wait for the war in Gaza to end or for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. They must take steps now to strengthen the accords in order for them to provide an effective path forward for the Middle East. 

Where to start?

First, to deliver strategic benefits for both the region and the United States, accords countries must go beyond normalizing relations with Israel. They should build on normalization to actively commit to core principles related to religious tolerance, broad-based economic growth, and a forward-looking approach to tackling shared challenges in cooperation with the United States. 

Second, those principles should be operationalized through a flexible mini-lateral structure that transforms the accords from a loose label into an effective network of countries spanning the Middle East and neighboring regions. This structure could learn from the successes and challenges of the Negev Forum launched under then US President Joe Biden in 2022. To succeed, this new mini-lateral forum must help identify meaningful, broad-based areas of cooperation that regularly bring together senior officials from participating countries even as political differences between some of those countries persist. In this regard, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, is a useful model, as argued previously by the Atlantic Council’s Dan Shapiro.

At the same time, the accords countries must avoid a cumbersome bureaucratic structure that creates work without delivering results and is not conducive to the private-sector engagement that should remain central to the accords network. Moreover, this structure should seek to coordinate with civil society actors—universities, hospitals, and nongovernmental organizations—that can help build people-to-people ties across countries and cooperation from the ground up. Given enough time, this network might even provide functions ranging from a voting bloc in the United Nations to an economic corridor, building on promising initiatives such as the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). 

Third, countries in the Middle East—particularly Israel—must take a greater leadership role in operationalizing that network and ensuring that new members see tangible benefits. For instance, Israel could be much more active in sharing technological expertise, financing, and building partnerships that continue to strengthen relations long after the signing of an accord document. Reviving the Abraham Accords Caucus in the Knesset could help facilitate such leadership. The UAE, which has been a consistent champion of the accords, should continue its outreach, leveraging its leadership in strategic sectors such as emerging technology, food security, and renewable energy. For its part, the United States can and should provide strong diplomatic support for the accords. Yet, as Trump made clear in Riyadh, the momentum must come from the Middle East itself. 

Early returns: How the accords are already delivering strategic benefits

An important reason to double down on the accords now is that they are already delivering meaningful results toward a more stable Middle East. Advocates of the accords often use increased trade as a metric of success, but the strategic benefits, while harder to measure, are more significant. For example, the UAE is currently leveraging its growing partnership with Israel to mediate between Jerusalem and the new government in Syria, helping to avert a major military confrontation in the Middle East whose consequences could reverberate for decades. Such talks are only possible because of the trust Emirati and Israeli officials have built over the past five years, constructing lines of communication across what previously seemed like insurmountable divides. Moreover, the fact that Arab partners helped shoot down Iranian drones and missiles launched against Israel in April 2024 demonstrates the willingness of those partners to take steps previously considered unthinkable to prevent military escalation in the region. 

The Abraham Accords have also revived or enabled economic connectivity projects that better leverage the Middle East’s role as a link between Asia and Europe. Continued success in this area through initiatives such as IMEC could benefit the global economic landscape while expanding economic opportunity for Middle Eastern countries. For the United States, such projects provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and help reduce opportunities for Chinese exploitation in the region. As a result, the accords reinforce US economic leadership in the Middle East—and they should continue to, especially in critical sectors such as artificial intelligence and emerging technology, where Gulf countries are increasingly asserting a major role.

What comes next

Many in the US foreign policy community assume the Abraham Accords are on pause until Saudi Arabia joins the accords. This is a dangerous assumption that risks jeopardizing the potential of the accords to deliver transformative change for the region. It’s true that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to formally normalize relations with Israel in the immediate term: Saudi officials have stressed the need not just for an end to the war in Gaza but also consensus on a credible path to a Palestinian state, and the current political realities of the region make this extremely difficult. Nonetheless, there is significant work that can and should be done to reinforce the existing accords and lay the groundwork for their meaningful expansion to other countries.

The Trump administration should build on the accomplishments of Trump’s first term by working with US partners to revive a regionally led mini-lateral forum for the accords based on clearly articulated principles. The United States and its partners should use this forum to advance tangible initiatives that strengthen collaboration between both existing and prospective accords countries so that when the accords are expanded, they are building on a solid foundation. This should include Muslim-majority countries in areas neighboring the Middle East that have natural economic, political, and security ties with the region and thus can play a meaningful role in promoting stability and prosperity. In doing so, the Trump administration should reassure its partners that the US vision for the Abraham Accords is premised on the assumption that the Palestinian issue must be resolved in a manner that is acceptable to moderate Palestinians. Doing so is essential not just to secure Saudi Arabia’s eventual participation in the accords, but to resolve a persistent threat to the Trump administration’s vision for a more stable and prosperous Middle East.

Only if this work is done now will the United States and its partners be prepared to seize the potential the accords provide for greater regional change after the war in Gaza comes to a close.

Allison Minor is the director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation and the Atlantic Council. She previously served as the deputy US special envoy for Yemen and the director for the Arabian Peninsula at the US National Security Council.

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In a recent speech at the 2025 Shangri-la Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told the audience that China’s attempt to conquer Taiwan by force “could be imminent.” The possibility of such a rapid escalation stems from China’s increased military activity around Taiwan, which has made distinguishing exercises from true military action nearly impossible. According to Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has reached a “rapid boil.” How rapid? In his April testimony before the Congressional Armed Services Committees, Paparo said there has been a 300 percent annual increase in Chinese military pressure against Taiwan. He later noted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is “stretching their legs” to meet President Xi Jinping’s 2027 military readiness goal of being capable of taking Taiwan by force.

As China’s increasing operational tempo has reduced the United States’ ability to distinguish military action from an exercise, US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has revealed reduced capacity and greater cracks in the United States’ sustainment strategy. This combination of reduced warning and response poses serious risks to the United States’ ability to deter a forceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait, a key objective of the Trump administration.

‘Dress rehearsals for forced unification’

While China’s 300 percent increase in pressure is alarming, this development unfortunately reflects a broader, consistent trend of escalating PLA activities, including persistent crossings of the Taiwan Strait’s median line. According to data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, PLA sorties across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese-declared dividing line between Taiwan and China, have increased from 953 incidents in 2021 to 3,070 in 2024.

Taiwan, with a leaner force, must either dedicate an increasing number of resources toward incursion responses or cede the declared dividing line to the PLA, allowing PLA forces to move even closer to Taiwanese territory unchallenged, reducing warning time. The PLA’s efforts are also a deliberate attempt by Beijing to cognitively shift Taiwan’s perception of actions in the strait, creating “the new normal” of military activity in its immediate vicinity, which could reduce reaction time in a real invasion.

Paparo underscored the seriousness of this escalation in his recent testimony, stating: “These are not just exercises—they are dress rehearsals for forced unification.” Earlier this year, he went even further on the record, warning that the increased operational tempo has brought INDOPACOM “very close to that [point] where on a daily basis the fig leaf of an exercise could very well hide operational warning.”

Placing forward forces

The erosion of operational warning time means INDOPACOM and US decision makers could have less time—and less certainty—to respond if China initiates military action against Taiwan. As the PLA continues to degrade US and Taiwanese abilities to detect tactical and operational indicators of conflict, China’s geographic advantage across the Pacific becomes even more acute.

According to the US Seventh Fleet, forward-deployed forces cuts an average of seventeen days in transit time, compared with continentally-based forces. While exact times are dependent on individual capabilities and other conditions, most conventional options for sea-based transport are slower and vulnerable to China’s expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope. Airlift options to support Taiwan with asymmetric capabilities, such as Patriot batteries or Harpoon missiles to destroy high-value targets, are similarly constrained by the sheer scale of the Pacific and limited US airlift capacity.

Paparo’s April testimony highlighted these logistical realities. He revealed that it took seventy-three flights to rapidly move a single Patriot battalion from United States Forces Korea’s area of operations to US Central Command. Furthermore, TRANSCOM has revealed to the Congressional Armed Services Committees that the C-5M “Supergalaxy,” a critical aircraft for airlift operations, had a reduced mission-capable rate of 46 percent in 2024, a 6 percent decrease from 2023. Even assuming efficiency improvements, there remain significant geographic constraints on how quickly the United States can surge critical defensive systems across theaters with its current airlift capabilities.

Moreover, Paparo’s admission—coupled with his direct warning that “lift requirements must be paid attention to”—amounts to a direct appeal for Congress to shore up TRANSCOM’s resources. The current situation not only strains INDOPACOM’s ability to support Taiwan if US policymakers choose to intervene, but it also risks undermining the defense of US forces and territories in the region. Moving critical assets westward—from the continental United States to Hawaii, from Hawaii to Guam, and onward to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—will face time and lift constraints, as well as the active interference of PLA forces once conflict begins. The enemy gets a vote—and it is unlikely that the PLA would allow US or allied air and sea lift into the theater unopposed once hostilities are underway. This makes the window between when China has decided to initiate conflict and when conflict actually begins critical.

As operational warning time continues to erode—and with TRANSCOM investments years away from fully materializing—INDOPACOM must increasingly rely on forces already positioned west of the International Date Line (IDL) for both deterrence and, if necessary, combat operations against Chinese military aggression. TRANSCOM’s revelation that 85 percent of the United States’ combat power remains in the lower forty-eight states indicates that much more work needs to be done in placing forces forward.

Three next steps for the Trump administration

Given these growing challenges, US policymakers must urgently consider three steps to strengthen forward presence and responsiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

1. Increase US military presence in partner nations through SOFAs

Hegseth recently declared that improving the United States’ forward defense posture is the first action that the Trump administration will take in strengthening deterrence. In order to ensure this action, the Department of Defense and the Department of State should leverage the frameworks of existing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) to expand the US military presence west of the IDL. While SOFAs primarily govern the legal status of US forces abroad, supplementary agreements, implementing arrangements, and diplomatic notes provide the flexibility to adjust troop levels and operational footprints.

Some groundwork for such expansions has already been laid. Under the Trump administration, the Department of Defense announced plans to add additional personnel to US Forces Japan (USFJ) to transition it from an administrative headquarters to a war-fighting command, although these initial moves appear focused only on the USFJ headquarters staff itself. Nevertheless, they suggest an emerging willingness by Tokyo to consider hosting additional operational forces.

Other allies, such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines, offer additional opportunities for expanded presence through rotational deployments, pre-positioning of equipment, and basing initiatives. Opportunities to flex the most capable and necessary US assets, like the recent inaugural deployment of NMESIS, the Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Luzon Strait during an exercise with the Philippines, is one such example. Deploying US F-35 aircraft to the Korea Peninsula, potentially permanently, is another. Building on these relationships will be crucial to ensuring sufficient warfighting capability in theater for deterrence and crisis response.

2. Increase the tempo of US campaigning in the Indo-Pacific

Campaigning, or the use of “normal and routine military activities in conditions short of conflict to achieve strategic objectives,” has long served as an effective way to temporarily increase US force presence in critical regions. As Paparo has emphasized, regular and visible military campaigning in the Indo-Pacific remains essential to maintain credible deterrence and operational readiness.

As China accelerates its operational tempo around the Taiwan Strait, the Trump administration should consider adopting a policy of proportional response, increasing US campaigning activities in line with PLA escalations. A proportional approach would degrade China’s understanding of US operational patterns—complicating Beijing’s planning—and ensure that combat-capable forces are present west of the IDL when and where they are needed most.

However, sustaining a higher operational tempo will require significant diplomatic engagement and substantial logistical and financial resources, in addition to wear on the warfighters themselves. Despite these factors, a nonlinear 300 percent increase in Chinese military pressure over the past year demands a bold response. US President Donald Trump’s proposed one-trillion-dollar defense budget should prioritize funding for increased campaigning in the Indo-Pacific, recognizing that higher operational tempo directly improves both US lethality and readiness—two core criteria for strengthening deterrence under this administration.

One example of how increased campaigning enhances lethality is through its training value for both US and partner-nation forces. Campaigning-based exercises allow US warfighters to refine tactics, integrate new systems, and adapt to austere or degraded operational environments. Simultaneously, joint training with allies and partners strengthens the integration of weapon systems and military forces, reinforces defense diplomacy, and enhances collective deterrence across the region.

3. Increase US military presence in COFA nations

The recently renegotiated 2024 Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands reaffirm the United States’ responsibility to defend these nations and preserve exclusive access for US military forces. These agreements provide an opportunity to strengthen forward posture across the central and western Pacific.

Through the COFA structure, the Department of Defense should prioritize developing additional operational sites within the Freely Associated States (FAS). Pre-positioning forces, enhancing distributed basing, and expanding logistics hubs across the FAS would enable more flexible and resilient warfighting capabilities in proximity to the Taiwan Strait. The relatively permissive legal frameworks of the COFA agreements—coupled with the geographic advantage of the islands—make the FAS ideal locations for expanded US presence, including forces capable of dispersal and sustainment under contested conditions.

The so-called “Guam Cluster”—which includes the FAS—is the cornerstone of US defense architecture west of the IDL, and it is critical to sustainment in a future crisis. The United States should continue to invest political and military capital into reinforcing US access and capabilities in the FAS to deter Chinese aggression.

Dark clouds continue to gather on the Indo-Pacific horizon as the PLA modernizes and Xi continues to signal his ambition to unify the Taiwan Strait by any means necessary. In this environment, the credibility of US deterrence depends on the visible presence of capable military forces west of the IDL and their ability to respond with sufficient force. Lethality and visible presence matter.

As the Trump administration has acknowledged, credible deterrence—and, if necessary, victory—against China requires the active forward presence of combat-ready forces. Increasing US force posture in the Indo-Pacific through expanded presence agreements, intensified campaigning, and investment in the FAS will ensure the United States remains postured to respond swiftly and decisively to aggression.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the N7 Initiative in the Middle East Programs and at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

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Maybe so. There were plenty of novel elements to Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb,” which destroyed a dozen or more large Russian military aircraft—including bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons—across the length and breadth of Russia, using drones launched from containers positioned near Russian airfields.

But in my field of nuclear deterrence, the attack was enlightening in another way: It reinforced principles that have been hiding in plain sight for years. For US nuclear strategists, the attack yielded at least four crucial lessons.  

1. The risk of nuclear escalation over conventional attacks is exaggerated

Ukraine’s drone strikes were a blow to the widely held belief that nonnuclear military attacks on nuclear-relevant facilities or assets will lead automatically to uncontrollable nuclear escalation.

As I have argued previously, too many analysts of nuclear affairs appear to overweight the risk that if a nuclear-armed country is facing attacks on nuclear-relevant locations or assets by conventional weapon systems or dual-capable ones (systems relevant to both nuclear and conventional missions), then that country will feel overwhelming pressure to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, perhaps even before assessing the extent of the attacks. This logic looks convincing. But it is empirically unsupported.

Russia may yet respond to the Ukrainian attack. But Russian nuclear retaliation in Ukraine seems unlikely, even after Russia lowered its stated threshold for nuclear use in September 2024. Ukrainian drone strikes on multiple Russian bomber bases would seem to be exactly the sort of attack that would trigger Russia’s lower threshold for resorting to nuclear weapons. Yet no such use has materialized.

To be clear, nuclear-armed states may well resort to nuclear use to coerce an end to military operations that could lead to unacceptable costs, such as the destruction of a large portion of that state’s nuclear arsenal. But last weekend’s operation is further evidence that attacks falling short of this threshold are not likely to trigger a major nuclear exchange.

2. Nuclear forces are only as dependable as their defenses

Ukraine’s attacks vividly illustrated the vulnerability of the US bomber fleet, which is often sitting on the tarmac. Drone threats are just one of a variety of air and missile threats to the US homeland, though certainly one that has received less attention in the strategic forces community. The 2023 Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report and a recent Atlantic Council study on missile defense both concluded that the United States must enhance its air and missile defense. In particular, it must pay attention to countering coercive attacks on civilian and military infrastructure, as well as on US nuclear forces.

Reflecting on the Ukrainian attacks, General Thomas Bussiere, the commander of US Air Force Global Strike Command, said at an Atlantic Council event on June 5 that the Air Force already deploys counter-drone systems around strategic air bases. The strikes on Russia this past weekend underscore that these efforts should improve and expand, perhaps under the aegis of the Trump administration’s proposed “Golden Dome.” This active defense must be completed by improved sensing, better coordination among responsible agencies, and the advancement of passive measures, such as the use of hardened shelters in peacetime, as well as air alerts and backup airfields in conflict or crisis.

3. Drones should be factored into nuclear-capabilities planning

There’s another truism in nuclear affairs rendered all the truer by last weekend’s operation: Advanced and emerging technologies can powerfully complement nuclear weapons in holding an adversary’s strategic nuclear forces at risk.

This possibility is especially tantalizing as US nuclear strategists grapple with the fact that China’s nuclear-weapons arsenal is expected to reach near-parity with the US nuclear arsenal in the mid-2030s. Because holding at risk an adversary’s nuclear weapons is an important part of how the United States deters nuclear war, the growth in China’s nuclear arsenal puts pressure on the United States to increase the size of its own nuclear arsenal. Advanced conventional weapons might complement these forces or even reduce the extent to which the United States will need to expand its nuclear forces. Perhaps drones could play a part in that equation.

4. Special forces should be at the center of major power competition

As my Atlantic Council colleagues have argued in recent reports, US special operations forces, which have been occupied with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Middle East for two decades, can play an important role in US competition with major powers such as Russia, marking a return to their Cold War-era roots. Ukraine’s attack on Russian bombers is best understood in the context of a long history of operations behind enemy lines to disrupt airfields.

Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb was certainly daring and will reduce the capacity of Russia’s long-range aviation for some time. More than marking a new chapter in the history of warfare, however, the strikes should spur the US government to address the vulnerabilities and opportunities that nuclear strategists have focused on for years.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

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KYIV—I arrived in Ukraine’s capital on June 1, several hours after news broke of the country’s successful destruction of advanced Russian bombers—TU-22s and TU-95s—and Russia’s most advanced intelligence plane, the A-50. Over the next two days, I had numerous meetings with senior Ukrainian officials, politicians, and civil society activists. The strike was a major morale boost across the board, though some of the Ukrainians I spoke with still worry whether the Trump administration will continue to supply military intelligence and equipment to Ukraine; others are optimistic that Trump will not let Russian President Vladimir Putin bamboozle him.

In the near term, the spectacular Ukrainian operation will have a major impact on Russia’s ability to strike from the air at Ukrainian civilian and military targets. It has also bolstered the nuclear security of the United States and its allies by taking out as much as 34 percent of Moscow’s nuclear-capable bomber force. But perhaps the greatest impact of the strike extends to the diplomacy to end the war, and in particular to the calculations of the Trump administration. That is because the strike undermined the common perception, including in the White House, that time was on Putin’s side and Russia would ultimately overwhelm Ukraine.

How has that big idea played out this week? It is notable that the only immediate reaction to the strike from Trump world came from outside actors, many of whom have shown little understanding that the Kremlin considers the United States to be its principal adversary. Some in this cohort have even naively argued that the United States has no stakes in its aggression against Ukraine. Trump allies Steve Bannon and Mike Flynn, for example, claim that Kyiv’s strike undermines Trump’s diplomacy to end the war. It is therefore time, in Bannon’s phrase, for the United States to “pull all support” for Ukraine. It should be noted that this was not a reflection of Trump’s policy. It was an attempt by some in his circle to influence that policy.

But Trump has not moved in that direction. In fact, the White House reaction to the audacious operation has been notably nuanced. The first word from the White House—almost a day after Ukraine’s “special military operation”—was that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had not informed Trump of the impending action. There was no real comment on the action itself.

Reading between the lines with Putin and Merz

The next step was Trump’s June 4 phone call with Putin. In a Truth Social post afterward, Trump noted that it was a good call, but the Russian president was very angry about Ukraine’s attack and would have to retaliate. Trump critics understandably complained that there was no indication that the US president had tried to dissuade Putin from doing so—although the next day, the Washington Post reported that Trump claimed to have told Putin not to retaliate. In any case, Trump chose not to characterize the Ukrainian action.

That task was left to Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, who in a terse public statement on June 4 noted that the attack on Russia’s nuclear strike capacity could be considered escalatory. This was essentially a performative smack on the knuckles for Kyiv. More relevant indications of Trump’s reaction and inclinations were leaked to the press on background. While expressing to his staff his frustration with both Putin and Zelenskyy, Trump also recognized the audacity of the Ukrainian operation, calling it “badass,” according to Axios. Still, Trump reportedly lamented that it would slow down movement toward a cease-fire.

Further indications of Trump’s outlook came June 5, when he met with Friedrich Merz, the new German chancellor. Merz’s objective, of course, was to strengthen Trump’s resolve to maintain support for Ukraine (and to maintain the US commitment to NATO, including keeping US troops in Germany). In that meeting, Trump said it seems that Putin wants all of Ukraine, an important sign that he is finally understanding that the Russian leader himself is the obstacle to the administration’s efforts to end the war.

All of this is of far greater importance to the diplomacy surrounding the war than the second meeting of Ukrainian and Russian negotiators in Istanbul on June 2. That meeting went as expected. On the plus side, there was another agreement on a limited prisoner exchange. On the question of a cease-fire, the Russian side finally presented its formal terms. Those terms are for a vindictive, victor’s peace. Ukraine would be required not just to declare neutrality and demilitarize; it would also have to hand over to Russia all the territory in the eastern Ukrainian oblasts—including areas currently controlled by Kyiv. Moscow’s terms were likely on Trump’s mind as he discussed Putin’s policy toward Ukraine with Merz.

Whither the sanctions bill?

Trump’s clearer understanding of the Putin problem and his new respect for Ukraine’s military capabilities—“badass” being a backhanded but clear compliment—is a plus. But it has yet to yield a stronger policy from the White House.

Restive Republicans in Congress have been chafing for months at Trump’s reluctance to do what he promised: to bring pressure on the side blocking peace. Taking a leading position on this, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) along with Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) proposed a sanctions bill in early April with fifty cosponsors. That bill now has eighty-two cosponsors. Last week, Graham said that he thought the bill would move forward in the Senate this week. House Speaker Mike Johnson supports the effort for tough sanctions. Strong national security Republicans seem to believe that Ukraine’s successful June 1 strike is making it more likely that Congress will move on the sanctions bill and that the United States will help supply Ukraine with additional military equipment. Deft Ukrainian diplomacy on Capitol Hill this week—led by Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak—has further encouraged this sentiment.

Yet it is still not clear that the administration will move. The Wall Street Journal reported on June 6 that the White House asked for the sanctions bill to be watered down, and Trump indicated in his meeting with Merz that he is considering, for some unknown reason, sanctioning both sides. This means, at a minimum, some delay as Graham, Johnson, and other advocates try to work out their differences with the White House. It might also mean that Trump cannot bring himself to punish Putin.

That can only strengthen Putin’s conviction that Trump will eventually allow Russia to gobble up Ukraine. Reports that the Pentagon, with a leadership that is energetically trying to diminish ties with Ukraine, is transferring desperately needed anti-drone technology from Ukraine to US forces will also be read in the Kremlin as a sign of US weakness.

Ironically, Trump’s success at reaching a sustainable end to the war in Ukraine depends on the efforts of those advocates for pressure on Russia. Kellogg seemed to be making this point in a June 6 statement that the Ukrainian special operation could be a forcing function for peace. If, as Trump admitted, Putin’s goal is not a durable peace but to seize Ukraine, then the only real way to end the fighting is to make it very uncomfortable for Putin to continue fighting. Ukraine’s June 1 attack was a step in that direction. Strong US action in the form of sanctions and military supplies can drive that point home. Without that, the US president does not keep his long-stated promise to bring a stable peace to Europe.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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Some US trading partners may be tempted to celebrate and retreat from or slow the pace of negotiations with the United States, perhaps to wait and see how appellate courts rule. But these US partners should not breathe easy, as Trump can impose substantial tariffs under other authorities that are less susceptible to legal attack—with Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 likely foremost among these authorities. And, importantly, if tariffs are imposed under this authority, then they will be more difficult to reduce or remove in response to positive negotiations. Therefore, trading partners should see the recent court decisions as an opportunity to reach a more stable agreement with perhaps a more eager counterpart, rather than a justification to escape engagement with the Trump administration.

When Trump announced IEEPA tariffs in early April on imports from nearly every country around the world, virtually all of them lined up to seek an agreement with the United States that would reduce or eliminate these “reciprocal” tariffs. They joined Mexico and Canada, who had already been engaging on separate IEEPA tariffs that were announced in early February in response to drug trafficking. Since then, the United States and United Kingdom have announced a high-level framework, and substantial progress reportedly has been made with India, Vietnam, and others. More difficult conversations with the European Union are ongoing. And after a series of escalations, China too reached a temporary truce, reducing the reciprocal tariffs on China-origin goods to 10 percent for the time being. Goods from Mexico and Canada also received a reprieve of sorts, with the Trump administration quickly exempting goods entitled to preferential treatment under the rules of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

The president’s use of IEEPA to impose tariffs, which two courts ruled unlawful, was novel. While IEEPA is frequently invoked to institute sanctions, it had never previously been used to impose tariffs. But other congressional delegations of authority exist—namely, Section 301 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962—and legal challenges to their use to impose tariffs have largely been unsuccessful. 

During his first term, for example, Trump imposed broad-based tariffs on China-origin goods under Section 301, following an investigation into China’s unfair intellectual property-related trade practices, including forced technology transfer. US President Joe Biden expanded those tariffs, and they remain in place today. Trump also imposed tariffs under Section 232 on steel and aluminum from around the world during his first term. Those tariffs remained throughout the Biden administration with some country-specific modifications or product-specific exclusions, and Trump strengthened and expanded those tariffs in the early days of his second term.

The Trump administration likely will use Section 232 as the basis for some sector-specific tariffs. Already, the Department of Commerce is conducting Section 232 investigations on a hefty list of imports, from timber and lumber to copper and trucks; from semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients; and from processed critical minerals and derivative products to commercial aircraft and jet engines. But I will focus on Section 301 because that is the more likely authority if Trump is looking to replicate the IEEPA tariffs, or more precisely, the leverage those tariffs afforded his negotiators.

How does Section 301 work?

Section 301, implemented by the US Trade Representative (USTR), investigates whether acts, policies, or practices of a particular country are unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and burden or restrict US commerce. By statute, the investigation must conclude within one year, but there is no minimum amount of time it must take. In the past, USTR has published a detailed report outlining its findings and evidence. This helps legitimize the findings and aids in discussions with allies and partners around the world by socializing and substantiating the concerns. But it is not required, and it could be slimmed down or scrapped in pursuit of speed. 

There are, however, limits to how quickly a Section 301 investigation can proceed. USTR must take public notice and comment on the substance of the investigation and hold a hearing if requested. If there is an affirmative finding, USTR must also subject any proposed remedial actions (e.g., tariffs) to public notice and comment. And, under a 2022 CIT ruling that such determinations are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, USTR must take the time to provide in writing its reasoning for rejecting substantial lines of argument raised by commenters. Once implemented, Section 301 tariffs can be modified if “appropriate,” a largely untested but no doubt expansive standard that suggests courts will show a great deal of deference to the USTR. But any proposed modifications too must be subjected to a notice and comment process. Trump almost certainly opted for IEEPA in the first place because it obviates the need for such a time-consuming process.

Moreover, unlike the global framing of Trump’s IEEPA tariffs and Section 232 findings, Section 301 focuses on the acts, policies, or practices of one particular country. There are two ways to broaden its scope to approximate the more far-reaching impact of the invalidated IEEPA tariffs. First, USTR could simply initiate a series of parallel Section 301 investigations into a common concern among several countries, as it did in 2020 with respect to digital services taxes of eleven different jurisdictions. Second, although it has never been used, Section 301 includes a provision that allows for remedies to apply on a “nondiscriminatory basis”—that is, globally—even though the investigation focused on the acts, policies, or practices of one particular country.

So, while Section 301 may entail more process and certain constraints, it provides a relatively straightforward pathway to broad-based tariffs. Notably, the statutory objective of remedies under Section 301 is the elimination of the investigated acts, policies, or practices. The statue explicitly states that the USTR is authorized to take action “against any goods or economic sector . . . without regard to whether or not such goods or economic sector were involved in the act, policy, or practice that is the subject of such action.” Thus, regardless of which unfair practices the USTR chooses to investigate, an affirmative finding would unlock broad powers to tariff any goods. And it closely resembles the “leverage” justification for tariffs that the CIT rejected as insufficient in the IEEPA context.

What Section 301 tariffs would mean for bilateral negotiations?

Trump has demonstrated a clear determination to alter terms of trade, and he has been equally committed to using tariffs not just as policy, but to shape and respond to negotiating dynamics. Should certain bilateral negotiations prove unsatisfactory, it is very likely that the Trump administration would pursue tariffs under a different authority like Section 301. US trading partners would be wise to try to avoid that result.

The speed that IEEPA enabled for imposing or increasing tariffs is a two-way street, meaning that the Trump administration could quickly employ removals, decreases, or exceptions in response to positive momentum in negotiations. Some may welcome the added process around Section 301 because it could slow the pace of change. But that same process would make Section 301 tariffs stickier once imposed. It could also create difficulty in comprehensively pulling down tariffs against a particular country should that partner make concessions the administration finds valuable but are not germane to the investigated acts, policies, or practices. The Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs from Trump’s first term have proven very durable.

What about other authorities to impose tariffs?

While Trump may proceed with sector-specific tariffs under Section 232, they are not a good fit for replicating the IEEPA tariffs because they focus on threats to national security from particular products. That makes it hard to tariff a broad range of products and limits flexibility to alter the scope or rate of tariffed products as negotiations and economic dynamics shift.

The CIT opinion pointed to Section 122 as an option to rectify goods trade deficits, but Section 122 tariffs are capped at 15 percent and can remain in effect for only 150 days. Those limitations severely undermine the leverage Trump covets.  

Finally, the administration could attempt to invoke Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (often referred to as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act), which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign country’s discrimination against US goods or the commerce of the United States. Section 338 not only predates the World Trade Organization, it predates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which first established the principle of most favored nation treatment in 1947. 

Section 338 imposes no temporal limitation on tariffs, but it does provide for a maximum tariff rate of 50 percent. While it appears to require no real time-consuming investigation, it has never been used, and there are virtually no mentions of it anywhere in the public record after the establishment of the GATT. Thus, there is uncertainty from novelty, which is what did in IEEPA, at least for the time being. Moreover, the administration would need to make sense of how mechanically to apply this previously unused, nearly century-old authority. Given these uncertainties, the Trump administration may favor using this authority as a tacit threat in negotiations, but not actually invoking it and inviting judicial scrutiny.

The bottom line remains that Trump still has many tariff tools at his disposal and, if implemented, they may prove harder to pull back. Therefore, US trading partners would be better served to treat the recent court rulings as an opportunity to drive ongoing discussions to their conclusion. The uncertainty created by the court decisions, the time required to reasonably replicate a large swath of tariffs through other authorities such as Section 301, and the procedural constraints those other authorities impose on the president’s flexibility, should make the administration more eager to reach deals it approves of and that allow it to avoid those difficulties. Where trading partners remain engaged and determined, the urgency on both sides presents the best opportunity for a mutually agreeable deal, which will provide greater near-term predictability that all can celebrate.

Brian Janovitz is a partner at DLA Piper. He previously served as director for international economics at the National Security Council and National Economic Council and chief counsel for trade enforcement strategy and competitiveness at the Office of the US Trade Representative, where he led the Biden administration’s comprehensive review of Section 301 tariffs.

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

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However, the uninterrupted flow of trade in the food and agriculture that feeds humanity is not guaranteed. The hemisphere’s leaders must think strategically and identify opportunities to strengthen the region’s agri-food architecture. 

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Food Security: Strategic Alignment in the Americas project, conducted in partnership with The Mosaic Company, assesses the Western Hemisphere’s food security in a changing strategic landscape. The project draws upon perspectives from across the Americas to understand the challenges and opportunities facing regional and global agri-food systems.

On April 10, the Scowcroft Center’s GeoStrategy Initiative hosted the project’s first private roundtable, bringing together dozens of leading experts from across the Americas from an array of research institutions, universities, the agri-food industry, government, and multilateral institutions. The discussion focused on food security in Latin America, highlighting the importance of trade, geopolitics, climate change, innovation, and investment trends.

A season of change

The Americas are navigating novel geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions, with uncertainties introduced by proposed new tariffs that the United States has placed (and might yet place) on its hemispheric neighbors. A significant concern involves the impact that such tariffs could have on established agri-food trade relationships across the hemisphere. Should the United States, Canada, or Mexico implement high tariffs on agri-food products, one potential consequence could be large reductions in the levels of agri-food trade around the globe and in the Americas. At the same time, some South and Central American countries might benefit from enhanced exports to one or more of those three countries. 

There are just as many, if not more, opportunities throughout the region to enhance food security. Intraregional trade in agri-food products—including processed goods such as cereals, food residues, meats, fats and oils, food preparations, oilseeds, beverages, and dairy products—provides a significant opportunity for enhanced cooperation in the Americas. Studies by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank have projected that Latin America’s intraregional agricultural market has room to expand; they identified some sixty-seven agri-food products with potential for growth in the future, forecasting market growth of some $3 billion (from $21.6 billion to $24.7 billion). Latin America’s subregions have substantial capacity to expand agri-food exchange with one another, thereby improving competitiveness in global markets. For example, while 60 percent of South America’s food imports come from intraregional trade in Latin American and Caribbean markets, in Mexico and Central America, that figure is only 20 percent.

Policymakers in Latin America should facilitate intraregional trade through regional trade agreements that, among other things, dismantle the complex set of rules currently hindering integration. Greater investment in ports, rail, and roads can create more physical connectivity. And digital connectivity, which can ease exchanges of all types, such as trade logistics, should be enhanced as well. As food security will depend on the increase of crop productivity in the coming years, there are opportunities to deepen intraregional partnerships on agri-food sciences, which will support sustainable production growth in these countries.

A changing climate

Roundtable participants also stressed how the changing climate will impact agriculture in Latin America. The planet’s ongoing warming (above 1.5 degrees Celsius compared with pre-industrial levels) poses serious challenges to Latin American agriculture. Strategies to overcome climate impacts should include a focus on both adaptation and mitigation to ensure that the region’s agriculture remains viable. Policymakers should focus attention on how to make smallholder farmers more resilient given the disproportionately harsh climate impacts they face. One strategy is to provide low-interest loans and access to training and other services to smallholder farmers. Such actions can increase access to land, fertilizers, seeds, and tools while boosting incentives to implement innovative agriculture technology, ultimately increasing yields and market access.

Roundtable participants also observed that on- and off-farm innovation plays an important role in shaping Latin America’s agri-food sector, stressing the criticality of emerging technologies in a more sustainable and resilient food system. The central challenge, they asserted, involves crafting the strategies needed to finance and successfully scale new systems given their expense. Improvements in data collection and analysis enhance understanding of how climate change is contributing to pest outbreaks and crop diseases. Alternative chemical processes for creating fertilizers and seed certification programs might improve soil and plant resiliency. The adoption of low-carbon agriculture models, backed with government support within streamlined and science-based regulatory processes, could further align agricultural policy with climate adaptation and mitigation objectives.

These reforms are needed in part because Latin America continues to face problems related to food insecurity. While the region has seen declining hunger and food insecurity in recent years, in part due to investments in social protection systems, 41 million people across the region were still affected by hunger last year. Even in major food-producing countries such as Brazil and Argentina, which dominate South American production and exports of soybeans, wheat, corn, and rice, lower-income populations continue to struggle to gain access to sufficient amounts of healthy food. 

To overcome food insecurity while ensuring that Latin America’s agri-food systems are resilient and interconnected, the region’s farmers, farming associations, agri-food firms and processors, supply distributors, and policymakers must cooperate with new, innovative strategies. Agri-food frameworks that are predictable, transparent, and based on rules and science will help cement the region as economically diversified, climate adaptive, and innovative. The Americas must take advantage of its strengths in the agri-food space for preeminence on the global stage.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a senior fellow with its Global Energy Center.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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European policymakers have reacted to Trump’s moves with shock and doubt about the US commitment to NATO, and some have stepped up their defense pledges accordingly. “We still believe that the ‘N’ in NATO stands for North Atlantic and that our European allies should maximize their comparative advantage on the continent,” US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said last week at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. “And thanks to President Trump, they are stepping up. An alliance cannot be ironclad if in reality or perception it is seen as one-sided.”

For its part, the European Union (EU) has approved a €150 billion defense funding loan program and allowed its members to exceed normal debt limits for military expenditures. Even before the EU’s moves, allies such as Poland and the Baltic States—who Hegseth called “model allies” in Singapore—were ramping up spending and sounding the alarm over the threat they face from Russia. But too many European allies have not yet increased their defense spending sufficiently.

What explains this contrast? Leading NATO allies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diverge from one another because they face different threats and levels of threat perception. These differences explain each ally’s major defense decisions (defense spending, military structure, and military posture) as well as the ally’s role in and relationship to NATO. I explore this issue more deeply in my forthcoming book on NATO, drawing from ninety-eight interviews with current and former policymakers.

NATO allies’ different threat perceptions can explain much of the current crisis within the Alliance, and they provide the backdrop for what could be a contentious summit.

The United States: China trumps Europe

The Trump administration sees China as the most significant state security threat to US interests. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment says that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening US interests globally.” The administration’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly focuses on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as one of two priorities for the Pentagon, along with combating drug cartels.

The Trump administration has cited the threat from China to explain its European security policy. Hegseth said in February that the United States could not remain the primary guarantor of European security, telling allied military leaders in Brussels: “The US is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.” The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly concludes that because of the focus on China, European allies must do more for their own defense.

This view of China can also explain the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark. Melting sea ice means that Greenland’s location will be critical for those seeking to control Artic sea lanes and it is home to large quantities of rare-earth minerals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stressed that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland but only to protect it from encroachment by China.

This can also explain Trump’s significant, though inconsistent, turn toward Russia. Some have argued that the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” aligning with Russia to weaken its ties to China. The Trump administration may even be turning toward Russia to pressure NATO allies into taking more responsibility for their own defense, as Victoria Coates, a former deputy national security advisor in Trump’s first term, has argued. Even though Trump has criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is reasonable for European leaders to fear that a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow remains a distinct possibility.

Europe: Divided by diverse levels of threat

Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States. Europe lacks integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, transport aircraft, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. European allies are struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for NATO’s new force model—doing so in the next decade without the United States would most likely be a bridge too far.

But even faced with these challenges, not every European NATO ally has shown the same level of urgency when it comes to increasing defense spending. The reason is that leading European allies face different threats and levels of threat, limiting the incentives of some allies to act. 

Meanwhile, from strategy documents and official statements, it is clear that Poland, Germany, France, and Britain all view Russia as their greatest security threat. However, they each have different levels of threat perception, which informs the differing approaches they have taken toward military spending.

Preserving a mutually beneficial relationship

The United States’ greater focus on China and push for Europeans to take more responsibility for their defense are likely irreversible trends. But the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month provides an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to reaffirm their commitments to the Alliance amid these shifting dynamics.

First, the Trump administration should use the summit to work with its European allies on a phased and structured exchange of responsibility for European security over the next decade. Under such a plan, the United States would work with European allies to develop defense capabilities they do not currently have while maintaining the commitment of the US nuclear deterrent.

Second, Trump should take the opportunity to reassure European allies. He should affirm that the United States would come to the aid of any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump should also state plainly that his administration will work with Denmark to bolster the defense of Greenland and that it does not intend to acquire the island by force.

Third, European countries should use the summit to announce further commitments on defense spending. Following through on such commitments will entail costly domestic tradeoffs. The present moment requires courage: European leaders must make the case that significantly more defense spending is necessary because of the threat Russia poses and the United States’ turn toward the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s government in particular will have a challenging task. Because Italians are focused on threats from the Mediterranean, officials in Rome will have to make the case that Russia’s threat to European security matters for Italy. European governments like Italy’s can also make a compelling case that spending more on defense may boost overall economic growth.

If NATO allies take these steps at this year’s summit, they can help build a future Europe more capable of defending itself and an Alliance that better serves both US and European interests.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

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On September 30, the framework for sharing important cybersecurity information between government and industry, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015), will expire unless Congress acts. This law—distinct from the similarly named Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (also CISA)—provides essential legal protections that allow private companies to share cyber threat information among themselves and with the government.

There is already bipartisan support for renewing CISA 2015. Senators Gary Peters (D-MI) and Mike Rounds (R-SD) introduced legislation to extend the current law for another ten years without changes, an approach supported by major trade associations. The bill’s authors correctly emphasize the importance of preserving the established information-sharing environment. Yet, renewing CISA 2015 unchanged leaves the cybersecurity community blind to critical threat intelligence that SMBs uniquely hold.

As originally passed, CISA 2015 removed legal barriers and disincentives to sharing cyber threat data. It provides liability protections and exemptions from certain public disclosure requirements or regulatory penalties for companies that share threat indicators in good faith. These protections significantly reduce the risk of lawsuits or regulatory enforcement when organizations exchange information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or other companies under the framework, provided the information was anonymized and used strictly for a “cybersecurity purpose.”

These protections dramatically enhanced cybersecurity information sharing. In the private sector, entities such as the Cyber Threat Alliance formed to facilitate voluntary company-to-company information sharing. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), organizations dedicated to collecting, analyzing, and disseminating sector-specific threat data, have also grown substantially. The National Council of ISACs now comprises twenty-seven sector-specific ISACs, while the Multi-State ISAC alone exceeded 18,000 members last year. These members share cyber threat information directly because of the protections offered by CISA 2015. Even government programs have evolved in response. DHS’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) platform has significantly improved rapid information exchanges and threat awareness, aided by CISA 2015 protections.

SMBs are being left behind

Still missing from this list, however, are the large number of SMBs that operate across the United States. SMBs have largely been overlooked, are subject to a large number of attacks, and their employees face social engineering threats such as phishing and fraud 350 percent more than those at large companies. While platforms such as DHS’s AIS are beneficial to larger corporations, SMB participation remains limited due to high costs, technical complexity, and inadequate outreach. This exclusion leaves SMBs vulnerable and deprives the cybersecurity community of a significant source of threat intelligence.

Since 2015, the cyber threat landscape has evolved, with SMBs now frequent targets. Roughly one in three small businesses will suffer a cyberattack in the next year, with each incident costing an average of nearly $255,000, almost an order of magnitude greater than the 2014 average cost of $27,752. This changed threat landscape and lack of participation in information sharing leaves a gap. 

Any new CISA 2015 authorization should address this gap to benefit the entire cybersecurity ecosystem. SMBs represent a valuable source of threat data, and integrating their insights would significantly enhance predictive capabilities and resilience. Strengthening SMB defenses would also reduce opportunities for attackers to exploit smaller entities as gateways to larger networks. 

How Congress can update CISA 2015

To achieve this integration, Congress should ensure any reauthorization addresses four targeted reforms. 

First, clarify definitions. The term “cybersecurity purpose” should explicitly include protections against social engineering threats such as fraud and phishing, ensuring SMBs receive comprehensive coverage for the threats they face.

Second, incentivize more participation among SMBs. Congress should authorize a DHS-managed initiative specifically designed to provide smaller businesses with accessible, actionable threat intelligence and affordable cybersecurity resources. Federal support could take the form of grants, vouchers, or subsidized cybersecurity solutions. 

Third, codify successful operational models into law. This was attempted last year with a bill introduced by Representative Eric Swalwell (D-CA-14) that would codify CISA 2015’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). The JCDC has successfully united federal agencies and private companies to effectively respond to high-profile cyber incidents, including the exploitation of Ivanti gateway vulnerabilities and the July 2024 CrowdStrike outage. Currently, JCDC and many similar programs lack explicit statutory authority, making them vulnerable to termination by executive action, which is what happened to the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council in March of this year. Codifying such programs ensures sustained and consistent cybersecurity collaboration irrespective of political shifts.

Fourth, rename the law to clearly distinguish it from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Cybersecurity acronyms are hard enough as it is. A new name, such as the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), a name from an earlier version of CISA 2015, would eliminate the confusion caused by acronym duplication. 

Reauthorizing CISA 2015 with these targeted improvements—clearer definitions, SMB support, codification of proven programs, and a distinct identity—will ensure that SMBs play their part in and benefit from making the next decade of cybersecurity more resilient than the last.

Tanner Wilburn is a recent graduate of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law with an MS in cybersecurity risk management from the Luddy School of Informatics, Computing, and Engineering. 

Sara Ann Brackett is an assistant director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. 

Urmita Chowdhury is an assistant director for trainings and competitions at the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. 

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The ATO process, designed to safeguard national security systems, is rooted in sound principles. But in practice, it has become a procedural obstacle course—one that sidelines innovative software with lengthy, bureaucratic delays. Having gone through my fair share of ATOs across the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps, I can attest that this process needs serious reforms. From mission planning tools to logistics dashboards, critical capabilities are too often stuck in limbo because of inconsistent, manual, and subjective risk determinations. For instance, this process has stalled the use of critical Identity Access Management software such as Okta. These software enable zero trust enforcement, rapid user authentication, and centralized access control across multi-domain, cloud, and on-premise environments without significant delays and bandwidth constraints into key warfighting systems.

To ensure US warfighters receive the tools they need in a timely fashion, the DoD should invest in updated technical training for cybersecurity professionals and implement automated, continuous security checks on software. But for these reforms to succeed, the DoD will need to institute a broader cultural shift among the cybersecurity and acquisitions workforces toward recognizing compliance as the crucial aspect of US national security policy that it is.

A subjective standard of risk

RMF is the US government’s structured approach to ensuring information systems are secure and resilient before they are allowed to operate within government networks. It was designed to replace checklist-style compliance with a risk-based decision-making process. Under RMF, systems go through several stages—categorization, control selection, implementation, assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring. At the heart of the process is the ATO—a formal decision by an authorizing official that a system’s security posture is acceptable for use. To reach this decision, program teams must document security controls, undergo assessments by independent cybersecurity experts, and respond to findings. The intent is to ensure systems are secure before they are fielded—but in practice, the process often results in extended delays, overly cautious reviews, and inconsistent standards across organizations.

One of the most challenging aspects of the ATO process is the subjectivity of risk determination. What is deemed an acceptable risk by one authorizing official may be an unacceptable liability to another. With no shared standard of risk tolerance, system owners must often start from scratch depending on who sits in the approval seat. This variability leads to costly rework, long delays, and disillusioned program teams. Worse, it creates a culture where innovation is stifled not by bad technology, but by indecision and fear.

This is not just a bureaucratic issue; it’s a mission-impact issue. Delays of twelve to eighteen months for an ATO mean that a new targeting application, mission planning software, or AI-enabled intelligence tool never reaches the unit that needs it. When marines or soldiers are using outdated or spreadsheet-based tools while Silicon Valley technologies sit behind compliance gates, something is broken. Compliance activities do have their place. They provide a framework and a set of standards that system owners should utilize. But compliance activities make up only one facet of a resilient security posture.

When it comes to the documentation for this process, the only thing consistent about it is its inconsistency. Each security control assessor, information systems security manager, and authorizing official has their own preferences for how security controls, and security requirement guides should be documented. Even when software as a service systems have received accreditation in one military service, the ATO often does not carry over to other services, requiring the process to start over again at each service.

Across most systems in the DoD, ATOs are manual one-time reviews that only look at a snapshot in time rather than monitoring software continuously. What’s more, this inadequate review takes a significant amount of time, labor, and resources. It requires a team of cybersecurity professionals to manually review and analyze all ATO documentation to meet compliance thresholds. Because there are few security assessor teams across the DoD, there is often a delay in getting the third-party assessor on schedule to conduct the manual review.

These one-time ATO reviews, which often approve a software for one to three years, are not useful for tracking a system’s long-term security posture. In fact, leaving a system approved for this long without further review increases its security risk. Continuous monitoring is a key step in the RMF, but it is often haphazardly implemented, with security scans sometimes occurring only monthly or even quarterly. Moreover, authorizing officials ultimately accept the risk with critical or high vulnerabilities to keep systems available for users. Instead, ATO and security posture should be continually assessed through an agreed-upon standard for security guardrails and thresholds. This continual assessment should in no way be manual. Rather, it should be baked into the day-to-day software development lifecycle through automated regression, quality, and security testing with each delivery of code.

The talent gap in modern cybersecurity

Compounding the problems with the ATO process is a talent management challenge. Many cybersecurity professionals tasked with evaluating and authorizing systems are not trained in modern software development or cloud-native architectures. Developments such as the shifts to hybrid cloud, containerized applications, and infrastructure as code have dramatically outpaced cybersecurity workforce training.

Security professionals steeped in legacy systems may treat every cloud deployment as a threat, rather than an opportunity for enhanced resilience, scalability, and automation. As a result, the process designed to manage risk often ends up misunderstanding it—focusing on outdated indicators instead of real attack vectors. In one of the ATO renewals I supported, our cybersecurity assessor subject matter experts didn’t know about cloud-hosted Kubernetes technologies, which are widely implemented across DoD software organizations. They also did not understand how to implement the Kubernetes security technical implementation guide, even though they were supposed to be assessing our security compliance. As a result, the first few days of the assessment were spent teaching assessors about containers, Kubernetes, microservices, and ephemeral IP ranges before the ATO process could move forward.

The DoD can’t automate trust, but it can automate verification. And that’s where the changes to the process must begin.

Recommendations for reform

To speed up the delivery of secure software, the DoD must rethink how it defines and manages risk. The following actions would make the ATO process more efficient, ensuring that warfighters can use the software they need to meet mission success.

• Invest in talent management and training. The DoD must invest in a new cadre of cyber professionals who understand development security and operations, continuous integration/continuous deployment pipelines, and cloud-native patterns. This starts with developing targeted training, incentives for continuous learning, and career pathways that reward technical skills over legacy tenure. It also requires an incentive structure that holds authorizing officials accountable for delayed ATO timelines, especially for software-as-a-service products that have already received ATOs in other organizations.
• Automate guardrails and thresholds. To embrace a continuous ATO framework, programs should implement automated security checks that enforce zero trust principles, identity policies, and vulnerability scanning. They should also require logging standards directly in the pipeline. When software is built with these guardrails from the start, this reduces the need for manual reviews, bolstering confidence in the system. That way, when code is pushed and meets the predefined security guardrails, it can go straight into production environments.
• Reduce redundant documentation. Much of the RMF burden is paperwork for paperwork’s sake. By adopting living documentation generated from automated pipelines—like real-time architecture diagrams, test coverage, and security telemetry—the Pentagon can save thousands of hours that are currently being wasted on static Word documents no one ever reads.

The SWFT strategy: A moment for culture change

The DoD’s new Software Fast Track (SWFT) methodology, announced on May 5, offers a hopeful roadmap. SWFT aims to make software development more agile by implementing regular software releases, modern and modular architectures, and outcomes-based measures that meet warfighter needs. But to be truly transformative, it must be paired with a culture shift across the acquisition and cybersecurity communities.

Acquisition and cybersecurity personnel must move away from compliance as a box-checking exercise and toward compliance as a byproduct of good engineering. The future lies in continuous ATOs, risk quantification tools, and AI-assisted cybersecurity—if the Pentagon is willing to invest in people and process changes.

If the DoD wants to outpace its adversaries and empower its warfighters with the tools they need, it must treat secure software delivery as a warfighting imperative—not a compliance chore. The ATO process, as it stands today, is a bottleneck the United States can no longer afford.

The call to action is clear: upgrade the workforce, automate security, and embrace a cultural change toward cybersecurity compliance. SWFT provides an opportunity—now it’s time to put it into practice.

Hannah Hunt is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished technical fellow at MetroStar Systems. She was previously the chief of product at the Army Software Factory under Army Futures Command and chief of staff at the US Air Force’s Kessel Run.

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The SDR was written independently by Lord George Robertson, a former UK defense secretary and NATO secretary general; General Sir Richard Barrons, a former commander of the UK Joint Forces Command; and Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert and former senior director for Europe and Russia at the US National Security Council. It benefits from the authors’ deep expertise and freedom to speak frankly.

In my assessment as a former Royal Air Force senior officer and director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff, I find the review blunt and refreshingly free of political gloss while still being infused with strategic depth. It offers a sobering analysis of the threats Britain faces and a coherent and comprehensive plan to deal with them.

If the UK media coverage of the review is anything to go by, then it has already been successful in promoting a national debate on the severity of the strategic risks the United Kingdom and its allies face. One of the review’s core aims is to foster a “total defence” culture, an understanding that security is not the sole preserve of the armed forces but a collective national responsibility.

No more “hollowing out”

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer echoed this whole-of-society message in a speech he delivered in Glasgow on Monday to launch the SDR. In the speech, he warned that the United Kingdom must prepare for a dangerous decade ahead. The United Kingdom would become, he said, “a battle-ready, armor-clad nation, with the strongest alliances and the most advanced capabilities, equipped for the decades to come.” Indeed, the review is laced throughout with the concept of “NATO first” and the United Kingdom’s aspiration to play a leading role in the Alliance.

On capabilities, the review outlines a serious agenda for restoring UK military strength after years of “hollowing out.” Among the most significant commitments is the acceleration of the United Kingdom’s sovereign nuclear warhead program (at a cost of £15 billion) to ensure that the country maintains an independent and credible deterrent. This is paired with equally serious investment in conventional capabilities, including the commitments to produce seven thousand long-range and cruise missiles and to construct six new munitions factories.

The SDR further calls for the United Kingdom to become a leading technology-enabled defense power, with an integrated force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To achieve that, it proposes a “three Is” model: integrated (rather than joint) forces, which are innovation-led and backed by industry. It emphasizes that greater attention must be given to the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. It also proposes making the army ten times more lethal by 2035 by exploiting autonomous systems and a “digital targeting web,” all informed by lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The government has also pledged £1.5 billion for the modernization and refurbishment of military living accommodations. This, together with a move to take a whole-force, skills-based approach to workforce planning, would constitute long-overdue investments that could begin to address the current crisis surrounding the recruitment and retention of personnel.

None of the review’s recommendations reflect a marginal upgrade. Striking the appropriate balance between mass, speed, and resilience has returned to relevance alongside the need to reinvigorate stockpiles, munitions manufacturing, autonomous systems, and the United Kingdom’s technological edge. As demonstrated by the war in Ukraine, all these factors will increasingly define combat effectiveness. The SDR further recognizes the need to radically transform defense procurement processes and practice. For Britain to remain a serious military power, addressing these issues is both overdue and essential.

Finding the funding

Crucially, all sixty-two of the SDR’s recommendations have been accepted by the UK government—an indication, at least on paper, of genuine resolve.

And yet, despite the soundness of the review and the seriousness of its ambitions, an inevitable question mark remains over how these recommendations will be funded.

The government’s pledge to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027 is a step in the right direction. This review is unique in recent British history for being accompanied by increases rather than cuts in the budget. But this is still only a step. The longer-term ambition to reach 3 percent of GDP is not backed by binding Treasury policy or formal financial commitment. Moreover, it seems to hinge on a “defence dividend” of economic growth from a revitalized defense industrial base. Such an aspiration is not enough. In the face of a deteriorating strategic environment, Alliance members are likely to demand a minimum of 3.5 percent of GDP expenditure on defense at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, which could lead to the United Kingdom falling behind the level of spending expected of a leading NATO power. Effective deterrence depends on credibility—and credibility hinges not on promises but on funded and delivered capabilities.

This financial dimension is especially critical in light of shifting US priorities. While the United States is unlikely to totally withdraw from NATO, there is a looming sense that Washington’s focus is inexorably moving away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations—regardless of party—have made clear that they expect European allies to carry more of the burden for their own defense. This has been brought into stark relief by the current US administration. A more self-reliant and militarily capable Europe is, therefore, no longer a theoretical objective—it is a strategic necessity.

For Britain, this means more than incremental increases in spending. It means making hard political choices and long-term industrial commitments now. The SDR lays out what needs to be done. The government has signaled its agreement. The next step—the most important one—will be putting money behind this critical endeavor.

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in the Royal Air Force, including as the UK military representative to NATO and the EU in Brussels and as director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff.

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In 2023, Brice Oligui Nguema, the former head of Gabon’s Republican Guard, took power in a bloodless coup. This coup was carried out just one day after aging President Ali Bongo was reelected in a contest that many within the country viewed as a fraudulent attempt by Bongo and his allies to perpetuate the nearly sixty-year political dynasty that began when his father took power in 1967.

While it would be easy to wrap this event in the same blanket as the many other West and Central African military coups between 2020 and 2024 that disrupted an unprecedented period of peaceful civilian rule across the region, Gabon’s situation is different in several ways.

The military coups and their aftermaths in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger have followed a similar pattern: They all occurred in poor and unprosperous countries; they were all followed by some sort of in-fighting or conflict within interim governments (and a second coup in the case of Burkina Faso); and the elections promised in all four countries have yet to take place.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Sungmin Cho: For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless

Kayla Orta: Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Shawn Creamer: Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi: Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless 

To understand Lee’s foreign policy orientation, it is more useful to compare his positions with that of former President Moon Jae-in, rather than that of Yoon, his conservative predecessor. 

Lee’s foreign policy will generally align with the Democratic Party’s traditional approach, promoting dialogue with North Korea and maintaining stable ties with China. But he is notably more pragmatic than Moon. While Moon emphasized peace and inter-Korean reconciliation, Lee advocates conditional dialogue with Pyongyang, taking a step-by-step approach toward denuclearization. His foreign policy advisers, Wi Sung-lac and Kim Hyun-chong, are known more as internationalists than nationalists, reinforcing Lee’s pragmatic stance. 

Lee prioritizes economic issues, and he has repeatedly stated that economic recovery is his top priority. During the campaign, for example, he pledged to establish an “Emergency Economic Taskforce” if elected. Given this focus, Lee is unlikely to pursue major foreign policy initiatives at first, avoiding Moon’s active diplomacy among Washington, Pyongyang, and Beijing. 

South Korea’s foreign policy shifts may instead stem from external developments, especially if US President Donald Trump reengages with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Lee would likely support a third Trump-Kim summit and would not oppose US troop reductions if Washington insists. While such moves could reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, there is concern that North Korea might exploit weakened deterrence to launch limited attacks against South Korea whenever it sees fit, as occurred during the 2010 crises. 

Taiwan issues will test Lee’s pragmatism. Under US pressure for support, he will likely exercise strategic ambiguity to the maximum—quietly discussing contingency plans with Washington while avoiding public commitments. He will neither support nor oppose United States Forces Korea’s strategic flexibility. At the same time, Lee is likely to emphasize South Korea’s acknowledgment of the “One China” policy to maintain balance in its relations with Beijing. 

In sum, Lee’s foreign policy is marked by pragmatism and economic urgency, distinguishing him from Moon’s more ideological and nationalistic approach. 

—Sungmin Cho, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University.

Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Lee ran on the platform of a “pragmatic” foreign policy, but whether his administration will be able to rise above the nation’s entrenched partisan divides to strengthen South Korea’s geostrategic position within the Indo-Pacific region remains to be seen.

Six months to the day since Yoon declared martial law, South Korean citizens took to the voting booths to elect a new leader. Lee’s win over the People Power Party nominee Kim Moon-soo heralds another pendulum swing in South Korea’s political leadership. As the liberal party returns to the presidency, the battle to address South Korea’s domestic political turmoil is only just beginning, and the nation’s fierce partisan divide is likely to continue. 

The political aftermath of Yoon’s call for martial law shocked the nation, weakening confidence in South Korea’s decades-long democratic institutions. The next South Korean president will have a challenging five-year term ahead to reestablish public confidence in the government at home while simultaneously addressing South Korea’s foreign policy concerns abroad.

North Korea’s ongoing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs—and its expanded security partnerships with Russia and China—present an immediate and existential threat to South Korea. Seoul faces a more hostile security environment today than it did under Moon, Lee’s liberal predecessor who leaned into diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Many in South Korea are increasingly concerned about North Korea’s “irreversible” nuclear arms buildup and more than 70 percent of polled citizens consistently call for South Korea’s own nuclear armament in the near future. 

Amid growing regional insecurity, Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo will matter. Despite previous statements, Lee campaigned on continuing to strengthen South Korea–Japan relations, building upon his predecessor’s US–South Korea–Japan trilateral security cooperation to address the growing instability in the Indo-Pacific region. However, balancing proactive foreign policy and intensifying domestic demands, as previously seen, is not an easy task.

Overall, Lee’s “pragmatic” diplomacy may signal strategic policy investment in bridging the conservative-liberal political divide. Lee may yet step up foreign policy initiatives in South Korea’s interest, building upon his predecessor’s foreign policy agendas.

—Kayla T. Orta is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration 

Lee’s election as president of South Korea is an opportunity to restore domestic political stability and resurrect Seoul’s reputation on the international stage following the martial law declaration, impeachment, and court drama surrounding the removal of Yoon from office. Domestic stability is made possible more from the political unity of the executive and legislative branches of government under the progressive Democratic Party than from a popular mandate. Political unity will likely allow the South Korean government to break out of partisan gridlock and make gains on efficient and effective governance. 

While Lee will have party unity, there is a sizable conservative opposition that maintains low degrees of trust in the more leftist elements of the Democratic Party, including the new president. Time will tell whether Lee governs more like the centrist candidate or the leftist opposition politician of his past. 

If the past is representative of the future, Lee will progressively evolve toward the center on foreign policy over his five-year term, as his Democratic Party predecessor Moon did. Moon learned, despite a troubled relationship with Trump, that South Korean sovereignty was best served by close alignment with the United States rather than an arrangement that subordinates it to the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, Moon learned that a deal with the Kim regime in North Korea would not be worth the paper it was printed on. Regrettably for peace and security in Northeast Asia, the Korea-Japan relationship will likely remain cool under Lee for the duration of his term based on the entrenched views of the Democratic Party.  

There is both risk and opportunity for Lee in South Korea’s alliance with the United States. Lee holds some strong cards if he plays them well. 

South Korea already funds its defense at 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and it has one of the most capable armed forces of all US allies. Lee should set in motion an increase in defense spending to above 3 percent of GDP in 2026 and chart a path for this to increase to at least 3.5 percent by 2030, demonstrating that South Korea is the US security partner of choice. Continued maturation of the Korean armed forces will also position South Korea to defend its interests in a very difficult neighborhood, while meeting alliance transformation benchmarks and increased Korean roles in combined defense. 

Second, Korean manufacturing is extremely strong, particularly in shipbuilding. Lee should leverage Korean dominance in shipbuilding to help Trump rebuild the US Navy, giving Trump a political win and assisting the United States in maintaining its global extended deterrence commitments. South Korean advanced manufacturing capacity offers additional opportunity for the United States and European rearmament efforts. Lee can leverage this assistance to advance Korea’s global economic interests on more favorable terms.   

There are also risks to the relationship with Washington, especially if Lee and Trump have a personality conflict. Lee will also find trouble with the US relationship if he seeks to deepen Korea’s relations with China or is overly antagonistic to Japan, the other major US ally in East Asia.      

—Shawn Creamer is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

Lee’s victory in Tuesday’s presidential election was expected, given his ability to court the centrist majority and the conservative camp’s feuds to field a united force. But while Lee’s election is a victory for the Democratic Party, his populist but realist orientation is likely to make him a different type of revisionist than his more ideological predecessor Moon. Still, given the controversies surrounding Lee, as well as uncertainties over his and the Democratic Party’s policies, the new administration will struggle to unite the deep divisions in South Korea.  

On the foreign policy and security front, it is possible that the new administration will take a balanced and pragmatic approach rather than a revisionist one. During the campaign, Lee talked about peace on the Korean Peninsula and restoring the 2018 military agreement with Pyongyang—trademark positions of the progressives. At the same time, he recognized the importance of the alliance with the United States and trilateral coordination with Japan—priorities for the conservatives. Even though much of this balanced approach was certainly part of Lee’s election strategy, it also reflects the strong recognition within South Korea about the importance of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security coordination; threats posed by North Korea, China, and Russia; and the limited prospects of improving inter-Korean relations.  

While there are many uncertainties about the Lee administration, Tokyo and Washington should continue working with Seoul to ensure strong, resilient, and sustainable trilateral security cooperation, which is imperative for stability in the Indo-Pacific region.  

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, an associate professor at Tokyo International University, and a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum.

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That’s why the world’s financial leaders are closely watching the debate playing out in Congress right now over the future of stablecoin legislation. Next week, the Senate will likely take up the GENIUS Act, which will define the responsibilities for US stablecoin issuers and clarify who is responsible for oversight. 

Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies whose values are pegged to a specific underlying asset. This makes them “stable”—at least in theory.

Currently, 98 percent of stablecoins are pegged to the US dollar, but over 80 percent of stablecoin transactions happen outside the United States. 

Countries around the world are taking notice. In April, Italy’s finance minister, Giancarlo Giorgetti, said that new US policies on dollar-backed stablecoins present an “even more dangerous” threat to European financial stability than tariffs. His argument was that access to dollars without needing a US bank account would be attractive to millions of people and could undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy not just in Europe but around the world.

In many ways, it’s an old problem with new technology. Dollarization—the situation where citizens in another country try to swap their local currency for dollars—has been a risk in emerging markets and developing economies for decades. In the early 2000s, for example, a range of countries from Ecuador to Zimbabwe to Argentina had difficulty managing the demand for dollars instead of local currency. In each situation, years of economic pain followed in these countries. 

Now stablecoins are making it cheaper and easier for people around the globe to get ahold of what is still the single most in-demand asset in the world.

Instead of the old way of having to go to a bank and exchange local currency for US dollars, which is time consuming and often involves significant fees, stablecoins make dollars seamlessly available to anyone with a cell phone.

US officials argue that this benefits the United States. When I interviewed Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller, who oversees payments at the central bank, about this issue in February, he said that stablecoins “could be in any fiat currency,” such as pounds or euros, “but everyone wants dollar-denominated stablecoins.” He added that “if we can get good regulation, allow these things to go out, this will only strength the dollar as a reserve currency.”

Waller’s point was that if stablecoin issuers need to back up their coins with Treasuries or other liquid assets, the increase in stablecoin usage around the world will generate even higher demand for dollars. The whole point of a stablecoin is that you can fully convert it into a dollar if you want to—meaning the issuers need to have those dollars on hand.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has put it even more bluntly. “We are going to keep the US the dominant reserve currency in the world, and we will use stablecoins to do that,” he said in March.

If so, the United States should tread cautiously. 

The global proliferation of stablecoins means that some companies will take advantage of the demand and issue stablecoins that claim they are digital versions of the dollar but in reality aren’t fully backed by dollars.   

If that company failed, it wouldn’t just cost consumers their savings. It could trigger a run on all kinds of financial assets.

Think back to the collapse of the algorithmic stablecoin TerraLuna in 2022. Over $45 billion in value for TerraLuna holders was wiped out within a week. But since that time, stablecoin volumes have increased across the world by over 60 percent. 

The current patchwork of regulations around the globe creates more confusion, more friction in payments, and ultimately higher costs for consumers. 

Already, that’s what’s happening. As new research from the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center shows, some countries want to create their own central bank digital currencies to compete with stablecoins, while other countries are trying to regulate the wallets that hold stablecoins. 

Instead of waiting for new regulatory fences to be built up in the coming years, the United States should show that it recognizes the concerns other countries have about dollar-backed stablecoins. The legislation in front of Congress helps domestically by creating transparency and reporting requirements, but it does little internationally.

This is where the Group of Twenty (G20) comes in. The United States has a golden opportunity to help set international standards around digital assets, including the risks and regulations associated with stablecoins, during its G20 presidency next year. A key first step would be creating a new G20 payments roadmap. 

A first roadmap was agreed to in 2020 and delivered important innovations on faster payments. But technology has rapidly changed in the past five years, and it’s time for an upgrade. 

If the United States made stablecoins a focus this year, it would raise the bar across the world and ensure that dollar-backed stablecoin users in all countries are getting what they bargain for—an actual dollar—instead of an imitation of one. 

The rest of the world will welcome US leadership in this space and will take it as a sign that, at least when it comes to the future of the dollar, the United States is not looking to export instability.

Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. 

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China dominates the rare-earth supply chain, with Beijing supplying about 60 percent of global rare-earths output and controlling up to 90 percent of refining capacity. For the United States, which needs neodymium and dysprosium for F‑35 fighter jet engines as badly as it needs lithium for electric vehicles, continued dependence on Beijing is impossible. The solution is not wishful “onshoring” to the United States alone; it is establishing a portfolio of reliable partners. Kazakhstan, already the world’s leading uranium producer and a top‑ten copper and zinc exporter, is a prime candidate for such a partnership.

Rare earths have become a geopolitical flashpoint. In practice, that means Beijing can throttle supply at will. In April, for example, China abruptly restricted exports of several important rare earths and permanent magnets—actions triggered by trade disputes with the United States under the pretext of “energy security.” US firms and strategists described the move as China’s latest attempt to weaponize its rare-earths dominance.

Supply shocks will recur, not recede. After Beijing halted exports of rare-earth refining technology to the United States in late 2023, it spent 2024 steadily ratcheting up export-license requirements on strategic rare-earth oxides or outright banning its exports. These moves culminated in April of this year, with Beijing placing export restrictions on seven heavy and medium rare-earth elements (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) on dual-use national-security grounds.

The United States has only just begun to free its high-tech supply chain dependence on China. Over the past few years, for example, US policymakers have launched some domestic projects and lured allies in Europe and Australia to develop alternatives, but many of those efforts are still nascent. New supply lines will take years to mature. Washington needs a long-term partnership strategy that goes beyond homespun mining; it needs countries capable of supplying rare earths at scale. Since 2020, Kazakhstan has ramped up rare-earth mining, increasing its exports nearly fivefold by 2024. Still, both in 2023 and 2024, 100 percent of its rare-earth output is exported to China—a telling indicator that the resource is there, but does not currently flow to the West. By moving swiftly, the United States could hedge against future Chinese disruptions—and help build a secure, diversified global supply chain for these critical minerals.

Kazakhstan’s rare earths

Unlike some prospective supplier countries, Kazakhstan already knows it has rare-earth wealth. In early April, geologists in the country announced the “Zhana Kazakhstan” discovery: an estimated twenty million metric tons of rare-earths‑bearing ore in the Karagandy region, including sizable heavy‑rare‑earth concentrations. If even 10 percent of the ore proves recoverable at today’s grades, that equates to around 200,000 tons of rare-earth oxide content—enough to meet current US neodymium magnet demand for a dozen years. If validated, the site would give Kazakhstan the world’s third‑largest rare-earth element reserves, trailing only China and Brazil. While promising, these preliminary findings are no sure thing and will require deeper study.

This find is not an outlier. Soviet‑era data and recent airborne surveys point to additional prospects across southern and eastern Kazakhstan. The geology has been there; what was missing was investor certainty. That is changing fast. In just the past few years, the government has opened scores of new exploration projects.

Kazakhstan is no newcomer to big mining. In 2024, the country led the world in uranium output (about 38 percent of global supply) and ranked among the top ten producers of copper and zinc. The national mining concern, Tau-Ken Samruk, consolidates dozens of mines and has global joint ventures in everything from gold to base metals. Kazakhstan’s energy and transport infrastructure likewise favors large-scale mining, as it already accounts for 14 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.

Kazakhstan’s “multivector” diplomacy also plays a factor. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev courts Beijing and Moscow, yet he also seeks deeper ties with Washington and Brussels to balance against those giants. That instinct makes Astana a willing partner for the United States, and a less risky one than conflict-scarred alternatives such as Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, the United States should not expect Kazakhstan to choose only Western partners over the major powers along its eastern and northern borders.

Since 2018, Astana has overhauled its subsoil code on a “first come, first served” model. New legislation helps promote fiscal stability, offers value-added tax holidays on exploration equipment, and caps royalties. As a result, majors from Rio Tinto to Fortescue have launched joint ventures, while US‑backed Cove Capital began drilling rare-earths targets near Arkalyk in 2024.

Kazakhstan also has an edge in infrastructure. The Middle Corridor rail‑and‑port network—which runs from western China through Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea and onward to Europe—was expanded last year with European Union (EU) financing. Aktau’s Caspian port already handles uranium concentrate bound for Canada and France; rare-earths concentrates could follow the same route with minimal modification.

In short, Kazakhstan offers what many mining countries do not: favorable geology and the business environment and infrastructure to exploit it. Kazakhstan already has smelters and refineries for many ores, and it boasts production of advanced materials such as purified manganese sulfate and titanium metal. It even produces gallium (used in semiconductors) and recycles rhenium, though admittedly it still lacks deep processing for rare-earth oxides.

The way forward

Washington has learned the hard way that pledges alone won’t break Beijing’s monopoly, and its next move should elevate quiet deals into an explicit strategy. On the Kazakh side, top leaders have made it clear that developing mining for Western markets is a priority. For example, Tokayev has called critical minerals the country’s “new oil,” and he has signed a number of memoranda with foreign partners on exploration and processing. Kazakhstan’s September 2024 “Kazakh-German” forum alone produced twenty-three agreements in mining, including rare-earth joint ventures.

Here are the three critical steps Washington and Astana should take next:

1. Unlock normal trade by repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to Kazakhstan. The United States should finish what H.R. 1024 has already teed up: removing Kazakhstan from the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment and extend PNTR to Kazakhstan. Scrapping this relic costs no money, instantly signals strategic seriousness, and eliminates the legal ambiguity that still shadows US financing and offtake contracts with Kazakh mines. PNTR lets both sides write binding long-term supply agreements.
2. Set up a US–Kazakhstan rare-earth task force to drive the deals. The United States and Kazakhstan should co-chair a cabinet-level task force comprised of the US State Department and US Commerce Department, as well as Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry. This task force would set annual, public targets for the number of exploration licenses issued to Western consortia, the amount of pilot separation plants financed and built on Kazakh soil, and the export tonnage of heavy and medium rare-earth elements to non-Chinese markets. The task force could instruct the US International Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank of the United States to prioritize Kazakh rare-earth projects, while Kazakhstan fast-tracks permitting and guarantees site security. Early co-location of processing near the mine head would lock in long-term offtake for US buyers and complement EU infrastructure money already pledged for the Aktau port.
3. Deploy a blended-finance and technology package along the full value chain. Washington should pair loan guarantees with technical assistance from the US Geological Survey, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Department of Energy’s Critical Materials Institute. Kazakhstan should match that support by streamlining visas for engineering teams and auctioning new mine blocks on transparent terms. The Pentagon’s National Defense Stockpile could start purchasing Kazakh oxides, while the Department of Energy and Nazarbayev University co-fund recycling research and development to close the loop at home.

To be sure, there are challenges ahead, and mining remains a difficult, uncertain venture. Bringing a greenfield rare-earths mine to commercial output can take more than a decade. But doing nothing cements Beijing’s leverage for that same decade and beyond. By acting now, Washington can buy future resilience and signal to market actors that rare-earths diversification is real.

Miras Zhiyenbayev is the advisor to the chairman of the board for international affairs and initiatives at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. He is also co-sponsoring the June 4 US-Central Asia Forum at the Atlantic Council.

The post How Kazakhstan can anchor a resilient rare‑earth supply chain for the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Aaron Korewa: Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO

Marek Magierowski: Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels

Danuta Hübner: Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Mark Scott: Social media was rampant in this election. But how much impact it had is unclear.

Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Some initial analysis may depict the Polish presidential election as a fight between democracy and autocracy, or between a pro-Trump and pro-European candidate. This seems exaggerated. The real challenge for Nawrocki will be deciding whether to find common ground with the Tusk government in the face of the threat from Russia and the need to work with the Trump administration on behalf of European and Ukrainian security. 

There are substantive grounds for at least some cooperation across partisan lines in Poland to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression and, to this end, to work with key European allies, such as Britain, France, and Germany, as well as with the United States. Unlike the Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, Polish nationalists and outgoing President Andrzej Duda generally support Ukraine and resolutely oppose Russian aggression. In early 2022, for example, PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński publicly broke with Orbán over the latter’s lack of support for Ukraine at the time. Poland’s current rapid military buildup began during the previous PiS government and continued under the Tusk coalition. Both political camps support NATO and strong relations with the United States. 

The Trump administration backed Nawrocki during the election campaign. However unwise US official partisanship during an election might have been, this will give Nawrocki advantages as a perceived ideological ally making the case in Washington for continued US military presence in Poland and US support for NATO and Ukraine. Nawrocki may face challenges working with the European Union (EU), which is still a source of significant funding for Polish development and is trying to support military buildup in Europe, an objective Poles across the political spectrum tend to support. He will also have to contain the anti-German rhetoric common to much of the Polish nationalist right. Poland has had legitimate complaints about German policy toward Russia. But it has won those arguments, as many Germans themselves recognize; Nawrocki would do well to take the win and work with Germany to counter the Russian threat both countries face. 

Many Poles were supportive of Ukraine in the initial phases of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, providing extensive benefits to Ukrainian refugees and taking hundreds of thousands of them into their homes. While the presence of so many Ukrainian refugees has grown less popular over time, Polish support for Ukraine has remained steady. Still, influential Polish constituencies, such as farmers and some groups concerned with the difficult historical issues between Poles and Ukrainians, have been skeptical about the extent of Polish support for Ukraine. During the campaign, Nawrocki declared that he does not currently support Ukraine’s NATO accession. Now, Nawrocki will have to find a way to balance strategic and political imperatives on support for Ukraine. 

As president, Nawrocki will have to balance his campaign rhetoric and partisan interests with broader national interests. He’s hardly the first winning candidate to have to do so. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO 

The Poles showed their dissatisfaction with the current government and the political establishment. Nawrocki was an outsider and that paid off. He managed to attract the voters who chose far-right candidates in the first round, while Trzaskowski did not manage to mobilize enough of the voters who supported Tusk’s coalition in October 2023.  

For Europe, this could mean that Poland will become more inwardly focused. At the same time, Tusk has previously signaled that he believes beating populism requires addressing some of the issues that drive it. Expect Poland to take a turn for the right on matters such as migration and the European Green Deal.  

Nawrocki was the only candidate who visited US President Donald Trump in the White House and received his endorsement. In late May, the Conservative Political Action Conference, known as CPAC, also held a rally in the southeastern town of Rzeszów that featured US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. Nawrocki’s people made conscious outreach to the US administration. In Poland, the movement that backs Nawrocki is very pro-American and pro-NATO, unlike several other parties in Europe that stand for conservative nationalism. The optimistic scenario is that as president, Nawrocki will establish a connection with Trump that will prevent any plans to withdraw US troops from Poland. At the same time, Tusk’s government will continue forging partnerships with other relevant European states, such as France and the Nordic and Baltic countries.   

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office which is part of the Europe Center.

Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels 

First and foremost, branding Nawrocki as “populist,” “hard-core Euroskeptic,” “far right,” “pro-Putin,” or “Trumpian” is preposterous. Polish politics is too complex to indulge in such simplistic terms. 

Poland’s president-elect is probably as “pro-Kremlin” as his entire political camp, which, while in power, provided Ukraine with hundreds of tanks, aircraft, howitzers, and communication gear, while pressuring all European partners to ramp up sanctions against Russia. 

Nawrocki is also as “Euroskeptic” as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, given the attitude of both politicians toward migration policies and EU climate regulations. And he is as “Trumpian” as his Finnish soon-to-be counterpart Alexander Stubb, who charmingly played a spot of golf with the US president a few weeks ago. 

Nawrocki is doubtless a staunch conservative who adroitly capitalized on the nature of wide swaths of the Polish electorate, which, contrary to European trends, has remained—politically, socially, and emotionally—attached to the notion of freedom, sovereignty, tradition, and Christian values. The PiS-backed candidate has also largely banked on the rising unpopularity of Tusk’s government, especially among young voters (Nawrocki won the eighteen-to-twenty-nine-year-old cohort). 

Another major factor in Nawrocki’s win was the aristocratic style and aloofness of his rival, Trzaskowski, who was unable to connect with the working class and Poland’s rural constituency. This stood in contrast to Nawrocki, the former boxer and son of a toolmaker and a bookbinder. 

—Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Poles know that their vote can change the course of the history of their country. And they have known from day one of this presidential campaign that this election matters deeply for our future. However, as, sadly, the campaign was about preventing the other side from coming to power, it is an open question whether the president we have just elected will understand what is good for Poles in these times of uncertainty.  

Will our new president spare no effort to overcome the deep polarization of the Polish people? A polarized society is easy to manipulate and an easy target for Russian disinformation. This is the biggest challenge for the new president—understanding the importance of building bridges between Poles. It is an extremely difficult task, especially in times when many political careers have been built for decades on societal divisions. And I worry that this president-elect comes from a political tradition with little propensity to seek compromise. The presidency is an important part of the Polish system of checks and balances, and the new president will need to support the government in building a democratic Poland where everyone can live. 

Poles need a president who will understand that isolation has never done Poland any good, that the European Union is our place, and that it is crucial that Poland takes its share of responsibility for Europe. Will the new president support European efforts to build its defense capabilities and its security-based economic competitiveness? Will he work for peace on our continent?  

In addition, my hope is that the new president will work to keep the United States and Europe together. They need each other.  

—Danuta Hübner is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. She was Poland’s first-ever European commissioner, responsible first for trade, then with regional policy. She also established and oversaw the institutional structure to deliver Poland’s accession to the EU.

Social media was rampant in this election. But what impact did it have?

The narrow victory for Nawrocki in Poland’s presidential election is the latest example of why it’s hard to directly link any country’s electoral outcome with how voters engage with candidates, political operatives, and others across social media. There was a significant amount of hyper-partisan attacks across social media, from both sides, ahead of Sunday’s vote in the Central European country. There was also evidence—including via research from the Atlantic Council—that foreign governments attempted to sway voter outcomes.  

But how successful these efforts were, as well as the ongoing interventions from social media companies to possibly reduce such content’s impact, are almost impossible to quantify. Given the tightly run race, small shifts in voters’ behavior—potentially spurred on by what people may have seen in their online feeds—could have played a role. But, at this stage, that is more a theory than confirmed reality. 

The most recent Polish presidential election joins a growing list of both European and non-European elections in which social media and its impact on how people voted remain a black box. As much as EU policymakers have centered their attention on how the likes of TikTok and YouTube may have amplified anti-EU voices ahead of national elections, there has been a growing offline shift in public opinion across the bloc away from greater EU alignment that has nothing to do with the digital world. 

At best, this weekend’s vote is another example of how, in the middle of 2025, these digital platforms are now part of every country’s election cycle. But social media’s impact on such a closely fought election is mostly unknown. 

—Mark Scott is a senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

The post Experts react: Conservative Karol Nawrocki is Poland’s next president. What does it mean for Poland, Europe, and the world? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Currently, remittances are not taxed separately, as senders already pay income tax on the earnings they transfer to family and friends abroad. “The One, Big, Beautiful Bill” would upend that system—effectively taxing those transfers twice. But that’s not all. A tax on remittances—valued at $905 billion globally—would not only hit US households and low-income countries, where they can account for more than 30 percent of gross domestic product; it could also undermine key US national security and foreign policy priorities.

If the Senate passes the Republican budget bill, remittance senders and recipients—who already contend with high fees—will undoubtedly be hit the hardest. In 2024, the global average cost of sending two hundred dollars across borders was 6.4 percent. That’s more than double the United Nations’ sustainable development goal of 3 percent and exceeds the Group of Twenty (G20) target of 5 percent.

If overall remittance volumes were to fall, US remittance providers—the companies that enable the sending and receiving of these payments—would be adversely affected. The proposed legislation imposes new responsibilities for these remittance service companies—such as verifying the sender’s citizenship and enforcing new fee structures and reporting mechanisms—all of which impose new costs, compliance burdens, and risks for remittance providers. These additional requirements threaten to reduce operational efficiency and drive up consumer prices, especially as US companies currently dominate the remittance services sector, setting standards for transfer speed, cost, and security. A tax-driven shift in the market would hurt these companies’ profitability and competitiveness, undermining broader US economic interests. 

The risk of driving transactions underground

When it comes to national security, the United States already has a robust framework to monitor and regulate money and payment flows, including laws and infrastructure designed to combat financial crime. Remittance service companies are a central component of this framework, enabling state and federal law enforcement to track and pursue suspicious transfers and bad actors. 

Moreover, research shows that taxing remittances leads to increased use of underground or informal channels for sending money. That is, senders seek out alternatives—less regulated, less transparent, and less safe ways of transferring their money abroad. In fact, countries that have enacted punitive measures on cross-border payments and currency exchange have often undermined their own ability to combat financial crime, thereby weakening their economies and diminishing their foreign influence. 

Argentina serves as a revealing case study. Under previous leadership, the Argentine government imposed foreign exchange and capital controls that drove transactions into underground banking networks, making it far harder to trace illicit activity. These restrictions also weakened the already vulnerable economy, contributing to stagnation and inflation. President Javier Milei is now actively reversing these policies in favor of open and transparent capital flows and foreign currency exchange—reforms that significantly benefit both law enforcement and economic stability.

In the United States, the revenue generated by a federal tax on remittances would likely be less than 0.1 percent of the national budget. At the same time, it would reduce remittance volumes or push them underground, contradicting broader US national security goals and making US companies less competitive by increasing their cost of doing business. Accordingly, policymakers should reconsider the trade-offs and recognize that transparent, reliable remittance services serve the national interest of the United States.

A foreign policy tool hiding in plain sight

With respect to foreign policy and the ability to influence global development, remittances play a vital role—especially in an era of shrinking public-sector aid. Private remittance flows often reach communities and individuals more directly and efficiently than government-to-government assistance. US senders are often family members and friends of recipients, as well as faith-based and other humanitarian organizations. These flows ultimately contribute to stabilizing fragile economies, reducing the financial distress that often drives illegal migration. Additionally, remittances often support democratic activity and institutions in recipient countries, while also helping undermine autocratic governments by empowering citizens with resources independent of state control.

Because they account for one-sixth of all cross-border payments, remittances also reinforce the global dominance of the US dollar. A large portion of remittances is sent in—or exchanged into—US dollars, bolstering the currency’s central position in the international financial system and providing visibility into foreign transactions. This visibility, in turn, allows for the effective enforcement of anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies, as well as sanctions enforcement in cases of illicit activity.

Given these strategic benefits, the United States should take concrete steps to better leverage remittances as a national security and foreign policy asset. This begins with adopting smart, forward-looking policies that strengthen remittance channels and maximize their impact.

First, US policymakers should not just protect, but also actively promote legal remittance channels to ensure that these funds can flow safely and efficiently. Rather than imposing restrictive measures such as new taxes, the United States should foster deeper collaboration between law enforcement and well-regulated remittance providers. Such cooperation would support the adoption of rapidly evolving compliance technologies that more effectively detect illicit financial flows.

Second, the United States should reduce the costs and friction associated with remittance transactions. This includes granting well-regulated US remittance providers direct access to national payments systems and modernizing AML and Bank Secrecy Act regulations to reflect the realities of digital transactions. Emerging technologies can improve financial crime detection—provided that regulators offer clear guidance and foster their adoption.

Third, the United States should leverage its presidency of the G20 in 2026 to establish a global working group that captures the complexity of remittances as a tool of foreign policy and national security. The G20 has traditionally provided targets for remittance payments. Additionally, a US-led working group could address the need for better global coordination to curb illicit flows, reduce frictions, and explore how remittances can complement official aid flows, especially in constrained fiscal environments. 

By recognizing and elevating the role of remittances, US policymakers can incorporate a powerful, underused asset into their broader foreign policy strategy—one that supports both domestic prosperity and global stability.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The author thanks Daniel Gorfine for his contributions to this article.

The post A tax on remittances could hurt US households—and national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Having spent the last four nights in a bomb shelter in Odesa and Kyiv as the Kremlin continues its massive missile and drone attacks on Ukraine’s cities, in a war of aggression that Moscow launched, I can assure you that Ukraine had every right to do what it did on June 1: Strike strategic bombers at five bases across the breadth of Russia.

In contrast to Moscow’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, Ukraine committed no war crime or breach of international law in destroying those Russian planes, which are regularly used against civilians.

Rather than recalling the Pearl Harbor attack, the complexity and boldness of Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb”—which involved smuggling drones into Russian regions from Murmansk to Irkutsk, and launching them against advanced Russian Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and A-50 intelligence planes—rivals the now legendary Israeli intelligence operation against Hezbollah fighters’ pagers last year. It has underscored once again that ingenuity along with determination are Ukraine’s strategic advantages in stopping Moscow’s war of aggression.

According to media reports, as many as forty planes have been hit. The Security Service of Ukraine—which planned and executed the operation—claims that the attack destroyed 34 percent of Russia’s strategic bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles. Russian defense sources say that while some planes were on fire as a result of the attack, no real damage was done. Some Russian war bloggers, however, are writing as if the damage was major, and video evidence on social media show the destruction of at least some planes.   

Whatever the number of destroyed planes, it is safe to conclude that Moscow will be more cautious about the basing of its remaining bombers, as it was last year when Ukrainian drones began to target Russian military assets. This will further reduce the role of Russian bombers in attacking Ukraine’s front lines, infrastructure, and cities. Of course, Moscow still has plenty of missiles and drones to continue its murderous campaign against civilian targets in Ukraine. But Operation Spiderweb revealed how vulnerable Russia is to unconventional Ukrainian attacks. This has been a major feature of the war evident in Ukraine’s successful 2022 counteroffensive, sweeping of the Russian navy from the central and western Black Sea, and Kursk offensive last year.  

It is also important to note that the Tu-95s and Tu-22s are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Their loss could weaken the aerial component of Moscow’s nuclear triad, which also has ground (missiles) and sea (submarines) components. Moscow considers the United States its principal adversary. As US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard noted in this year’s national intelligence assessment, Russia, like China, is an adversary of the United States. As with Ukraine’s chewing up of Russia’s conventional military in the war, this operation proves another Ukrainian contribution to US security.  

Beyond the battlefield, the impact of this operation is perhaps even more significant. It is a strong counter to the dubious “common wisdom” that the war is moving inevitably in Moscow’s favor. This same assumption explains why Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected numerous proposals for a cease-fire by US President Donald Trump, and why he has refused to send a paper with the Kremlin’s terms for a cease-fire to Ukraine before the June 2 peace talks in Istanbul that he proposed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy correctly described that proposal as a stalling tactic, but against the backdrop of this daring operation finally announced that Ukraine would attend the talks. At this point, Moscow is not talking about boycotting them.

Most observers expect some form of Kremlin response to the Ukrainian attack. While some unhinged Russian war bloggers are calling for the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, it is more likely that Moscow will respond along current operational lines—for example, by conducting even more massive air attacks. While the destruction of the planes is a serious blow against Russia’s air force and Putin’s own prestige, it does not compare in importance to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the fall of 2022. When it comes to Putin’s calculations in this war, nuclear weapons are principally a rhetorical tool to intimidate Western leaders from backing Ukraine more firmly.

A key question is how the Trump administration will respond to this operation. Several hours after the news broke, the only word from the White House was that Kyiv did not let it know of the operation in advance. The attack occurred just days after the visit of Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal to Ukraine, where they announced that the Senate will move ahead this coming week on their long-awaited bill to impose major additional sanctions against Russia. 

Trump has been coming under increasing criticism for his reluctance to put real pressure on Putin for the Russian president’s failure to accept cease-fire terms proposed by Washington and accepted by Kyiv. Will Trump let the sanctions bill—which has eighty-two co-sponsors—pass the Senate? He could call Putin, point to Ukraine’s latest military accomplishment as one more reason to accept Trump’s compromise solution for a cease-fire, and note that political pressure in Washington to take more action against Russia is growing. (The US president can also point to Ukraine’s effective operation, which flummoxed Russian air defenses, as one more reason the United States needs his proposed Golden Dome missile defense system, which Ukraine could be a uniquely capable partner in building.)

Trump could convey the message that if Putin cannot bring himself to accept a cease-fire, significant new sanctions are coming. That would be a clever way to leverage Ukraine’s battlefield success to achieve Trump’s own goal: a durable peace in Ukraine.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The post Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine’s daring drone attack gives Trump leverage against Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

China: There is no cooling off this trade war

European Union: New US tariffs unaffected by the courts could have the biggest bite

United Kingdom: The UK-US deal continues to provide certainty and some unique advantages

Mexico, Canada, and the Americas: While some countries may be in less of a rush, USMCA negotiations will ramp up

India: Its special position means New Delhi should press ahead on a deal

China

European Union

United Kingdom

Mexico, Canada, and the Americas

India

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

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These technological changes necessitate a hard look at how intelligent machines and robotics should be deployed to prepare for and assist human explorers. Exploiting these technologies can accelerate discovery, enhance safety, and increase the productivity of future crewed space voyages. Additionally, if the United States chooses to synchronize technology investment in space and on Earth, we will innovate faster and accelerate exploration and discovery, all while strengthening our earthly economy and quality of life.

On Earth, a technological revolution is in full motion. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are coupling with vast computational advances to create machines that can sense, think, learn, and adapt. Machines are assisting, protecting, and replacing humans in hazardous environments and in industrial work. They’re taking on greater roles—and with more autonomy—to increase efficiency, quality, and safety across a wide array of sectors, including agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. Some robots have even taken a central role in providing the steadiest, most skillful hands for demanding surgeries. These advances are dramatically affecting how we live and work on Earth.  

Lessons from Apollo: Transforming spaceflight with robotics

This technological revolution has direct applications for space travel. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program, its present-day plan to return astronauts to the Moon, mimics the approach of its Apollo program from the 1960s and early 1970s. For many of those who are old enough to have witnessed the first Apollo Moon mission through black and white TV sets in 1969, the dramatic Apollo 11 lunar landing is etched into their memories. But what many likely don’t recall are the risks and challenges that had to be overcome to make such a historically groundbreaking achievement possible. For instance, the iconic Apollo 11 mission narrowly escaped disaster when its lunar module (the spacecraft intended for transporting astronauts to the Moon’s surface) missed its intended landing site. Had it not been for Apollo 11 astronaut Neil Armstrong’s skillful last-minute piloting, and a bit of luck, the mission could have gone down in history as a great tragedy. 

Back then, there were no intelligent machines. Sole reliance on the adaptability of US astronauts was the best bet for accomplishing lunar exploration. It was an enormously risky venture and required extreme bravery. In certain fateful circumstances, it took extreme sacrifice from human explorers. While understandable given the technology of the 1960s and 1970s, is this still the way the United States should be approaching exploration missions in the twenty-first century? 

Beyond Artemis’s schedule setbacks, cost growth, and technical challenges that are garnering headlines, there lies a fundamental question: Why is humanity still relying so heavily on humans in space, when on Earth, it is steadily learning to use intelligent, adaptable, machines to ensure safety and increase efficiencies? Should these tools not take on even more advanced roles in the “final frontier”?  

This is not to suggest that humans should be removed from spaceflight. It would be a mistake to assume that robots and machines can substitute for the inspiration felt from seeing human explorers venturing into the unknown. The image of a human once again setting foot on the barren lunar landscape or an astronaut standing upon a dried Martian lakebed for the first time will generate enduring lightning bolts of wonder for young and old alike. In addition, the powerful symbolism of the astronauts of partner nations exploring together will help to bind humanity together. That said, human spaceflight is currently on the order of thirty times more costly than robotic missions. Additionally, it is questionable whether it makes sense to continue to put astronauts at high risk while there are autonomous alternatives that, at a relatively moderate cost, can increase the likelihood of success. As NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) stated in its January 2025 report’s assessment of the Artemis program, “the aggregate risk associated with accomplishing so many ‘first-time’ milestones . . . may be too high.”

In several respects, the Chinese space program has proven to be more effective at integrating robotics into its space travel missions. China’s recent successful robotic lunar sample return missions indicate that they are taking a more thoughtful approach to exploration than the United States. With less investment, and in less time, than the United States, China is realizing meaningful gains through its recent Chang’e-5 and 6 lunar sample return missions. Meanwhile, the United States is struggling with the technical, cost, and schedule issues arising from the development of new rockets, complex cryogenic landers, and the intricacies of leading with crewed exploration missions.

Looking forward and reaching upward

NASA needs to forge a future in which intelligent machines and humans work together seamlessly and the strengths of each are maximized. Human spaceflight missions should focus on major events and major steps forward that evoke maximum inspiration. NASA should increase the use of robots as the workhorses of space exploration. Robotic missions should continue to lead scientific investigation and their roles should be expanded to prepare sites for human explorers, as well as to build, sustain, maintain, and operate space equipment and infrastructure in support of human presence.

Three aims should guide how NASA moves forward with integrating intelligent machines into spaceflight operations.

Modernize NASA’s organizational structure. NASA’s current organizational structure separates science from exploration and maintains separate budget lines for each. Its Science Directorate governs robotics and intelligent machines, while its Exploration Directorate focuses on human spaceflight. This artificial distinction has not withstood the test of time, as there is simply no space exploration without scientific objectives. NASA should reorganize around its main contemporary objectives and let its talented leaders across science and engineering determine the best ways to achieve them.

Reformulate NASA’s Artemis campaign. NASA should change its plan so that early flights are robotic, with work and preparations being performed by intelligent machines ahead of crewed missions. For instance, robotic missions could be used to investigate and prepare lunar landing sites, build shelters, and stock them with pre-positioned instruments, equipment, and provisions. By leading with machines rather than astronauts, the risk of dangerous landings (like those which nearly resulted in catastrophe during Apollo and ended several recent robotic missions) can be reduced. By preparing lunar habitats robotically, the first astronauts could have a shelter available upon landing, should unanticipated issues arise. This robotic integration could be lifesaving, providing modern safeguards for Artemis astronauts that would also begin to address the safety concerns recently raised by NASA’s ASAP.

To accomplish this, NASA should accelerate and build upon its Commercial Lunar Payload Services program, which has already begun to prove fruitful through recent successful partnerships such as Firefly Aerospace’s Blue Ghost Mission 1. Congress should increase funding for highly capable lunar machines that can travel large distances and move lunar rocks and soil for scientific exploration and infrastructure construction. Looking forward, humanoid robots should be used to activate the lunar base and operate equipment when astronauts are not there or are on excursions.  

Equip lunar robots with virtual reality. The integration of virtual reality (VR) technologies into intelligent space exploration machines could enable scientists, engineers, and others on Earth to become active participants in the exploration of the Moon, distant planets, and beyond. These integrated VR capabilities could both increase scientific collaborations and provide indelible experiences, increasing public awareness, inspiration, and support for space exploration and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education.

Humanity will naturally explore. There is huge potential ahead in advancing knowledge in space science and finding ways to tap the nearly limitless resources available in space. As government leaders consider the options for the next giant leap for humankind, it behooves them to take a clearheaded look at their objectives and how they can be most efficiently and safely met. NASA should be leading the way in the international scene by driving advances in intelligent machines and robotics. In doing so, it will improve the US space program and ensure that technological investments in space are well aligned with the needs back on earth.

Dan Hart is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Emily Sespico is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

The post NASA needs a twenty-first-century approach to space exploration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Merz was in Vilnius to formally inaugurate the 45^th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, which will embed German combat power at the heart of Baltic defense. Germany will implement a phased deployment—it sent advanced elements in early 2024 and formally activated the brigade on April 1. The brigade is expected to reach full combat readiness by 2027. Once complete, this will offer Lithuania and its neighbors a sustained, high-end deterrent anchored in the NATO framework.

But it’s not just Germany that is helping bolster the defenses of NATO’s strategically exposed eastern flank. The eastern flank countries themselves are implementing concrete measures to overcome Europe’s entrenched defense fragmentation. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—all located along the eastern border of both NATO and the European Union (EU) with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad exclave, and Belarus—are emerging as leaders in bolstering regional defense integration, the benefits of which could extend throughout Europe. This shift is especially significant amid growing transatlantic tensions and renewed calls from the United States for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security and conventional defense.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries have aligned their border protection efforts by integrating their counter-mobility measures. They have initiated the process of cooperatively developing deep-strike capabilities. They have also started the procurement process for German weapon systems, introduced the German defense industry to the region, and will soon host the first-ever permanently deployed German brigade. All these initiatives show that Europe’s defense efforts are well-positioned to grow together and consolidate from the epicenter in the northeast of the continent. By anchoring their defense planning in regional realities, the eastern flank countries are demonstrating that regional coordination, backed by political determination, can transform exposed vulnerabilities into strategic assets that enhance deterrence and operational readiness.

Integrating counter-mobility systems

Faced with growing geostrategic pressure along their borders with Russia and Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have taken decisive, coordinated steps to reinforce border protection and defense. Increasingly aligned in their strategic approach, these countries are developing integrated fortification systems that form a continuous defensive line along the eastern border of NATO and the EU.

Two major initiatives launched in 2024—the Baltic Defense Line covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Poland’s East Shield—share the common goal of strengthening deterrence and denying adversaries access to NATO and EU territory. These efforts include expanding existing forested areas, deepening drainage ditches, building engineering depots to store physical barriers such as “dragons’ teeth,” “hedgehogs,” “Spanish horse,” and solid concrete road barriers, as well as installing anti-tank landmines and mine-laying equipment. There are also plans for developing reinforcements with drone and anti-drone technologies. The overall goal is to ensure the two defense initiatives’ integrity, especially as they converge at the Suwałki Gap, a security chokepoint and the primary axis for NATO’s land reinforcement to the Baltic states.

Finland’s accession to NATO added 1,340 kilometers to the Alliance’s border with Russia. Unlike the more exposed terrain of the Baltic states and Poland, Finland’s border region is naturally defensive, dominated by forests, lakes, and wetlands, which would complicate a large-scale Russian ground incursion. Accordingly, Finland has chosen not to build physical fortifications along the border.

However, to reinforce deterrence and secure vulnerable segments, Finland aligned itself with the regional consensus by withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. This means the eastern flank countries can jointly deploy and stockpile anti-personnel landmines as a shared border defense tool against Russia. Both Russia and Ukraine have used anti-personnel landmines in Ukraine.

The regional integration of border defense has triggered broader EU interest. Following Baltic and Polish calls for a collective response, the European Council’s conclusions on European defense, released on March 6, recognized the importance of EU border defense. The EU’s White Paper on Defense, published in late March, endorsed the idea of creating an “Eastern Border Shield” and in April, the European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line as flagship projects for common security. This momentum must now translate into concrete EU support—and funding—for transforming the eastern flank countries’ national efforts into a unified, layered European border defense architecture.

Coordinated development of deep strike capabilities

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland are also integrating their long-range firepower into a regional deep-strike architecture, which significantly raises the threshold for aggression along the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have each contracted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers and committed to trilateral cooperation with the United States on HIMARS integration, personnel training, system maintenance, and service. Embedding HIMARS into a joint operational concept will allow the Baltic states to conduct combined live-fire exercises and harmonize sustainment through shared maintenance, training, and logistics chains. Estonia’s six launchers, delivered in April, now reach well beyond four hundred kilometers. Lithuania’s eight launchers, due to arrive by 2026, will achieve a similar reach. Latvia is set to receive six launchers in 2027, which will complete the Baltic deep-strike firewall.

This Baltic cluster is dovetailing with Poland’s even larger “Homar-A” deep-strike program, under which some 486 additional HIMARS variants will be mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks and integrated into Poland’s Topaz command system. Together, Poland and the Baltic states are planning a joint logistics hub to manage munitions stockpiles, spare parts, and forward displacement. They are also planning to exercise joint targeting and coordinate fire support across borders.

Finland has opted to upgrade its M270 multiple-launch rocket systems rather than buy HIMARS. The upgrade, approved in 2023, allows Finnish M270s to fire the same munitions as their Baltic neighbors. This technical alignment transforms Finland’s forces into a seamless fourth pillar of the regional deep-strike ensemble, enabling integrated planning, data‐sharing, and cross-border reinforcement exercises.

By integrating US-provided launchers, coordinated doctrine, shared logistics, and interoperable fire-control standards, the five eastern flank nations are establishing a continuous, multi-tiered long-range fire network that spans from Finland to Poland. This network helps project deterrence and complicate adversary planning, solidifying a new level of collective defense integration on the eastern flank.

Regional consolidation with German weapon systems

The eastern flank countries have also deepened their partnerships with German weapon manufacturers. Lithuania is aligning its force modernization with the German brigade’s forward posture in the Baltics. In December, Lithuania’s defense ministry signed a €950 million contract with for forty-four Leopard 2 A8 main battle tanks—its first indigenous tank battalion—which will arrive through 2030, alongside an expanded fleet of twenty-seven additional Boxer “Vilkas” infantry fighting vehicles, which will arrive by 2029. Finland and Poland likewise use Leopard 2 variants, creating a shared main battle tank backbone across the eastern flank.

In the air defense domain, Estonia and Latvia will each field three IRIS-T surface-launched missile batteries this year, while Lithuania has bolstered its two national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS) batteries (initially deployed in 2020) with additional systems due to arrive in 2026. To underpin sustained operations, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall’s new NATO-standard 155 mm ammunition plant in Lithuania, scheduled to be online by mid-2026, will produce tens of thousands of shells annually, significantly enhancing regional munitions resilience.

In the defense innovation field, Lithuanian laser technology firm Aktyvus Photonics has partnered with German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, having signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic collaboration in unmanned systems this month. Together, they will codevelop and field-test unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with laser capabilities, aiming to expedite deployment timelines and establish a standard for next-generation, networked unmanned systems in NATO’s eastern defenses.

Beyond procurement, production, and innovation, Lithuania has also positioned itself as a regional arms maintenance hub: Through the establishment of Lithuania Defense Services—a joint venture between Rheinmetall Landsysteme and French-German defense manufacturer KNDS—it provides repair, overhaul, and upgrade services for German vehicle platforms, including Boxer Vilkas IFVs, PzH 2000 howitzers, the Leopard main battle tank family, and tactical logistics vehicles.

Collectively, these deployments, procurements, and industrial partnerships do more than fill capability gaps: They forge a contiguous eastern flank defense ecosystem. By standardizing on German platforms, harmonizing training and logistics, co-locating production and repair facilities, and co-training under unified command structures, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland, together with Germany, can achieve unprecedented interoperability and strategic depth. These initiatives are transforming NATO’s eastern flank into a seamless, multi-domain bulwark.

Strategic depth through regional alignment

The eastern flank’s transformation from a collection of fragmented national postures into a cohesive, multi-domain defense network exemplifies how sustained regional integration can overcome long-standing capability gaps. By aligning border defense, harmonizing long-range fires, and embedding German heavy armor and sustainment infrastructure, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are creating a continuous belt of deterrence that leverages shared doctrine, logistics, and industry. This holistic approach raises the cost of aggression and sets a new standard for European collective defense: one where interoperability and joint capacity-building replace duplication and dependency, anchoring strategic depth at NATO’s most exposed frontier.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post How NATO’s eastern flank is setting the standard for collective defense appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To illuminate what this all means, we reached out to Shalom Lipner, a former adviser to seven consecutive Israeli prime ministers, including Netanyahu, to get a sense of how the Israeli political landscape has shifted after more than six hundred days of war.

1. What is the state of play in Israeli politics right now? 

The Israeli public square is a bubbling cauldron, with multiple challenges—foreign and domestic—negatively impacting the prospects of Netanyahu’s majority. His government has demonstrated remarkable resilience over these past twenty months of multifront warfare, rebounding relatively quickly after October 7, 2023, to put Israel’s enemies (including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon) on the defensive. However, the pressing need to make strategic decisions is exposing fissures that now threaten the stability of Netanyahu’s governing coalition.

Netanyahu’s next moves on Gaza and Iran—two theaters of operation where he appears increasingly misaligned with the Trump administration—could exacerbate those pressures, compelling him to choose between the support of the United States and that of his key coalition partners. More immediately, a potential revolt within the ranks of his government, whose ultra-Orthodox members have issued an ultimatum that they will bolt unless their demands for a military draft exemption are met next week, could create a cascade that triggers early elections. Adding to this volatility, Netanyahu’s cross-examination by the prosecution in his corruption trials will begin next week.

2. How do current divisions compare with pre-October 7 divisions in Israeli politics? 

The horrors of October 7 had a chilling effect on the Israeli population, instantly sidelining the disputes—most prominent among them, issues relating to plans for an overhaul of the judiciary—that had paralyzed the country, with precedence shifting to the critical functions of national defense and rehabilitation. Israelis mobilized to meet those tasks, with civil society often filling vacuums in service left by a crippled bureaucracy.  

With the passage of time, however, as many crises have since been downgraded or become routine, a “new normal” has created space for pre-October 7 divisions to resurge with a vengeance. This has been most evident in the resumption of divisive government initiatives to circumscribe the mandate of the courts and to assert absolute control over senior appointments. After more than eighteen months of combat, many in Israel believe that when Israelis do ultimately return to the polls, a fault line will be apparent. On one side will be those who have contributed tangibly to the war effort, with many spending hundreds of days on Israel Defense Force reserve duty. On the other side will be those who have evaded such responsibilities.

3. What does this mean for Netanyahu’s government? 

In this state of affairs, an embattled Netanyahu is maneuvering to keep his coalition afloat, requiring him to keep its various components satisfied—notwithstanding assessments that most of them have no viable alternative to his leadership. To that end, the prime minister has rejected all solutions for Gaza that would enable Hamas to remain in the territory and, in the interim, to have a hand in administering the distribution of humanitarian aid. Netanyahu’s support for a lenient conscription bill fits into this category as well.  

The success of his juggling act is far from guaranteed, however. His government has faced growing pushback from the international community—including, but not limited to, arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court; consideration of targeted sanctions by the United Kingdom, France, and Canada; and a review of the European Union’s association agreement with Israel. This has compounded the stakes of his gambit, possibly exacting an untenable cost for Israel that could encourage a shift in course.

4. What does this mean for US-Israel relations? 

Mounting criticism from many of Israel’s traditional friends has only heightened its reliance on Washington. Not only does the United States continue to provide the overwhelming bulk of diplomatic and military assistance afforded to Israel, but Trump administration officials are also playing the lead role in ongoing mediation with Israel’s adversaries. Reportedly, however, Netanyahu has been flustered by a series of events that suggest that Trump’s objectives could actually imperil Israel’s situation.

Emerging details of negotiations that Steve Witkoff, the Trump’s Middle East envoy, has been conducting with Hamas and Iran have been a cause of concern in Jerusalem. Similar consternation was manifest when an end to US hostilities with the Houthis exempted Israel, and when the United States extended its embrace to the new Syrian regime. Netanyahu has repeatedly dispatched messengers to present Israel’s case before administration principals, but the differences between their approaches are unmistakable and could spark a wider breach in the bilateral relationship at an extremely precarious juncture.

5. How might this impact what comes next in the war? 

The United States holds most of the cards in this scenario, as well as the agency to deploy them. If Witkoff produces a deal with Hamas that meets Trump’s minimum expectations, Netanyahu will have little choice but to overcome his reservations and accept its terms—and hope that he can persuade enough of his coalition to do likewise. The other, more dangerous option would be to risk running afoul of the White House and being subjected to a similar Oval Office reception as the presidents of Ukraine and South Africa, something which would broadcast Israel’s new vulnerability to the world.

Netanyahu is walking on even more fragile eggshells regarding Iran. Trump has stated that it “would be inappropriate” for Israel to attack Iran “right now because we’re very close to a solution.” The possibility of just such a strike—especially if Israel were to determine that Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon was imminent and unimpeded—cannot be ruled out unequivocally. In that event, however, and in its aftermath, a rupture with Trump could have disastrous consequences for Israel.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem.

The post Five questions (and expert answers) on the state of the Netanyahu government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Four months of chaotic shuttle diplomacy aimed at reaching a cease-fire in Ukraine, multiple phone calls between US President Donald Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, repeated US attempts to pressure, browbeat, and bully Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into concessions, have all yielded exactly nothing. 

Which is not in the least bit surprising. Because there is no deal to be had with Russia on Ukraine. There never has been, and there never will be.

There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals. Moscow wants to end Ukraine’s sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as an independent sovereign state. Given this, no compromise is possible. Any Kabuki negotiations or Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief. 

“Russian imperialism will not be neutralized by negotiations, compromises, or concessions,” Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on May 22. 

Following his latest call with Trump, Putin said he wanted any settlement to address what he called the “root causes of the crisis.” That choice of phrase was no accident. The Kremlin leader used a similar formulation when addressing the issue of ending the war during a joint press conference with Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka in March.

Putin’s repeated use of the term “root cause” is a tell. For the Kremlin leader, the root cause of the war is the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, which he has long seen as anathema. At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Putin made this clear when he told then US President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a state.” Putin has also repeatedly referred to Ukraine as “little Russia,” a Tsarist-era term to describe Ukrainian lands.

For Putin and the Kremlin elite, Russian colonial dominance of Ukraine is an ideological issue that is not subject to negotiation. The Kremlin cannot be persuaded, it can only be defeated.

Russia’s game: decouple the war from relations with Washington

If anyone doubts Russia’s intentions, then recent remarks by Vladimir Medinsky, one of Putin’s court ideologists and the Kremlin’s chief representative at recent talks in Istanbul, should put them to rest. “Russia,” Medinsky told the Ukrainian delegation, “is prepared to fight forever.” He added, in reference to the Northern War of 1700-1721, which elevated Russia to the status of an empire, “we fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?”

But with the front line largely static and Russia making miniscule gains with high casualties, forever may turn out to be a very long time and have a very steep cost.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in the first four months of 2025, Russia advanced just 1,627 square kilometers on the front in eastern Ukraine while suffering 160,600 casualties. That’s a staggeringly high ninety-nine casualties for every square kilometer of territory. ISW also estimates that “at this rate of advance, it would take Russian forces approximately 3.9 years to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts,” the four regions Putin has claimed to have annexed. Moreover, according to ISW, it would take nearly a century to seize all of Ukraine save its Western border regions at a cost of nearly fifty million casualties—which is roughly one third Russia’s current population. 

The economics of the war are also not trending in Moscow’s favor. As Charles Lichfield, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center wrote in February, “while Moscow has found ways to mitigate the impact of [Western sanctions], growing deficits, unsustainable subsidies, and the rising cost of debt servicing” are putting severe strain on the Russian economy. 

Additionally, a widely circulated report by Craig Kennedy of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies suggests that the “surprising resilience” that the media and analysts have been seeing in the Russian economy is largely a mirage. According to Kennedy’s research, published earlier this year, the war is largely being financed by concessionary off-the-books loans to defense contractors at well below market interest rates. Simply put, this is not sustainable over the long term.

Given this, the Kremlin’s goal vis-à-vis the United States is to decouple the war from Russia-US relations, normalize relations between Moscow and Washington, and get sanctions relief. In a speech in late February, Putin said that Moscow “would be happy to cooperate with any foreign partners, including American companies” to secure rare-earth-minerals deals. Putin added that lifting sanctions could lead to a profitable new economic relationship between the United States and Russia, particularly in the energy sector. 

Putin, of course, wants an economic rapprochement without ending his quest to conquer Ukraine. Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with aerial assaults, resulting in mass civilian casualties even as he seeks to entice Washington economically. 

And for his part, Trump appears open to the idea. Following his most recent call with Putin, the US president indicated a desire to establish normal economic relations with Moscow. This would be a grave error, as it would throw Putin a lifeline to continue his war of aggression.

Fortunately, there does appear to be pushback in Washington. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, which would expand existing penalties on Russia, was introduced in the US Senate by South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham and Connecticut Democrat Richard Blumenthal and has more than eighty cosponsors.

Europe’s moment and Ukraine’s resolve

For its part, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom have already moved ahead with their own new package of sanctions enacted on May 20, a day after the latest Trump-Putin call. Brussels and London are also pledging to increase military assistance to Ukraine to make up for any shortfall resulting from a US cutoff. 

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, all seem to understand that this could be Europe’s moment. But one of the biggest wildcards going forward is whether Europe can overcome its internal divisions—mainly opposition from Hungary and Slovakia—and surge arms to Ukraine.

Which brings us to Ukraine itself—and here the calculations are simple. As the Ukrainian political scientist Anton Shekhovtsov wrote earlier this week, “Ukraine’s choices are to fight back and risk being killed, or to surrender and be killed. By fighting back, Ukraine has a chance; by surrendering, it has none—making surrender not a viable option.”

And for Ukraine, as always, necessity has become the mother of invention. Faced with a potential shortfall in weapons, Kyiv has created a vibrant domestic arms industry focusing on drone warfare. 

“In just three years, Ukraine’s military has evolved from defending itself with leftover Soviet weapons to pioneering a new kind of warfare,” the Ukrainian war correspondent Nataliya Gumenyuk writes in the Atlantic. 

“Fortunately for Ukraine, American weapons are not the only factor that has rebalanced the battlefield in the past three years. Starting in 2024, Ukrainian-made drones definitively changed the way both sides waged war. For Ukraine, the adjustment was not just tactical, but a broader, doctrinal evolution in how its military fights.”

Gumenyuk concludes by noting that “as Ukraine’s partners speak of peace deals and security guarantees, Ukraine’s armed forces are adapting in every way they can to continue carrying out their mission . . . They cannot afford the luxury of counting on American commitments or Russian concessions, because for most Ukrainians, what matters above all is physical safety. And the only force protecting human lives in Ukraine is the Ukrainian military.”

So here we are, after three years of war and four months of failed diplomacy to end it. This war will be decided on the battlefield. It is for the United States and Europe to decide whether they are prepared to help Ukraine win it.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

The post Welcome to the long war: Why a Ukraine deal was never realistic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So far, the Taliban has adopted more than two hundred decrees targeting women and girls. The bans and restrictions affect all aspects of life—from banning girls’ education past the seventh grade and limiting women’s employment to curtailing their freedom of movement and social engagement. To implement these decrees, Taliban authorities exercise broad discretionary powers to interpret and enforce the law, relying on a range of extrajudicial methods such as physical coercion, social control, and public intimidation.

In effect, the Taliban regime has employed the instruments of lawmaking and law enforcement to establish a system of control and oppression of women that amounts to gender apartheid. The system was reinforced with the adoption of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law on August 21, 2024. While women’s rights and freedoms were already curtailed by earlier Taliban decrees, the adoption and implementation of this law has had far-reaching consequences, stripping women of even more basic rights and personal autonomy and exacerbating their economic dependence and social isolation.

To combat the Taliban’s institutionalization of gender apartheid in Afghanistan, international actors and civil society groups should document both the regime’s human rights abuses and the system of lawmaking and law enforcement that produces them. Documentation strategies should be geared toward supporting ongoing cases at international courts and catalyzing further accountability processes. An international investigative mechanism, modeled on the United Nations’ (UN) International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM), can help to hold the Taliban accountable for implementing gender apartheid and the specific rules and tools they use to maintain that system.

From constitutional order to rule by executive fiat

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the legitimacy and legality of the Afghan state were vested in the 2004 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which served as the supreme law of the country for seventeen years.

The Constitution was preceded by a Constitutional Loya Jirga or “grand council,” held in 2003, and was approved by consensus in January 2004. It provided an overarching legal framework for the relationship between the Afghan government and Afghan citizens and stipulated a set of constitutional principles and rights, such as separation of powers, due process of law, freedom from persecution, and freedom of expression.

In the new order created by the Taliban, by contrast, there is no constitution or equivalent supreme law. Laws and regulations are issued by the Taliban’s leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, by his leadership council, and by a host of public officials and religious authorities in an ad hoc manner. Sometimes they take the form of written decrees, such as the “Virtue and Vice” law, but often they are only issued verbally. For example, officials from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice set the law in declarations and conference speeches, while clerics do so in sermons—bypassing any formal process of lawmaking and ignoring basic requirements that laws must be general, prospective, clear, and stable.

Lawmaking and law enforcement as instruments of control and oppression

In the absence of a constitutional framework that anchors the legal order, regulates the exercise of state power, and protects the rights of citizens, Taliban law draws on a range of other sources. They include extremist religious ideology rooted in a rigid—and contested—interpretation of Sharia law, which has been influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, as well as patriarchal tribal norms and practices.

These sources inform and justify the system of control and oppression of women that has emerged and expanded under Taliban rule, which includes bans and restrictions on women’s education, employment, and a range of fundamental rights and freedoms. While the system is built on a multiplicity of verbal and written decrees and directives, the Taliban is aware that its effectiveness depends on more systematic codification and consolidation. This may explain the broad remit of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law, which, inter alia:

• Bans women from travelling without a male guardian and denies them access to parks, gyms, and other public spaces.
• Requires women to cover their faces and bodies in public; for example, Article 13(8) stipulates: “If an adult woman leaves her home for an essential need, she must cover her voice, face, and body.”
• Declares that women’s voices are awrah (private), which means that women should not be heard in public.

The law’s sweeping, vague language gives the Taliban broad discretionary powers to interpret its provisions, creating ample space for abuses. Article 17, for example, requires media outlets to adhere to religious guidelines, prohibiting any content that may be deemed contrary to Sharia law, without clarifying what that means in practice. Taliban forces are tasked with ensuring compliance with the law—especially by women—and violations are punished with warnings, fines, flogging, and imprisonment. Article 17 gives them broad surveillance and enforcement powers: “Taliban forces are present in markets, streets, universities, offices, and public transportation to ensure that people, particularly women, comply with the imposed laws.”

Such provisions of the “Virtue and Vice” law have further strengthened the core characteristics of law enforcement under the Taliban. An array of authorities—Taliban officials and forces, imams, and other religious figures—are exercising broad discretionary powers to enforce a growing number of vaguely defined rules in arbitrary ways, free from due process constraints and safeguards such as judicial review. Any attempt to resist or circumvent the regime’s bans and restrictions is met with a brutal response, often involving punishment on the spot. Human rights groups have publicized several cases of female activists being detained, disappeared, or killed for protesting Taliban laws. They have documented cases of women getting arrested for secretly teaching young girls and have reported on women being flogged for minor infringements and entire families being ostracized or punished for resisting Taliban edicts. The “Virtue and Vice” law reinforced this brutal system of arbitrary law enforcement with new written edicts that Taliban authorities could use to justify human rights abuses.

Pushing back on gender apartheid: Documentation and accountability strategies

Afghan women are already living in a system of pervasive control and oppression that is best described as gender apartheid. Left unchecked, the Taliban will further institutionalize and entrench that system, making it even more difficult to challenge and reverse in the future. International actors—including international organizations, concerned states, human rights groups, and Afghans in the diaspora—must take appropriate steps to prevent that outcome.

Documentation and accountability strategies offer a path forward. Documenting human rights abuses is critical but given their widespread and systematic character, it must be complimented with documentation of Taliban lawmaking and law enforcement—the rules and practices that produce these abuses. And it must involve structural investigations to show how egregious abuses of power and human rights violations are not byproducts of the system of gender apartheid in Afghanistan but are rather its very means and ends, central to maintaining the system.

Building robust documentation can support ongoing accountability processes and initiatives, such as the case against the Taliban at the International Criminal Court for gender persecution as a crime against humanity. It can also strengthen an anticipated case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In January, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada announced that they intend to sue the Taliban at the ICJ for gross violations of women’s rights, invoking the interjurisdictional clause of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The experiences of other countries affected by widespread and systematic repression and human rights abuses suggest that documentation efforts can open other, potentially unforeseen pathways to accountability—when such efforts are scaled up and institutionalized. Afghanistan needs an international investigative mechanism modeled on the IIIM for Syria. The Syrian IIIM was established by the UN General Assembly—bypassing the Security Council—and has contributed to a spike in universal jurisdiction prosecutions of Syrian offenders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

An IIIM for Afghanistan can serve both as a catalyst and repository for gender apartheid documentation. It can also help build structural investigations and prepare criminal cases for prosecution when jurisdictions are able and willing to take up such cases in the future. This would create a vital resource and build momentum for the growing movement to criminalize gender apartheid in international law and ensure that its architects are held to account.

Wesna Saidy is a poet and researcher with a degree in law and political science, focusing on human rights and gender justice in Afghanistan. She is a fellow at the Civic Engagement Project focusing on documentation.

Iavor Rangelov, PhD, is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and has extensive experience with documentation, justice, and accountability strategies in the Balkans, Central Asia, East Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post How the Taliban is using law for gender apartheid, and how to push back appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The benefits are clear. According to initial estimates, IMEC’s overland transportation route could reduce logistics costs by 30 percent and transportation time by 40 percent relative to shipping via the Suez Canal. The new route would also likely provide important structural benefits, such as reducing the risk of supply chain shocks and lowering energy costs. There are also geopolitical implications: Washington, Europe, and India have welcomed the IMEC proposal as a potential counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

As the main market at the end of the proposed route, Europe has a critical role to play in ensuring IMEC’s success. With its strong regulatory and logistics capacity, the European Union (EU) will need to take a leading role in setting the rules of the game for IMEC while making much-needed investments to resolve specific bottlenecks around financing, customs alignment, and conflict-resolution mechanisms. To do this, however, Europeans will need to act decisively and quickly.

Where IMEC has paused

The initial IMEC signatories include the leaders of India, the United States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Italy, France, Germany, and the European Commission. Although not yet signatories, Greece, Israel, and Jordan are implicitly included in the initiative, given the proposed route that goes through the Port of Haifa as the gateway to the Mediterranean. 

Momentum for the project was strong when it was first announced. However, recent instability in the Middle East has led to substantial uncertainty. Just weeks after the IMEC memorandum of understanding was signed at the G20 Summit, Hamas’s October 7 attack against Israel—and the continuing Israel-Hamas conflict—effectively put the brakes on another important initiative: a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal. Normalization was widely regarded as a critical enabler for progress on IMEC given the centrality of the Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Israel railway link in the project. While normalization would certainly ease political and logistical hurdles, it’s not an absolute requirement, and the project could still move forward with careful diplomatic management. 

This will be an important hurdle to overcome given that a normalization deal does not seem imminent. Immediately following a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in February, where Trump called for turning Gaza into a “Riviera for the Middle East,” the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated the country’s position that it will not seek a full-normalization agreement or engage on Gaza reconstruction until there is “a credible, irreversible pathway to a Palestinian state,” and the establishment of a more enduring cease-fire agreement. The Saudi foreign ministry’s statement did not mention IMEC by name, but it appears to be affected by this pause. 

Where IMEC is moving forward

Despite the lack of top-down progress toward a secretariat or coordinated development plan among the various signatories, there have still been positive developments on IMEC in the interim. Building on a 2024 Intergovernmental Framework Agreement signed between the UAE and India, both countries have deepened their cooperation on IMEC by launching a digital trade corridor and working together on port modernization. As a result of improving bilateral ties, UAE-India trade reached $65 billion in 2024, representing 20.5 percent growth from 2023. India is now the UAE’s second-largest export market, comprising 9 percent of its total foreign trade and 14 percent of its non-oil exports. This year, UAE-India trade is anticipated to reach $85 billion. 

There is other positive news as well. Several European countries have appointed special envoys to IMEC, including France and Italy. And earlier this month, Israel and Cyprus announced new energy development projects under the framework of IMEC, calling to relaunch the Israel-Cyprus-Greece trilateral forum.  

Where Europe steps in

These are all steps in the right direction, but today, it is important for Europe and the United States to double down on their support for IMEC so that this progress doesn’t falter. The EU and Washington can do this by promoting policies that continue to build momentum in various bilateral relationships and sectors underpinning IMEC, which will also reaffirm their leadership roles within the project. This is especially true for European policymakers, who now have a unique opportunity on the tail end of Trump’s visit to the Gulf in May to step up their leadership on IMEC. Doing so now would signal the European Commission’s increasing commitment to securing its core energy, commercial, and connectivity interests from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, while also demonstrating its ability to advance a foreign policy agenda that can gain support in a skeptical Washington. So, how should the EU do this? 

To begin with, Europe should name an official EU coordinator for IMEC. Based in Brussels, this person could coordinate the Europe side of the project, working primarily with the EU commissioner for international partnerships and the EU commissioner for trade and security. The goal should be to integrate regional partners, work on project timetables and cost estimates, and coordinate with France, Italy, and Greece to discuss IMEC’s terminal port. All three of these countries—with their ports of Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Trieste, and Marseille—are vying to host IMEC’s terminal port. At the moment, Greece and Italy seem to make the most sense, simply by virtue of their proximity to both the Middle East and existing infrastructure. In reality, each of these ports will likely play its role in the project, but the final decision will come down to questions of strategic alignment, investment commitments, and geopolitical concerns, including China’s role in the Port of Piraeus. A high-level EU coordinator is necessary to work through these ongoing and often difficult debates. 

Funding must come next. As the EU discusses how to mobilize funding for major defense projects, such as Readiness 2030, it should also rethink how it mobilizes funding for major connectivity projects. Later this year (potentially alongside the planned EU-India Summit tentatively scheduled for the last quarter of 2025) the EU should host a major “IMEC summit” co-hosted with India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. This summit could include the announcement of an IMEC fund, which could be seeded with money out of the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative, the European Investment Bank, and contributions from member states. This would put needed heft behind IMEC (and Global Gateway, for that matter), while simultaneously showcasing the EU’s ability to lead on major initiatives. In turn, these tangible commitments could potentially attract more private and Gulf investment. 

Although the idea of EU-level debt issuance comes with real questions and caveats about the drawbacks and risks over joint borrowing, the EU could create an IMEC fund building on financial mechanisms already in place. For instance, the European Investment Bank (EIB) already issues “green bonds,” known as Climate Awareness Bonds (CABs) and Sustainability Awareness Bonds (SABs). These bonds finance projects that support climate action and environmental sustainability. The EIB could issue CABs and SABs that help fund “green” portions of IMEC, such as a renewable energy grid and a green hydrogen pipeline, but it could also create IMEC-specific bonds that could attract investors interested in the project more generally. These could help with things like port upgrades or rail construction. 

Finally, a strong India-EU partnership will be key to advancing IMEC. In February, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the EU College of Commissioners visited New Delhi. This first-of-its-kind trip highlighted the EU’s recognition that it needs to look beyond the United States for stable long-term economic partnerships. For its part, India appears ready to jump at this opportunity. Thus, IMEC’s chances of success could be bolstered by the EU and India continuing to build the economic and connectivity projects already underway. Officially signing the free trade agreement after years of negotiations, for example, will be a difficult but necessary step in that direction. 

Stronger European leadership alone will not overcome all the hurdles ahead for IMEC. It is unlikely, for example, to deliver an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal or bring peace to the Middle East. However, it is important both for the EU and Washington that IMEC projects develop in line with their shared values, priorities, and vision for a secure region-spanning architecture.

Factoring in the view from Washington

For a Washington that wants to see results and is renegotiating how it works with its allies, firm, coordinated, and proactive European leadership that makes tangible—if incremental—progress on IMEC would likely be perceived positively. As IMEC moves forward, the United States will likely emphasize the importance of mitigating Chinese influence across dual-use infrastructure and in the sectors promoted by the project. Washington will also be interested in ensuring open competition for tenders and contracts related to IMEC projects and guaranteeing a role for US companies in the initiative. Europe needs to step up its proactive leadership of IMEC to get ahead of these concerns, particularly before a ministerial meeting is set to determine the path toward a more formalized governance architecture.

History shows that when Trump sees an area ripe for investment, he commits. Now is the right time for Europe to lead on IMEC as the United States is actively deepening its relationships with all the corridor countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and India, and is calling on European leaders to do more. The problem each side keeps running into is the classic “first-mover problem,” whereby early players shoulder an outsized share of risk given the overall uncertainty. The success of IMEC could potentially reshape connectivity and trade throughout the globe and lay the framework for more projects of its kind. The EU should jump at the opportunity to help make it something tangible.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. 

Nicholas Shafer is a consultant at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

The post It is Europe’s time to shine on IMEC  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I have written about the Nippon deal numerous times, always emphasizing the commercial benefits of the deal, the ways in which Japanese investment in the US steel industry is a net positive for US national-security concerns, and the dangers of blocking the transaction. The big question now, beyond the specific details of the Nippon deal, is if the CFIUS process itself has changed in ways that will affect future deals.

Rather than indicate that CFIUS has returned to its narrow national-security mandate, the Nippon deal suggests that the Trump administration is willing to use CFIUS authorities to intervene in private transactions for political and industrial policy objectives.

First, the terms of the deal, while still scant, suggest that most of the terms mirror what was already on the table, just with a different public relations spin. In an attempt to head off criticism of the transaction, Nippon clarified that US Steel would retain its name and Pittsburgh headquarters and a majority US-citizen board. As public pressure against the deal mounted, Nippon also committed to invest substantially in upgrading US capacity and promised to not offshore US production. 

Second, what may be different from Nippon’s previous offer is what US Senator David McCormick (R-PA) is describing as a “golden share.” This arrangement would likely give the US government direct control over a certain number of board seats, though no specific details of the arrangement have been disclosed. Despite the use of the term “share,” there doesn’t seem to be any indication that the US government would take an ownership stake in the company. While CFIUS mitigation agreements have in the past provided the US government with some authority to maintain minimum standards for key personnel post-merger, it would be a substantial increase in the use of CFIUS authorities to create an open-ended requirement for the US government to approve board members in an active and ongoing manner. 

Depending on the final wording of the arrangement and the manner in which CFIUS implements it, government control over board members could be used for broad industrial policy practices. CFIUS is supposed to analyze proposed cross-border acquisitions for discrete national-security risks and to only intervene if it finds a risk to national security that arises from the transaction under review. Its mechanisms for intervention are a mitigation agreement or a recommendation that the president prohibit the investment. CFIUS was not envisioned as a tool to manage US industries’ strategic competitiveness broadly, but the United States’ expanded interest in critical supply chains has substantially blurred the line between strategic industrial policy considerations and narrow national-security concerns. 

If the US government began imposing strict production requirements on Nippon, that would mark a substantial drift toward statist production management measures. Moreover, the embrace of a more forward-leaning mitigation stance would mirror the French approach to foreign investment review since 2014. As a reflection of how that has played out, Paris imposed mitigation measures on 53 percent of authorized transactions in 2022. More to the point, it would run counter to the White House’s America First Investment Policy, which explicitly calls for the end of “overly bureaucratic, complex, and open-ended ‘mitigation’ agreements” in favor of ones that “consist of concrete actions that companies can complete within a specific time, rather than perpetual and expensive compliance obligations.” 

Finally, Trump, who announced a celebratory rally in Pittsburgh along with the agreement, and Biden, who touted his decision on the campaign trail, set a concerning precedent by openly politicizing the Nippon Steel deal. In 1975, US President Gerald Ford established CFIUS through Executive Order 11858. Originally little more than a data-seeking exercise, CFIUS was explicitly formed to depoliticize foreign direct investment (FDI) at a time when some members of Congress were increasingly alarmed about the security implications of investments from oil-rich nations. Over the years, the four major overhauls of CFIUS authorities in 1988, 1992, 2007, and 2018 have all, to varying degrees, featured a tug-of-war between a Congress that sought more oversight over FDI for a mixture of security and political reasons and an executive branch that generally tried to keep FDI from becoming a political football. 

If CFIUS reviews become simply political talking points—rather than being based on factual merits—and if firms think that they must mollify the US president in order to be allowed to invest in the United States, then the Nippon Steel deal will be remembered as the transaction that confirmed the fifty-year attempt to depoliticize FDI into the United States has failed.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

The post Does the Nippon Steel deal reflect a new normal for foreign investment in the US? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

Public Event Tue, May 27, 2025 • 9:00 am ET

The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson on Britain in an enduring transatlantic relationship

British Ambassador to the United States The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson speaks at the 2025 Christopher J. Makins lecture to discuss the significance of the transatlantic relationship during this unprecedented geopolitical period.

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Eighty years ago this month, the streets of Britain, America, and allied nations erupted in celebration at the fall of fascism in Europe.

For me personally, it’s a source of enormous pride that my grandfather, Herbert Morrison, served as home secretary in Winston Churchill’s wartime coalition.

He also served as deputy prime minister in Clement Attlee’s transformative postwar government in Britain. That government didn’t just support the formation of NATO to counter Soviet expansionism—they were the co-architects of it.

Amidst Cold War tensions and economic upheaval, Britain and America advanced from allies to integrated strategic partners at the dawn of the nuclear age, our scientists having joined forces in the Manhattan Project to create the advantage we had at the beginning of this age. 

It was Western unity which ultimately ended the Cold War peacefully and demonstrated resilience to new threats, including the 9/11 attacks, where NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time.

Over eight decades, the foundations of collective defense have remained steadfast whilst the transatlantic relationship has continuously evolved and adapted to counter new challenges.

Today, I want to talk about the profound challenge we face in a new age of great power rivalry, a period characterized by political volatility, by economic mercantilism, and geopolitical competition.

We are witnessing the end of an era of hyper-globalization where we assumed that economic integration had made wars almost obsolete.

The logic seemed compelling: Mutual interests, integrated global supply chains, and shared economic stakes created too much to lose from warfare. History seemed to point only in one direction.

And those comfortable assumptions have been shattered.

We now see the rise of modern mercantilism, where nations prefer to prioritize national economic strength and autonomy in many respects.

States are intervening and playing a more protectionist role in managing trade and directing industrial policy to become ever more self-sufficient and localized.

I’m not declaring globalization dead, but it is being radically reconfigured around us.

China’s export-driven growth strategy flooded the global market with state-subsidized products, undercut Western manufacturing, and hollowed out industry.

The social disruption of rapid technological change, where, if you take media as an example, we have moved suddenly from decades of information flowing to people through established news organizations to a future where you only see “news” online that is curated to what you want to know, or what the algorithm—and those behind it—decides you want to know. And then there’s the backlash against globalization’s uneven distribution of benefits.

You can produce many different numbers to show the widening wealth disparities in the West over the past thirty years, but I would choose a simple one: GDP per capita in the United States has grown about 60 percent to 70 percent in real terms, but real median household income growth has been about 20 percent to 25 percent. The typical American household has not done as well as the booming US economy would suggest. A similar story holds true across all our countries in the West.

This has posed profound challenges to culture, place, and society—which too many of us over the past decades, frankly, have ignored. From the American Midwest to the coastal towns of England, a hands-off approach left many places adrift from the success stories of global cities such as London and New York.

And in a world which has often felt dominated by the exponential rise of social media, a sense of grievance—and of difference between us and them—has been amplified.

So yes, I credit President Trump’s acute political instincts in identifying the anxieties gripping not only millions of Americans, but also far more pervasive global trends: Economic stagnation, a sense of irreversible decline, the lost promise of meaningful work for so many people. These are the giants now that we must confront head-on.

So, where do we go next?

It is in no one’s interest—certainly not those of close allies—that each country pursues a wholly individualized path, which leads to accelerated economic fragmentation.

But if we are serious about rebuilding confidence in the international system, if we wish to maintain a set of common rules and standards—a shared economic and security commons in between us—we need to devote an enormous amount of energy and goodwill to preserve, sustain, and deepen the alliances which exist between like-minded countries.

For the UK and the rest of Europe, we must reboot the transatlantic alliance—indeed, a boot up the proverbial backside is needed now—to deliver peace through strength across three interconnected domains: military, economic, and technological.

For my generation, the twentieth-century gains in peace and prosperity were thought of as a European peace dividend. 

I now recognize it as an urgent bill, that peace dividend: An urgent bill for decades of defense underinvestment—a payment that is long overdue.

We have lived in a fantasy created by the US security guarantee, complacent that a friendly heavyweight across the water would be always there when the going gets tough.

We meet in the shadow of Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year.

The UK strongly supports President Trump’s initiative to bring this terrible war to an end. And we are working together with partners to secure a just and lasting peace. 

The Ukraine conflict has served as a brutal wake-up call. State-on-state war has returned to Europe. Adversaries are using nuclear rhetoric to influence decision-making, and we are seeing regular attacks on European infrastructure beneath the threshold of warfare.

It is crystal clear that European defense must step up and rebalance for our collective security. Actually, I think President Trump is doing Europe a favor by confronting us with this reality.

The United States is the UK’s closest defense and security ally. We must become less dependent on America, while remaining inseparably linked to America—a distinction that I underline of critical importance. Yes, less dependent, but still inseparably linked.

Ukraine is just one flashpoint of many amid growing global instability. Even the US does not have limitless resources.

This is precisely why Britain must step up in providing for European security and why we have committed to the biggest sustained increase in defense spending since the Cold War.

We will become NATO’s fastest-innovating nation, ensuring our military forces have the technological and military capabilities to secure long-term strategic advantage, not just spending more, but spending better.

Of course, this all needs to be grounded in intelligent and effective strategic choices, not merely increased expenditure. Efficiency and innovation to renew our defense manufacturing bases must drive every pound, every dollar, and every euro that we invest.

And we will double down on our alliances. In defense, we will always be NATO first but not NATO only—and this is particularly true of the UK’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, as well as our new security partnership with Europe.  

One good example is AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership with Australia and America, which will deliver advanced nuclear-powered submarines and catalyze technology sharing on other advanced capabilities.

Turning to the theme of economic strength, Britain now enjoys something that has eluded us for far too long: a government with both unity of purpose and longevity.

This government’s mandate and President Trump’s will both last for the next four years—providing huge opportunities for collaboration between us.

We are both pro-business and pro-trade in Britain, and committed to innovation, not as empty slogans but as practical imperatives.

This UK government is committed to creating the best investment environment with a regulatory reset that makes us the most competitive in Europe—that’s our aim.

One of the reasons we were able to close the first trade deal of the Trump administration is that our strong economic relationship between our countries is fair, balanced, and reciprocal. But also because, frankly, we are a businesslike nation with pragmatic instincts.

One of the great backhanded insults in British history was when Napoleon Bonaparte dismissed us as a mere “nation of shopkeepers.” He was right: Commerce is the lifeblood which flows through our veins, and that is one reason why we British and American cousins remain so close.

And that is also one reason why I see the current deal as the beginning of a new chapter as well as an end, in a sense, in itself. There is scope for an even more transformative stage in our long partnership. And I believe that centers on technology.

So let me address technological strength as the third. We face a clear, shared threat. There is nothing in this world I fear more than China winning the race for technological dominance in the coming decades.

China represents a far more dynamic and formidable strategic rival than the Soviet Union ever was: economically sophisticated, highly innovative, and strategically patient.

The United Kingdom and United States are the only two Western nations with trillion-dollar technology ecosystems combined with unparalleled talent and research capabilities in our universities and corporations. 

We must combine forces, in my view, to drive the scientific breakthroughs that will define this century, and AI should be the spearpoint of that collaboration.

Artificial intelligence stands as the next great foundational technology. Through its power, we can rapidly make progress across so many frontiers of science: quantum, synthetic biology, medicine, nuclear fusion.

Rather than stifling these transformative technologies through excessive regulation, our two governments must unleash their immense potential for human benefit and Western advantage.

Let me say this in conclusion. In his immortal Iron Curtain speech, delivered in Missouri, Churchill spoke eloquently about the primacy of American power and its awesome responsibility to future generations.

Today, we face our own historical inflection point.

No one should doubt that we face accelerating global competition in which it is strongly in our interests to expand the perimeter of our alliances while deepening the transatlantic partnership at its core.

So our diplomacy must be more urgent, more agile, and more creative. We must deepen the political and military alliances which defined our past successes but also create new partnerships—borne in and of technology—which will redefine our future. The stakes could not be higher. The opportunities, actually, could not be greater. And I am confident that our two countries will indeed rise together to meet those challenges.

Peter Mandelson is the British ambassador to the United States.

Watch the full event

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What’s new?

On May 25, US President Donald Trump issued a blistering criticism of Russia’s massive and dayslong bombardment of Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities. Trump’s language was blunt and directed squarely at Russian President Vladimir Putin. In an impromptu discussion with reporters, Trump said of Putin: “I’ve known him a long time, always gotten along with him, but he’s sending rockets into cities and killing people, and I don’t like it at all. We’re in the middle of talking and he’s sending rockets into Kyiv and other cities. I don’t like it at all.” He also spoke about imposing additional sanctions on Russia.

Trump followed up this statement with a strongly worded Truth Social post, in which he said that Putin “has gone absolutely CRAZY! . . . I’ve always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that’s proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia!” 

What does it mean?

These developments have led some observers to ask whether, after weeks of expressing frustration but ultimately accommodating Kremlin obstructionism, the Trump administration is about to take a tough stand. This was the strongest of several statements Trump has made against Putin over the past two months as it has become obvious, even to members of the administration who have sought to end support for Ukraine, that Putin has no interest in accepting Trump’s approach to achieving a negotiated end to the war. Trump made similar remarks in late April and early May, both suggesting that he would impose additional sanctions on Russia.

But there’s the rub. Trump’s criticism of Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and Kremlin nay-saying in the peace talks has not led to new sanctions. And just last week, after his long phone call with Putin, who once more refused US terms for a cease-fire, Trump heralded the Kremlin call for continuing direct Russia-Ukraine talks. It is therefore no surprise that Putin doubled down with massive air strikes in Ukraine.

Putin no doubt takes solace that in the Truth Social post that labeled him “CRAZY,” Trump also slammed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for “talking the way he does. Everything out of his mouth causes problems, I don’t like it, and it better stop.” At this point, Putin reads Trump, like other Western leaders since Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia, as unwilling to take strong action against aggression.

Is Putin right? Yes, Trump has vacillated over the past three months, treating Zelenskyy’s understandable public reservations about White House wavering more harshly than Putin’s active obstruction of US objectives. Trump has also taken substantial criticism from friendly editorial pages, such as the New York Post and the Wall Street Journal, as well as from at least some Republicans in Congress. On Monday, Republican Representative Don Bacon and Republican Senator Chuck Grassley both publicly called on Trump to take further action against Russia. 

What to watch next

What’s more, momentum is building to move the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025—introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and now cosponsored by eighty-one senators. According to well-connected Republicans, the White House saw value in the presentation of the bill in April as a way of subtly putting pressure on the Kremlin, but it did not want any movement toward passage at that time. In the wake of recent developments, I am hearing that the Trump administration is mulling giving Republican senators the option of voting their conscience. With more than eighty cosponsors, that means the bill would pass easily.

This step cannot be taken for granted, and it is a sign that Putin’s aggressive posture—which prompted even US Vice President JD Vance to remark earlier this month that Russia was asking for too much—may finally prompt Trump to take more vigorous action. Indeed, Putin continued his vicious air campaign on Monday night, prompting another Truth Social post on Tuesday where Trump focused only on Putin, saying that the Russian leader is “playing with fire.”  

While it remains to be seen whether actions will follow from Trump’s tougher rhetoric, Zelenskyy could help himself and Ukraine by taking a page from Putin’s playbook and controlling his urge to criticize White House policy. Responding to Trump’s strong criticism of Russia’s belligerence, Putin called Trump overly emotional but still thanked him for his peace efforts. Even justified criticism of US policy by the Ukrainian president diverts Trump’s attention from the real problem.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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Within the Trump administration, there appear to be competing and sometimes contradictory perspectives over what dollar dominance means for US policy interests. The perspectives mirror broader debates beyond the White House about the role of the US dollar. Three divergent playbooks—around the dollar as a reserve, payment tool, and store of value—are worth exploring, not least because they are increasingly at odds.

The “America first” dollar

For Trump, the dollar’s international role appears to be of a piece with his broader “America first” philosophy. Trump’s statements suggest that he sees the use of the dollar in global payments as a symbol of US nationalism. During his campaign, for example, Trump threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on nations from the BRICS group of emerging economies and others seeking to build alternative currency blocs aimed at undermining “the mighty US dollar.” In his words: “You leave the dollar, you are not doing business with the United States.”

Trump’s renewed tariff policy risks undermining dollar dominance by disrupting the economic relationships that have sustained the global dollar system. The many countries that run trade surpluses with the United States value holding and using dollars in international trade. This is because the dollar boasts strong network effects and highly liquid markets. It offers ease of trade and the convenience of invoicing and settling in a single dominant currency. This creates a cycle: Dollars flow out when the United States imports more than it exports, and then those dollars come back as foreign investment in US assets. If the United States reduces imports significantly—via tariffs or trade restrictions, for example—fewer dollars flow abroad. There are already signs that this is happening: Foreign investors have sold $63 billion in US equities between March and April 2025, and the US dollar index is down 8 percent this year. This marks a major retrenchment given that foreign investors entered 2025 with a record 18 percent ownership share of US equities.

Although tariffs are paid by US importers, they also hurt foreign exporters by reducing demand for their goods. Importantly, these tariffs signal that the United States is willing to use its dominant position in global trade and finance as a tool of coercion. In response, affected countries may seek to reduce their dependencies on the United States by developing alternative payment systems, trading in local currencies, and diversifying their reserves. These likely consequences may be an incentive for the administration to pursue a more moderate tariff policy than originally announced, as is already happening, at least temporarily.

Trump also sees domestic innovation in private sector financial technology as central to sustaining the dollar’s global role. On January 23, Trump signed an executive order encouraging the development of dollar-backed stablecoins issued by private firms to enshrine dollar dominance. As much as 80 percent of the flow of dollar-backed stablecoins is happening outside of the United States, and countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Nigeria have seen significant adoption of stablecoins for remittances or as a hedge against local currency instability. 

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller have emphasized that stablecoins could reinforce the dollar’s primacy by creating new demand for US Treasuries, since almost 99 percent of stablecoins are dollar-denominated. While the widespread adoption of dollar-backed stablecoins could reinforce dollar dominance, it also introduces new vulnerabilities. For example, stablecoins could potentially accelerate de-dollarization, especially if nations become concerned about excessive dollarization of their economies and threats to monetary sovereignty. 

According to the Atlantic Council’s central bank digital currency (CBDC) tracker, there has been a global increase in retail CBDC development since the Trump administration took office—potentially signaling that countries are creating domestic digital alternatives specifically designed to limit the proliferation of dollar-backed stablecoins in their economies. Moreover, if inadequately regulated, stablecoins could pose systemic risks—such as triggering bank runs or forcing the liquidation of reserve assets during periods of financial stress, destabilizing Treasury markets. Furthermore, widespread stablecoin adoption without appropriate regulations could lead to shadow payment systems evading traditional oversight, undermining sanctions and monetary policy.

Internal tensions within the Trump administration on digital assets are already emerging. Trump’s inner circle of business leaders appear to favor the broader adoption of digital assets to bolster US competitiveness, while national security officials seem to worry that stablecoins could facilitate money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as undermine Washington’s ability to effectively wield sanctions. The ultimate role of stablecoins in the dollar’s international standing will depend on whether these two groups can reconcile the multiple priorities at stake.

The dollar as an economic burden

But there are other views on the dollar in the White House, as well. Stephen Miran, the chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, has argued that the dollar’s reserve currency status comes at a steep cost to American workers and industry. In November 2024, Miran framed the dollar’s reserve currency status as a structural liability—one that forces the United States to run persistent trade deficits and maintain an overvalued dollar to meet global demand for safe dollar-denominated assets. At the time, Miran proposed unconventional remedies, including purposely devaluing the dollar to create a multipolar currency system to share the reserve status burden. 

Miran seems unconcerned about the dollar’s share of global central bank reserves but acknowledges the risks of a weaker dollar—primarily that investors might abandon dollar assets, increasing US borrowing costs. His proposed solution is to “term out” US debt by convincing countries to exchange short-term holdings for one-hundred-year bonds. While this would lock in foreign investment and reduce rollover risk, the extremely distant maturity could undermine trust rather than build it. Reserve holders prioritize liquidity and flexibility, so dramatically extending maturities might backfire, accelerating diversification away from dollar assets as the currency depreciates.

A fractured coexistence

At the heart of these competing views lies a critical tension that policymakers must address: The dollar serves multiple functions globally, and each function demands distinct strategic approaches.

Miran’s critique focuses on the dollar’s role as a reserve currency. Trump’s BRICS tariff threats, by contrast, focus on the dollar’s payments role. And the Federal Reserve and Treasury’s emphasis on stablecoins is best understood as an attempt to bolster the dollar’s store-of-value function. These are different hats that the dollar wears, and they often require divergent policy responses. Managing one of the hats without due attention to the others risks internal contradictions that could erode the very dominance policymakers seek to preserve.

It is unclear which side within the administration will ultimately have more influence, leading to uncertainty about US policy in the interim.

So what’s the dollar strategy, then?

To maintain long-term dollar dominance, the Trump administration should focus on creating a cohesive policy that reconciles the dollar’s multiple roles and avoids conflicting policy actions. Central to this effort should be a commitment to financial stability (avoiding large-scale tariffs, significant currency manipulation, and cryptocurrency spillover). The world is more likely to view the dollar as trustworthy when it sees the United States as a stable and reliable custodian of foreign assets.

Here are three specific ways the White House can pursue a strong, cohesive dollar policy:

Promote responsible innovation and oversight of dollar-backed stablecoins: The administration—particularly national security agencies, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve—should actively monitor risks posed by the global proliferation of dollar-backed stablecoins. Policymakers should not ignore the accelerated dollarization of emerging markets and potential restrictive responses. Regulation alone is insufficient; clear enforcement mechanisms are needed to ensure compliance and mitigate systemic risk.

Seek stability through strategic trade measures: The administration should prioritize a stable trade policy and eliminate broad, across-the-board tariffs. Instead, it should apply targeted measures to address specific instances of nonmarket practices and currency manipulation. This would help preserve the dollar’s role by maintaining global investor confidence and ensuring continued dollar circulation in trade without disrupting broader relationships or supply chains.

Reinforce institutional credibility and policy coordination: Reaffirming the Federal Reserve’s independence is important for maintaining global confidence in US monetary policy, capital markets, and the dollar’s long-term strength. At the same time, the administration should enhance the coordination of analytic efforts and ensure consistency across agencies in messaging and policy implementation on dollar-related issues. This could be achieved by more effectively leveraging existing interagency structures, such as the National Security Council and the National Economic Council. Or, if necessary, it could be done by creating a new, dedicated coordination mechanism. The key objective is to deliver greater clarity, predictability, and coherence in the government’s approach.

Above all, policymakers should recognize that the greatest threat to the dollar is not external—it is the erosion of trust in the United States’ political and legal institutions. The dollar is not just backed by the size of the US economy; it is backed by faith in the rule of law, the sanctity of contracts, an independent central bank, and the stability of democratic governance. Structural advantages—network effects, deep capital markets, and the dollar’s centrality to global payments—make its dominance resilient. But these foundations are only as stable as the legal, political, and institutional frameworks behind them. If that foundation weakens, then no number of tariffs or volume of stablecoins can preserve the dollar’s central role in the global system.

For now, there is no viable alternative to the dollar. But the Trump administration’s competing and fractured view on the dollar’s various roles may cause enduring harm to its long-term dominance.

Alisha Chhangani is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Israel Rosales contributed to the data visualization in this article.

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New reactors and national security

“Deploying Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security” is the most comprehensive of the four. It aims to speed the deployment of advanced reactors at Department of Defense facilities, in order to provide power for military installations and for operational energy. The executive order notes that the regulatory pathway will be through the United States Army and ambitiously calls for one reactor to be operational at a “domestic military base or installation no later than September 30, 2028.” It also calls for the deployment of advanced reactors at Department of Energy facilities, and it directs the US secretary of energy to designate artificial intelligence (AI) data centers that “are located at or operated in coordination with Department of Energy facilities . . . as critical defense facilities, where appropriate.” 

In a departure from what has been the US government’s de facto stance toward commercial nuclear fuel recycling in the United States (assuming that it refers to commercial reactors), this order calls for the US secretary of energy to “identify all useful uranium and plutonium material within the Department of Energy’s inventories that may be recycled or processed into nuclear fuel for reactors in the United States.” There are currently no domestic commercial fuel recycling facilities in the United States, and the partnership outlined in this order between the Department of Energy and industry will likely be a boon to US reactor companies looking to use recycled fuel, especially as competitor countries stand up their own recycling capabilities. The order then goes on to direct the Department of Energy to provide high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for commercial reactors that are authorized to deploy at the department’s sites. This will add to the demand signal for HALEU fuel and strengthen the domestic nuclear fuel supply chain.

Importantly, the order excludes the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for construction of advanced reactors on some federal sites. It also notes that there may be additional categories that will be excluded from adhering to NEPA. The Department of the Interior already has a number of categorical exclusions for NEPA (for example, for geothermal exploration) but does not yet have any listed for nuclear reactors. The rest of this order touches on interagency coordination, civil nuclear exports, and employee clearances.

Changes to the NRC

At first glance, the next executive order, “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” appears more measured than news reports had predicted over the past few weeks. It mentions a reduction in force for the commission, but it notes that “certain functions may increase in size consistent with the policies in this order, including those devoted to new reactor licensing.” At the same time, the order directs the NRC to finalize a revision of its regulations and guidance documents, and this revision must be concluded within eighteen months. It also directs an eighteen-month deadline for final decisions on construction and operation applications for any type of nuclear reactor. It is difficult to see how an understaffed agency will be able to complete more work in less time.

Although the new executive order does not explicitly mention White House oversight of the NRC, it does note the involvement of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and especially the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in reorganizing the NRC. These measures, combined with the February 18 executive order “Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies”—which already decreased the independence of the NRC—could likely reduce the NRC’s workforce and lessen its standing among global nuclear regulatory authorities. This could happen even as the White House directs it to hasten its regulatory processes to expedite the licensing and deployment of next-generation nuclear technologies.

The question of new testing

A third order, “Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy,” directs the national laboratory system to reform its process for ensuring that reactor developers are able to test their reactors quickly and effectively. However, the document does not explicitly direct the national laboratory system to construct new test reactor facilities. The first Trump administration signed into law the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Capabilities Act in 2017, which addressed the need for a fast-neutron test reactor and resulted in the start of the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) project at Idaho National Laboratory.* But Congress later defunded this project. Although the new order does not explicitly call for the construction of a new testing facility, its direction to increase capacity for testing new reactors may lead Congress to look again at the VTR project.

The broader nuclear base

Finally, “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base” addresses well-trodden issues, such as workforce development and the restarting, completion, uprating, or construction of nuclear power plants. It also calls for a new report to address the fuel cycle, especially regarding high-level waste management, fuel recycling (including commercial recycling), isotopes, and enrichment and conversion. This new report would follow the Nuclear Fuel Working Group’s 2020 report “Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership,” which focused on the front-end of the fuel cycle as well as civil nuclear exports. The order also notes that the US secretary of energy shall update the department’s “excess uranium management policy to align with the policy objectives of this order and the Nuclear Fuel Security Act” of 2023, which was signed into law by US President Joe Biden. 

Based on these new executive orders and earlier announcements, the second Trump administration’s policies toward nuclear energy seem largely aligned with the policies of the Biden administration and the first Trump administration. The major shift that is reflected in this set of executive orders is the desire to conduct a reduction in force across government agencies and to weaken the independence of regulatory authorities, including the NRC. In the new orders, the Trump administration has articulated ambitious goals for rapid deployment of next-generation nuclear technologies; however, reducing personnel and funding for the NRC and the Department of Energy, along with weakening the NRC’s independence and global credibility, will make it challenging to realize the full potential of the US nuclear energy industry. 

Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Note: The Idaho National Laboratory is a donor to the Atlantic Council’s Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative.

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Typically, new Bangladeshi leaders head to India for their first bilateral visit abroad, but Yunus instead traveled to China. Peking University bestowed him with an honorary doctorate. China’s ambassador in Dhaka hailed the trip as the “most important visit” by any Bangladeshi leader in the last half a century. Yunus himself declared that the Bangladesh-China relationship has entered “a new stage.” The symbolism was unmistakable: Dhaka is abandoning its decades-long balancing act between India and China for a more assertive embrace of Beijing.

Bangladesh, with which India shares its longest international border, is critical to India’s security. For China, Bangladesh is a vital partner in its Belt and Road Initiative and String of Pearls ambitions, offering a strategic foothold in India’s backyard. Welcoming Chinese influence may put wind in Bangladesh’s economic sails, but it comes with the risk of transforming the nation into a battleground for the Sino-Indian rivalry. Bangladesh, in its hasty geopolitical gambit, may have just traded a delicate tightrope for treacherous quicksand.

China’s gains and India’s losses

China didn’t hold back during Yunus’s visit. Bangladesh secured $2.1 billion in investments, loans, and grants. The real wins for Beijing, however, were strategic: a $400 million modernization deal for Mongla Port—Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport—and increased engagement with the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project.

The Teesta project, in particular, strikes at the heart of regional tensions. For over a decade, negotiations between India and Bangladesh over sharing the river’s water have stalled, with Bangladesh wanting a larger share to address water scarcity in the north. The Teesta Barrage, built to direct the flow of the Teesta River, sits perilously close to India’s “Chicken’s Neck”—the narrow corridor linking India’s mainland to its turbulent northeastern states, known as the Seven Sisters. This narrow corridor lies just a few hundred miles south of an area where China’s military presence is growing, positioning the strip as a strategic chokepoint. India perceives Chinese military presence in the region as an existential threat, as Chinese boots on the ground could quickly divide India in two.

For years, China has expressed its interest in the Teesta River management project due to the river’s strategic significance. Just last year, then Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina indicated that she would cede the project to India, given both nations’ shared stake in the river’s water, or perhaps a calculated measure aimed at soothing New Delhi’s security concerns regarding Chinese influence in the region. Yunus’s decision to greenlight China’s involvement constitutes a major shift, representing a diplomatic coup for China and a direct challenge to India.

Compounding this tension, some media outlets reported a possible Chinese proposal to construct an airfield in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district, which is also near India’s “Chicken’s Neck” region. Soon afterward, media outlets also reported that India has bolstered its military presence in the area.

Bangladeshi diplomatic moves toward China didn’t stop there. For the first time, Dhaka explicitly opposed Taiwan’s independence. And the two countries brokered a deal to invite Chinese investment to modernize and expand facilities at the Mongla Port, which hands China another strategic foothold in the Bay of Bengal.

Yunus appears to see China as a springboard to elevate Bangladesh’s global stature. He even mused that Bangladesh could serve as “an extension of the Chinese economy” and the sole oceanic gateway for India’s Seven Sisters states, calling the states “landlocked”—a remark that surely rattled New Delhi.

This pivot toward China marks a stark departure from Hasina’s cautious ambiguity in balancing China and India during her fifteen-year tenure. Over the last decade of Hasina’s administration, China has become Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, top supplier of military hardware (including two submarines and support for a naval dock), and leading development partner under the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, Hasina ensured that economic cooperation with China never undermined Dhaka’s relationship with New Delhi—especially given that her political party, the Awami League, has long been India’s ally.

Since Hasina’s dramatic exit amid the July 2024 uprising, India-Bangladesh relations have plummeted to their lowest ebb. Tensions along the border have flared. Just before taking power, Yunus issued a warning that any Indian attempt to destabilize Bangladesh could spill over to India’s volatile Seven Sisters states—a statement many Indian analysts interpreted as a veiled threat. Last year, Dhaka accused India of opening water gates to flood Bangladesh. India, in turn, raised alarms over attacks on minorities in Bangladesh—claims Dhaka dismissed as grossly exaggerated. In addition, the spread of disinformation among Indian media has added to these tensions.

On top of that, Hasina, now exiled in India, remains a festering sore in bilateral ties. Bangladesh has demanded her extradition to face charges related to mass killings and forced disappearances during student-led uprisings in July and August 2024, but India has so far refused. The Indian Army chief has publicly stated that normalized relations between the two nations hinge on Bangladesh installing an elected government—a pointed jab at Yunus’s unelected interim regime.

Eight months into his tenure, Yunus finally secured face time with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April after New Delhi rebuffed Dhaka’s earlier overtures before the pivotal Chinese visit in March. Yunus brought up long-standing issues such as border killings and Hasina’s extradition, while Modi reiterated concerns about minority oppression in Bangladesh and cautioned against provocative rhetoric—likely referencing Yunus’s recent comments about India’s Seven Sisters region. Although a necessary first step toward repairing relations, the talks more closely resembled a recitation of grievances than an attempt at reconciliation. The ice finally cracked—but hardly melted.

Why Bangladesh must move with caution

Bangladesh has outgrown its days as a small power. As one of South Asia’s largest economies—and with a strategic position at the Bay of Bengal and a population of 170 million—Bangladesh now wields considerable political clout. With that clout, Bangladesh can more easily chart an independent foreign policy.

As the global order continues to evolve, great powers are realigning, and nations across Asia (including Bangladesh) are recalibrating their relationships to match new realities and national interests. Yet, this moment of opportunity demands caution. A headlong rush toward China risks Bangladesh’s future for four critical reasons.

First, China’s allure comes with caveats. Though Bangladesh has benefited from Chinese investment, there are still risks. Since 2014, China has pledged forty billion dollars to Bangladesh through its Belt and Road Initiative, yet only $7.07 billion has materialized. Although now operational, ventures such as the Padma Bridge and Payra Power Plant faced delays and cost overruns during construction. Furthermore, Chinese loans come with a 3 percent interest rate, higher than the rates offered by other lenders, though Beijing is now considering lowering the rate. Yunus’s government must continue to pursue careful loans and avoid the common risks associated with an overreliance on Chinese investments to secure Bangladesh’s economic future.

Second, India, a geopolitical heavyweight next door, cannot be ignored. Bangladesh sits nearly encircled by India, leaving both countries mutually dependent. Any friction with India over strategic projects like Teesta would trigger cascading security and economic consequences. Bangladesh’s ties with China must be fostered with careful geopolitical calculation, not as an impulsive reaction to the friction with India that has appeared since Hasina’s ouster. Strategic clarity, not emotion, should guide Dhaka’s choices.

Third, the United States looms as Bangladesh’s “third neighbor,” meaning that Dhaka’s shift toward China may have consequences beyond South Asia. As Bangladesh’s largest export market, the United States wields outsized influence over Dhaka’s policy. In Hasina’s final years, Washington ramped up pressure over Bangladesh’s closeness to China and democratic backsliding. Hasina was able to juggle US demands and maintain bilateral ties with the United States by leveraging her connections with India. Indian officials were concerned about the opposition in Bangladesh gaining power and lobbied their US counterparts to temper their criticism of Hasina’s administration. Yunus’s interim government lacks that buffer. The interim government is courting the United States—seeking energy deals, rolling out Starlink, and implementing changes to secure lower tariffs on US goods—hoping that the Trump administration will prioritize trade over geopolitical considerations and will see Bangladesh on its own terms, not as India’s junior partner. Yet the United States announced a 37 percent tariff on all imports from Bangladesh—though that has been temporarily reduced to 10 percent, alongside most of the world—which would be a significant economic hit. Amid the US-China trade war, Dhaka should at least aim to understand Washington’s evolving red lines before doubling down on closer ties to Beijing.

Lastly, a major foreign policy shift by the interim government, currently operating with a dissolved parliament, may trigger domestic unrest, policy inconsistency, and diplomatic friction. The interim government’s stated priority is to guide Bangladesh toward reform and elections. But the interim team may not have the democratic legitimacy that is needed to make a sweeping foreign policy change. Yunus’s pivot to China could commit Bangladesh to a course that the public may not support and the next elected government might not honor. Decisions of this magnitude—potentially redrawing Dhaka’s regional and global stance—would ideally require parliamentary backing, a democratic mandate, and political weight to handle the consequences. An interim regime, by its very nature, may be better suited to prioritize stability over implementing revolutionary shifts.

Bangladesh can continue to chase opportunistic gains with China, risking Indian ire and isolation (without a clear signal from its people that it has a mandate to do so), or it can recalibrate with restraint, preserving the equilibrium that has long underpinned its rise. Regardless of what choice it makes, Bangladesh must tread with caution. The paths it chooses will ripple across South Asia, determining whether Bangladesh emerges as a bridge between giants or a battleground where they clash. For a nation outgrowing its small-power past, the stakes have never been higher.

Wahiduzzaman Noor is a Bangladeshi national security professional and former diplomat at the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington, DC, with expertise in South Asian affairs, Indo-Pacific Security, and counterterrorism.

Samantha Wong is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Her work centers on the technology and security portfolio, where she researches and develops collaborative solutions to global challenges arising from China’s rise.

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Governments and private actors alike are giving gold’s role in the global financial system a boost, but with a twenty-first-century twist. Individual countries and groups of countries are experimenting with creating gold-backed digital assets and trading systems that bypass the dollar-denominated financial system. In many cases, these initiatives are for purely economic benefits. However, gold is also being used by US adversaries to evade sanctions or finance activities that counter US national security interests.

The rise of gold-backed currencies that circumvent the US banking system, coupled with sanctioned regimes’ growing interest in the adoption of alternative currencies and payment systems, could create a massive blind spot for US financial intelligence and sanctions enforcement efforts. To reduce the proliferation of these alternatives to the dollar-based financial system, the United States should temper its use of coercive economic measures that can cause gold prices to rise and promote dollarization through trade and investment ties, especially with third countries impacted by sanctions on US adversaries.

Why Russia is interested in gold

Russia’s central bank is among the top holders of gold in the world, having built gold reserves from 2014 to 2020 to hedge against Western sanctions. While the central bank’s gold reserves have not increased substantially since 2020, Russia’s Ministry of Finance is thought to be buying gold from domestic producers without reporting it. In 2021, the Ministry of Finance doubled the share of gold in Russia’s National Wealth Fund to 40 percent. 

After the West froze $300 billion of the Russian central bank’s assets in response to Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this gold-hoarding strategy paid off. As gold prices skyrocketed this year, the value of Russia’s gold reserves increased by $96 billion, offsetting one-third of the frozen assets.

Gold has also played a major role in Russia’s illicit trade. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a BRICS+ member and a global hub for gold trade, as well as Turkey, have engaged in cash-for-gold trade with Russian banks. The Russia-based Lanta Bank and Vitabank received twenty-one shipments of currencies such as US dollars, euros, UAE dirhams, and Chinese renminbi worth $82 million from the UAE and Turkey in exchange for Russian gold. Late last year, the United States and United Kingdom sanctioned the network of entities and individuals involved in Russia’s illicit gold trade due to their role in generating revenue for Russia’s war chest. Additionally, Britain’s National Crime Agency published a red alert in late 2023 on gold-based illicit trade and sanctions circumvention. 

Apart from using gold for reserves and sanctions evasion, Russia is also trying to leverage the BRICS+ grouping as a platform to advocate for the creation of a gold-backed BRICS+ currency. It remains to be seen if the group makes any tangible progress ahead of the next BRICS+ Summit in Brazil in early July. In the meantime, tracking the rise of gold-backed currencies and alternative payment systems across the world offers valuable insights into how they could be used for sanctions evasion. 

The rise of gold-backed stablecoins

Gold-backed stablecoins—cryptocurrencies whose prices are pegged to gold—offer the most valuable property of gold, which is stability during financial uncertainty. They are also logistically more convenient to store and sell than physical gold. Companies such as Paxos* and Tether capitalized on these qualities, creating gold-backed stablecoins in 2019 and 2020, respectively. 

Usually, each token of gold-backed stablecoin corresponds to a specific amount of gold. For example, by purchasing one unit of Tether Gold (XAUT), investors receive the ownership rights of one troy ounce of physical gold on a specific gold bar with a serial number. Each gold bar weighs four hundred ounces on average, so if investors would like to redeem a gold bar, they have to own units worth one full gold bar. Issuers of these stablecoins hold gold reserves in safe vaults, typically in the United Kingdom or Switzerland. Third parties regularly audit gold reserves to confirm that the supply of tokens does not exceed the amount of gold held by issuers.

Although commodity-backed stablecoins represent less than one percent of the market capitalization of fiat-backed stablecoins, governments are now following the lead of crypto companies in experimenting with them. Earlier this month, for example, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance announced that it will launch a gold-backed stablecoin called USDKG in the third quarter of 2025. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance holds gold reserves worth $500 million and plans to expand that number up to $2 billion. (This is separate from the gold reserves held by the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, which was among the top buyers of gold in the last quarter of 2024.) USDKG will not track the price of gold, unlike well-established stablecoins such as Paxos Gold or Tether Gold. Instead, it will be pegged to the dollar but solely backed by gold reserves. USDKG holders will be able to redeem gold, other crypto assets, or fiat currency. 

The reported objective of the gold-backed stablecoin is to facilitate cross-border inflows of remittances, which make up one-third of Kyrgyzstan’s gross domestic product. Russia accounts for more than 90 percent of remittances that flow into Kyrgyzstan, sent by migrant workers back to their families. Kyrgyzstan has not yet launched the stablecoin, but if it’s going to be used to facilitate cross-border flows with Russia, then there is a chance that certain actors could use USDKG to export sanctioned goods to Russia outside of US authorities’ oversight. Financial institutions in Kyrgyzstan have already been sanctioned for their involvement in Russia sanctions evasion schemes by the United States. 

For example, earlier this year, the Treasury Department sanctioned Kyrgyzstan-based Keremet Bank for facilitating transactions on behalf of US-sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold the controlling shares of Keremet Bank to a firm connected to a Kremlin-linked Russian oligarch in 2024. According to the Treasury press release, the transaction was intended to turn Keremet Bank into a sanctions evasion hub that would enable Russia to receive payments for exports and pay for imports. Given sanctioned Russians’ strong interest in taking advantage of Kyrgyzstan’s financial system to import restricted technologies, they will likely be drawn to USDKG because of its ability to process transactions with Kyrgyz entities while completely bypassing the US banking system. 

How the US can stem the digital gold rush

It is no coincidence that stablecoins account for 63 percent of all illicit crypto transactions and have become a preferred tool for sanctions evasion. They attract sanctioned entities because of their ability to transfer value pseudonymously with high speed and at low cost. While the US Senate recently advanced the GENIUS Act to regulate stablecoins, one of the major deficiencies of the bill is that it does not adequately regulate offshore stablecoin issuers. Even if put into law, the GENIUS Act would fail, for example, to regulate Tether, the largest offshore issuer of dollar-pegged stablecoins, which has been the subject of federal investigations because of its alleged widespread use by terrorist groups and Russian arms dealers. 

Unlike US-issued or dollar-backed stablecoins, foreign-issued gold-backed stablecoins such as USDKG will likely escape US regulation because they don’t have a touchpoint with the US banking system. Their proliferation, along with gold-backed trading schemes, is driven to a large extent by the United States’ weaponization of the dollar, as well as uncertainty over US trade policy. 

The United States has the power to indirectly reduce gold prices and encourage the adoption of dollar-backed assets by returning to being the provider of stability in the global economy. That can be achieved by dialing down the use of tariffs and other economic measures that could cause governments and private actors to turn to gold.

At the same time, the US government should promote the dollarization of economies such as Kyrgyzstan’s by continuing to provide financial assistance and deepening trade and investment ties with other third countries impacted by sanctions against Russia. Doing so will help close gaps in US financial intelligence, strengthen US sanctions enforcement, and lower the demand for currencies outside the dollar-based financial system.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She is a former senior Treasury official and National Security Council director. Follow her at @KDonovan_AC.

Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center. 

Note: Paxos is a partner of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post Gold’s geopolitical comeback: How physical and digital gold can be used to evade US sanctions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By leveraging its existing strengths, the 3SI can accelerate the development and cross-border deployment of advanced security and defense technologies to help protect critical infrastructure. This would significantly bolster regional resilience and help deter threats operating in the “gray zone” between civilian and military domains. With shared threat perceptions and strategic alignment, 3SI member states—supported by key partners such as the United States, Germany, the European Commission, Japan, and Ukraine—are uniquely positioned to confront these challenges.

The best way for the 3SI to proceed is by creating a 3SI Defense Innovation Hub that cuts across the three existing pillars of energy, transport, and digital. Devoted to developing cutting-edge technologies for critical infrastructure protection, the 3SI Defense Innovation Hub would contribute to the much-needed paradigm shift in the overall approach to connectivity projects. It would do this by incorporating tools and processes for protection from the very outset of infrastructure planning. 

Moreover, the 3SI Defense Innovation Hub could evolve into a key specialized critical infrastructure protection node within a broader allied defense innovation ecosystem, spanning from North America to Europe to the Indo-Pacific. In doing so, it could help serve as a strategic counterweight to the deepening defense-industrial cooperation and hybrid warfare efforts of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.

A region under attack

Across the 3SI region, Russia-backed saboteurs have increasingly targeted energy infrastructure as part of hybrid campaigns aimed at undermining societal resilience and inflicting economic harm. Undersea pipelines and power cables in the Baltic Sea have suffered clandestine cuts and physical damage, prompting NATO and littoral states to launch dedicated missions to safeguard these vital links.

On land, arson attacks and hoax bomb threats, including waves of coordinated false alarms at Lithuanian schools, airports, and governmental institutions, have become widespread phenomena. While delivering no physical destruction, these false alarms incidents have strained security services and revealed gaps in crisis-response protocols.

In the transport domain, rail lines across the 3SI region and in Germany have been subject to sabotage attempts aimed at fracturing strategic north–south corridors. In addition, GPS jamming—likely from Russian electronic-warfare units in Kaliningrad—has repeatedly degraded navigation for commercial shipping and civilian flights in the Baltic Sea region. This jamming has forced in-flight diversions and resulted in aborted landings. Potentially more destructive planned attacks have thankfully been detected before being carried out. Earlier this month, for example, three men were arrested in an alleged Russia-linked plot to place parcels with explosives on cargo planes traveling from Europe to the United States and Canada.

The digital battlefield in 3SI countries has become equally contested. For example, cyberattacks have targeted governmental institutions in the Czech Republic, Germany, and Latvia, as well as energy-sector operators in Romania, exploiting unpatched systems to plant malware or launch distributed denial-of-service attacks. Chinese cargo and Russian “shadow fleet” vessels maneuvering in the Baltic Sea are suspected of cutting undersea data cables, as well, posing a threat to digital connectivity in the region.

Collectively, these hybrid threats expose the vulnerability of siloed infrastructure sectors and underscore the urgent need for the 3SI to integrate defense-grade innovations into its energy, transport, and digital development agenda.

Incorporating defense from the start

Critical civilian infrastructure in the energy, transport, and digital domains no longer exists in isolation from the military domain—the domains have merged into a single battlefield of resilience and readiness. Power grids and pipelines, once engineered solely for economic efficiency, must now be designed with embedded defensive features. This includes hardened control systems, automated isolation protocols, and redundant interconnects that can withstand kinetic strikes, physical impact, or cyber-enabled sabotage. 

Likewise, north–south transport corridors can no longer be planned as purely commercial arteries: They must accommodate the rapid deployment of heavy armor, pre-positioned logistics modules, and secure communications nodes, all while deterring adversarial probes or hybrid ambushes.

This is the area in which the 3SI has already recognized its role, as evident in its 2024 Joint Declaration, which reaffirms the need to strengthen “the resilience of dual-use infrastructure in the region for enhanced civilian and military mobility along the North-South axis.” However, if established, the proposed 3SI Defense Innovation Hub should go further and offer solutions not only for upgrading new transport infrastructure for a dual civil-military use, but also for effectively protecting it from physical and cyber sabotage.

True resilience requires that innovation for the protection of critical infrastructure be integral to the earliest design and development phases of the 3SI’s infrastructure. An alternative, retrofitting “defense layers” onto critical infrastructure systems after their construction has been finalized, often creates significant security gaps and increases costs. It’s better to incorporate these aspects from the start.

The bigger picture

The 3SI’s broad partnership network—anchored by the United States, Germany, the European Commission, Japan, and enriched by Ukraine—provides an unparalleled foundation for extending its remit into defense innovation and contributing to the broader goal of transatlantic defense-industrial alignment.

With Russia’s war against Ukraine transforming the way war is fought and placing constant pressure on Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure, Europe must adapt its technologies and defense strategies to prepare to confront similar challenges. Learning from Ukraine, which, under constant attack, has become a real-time innovation lab for unmanned systems, energy resilience solutions, and rapid infrastructure repairs, is essential.

With Chinese coercion and sabotage around Taiwan posing similar threats to regional stability, it is clear that a broader adversarial strategy is at play. As the European and Indo-Pacific theaters become increasingly interconnected due to similar security challenges, it will be necessary for European countries, the United States, and democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific to align their responses. 

In the meantime, the United States and the EU are searching for common ground in aligning their defense industries. However, tensions have persisted, particularly around new EU funding mechanisms, which are often perceived in Washington as favoring domestic European firms at the expense of transatlantic cooperation.

This is where the 3SI can play a pivotal role. By launching a Defense Innovation Hub focused on critical infrastructure protection, the 3SI could serve as a catalyst for deeper transatlantic defense-industrial alignment. Such a hub would help bridge regulatory, political, and operational gaps, offering a constructive step forward in building a truly interoperable, forward-leaning allied defense ecosystem in a common effort to outpace and out-innovate authoritarian challengers.

The way forward

The upcoming Croatian presidency of the 3SI in 2026—marking the tenth anniversary of the initiative’s inaugural summit in Dubrovnik—offers a timely opportunity to expand the initiative’s mission to include defense innovation. 

Building on its success in infrastructure development, the 3SI should replicate its network-based model in the defense sector—pooling risk and capital among governments, private industry, and financial institutions. This would unlock dual-use innovation pipelines that are often too complex or costly for individual actors to pursue alone. The recently launched 3SI Innovation Fund offers a promising starting point for exploring sustainable financing mechanisms to support the activities of a potential 3SI Defense Innovation Hub.

As the geopolitical landscape grows more contested, the 3SI should evolve from a connectivity-focused platform into a strategic driver of allied resilience. A dedicated Defense Innovation Hub would make the 3SI a force multiplier for NATO and EU efforts—accelerating deterrence, deepening regional interoperability, and embedding security into the DNA of the eastern flank’s critical infrastructure while at the same time providing a much-needed push for a transatlantic defense-industrial alignment.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kimberly Donovan: Sanctions are a powerful, yet slow-burning tool 

Rachel Rizzo: Europe is no longer waiting for the United States to act

Elisabeth Braw: Spotlight who is replenishing Russia’s shadow fleet, too

Aleksander Cwalina: There is still more the EU can do to tighten the screws to Russia

Olga Khakova: If Trump also goes after the shadow fleet, it could bring Putin to the table

Sanctions are a powerful, yet slow-burning tool 

The EU’s seventeenth package is a welcome addition to the extensive sanctions the Group of Seven-plus (G7+) coalition maintain on Russia in response to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. The latest package further brings EU sanctions in line with US and UK designations on Russian oil producers including Surgutneftegas, as well as the ongoing strategy to target Russia’s illicit oil trade using shadow fleet vessels.  

The extent and timing of this latest sanctions package demonstrate Europe’s resolve to maintain economic pressure on Russia, and they are a clear signal that Europe maintains strong economic leverage in potential negotiations with Russia to end the war.  

It’s hard not to notice that the sanctions were announced the day after US President Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and posted on social media that “Russia wants to do largescale TRADE with the United States when this catastrophic ‘bloodbath’ is over, and I agree.” There is growing concern about a potential divergence in US and EU foreign policy, and the latest EU package is a strong reminder that EU sanctions could remain in place even if Washington decides to ease its sanctions or open avenues for trade and finance with Moscow. 

That said, EU sanctions require renewal every six months and need consensus by all twenty-seven members. If the United States does not maintain economic pressure on Russia, then there is concern that Hungary may break with the bloc and veto EU sanctions on Russia’s economy when they are up for renewal in July. 

Sanctions are a powerful, yet slow-burning tool. The multilateral sanctions that G7+ coalition partners levied against Russia are finally having the intended effect. Russia’s economy is struggling, interest rates and inflation remain high, Russia is drawing down on its National Welfare Fund, and the country is in a wartime economy. This is why Moscow’s primary demand from the Black Sea cease-fire talks was lifting sanctions.  

To get a better and bigger deal with Russia over the war in Ukraine, it would be in Washington’s best interest to not only engage its European allies in negotiations, but also to join them in issuing additional sanctions to deny Moscow the opportunity to gain leverage at the negotiation table. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

Europe is no longer waiting for the United States to act

The latest round of EU sanctions against Russia highlights the EU’s willingness to do something it hasn’t yet done since February 2022: take ownership over the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The United States has always been in the driver’s seat, with the Biden administration both shaping and leading the West’s response to the war. The re-election of Trump brought an almost 180-degree shift in the US approach, with a much more conciliatory tone toward Russia emanating from the White House, along with a hope that Trump’s dealmaking skills could get both sides to the table for a cease-fire. That approach has yet to bear fruit.  

This is where the EU’s pressure becomes important. It highlights the bloc’s willingness to act independently of the United States and use its own tools to get Russia to the table without waiting for the United States to provide political cover. With European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen leading the charge, the hope is that the EU stays united on the sanctions front for the foreseeable future, squeezing Russia’s war machine (and its broader economy) to the point where Putin has no other choice than to stop the war. 

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship.

Spotlight who is replenishing Russia’s shadow fleet, too

Every sanction helps reduce the shadow fleet’s activities, and the EU’s diligent efforts to identify shadow vessels are to be saluted. The EU should be especially proud of its latest package, which includes sanctions against an extraordinary 189 shadow vessels and some of the ships’ owners. The latter is especially important, since the owners do their best to operate in the shadows and are extremely hard to trace. 

However, the shadow fleet’s main characteristic remains in place: the fact that it can be constantly replenished. It can be replenished because there are ship owners willing to sell their retirement-age ships into the shadow fleet. In fact, doing so is commercially advantageous for them: Retiring old vessels involves paying for them to be scrapped, while selling them into the shadow fleet brings in money—a lot of it.  

Unfortunately, a few shipowners, including in Western countries, undermine sanctions against Russia by selling their ships into the shadow fleet. Perhaps even worse, by doing so, they willingly create risks on the high seas, because shadow vessels pose hazards to other vessels, to the maritime environment, and to coastal states. Publishing their names would send a strong message. 

—Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

There is still more the EU can do to tighten the screws to Russia

On the sidelines of the G7 finance ministers’ meetings in Banff, Canada, this week, the United States opposed language in a joint statement that included “further support” for Ukraine. The United States also expressed reluctance to describe the Russian full-scale invasion of the country as “illegal,” further distancing Washington from its G7 counterparts. This follows a concerning trend as Trump has talked about Washington stepping back in peace talks and eventually restarting US trade with Russia. 

In contrast, the European Commission pushed forward and adopted its seventeenth sanctions package against Russia, underlining European Union unity and clarity. The package closed some remaining loopholes that allow Russia to fund its war machine and access key Western technology for military use. In doing so, it reiterated EU solidarity with Ukraine. 

The package was received well in Kyiv, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calling the newest round of sanctions “strong” and saying that they will limit Moscow’s ability to continue its invasion.  

However, more can be done to tighten the screws on Russia.  

Kyiv and its European allies are already discussing how to raise the stakes in a harsher eighteenth EU sanctions package if Moscow does not make serious efforts toward a cease-fire. This would most likely target the Russian banking and energy sectors and aim to further limit the Russian shadow fleet that Moscow uses to evade maritime trade restrictions. The EU and its partners should continue to target these industries. The bloc should also seriously consider seizing assets from sanctioned individuals in the EU for Ukraine and implementing secondary sanctions that limit third-party purchasing of Russian oil—both steps recommended by Kyiv. 

As European leaders are becoming increasingly frustrated with Washington’s stalling and Putin’s faux negotiations and maximalist demands, the EU should lead by example and take bold steps to continue aiding Ukraine and putting pressure on Russia. 

—Aleksander Cwalina is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

If Trump also goes after the shadow fleet, it could bring Putin to the table

Putin’s strategy of buying time with deceitful “peace” promises is shown to be failing in the face of the new EU and UK sanctions, as funding for Moscow’s war starts to run out. 

The shadow fleet carries more than 60 percent of Russian oil exports, according to a recent estimate, and the new sanctions will help strengthen enforcement of the price-caps mechanism on Russian oil. Currently, there are some discussions at the G7 level on lowering the price cap for the next sanctions package. But lowering the price cap will only impact Russia if it is enforced. Otherwise, Russia will continue to send large quantities of its oil through the shadow fleet, ensuring it continues to rake in profits.  

In addition to curtailing Russia’s oil profits, the shadow fleet sanctions protect European coastlines from the potential environmental damage and sabotage that the Russian shadow fleet could cause. Europe is achieving this by refusing the provision of services, insurance, and port access to these metal-scrap grade ships. 

The United States has already sanctioned 183 vessels. Now, Trump has an opportunity to forge his legacy as a peacemaker by joining the EU and UK sanctions on 342 vessels to bring Putin to the negotiating table. Moscow will only take US pressure seriously if it is implemented with decisiveness and strength—something the Trump administration has demonstrated effectively in tough negotiations with other nations.   

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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The announcement defied some of the policy discussions around Golden Dome so far, which have focused on its technical feasibility and relevance vis-à-vis Chinese, Russian, and North Korean missile arsenals. Golden Dome proponents seek to address challenges to homeland and extended deterrence as the United States faces what it describes as a two-peer or near-peer threat environment. However, less attention has been dedicated to how Golden Dome could impact US partnerships worldwide, potentially offsetting some of the political costs of a diminished US troop presence abroad.

US missile defense has always involved cooperation with regional partners. The United States exercises broad influence in the production and planning of missile defense programs in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The executive order that first outlined Golden Dome, which Trump signed in January, reiterated this international dimension of missile defense. The executive order called for increasing bilateral and multilateral cooperation on missile defense technology development, capacities, and operations. And in his address Tuesday, Trump explicitly cited Canada as a potential first partner for the implementation of Golden Dome.

Although the details of Golden Dome remain unclear, the Trump administration should seek to hold a revived missile defense dialogue with US partners and allies across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Such a dialogue would serve the Trump administration’s agenda in its strategic, political, and industrial dimensions. However, the success of this dialogue and effective missile defense collaboration will require overcoming technical military challenges, as well as carefully addressing the sensitivities of regional partners. In particular, this means being careful not to overstate Golden Dome’s role in the United States’ pledges of extended deterrence to its allies.

Can US missile defense help the Pentagon prioritize the Indo-Pacific?

Renewing US investment in missile defense could be seen by the current administration as a way to help reassure allies from the threat of potential adversaries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran while mitigating the need for a massive deployment of US troops on the ground. This logic is not new. During the Obama administration, US officials conveyed to NATO allies that deploying missile defense systems in Europe would compensate for the reduction in the number of army brigades deployed on the continent. The origins of Poland’s Aegis Ashore system in Redzikowo, officially transferred to NATO in November 2024, date back to the decisions taken by the Obama administration.

Given the Trump administration’s desire to reduce the US military footprint worldwide and focus on strategic competition with China, missile defense could be a convenient way to maintain global influence while lowering overseas troop commitments. From the outset, missile defense has always involved advanced technologies, demanding years of research and development that only a few countries can afford. If Golden Dome achieves its goals, it will shift resources to develop space-based missile defense systems. This could disrupt the current market for missile defense, which is made up mainly of ground and naval-based sensors and interceptors. Today, none of the US allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia has a space industry that could credibly invest in this new domain. Consequently, it is likely that strategic cooperation on Golden Dome means allies procuring future US missile defense systems and added incentives for co-production. A few regional partners are engaged in the co-production of US missile defense systems, such as Japan* for the surface-to-air SM-3 and PAC-3 missiles. Last April, Japan proposed the co-production of SM-6 new-generation long-range ship-to-air missiles. Israel may be interested in similar collaborations, as its main missile defense systems (Iron Dome, Arrow, David’s Sling) already rely on co-development and co-production with the United States.

For a broader allied collaboration on missile defense production to take shape, however, the United States will need to navigate several military and diplomatic difficulties in dialogues with its partners.

Different allies, different reassurance needs

First, US partners in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific face different threats from their respective adversaries’ missile capabilities. Golden Dome is conceived to address global competitors launching an intercontinental ballistic missile at US territory. It is planned to include space-based interceptors, which could prove effective in defending allies against adversaries using long-range ballistic missiles—for instance, if Russia were to launch a strike against Europe.

However, Europeans are also worried about shorter-range cruise missiles and drone campaigns such as the one launched by Russia in Ukraine, which requires different systems to address. In light of Ukraine’s experience, Europeans started addressing their capability gaps to protect against a full spectrum of air threats (cruise missiles, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, aircraft, and unmanned aircraft sysems). Meanwhile, the Gulf states and Israel face the threat from rockets and missiles fired by Iran or its proxies.

The ability of missile defense to reassure local partners varies according to the severity of the threat. For instance, in the extreme scenario of a total US withdrawal of troops from South Korea, it is unlikely that Seoul would view US missile defense as a credible substitute for US boots on the ground as a defense against North Korea. Lastly, allies and partners are unlikely to receive the same amount of attention. The United States is prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater, and Golden Dome is intended as a technological breakthrough in the space domain—an area where China is rapidly advancing. This will lead European and Gulf states to fear being left out of any new missile defense arrangement. 

Golden Dome and Alliance politics

The second challenge facing Washington lies in the disparities in the regional security architectures in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In the past two decades, the United States has only succeeded in creating a truly regional framework for missile defense in Europe.

In the Middle East and Asia, most US missile defense cooperation is bilateral. The lack of regional integration often results from distrust among local partners. It is also caused by the reluctance of countries in these regions to tie their national security prerogatives to an intergovernmental mechanism heavily dependent on Washington. This constrains the United States’ ability to apply missile defense cooperation lessons from NATO elsewhere.

In the Middle East and Asia, Washington must build on its existing cooperation frameworks and should consider exploring new formats. The August 2023 Camp David Summit opened up the development of a trilateral security cooperation framework with Japan and South Korea, with more consultation, information-sharing, and cooperation designed to accompany the integration of Indo-Pacific missile defense architecture. The three countries have since implemented real-time information sharing about North Korean missile launches. Additionally, missile defense could become an item on the agenda of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or between NATO and its four Asian partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

Washington will also have to accommodate the different industrial interests of its partners. Today, US allies have domestic defense industries with their own missile defense programs to protect. In Asia, countries such as South Korea and Japan have produced their own missile defense systems. Even though they will keep procuring US products, their governments will carefully protect their industrial bases. In Europe, the Sky Shield initiative, launched in 2022 by twenty-four participating countries, will rely on US Patriot and Israeli Arrow batteries. France fiercely opposed the initiative in the name of strategic autonomy, to no avail.

However, Sky Shield may not reflect the current state of US-European relations. Golden Dome emerges amid a transatlantic crisis in which Europeans are trying to become more self-sufficient in their defense. Their desire for strategic autonomy and the need to protect the European defense industrial base mean they will likely pursue their own version of missile defense. In this case, European governments must make clear the areas where they intend to design and produce their own systems, including investments in the space domain.

Differences in political priorities and strategic culture are inevitable, but consultations should identify the space for common interests between the United States and its allies. The case of Israel offers positive lessons on cooperation in missile defense. The US and Israeli militaries have very few things in common when it comes to threat assessment, force structure, and doctrine, not to mention Israel’s desire to protect its national defense industry. But both countries—and their defense industries—have found ways to develop missile defense technologies to mutual benefit.

Ultimately, the success of a renewed missile defense dialogue will boil down to how much cooperation on the Golden Dome project can serve the security interests of US partners. While the deterrent value of missile defense remains limited, Golden Dome could play a complementary role. With nuclear and missile threats becoming ever more serious, the question of how to defend against such attacks has never been more salient in allied capitals, be they in Europe, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific.

Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

Jean-Loup Samaan is a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore, as well as a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Correction: This article was updated on May 29, 2025 to reflect the fact that multiple regional partners engage in co-production of US missile defense systems. A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that Japan was the only country to do so.

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Both the Kremlin and the White House statements on the two-hour May 19 phone call between presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin suggest that the results were meager—and Trump may be backing off some of his tough rhetoric on Putin. On Truth Social, Trump said: “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War. The conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.” 

For his part, Putin labeled the conversation “informative and helpful,” but he also said that the “root cause of the issue” must be addressed. That means Ukraine must agree to the draconian terms that Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky recently set down in Istanbul, such as the demilitarization of Ukraine and Ukrainian troop withdrawals from Ukrainian territory Russia has “annexed” but does not occupy. In short, this represents zero movement toward ending the fighting since the Ukraine-Russia talks last week in Istanbul.

“I believe it went very well,” Trump said of the call with Putin on Monday. Trump’s positive characterization of the exchange is odd because last week, when Putin chose not to show up at the talks in Istanbul that he had proposed—talks that Trump encouraged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to attend—Trump justified Putin’s capriciousness by saying that, of course Putin did not show up because he, Trump, was not there. The US president asserted that “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together, okay?” In preparation for the call with Putin this week, Trump wrote on Truth Social: “THE SUBJECTS OF THE CALL WILL BE, STOPPING THE ‘BLOODBATH’ THAT IS KILLING, ON AVERAGE, MORE THAN 5000 RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS A WEEK, AND TRADE.”

Yet at the end of that call, Trump was upbeat about the resumption of Russian-Ukrainian talks, and he was silent on the need for him to meet with Putin. This outcome is no surprise because Putin continues to thwart Trump’s stated goal of achieving an immediate end to the shooting. Putin underscored this Sunday night with the launch of the largest drone attack on Ukraine—over two hundred drones—since the start of the invasion. 

In the days ahead of the call, US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that if progress toward peace does not actually appear, the United States could “walk away” from the talks. This is a way of putting pressure on the parties. Without explanation, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said that the administration is frustrated with both sides, even though, as Vance said earlier this month, it is Russia that is asking for too much.  

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy and his European partners in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and elsewhere are proceeding with their efforts to place additional sanctions on Moscow, an effort that would be more effective at moving the Kremlin toward an actual cease-fire if Trump worked with this group. At the moment, White House policy does not reflect the view of 61 percent of the American public that the administration’s policy is weak on Putin.

Despite the tentativeness of recent White House policy, it cannot be ruled out that Trump will make good on his promise to achieve a durable peace by putting ample pressure on the party obstructing that outcome. But for now, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Trump blinked.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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This means that for the first time in Portuguese democratic history, there is not a “center majority” between the center-right and center-left. With new power balances in play, Portugal’s politics may get even messier—with political paralysis the new norm, preventing necessary reforms in key sectors such as housing, healthcare, and defense.

This was the third election in three years for Portuguese voters. Among European Union (EU) nations, only Bulgaria has had more elections than Portugal over the past seven years—and election fatigue was evident in this campaign. What Portuguese voters really want is stability, but these results might make that dream harder to come by in the months and years ahead.

Winners and losers

AD, a center-right coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the CDS-People’s Party, won the March 2024 legislative elections by the slimmest of margins, taking the reins of government from PS for the first time since 2015. That election also marked the surge of the far-right Chega party—“Enough” in Portuguese—with a strong third-place showing. Although this fractured political landscape made governing difficult for AD, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, it was still able to pass a budget and begin implementing its program as a minority government. 

The 2025 election campaign was nearly identical to the 2024 cycle, with the same eight principal parties/coalitions on the ballot—all led by their same respective leaders. The Portuguese housing crisis and migration topped the list of voter concerns, followed by healthcare, pensions, and salaries. The war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and defense investment were not actively discussed during the campaign and the debates. 

Three parties secured the majority of the 230 parliamentary seats, and they will drive the Portuguese political system for the near future.

AD won the election, but it fell short of an absolute majority. With eighty-nine seats (up from eighty in 2024), the election reinforces Montenegro’s belief that the country is asking for stability and the opportunity to govern with the normal full four-year mandate. But even if AD partners with smaller parties, it still will not have a majority to govern outright. Thus, AD is hoping the president will once again ask the center-right to form a minority government. 

The Socialist Party was the big loser on Sunday, securing only fifty-eight seats (down from seventy-eight) and losing more than 360,000 votes from 2024. This is an epic fall for a party that has been a staple of Portuguese politics since the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In the next government, PS—even if aligned with small left-wing parties—will not be able to outright block government initiatives, leaving the role of kingmaker to Chega. 

The far-right party was the biggest winner, as Chega secured fifty-eight seats (up from fifty), gaining more than 230,000 votes from the 2024 contest. Depending on the distribution of the last four seats, which are reserved for the votes of Portuguese citizens living outside the country, Chega could find itself in second place. (The distribution of these seats will be known by May 28.) In 2024, Chega won two of the four “emigrant” seats, with the other two split between PS and AD. A similar outcome this year would put Chega in the runner-up position. The election results show that the issues most central to Chega’s program—illegal migration and corruption—continue to resonate with the Portuguese electorate.

Political pitfalls ahead

Although AD won the most votes, there is no guarantee that President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa will immediately invite Montenegro and AD to form a government. That’s because the president is keen on stability, and he made it clear during the election that he wants any government he nominates to have its program accepted by Parliament. 

In Portugal, the nominated prime minister has ten days to present its governance plan to Parliament. If no party or faction within the new Parliament votes to reject (or approve) the program, then the program passes automatically, and the nominated government inherits full executive authority. Should any party or faction reject the program, then it would go to a vote to the whole of Parliament. 

In this case, an absolute majority would be needed to bring down the nominated government—forcing the president to nominate a different government configuration (as happened in 2015) or subject the country to another legislative election. But the Portuguese Constitution prohibits the legislature from being dissolved within the first six months of its mandate or during the final six months of a presidential term. Rebelo de Sousa will finish his second term in March 2026, with the next presidential election scheduled for January 2026. This means late spring 2026 could be the earliest opportunity for new elections. So if a nominated government is brought down, it would leave a long-term caretaker government—a situation the president wants to avoid. It is unlikely that Chega and the Socialists would join forces to block the installation of an AD minority government. Nonetheless, the president will do his due diligence behind the scenes before nominating Montenegro to be prime minister again.

Regardless of the composition of the new government, there is now an absolute majority on the right. Should AD and Chega find common ground on a particular issue—such as immigration—they will be able to enact policy without the left blocking proposals. With Chega possibly becoming the number two party in Parliament, it will be under more pressure to show it is more than just an anti-incumbent party and has the ability and gravitas to govern. 

From Lisbon to Washington

It is still too early to see how any new Portuguese government will approach the current US administration, but it is unlikely that Portugal will change its approach of having the transatlantic relationship be one of the pillars of its foreign policy. Montenegro’s government was reserved and cautious on transatlantic relations during the early days of the new US administration. The prime minister refused to critique the United States for its stance on Gaza, while asking for “realism” and dialogue concerning tariffs. Yet, Montenegro allowed his defense minister to openly question US predictability as an ally when making public comments about the potential purchase of the US-built F-35 fighter jet. 

Chega’s outsized role in the next Parliament, even if it does not become part of the government, may change this dynamic and push the executive toward reinforced ties with the United States. US President Donald Trump invited André Ventura, Chega’s leader, to attend the presidential inauguration in January, while Chega vowed to “privilege the transatlantic link” and prioritize its alliance with the United States as part of its 2025 election campaign foreign policy program. Montenegro has often critiqued Chega as unreliable, but he may have to adapt to the new reality of the Portuguese political landscape.

The NATO Summit looms on the horizon, and it is possible a new government begins its mandate only a week or two before the June 24-25 event in The Hague. Whoever represents Portugal as head of government will have the unenviable position of articulating a plan to increase defense investment, which is still well below the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold set in the Alliance’s 2014 Wales pledge. 

Defense spending is one area that the AD and Chega may find common ground. Chega proposed for Portugal to meet its 2 percent goal in 2026, three years earlier than AD’s 2029 goal, while PS did not quantify a target date in its electoral plan. It will take political will by Montenegro and AD to use this opportunity to move Portugal out of the shrinking list of NATO members still unable to fulfill the Wales pledge. This willpower has been historically absent in Portugal among all parties, a country benefiting from its geography and its distance from the Alliance’s eastern flank to under-prioritize defense spending while focusing on social programs. 

With the composition and functioning of the new government in flux, Portugal could remain in an era of political paralysis for some time. How the future center-right government leads with a far-right primary opposition will determine if the country can break through its fractured political landscape and address the country’s challenges. Lisbon’s foreign policy could remain unsettled for some time given this reality. The big question remains whether the government will come together effectively enough to avoid yet another election in a year’s time.

Andrew Bernard is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Yet even as the United States expands strategic cooperation with India—publicly endorsing its counterterrorism priorities—it continues to extend Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status to Pakistan. This gives Pakistan a privileged military cooperation position under US law and eligibility for loans, agreements, and priority weapons delivery, along with closer ties to NATO countries’ military establishments—all without any preconditions or accountability on counterterrorism. This dual-track posture risks US credibility and incentivizes ambiguity over accountability. It sustains a structural pattern: provocation by militant actors, calibrated retaliation, and rapid external intervention—without a chance for any party to go to the root of the problems.

As such, the United States should pursue a conditional revocation of Pakistan’s MNNA status—suspending it while outlining concrete benchmarks for its restoration. Revoking Pakistan’s MNNA status would reinforce an ongoing recalibration in US regional policy—aligning security privileges with counterterrorism performance, encouraging institutional accountability within Pakistan, and acknowledging the growing weight of US-India strategic cooperation without foreclosing future engagement with Islamabad.

The US counterterrorism role in South Asia

For over two decades, US counterterrorism policy in South Asia has combined growing alignment with India and strategic privileges for Pakistan. This contradiction has normalized a repetitive cycle of terror attacks on India, targeted retaliation, and a US desire to be part of the solution but no institutional changes that could meaningfully shift the landscape.

To his credit, US President Donald Trump has worked toward effecting change—which was visible after India’s 2019 revocation of Article 370, which removed the Jammu and Kashmir region’s special constitutional status. The Trump administration refrained from public criticism of this move, framing it as a bilateral matter. Similarly, after the 2019 Pulwama attack, the United States condemned the terrorist act and urged Pakistan to dismantle terror infrastructure on its soil. The first Trump administration also played a pivotal role in maintaining Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force grey list, pressuring Islamabad to act against terrorist financing networks.

The Trump administration’s endorsement of India’s strategic autonomy, especially in counterterrorism operations, marked a shift toward recognizing India’s capability to address its security challenges independently. India’s less formal and less codified designation as a Major Defense Partner (but not a MNNA) further underscored this approach. It resonates with Trump’s broader foreign policy doctrine, which favors burden-sharing and encourages allies to take greater responsibility for their defense. Ensuring a strategically autonomous India is not just a US interest, but a potential milestone achievement for Trump.

However, the most immediate obstacle is a US security policy that continues to privilege Pakistan’s military establishment. The Pahalgam attack occurred in close proximity to Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India, drawing historical parallels to the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre, which took place hours before President Bill Clinton’s arrival. While causality is debatable, the recurrence of such timing highlights how extremist violence in the region can intersect with high-visibility diplomatic moments, complicating crisis management and signaling.

While confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan—such as the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises and the 2005 nuclear confidence-building measure framework—remain in place, they have proven insufficient during episodes of heightened tension. In recent crises, including in 2019 and 2025, India has kept key partners, including the United States, informed ahead of taking action to manage signaling risks and minimize escalation. Pakistan has also engaged international stakeholders, though typically only in the context of post-escalation outreach. These differing approaches to crisis communication carry implications for how third-party actors interpret intent and calibrate their response.

The contrasting diplomatic practices of India and Pakistan directly influence how external actors, particularly the United States, interpret each country’s intent and determine their diplomatic responses during crises. Given these differences in crisis management behavior, Washington’s continued extension of MNNA status to Pakistan without clear criteria related to counterterrorism or escalation management creates ambiguity. But US strategic designations like MNNA should periodically be reassessed and clearly linked to behaviors—such as transparency, proactive communication, and restraint—that concretely support regional stability.

Besides, Pakistan’s designation as an MNNA in 2004 was intended to anchor counterterrorism logistics during the US war in Afghanistan. With the war over and US dependence on Pakistani transit routes effectively ended, the core justification for Islamabad’s MNNA status has eroded. At the same time, China now accounts for over 70 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports, while US lawmakers—citing both strategic drift and insufficient counterterrorism compliance—have repeatedly questioned the designation’s utility. Rebalancing US priorities does not require substituting Pakistan with India but rather ensuring that strategic privileges reflect Washington’s current alignment—not legacy entitlements.

How the US can use its economic leverage

As a frequently used quip goes, “Most states have armies. In Pakistan, the army has a state.” That inversion isn’t rhetorical—it defines a structural barrier to Pakistan’s economic recovery. Through business entities such as the Fauji Foundation, Bahria Foundation, and Army Welfare Trust, the military retains a significant commercial presence across the banking, real estate, fertilizer, and logistics industries. While not unique among developing states, the scale and opacity of this role pose obstacles to reform. Repeated International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs have flagged structural issues—such as privatization bottlenecks, tax distortions, and subsidy burdens—as impediments to stabilization.

In fiscal year 2023, Pakistan’s debt servicing obligations absorbed over 80 percent of federal revenue, foreign exchange reserves fell below four billion dollars, and inflation peaked near 30 percent, though it has now eased to around 5 percent. These economic pressures sharply limit the policy options available to civilian leaders. The United States could more effectively support structural economic reforms in Pakistan by explicitly linking privileges—such as MNNA status—to concrete progress on economic governance and institutional accountability.

In this context, revoking MNNA would not rupture relations but reframe them around contemporary realities. The United States remains a key voice in international financial institutions and investment forums that shape Pakistan’s recovery path. From IMF conditionality to multilateral development flows, economic leverage is now the primary channel of influence. Rather than permanently revoking MNNA, Washington should set clear, achievable economic and governance benchmarks, creating a credible pathway for Islamabad to regain or enhance strategic privileges upon meeting certain standards.

Stability through strategic restraint and recalibration

The May 10 pause in fighting reflected a recalibration in South Asia’s strategic balance. Pakistan entered negotiations under mounting pressure: its military had sustained visible losses and continued escalation—while a one-billion-dollar tranche of IMF funding remained pending—threatened deeper fiscal and political instability.

India, in contrast, had secured a clear tactical upper hand through Operation Sindoor. Yet its swift endorsement of the cease-fire reflected strategic restraint. The decision allowed India to reinforce deterrence, bring the Indus Water Treaty to the renegotiation table, and redraw red lines. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statements that India “will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail” and “will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism” signals a new red line—in the instance of a repeat attack, India could target the Pakistani military in addition to terrorist camps. 

To prevent similar escalations with these new red lines having been drawn, Washington must reassess the strategic benefits it extends in the region. Conditionally revoking Pakistan’s MNNA status would clarify that US defense privileges are tied to demonstrated counterterrorism cooperation and economic reform, rather than past strategic alignment. While some warn that this move could drive Pakistan closer to China, retaining MNNA status without accountability has already reduced US leverage. If the goal is influence, the United States should anchor its partnerships with conditionality—not ambiguity.

Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Mrittika Guha Sarkar is the India policy consultant at Horizon Engage.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

Victoria Olari: The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Anca Agachi: Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different?

Mark Scott: It was an election fought as much online as offline

Andrei Covatariu: After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington?

Olga Khakova: Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country

Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

There are two lessons to take from Romania’s presidential elections. First, Romanians seemed turned off by the establishment parties that have traded off running the government for decades. The candidate of the ruling coalition didn’t make it past the first round; and Dan and Simion were both seen, Romanians tell me, as alternatives to the ruling coalition. Second, despite predictions (or fears), the preference for an outsider didn’t translate into a preference for a nationalist or anti-EU firebrand, which is how Simion ran his campaign. Dan, a mathematician by training, ran a campaign that was pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine. 

Simion appeared to enjoy support from Russia, and plenty of stories are circulating of Russian information ops in his favor. He had maintained distance from Russian President Vladimir Putin (wise in Russo-skeptic Romania) and instead courted the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, even visiting the United States during the campaign. But this did not translate into enough support at home.   

Dan’s win is decisive, but it alone will not overcome the divisions in Romanian society. Romanians have voted for Europe and democracy, not nationalism, but they also seem to want change in the form of better governance. Dan will have a mandate but a big job ahead. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Romania’s presidential runoff turned into an intense race with significant stakes for the nation and the wider region. Dan won, an outcome expected mainly given the high voter turnout, offering him a strong democratic mandate. 

From the early hours of election day, Simion’s ultra-nationalist camp signaled that they would not accept a loss. They took to social media with accusations of fraud and amplified fake news stories that mimicked legitimate outlets and falsely declared Simion the winner. Simion told his supporters not to trust the exit polls, claiming that political elites had manipulated the results behind the scenes. His team also accused foreign actors of interference, notably targeting Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, for allegedly mobilizing Romanian voters in Moldova. This followed an unprecedented voter turnout there in the second round, partly spurred by Simion’s hostile rhetoric toward Moldova. The nationalist camp further alleged meddling by France, specifically accusing President Emmanuel Macron of election interference. 

Despite these efforts, the election results left little room for dispute. Dan secured a mandate from Romanians. Simion conceded early Monday morning, marking the end of a tense and polarized campaign. 

This election isn’t just about Romania. It’s a big deal for the region, too. A win for Dan will likely lock in Romania’s commitment to the EU and NATO, a vital move as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to unsettle the region. This is critical, as Romania’s strategic position strengthens regional security and support for Kyiv. Additionally, it will likely bolster Moldova’s EU integration efforts under Sandu, fostering closer Romania-Moldova ties and countering Russian influence. On the other hand, a Simion victory would have likely emboldened far-right movements across Europe, disrupted regional unity, and undermined support for Ukraine, which Simion openly opposed. 

Even with all the divisions, Romanian voters sent a loud message: they reject the old political elite. Both Dan and Simion positioned themselves as anti-system challengers, capitalizing on widespread frustration with corruption and governance failures. This call for change is real, and it’s going to continue to shape Romania’s future.  

—Victoria Olari is a research associate for Moldova at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different? 

“Hope and patience.” This is what Dan, the now president-elect of Romania, asked for in his speech when the first exit polls were released. 

Patience because his mandate will be an incredibly difficult one. Immediately, he will have to choose a prime minister and help establish a pro-European political coalition in the Romanian Parliament, one third of which is made up of far-right parties. He will need to help build trust in an economy that has the EU’s highest budget deficit compared to gross domestic product. And he will need to lead the country’s foreign policy at a time when the regional context for Romania has never been more dangerous given Russia’s continued war in Ukraine. In the long term, Dan will have to face down the unaddressed root causes of discontent that gave oxygen to far-right parties in the first place and brought Romania to the brink of disaster. The country is plagued by poverty, inequality, a failing public health system, corruption, and inefficient, unresponsive, and distrusted state institutions, as well as a forgotten diaspora. He will have to “rebuild a one Romania” together with a divided population. 

But Dan was also right to ask for hope. In the election result Sunday, Romania decided it cannot go back, and Romanians have firmly made the choice to remain anchored in the Western, transatlantic community. Despite external pressures, disinformation campaigns, suspicions of Russian interference, and fears of a contested election result, Romanians made it clear that they are European. But the same voters who turned out in massive numbers for two anti-system candidates also made it clear that more of the same in Romanian politics is simply not acceptable. This is the hope and the opportunity Romania is facing—starting now. 

—Anca Agachi is a nonresident fellow with Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She currently serves as a defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she focuses on international security and defense issues.

It was an election fought as much online as offline 

Faced with a barrage of false online information, potential foreign interference, and opaque practices by social media companies, Romania’s second-round presidential election held up to scrutiny—but only just. In the hours before Dan was elected, Simion took to X to proclaim himself as Romania’s new president, only to backtrack on that claim when the official tally gave Dan the final victory.

Pavel Durov, the chief executive of Telegram, the popular messaging service, also took to his platform and other social networks to accuse “a Western European government” of urging Telegram to “silence conservative voices in Romania.” The Russian tech boss subsequently named that country as France, though Paris denied any potential interference in the Eastern European country’s election.

More than any other recent European election, Romania’s vote has been riddled with potential digital attacks on local democratic institutions, including scores of cyberattacks that the country’s security forces suggested may have come from Russia. In response, Romanian officials and those from the European Commission have criticized social media companies for not doing enough to combat malign actors, both in and outside of the country.

Yet even hours after Dan was officially named as Romania’s next president, little, if any, evidence about the role these global platforms played in promoting election-related falsehoods has been made public. Local voters remain mostly in the dark about how social media—and potential bad actors—may have targeted them in this weekend’s election. That has left more questions than answers as policymakers, tech giants, and the public try to unpack how Dan successfully saw off Simion in an election that was fought as much online as offline. 

—Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the DFRLab’s Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington? 

Romania avoided a political shock this weekend as pro-European candidate Dan defeated right-wing populist Simion. The result reassures Romania’s continued commitment to EU and transatlantic partnerships. Yet, after months of political turbulence and voter polarization, restoring macroeconomic stability now depends on forming a new government—no easy feat despite a pro-European majority in Romania’s Parliament. 

The election outcome has implications for Romania’s strategic energy direction, too, even though energy and climate policy were not prominently featured in the campaign debates. Dan has pledged to keep Romania on its path of regional energy relevance, proven over the past few years, and to enhance the existing cooperation with the United States and the EU. His platform includes proposals to create a national energy champion, reduce Romania’s energy dependencies on authoritarian regimes, support strategic investment (including in data centers), and deepen ties with Moldova and Ukraine. His strong backing for EU enlargement further strengthens Romania’s geopolitical and energy role in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 

At the same time, Romania—like other CEE states—faces a growing tension between the EU’s accelerated decarbonization push and the United States’ emphasis on “energy freedom,” as recently articulated by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright at the Three Seas Business Forum in Warsaw. This divergence presents both challenges and opportunities. The Romanian president can play a key role in expanding the win-set between Brussels and Washington through enhanced energy diplomacy—advancing nuclear partnerships (notably small modular nuclear reactors with US support), Black Sea gas development, cross-border infrastructure with Ukraine and Moldova, and clean generation scale-up. Romania also has the potential to become a clean technology manufacturing destination, supporting both EU goals and transatlantic alignment in a shifting geopolitical landscape.  

By advancing projects that resonate in both Brussels and Washington, Romania can amplify its geopolitical weight in the energy space. 

—Andrei Covatariu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country 

This anti-establishment, anti-corruption vote presents a historic opportunity for the new Romanian leadership to use this mandate to build on previous positive energy reforms. The next Romanian government has a chance to engage with the population to forge a secure, resilient, and diversified energy strategy that can attract new deals and investments in the energy sector. 

However, the close election results showcase that national concerns such as energy prices, reliability, and industrial competitiveness helped drive a significant percentage of voters to support the candidate with a nationalistic platform. The good news is that Romania can prioritize domestic issues through stronger partnerships and deeper regional integration: developing Black Sea resources, integrating electricity and gas interconnections with neighboring countries, and making progress on nuclear agreements with countries like the United States. 

Romania has led on diversification from Russian energy sources and support for Ukraine and Moldova’s energy security. The new coalition can lead by example in fortifying the region from backsliding into Russian natural gas dependence, as seen in the growing Russian liquefied natural gas shipments to the EU. 

Moreover, a strong energy agenda could also be a unifying platform for building the ruling coalition. 

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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The results are now in from the first direct talks between Russia and Ukraine since the revelations of Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Bucha and Irpin three years ago. And one thing is clear: It remains Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aim to seize more territory so that he can achieve effective political control over Ukraine.

The talks were productive in the important but limited sense that the sides agreed to each exchange one thousand prisoners of war. But the parties took no steps toward an eventual end to the hostilities, as the Kremlin negotiators insisted that Ukrainian troops withdraw from areas of Ukraine that Moscow has “annexed.” 

This is just the latest twist on the roller coaster that is the negotiating process to end Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s approach to a negotiated peace has required compromise from both Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine was asked to accept de facto Kremlin control of Ukrainian territory that Russia currently occupies and to put its aspirations for NATO membership on hold. Washington has asked Russia to accept the presence of European troops in Ukraine as a peacekeeping force and ongoing Western arms supplies to Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression. Ukraine has largely accepted these terms; Russia has not. Ukraine agreed without objection to the mid-March general cease-fire that the United States proposed, as well as the naval cease-fire in late March. Russia rejected both. Each side agreed to a cease-fire involving energy installations that same month, but Moscow violated it within hours.

The Trump administration’s approach through late April was hobbled by its unwillingness to put pressure on Moscow for rejecting the general and naval cease-fires, which contrasted with the severe pressure the US administration put on Ukraine after the difficult Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28. When Moscow refused the United States’ proposal for a naval cease-fire, the White House’s approach was to offer Russia more carrots, which prompted substantial criticism from Trump-friendly newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post, as well as from some Republicans on Capitol Hill. This tendency continued in late April as the White House proposed the truly damaging concession of recognizing Russian control of Crimea.

All of this changed—at least for the moment—when the United States and Ukraine inked the critical minerals deal on April 30. The deal included a paragraph in which, for the first time, the Trump administration mentioned the possibility of new US weapons going to Ukraine. It was no coincidence that at the same time, the White House separately approved two modest shipments of weapons to Ukraine. While the Trump administration did not stress this point publicly, the approval of the weapons shipments clearly complicated Putin’s efforts to take more Ukrainian land. It is worth noting that in response to criticism of its weak approach toward the Kremlin, the Trump administration has been talking for weeks about putting new sanctions on Russia. So far, however, it has not acted on these threats.

At the same time, Zelenskyy has been continuing to leverage his relationships with key European allies. He hit paydirt last weekend when the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland joined him in Kyiv to demand that Russia agree to a general cease-fire by May 12, threatening new sanctions if the Kremlin did not agree. Those leaders also called US President Donald Trump during their meeting and sought his support. He did not discourage them.

As circumstances grew unfavorable for him, Putin parried with a proposal for direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul—a bid to delay progress on a cease-fire, avoid sanctions, and split Trump from the Europeans. At first, the gamble seemed to pay off. Zelenskyy immediately denounced the idea as a Russian stalling tactic and said Ukraine would not participate. But Trump reacted quickly as well; while skeptical that Russia wanted peace, he called on Zelenskyy to engage. Demonstrating his diplomatic nimbleness, Zelenskyy swiftly changed his mind and announced his intention to got to Istanbul.  

This prompted a change of position in Moscow, with Putin announcing that he would not participate in the talks and Russian media criticizing the very concept of these talks—without mentioning that they were Putin’s idea. While Putin did not split off the Trump administration from Europe, his gambit did block the plans of Ukraine, Poland, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to impose sanctions against Russia this week. And the instincts of the Trump team made that possible. After encouraging Zelenskyy to go to Turkey to negotiate, Trump provided cover for Putin’s cynical decision not to attend the talks. Trump said it was natural for Putin not to attend since, he, Trump, would not be there. 

On Thursday, Trump declared that there will be no real progress toward peace until he and Putin sit down together. Trump may well be right about that—but only if he makes clear that if the Kremlin continues to reject reasonable compromises, the United States will send major new arms supplies to Ukraine and levy additional economic sanctions against Russia.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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1. Why is Colombia joining the BRI?

Colombia’s decision to join the BRI appears less the result of a strategic foreign policy shift and more a reflection of domestic political needs and improvised diplomacy. In the lead-up to Petro’s visit to Beijing, tensions between him and Foreign Minister Laura Sarabia—particularly over the BRI—exposed the administration’s lack of internal consensus on China policy. Colombia did not have a clear framework for engaging China, and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed during the visit reflects that ambiguity.

The MOU itself is broad and general. It outlines cooperation across diverse sectors—connectivity, health, technology, green development, and trade—without tailoring to the specific contours of the Colombia-China relationship. There are no flagship projects or unique priorities; instead, it reads like a catch-all document with aspirational language. This generic approach suggests that Colombia is not yet in the driver’s seat when it comes to shaping its partnership with China. As things stand, China is likely to define future cooperation with Colombia under the BRI framework.

Aligning with the BRI offers Petro a symbolically strong, though substantively vague, diplomatic win amid mounting challenges at home. It also aligns with Petro’s broader ambition to project himself as a regional statesman. His remarks at the China-CELAC Forum were less about concrete proposals and more about positioning himself as a Latin American voice in global affairs.

Yet, this decision carries geopolitical risks. Petro spoke positively of the United States during his speech in Beijing and even called for a CELAC-US summit in an apparent attempt to reassure Washington. This cautious messaging suggests Colombia joined the BRI without preemptively managing the fallout with its principal strategic ally. The lack of a coherent China policy parallels an equally absent US engagement strategy, which is concerning given the potential sensitivities around growing China-Latin America ties, especially under the Trump administration.

Colombia’s entry into the BRI reveals more about its domestic political landscape and reactive foreign policy than any strategic realignment. It remains to be seen whether the country can translate this membership into tangible, sovereign-led development outcomes.

—Parsifal D’Sola is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the CEO of the Andrés Bello Foundation–China Latin America Research Center in Bogotá.

China is already an important economic partner for Colombia. Economic ties between the two countries have been deepening for the past fifteen years and Petro inherited an economy that was already increasingly interconnected with China’s. While the United States remains the country’s main trading partner, January data showed Chinese products leading over US imports for the month. Ultimately, Colombia does not need to sign on to the BRI to continue deepening its commercial and investment relationship with China. In fact, doing so is a surefire way of losing friends in Washington at a time when the Trump administration is laser-focused on combating Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. So this is ultimately about domestic politics. An April survey by the leading pollster Invamer found that 62 percent of Colombians now have a favorable opinion of China, up 12 percent since February. This compares to just 40 percent that have a favorable opinion of the United States.

The MOU is wide-ranging. The focus goes beyond mere infrastructure to include topics such as technological exchange, decarbonization, and reindustrialization—but none of that comes with a clear commitment. Instead, the pillars mirror the main elements of Petro’s National Development Plan, suggesting this is merely a statement of intent from China to continue to play a role in Colombia’s economic development rather than a play to pry Colombia away from Washington’s sphere of influence.

This showcases the challenge that the United States faces in convincing Colombia of the value of US partnership. There was alarm in Washington over the fact that a Chinese firm inked a deal to construct and operate Bogotá’s first metro system. But no US firms placed bids on the metro system project or on any of Colombia’s large infrastructure projects in recent years. If Washington hopes to compete with China in the Western Hemisphere, it will have to credibly demonstrate a willingness to dramatically increase investment in infrastructure and other sectors that are attractive to Colombia and other governments across the region.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Colombia’s announcement to join the BRI came in 2024 after Petro signaled that his administration would further open its markets to China and diversify its international partners to seek greater commercial and investment opportunities. Moreover, Colombia became one of China’s strategic partners during Petro’s 2023 visit to Beijing. In this sense, the official signing of Colombia’s participation during the China-CELAC Summit only reiterated previous plans to expand ties with China. Even before this announcement, Colombia had already welcomed several Chinese investments into the country, including Bogotá’s metro line, by China Harbour Engineering. While this move may raise some concerns over Colombia’s relationship with the United States, it is also a test of how Petro’s administration will balance relations with both Washington and Beijing as US-China tensions escalate.

—Victoria Chonn-Ching is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she supports the Center’s China-Latin America work.

While some countries in the region remain cautious in their approach to China to maintain cordial relations with Washington, Colombia is embracing the opportunity to deepen ties with Beijing. Once hailed as a model of US bipartisan support in the hemisphere for its commitment to counterterrorism and anti-narcotics efforts, Colombia is now erratically pivoting under Petro. He has justified this shift by citing the strain placed on the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement by the Trump administration’s imposition of “reciprocal tariffs.” These tariffs have effectively altered the commercial agreement’s 0 percent tariff baseline, imposing a 10 percent duty on non-mining and energy products. This affects the competitiveness of key Colombian exports to the US including coffee, cut flowers, avocados, mangoes, blueberries, peppers, light manufacturing goods, and apparel. Petro claims that China might now buy all these goods without conditions, but Beijing will not grant this for free.

Petro suggested that the free trade agreement with the United States needs to be renegotiated because it left Colombia with a trade deficit. But Colombia’s trade deficit with China is over thirteen billion US dollars per year, so it is not clear if the accession to the BRI will be an appropriate answer to this populist complaint.

—Enrique Millán-Mejía is a senior fellow for economic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He previously served as a senior trade and investment diplomat of the government of Colombia to the United States between 2014 and 2021.

2. What signals did we get from the rest of the region about China during the summit?

The latest China-CELAC Forum followed a familiar pattern: strong symbolism, minimal substance. While participation was notable—seventeen foreign ministers and three heads of state attended—the event was more a showcase of diplomatic optics than a venue for concrete policy advancement. Lofty rhetoric dominated public pronouncements, but there was little in the way of actionable deliverables or follow-through mechanisms.

The headline announcement—a $9.2 billion credit line for the region—made waves, but details remain scarce. No specifics were offered regarding how the funds will be distributed, which countries will benefit, or what the timeline looks like. Given China’s track record of making high-profile pledges that don’t always translate into implementation, it’s prudent to temper expectations.

The clearest signals came not from the multilateral setting but from bilateral tracks—especially Brazil and Chile. Both countries sent their presidents accompanied by large, high-level delegations. The presence of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, alongside nine of his ministers, underscored Brazil’s intent to deepen ties with China through structured, bilateral channels. The contrast with his visits to the United States is stark: all of Lula’s trips to Washington have involved significantly smaller delegations, often limited to a handful of advisers. That disparity speaks volumes about where Brazil sees its strategic priorities.

Chile followed a similar playbook, arriving in Beijing prepared to engage substantively. These engagements signal that China is increasingly prioritizing bilateral diplomacy over regional multilateralism when it comes to tangible cooperation. Countries with a clear agenda and internal coordination—like Brazil and Chile—are well-positioned to benefit.

The forum revealed more about China’s dual-track approach—multilateral symbolism paired with bilateral pragmatism—than about any coordinated regional response to China’s rise.

—Parsifal D’Sola

3. What are the diplomatic implications of the summit for China?

This week’s China-CELAC summit in Beijing underscores China’s expanding ambitions to exert greater influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. What were once isolated engagements with select countries have evolved into a substantive effort to shape economic development, forging geopolitical alliances in some cases and ideological ones in others. This shift is evident in China’s pledge of substantial financial support—$20 billion for infrastructure, $10 billion in concessional loans, and a $5 billion cooperation fund—solidifying China’s increasing role as a development partner in the region.

Initiatives such as the “1+3+6” cooperation framework and Colombia’s decision to join the BRI reflect a broader trend among Latin American countries seeking to diversify their economic partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. Beyond economic cooperation, China is also strengthening collaboration in technology and legal frameworks. Projects like the China-LAC Technology Transfer Center and the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program demonstrate Beijing’s intent to integrate the region into its innovation ecosystem. The inaugural China-CELAC Legal Forum further institutionalizes these ties, fostering cooperation in areas such as digital law, finance, and governance.

Diplomatically, China’s growing presence poses a direct challenge to US dominance in the region. China is also leveraging the summit to diplomatically isolate Taiwan by engaging with countries such as Haiti and Saint Lucia—two of Taiwan’s remaining allies—further undermining Taipei’s international recognition.

China is also expanding its soft power through scholarships, training programs, and youth exchanges designed to cultivate relationships with future regional leaders. The summit reflects China’s aim to foster a multipolar global order, employing economic incentives, diplomatic engagement, and cultural diplomacy to establish itself as an indispensable partner to Latin America and the Caribbean.

—Enrique Millán-Mejía

The summit provided new indications that LAC countries must continue to collaborate on economic issues, particularly in the context of a lack of investment in regional infrastructure and ongoing pressure from the United States, which is engaged in a global trade war.

At the opening of the event, Xi emphasized his role as a reliable partner for LAC countries in the face of “geopolitical confrontation” and “protectionism,” a clear criticism of the United States. Xi also proposed initiatives to “build a Sino-Latin American community with a shared future” and pledged $9.2 billion in development credits for the LAC region. The delegations of the thirty-three CELAC countries responded positively, but there are still few details about how and when it will be spent.

But the announcement represents a further development in China’s interest in LAC. The region is a key target for Beijing, which is already the primary trading partner of Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Indeed, trade between China and the LAC countries surpassed $500 billion for the first time last year, a figure forty times higher than at the beginning of the century.

In contrast, despite the commitment of CELAC to regional integration, its members have taken different approaches to Beijing. While Colombia signed an agreement to join the BRI, Brazil has long avoided making such an association despite strengthening Brazil-China ties.

The United States’ more aggressive approach to Latin America has prompted several Latin American and Caribbean countries to seek closer ties with China, a phenomenon that emerged during US President Donald Trump’s first term. However, the practical implications of this enhanced relationship with Beijing over the next few years, and the potential costs for the region, remain uncertain.

—Thayz Guimarães is a visiting fellow for the China in Latin America Program at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a foreign desk reporter at the Brazilian newspaper O Globo.

4. What are the implications for the United States?

The summit demonstrated China’s aims to strengthen ties and be seen an attractive partner for the region by highlighting its support for multilateralism and opposition to protectionism. For many countries in the region, China has become a key partner, albeit one that is treated with caution and reluctance. Nevertheless, as US-China competition continues, LAC countries may have to face the challenge of balancing the pursuit of their own interests as Washington seeks reengagement with the region and China increases its efforts to present itself as a more reliable partner.

—Victoria Chonn-Ching

As China deepens its ties with LAC countries through trade, it challenges the United States’ historical dominance in the Western Hemisphere. On the diplomatic front, the summit proves China’s ability to present itself as an alternative partner that offers less conditional support compared to the United States, which sometimes links aid to governance reforms or democratic norms. This approach resonates with some leaders, especially in LAC countries that are disenchanted with US foreign policy. For the United States, failure to recalibrate its approach to regional diplomacy risks further alienation and erosion of soft power in its traditional sphere of influence.

The United States faces a strategic imperative to strengthen its alliances in the region. Washington should pursue this through renewed diplomatic efforts, competitive investment initiatives, and cooperative programs that address shared challenges such as renewable energy, illegal migration, and economic inequality.

—Enrique Millán-Mejía

The post Four questions (and expert answers) about the China-Latin America summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These neighbors are Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives, none of which has nuclear weapons. They are not simply bystanders to the crisis. They are strategic actors who may now look to recalibrate their foreign policies in response to the conflict’s regional aftershocks. These are the “swing states,” and they deserve far more attention before the next escalatory episode in the India-Pakistan conflict.

India-Pakistan crises have long been treated as isolated bilateral dramas, bracketed by historical grievance and nuclear deterrence. However, each episode, whether Balakot in 2019 or the present-day Kashmir escalation, creates cascading effects that test the diplomatic, economic, and strategic footing of the region’s smaller, nonnuclear states. This time, the stakes are especially high, as these “swing states” must increasingly calibrate their strategic hedging efforts with China, which is now a central part of the geopolitical equation.

Bangladesh: From alignment to ambiguity

Bangladesh finds itself in the most precarious position. Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India Awami League government in August 2024, along with the rise of a transitional administration, the country is navigating both internal fragility and external recalibration.

Civil-society actors, nationalist voices, and Islamist groups are converging around a shared skepticism of what they see as New Delhi’s interference in Bangladesh’s internal politics—especially given India’s role in sheltering Hasina and maintaining support for the Awami League. Hasina’s party was recently banned by Bangladesh under the country’s anti-terror laws, following a United Nations report that accused the former government of engaging in human rights violations, from extrajudicial killings to arbitrary arrests; the report also said that as many as 1,400 protesters were killed at the hands of military firearms.

As anti-India sentiment intensifies, Dhaka may feel compelled to reassert a more independent or even oppositional posture. India has heightened security measures around the Siliguri Corridor (called the “Chicken’s Neck”), a critical link to its northeastern states, amid Bangladesh’s deepening ties with China and its reported agreement to a recent United Nations proposal for a humanitarian-aid corridor into Burma’s Rakhine State. Although framed as a humanitarian initiative, Indian analysts interpret this move as part of a broader trend of external encroachment in India’s strategic backyard.

This is particularly volatile timing for India. It faces a Bangladesh that may lean harder into diversifying its infrastructure via China, renewing engagement with Pakistan, and framing neutrality as sovereignty. Bangladesh has accused India of pushing at least 260 people—including undocumented migrants and Rohingyas—into Bangladesh since last week. Observing India’s unilateral approach to Pakistan, the interim government in Dhaka may seek to quickly acquire Chinese weapons and defense systems.

In the long run, a Bangladesh reasserting its strategic autonomy, via diversified partnerships and “soft balancing,” could fundamentally shift the Bay of Bengal’s strategic geometry, especially given Bangladesh’s location next to Burma.

Sri Lanka: Fragile coalitions and minority resonance

In Sri Lanka, the Kashmir crisis reverberates through the dual pressures of domestic fragility and regional recalibration. Still recovering from economic collapse and navigating reforms required by its deal with the International Monetary Fund, Colombo has limited bandwidth for overt foreign alignment. Yet India’s assertiveness during moments of crisis, such as its tightening of security partnerships and its invocation of counterterrorism narratives, puts pressure on Sri Lanka to demonstrate loyalty to its northern neighbor.

At the same time, China remains deeply embedded in Sri Lanka’s economic fabric, from the Hambantota Port to Port City Colombo. Indian policymakers may expect regional solidarity, but for Sri Lanka, overcommitting to India could jeopardize its strategic balancing act. Maintaining maneuverability between India and China is not just a diplomatic preference but also a form of strategic hedging critical for economic recovery and political stability.

Layered onto this is the domestic sensitivity of Sri Lanka’s Muslim population, which remains attuned to regional narratives of anti-Muslim sentiment. India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leads a Hindu-nationalist agenda. The BJP also has ties to a Hindu-nationalist organization called the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), with most in India’s cabinet, and Modi himself, current or former members of RSS. According to the leader of the Sri Lankan Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist group Bodu Bala Sena, the group had discussed the possibility of forming a “Hindu-Buddhist peace zone” with RSS to counter what they frame as Islamic extremism in South Asia (although RSS denied this claim). This growing alignment between Buddhist and Hindu nationalist actors contributes to a perception among the Muslim community that exclusionary majoritarianism is regionally coordinated. In this context, overt alignment with a Hindu-nationalist India during a Kashmir crisis could inflame domestic tensions, further narrowing Colombo’s already limited strategic space.

Nepal: Blockade memories and the limits of neutrality

Nepal has long pursued a balancing act between India and China, using subregional frameworks such as the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement and Belt and Road Initiative rail diplomacy to diversify its dependencies. Yet, heightened Indian security sensitivities during periods of crisis make this balancing act harder to sustain. Kathmandu knows too well what happens when it asserts too much sovereignty: In 2015, Nepal adopted a new constitution over Indian objections, refusing to amend provisions that New Delhi viewed as not inclusive of concerns held by the Madhesi populations—ethnic groups with strong ties to India. This was followed by a months-long blockade at key border points, which, while officially denied by India, was widely perceived in Nepal as Indian coercion. That perception was not unfounded—India had previously imposed an official economic blockade on Nepal in 1989 in part in response to arms purchases from China. The 2015 blockade triggered widespread fuel and medicine shortages and ignited a surge in anti-India nationalist sentiment across Nepal. More recently, India and Nepal have been locked in a cartographic dispute, following India’s 2019 release of a new political map that included contested territory. That move provoked diplomatic escalation and led the Nepalese parliament to publish its own revised map—an assertive gesture of sovereignty.

In moments of India-Pakistan escalation, Kathmandu’s efforts to remain equidistant may be recast as disloyalty by New Delhi. With its foreign policy under scrutiny and nationalism rising at home, Nepal may face a shrinking space for strategic hedging. The ambiguity that once gave it leverage, such as balancing infrastructure deals, cross-border trade, and diplomatic signaling, may now be a liability in an increasingly polarized regional environment.

Bhutan: Quiet hedging in a noisy region

Bhutan is expected to remain aligned with India, given their close historical, economic, and security ties, with the countries having signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1949. Yet, Indian military distraction on the western front creates a vacuum of attention in the north, where Chinese territorial pressure has grown steadily. That has particularly been the case since the Doklam standoff in 2017, when Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a seventy-three-day face-off over a road China was constructing in a strategically sensitive area near the trijunction of India, China, and Bhutan—in territory claimed by both China and Bhutan and considered vital to India’s security posture in the northeast.

While Thimphu’s foreign policy appears cautious, the reality is more complex. Bhutan practices hedging of a different kind, where it defines its international posture through minimalist diplomacy and self-protective slowness, rather than binary choices.

While crises like Kashmir do not dramatically alter Bhutan’s foreign policy, they add pressure on Thimphu to quietly reassess its strategic environment, particularly as India’s regional bandwidth narrows and Chinese overtures in the north continue to intensify.

Maldives: Between militarization and backlash

In the Maldives, the Kashmir flare-up may rekindle anti-India backlash among Islamist and conservative political groups, just as New Delhi is looking to deepen its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The president of the Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, won the 2023 election with an “India Out” campaign, which framed Indian military presence on the archipelago as an infringement of Maldivian sovereignty. Muizzu has since moved to recalibrate the country’s foreign policy orientation, including by asking Indian troops to pull out from his island nation. Even though the Maldivian president has recently softened his stance with his trip to India, political figures, particularly those aligned with conservative groups, may now seize on the conflict in Kashmir to amplify anti-India sentiment, framing the crisis as part of a broader campaign against Muslims, who form the majority in the Maldives.

At the same time, Malé’s close economic ties to China and development partnerships with India put it in a bind. The country’s hedging strategy, balancing regional power interests while cultivating leadership on climate security, relies on maintaining diplomatic maneuverability. The India-Pakistan conflict narrows that space.

Strategic hedging, under pressure

What ties these disparate responses together is a common strategy: Hedging. These five “swing states” have, in recent years, mastered the art of calibrated ambiguity. They seek economic gain from and security cooperation with multiple powers—India, China, and the United States—without being drawn into hard alliances. This allows them to maximize autonomy and avoid capture, whether through aid dependency, military pressure, or infrastructure entanglements.

Yet, India-Pakistan crises stress test this architecture. Each episode forces these “swing states” to signal their preferences, take rhetorical positions, or manage public backlash, which is often at the expense of their preferred strategy of quiet recalibration.

Washington must take note

The United States increasingly views India as a pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy, but India’s regional leadership is only as strong as its relationships with its neighbors. A South Asia in which every India-Pakistan skirmish pushes the “swing states” toward anti-India sentiment or deeper engagement with China is a region less stable—unfavorable for US interests.

At the same time, the United States continues to prioritize maritime-centric approaches and groupings such as the Quad in its Indo-Pacific strategy, focusing primarily on the Chinese threat to maritime stability. While it does so, it is sidelining the very terrain where regional contestation is already unfolding: in continental South Asia. Such contestation has taken place over land connectivity, subregional diplomacy, maritime security, and crisis responses among the five nonnuclear countries.

If Washington wants to invest in long-term regional stability in South Asia, it must understand not only the loud actors, but also the quiet strategists—the five “swing states.” Ignoring their pivotal roles risks ceding ground to rival powers and destabilizing South Asia’s fragile geopolitical balance, with consequences far beyond the subcontinent.

Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. 

Nazmus Sakib is a lecturer in the Lewis Honors College at the University of Kentucky.

The post How South Asia’s ‘swing states’ navigate India-Pakistan tensions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The EU and Britain need each other. Their shared challenges, including sluggish economic growth, the protracted war in Ukraine, and a US administration erecting tariffs on European goods and seeking to disengage from the continent’s defense, have made this abundantly clear.

Faced with these common challenges, EU and UK leaders are looking to sign three agreements at the summit. The first is a broad statement of shared values and common principles—a “geopolitical preamble” to shape a new strategic partnership. This statement is expected to reaffirm a commitment to free and open trade, Ukrainian sovereignty, and multilateral action to address global issues such as climate change.

The second, and most urgent, prospective agreement is a security and defense pact, which would open the way to the United Kingdom’s participation in EU-backed military spending. This agreement would allow Britain to take part in joint procurement for military capabilities alongside the bloc’s member states and to enable EU countries to purchase British-made military equipment as part of the new €150 billion European instrument to ramp up defense spending.

As one of Europe’s leading miliary powers, Britain is essential to achieving the continent’s aim of taking the primary role of defending itself in the wake of the Trump administration’s stated desire to reduce the United States’ commitment to defending Europe. In February, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged that Britain would increase its defense spending to 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product by 2027 and to 3 percent during the next parliament.

European fears about Russian aggression and US withdrawal from the continent have increased the pressure for decisive action on defense and security, and the EU-UK pact would represent a welcome step toward developing the continent’s defense industrial base and enhancing effective military cooperation.

The third item on the summit’s agenda is to agree to a “common understanding” on a range of issues concerning the trade and economic relationship between Britain and the EU. Current UK-EU trade arrangements are governed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed by the two sides in late 2020.

For all the fanfare associated with the economic deal the United Kingdom signed with the United States on May 8, the EU remains Britain’s single largest trading partner by far. Boosting economic ties weakened by Brexit could bring desperately needed dividends for both sides, even if it doesn’t produce the growth that would come from Britain rejoining the European single market, a policy Starmer promised not to pursue on the campaign trail.

The TCA is subject to a joint review next year, and both the United Kingdom and EU have bilateral issues they want to amend. The United Kingdom is keen to negotiate an agreement to reduce border checks on agricultural products and secure a mutual recognition agreement for professional qualifications to help open up markets for UK service exporters.

On the EU side, there are calls from France and others to support EU fishing rights in UK waters and a European Commission proposal to create a youth mobility scheme, which would allow young people from across Europe to work and travel freely between the United Kingdom and the EU.

Some of these issues will require political risks and trade-offs from both sides. Starmer’s popularity has slumped since he was elected last summer, and Brexiteers in the United Kingdom will be ready to accuse him of compromising on the outcome of Britian’s referendum to leave the European Union.

This domestic pressure has become more intense after local elections in England earlier this month that represented a heavy defeat for the governing Labour Party and a significant victory for the populist right-wing party, Reform UK, led by the arch Brexit champion Nigel Farage.

There will be pressure on European governments, too, not to compromise the principles of the EU single market for a deal on defense and security. And there remain concerns in European capitals about Britain’s long-term commitment to closer ties with a club it chose to leave nine years ago.

Yet, for all the political difficulties, this is a time for both the EU and the United Kingdom to be bold. Squabbles about fishing or veterinary checks cannot be allowed to undermine the vital steps that must be taken to confront the economic and security threats facing Britain and the EU today.

Europe has always been stronger when the United Kingdom and its continental neighbors are united. Next week’s summit can mark a modest but important step forward for UK-EU relations and demonstrate that the friction and pain of the last decade can be replaced by a new partnership with mutual benefits.

 Ed Owen is a nonresident fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former UK government adviser.

The post Can the EU-UK summit lead to a new post-Brexit partnership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has laid bare Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions and the direct threat it poses to its so-called near-abroad. For NATO frontline states such as Latvia, the security landscape has fundamentally changed over the past three years. While Russian forces are currently taking staggering losses in Ukraine, necessitating a period of force reconstitution, Russia’s military could be rebuilt and ready to invade a Baltic state in as few as three years, according to estimates from some Western intelligence agencies.

Other factors complicate the picture further. On the positive side, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance, growing defense capabilities in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, and Poland’s significant defense investments, all provide Latvia with a strengthened collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. However, this has occurred amid growing uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term commitment to European security. Critical US enablers and rapid reinforcements cannot be taken for granted to the same degree as in the past. While the US nuclear umbrella remains extended so far, the erosion of trust is noticeable, creating potential vulnerabilities that the Kremlin might seek to test.

The stakes could not be higher. For Latvia and its Baltic neighbors, Russian aggression represents an existential threat. At the same time, a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank would quickly reverberate across the entire Alliance.

In response to these threats and changing security dynamics, Latvia should pursue three fundamental and interconnected strategic goals:

• First, demonstrate political will: Latvia must demonstrate to allies in Washington and across Europe that it is maximizing its own defense capabilities and resilience, shouldering its share of the burden, and signaling unwavering commitment. It must then use that demonstration to harness the power of the Alliance for its national defense. Latvia’s defense budget hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 when Russia first invaded Crimea. Its defense budget this year is set at about 3.65 percent, with announced plans to push it to 5 percent of GDP soon. Latvia needs to make up for lost time.
• Second, generate sufficient capabilities: Riga needs to generate sufficient domestic defensive capabilities, integrated with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup, to realistically hold a defensive line against aggression long enough for decisive allied reinforcements to arrive. It needs to achieve a degree of deterrence by denial. This will require a significant Latvian military buildup.
• Third, enhance societal resilience: Latvia must also project an undeniable national will, making it clear to Moscow that any aggression would face fierce, protracted, whole-of-society, and costly resistance. There can be no perception of Latvia as an easy target.

Achieving these goals demands immediate, focused action in Latvia, as well as a rallying of Riga’s NATO allies.

National defense priorities

Latvia should begin by making its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality. The 2018 adoption of this framework, which called for integrating civilian elements into national security, is its vital strength. Through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated ingenuity and cooperation. For example, Latvia’s municipalities and state companies collaborate to support armed forces mobility and counter-mobility efforts. Another example is the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—as a patriotic and armed part of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. While these efforts are commendable, more must be done to ensure that civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens are actively integrated into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills. As comprehensive defense evolves into the reality of society, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Latvia must also maintain momentum and keep military modernization on track. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities. Riga’s commitment to acquiring advanced systems such as HIMARS rocket launchers, IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, and coastal defense missiles sends a vital message: the country is serious about bolstering deterrence by denial. However, acquiring advanced hardware is only part of the equation; Latvia must also ensure that these systems can be effectively commanded, supplied, and maintained during high-intensity conflict. This necessitates trained personnel and critical support elements, including robust command-and-control, resilient logistics, sufficient ammunition stockpiles, and effective maintenance infrastructure. Not all equipment needs to be expensive or high-tech. Land mines along the border that would channel an attack and swarms of low-cost drones can have dramatic results on the battlefield. Perhaps most important, Latvia must ensure that it can sustain combat operations beyond the initial phase, proving it possesses the national endurance required to hold the line until allied reinforcements arrive.

National resilience also requires forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. In 2023, Latvia introduced a mandatory conscription policy called State Defense Service (SDS) to bolster recruitment. This policy of mandatory eleven-month service has shown early signs of success. Latvia is planning to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028, and 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. However, given Latvia’s demographics, active service alone cannot generate sufficient manpower; it must be complemented by a ready and responsive reserve system—one that currently requires significant overhaul. With SDS providing a new input stream, the reserve system must be adapted to effectively integrate these personnel and grow combat power over the long term. Latvia could add significantly to its manpower mobilization by combining professionals, the Home Guard, and SDS graduates, as well as by implementing dedicated reservist training and early military education. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, plus an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. While this objective is sound, the current timeline appears misaligned with the potential speed of Russian force reconstitution. Latvia must confront substantial constraints, including the need for adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies to drive recruitment and conduct training at the required scale and speed.

Furthermore, physical defenses require turning the Baltic Defense Line from a concept to a concrete plan. A fortified line across the Baltics, leveraging naturally difficult terrain, is a clear-headed and necessary response to the Russian threat. Correctly executed, it could effectively impede a potential incursion, buying time for national counteractions and allied mobilization. Fast-tracking construction, funding, and policy decisions will be crucial for realizing this critical barrier. Critically, forces must train to fight effectively from these prepared positions, integrating them fully into national and regional operational plans.

Finally, Latvia must ensure that it has the infrastructure to support military mobility and to provide host nation support. Latvia’s defense fundamentally relies on NATO allies arriving quickly and in force, requiring substantial investment in mobility infrastructure and support elements. Latvia must therefore proactively invest in and expand the critical infrastructure needed to receive, stage, and sustain large-scale allied forces. Short-term priorities include accelerating projects like the Liepāja military port and enhancing airfield capacity at Lielvārde airbase and Riga International Airport. Accelerating Rail Baltica’s military utility is also crucial, as it could fundamentally alter the capacity and speed of NATO reinforcements into the region.

Rallying allied support

While Latvia shoulders these critical domestic responsibilities, its security ultimately rests on robust collective defense and the tangible commitment of its allies. Latvia must advocate for specific actions from its NATO partners, recognizing that the window before Russia potentially reconstitutes its offensive capabilities is short. This diplomatic push requires urgency and clarity.

The place to begin is in Washington. All three Baltic states and Poland have essentially accepted US President Donald Trump’s challenge for allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. This should be presented in a high-profile fashion to Trump during the NATO Summit in June. As part of this presentation, Latvia should urge Trump to continue hosting US forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis and to augment those rotations with high-impact capabilities such as air and missile defense assets.

To deter Russia, NATO must strengthen its forward defense posture on the ground. Latvia should continue advocating for transforming the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup on its territory into a combat-credible forward defense force that expands on the full-time brigade and integrates it with national defense structures that match adversary military capabilities. Enhancing this forward defense by securing broader participation, particularly from a nuclear-armed European ally, would send a strong deterrent signal to Moscow.

This enhanced forward presence must be embedded within deeper, more integrated regional defense planning. Latvia, working closely with its neighbors, should champion the development of genuinely interlocking, all-domain defense plans within an enhanced Nordic-Baltic-Poland framework. This necessitates moving beyond interoperability exercises toward shared operational concepts and assigned responsibilities. This will help forge a more cohesive and resilient defense architecture in NATO’s northeast as part of the Alliance’s broader reinforcement strategy. Consequently, Latvia must be a vocal proponent of the regular, rigorous exercising and continuous streamlining of the supreme allied commander Europe’s reinforcement plans for the Baltic region. Identifying and resolving friction points, especially cross-border military mobility bottlenecks and logistical hurdles, requires sustained, collaborative effort with those allies designated to reinforce the region in a crisis.

Minimizing the time required for those reinforcements to arrive necessitates a concerted push to maximize the pre-positioning of allied military equipment and essential stocks within Latvia and the region. Reducing the lift requirement during a crisis by having equipment already in theater dramatically shortens response timelines, directly bolstering deterrence by showcasing NATO’s capacity for rapid, large-scale reaction.

Lastly, building on a deep-seated relationship, the Baltic states must treat strengthening security cooperation with Ukraine as a long-term strategic imperative. Currently, Kyiv’s resolute defense delivers immediate dividends by tying down significant Russian forces and offering invaluable, hard-earned combat lessons. For the Baltic states, a battle-hardened ally such as Ukraine can be a substantial security and defense contributor to the region. If Russia were to test NATO’s defense capabilities on its eastern flank, the prospect of Ukraine joining the fight would dramatically expand Moscow’s theater of operations.

Latvia has a brief respite as Russian troops are worn down in Ukraine, but it will take little time for Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces. Latvia must use this window to create a more favorable defense environment. At home, it must rapidly build up its defense capacity and resilience. Abroad, it needs to assure a continued US commitment to its defense, generate a greater NATO forward presence on its soil, and deepen regional integration. It also needs to refine reinforcement mechanisms and maximize pre-positioning. Convincing allies to commit the necessary political will and resources before Russia regains its strength is the most critical security task facing Riga and its regional partners.

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on the Baltic states’ defense and security, as well as the foreign and security policies of Russia and Belarus. Previously, he worked on policy analysis and planning at the Latvian Ministry of Defence, focusing on crisis management and comprehensive national defence issues.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in several senior US government positions, including special assistant to the president for defense policy, principal deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and director of the Institute for National Security Studies. 

The post Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.  

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.  

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Qutaiba Idlbi: This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region 

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable\

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK 

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere   

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses. 

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence. 

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations. 

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace. 

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria. 

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions. 

Going forward, there are three things to watch:   

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation. 

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future. 

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December. 

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists. 

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding 

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity. 

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions. 

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land. 

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.   

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications. 

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders 

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors. 

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.” 

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention. 

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening. 

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security. 

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.  

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.  

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.  

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state. 

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development. 

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country. 

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise. 

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran.  The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria. 

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination. 
 
—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate. 

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. 

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division. 

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable 

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.” 

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.” 

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.  

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.  

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.  

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts. 

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center. 

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians. 

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria. 

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal. 

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation. 

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs. 

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood. 

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory. 

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria. 

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. 

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.   

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life. 

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.  

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough. 

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians. 

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed. 

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses. 

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community. 

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in. 

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries.  

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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This is Haiti’s fourth year without a president, its ninth year without holding presidential elections, and its second year without a single democratically elected official in power. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the country has witnessed a litany of crises—security, humanitarian, and political—that have internally displaced over one million Haitians, more than half of whom are children. Weakened state institutions and an under-resourced national police force have left Haitians to confront these challenges with little to no support from their government. While resilience has long been a defining trait of the Haitian people, forged through more than two centuries of adversity, the past several months have tested that endurance to its limits. Gangs have made staggering advances into densely populated areas of the capital and previously sheltered rural regions, driving a surge in violence that has claimed over 1,500 lives since January 1.

Experts warn that the total collapse of Port-au-Prince is now closer than ever. What happens if the capital falls to the gangs? Beyond a seismic humanitarian crisis, the Transitional Presidential Council—a provisional governing body formed in April 2024 with the support of the Caribbean Community and the United States—would likely unravel, taking with it any remaining hope for constitutional reform, credible elections, and a functioning central government. And as gangs expand their control beyond urban strongholds and into the countryside, the entire nation would teeter on the edge of state collapse.

While there are no immediate solutions to the crisis in Haiti, there are several tangible steps the United States can take to ameliorate the suffering of the Haitian people and help facilitate the country’s recovery. Failing to do so risks allowing the crisis to not only worsen, but spill over into the United States and throughout the region.

Ripple effects

The paramount consequence of Haiti’s potential collapse into a failed state would be the devastating loss of life and the shattered futures of hundreds of thousands of Haitians. But this fallout would not be contained within the country’s borders—the United States and the broader Caribbean Basin will inevitably feel the ripple effects of the crisis as well.

A humanitarian disaster of this scale would trigger a dramatic surge in migration to countries across the region, including to the US southern border. This coincides with the Trump administration’s revocation of Temporary Protected Status for 200,000 Haitian refugees, forcing deportations at a moment of maximum instability. The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s closest neighbor and a key US ally, would also face intensified pressure—both from refugee flows and the risk of cross-border violence. In the total absence of a functioning state, Haiti could become a staging ground for terrorist activity, drug markets, and transnational criminal networks already active in the region, further destabilizing the Caribbean Basin. With this level of insecurity just miles from the United States’ shores, the situation represents a five-alarm fire for US national security.

US foreign policy in Haiti has long been marked by intervention, mismanagement, and short-term fixes. Many experts fear that the designation of Haiti’s gangs as foreign terrorist organizations falls into the same pattern—failing to address the root causes of gang violence or consider the impact on civilians who rely on aid. And as the failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support mission to restore security to Haiti has made clear, even efforts with significant US backing have proved inadequate to the challenges of the moment. Past US interventions and policies toward Haiti have fueled suspicion among many Haitians and hopelessness among many US policymakers. Yet while the US government bears significant responsibility for this skepticism, it also possesses the influence to effect positive—even if incremental—change for Haiti.

How the US can help right now

The US government can take several steps in the near term to bring back a modicum of stability and prepare the nation for “the day after.” Many of the necessary policies already exist—they simply require reauthorization or targeted revisions to be effective.

Although Haiti is widely recognized as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States remains the largest market for its most profitable sector: textiles. Thanks to bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in 2006 and 2010, known as the HOPE and HELP acts, which established preferential trade terms for the sector, Haiti’s apparel exports to the United States surged from $231 million in 2001 to $994 million in 2021. Although the crisis has severely undermined textile production, these exports provide a resilient economic lifeline for what remains of Haiti’s formal economy. However, unless reauthorized, these trade preferences are set to expire in September. Rather than imposing tariffs that further destabilize Haiti’s fragile manufacturing sector, Congress should move quickly to preserve the near-shoring of US manufacturing imports by passing HR 1625—the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2025, sponsored by Representative Gregory Murphy (R-NC).

The withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) raises many questions about the future of development organizations in Haiti, as hundreds of life-saving programs are put on indefinite hold. Several voices within the Haiti policy community note that the agency’s work, despite its best intentions, sometimes created an overreliance on foreign aid within Haitian institutions. Over a century of this dynamic led Haiti to become, in the words of Haiti expert Jake Johnston, an “aid state.”

In the wake of USAID’s departure, the United States has the opportunity to sculpt a more effective aid strategy that puts the onus of development work in the hands of an ever-resilient Haitian civil society, not just foreign contractors. This strategy proved successful in the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. And this approach serves as the foundation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), a law passed by Congress during US President Donald Trump’s first term that prioritizes localization and reorients US foreign policy strategy in fragile states toward preventing conflict rather than reacting to it. Haiti was designated one of the GFA’s ten priority countries and the Biden administration made meaningful strides toward developing a strategy that prioritizes engagement with a broad range of trusted local partners. Renewing the GFA could build on this groundwork by channeling substantial resources into empowering local partners, thus fostering greater self-reliance within Haitian institutions. Representatives Sarah Jacobs (D-CA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) have introduced a bill to reauthorize and strengthen the GFA. Yet despite the Trump administration’s support for aid localization, momentum for renewing this policy has faltered in both the legislative and executive branches, leaving its future in peril.  

A whole-of-government approach

As Georges Fauriol, an expert on the Caribbean, has described US policy toward Haiti, “the challenge is not so much the absence of a strategy as its disaggregated character.” Whether it be the State Department, the Office of the US Trade Representative, or the Department of Defense’s US Southern Command, the US government possesses no shortage of entities that conduct Haiti policy—not to mention the influence of external interest groups such as those in the US Haitian diaspora.

Although working toward the same mission, these initiatives tend to operate in silos and do not come together to form a cohesive strategy for the long-term stability of the country. This dynamic was evident during the US response to Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, as US Southern Command-led military relief operations and USAID disaster initiatives often struggled with unclear divisions of responsibility, resulting in operational inefficiencies. The GFA and policies such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative aim to establish a whole-of-government approach to address this issue. Rather than launching new initiatives for each emerging crisis, the Trump administration should also appoint a special envoy to coordinate and leverage existing Haiti policies within the various branches, helping to shape a more coherent foreign policy for the island and the broader region.

The severity of Haiti’s ongoing crisis makes envisioning “the day after” a challenge. Yet, for countless Haitians, whether living in Haiti or abroad, this vision is worth fighting for, just as it has been during past periods of turmoil. The United States has a strategic interest in advancing a Haiti policy focused on long-term stability rather than short-term fixes. No single policy or initiative will solve the security, humanitarian, and economic challenges that have engulfed Haiti for the past four years. But failing to act at all would further jeopardize the stability of Haiti, the United States, and the region as a whole.

Camilla Reitherman is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

The post There is no easy fix for Haiti’s crises. But here’s where the US can start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• “Some historians have compared the flux of ideas and connections today to the turmoil of the Renaissance and Reformation five centuries ago, but on a much larger scale. And those eras were followed by the Thirty Years’ War, which killed a third of the population of Germany. Today, the world is richer and riskier than ever before.

• I am sometimes asked whether I am optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the United States. I reply, ‘Guardedly optimistic.’ The United States has many problems—polarization, inequality, loss of trust, mass shootings, deaths of despair from drugs and suicide—just to name a few that make headlines. There is a case for pessimism. At the same time, we Americans have survived worse periods in the 1890s, 1930s, and 1960s. For all its flaws, the United States is an innovative and resilient society that, in the past, has been able to recreate and reinvent itself. Maybe Generation Z can do it again. I hope so.”

Below, members of the Atlantic Council community reflect on the impact Nye made on both our work and the wider world.

Click below to jump to an expert reflection:

Matthew Kroenig: “In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Chuck Hagel: “He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

Jan Lodal: He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Paula Dobriansky: “His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Daniel Fried: “He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

“In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Just recently, our CEO Fred Kempe applied the “Joe Nye rule” as a guide to the Atlantic Council’s geostrategy work. He advised that our regular, private Strategy Consortium convenings bring together the caliber of strategic thinkers who will entice people like Joe Nye to remain engaged.

We are deeply saddened to learn of Nye’s passing and that his participation in our convenings will no longer be possible. He was a longstanding Atlantic Council board director and a regular participant in our private Strategy Consortium meetings for many years, most recently in December 2024 on the topic of anticipating a future Trump administration national security strategy. He also contributed to our strategy work in other ways, authoring forwards for our Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series and articles for our website.

He was a towering intellect and a resolute and courteous commentator on global affairs. He brought penetrating insights to our meetings and did not shy away from expressing disagreement, but always in a generous way, intending only to elevate the discussion and improve the quality of the work.

In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist about American power, alliances, and global engagement. Even though he is no longer with us, Nye’s strategic clarity, civility, and optimism will continue to inspire the Atlantic Council.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

“He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

We have lost an exceptional human being. He brought clarity to so many complicated issues over the years. We all learned from him and benefitted from his wisdom and knowledge and unpretentious style. He’ll be missed by many.

—Chuck Hagel is a member of the Atlantic Council international advisory board, a former US secretary of defense, and a former US senator from Nebraska.

He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Joe’s contributions to his students, his family, and world peace and security were unparalleled. His impact will be felt indefinitely. 

Joe was also a magnificent personal friend and colleague. We survived numerous hikes to the top of the mountains in Aspen after the exhilarating discussions he had organized for the Aspen Strategy Group. He asked me to take over the group when he had to step down, which I was honored to do. I then imposed on him to join my team as assistant secretary for international security affairs under Bill Perry in the Clinton administration. He was the best ever in that storied office. 

Joe actually changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts—”soft power” being perhaps the most memorable. He was a devoted husband to his dear wife, Molly, and a great art dealer from whom we obtained twelve paintings that grace our walls and remind us daily of Joe. We will miss him greatly. 

—Jan Lodal is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, a former principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, and a former senior staff member of the National Security Council.

“His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Joe Nye was an extraordinary scholar, intellect, professor, and public servant. He was a prolific writer whose books, articles, and op-eds advanced innovative ideas and provided cogent analyses of complex national security issues. Described as a “towering figure in international affairs,” he produced writings that have had a profound impact on policymakers both at home and abroad. He was widely known for having conceived the “soft power” approach in US foreign policy, which promotes American power through influence, persuasion, and diplomacy.

Joe’s service at the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and as chair of the National Intelligence Council was distinguished and results-driven. During his tenure at the State Department as deputy to the under secretary for security assistance, science, and technology, he chaired the consequential National Security Council interagency group on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

I have long admired Joe’s achievements in foreign policy and public service. On a more personal level, I was also proud to have been his colleague and friend. He touched my life in so many ways. While at Harvard for my master’s and Ph.D. degrees, Joe was not only my professor there, but a wonderful mentor. One of his many admirable qualities that I loved was his desire to have a good lively policy debate. He always brought opposing points of view into a discussion and relished a vibrant exchange of opinions. His calm demeanor in the midst of bureaucratic squabbles or crises was exemplary.

I will miss him terribly, but I am gratified that his policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure. He was indeed a giant in international affairs and leaves a remarkable legacy.

—Paula J. Dobriansky is the vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former US under secretary of state for global affairs.

“He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

Joe Nye was the rare combination of government foreign policy practitioner with political thinker and public scholar of the first order. He has been called a “neo-liberal.” But that term, like its twin “neo-conservative,” is more of an epithet than a useful guide. Roughly put, Nye believed that the rules-based international system that the United States created and led for three generations after World War II was a good thing—that it had more potential to generate prosperity, avoid world war, and advance American values and thus American interests than the competition. Because the competition in the twentieth century was fascism and communism, Nye’s judgment was a sure thing.

But Nye’s optimistic view now seems eclipsed by the dark neo-nationalism espoused by many in the United States and indeed across Europe. When some in the Trump administration, including US President Donald Trump, call for seizing Greenland, they seem to argue that only physical control of (and raw power over) territory can secure US interests, that there is no place for cooperation between nations to achieve goals that benefit both. That’s not a new view; it’s a mere repackaging of old European, great-power imperialism that brought disaster in its time and could bring disaster in ours. Such thinking would reduce the United States to a mere grasping, greedy superpower, a larger version of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, seeking to dominate through force and fear.

Nye’s views are now, more than ever, worth considering. He was no naif about the need for power in the international arena. But he acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right. When he spoke of such things, he meant it: artful, creative, committed, and realistic in the best sense. What a compelling and inspiring legacy he leaves behind.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The post The father of ‘soft power,’ a supreme intellect, and an eternal optimist: The Atlantic Council remembers Joseph Nye appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Melanie Hart: It looks like China has the upper hand in trade talks with the US 

Josh Lipsky: Treating US-China trade like a light switch will cause it to short circuit

Barbara C. Matthews: The tariff suspension creates a powerful incentive for third countries to choose a side

L. Daniel Mullaney: Whatever the outcome of talks, tariff unpredictability will reduce US trade dependence on China 

Hung Tran: The agreement is overshadowed by the possibility of abrupt change

It looks like China has the upper hand in trade talks with the US

The big takeaway from the weekend’s US-China meetings: Washington blinked, and Beijing decided to take the easy offramp on offer. 

It is no accident that these talks occurred just as Walmart and other major US retailers ramped up their warnings to the administration to prepare for COVID-19 pandemic-level shortages. Shortages were already showing up in shipping and port data. Consumer retail shelves were coming up next. And there is zero indication that US consumers are willing to experience shortages reminiscent of the Great Depression to accommodate a trade war with unclear aims.  

Meanwhile, Beijing was managing the economic fallout on the other side of the Pacific. Exports pivoted from the United States to Southeast Asia (likely the first step in a route designed to circumvent US tariffs). Many Chinese citizens praised President Xi Jinping for standing up to US bullying. Those that did not were censored. 

From Beijing’s perspective, China now has what it wants with all US administrations: a negotiation process. And it didn’t give up anything of value to get it. At home, Xi secured strongman bona fides for standing up to US President Donald Trump and a new boogeyman to blame for China’s domestic economic woes. Globally, Xi gains points for looking like the rational actor willing to come to the table and seek a deal. Beijing has been trying to engage the United States in talks over fentanyl for months. China issued a white paper back in March laying out its efforts to crack down on fentanyl. Politically, as of May, we are now back where we started at the beginning of the second Trump administration, with one major change: the United States and China are now actively engaged in trade negotiations, and it feels like China has the upper hand. 

—Melanie Hart is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former senior advisor for China at the US Department of State. 

Treating US-China trade like a light switch will cause some short-circuiting

This was a massive, unexpected, and very welcome de-escalation. We can cite gross domestic product statistics and market reactions, but the real driver from the US side was the prospect of missing backpacks, sneakers, and T-shirts at Walmart and Target just as parents start back-to-school shopping. 

China had a similar sense of urgency. Layoffs across ports and factories in southern China were becoming widespread. Apparently, the Chinese came into the negotiations ready to address nearly all the complaints the United States had raised and did so in a way that made US Treasury Secretary Bessent and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer believe it was a genuine show of good faith.

Now the hard part starts—getting to a Phase Two trade deal. Inside the Trump administration, there is confidence that it can happen in ninety days. But the US-China trade deal signed during Trump’s first term took two years to negotiate—from 2018 to 2020—and this one is more complex and will address fentanyl, technology, semiconductors, and more. In the meantime, the Trump administration is going to introduce new tariffs, including on pharmaceuticals.  

Treating the relationship between the world’s two largest economies like a light switch is going to cause some short-circuiting. Expect a new surge of imports in June and July as retailers try to get ahead of whatever the fall may bring—it’s very difficult to run a global economy with this kind of uncertainty.  

The deal may be especially concerning for Europe. While Europe avoided the onslaught of cheap Chinese goods redirected to their shores, the United States is still on the hunt for revenue generators to offset the cost of Trump’s domestic priorities, including tax cuts. With China’s tariffs at least temporarily slashed and the negotiations with the European Union (EU) not gaining any traction, this puts Brussels in the hot seat.  

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, senior director of the GeoEconomics Center, and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

The tariff suspension creates a powerful incentive for third countries to choose a side

The great global trade rebalancing of 2025 continues to gather momentum, illustrating that asymmetric negotiation is effective for counterparts seeking strategic shifts. The time horizon for tariff policy uncertainty has now extended to mid-August, aligning neatly but unfortunately with likely US fiscal policy constraints and the US budget process. The concessions by both China and the United States this weekend extend far beyond the headline temporary tariff reductions.   

Both parties have now publicly acknowledged that the Bretton Woods structure for creating economic interdependence continues to create powerful incentives for de-escalation; neither China nor the United States (much less the rest of the world) can afford to pursue long-term decoupling and trade diversion. This is the most positive signal that emerged from Switzerland over the weekend. 

Both parties also now tacitly agree that the trade imbalances created over the course of the last few decades must be addressed. China effectively had no choice: the last sixty days have seen a range of entities (the EU, the World Trade Organization, and the United Kingdom) publicly agreeing with the United States’ list of grievances against the multilateral trading system articulated in Trump’s executive order establishing high reciprocal tariffs. 

The ninety-day reprieve creates incentives for both the United States and China to build new bilateral trade arrangements with third countries to solidify their respective bargaining positions.   

The tariff suspension also creates powerful incentives for those third countries to choose a side. The recently concluded US-UK framework agreement and ongoing US negotiations with other large trading partners (including India, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and the EU) is mirrored by ongoing Chinese efforts to solidify the economic heft and geoeconomic stature of the BRICS economies. South Africa, as president of the Group of Twenty (G20) this year, has maintained a studious silence. India’s negotiations with the United States display potential fissures within BRICS, even as Brazil and Russia increase their economic ties with China. 

The current global trade policy volatility thus ironically replicates the parallel structure of negotiations that occurred in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, eighty years ago. The great powers of the day gathered in the Gold Room to strike what we today would call “plurilateral” deals that set the boundaries of the possible even as broader negotiations in plenary sessions proceeded in the ballroom. Both then and now, the great powers of the day engaged in straight talk and struck difficult bargains for the purpose of setting a new economic equilibrium. The composition of participants in today’s Gold Room may be different, but the negotiating dynamic remains the same. The outcome will also achieve the same overall purpose: to restructure the geoeconomic balance of power. One can only hope that the deals struck over the next few months prove to be as durable as the original Bretton Woods agreement. 

— Barbara C. Matthews is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. She is also CEO and founder of BCMstrategy, Inc and a former US Treasury attaché to the European Union. 

Whatever the outcome of talks, tariff unpredictability will reduce US trade dependence on China

There are three major takeaways from this morning’s announcement of a temporary agreement between the United States and China: First, it is added proof that the Trump administration’s trade policy is less about the tariffs per se (or decoupling, in the case of China) than it is about achieving the objectives behind the tariffs. These objectives include curbing nonmarket excess capacity and other nonmarket policies and practices, unfair trade barriers abroad, and the goods trade deficit. Broad tariffs are ready and powerful tools for achieving these objectives, but they are also crude ones that inflict self-harm and are therefore less desirable than other arrangements with equivalent effect.   

Second, trading partners that immediately started negotiations over these objectives instead of retaliating are in as good a position as, if not better than, China, which chose a hardline retaliatory stance. The former are in negotiations with the United States, as China is now, but without the severe economic harm inflicted by the retaliation in the interim.   

Third, the United States and China are now in a position similar to that before China received “permanent normal trade relations” status and joined the World Trade Organization, when the trading relationship was subject to the uncertainty of yearly most favored nation status renewal. There was significant trade between the United States and China in this period, but it was hobbled by the unpredictability of the tariff regime. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of this morning’s agreement in terms of tariff levels, the unpredictability in the tariff regime will continue to serve the Trump administration’s objective of reducing trade dependence on China. 

—L. Daniel Mullaney is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as assistant US trade representative for Europe and the Middle East. 

The agreement is overshadowed by the possibility of abrupt change

The United States and China have agreed to reduce their respective bilateral tariffs on each other for the next ninety days, buying time to negotiate a trade deal. Essentially, the 145 percent tariffs the United States levied on China will be cut to 30 percent, and China’s 125 percent tariffs on US goods will be cut to 10 percent. The agreement has eased tension between the two countries and triggered major rallies in international equities, as well as the dollar, which had been under selling pressure.  

While the reduction of tariffs and commitment to negotiate a trade deal between the world’s two largest economies is to be welcomed, these steps have raised important questions for the international trading system. First, this deal together with the recent US-UK trade agreement have confirmed that the world has moved into a bilaterally managed trading system based on reciprocity—with no references to previously agreed multilateral rules nor the World Trade Organization. Second, the agreements were made in a rather casual manner, without being codified into trade treaties or national laws. This adds to the uncertainty about how robust and sustainable those agreements can be, as they are overshadowed by the possibility of abrupt change. Finally, even with those agreements, US tariffs on other trading counterparts will likely remain higher than before April 2025. It appears that the global 10 percent tariff rate will become the floor tariff rate on imports by the United States.  

Taken together, these developments elevate uncertainty, unpredictability, and complexity in the world trading order. They are likely to reduce trade volumes, especially shipments to the United States, which aims to cut its trade deficit. If trade among the rest of the world doesn’t increase enough to compensate, the decline in global trade will contribute to a weakening of global growth prospects. 

—Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center and former IMF official. 

The post Experts react: The US and China just agreed to dramatically reduce tariffs on each other, for now. What’s next?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This showdown between countries that each possess approximately 170 nuclear warheads has been fueled by decades-long disputes over Kashmir and historical enmity. It unfolded following a terrorist attack on April 22 that killed twenty-six, mostly Indian civilians. India attributed the attack to Pakistan-based militants and last week responded with drone strikes, missile exchanges, and a significant airstrike on Pakistan’s Nur Khan air base, raising Pakistani fears that India would launch a decapitation strike on its nuclear command.

On May 8, US Vice President JD Vance asserted that the conflict was “fundamentally none of our business.” But then the United States received an intelligence briefing on Friday, one that likely highlighted grave developments such as, potentially, intercepted communications or troop mobilizations. Within twenty-four hours, Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were compelled by a fear that the crisis could go nuclear to engage directly with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani leaders to secure a cease-fire. India and Pakistan agreed to that cease-fire on Saturday, although both sides have since issued accusations that the truce had been violated.

This rapid shift from Vance’s isolationist rhetoric to high-stakes diplomacy demonstrates the global stakes of nuclear crises and the impossibility of dismissing them as regional concerns. A nuclear exchange would devastate any region, disrupt trade routes, spike energy prices, and generate millions of refugees, overwhelming international systems. Radioactive fallout would pose environmental risks far beyond the countries involved, directly impacting US economic and security interests.

Those stakes are why the United States must prevent Iran’s regime from retaining the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons. Allowing Tehran such capabilities risks replicating the perilous dynamics of the South Asian nuclear standoff, with profound global consequences.

Vance’s initial claim that the conflict was “none of our business” ignored these consequences, but the crisis’s rapid escalation forced US action. The Iran nuclear negotiations must internalize this lesson.

Tehran’s regime, with its history of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, has demonstrated a propensity for destabilization, as seen in the 2019 Aramco attack. If Iran retains the technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons, it could leverage the threat of weaponization to escalate regional aggression or actively work clandestinely to develop a weapon, creating a crisis that, like India and Pakistan’s, becomes a global liability.

The South Asian crisis also illustrates how nuclear technology can embolden provocative behavior under the guise of deterrence. India’s retaliation for the April 22 attack, which it blamed on Pakistan, and Pakistan’s counterstrikes reflect a cycle of escalation enabled by mutual nuclear capabilities. Despite Vance’s hope that the conflict would not “spiral into a broader regional war or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict,” the rapid deterioration necessitated US intervention.

Iran poses an even greater risk. With nuclear technology, Tehran could intensify proxy operations—Hezbollah targeting Israel or the Houthis disrupting Red Sea shipping—confident that its potential nuclear arsenal deters retaliation. This could spark a regional arms race, with Saudi Arabia and others pursuing nuclear capabilities, heightening the risk of miscalculation.

The India-Pakistan experience highlights the challenges of managing nuclear-armed states. Decades of diplomacy have failed to resolve their tensions, as mutual distrust and nuclear arsenals perpetuate a fragile stalemate. Iran’s history of evading International Atomic Energy Agency oversight and prolonging negotiations, as seen with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, suggests similar challenges. The United States must pursue a stringent approach in the negotiations that lie ahead, demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear weaponization infrastructure, backed by robust verification, sustained sanctions, and a credible military deterrent.

The latest India-Pakistan crisis, triggered by a terrorist attack and propelled to the brink of nuclear conflict, forced Vance to abandon his “none of our business” posture and engage urgently to avert catastrophe. Like it or not, Washington carries a heavy burden in these crises, and that’s why it must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons—before it’s too late.

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He is currently a principal and industry director at Providence Consulting Group for aerospace, defense, and high-tech electronics.

The post The India-Pakistan crisis shows Washington that it must stop Iran’s nuclear rise appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If Iran and the United States ultimately bridge these differences and reach a deal, how will we know if it’s a good one? Here’s my guide for how to grade various potential outcomes of these high-stakes negotiations.

A: Resolution of the nuclear problem and regional malign influence

The issue of Iran’s nuclear program is almost certainly the focus of the talks, and an understandable one given how close Iran is to having enough enriched uranium for a bomb. But if it is indeed the only issue on the table, siloing it off from the Islamic Republic’s efforts to advance its ballistic missile program, regional malign influence, terrorism operations, and global assassination and hostage-taking campaigns is a mistake—one that ensures a great deal worthy of an A grade is already off the table. 

In seeking a narrow, nuclear-only deal, Trump is almost certainly ensuring most, if any, of those other challenges will simply never be addressed, just as they were not after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That would leave Iran’s position in the Middle East strengthened and the region less safe overall. 

B: Full dismantlement

To get a good deal and earn a solid B grade, Trump would have to ensure that Iran fully dismantle its nuclear program, giving up its right to enrichment for civilian nuclear power. Iran claims this is the purpose of its current program, but the option to have nuclear power exists without enrichment. Other countries import the fuel, run it through their reactors, and ship the spent fuel back to its origin.

This agreement alone would not be enough to achieve a B grade, though. Iran would also have to agree to give up all of its centrifuges, which are used for spinning uranium to build a stable nuclear device, and allow them to be removed from the country. In other words, a good deal means Iran being willing to give up its program fully, similar to what Libya did in 2003. Witkoff recently said that if Iran doesn’t want a nuclear weapon, as its leaders have long claimed, then “their enrichment facilities have to be dismantled. They cannot have centrifuges.”

But such a scenario is highly unlikely. Iran has continuously professed its right to enrich uranium and its current “moderate” political leaders, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Araghchi, would almost certainly struggle to convince an already skeptical Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to agree to give up a right he has long advocated—particularly given how things ended for Libya’s dictator. Moreover, Pezeshkian and Araghchi would probably be concerned that even offering that trade could prompt such intense blowback from hardliners that their own leadership could be at risk.

C: “Civilian” enrichment with stringent conditions

In a deal worthy of a C grade, Iran would be permitted to enrich uranium to 3.67 percent, the course of action seemingly preferred by at least some in the administration, including Vice President JD Vance. Such an amount would be sufficient for Iran to have a civilian program, but Iran would have to accept more permanent restrictions than existed as part of the JCPOA deal. 

Iran would have to give up its more advanced centrifuges—known as IR-8, IR-6, and IR-2 centrifuges—that, in essence, provide it with the capability to more quickly enrich uranium than its original IR-1 design. But there would also have to be strict limits on the IR-1s themselves. Otherwise, production capacity would eventually exceed that of more advanced centrifuges; it would just take a while.  

Moreover, a deal earning a C would not put a time limit on the restrictions or have sunset clauses like in the JCPOA, something Witkoff claimed would be the US position, stating, “there’s no sunsetting of their obligations.” Among the most critical sunsetting provisions in the JCPOA were those that expired in 2023 related to ballistic missiles and those set to expire in 2031 that lifted restrictions on Iran’s uranium enrichment level and stockpile. Finally, Iran would have to agree to inspections from not only the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) but also from the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, aka the “P5+1” nations that negotiated the JCPOA. 

Such a deal would be far from ideal. The threat of Iran being able to obfuscate its enrichment development would be perpetually present, no matter how intense the inspections. But even if Iran complied with the new agreement and restrictions, the domestic conditions in Iran, and the regional situation in the Middle East, will not remain stagnant. If conditions deteriorate, an Iranian regime under threat could quickly decide to restart its nuclear program. Iran could give up a lot in a deal, but there is no Men in Black “neuralyzer” to erase Iranian knowledge of how to properly enrich uranium and create a nuclear weapon.

D: “Civilian” enrichment with advanced centrifuges

For a below-average D grade, a deal would have the same bounds as for a C, but without Iran agreeing to give up its more advanced centrifuges or allowing in inspectors from the P5+1 to monitor its compliance with the agreement. Such a deal would leave Iran perpetually on the cusp of having a nuclear weapon, with less leverage than ever by the United States and its allies to prevent it.

F: “Civilian” enrichment with sunset clauses

And finally, an F would be the correct grade for a deal that permits an Iranian civilian nuclear program with domestic enrichment, does not compel Iran to give up its centrifuges (only to put them in storage), prohibits non-IAEA inspectors, and contains multiple sunset clauses.

Allowing sunsets almost ensures Tehran’s return to the concept of strategic patience and that some years from now, the world will once again be at risk of another crisis over Iran getting a nuclear weapon. Buying time is not always an unreasonable strategy; it wasn’t during the original JCPOA. But that was at a time when Iran was months to years from having enough enriched uranium for a single bomb. Today, Iran is only days away.

Trump may well be on his way to getting a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. But whether it passes the test will depend on its details.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East on the US National Intelligence Council.

The post From A to F, here’s how to grade a possible nuclear deal with Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This post will be updated as the story develops and more expert reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Alex Plitsas: The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

Srujan Palkar: The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Shuja Nawaz: By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Rudabeh Shahid: What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

Manal Fatima: India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

The recent cease-fire between India and Pakistan marks a critical juncture in averting a potentially catastrophic escalation in South Asia. The decades-long rivalry, rooted in territorial disputes over Kashmir and fueled by mutual distrust, has repeatedly brought these nuclear-armed neighbors to the brink. This latest de-escalation, while fragile, underscores the urgent need for restraint and timely international intervention, both of which were dangerously absent as tensions spiraled.

The conflict had gone too far. Cross-border skirmishes, artillery exchanges, and inflammatory rhetoric intensified, with each side miscalculating the other’s resolve. India’s aggressive posturing, often tied to domestic political pressures, clashed with Pakistan’s defensive yet provocative responses. Both nations’ militaries, equipped with advanced weaponry and nuclear arsenals, risked missteps that could have triggered a broader conflict. The 2019 Balakot airstrike and subsequent retaliation demonstrated how quickly localized incidents can escalate, yet lessons from that crisis were poorly applied. Mismanagement was evident in the failure to prioritize diplomacy over brinkmanship, with both governments amplifying nationalist sentiments rather than seeking de-escalation.

World powers, particularly the United States, China, and the United Nations, were alarmingly slow to intervene. Their delayed response allowed the situation to fester, emboldening hardline factions and undermining moderates who sought dialogue. Global attention, distracted by other crises, underestimated the stakes of a potential India-Pakistan war, which could destabilize the region and disrupt global security. The cease-fire, brokered only after significant loss of life and economic strain, highlights the need for proactive international mediation.

This truce is not a solution but a reprieve. It averts immediate disaster, preserves economic stability, and opens a window for dialogue. However, without sustained global pressure and a commitment to address root causes like Kashmir, the cycle of escalation will persist. The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Saturday’s cease-fire had a degree of US involvement. But India’s recent counterterrorism operations under Operation Sindoor, followed by retaliatory strikes and escalation, have exposed an imbalance in US policy toward South Asia. As negotiations continue in the coming weeks, there is one policy shift the United States could take that would ensure it builds trust with India while putting the onus on the Pakistani establishment to play its part in counterterrorism—and that is revoking Pakistan’s Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status.

Despite deepening ties with India—a key Indo-Pacific partner—the United States continues to extend MNNA status to Pakistan, a country whose military-intelligence apparatus has long tolerated, if not enabled, cross-border terrorism. The recent Pahalgam attack, timed with a high-level US visit, highlights a recurring pattern of militant violence during diplomatic moments—echoing the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre on the eve of a visit by President Bill Clinton.

From New Delhi’s perspective, the MNNA designation for Pakistan—which India does not have—sends contradictory signals. While US policymakers express solidarity with India during crises, they continue to offer Pakistan privileged military status without conditioning it on measurable counterterrorism compliance. This undermines deterrence, weakens regional crisis management, and emboldens actors who operate outside the norms of accountability from Pakistani soil.

The original justification for Pakistan’s MNNA status—logistical cooperation during the US war in Afghanistan—has expired. Today, China is Pakistan’s primary defense partner, and US assistance has largely dried up. Revoking MNNA would rebalance Washington’s ties with Islamabad and recognize strategic realities. It would also reinforce India’s role as an independent regional security provider, not dependent on US largesse, while establishing that Washington will hinge its support on alignment with counterterrorism and regional stability goals.

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council. 

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Now that both India and Pakistan have executed their military responses to each other’s real or perceived actions against the other in Kashmir, good sense has prevailed in the shape of a cease-fire. If the announcement holds, this stops the ratcheting up of hostilities that were putting both nuclear-armed rivals on a steep escalation ladder. Historically, both sides try to gain some tactical advantages by extending the cease-fire limits. And there are many trigger-happy local commanders on both sides of the line of control in Kashmir, which would explain reports of clashes in the hours after the cease-fire announcement.  

I am hearing from Pakistani sources that the agreement to cease hostilities emerged after closed and direct talks between the directors general of military operations of both armies and representatives of the two national security advisors. It helped that in the case of Pakistan, the national security advisor, Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, was also the current director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (likely preparing himself for that generally civilian role post-retirement in a few months). Helping the process to put the lid on this regional flashpoint was the behind-the-scenes encouragement of US President Donald Trump, his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and possibly Saudi Arabia.

What next? Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin the process of what Rubio identified as the beginning of “talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” It will be interesting to see what is considered a neutral site. The Gulf is one possibility.

Three main items should be on the agenda.

1. The Indus Basin Water Treaty

Front and center should be the discussion of the effects of climate change on both India and Pakistan and the need to update the Indus Basin Water Treaty, originally agreed upon with US help and under the aegis of the World Bank. That treaty, signed in 1960, took nine years of negotiation. Both countries have been dancing around the shared waters issue in the past. India recently unilaterally abrogated the treaty—a debatable action. Regardless, the Himalayan and Karakoram glaciers feeding their rivers are declining, and time is running out for measures to counteract that reality. Both nations will suffer the consequences of dying waterways. Moreover, the shared aquifers of the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs badly need recharging. The misuse of tubewells has dropped the water tables, and overwatering has produced waterlogging and salinity. Combined efforts to revive underground water resources will help fight climate change. Otherwise, agriculture will suffer, and the population may die of thirst. …

Read more from Shuja Nawaz, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, here:

New Atlanticist

May 10, 2025

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, India and Pakistan can turn this cease-fire into an enduring peace

By Shuja Nawaz

Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin negotiations.

What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

The recently brokered cease-fire between India and Pakistan, hailed just this morning as a sign of returning stability, was violated shortly thereafter—underscoring the fragility of such diplomatic pauses in South Asia. The shaky agreement, facilitated by the Trump administration, highlights a deeper regional truth: while the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction may avert full-scale war, it does little to halt the cycles of escalation driven by mistrust and historical grievance.

In a region marked by volatility and deep-seated animosity, cease-fires are never just about halting gunfire. They are signals of restraint, tactical pause, or strategic recalibration. Their violation carries meaning too: It hardens political rhetoric, narrows diplomatic space, and amplifies insecurity far beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir. For South Asia’s non-nuclear states, this renewed conflict is more than a bilateral affair. It is a regional stress test with asymmetric consequences.

In Bangladesh, where an interim government has replaced Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing pro-India administration, anti-India sentiment has intensified further. The recent protests, which have successfully pressured the interim government to ban the Awami League under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act, are now also inflected with broader regional anger. India’s posture during and after the cease-fire may be seen as coercive, deepening the backlash and weakening Dhaka’s willingness to align with New Delhi on strategic matters.

Sri Lanka, navigating domestic fragility and a delicate geopolitical balance, will attempt to remain neutral. Yet neutrality is not invisibility. Muslim communities in the country remain attuned to wider Islamophobic narratives, and Indian pressure may provoke political ripples. Meanwhile, China’s deepening footprint in Colombo further constrains Sri Lanka’s room for maneuver.

Nepal’s balancing act between India and China might also come under strain. Heavily reliant on Indian trade and remittances, India may grow increasingly wary of Kathmandu’s neutrality, especially amid heightened security anxieties. In this environment, Nepal’s neutrality could be interpreted as disloyalty, thereby placing the landlocked country in an increasingly untenable position.

Bhutan, while closely tied to India through the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, is not insulated either. Bhutan may again face increased Chinese pressure along its contested border, particularly if India redirects strategic focus northward—just as it did during the Doklam standoff in 2017.

The Maldives, too, might face growing pressure. As India reasserts its strategic role in the Indian Ocean, Malé’s policy of hedging between New Delhi and Beijing becomes harder to sustain. Domestic political undercurrents, including Islamist sentiment, may complicate Malé’s ability to respond to Indian pressure without facing internal pushback.

Above all, the shaky cease-fire underscores the chronic dysfunction of South Asia’s regional institutions. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains paralyzed, thereby lacking any mechanism for mediation, de-escalation, or collective response. Non-nuclear South Asian countries remain vulnerable to the centrifugal pull of India-Pakistan tensions, without a regional forum to cushion the fallout.

For the United States, the original cease-fire may have seemed like a diplomatic win. Saturday night’s violations, however, reveal the limits of transactional diplomacy. More significantly, it reflects a broader regional transformation: A more assertive regional posture by India will be perceived by non-nuclear neighbors as encroaching on their strategic autonomy—prompting deeper engagement with China as a counterbalance.

The real challenge is no longer merely avoiding the next crisis. It is about envisioning a regional order where diplomacy is consistent, non-nuclear South Asian states are not treated as collateral, and cooperation—not coercion—defines the regional norm.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.  

India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

Saturday’s US-mediated cease-fire between India and Pakistan is a welcome development after a tense week that brought South Asia alarmingly close to a broader military confrontation. This recent exchange revealed not only the heightened lethality of modern warfare between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, far surpassing past skirmishes, but also reinforced a recurring pattern in contemporary conflicts—the emergence of social media as a significant new front. With widespread misinformation circulating, the narrative war was self-evident. Against this backdrop, Pakistan lifted its fifteen-month ban on X, while India ordered the takedown of over eight thousand X accounts for allegedly spreading disinformation.

However, this pause also invites deeper scrutiny into the outcomes of the past few days. India’s decision to launch airstrikes based on unproven allegations of Pakistani involvement in the tragic April 22 Pahalgam massacre naturally raises questions about their effectiveness. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India, eager to assert its role as a rising global power, arguably emerges from this crisis with a dented posture. Reports confirm the loss of at least two Indian military aircraft, including a French Rafale reportedly brought down by Pakistan’s Chinese-made J-10. Analysts have viewed the downing of the Rafale by a comparatively lower-cost Chinese aircraft as a blow to India’s defense credibility and a sign of tactical underperformance. Additionally, while some Indian media outlets circulated lists of terrorists allegedly killed in the initial strikes under Operation Sindoor—individuals linked to Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba—the unclear results of the operation make it difficult to ascertain New Delhi’s actual achievements and the effectiveness of these measures in realizing its intended goals.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s government finds itself on a relatively stronger footing. It has been under considerable scrutiny in recent months, particularly following the contentious 2024 general elections, or reasons including its handling of unrest in Balochistan and Balochi human rights activists, and its dealings with internal opposition. The external threat appeared to unify fractured political forces domestically. Amid this, the Pakistani Supreme Court’s controversial decision to allow civilians accused in the May 9, 2023 riots to be tried in military courts simply faded into the background as nationalist fervor dominated the country’s political atmosphere.

On the international/diplomatic front, Islamabad also appears to hold an advantage over New Delhi, which seems displeased with the Trump administration’s tone in mediations, viewing it as unfairly equating Pakistan with India. Further, Trump’s commitment to work with both countries “to see if … a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir” aligned more with Islamabad’s preference for international involvement rather than New Delhi’s desire to keep it a bilateral matter.

However, the fate of Kashmiris still hangs perilously between the two countries. While the ceasefire may have halted the immediate escalation toward all-out war, unrest in the disputed territory and the deeper conflict persist. For Kashmiris, caught between militants, military crackdowns, and political repression, the reality remains largely unchanged. In fact, there is a potential for an increase in the crackdown that followed the April terrorist attack by the Indian government, and within the ambiguous category of “suspected” terrorists, many may be unjustly targeted.

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

The post Experts react: India and Pakistan have agreed to a shaky cease-fire. Where does the region go from here?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I am hearing from Pakistani sources that the agreement to cease hostilities emerged after closed and direct talks between the directors general of military operations of both armies and representatives of the two national security advisors. It helped that in the case of Pakistan, the national security advisor, Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, was also the current director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (likely preparing himself for that generally civilian role post-retirement in a few months). Helping the process to put the lid on this regional flashpoint was the behind-the-scenes encouragement of US President Donald Trump, his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and possibly Saudi Arabia.

What next? Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin the process of what Rubio identified as the beginning of “talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” It will be interesting to see what is considered a neutral site. The Gulf is one possibility.

Three main items should be on the agenda.

1. The Indus Basin Water Treaty

Front and center should be the discussion of the effects of climate change on both India and Pakistan and the need to update the Indus Basin Water Treaty, originally agreed upon with US help and under the aegis of the World Bank. That treaty, signed in 1960, took nine years of negotiation. Both countries have been dancing around the shared waters issue in the past. India recently unilaterally abrogated the treaty—a debatable action. Regardless, the Himalayan and Karakoram glaciers feeding their rivers are declining, and time is running out for measures to counteract that reality. Both nations will suffer the consequences of dying waterways. Moreover, the shared aquifers of the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs badly need recharging. The misuse of tubewells has dropped the water tables, and overwatering has produced waterlogging and salinity. Combined efforts to revive underground water resources will help fight climate change. Otherwise, agriculture will suffer, and the population may die of thirst.

Specifically, an updated treaty may need to recognize the need for India, the upper riparian, to build dams with gateways to release water and accumulated silt periodically—because silt reduces the life of dams—while keeping in the mind the timing of releases so it does not harm Pakistan, the lower riparian. So there should be no releases when crops are being planted or harvested. This is a practical issue that needs to be addressed quickly, without making it a politically charged discussion. Even within India itself, there are major disputes between administrative divisions that are upper or lower riparians. This should inform Indian thinking.

2. Armed extremist groups

Talks between India and Pakistan must also address the role or acceptance of extremist right-wing religious groups in Pakistan that may have a dual purpose—to educate poor children and to prepare them for potential militant activities in neighboring countries, including India. At different times, Pakistani leaders have announced measures to clamp down on such activities, but these militant groups survive by reinventing themselves and using the lax banking system to move their ample funding with ease to safe accounts.

Pakistan needs to recognize the inherent danger to the state of armed non-state actors within its borders, so that its military retains the monopoly of armed force in Pakistan. Its civilian population is heavily equipped with military weapons, especially now that some of the vast supply of US arms left behind in Afghanistan have found their way east into Pakistan. The civilian licensing system for weapons is a sieve. The fraught relations with the Taliban government have complicated that situation no end, propelling Pakistan to even launch attacks across the border against Pakistani rebel groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan that have gained sanctuary in Afghan territory.

3. Regional trade

On the more positive side, India and Pakistan need to end their ban on trade with each other, and even consider opening their borders to travel, under the aegis of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Visa Exemption Scheme or by mutually agreed visa-on-arrival facilities. (This has worked for Sikh pilgrims visiting their holy sites in Pakistan.) This action would potentially boost bilateral trade to pre-1947 Partition levels and rise from the current millions to above forty billion dollars a year, according to a 2010 study by Mohsin Khan of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Visa-free travel would immediately allow trade between small- and medium-sized enterprises. And travel by ordinary citizens would help them better know and understand each other, rather than be affected by the caricatures that social media influencers have produced over the years.

Beyond these advantages, opening the borders would allow India to trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistan, and both countries would benefit from cheap and clean energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well from Uzbekistan. Afghanistan would benefit from transit fees. And if US sanctions are eventually eased on Iran, the dormant Iran-Pakistan-India pipelines could allow gas to flow into India.

So much could be achieved, given the political vision and will in both India and Pakistan, and active support from China, the Arabian Peninsula, and the United States, among others. If governments in South Asia are prepared to invest in their own futures, what has been a flashpoint could become the center of gravity for economic development and stability in Asia. There could be another Nobel Peace Prize, or two or three, in the offing.

Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the author of The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood and Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within.

New Atlanticist May 6, 2025

Experts react: India just launched airstrikes against Pakistan. What’s next? 

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts share insights on India’s missile strikes on Pakistan, which came two weeks after a terrorist attack targeting Indians in Pahalgam.

Conflict Extremism

New Atlanticist Jan 25, 2024

The skies are quiet, but the Iran-Pakistan strikes left lasting diplomatic damage

By Muhammad Faisal

While the immediate crisis will subside, an intensified security dilemma will be permanent for Islamabad.

Conflict Economy & Business

The post By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, India and Pakistan can turn this cease-fire into an enduring peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Thu, May 8, 2025 • 9:30 am ET

General John Raymond on national security and the future of space commerce

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Raymond, who served as the first chief of space operations of the US Space Force, talks about maintaining the US military edge as the space domain becomes increasingly contested and congested.

Space Space Security Technology & Innovation United States and Canada

China is catching up in the race to integrate space capabilities with the rest of its military, according to John W. Raymond, a retired US general who served as the first chief of space operations of the US Space Force.

Raymond, speaking at an Atlantic Council Front Page and Commanders Series event on Thursday ahead of receiving the Council’s Distinguished Military Leadership Award, explained how for decades, the United States had the advantage. But now that “others have had a front row seat and have watched that advantage,” he added, “now they’re doing the same thing.”

“If you look at what China has built, they now have a very capable space-enabled military that can threaten our traditional joint warfighting partners,” he warned. “We have to have the ability to protect those forces.”

Regardless of China’s advancements, Raymond said that the United States is still “the best of the world in space, especially with our allies and partners at our side.” In weighing the likelihood of further international partnerships on space, Raymond said he is hopeful. “I think space is a domain that helps unite countries globally.”

Below are more highlights from the event, moderated by Breaking Defense Senior Space Reporter Theresa Hitchens, where Raymond talked about securing the space domain through deterrence and working with US partners and the private sector.

Costs and benefits

• Raymond, who served as chief of space operations from 2019 to 2022, said that over time, he has seen the space domain change “significantly,” becoming more congested, contested, and competitive.
• As security threats—including nuclear threats—become more elevated, Raymond said space will play an important role in maintaining an integrated deterrence. “If we can deter conflict from beginning or extending into the space domain, then I think we’ve got a real shot at deterring conflict from spilling over into other domains,” he said.
• In fortifying deterrence in space, Raymond explained, the United States “really focused on denying benefits” of any aggressive action, for example by making its space architecture more resilient to attacks. But “if you’re going to really deter, you also have to be able to impose costs,” he said. “It’s about protecting our land forces, our air forces, and our maritime forces.”

All systems go

• Raymond reflected on the rise of the commercial space industry, noting that as the Space Force has partnered more and more with the private sector, it has seen the speed of its innovation rise, costs decline, and its mission capability widen.

• At the same time, there are differences between the Space Force and industry when it comes to profit and loss and time cycles. “There’s lots of challenges,” Raymond said. “But if we can work through this . . . I think there’s advantage there to be had.”

• The Space Force is looking to implement acquisition reforms, given that smaller companies have had trouble navigating the processes to procure additional capabilities and technologies. But the issue, Raymond said, “actually starts well before acquisition.” It lies with “force design,” or the structure of the United States’ technological arsenal.

• For example, if the Space Force acquires a small number of expensive satellites that take many years to build, rather than procuring many lower-cost satellites that sit in various orbits, “you’re not going to do that fast . . . and you’re probably not leveraging the small new innovative commercial space industry,” he said.

• Raymond raised concern about the increasing number of objects—space debris—floating through space, in addition to satellites. With that, and the Space Force’s role as “space traffic control” for the world, “domain awareness is critical,” he said. But, he added, the United States is thinking about how to shift that role to a civilian agency. He agreed with the shift, urging the Space Force to “focus military efforts on military types of missions.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the Atlantic Council’s editorial team.

Watch the full event

The post General John Raymond on how China’s ‘space-enabled military’ threatens US and allied deterrence and warfighting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The election of a pope thrusts a previously little-known figure onto the world stage and places significant geopolitical influence in his hands. As head of state of the Holy See, the pope oversees a vast diplomatic network and holds a moral authority that resonates across both the spiritual and political spheres. Each new pontiff brings a unique imprint to the role. Pope Francis, for instance, drew deeply from his experience working with marginalized communities in Argentina—a perspective that shaped the priorities and tone of his papacy from the beginning. In his first speech to the world as the new pontiff, Pope Leo XIV addressed the crowds in Spanish and greeted “his beloved Diocese of Chiclayo in Peru,” perhaps an early sign that his US–Peruvian identity will leave an imprint on his papacy.

This unique combination of identities could represent more than just mere symbolism. It may also help Pope Leo XIV reframe the US–Latin American relationship in more humane and values-driven terms. To do so, he will need to pick up where Pope Francis’s social justice work left off, but better communicate the shared humanity of people across the hemisphere to a US audience, who increasingly disapproved of Pope Francis and his views during his papacy.

Two decades in Peru

As a missionary and priest in towns and cities across Peru, Pope Leo XIV worked with marginalized communities during some of the country’s most turbulent decades. The 1980s and 1990s in Peru were marked by hyperinflation, an internal armed conflict between Maoist guerrillas and the Peruvian military that left an estimated seventy thousand people dead, and a dramatic erosion of the rule of law. During this period, he became a vocal advocate for vulnerable populations and sought to hold those in power accountable for the lives lost amid the violence and political breakdown.

In 2015, Pope Francis appointed him apostolic administrator of the Diocese of Chiclayo, a coastal city in Peru, a role he held until 2023. In this position, he became known for his closeness to rural communities and his support for social programs, including efforts to combat child malnutrition. As more than 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants escaped to Peru seeking asylum during his eight years in the Diocese of Chiclayo, Prevost showed care and defended their right to migrate. In 2023, he also publicly condemned the violent crackdown by Peruvian security forces against protesters, reinforcing his long-standing commitment to human dignity and justice. To this day, many Peruvians remember him as a priest who never hesitated to walk alongside the country’s poorest and most forgotten.