Session I

Session II

Session III

Session IV

Session V

Sasha Toperich
Executive Vice President
Transatlantic Leadership Network

Report May 20, 2025

The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement

By Valbona Zeneli, Richard Grieveson, Isabelle Ioannides, Dimitar Bechev

EU enlargement faces a test case in the Western Balkans. The current plan offers real benefits before accession, creating incentives for reform, but questions of enforceability and the relatively low amount of financial support threaten the success of the EU’s political influence in the region.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Mar 7, 2025

What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans

By Agon Maliqi

Shifts in US policy toward Europe could prompt the EU to step up on security for the Western Balkans and revive the enlargement process.

Freedom and Prosperity Political Reform

Report Oct 7, 2024

Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans

By Maja Piscevic, Ilva Tare

The United States and the European Union must work together, and play to their own respective strengths, to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West.

Corruption European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post Southeast Europe Transatlantic Economic Forum 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

July 1 will mark a dozen years since Croatia joined the the European Union (EU), the most recent country to do so. In the years after Croatia’s accession, the bloc’s eastern enlargement process stalled almost entirely. The EU’s enthusiasm for admitting new members waned, driven by rising anti-EU sentiment within member states and fears that further expansion could strain the bloc’s already burdened consensus-based decision-making. Meanwhile, democratic backsliding and disputes between candidate countries further undermined their cases for accession.

Then in 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived the geopolitical imperative for enlargement in Brussels by highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to “gray zones.” Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia swiftly advanced along their accession paths, and hopes were somewhat revived in the six countries of the Western Balkans.

While Montenegro is the most advanced in accession negotiations today, Albania is also capitalizing on this new enlargement momentum. On May 11, Albania held parliamentary elections in which the Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won its fourth consecutive mandate, promising EU membership by 2030. After gaining EU candidate status in 2013 and waiting over a decade for the next formal step, Albania and the EU have been on an unprecedented roll since October 2024. Over the span of several months, the EU opened four clusters of negotiation chapters with Albania—covering twenty-four out of thirty-three chapters—and may open the remaining ones by the end of June. The opening of chapters signals that Albania has met initial EU benchmarks in those policy areas and will now negotiate to close the chapters—which aim to align Albanian laws, institutions, and practices with EU law.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.  

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards. 

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If Trump wants to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, and he has made that an administration priority, then he should reflect on what it took to finally stop Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in 1995—after nearly four years of killing and more than 100,000 dead, including the massacre at Srebrenica, Europe’s worst genocide since the Holocaust.

A deal required relentless US diplomatic engagement backed by a demonstrated military threat and carried out alongside unified European allies. It also took twenty-one days of intensive negotiations in Dayton—not involving then US President Bill Clinton until the end—while all parties were cloistered from media and outside influences at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Marking the Dayton anniversary, Ohio Congressman Mike Turner brought the NATO Parliamentary Assembly here last week, gathering delegates from the thirty-two allies as well as from partner countries. They joined leaders from the Western Balkans, assorted experts, and even the Sarajevo Philharmonic, which performed for participants in a giant hangar stocked with presidential aircraft in the National Museum of the US Air Force.

Though I came to commemorate history, I left having interrogated its architects. My aim was to gain clues that might help the Trump administration in its still-fruitless quest for an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine. 

It would be easy to discount the lessons for Ukraine and Russia now, where the stakes are so much higher, from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia then. Nuclear-armed Russia has two hundred times the land mass of Serbia and more than twenty times its population. And Ukraine, with its pre-war population of forty million and France-sized territory, is more than ten times larger in geographic size and population than Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my view, that makes the lessons only more compelling.           

The first lesson? “Peace agreements are extremely rare,” former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the European Union’s special representative at the talks thirty years ago, said in a session of former officials that I moderated. “In modern European history, there are only two really: Dayton and the Good Friday Agreement,” which in 1998 ended a thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland known as “the Troubles.”

Both were forged in the aftermath of horrific violence, which is also the case in Ukraine. Yet both also required something that is still lacking today: determined, focused, and creative US leadership in lockstep with European partners. Both also succeeded through disciplined diplomacy, military leverage, and the unglamorous work of compromise.

Beyond that, winning peace in Dayton demanded US credibility but not neutrality. At Dayton, the United States was not an impartial mediator but rather a focused powerbroker, using whatever muscle was necessary to shape the outcome. No lasting deal can reward Putin’s aggression, just as Dayton didn’t knuckle under to reward Milošević.

Another lesson is that building peace is as crucial as ending war. Dayton and Belfast were both followed by years of international engagement, economic aid, and security commitments. Peace might have collapsed had those efforts not continued.

Most importantly, the United States led but did not go it alone. Peace that endures requires multilateral support. Dayton hasn’t worked perfectly, but without the European Union and NATO it wouldn’t have worked at all. “Only when the international actors can get together with a uniform message and policy can results be achieved,” said Bildt, who is also an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member. “There was success in Dayton, yes. But it should also be said that there was massive failure prior to Dayton due to disagreements across the Atlantic, disagreements in Europe, and disagreements in the United States.”

US General Wesley Clark, who at the time was the military right hand to Richard Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator, took away a different lesson: “Don’t be timid,” Clark, a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors, said to the NATO parliamentarians. “We are going to have to be unified. And we are going to have to be forceful enough to convince Putin he will not win. Right now, he thinks he’s winning.”

In a slap across the face of Trump’s efforts to broker peace, Putin from last Friday to Sunday launched what Ukrainian officials called the largest combined aerial assault of the conflict, including some nine hundred drones and dozens of missiles of various types. That prompted a frustrated Trump to write on Truth Social about Putin that “something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY!” The US president added that “missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever.” 

The problem is that there’s nothing crazy about Putin’s calculations, and his reasons are obvious. He’s trying to wear down Ukraine and its partners, and he’s betting that he has more staying power. He sees US military and diplomatic support in retreat, European efforts as insufficient, and Ukraine as weary. Trump has belatedly acknowledged that Putin has been “tapping” him along. 

With all that in mind, Washington will have to try far harder now than it did then to change a murderous despot’s mind—or resign itself to accepting Putin’s ongoing war and its ambition to redraw the European map. 

Until Washington stood up to Milošević in 1995, Clark said, the Serb leader thought he could pull the wool over Europe’s eyes with his small army overrunning Bosnia. When he bid farewell to Milošević at the end of the talks, Clark remembers the Balkan leader saying, “We Serbs never had a chance against your NATO, your airplanes, your missiles.”

Speaking with me at the same NATO session, Christopher R. Hill, who was part of the Holbrooke delegation in Dayton, added another important lesson—that the parties must be ready to end the war. “I am not sure Russia is ready for peace,” he said. “They should be, but they don’t seem to be. I think until they are, we have got to help Ukraine because a hundred years from now . . . our grandchildren, our great-grandchildren, will be thinking about what we did to deal with this crisis.”

The Dayton Accords were not perfect, but they were proof of what US leadership can achieve when properly applied. Speaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after the agreement was finalized, the then US president explained why the United States had chosen to lead, rather than cut and run from the European conflict. 

“Around the world, people look to America not just because of our size and strength but because of what we stand for and what we’re willing to stand against,” Clinton said. “And though it imposes extra burdens on us, people trust us to help them share in the blessings of peace. We can’t be everywhere . . . But where we can make a difference, where our values and our interests are at stake, we must act.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post Dispatch from Dayton: What Trump can learn about ending war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The European Union (EU) Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to integrate the region into the EU single market, enhance regional cooperation, implement significant governance and rule of law reforms, and boost EU financial support. In doing so, the EU seeks to foster economic development, political stability, and security in the region amid rising geopolitical tensions, while accelerating the Western Balkans’ EU accession process.

The Growth Plan holds substantial potential to reinvigorate the enlargement process and counter the stagnation felt by both the EU and the region. Strong points include:

• Tangible benefits before full accession: Providing stronger incentives for reform.
• Active involvement of regional governments: Increasing buy-in from local leaders, who must submit their own reform agendas.
• Enhanced economic integration, greater access to the EU market, increased EU funding, and reforms to governance and the rule of law: Stimulating investment, promoting economic growth, and raising living standards.

These improvements would bring the Western Balkans closer to the economic success seen in the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU over the past two decades. Moreover, fostering deeper regional cooperation will not only deliver an economic boost but also contribute to political normalization. If successful, the plan will bolster the EU’s political influence in the region, countering the impact of external actors and encouraging much-needed nearshoring investment from EU firms.

However, the plan faces several challenges:

• Enforceability: Although conditionality is rigorous, with disbursement of funds tied to strict conditions to prevent misuse, there are concerns regarding its enforceability. The European Court of Auditors has already raised reservations.
• Quantity: Additionally, the financial support offered is significantly lower than what EU member states in Southeast Europe receive. The reforms required for fund access and single market integration are substantial and will demand significant political will and institutional capacity—both of which have been lacking in the region at times over the past two decades.

The success of the growth plan will largely depend on its implementation. The EU must ensure rigorous enforcement of conditionality, reward positive reform steps, and increase funding for countries making progress. Civil society in the Western Balkans should be engaged as much as possible to foster broader support and transparency. The EU should also leverage the plan to align with its broader geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, particularly in strengthening its strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Growth Plan should be fully integrated with the EU’s competitiveness, green, and digital transition agendas. For their part, Western Balkans leaders should seize the increased agency provided by the plan. They must take ownership of the reforms they propose, participate actively in EU meetings, and design their reform agendas to deliver better living standards and deeper EU integration for their populations.

Fellow

Valbona Zeneli

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Albanian Corruption

Dimitar Bechev
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

Isabelle Ioannides
Nonresident Senior Research Fellow
Hellenic Foundation for Foreign and European Policy (ELIAMEP)

Richard Grieveson
Deputy Director
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies

Report Oct 7, 2024

Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans

By Maja Piscevic, Ilva Tare

The United States and the European Union must work together, and play to their own respective strengths, to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West.

Corruption European Union

Report Nov 14, 2024

North Macedonia: A reform agenda on the path to EU integration

By Aleksej Demjanski, Biljana Ivanovska, Branimir Jovanović, Sara Milenkovska, Lura Pollozhani, and Malinka Ristevska Jordanova

Five experts from the region map out a reform agenda for North Macedonia’s newly elected government to pursue greater democratic progress and eventual European integration.

Elections Europe & Eurasia

Report Dec 11, 2023

Getting back on track: Unlocking Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic and development perspective

By Agon Maliqi

Report exploring the path forward for Kosovo’s integration into transatlantic institutions and the geopolitical and economic challenges and opportunities facing the country.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahead of the election, Europe Center experts break down the key issues, players, and trends to watch this weekend.

Who is Prime Minister Edi Rama—and who are his main challengers?

The Socialist Party (PS) and its popular leader Edi Rama are running for a fourth term in office, despite the wear and tear of years in power and a series of corruption-related controversies tied to their administration at various political and executive levels.

Rama’s main challenger is Sali Berisha, who has been the leader of Albania’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party (PD), for the last three decades. He served as prime minister from 2005 to 2013—a position he last held twelve years ago. In the interim, he faced a three-year period of internal party conflict over his designation as “persona non grata” by the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as corruption investigations by the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK).

Next to the eleven parties participating in this election, SPAK is a key actor to watch, as it is currently investigating high-level politicians across the political spectrum. Ilir Meta, the former president of the Freedom Party (PL)—the third largest party in the country based on the results of the 2021 parliamentary elections—is under arrest; Arben Ahmetaj, the former deputy prime minister, is on the run; Erion Veliaj, the mayor of Tirana, has been detained; and Sali Berisha, the main opposition leader, is under investigation.

Due to its handling of high-profile cases, SPAK is now the most trusted institution in Albania, and a majority of voters support its continued operation as an independent body, free from political interference. Meanwhile, opposition leaders such as Berisha have openly called for SPAK’s dismantlement and frequently accuse the agency of political bias.

It’s also worth noting that over the past year, three new political entities—the Coalition Shqipëria Bëhet (Albania is Being Made), the Mundësia (Opportunity) Party, and Lëvizja Bashkë (Together Movement)—have entered the race. Although these parties represent diverse ideological positions—spanning the center, right, and left—they share anti-establishment sentiments and appear to be emerging as a significant political force ahead of the vote.

—Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Rama, the eccentric leader of the PS, has been a central figure in Albanian politics for nearly a quarter century, serving three terms as the mayor of the capital Tirana (2000-2011), and then another three as prime minister. He is now seeking an unprecedented fourth term while still presenting himself as a candidate of change. Although this narrative seems far-fetched, it might gain traction, largely because his main rival, Berisha, has been in politics even longer, serving as Albania’s first post-communist president and later as prime minister for two terms.

Albania’s highly polarized political scene is largely a duopoly between the PS and PD, where electoral victories have often been determined by the ability of the two parties’ strong-handed leaders to control “rebellious” factions on the margins. The PD’s last stint in power (2005-2013) came after a sizable split within the left. Now, it is the right wing that has splintered, creating a few smaller factions and leaving the opposition less competitive. A handful of small, new parties are competing and may secure a few seats—mostly in the capital, Tirana. They hope to gain decisive leverage if Rama, who is favored to win, fails to secure a majority to govern alone.

—Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Active in Albanian politics since 1998, starting as minister of culture, Rama has served as prime minister since 2013. While internationally recognized for his distinctive political style, his artistic background, and his focus on urban development, Rama’s three terms in office have been marked by a mix of modernization efforts and corruption scandals.

His main challenger is the center-right PD, the country’s primary opposition force, which has itself been mired in internal turmoil in recent years. Meanwhile, the former Socialist Movement for Integration, now known as the PL, has seen its influence wane, particularly after suffering heavy losses in the 2021 elections. Party leader and former President of Albania, Ilir Meta, remains in custody since his arrest in October 2024 on charges of corruption and money laundering. Yet he is still running for a seat in parliament on the open list of the Democratic Party’s “Alliance for Glorious Albania” coalition.

The novelty in these elections is the prominent role of SPAK, whose creation and operations have been strongly backed by the United States and the EU. SPAK’s mandate—to investigate corruption, electoral crime, vote-buying, abuse of public office, and ties between organized crime and politics—directly targets the longstanding problems that have weakened Albania’s electoral integrity.

—Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

What political dynamics are shaping Albania’s 2025 parliamentary elections?

Prime Minister Edi Rama enters this election with a twelve-year track record, positioning himself and the PS as the only modernizing political force equipped to bring Albania’s lengthy transition from communism to a close through EU accession. However, Rama’s party carries the weight of his long tenure, which has been marred by major corruption scandals at various levels of governance, along with economic difficulties stemming from the rising cost of living and deepening income inequality. Albania also continues to grapple with emigration and a rapidly aging population.

According to national polls, the PS currently holds a lead with more than 40 percent of projected votes, followed by the PD with 30 percent, and smaller shares going to the new parties. Due to the highly fragmented opposition vote and the regional proportional electoral system—which includes a single preferential vote that can distort results if opposition parties fail to win seats in multiple districts—projections indicate that the PS could once again secure a majority of at least seventy-one seats in parliament. Rama hopes to surpass the party’s previous result of seventy-four seats and move closer to a qualified majority of eighty-four seats. For the first time, Albanians living abroad have been granted the opportunity to vote. So far, more than 245,000 vote-by-mail requests from eighty-five countries have been registered. It remains to be seen how many of these will turn into actual ballots. Diaspora votes will be counted at the district level.

—Ilva Tare

There are no significant ideological differences between the PS and the PD on either domestic issues or foreign affairs. Their competition largely hinges on the personalities of their leaders and their historical patronage networks. Both parties are seeking to motivate their base and convince a small pool of independent voters that they can govern more effectively. Incumbency and political control over resources favor Rama, but after three terms in office, the flip side is deep fatigue and disillusionment. These elections are essentially a referendum on how tired Albanians are of Rama’s long rule and how motivated PS voters are to turn out. Meanwhile, Berisha is seen as too polarizing beyond the PD base, and the right is fractured.

Rama’s rule has brought about some transformative change, with public and private investments reshaping infrastructure, particularly in urban and coastal areas. This has fueled an unprecedented tourism boom and solid economic growth. Yet a widespread corruption and oligarchic control have sent most of the spoils to the well-connected, while wages have struggled to keep up with inflation and a sharp spike in the cost of living. On the issue of corruption, Albania’s new rule of law bodies—backed by the EU and the United States and created during Rama’s rule—have been shaking up the political landscape. There have been a series of indictments across the political spectrum, implicating powerful leaders on both the left and the right (including members of Rama’s inner circle and his rivals Berisha and Meta). This has created a paradoxical situation in which Rama is attempting to brush over corruption scandals while simultaneously taking credit for establishing SPAK, the institution responsible for uncovering them. Both camps seem uncomfortable discussing corruption directly, so the campaign focus has mostly been on cost of living and who can increase salaries the most.

—Agon Maliqi

How will the outcome of the election shape Albania’s EU ambitions?

As part of his alleged push for positive reform in the country, Rama is pulling out all the stops to accelerate Albania’s accession to the EU, with the ambitious goal of concluding accession talks with Brussels by 2027. If reelected, Rama will seek to maintain Albania’s reputation as a front-runner for EU accession in the Western Balkans, alongside Montenegro.

Indeed, EU membership is the flagship promise of the PS in this election. According to Rama, US President Donald Trump’s victory has created a unique geopolitical opportunity for Albania, as it has heightened European concerns about US disengagement—prompting the EU to accelerate integration efforts in the Western Balkans. Rama argues that this moment aligns the EU’s political will to expand with Albania’s readiness to meet technical and political criteria through a preferential negotiation path. That said, EU integration has never been a politically divisive issue in Albania. The only real debate concerns the pace of the process and which political actor is best suited to deliver it. Looking ahead, Albania might try to make the most of the current geopolitical moment—but the EU’s decisions on enlargement are likely to remain highly unpredictable in the coming years.

—Ilva Tare

This election will serve as a litmus test of Albania’s democratic maturity and could either advance or hinder its EU accession. In the past, Albanian elections have been marred by issues such as vote-buying, opaque political party financing, and allegations of organized crime influencing voter mobilization in certain regions. If the integrity of the election process is once again questioned, it could trigger a new wave of political instability that may jeopardize the EU accession path.

The most significant development in Albania in recent years has been the tangible progress in reforming the justice sector—one of the key requirements for the EU. After nearly a decade of restructuring and overhauling judicial institutions and introducing the vetting of prosecutors and judges, SPAK has made great strides in dismantling the culture of impunity that has long pervaded the country’s political class since the fall of communism. SPAK’s increasing prominence is helping restore public trust in rule of law. Indictments of former and current political leaders—prime ministers to mayors—as well as ongoing investigations into powerful organized crime figures have been pivotal in advancing Albania’s EU accession process. These efforts have positioned Albania alongside Montenegro as a regional frontrunner in the accession race. Whether this momentum can be sustained, and whether SPAK and other institutions can continue to scale their efforts, remains to be seen.

—Agon Maliqi

These elections will be pivotal not only for Albania’s EU integration but also for the broader stability of the Western Balkans. After years in the EU’s waiting room, Albania has gained fresh momentum, spurred by the new geopolitical urgency surrounding enlargement.

Edi Rama has centered the PS campaign on securing EU membership before 2030, positioning his administration as the only force capable of delivering the necessary reforms. While EU integration is not a divisive issue in Albania, internal political rifts and the lack of bipartisan consensus on key reforms have posed significant obstacles. Ultimately, these elections carry deep implications, not just for who governs, but for whether Albania’s parliament can foster the cross-party cooperation needed to advance EU membership and strengthen liberal democracy.

Albania’s upcoming elections take place within days of the European Political Community (EPC) summit, which will occur in Tirana from May 16 to 17. At the summit, European leaders will address enlargement, security, and stability in the Western Balkans, placing Albania in the center of both regional and European attention.

—Valbona Zeneli

What is the role of the United States in the election and its campaign?

The influence of “Trump World” has become a striking feature of Albania’s 2025 campaign landscape. Both Prime Minister Edi Rama and opposition leader Sali Berisha are invoking the US president in their campaigns—albeit for different purposes. Rama, who has traditionally aligned with European social democrats, is now publicly praising Trump as “good for everyone” and presenting Albania’s EU accession hopes as aligned with a second Trump presidency, emphasizing the new geopolitical reality that it has brought about.

Meanwhile, Berisha—who is banned from entering the United States over corruption allegations—has embraced the Trump playbook. The PD has hired Trump’s former campaign manager Chris LaCivita and adopted the slogan “Make Albania Great,” signaling a strategic pivot toward nationalism, anti-elite rhetoric, and culture-war themes designed to energize a disillusioned electorate.

The result is an election in which Trump’s legacy—his methods, his advisors, and his message—resonates far beyond US borders, influencing not only campaign strategies but also how candidates position Albania within a rapidly shifting global order.

—Ilva Tare

The United States has featured prominently in the current campaign as both camps have sought to project an image of being on good terms with the new US administration while also seeking to influence decision-making in Washington, DC, in their favor. Berisha—who was sanctioned by the Biden administration on allegations of corruption, a serious obstacle for a political career in a pro-US country and NATO member—has touted the hiring of a Trump campaign manager as his own campaign aide. The PD has reportedly also engaged lobbyists to reverse the sanctions against Berisha, which it claims were the result of left-wing lobbying. Meanwhile, Rama’s government has given preferential strategic investor status to a private company owned by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner to develop a luxury resort on an Albanian island.

With many other priorities around the world, the United States appears largely disinterested in Albania—at least for now. Most importantly, voters in Albania also seem unlikely to be swayed by any of these moves by the political elite.

—Agon Maliqi

The United States is Albania’s most important strategic ally. While the US government maintains a neutral stance toward political parties in Albania, it has consistently supported democratic processes, institutional reforms, and anti-corruption efforts. Nevertheless, Albanian leaders often seek to leverage their US ties for personal or political gain, such as with the PD’s enlistment of Chris LaCivita as an advisor and its embrace of an anti-elite, nationalist “Make Albania Great” message—though so far, it has struggled to gain strong traction with voters.

—Valbona Zeneli

Further reading

New Atlanticist

Mar 7, 2025

What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans

By Agon Maliqi

Shifts in US policy toward Europe could prompt the EU to step up on security for the Western Balkans and revive the enlargement process.

Freedom and Prosperity Political Reform

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post Your primer on Albania’s parliamentary election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Note: This article was updated on April 23 to reflect Dodik’s attempted arrest.

Milorad Dodik has dominated politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Republika Srpska entity for most of the past two decades. But a court ruling earlier this year has put his political future in question, and the response to his legal troubles has instigated perhaps the greatest institutional crisis in BiH since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995.

In late February, a BiH state court sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and a six-year ban on holding public office for defying the decisions of the Office of the High Representative, the international body overseeing the implementation of the postwar Dayton Accords. If this sentence is enforced by a second-instance ruling expected later this year, then Dodik—who has been sanctioned repeatedly by the United States and United Kingdom for corruption—would no longer hold any formal power.

As is often the case with strongmen who equate their personal destiny with that of their people, Dodik framed the verdict as an enemy attack on the Republika Srpska, and he doubled down on secessionism. The Republika Srpska assembly passed laws blocking state-level institutions from operating within the entity and approved a draft constitution claiming the Republika Srpska’s right to self-determination. Ethnic Serbs were invited to abandon several state-level institutions, while a Republika Srpska army and judiciary were also announced. Then in early March, it was revealed that since December, Dodik had also been under investigation in a second case on charges of attacks against the country’s constitutional order. His failure to appear for questioning led to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.

While BiH’s constitutional court has suspended the Republika Srpska’s separatist laws, the legal and political quagmire exposed the difficulty that BiH institutions face in exercising their authority in the Republika Srpska. Dodik threatened that his security team and the Republika Srpska police would clash with any BiH agency willing to arrest him. On April 23, BiH special police reportedly attempted to arrest Dodik during a visit to East Sarajevo, but were deterred by heavily armed Republika Srpska police units.

This crisis has also exposed the lack of unity in the European Union (EU) on how to handle Dodik. He still enjoys the strong backing of countries such as Hungary, which reportedly even sent special police units to extract him in case of an arrest. Despite the harsh condemnation of his actions by Western officials and the hardening of sanctions against him by Germany and Austria, many in the West still worry that his arrest could trigger a broader security crisis in the Balkans and would prefer to see Dodik make a more orderly exit from office.

Yet by crossing these major red lines for regional security and openly challenging the authority of the BiH government, Dodik has also exposed his weakness and desperation. With a possible dead end in sight for his secessionist threats, Dodik’s main external backers might already view him as more of a liability than an asset.

Who would follow Dodik down the rabbit hole?

This latest episode is merely the most extreme case of a consistent pattern: Dodik instigates a crisis to extract personal concessions from domestic and international actors. In this case, he is stoking a constitutional crisis, likely in the hopes of winning concessions on his legal troubles and keeping himself in power. His saber-rattling counts on Western fears (as evident in dramatic media headlines) that he will push BiH and the Balkans back into war if he does not have his way. While an attempt at Republika Srpska secession would almost certainly lead to a regional conflict, the number of actors who have already shown they are not willing or capable of supporting Dodik down this rabbit hole indicates, at least for now, that his threats lack credibility.  

This includes first and foremost Bosnian Serbs, many of whom share Dodik’s secessionist goals, but may not view the dismantling of state-level institutions, let alone a new war under current circumstances, as serving the interests of the Republika Srpska. There was reportedly no enthusiasm for Dodik’s calls to leave state-level jobs in the entity, while Bosnian Serb opposition parties also denounced the move as self-serving.

The experience of Serbs in northern Kosovo provides a cautionary tale that Bosnian Serbs may be heeding now. In April 2023, northern Kosovo Serbs boycotted local elections, which resulted in Albanian candidates winning with a miniscule turnout of less than 3.5 percent. Only a year ago, it was Dodik himself who warned that a boycott of BiH institutions could lead to a similar scenario for Bosnian Serbs.

Dodik’s gambit also rested on foreign-policy miscalculations. His hopes that the Trump administration would shift US Balkans policy in his secessionist direction were rebuffed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s clear condemnation of his actions in March. Russia certainly continues to have an interest in turning the region into a new hotspot to distract Western attention and resources from Ukraine. Dodik himself appeared in Moscow on April 1, and he was given a reception with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yet there are clear limits to what Russia can do to support the secessionist movement, especially if Dodik’s key backer and neighbor Serbia does not greenlight it.

How Serbia’s leader sees the situation

The leverage that this situation has given to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučiċ illustrates why he has been Dodik’s key backer and enabler over the past decade. Much like the case of Kosovo’s Serbs, Dodik’s troublemaking has been a useful tool for Vučiċ to fuel nationalist narratives at home while maintaining plausible deniability and an image of “constructiveness” in his relations with the West.

Dodik’s political fate may now be a bargaining chip in the hands of Vučiċ, who leads a country drifting toward authoritarianism and who constantly hedges and negotiates with the West on problems he creates. Considering Vučiċ’s own difficult domestic situation, with a large-scale and enduring student protest movement that has threatened his power and shattered his image abroad, it would not be a surprise if he sacrifices a distressed and expended asset like Dodik to the West to further his own goals. If Dodik were to lose Vučiċ’s backing, he would be unable to continue paralyzing Bosnian institutions with his secessionist threats and may have to respect the final court sentence or seek exile in Moscow or Budapest.

The West seems to be done buying Dodik’s threats of regional instability and largely appears determined to see him leave office, whether that means his arrest or resignation and exile. But while Dodik leaving office would be good for BiH and deterrence against Republika Srpska secessionism in the short term, the West is not adopting the same attitude toward his enablers in Belgrade and Budapest.

In defiance of the EU, Vučiċ recently stated that he would join the World War II victory parade in Moscow on May 9 and invited Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, to “investigate” claims that sonic weapons were used against Serbian student protesters (of course, no foul play was found). This most recent foreign-policy signaling by Vučiċ illustrates that while Dodik’s political future seems grim, the underlying conditions behind his troublemaking in Moscow and Belgrade will remain undeterred, waiting for more opportune moments.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post What’s at stake for Bosnia and Herzegovina as Milorad Dodik faces a political reckoning? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, explores Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragile political landscape, as the country nears the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement. With separatist pressures rising and youth fleeing the country, is silent abandonment more dangerous than loud secession?

Joined by Adnan Ćerimagić, Senior Analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative based in Berlin, the conversation delves into:

• The implications of Milorad Dodik’s conviction and continued political activity;

• The EU’s and NATO’s stances on Bosnia’s sovereignty and why EUFOR will not get involved in a potential arrest of Dodik;

• Legal actions against Republika Srpska leadership and questions over the constitutional changes and international enforcement; and

• The future of the Office of the High Representative and the so-called Bonn Powers in Bosnia.

With tensions high and regional implications looming, this episode asks the urgent question: What will it take for Europe—and the West writ large—to finally draw a line in the sand?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post From Dayton to Dodik, what’s at stake in Bosnia? | A Debrief with Adnan Ćerimagić appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, over 100,000 Russians have sought refuge in Serbia, drawn by historical ties, visa-free entry, and the complex geopolitical landscape. But who are these Russians, and what are their beliefs? What do they envision for their future in Serbia, a country at the crossroads of the East and West?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, delves into the growing Russian community in Serbia—a topic that has sparked significant discussion across the Western Balkans. Joining her are Srdjan Cvijić, President of the International Advisory Board of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Maxim Samorukov, Fellow at the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Center.

Their latest research offers a fresh perspective on the Russian community in Serbia, revealing their non-malign influence and shedding light on their social, political, and economic integration.

In this episode, we explore:

– The scope and size of Russia’s migration to Serbia—are we witnessing a cultural shift or a temporary wave?

– Who are the migrants arriving—political dissidents, tech workers, or others—and what are their motivations?

– Are these immigrants looking for safety, or do they see themselves as agents of change?

– How do they view Vladimir Putin and Serbian President Vučić?

– And what does their growing presence mean for Serbia’s future as it balances ties between the East and West?

Don’t miss this insightful conversation on the evolving role of Russian immigrants in Serbia’s political, social, and economic landscape.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post What is the future of Russian immigration to Serbia? | A Debrief with Srdjan Cvijić and Maxim Samorukov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Under President Donald Trump, the United States has rapidly shifted its approach toward Russia and the war in Ukraine. This has many pockets of Europe scrambling to understand the local implications of this change and to adjust their postures accordingly. The Western Balkans—a part of the continent outside the European Union (EU) where the United States has a significant security and development footprint—is already feeling the effects and is bracing for more.

The Trump administration is not expected to focus intently on the Western Balkans anytime soon. Yet it is reasonable to expect that a divergence between the United States and the EU on broader questions of security and trade will be reflected in the region. This could make the Western Balkans into an area of competition rather than complementarity for Washington and Brussels.

Western policy fragmentation could reshape regional dynamics that until recently had been anchored around EU and NATO accession—twin goals that the United States and the EU have pushed for together. Regional leaders who are angry with Brussels, whatever their reasons, may use the “Trump card” to agitate the EU, which could fuel instability and potentially even arms races and conflict.

For now, questions over the future of NATO,  unsubstantiated reports that the US military will retreat from the Balkans, and speculation on how a settlement to end the war in Ukraine could change Europe’s borders are already fueling security dilemmas in the region. This is particularly the case in non-NATO countries, such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have interethnic tensions, border disputes with neighbors, and a reliance on NATO and the United States as guarantors of peace settlements.

Can Europe fill the gaps created by US disengagement and play a credible deterrent role in the Balkans at a time when it may also have to significantly step up its support for Ukraine? What would happen if, as part of its broader rapprochement with Russia, the United States went over Europe’s head and tried to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, which Brussels—much to the dismay of Washington—has failed to do for fourteen years? These are questions European policymakers need to start asking themselves.

But the uncertainty the United States’ policy shifts have caused in Europe could also turn out to be a blessing in disguise. The United States’ disengagement from the region could put further productive pressure on Europe to take care of its own security, fill the gaps in democracy promotion that Washington is leaving behind, and jolt EU enlargement from its current limping state.

Backlash against Brussels

US-EU discord is already deepening regional fragmentation, mostly in an anti-EU direction. Early signs of this were visible in last week’s United Nations General Assembly vote on Ukraine, which pit the EU against Russia and the United States.

While Serbia, the region’s hedging power, did vote in favor of the EU-sponsored resolution backing Ukraine, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić later backtracked and suggested that it was a mistake. North Macedonia—a country whose membership in the EU has been blocked by its neighbors—notably abstained. With Hungary the only EU country to abstain, the contours of a regional Kremlin-friendly Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje axis—hostile toward Brussels and able to paralyze decision making in the EU—are forming.

Countries along this axis understand the transactional nature of the Trump administration and are actively courting strategic US investments for further leverage. In other cases, like in Bosnia and Herzegovina—where Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik is ramping up his secessionist agenda—troublemakers are feeling emboldened to test the limits of the new geopolitical environment.

On the other side of the spectrum is the region’s most pro-US country, Kosovo, which finds itself in a strategic pickle, as its statehood and security rely on transatlantic unity. What’s more, the country’s decision making has been paralyzed in the aftermath of an inconclusive election in February, which could drag out the formation of a new government for weeks, if not months.

Kosovo is highly dependent on the United States for its security and has many grievances with the EU. Its statehood is still not recognized by five EU member states, which blocks any advancement to candidate status, and Pristina remains under EU restrictive measures due to how the outgoing government handled affairs in its Serb-majority north. At least one major part of Kosovo’s political spectrum is also angry at the EU for its treatment of Kosovo’s former leaders who are on trial for war crimes at The Hague—a grievance that some members of the Trump administration apparently share.

Whether Kosovo uses its “Trump card” in the context of a US-EU split depends largely on who forms the next government and what the Trump administration has to offer. For instance, a breakthrough in international recognition would be a compelling prospect. Yet, Kosovo also remains somewhat anxious about Trump’s cordial relations with Belgrade, while acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti, whose party came in first in the recent elections, had an infamously difficult history with the first Trump administration.

Albania and Montenegro seem to be more aligned with Brussels at the moment, as they have positioned themselves as regional frontrunners in the EU accession path and have both set the ambitious goal of joining the bloc in the next few years. Yet, this EU path is affected by another major shift in Washington’s foreign policy. EU accession is heavily centered on rule of law and democratic reforms, areas in which the United States has invested in the past few decades. The Trump administration’s decision to halt foreign aid through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has given such efforts a major hit. For example, in the past few years, Albania has made progress on tackling elite impunity through new rule of law bodies, which were built largely through US technical expertise and are now vulnerable.

The disruption in the operations of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—a key pillar of US democracy promotion—is also shrinking the space for regional civil society. The Serbian government is now persecuting some of the leading pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations under the convenient pretext of “abusing USAID funds.”

How Europe can fill the gap in the Western Balkans

To prevent the further deterioration of the security situation and an authoritarian descent throughout the Western Balkans, Europe needs to step up and claim its role as an anchor of regional security and democracy. On security, that would require not just the usual French-German leadership within the EU, but also an active role for European NATO powers such as the United Kingdom and Turkey, both of which are invested in preserving the regional order and have troops on the ground in the Western Balkans. The upcoming visit to the region by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is a welcome sign and should be followed by firm guarantees of deterrence.

On democracy, the EU already has the instruments in place to fund institutional reforms or support civil society—such as the continent’s NED equivalent, the European Endowment for Democracy. Now, it needs to use those instruments to fill the financial gaps left by the United States.

However, the real litmus test of Europe’s power will be its ability to resolve the lingering bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans and to finally push the region forward toward EU accession. Yet, these goals would be best served by an approach that tries to work together with Washington, rather than against it.

Competition over Western Balkans policy between the EU and the United States over the next four years would deepen the region’s fragmentation, undermining any attempts for an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Europe also needs Washington engaged because there is a need to deter Russia from continuing to play a spoiler role in the Western Balkans through its regional allies, primarily Serbia. The current US-Russia dialogue seems broad in scope—Washington and Moscow recently discussed Middle East issues—and, with US-EU coordination, these talks could be used to serve joint Western interests in the Balkans.    

At the same time, there are actions the EU could take on its own that could incentivize regional actors to anchor around its goals. It could start, for example, by eliminating decision-making obstacles to its enlargement process that have allowed individual member states to stall and veto candidate countries’ membership bids over petty disputes. Much like in the case of Ukraine, Washington cannot be blamed for, nor expected to solve, problems of the EU’s own making.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been halted as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the executive order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Germany’s political landscape is shifting after the parliamentary elections on February 23—conservatives won, the far-right AfD surged, and foreign policy questions loom large over Berlin. What will the next leadership in Germany mean for the country’s approach to EU enlargement and, in particular, the Western Balkans?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, sits down with Gerald Knaus, Chairman of the European Stability Initiative, a leading voice on EU engagement, to discuss why Germany must step up as Europe’s stabilizer. Knaus warns that the next four years are critical: Berlin must push for EU enlargement in the Balkans—no more delays, no vague goals. Without bold leadership, the region risks stagnation.

Knaus also highlights Merz’s recent foreign policy statements as the boldest from any European leader now and argues that Merz’s government could be the most consequential in Germany since Konrad Adenauer in 1949.

Will Germany step up as Europe’s stabilizer? As Europe faces a growing security crisis, will Germany push for a stronger NATO presence in the Balkans? Could a potential divide between the United States and the EU weaken efforts to stabilize the region? What one piece of advice would Gerald Knaus give to Germany’s new leadership regarding the Balkans?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post Will Merz step up Germany’s role in the Balkans? | A Debrief with Gerald Knaus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on February 9 have painted a complex picture, as Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje remains the strongest party, but it has lost its absolute majority from 2021. So, why did voters back Kurti yet limit his power? Is this a sign of growing dissatisfaction in Kosovo, or perhaps a call for more political balance?

With coalition talks ahead, the big question iss whether Kurti can form a stable government or if opposition parties will seek to unite and form a mandate. Meanwhile, tensions with Serbia remain high, normalization talks are stalled, and Kosovo’s relationship with key Western allies—including the United States—has become increasingly strained.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with former U.S. Ambassador to Kosovo, Jeff Hovenier, to break down the election results, the possible governing scenarios, and what’s at stake for Kosovo’s democracy, regional stability, and international partnerships.

Drawing from his personal experience, Hovenier reflects on the challenges of navigating the often-tense relationship between Washington and Prime Minister Kurti’s government during his tenure.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post Is Kosovo Headed for Political Gridlock? | A Debrief with Jeff Hovenier appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The European Union’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to accelerate economic growth and convergence in the region—but can it truly deliver? With reform, investment, and EU integration at stake, how can the region turn this initiative into real progress?

Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, dives into the risks, opportunities, and challenges with three co-authors of the Atlantic Council’s EU Growth Plan report: Valbona Zeneli, economist and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council; Richard Grieveson, Deputy Director at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies; and Isabelle Ioannides, Europe’s Future Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and the ERSTE Foundation.

Can the Growth Plan restore trust in the EU’s commitment to enlargement, or will political deadlock, limited funding, and institutional struggles stand in the way? What role can private sector investment and regional cooperation play in amplifying its impact? And how can the EU ensure stronger rule of law and accountability as part of the process?

Join us for an in-depth discussion on #BalkansDebrief as we break down what’s at stake for the region’s economic future.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post The EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans – A Debrief with Valbona Zeneli, Isabelle Ioannides, & Richard Grieveson appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahead of the election, the Europe Center is answering questions about the key candidates and issues at play.

What is the political context of this election?

Kosovo is gearing up for parliamentary elections on February 9, marking a big moment in its political history—the first time a government has completed a full term since Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his party Vetëvendosje (“Self-Determination Movement,” VV), who won a landslide victory in 2021 with 50.28 percent of the vote, are now seeking re-election in what’s shaping up to be a heated contest, as the opposition is determined to make significant gains.

Kurti is a bold and polarizing figure—hailed as a reformer and disruptor by those who want sweeping changes, yet criticized by others who claim his policy undermines progress toward positive regional relations. For many, he is a symbol of hope and progress; for others, his hardline stances, especially on domestic reforms and the stalled dialogue with Serbia, raise red flags. As voters head to the polls, Kurti’s leadership and vision remain at the center of Kosovo’s political debate, sparking questions about the country’s path forward.

Kosovo’s future depends heavily on its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, with a new European Commission team and opportunities with the freshly appointed special representative for the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Additionally, a potential shift in priorities of the new US administration adds another layer of uncertainty. As Kosovo navigates this evolving global landscape, its relationship with the United States will play a key role in shaping the country’s future aspirations.

—Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Kosovo is often viewed as stagnant, and its attempts to build respect and diplomatic recognition on the international stage have been largely ineffective. Although Kurti is heading the longest-serving government since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, he has been repeatedly accused by opposition parties of delivering little, defying the international community, and complaining about Serbia while missing out on opportunities to build infrastructure and develop Kosovo economically. The results of this election will be a critical indicator of Kosovo’s future.

—Jonathan Moore is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Who is Albin Kurti—and who are his main challengers?

Kurti, the current prime minister and leader of VV has long maintained a strong stance on Kosovo’s sovereignty, frequently targeting Serbia’s influence in the region. He has labeled Serbia a “proxy of Russia” and accused Western powers of appeasing Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. His campaign continues to focus on anti-corruption, national independence, and a tough approach to Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia.

Kurti’s main challengers are the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), now led by Memli Krasniqi, who has nominated Bedri Hamza as their candidate for prime minister, and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Lumir Abdixhiku. The PDK, which won 17 percent of the vote in 2021, is focusing its campaign on economic reform and strengthening Kosovo’s international relationships. Bedri Hamza has emphasized the need for Kosovo to attract foreign investments and improve living standards, proposing pragmatic policies to stabilize the economy and create jobs. The LDK, which secured 13 percent in 2021, advocates for a more balanced approach to the dialogue with Serbia and calls for a reset in Kosovo’s diplomatic strategy. Abdixhiku’s campaign centers on restoring Kosovo’s credibility in international negotiations and rebuilding trust with the West. Both parties have criticized Kurti and his handling of the dialogue with Serbia in particular, which they argue has stalled Kosovo’s domestic and international progress. They emphasize their commitment to economic development, strengthening Kosovo’s international presence, and adopting a more constructive approach to relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States. Despite their criticism, recent polls indicate that while VV maintains a lead, the opposition parties are closing the gap. However, the result remains uncertain as election day approaches.

—Ilva Tare

Kurti entered the political stage as a firebrand, initially making his mark as a student protestor in the late 1990s. His left-leaning party VV gradually built its parliamentary presence starting in 2010. VV was founded on a reputation of refusing to compromise, even with Kosovo’s most important international partners. While Kosovo’s lack of progress toward EU standards may be more apparent outside the country, voters are increasingly aware that they are falling behind. At the same time, many Kosovars view Kurti’s political opposition as either compromised or outright corrupt.  The three major opposition parties (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, or AAK; LDK; and PDK) share similar goals: they want to leverage US and European support to secure NATO and EU membership. However, their difficult histories and bitter rivalries on the local level have prevented them from uniting ahead of the election. There is much talk of joining efforts if VV fails to secure an outright majority, with the most successful of the three parties taking the lead in forming a new government. However, the outcome of such an effort is uncertain. Especially, as all of the three parties have leaders who are determined to succeed on their own. On top of that, it is also conceivable that Kurti could form a coalition with one of them to retain power.

—Jonathan Moore

What do the polls say about who is likely to win?

The question is in the air about what would happen if VV falls short of the 50 percent threshold required to govern with an outright majority. Even though some local media have speculated about a potential coalition between VV and the PDK, Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi has recently denied this possibility. The presidency, which will become vacant after Vjosa Osmani’s term ends next year, could become a key bargaining chip in such negotiations if they do take place with an opposition party. Kosovo’s ethnic Serbs make up about 2.3 percent of its 1.6 million population, though this figure is contested due to a census boycott by Serbs. The next government will need to face the issue of implementing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM), which aims to address the concerns of Kosovo’s Serbian minority and is backed by both the EU and the United States. Additionally, Serbia is expected to deliver on the de facto recognition of Kosovo.

—Ilva Tare

As is often the case elsewhere in the region, polls in Kosovo have not been very accurate in the past, and VV’s victory in 2021 was unprecedented, with the three opposition parties performing poorly (PDK: 17 percent; LDK: 12.7 percent; AAK: 7.1 percent). Since then, both PDK and LDK have changed their leadership.

—Jonathan Moore

What are the biggest challenges Kosovo’s next government will face?

The United States must play a more prominent role in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to address the region’s political complexities. It is unclear how the recent statement by Special Envoy Ric Grenell about Kurti and his government’s relationship with Washington may reflect future US policy toward the region. However, the EU’s inability to break the deadlock has stalled progress. With Serbia’s ongoing ties to Russia and Kosovo’s aspirations to solidify its sovereignty, the United States could leverage its influence to steer both parties toward a more pragmatic, long-term agreement. The shifting international landscape calls for a more balanced approach, emphasizing stronger transatlantic collaboration to foster stability and address unresolved issues between Kosovo and Serbia. A critical aspect of this dialogue is Serbia’s eventual recognition of Kosovo, which could also push the EU’s five non-recognizing members to reconsider their stance, thereby strengthening Kosovo’s international legitimacy. The ultimate goal remains the full normalization of relations, culminating in Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state and the country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

—Ilva Tare

Kurti has built a reputation on refusing to compromise and takes pride in his unwillingness to normalize relations with Serbia. If the opposition comes to power, they are likely to seek closer ties with Washington and Brussels, but will struggle to make significant progress on normalization in the short term. They had the opportunity of implementing agreed-upon steps in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue when in power but chose not to, citing domestic political objections. Incentives to move the normalization Dialogue forward, particularly from the EU, would be important.

—Jonathan Moore

Youth brain drain is a major policy challenge across the Western Balkans, and the next government in Pristina must contend with it. One in four citizens has left the region, driven by low salaries, limited economic opportunities, political instability, and corruption. The World Bank’s latest report on the Western Balkans highlights that emigration from the healthcare sector, in particular, has resulted in over 20 percent of Kosovo’s young talent residing in other European countries. As Kosovo’s population continues to age, this will only intensify, presenting an even greater challenge for the incoming government.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

What obstacles does Kosovo face in achieving its foreign policy goals?

NATO and EU membership remain top priorities for Kosovo’s foreign policy, but both the current government and some of its predecessors have, at times, put the cart before the horse. Even though it has made significant diplomatic efforts to secure global recognition and membership in the Council of Europe, Kosovo remains outside the United Nations. NATO and EU members—some of which have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence or establish diplomatic relations—continue to demand tangible steps toward “normalization” between Belgrade and Pristina, along with the implementation of past agreements. The timing of this election coincides with the appointment of Danish/EU diplomat Peter Sørensen to head the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, potentially shaping the course of future negotiations.

—Jonathan Moore

Kosovo’s path toward EU accession hinges on the outcome of these elections. If Kurti secures another majority mandate, the country could see more political brinkmanship between Kosovo and the EU, particularly if US President Donald Trump pivots away from traditional US support for the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration and Brussels remains divided on enlargement. On the latter, there are positive signs that under High Representative Kaja Kallas, enlargement will be a political priority, at least with regard to Ukraine and Moldova. Renewed enthusiasm for enlargement, spurred by these two countries, should in all logic be good news for the Western Balkans.

If VV is forced into a governing coalition with PDK or LDK, there is some hope that Kurti’s rhetoric could become more moderate, leading to greater openness to dialogue with regional and international partners. However, a PDK-LDK grand coalition excluding VV would likely lead to an unpredictable platform and an unstable mandate. With such widespread support, Kurti in opposition would be a nightmare for a PDK or LDK prime minister, similar to governments elsewhere in Europe, such as in France, Spain, and potentially Germany, where diverse political alliances struggle to maintain cohesion, sometimes at the expense of effective policymaking.

—Stuart Jones

Related reading

Report

Dec 11, 2023

Getting back on track: Unlocking Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic and development perspective

By Agon Maliqi

Report exploring the path forward for Kosovo’s integration into transatlantic institutions and the geopolitical and economic challenges and opportunities facing the country.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Your primer on Kosovo’s parliamentary election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Serbia is at a crossroads. What started as grief over the Novi Sad tragedy has become a full-scale protest movement, forcing Prime Minister’s Vučević’s resignation and even earning students a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. But with no clear leader, how is pro-government media responding? Is this the start of real change, or will the movement be silenced? Ilva Tare, a Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Božić, News Director at TV N1, and Marko Prelević, editor of Nedeljnik, one of Serbia’s most influential weekly news magazines.

Who is the driving force behind these massive protests? How is the government-controlled press handling the massive protests? What comes next after the Prime Minister’s resignation? Will this moment define Serbia’s future? Tune in for an in-depth look at the movement shaking the Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post How is the media covering Serbia’s protests? A Debrief with Igor Božić and Marko Prelević appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Just across the border in Kosovo, the ruling party’s narrative has been that of an imminent war with Serbia, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and an attempted armed insurgency in the Serbian-majority north in 2023. Government officials and their media proxies have regularly framed the government’s critics—journalists, activists, and prosecutors—as being part of Serbia’s hybrid war against the country.   

Rule through fear is neither new nor unique to the Western Balkans. It has been the political zeitgeist in the region for a while, in part because there have long been valid reasons to be fearful.

The region continues to have an unresolved security architecture, with most of its countries still limping toward European Union (EU) and NATO membership, which were supposed to make its contested borders irrelevant. Insecurity about the future has paved the way for secessionist ideas to resurface. In 2022, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine sent this anxiety into overdrive, as Moscow actively sought—to no avail—to expand the front and stir trouble in the Balkans, primarily via its allies in Serbia.     

Yet these fears also gave regional leaders a useful tool to distract attention from poor governance and to suppress dissent. For Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who has pursued a policy of hedging between Moscow and the West, the threat of regional destabilization also serves as a bargaining chip with the latter.

Nevertheless, there are hopeful signs that people in the Western Balkans, as well as Western decision makers dealing with the region, are no longer buying into this blackmail. Throughout the region, leaders seem less able to distract their citizens from socioeconomic concerns. At the same time, the EU seems to be learning not to engage with regional troublemakers from a position of fear. Indeed, Brussels has shown that it has ample geopolitical and economic leverage to press its concerns on domestic reforms, Russia policy, and regional stability to Western Balkan nations while working to integrate them into the bloc.

Diminishing returns

The current wave of student protests in Serbia against government corruption has been the most successful and sustained opposition movement against Vučić so far. This is despite attempts to discredit the protests as sparked or supported by foreign governments. The demonstrations clearly have the government worried, as indicated by the resignation of Vučić ’s appointed prime minister. A recent poll by CRTA—a prominent pro-democracy nongovernmental organization in the country—shows that 61 percent of citizens support the protests and two-thirds believe corruption to be the country’s main problem.

In Kosovo, which holds national elections on February 9, the decision by popular Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s ruling party to run entirely on a “sovereignist” agenda with the nationalist slogan “from corner to corner”—highlighting its crackdown on Serbia’s structures in the north of Kosovo—and attacking his critics as unpatriotic, may turn out to be slightly backfiring. The two leading opposition parties, which are running on platforms emphasizing economic issues, seem to be having enough of a resurgence to complicate Kurti’s ability to form a government.

To be sure, there are still real risks of violent escalation due to miscalculation, and some degree of public angst about the potential for war remains prevalent in the region. A November 2024 regional Securimeter poll by the Regional Cooperation Council, an intergovernmental body, shows that while concern about war may be low in Kosovo (only 21 percent of citizens), it remains high in Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where more than half of those polled say they are concerned about a war breaking out. Yet region-wide, security concerns remain dwarfed by socioeconomic ones: the same poll shows poverty (49 percent), corruption (48 percent), and depopulation (36 percent) as being the top three priority concerns regionally. On top of that, a staggering 77 percent of respondents in the region identified the high cost of living and inflation as the main economic concern, followed by low wages (55 percent).

A position of strength

Part of the reason why fearmongering may no longer be paying political dividends in deflecting from citizens’ economic concerns is that, with time, the security threats have run out of credibility. Russia has failed to project meaningful power beyond its efforts in Ukraine. The West, for all its faults in mishandling the Western Balkans’ accession into the EU, proved it has the leverage and instruments for deterrence in the region. Indeed, NATO is present both within the region and around it, the EU is by far the region’s biggest trade and investment partner, and US and EU sanctions against Western Balkan nations can bite.

An attempt by Serbs in northern Kosovo to start an armed insurgency in October 2023 was quashed within a day by Kosovo’s Special Police, which was aided by NATO peacekeepers. Milorad Dodik, president of the Serb-majority Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia, has backed off his regular threats to secede from the country whenever he was threatened. Over the past year, Vučić was forced to admit that his hedging space has shrunk: Serbia purchased French warplanes, granted the EU access to its lithium resources, and now is being forced to nationalize its oil and gas industry from US-sanctioned Gazprom.

The West no longer seems to need to negotiate with Vučić from a position of fear—that is, treading carefully due to a concern that the Serbian president will turn further toward Russia or cause regional instability. Despite Vučić’s latest pro-Western moves, the European Council recently decided to keep Serbia’s accession talks effectively frozen due to concerns about democracy, relations with Kosovo, and nonalignment with the EU’s Russia policy.

This tougher stance on Serbia is a welcome departure from overly cautious EU policy toward the Western Balkans for the last ten years. While the EU has been right to fear that failing to integrate the Western Balkans would leave the bloc less secure, it was wrong to be afraid to dictate accession terms to Balkan nations given the EU’s leverage over the region.

Fear had driven the EU’s thinking about Western Balkan countries’ accession for most of the past decade. Some members were worried about the EU’s ability to absorb more Eastern countries with questionable governance standards and security postures. The EU’s far right also fueled xenophobia about the region’s Muslim-majority countries. As a result, the Western Balkans was parked in an effective containment policy, which empowered authoritarians who showed they could at least keep the peace.

Yet, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the fears of bringing the region into the EU were dwarfed by fears of keeping it out. Gray zones like the Western Balkans turned out to be a security vulnerability. There is a growing recognition within the EU that it needs to bring the Western Balkans into the bloc. However, this is coupled with an awareness that Brussels can afford to make demands of aspiring members if their accession prospects are to progress. Reflecting this balance, the new momentum for EU enlargement has now opened a window for at least Montenegro and Albania—the countries with the least amount of obstacles to membership and which are undertaking some reforms—to be part of the next accession wave.

The Western Balkans’ peace and stability will, however, remain fragile for as long as its countries remain stuck in bilateral or identitarian disputes. But over the past few years, the EU has shown that it has the leverage to resolve the disputes that stand in the region’s way. The Western Balkans present the ultimate litmus test of the bloc’s geopolitical weight. Going forward, the EU should use the leverage at its disposal without allowing fearmongering from Western Balkan leaders to deter it from its efforts to bring the region into its fold.

Agon Maliqi is an independent researcher and political analyst from Pristina, Kosovo. He was the co-founder and longtime editor of Sbunker, a think tank and blog on Western Balkans affairs, as well as a former Reagan-Fascell Democracy fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy.

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Fearmongering from Western Balkan leaders is no longer working on their citizens—or the EU appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As protests against lithium mining intensify across Serbia, fears of environmental damage and distrust in government accountability are uniting citizens like never before. Could this rare unity spark broader democratic change?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Resident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare explores the roots of this resistance with Ivanka Popovic, founder of the ProGlas movement and professor at the Faculty of Technology and Metallurgy at the University of Belgrade. Together, they discuss the environmental, social, and political implications of the controversial Jadar Valley lithium project.

With backing from EU leaders and major automobile companies, how is the role of foreign investment in shaping Serbia’s mining policies perceived, and what impact does this have on local communities opposing the project? How have recent protests, accented by the Novi Sad tragedy, influenced public trust in the government’s ability to manage environmental concerns associated with pollution and contamination? Discover the factors driving this movement, the role of grassroots activism, and the potential consequences for Serbia’s democratic future.

Ilva Tare

Welcome to Balkans Debrief. I’m Ilva Tare , a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Centre. Today we will focus on the growing protests in Serbia over the controversial lithium mining project in the Jadar Valley. While the government promotes this initiative as a game changing boost to the economy, local communities are sounding the alarm on environmental risks and government accountability—heightened by the recent tragic loss of 14 lives at Novi Sad railway station.

Joining me today is professor Ivanka Popovic, one of the founders of the ProGlas movement and also a former rector of the university of Belgrade. Thank you and welcome Ivanka. I hope we will discuss about the roots of this resistance, the government’s ambitions, and what this all means for Serbia’s future.

Ivanka Popović

Thank you, Ilva, it’s pleasure to be here.

Ilva Tare

Thank you so much. And I’ll start with the first question that is around the fact that, what do you think in your view, what has driven such a rare unity among Serbian citizens against this project, the lithium mining, despite their political or social differences?

Ivanka Popović

Well, I think we, what we’re seeing now is the culmination of the system breaking down and not meeting citizens’ expectations. First and foremost, many of the communal services such as the water supply, sewage, landfills, sanitary landfills, they’re all failing in the respect that they’re not functioning.

So something as challenging and high tech as a complex that would include a mine, a processing plant, and then also a landfill, a place where you would leave the residue of the process, is something that has, I have to say, really made people frightened, because people have lost trust in the system, in the various safeguards that exist through the functioning of institutions, independent institutions that would monitor the process.

This would not function for the needs of the people, but for the needs of those who would earn some money off of this project. And this is a real fear, because as I said, we’ve seen very simple projects fail.

For example, I’ll give you one really shocking event. For example, you have simple water supply systems in Serbia that provide running water. More than one third of this water is lost somewhere in the pipe because they have holes. So if we cannot even provide a full transfer of running water, how can we talk at all about some kind of higher technological level?

And the second point that I would like to make, there are some other projects that have already been realized in Serbia that have caused significant pollution and have affected the health of citizens in the eastern part of Serbia.

So when people put two and two together, it doesn’t really matter what your political affiliation is. You are really needing to respond to protect yourself and your family and your future.

Ilva Tare

Professor, I wanted to ask you, how are the citizens and you that are part of the protest and other citizens that have joined this cause, how do you balance the concerns about the environmental damage that you are mentioning with the potential economic benefits, such as jobs and infrastructure investment from this project, the Jadar lithium?

Ivanka Popović

So I would like to make something very clear. I am a chemical engineer and I fully understand how such a processing plant could function. And with all the potential that could exist, and even then there would be some risk. Considering how this country functions, I think it’s a really serious issue that we are facing here.

And my second point that I want to make, this is not a population that is against technological progress. Because for decades, and in former Yugoslavia, this was an area that was really growing very quickly in terms of economic development, industrial growth. But what we see now is the offset of potential gains, which I have to say would not be significant because the multilateral company Rio Tinto is the owner of this complex. And actually the very poor arrangement of how Serbia would be compensated in terms of mining fees is such that there would be significant revenue for Serbia. On the other hand, the potential problems are tremendous. And I will also explain why this is an unusual situation that we have with this potential complex.

First of all, it’s situated in fertile agricultural land that has for centuries been used for these purposes. It is one of, while not a breadbasket, it’s a place where fruit, vegetables are grown, there is very lively agricultural activity.

And the second point, because of the increasing threat of lack of quality water supply, this location is directly above what is a very significant aquifer. It’s a regional reservoir of underground water that in the future could supply Belgrade and surroundings and also this area.

Any type of interference above ground could pollute this water. So I think it’s a gamble that many people do not think is worth it, because even if there were money to compensate for damages, the funds required to correct the situation would far outweigh what the actual economic gain was.

So as a concerned citizen, but also as someone who is I think sufficiently technically literate, I could say that this is a very, very risky project that would not provide the benefits that Serbia needs. And I do believe that Serbia needs that economic development, industrial growth, but maybe in projects that would not be so rich yet.

Ilva Tare

Professor, apart from the government backing this project, there are EU countries, governments and corporate support for the lithium mining in the Jadar Valley. How do you think the citizens and the protesters can have their voice, concerns heard compared to the West, let’s say, supporting this project of the government?

Ivanka Popović

Well, this is also something that has disturbed people. As you know, Serbia is a candidate country that has not been very, let’s say efficient, in fulfilling the requirements to join the European Union. So, it’s still a long road ahead.

But on the other hand, Serbia has signed an agreement with the EU dealing with critical resources. And because these lithium reserves are quite significant, there are also other resources available in Serbia. And this is time, as I said, when you have a mutually beneficial partnership that will be beneficial for both sides.

What I see here is that maybe that there is on the side of the European Union, unfortunately, more a belief that the benefit would outweigh the risks. And of course, the benefit would be all exclusively for the European Union and not for us.

And what we have seen is also that Chancellor Scholz, the German Chancellor, visited Serbia in the summer. And there was, as I said, this agreement that was signed also with Sefcovic from the European Union. And in some ways, Germany almost wanted to provide guarantees that the project would run smoothly, but as you know, then I don’t believe that in any case in history that one country could guarantee for another country the implementation of a project. And what we all have seen is the collapse of the German coalition in power, so I think there will be new elections in Germany. No one can guarantee who the new German Chancellor will be.

So this is more or less, I have to say, a smokescreen for the Serbian government to say, the Germans are guaranteeing this, so it’ll be fine. It won’t be fine. And each country is responsible for, well, its own activities. And I think we have to be very responsible for our own population. We don’t want to be uncooperative, and we also—or some of us here—want to be part of the European Union, but in a way that we would like to see an even a partnership that would not somehow see as a relationship where one side is having much more benefits.

Ilva Tare

How do you assess the government’s handling of the public opposition to the lithium mining? And in your view, what steps are needed to address citizens’ concerns? Is there, in your opinion, any potential ideal scenario that all the concerns, environmental concerns can be addressed and the project can continue?

Ivanka Popović

Well, I would say that this is an issue that far surpasses environmental issues. We’re talking about the need for social change in this country and a government that would be willing to implement it.

And if you know, in 2022, there were mass demonstrations in Belgrade and other places in Serbia, where the number of people that were actually protesting was such that the government pulled the plug on this project, halted it, and said they will stop the project.

That was 2022. After elections this year, which were a very specific process where fortunately the population became fully aware of the amount of manipulation and tampering with voting that was occurring. In the summer, we also had very, very large, demonstrations dealing with it, you know, because after the elections in June, the government said, yes, we are now continuing with the project, knowing that there will be less opposition because there are no new elections in sight.

But this is something that really disturbed people and brought them out into the streets again. So what we’re seeing is an abuse of power by the government, so we all fully recognize that in a democracy, the majority will rule, but if this majority has been made to manipulate the processes, which is highly probable in this case, then you wonder about the legitimacy of this government.

Also, when the institutions have been hijacked, when you have a judiciary that is not responding in the proper way, but only for the needs of the government, and independent institutions that could monitor not only the environmental aspect, but any other aspect, like the financial aspect, anything that is going on. We are really worried.

And the recent tragedy in Novi Sad, this is a town 80 kilometers to the north of Belgrade, where the roof of the newly renovated train station collapsed, killing now 15 people and leaving two people fighting for their lives. It’s something that really sent the message home. You know, the first aspect with Jadar, we know the consequences of mining in eastern Serbia. Now we know because of very questionable contracts that were signed, obvious and significant corruption that is going on, a train station that was opened twice in the previous years by politicians and hailed as a tremendous step forward has made it insecure that no matter where you are in Serbia, in some kind of a building that has been somehow maybe renovated, you are really risking your life.

And I don’t think that fear is the best driving force for social change, but it’s becoming quite a significant factor to make people aware of their rights as citizens and that they need to do something to make a change and change this country into a functioning democracy where government works for the people and not so that the people are working for the benefit of the government.

Ilva Tare

And as one of the founders of the ProGlas movement—“For vote” movement—how do you see grassroots activism shaping national debates on issues like lithium mining?

Could this current public outcry over lithium be a catalyst for broader democratic changes in Serbia, in your view?

Ivanka Popović

Yes Ilva, I think you’re quite right because this—ProGlas is a play on words. It means “Pro vote”, but it also means “pro voice,” because Glas is voice. That means we would like, as a group, to be an initiative that makes people socially aware and aware of their civic rights and duties as active citizens to maintain our society and get it moving in the right direction.

The various civic initiatives have increased over the years because citizens are disappointed by opposition parties that somehow are not managing to voice the needs of the citizens and are maybe seen sometimes as maybe looking for their own narrow interest, to maybe enter parliament, which is maybe being too rough on this opposition, which is very weak and is not sufficiently united, but it’s clear that it’s not only citizens groups, grassroots organizations, but all also these opposition parties and perhaps new ones that will, grow out of these grassroots organizations will be needed.

It will have to be a very massive front encompassing all parts of the political spectrum and active citizens to try to make a change. So yes, I think this is a topic, because if you look at it either from an environmental, political, economic, any aspect, it’s a sort of a showcase of everything that’s wrong in this country and what we need to do to change it.

So I think, yes that this is the beginning of a movement that will continue and it will be very, very persistent and have a lot of energy. It does not matter how long it will take, but it will try to change this country for the better.

Ilva Tare

And lastly, how has media coverage shaped public opinion on the issue of the lithium mining and the civic movements that it has sparked in your view?

Ivanka Popović

Oh, that’s a very sensitive issue. Let’s say it’s a very depressing one.

Serbia, as you know, unfortunately does not have freedom of the press. You have a state-controlled media, regardless of whether they are state-funded or private, and you actually have only a few independent media that do not have national coverage.

So at the moment, all national coverage is by government-controlled media. A lot, a good part of the population is not even getting a balanced view of what is going on. It has increased the importance of social networks trying to get the message out because, as I said, this is not someone trying to sell a better product. It’s a question of providing the population with all the necessary information so that they themselves can make a decision on what they want to do. If they don’t want to do anything, that’s fine, but they need to have all the information and they don’t have it now.

Ilva Tare

Do you think this protest, and as I said, this rare unity among Serbian citizens will be successful in the end? And what will success be for you? What will it look like?

Ivanka Popović

Well, I’m always an optimist, so yes, I believe that we will prevail in the end, but it’s the learning curve.

Serbia is a country that has a very fragile democracy. It doesn’t have a democratic tradition, and therefore it doesn’t have a population that is used to being active in governance, more of a passive situation where more or less you vote, agreeing or not agreeing fully with what’s going on, and then you sort of are the recipient of what the government calls out for you.

Now we are trying to show, and really working on it, to show that the government—the citizens themselves have the power and duty to change the situation in this country. So yes, I’m optimistic, but I cannot give you a time frame.

Ilva Tare

Thank you very much for sharing your concerns and I wish you the best of luck with raising the voices and concerns and this activism that you are keeping alive in Serbia. Thank you Professor Popović.

Ivanka Popović

Ilva thank you very much. And I would just like to say one thing at the end.

I think it’s very important to understand that this is an autonomous, really unique situation where you can hear the voice of the Serbian people.

This is not an imported revolution or imported or somehow manipulated situation. I think we are now really seeing and hearing that people want change. Thank you so much for your time.

Ilva Tare

Thank you.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Can Serbia’s Lithium Protests Redefine Its Future? | A Debrief with Ivanka Popovic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction | Aleksej Demjanski
• Economy: So much to do, so little on the agenda | Branimir Jovanović
• EU integration: Gaining credibility | Malinka Ristevska Jordanova
• Anti-corruption: A holistic approach to reduce risk factors | Biljana Ivanovska
• Youth: From rhetoric to real change | Sara Milenkovska
• Civil society: Inclusion and integration | Lura Pollozhani
• Conclusion and policy recommendations

Introduction

Aleksej Demjanski

North Macedonia’s 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections resulted in a major shift in power. Seven years after securing victory by riding a wave of protests demanding concrete reforms, a renewed EU accession perspective, and the fight against corruption, the liberal center-left Social Democratic Union of Macedonia saw its worst election result since independence in 1991. This year, the conservative center-right opposition Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) rode its own wave of dissatisfaction with the slow pace of EU integration burdened by bilateral demands from Bulgaria and unrealized domestic reforms.

A coalition government between VMRO-DPMNE, the Albanian VLEN bloc, and the ZNAM movement has taken the reins. The partners have agreed on a set of priorities that include the economy, EU integration, and the fight against corruption. A slew of urgent tasks lies ahead for the new government in these areas, but also in tackling other pressing challenges regarding youth and emigration as well as cooperation with civil society. Addressing these priorities—domestically and internationally—will require astutely walking a tightrope amid citizens’ demands for a change in the status quo.

While the transatlantic community will remain preoccupied with a political transition in the European Union (EU) and elections the United States over the next six months, the new government in North Macedonia will have time to prepare its reform agenda and engage international partners on achieving common goals. The modus operandi of all Macedonian governments since independence is no longer tenable. A paradigm shift is needed to pursue reforms that benefit all North Macedonia’s citizens.

This policy brief is a compilation of expert analyses that serve as a kind of reform agenda—a road map of policy recommendations for the new Macedonian government in several key areas the coalition partners have already identified as priorities. The first section by Branimir Jovanović outlines how the government can revive the fragile economy and deliver on important public investments. The second section by Malinka Ristevska Jordanova argues the need to shift the EU narrative in North Macedonia and double down on reforms at home to unlock the path to EU accession. The third section by Biljana Ivanovska outlines how the new government can reduce risk factors for corruption and take a holistic approach to tackling the problem. The fourth section by Sara Milenkovska looks at how the new government can improve the approach to youth policies and address the challenges confronting the country’s youth. Finally, the fifth section by Lura Pollozhani provides a series of recommendations for how civil society can better engage the new government and how the government can reap the benefits of a constructive partnership with the country’s civic sector.

The brief concludes with a section outlining all these tangible policy recommendations for North Macedonia’s new government. These recommendations will serve as a useful tool for civil society and the international community in advocating for North Macedonia’s further democratic progress and European integration.

Economy: So much to do, so little on the agenda

Branimir Jovanović

North Macedonia’s new government faces several challenges. These are not limited to the dire fiscal situation and the tricky task of supporting a faltering economy while working within budgetary constraints. They also include deep-seated structural issues born from decades of governments pursuing a flawed economic model.

The most pressing challenge will be finding the money to sustain public spending. North Macedonia’s fiscal deficit in the first three months of the year amounted to 7.4 percent of the gross domestic product. This resulted from the generous fiscal package that the previous government adopted at the end of 2023 to win public support ahead of the elections. While that public support never came, the money was still spent and will continue to be spent, further straining the budget.

The second challenge will be supporting the fragile economy, which grew just 1.2 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Even this modest growth was largely due to the generous fiscal package mentioned above, which will soon vanish. Therefore, the new government must think of something quickly if it wants to avoid a recession.

The most daunting issue, though, will be to transform the outdated economic model based on low taxes, stingy public spending, nonintervention of the government in the economy, and a preference for foreign investment. This model, pursued over the past twenty to thirty years, has kept the country’s average per capita income at just 40 percent of the EU average, the poverty rate at more than 20 percent, and the rate of inequality among the highest in Europe.

Regrettably, the electoral program of the victorious VMRO-DPMNE party and initial statements from its leadership offer little cause for optimism. In his first interview after the election, incoming Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski addressed only the immediate financial challenge, proposing to secure a €1 billion loan from another country. Since then, North Macedonia and Hungary have agreed to a €500 million loan.

However, Mickoski did not say how he plans to support the economy, only cryptically stating his preference for investment over public consumption. This suggests that the economy is likely to decelerate in the second half of the year and might even slip into a recession after the expiration of the current fiscal package.

Most troubling, VMRO-DPMNE’s electoral program lacks the structural reforms needed to address North Macedonia’s outdated economic model. It merely echoes programs from former prime minister Nikola Gruevski’s time in office, recycling outdated concepts such as the regulatory guillotine, tax reductions, labor market flexibilization, offering public-sector employees to private firms, and closing old and opening new state agencies and ministries.

In addition to securing a loan to address the country’s urgent fiscal challenges, the new government must enhance fiscal revenues over a longer term by implementing a progressive tax system. It should impose higher taxes on higher-income brackets, larger corporations, and wealthier individuals.

To kick-start the economy, the government should increase the minimum wage, public-sector salaries, and all social transfers. Additionally, it should accelerate public investments in infrastructure, including roads, railways, and energy.

Finally, structural reforms are crucial to overhaul the outdated economic model. The government should introduce a strategic industrial policy to support key economic sectors, fostering innovation and international competitiveness. Investments in public services such as education, healthcare, and social protection need to be significantly increased to enhance the quality of life and productivity. The current exploitative model must be replaced with one that emphasizes equality and ensures the benefits of growth are broadly shared across the population rather than captured by a small, privileged elite.

EU integration: Gaining credibility

Malinka Ristevska Jordanova

In 2019, the Republic of Macedonia changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia to end a dispute with Greece and pave the way for its Euro-Atlantic integration. However, while North Macedonia has been admitted into NATO, its membership in the EU remains blocked. The new French methodology on enlargement from 2020 further delayed the launch of EU accession negotiations and was followed by a Bulgarian veto. The unprecedented Bulgarian conditions related to Macedonian identity and history were incorporated in the accession process through the 2022 “French proposal.” The proposal, which includes General Affairs Council conclusions, joint/common positions, as well as the negotiating framework, triggered massive protests and reactions both domestic and international. The conditions, which include changing the Macedonian historic narrative, are based on the Bulgarian claim that the Macedonian nation does not exist. Bulgaria also does not recognize the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and fails to implement its international obligations related to the freedom of association.

In practice, Macedonia’s (imposed) bilateral agreements with Greece and Bulgaria have become a tool for these neighboring countries—EU and NATO members—to further exert pressure on the Macedonian side for concessions on issues of identity and history rather than serve as a demonstration of solidarity, support for its EU accession, and improve cooperation in good faith.

In addition, while the enlargement process has returned to the EU agenda with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it did not actually make the EU perspective for Western Balkan countries, including North Macedonia, more tangible. Instead, the EU enlargement agenda was tied to the future EU internal reform agenda, and new proposals for gradual or partial integration of the Western Balkan countries came to the forefront.

The almost-three-decades-long process of EU integration and the continued imposition of bilateral conditions that have nothing to do with the Copenhagen criteria that define whether a country is eligible to join the EU, and even run opposite, have diminished the EU’s credibility in North Macedonia. Lacking the majority in the Macedonian parliament needed to deliver the promised first step in fulfilling Bulgaria’s numerous conditions—constitutional amendment to include the 3,504 Macedonian citizens that identify as ethnic Bulgarians in the 2022 census as a minority community—the former government (strongly supported by international partners) failed to deliver its promise to the EU.

Around 65 percent of Macedonian citizens are against the constitutional amendment—80 percent of the majority ethnic Macedonian community is against them, while 53 percent of the Albanian ethnic minority community is in favor. Nourishing ethnic division and polarization, the twisted national European agenda has turned into a perpetual response to vetoes rather than a genuine process of Europeanization.

Furthermore, marred by “constructiveness” in bilateral relations and promises that EU accession negotiations will automatically bring reform and well-being, backsliding on reforms related to EU membership, especially in the area of rule of law, became apparent. The distorted EU agenda was a key factor in the opposition VMRO-DPMNE’s victory in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections.

The new government, led by VMRO-DPMNE and largely perceived internationally as “nationalist,” will face a critical challenge: How can it inject credibility into the EU reform process, both internally and externally, without compromising its promises to the electorate?

The Macedonian EU narrative needs an essential shift—from fulfilling bilaterally imposed conditions that have nothing to do with EU accession criteria toward genuine economic and normative convergence with the EU. Instead of short-term concessions for small rewards, a long-term approach that protects national interests should be designed and implemented. A consistent and cohesive national strategy for EU accession needs to be developed and meticulously pursued domestically and internationally. An inclusive approach based on dialogue and arguments is essential in this process.

In order to gain credibility, the new government has to demonstrate, in practice, a decisive commitment to upholding EU standards on democracy, fundamental rights, and the rule of law while at the same time fulfilling the expectations of Macedonian citizens.

In that vein, EU-related reforms must be domestically driven and embedded in a consistent, inclusive, transparent, and evidence-based policymaking process. Significant improvements are necessary to put the policymaking cycle on track. In this context, the transposition of the EU acquis should be well-planned and methodologically consistent.

Furthermore, only depoliticized institutions can support the societal change needed for genuine Europeanization. The institutional setup for EU accession negotiations and management of the EU integration process should be streamlined and resources pooled. Developing capacity for the absorption of EU funds, in parallel with improving the national policymaking process, is imperative.

Finally, the Macedonian authorities’ dialogue within the region, Europe, and internationally needs to be significantly intensified and elevated to prevent further bilateralization of the EU accession process and protect crucial national interests. Macedonian authorities should take better advantage of their NATO membership, as well as membership in other international organizations, and foster sustainable and constructive relations with their partners.

Anti-corruption: A holistic approach to reduce risk factors

Biljana Ivanovska

Corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon, constantly evolving and intertwined with diverse economic, legal, political, and sociological factors. The negative effects of corruption are profound and far-reaching, spanning the public, private, and civil sectors. Corrupt behavior undermines confidence in institutions and the efficient use of public resources. It threatens democracy and the exercise of human rights due to the erosion of social values.

Through a systematic approach and assessment of corruption risks pertaining to spending public funds or abusing official positions in the public sector, the Macedonian State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption prepared a National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interest (2021-2025). The strategy, a pivotal step in confronting corruption, was adopted in 2020 by the Assembly of North Macedonia. However, the efficacy of this strategy hinges on the thorough execution of the accompanying Action Plan, which, unfortunately, has seen limited implementation thus far.

Corruption manifests through various channels, with several common denominators identified across sectors. Political interference in the public sphere, deficiencies in the rule of law, and a culture of impunity all contribute to its proliferation. Institutional weaknesses, a lack of integrity and transparency, and inconsistent regulations create fertile ground for corrupt practices to thrive.

A multifaceted approach is imperative to tackle corruption effectively. Strengthening integrity lies at the core of this endeavor. Personal and institutional integrity can be strengthened by fostering a merit-based value system and promoting ethical behavior. Moreover, ensuring the impartial enforcement of the rule of law and establishing independent and transparent institutions are vital steps in combating corruption’s entrenched presence.

Transparency and accountability are powerful weapons in the fight against corruption. Embracing digitalization initiatives can enhance transparency, streamline processes, and minimize opportunities for malfeasance. Simultaneously, robust accountability mechanisms must be enforced to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future misconduct. Strengthening supervisory and control mechanisms will further bolster anti-corruption efforts, providing additional safeguards against the abuse of power.
Legislative reforms are indispensable in fortifying the anti-corruption framework. Legal accountability must be enforced through rigorous prosecution of corrupt individuals, supported by legislation on the origin of property to curtail illicit wealth accumulation. Moreover, protecting whistleblowers and fostering public awareness are necessary to empower citizens to report corruption without fear of reprisal.

Political accountability must be upheld, with public officials answerable for their actions and decisions. Transparent employment practices, coupled with integrity-driven recruitment and human resource policies, are essential to cultivate a culture of accountability within public institutions. Institutional capacity-building and strengthening law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary are equally critical, equipping them with the resources and expertise to effectively investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

The private sector also plays a pivotal role in anti-corruption efforts. Regulatory frameworks should be implemented to promote transparency and integrity in private-sector operations, mitigating the risk of collusion and bribery. Furthermore, civil society and media engagement are indispensable in fostering public awareness and scrutiny, holding institutions accountable, and advocating for systemic reforms.

Cooperation among relevant stakeholders is indispensable in translating anti-corruption rhetoric into tangible action. Prioritizing the recommendations of anti-corruption agencies and fostering interstate cooperation can also attract collective expertise and resources to combat corruption effectively at all levels.

In conclusion, addressing corruption in North Macedonia demands a holistic approach that encompasses legislative reforms, effective criminal justice response, digitalization of public services, institutional capacity-building, and societal engagement.

Strengthening institutional integrity, enhancing transparency and accountability, and fostering cooperation among stakeholders can pave the way for a more efficient anti-corruption future.

Youth: From rhetoric to real change

Sara Milenkovska

In Macedonian politics, youth have been paid lip service but have not seen a substantial improvement in their situation. Contrary to the popular narrative in the media that youth in North Macedonia are apathetic, young people have led societal change and played a crucial role in civil society.

Still, a recent survey by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy shows that young people in North Macedonia are disillusioned and disengaged. Only 31 percent of youth surveyed believe the country is moving in the right direction, and a mere 3 percent are fully satisfied with their place in society. Six out of ten respondents feel they cannot impact government decisions, and only 22 percent think the government is addressing youth issues. Social inactivity is high, with 71 percent describing themselves as inactive citizens, and just 8 percent have tried to solve societal problems. Additionally, 90 percent have never participated in civic or nongovernmental organizations. While 64 percent always vote in elections, half of all surveyed do not believe voting can influence the country’s situation.

Despite these challenges, youth organizations were able to make progress. For example, they continued to advocate for adopting the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies in 2020 and pushed for a new National Youth Strategy. In past elections, political parties prioritized youth issues in their election promises. The failure to implement the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies, however, reinforced young people’s perception that they are not a priority for decision-makers. A 2019 survey by the National Youth Council of Macedonia (NYCM) found that 13 percent of respondents felt decision-makers ignored them and that current practices in the country make it challenging to alter this perception among the youth. This sentiment was confirmed by youth organizations involved in developing the National Youth Strategy. The NYCM noted that the final document adopted by the government differed from what had been collaboratively created. Respondents also pointed to a lack of implementation, action plan, indicators, and budget.

Further, the NYCM’s Monitoring Report on the Implementation of the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies revealed that only 12 percent of municipalities in North Macedonia have established local youth councils, only 11 percent have opened a youth office, and 69 percent have appointed a youth official. This indicates minimal progress and a lack of prioritization of the institutional implementation of youth policies at the local level, evidenced by insufficient investment. A key recommendation for further implementation is to introduce a dedicated budget for youth within municipal and state budgets. As the law outlines, this would ensure transparency and accountability in fund allocation.

In October 2022, the Agency of Youth and Sport, with the support of the international community and youth organizations, began developing the National Youth Strategy for 2023-2027. This strategic document was supposed to set medium-term goals and priorities for youth policy development and promote the interests of young people in North Macedonia. As important as it is that youth organizations are not giving up on these processes, there is a need for a strong and clear approach on the part of the government to implement the strategy. Therefore, some of the recommendations that the future government can take include:

• Youth, youth policies, and youth participation should be recognized as a priority and a matter of strategic interest for the country’s development.
• A commitment should be made to implementing and funding youth policies by aligning government actions with the objectives outlined in the National Youth Strategy. This includes proper allocation of resources, both financial and human, to support youth initiatives and programs.
• Young people should not be treated as tokens but rather included in the decision-making processes at all levels of government. This should be achieved by establishing local youth councils in all municipalities and investing in informal education and creating youth centers to serve as focal points for youth-related issues and initiatives. The proper implementation of this recommendation will mean creating a national youth assembly that will elect youth representatives to its advisory body. Youth must actively participate in creating and monitoring youth policies, including the fiscal implications, through participation in the advisory body. Hopefully, the diverse participation will compensate for the general lack of intersectionality when creating youth policies.
• Ensure transparency and accountability in implementing youth policies by developing clear action plans, indicators for monitoring progress, and dedicated budgets for youth within municipal and state budgets.

Unfortunately, VMRO-DPMNE doesn’t have a good track record of working with civil society. Therefore, the new government must clearly commit to strengthening civil society engagement to foster stronger partnerships with youth-led organizations and civil society groups that can amplify youth voices and address their concerns effectively. The new government has reconstructed the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy to create the Ministry of Social Policy, Demography, and Youth. While the new ministry’s scope includes the aspects of youth policy, its broader mandate includes many other areas, which may dilute the focus on youth if not properly balanced and prioritized.

North Macedonia can leverage its demographic dividend by focusing on youth empowerment, encouraging inclusive dialogue, and providing opportunities for meaningful participation. Even with the right support systems in place and its youth’s energy, creativity, and passion a significant transformation across all areas of society cannot occur without a clear political will.

Civil society: Inclusion and integration

Lura Pollozhani

Civil society in North Macedonia is an active and crucial actor in preserving the country’s democracy. According to data from 2022, nearly fifteen thousand civil society organizations (CSOs) are registered in the country, which attests to the diversity of the sector. As per the European Commission’s 2023 report, CSOs “continue to operate in an enabling environment” in North Macedonia. However, more needs to be done to integrate them into the government’s work and, more importantly, to support the inclusion and the work of an independent civil society.

The government of North Macedonia has a Department for Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations within its General Secretariat. This department follows the implementation of the strategy for cooperation with and development of the civic sector and its 2022-2024 Action Plan, which expires this year. The strategy lists these priorities:

1. Normative, institutional, and financial framework for the development of civil society
2. Democratization, active participation of civil society in societal processes, the creation and monitoring of policies, with a special focus on EU integration
3. Civil society sector as a stakeholder in socioeconomic development

An advisory council for cooperation between the government and civil society was established in 2018. Initially, the council worked efficiently and contributed to better collaboration between civil society and the government. However, cooperation started to crumble after the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a reduction in transparency and funds for CSOs. Notably, CSOs were not consulted on the administrative reforms of 2022, when funds for CSOs were cut and transferred to a new entity, the Ministry of Political System and Inter-Community Relations, among other issues. This led to a boycott by CSOs, which is ongoing and has seriously affected cooperation and trust between the government and the civil sector. It has also hampered the implementation of the abovementioned strategy. This conflict has exposed the need to make cooperation more organic and less dependent on the politics of the day. There needs to be a way to safeguard the environment of CSOs by establishing a secure budgetary framework that is only revised with their input.

Regarding the visibility of CSOs and their work, they cover various fields, including education, human rights, environmental issues, political participation of marginalized groups, economic empowerment, etc. However, one persistent issue is the inclusiveness of these organizations. Many CSOs that receive and secure more funding are based in Skopje. They are generally organizations with a history of funding, making it harder for new players to come along. There is also the issue of outreach depending on the CSOs’ target audience. For instance, posts and publications are rarely translated into local languages other than Macedonian unless the organization’s primary work is on interethnic issues. The same goes for the inclusion of other marginalized groups or doubly marginalized groups.

Despite these shortcomings, the CSO sector is well placed to improve, learn, and, most importantly, act as one of the main enablers of democracy in the country, particularly by taking concrete measures. An annual session between the government and CSOs should be instituted to assess the government’s priorities as well as the needs of the field arising from the work of CSOs. These annual sessions should resemble the government’s regular weekly sessions, where ministers provide updates on their ministries’ activities and set out the work envisioned ahead. For more transparency, it would be best to set a date and time for these meetings that coincide with the EU Progress Reports. CSOs are already included in the Program of the Government, but there needs to be more direct contact between ministers and CSO representatives.

Local government is equally important, if not more so. There needs to be more investment in creating an enabling environment for CSOs at the local level. This can be achieved by instituting local councils to foster better cooperation between CSOs and local government. Similarly, financial support for the work of CSOs with public money must be based on the needs of CSOs and determined in a consultative process between the government and CSOs. In that vein, the government should also secure a fund for inclusiveness for CSOs that want to reach out to marginalized groups but lack the resources. This may include language interpretation and translation or the installation of ramps and other supporting infrastructure. Finally, CSOs should be encouraged to cooperate by funding projects involving at least one partner from another city and community. This would ensure that CSOs connect and engage beyond Skopje.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

North Macedonia is once again at a crossroads. With the election of a new government, the country has the opportunity to move forward, making necessary democratic reforms, revitalizing the economy, and advancing toward EU membership. It can serve as a success story for the region, or it can remain caught in limbo, in a no man’s land, unable to advance on EU accession and reluctant to implement domestic reforms, further becoming a cautionary tale for other countries in the region. The EU’s approach to the region and North Macedonia over the past decade or more is partly to blame for the present situation. The EU should, as part of its ongoing internal reforms, ensure that bilateral issues remain outside of the accession process. The Union must regain its credibility in the region and North Macedonia. The enlargement process was and should remain based on merits, reforms, and adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. It is in the EU’s own interest that discussions around integration focus on European values and democratic standards, not debates about national identity and history. By focusing on democratic values and standards, from the fight against corruption to improving living standards, North Macedonia’s government and citizens will also be reinvigorated to make concrete, meaningful strides toward EU accession. We hope the policy recommendations, as described in this brief and outlined below, will serve to kickstart this process in North Macedonia and allow it to become the region’s success story.

Economy

• Implement a progressive tax system by imposing higher taxes on higher-income brackets, larger corporations, and wealthier individuals to enhance revenues over a longer term.
• Increase the minimum wage, public-sector salaries, and all social transfers to kick-start the economy.
• Accelerate public investments in infrastructure, including roads, railways, and energy.
• Introduce a strategic industrial policy to support key economic sectors, fostering innovation and international competitiveness to overhaul the outdated economic model.
• Increase investments in public services such as education, healthcare, and social protection to enhance the quality of life and productivity.

EU integration

• Develop and pursue a consistent, cohesive, and inclusive national strategy for EU accession domestically and internationally. The Macedonian EU narrative needs an essential shift—from fulfilling bilaterally imposed conditions that have nothing to do with EU accession criteria toward genuine economic and normative convergence with the EU.
• Elevate and intensify the level of dialogue by Macedonian authorities within the region, Europe, and internationally. Take better advantage of NATO membership, as well as membership of other international organizations, to prevent the bilateralization of the EU accession process and protect national interests.
• Ensure the credibility of the Macedonian EU accession process by pursuing resolute reforms and ensuring a high level of compliance with EU and international standards, especially in the priority areas: democratic standards, human rights, and the rule of law.
• Transpose, embed, and drive domestically the EU acquis and other EU-related reforms through an inclusive and transparent evidence-based policymaking process. Significant improvements are necessary to get the policymaking cycle on track.
• Streamline, depoliticize, and pool resources among institutions to manage the EU accession process.
• Develop the capacity to absorb EU funds in parallel with improving national policymaking processes.

Anti-corruption

• Embrace digitalization initiatives to enhance transparency, streamline processes, and minimize opportunities for malfeasance.
• Enforce robust accountability mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future misconduct.
• Strengthen supervisory and control mechanisms to bolster anti-corruption efforts, providing additional safeguards against the abuse of power.
• Fortify the anti-corruption framework through legislative reforms.
• Rigorously prosecute corrupt individuals to enforce a standard of legal accountability.
• Advance legislation on the origin of property to curtail illicit wealth accumulation.
• Protect whistleblowers and foster public awareness to empower citizens to report corruption without fear of reprisal.
• Hold public officials politically accountable and answerable for their actions and decisions.
• Cultivate a culture of accountability within public institutions through transparent employment practices coupled with integrity-driven recruitment and human resource policies.
• Build the institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary by equipping them with the resources and expertise needed to effectively investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
• Implement regulatory frameworks to promote transparency and mitigate the risk of collusion and bribery in private-sector operations.
• Prioritize the recommendations of anti-corruption agencies and foster inter-state cooperation.
• Engage civil society and media as essential actors to promote public awareness and scrutiny, hold institutions accountable, and advocate for systemic reforms.

Youth

• Recognize and prioritize youth, youth policies, and youth participation as an essential matter of strategic interest for the country’s development by adding youth to the list of strategic priorities.
• Commit to implement and fund youth policies by aligning government actions with the objectives outlined in the National Youth Strategy.
• Allocate financial and human resources to support youth initiatives and programs.
• Establish local youth councils in all municipalities, create youth centers to serve as focal points for youth-related issues and activities, and invest in nonformal education.
• Create a national youth assembly that will elect youth representatives to an advisory body. The youth sector has an obligation to actively participate in the creation and monitoring of youth policies, including their fiscal implications, through participation in an advisory body.
• Develop clear action plans, indicators for monitoring progress, and dedicated budgets for youth within municipal and state budgets to ensure transparency and accountability in the implementation of youth policies.
• Make a clear commitment to strengthening civil society engagement. This will foster stronger partnerships with youth-led organizations and CSOs that can amplify youth voices and address their concerns effectively.

Civil society

• Institute a yearly session between the government and CSOs to assess both the priorities of the government and the needs from the field emanating from the work of CSOs. These yearly sessions should resemble the government’s regular weekly sessions, where the ministers update on the activities of the year and set out the work envisioned ahead. It would be best if there is a date and time set out for these meetings which could coincide with the EU Progress Reports for more transparency. There is already CSO inclusion in the Program of the Government, but there needs to be more direct contact between ministers and CSO representatives.
• Institute local councils for better cooperation between CSOs and local government. Local government is equally as important if not more so and there needs to be more investment to create an enabling environment for CSOs at the local level.
• Base public-funded support for the work of CSOs on the needs of CSOs through a consultative process between the government and CSOs.
• Secure a fund for inclusiveness for CSOs that want to reach out to marginalized groups but lack the resources. This may include language interpretation and translation or the installation of ramps and other supporting infrastructure depending on needs.
• Encourage cooperation between CSOs by funding projects that involve at least one partner from another city and community. This would ensure that CSOs connect and engage beyond Skopje.

Aleksej Demjanski is an independent researcher and political analyst specializing in North Macedonia and Southeast Europe. He works as a program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, providing political analysis and managing support for independent media and civil society in North Macedonia, Kosovo, and the broader Balkan region. He specializes in transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, and media development. He has extensive democracy and civil society program management experience alongside policy analysis, consulting, and research stints in the United States and Central and Eastern Europe. As a hobby, he created the Macedonian Matters weekly newsletter, curating news on politics and society in North Macedonia.

Biljana Ivanovska is an economist and currently an adviser at North Macedonia’s Audit Authority for IPA Funds. Most recently, she served as the president of the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (2019–2024). Ivanovska started her career in parliament, where she worked for six years in the parliamentary commissions for economic affairs. She then continued her work at the Ministry of Finance where she was head of the Budget and Funds Department. After that, she spent thirteen years at the State Audit Office as a principal auditor carrying out audits of state bodies, local governments, and public enterprises in North Macedonia.

Branimir Jovanović is an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, focusing on the economies of the Western Balkans. His research primarily explores topics such as economic inequality, poverty, fiscal policy, taxation, social policies, EU integration, and foreign direct investment. He served as an adviser to the minister of finance of North Macedonia from 2017 to 2019 and was a researcher at the National Bank of North Macedonia from 2007 to 2015. He also participated in the social protests in his native North Macedonia from 2014 to 2016, including the “Colourful Revolution.”

Sara Milenkovska is a researcher and co-founder of the Stella Network, a mentoring network for women and girls. With a background in gender studies, political science, and strategic communications, she holds a master of science in gender, politics, and inequality from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a master in strategic communications from Institute for Communication Studies Skopje. Her research delves into youth and systemic inequality, intersectionality, anti-gender movements, and (digital) gender-based violence.

Lura Pollozhani is a researcher at the University of Graz, researching social movements in the Western Balkans as well as EU enlargement. Her other research interests include radicalization, citizenship practices in divided societies, and democratization.

She completed her PhD in law and politics at the University of Graz and earned an MSc in European studies: ideas and identities at the London School of Economics. Pollozhani worked as an adviser to the prime minister of North Macedonia on cooperation with international organizations between 2019 and 2020. She is one of the co-founders of the Stella Network, a mentoring network for women and girls, and is a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group.

Malinka Ristevska Jordanova has been engaged in the EU integration process since the late nineties, holding high public administration positions in the Macedonian parliament and government. She made special contributions to the candidacy of the Republic of Macedonia for its accession to the EU and road map for visa liberalization.

Dr. Ristevska Jordanova is a former director (from 2011 to February 2017) of the Macedonian think tank European Policy Institute. In her research, Jordanova has focused on the application of the EU policy of conditionality in the region, as well as on the transposition of the EU acquis.

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The post North Macedonia: A reform agenda on the path to EU integration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ilva Tare, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with Majlinda Bregu, the outgoing Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council, in this compelling #BalkansDebrief episode to discuss the current challenges of the region’s integration and cooperation as well as the gap between signing regional agreements and their actual implementation. Bregu highlights pressing issues such as the recognition of professional qualifications and the freedom of movement with ID cards, emphasizing that the effectiveness of these agreements relies heavily on the commitment of regional leaders to take action beyond ceremonial signings.

Bregu explains the Common Regional Market (CRM) 2.0 goals and its critical role in aligning with EU integration, by enhancing economic cooperation and convergence and paving the way for smoother entry into the EU’s single market.

She also addresses the Western Balkans’ pressing security and economic challenges, revealing how rising inflation, increasing costs, and corruption are creating distress for citizens and businesses. Moreover, Bregu warns that non-economic concerns, particularly the region’s troubling depopulation and ongoing disputes, are emerging as significant security threats.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Why is Depopulation a Threat to Balkan Security? | A Debrief with Majlinda Bregu appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since March 2024, Russia has decimated Ukraine’s thermal and hydro power plants. As a result, Ukraine is now reliant on the country’s nuclear industry to provide over 70 percent of its electricity needs. It is therefore vital for Ukraine to protect, sustain, and expand its nuclear power generation. Given the Soviet origin of Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, this will not be straightforward.

Obtaining parts to keep old reactors in operation while Kyiv transitions to Western nuclear technologies and expands energy production in other sectors, such as renewables, is essential. An opportunity to overcome the scarcity of parts now presents itself and must be seized to help Ukraine keep its infrastructure running and expand the country’s nuclear electricity generation as quickly as possible.

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As part of efforts to fill gaps in energy generation created by Russia’s targeted attacks, Ukraine and Bulgaria are currently pursuing a deal to transfer excess nuclear equipment intended for Bulgaria’s Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to Ukraine’s Khmelnytsky NPP. This will make it possible to complete construction of reactors three and four at the Ukrainian plant.

Once Bulgaria had ruled out beginning the process of installing Russian-produced equipment at its Belene NPP, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company, Energoatom, quickly recognized an opportunity. They saw that Bulgaria was now the only country in the world with the type of excess Russian nuclear equipment needed to complete the unfinished units at Khmelnytsky NPP.

Given that Ukraine started building the two incomplete units some years ago using Russian technology, it faced two options: Abandon the units and their power generation entirely, or access the equipment possessed by Bulgaria to safely install those components in cooperation with Energoatom’s Western nuclear industry partners to increase electricity production in Ukraine. In the process, this could lead to new shared expertise that will help countries around the world reduce and ultimately end their dependence on Russia’s Rosatom.

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Ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria highlight Russia’s declining energy clout in the Balkans, but this does not mean that the initiative is without challenges. On the contrary, a number of major obstacles are holding up completion of this vital deal. One is Russia’s long-standing influence in Bulgaria. This includes the activities of Kremlin proxies in Bulgaria who are working to sabotage the transfer of Bulgaria’s nuclear equipment to Ukraine. The second barrier is the financing of the potential equipment transfer.

For decades, Russia has exercised considerable influence in the Bulgarian energy, media, and political spheres. Moscow is not relinquishing its position without a fight, and is doing everything possible to maintain its standing as a decisive player in Bulgarian affairs.

A key component of Moscow’s strategy in Bulgaria is the systematic organization of a campaign, closely resembling efforts elsewhere including in Moldova and Serbia, to quash the deal with Ukraine, thereby preventing additional power generation in Ukraine and further eroding Ukraine’s efforts to end its dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere. Earlier this year, when Ukrainian nuclear experts traveled to Bulgaria to inspect the equipment, supporters of Bulgaria’s pro-Russian Vazrazhdane (Revival) party clashed with the Ukrainian delegation and sought to prevent it from accessing the equipment.

The second key issue is financing, with talks already underway for almost two years. Bulgaria’s parliament is pressing the government to conclude the deal at a price of at least €600 million, the same price the Bulgarian National Electricity Company paid to Russia’s Atomstroyexport. Progress could be made if international partners provide Bulgaria with funding to invest in the expansion of its Kozloduy NPP, where Westinghouse will build reactors. The fact that Westinghouse is engaged in fuel production and reactor building in both Ukraine and Bulgaria is a potentially important point of intersection for the two countries and reflects why the United States in particular has an interest in the successful transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine.

Given that the purchase and transfer of the equipment would benefit Europe’s long-term energy security, there are European funds that could be used, including those available via the European Commission’s Ukraine Facility, which has a mandate to rebuild infrastructure and support the continuity of critical services such as energy transmission. The US could support the Europeans in this endeavor, including by allocating funding from its aid to Ukraine. However, Kyiv is likely to face significant transparency concerns and will need to instill stakeholder confidence.

The transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine would help address Kyiv’s electricity generation needs while also representing a major setback for Russia’s strategy in both Ukraine and the Balkans. Boosting Ukraine’s nuclear power capabilities would enhance the country’s economic outlook and position Ukraine to eventually replace Russia as a principal energy supplier to Europe in the postwar period. This makes Ukraine’s acquisition of Bulgarian nuclear power plant equipment a significant opportunity for the West that must not be missed.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Ukrainians brace for blackouts ahead of Russian winter air offensive

By Aura Sabadus

A recent lull in Russian missile attacks has led many Ukrainians to conclude that the Kremlin is stockpiling ahead of a major winter air offensive targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Putin’s North Korean escalation is a direct result of Western weakness

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The arrival of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe is the result of more than a decade of weak Western responses to escalating Russian aggression in Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Russia’s economy is overheating but Putin cannot change course

By Alexander Mertens

Russia’s wartime economy is in danger of overheating due to a combination of record military spending, sanctions pressures, and runaway inflation, but Vladimir Putin dare not change course, writes Alexander Mertens.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Ukraine needs Western support to boost its nuclear energy potential appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A last-minute breakthrough enabled the Western Balkans to sign key regional cooperation agreements at the Berlin Process Summit on October 14 of 2024. This was thanks to the skilled diplomacy of Manuel Sarrazin, Germany’s Special Representative for the Western Balkans, and the political will of regional leaders.

In a crucial compromise, Kosovo agreed to lift its ban on Serbian imports at the Merdare crossing. As part of the deal, Germany and its allies pledged to provide advanced scanners to enhance security at Kosovo-Serbia borders, a necessary step that has yet to be implemented.

Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sat down with Manuel Sarrazin to discuss the complexities of these negotiations. Sarrazin shares how he played a pivotal role in persuading Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, to lift the ban—a move vital to unblocking CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) and advancing the Berlin Process.

Sarrazin also speaks about the security concerns that arose, particularly in light of the recent Banjska incident, and how Germany’s offer to provide scanners is part of a broader effort to bolster both trade and border security.

While the situation at the border remains fragile, with ongoing security concerns, Sarrazin emphasizes that the political capital Germany has invested, alongside the EU and the US, is creating momentum for deeper regional cooperation and economic progress.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post How was the CEFTA deal secured before the Berlin Process Summit? | A Debrief with Manuel Sarrazin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the Berlin Process celebrates its 10th anniversary in 2024, over 115 organizations gathered at the Civil Society and Think Tank Forum on October 9-11 this year to raise alarms about shrinking civic spaces, threats to democracy, and rising intimidation across the Western Balkans.

In this insightful episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks with Simonida Kacarska, Director of the European Policy Institute, and Klodjan Seferaj, Program Manager at the Open Society Foundation Western Balkans, about the forum’s key recommendations and the uncertain future of the Berlin Process writ large—including where the next summit will take place and the adjustments needed to maintain its relevance.

What are the biggest challenges for civil society in the Western Balkans today? How are governments responding to concerns about the rule of law, democracy, and civic spaces? And what can be done to hold them more accountable? Watch now for expert analysis on the future of the Berlin Process.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post What’s next for the Berlin Process? | A Debrief with Simonida Kacarska and Klodjan Seferaj appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Europe and the United States navigate leadership change and turnover on both sides of the Atlantic, the Europe Center’s new report Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond offers a productive vision for transatlantic relations with forward-looking policy recommendations for the next US administration and European Commission.

On this special edition of the #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Resident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare and Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow Maja Piscevic unpack their section of the report “Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans” and recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

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Jörn Fleck

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Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What is a new vision for a transatlantic approach to the Western Balkans? | A debrief from Ilva Tare and Maja Piscevic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The bottom line

The Western Balkans is a region neither the United States nor the European Union (EU) can afford to ignore or mishandle. Tensions are too high, and the geopolitical implications of misinformed and misaligned policy are costly. The United States and the EU must work together, and play to their own respective strengths, to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West.

State of play

Visits to the Western Balkans elicit two contradictory feelings. On the one hand, the region is vibrant and brimming with potential. The World Bank projects the regional gross domestic product growth for the Western Balkans Six—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia—to be 3.2 percent this year and 3.5 percent in 2025, noting some “cautious optimism.” On the other hand, too often the region is stuck in a disorganized and chaotic feedback loop, its violent histories seem inescapable, and its democratic culture remains lacking. Flashes of ethnic and political violence have risked upending the fragile peace between Serbia and Kosovo. Democracy ratings by international observers such as Freedom House are tracking democratic declines or stagnation in the region.

The United States and the EU have recognized the importance of the Western Balkans and have worked on engaging the region, to varying degrees of success. There has been modest progress on the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and there remains moderate to strong support inside the region for a European future. There has also been renewed momentum from the EU to make progress on enlargement to the region as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the bloc’s understanding of the geopolitics of enlargement.

Yet structural issues continue to frustrate the region’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory. The EU’s enlargement process, with single member state vetoes holding up progress, remains deeply flawed. At the same time, US policy toward the Western Balkans, particularly focusing on the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, has not produced the desired results, as local politics and nationalisms have torpedoed the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities. These opportunities and challenges together will require leadership from the United States and the EU to realize the region’s potential.

The strategic imperative

Geopolitics is the main driver of the external focus on the Western Balkans. The region for years has been Europe’s “soft underbelly,” where Russia holds significant influence as both an instigator and negotiator, especially in Serbia and Republika Srpska (the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) but also in North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the stakes about Moscow’s willingness to inflame conflict in the region. Securing the region within the Euro-Atlantic framework will do much to stem Russia’s influence and diminish the chances of violence on the continent.

Another geopolitical driver is the role of China. Beijing has stepped up its involvement primarily through investments in major infrastructure projects and mines. The US House Foreign Affairs Committee estimates that China has invested around $1 billion in the region annually since 2011, and approximately $10.3 billion in Serbia alone from 2009–2021. Five of the Western Balkans Six are members of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Serbia’s security cooperation with Beijing has grown to encompass overseas “police stations,” surveillance and facial recognition camera installations, and joint military exercises.

There are positive motivators for transatlantic engagement, too. The region could be a success story for the West’s de-risking agenda. Lower labor costs and the region’s strategic geographic location and physical proximity offer a twofold opportunity to help realize Europe’s—and the United States’—efforts to reshore its supply chains and investments and diminish China’s own influence.

Both the United States and the EU need a clear vision for the region. With the right strategy, the region can overcome its challenges and emerge as a stable, prosperous, and democratic part of Europe. By prioritizing democratic values and good governance, economic revitalization, and strategic partnerships, the United States and the EU can significantly and positively impact the region’s trajectory. Ultimately, a successful transatlantic policy in the Western Balkans requires a long-term commitment, sustained engagement, and a clear vision for the region’s future.

Looking ahead

The Western Balkans will remain a focus on both sides of the Atlantic. Either a Democratic or Republican administration is expected to be more engaged once in office than during this past election year and will bring a focus on security issues, economic development, and regional integration, as well as on the rule of law, the fight against endemic corruption, and democracy. In Europe, too, the European Commission will focus on the region, including on enlargement, economic growth, and the rule of law.

Of crucial importance is how the new administrations will implement their policies in the region. Many of the key topics and priorities have already been identified. For example, Serbia will likely be the main focus of the next US administration due to its relatively large size, economic development, and the deteriorating state of its democracy, rule of law, and media freedom—not to mention its geopolitical role as a willing partner to both Moscow and Beijing. The European Commission’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans will also continue to be a centerpiece of transatlantic priorities for the region.

The uncertainties are prioritization and calibration. How will policymakers prioritize the need to address economic or democratic reforms? Will the United States continue its practice of giving the lead to the EU, which all countries in the region at least nominally aspire to join?

The prioritization of democratic values will be the key to engaging the region successfully in the future. A more decisive and uncompromising insistence on the development of democratic institutions and values—such as free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption and organized crime—must be a priority. Reforms in these areas are prerequisites for any sustainable economic progress and investment, and stronger democratic consolidation will do far more to reduce the impact of malign influences from Russia and China that thrive precisely in the absence of these values. Failing to prioritize democracy in the region will risk cementing the petrifying status quo.

Whatever happens in November, a much stronger and more active US role in the Western Balkans will be required. Previously, the United States has given primacy to the EU, but that strategy has not yielded convincing and sustainable results on key issues like the struggles of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (and the lack of implementation of the Brussels and Ohrid agreements that underpin it), and the festering ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a consequential demonstration of the EU’s inability to take a leading role and bring key players to the table with the determination to reach an agreement. As a result, the process of normalization between Kosovo and Serbia has stalled—or worse, deteriorated.

The EU is an important and powerful bloc, but its institutional structure has limited its effectiveness. The bloc is a heterogeneous and loose union of twenty-seven members, many with vastly different priorities for the region. While still immensely influential, it is not decisive in some key policy areas, especially enlargement, where the current veto system has left the Western Balkans as a political punching bag for domestic politics among EU member states. A few such cases include Bulgaria and Greece blocking North Macedonia’s progress, Slovenia delaying Croatia’s 2013 accession over border disputes, and traditional enlargement skepticism in France and the Netherlands stemming from, among other considerations, domestic political concerns about, for example, immigration. Given that this decision-making framework is embedded in the highest legal act of the EU, it is not realistic to expect any change in the foreseeable future—even though change is much needed.

The United States is not as constrained in implementing its policy toward the Western Balkans. Provided the next administration does not change its priorities for the Western Balkans, it would be of crucial importance to take a more decisive stance in pursuing its interests, especially when it comes to security, the fight against corruption, the rule of law, media freedom, and the reduction of Russian and Chinese influence. All of these goals are achievable, but only if the next administration acts energetically and resolutely in their implementation.

Policy recommendations

There is much that the United States and the EU can do—together and separately—to enact positive change in the Western Balkans. Recommendations include:

Insist on the primacy of democracy and the rule of law. The underpinning of democracy should be a prerequisite of any approach to the region. The United States and the EU, therefore, must prioritize support for democratic reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and the rule of law in the Western Balkans, specifically through:

• Anti-corruption measures: Corruption is a pervasive problem in the region. US and EU policymakers should provide technical assistance to develop and implement effective anti-corruption strategies, including strengthening law enforcement, improving transparency, and protecting whistleblowers.
• Judicial reform: Independent and impartial judiciaries are crucial for upholding the rule of law. Plans for the region should include the provision of training for judges and prosecutors and promoting the independence of the judiciary.
• The empowerment of civil society: An independent and vocal civil society is essential for holding governments to account. The United States and the EU should support civil society organizations, particularly those working on good governance, human rights, and anti-corruption initiatives.

Scale up economic engagement. The Western Balkans region possesses untapped economic potential. The United States and the EU must significantly expand and see through economic engagement in the region. Building on the foundation set by the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act, a bill introduced by US Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Roger Wicker (R-MS), policymakers should aggressively pursue a strategy of investment, trade facilitation, and infrastructure development in the region by:

• Doubling down on investment: Policymakers should double down on investments in the region, focusing on sectors with high growth potential, such as renewable energy, technology, and agriculture. Leveraging public-private partnerships will be key to attracting private capital and creating jobs. Investments should be coordinated or at least deconflicted between Washington and Brussels.
• Streamlining trade: Facilitating trade, particularly between the United States and the Western Balkans, is an important signal of the West’s involvement in the region. Reducing trade barriers, simplifying customs procedures, and providing technical assistance on EU standards alignment will help boost exports and attract foreign investment.
• Driving infrastructure development: Investing in infrastructure such as transportation, energy, and digital connectivity will help economic growth, regional integration, and the green transition. The United States can partner with the EU (and international financial institutions) to finance large-scale projects. This would be particularly welcome to counter Chinese infrastructure investments in the region.

Refocus on regional economic competitiveness. Increasing the Western Balkans’ competitiveness will make Europe more competitive. To accomplish this, a joint effort is needed to improve the business environment, foster innovation, and develop a skilled workforce, including by:

• Improving the business climate: The United States and the EU should provide technical assistance to reform regulatory frameworks and improve governance with the goal of reducing bureaucratic hurdles, enforcing property rights, and combating corruption—all of which are essential for attracting foreign investment.
• Fostering innovation: Supporting research and development, technology transfers, and entrepreneurship can help drive innovation and create new opportunities. Establishing innovation hubs and incubators can help nurture a culture of entrepreneurship.
• Investing in human capital: A skilled workforce is essential for economic growth. The United States and the EU can support education and vocational training programs, particularly for young people. Instead of looking to emigrate elsewhere, the region’s youth can find incentives to stay.

Develop a new approach to the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. The Serbia-Kosovo dialogue has been a longstanding and complex issue. It needs new life with incoming US and EU administrations. The United States, specifically, should play a more active role in facilitating a comprehensive and final normalization agreement. Recommendations include:

• Introduce joint US-EU leadership: The United States and the EU should jointly lead the dialogue, leveraging their combined diplomatic weight and expertise.
• Focus on normalization: The dialogue should prioritize practical steps toward normalization of relations, including economic cooperation, freedom of movement, and mutual recognition.
• Develop conditional incentives: Economic incentives can be used to encourage progress in the dialogue, but they should be conditioned on concrete achievements. The EU’s Growth Plan can be a crucial mechanism to promote progress and discourage stagnation, or worse—cooperation with malign actors.
• Addressing the root causes: The underlying issues of the conflict, such as minority rights and safeguarding territorial integrity, must be addressed to achieve a lasting peace.

Develop policy for cybersecurity and infrastructure protection. The Western Balkans is increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats, as have been documented recently in Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Protecting critical infrastructure and building cybersecurity capacity are essential for economic growth and regional stability.

• Cybersecurity capacity building: The United States and the EU should support the development of cybersecurity capabilities in the region through training, capacity building, and technology transfers.
• Critical infrastructure protection: Partnering with the private sector, the United States and the EU can help protect critical infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications, from cyberattacks.
• Countering disinformation: The spread of disinformation and foreign interference is a growing challenge. The United States and the EU have successfully supported media literacy programs and fact-checking to counter these threats, but more can be done at the local level in cities outside the capitals.

Refocus on countering malign influence. The Western Balkans remains a geopolitical battleground, with Russia and China seeking to increase their influence in the region. The United States and the EU should develop strategies to counter these efforts. Such a strategy should include:

• Strategic competition: The United States should adopt a competitive approach to Russia and China, offering alternative partnerships, investments, and security cooperation.
• Energy security: Reducing the region’s dependence on Russian energy is crucial. The United States can support diversification of energy sources and infrastructure development.
• Information warfare: Countering disinformation campaigns and strengthening media literacy are essential to protect the region from foreign manipulation.
• Strengthening NATO: Reinforcing NATO’s presence in the region is crucial to deter aggression and reassure allies. Eventually, moving Kosovo closer to NATO membership will be an important step toward regional stability.

Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the center in the Western Balkans.

Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and host of the #BalkansDebrief podcast.

Report Oct 7, 2024

Realizing a bolder transatlantic agenda for cooperation with Africa

By Rama Yade

Recent initiatives could be a beginning in the revitalization of cooperation between the United States and the European Union in Africa.

Africa European Union

Report Oct 7, 2024

Foreword: A new agenda for the next four years of US-EU relations

By Daniel Fried, Jörn Fleck

The transatlantic partnership, powered by the US-EU relationship, is a geopolitical necessity. From the other side of the world to each other’s backyards and into cyberspace, Washington and Brussels need each other.

European Union United States and Canada

Report Oct 7, 2024

Unleashing US-EU defense cooperation

By Rachel Rizzo

Instead of pushing back against European defense efforts as it has done in the past, Washington must fully embrace the steps the European Union is now taking.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cyber-attacks are on the rise in the Western Balkans, with 1.2 million personal records exposed to data breaches and a 200% surge in ransomware attacks over the past two years. Businesses across the region have paid millions of euros to recover compromised data, and 75% of companies report facing phishing attacks. Cyber-actors are exploiting internal ethnic tensions to target reconciliation efforts, while disinformation campaigns undermine democracy, destabilize institutions, and disrupt daily life.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with Ramadan Ilazi from the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and Filip Stojanovski, Director of Partnerships at Metamorphosis in North Macedonia. Together, they delve into the cybersecurity vulnerabilities threatening the region’s political and economic stability, examining the implications for critical infrastructure, businesses, and citizens.

The discussion tackles key questions, including how cyberattacks are being used to advance political agendas, the impact of emerging technologies like AI and the Internet of Things, and the gaps in regional cooperation. They also explore how the Western Balkans can strengthen its integration into the EU’s cybersecurity framework, including the role of ENISA in supporting regional efforts.

As cyber threats continue to evolve, this conversation highlights the urgent need for a resilient digital future in the Western Balkans, from workforce development to bolstering regional collaboration. Tune in for expert insights on navigating one of the region’s most critical challenges.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The post How do cyber-attacks threaten the Balkans? | A Debrief with Dan Ilazi and Filip Stojanovski appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Coal dominance, renewable potential

The Western Balkans rely heavily on coal. Four of its six nations produce at least 50 percent of their electricity from locally mined lignite, the most polluting coal class. Albania is unique in having no coal generation, although it supplements locally produced hydropower with electricity imports from its coal-burning neighbors.

The region’s second-largest source of electricity is hydropower. With more than 9,000 megawatts (MW) of installed capacity, hydropower accounts for more than 80 percent of the Western Balkans’ renewable energy capacity. Hydropower is a low-emission technology, but it can have a significant environmental impact. Moreover, the zero-marginal cost nature of hydropower can make it difficult for other renewable power technologies to compete in competitive power markets.

Wind and solar resources in the Western Balkans remain relatively untapped. The region had installed capacities totaling 1,011 megawatts (MW) of wind and 897 MW of solar at the end of 2023. A patchwork of support mechanisms aims to boost wind and solar, including reverse auctions, feed-in tariffs, private market deals, and self-consumption regulations—albeit with mixed success. Tens of thousands of megawatts of solar and wind projects have been proposed within the region, reflecting investor appetite for new projects. But the vast majority remain in the development or planning stages.

To facilitate offtake for these projects, auctions have been implemented across the region. Serbia used an auction in 2023 to solicit bids for 400 MW of wind and 50 MW of solar projects. The wind portion of the auction was oversubscribed, yet the solar portion underperformed. In terms of consumer participation in renewables, all Western Balkan nations have begun to develop self-consumption frameworks to enable onsite renewable power generation. North Macedonia and Albania have adopted these frameworks faster than their neighbors.

The need for investment

The average coal-fired power plant in the Western Balkans is more than 40 years old. These inefficient plants are significantly more polluting than their counterparts within the European Union (EU), causing regional public health issues and creating obstacles to national EU accession goals, which require alignment on climate policies.

Air pollution—much of it from burning coal for electricity—causes 30,000 premature deaths annually in the Western Balkans. Retiring older coal plants would lower emissions, facilitate compliance with EU air pollution requirements, and enhance European energy market integration. But under any scenario, security of supply must be maintained.

To retire coal, replacement capacity must be built, which can offer a range of secondary benefits beyond cleaner power generation. Renewable power deployment can provide impetus for regional clean energy business clusters which facilitate local manufacturing, new jobs, and economic growth. New large-scale renewable energy facilities also typically boost property tax revenues, create construction jobs, and supply indirect economic benefits from new expenditures resulting from the projects.

Challenges to deployment

Despite policy incentives and positive market signals, significant renewable energy deployment in the Western Balkans is not guaranteed. Five key challenges remain.

First, limited available transmission capacity makes it difficult to deliver clean power to consumers. Serbia’s grid operator has received requests to connect 20,000 MW of new renewable power, which is several times greater than Serbia’s available capacity.

Second, entrenched coal interests diminish the prospects for rapid decarbonization. Tens of thousands of jobs across the region are supported by the coal industry. Careful planning, early stakeholder engagement, reskilling programs, and prudent messaging around these efforts are key to generating public support for decarbonization as aging plants are phased out.

Third, illiquid electricity markets can make financing difficult. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina has no organized electricity market, and most of the region’s nations only began rolling out time-differentiated markets in 2023. This limits power commercialization opportunities and financing options for the private sector.

Fourth, finding offtakers to purchase renewable power represents a challenge. State-owned utilities within the region can help through bulk purchases from renewable projects. But they often lack the financial wherewithal to serve as offtakers. Large-demand private commercial and industrial consumers, when enabled by regulation, could meet a portion of power demand via contracting with renewable projects. Yet these firms do not always enjoy physical proximity to renewable projects, nor sufficient demand to buy all of the electricity produced from a single large-scale project.

Finally, a lack of regional coordination and inconsistent rules across jurisdictions raises the barriers to entry for new market participants in the Western Balkans and creates silos that may reduce the perception of scale of a truly regional opportunity.

Coal, grid capacity, and technology

Despite coal’s outsized role in the region’s energy system, there are no current plans for new coal capacity. Within the next decade, many aging plants will either retire or be refurbished to become less polluting. To facilitate both retirements of coal and deployment of renewables, private developers should pursue clean energy projects adjacent to planned coal plant retirements to secure valuable transmission capacity and help move renewable projects to construction and operation.

Battery storage will also play a role in enabling growth in renewables as coal plants retire. Regulations that incentivize battery deployment would help new solar and wind replace coal by firming up intermittency. Battery systems can also facilitate incremental increases in solar and wind capacity—for example, if a solar project has 100 MW of grid capacity, its owner can overbuild to 120 MW, store the excess 20 MW, and deliver this power to consumers when the solar output declines in the evening.

Other technical solutions, like grid-enhancing technologies (GETs), can increase the capacity of existing power lines. With minimal investment, GETs carve out room on the grid for new solar and wind projects where there previously was none. In addition to grid capacity, the introduction of GETs can enable business partnerships and knowledge transfer between the companies that deliver these technologies and utilities or power grid operators.

Procuring renewable power

Auctions are a proven method used by many countries to secure investment in power generation. They can enable price discovery and enhance competition, leading to the deployment of inexpensive power.

Serbia, Albania, and Kosovo have implemented auctions for procuring renewable energy. Other nations in the region may follow suit.

Yet auctions can lead to problems. Auction design and administration must account for local contexts. If implemented incorrectly, auctions can inspire collusion, thereby undermining legitimacy and competitiveness. Or they can cause overly aggressive bidding, harming project completion rates. Finally, auctions often limit the number of suppliers, which can reduce competitiveness.

One alternative to auctions is a bilateral approach, in which procurement is negotiated directly between power purchaser and project developers, leading to quicker deployment and lower transaction costs. Such an approach can also unlock access to suppliers that may not normally join an auction process.

European Union support

Support from the EU and European institutions is a key facet of the Western Balkans’ transition. Serbia’s utility recently secured $100 million in green debt from an Italian bank, enhancing its viability as a green offtaker. The prospect of EU accession provides a carrot for decarbonization as well. The EU has made billions of euros available to support regional energy transition projects. Meeting EU standards to access financing could encourage standardization of rules that would help private investors more effectively navigate the region.

Looking ahead

The tailwinds propelling solar and wind investment are strong. Developing solar and wind generation will bolster the Western Balkans’ economy and provide broader strategic advantages as the region continues to face fast-evolving energy and geopolitical paradigms.

 Michael Hochberg is chief development officer at HGR Energy.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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EnergySource Jun 30, 2022

The war in Ukraine and gas in the Western Balkans

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Russia has made inroads in the Western Balkans with its promises of plentiful gas supply. The EU and NATO must grasp the region’s strategic value and work to promote efforts to diversify gas imports from alternative suppliers and build an expansive network of gas infrastructure.

Energy & Environment Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Dec 20, 2023

Up for grabs? The Western Balkans’ aging energy systems place it between East and West

By Aleksandar Kovacevic

The Western Balkans’ hydropower can help Europe’s pursuit of energy security. Failure to act on this potential brings significant costs.

Energy & Environment Europe & Eurasia

Issue Brief Feb 26, 2024

Western Balkans must pursue more competitive energy sectors

By Matthew Bryza

The EU needs to take steps to support more competition and efficiency in the energy sectors of Bulgaria and the Western Balkans to advance the energy transition and promote energy independence from Russia.

Energy Markets & Governance Energy Transitions

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Renewables offer opportunity in the Western Balkans. But challenges remain. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This report aims to explore the prospects for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Western countries in the Black Sea region in the new geopolitical setting following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It emphasizes Turkey’s key role in the region as NATO’s second-largest military power and the gatekeeper of the Black Sea, and identifies opportunities for the West to engage with Ankara to strengthen regional security and cooperation. Drawing on expert interviews and desk research, the study suggests that—by focusing on defense, maritime security, energy, and political dialogue—the West can leverage Turkey’s strategic position to enhance stability and security in the Black Sea region.

In the political sphere, the interests of Turkey and the West in the Black Sea largely overlap. These include pursuing stability and restoring the regional security order; containing Russian revisionism; bolstering the resilience of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and supporting their European and Euro-Atlantic integration; strengthening NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities; and exploiting the region’s energy, transportation, and connectivity potential. However, the Black Sea cannot be isolated from the broader context of Turkey’s relations with the West, and achieving better synergy in the Black Sea would require considerable efforts to deconflict Turkey-West relations on tracks that extend far beyond the Black Sea itself.

In the maritime domain, Turkey, with the longest coastline and significant naval and air assets, remains a key player in addressing maritime security challenges. While Ukrainian strikes have significantly degraded Russia’s ability to sustain its maritime power in the Black Sea, both Ukraine and NATO will need to work more closely with Turkey to maintain this favorable balance of maritime power. The recently launched Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group (MCM Black Sea), which relies on NATO littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) for force generation, can be seen as a milestone for maritime security in the region. This initiative can potentially serve as a reincarnation of Ankara’s idea of regional ownership and provide opportunities for broader cooperation with the West. For example, while Ankara strictly adheres to the Montreux Convention¹ to prevent expanded presence of extra-regional powers in the region, US and UK air control over the western Black Sea reinforces Turkish posture in the region, ensuring that those countries will remain important non-littoral actors in Black Sea security for the foreseeable future. 

Ankara also possesses unique assets for stabilizing the region through its growing defense industry. Turkish advances in unmanned systems have become an important offset to Russian defense technological advantages—which helps Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other Russian neighbors to deter or blunt Russian military adventures—and provides support from the sea. A major naval buildup in recent years, led by indigenously produced ships and systems, has put the Turkish navy on a more equal footing with Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Supporting defense industrial complementarity between Turkey and other NATO members, as well as between Ukraine and Turkey, would help deter Russia, strengthen NATO’s European defense pillar, and contribute to a positive dialogue between Ankara, Washington, and Brussels. 

Turkey’s strategic position in the region reinforces its role as a critical energy conduit between east and west, providing a unique opportunity to develop energy cooperation that could have a significant impact on energy security and economic interdependence across Europe. As Turkey and the European Union (EU) are developing a deeply interconnected partnership, centered around natural gas and renewable energy sources, harnessing Turkey’s energy potential would be key to achieving a resilient and diversified energy future for the region. While the EU continues its efforts to diversify away from Russian gas, Turkey plays a crucial role in transporting Azerbaijani piped gas through the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), as well as supplying liquefied natural gas (LNG) through its LNG facilities. The development of Turkey’s largest field—Sakarya in the Black Sea, which has huge potential to supply natural gas to Eastern and Central Europe—would further contribute to regional energy diversification and security.

Now that both Turkey and the EU are seeking greater strategic autonomy in today’s complex geopolitical environment, viewing Turkey as a vehicle for advancing Western interests in the Black Sea region would be both misguided and precarious. Instead, recognizing divergences where necessary—and promoting complementary, better-aligned policies where possible—would enable Turkey and the West to achieve results together that neither could accomplish alone.

This report is not a collaborative effort by a group of experts, but rather a series of analyses authored independently by four different contributors. It is intended to reflect a diverse range of perspectives from the Turkish, US, and European expert communities and academia. The views expressed in each analysis are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the positions or opinions of the other contributors.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. “A Sea of Opportunities: Can the West Benefit from Turkey’s Autonomous Foreign Policy in the Black Sea?“ is a project of CATS Network.

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Nov 13, 2024

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While Turkey and Europe have their own maritime strategies for the Black Sea, finding ways of cooperation is critical to counter Russia’s maritime power.

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Oct 16, 2024

Turkey and the West’s Black Sea interests converge more often than is acknowledged—opening up opportunities for cooperation

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Turkey and the West have clear opportunities for more effective cooperation in the Black Sea, but both sides need to show will.

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Jul 5, 2024

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Aug 28, 2024

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This report draws on the findings of a research project titled “A sea of opportunities: Can the West benefit from Turkey’s autonomous foreign policy in the Black Sea?”¹, a joint initiative of the Atlantic Council in Turkey and the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS). Through a series of interviews with experts and policymakers, as well as desktop research, the authors explore opportunities for enhanced cooperation between Turkey, European countries, and the United States in the new security environment that has emerged in the Black Sea region following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In this report, the Black Sea region refers to the six littoral states and the South Caucasus (i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia).

As the second-largest military power in NATO and the gatekeeper of the Black Sea, Turkey plays a critical role in European stability and security. Since the first days of Russia’s all-out war in Ukraine, the Turkish government has kept the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles closed to Russian warships, expanded defense and military cooperation with Kyiv, and later engaged in active diplomacy, including facilitating the Black Sea Grain Initiative and prisoner swaps. Turkey has remained steadfast in its political support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and has consistently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories. Ankara has also developed close cooperation with the two other NATO members located along the Black Sea—Romania and Bulgaria—and has been vocal in its support for Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO membership bids.

On the other hand, Ankara has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, has opposed NATO’s enhanced naval presence in the Black Sea, and has continued cooperation with Russia on a range of issues, most notably energy projects and bilateral trade. At the same time, Turkey’s own security sensitivities and threat perceptions, which differ significantly from those of other NATO allies, have over time cemented Ankara’s traditional “regional ownership” approach, which focuses on Turkey’s own national interests in the region and limits opportunities for cooperation with other extra-regional actors in the Black Sea region.²

While the end state of Russia’s war in Ukraine is difficult to predict, there is no doubt that Turkey will remain a key actor in the postwar regional security environment. This study not only examines both Turkey’s Black Sea policy priorities and the potential role of Western countries in that region, but also explores the possibilities for closer cooperation between Turkey and its Western allies in this new security setting.

Notably, Turkey views strict adherence to the Montreux Convention as a cornerstone of its regional policy and even of its state sovereignty. Yet there are still many areas of overlapping interests that could allow for enhanced cooperation with the West without violating Turkey’s traditional principle of regional ownership. In line with NATO policy, Turkey’s strategic objectives in the Black Sea include deterring, without openly challenging, Russia’s military and naval presence; ensuring that Ukraine does not fail and that its southern regions are not fully occupied by Russia, which would turn the Black Sea into a “Russian lake”; and strengthening Ankara’s defense industry, naval capabilities, and diplomatic clout in the region.

Turkey sees Ukraine as a natural ally as both countries seek to counter Russian superiority in the Black Sea. Despite maintaining strong economic ties with Moscow, Ankara attaches strategic importance to its relationship with Kyiv, which it regards as a counterweight to Russia, a key element in Ankara’s delicate balancing act with the West and Russia, and an important partner in defense production. Backed by Western allies, this emerging strategic connection could become a backbone of the future security architecture in the region and also strengthen Turkey’s ties with the West. 

Now that Ukraine has humbled Russia’s navy in the Black Sea, Turkey’s maritime capacity there stands out all the more. Ankara is using this moment to develop closer defense cooperation with Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO allies. Elements of that cooperation can be seen in progress on the F-16 deal, Sweden and Finland joining NATO, and cooperation between Washington and Ankara on military production.

Positive dynamics in the broader context of Turkey’s dialogue with the United States and European partners have created momentum for exploring new cooperation opportunities in the Black Sea. While the region remains sensitive to fluctuations in Ankara’s relations with its Western partners, these developments also create a window of opportunity for improving relations, and could emerge as a much-needed success story in the transatlantic partnership. Turkey is also seen as an increasingly important actor in the European energy market, both as a transit country and as a potential new supplier of hydrocarbons with the potential to contribute to Europe’s energy resilience.

Recognizing the importance of closer cooperation between Turkey, Ukraine, and Western partners for both regional security and Turkey’s own democratic future, this report provides an in-depth analysis of key areas of common interest in the Black Sea region: deepening political and diplomatic dialogue; strengthening defense and military cooperation; ensuring freedom of navigation and maritime security; and promoting energy diversification.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment.”

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Follow her on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @GaberYevgeniya.

Report Sep 13, 2024

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Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region

By Rich Outzen

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The rise of the strategic weight of the Black Sea

Experts widely agree that the Black Sea region has remained a blind spot for the West since the Cold War. Despite NATO and the European Union and individual states declaring “interests” in the area, no attempts to formulate a strategic vision for the Black Sea have been made until recently. Sporadic discussions about the region’s neglect surfaced following Russia’s military campaigns in 2008 (against Georgia) and 2014 (in Ukraine), but the spotlight truly trained on the region after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its increased military activity in the Black Sea.

The urgent push to develop a strategy to strengthen the West’s presence in the region now is a positive development. For instance, the Black Sea Security Act, passed as part of the US 2024 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the development of a formal US strategy with regard to the Black Sea region. 

The West’s presence in the area is upheld by three NATO states (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania), NATO partners Ukraine and Georgia, EU members Romania and Bulgaria, and three EU candidate states (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia). Despite the Black Sea’s geopolitical importance, it was often viewed as on the periphery, based on Russia’s historical perception of the region as its strategic backyard. Today, it has gained prominence as a critical area for Western interests. The outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war and the resulting new security framework in the Black Sea are seen as pivotal elements in the broader European and global architecture.

Turkey’s role, significant in its own right, has been heightened by the increasing importance of the Black Sea to the broader West. As the most militarily capable NATO member in the region and a longstanding architect of regional security, Turkey’s pivotal role in managing escalation is acknowledged by its partners. With centuries of experience in dealings with Russia, a strong rapport with Russian decision-makers in the modern period, and participation in collective efforts to contain Russia at the same time, Turkey is recognized as uniquely positioned to address the resurgence of Russian influence. While doubts persist regarding its autonomy vis-à-vis Russia, Turkey’s contributions in the Black Sea region have proven invaluable to Western partners on numerous occasions.

Turkey’s mediating potential and position on NATO’s eastern flank are noteworthy. Amid strained Turkey-West relations, Ankara’s pursuit of strategic autonomy has sometimes clashed with the perspectives and policies of its Western allies. Although Turkey’s approach has posed challenges to the Alliance’s cohesion when it appears to contradict common positions, Ankara’s special position is widely acknowledged.

Engaging Turkey as a mere conduit for Western interests in the Black Sea region would likely be a futile endeavor. Nevertheless, Turkey possesses unmatched experience and influence in Europe’s eastern neighborhood. With better-aligned policies, Turkey and the West could synergize their shared interests, and bring about results unlikely to be accomplished by either party alone.

Turkey as a Black Sea power

Acknowledging Turkey’s potential for playing a greater stabilizing role in the Black Sea should not overshadow the reality that Turkey itself lacks a clearly defined strategy for the Black Sea.

Turkey’s lack of a clear stand-alone Black Sea regional conception is widely understood.¹ Unlike many states that articulate their objectives and assessments through public strategic documents, Turkey does not have a formal codified vision for its foreign policy strategy, particularly regarding the Black Sea.

Turkey’s primary perceived sources of insecurity historically lie beyond the Black Sea region, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Consequently, its focus on these areas has overshadowed the development of a distinct Black Sea strategy. The government’s prioritization of terrorism as the primary security threat is logical, as Turkish armed forces are engaged in operations aimed at combating this threat across theaters such as Syria and Iraq. The only genuinely and publicly problematic relationship Turkey has in the Black Sea region is with Armenia. Its relationship with Russia is considered as a potential source of tension, but a manageable one.

Central to Ankara’s stance in the Black Sea has been the delicate balancing act between Russia and the West, a principle likely to endure. Turkey has perceived a greater Western presence in the region as unwarranted. For instance, when Russia annexed Crimea, the West’s relatively muted response resonated with Turkey’s preference to avoid direct confrontation with Russia.²

Turkey’s Black Sea policy has been likened to a “chimera,” representing a multifaceted paradigm composed of disparate elements and diverse policy directions.³ Indeed, Ankara’s foreign policy in the Black Sea region appears fragmented, reflecting a multilayered system of interests and a combination of approaches toward Russia, the South Caucasus subregion, Ukraine, and both NATO and the EU. Moreover, Turkey’s Black Sea vision is notably centered around Russia.

Since 2022, the situation has evolved, prompting Turkey to reassess security threats emanating from the Black Sea, which has transformed into an active battlefield that poses a more tangible threat to Turkey. The region is heavily mined and commercial navigation is partially obstructed, adversely affecting all littoral states. The foundations of the regional order that Turkey had sought to nurture have crumbled. Multilateral institutions, the principle of regional ownership, unimpeded trade flows, and the stability and peace guaranteed by the Montreux Convention are jeopardized.

In this environment, Western partners are placing more pressure on Turkey to change its flexible balancing posture and instead align more closely with its NATO allies. This alignment entails supporting the Alliance’s efforts to bolster its defense and deterrence posture against Russia on the eastern flank.⁴ A crisis in relations between Russia and the West has been described as an opportunity for Turkey to reestablish its Euro-Atlantic orientation and to reassert its central security role in the Alliance after years of estrangement.⁵

There is scant evidence, however, to suggest that Turkey is undergoing a strategic shift away from its traditional posture. Balancing continues to be Turkey’s preferred approach, with its approach to Russia’s war against Ukraine seen by Turkish policymakers as a means to reaffirm its pivotal role—in line with its aspirations as a middle power with global ambitions.

Shared interests in the Black Sea

For decades, Turkey and its Western partners have collaborated on issues of common interest: e.g., the pursuit of stability in the Black Sea region, countering Russian revisionism, bolstering the resilience of post-Soviet states and supporting their European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and leveraging the region’s potential in terms of energy, transportation, and connectivity. The collaboration has been marked by varying approaches and difficulties, notably concerning the involvement of external, non-regional powers in regional affairs. In recent years, mutual distrust and substantial estrangement have defined Turkey-West relations. The overall alignment of foreign policy priorities is notably limited: there is, for example, considerable divergence between Turkey’s foreign policy and the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), as indicated by a notably low alignment rate, averaging only 10 percent, according to the European Commission.⁶

The Black Sea cannot be isolated from the broader context of the generally problematic relationship between Turkey and the West. To overcome the deep-seated distrust of Ankara and facilitate aligning and coordinating its actions with its partners would require considerable efforts and deconflicting of Turkey-West relations, sometimes on tracks that have nothing to do with the Black Sea itself.⁷

Beyond existing tensions, there is a fundamental challenge in identifying areas of shared interest in the Black Sea region specifically. The Black Sea has not been a priority for many countries, including the United States, leading to a lack of specific Black Sea strategies or codified visions.⁸ Differing perceptions among individual states on how to address the Black Sea, particularly in response to a resurgent Russia, further complicate efforts to coordinate joint Turkey-West actions.
It is worth noting that Turkey also shares some profound interests in the Black Sea with Russia. Even amid Moscow’s war against Ukraine, Turkey and Russia have strengthened their strategic partnership, collaborating on coordinated actions in the Black Sea. Turkey’s narrative of emphasizing regional ownership of the Black Sea and questioning the need for a larger NATO role, particularly from the United States, aligns closely with Russia’s vision. Long-term shared interests such as energy and trade contribute to this alignment—and the West often cannot offer Turkey the same incentives that Russia can.⁹ Moscow, for instance, is prepared to provide immediate security benefits and economic relief, as demonstrated by its decision to defer payments for natural gas ahead of the 2023 Turkish general elections.  Conversely, there also is recognition that Turkey’s relationship with the West, of which it is an integral part, remains indispensable to Ankara, making a genuine shift toward Russia unlikely.

There are several areas of shared interests for Turkey and the West, as outlined below.

Pursuing stability and restoration of the regional security order

Restoring the regional security order in the Black Sea, which is not Russia-dictated and shaped by its coercion, seems to be a common denominator for both Turkish and Western visions for the Black Sea. This implies restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, bolstering their resilience through solid democratic anchoring and future EU membership, and supporting eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.

At the same time, Turkey’s view of stability in the Black Sea is connected to nonescalation strategy.  Turkey perceives itself as a “central country,” – a state with a key geostrategic position – and simultaneously a frontline or outpost state. Given Turkey’s complex geography and its proximity to turbulence across the Middle East, Mediterranean, Balkans, Black Sea, and South Caucasus, it has developed a strong frontier state mentality and identity, which dictates caution in exercising foreign policy.

This focus on nonescalation can be seen in some of Turkey’s recent actions. It calls for the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture to be “feasible, affordable, and sustainable,” and tailored to the region’s specificities, including the Russian military buildup. (For more on maritime security and defense cooperation, see parts 2 and 3.) According to Turkey’s interpretation, NATO’s presence in the region should prioritize measures to avoid provocations. For example, Turkey blocked the creation of a “Black Sea flotilla” by littoral allies, arguing that it would have remained vulnerable to Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, thus exacerbating tensions.¹⁰

Despite Turkey’s reluctance to allow greater Western involvement in the region and to openly confront Russia, it is not risk averse. Its actions in the shared neighborhood of the South Caucasus, and efforts to balance its relations with Russia through deeper cooperation with Ukraine before and during the war indicate that Turkey perceives Russian revisionism as a threat to the very stability that Ankara attempts to preserve at all costs. While Turkey may not openly acknowledge this threat in the same way as other allied nations do, its desire to maintain equilibrium in the Black Sea and keep Russia in check is an important factor that aligns it closely with the Western vision.

Adhering to the Montreux Convention as a balancing instrument

Turkey’s crucial role as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea is generally in line with Western interests. Ankara, renowned for its fervent commitment to the convention, holds the power to control the transit of warships from belligerent and nonlittoral states during times of war. Turkey recognizes its unique position in the Black Sea, a role that has been acknowledged and esteemed by its Western allies. The Montreux Convention is generally perceived as serving the interests of all signatories and the international community, and any attempt to undermine it, per Turkish experts, would be tantamount to shaking a pillar of the international order.¹¹

In February 2022, Turkey invoked the Montreux Convention, applying it to both Ukrainian and Russian warships, as well as nonlittoral states. Closing of the straits for Russian warships was hailed by Ukraine and Turkey’s Western allies as a positive step in aiding Ukraine’s war effort. Despite the absence of external NATO powers’ warships in the Black Sea, there is a recognition that the Montreux Convention helps maintain a delicate balance in the region, and that this equilibrium in the Black Sea is to Ukraine’s advantage. (For more on the miliary implications of the convention, see part 2.)

Clarity about future application of the Montreux Convention should be a common interest for Turkey and its Western counterparts, as this will define the naval component of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture.

Strengthening Turkey’s regional leadership

Leveraging Turkey’s convening power and its experience in dealing with the multifaceted Black Sea region could be significant for Turkey-West cooperation. Turkey’s status as a regional leader is clear-cut. While the Black Sea may not be a primary strategic priority for Turkey, it perceives itself as a natural regional leader due to its central location.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey has advocated for strong multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea: In 1992, it spearheaded the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC). In 2001, Turkey championed the creation of security-related formats including the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BlackSeaFor), and in 2004, the Black Sea Harmony initiative, adding to an early emphasis on multilateral cooperation in economic sphere.¹²

Turkey also has been actively involved for decades in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, regions that Russia considers to be part of its sphere of privileged influence. This competition remains a dynamic and potentially conflictual aspect of the Turkish-Russian relationship.

Whenever Russia has openly undermined the regional balance and resorted to force, Turkey appeared to have accepted Moscow’s actions as a fait accompli and did not openly confront Russia. However, Turkey continues to harbor ambitions of maintaining its position as a regional leader, and aims to counterbalance Russian revisionism. There have been indications that with Russia heavily engaged in Ukraine for an indefinite period, depleting its resources, and redeploying some of its troops from other conflicts (such as Georgia’s occupied regions and Syria) to support its war effort in Ukraine, Turkey seeks to enhance its presence in their shared neighborhood.¹³

In the South Caucasus, Turkey supports Azerbaijan and seeks a more even distribution of influence in the region. With Russia presumably losing its preponderant position in the South Caucasus, both because of the war in Ukraine and the inflation of its security guarantees to Armenia, Turkey may explore arising leadership opportunities.¹⁴ The efforts to normalize relations with Armenia and advocacy for a six-state regional cooperation platform (bringing together the three South Caucasus states plus Russia, Turkey and Iran) are evidence of Turkey’s ambition to play a leadership role in the region. 

Acknowledging Turkey’s role in subtly challenging Russia in what the latter perceives as its geopolitical backyard, and understanding how to incentivize Turkey to engage through all available levers with regional states (particularly in the South Caucasus), is of crucial importance to the West. Supporting Turkey’s interest in normalizing relations with Armenia, facilitating a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and promoting stability in the South Caucasus through connectivity projects could serve as a platform for aligning Turkish and Western interests.

Containing Russia, supporting Ukraine

A common thread in Turkey-Western relations is the shared goal of containing Russia and supporting Ukraine. However, significant disparities exist in the scope and character of actions taken, as well as in the narratives that explain the policies pursued.

Many analysts have characterized Turkey’s actions as a “balancing act,” a term frequently employed to encapsulate Turkey’s stance. There is a growing consensus, however, that this term requires more nuance. It could be argued that Turkey’s policy does not entail maintaining equidistance between the two conflicting parties. Instead, there is a discernible pro-Ukrainian leaning, along with an official acknowledgment of the imperative to uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a fundamental precondition for enduring stability in the region. The “geopolitical DNA” of Turkey’s relations with Russia and Ukraine exhibit fundamental structural differences.¹⁵ Turkey has sought to maintain an approach of being pro-Kyiv, without being overtly anti-Moscow.¹⁶

Ukraine has emerged as a strategic partner for Turkey in curbing Russia’s expansionism in the Black Sea region. Turkey’s relations with Ukraine are aimed at salvaging what remains of the shattered equilibrium in the Black Sea, and halting or at least containing Russian revisionist ambitions. By supporting Ukraine, Turkey strives to build a scenario where Russia “bleeds out in Ukraine,” giving space for Turkey’s unhindered regional ambitions.¹⁷ Turkey’s position is to prevent both Russia’s full defeat and victory.

Ukraine and Turkey have burgeoning defense industry relations. In the face of sanctions from its allies due to Turkey’s Syria operation or purchase of the Russian S-400 system, Turkey has intensified its cooperation with Ukraine, which has emerged as an alternative supplier of critical technologies and equipment.

Turkey has not recognized Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and has protested against the human rights violations on the peninsula. Ankara has joined the Crimea Platform, which Kyiv launched as an “international consultation and coordination format” to deoccupy Crimea.¹⁸ After Russia’s reinvasion in 2022, Turkey applied the Montreux Convention, preventing Russia from reinforcing its navy in the Black Sea, which has been a significant support to Ukraine’s battlefield efforts. But Turkey has not been willing to pay the economic costs of challenging Russia more robustly through implementing Western sanctions or closing its airspace. Since 2014, when sanctions were introduced after Russia’s initial aggression against Ukraine, Turkey has remained critical of them as an instrument of foreign policy. Ankara is the only NATO member to abstain from introducing sanctions. After the February 2022 reinvasion, Turkey’s position did not change.

Turkey’s transactional and compartmentalized relations with Russia have flourished in recent decades. Both states maintain a competitive stance regarding their shared neighborhood, despite their cooperative engagements. As a result, the bilateral relationship has been termed a “cooperative rivalry,” “competitive cooperation,” and an “adversarial collaboration,” reflecting its hybrid nature.¹⁹

The bilateral relationship is built on an interdependence that is structural and long term. In recent decades, the quest to develop strategic autonomy from the West has prompted a Turkish pivot toward Moscow and deepened its interdependence with Russia.²⁰ Though Turkey is often identified as being disproportionately dependent on Russia, in fact Russia relies significantly on Turkey, especially in light of its growing isolation.

One of the most consequential deals that Russia and Turkey made was Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. The acquisition had a profound impact on Turkey’s relations with the United States and other allies. Russia is also constructing Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, hailed as the biggest project in the history of Russian-Turkish relations, and the world’s first power plant project implemented according to the build-own-operate model (Rosatom’s stake is 99.2 percent).²¹

There are a variety of opinions on the extent to which the lack of Turkish sanctions has enabled Russia’s economic survival and ability to carry out warfare against Ukraine. One opinion is that though Turkey may have indirectly enhanced Moscow’s resilience, it plays a “more consequential role on the operational and tactical levels” in helping Ukraine’s defense efforts.²² There is no denying Turkey’s significant, albeit low-profile, contribution to Ukraine’s war effort, and its efforts to bolster NATO’s posture in domains other than naval ones in the Black Sea. The critical question pertains to quantifying the damage inflicted on these very policies by Turkey’s simultaneous facilitation of Russia. Allowing Russia to evade sanctions poses a detriment, which at times outweighs the benefits of Turkey’s actions for its own, Ukraine’s, or NATO’s security.

Turkey needs to be engaged on issues related to containing Russia, sanctions evasion, and reducing its reliance on Russia in the energy sector. One promising avenue for cooperation is potential defense collaboration involving Ukraine, Turkey, and third parties, such as the United Kingdom (see part 3 on military cooperation). The fact that Turkey’s approach sometimes aligns favorably with Russia does not necessarily mean that Turkey adopts this approach for Russia’s benefit. Identifying ways to safeguard Turkey’s interests while simultaneously reducing Ankara’s dependence on Russia is crucial in establishing common ground for cooperation between Turkey and the West in the Black Sea region.

Employing Turkey’s mediation endeavors

Russia’s war against Ukraine has presented Ankara with an opportunity to enhance its international standing by offering mediation between Ukraine and Russia, aligning with its broader strategy of positioning Turkey as a mediator between Russia and the West. Since 2014, Turkey has asserted itself as a bridge between Russia and the transatlantic community, emphasizing that maintaining relations with both Russia and the Alliance is both essential and not mutually exclusive, given Turkey’s complex geographical context.

Following Russia’s reinvasion in February 2022, Turkey facilitated several rounds of negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. Ankara, in collaboration with the United Nations, mediated the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which operated for one year until Russia withdrew from it in July 2023.

Turkey has mediated Ukraine-Russia prisoner exchanges, including the 2017 release of Crimean Tatar dissidents from Russian captivity and the 2022 release of 215 Ukrainian prisoners. Turkey also played a facilitating role in the major prisoner exchange between Russia and the West in August 2024, providing Ankara Airport as the venue for the swap and reinforcing its international reputation as a mediator.

There are significant caveats to Ankara’s actions as a mediator. While some of Turkey’s interventions, such as the grain deal and facilitating a prisoner exchange, have been effective, its efforts to broker a peace settlement in the early stages of the war failed. Ankara is not positioned to change Russia’s strategic objectives to subjugate Ukraine. Additionally, its practice of not sharing information or coordinating with its allies has somewhat limited the effectiveness of its initiatives, as noted by a UK official interviewed for this research.²³ There is a need for greater engagement with Turkey to explore how its mediation capabilities can be utilized to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace for Ukraine in closer coordination with allies.

Strengthening NATO’s posture in the Black Sea

One of the mutual security interests between Turkey and the West is to bolster NATO’s flank in the Black Sea. Despite its anti-Western rhetoric, Turkey has contributed to the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO and its overall capabilities. The country hosts several NATO commands and a major base in Incirlik, and has contributed to NATO’s maritime operations and stabilization efforts.²⁴ Post-2014, Turkey has invested heavily in its armed forces and boosted its security cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia, including supporting their NATO membership aspirations. Turkey has also consistently complied with all measures and decisions of the Alliance aimed at enhancing NATO’s defense and security posture since 2014.²⁵

However, Turkey’s inclination to pursue an autonomous foreign policy often brings it into conflict with its NATO membership, prompting questions about whether Turkey serves as NATO’s pillar in the Black Sea or acts as an obstructionist power.

There are indications that Turkey, as a status quo power and a proponent of the principle of regional ownership of security, has sought to maintain a balance of power in the region, curbing more assertive positions of nonregional actors. Amid growing tensions between Russia and NATO, Turkey has chosen a policy of “caution” and defending the status quo.²⁶ This has sometimes led to Turkey limiting NATO’s role in the region, such as preventing the deployment of Active Endeavour operation to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean Sea, where NATO ships patrolled to deter terrorism from 2001 to 2016. Additionally, Turkey’s advocacy for a comprehensive peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, through platforms like the “3+3” regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, underscores its belief in regional states’ ability to “solve their problems by themselves.”²⁷

The emergence of Russia as a revisionist power intent on reshaping the regional security order has made maintaining the status quo untenable. There is a growing consensus among experts and practitioners that Turkey’s principle of regional ownership has become obsolete in the evolving security environment of the Black Sea. Presently, Turkey seems inclined to focus on cooperation among allied nations in the region and, depending on Russia’s behavior and evolving security dynamics, to revitalize the regional ownership format as the basis for a new security architecture in the region.²⁸

Divergent threat perception as a main obstacle to pursue shared interests

Deep-seated divergences in threat perception limit the potential of Turkey and the West pursuing shared interests. Turkey perceives the Ukraine-Russia war as an isolated regional conflict—despite the implications of the war for the regional order that Turkey has meticulously worked to build and sustain. This disparity is evident in the differing levels of attention given to Russia’s war against Ukraine in the everyday politics of Turkey compared to other NATO members.

Turkey’s position in the Black Sea is closely intertwined with its Syria policy, a conflict that has taken precedent in Turkish foreign policy over Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Turkey views Russia as a threat, as commonly referenced by Turkish experts, this sentiment is not openly manifested. Unlike the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, which labels Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” Turkish officials do not use similar definitions, and Russia is not formally defined as a threat at the governmental level. Notably, the necessity of managing Russia on two fronts is unique and contributes to a distinct threat perception. This entails addressing the risks associated with the potential of being outflanked by Russia from both the north and the south.

Turkey’s portrayal of Russia’s war against Ukraine appears to be selective rather than comprehensive. Its attention to that war revolves around three major tracks. The first deals with maritime security and includes issues such as Turkey’s application of the Montreux Convention and demining of the Black Sea. The second track has been concerned with the Black Sea Grain initiative, a now-defunct deal brokered by Turkey and the UN involving Ukraine and Russia. Lastly, Turkey’s interest lies in continuing to serve as a mediator; it mediated between Russia and Ukraine in the early weeks of the war and facilitated prisoner exchanges, including the 2024 prisoner swap between Russia and the West.

Despite Turkey’s condemnation of Russia’s aggression and Ankara’s refusal to recognize the occupied Ukrainian regions, Turkey’s perception of the war against Ukraine is somewhat similar to the official Russian narrative. Public discourse in Turkey underscores the war as a competition between the great powers,²⁹ with Russia defending itself from Western encroachment and provocations, rather than as an unjust and unprovoked war. In a September 2022 poll, only 21 percent of Turkish respondents considered Russia to bear the primary responsibility for the war in Ukraine, and 46 percent said that Ukraine and Russia are equally responsible.³⁰

The majority of constituencies in Turkey support the government’s balancing policies following the onset of the war. Similarly, a consensus exists—from the government to the opposition—regarding the importance of the Montreux Convention. Within the political establishment of the country, there is a semblance of agreement that “Ukraine needs to win, but Russia should not suffer defeat either.”³¹

This situation may stem from Turkey’s perceived grievances regarding insufficient acknowledgment of its security concerns among its Western partners, who presumably overlook the broader threats Turkey faces beyond those in the Black Sea region. While bridging this gap in understanding could prove challenging, it is essential to recognize that the security threats confronting all parties are not fundamentally different.

Conclusions and recommendations (Part 1)

There are numerous areas where the interests of Turkey and its Western allies align, particularly concerning the restoration of regional security in the Black Sea and leveraging the region’s transit potential. However, differences in perception regarding the nature of threats and the preferred policies to address them have frequently emerged.

Turkey’s strained relationship with the West and its autonomous foreign policy approach together impose inherent limitations on efforts to harmonize policies, even in areas where mutual action could yield significant impact through clearer communication and coordination. In reality, the West has limited influence over Turkey’s perception of its national interests, especially in the Black Sea region, given the historical complexities of their relationship.

Special attention should be directed toward emphasizing that Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy must involve reducing its dependencies on Russia and addressing societal, economic, and security vulnerabilities that Russia readily exploits. This underscores the importance of Turkey closing the loopholes that allow Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, for instance stopping the reexport of dual-use goods and technology to Russia, thereby preventing the enablement of Russia’s malign policies, which has been in direct conflict with Turkey’s own interests. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the presence of and risks associated with Russia’s influence operations in Turkey, which serve to amplify anti-Western narratives.

In the medium term, Turkey may be becoming increasingly inclined to contemplate and endorse initiatives aimed at reestablishing a security equilibrium advantageous to Western (including Turkish) interests and implementing some form of provisional security order pending Ukraine’s victory. While Ankara currently appears to be one of the few NATO states not engaged in negotiations regarding security guarantees for Ukraine, the current environment seems conducive to practical projects that enhance Ukraine-West cooperation, with Turkey playing an active role. Ankara may be willing to consider multilateral projects aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s military capabilities without placing itself at the forefront of confrontation with Russia, yet still providing a more meaningful deterrent against Russia. Turkey’s desire to support Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction efforts should also be welcomed.

It’s important to address the fragmented security architecture in the region. This can be done by leveraging Turkey’s potential by establishing a military cooperation mechanism that complements NATO activities and involves Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania (with the possibility of including Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova); and supporting allied and partner countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia) in upgrading their naval capabilities and coordinating with Turkey to develop individual maritime security action plans.³² This effort would rely heavily on Turkey’s willingness to approve of and engage in these activities. According to Turkey watchers interviewed for this research, there is a prevailing opinion that exploring the idea of establishing new cooperation models in the Black Sea is worthwhile, particularly while the regional ownership principle is defunct due to Russia’s position. However, as noted by a UK expert in an interview, it is unlikely that Turkey will take on the role of a “convenor” or an “instigator power” behind all-regional formats (including littoral states plus potentially external NATO powers) with only Russia excluded. Instead, Turkey is more likely to express interest in initiating and participating in “minilateral” initiatives.³³

US-Turkey relations are central to Western engagement with Turkey. Significant changes in Turkey’s stance on contentious Black Sea issues would require a broader reconciliation between Turkey and the United States. Furthermore, the incremental progress toward normalizing EU-Turkey relations has been identified as a significant factor facilitating potential greater coordination in the Black Sea. This could entail prioritizing steps such as upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union, which one of the interviewees considered more achievable than implementing a visa-free regime or revitalizing membership talks. The need to renew a regular and structured foreign and security policy dialogue between Turkey and the EU, focusing on joint strategies in their shared neighborhood, seems to be a priority among many analysts.³⁴

There are areas of overlapping interests where Turkey could benefit from aligning with the common position of its allies, especially amid a broader normalization of relations. Exploring avenues of cooperation and fostering a more cooperative engagement culture is essential. While any unilateral initiative from Turkey that can leverage its influence on Russia should be welcomed, greater emphasis should be placed on fostering closer coordination with allies to make sure that a principle of containing Russia is not undermined by such actions.

To be sure, a significant departure from Turkey’s current stance is unlikely, but as the number of areas of Turkish-Western policy convergence grows, a shift in approach is possible. The goal should be to encourage Turkey to explore these areas and for Western partners to move away from short-term thinking and transactional approaches in dealing with Turkey and instead focus on addressing shared long-term strategic concerns. While it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate alignment of security perceptions, the actual interests of the parties are more closely aligned than is publicly acknowledged.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment.”

Dr. Maryna Vorotnyuk is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) in London. Previously, she held the position as Research Fellow in the International Security Studies team at RUSI. She works on security developments in the Black Sea region, Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish foreign policies, and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Before joining RUSI in January 2021, she worked as a researcher for the Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies at the Central European University in Budapest (2017-2020), and as a visiting lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences of Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia (2015-2017). From 2006 until 2015, Maryna was affiliated with the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine and the Centre for International Studies of Mechnikov Odesa National University. 

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment

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Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region

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For stability in the Black Sea region, the West should seek to converge with its most potent regional ally, Turkey.

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Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas

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The post Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Toward a regional security arrangement

This summer, three NATO members from the Black Sea activated the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group (MCM Black Sea) in Istanbul. The July 1 activation can be viewed as a milestone for maritime security in the region—with sole reliance, at least initially, on littoral states (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) for force generation.¹ In that regard, it may be considered a reincarnation of the Turkish idea of regional ownership in addressing maritime security issues in the Black Sea.

The task group represents a regional response to the growing threat of mines. It is aimed at ensuring the safe passage of ships in the Black Sea both in general and especially in the new grain-export corridor established by Ukraine after Russia’s withdrawal from the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023.

Arguably, this task force represents a compromise position for littoral and nonlittoral stakeholders. First, its NATO aspect is much less pronounced than Bulgaria and Romania would have preferred, but more than Turkey would have welcomed in a perfect world.  Ultimately, it is a task force assembled by NATO members outside the institutional framework of the Alliance to enhance maritime security in the Black Sea and maritime situational awareness of NATO in the region. In the activation ceremony, there was a marked absence of NATO insignia and language, yet it was also stated that this regional collaborative effort could be extended to include nonlittoral members of the Alliance in the future. It was the prospect of that inclusion that made the Turkish initiative acceptable to Bulgaria and Romania.

MCM Black Sea is the most recent security arrangement reflecting a compromise within NATO regarding the extent of involvement for the Alliance as a whole and its nonlittoral members in the regional maritime domain. As such, it perfectly captures the dilemma of crafting security practices and institutions in a region that faces the unraveling of the rules-based international order. The weakening of international norms and institutions have inevitably determined regional actors’ approaches to maritime security.

This section argues that the structure and processes of the international system have defined security dynamics in general, and maritime security dynamics in particular, in the Black Sea since the end of the Cold War: for regional actors, geographical, historical, and legal factors have driven or constrained alliance and collaboration approaches and practices. The section begins with a discussion of maritime security institutions and practices attempted in the region before Russia turned into a revisionist actor. The period between 2014 and 2022 merits particular attention, as this was when all the post-Cold War regional security arrangements collapsed. This situation has given rise to competing visions of maritime security in the Black Sea. Consequently, the section discusses such visions. Finally, it closes with several predictions regarding the future configuration of security arrangements and respective roles of international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, as well individual actors including Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. The fluidity of regional geopolitics complicates the situation, and it is probably safe to conclude that a lasting maritime security arrangement will be closely linked to the eventual redefinition of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, as two rival maritime security providers.

Maritime security in the Black Sea

Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 made the Black Sea  a policy concern for the EU, NATO, and the United States,² but the region has always been a major security consideration for both Turkey and Russia, particularly in the context of managing their regional competition. Their competition management practices have resulted in a convergence of Turkish and Russian views on the undesirability of nonlittoral states’ involvement in the region.

This convergence has led some to conclude that the Black Sea has become a Russian-Turkish condominium.³ By narrowly focusing on the pragmatic and practical cooperation, this approach misses or disregards the reality that the essence of interactions between these two regional heavyweights is competition. Their relations have waxed and waned between outright confrontation to reconciliation and collaboration even in the last decade. The two countries are involved in fierce rivalries in other parts of the world, such as Libya and Syria. Transactional foreign policies have served their core-interests. Russia’s exclusion from, and Turkey’s marginalization in, the rules-based international order has acted as a catalyst for bringing these two major players in the Black Sea closer.

In terms of cycles of hostility and collaboration between Ankara and Moscow, it is worth recalling the situation after a Russian SU-24 Fencer bomber was shot down by Turkish F-16s on November 24, 2015 near the Turkish-Syrian border. In the months following the downing, the military and naval situation between Russia and Turkey resembled that of the World War II era,⁴ with one difference: Turkey is a member of NATO. But for eleven months in 2016, that membership was of little help to Turkey. Russian A2/AD bastions in the north and south rendered Turkish air and naval activity beyond its borders risky ventures, for fear of Russian revenge-seeking. Meanwhile, US warships that patrolled the Black Sea as part NATO’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) were harassed by Russian aircraft. At the height of the Turkish-Russian crisis, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called NATO to the rescue. Otherwise, he warned, the Black Sea would soon turn into a “Russian lake.”⁵

The November 2015 bomber incident proved that from a purely material capabilities perspective, Turkey lacks the means to “balance” Russia on its own.⁶ It has always needed partners and allies, regional or extraregional, depending on the distribution of power internationally and regionally among status quo and revisionist powers. Notably, multilateral regional arrangements were enacted in the post-Cold War era to accommodate Russia as a legitimate stakeholder in the Black Sea security.

How recent challenges to the regional order affected Turkey’s policy

Tensions were evident before the annexation of Crimea. The Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 signified a turning point for Russia and added momentum to its military modernization and transformation efforts. Before the war, Turkey had supported Georgia’s military modernization. Ankara had invested in an airfield where Turkish military aircraft could be based in times of need, and supplied Georgia with coast guard boats. The Marnuli airfield and Turkish-supplied coast guard boats were among the military targets destroyed by the Russian artillery in the early stages of the war. In other words, Ankara’s attempts to gain traction in the southern part of the Caucasus were ultimately and effectively checked by Russia.

The war brought about de facto changes in the territorial and maritime status quo in the Black Sea. South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared their independence with Russian support. The Abkhazian declaration of independence created the potential for great impact on regional geopolitics, considering it gave rise to an unrecognized state with access to the Black Sea.

The idea of regional ownership and its mechanisms received a substantial blow, but nevertheless survived the war, partly because the Obama administration had not yet dismissed the idea of accommodating Russia in the liberal international order. Again, the strategic choices of the global leader largely determined the parameters of interaction regionally.

In November 2010, after a general decline in Turkey’s naval standing, Ankara endorsed NATO’s new strategic concept, which called for development of ballistic missile defense system (commonly known as “the missile shield”). At a global level, Russia saw this as a way station to the development of a US missile defense system that would eventually cancel out Russia’s nuclear deterrent and weaken its international status. Additionally, two aspects of NATO BMD system were destined to increase the Alliance’s footprint in the region: the ground-based interceptors, to be deployed in Romania, and the regular rotation of the US Navy’s Aegis-class destroyers as sea-borne assets of the system into the Black Sea.

Russian apprehensions grew after Ankara agreed to the deployment of an X-Band missile detection system and tracking radar in Turkey’s southeast as part of this missile defense structure, as well as ascent for Aegis destroyers’ frequently appearing in the Black Sea. Russia countered this move by deploying S-300s and the latest S-400 air defense missiles in its Southern Military District, beginning in 2012. These were the core capabilities around which an A2/AD sphere would eventually be erected in the region.

In hindsight, there is a general agreement about how the West missed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s messaging regarding his intentions in 2007. Although he revealed them in his speech at the Munich Security Conference, it failed to grab the attention of his Western audiences. Similarly,  Russia’s ambitions in Georgia were largely overlooked by the West.

The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea was the final nail in the coffin for the regional security architecture championed by Turkey. With this annexation, Moscow was able to build a formidable A2/AD sphere covering the Black Sea,  extending to the shores of Turkey.⁷ Russia then began to voice stronger opposition to the naval presence of nonlittoral states in the Black Sea.⁸ Moreover, Moscow added new weight and momentum to its naval reconstruction program for the Black Sea fleet. The plan foresaw the addition of six new submarines, six frigates, and four new corvettes armed with cruise missiles by 2020. This signified a tripling or even quadrupling of Russia’s naval strength in the Black Sea.⁹ Russian revisionism rendered Turkey’s status quo policy in the Black Sea unsustainable and untenable.

It’s important to note that during the 2014 crisis in Crimea, Turkey carefully assumed a low profile. For instance, Ankara did not cancel or postpone plans to send the Turkish Naval Task Force “Barbaros,” comprising two frigates, a corvette, and a replenishment ship, for a trip around the Horn of Africa during this time of high tensions between NATO and Russia.¹⁰ By sending a naval force of this size on such a distant mission, Ankara showed that it was not interested in deepening the crisis between Russia and NATO, nor did it want to take sides. Hence, Russian-Turkish political, economic, and naval relations survived the Crimean crisis with perhaps some Turkish loss of confidence in Russia.

Now that Turkey’s maritime ambitions go beyond the “blue homeland” (the Eastern Mediterranean area it regards as its exclusive zone), Ankara may find itself in a similar situation: needing to make a hard choice between committing its assets to address maritime security challenges in its immediate neighborhood or to support its growing overseas commitments from Somalia to Libya and Qatar. Importantly, maintaining the status quo in the Black Sea indeed helps Turkey focus more of its attention and resources away from the Black Sea. This provides yet another incentive for Turkey to resist any attempt to upset the existing balance of maritime power in the region.

Naval situation before the broader Russian attack on Ukraine

By 2016, Russia had secured a comfortable degree of naval superiority in the Black Sea. As early as in September 2016, Russian Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov pronounced that the days of the Turkish Navy’s mastery in the Black Sea were over. At the time, the Turkish Navy was set to receive the last two of four indigenous Ada-class corvettes (MILGEM), ordered in the previous decade. The second batch of four more units was canceled in favor of four more capable, I-class frigates based on MILGEM basic design. The Turkish submarine service was to receive six German 214 air independent propulsion diesel submarines. To bolster the Turkish navy’s blue water capabilities, a Juan Carlos-class strategic projection ship was ordered to be built by Turkish shipyard Sedef under license from Spanish shipbuilder Navtia.

Despite these various naval-development attempts, Russia could comfortably claim mastery of the Black Sea when it unleashed its attack on Ukraine in February 2022. It had a formidable array of combat and auxiliary vessels supported by an impressive naval air power stationed in Crimea.

At this time, other littoral states began focusing on their poor naval capabilities. Ukraine, which had inherited among others a single Kirvak III-class frigate (Hetman Sahaidachny) from the Soviet Union, placed an order for two Turkish Ada-class corvettes to modernize its navy in December 2020, with an option for two or three more units. The Romanian Navy had a single submarine for training purposes only. The latest additions to the surface fleet consisted of two ex-British Type 22 frigates purchased in 2004. It had another frigate, a Romanian design, and a motley collection of mostly Cold War-era smaller surface vessels. In 2019, French shipbuilder Naval Group was awarded a contract to build four Gowind-class corvettes for the Romanian Navy for €1.2 billion. These frigates were in way Romania’s response to Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Like Romania, Bulgaria relied on Cold War-era Soviet designs, with the exception of three Wielingen-class multirole frigates and three Tripartite-class mine hunters, received from Belgium in 2004; its navy also ordered two multirole corvettes from German shipbuilder Lürssen Werft in December 2020.¹¹

This mastery, however, would not even last past the first year of the war. In March 2022, Turkey closed the straits to the warships of belligerents at the request of the Ukrainian government. Turkey’s decision, in effect, turned the Black Sea into the maritime equivalent of a boxing ring, denying belligerents the opportunity to reinforce their existing fleets with units from other theaters and/or countries.¹² Since then, the Russian Black Sea fleet has suffered huge losses including a guided missile cruiser, several amphibious assault ships, and an improved Kilo-class diesel submarine. So long as the war goes on, Russia will be unable to replace its losses, increasingly a hostage to the Black Sea than its paramount.

The prospects for Russia to recover naval dominance in the Black Sea are slim. Since March 2022, Ankara has managed to persuade its non-Black Sea littoral NATO allies to keep their warships away from the Black Sea to reduce the risk of escalation. Although this may be temporary relief for Russia, the Kremlin has had to withdraw its naval assets to the east to avoid further losses to Ukrainian standoff anti-ship and air-to-ground missiles. The introduction of US Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) into the war prompted the redeployment of Russian air and naval air assets away from Crimea and the Black Sea coast. Russia, thus, has lost the tactical and operational momentum that it clearly possessed in the initial months of the war. The situation in the Black Sea reflects the overall change in the character of war from maneuver to attrition. In the meantime, as the Russian Navy is worn down, others seek to increase their naval strengths. By the time the war ends, Russia may face a radically altered and very unfavorable naval balance of power in the Black Sea.

At present, Ukraine has two Ada-class corvettes on order from Turkey, while Bulgaria has plans to procure two second-hand submarines, and Romania has plans to acquire three newly built submarines based on a French design. The latter received two Sundown-class mine countermeasures vessels decommissioned by the Royal Navy. Meanwhile, Romania canceled the contract for Gowind-class corvettes; according to media reports, Turkish STM offered Ada-class corvettes for the new tender, which would make Romania the third Black Sea navy to operate them. In that case, a common platform would likely contribute to closer cooperation and interoperability between Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.¹³

What does the future hold?

Russia has lost sea control in the western Black Sea. Its naval blockade of Ukraine’s remaining coastline did not survive the first year of the war. The sinking of the cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea fleet, indeed symbolized the demise of the Russia blockade. Ever since, Ukraine has maintained somewhat secure access to the Black Sea, on which its future as a sovereign and independent state hinges. The western Black Sea is now effectively denied to the Russian Navy’s surface vessels. Moreover, Ukrainian attacks on command and control centers, A2/AD assets, and shipyards, have substantially degraded Russia’s ability to sustain its maritime power in the Black Sea—now a wholly contested maritime theater of operations for both belligerents. Russia is unlikely to attempt to reclaim it, having refrained from challenging or disrupting Ukraine’s new grain corridor in the maritime domain. Some Turkish naval observers are of the opinion that Russia may be content with the status quo, and has little to gain from escalation in the maritime domain. Therefore, Russians cannot interrupt maritime traffic in the new grain corridor unless it is willing to take the risk of escalation.¹⁴
The balance of maritime power has turned, but that does not mean NATO has secured sea control. For NATO to maintain this favorable balance of maritime power—with Russia effectively denied the western part of the Black Sea—requires Turkey’s maritime capabilities. For instance, Turkish naval and naval air assets provide around 65 percent of the recognized maritime picture in the Black Sea.¹⁵ Turkey is capable of performing NATO’s functions alone without any other littoral or nonlittoral member of the Alliance. It has accumulated the required capability and competence to fulfill missions alone. Indeed, it was the only NATO member in the Black Sea region that continued to invest in additional naval capabilities in step with Russian naval modernization, while Bulgaria and Romania lagged behind both Russia and Turkey.¹⁶ Considering that Russian effectiveness in the Black Sea has gone down to a tolerable level, NATO’s direct maritime presence is no longer warranted.

There have been talks of transferring warships and/auxiliary vessels from some NATO members to Ukraine. The debate started in Germany first,¹⁷ and reached a new height with Britain’s decision to donate two ex-Royal Navy Sundown-class mine hunters to Ukraine. Turkey made it known that it would not allow their transit through the Turkish Straits as long as Article 19 of the Montreux Convention is in effect. The former supreme allied commander Europe for NATO, Admiral Stavridis, argued that mine hunters were defensive ships and therefore exempt from the Montreux restrictions.¹⁸  In both cases, the debate revealed the depth of knowledge (or lack thereof) among Turkey’s NATO allies of the legal intricacies of the Montreux Convention. A common argument is that freedom of navigation should be implemented without any limitations as set forth in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); ironically, the Montreux Convention limitations are recognized as deviations from freedom of navigation for warships by UNLCOS III. Therefore, the wording of the Article 19 does not leave any room for a liberal interpretation of the convention to allow transit of warships (and auxiliaries) of the belligerents. It does not recognize any distinction between offensive and defensive ships either.

Of course, there is nothing in the convention that would restrict or prohibit transit of warships acquired by the nonbelligerent Black Sea powers which may later contemplate to transfer such ships to Ukraine. However, such a transfer could be considered a hostile act and risk bringing NATO directly into the war.¹⁹ Such a course of action is inadvisable unless NATO deliberately pursues direct entanglement in the conflict.

On the other side of the coin, there have been calls on Turkey to close the Turkish Straits for merchant marine traffic to and from the Russian Black Sea ports. Heeding the calls would entail ending the freedom of navigation for Russian merchant vessels, particularly those involved in transporting war materials and grain exports. It’s worth noting that the Montreux Convention establishes a permissive transit regime for merchant vessels, even in times of war, between the littoral states. Freedom of navigation is the essence of that regime, and past attempts to interdict and seize merchant ships transporting war materials have been overturned by national and international courts. This was firmly established after a Greek Cypriot-flag cargo ship, Cape Maleas, was seized by the Turkish authorities in the Bosphorus in October 1991. The cargo ship was chartered by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRASL) to carry arms and ammunition from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to Iran. Its cargo was declared as “special equipment,” and the ship was seized for arms smuggling by the Turkish Coast Guard. The court authorization for seizing the ship was later overturned by the Court of Appeal in Turkey on the grounds that merchant ships enjoy absolute freedom of navigation in the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention, so long as Turkey is not at war with the country of flag or the country that chartered the ship.²⁰ Subsequently, IRASL sued Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for unjustified control of property. In 2007, the ECHR decided that Turkey’s action constituted a violation and awarded the applicant €35,000 for costs and expenses.²¹ Therefore, under the current transit regime, and in view of the decisions by the national and regional courts, Turkey cannot justify blocking merchant traffic to and from Russian Black Sea ports. The freedom of navigation remains the cardinal rule in regulating the transit of merchant vessels in the Turkish Straits.

Conclusions and challenges (Part 2)

The turn of events since 2008 points to a clear pattern in Russian behavior in the Black Sea. Moscow had been responsive to regional initiatives, so long as they were perceived to be complementing efforts to bring Russia into the Western fold or the liberal international system. In 2008, the incoming Obama administration chose to pursue a reset and, therefore, did not attempt to punish or exclude Russia after it invaded Georgia: the Black Sea regional security architecture managed to hold despite the war. After 2014, Russia transformed into an adversary to be checked. Gradually, nearly all institutional bonds between the West and Russia were dismantled. This inevitably had ramifications for regional security arrangements, which could no longer complement arrangements at the global level. In short, there was nothing left to complement at the global level through regional cooperation.

Ironically, Ankara regards the United States as a potential revisionist extraregional power. Its tendency to question and occasionally challenge the relevance of the Montreux Convention contributes to Turkish apprehensions about Washington’s intentions. Moreover, the US military interventions in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, haunt Turkish policymakers and the public alike regarding the destabilizing consequences of Great Power involvement in a neighboring region.²² While Ankara continues to grapple with the fallout from the US invasion of, and  subsequent withdrawal from, Iraq, it fears prospects for destabilization of comparable magnitude to its north. Therefore, Ankara values the Montreux Convention as a tool for preventing sudden changes in regional geopolitics.

Fundamentally, the US and British air control over the western Black Sea facilitates Turkish primacy in the Black Sea, ensuring that they will remain the most relevant nonlittoral actors in Black Sea security for the foreseeable future.²³ Both have committed to support MCM Black Sea, if needed.

Sea mines are the most serious among current maritime security challenges. The MCM Black Sea was devised to tackle this challenge. In many ways, the MCM represents the latest manifestation of Turkey’s long-standing regional ownership idea. The absence of NATO imagery and language is in line with Turkish thinking to exclude nonlittoral powers from the Black Sea.²⁴ However, the MCM has extended Turkey’s relevance to regional maritime security and affirmed its credentials as the primary maritime security provider there. Indeed, it may even be considered a scaled-down version of the BlackSeaFor, tailored to NATO purposes. Its future depends on the degree of commitment from Romania and Bulgaria.

There are indications that the EU may be contemplating a Black Sea strategy without regard to Turkey and its concerns. This approach may enjoy the support of EU members such as France, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. In its June meeting, the European Council made the following statement:

The European Council reaffirms the importance of security and stability in the Black Sea and invites the Commission and the High Representative to prepare a Joint Communication on building an EU strategic approach to the Black Sea.²⁵

Romania and Bulgaria may be tempted to bring the EU in, as a counterbalance to Turkey’s influence as the primary maritime security provider to the region and as the strongest NATO member in the Black Sea.  Persistence of the EU’s exclusionary practices may be self-defeating and drive Turkey even closer to Russia. Although Kemal Kirişçi, an international relations expert and nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, sees MCM Black Sea as an indicator of a subtle convergence of Turkish and US policies in the region, he draws attention to the dangers of excluding Turkey when devising a Black Sea strategy.²⁶

On the other hand, even if Turkey adopts a more inclusionary approach, a major issue is that the United States or the EU may no longer function as stable anchors for Turkey’s international and regional behavior. Both are undergoing a process of redefining their global roles, and therefore cannot serve as stable anchors until they come up with consistent and coherent visions to confront current security problems at the global level. In short, as there is a great deal of uncertainty, and Turkey will probably be less responsive to US and EU leadership attempts, From Turkey’s perspective, their pro-Israeli attitudes have eroded their claims as the moral champions of the rules-based international order.

Finally, a Russian defeat, though it would mark a significant weakening of Russian military threat regionally, runs the risk of complicating the maritime security situation in the Black Sea for Turkey. Such an outcome could eventually lead to the unfolding of the Montreux regime. If the war ends with a Russian defeat, peace terms may include Moscow’s acceptance of a new status in the Black Sea. In other words, if Russia capitulates, Ankara may find itself isolated as the only champion of the status quo on the Turkish Straits. Current parties to the convention include Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, Russia, and Serbia. Of the original signatories, Japan withdrew in 1951, whereas the Soviet Union was succeeded by the Russian Federation and Yugoslavia by Serbia. This lineup does not seem very promising when it comes to Ankara building a pro-status quo coalition.

Takeaways and challenges

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended our understanding of European security and its institutions. The course of events re-affirmed that NATO, once considered by some as brain-dead, remains the core institution of the European security architecture to tackle revisionist Russia’s military threat.

At this point, a crucial question is how to keep Turkey in NATO so that it is an asset rather than a liability for European security. There are two possibilities: the current war will either play a catalyst role in bringing Turkey back into the fold of mainstream European politics or will add momentum to its alienation from the West in general.

The war in Ukraine has given a new lease on life to the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and simultaneously added momentum to Turkey’s ambitions for a strategic autonomy at a regional level. Recently, Vice-President of the EU Commission Josep Borrel admitted “growing Turkish and Russian influence has derailed the EU’s ‘Mediterranean Order.’”²⁷ If this is truly the case, the EU’s emerging perception of Turkey as a strategic competitor may frustrate its attempts to promote a regional maritime security order in the Black Sea.  Hence, Turkey’s role in the new security environment will ultimately depend on choices made in Ankara, Washington, and Brussels and to a lesser extent in Moscow.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region.”

Dr. Serhat Güvenç is currently Professor of International Relations and the Dean of the College of Economics, Administrative Sciences at Kadir Has University. Previously, he held faculty positions Istanbul Bilgi University (2000-2010) and lectured as visiting Assistant Professor of History at the University of Chicago (2006), as adjunct professor of international relations at Koç University (2008 and 2009) and Bosphorus University (2014). Dr. Güvenç’s research interests include Turkey’s foreign relations and modern Turkish military and naval history. He has authored or co-authored five books. His articles have appeared in Middle Eastern Studies, International Journal of Naval History, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Exotierika Themata (Greek), Journal of Strategic Studies, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, International Journal, Turkish Studies, Turkish Policy Quarterly, The Journal of Military History, the Journal of Cold War History and War and Society.

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment

By Maryna Vorotnyuk

Turkey and the West should explore avenues of cooperation and fostering a more cooperative engagement culture.

Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region

By Rich Outzen

For stability in the Black Sea region, the West should seek to converge with its most potent regional ally, Turkey.

Conflict Defense Industry

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas

By Eser Özdil

Turkey’s strategic position in the region provides cooperation opportunities for European energy security and economic interdependence.

Eastern Europe Energy & Environment

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The post Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has challenged Turkey’s long-term strategy of multilateral diplomacy and regional ownership in the Black Sea. However, it has also created new opportunities for Ankara by highlighting the growing importance of the region—and Turkey as its key player—to the broader West.

The war in Ukraine has also marked a turning point in Ankara’s relations with the EU and NATO, as it can either act as a catalyst to bring Turkey back into the fold of the European politics or accelerate its alienation from the West and push Ankara even closer to Russia. To achieve the former and avoid the latter, it is important that Ankara’s Western partners recognize Turkey’s leading role in regional security and adopt a more inclusive approach that involves Turkey in shaping their policies toward the Black Sea region.

On the other hand, Turkey should acknowledge the benefits of such cooperation and constructively engage with the United States and EU to defend the rules-based order both regionally and globally. Whereas a significant departure from Turkey’s current stance is unlikely, a shift in approach is possible—especially in the Black Sea region, where the Turkish-Western policy convergence has grown since the invasion of Ukraine.

These policy recommendations represent a summary of key insights of the report as a whole, which includes four independent analyses covering political dialogue, defense cooperation, maritime security, and energy. For a more detailed examination of the authors’ individual conclusions, please refer to the respective chapters.

Political and diplomatic dialogue

Recommendations for Western partners

1. Recognize Turkey’s aspiration to play a pivotal role in the Black Sea region. Leverage Turkey’s political and diplomatic clout in the region for mutual benefit.
2. Engage Turkey in consultations to ensure better aligned and coordinated policies toward the Black Sea region. 
3. Harness Turkey’s mediation potential in Russia’s war on Ukraine.
4. Support Turkey’s interest in normalizing relations with Armenia, facilitating a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and promoting stability in the South Caucasus through connectivity projects.
5. Identify ways to reduce Ankara’s dependence on Russia by providing feasible alternatives through cooperation with the West.
6. Work together to bolster NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea.
7. Address grievances regarding the lack of recognition by its Western partners of Turkey’s security concerns in and beyond the Black Sea region.

Recommendations for Turkey

1. Recognize that strategic autonomy must involve reducing Turkey’s dependence on Russia and address societal, economic, and security vulnerabilities that Russia exploits.
2. Use the current security crisis in the region as an opportunity to reaffirm Turkey’s central security role in the Alliance, particularly in deterring Russian aggression in the Black Sea and on NATO’s eastern flank.
3. Step up efforts to close the loopholes that allow Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, including the reexport of dual-use goods and technology to Russia, which has been in direct conflict with Turkey’s own interests as well as US and EU policies.
4. Counter Russia’s influence operations in Turkey, which serve to amplify anti-Western narratives.
5. Support multilateral projects aimed at enhancing Ukraine’s military capabilities, as well as recovery and reconstruction efforts, both bilaterally and in cooperation with the West.
6. Establish new cooperation models in the Black Sea region that complement NATO activities and involve Bulgaria and Romania, with the possibility of including Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
7. Foster a more cooperative culture of engagement with Western partners. Work to renew a regular and structured foreign and security policy dialogue with the EU and achieve a broader normalization of relations with the United States. 

Maritime security

Recommendations for Western partners

1. Reaffirm adherence to the Montreux Convention, as the tendency to question its relevance contributes to Turkey’s concerns about the destabilizing consequences of broader US involvement in the Black Sea region.
2. Commit to support the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group.
3. Provide air control over the western Black Sea to reinforce Turkey’s naval posture vis-à-vis Russia and facilitate uninterrupted functioning of sea lanes of communication.
4. Consider Turkey’s security concerns and sensitivities while developing a new EU Black Sea Strategy.

Recommendations for Turkey

1. Leverage the potential of the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group to enhance Turkey’s relevance in regional maritime security and reaffirm its credentials as a primary maritime security provider.
2. Support allied and partner countries (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine) in upgrading their naval capabilities and developing maritime security action plans.
3. Enhance shipbuilding cooperation (in particular, Ada-class corvettes) with littoral states. This would contribute to closer maritime cooperation and interoperability among Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.

Defense cooperation

Recommendations for Western partners

1. Support defense industrial complementarity between other NATO members and Turkey, as well as between Ukraine and Turkey. Build on the positive trends that have emerged with the resumption of the F-16 deal and US-Turkish cooperation in production of artillery shells.
2. Allocate part of US defense assistance to Ukraine to finance Turkish-Ukrainian projects.
3. Pursue defense cooperation and joint defense production with Turkish partners—Georgia and Azerbaijan—as well as economic support to the development of the Middle Corridor.
4. Suspend or eliminate spending policies that limit joint EU funding of non-EU producers of critical defense goods.
5. Strengthen the capabilities of littoral NATO states in the region for air defense, naval defense/anti-ship missiles, and ground defensive capabilities to raise the costs of Russian revisionism to unsustainable levels.
6. Avoid the temptation to work around Ankara when planning and resourcing security for the region. Instead, consult with Turkish officials during formulation of policies. Recognize Turkey’s lead in NATO operations in the Black Sea region.
7. Address Turkey’s security concerns in a wider region—most critically, US support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, which Turkey considers a branch of the terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Recommendations for Turkey

1. Work together with the network of littoral NATO allies and non-NATO regional partners to strengthen multilateral deterrence of further Russian aggression in the region.
2. Take advantage of diplomatic channels of communication with Russia to create openings for de-escalation and mediation between Russia and Ukraine, when conditions are ripe.
3. Leverage Turkish conventional military power and its proven ability to train, equip, and coordinate with forces beyond its own borders to reinforce NATO’s defense and deterrence posture in the region.

Energy cooperation

Recommendations for Western partners

1. Increase the capacity of TAP/TANAP from 16 bcm to 31 bcm to facilitate the transportation of non-Russian gas to Europe via Turkey, thereby enhancing the continent’s energy security and reducing reliance on Russian gas.
2. Enable renewal of the Turkey-Greece interconnector to ensure continued support and normalization of energy relations.
3. Complete the technical modifications of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline to enable its reverse-flow capabilities, facilitating the transport of natural gas from the south to the north.
4. Enhance LNG supplies for Central European countries such as Slovenia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, using Turkish LNG infrastructure.
5. Strengthen collaboration between the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority to enhance regulatory frameworks and operational efficiency in energy markets. Conduct joint workshops, personnel-exchange programs, research projects, and capacity-building initiatives.

Recommendations for Turkey

1. Expand Black Sea energy cooperation and broaden Turkish natural gas export agreements with Eastern and Central European countries in the Black Sea region, thereby diminishing Russian influence and solidifying Turkey’s role as an energy hub.
2. Maximize production from the Sakarya gas field to increase natural gas supplies to Eastern and Central European countries.
3. Prioritize the integration of small modular reactors in the Turkish energy system, targeting an additional 5 GW of capacity, to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear power.
4. Enhance investments in renewable energy projects in line with the European Union Green Deal, including wind, solar, and green hydrogen.
5. Use Turkey’s strategic position to develop and commercialize new natural gas routes from Turkmenistan, northern Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment

By Maryna Vorotnyuk

Turkey and the West should explore avenues of cooperation and fostering a more cooperative engagement culture.

Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment

By Serhat Güvenç

A redefinition of the EU-Turkey relations will result with a lasting maritime security arrangement in the Black Sea.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region

By Rich Outzen

For stability in the Black Sea region, the West should seek to converge with its most potent regional ally, Turkey.

Conflict Defense Industry

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The post A sea of opportunities: Main takeaways and policy recommendations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Assessing the strategic environment

In its Black Sea neighborhood, which includes Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, Turkey faces a centuries old dilemma.¹ On one hand, Turkish leaders see a strategic imperative to oppose the hegemony of Russia, the only regional actor with an imperial appetite. On the other hand, trade ties and mutual strategic vulnerability compel Ankara to seek the least risky modus vivendi with Moscow—and to avoid interventions by extraregional powers that could escalate into direct warfare between Russian and Turkish forces.

Time tests ideas and approaches. During the Cold War, a deep disparity between Soviet and Turkish power compelled Turkey to balance Russia through NATO membership, which included the stationing of American troops, aircraft, and tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil.² After 1991, the gap between Russian and Turkish deterrent capabilities decreased, while messy Western military interventions on Turkey’s southern borders left Ankara disinclined to trust those Western powers in the Black Sea region. Consequently, Turkish strategy in the region shifted from NATO-assisted deterrence of Russia to a triangular balance in which Turkey seeks to offset Russian power by strengthening both its own capabilities and those of non-NATO allies (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), defense cooperation with littoral NATO states without broader NATO presence, and maintaining robust economic and diplomatic ties with Russia while developing military deterrent measures against it.

The goal of triangular balancing has been a constrained competition, or condominium that compartmentalizes conflict, preserves trade and diplomatic contacts, and prioritizes military de-escalation.³ A key part of this approach has been supporting Ukrainian sovereignty without seeking total Russian defeat. Prior to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ankara sought to co-opt Russia in local security initiatives that minimized the role for extraregional states. After 2014, Ankara focused on a military force-building project with Ukraine, which accelerated after Russia’s expanded invasion in 2022 and led to defense industrial symbiosis in several areas.

Turkey wants both Ukraine and Russia, as neighbors, to survive—and that means Ankara wants Moscow to have incentives to settle for less than outright victory. For the foreseeable future, this objective will require an activist stance in military and diplomatic affairs in the region—and neither acquiescing to NATO’s lead nor Russian revanchism in the process.⁴ As the United States crafts a new Black Sea strategy, and NATO plans for enduring commitments to Ukraine, both would do well to understand this Turkish approach, and work effectively alongside it.

Doing so entails three critical elements: NATO must strengthen Turkey’s own deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis Russia, recognize and facilitate Turkish leadership in NATO operations in the region, and consult Ankara regarding conflict termination modalities, especially arrangements for peacekeeping forces and the approach to Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO candidacy. In other words, the West would be wise to support a stable strategic triangle in the region consisting of Russia, Turkish-aligned non-NATO members (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and NATO via its Black Sea littoral members.⁵ It should avoid a strict binary equation in the region, recognizing that the combination of Turkey’s participation in NATO, its defense ties to non-NATO countries, and its continued engagement with Russia provide unique tools to influence Russian behavior in both the present war and the regional future.

Successful deterrence in this manner may enable the region to emerge from the war as what President Erdoğan has called a “basin of peace” in which Russia has a legitimate but constrained role.⁶ Ankara would welcome a settlement that leads to energy deals and trade that Russia cannot, or will not, disrupt.⁷ Turkish foreign policy statements have made clear that Ankara sees this combination of deterrence, de-escalation, and economic mutual interest as the key to the future security of the region—and a Turkish role will be crucial.⁸ Given Russia’s apparent ability to sustain the war and the West’s limited appetite for escalation, it is the security strategy that offers the greatest chance of success in the coming years.

Turkey’s regional role and interests

Turkey has long pursued a Black Sea security architecture that supports Ukrainian independence, balances Russian power without directly confronting it, and strengthens other littoral states (NATO and non-NATO).⁹ Ankara developed a politico-economic forum, BSEC; multilateral security mechanisms including Russia, Black Sea Force, and Black Sea Harmony; and a multinational brigade comprised of units from NATO countries operating independently of NATO command, the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG).¹⁰

Then Ankara witnessed Moscow’s willingness to launch hot wars against smaller neighbors (such as Georgia in 2008), and that it was not likely to be restrained by an inclusive approach and trust-building measures.¹¹ This realization encouraged Turkish leadership to enhance their own hard-power deterrent capabilities, a process that played out over a decade as Turkey developed significant power projection capabilities—from Libya and Syria to the Caucasus and beyond—and demonstrated a willingness to use them against Russian forces or proxies in regional conflicts.¹²

Vladimir Socor, a Romanian-American geopolitical analyst, discussed the evolution of Turkey’s approach to the region in the face of Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions:

There have been and remain limits to how far the West can go on “improving Turkish attitudes” on the Black Sea. Over a twenty-year period, the Turks staunchly opposed NATO activity there, for example by stopping the attempt to expand Operation Active Endeavor from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Turkish policy then was a condominium with Russia, while minimizing Western presence. This entailed allowing only what the Montreux Convention, strictly construed, would allow. Instead of a steady Western presence, Turkey tried to establish a Black Sea Force naval patrol mechanism that included Russia—the hope for a neighbors’ condominium. Before Crimea, Turkey could believe it had naval parity. After Crimea, the sense of naval parity was gone; the ability for land-based forces to strike at sea had to be added to the naval equation. Russia now appeared superior in the overall balance of power in the [Black Sea region], especially in terms of anti-access and area denial (A2AD) weapons. Turkey appears at times to be intimidated by Russia in the Black Sea, hunkering down near its own coast. It can be argued that Turkey tried to avoid conflict by appeasing Russia even after Georgia [in] 2008, when the Russian Navy attacked and destroyed the Georgian coastal guard in port [at Poti]. Turkey continued the Black Sea Force—though Romania wanted to end it. Finally, the 2014 invasion of Crimea metaphorically sank the Black Sea Force as a concept.¹³

Turkey’s public response to the 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimea and Ukraine’s eastern provinces was relatively muted,¹⁴ but Ankara has consistently supported Ukrainian sovereignty over these territories,¹⁵ supported UN condemnations of the invasion,¹⁶ and called for Ukrainian accession to NATO.¹⁷ More importantly, Ankara paired cautious diplomatic opposition with stout efforts to bolster Ukrainian defense capabilities far earlier than the West. Initial discussions on defense industrial cooperation took place in 2015, with senior officials from the two countries agreeing to elevate such ties to a strategic level in early 2016, covering a broad array of programs and technologies.¹⁸ This came at a time of escalating Russo-Turkish tensions,¹⁹ and reticence by Washington and European allies to arm Ukraine.²⁰ Within five years this deepening defense relationship yielded more than thirty joint defense projects, including drones, motors, electronics, ground systems and naval vessels. Many of these projects involve complementary production and development rather than simple sales or transfers.²¹

Less publicly, Turkey in 2016 appears to have sent a multiservice assessment team to lay the groundwork for training programs involving staff officers, special forces, and naval personnel.²² Turkish support continued in the years prior to Putin’s February 2022 escalated invasion, despite the risk of Russian retaliation.²³ Turkish-made TB2 Bayraktar armed drones made their debut in Ukraine in October 2021, fighting against Russian proxies in Donetsk.²⁴ Turkish support for the equipping and training of Ukrainian defense forces predates the current phase of the war and seems certain to continue after its conclusion. The contributions to Ukraine’s defense from the United States and Germany have surpassed Turkish aid over the past two years, but the timing of Turkish assistance was especially impactful before the larger donors fully beginning in 2022.

Turkish impact on the war in Ukraine

Despite Russian protestations, Turkish military and defense industrial support continued up to and beyond February 24, 2022.²⁵ The TB2s drew attention through widely distributed videos of their strikes on advancing Russian columns, and were memorialized in song by Ukrainians grateful for their role in blunting the Russian drive on Kyiv.²⁶ Other weapon systems proved useful, too. Kirpi armored vehicles²⁷ have provided protection for light units and logistics convoys, while Turkish machine guns have enhanced ground unit defensive capabilities.²⁸ Turkish shipyards have produced Ada-class corvettes to strengthen Ukrainian naval defense, though their extended delivery schedule and limited basing options limit near-term impact.²⁹

Artillery ammunition has emerged as a mainstay of Turkish defense industrial support to Ukraine. Turkey’s Mechanical and Chemical Industrial Corporation produces a significant portion of NATO’s 155 millimeter ammunition supply, and has exported directly to Ukraine since the war began.³⁰ These may have included rounds with dual-purpose improved conventional munitions, or DPICM (“cluster bombs”), a potent tool against Russian ground forces, though Turkey denies doing so.³¹ The Turkish firm Repkon has begun production of 155 mm ammunition at a factory in Texas, which should increase American production by a third, and will be used to further augment Ukrainian supply should the war extend for years.³² Turkey has become the leading exporter of artillery ammunition to the United States, has made massive ammunition deliveries directly to Ukraine, and is key to NATO’s efforts to match Russian output as the war in Ukraine has become, among other things, a large-scale, continuous artillery duel.³³

What do experts think about how determinative this has been to the course of the war?

Can Kasapoglu, a Turkish defense analyst at the Hudson Institute, noted that Turkey stepped in when no others would, and when battlefield conditions maximized the impact of the aid:

Turkish assistance was like a cortisone shot, effective and crucial to keep the body moving despite pain. It was critical at the outset that Turkey was contributing TB2s when other NATO members were arguing about nonlethal aid like helmets. They were very useful at a time when the battlefield was very messy, and the Russians were struggling to put together multiple-corps level operations—unlike anything they had seen in 2014, in Georgia, or in the Chechen wars. There were gaps in Russian integrated air defense, clumsy logistics, incomplete battlefield intelligence and surveillance. The Ukrainians pursued a different target set than the Russians anticipated—they were more interested in hunting down bread trucks and fuel tankers than artillery or main battle tanks, because they knew logistics would be the Achilles’ heel of a drive on Kyiv. Turkish aid also gave a huge political boost—remember that at that time the West was offering Zelensky a flight out of Kyiv, while he was committed to staying and resisting. It was a critical turning point in the political and popular will to resist—and helped rally the resistance and defense while singing the praises of TB2 Bayraktar. It may be less critical now, but was hugely critical then.³⁴

Vlad Socor, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, expressed skepticism that the support has been sufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory, though it may have staved off immediate defeat:

There may not be an end to the war in the commonly understood sense. References to “when peace comes,” or “after the end of the war,” lose meaning in the age of hybrid war, with no clear delineation of war and peace. At best there will be an armistice, codified or not. It will become frozen with varying degrees of conflict continuing, with spikes of high intensity, and long-term low intensity conflict. This is likely to resemble the state of affairs from 2015 to 2022 in Ukraine. It can further be argued that Russia has already won, in the sense that Hans Petter Midttun asserted in 2023—Russia does not need to win another square centimeter of [Ukrainian] territory in order to win the war. It cannot be dislodged; it could have been dislodged in summer 2023 if the Biden admin had not self-deterred. Ukraine has suffered a catastrophic hemorrhage of civilian population to the West and to Russia. Depopulation, destruction, lost access to most of Black Sea have ensued. The West is prepared to provide some military protection to rump Ukraine, and in that sense Turkish aid will become even less relevant over time.³⁵

The future course of the war in Ukraine is unclear as of mid-2024, but the role of Turkish arms, training, and defense industrial cooperation heretofore has been significant. Turkey helps Ukraine for several reasons: two-way technology transfer, profit, supporting NATO—but above all else, the knowledge that Ukrainian defeat would transform Russia into a far more dangerous neighbor.³⁶

Possible areas of cooperation with the West

In the coming years, and no matter the course of that war, Ankara possesses unique assets to stabilize the region through its:

1. Defense industry.
2. Naval power.
3. Geography/control of the straits.
4. Ability to expand cooperation within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).
5. Diplomatic agility.

In the national defense sector, for instance, Turkey has begun production of a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the Kaan, with a prototype flown on February 21, 2024. Ukraine has indicated that it will buy, and perhaps help build, the Kaan.³⁷Overall, Turkish defense industry output nearly doubled between the 2008 Georgia war and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, making Turkey the world’s eleventh-largest arms exporter (with 1.1% of global output), and dramatically reducing reliance on arms imports.³⁸ The defense industrial partnership between Turkey and  Ukraine is a good fit, and goes both ways: Ukraine produces systems that Turkey has lagged in, such as high-thrust engines for aircraft.³⁹Ukrainian forces have destroyed between 20 percent and 30 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet,⁴⁰ in some cases using Turkish systems, shifting the long-term naval balance of power in the region. Turkish advances in unmanned systems have provided a partial equalizer to Russian defense technological advantages, one that helps Ukrainian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and other Russian neighbors to deter or blunt Russian military adventures, or at least the ability to support them from the sea.⁴¹ A major naval buildup in recent years, led by indigenously produced ships and systems, has put the Turkish Navy on a more equal footing with Russia’s Black Sea fleet.⁴²

Control of the straits favors Turkey in the Black Sea in a way that no other power can replicate. Montreux rights have been used well since the start of the war.⁴³ Kasapoglu put it this way:

After Ukraine destroyed a good portion of the Black Sea fleet without a real fleet of their own to speak of—unprecedented in modern warfare—the Russians were vulnerable because they could not augment from other fleets. The damage was done not with frigates or submarines, but with ground-based missiles and unmanned systems. Russian concepts of A2/AD were used against them by Ukraine’s coastal defense program; the beast is not immune to its own venom, and Montreux helped.⁴⁴

Turkey has yet to fully gain the upper hand over Russia in the Black Sea region. There is no freedom of navigation, though the Russians have been pushed off the coast of Ukraine. A narrow strip along the territorial seas of Romania and Bulgaria remains open, but the costs of insurance, and demining prohibit normal commerce. The Ukrainian ports of Kherson and Mykolaiv remain blocked—stranding several Turkish merchant ships in Kherson since February 2022. Turkey has not troubled Russia over the Shukru Okan incident, in which Russian forces forcibly boarded and inspected a small Turkish ship.⁴⁵ 

Deepening cooperation within the OTS provides Ankara additional diplomatic and economic partners with a common view of the region as a secure, stable, and prosperous stretch of the Middle Corridor, an east-west economic project free from Russian (or Iranian) control.⁴⁶ Economic partnerships can complement Turkish hard-power deterrence in the region through development projects that benefit Russia as well as other littoral and regional states. The Turkish-brokered grain deal of 2023 provides an example of such thinking: by negotiating terms for the sale of Ukrainian and Russian grain, Ankara was, for a time, able to help both countries, as well as grain consumers further afield.⁴⁷ The deal had numerous shortcomings, but demonstrated Turkey’s diplomatic agility—the ability to convene both conflict parties and generate creative, economically-oriented approaches to de-escalation.⁴⁸

Obstacles and challenges: Russia, littoral sensitivity, and intra-NATO trust deficit

Despite Turkey’s great potential for strengthening the defense of Ukraine, bolstering NATO deterrence, and stabilizing the region, three key dynamics limit the room for convergence with Ankara’s Western partners:

1. Risk aversion in Ankara regarding Moscow.
2. Skepticism and sensitivity regarding greater NATO presence in the Black Sea region, and actions by some Western powers to limit Turkish aid to Ukraine, even though Turkey is one NATO member that Putin knows can and will hit back effectively—a legacy of conflicts in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus.⁴⁹ 
3. Possession of the means and will to inflict pain on Russia, which may create a mutual interdependence with costs that deter conflict.⁵⁰

This brutal agreement or mutual deterrence epitomizes Ankara’s Eurasian strategy of balancing against Russia with NATO, Black Sea neighbors Ukraine and Georgia, and the OTS, while assuring Russia that such balancing is not a prelude to open antagonism. This enigmatic relationship inclines Turkish strategy more toward deterrence and diplomatic overtures than mutual economic injury with the Russians.

This strategy comports with US interests in limiting Russian aggression, despite the difference in method.⁵¹ Erdoğan has made it clear that Turkey can and will push back against Russia over a broad geographical range, but prefers to do so cautiously and patiently in the region. The rough symmetry that underwrites this arrangement would be upset were Ukraine to lose access to the sea.⁵² 

The Russians understand that Turkish regional hedging not only limits their reach, but also militates against perceived Western threats and intrusions in or near the Black Sea.⁵³ This exemplifies the Turkish tradition of balancing Russia against the West to ensure autonomy from both, as noted in the opening of the chapter.⁵⁴ Complex interdependence with Russia conveys mutual leverage, meaning that both sides have reason to reach mutually acceptable stability in the Black Sea region; it may be the only significant nonzero-sum factor in the current regional security equation, and therefore a unique advantage for postconflict arrangements.⁵⁵

Western security analysts have argued that securing NATO’s southern flank and the Black Sea region more generally requires a more robust military presence in Romania, Bulgaria, and on the Black Sea.⁵⁶ The latter proposition runs headlong into Turkey’s “blue homeland” doctrine, which dictates that Turkey assert primacy in its near waters with the same vigor it affords ground territory and airspace. In the case of the Black Sea, this can be read as: NATO does not own the Black Sea, nor will Russia.⁵⁷ Western pressure for greater access for nonlittoral navies is viewed by Ankara as escalatory and unnecessary.⁵⁸ Turkey’s experience with Western interventions on its southern borders (e.g., Iraq, Syria) has not been positive, and they are anxious not to turn the Black Sea region into the Middle East.⁵⁹ 

If Ankara will brook no external lead for Black Sea security, is it willing and able to take on the role? There are positive signs. One came earlier this year when a Turkish F-16 flying from a Romanian airbase went to investigate possible debris on Romanian territory after a Russian drone attack near Ukraine’s border with Romania.⁶⁰ Bulgaria has signed a new agreement with Turkey to allow similar flights.⁶¹ Another example is Turkish contribution to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a brigade-sized force created in 2014 to bolster NATO’s deterrence against conventional attack.⁶² 

While Turkey’s role in maritime security is often discussed, its role in the air domain is less examined. The US approval of F-16 modernization kits will make Turkey a stronger anchor on NATO’s southern aerial flank. As US allies in and near the region, and Ukraine, expand the use of their F-16s, Turkey’s decades of experience with the platform (including maintenance and production capabilities) will necessarily strengthen NATO’s southern capabilities in the air.⁶³ Expanded air presence from NATO, expanded Ukrainian capability, and better intra-NATO air coordination will enable NATO to more effectively contest Russian air superiority, adding another layer of deterrence.

Kasapoglu believes NATO has smart options to strengthen its position in the region without major naval assets passing through the straits: 

A logical alternative to pressing Montreux’s limits is to provide everything and anything that relates to the three littoral states that are in NATO—resources, infrastructure, and authorities. A scenario in which Ankara was flexible enough on Montreux to allow US carriers or subs in? Even the most Atlanticist government in Turkey wouldn’t do it. Then policy pillars for Turkey in the Black Sea were two: Montreux and regional ownership. The latter is in tatters now due to Russian actions. There is an opportunity for the West to make the case that Russia destroyed the second pillar—and that NATO must grow new capabilities in the south to ensure Russia doesn’t end with the commanding position.⁶⁴ 

One part of the challenge, then, consists of NATO recognizing and working within Turkish sensitivities regarding the role of nonlittoral NATO states operating in the Black Sea region, and recognizing Turkey as the lead NATO power within it. Yet NATO working under Turkish lead there would require the rebuilding of mutual trust, which has been undermined by actions beyond the region over the past two decades. As Socor notes: 

Working together in the Black Sea must begin outside of the Black Sea. The U.S. must meet Turkish concerns about the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party]—stop paying and arming the YPG [People’s Protection Units affiliated with the Syrian Kurdish population] in Syria. There is a great deal of mistrust toward the U.S.—not just Erdoğan, but at a popular level. We must rebuild trust beginning with northern Syria. Turkey has interests beyond the Black Sea that require tranquility in the Black Sea: Libya, Somalia, elsewhere. This has led to a modus vivendi with Russia on terms favorable to Russia. To change that calculus, Syria is the starting point. The second step is the U.S. demonstrating that it can and will stand up to Russia, and shield Turkey, if necessary, from Russian retaliation. Ankara considers the Biden administration position on Russia—pusillanimity—when deciding how much risk to accept. ⁶⁵

Lt. Gen. (retired) Ben Hodges, former commander of NATO Land Command in Izmir, Turkey, also sees a need to rebuild trust as part of an enhanced NATO presence in the Black Sea region: 

The U.S. and other European nations should work hard to regain Turkey’s trust, sort of a U.S.-Turkey 2.0. A clearly defined US strategy for the greater Black Sea region developed in coordination with Ankara and accounting for Turkish interests and concerns would go a long way to helping rebuild that trust. At the same time, the U.S. should look for ways to maximize its opportunities for naval presence within the parameters of the Montreux Convention. In past years, we used less than 50 percent of the available days in the Black Sea because of a lack of US Navy resources and because it was not a high enough priority.⁶⁶

Italian security analyst Maurizio Geri notes that rebuilding trust between Ankara and its Western allies regarding the Black Sea has significant strategic implications. They are crucial, he says, “not only for the U.S. and NATO but for Europe more broadly, in particular because Turkey connects Europe with Central Asia, through Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan—and in the future perhaps through European Russia.” NATO allies and the US government need to see and address “this long-term value in economic and geopolitical terms,” he adds.⁶⁷ 

Yet the new US Black Sea strategy risks further eroding trust and repeating the mistakes of Syria and Iraq—by not making early strategic compromises with Turkey that will lead to support, rather than resistance, to Washington’s approach. The new, congressionally mandated, US strategy for the Black Sea appears not to have considered Turkish concerns in a substantive way. As the Atlantic Council’s Arnold Dupuy says: 

Turkey was very much absent from the initial strategy that came out last year, and a slightly updated version in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act—it was just listed as a regional state. There has to be a diplomatic effort with Turkey to work with them and not around them—Turkey has to play a key role, and there has to be a reassurance campaign. Yet formal strategy documents do not yet reflect such cooperation as an imperative. 

In other words, he says, Washington cannot ignore the Black Sea country with the longest coastline, significant economic strength, and naval forces.⁶⁸

More Turkish hedging behavior is likely, according to Kasapoglu, if this NATO member is presented with a strategy without consultation with Ankara in its developmental stage. Without that, it is a “deal-breaker.” He points to what happened in Syria:

In Syria it hasn’t gotten everything it wanted, but assigned talismanic value to confounding deals made without its inclusion. We are talking about the biggest NATO player in the region, and with much overlap with the U.S. regarding a strong Ukraine. Building coastal defenses, strengthening Georgia, strengthening [the Ukrainian] defense industry: we overlap on all. Leaving the Turks out in the cold is replicating the Syrian mistake.⁶⁹

US strategy documents are not the only irritant inhibiting trust. Another is the effort of certain EU members (especially France, Greece, and Cyprus) to prevent EU funding for purchases of military aid for Ukraine from non-EU members.⁷⁰ The latter had the effect of slowing the provision of Turkish-made artillery shells to Kyiv, while the United States was finalizing a bilateral deal bringing Turkish artillery production lines to Texas to help meet both American and Ukrainian needs. When a coalition of European powers try to undercut Turkish power elsewhere, it is hard to see how Europe can leverage Turkish power to help stabilize the Black Sea region.

Scenarios and recommendations (Part 3)

Experts disagree on where the war in Ukraine is headed, but generally agree that in either best- or worst-case scenarios, Western interests in the Black Sea region will require closer consultation and collaboration with Turkey. In the best case, continued Western assistance would stabilize Ukrainian defenses, enabling Ukrainians to retake territory lost to the Russians in recent years, and catalyzing negotiations that would probably almost certainly involve a Turkish role as facilitator, observer, and guarantor. In the worst case, a Russian victory would imperil a rump Ukraine and other littoral states in a manner that would certainly require Turkish hard power to deter. 

Recent positive movements in US-Turkish bilateral relations, including the F-16 deal and Sweden’s NATO accession, augur a strategic reconvergence that could facilitate a more secure and NATO-friendly region. Increased US diplomatic traffic to Turkey—particularly by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland (who retired in March)—created clearer channels for collaboration on Ukraine, Gaza, and other crisis areas.⁷¹ The simultaneous presence of an effective, well-connected US ambassador in Ankara and successive effective, well-connected Turkish ambassadors in Washington, have created opportunities for new growth in business and defense relationships.⁷² 

The United States and its European allies should seek to build on this positive trend with concrete steps specific to achieving a stable triangular security equation in the Black Sea region:

1. Support defense industrial complementarity between the NATO members and Turkey, as well as Ukraine and Turkey. Renewed F-16 sales and Turkish production of artillery shells in Texas are a small start to defense industrial production deals that will strengthen all three countries. As US defense assistance flows to Ukraine, some should go to Turkish-Ukrainian projects that will be sustainable once US funding flows decrease. Defense cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan—as well as economic support to the development of the Middle Corridor—should be pursued to strengthen the “Turkey and others” leg of the triangular equation. European allies should pursue more joint defense production with Turkish partners, and suspend or remove spending policies that limit common EU funding from non-EU producers of critical defense goods. 
2. Strengthen the capabilities of littoral NATO states in the region (i.e., Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) for air defense, naval defense/anti-ship missiles, and ground defensive capabilities to raise the costs of further Russian adventurism to unsustainable levels. 
3. Recognize the central role of Turkey in the region by consulting with its officials on US and NATO strategy during formulation, not after promulgation. Such consultations, as well as recognizing Turkey’s lead in NATO operations in the Black Sea region, will help avoid triggering Ankara’s hedging instincts. Washington and Brussels must avoid the temptation to work around or over Ankara when planning and resourcing security for the region; they must work with and through, instead.

Turkey, working together with its network of littoral NATO allies and non-NATO regional partners, is in a position to strengthen multilateral deterrence of further Russian aggression in the region even while it engages Moscow economically and maintains positive diplomatic relations that can reduce Russian paranoia and create openings for de-escalation. Multilateral deterrence depends in turn upon Turkish conventional military power, both its large array of forces and its proven ability to train, equip, and coordinate with forces beyond its own borders. Washington can supplement this deterrent package through the steps listed above. Other actions taken outside the Black Sea region will also affect the quality of Turkish cooperation with Western partners in it, most critically cessation or continuation of support to the YPG in Syria. Whatever the course of the war in Ukraine, stability in the Black Sea region on terms favorable to the Alliance can only be envisaged in the context of convergence with its most potent regional ally.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas.”

Colonel (retired) Rich Outzen, PhD, is a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC. He served in the Department of State as both a military and civilian advisor from 2016 through 2021, working in the Policy Planning office and later the office of the Special Representative for Syria (SRS). He was a member of the National Defense University (NDU) and Institute for National Security Studies faculty from July 2013 through June 2016. He served as the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2014-2015, on temporary duty from NDU. He previously served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Development for the U.S. Security Coordinator in Jerusalem. He has researched and published extensively on matters of policy and strategy, with a focus on the greater Middle East and Central Asia. A U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer, he has served in a variety of staff, command, and policy support assignments in Washington, D.C. and overseas. He has helped shape interagency discussion and national policy options for transitions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.  His areas of expertise include Defense Policy and Strategy, Strategic Culture, the Middle East, NATO/Europe, and Central Asia.

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment

By Maryna Vorotnyuk

Turkey and the West should explore avenues of cooperation and fostering a more cooperative engagement culture.

Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment

By Serhat Güvenç

A redefinition of the EU-Turkey relations will result with a lasting maritime security arrangement in the Black Sea.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas

By Eser Özdil

Turkey’s strategic position in the region provides cooperation opportunities for European energy security and economic interdependence.

Eastern Europe Energy & Environment

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The post Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Strategic assessment

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has undergone a profound transformation in its energy policy to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. In this evolving policy landscape, Turkey has emerged as a key partner, strategically positioned to curb Russian commercial influence in Europe and the Black Sea region while maintaining its balancing act. In this vein, the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory advancements, exemplified by the REPowerEU plan, the EU Toolbox, and the European Green Deal, have significantly reshaped energy procurement strategies, emphasizing diversification and security. Turkey’s recent natural gas export agreements, primarily those with Moldova, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, underline its critical role in enhancing European energy resiliency. Moreover, Turkey’s robust liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and its potential for future projects fortify the energy security of both European nations and Black Sea littoral states. Crucially, Turkey’s nuanced balancing act in its foreign policy, encapsulated in its natural gas policy, deftly integrates price rationality with geopolitical strategy, enabling it to govern complex international dynamics effectively. Turkey’s approach ensures flexibility in energy sourcing, thus reducing dependency on any single supplier while leveraging the country’s geopolitical position to establish a resilient energy policy. This policy is characterized by agility and adaptability, responding swiftly to regional and global natural gas trade, and enabling Turkey to navigate the fast-changing dynamics in natural gas policymaking. Last but not least, even with flexibility tools like LNG terminals and/or underground storage, high-level dependency in imports on a single supplier poses energy security risks. Since securing LNG and pipe gas quickly is not possible, creating a balanced import portfolio secures countries from short-term energy shocks, which may have destructive effects on market participants. As Turkey has also been developing nuclear projects with Russia, a delicate balance in its energy relations should be carefully maintained.

Preinvasion state of natural gas trade between Europe and Russia

Understanding the evolution of the European natural gas strategy provides important context for Turkey’s ongoing ties with EU nations, especially given the direct implications for EU gas supplies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU relied heavily on Russian natural gas, representing 40 percent of imports,¹ or 150 billion cubic meters (bcm), in 2020.

With a total annual gas demand of approximately 400 bcm, the EU sourced only 10 percent domestically, and supported limited LNG infrastructure, before the war in Ukraine. In 2021, the EU imported 155 bcm of natural gas from Russia,² with the number dropping to 80 bcm in 2022,³ and 43 bcm in 2023. As a percentage, the EU’s reliance on Russian gas has decreased from 45 percent of total imports in 2021 to 15 percent in 2023. These radical policy measures, supported by technical and commercial actions, represent the EU’s renewed strategy against reliance on Russian gas.

During this period, the EU initiated a strategic transition from pipeline gas to LNG,⁴ with US LNG imports accounting for 44 percent in 2022 and 48 percent in 2023. Qatar, Algeria, and Nigeria have also become significant LNG suppliers, contributing 12.1 percent, 9.4 percent, and 5.6 percent, respectively. Despite a total reduction in pipeline gas imports, EU countries still received 17.8 bcm of LNG⁵ from Russia⁶ in 2023, representing 6.1 percent of total gas demand. In the infrastructural axis, the EU continues to sustain its ambitious investment plans for expanding LNG import capacity.

In line with the ongoing high investments in LNG infrastructure, the EU increased its LNG import capacity by 40 bcm in 2023, with plans to add another 30 bcm by 2024,⁷ though this infrastructure is still under construction. The share of LNG in the EU’s gas supply rose from 20 percent in 2021 to 41 percent in 2023, reflecting a radical diversification of energy sources in response to the conflict in Ukraine.

Importantly, while the EU continues to purchase Russian LNG via Novatek, the fourteenth sanction package,⁸ which was established in June 2024, fully prohibits all forms of reexport agreements. This measure will prevent Russian LNG carriers from utilizing the EU’s developed LNG infrastructure in the near future.

Finally, the majority of the EU’s dependence on Russian gas was based on long-term natural gas pipelines. Notably, historical pipeline agreements, such as the Gazprom-Naftogaz deal, allowed Russian gas transit through Ukraine. This $7 billion agreement⁹ aimed to transit 225 bcm from 2020 to 2024. Post-invasion reductions led Naftogaz to seek international arbitration against Gazprom, and the collaboration will no longer exist after 2024.

Other widely discussed and criticized projects within the EU were Germany’s Nord Stream pipelines, which have become inoperable. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline began operations in 2011, and the proposed Nord Stream 2 aimed to double the capacity to 110 bcm per year. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz initially supported Nord Stream 2, like his predecessor,¹⁰ Angela Merkel, despite warnings from the United States, which argued that the project created a power asymmetry in favor of Russia. Despite significant technical discussions on this asymmetry within the transatlantic community, the project was halted only following the invasion. The damage to Nord Stream 2 and the cessation of Nord Stream 1 exposed vulnerabilities in Germany’s gas supply, prompting the EU to rapidly increase investments in LNG infrastructure.

The EU’s legislative actions to diminish reliance on Russian natural gas

In October 2021, the European Commission introduced a comprehensive “toolbox”¹¹ designed to help EU member states address rising energy prices and bolster energy supply security by reducing dependence on Russian natural gas. Key measures included enhancing gas storage efficiency, establishing a collective gas purchasing platform, and reassessing the EU’s electricity market with the support of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).

In April 2022, the EU launched the EU Energy Platform¹² to focus on demand aggregation, joint purchasing of non-Russian gas, efficient use of natural gas infrastructure, and extensive international outreach. This platform aims to mitigate intra-EU competition, diversify supply chains, and reduce reliance on Russian energy sources in a coordinated and multilateral manner.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European nations, particularly Germany, intensified efforts under the REPowerEU plan¹³ to reduce dependence on Russian gas. Introduced in May 2022, REPowerEU aims to eliminate reliance on Russian fossil fuels by 2027 by emphasizing energy efficiency, transitioning to renewable energy sources, and diversifying natural gas imports. These policy measures include nationalizing Gazprom’s storage facilities to safeguard German national security.

In conjunction with the regulatory restrictions on Russian facilities, the EU updated the Renewable Energy Directive,¹⁴ setting a 45 percent renewable energy target by 2030. The European Commission’s classification of natural gas as “green”¹⁵ facilitated the expansion of LNG import capacity, aligning with REPowerEU’s objectives for non-Russian gas procurement. Clearly, the EU has implemented a comprehensive and systematic policy program that combines the EU Toolbox with the REPowerEU plan.

Evolution of Germany’s natural gas tactics

Reflecting current geopolitical power shifts and energy security concerns within the EU, there exists a concerted multilateral effort and intergovernmental approach to reducing Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas through a variety of measures. Nevertheless, Germany’s energy policy has notably differed from those of other European nations—reflecting a unique relationship with Russia over time and overlooking the importance of energy diversification in favor of strategic use of materials, primarily pipelines, in its natural gas trade, initially with the USSR and subsequently with the Russian Federation.
 
By 1981, Germany’s natural gas trade with the USSR had reached 17.2 bcm,¹⁶ without any substantial local technical improvements. Another critical twenty-five-year contract in 1981 established an annual export of 10.5 bcm.¹⁷ After the Berlin Wall fell and Germany reunified, the USSR began supplying about 30 percent of West Germany’s natural gas needs. By 1990, Soviet gas exports to Western Europe had grown drastically to 63 bcm.¹⁸

During this period, Germany faced two significant political-economic challenges in its dealings with Russia. First, the USSR engaged in barter trade, exchanging natural gas for steel pipes, pipe-laying equipment, and other related infrastructure materials with Germany via its companies. Second, Germany leveraged its robust domestic iron and steel sectors to secure cheap Russian natural gas, which it then sold to its European allies.

This approach greatly expanded Germany’s economic reach and indirectly subsidized gas prices for other European countries by maintaining dependence on Russia as the primary natural gas source. A similar mindset prevailed in many Germany-Russia natural gas projects—until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted a significant shift.

End of an era: Russia’s 2022 invasion cuts historic gas bonds with Germany

Germany’s reliance on Russian natural gas, a legacy of the USSR-era pipe-for-gas agreements,¹⁹ conflicts with the essential principle of energy diversification. It is best exemplified by its pre-invasion support for Nord Stream 1 and 2, which represented a total capacity of 110 bcm yearly and would have made Germany unilaterally dependent on Russian gas as a single source, without alternative investments such as LNG infrastructure and gas storage. Germany’s reassessment led to the implementation of the EU Toolbox and REPowerEU, which are aligned with the Green Deal’s targets and green economic model.

In reaction to escalating energy security concerns, Germany has accelerated its diversification efforts by investing in LNG infrastructure, notably acquiring four floating LNG storage and liquefaction facilities. In aggregate, Europe’s LNG investment is poised for considerable expansion. Currently, there are thirty-seven operational import terminals:²⁰ eight newly commissioned, four expanded in 2022 and 2023, thirteen new terminal projects under construction, and four existing facilities with planned expansions.

Turkey and Germany: Contrasting approaches to natural gas

Within the transatlantic community, Turkey, much like Germany, has faced criticism for its reliance on Russia. Nonetheless, Turkey and Germany, as NATO allies, exhibit starkly divergent strategies in their approaches to natural gas procurement and energy security. Reflecting Turkey’s balancing act in its natural gas policy, Ankara has historically pursued a multidimensional foreign policy that is sensitive to price fluctuations and geopolitical shifts from the Black Sea to Europe.

This approach began in earnest in 1986 under then-President Turgut Özal, whose neoliberal vision led to market-driven strategies that reshaped Turkey’s natural gas trade mindset. A decisive point was reached in 1987, when the state-owned BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation initiated its first gas imports²¹ from the USSR, marking the start of Turkey’s strategy to procure natural gas internationally. This was followed in 1988 by the beginning of LNG purchases from Algeria,²² diversifying further in 1995 with a long-term LNG contract with Nigeria at Marmara Ereğlisi, Turkey’s first LNG terminal.²³ The deal with Nigeria is widely believed to have been insurance in case of Russian gas cuts.

Turkey’s natural gas procurement history contrasts strongly with Germany’s energy policy, which has been centered on Russian natural gas and offered limited alternatives like LNG infrastructure. Germany’s dependence was highlighted during Russia’s irredentist moves in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, and lastly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, delineating the vulnerabilities inherent in this reliance. Germany’s turning point came quite late, in 2022, when it implemented the EU Toolbox, REPowerEU, and the Green Deal to diversify its energy sources and develop LNG capabilities.

Amid the varied landscape of energy strategies, it is essential to underscore that Turkey distinctly avoided the trade of strategic equipment, such as Germany’s pipe-for-gas strategy, which set the stage for advancing Russian influence in Europe through its pipelines and storage facilities. For more than fifty years, Turkey’s multidimensional approach has been a cornerstone of state policy, beginning with engagement with international markets in the 1980s. This strategy effectively melds considerations of price rationality and ongoing geopolitical risk assessment, integrating them in the foreign-policymaking process through a meticulously managed balancing act. (See Part 1 for more on diplomacy and dialogue.)

In line with this balancing act, Turkey expanded its LNG import capabilities and infrastructure, demonstrating a proactive and versatile approach that has been adaptable to price volatility since the first day of its natural gas procurement. This multidimensional strategy has always ensured flexibility and security in its energy supply and underlined Turkey’s aim of diversifying its energy sources without becoming dependent on fixed infrastructural ties, the dangers of which can be seen in Germany’s delayed response to diversifying away from Russian natural gas infrastructure.

Turkey’s policy and interests in the Black Sea region

From the 1980s to the 2020s, Turkey’s natural gas policy has consistently involved incorporating delicate balancing acts into its contracts with other nations. Between 2010 and 2023, under the leadership of Hakan Fidan at the National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı; MIT), Turkey demonstrably enhanced the technical capabilities²⁴ of its foreign operations within the security sector, making the security bureaucracy one of the key decision-makers of foreign policy. In June 2023, Fidan was named minister of foreign affairs.

Fidan’s vision for Turkish foreign policy is informed by the concept of complex adaptive systems, leading him to move away from traditional definitions²⁵ of international systems, whether unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. He views the international system’s complexity as a call for agile policymaking, a strategy that echoes Özal’s nuanced approach. Notably, Özal advanced Turkey’s strategic interests by securing pipeline gas agreements with the USSR while diversifying energy sources (e.g., LNG imports, Marmara Ereğli terminal). Fidan, too, combines in-depth geopolitical analysis with a systematic decision-making process, skillfully addressing both economic and security challenges.

Prompted by geopolitical tensions originating in Syria after Turkey downed an SU-24 type Russian jet in 2015,²⁶ a critical reassessment of the nation’s substantial reliance on Russian gas, which had previously constituted over 50 percent of its total gas imports, became a focal point of Turkish foreign policy.

This strategic reconsideration sparked a vigorous public and governmental debate, which in turn accelerated significant investments in Turkey’s LNG import infrastructure. In this vein, the transmission capacity of Turkey’s natural gas networks has expanded, with current daily gas entry capacity exceeding four hundred thousand cubic meters (mcm) daily. Turkey is actively working to increase its natural gas storage capacity to at least 20 percent of its annual consumption.

Significant steps in this direction include the deployment of three floating storage regasification units (FSRUs) and upgrades to the total capacities at LNG terminals, now totaling approximately 156 mcm per day. These developments are also in line with the goals set forth by Turkey’s Ministry of Energy, led by Alparslan Bayraktar, following the election last year,²⁷ to further secure the nation’s energy supply and diversify its sources, ultimately aiming to elevate total capacity to over 500 mcm per day from 2023 onwards.²⁸

Since 2015, Turkey has decisively shifted away from an overdependence on Russian gas. Nonetheless, the implications of Turkey’s balancing act in natural gas contracts may vary in response to price fluctuations and geopolitical assessments, as can be observed in the comparative supply strategies between 2020-21 and 2021-23.

Rising through the ranks of LNG importers in Europe (2020-21)

Turkey’s development of its LNG infrastructure facilitates the implementation of its balancing act in natural gas contracts, enabling it to sign LNG contracts along with pipelines. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2021, Turkey’s approach to securing its natural gas needs via LNG contracts was notably a consequence of its traditional policy of price rationality. In accordance with that policy, Turkey positioned itself as the fourth-largest LNG importer in Europe with an increase of 1.3 million metric tons in 2020.²⁹

This positioning entailed a shift toward spot market purchases rather than long-term commitments, as global gas prices plummeted due to decreased demand on production cycles. During that time of pandemic lockdowns, Turkey capitalized on these lower prices to enhance its energy security without binding itself to long-term agreements. The flexibility of relying on spot market LNG allowed Turkey to manage its energy costs effectively during a period of high economic and global uncertainty.

Adapting to market shifts brought piped gas to the fore (2021-23)

From 2021 to 2023, Turkey shifted its natural gas procurement strategy, increasingly favoring contracts through pipelines with suppliers like Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. In 2022, the total volume of natural gas imports to Turkey reached 54.66 bcm, with a substantial 72.25 percent being transported via pipelines.³⁰ This reflects a strong preference for pipeline-based deliveries over LNG, which accounted for only 27.75 percent of imported natural gas.

By 2023, this preference was evident as Russia became Turkey’s predominant energy supplier, providing 59.14 percent³¹ of its energy imports by October, according to data from the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu; EPDK). The shift in a very short period from LNG to pipeline contracts was a clear demonstration of Turkey’s balancing act in a multidimensional era, addressing the complexity of economic and security challenges. It also showcased Turkey’s agile approach to the consistently changing international system. This shift was driven by a combination of factors, including energy market price stabilization, increased demand in the LNG sector, and a gradual increase in natural gas prices.

Examining the nuances of Turkey’s current energy policy

To fully understand the implications of Turkey’s balancing act in natural gas procurement, it is essential to examine the broader context and current dynamics of the Turkish natural gas and energy market. Turkey’s energy policy has undergone a significant evolution across two distinct phases, as defined by Bayraktar,³² each designed to effectively respond to both global shifts and domestic needs.

Energy transition 1.0: Liberalization and privatization (2002-17)

The initial phase began with the ascent of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) to power in 2002, focusing on liberalizing and privatizing the energy sector. This era ushered in over $60 billion in investments, dismantled monopolistic structures, and cultivated a more transparent and competitive market, thereby enhancing innovation and efficiency.

Energy transition 2.0: Localization, improvement, market predictability (2017-23)

This second phase prioritized enhancing the security of supply, localization, and market predictability. During this period, Turkey significantly expanded its LNG capabilities, incorporated new infrastructure such as FSRUs, and made a major natural gas discovery in the Sakarya gas field, all of which substantially strengthened domestic resources and supply security. Despite these advancements, challenges persisted, notably the continued dominance of state-owned BOTAS in the natural gas sector, which impacted market liquidity and predictability.

Energy transition 3.0: Decarbonization, decentralization, digitalization, and diversity (2023-35)

Currently, under the continual impacts of global regulations on energy markets, some industry experts, including myself, argue³³ that Turkey is in the midst of a third phase, dubbed the smart energy transition, which emphasizes decarbonization, decentralization, digitalization, and diversity (the 4Ds).

This phase aims to ensure secure energy supplies, diversify the energy mix, and position Turkey as a central energy hub between Asia and Europe. A significant objective within this framework is the development of green and blue hydrogen technologies, with a target of achieving five gigawatts (GW) of electrolyzer capacity by 2035, highlighting Turkey’s commitment to renewable and sustainable energy solutions.

Understanding the nuances of each transition era in Turkey’s energy policy is crucial to grasping the strategic shifts made as part of its balancing act and how they have shaped its current energy landscape. As Turkey continues to evolve its energy strategy, appreciating these nuances will be key to achieving a resilient and diversified energy future.

Potential areas of Turkish-European cooperation

Turkey and the EU are on the cusp of developing a deeply interconnected partnership, centered around natural gas and renewable energy sources, and set against a backdrop of shifting regional powers in the international arena. Despite the negative political climate³⁴ that has persisted between the EU and Turkey for almost ten years, their commercial relations continue to strengthen, exemplifying a new model of bilateral governance marked by transactionalism.

Within this governance framework, Turkey’s strategic position as a NATO member enhances its role as a critical energy conduit between East and West, providing a unique opportunity to develop energy cooperation that could significantly impact energy security and economic interdependence throughout Europe.

Meanwhile, as Russia redirects its natural gas exports to new markets like China, India, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, in response to strained relations with European nations, Turkey continues to maintain strong natural gas trade links with both Russia and the EU.

Despite Russia’s attempts to overtake Turkey’s cultural and political ties with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to establish alternative gas routes, the robustness of Turkey’s trade relationships emphasizes its key role in the global energy market.

In this geopolitical setting, this intricate chessboard showcases Turkey’s balancing act, as it incrementally challenges Russian market dominance in Europe by negotiating lower gas prices, while serving as a crucial conduit for transporting piped gas through both the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which are carrying only Azerbaijani gas being produced in Shah Deniz field and non-Russian LNG to Europe through non-Russian agreements.

At this juncture, Turkey’s delicate balance between these dynamics not only demonstrates its capacity for multidimensional governance, but also has the potential to diminish Russia’s influence in global markets over the long term as a unique member of the Alliance.

Integrating Black Sea and European energy security: Turkey’s strategic influence

Turkey’s energy policy, including leveraging natural gas and renewables, holds strategic importance. Establishing a Turkey-EU natural gas trade axis could diminish Russian influence/control³⁵ over Eastern and Central Europe while improving and formalizing relations with the EU, potentially opening doors to cooperative ventures in renewable energy. At this point, opening an energy chapter for official negotiations on EU accession will help both sides further harmonize energy regulatory frameworks as well as energy policies. Focusing on enhancing stability in the broader Black Sea region through natural gas, Turkey (via BOTAS) has secured significant natural gas export agreements since 2022 with several Eastern and Central European countries including Moldova, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and potentially Greece through the Bulgarian agreement.
 
Building on this strategy, BOTAS aimed to secure new natural gas export agreements by leveraging its infrastructure investments, advanced transmission system, geographical location, and robust infrastructure to meet the natural gas demand of Eastern and Central Europe. As part of this strategy, BOTAS and Moldova’s East Gas Energy Trading agreed to export two million cubic meters³⁶ of natural gas daily to Moldova starting in September 2023. This translates to approximately 0.73 bcm annually, or about 25 percent of Moldova’s annual natural gas³⁷ consumption.
 
Similarly, Turkey’s strategy to secure Central European energy and increase Romania’s energy resiliency against Russian influence resulted in another export deal with Romania in October 2023. This agreement permits the supply of up to four million cubic meters³⁸ of natural gas per day, and will expire in March 2025. Under this deal, Turkey contributes approximately 1.46 bcm annually to Romania, constituting about 12 percent of Romania’s annual natural gas consumption.
 
On the other hand, BOTAS and Hungarian state-owned energy company MVM signed³⁹ another crucial natural gas export deal in August 2023, marking Turkey’s first nonbordering recipient of natural gas exports. Even though portions are small, it is a remarkable event in terms of Hungary’s efforts to diversify gas import sources.

The most significant agreement to boost Turkey’s commercial influence in the Black Sea regional energy markets is with Bulgaria. In January 2023, Turkey and Bulgaria, via Bulgargaz, sealed a comprehensive thirteen-year agreement enabling the annual transmission of up to 1.5 bcm.⁴⁰ This deal, which supplied approximately 50 percent of Bulgaria’s natural gas consumption⁴¹ in 2023, also grants Bulgargaz access to this capacity at Turkish LNG terminals, notably the new FSRU Saros terminal, with the gas transported through Turkey’s network to the Turkish-Bulgarian border.

Turkey’s economic collaborations with European countries, particularly the littoral nations of the Black Sea like Bulgaria and Romania, underline the establishment of a strategic cooperation to curb Russian commercial influence. This cooperation model could even pave the way for the reactivation of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline (TBP) with a reverse gas flow, further entrenching the alliance in a complex interdependent manner.

In this context, as a policy option, the reverse flow of the TBP—which would allow gas to move from the south to the north, bypassing Russia—could be utilized to strengthen cooperation through pipelines. This would require technical modifications, such as installing bidirectional compressors, an area where Turkey has the necessary expertise and infrastructure knowledge. This policy option would reduce the geopolitical leverage of a single supplier, like Russia, over transit countries. For instance, Turkey could leverage this capability to act as a gas hub, redistributing gas from its LNG terminals or Azerbaijani and/or Turkmen supplies to Europe, further enhancing the region’s energy flexibility and security.

Turkey’s LNG terminals, including the Etki FSRU (28 mcm/day), Marmara Ereğlisi LNG terminal (35 mcm/day), Egegaz LNG terminal (40 mcm/day), Dörtyol FSRU (28 mcm/day), and Saros FSRU (25 mcm/day), collectively contribute to a capacity of 156 mcm/day.⁴² This extensive capacity, coupled with Turkey’s idle capacity of approximately 15 bcm, positions it to supply LNG to Slovenia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively. This is a window of opportunity for Turkey’s advanced LNG infrastructure to play a crucial role.

Conclusion and energy policy recommendations

Turkey plays—and will continue to play—a crucial role in supporting the energy security of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European countries. This strategic contribution not only enhances these countries’ energy resiliency against Russia’s commercial influence, but also strengthens a more stable Black Sea region as Turkey, the transit country, emerges as NATO’s second-largest army. Turkey’s recent gas export agreements with Moldova, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria underline its commitment and capacity to act as a key energy supplier and gas hub in the region.

Recommendations

1. Increase the capacity of TAP/TANAP: Turkey’s transportation of non-Russian gas contracts to Europe aligns with Europe’s 2027 targets. To support this alignment, efforts should be made to increase the pipeline capacity of TANAP and TAP. This involves raising the current capacity from 16 bcm to 31 bcm to facilitate the transportation of non-Russian gas to Europe via Turkey, thereby enhancing the continent’s energy security and reducing reliance on Russian gas.
2. Expand Black Sea energy cooperation: Turkey could further broaden its natural gas export agreements and strategic partnerships with Eastern and Central European countries in the Black Sea region, thereby diminishing Russian influence and solidifying its role as an energy hub in the European energy markets.
3. Maximize production from the Sakarya gas field: Turkey’s first deepwater gas field discovery is expected to significantly increase its production capacity from 3.5 bcm to 14 bcm in its second phase. This field should be developed as a key resource for supplying natural gas to Eastern and Central European countries, contributing to regional energy diversification and security.
4. Enable renewal of the Turkey-Greece interconnector: In 2023, Greece’s total natural gas consumption was 6.38 bcm. The Turkey-Greece interconnector, which transported 0.75 bcm, accounted for approximately 11.75 percent of Greece’s total consumption. To ensure continued support and normalization of energy relations, the Turkey-Greece interconnector agreement should be renewed.
5. Enable reverse flow of Trans-Balkan Pipeline for regional security: Prioritize completing the technical modifications of this pipeline to enable reverse flow capabilities, facilitating the transport of natural gas from the south to the north and enhancing regional energy security.
6. Secure Central Europe via Turkish LNG: Given Turkey’s advanced LNG infrastructure and significant idle capacity, there is an opportunity to enhance energy supply diversification for Central European countries such as Slovenia, Hungary, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7. Integrate small modular reactors to diversify Turkey’s nuclear energy security supply: To ensure energy security and reduce dependency on Russian nuclear power, Turkey should urgently prioritize integrating small modular reactors into its nuclear energy supplies, targeting an additional minimum 5 GW capacity.
8. Enhance investments in renewable energy in alignment with the EU’s Green Deal: Joint ventures between Turkey and the EU in renewable energy projects, including wind, solar, and green hydrogen, will diversify both regions’ energy mixes and significantly reduce carbon emissions. This strategy aligns with the EU’s Green Deal, which aims to achieve at least 45 percent of energy from renewable sources by 2030, while reducing dependence on Russian gas.
9. Use Turkey’s strategic position to create new natural gas commercialization routes: To enhance regional energy security and support the EU’s REPowerEU plan, Turkey should capitalize on its geopolitical position by developing and commercializing natural gas routes from Turkmenistan, northern Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean. This diversification would reduce dependence on Russian gas, for both Turkey and Europe, and foster both regional stability and economic integration.
10. Strengthen collaboration between Turkey’s EPDK and the EU’s ACER: To enhance regulatory frameworks and operational efficiency in energy markets, EPDK and ACER should bolster their ongoing cooperation by focusing on joint technical workshops, personnel exchange programs, collaborative research projects, and capacity-building initiatives, thereby supporting energy market integration, security, and the adoption of renewable technologies in alignment with the EU’s Green Deal and Turkey’s energy transition goals.

Continue on to the next chapter of the report: “Main takeaways and policy recommendations.”

Eser Özdil today bases his expertise on one and half decades of business experience. As part of his professional portfolio, Mr. Özdil is responsible of management GLOCAL Consulting, Investment & Trade, where he is competently advising top energy companies on public policy, government relations and commercial diplomacy, commercial due diligence, strategy and business development, mergers & acquisitions,  investment and trade. Between 2012 and 2020, Mr. Özdil worked as Secretary General at Petroleum and Natural Gas Platform Association (PETFORM) based in Ankara, Turkey. Prior to PETFORM, he worked at various regional associations and think-tanks. Prior to PETFORM, he worked at various regional associations and think-tanks. Mr. Özdil participated in various official meetings of international organizations, namely Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), European Union, World Bank, OECD, IEA, EFET, and IGU. Özdil recently joined IVLP (International Visitor Leadership Program), the global public diplomacy program run by the U.S. Department of State. He is also a member of the BMW Foundation Responsible Leaders Network and Non-Resident Fellow of Atlantic Council.

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 1. Political and diplomatic dialogue: Challenges and opportunities for Black Sea cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-2022 environment

By Maryna Vorotnyuk

Turkey and the West should explore avenues of cooperation and fostering a more cooperative engagement culture.

Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 2. Maritime security: Redefining regional order in a new security environment

By Serhat Güvenç

A redefinition of the EU-Turkey relations will result with a lasting maritime security arrangement in the Black Sea.

Defense Policy Eastern Europe

Report Sep 13, 2024

Part 3. Defense cooperation: Turkey’s triangular balancing in the Black Sea region

By Rich Outzen

For stability in the Black Sea region, the West should seek to converge with its most potent regional ally, Turkey.

Conflict Defense Industry

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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The post Part 4. Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Black Sea and European energy security: From pipelines to liquefied natural gas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the challenges for Mickoski’s North Macedonia? Following the significant power shift in North Macedonia’s May 8 elections, the VRMO-DPMNE party, led by Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski faces a complex landscape.

Six renowned experts have crafted a strategy brief for the Atlantic Council, outlining crucial recommendations for the new government, including democratic reforms, the fight against corruption, economic revitalization, EU integration, and addressing rising ethnic tensions.

In this #BalkansDebrief, Resident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare engages in a conversation with three of the policy brief’s authors to discuss the country’s reform agenda.

Key questions include: What economic and political implications arise from the loan exceeding half a billion loan from Hungary? What strategies does the government have to address the fiscal deficit?

Why is there little optimism for immediate Constitutional changes and how could this impact the center-right government? 

How will the citizens’ frustration with the stalled EU integration process be addressed to progress with EU accession?

What are the potential consequences for the country’s democracy amidst the Ethno-nationalist narrative following recent ethnic tensions?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post What are the challenges for Mickoski’s North Macedonia? | A Debrief with Malinka Jordanova, Branimir Jovanovic and Lura Pollozhani appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? The European Union’s recent memorandum of understanding with Serbia on raw materials has sparked debate across the Balkans. Signed during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit, the MoU revives a controversial lithium mining project, drawing opposition from many Serbians.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and Head of Europe’s Futures Project in Vienna, to dissect this complex issue.

Does Mr. Vejvoda share the criticism that the EU and Germany are prioritizing lithium access in Serbia over essential democratic principles like environmental protection, rule of law, and independent media?

With concerns about weak independent institutions and a critical public sphere in Serbia, can the country uphold high environmental and social standards?

How can the EU ensure that such agreements maintain rigorous environmental and social principles?

Could this agreement reduce Serbia’s reliance on China, and what might be the broader geopolitical implications?

Join #BalkansDebrief for an in-depth discussion on the potential impacts of this deal and the geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the EU in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? A Debrief with Ivan Vejvoda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? Why should Europe focus on the Balkans? What are the potential opportunities and challenges for EU enlargement and the Growth Plan for this region?

Join Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare in this episode of #BalkansDebrief as she interviews Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy and current President of the Institut Jacques Delors. With his extensive experience in European Union affairs and his recent influential report on the future of the Single Market, Mr. Letta provides deep insights into the necessary reforms for successful EU enlargement.

In this episode, Mr. Letta discusses his advocacy for the “Regatta Method” over the “Big Bang” approach for EU enlargement, emphasizing the importance of allowing each country to join when ready rather than waiting for the slowest in the region. He also elaborates on his proposed blueprint for EU enlargement success, which includes critical reforms such as on veto rules and the creation of a “solidarity enlargement facility.”

Discover the future of the EU and the vital steps needed to integrate the six Western Balkan countries into the new Single Market, as envisioned by Enrico Letta, a staunch advocate of enlargement in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? A Debrief with Enrico Letta appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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For decades, the United States and Serbia have engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance. Recently, Serbian think tank representatives visited Washington, DC, for critical talks with US policymakers.

Their agenda? Navigating the complexities of Serbia’s democratic health and evolving foreign policy, including unpacking its shifting alliances with Russia and China, and how these relationships impact Serbia’s aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU).

Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Bandovic, Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Nikola Burazer, Program Director at the Center for Contemporary Politics, to discuss their main concerns regarding Serbia’s state of democracy, nationalistic rhetoric, and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What are the top foreign policy and security challenges facing Serbia currently?

The All-Serb Assembly reignited nationalist sentiment across the region. How significant is this, and what potential consequences could it have for Serbia and regional stability?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Where next for Serbian foreign policy? | A Debrief with Igor Bandovic and Nikola Burazer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? Football and politics are deeply intertwined, especially in the Balkans, where the mix can be volatile. At the UEFA Euro Cup in Germany this year, nationalistic chants and provocative acts highlighted the ongoing tensions among Balkan nations. Serbia, Albania, and Croatia clashed not only in the stadiums but also in a display of ethnic rivalries.

In this episode Ilva Tare is joined by Florian Bieber, a renowned historian and professor at the University of Graz, specializing in inter-ethnic relations and nationalism in the Balkans. They discuss the complex role of football as both a catalyst for rivalry and a potential bridge for unity in the region.

How does football act as a double-edged sword, fueling both rivalry and potentially fostering unity in the Balkans?

How do nationalistic rhetoric and historical narratives shape the current tensions?

Can the younger generations break the cycle of resentment, or are they destined to inherit past grievances? What role can they play in reconciliation?

Given the political landscape, is peace in the Balkans a realistic goal? What concrete steps can governments and the international community take to foster stability?

Join #BalkansDebrief for a thought-provoking discussion on the dynamics of football, nationalism, and the quest for peace and reconciliation in the Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? | A Debrief with Florian Bieber appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why is distrust in institutions alarming for the Balkans? The recent International Republican Institute (IRI) poll on the Western Balkans has revealed some concerning trends for the region’s aspirations of joining the European Union. While the war in Ukraine presented a potential opening, the path to membership appears to be facing significant challenges. 

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Amila Karačić, Director of Programs of IRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who also oversees the Western Balkans regional programs, to discuss the main takeaways of the poll conducted in the six countries. 

Is there evidence that pro-Russian narratives are gaining traction outside of Serbia?

Why are citizens in the Western Balkans less likely to push for political change, despite wanting EU integration? How deep is their distrust in politicians and institutions?

Why does it seem that citizens prefer strongman leaders despite their potential to undermine the path towards the EU? 

Is nationalism a concern in the region? In which country is it most pronounced?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is distrust in institutions alarming for the Balkans? | A debrief with Amila Karačić appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Western Balkans stand at a pivotal moment. Regional stability, security, and prosperity require a more robust US engagement. EU accession remains the goal but simmering ethnic tensions and resurgent nationalism demand a comprehensive US strategy that includes specific and actionable commitments.

In the light of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine that has shaken European security foundations, how can the US enhance its collaboration with the EU to develop a unified approach regarding the future of the Western Balkans?

Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, discusses with outgoing US Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Representative for the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar, at the end of his term, the most pressing issues for the region’s EU prospects, the challenges with corruption and economic growth, and the main concerns for increased tension and risks for stability.

Tare asks DAS Escobar if prioritizing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities on the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia was the most effective strategy, and what is the path forward on this issue?

Is the US considering alternative approaches towards Serbia to achieve progress on EU alignment, especially after the composition of the new government? 

Can the US prevent a fracturing of the fragile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

How concerning is Russian influence in the Western Balkans? Specific questions on Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania will also be covered in this #BalkansDebrief episode.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the US role amidst fragility in the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Gabriel Escobar appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What were the main outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris, Belgrade and Budapest? How successful was President Macron in demonstrating European unity on China? How concerned should the EU be with China’s economic and bilateral relationship with Hungary? What are the implications of growing Serbia-Chinese relations for the Western Balkans and the region’s European integration?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Valbona Zeneli, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow, to discuss the significance and impact of Xi’s visit and implications for EU-China relations and transatlantic cooperation on China.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What was the outcome of Xi’s visit to Europe? | A Debrief from Valbona Zeneli appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wrapped up in this electoral contest is the issue of a constitutional amendment. In 2020, Bulgaria vetoed North Macedonia’s EU accession. Sofia has since demanded the inclusion of language in North Macedonia’s constitution recognizing ethnic Bulgarians as one of the country’s founding peoples as a prerequisite to restarting EU accession negotiations. The proposed amendment is but one in a series of disputes over identity and history that have plagued relations between the two countries and halted North Macedonia’s progress toward EU membership. Polling has found that over two-thirds of North Macedonia’s citizens are against the constitutional changes. The ruling SDSM and the parties from the Albanian bloc (DUI and VLEN) are in favor of the amendments, whereas the opposition VMRO-DPMNE, ZNAM, and Levica are opposed.

First impressions from the first round

To get a better sense of what might happen on May 8, it is worth looking at the April 24 results. According to North Macedonia’s State Election Commission, Siljanovska-Davkova received 40 percent of the vote, more than double that of Pendarovski, who received just under 20 percent. Siljanovska-Davkova outperformed polls, and her victory will be wind in the back of VMRO-DPMNE heading into the general election next week. In contrast, Pendarovski’s performance is the worst result by a Social Democrat candidate since the country’s independence in 1991, indicating voter dissatisfaction with the SDSM-DUI coalition government of the past seven years.

Aside from VMRO-DPMNE’s better-than-expected performance and SDSM’s lackluster result, there were several surprises from the first-round vote.

Some analysts thought before the election that voter apathy, a lack of interest in politics, and disillusionment with the current government and the unreformed opposition would result in low voter turnout. However, turnout stood at nearly 50 percent, which was higher than the 42 percent first-round turnout in 2019. With seven candidates running, the high number of options likely helped drive voters to the polls. Since the runoff vote is paired with parliamentary elections, turnout is expected to remain stable. However, a possible boycott by ethnic Albanian voters could threaten the 40 percent presidential turnout threshold.

Another surprise was the strong showing of Kumanovo Mayor Maksim Dimitrievski, backed by his newly formed ZNAM movement. Dimitrievski overperformed the polls, raking in more than 83,000 votes (9.26 percent of the vote), putting him in fourth place. This positioned the ZNAM movement as an influential third option ahead of the parliamentary election. A former Social Democrat, Dimitrievski peeled off the more conservative wing of SDSM, with many former party members now running on his ZNAM ticket.

Amid speculation that the united Albanian opposition, VLEN, might finally outperform the ruling Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the result did not live up to expectations. Despite a bitter battle, DUI’s candidate, Bujar Osmani, defeated VLEN’s Arben Taravari by some 37,000 votes. While VLEN weaved together the main opposition voices in the Albanian political bloc, the DUI still had the state apparatus in its corner and brought into its fold Menduh Thaçi’s DPA, Ziadin Sela’s wing of Alliance for Albanians, as well as several parties from the Roma, Turkish, and Bosniak communities, giving them enough to eke out a win.

Finally, the left-wing Levica party fell flat, with Biljana Vankovska Cvetkovska getting just a little more than 41,000 votes, or about 4.5 percent. But this result could be evidence that the party has stabilized its base, as it received around 37,000 votes in the 2020 parliamentary election and around 50,000 votes in the 2021 local election. Vankovska Cvetkovska’s poor performance could harm the party in the general elections, though its parliamentary candidates could have stronger showings since some other party members enjoy higher popularity.

VMRO-DPMNE’s Siljanovska-Davkova remains favored to defeat SDSM’s Pendarovski in the runoff, but all eyes are on the losing candidates and which camp they will throw their weight behind. So far, mum’s the word.

The coalition-building process

There are seventeen parties or coalitions running in the parliamentary elections on May 8, but only VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI, VLEN, ZNAM, and Levica are projected to pick up seats. The most likely coalition to form a government would be among VMRO-DPMNE, VLEN, and ZNAM. Based on recent polls, they would likely have a comfortable seventy-five-seat majority in the 120-seat parliament. VMRO-DPMNE has shown openness to working with both VLEN and ZNAM for some time now. However, the multiparty composition of VLEN will complicate the coalition-building process.

Furthermore, VLEN’s stance in favor of the constitutional amendments and VMRO-DPMNE and ZNAM’s opposition is another challenge. VLEN has made other demands for policies that VMRO-DPMNE opposes, and these demands could become a factor. First, VLEN wants the president to be elected by parliament rather than via direct elections. Second, it wants to reformulate the Ohrid Agreement, signed in 2001, so that Albanian is explicitly an official language of North Macedonia, replacing the current policy in which “any language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language.”

Whatever coalition ultimately forms, however, it is unlikely that there will be enough votes in parliament to pass the constitutional amendments, which would require a two-thirds majority. The parties in favor of the amendments (SDSM, DUI, and VLEN) are projected to win as few as fifty-three seats and would need to convince almost thirty other members of parliament to change their position to pass the amendments. This would be a daunting task given that the parties in favor of the amendments now have more than sixty members in parliament and have been unable to complete the task.

As the constitutional amendments remain front and center in the election campaign, political parties have ramped up nationalist rhetoric. With VMRO-DPMNE poised to rise to power, the country’s EU accession is in flux. It is unlikely that the next government will succeed in either renegotiating the EU’s accession framework or stalling the constitutional changes until the country is on the cusp of joining the EU.

Recent history has shown that when progress toward accession halts due to international disputes, North Macedonia can take an undemocratic turn and lose years in the EU waiting room. As the election approaches, the everyday concerns of citizens—such as healthcare, the economy, youth emigration, the environment, and the fight against corruption—are being pushed to the background. Regardless of the election outcome, however, political polarization will persist, and North Macedonia’s EU integration will likely remain at a standstill for the foreseeable future.

Aleksej Demjanski is a political analyst and editor of the “Macedonian Matters” weekly newsletter.

The post What will North Macedonia’s upcoming elections mean for its EU accession prospects? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 8, voters in North Macedonia will go to the polls in a pivotal parliamentary election that will chart the nation’s course towards European Union integration, alongside the decisive second round of the presidential election. The outcomes are anticipated to signal a shift in the electorate’s mood, reflecting their discontent with the stalled EU accession progress since the 2019 name change and the tensions with Bulgaria over demanded constitutional amendments.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare and political analyst Aleksej Demjanski, editor of the MacedonianMatters newsletter, discuss in this episode of #BalkansDebrief the significance of these elections for North Macedonia’s European aspirations.

They explore what Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova’s lead in the presidential election’s first round, securing 40.1% of the votes, reveals about the public’s appetite for change. The conversation will also cover the core messages and strategies of the incumbent SDSM party’s campaign, as well as the resonating themes of the opposition VMRO-DPMNE’s efforts, and how they align with the citizen’s concerns.

Furthermore, the conversation covers the potential post-election alliances. Could we witness a coalition between VMRO-DPMNE, ZNAM, and VLEN, or will the SDSM and DUI maintain their coalition? How will the political landscape and impact North Macedonia’s EU path?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why do North Macedonia’s elections matter for its EU future? | A debrief with Aleksej Demjanski appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 21st, Global China Hub Senior Director David O. Shullman was featured on the podcast “Novi Magazin,” for a discussion on Serbia’s close relationship with China and the United States’ perspective on this cooperation.

The post Global China Hub Senior Director David O. Shullman in “Novi Magazin” Podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Western Balkans remain a security concern, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recently, France has deployed a battalion as part of the Strategic Reserve Force to assist the EUFOR mission and exercise a level of deterrence in Bosnia and Kosovo, two countries with security issues, where France wants to see progress.

Ilva Tare, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, discusses regional security issues with Alexandre Vulic, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, International Security, and Arms Control at the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Why does France consider the situation in Bosnia as stable yet fragile? What are the main concerns that threaten security in the region? How do cybersecurity, disinformation, and false narratives affect the Western Balkans? And how can France counter Russia’s influence, which is exercised via proxies and nationalist forces?

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is France refocused on security in the Balkans? | A debrief with Alexandre Vulic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the Ukraine war underscoring security risks in the Western Balkans, the United Kingdom has doubled down on its commitment to the region’s stability. In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Lord Stuart Peach, the UK’s Special Envoy for the region.

Tare asks Lord Peach about the reasons for optimism and pessimism in the region. How do the old issues such as nationalism, Russian influence, and a media landscape rife with misinformation impact the lives of citizens, particularly the younger generation? Why is the UK prioritizing reconciliation efforts in the Balkans?

What are the UK’s expectations for the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia? What concrete steps should the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti take to achieve progress? How concerned is the UK about calls for secession of the Republika Srpska by Milorad Dodik? Why are free and fair elections crucial for the EU aspirations of the Western Balkan countries?

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is the UK focused on reconciliation in the Balkans? | A debrief with Lord Stuart Peach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

North Macedonia, a small nation of 2 million, in the Western Balkans, gained international attention in 2019, when it agreed to the seemingly impossible: changing its name in exchange for EU negotiations and NATO membership. While NATO membership was secured, EU accession talks have stalled for years. This is largely due to Bulgaria’s demand for Constitutional changes recognizing a Bulgarian minority.

For North Macedonians, Sofia’s veto was a bitter pill to swallow resulting in public support for the EU dropping sharply, according to surveys. On May 8, the country faces critical elections that will decide its future in relation to the EU.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare sits down will Marko Troshanovski, President of the Institute for Democracy, to discuss the importance of the elections and the key issues debated by the main two opposing political camps.

Can the North Macedonian public regain trust in the EU accession process? What do the surveys suggest about the winner of the political elections? How will a potential victory by the center-right VRMNO-DPMNE opposition affect the country’s foreign policy and its EU path? What role will Albanian parties play in the winning coalition? How should the new government address the problem of corruption?

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Ilva Tare

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why are elections in North Macedonia critical for its EU path? | A debrief with Marko Troshanovski appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kosovo’s recent ban on the dinar, aimed by the Kurti government at curbing illegal cash flow, has sparked tensions with US and the European partners and raised concerns about its impact on the Kosovo Serb community, on the normalization dialogue with Serbia, and Kosovo’s wider relationship with its Western allies.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare discusses the reasons behind this controversial move with two esteemed guests; Arian Zeka, Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo and Dragisa Mijacic Executive Director of InTER Institute for Territorial Economic Development.

Key questions: Why did the Central Bank of Kosovo announce the euro-only policy on February 1st? How does this decision impact the daily lives of Kosovo’s Serb community considering pensions and welfare concerns raised by the local NGO’s? Should Westerns partners have been consulted by the Kosovo government before the ban? What are the potential implications for US-Kosovo relations after the call to reverse the ban? Can the Association of the Serb Majority Municipalities address the issue of financing and dinar use, as some suggest?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why did the dinar ban spark Kosovo-US tension? | A debrief with Arian Zeka and Dragisa Mijacic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Western Balkan energy: Too little competition, too much coal, and too much Russia

Energy sectors across the Western Balkans are dominated by state enterprises whose non-transparency and mismanagement have hampered competition, enabled Russian meddling, and slowed investments in the energy transition.

Privatizations of electricity networks in Serbia in the mid-2000s and Montenegro in 2009, for example, were marred by allegations of undervaluing state assets to benefit politically connected investors and thereby defrauding state budgets. The European Commission, meanwhile, recently criticized a lack of transparency in access to North Macedonia’s natural-gas transit infrastructure, as well as the country’s illiquid gas market. And concerns about corruption, mismanagement, and environmental degradation regarding the Kalivac hydropower project in Albania have resulted in major delays and cost overruns, with the project ultimately scaled back significantly.

Russia exploits these energy-sector weaknesses for both economic and geopolitical gain. The 2007 Comprehensive Energy Agreement Between Serbia and the Russian Federation, for example, outsources much of Serbia’s energy security and fiscal control to Russia.  Under this framework, Russia’s Gazprom Neft acquired 50 percent of shares in Serbia’s national oil company, Naftna Industrija Srbij (NIS), while Gazprom gained 6.15 percent, yielding a controlling stake of 56.15 percent for Russia’s majority state-owned Gazprom group. Moreover, this arrangement grants Gazprom control over NIS revenue payments to the Serbian government that account for approximately 25 percent of national budgetary revenues.

Serbia is also a key player in the Balkan Stream pipeline, an extension of the TurkStream pipeline that exclusively carries Russian gas under the Black Sea to Turkey, then across Bulgaria to Serbia and Hungary. Moscow has pursued this project, previously called South Stream, since 2007 to resist competition from Azerbaijani gas while bypassing Ukraine as a transit route into Southeast Europe.

Today, Balkan Stream reinforces the efforts of both Serbian President Aleksander Vucic and Hungarian President Viktor Orban to balance relations between the EU and Russia.

Meanwhile, governments across the Western Balkans have also failed to make concerted efforts on perhaps the quickest and most cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions in their countries’ energy sectors: switching from coal to natural gas as a primary fuel for electricity generation.

Though also a fossil fuel, natural gas emits only one-half to one-third the amount of carbon dioxide when burned that coal does. Moreover, switching to natural gas is a cost-effective way to maintain sufficient electricity volumes to sustain economic growth, even as countries muster the massive investments required to transition fully to renewable energy.

Germany provides an illustrative case. For the past four decades, the German government has been a global leader in transitioning to renewable energy under its Energiewende program, through which it has invested hundreds of billions of euros in wind and solar-power technologies, electricity-grid upgrades, and other elements of the green-energy transition.

Germany chose affordability over sustainability, however, when the US “Shale Revolution” took off in 2008, as new horizontal-drilling and rock-fracturing technologies unlocked vast new quantities of natural gas. This large increase in supply caused the price per unit of energy of natural gas in the United States to drop beneath that of coal. As a result, many US electricity companies switched from coal to gas as a primary fuel. This freed up US coal for export, causing its price per unit of energy in Germany to fall below that of natural gas. Many German electricity producers therefore moved in the opposite direction of their US counterparts, shifting back to “dirty” coal. Germany consequently missed its targets under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol for reducing its greenhouse-gas emissions while the United States, which never ratified the protocol, met its Kyoto targets thanks to its increased use of natural gas rather than coal.

Despite Germany’s short-term reembrace of coal but long-standing pursuit of renewable energy, German industry still chooses to depend significantly on natural gas to cover approximately 27 percent of the country’s fuel demand, second only to oil and significantly more than renewables’ share of 16 percent.

Before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia provided 70 percent of Germany’s natural-gas supply. When Russia subsequently slashed those supplies, Berlin did not double down on renewable energy. It instead replaced Russian gas supplies with liquid natural gas (LNG), largely from the United States, after executing an unprecedentedly quick investment program to develop four import terminals to re-gasify LNG and deliver it into Germany’s pipeline network.

Western Balkan countries, however, have so far not chosen to follow Germany’s lead in relying on natural gas as a key transition fuel to a renewable-energy future. As the table indicates, Kosovo, a potential EU candidate country, uses coal for 95 percent of its power generation—primarily lignite, which is locally plentiful but the dirtiest variety of the dirtiest primary fuel. In North Macedonia, coal is responsible for generating 75 percent of the country’s electricity, while the figure is 70 percent in Serbia and 63 percent in Bosnia.

Montenegro and Albania use less coal and more hydropower. Coal is responsible for 43 percent of electricity generation in Montenegro, hydropower provides 47 percent of its electricity, and wind and solar provide the remaining 11 percent. In Albania, hydropower generates 99 percent of the country’s electricity, but the supply is insufficient, which requires electricity purchases from neighboring countries, most of which are generated from coal.*

Many climate activists are pleased that none of the Western Balkan countries relies on natural gas to generate significant volumes of electricity, and they advocate for the EU to press these aspirant countries to jump directly from coal to renewables. This is precisely what Kosovo plans to do. It is difficult to understand, however, how Kosovo will be able to attract the massive investments necessary to generate sufficient volumes of renewable electricity quickly enough to alleviate serious electricity shortfalls and affordably enough to maintain political stability, especially with 40 percent of its population living below the poverty line.

The government of Serbia, in contrast, is planning to increase the role of natural gas in its economy. Serbia has been buying Russian natural gas for decades. It now plans to increase those purchases via the Balkan Stream pipeline. In addition, Bulgaria and Serbia are finalizing a separate gas interconnection that could theoretically provide non-Russian supplies, but in practice may deliver exclusively Russian gas—albeit disguised as “Turkish gas”—via a recent agreement between the state-owned natural gas monopolies of Turkey and Bulgaria.

At the same time, Belgrade is also planning to diversify its supplies of natural gas to try to reduce its dependence on Russia.  Serbia thus hopes to purchase Azerbaijani gas via the EU-supported Southern Corridor.

The Southern Corridor consists of the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline across Azerbaijan and Georgia, which then connects with the Trans-Anatolia Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, which in turn feeds into the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) across Greece and Albania and under the Adriatic Sea to Italy. The Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (ICGB) will divert gas from TANAP at the Turkey-Greece border and deliver it into Bulgaria; from there it will soon be able to enter Serbia via a new Bulgaria-Serbia interconnection.

Albania is also weighing whether to introduce natural gas into its economy to expand electricity generation in a more cost-effective way than building new hydropower plants, which have sparked sharp environmentalist protests in the past, such as at the aforementioned Kalivac dam project. Thus, the government of Albania is considering whether to develop localized natural-gas grids in two cities, perhaps as precursors for a national natural-gas grid.

North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro are also considering significant investments in natural-gas infrastructure. Moscow, however, is working to lock these countries and their neighbors into dependence on Russian natural gas, with Russia now developing seven natural gas power plants, in tandem with Chinese financing and technology, in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia.

Bulgaria: State monopolies and coal crowd out the private sector and gas

In contrast to plans by five of the six Western Balkan countries to adopt natural gas as a cost-effective way to sustain economic growth and reduce carbon emissions, Bulgaria has been moving in the opposite direction for the past thirty years. Natural-gas consumption has decreased from 7 billion cubic meters (BCM) in 1993 to approximately 3 BCM today. As a result, coal remains the primary fuel for generating 56 percent of Bulgaria’s electricity. In contrast, during the same period, natural-gas consumption increased in Greece from zero to 7 BCM, and in Turkey from 15 BCM to 70 BCM.

To make matters worse, Bulgaria’s electricity system remains so inefficient that 80 percent of the energy released by burning coal in power plants is lost before the electricity reaches customers. This creates a double blow to the EU’s greenhouse-gas reduction targets: excessive use of fuel in general, and over-reliance on the dirtiest fuel, coal.

Bulgaria, like Serbia, consequently consumes more than three times as much energy and emits three times as much carbon per unit of GDP as do the EU’s original member states, which have been consuming significant volumes of natural gas for decades. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the energy intensity of Bulgaria’s economy today is roughly equal to that of Germany and the Netherlands in the 1970s, when they first began to adopt natural gas. Rather than emulating the Netherlands and Germany in switching from coal to natural gas, however, the Bulgarian government continues to subsidize coal-fired electricity, perpetuating decades of non-transparent revenue streams acquired and distributed via state-owned energy monopolies.

Moreover, with the lowest per-capita GDP in the EU, Bulgaria’s energy investments must be affordable, which rules out the enormous capital investments required for a direct jump from coal to renewables. The most cost-effective—and therefore politically sustainable—way for Bulgaria to slash carbon emissions would be to encourage private investment in a shift from coal-fired electricity to natural gas.

Unfortunately, this is not happening. Instead, Bulgaria’s state-owned energy monopoly, Bulgaria Energy Holdings (BEH)—which includes natural-gas supplier Bulgargaz and transmission-system operator Bulgartransgaz—has been crowding out private companies that are eager to invest in Bulgaria’s natural-gas infrastructure.

In 2012, for example, BEH prevented private companies from using Bulgaria’s natural-gas transmission pipelines. The European Commission fined BEH 77 million euros for this anticompetitive behavior. BEH continues to fight that fine in court, while private companies struggle to carve out space to compete with the state monopoly.

Punished for doing the right thing

Bulgaria’s private natural-gas suppliers are under severe financial strain after obeying EU regulations to fill Bulgaria’s underground gas storage (UGS) to 80 percent capacity by November 2022 to ensure security of supply in case Russia cut off gas to the EU following its invasion of Ukraine. This required Bulgarian gas suppliers to buy natural gas last summer at all-time peak prices and inject it into Bulgaria’s natural-gas storage facility at Chiren. Once the winter heating season concluded, natural gas prices in Europe fell to a fraction of the price suppliers paid to fill Bulgaria’s UGS. Normally, Bulgaria’s gas suppliers would have purchased hedges to protect against such dramatic seasonal price shifts. In this instance, however, there appeared to be no reason to do so because the European Commission had directed member-state governments with gas in storage to take “all necessary measures” to protect gas suppliers against such financial losses, as per Regulation (EU) 2022/1032.

Unfortunately, as of February 2024, the Bulgarian government had not yet promulgated the compensation mechanism it promised in accordance with the EU regulation. Private buyers of the stored gas therefore face a brutal financial dilemma: either sell now at enormous losses or hang onto the gas until prices rise, denying them the revenues required to service their loans. Either way, private Bulgarian gas suppliers face a severe liquidity squeeze, which could bankrupt them. As a result, they would likely be unwilling and/or unable to make emergency gas purchases again for this coming winter in case of another supply crisis.

Sofia did, however, extend a highly concessional 400-million-euro loan to Bulgargaz to compensate for some of its unhedged losses. However, the government then rejected requests by the country’s private gas suppliers for an analogous loan. The government’s loan to Bulgargaz would therefore appear to be an example of illegal state aid and another example of the state crowding out private companies in Bulgaria’s energy sector. The European Commission, however, decided to permit the market-distorting example of state aid because of what it terms an “energy” crisis caused by Russia’s sharp curtailment of natural gas deliveries into the EU.

Bulgaria’s nexus among corrupt energy officials and Russia

BEH’s non-transparent and anti-competitive behavior also undercuts the EU’s geopolitical goal of reducing energy revenues on which Russia relies to finance its war against Ukraine.

Bulgaria is infamous for murky ties between its government officials and their Russian counterparts. One former Bulgarian minister of energy, Rumen Ovcharov, is sanctioned under the US Global Magnitsky Act for participating in corrupt deals with Russian natural-gas and nuclear-fuel suppliers, as are Aleksandar Nikolov and Ivan Genov, two former chief executive officers (CEOs) of Bulgaria’s Kozloduy nuclear-power plant.

Today, Russia’s enduring presence in Bulgaria’s energy sector is evident at the country’s most valuable industrial asset, the Neftochim oil refinery in Burgas, which is owned by Russia’s Lukoil. While Bulgaria’s current government may be planning to nationalize and then privatize the refinery via non-Russian investors, its predecessor caretaker government secured a derogation from the EU’s ban of Russian oil imports to feed the refinery until 2027.

Meanwhile, Russia’s role in Bulgaria’s natural-gas sector appears to be growing, thanks to a January 2023 confidential agreement between the state-owned natural-gas monopolies of Bulgaria and Turkey. That agreement, the terms of which were leaked to Bulgarian media and subsequently confirmed by the current Bulgarian government, define a thirteen-year contract that reserves the entire capacity of the gas interconnection between Turkey and Bulgaria for BOTAS and Bulgargaz, locking out all competitors. Moreover, the agreement obligates Bulgargaz to accept any gas from BOTAS without BOTAS having to disclose the origin of that gas, while obligating Bulgartransgaz to deliver that gas to any exit point from Bulgaria via the country’s transmission pipeline system.

These unusual contractual obligations by Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz are now reportedly under investigation by the European Commission as potential violations of EU competition rules. The commission is also exploring whether the contract provides a potential “backdoor” for Russian gas to enter the EU even after the EU’s 2027 cutoff date for ending all imports of gas and oil from Russia, a suspicion reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to establish what he termed “a Turkish hub for Russian natural gas” during his September 4 meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan, in contrast, is pressing for a genuine natural-gas trading hub in Turkey, where supplies converge from multiple directions and prices are set by market forces.

Conclusion: Set the right example in Bulgaria for the EU’s enduring integrity

Analogous versions of these Bulgarian energy problems are prevalent across the Western Balkans. They are almost certain to persist as long as government-owned companies dominate these countries’ energy sectors. Although it will take years to eliminate these state-led market distortions, there are significant steps the European Commission can take now in Bulgaria to strengthen private-sector competition, reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, mitigate corruption, and thwart Russian meddling, thereby setting examples for the EU aspirants in the Western Balkans. The European Commission should therefore press the Bulgarian government to:

• Encourage the Bulgarian government to end subsidies for coal-fired electricity and instead support increased use of natural gas as a transition fuel to renewable energy, while also creating an operating environment that is conducive to investments in natural gas infrastructure by non-Russian and non-Chinese parties;

• penalize the Bulgarian government for illegal state aid that crowds out the private sector and reduces competition, such as the 400-million-euro loan to Bulgargaz;

• enforce Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 by insisting that the Bulgarian government finalizes and implements its “necessary measure” to protect against significant financial losses incurred by suppliers that injected gas into storage ahead of the 2022–2023 winter heating season, as required by the European Commission;
• and demand the same level of transparency regarding the origins of natural gas at entry points into the EU (such as at the Turkey-Bulgaria border) as the European Commission already requires inside the EU at interconnections between member states.

Taken together, these measures would set a powerful example for political and business leaders across the Western Balkans and stress that they must take seriously the EU’s rules pursuing more transparent, efficient, and competitive energy sectors within its member states, which are are driven by well-governed private companies that invest in the energy transition and are free from Russian influence. Absent such steps in Bulgaria, however, Brussels risks signaling to leaders across the Western Balkans that the reform commitments they make today to secure EU membership can be ignored tomorrow. Such disregard for EU requirements risks undermining the credibility, and eventually even the viability, of the European Union as the world’s premier rules-based organization.

Matthew Bryza was a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Bryza was formerly the US Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Follow him on X (formerly known as Twitter) @BryzaMatthew.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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On February 1, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Valbona Zeneli was quoted by Voice of America on Russia’s and China’s influence in the Western Balkans. 

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Valbona Zeneli

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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“We need development. And one of the most important factors for that development is connectivity,” said Polish President Andrzej Duda on January 17 at the Atlantic Council’s Three Seas Hub on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Duda spoke alongside Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs, and Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković as the heads of state took stock of the Three Seas Initiative at age nine, with an eye toward what’s next for the group at a time of war and uncertainty.

The Three Seas Initiative, established in 2015 by Duda and Croatia’s then President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, is a forum of thirteen European Union (EU) member states running north to south from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic seas. The initiative is dedicated to advancing connectivity, security, and foreign investment in the Central and Eastern Europe region.

The initiative’s founding mission “to establish north-south access” in Central and Eastern Europe required “a visionary approach,” said Nausėda. Today, amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has led to Moscow’s isolation, “it’s very important to replace west-east access with north-south access.”

Below are more highlights from this discussion, which was moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

Integrating Ukraine

• When it comes to cooperating on projects under the Three Seas Initiative, Nausėda said, “I am looking not only at the member states of the European Union,” but also potential future members of the bloc—especially Ukraine and Moldova. The initiative’s agenda is “also about the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine,” said Nausėda, who will host the next Three Seas Summit and Business Forum on April 11 in Vilnius.

• Building more infrastructure and increasing connectivity also has implications for Ukraine’s war effort. “We need excellent infrastructure, motorways, railways to deliver military equipment” to Ukraine, said Duda.

• Ukraine and fellow EU candidate Moldova were made associate states of the initiative at the Three Seas Summit in Bucharest last September. Membership in the initiative is reserved for EU member states, and there is no plan to change this rule, Duda said. However, he said, “We hope Ukraine will be a full member of Three Seas Initiative because we all support Ukrainian efforts to join the European Union.”

Jumpstarting investment

• Nausėda said the initiative needs to make its projects “economically interesting” to private businesses and foreign investors. “Otherwise it will be very difficult to implement these projects” only with state and EU resources, he said. “Those are also important, but they cannot cover all the financial gaps we have with the Three Seas Initiative.”
• Looking at ways the initiative can attract more outside investment, Plenković said that “we should all strengthen our judiciary. We should all fight corruption.”
• “It will take several multi-annual financial frameworks and investments” to attain the level of economic development of the EU’s founding members, said Plenković. “And this catching up policy is not something you can do overnight.”

Raising ambitions

• The countries in the initiative “need to get more attraction also outside this region” to increase foreign investment, said Rinkēvičs. “While there is a profound interest” for cooperation within the Three Seas region, he said, “there is also an interest to attract more investment, trade relations with the outside world.”
• There is also room to increase security cooperation with outside countries, including the United States, through the Three Seas Initiative, argued Rinkēvičs. “When we talk about military security, energy security, cyber security, we need to put more effort into working with our transatlantic partners,” he said.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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2024 has already plunged the Western Balkans into a maelstrom of complex developments. Serbia’s post-election protests, the precarious Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, and the Kremlin-aligned Dodik’s paramilitary parade all raise critical questions about the region’s stability.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, welcomes Damir Kapidžić, Political Scientist and Associate Professor at the University of Sarajevo, and a Weatherhead Visiting Scholar at Harvard. Together, they dissect the critical crossroads facing the region as U.S. and EU elections loom on the horizon.

Key questions: How will the new U.S. and EU administrations engage with the Balkans? Can the region still harbor hopes for progress towards EU membership? And how can the newly proposed EU Growth Plan translate from promises into tangible advancements, paving the way towards economic integration?

From unexpected twists in the electoral landscape to the ever-shifting sands of regional politics, this year promises to be a rollercoaster. Tune in to hear Krastev’s insights into the key forces at play and why the Balkans and not only, are poised for a turbulent year. 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What awaits the Balkans in 2024? | A debrief with Damir Kapidzic  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As 2024 dawns, the Balkans cling to a fragile dream: EU membership. But the region and the Union itself are beset by internal tremors. From simmering protests in Serbia to looming threats and economic storms, the region braces for a year of turbulence. Can they emerge resilient from this crucible?

Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow, delves into these questions and more with Ivan Krastev, chair of the Center for Liberal Strategies and Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. 

Krastev casts a cautious eye on EU reform prospects, outlining potential timelines and highlighting the factors that could determine success or failure. He also analyzes how the November US elections might reshape Washington’s engagement with the Balkans, with implications for the region as a whole and, in particular, the fragile Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

From unexpected twists in the electoral landscape to the ever-shifting sands of regional politics, this year promises to be a rollercoaster. Tune in to hear Krastev’s insights into the key forces at play and why the Balkans and not only, are poised for a turbulent year. 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – How will the US&EU elections reshape the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Ivan Krastev appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Serbia witnessed a tumultuous end to 2023, with protests erupting in Belgrade following the December 17th elections. Thousands demand the annulment, alleging President Vučić’s Progressive Party fabricated results through cross-border voting. Despite claiming a “cleanest and most honest” victory, international observers have condemned widespread fraud and manipulation. The West, has been criticized for turning a blind eye to Vučić’s actions. But with renewed protests and whispers of regional conflict, will the honeymoon end?

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Rasa Nedeljkov, Program Director of the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability which has monitored closely the election with particular focus on the capital, Belgrade. 

International observers have condemned the irregularities, while Brussels and Washington demand a response from the government. What role can the international community play in mitigating these tensions? How should the West engage moving forward? Were the alleged manipulations significant enough to alter the outcome? If a rerun were to occur, particularly in Belgrade, could a different outcome be anticipated?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Unrest in Serbia after elections: is democracy at risk? | A debrief with Rasa Nedeljkov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 23, GCH Nonresident Senior Fellow Wawa Wang co-authored a piece in The Diplomat on China’s new Free Trade Agreement with Serbia and the security concerns the agreement poses for the region.

The post Global China Hub Nonresident Senior Fellow Wawa Wang Featured in The Diplomat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Dinaric Alps that span the Balkans have the highest precipitation levels in Europe. The significance of this natural resource was recognized by the Marshall Plan for Europe in 1947, but its potential has been systematically undermined since the 1970s in favor of lignite-fired power plants. Today, the area’s existing and potential hydropower capacity will determine Central Europe’s ability to deploy intermittent renewable energy to (sustainably) reduce its dependency on Russian natural gas. Use of this massive strategic resource depends on a self-sufficient local electricity market and reforestation of the territory, both of which are dependent on the quality of local governance, which is influenced by external interests. This article highlights the massive opportunity of unlocking the Balkans’ capacity to bolster European energy security and the unfathomable cost of the failure to act.

An actionable plan

The Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) has thus far failed to deliver on its critical material obligations. However, it provides the only legal framework that (at least nominally) links the Western Balkans to the EU energy market. It is crucial to preserve the EnCT and restore its material obligations in a context that includes the Paris Agreement (reached at a UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties in 2015), and with a refreshed understanding encompassing environmental impacts and human rights, the current and likely future energy security situation, and geopolitical realities. A thorough evaluation of reality and a newly upgraded and relevant treaty are urgently required. The UN, the United States, the World Bank, and the EU—which convened in 1999 to 2005 within the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (the predecessor to the RCC) to create the EnCT—have the capacity to initiate this process.

In its role to decarbonize the Western Balkans and rebuild Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the EnCT will need to facilitate the largest investment undertaking in a generation with the potential to alter Europe’s energy supply for a more resilient and sustainable future. To make this sensitive task more feasible, the EnCT Secretariat, currently in Vienna, should be relocated to a NATO member state to ensure that delicate planning can take place in a secure environment.

A roadmap of the accession of the Western Balkans to EUETS by 2026 and use of the carbon-credit allocation mechanism through 2034 is necessary to overcome uncertainties and facilitate investments. In order to avoid the shortcomings evident in use of a similar mechanism with Central Europe, allocation of EUETS allowances for decarbonization (or, effectively, coal phaseout) of the energy sector within the EUETS system must be handed over to particular plant operators in the Balkans, in line with effective decarbonization plans and commercial commitments to execute them. Following the principle of additionality, these plans should combine into a much higher ambition of decarbonization than is currently expressed by the national energy and climate plans (NECPs). Once a carbon-intensive plant is phased out, a proportion of allowances could be sold at the EUETS market to European operators, who are making five times more economic value per ton of CO2 than in the Balkans. Sustainable energy portfolios would emerge rapidly. It is only sustainable energy—not simple combustion of lignite—that is suitable to support “nearshoring” of both manufacturing and provision of strategic materials and rare earths to the Balkans.

There is a hope that, this time, the EU is going to “walk the walk” following the president of the European Commission’s announcement of “Rule of Law Reports” for countries in the accession process. Addressing the rule of law, fiscal discipline, and the environmental violation of human rights may set the stage for an improvement in the quality of governance.

However, proper facilitation and conditions for investments are not enough. An EnCT decarbonization roadmap needs to be augmented by actual physical interventions. Actual investment opportunities must be formulated to ambitiously exceed the nominal NECP. It will require the leadership of the transatlantic community, a keen understanding of strategic implications, and deployment of the most modern technologies and commercial wisdom to make it happen. Herein lies a call to action: bring the public and private power generation companies of the Western Balkans to the table. Present them with the opportunity to be a critical part of the solution. Operators of the region’s power systems have suffered from systemic underinvestment, with technical failures getting more frequent. These stakeholders, not their governments, are now struggling for survival. For them, the fight for energy security is one that impacts the future of their families, their communities, and their employment. They have skin in the game to make the best use of domestic resources, avoid import dependencies, bring hydropower to the European market, deliver heat and power to domestic customers, and fight bad governance. They need a commercial opportunity beyond “just transition funds.” They need the opportunity to secure meaningful investment. Funding private sector-led opportunities from existing commercial export credit and decarbonization funds is a realistic option.

European public funds and the Regional Climate Partnership involving Germany and six Western Balkans states present a great opportunity to overcome energy poverty in the region. If effectively planned and executed, it could reduce network losses by one-third and introduce sustainable and clean energy to households and local communities: this would improve the lives of millions of people and bring them toward European integration. It is not about raising awareness further but about actual projects that will clean the air.

Synchronized deployment of these commercial and public funds would create an opportunity for European industry as well. It would respond to the EU Economic Growth Plan for the Western Balkans by better targeting and further mobilizing commercial funds. It would increase technological sophistication while raising demand for advanced technology and equipment that US, UK, Japanese, South Korean, and European industry could deliver. It is a real opportunity for reindustrialization.

It is now time to cancel the alternative that involves outsourcing energy security. It is up to key stakeholders to devise specialized institution and give birth to a framework that will deliver this much-needed change.

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The post Up for grabs? The Western Balkans’ aging energy systems place it between East and West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A sigh of relief, perhaps even cautious optimism, has swept across the Western Balkans. The EU Council’s decision to open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, alongside a conditional green light for Bosnia and Herzegovina, signals renewed engagement with the region. But is this truly a new dawn, or just a flicker of light in persistent uncertainty?

The stakes are high, with implications for political stability, economic growth, and ultimately, the future of the Western Balkan six countries.