As with any recent tariff announcement by Trump, the devil is in the details. Venezuela currently exports oil and gas to a variety of countries, ranging from US rivals such as China and Russia to US allies such as India, Spain, France, and a number of small Caribbean nations. Is Trump interested in slapping an additional 25 percent tariff on Chinese goods sold in the United States, on top of the current 20 percent tariffs? Is he willing to impose tariffs on US allies? And are any of these countries willing to risk those tariffs in order to continue receiving Venezuelan crude oil and gas? All of this remains unclear.

What is clear is that, at the same time that Trump is seeking to box out foreign companies, he is preserving space for US companies to operate in Venezuela’s oil sector. Just hours after the president announced the tariff plan, the US Treasury Department announced that it had extended the “wind down” period it had previously given Chevron to pull out of Venezuela. Instead of the original deadline of April 3, the US oil major now has until May 27 to end its operations. But the fact that the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) extended this license, coupled with the reality that previous OFAC licenses that have been framed as “wind down” notices (like the limited General License 8) have been renewed consistently since 2019, suggests this wind down could evolve into a more permanent arrangement. This license has so far only permitted restricted activities, but other licenses allowing European and other companies to operate have so far remained in place. It is too early to be certain, but there is a chance that Chevron may be allowed to continue to operate in Venezuela, but on a tighter leash.

Such an approach would fit with Trump’s “America first” agenda. So far, US sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector have done nothing to dislodge Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro from the presidential palace in Caracas and may have actually pushed Venezuela further into the orbit of US global rivals. Until Chevron was given a green light to deepen its operations in Venezuela in 2022, oil sanctions created an opening for China and Iran to emerge as Venezuela’s primary trading partners. Iranian traders received Venezuelan oil in exchange for condensate, which Venezuela’s state-owned oil company then mixed with its extra-heavy crude in order to sell it on the global market at steep discounts, largely to Chinese firms. Russian firms, meanwhile, have maintained limited but important investments in the country’s oil sector even in the face of secondary sanctions. Essentially, US sanctions were subsidizing cheap oil for China and preserving undue influence to Russian investors—all to the detriment of US interests.

As for US allies and partners such as Spain, France, Italy, and India, there is likely no need for the administration to escalate matters by imposing tariffs. Instead, OFAC could simply end specific licenses and comfort letters, which provide specific guidance allowing certain companies to operate. Of course, doing so might compound the problem further by creating an opportunity for US rivals to step back in and exert their influence, especially if US energy firms are also instructed to pull out of Venezuela. If that happens, expect an increase in Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence over Caracas. China has made clear that Venezuela is an “all-weather strategic partner” of Beijing and is unfazed by the threat of tariffs. Instead of signaling its compliance with the new executive order, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has issued a statement rejecting US influence in Venezuela and asserting that the tariffs would only hurt US consumers. Venezuelan oil is expected to continue to flow to China’s market, even in spite of a current slowdown caused by the uncertain climate.

Trump and his cabinet are almost certainly aware of this risk. They understand that it is not in the US interest to simply sit back and watch Venezuela, the country with the largest oil reserves on the planet, drift further into the arms of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. This is likely why, in spite of the recent rhetoric, the White House sent Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell to Caracas in February to begin conversations with the Maduro government. Grenell’s work has so far secured the release of six American hostages and convinced Maduro to accept repatriation flights of Venezuelan deportees.

Ultimately, the White House seems to be advancing an approach that Trump knows well: making a deal. With conversations ongoing and the door left open to Chevron and other US companies to continue operating in Venezuela, even if foreign companies are forced out, the administration seems to be preserving space for an agreement. An attractive deal might include concessions on migration, such as an acceleration in repatriation flights to match the administration’s interest in increasing deportations. It could also see some concessions on oil, such as the passage of legal reforms allowing US companies to assume majority ownership of joint ventures with the state oil company. But it should also include concessions that could move Venezuela toward a gradual democratic opening. After all, offering sanctions relief to shape internal incentives in Maduro’s inner circle is precisely what drove the government to organize, and to ultimately lose, last July’s presidential election.

There is a slim, but counterintuitive, opportunity in the fact that Maduro has said he will promote reforms to Venezuela’s 1999 constitution. Of course, Maduro is unlikely to agree to anything that will threaten his control in the immediate term, and he probably sees constitutional reform as a way to further entrench his power. But if Washington is open to expanding a US footprint in Venezuela’s energy sector, that gives US policymakers significant leverage as the ruling party debates any reforms. The United States should use this leverage to advance its oil and migration interests. But Washington should also seek verifiable progress on benchmarks such as the release of political prisoners, an end to the persecution of opposition activists, competitive electoral conditions, and perhaps a roadmap toward power-sharing and restoring the country’s democratic institutions.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post An ‘America first’ approach to Venezuela is taking shape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) have led the way on these sanctions, and between them have created an extensive list of individuals who have seen their assets frozen, been denied visas, and been shut out of the financial order in these countries. This tracker provides an interactive tool to search the list by sanctioning country or individual, with the aim of highlighting gaps in sanctions between countries and visualizing the progression and composition of country-specific sanctions regimes.  

Venezuela individual sanctions tracker

Explore the tracker below to see which individuals are sanctioned by which countries. Select the column titles to sort alphabetically or by country.

US sanctions timeline: Major milestones

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Nicolás Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals in the early years of Venezuela’s crisis, the first Trump administration sanctioned 135, and the Biden administration sanctioned 50. So far, the second Trump administration has not sanctioned any individuals linked to Venezuela’s crisis. 

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Created in partnership with the Atlantic Council's Economic Statecraft Initiative.

Jul 24, 2024

Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group is a diverse group of experts and practitioners from Venezuela, the United States, Latin America, and Europe, brought together to advance the conversation on how to reach a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in the South American country. The group comprises former government officials, civil society leaders, private sector leaders, humanitarian voices, economists, and leading experts on Venezuela who work to promote debate and propose actionable and concrete policy recommendations in order to advance policy innovation in addressing the situation in Venezuela. 

Issue Brief Jan 8, 2025

Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela 

By Geoff Ramsey, Lucie Kneip

As Maduro consolidates power in Venezuela, who has the United States sanctioned—and are those sanctions working?

Democratic Transitions Economic Sanctions

Online Event Tue, November 19, 2024 • 3:30 pm ET

Enhancing international coordination on Venezuelan migrant integration

How can the US and regional allies develop a comprehensive response plan for the expected increase in Venezuelan migration as Nicolas Maduro looks to extend his illegitimate rule?

Colombia Conflict Crisis Management Human Rights

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

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The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

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The post Venezuela sanctions tracker: Who is the international community sanctioning in Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The “maximum pressure” strategy employed from 2018 to 2022 against the illegitimate Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela did not serve US interests. Stringent oil sanctions imposed on Venezuela forced the retreat of Western oil firms from the country, principally benefitting adversaries. During the maximum pressure campaign, Venezuela’s oil production was rerouted to China at discounted prices, Iran supplied the diluent Venezuela required for oil production, and Russian investors became more critical amid a dearth on Western investment.  

A democratic transition remained elusive while repression and human rights violations continued. Venezuelans suffered, US adversaries expanded their influence, and Maduro remained. 

The current system of issuing specific licenses for Western oil producers to operate in Venezuela has yielded superior results. The benefits of this policy have been the following:    

1. Venezuelan oil exports have been diverted to friendly nations.
2. Treasury has increased visibility on all oil-related transactions, decreasing the clandestine shipment of oil through shadow tanker fleets operated by the Chinese defense establishment, Iran, or PDVSA.
3. Compensation to the regime is limited to taxes and royalties, which are required by Venezuelan law.
4. The system has enabled the return or reemployment of qualified engineers and technicians to restore production from degraded oilfield infrastructure.

The incoming US administration should prioritize inflicting more harm on the regime and its enablers than the Venezuelan people—or US interests.

To do so, sanctions must be linked to clear objectives. An uncalibrated reapplication of maximum pressure would cede influence to China, Russia, and Iran, while doing little to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Instead, the existing system of specific licenses should be maintained and expanded. To punish Maduro, the administration should continue to target individuals who enable his illegitimate rule, adding to the 180 individuals already sanctioned by the Treasury. A targeted sanctions policy—not maximum pressure—is the only way to ensure that US actions to confront the Maduro regime impose their desired effect, and do not play into the hands of Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran. 

Former staff

William Tobin

Former Assistant Director

Global Energy Center

Africa China

EnergySource Dec 3, 2024

There’s a more effective way forward than “maximum pressure” for Venezuela

By David Voght and Patricia Ventura

Following the fraudulent outcome of Venezuela’s July election, there is growing pressure on the United States to reintroduce sanctions to expel Western firms from the nation’s oil sector. However, preserving the existing policy, which restricts the regime’s financial access while promoting energy security and countering foreign influence, might prove more effective.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Oct 2, 2024

China’s cleantech growth strategy sets its sights on Brazil

By Joseph Webster, William Tobin

China is relying on cleantech exports to help drive economic growth, but with the United States and other developed nations becoming increasingly hesitant to purchase Chinese imports, China’s cleantech sectors need to search for alternative markets. Brazil has emerged as a potential top buyer, but it must walk a fine line to avoid becoming overly dependent on China.

Brazil China

EnergySource Sep 12, 2024

After Venezuela’s stolen election, here’s how the US should craft an effective sanctions policy

By David L. Goldwyn

As Venezuela’s political crisis worsens, the United States has a role to play in advancing the country’s democratic cause and also inflicting pain on the Maduro regime, while minimizing negative impacts on Venezuelans, the broader region, and US interests. This will require crafting a smart sanctions policy based on lessons learned and five key elements.

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The post ‘Maximum pressure’ sanctions on Venezuela help US adversaries, hurt Venezuelans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He’s tightening his grip. Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro was inaugurated for a third term as president on Friday despite international observers, including the United States, determining that his victory in last year’s election was fraudulent. Maduro’s swearing-in was accompanied by a new round of US sanctions against Venezuelan officials and comes one day after the government briefly detained opposition politician María Corina Machado. Below, our experts explain what Maduro’s inauguration means for the region, the Venezuelan opposition, and the future of US sanctions policy. 

• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

What Biden did, and Trump can do

• “The Biden administration has slightly increased pressure” on Maduro’s regime, Iria tells us. While the United States has sanctioned two thousand individuals and raised the bounties on Maduro and his interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, US oil giant Chevron maintains its license to operate in Venezuela. “The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power,” she argues.
• After it takes office in ten days, the Trump administration should work with regional governments, says Jason, to “accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices.”
• Despite the regime’s escalating crackdown on the opposition, “it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is,” Geoff argues. He points to Maduro’s post-election cabinet reshuffle to empower hardliners, coupled with the elevation of Cabello, a longtime rival, as “a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left.”
• Geoff advises the incoming Trump administration to take note of internal divisions in the Maduro regime that can be further undermined by economic pressure. “Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro,” he says, “unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow.”

Regional rejection

• Maduro has brought Latin American leaders “from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab,” Jason tells us. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, Argentinian President Javier Milei, and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, he notes, have all rejected Maduro’s claim to victory in last year’s presidential election.
• The highest-ranking foreign official at Maduro’s inauguration, Jason points out, may have been the speaker of Russia’s Duma.
• “The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat,” Jason says, given Latin America’s historical divisions. “But the critical question,” he adds, “is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition.”

A mobilized opposition

• Amid Maduro’s third inauguration, “Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González,” says Iria. The Biden administration should use this opportunity to take more “meaningful action” against Maduro, she argues, as “the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.”
• Regional governments working to pressure Maduro, Jason says, should also strive to “avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships.” Pressuring Maduro’s government while sparing the Venezuelan people from the worst effects of sanctions is “a delicate tightrope to walk” Jason adds, but is “necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.”

The post What the world can do about Maduro appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: Latin American leaders across the political spectrum are rejecting Maduro’s power grab

Geoff Ramsey: Trump should take note of the Maduro regime’s internal tensions

Iria Puyosa: The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro from power

Lucie Kneip: The Venezuelan opposition will need to unite around a theory of change

William Tobin: Going forward, the US should better balance oil sanctions with sanctions against individuals

Latin American leaders across the political spectrum are rejecting Maduro’s power grab

The voting tally sheets overwhelmingly showed that González won Venezuela’s presidential election on July 28, 2024. It’s even a point on which Trump and US President Joe Biden agree. Both have referred to González as president-elect, with Trump doing so over social media yesterday following the reported detention—and release—of opposition leader Machado.

So, in what type of country does a president lose an election—and there’s evidence to back it up—but then goes ahead and assumes another term anyways? “It’s a dictatorship,” says Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric, in reference to Maduro’s government. Boric is one of many Latin American leaders who have categorically rejected Maduro’s claim that he won the July presidential election. On that point, there is agreement among Boric on the left to Argentinian President Javier Milei and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino on the right—both countries which González has visited. González also visited the United States in the past week, where I had a chance to speak with him. 

In a fragmented and polarized region, what Maduro has achieved is to bring leaders from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico—although not recognizing Maduro’s win—unfortunately had representatives present at today’s inauguration. But at least the presence was limited to the current ambassadors serving in the country. Perhaps the highest-level foreign official at the inauguration was the speaker of Russia’s Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin. 

The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat. The region is historically divided. But the critical question is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition. Regional governments, including the incoming Trump team, should accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices. At the same time, these governments should work to avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships. It’s a delicate tightrope to walk, but it’s necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Trump should take note of the Maduro regime’s internal tensions

By assuming yet another illegitimate mandate based on a fraudulent election, Maduro has confirmed that he is willing to cling to power at all costs. Opposition leader Machado and election winner González are deeply popular in Venezuela, but Maduro has the guns and thugs on his side—and he’s not afraid to use them. Yet in spite of the mounting number of political prisoners and the recent reported detention and release of Machado, it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is. 

In the wake of July’s stolen election, Maduro has had to reconfigure his cabinet completely, placing more and more power in the hands of hardliners in the Chavista coalition. A key benefactor of Maduro’s drive to assume a new mandate is Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, a longtime rival who Maduro has kept at arm’s length since taking power in 2013. Entrusting him as top enforcer may well be a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left inside Chavismo. Others in the coalition, meanwhile, may well have doubts about the idea of six more years of economic chaos, violence, and international isolation. 

When Trump takes office on January 20, his team should take careful note of these internal dynamics. The goal should be to combine pressure with incentives that can disrupt regime cohesion, presenting key figures in the ruling coalition with dilemmas in a way that makes a democratic transition more appealing than clinging to power. For this strategy to work, the next US administration will have to keep sanctions policy nimble and responsive to events on the ground, and avoid a “set it and forget it” approach. Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro, unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow. The first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework, presented in 2020, laid out a vision for change involving power sharing and reconciliation, and it may be worth dusting off this time around as well.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro from power

In response to Maduro’s illegitimate swearing-in for another term as president of Venezuela—despite González’s electoral victory—the Biden administration has slightly increased pressure on his authoritarian regime. The new measures include raising the rewards for Maduro and Cabello to a maximum of twenty-five-million dollars and sanctions against two thousand individuals involved in repression, violation of human rights, and electoral fraud. However, the US oil company Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela remains in place.

Indeed, the new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power. The ruling coalition, which White House representatives are now labeling as “narcoterrorists,” can continue to collaborate with transnational criminal networks that include allies in Iran and Russia while simultaneously increasing repression against democratic political leaders and human rights defenders in Venezuela.

Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González. The Biden administration has an opportunity to take more decisive action to support Venezuela’s democratic re-establishment. Helping to pave a clear path for Venezuela’s return to democracy could become a significant legacy for Biden in the Western Hemisphere. Delaying meaningful action could risk losing this crucial opportunity, especially since the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The Venezuelan opposition will need to unite around a theory of change

Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration is the latest scheme in the authoritarian government’s campaign to eliminate resistance to its consolidation. To add insult to injury, regime affiliates briefly detained Machado during her first public emergence after months of hiding, rattling supporters domestically and abroad. While swaths of the Venezuelan opposition quickly condemned her detention, it remains to be seen how the opposition will respond to tests of its ability to unify in 2025, given differences in attitudes toward electoral participation, negotiations, and pressure tactics.  

Heading into the 2025 subnational elections, opposition coalition candidates will have to determine whether it’s worth throwing their hat in the ring given the electoral conditions. Some may decide that the government’s blatant fraud at the national level will be even more easily achieved at the local level, while others may seek to draw on the infrastructure of their strongholds to procure as much regional power as possible, in which case they will need to develop a clear strategy of mobilization. The regime will seek to exploit these conflicting strategies to undermine the opposition’s political will to rise to the occasion.

Maduro’s government has historically proven adept at taking advantage of internal divisions by providing opportunities for disgruntled splinter groups within parties to gain footing by positioning themselves more closely to regime affiliates. This strategy of party cooptation is likely to continue in many of the major parties unless the opposition can find a way to resolve internal differences and coordinate on defining a theory of change.

Beyond electoral participation, opponents of Maduro will continue to face repression through the targeting of political figures, journalists, and human rights activists, as well as crackdowns on protests and digital censorship. Maduro’s best strategy is to stoke fear and fatigue with protests and mobilization. International allies will be critical in supporting political participation and free speech as Maduro seeks to further stifle these tenets of democracy.

—Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Going forward, the US should better balance oil sanctions with sanctions against individuals

As Maduro illegitimately steps into office for his third term today, Venezuela’s oil sector is in sustained yet marginal recovery. In recent months, Venezuela surpassed the one-million-barrel-per-day milestone for the first time since mid-2019.

The oil sector in Venezuela has been experiencing a secular decline since the early 2000s, and production output from Venezuela’s degrading oilfield infrastructure began to drop dramatically during the first half of 2014. An oil price crash sent dominoes cascading for Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, SA, which faced declining demand at the same time as it confronted a sizeable volume of maturing debt, the beginning of central bank monetization, and intensifying operational inefficiencies. 

The sanctions imposed on the oil sector under the “maximum pressure” campaign from 2018 to 2022, spanning the Trump and early Biden administrations, exacerbated but did not cause this decline. However, the strategy did divert most of Venezuela’s oil to China at discounted prices, and led Iranian service company NIORDC to play a key role in maintaining output. Phantom traders from China and Iran handled virtually all of Venezuela’s exports in 2021.

The recent uptick in Venezuelan oil output has come with the reentry of Western firms, most substantially since April 2024 under the US Treasury Department’s policy of “specific licensing.” Under this policy, individual firms can seek authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to operate in Venezuela under transparent and restricted terms, which strictly limit remuneration to Maduro’s enablers. Under this policy, approximately half of Venezuela’s exports have been routed to the United States or to Europe since May 2024. This effectively represents a diversion from China and increases transparency.

There is doubt that a renewed maximum pressure strategy would achieve its aims. In any case, it is incumbent on the Treasury Department to ensure that Maduro cannot use the oil sector as a cash cow, and to continue to tighten its clasp around Maduro’s network of enablers through individual sanctions.  

—William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

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Evolution of freedom

Since 1995¹, Venezuela’s overall Freedom Index score has significantly declined, with a decrease of more than twenty-eight points. Initially, the country’s freedom score was just 1.4 points below the Latin America & the Caribbean regional average, but its scores on all three subindexes have declined and the gap between Venezuela and the regional average now exceed thirty points. The national statistical system has faced a significant setback, with data either disappearing or remaining outdated. Venezuela has outperformed the region on only one indicator—women’s economic freedom, with a significant increase of thirty-five points since 1971, and over eighteen points since 1995, making this evolution a consistent trend in the society.

Venezuela’s poor performance in the twenty-first century can be attributed to the political and ideological project known as “socialism of the twenty-first century,” which aimed to dismantle the institutional framework established during the democratic period, 1958–1998, and replace it with a system rooted in socialist ethics and production mode, with a geopolitical scope, and where individual freedom is no longer a value.

Its economic subindex improved by over eight points from 1995 to 2000, driven by trade freedom, but has since declined. The most significant driver of the decline has been the erosion of property rights, with 1,423 documented cases of expropriations, interventions, occupations, and confiscations . Additionally, the “land rescues” under the 2001 Land Law resulted in the seizure of five million hectares, equivalent to 5 percent of Venezuela’s territory, according to the National Land Institute. From 2014 to 2019, the Organic Law on Fair Prices, enforced by the National Superintendence for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights, led to 149,811 actions, including inspections, closures, and fines. As a result, the economy stagnated, supply chains were dismantled, and the violation of property rights exacerbated uncertainty, heightened risk perception, discouraged investment, stifled job creation, and deepened poverty.

Since 2020, a series of pseudo-privatizations have occurred, under the Anti-Blockade Law, which allows the suspension of legal provisions, the use of exceptional contracting mechanisms, and the classifying of actions as secret or confidential. Alongside this, an indeterminate number of affected companies and assets have been returned without transparency, and have not adhered to the basic standards of reparation or property rights restitution.

The socialist model currently guiding Venezuela’s policies is marked by excessive populism and state intervention. Economic activity and entrepreneurship are severely hampered by widespread government interference, inconsistent regulatory enforcement, and a heavy bureaucratic burden. The lack of transparency in government decision making, the shrinking of market size, and entrenched cronyism have resulted in a market with little competition and virtually no freedom for investment.

The government’s lack of transparency and accountability and a setback in the official statistical system have been other key factors in undermining economic freedom, making it difficult to base decisions on reliable information and fueling misinformation. This issue is particularly evident in the erosion of information related to the national budget and its management, with clear political intent, allowing the executive between 2006 and 2012, the discretionary and opaque management of large public funds for social programs known as “Misiones,” which failed to produce positive social outcomes.

At the same time, political freedom in Venezuela has drastically declined, with a nearly fifty-five-point drop since 1995 in the political subindex. Initially, Venezuela outperformed the regional average by twelve points but now lags by more than forty points, with the gap widening after 1999. Electoral performance has steadily worsened, with sharp declines between 2012–13 and 2016–17. The presidential election on July 28, 2024, particularly exposed the subordination of the electoral and judiciary branches to the executive, disregarding the popular will and eroding the integrity of elections as a means of democratic alternation.

Legislative checks on the executive have collapsed by 85 points since 1995. Although there was an apparent improvement between 2014–2016, when the democratic opposition won a qualified majority in the National Assembly, this progress was undone by a Supreme Court decision loyal to the executive, followed by the establishment of a Constituent Assembly that stripped the National Assembly of its powers. The situation seemed to offer some hope in 2018–2019, with the emergence of an interim presidency and mounting international pressure and sanctions on the regime. However, the anticipated political change toward greater freedom never materialized.

The rule of law, as measured by the legal subindex, has eroded, with the score dropping dropped by over twenty-five points in Venezuela since 1995. Initially, scores were above the regional average, but this trend reversed in 1998, leading to the country’s current position below that average. Judicial independence and effectiveness have sharply deteriorated, with significant declines between 1997–2000 and 2003–05, after which they have remained consistently low.

The main drivers for the decline in the rule of law during this century are a) the consolidation of executive supremacy, enabled by the expansion of presidential powers in the 1999 Constitution and the frequent use of decrees and special powers through enabling laws; b) the increasing role of the military in controlling and implementing government policies; and c) the rise in corruption and lack of transparency, bypassing legal accountability standards. The decline has been further compounded by a 73 percent drop in judicial independence between 1995 and 2017. These elements have eroded democratic governance and undermined institutional integrity.

In 2019, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights violations in Venezuela since 2014. Its latest report issued in September 2024 focused on the post-electoral crisis following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024. The report highlighted a significant intensification of the state’s repressive apparatus, documenting serious human rights violations, including brutal crackdowns on protests, which resulted in twenty-five deaths, hundreds of injuries, and thousands of arrests, including 158 minors. The report detailed arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence, all of which escalated during this period. Additionally, the report noted an increase in harassment and judicial persecution of journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and key civil society actors. This repression worsened following the approval of the Law on the Supervision, Regularization, Action, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations (August 2024), which imposed severe restrictions on the operations of these organizations.

Evolution of prosperity

Since 1995, Venezuela’s Prosperity Index score has experienced significant fluctuations, while the regional average has generally improved. Between 2003 and 2012, Venezuela saw a period of growth, followed by a sharp decline, placing it among the lowest-ranked countries in terms of prosperity. This decline demonstrates how undermining the institutional framework that safeguards individual freedom, freedom of expression, and political and economic liberty can devastate a society’s prosperity and the quality of life of its citizens.

The perception of progress in income per capita during the positive period was largely driven by an oil price boom that was managed wastefully. Even before oil prices reversed, the country was left impoverished, with a destroyed middle class, crippling debt, and a lack of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, and telecommunications, as well as of public goods like security, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, Venezuela lost nearly a quarter of its population to migration. Today, its prosperity has fallen below early 2000 levels, reaching a state of low prosperity.

Between 2013 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted by more than 75 percent (as measured by GDP). Despite apparent recovery rates in recent years, the economy remains far too small to meet the population’s needs, and without a robust institutional framework ensuring transparent and fair rules, sustainable growth and improved quality of life remain elusive. Since 2008, Venezuela has suffered from double-digit inflation year-over-year, reaching hyperinflation between 2016 and 2019, which would be overcome by a process of dollarization.

Given the lack of updated and verifiable official economic data², the World Bank in 2021 unclassified Venezuela, which previously classed as an upper-middle-income country. For the size of the economy at that time, Venezuela could have been classified as a low-income country.

Official socioeconomic data is scarce and irregular, so it is thanks to the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) conducted by well-reputed Venezuelan universities that we know that in 2021, 94.5 percent of the population lived in poverty, with extreme poverty affecting two-thirds of the households, due to the combined effects of a collapsed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Those figures improved by 2023 when extreme poverty dropped to 59.1 percent and multidimensional poverty to 58 percent, but in rural areas, both indicators remained over 70 percent, so the population is still struggling. This starkly contrasts with the year 2000, when seventy percent of the population belonged to the middle class, and fewer than 25 percent lived in poverty.

The education system has become increasingly substandard, with significant deterioration since 2013. However, the true extent of this decline is difficult to assess due to the manipulation, absence, or lack of updated official statistics, which can lead to misleading information being reported to multilateral organizations. The education crisis is marked by crumbling public school infrastructure, a shortage of underpaid teachers, inadequate educational coverage, high student dropout rates, and a significant reduction in both the reach and consistency of the school feeding program. This downward trend extends to university education, where enrollment dropped by 24 percent between 2008 and 2018, and by 60 percent in the country’s major universities from 2012 to 2024. According to the 2023 ENCOVI report, only 60 percent of students regularly attend school with some degree of normality, while 40 percent have irregular attendance.

The decline in educational quality is further highlighted by an Early Grades Reading Assessment test, where third grade students achieved, on average, only 57.3 percent correct answers. Additionally, seventy-five percent of students scored below 76 percent, with just 25 percent achieving between 76 percent and 100 percent correct answers, underscoring the significant gaps in learning outcomes. The situation deteriorated further during the COVID-19 pandemic, as schools were unprepared for virtual learning. The post-pandemic period brought additional challenges, with many schools being looted, resulting in the loss of supplies, furniture, and electrical wiring and damage to infrastructure. Compounding the crisis is the government’s response to teachers’ demands, which has involved threats, harassment, and surveillance. This hostile environment, coupled with poor working conditions and restricted freedom of speech, has driven many educators to quit their jobs or leave the country altogether, exacerbating the already fragile state of the education system.

In contrast to the improving health outcomes in much of Latin America, Venezuela’s health performance has stagnated and deteriorated. Once outperforming the regional average, the country fell behind in 2009 and is now more than three points below the regional mean. Various indicators reflect the decline in the overall health of the Venezuelan population during the twenty-first century. Life expectancy dropped from around seventy-three to seventy-two years, while the infant mortality rate increased from 17.9 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 21.1 per 1,000 by 2017. Maternal mortality surged to 125 per 100,000 live births by 2015³. By 2020, nearly one-third of Venezuelans were food insecure, and the 2017 ENCOVI survey found that 64.3 percent of the population had lost weight due to food shortages. Additionally, once-controlled communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diphtheria resurfaced, with malaria cases rising from 35,500 in 2009 to over 400,000 by 2017. By 2018, over 80 percent of hospitals reported shortages of basic medicines, and many healthcare facilities lacked electricity and clean water.

This situation stems from a combination of factors: lack of investment in public services worsening healthcare; infrastructure collapsing due to corruption, poor maintenance, and a lack of new investments; ineffective public policies; the exodus of healthcare workers and skilled professionals because of low salaries and poor working conditions; widespread shortages of food and medicine; rising poverty; and persistent inflation and hyperinflation. These issues result from the model imposed at the beginning of the century, which dismantled the institutional framework, curtailing liberty and economic opportunities.

Additionally, Venezuela has experienced significant environmental degradation, jeopardizing the prospects for future generations. The massive and uncontrolled exploitation of the Orinoco Mining Arc, which encroaches on Indigenous territories and Areas Under Special Administration Regime with government knowledge and authorization, has drawn serious concerns from social, environmental, and human rights organizations since 2016 regarding its harmful implications for Indigenous communities and biodiversity. This mining project has led to significant destruction in the Amazon region in Venezuela, with illegal mining operations deforesting 1,000 hectares of Canaima National Park and damaging 2,227 hectares in Yapacana National Park. Moreover, mercury pollution has affected the Ventuari, Caura, Caroní, Cuyuní, and Orinoco rivers.

Petróleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, has also neglected environmental and safety protocols, increasing accidents, including spills in sensitive ecosystems such as the Orinoco River and Lake Maracaibo. The Global Gas Flaring Tracker from the World Bank indicates that Venezuela’s flaring intensity quadrupled between 2012 and 2021, with the amount of gas flared in 2022 exceeding the amount of gas recovered for productive purposes. This practice contributes to higher emissions of harmful gases, placing Venezuela fifth globally in gas flaring.

Several indicators highlight the environmental harm in Venezuela. Global Forest Watch tracks increased deforestation, the Living Planet Index reveals a decline in biodiversity, the Water Quality Index assesses levels of water pollution, and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and the Global Carbon Atlas, reflects the environmental stress caused by fossil fuel extraction and energy mismanagement. The Air Quality Index (EPI-Yale) indicates issues related to inadequate industrial regulation and vehicular emissions, the Waste Management Index (EPI) shows a decline in waste management capacity, with improper disposal of solid and hazardous waste, and the Environmental Vulnerability Index highlights high vulnerability due to poor natural resource management. These indicators collectively demonstrate the country’s ecological deterioration across multiple dimensions. This troubling environmental situation stems from a lack of rule of law, corruption, and influence peddling, leading to the indiscriminate depletion of natural resources and the contamination of the environment to the detriment of future generations.

The path forward

Venezuela’s current situation is critical: Citing the nation’s institutional and social fragility, the International Monetary Fund placed it on its List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. The International Monetary Fund has alluded to a government that is either unable or unwilling to fulfill essential state functions such as providing security, justice, and basic services to the majority of its population, with weak institutions, nonexistent governance, and high poverty levels.

This crisis is the result of nearly twenty-five years of the socialism of the twenty-first century model, which has eroded the progress made in the previous century. From the outset, various levels and forms of resistance to this model have emerged, yet the regime has maintained its grip on power through various means, increasingly revealing its authoritarian nature over time. Despite these challenges, the population has demonstrated remarkable resilience, remaining active and committed to pursuing political change that could reverse the current situation by leveraging its available natural, human, and financial resources.

Thus, this moment can be seen as a crossroads, a tipping point, a moment of bifurcation, with the potential to shape the future. The political driver at play will serve as the catalyst for two vastly different scenarios.

1) Scenario 1: Oppression and poverty. This scenario envisions the end of Venezuela’s liberal democratic republic model, resulting in the entrenchment of tyranny and the subordination of all powers to the executive. Venezuela could become a significant node in the multidimensional networks of illegality.

If the popular will, as expressed in the 2024 presidential elections, is disregarded, the country may plunge deeper into a society marked by diminished freedom and prosperity. Venezuela is unlikely to reintegrate into global financial flows, facing obstacles in renegotiating its debt with multilateral organizations and receiving the necessary support to address its complex humanitarian crisis.

In this context, recurrent macroeconomic imbalances are expected, leading to increased economic volatility and a shortened investment horizon, which would elevate risk premiums. Maintaining policies to stabilize the exchange rate and control inflation would become increasingly difficult, with restrictions on credit and foreign currency inflows. That will widen the gap between official and parallel exchange rates, fostering the debasement of the national currency and deepening dollarization.

To manage these macroeconomic challenges, fiscal and parafiscal pressures on the private sector would intensify, making production less profitable and riskier, promoting informal economic activity, reducing domestic supply, and reigniting inflationary pressures.

The prevailing situation would hinder the ability to address social needs, exacerbating poverty and exclusion. As popular dissatisfaction rises, the government is likely to respond with increased repression, leading to a heightened militarization of public spaces and severe human rights violations. This dynamic would contribute to the further erosion or outright extinction of the rule of law, undermining freedoms of expression and association, as well as civil, political, and economic rights.

Such conditions would foster opacity in public fund management, heightening corruption and enabling arbitrary public policies and decision-making processes. An ongoing source of income may come from continued licenses for oil resource exploitation or from actors unconcerned about the reputational risks of engaging with a sanctioned state, which would likely result in lower prices for oil sales.

In this tyrannical scenario, characterized by a lack of freedom and a bleak future, a significant new wave of migration could emerge, predominantly involving very low-income groups. This influx would put pressure on neighboring and destination countries, potentially fueling anti-migration policies and discriminatory attitudes.
The consolidation of a tyrannical regime would facilitate the exploitation of Venezuela’s valuable natural resources to support illicit networks, transforming the country into a hub of regional, hemispheric, and global instability.

2) Scenario 2: Freedom and prosperity. This scenario envisions the reestablishment of Venezuela as a liberal democratic republic, anchored in Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and prosperity. Under this vision, Venezuela could reclaim its stabilizing role in the western hemisphere.

If the democratic alternative—which won the presidential elections on July 28, 2024 and transparently demonstrated its results to the world—gets into power, it will pave the way for a positive future. This could not only enhance freedoms and respect for political, civil, and human rights but also improve the quality of life and spur economic growth.

The recovery would be guided by a proposed plan called Venezuela: Land of Grace—Freedom, Democracy, and Prosperity, advanced by the team supporting the political leader Maria Corina Machado, and built on three foundational pillars: (a) free development of individuals: recognizing the intrinsic dignity and creative potential of free individuals; (b) a state at the service of the citizen: protecting life, liberty, and property, ensuring access to justice and public security through independent branches of government, with a focus on efficiency, transparency, and public-private partnerships in managing services as well as education, healthcare, and security; and (c) free market economy: unlocking the country’s potential by transforming its abundant resources into wealth through citizens’ efforts, fostering entrepreneurship, and stimulating economic growth.

With these pillars in place, a myriad of opportunities could arise to restore citizens’ quality of life in an ambiance of freedom and peace. A robust institutional framework and a stable macroeconomic environment could attract investments across various productive sectors, enhancing domestic supply, creating jobs, and improving living conditions for households. Full support from multilateral organizations, following the renegotiation of defaulted external debt, could guide the nation toward overcoming the humanitarian crisis and significantly reducing poverty levels.

Venezuela could emerge as an energy hub due to its vast reserves of hydrocarbons and renewable energy resources, bolstered by private investments, reclaiming its status as a major player in oil and gas production and refining, and resuming its role as reliable supplier within the western hemisphere. In this scenario, Venezuela could contribute to reducing global geopolitical tensions, combating illegality, and promoting freedom and peace.

Sary Levy-Carciente is a research scientist at the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, Florida International University; former president of the National Academy of Economic Sciences (Venezuela); and dean of the faculty of Economic and Social Sciences (Central University of Venezuela). LevyCarciente is a Fullbright fellow at the Center for Polymer Studies, Boston University; and visiting researcher at the Department of Economics, UMASS. Levy-Carciente is the author of the International Property Rights Index (Property Rights Alliance) and the Index of Bureaucracy (Florida International University).

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The post Venezuela’s 2024 stolen election compounds challenges to stability and democratic renewal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Venezuela continues to grapple with a deep political and economic crisis, the international community is at a critical juncture in shaping its response. The stolen presidential election of July 28 marked a watershed moment, signaling the country’s further descent into authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro’s regime. In this context, policymakers in the United States and other countries are likely to continue to impose sanctions against political, military, and economic elites as a means of seeking to exert pressure without worsening the humanitarian situation. 

With over eight million Venezuelans displaced by the crisis, US and other international policymakers are cautious about the unintended consequences of tightening existing oil and financial sanctions. Although the outgoing Biden administration at one point said it was evaluating whether to rescind privately issued specific licenses that authorize energy companies to maintain a foothold in the country, it has not done so, partly out of an interest in preventing the worsening of economic conditions. Instead, the Biden administration prioritized sanctions against individuals responsible for Venezuela’s deteriorating human rights situation. On September 12, the Biden administration sanctioned sixteen government-linked individuals, including leaders of the National Electoral Council who oversaw the stolen election, and members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice who validated the fraudulent results. Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the goal of the individual sanctions is to “promote accountability” for those undermining democracy in Venezuela. Three months later, Canada’s foreign ministry announced it would add five of these same individuals to their sanctions list for fraudulently declaring Maduro the winner of the July election. The US added an additional 21 individuals to the sanctions list in November 2024. Following Maduro’s illegitimate inauguration in January 2025, the US, Canada, and the EU all announced additional sanctions on regime officials and affiliates.

This interest in targeted sanctions is likely to continue under the second Trump administration, given that Trump’s first term saw heated internal debate over the potential impact of broader economic sanctions on Venezuela’s migration crisis. Indeed, the use of individual sanctions accelerated under President-elect Trump’s first presidential term even as he oversaw the imposition of broader sectoral sanctions targeting Venezuela’s links to the international oil and financial markets. 

With Trump returning to the Oval Office, here’s what policymakers should know about the use of individual sanctions—and what can make Venezuela sanctions policy more effective.

The sticks: A history of the Venezuela sanctions regime

From 2009 to 2015, Venezuela-related sanctions were few and primarily targeted kingpin leaders involved in drug trafficking and financial support for Hezbollah. In March 2015, Executive Order 13692 created the country-specific sanctions regime on Venezuela. Seven military officials were initially sanctioned for their involvement in stifling protests. This program allowed the United States government to sanction individuals involved in human rights abuses, corruption, or the undermining of democratic processes. In November 2018, Executive Order 13850 created a new Venezuela-related sanctions program under which the United States could freeze assets and prevent actors from conducting corrupt transactions with the Venezuelan government to move money. In August 2019, Executive Order 13884 blocked Venezuelan government assets and enabled sanctions on actors assisting the Venezuelan government, and an initial seven military officials were sanctioned for their involvement in actions undermining democratic processes. 

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals, including the first seven military officials sanctioned under the Venezuela-specific sanctions regime. After Trump took office in January of 2017, the number of individual sanctions increased dramatically, with forty-one issued in 2017 alone. The administration issued twenty individual sanctions in 2018, forty-nine in 2019, and twenty-five in 2020. (These numbers do not include individuals who were sanctioned and later delisted). Under the Trump administration, some of the sanctions targeted Venezuelan access to the US dollar and to international financing, and therefore Venezuela’s ability to reconcile its sovereign debt. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy took off in 2019, which saw the imposition of over 180 Venezuela-related sanctions, including the forty-nine targeting individuals. That year also saw the first implementation of sectoral sanctions on industries including oil, gold, finance, defense, and security.

This shifted under US President Joe Biden. Until September 2024, Biden had not added a single Venezuelan national to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list since taking office. However, after the July 28 stolen presidential election, the government-backed National Electoral Council declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner, despite opposition candidate Edmundo González emerging as the clear victor following the opposition’s independent collection and publication of over 80 percent of the official actas, electoral vote tallies produced by each voting center. Roughly a month and a half after the election, the United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals, for obstructing the elections and intensifying post-election repression, ultimately forcing Gonzalez to flee the country. Two more rounds of sanctions were announced in November 2024 and January 2025.

The carrots: When and why individual sanctions have been lifted

The Biden administration largely opted for a different approach than the first Trump administration, seeming to prefer carrots over sticks. On multiple occasions, Biden took Venezuelan nationals off the list. 

In December 2021, the administration announced it would no longer designate the former Colombian guerrilla movement, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), as a terrorist group. As part of a package of ninety-two FARC-linked delistings, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on five Venezuelans including Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, a military officer and former Venezuelan minister of interior who worked as a go-between between the FARC rebels and the Venezuelan government.

In June 2022, the Treasury Department announced that it had lifted the sanctions on Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, a former national treasurer and vice president of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. Malpica Flores is also the nephew of current Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, and his delisting was reportedly part of an effort to induce the Venezuelan government to restart negotiations with the opposition—and indeed, days later opposition and government representatives met in Oslo. In November 2022, two other nephews of Flores, known as the “narcosobrinos” due to their involvement in transnational drug trafficking operations, were released as part of a prisoner swap that included the release of ex-officials of Citgo, the US-based subsidiary of PDVSA. 

In July 2023, the Treasury removed Carlos Rotondaro, former board president of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS), from the SDN list. Sanctioned for “economic mismanagement and acts of corruption,” Rotondaro was reportedly delisted for providing information to the United States on financial movements made by the family of Haiman El Troudi, former Minister of Planning and Development and Minister of Public Works.

These delistings fit with the Biden administration’s broader reticence toward announcing new sanctions on Venezuela. Rather than rolling out new sectoral sanctions, the Biden White House sought to incentivize a democratic opening by issuing licenses to US and Western oil companies to operate in the country despite broader oil and financial sanctions, in exchange for a series of agreements between the government and the democratic opposition that led to the July 28 election. 

Biden was not alone in attempting to use sanctions relief to incentivize change in Venezuela. Even as the first Trump administration ramped up the use of individual sanctions, it also offered sanctions relief to individuals who “take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses and speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.” As part of this strategy, the Trump administration lifted sanctions in two cases. In March 2019, the Treasury delisted the wives of Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo, two regime-linked businessmen who reportedly tried to work as middlemen between Washington and Caracas. According to press accounts, Gorrín worked to support a failed attempt to overthrow Maduro in April of that year, and Treasury’s removal of his wife and the wife of his business partner from the sanctions list was a decision made in exchange for his support for the coup.

In May 2019, after the uprising failed, the United States delisted Manuel Cristopher Figuera, former Director General of Venezuela’s National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Figuera had taken part in the coup attempt and fled the country when it failed. In its press release, the Treasury Department stated that the move “demonstrates that U.S. sanctions need not be permanent and are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.”

Who’s on the list?

The United States has rescinded the visas of almost two thousand Venezuelans and currently sanctions 202 Venezuela-linked individuals on the SDN list (as of January 13, 2025). Of these 202, eighty-one have been sanctioned primarily for their current or former roles with Venezuelan security and intelligence outfits. Nine have worked in the military counterintelligence branch known by its Spanish-language acronym DGCIM, eleven have worked in the intelligence branch (SEBIN), thirty have worked in the national armed forces (FANB), twenty-six have worked for the national guard (GNB), and seven have worked for the national police (PNB). Some of these individuals have worked for multiple branches of the security or counterintelligence service. 

The United States also has a history of sanctioning key Venezuelan political officials. Maduro has been sanctioned since 2017, and his wife and son have been sanctioned since 2018 and 2017, respectively. Attorney General Tarek William Saab was sanctioned in 2017. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, Communications Minister Jorge Rodríguez, Former National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello and his wife and brother, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez were all sanctioned in 2018.

Beyond key officials of the Venezuelan government and their affiliates, the United States has also sanctioned several economic and financial elites linked to operations with the government or the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Veronica Esparza Garcia, Joaquin Leal Jimenez, and Olga Maria Zepeda Esparza were sanctioned in 2020 for “operating a sanctions-evasion scheme benefitting the illegitimate Maduro regime and PDVSA.” In early 2021, Alessandro Bazzoni, an Italian citizen, Francisco Javier D’Agostino, a dual Spanish-Venezuelan citizen, and Philipp Paul Vartan Apikian, a Swiss citizen, were sanctioned for their ties to “a network attempting to evade United States sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector.” Apikian and his company, Swissoil, were removed from the sanctions list in June 2023. Bazzoni and D’Agostino were removed in January 2025.

Additionally, as of September 2024, eleven individuals connected to Venezuela have been sanctioned under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and classified as “specially designated narcotics traffickers.” The sanctions connected with this particular designation are separate from the Venezuela-specific sanctions programs created by executive order but have been perceived by observers as connected to the US-led pressure campaign. 

Coordinating sanctions with allies

This graph does not include sanctions issued by all three countries on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The United States, with its current list of 202 designees, is not the only government that has sanctioned individuals related to Venezuela. Canada currently sanctions 115, and the European Union (EU) sanctions sixty-nine. Of the 202 US-sanctioned individuals, Canada sanctions eighty-three of the same individuals, while the EU sanctions fifty-eight. Forty-eight individuals are currently sanctioned by all three parties. Most of these were sanctioned by the United States months or years before they were sanctioned by Canada and the EU. These include high-level officials such as Delcy Rodríguez, Tarek William Saab, and Diosdado Cabello. However, it is notable that the EU has not placed individual sanctions on Maduro himself. Neither Canada nor the EU has placed sanctions on any individuals sanctioned by the United States that we have classified as economic elites. 

Of the thirty-two people that Canada sanctions that the United States does not, a number are judicial officials such as magistrates and individuals associated with repressive acts. All except for one were sanctioned between 2017 and 2019. The eleven individuals sanctioned by the EU that are not sanctioned by the United States include people known to have committed human rights violations and officials contributing to the erosion of democracy and democratic institutions. Most of these were sanctioned between 2020 and 2021.

How effective are individual sanctions?

Individual sanctions can allow decisionmakers in Washington to signal a policy stance and provide a degree of accountability, which may be useful to victims of Venezuela’s authoritarianism. Listed individuals are unable to travel to the United States and they cannot operate directly in broader financial systems. There is an argument to be made that this makes the target’s life uncomfortable or at least more difficult, whether the sanctions involve freezing assets, limiting their mobility, or restricting business operations. Individual sanctions may also serve as a measure of justice for human rights victims. However, in Venezuela so far there is little evidence that being added to the individual sanctions list encourages defection. Only one case of a sanctioned official defecting exists (Manuel Christopher Figuera). Other key individuals who have defected, such as former Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez and former Prosecutor General Luisa Ortega Díaz, were never sanctioned by the United States (although Ramírez was sanctioned by Canada).

One way to tighten the strategy for individual sanctions involves targeting more overseas assets of Venezuelans who have contributed to political and economic destabilization, and those of their family members and associates. While some of the assets of more prominent Venezuelans have been seized, a number of Venezuelan officials still own properties in Miami and other US cities, Latin America, and Europe. According to a 2022 joint investigation by Armando.Info and El Nuevo Herald, at least 718 companies in Florida are owned by current or former Venezuelan officials, including over two hundred that are owned by members of the military. Most of these owners have not been sanctioned. While an SDN designation implies that all US properties and financial assets of the individual will be frozen, some sanctioned officials continue to have access to large financial networks through assets held by family members or affiliates who are not sanctioned. Ramping up the targeting of the asset networks of current or former affiliates of the dictatorship could potentially create more room for those affiliates to consider the value of remaining loyal to Maduro, while avoiding harming the Venezuelan people.

The key question lies in how international actors can sanction individuals in a way that pulls the regime apart instead of consolidating it. Maduro has honored some of those sanctioned with replicas of independence leader Simón Bolívar’s sword. After the most recent wave of sanctions, government officials have painted being sanctioned as a badge of honor, a sign of loyalty to the revolution. According to Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, being sanctioned is a recognition of officials’ “morale, physical and professional integrity, and their leadership.”

One way to mitigate this is to follow sanctions announcements with targeted, discrete, and strategic communication with sanctioned individuals on the steps needed to get off the list, as occurred in the case of Manuel Christopher Figuera. Similar communication could occur with individuals the government is considering sanctioning, as may have been the case with Ortega Díaz. Coordinating more closely with multiple countries to impose parallel individual sanctions on individuals can help the international community to align on sanctions priorities. This may include advising interested international allies on the creation of their own legal sanctions frameworks. 

But sanctions should not be the only manner of engagement with regime affiliates. The goal should always be to identify and engage those most likely to support democratic reform from the inside. This means empowering moderate elements within Chavismo and isolating hardliners to maintain the potential for a peaceful, democratic solution.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

The authors would like to thank Brennan Rhodes for his research support in contributing to this piece. 

Jul 24, 2024

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group is a diverse group of experts and practitioners from Venezuela, the United States, Latin America, and Europe, brought together to advance the conversation on how to reach a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in the South American country. The group comprises former government officials, civil society leaders, private sector leaders, humanitarian voices, economists, and leading experts on Venezuela who work to promote debate and propose actionable and concrete policy recommendations in order to advance policy innovation in addressing the situation in Venezuela. 

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The post Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2024 was a transformative year for Latin America and the Caribbean. Elections brought some surprises, but the region also bucked the global trend as continuity was the theme in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, where Claudia Sheinbaum made history as its first female president. Further south, Brazil played a pivotal role as the host of the Group of Twenty and Peru welcomed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, asserting Latin America’s leadership on the global stage.

Meanwhile, the region faced enduring challenges—from Nicolas Maduro’s ignoring electoral results in Venezuela to the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations. The region remains trapped in a low-growth economic environment with considerable strains on fiscal revenue, while a strong hurricane season reinforced the importance of building greater resilience across the Caribbean. China’s influence surged, with increased, notable new investments and Colombia’s decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

The post Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025: Ten predictions to shape the year ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Chevron CEO Mike Wirth on the future of energy policy

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Mike Wirth, chairman and chief executive officer of Chevron, discusses his vision for policies that address both energy security and environmental protection in an increasingly complex global landscape.

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According to Chevron* Chief Executive Officer Mike Wirth, there’s a rising “recognition” that the energy transition is “going to take longer than people would have hoped a few years ago.”

At a December 6 Atlantic Council Front Page event, Wirth argued that building what is essentially “a separate energy system”—a zero-carbon energy system—“in parallel” is going to require new infrastructure and new investments. “That’s going to take time,” he said.

Wirth explained that while finding solutions for climate change is at the forefront of policy discussions in Europe and the United States, developing countries are more focused on solutions that enable energy access and affordability. But, Wirth said, there are no “one-size-fits-all solutions.”

“The reality is some of these solutions work better in some places than they do in others, and none of them serve all the different needs of a diverse economy,” Wirth said. He added that he thus appreciates the flexibility of the Paris Agreement, in allowing countries to make their own nationally determined contributions based on their own contexts.

With President-elect Donald Trump soon to reenter the White House, Wirth said that he expects to see continued growth in conventional energy and also in “new technologies that address future market demands.”

“The US is an energy superpower. We have a strong diverse energy economy, and it is fundamental to our economic competitiveness,” he said. “We need all of these solutions” to satisfy future demand for energy.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, in which the Chevron head discussed the future of the energy system under a new US administration and the impacts of geopolitics on energy.

The four-year outlook

• Wirth said the next US administration needs to craft policies that “balance” between three “tradeoffs”: Mitigating environmental impact, ensuring access to affordable energy, and maintaining national security.
• Wirth said that he believes Trump understands “the importance of a strong energy economy for a strong US economy.” He added that he expects the Trump administration to “reduce the regulatory burden” that the energy industry faces, and that there will be continued growth and advancement in both renewables and conventional energy.
• The next administration may want to take a look at the United States’ sanctions on oil-producing countries Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, Wirth noted. “Enforcement of those sanctions has been designed to allow those barrels to continue to come into the market” in part to avoid spiking oil prices, he said.
• “They haven’t really crimped supply, they’ve just redirected supply,” he argued. And that, he added, has created “certain risks” as the countries that have been subject to sanctions have looked into other, more dangerous ways to sell and ship their energy. For example, Wirth explained, Russia has resorted to using a shadow fleet, which poses risks for other ships and the environment. “That’ll be another issue that the administration will grapple with,” Wirth said.
• Chevron is the only US oil company allowed to operate in Venezuela. Wirth said that while the company has not yet discussed this with the incoming Trump administration, Chevron wants to maintain its presence there. “Other companies have left Venezuela. They’ve been replaced by and large with companies from two countries: Russia and China,” Wirth said. “If we were to leave,” he added, there is “no doubt” Chevron’s operations would meet the same fate.

Energy and geopolitics: “Fundamentally intertwined” 

• Wirth said that energy and geopolitics—including the conflicts unfolding around the world—are “fundamentally intertwined.”
• Considering Europe’s scramble to decrease its dependence on Russian gas following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Wirth argued that “Europe is going to have to reassess its overall approach to energy supply.”
• The United States, Wirth said, can be “an important source of supply to our allies” in Europe and beyond. “We’ll need to be in that future to avoid creating the same kind of single-point dependence that has existed.”
• On the conflict in the Middle East, Wirth said that Chevron has shut down natural gas platforms in the eastern Mediterranean. “These facilities have been targeted by rockets and missiles from Hezbollah,” he said. But, he added, “the naval version of the Iron Dome has proven to be effective in interdicting,” Wirth said.
• In discussing the technologies supporting the energy transition, Wirth warned that China has a “very strong hold” on the supply chains for materials—including rare earths and critical minerals—that make up technologies such as solar panels and electric vehicles.
• “You see a lot of the mining activity going on in Africa . . . and a lot of the processing goes on in China, which gives China a lot of influence over supply pricing,” he said. “We haven’t diversified the supply chains for some of these inputs to new energies nearly enough.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council. 

Note: Chevron is a donor to the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

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But despite the fraught politics of the OFAC licensing system, Washington should stick with the current policy—which regulates cash flow into Venezuela, distances the country from China and Iran, and strengthens transatlantic energy security—rather than returning to the “maximum pressure” strategies that preceded it.

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Maximum pressure, minimal results

In January 2019, the first Trump administration imposed broad sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA, which expanded into a “maximum pressure” campaign that barred US oil companies from operating in the country and extended sanctions risk to non-US firms.  

Stricter sanctions contributed to an abrupt decline in Venezuela’s crude oil production. Output crashed from 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in January 2019 to 430,000 by July 2020—although the effects of long-term underinvestment, national blackouts, and COVID-19 also impacted oil operations during this period.

The economic fallout from Venezuela’s oil bust intensified a wave of emigration that had begun in 2015. But the sanctions failed to dislodge Maduro—and polling, both internally and among the country’s diaspora, showed they were unpopular with most Venezuelans.

PDVSA quickly learned how to circumvent the sanctions. Secondary sanctions aimed at preventing companies from selling Venezuelan oil abroad were overcome through an extensive network of phantom traders.

As a result, by the end of 2020 China and Iran had emerged as Venezuela’s primary trading partners. Between July 2021 and July 2023, Venezuela imported over 35 million barrels of Iranian condensate as diluent used to produce 400,000-500,000 bpd of extra heavy crude oil. Over this two-year period, Iranian traders acquired over 47 million barrels of crude in exchange for that condensate, with nearly all shipments routed to China clandestinely and at steep discounts. These swaps circumvented sanctions and strengthened ties between Venezuela and Iran.

Course correction

Two years into the Biden administration the policy changed. In November 2022, OFAC issued General License (GL) 41 to Chevron, permitting it to resume operations under an agreement with PDVSA that allowed the US company to manage key aspects of its joint ventures, including procurement, crude marketing, and finance. Under GL41 and other specific licenses, Chevron can swap oil for US-sourced diluent. All production from joint ventures is required to be sold on the US market. Greater operational control has allowed Chevron to improve working conditions and mitigate safety and environmental risk.

In October 2023, GL44 lifted nearly all sanctions on PDVSA to induce the Maduro government to hold free and fair elections. However, the license was allowed to expire in April 2024 when the regime failed to recognize Maria Corina Machado or her designee as the opposition candidate in the presidential race. Instead, OFAC adopted a policy of issuing “specific” licenses to companies on a case-by-case basis for limited projects or activities.

Joint ventures operating in connection with specific licenses pay the Venezuelan government taxes and royalties in bolívars—not dollars—up to 50 percent of sales, as required by Venezuelan law. Payments to PDVSA are not allowed. Thirty percent of the value of each cargo is reinvested into operations and maintenance. The private partner manages this reinvestment, ensuring an additional layer of accountability. Funds are channeled to strictly vetted service companies.

Finally, 20 percent of each cargo is earmarked for the repayment of debt owed to the minority partner.

Detractors of the licensing regime express frustration with a lack of public information. OFAC licenses are diplomatic tools that permit certain economic activities within restrictions that result from challenging geopolitical conditions. Consequently, key information related to license activities is not made public. But “non-public” does not mean “opaque.” Detailed reports on all activities are filed with OFAC. Information on crude trades is available from numerous subscription sources.

Objectively, specific license holders do channel hundreds of millions of US dollars into the Venezuela economy through private banks. Many economists agree that the flow of these funds into the domestic economy plays a crucial role in stabilizing the exchange rate and managing inflation, which benefits all Venezuelans.

Better than the alternative

Given the unverifiable election results and subsequent human rights abuses in Venezuela, many question why the US government would authorize foreign oil operators to generate revenue from Venezuelan crude. The answer is that OFAC licenses are far more effective at regulating the cash flow from these sales than the maximum pressure sanctions of 2019 to 2022, when Western companies were divorced from their joint venture activities.

The issuance of specific licenses directed Venezuelan oil exports away from China and toward the United States, Europe, and India. In 2024, Venezuela exported 310,000 bpd to China, down from 491,000 in 2021. The share of oil exports marketed by phantom traders decreased from virtually all in 2021 to about 60 percent in 2024. Venezuela’s reliance on Iranian condensate ended, as OFAC-licensed companies are now allowed to import Western-sourced diluent for extra-heavy oil production.

If specific licenses are revoked, the consequences would not align with US energy and security interests, and may bring unintended costs for the opposition and the Venezuelan people.

PDVSA knows how to skirt maximum pressure sanctions and is well prepared to do so again. If those sanctions return, PDVSA would regain full discretion over revenue generated by approximately 300,000 bpd of crude exports, giving the Maduro regime direct access to more money than it currently receives—with no transparency requirements on how it uses it.

Crude sales would be diverted back to China from the United States, Europe, and India. Large discounts would effectively subsidize Chinese imports at the expense of Western company debt repayment. PDVSA would likely resume its reliance on Iran—instead of the US Gulf Coast—for diluent supply.

Venezuela accounts for just 1 percent of global oil production and has limited influence over oil prices. But with instability in the Middle East, it does no good to the United States to lose access to supplies so close to home. Removing Western companies from Venezuelan oil production would only increase energy security risks.

A fine line

Investors face a delicate balance in contemplating engagement with Venezuela, where human rights abuses and corruption pose real risks to moral integrity and financial viability. But the existing approach to OFAC licenses has found a productive middle path that provides greater economic stability, transparency, and control over the flow of revenue to the Maduro regime.

The United States remains limited in its ability to deliver a satisfactory political resolution in Venezuela. Although sanctions are historically ineffective at forcing regime change, they are likely to remain given Venezuela’s complex socio-political environment. But by retaining the existing system and avoiding a return to maximum pressure, the United States can act pragmatically to improve conditions for the Venezuelan people, support more effective mobilization for change, address global geopolitical priorities, and enhance transatlantic energy security.

David Voght and Patricia Ventura are experts on Latin American oil and gas markets and its energy transition.

The views expressed in this analysis are the authors’ own, based on independent research, and do not necessarily reflect those of any clients.

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Standard national security practice is to value the protection of intelligence, assets, methods, and sources, only sharing information on a strictly need-to-know basis. National security professionals maintain strict adherence to this culture, which is underpinned by a system of security clearances and information classification levels. This system is a cornerstone of effective national security, protecting the intelligence from getting into the wrong hands, the sources gathering the information, and the methods in which the information is obtained.

Hostage and wrongful detention cases represent a unique operational environment, as they involve the family members of the hostage, who are rarely counterterrorism experts, national security professionals, or diplomats. Imagine having a family member held hostage in a foreign country and feeling like an outsider in the efforts being carried out to secure their freedom—a reality that was initially addressed nearly ten years ago.

In 2015, the approach to managing hostage-taking and wrongful detention incidents involving US nationals inherently changed, guided by policies created by the Barack Obama administration. The policy changes were the result of an extensive review that Obama personally ordered following the murders of four US nationals, including James Foley, at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) in Syria and complaints from families in these and other cases about their treatment by the US government.

A cornerstone of the policies introduced was the recognition that families have an important role in these cases. As such, the policies enshrine a requirement for intelligence sharing between the US government and hostage families. For example, the family of a hostage who is currently held in the Middle East should be privy to intelligence related to the geopolitical situation impacting that country and thereby impacting their loved one. Families must be at the center of hostage policy for several compelling reasons:

1. Reducing the emotional and psychological impacts on the family Families with loved ones held hostage find themselves in crisis—stuck in a geopolitical situation that often depends on government assistance or leadership to resolve. As US nationals, the families deserve support and transparent updates from the government during this intensely traumatizing period. A lack of transparency intensifies the stress they feel.
2. Involving the most crucial stakeholder Apart from the hostage, the families are the single most important stakeholder in these cases, with their primary concern being the swift recovery of their loved one. They have the greatest motivation, and it is in their collective interest to treat intelligence prudently.
3. Cooperating in resolution In numerous hostage cases, families actively contribute to the efforts to bring their loved ones home, whether by communicating with hostage takers themselves or providing valuable intelligence on the case secured through their private means. Additionally, as positions in and out of government rotate, families are often the only stakeholders in long-term cases that retain valuable historical knowledge of the case. Kidnapping—by states, terrorists, or criminals—is not always solved by governments or governments alone. In fact, when the government partners with families and operates as a united front, it can galvanize national and international support, avoiding fractured and, ultimately, counterproductive efforts.
4. Broadening options Given the uniqueness of these situations, innovative methods of resolution are explored and sometimes required to bring hostages home. Families frequently contribute unconventional ideas and solutions, assisting the government in considering and exploring creative strategies. Diversity of ideas, connections, and approaches can make the difference.  

The Obama administration introduced Presidential Policy Directive 30 (PPD-30) and Executive Order 13698 (EO13698) in 2015. The directive was designed to enhance efforts to respond to these crises and ensure a coordinated and effective approach across the US government. PPD-30 established two new operational offices, the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC), an interagency group within the FBI, and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA), an office within the State Department designed to oversee the diplomatic response to hostage and wrongful detention cases.

PPD-30 emphasizes support for hostage and detainee families, recognizing their vital role in the resolution process and the importance of transparent communication and information sharing with them. Furthermore, EO13698 mandates improved intelligence and information sharing across agencies and prioritizes information sharing with appropriate parties, including the family.

Five years later, in 2020, the Levinson Act, in the name of former Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) agent Robert Levinson, who was abducted in Iran in 2007, passed into law. This law codifies provisions in PPD-30 and EO13698, including, but not limited to, engagement, intelligence sharing, and transparency of updates with families. Finally, in 2022, Executive Order 14078 (EO14078) addressed the need for enhanced coordination and communication with families. In practice, this means the parents of a man being wrongfully detained in China, for example, as the most invested parties in the resolution, would be a collaborative partner with the government and have access to information related to his well-being, the geopolitical situation, challenges surrounding ongoing negotiations, and be brought to the table to share ideas and updates of their own.

Collaborating with families and identifying relevant intelligence to expeditiously declassify and securely share it is a complex task that is not without challenges, of course. The practice inherently runs counter to the culture within national security agencies, which prioritizes protecting sensitive information. Should certain information be leaked, it could compromise ongoing operations, endanger national security goals, or disrupt delicate diplomatic relationships. Moreover, protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering is critical to maintaining the integrity of the collection process and safeguarding agents and assets.

These reasons make it easy to revert to the comfort of guarding information from a national security perspective. However, President Obama’s policies require national security professionals to work against their training in this regard, and the cultural pull towards secrecy requires constant vigilance to overcome. Officials must continue to resolve to minimize the risks of sharing information by working hard to declassify information swiftly to share via strict protocols and secure communications channels. Additionally, officials have a responsibility to ensure families understand the information being shared and internalize the potential risks if shared further. It is worth noting that prioritizing collaboration and aiming for a quicker resolution inherently minimizes the risk of a leak because as cases are resolved more swiftly, the opportunity for an information leak from any party diminishes. As the timeline extends and families continue to wait for a resolution, frustration grows, making it imperative for the families to fully understand the risk of potential leaks in their knowledge of the negotiations and other intel related to the case.

It is important to recognize how challenging it is to ask professionals to go against their institutional ethos and recognize that while the traditional culture of protecting information is imperative in the vast majority of national security challenges, hostage and wrongful detention cases are unique. These unique national security issues require recognizing the value of the family’s involvement in the response and, thus, a unique shift in culture towards proactive information sharing. Policies enacted in 2015, nearly a decade ago, and codified by subsequent law, create a receptive environment for officials to partner with hostage families. In the absence of partnership, trust breaks down, families are isolated, the relationship erodes, and the safe release of the hostage is put at risk.

Institutional changes endure more easily than culture. Especially in the revolving door of US government service, where officials working on hostage policy change every few years, the work of cultural change is never done. It is vital that current and future officials managing hostage and wrongful detention cases are cognizant of the origin of the guiding policies and laws. They must avoid using the classification of relevant information as a shield for not proactively identifying and declassifying information pertinent to families. Embracing the practice of sharing information with families will not only lessen the trauma families feel and build strong partnerships, but experience shows that openness and transparency often lead to better outcomes for hostages and wrongful detainees. The US government must collectively, and at all levels, work to adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of these policies and directives and make every effort to reinforce and improve the culture of information sharing with hostage and wrongful detainee families that President Obama and the authors of the policies and laws envisioned.

Liz Cathcart is the executive director of Hostage US and an active member of the Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project.

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Within minutes of a disputed declaration of Nicolás Maduro’s victory—which “could not be verified or corroborated” by the only independent, international observers there and spurred brutal crackdowns on protesters—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian, in a press briefing, congratulated Venezuela on its “smooth presidential election” and Maduro for his “successful reelection.” As calls rose for transparency and recognition of the Venezuelan voters’ will—nine Latin American nations, among others, called for a review of the vote—Lin doubled down: “I made clear China’s position yesterday. The Venezuelan people’s choice should be respected.” That same day, Chinese leader Xi Jinping declared that Beijing will “firmly support Venezuela’s efforts to safeguard national sovereignty, national dignity, and social stability.”                                 

In August, I participated in the American Foreign Policy Council’s annual delegation to China and had the opportunity to voice my frustrations over Beijing’s support for Maduro directly with Chinese decision makers. Senior leaders at both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (a Ministry of State Security-affiliated think tank) gave similar responses. They told me that China does not interfere in the affairs of other countries and that there are claims of election interference across the world, including in the United States’ most recent presidential election. In these cases, in which one party contests the vote, one official asked me, what would you have us do?

Nothing, actually. If China truly was the neutral, nonjudgmental partner that it claimed to be, Beijing could have chosen inaction, gotten out of the way, and allowed the will of the people to run its course. It also could have sided with the preponderance of evidence suggesting fraud—as dozens of other nations have. But by issuing these statements of support for Maduro, and speaking out so quickly, China decisively put its finger on the scale to help prop up a fellow autocracy, upending the will of a democratic movement.

Life support for Maduro

China’s longstanding support for the undemocratic regime in Venezuela is financial and material as well as diplomatic. In the 2000s, Beijing gave President Hugo Chávez tens of billions of dollars in investments and loans-for-oil deals. Maduro, Chávez’s hand-picked successor, took office after Chávez’s death in 2013, and since then, China has provided critical life support to his increasingly oppressive regime in the form of loans, cash, and investments.

Beijing’s support has at times included acting in accordance with Maduro’s interests during elections. In January 2019, when opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president, over fifty governments officially recognized his election. China stayed silent. That silence benefited Maduro, but Beijing cited noninterference as the reason for their inaction. In December 2020, Venezuela’s major opposition parties boycotted parliamentary elections, which they described as fraudulent and failing to meet the minimum requirements to qualify as free, fair, and transparent. Those elections were rejected by more than fifty-five countries, including the United States, members of the European Union (EU) and the EU-led International Contact Group, the Organization of American States, and the multilateral Lima Group. China, Russia, and Cuba were the only countries that recognized the 2020 parliamentary elections as legitimate. In January 2023, when the Maduro regime attempted to block a legitimate vote for National Assembly president, Beijing again remained silent.

Concrete proof of Maduro’s loss

The Venezuelan democratic movement pulled off a massive achievement in gathering clear evidence of electoral fraud in the presidential elections in July. In the weeks leading up to the election, roughly five thousand workshops were held for tens of thousands of volunteers, although some estimates place the size of the group closer to one million (out of Venezuela’s population of 28.3 million people). Volunteers were trained on electoral laws, including their right, as volunteer observers representing political parties, to obtain copies of their polling location’s voting tally. When election day came, volunteers faced significant hostility from soldiers, police, and Chavista loyalists guarding the polling stations. And yet, a mass democratic movement, operating in one of the world’s most oppressive regimes, succeeded. In an impressive logistical feat, volunteers gathered 83 percent of the voting tallies across the country, and, within forty-eight hours, digitized them and uploaded the results to a public website. The result was concrete proof that the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, had won 67 percent of the vote, compared to Maduro’s 30 percent.

The tallies have since been verified by five independent analyses: the Associated Press; the Washington Post; Colombian nongovernmental group Misión de Observación Electoral; Walter R. Mebane Jr., University of Michigan professor of election forensics; and the New York Times, whose analysis of partial voting tallies both broadly replicated the opposition’s estimates of the results within two percentage points and ruled out the possibility of a Maduro victory by any margin

Maduro nonetheless declared victory, backed by Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced that he had secured 51 percent of the votes, compared to 44 percent for González. As the opposition party revealed that it had evidence to prove that its candidate had won, most of the international community came to a similar conclusion about the fraudulence of the official tally. The Carter Center, which was invited to observe the election, issued a statement that the vote “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity,” and that the outcome “cannot be considered democratic.” In the following twenty-four hours, the United States, EU, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and the United Nations all cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election results.

Out of step with Latin America

China—Maduro’s longtime friend—stood apart from the crowd. One big question now is, to what degree will Beijing’s support for Maduro constitute a reputational hazard for China in Latin America and beyond?

China is now firmly out of step with most nations in a region where Xi hopes to deepen relations. All of Latin America, aside from Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Cuba, has either rejected Maduro’s reelection claim or expressed concern over the official election results. Mexico, which famously avoids entanglement in foreign controversies, has asked to see the National Electoral Council’s voting records. Even those who are not concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela will surely resent the resulting massive influx of migration putting a strain on the economies of Venezuela’s neighbors. On this matter, China is also at odds with several of its BRICS partners, both in the region (Brazil) and beyond (India and South Africa).

The extent to which this incident will factor into decision making in Latin American countries vis-à-vis China remains to be seen. As observers, we can only hope that citizens across the region are taking note of what seems to be a clear lesson from the China-Venezuela relationship: If you are looking for a partner who will allow you to shape the future of your own country, look elsewhere.

Caroline Costello is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.   

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The government has responded to massive protests with heavy repression. More than 2,400 people have been arrested in the postelection crackdown. At least two dozen have been killed. Maduro has blocked or restricted international news sites and social media platforms including X and Signal. The National Assembly passed a law to increase the regulation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in mid-August. While the fine print is not yet public, human rights activists fear the law will stifle the efforts of even the most apolitical CSOs, including health and humanitarian organizations. An arrest warrant for González forced the election winner into exile, and opposition leader María Corina Machado’s allies continue to face harassment and detainment.

Amid these bleak circumstances, the worst thing the international community can do is succumb to fatigue. While Venezuelans must lead any effort to advance a transition, the United States and its Latin American and European allies must coordinate sustained and targeted efforts to encourage dialogue and prevent further regional destabilization. In the lead-up to the January 10 presidential inauguration, regional leaders must push for a credible negotiations process to preserve space for a democratic transition while preventing Maduro from drifting further toward Russia and China. The way the United States and its allies engage with or isolate Maduro in the coming months will have hemispheric implications for both migration and security.

A combination of negotiations and targeted pressure led the Maduro government to organize a July 28 presidential election that reinforced the true extent of his unpopularity and illegitimate rule. Future efforts to pair negotiations and pressure should build on this model of multilateral coordination by leveraging the unique positioning of a variety of actors. Governments are critical players, but multilateral organizations including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States can also push for credible negotiations. Each country or organization should recognize the opportunities and limitations that it holds from its respective position. 

Brazil and Colombia

Brazil and Colombia have declined to explicitly condemn Venezuela’s election as fraudulent. Rather, they have remained engaged with the Maduro government while calling for transparency, initially stepping in to shoulder the burden of mediation along with Mexico. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said he was “disappointed” with Maduro’s behavior regarding the election, but that Brazil will maintain relations and work toward a “negotiated” solution. The costs of an electoral condemnation and a potential break in relations would be immense for Brazil and Colombia, neighbors of Venezuela that have struggled to mitigate the increase in drug trafficking and violence that have been perpetuated from within the country. Both countries have received an influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees: Brazil hosts more than 568,000, and Colombia houses over 2.8 million. This number is expected to rise in the coming months as Venezuelans who once held out hope for political change leave the country.

Brazil and Colombia have proposed measures such as new elections and power-sharing arrangements, which were swiftly rejected by both the opposition and the government. Questions remain as to how committed these countries are to pushing for a transition of power. In the next few months, both countries can benefit from playing the middle ground by maintaining discussions with both the United States and the Maduro regime while pressing Maduro to respect the will of the Venezuelan people. They can leverage their relatively stable relations with Venezuela to push for credible negotiations in ways that other countries cannot. While negotiations alone will not guarantee a peaceful transition of power, they are a necessary element, even when dealing with an actor with a record of using them to suit his own interests. 

The United States, Canada, and the EU

The United States, Canada, and the EU have been more vocal in their rejection of the government-announced election results. As the main imposers of sanctions on Venezuela, these countries should lead the coordination of sanctions policy in the months leading up to January’s presidential inauguration, and, absent a transition of power, in the period following. This requires a clear consensus on sanctions objectives and timeframes. If one country communicates specific parameters for sanctions relief, the same parameters should be reflected in corresponding sanctions regimes—though this coordination can be challenging at times given how the legal framework for US sanctions differs from that of its partners. 

Sanctions can be useful in advancing certain policy objectives, but can be ineffective or harm local populations when misused or improperly implemented. Sanctions are more successful when they involve multilateral coordination, establish concrete objectives, and clearly state the conditions required for sanctions relief. Between now and January, the United States and its allies should develop consistent messaging on conditioning sanctions relief and/or new sanctions with progress on negotiated political agreements. The first step in this process involves clarifying objectives and timeframes for meeting specific conditions. The international community must find creative ways to incentivize the Maduro government to remain at the negotiating table and involve the Venezuelan opposition in defining a path forward. 

Both domestic and international coordination on sanctions is critical. While the United States has already sanctioned more than 140 individuals connected with the Maduro government or who are otherwise contributing to the Venezuelan crisis, additional individual sanctions, particularly on economic and military elites, could help increase targeted pressure on government allies to reconsider their commitments to another six years under Maduro. The United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals last week, including some involved in ratifying the government-announced election results or issuing an arrest warrant for González. However, unilateral sanctions have limited effectiveness and should be paired with coordinated efforts to balance pressure and incentives. For example, the United States and regional allies should identify Maduro affiliates who are more open to dialogue and discuss ways to either lower the costs of defection or incentivize them to encourage change from within their circles.

Domestic coordination on messaging is key for presenting a coherent foreign policy strategy that balances pressure and incentives. While bipartisan action is hard to come by in the current US political environment, consensus across party lines is still possible. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Rick Scott (R-FL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Michael Bennet (D-CO), and Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart (R-FL), María Elvira Salazar (R-FL), and Carlos Giménez (R-FL) condemned the Maduro government for committing fraud and recognized González as the winner of the election, stating that “this is not about political ideology, this is about defending the will of the Venezuelan people.” Future joint statements should emphasize the common goal of upholding Venezuelans’ right to self-determination, regardless of which party sits in the White House come January. The United States and other regional host countries must address the needs of millions of displaced Venezuelans who remain in political and economic limbo, which will require both bipartisan and international coordination.

The United States, the EU, Canada, Brazil, and Colombia must account for their respective abilities to leverage political and economic incentives to encourage favorable actions from the Venezuelan government. Meanwhile, Chile, Peru, Panama, and other countries that have called for transparency in Venezuela’s electoral process should continue to push for dialogue and an end to the government-led repression. Maintaining space for dialogue through sustained coordination and support for the Venezuelan people is the best chance that democratic leaders have to help move toward a transition of power and greater stability in Venezuela.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia.

The post To prevent further destabilization in Venezuela, regional leaders must trade chaos for coordination appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: Democracies need to make life miserable for Maduro

Kevin Whitaker: Democracies should use Venezuela’s military and private sector to squeeze Maduro

Samantha Sultoon: It’s time to tighten sanctions and limit Maduro’s access to the UN

Diego Area: González now has an opportunity to lead renewed diplomatic efforts from abroad

Iria Puyosa: With Venezuela’s opposition under siege, now is the moment for coordinated international support

Democracies need to make life miserable for Maduro

González ultimately saw no other alternative. He was left with two choices: face arrest—and likely torture—by the Maduro regime or continue the fight for Venezuelan democracy from abroad.

At age seventy-five, the choice was Spain—a longtime destination for those fleeing Maduro’s autocracy. But it’s not a choice he should have had to make. Instead, it’s a reflection of the inability of the international community to force Maduro’s hand after published vote tallies showed that González bested Maduro by more than 30 percentage points in the July 28 presidential election. While Brazil and Colombia have sought to find some type of negotiated solution, the actions of Maduro—including detaining over 2,400 people—show that he is only looking to double down on this newest campaign of repression.

González’s departure leaves opposition leader María Corina Machado to fight for a restoration of democracy in Venezuela. She will need regional and global democracies to back her up with more than just statements. Words don’t resonate with Maduro unless backed up by actions to make life miserable for him and those closest to him. Here, the recent seizing of Maduro’s plane in the Dominican Republic should be a warning of what more could be coming his way, especially with greater international coordination.

Months before his election, González said, “We’re confident that on the day the opposition vote will be so massive our victory will be indisputable.” He was right. The victory of the opposition is clear. Now, what must be made clear to Maduro are the consequences of the most blatant vote grab in recent regional history.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Democracies should use Venezuela’s military and private sector to squeeze Maduro

González’s tragic if understandable decision to leave Venezuela represents the failure of a well-conceived effort to achieve an institutional exit from dictatorship. A government-in-exile will be doomed to irrelevance. González’s departure will increase demands from supporters in the United States from both parties, along with the astonishingly stalwart Machado, to impose new sanctions. But “maximum pressure” failed before and will again, as Maduro enjoys the support of an authoritarian bloc led by China. Moreover, sanctions on the oil sector could rebound with catastrophic economic and political consequences if they feed an otherwise likely fresh wave of emigration. Internationally, the Brazil-Mexico-Colombia diplomatic gambit appears defunct. The Venezuelan street has been largely silent.  

The bitter reality is that Venezuela’s best chance in decades for an institutional democratic exit from dictatorship failed. Maduro and his thugs plainly see that neither sanctions, nor negotiations, nor popular pressure has dislodged them, despite González’s undeniable electoral victory. 

For supporters of democratic change, recognition of the inadequacy of our tools is not the end of the discussion. The center of gravity of the regime remains the armed forces, where we lack entree. That path needs to be (re?) examined, perhaps in the persons of the hard men and women who led US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These former officials’ will and professionalism can have special purchase with those leading Venezuela’s armed forces. They could explain to the Venezuelan generals that their responsibilities should be to support and defend Venezuela’s institutions, not the interests of the repressive Maduro regime. Meeting their unique responsibilities will bring them credit; continuing to support the dictatorship will damage Venezuela’s national interests and will have direct implications for them as individual leaders. In addition, there could be a shared interest in confronting the criminal groups sheltering in Venezuela that feed the flow of migrants and drugs to the United States.

Another unexploited angle is with the Venezuelan private sector, which has profited from collusion with the Bolivarian regime yet enjoys access to US and other Western markets. Finally, while the current leaders of Latin America’s genuine democracies in Mexico City, Brasília, and Bogotá have demonstrated their incapacity or unwillingness to press forward, civil society in all three nations can be mobilized in support of democratic change in Venezuela.  

Critically, we all must acknowledge the unsustainability of the situation. A continuation of Maduro’s dictatorship will bring pain to Venezuela and a renewed flood of migrants, to the detriment of all involved.

—Kevin Whitaker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former US ambassador to Colombia. 

It’s time to tighten sanctions and limit Maduro’s access to the UN

The abrupt departure of Venezuelan opposition leader González, less than two months after the disputed Venezuelan elections, most likely reflects the level of aggressive threats the Maduro regime made against him. In addition to last week’s arrest warrant accusing him of falsifying public documents, instigation to disobey the law, conspiracy, and other charges that clearly seek to undermine the integrity of the opposition’s vote tally, regime officials have made every effort—public and private—to undermine and intimidate González and the opposition into submission. This aggressive effort to deny the Venezuelan people democratic representation by those for whom the people clearly voted in the July elections is quintessential Maduro. Time and time again, when the opportunity for a fresh start is offered, Maduro and his cronies throw it away and suffocate the will of the Venezuelan people. Declaring Christmas in October will not allow Maduro to gloss over his continued destruction of the Venezuelan economy.

While the Biden-Harris administration is carefully balancing multiple global conflicts and the United States’ role within each of them, its efforts to support the people of Venezuela will need to be redoubled, and quickly. Without González in the country and without credible, transparent election results shared publicly, the Venezuelan people will be left to wonder why they turned out to vote in the first place. They will also certainly question where the United States, European Union, and others that voice support for Venezuelan democracy do not back up their words with clear public actions.

Tightening sanctions on Maduro and his cronies responsible for continuing to undermine democratic processes and institutions in Venezuela, along with the regime’s ongoing corruption and human rights abuses, is one available step. Another public messaging step could be limiting access during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly in New York. If Maduro and his cronies seek to participate in such global gatherings, then there should be a minimum bar for entry that disallows those who squander democracy until they’ve publicly changed their ways. Further public (and private) efforts should be coordinated across the Group of Seven (G7) or other international alliances to highlight for Maduro the isolation he is inviting if he is sworn in again in January. While unlikely, there is still a narrow window for change that remains.

—Samantha Sultoon is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former director for Threat Finance and Sanctions at the National Security Council at the White House, and a former sanctions policy expert for the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

González now has an opportunity to lead renewed diplomatic efforts from abroad

A new chapter begins in the courageous struggle to liberate Venezuela from a dictatorship that has lost its support base both domestically and internationally, following the flight of González to Spain. His life was clearly at risk after receiving multiple threats and an arrest warrant amid a wave of postelection repression, which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights labeled as “state terrorism.” While this decision may seem like a retreat, it is undoubtedly a strategic move in the broader fight for Venezuela’s freedom.

Rather than disheartening those who support Venezuela’s democratic restoration, this should be viewed as a safeguard—González, with his legitimacy intact, is now beyond the reach of a regime that imprisons, tortures, and executes opponents while stealing elections and suppressing the people’s will. It also provides González with a historic opportunity to engage with more than seven million Venezuelans who have fled the country, many of whom were denied their political rights. Only 69,211 Venezuelans were allowed to vote in this year’s election.

As an experienced diplomat, González’s escape positions him to lead renewed diplomatic efforts with international allies. The Maduro regime will likely continue to channel resources into complex lobbying structures, influencing narratives and spreading disinformation in coordination with Russia, China, and Iran. But now the democratic opposition will have a legitimately elected leader mobilizing Venezuelan communities worldwide to counteract the regime’s economic and repressive power.

—Diego Area is a deputy director of strategic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin American Center.

With Venezuela’s opposition under siege, now is the moment for coordinated international support

The Venezuelan regime’s forced exile of González has unquestionably crossed the threshold that democratic governments in the Americas and Europe have repeatedly warned against. Urgent action is now imperative, and democratic governments must go beyond mere expressions of concern and take immediate steps to support a peaceful transition of power that the people of Venezuela have rightfully earned through democratic processes. 

While it is Venezuelans’ responsibility to continue their impressive movement towards democracy, the recent crackdown against political parties and civil society has significantly hindered progress. The movement’s leaders, including Machado, are now under siege. External support is crucial for reestablishing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Venezuela. What can external allies do to compel Maduro to step down and ensure that a new president takes the oath on January 10, 2025?

The response must focus on severing the regime’s support from its current pillars. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration, along with agencies in partner countries, should disrupt transnational criminal networks that exploit Venezuela’s natural resources, engage in financial corruption, and have ties to organized crime. The United Nations could be a good venue for external allies to address the international support that the Maduro regime continues to receive from authoritarian states and some left-leaning democratic countries that place ideological affinity over fundamental rights. Moreover, the United States and regional countries should look for opportunities to thwart Venezuela’s security forces and ruling party paramilitaries, as they instill fear among the population—and even among the armed forces’ middle ranks—through kidnapping, incarceration, and torture.

A solid and coordinated international effort to weaken the regime pillars will enable the pro-democracy movement to force the ruling party to accept the transition, ultimately bringing about positive changes in Venezuela and the entire Western Hemisphere.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

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More than 7.7 million Venezuelans—about a quarter of the population—have left the country since 2014, 6.5 million of whom are living in Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia alone hosts more than 2.8 million displaced Venezuelans, which has strained its ability to provide basic services amid its own ongoing fight against criminal groups. Available polling suggests migration flows are likely to rise in the coming months as Nicolás Maduro looks poised to maintain his stranglehold on power despite the cost. His regime has severed diplomatic relations with regional countries, arrested thousands of protesters, and blocked social media platforms in the country.

Earlier this month, opposition leader María Corina Machado said that if Maduro stays in power by force, the region will experience “a wave of migration like never before: three, four, five million Venezuelans in a very short span of time.”

Moreover, Venezuelans who have already left home are unlikely to return without political change. In a survey before the July 28 election of Venezuelans residing in the United States, 65 percent stated that they would return if an opposition candidate won the election, while less than 15 percent said they would return if Maduro remained in power, even if the economy significantly improved.

“We don’t have the regional resources to handle the migration from Venezuela,” Ronal Rodríguez, a researcher at the Colombian Migration Observatory in Bogotá, told the Associated Press this month. Young Venezuelans who already migrated have begun bringing over older relatives to see if conditions improve before the January presidential inauguration, but Rodríguez warns this could become a permanent flow.

As of May 2024, Colombia housed more than 2.8 million Venezuelans; Peru, more than 1.5 million; Brazil, more than 568,000; and the United States, more than 545,000. Chile and Ecuador host more than 532,000 and 444,000, respectively.

From January to June 2024, US Customs and Border Protection reported 114,695 encounters with Venezuelans. (This figure includes individuals who attempted multiple crossings, so one individual may be counted for multiple encounters.) In the same period last year, the United States reported 150,673 encounters. This does not include spikes later in the year: in September 2023 alone, the United States reported 72,325 encounters. The United States may see similar spikes in encounters in the next few months as more Venezuelans make their way north.

While it’s too early to tell how many will migrate, regional leaders should prepare for the worst. Backlash toward Venezuelans is rising in Chile, which has used armed forces and thermal cameras to limit illegal crossings, and in Peru and Ecuador, which have tightened visa restrictions and required arriving Venezuelans to present difficult-to-obtain passports.

Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, and other criminal organizations have taken advantage of migrant outflows to push into host countries, increasing violent crime. But trying to curb legal migration has only increased illegal migration. For desperate migrants, detainment, trafficking, and death might be a possibility, but for those who stay, they are often a certainty.

So, how should the United States and its regional partners prepare for this expected increase in migration from Venezuela?

Develop plans for transitioning from temporary to more permanent response strategies. Several major host countries, including the United States, Colombia, and Brazil, have developed distinct responses to the influx of migrants by granting various forms of temporary legal status to Venezuelans. Under Colombia’s temporary status program, for example, qualifying Venezuelans can obtain a ten-year permit, which includes work authorization, labor protections, and access to public education. Widespread rollout has seen more than 1.9 million Venezuelans approved for permits. Last September, the United States expanded Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to half a million Venezuelans, allowing them to live and work in the country legally and adding to the estimated 240,000 previously covered.

Neither program is perfect. Colombia’s program has been critiqued as offering only “liminal legality” because it does not offer a direct line to permanent residence. The United States’ TPS program likewise does not involve a path to permanent residency, though some politicians have cautioned that expanding TPS will incentivize additional migrants to journey to the United States and will allow people to stay indefinitely if their status is extended. However, the TPS extension has been praised in other US political circles because it grants work access, increases self-sufficiency, and relieves strains on local resources.

Brazil’s two-year renewable permits for Venezuelans grant similar rights and access as Colombia and the United States. After two years, however, Venezuelans can apply for long-term residence and, potentially, citizenship. Brazil also implemented a mass asylum grant in 2019 which has been extended to more than a hundred thousand people. Unlike many countries, Brazil grants work authorization to asylum seekers, leading more Venezuelans to seek the asylum route there.

While much attention has been directed toward temporary status programs, there is a clear discrepancy between the long-term nature of the Venezuelan crisis and the temporary nature of these programs. For migrants and refugees, temporary status often adds to their insecurity, rather than mitigating it. Most programs last only a few months or years and involve complicated renewal processes. Most also do not necessarily offer direct paths to permanent residency, making it harder for Venezuelans to invest in their futures.

For many countries with convoluted or heavily bureaucratic immigration systems, short-term programs, such as TPS, are useful for providing more responsive options for displaced persons. However, the majority of displaced Venezuelans have obtained legal status through more institutionalized programs, including mobility and residence agreements and asylum and visa programs. Improving the adaptability and applicability of existing immigration infrastructure involves clarifying qualifications and application steps, reducing processing time, and demystifying any renewal processes. Expanding and simplifying access to these programs can provide greater stability for Venezuelans, allowing them to integrate more rapidly and bolster the host country’s workforce.

Invest in improving working conditions in host countries. Most urgently, host countries should focus on improving conditions in sectors with high degrees of informality, temporality, and low pay. These sectors often have higher concentrations of Venezuelan migrant and refugee laborers.

In Colombia and Brazil, access to work permits has not necessarily led to formal employment, and Venezuelans often face poor working conditions and labor abuses. In Brazil, a 2017-2021 survey found that more than half of all displaced Venezuelans were earning less than the Brazilian minimum wage.

Host countries can start to improve working conditions by fostering public-private partnerships between civil society actors, trade unions, migrant associations, and government actors. These partnerships can work to improve wages, educate migrants on their rights, and prevent and challenge labor abuses. Expanding the network of institutions that invest in these efforts to create a more robust support system can create benefits not only for displaced Venezuelans but also for the economies of host nations.

Strengthen international coordination toward Venezuela aimed at mitigating its ongoing political and economic crisis. Without progress on a democratic transition in Venezuela, the United States and regional partners will need to take steps to either accommodate Venezuelans’ displacement on a more permanent basis or provide support to governments that are willing to do so. Greater humanitarian assistance and public-private partnerships can alleviate the worst of the widespread poverty and suffering facing Venezuelans both at home and abroad.

Mitigating the refugee crisis will also improve the economic and security situation of Colombia and other host countries, returning benefits for Venezuela’s neighbors. Regional leaders must continue to support negotiations and prioritize efforts to address Venezuela’s political and economic crisis to mitigate the impact of the projected mass exodus in the coming months.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia.

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Below, experts from the Atlantic Council and its Venezuela Solutions Group answer five pressing questions about the country’s ongoing political crisis.

1. What is the situation in Venezuela since the election?

Venezuela is experiencing a deepening of its crisis. The lack of transparency in the electoral process and the failure of the CNE to present the electoral bulletins have led the country into a chaotic situation. Repression is increasing by the day, reaching levels that exceed anything previously seen in Venezuela. Respect for the right to demonstrate and for the popular will of the people are fundamental pillars of any government that calls itself democratic. The world cannot remain silent in the face of the systematic and violent repression of opponents and dissidents in Venezuela.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group. 

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

2. What exactly is the issue with the election results?

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group. 

3. What role can other countries in the region play? 

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries. 

—María Ángela Holguín

4. Is there any hope the Maduro regime will negotiate a transfer of power?

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.  

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

5. How is the US working to advance a democratic transition?

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution. 

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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On July 30, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on BBC Newshour about the results of Venezuela’s presidential election.

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Vice President and Senior Director

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On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted in The New York Times about the Venezuelan election.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on BBC’s World Business Report about the Atlantic Council’s Memo to the President outlining scenarios and paths forward for Venezuela.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by The Hill about Venezuela’s contested election.

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On July 29, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on DW’s The Day (broadcast on PBS in the United States) about the evolving situation following Venezuela’s presidential election.

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Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by AP about Venezuela’s contested election.

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He’s not giving up without a fight. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s election commission declared him the winner in Sunday’s vote, despite ample evidence of fraud and intimidation. Opposition candidate Edmundo González declared victory as the United States and other countries expressed concerns about the results. What will be the opposition’s next move? How will Maduro respond? And what role will regional and global powers play? We polled our experts for the answers.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

How to steal an election

• The stage was set for this moment in the months leading up to the vote, when the regime banned opposition leader María Corina Machado, with González ending up on the ballot. Then, as Jason points out, only small delegations from the United Nations and the Carter Center were allowed to monitor the vote, meaning “the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results.” 
• The González camp said he won about 70 percent of the votes that his team was able to verify—while Venezuela’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won 44 percent of the vote, with Maduro earning 51 percent. Jason notes that “it would be a mathematical miracle for Maduro to prevail” based on how the opposition has described the votes that it has seen.
• The public isn’t fooled, Iria tells us, noting the “outpouring of messages and videos on social media” from witnesses on the ground indicating their certainty that González won. “This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy,” she adds.
• As of this afternoon, those voters are mobilizing in the streets, creating a new test for the regime. “Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames,” Geoff says. “He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years.”

Pressure from abroad

• In addition to the “serious concerns” expressed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, several countries throughout the region called for more transparency around the vote count—including neighboring Colombia, where, as Jason notes, “President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro.”
• Without full results and an independent audit, “the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure,” Geoff says, with the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe playing a crucial role.
• That international pressure will be important to uphold the will of Venezuelans, but there are self-interested reasons for regional and international powers to push for change. Jason says another six years of Maduro will lead to “new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.”

Crackdown at home?

• The major point of contention will be sanctions, which the United States reimposed in April after the Maduro government didn’t uphold its end of last year’s deal to hold free and fair elections. “I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe,” Geoff says.
• The opposition, therefore, should “exploit divisions within the ruling coalition,” Iria says. At the same time, opposition leaders should “find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017.”
• And if Maduro were to return to the bargaining table, it would look very different from the negotiations between the government and the opposition, Iria tells us. Now, she says, negotiations would no longer be about electoral conditions “but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela.”

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

—Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Washington Post about Venezuela’s contested election.

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed by BBC News about the Venezuelan presidential election taking place that day.

Venezuela is STILL waiting for results in its presidential election.

An exit poll predicts an opposition victory but both sides sound confident.

"If the ruling socialist party actually has the results then the electoral authorities should be able to prove it."@GRamsey_LatAm pic.twitter.com/wtG4DOO9U4

— Carl Nasman (@CarlNasman) July 29, 2024

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela’s contested election.

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday about Venezuela’s election.

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On July 26, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Los Angeles Times about Venezuela’s election.

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What does the US president need to know? Our “memo to the president” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: Although Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election will take place amid high volatility, a significant likelihood of protests, and possible repression, it represents the best opportunity for a peaceful, democratic solution to the country’s long-running political crisis. The election will most likely be followed by a political negotiation process. Venezuelan economic, political, and military elites want the last three years of economic growth and greater international integration to continue, and incumbent Nicolás Maduro has a strong incentive to connect to the global economy and avoid the resumption of international pressure. The United States and its partners should take advantage of this, offering incentives and support for a Venezuelan-led negotiation process to encourage the restoration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions.

Background: Regardless of the election results, both the ruling party and the opposition will face incentives to negotiate.

A July 12 scenario-planning exercise, held by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute, identified several possible outcomes for the election and the weeks that follow.¹

Scenario 1: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, with no documented evidence of irregularities or vote tampering.

If Venezuelan electoral authorities in the National Electoral Council declare Maduro the winner, he will face the enormous challenge of “landing the plane” and continuing down the current path of sanctions relief, global reintegration, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. He cannot credibly do so without entering into a sustainable negotiation process with the opposition, in which both parties are willing to make the significant concessions required.

• The specific aftermath of a Maduro victory will depend on whether there is clear evidence of irregularities or tampering with the vote count on election day. Maduro’s best hope of winning by the numbers is if participation is low and the opposition base is unmotivated to turn out at the polls.
• Some in Maduro’s ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) believe they can successfully mobilize the party base to outperform polls and demotivate opposition voters, as has occurred on several instances over the last twenty-five years—most recently in the 2021 state and municipal elections. They believe they can count on the minimum of five or six million votes that Maduro received in the 2018 election, which the opposition boycotted.

Scenario 2: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, despite evidence of irregularities and vote tampering.

• Even if the ruling party were to commit documented acts of electoral fraud, Maduro’s first challenge would be to reassure elements in the ruling PSUV and armed forces leadership that he would be able to continue the last three years of economic growth. He will be unable to do that in the face of opposition protests and the risk of an escalation in the international pressure campaign—which would be almost inevitable in the case of blatant vote rigging.
• The irregularities could begin before July 28. Credible polling suggests that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia has a fifteen- to twenty-percentage point lead over Maduro, although that number is lower among the most likely Venezuelan voters. If it becomes clear that Maduro’s party has no chance of winning the vote count, even through abstention, there is a chance that the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will ban González’s Democratic Unity Table Roundtable coalition—this would likely guarantee an advantage to Maduro and dissuade opposition participation. A TSJ ruling could ensure that votes for the Democratic Unity Table Roundtable would be invalidated, and would force the base to either call for abstention, cast votes for González under less popular tickets from the Un Nuevo Tiempo or Movimiento Por Venezuela parties, or align behind an alternate candidate such as Enrique Marquez.
• The ruling party could also engage in vote tampering on election day. However, this would be very difficult to conceal given the opposition’s election monitoring efforts and the presence of independent international observers affiliated with the Carter Center and the United Nations. Previous instances of fraud, such as when observers documented tampering with voter tally sheets in Bolivar state in the 2017 regional elections, have been clearly documented by comparing results with poll witness records.
• A clearly fraudulent result would likely trigger street protests organized by opposition leader María Corina Machado and others. As in previous protest waves in 2014, 2017, and 2019, this may lead to clashes with security forces, but the prospect of these mobilizations forcing a change in government is highly unlikely. All eyes will be on Machado to gauge how she would react to low turnout or electoral fraud, and what each would mean for the prospect of unrest.
• The security forces will likely be reluctant to engage in massive repression on the scale seen in the 2014 and 2017 protests, given how this fueled international condemnation and the investigation of International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan. Elites in the military and ruling party would likely apply quiet pressure on Maduro, even as he declares victory, to demonstrate an openness to reforms and a willingness to signal an element of power-sharing with the opposition in his next term.
• Such overtures could split an opposition that has become more unified today than in the past. For ruling elites, there is no interest in reversing the last three years of economic growth and returning the country to the worst period of the country’s crisis, including greater international isolation.
• The private sector in Venezuela would likely seek to ensure the continuation of government policies that have helped jumpstart growth and slow inflation to its lowest level in twelve years. Business leaders know that a fraudulent win by Maduro would jeopardize this, with all eyes on whether the US government would return to a pressure campaign that would place investment at risk.
• An escalation of the border challenges with neighboring Guyana to deflect pressure at home cannot be ruled out, though it is unlikely. This would be a double-edged sword for the government, as the military is uninterested in assuming the risk of outright conflict with Guyana and would prefer to maintain tensions at current levels.

Scenario 3: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare González the winner.

A recognized opposition victory would face a myriad of immediate challenges. To have any hope of assuming office in January 2025, González would need to reach a comprehensive agreement with Maduro and the PSUV. Any negotiations must address complicated issues such as institutional reforms, transitional justice, the release of political prisoners, and electoral conditions for the upcoming legislative and regional elections. It is difficult to imagine Maduro ceding power without ironclad guarantees from the opposition and the international community regarding his safety, immunity, and influence, and that of his inner circle.

• The opposition’s best hope of translating polling support for González into votes on July 28 is massive voter participation. Given the opposition’s own election monitoring efforts and the presence of international electoral observers, an overwhelming margin of victory would be difficult to paper over by vote tampering.
• Voter participation at around the same level as the 2013 presidential election (roughly 80 percent) could cement an opposition win and could even force actors in the ruling party to recognize the result.
• The PSUV coalition is likely to face internal fragmentation in the event of a clear, recognized González win. While moderates in the ruling coalition may be willing to bet on their political future in a post-transition landscape, more hardline elements in the PSUV and security forces could derail a transition in pursuit of self-preservation. Here, the armed forces will almost certainly have outsized influence over a transition and would likely seek to dictate the terms of a transfer of power.
• The unity of the opposition would come under strain after a González win. While Machado has been the face of the electoral campaign over the last nine months, González is on the ballot as she is currently banned from holding office as part of a longstanding campaign against her. The opposition coalition would have to define where Machado stands in the decision-making apparatus, with the added complication that the Maduro government has explicitly refused to negotiate directly with her—and will likely continue to do so if the opposition wins. This would pose an early test of González’s leadership.
• The role of the international community will be crucial. To be credible, any opposition guarantees would have to be backed up by the United States, which could offer full sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition to Caracas, and lift bounties placed on the heads of PSUV leaders. European and Latin American heads of state also have a role to play. Still, due to its sanctions policy, the US role—and Maduro’s trust that guarantees will hold under any US administration—is vital.
• The international community should pay close attention to the prospect of fragmentation in the ruling coalition, particularly among the mid-level officer ranks in the armed forces, who will also seek guarantees and to preserve their influence.
• Having been out of power for twenty-five years, the opposition’s return to government could come with a high degree of administrative turbulence. The opposition would face significant incentives to seek technical assistance and advisory support in governance, economic reform, and public administration from the private sector, international organizations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations—all while negotiating its policy approach with the outgoing PSUV, which would likely seek to retain political influence.

How the United States and international allies should respond:

1. Keep the focus on election data from credible international observers and independent monitoring efforts.
   • Prioritize data and reports from local and international independent observers, including the Carter Center and the United Nations, to assess the legitimacy of the election results. Communication with the public and international partners should be clear, consistent, and fact-based.
   • Rather than making a snap decision regarding developments on July 28, wait until the detailed vote count at the polling station level has been released, as has occurred in almost all previous elections. Delay any policy shift until there is a clear picture of the results.
   • Any actions should be grounded in verified data and credible sources to avoid hasty or misinformed decisions.
2. Explore opportunities for coordinated US and EU sanctions relief to accelerate incentives and advance negotiations.
   • Regardless of the election result, both González and Maduro understand they cannot govern a country in flames, and any effort to keep sanctions relief and normalization on the table will require them to negotiate the terms of governability.
   • There will be a deep need for greater multilateral coordination by sanctioning countries. The United States, as the only country to impose oil and financial sanctions against Venezuela, has outsized leverage, but the European Union and others that have sanctioned government officials can also place sanctions on the table to support negotiations.
   • Any solution will also require complex discussions regarding the restoration of the country’s democratic institutions while ensuring a place for Chavismo in the country’s political landscape.
3. No need to start from scratch.
   • The basis of any dialogue should be the 2021 Mexico City memorandum of understanding, which has served as the framework for international negotiations facilitated by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry with US, EU, and other international support.
   • This agreement outlined a seven-part agenda for dialogue efforts that have not been fully addressed, including guarantees of political rights for all, the restoration of constitutional order, coexistence and reparation for victims, economic reforms, and the verification and implementation of future agreements.
   • From there, talks can expand to focus on power sharing, the release of political prisoners, a judiciary overhaul, reforms of the security forces, the separation of powers, and improvements to electoral conditions ahead of 2025 legislative and regional elections.
   • The United States and international allies should focus on achievable, incremental progress rather than aiming for comprehensive solutions immediately. Small victories can build momentum and trust.
4. Promote a regional response led by Colombia and Brazil.
   • The United States and allies should emphasize solidarity among these neighboring countries, encouraging them to take lead roles in support of negotiation efforts while ensuring that Norwegian facilitators retain their influence on ongoing talks. Brazil, which has ceded space to Colombia so far, in particular could play a more active role.
   • Joint statements and actions can amplify impact, and the international community should formalize the ‘’Group of Friends’’ mechanism outlined in the 2021 memorandum of understanding. The creation of such a group, while still giving primacy to existing negotiations, would provide clarity for regional leaders seeking to coordinate Venezuela policy and allow more formal negotiating channels with Venezuela to incentivize more robust compliance with existing accords.
5. Regardless of outcome, consider the long-term benefits of an expanded Western footprint in Venezuela.
   • Specific licenses issued by the Treasury Department have allowed Western energy companies to maintain operations in Venezuela. The current foreign investment framework permits new modes of governance and payment and new rules of reporting, and provides opportunities for greater transparency.
   • Though sanctions are an important part of the United States’ leverage in Venezuela, there is space and good reason for this investment framework to be expanded. It is not in the US interest to sit back and watch as its rivals deepen their footprints in the country with the largest proven oil reserves on the planet—nor is it in the US interest to see Venezuela grow closer to these authoritarian powers and drift further into authoritarian rule.
   • Allied governments should continue to consider the broader geopolitical context, including relationships with China, Russia, and other influential countries with interests in Venezuela. The goal should be balanced policies that address these dynamics, acknowledge Venezuela’s role in global energy markets, and prioritize the humanitarian needs and human rights of the Venezuelan people.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and launched the center’s work on Venezuela in 2017. He is an adjunct professor at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Brian Fonseca is director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct professor in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs.

Eduardo A. Gamarra is a tenured full professor of political science in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University.

¹ Aspects of the discussion during our scenario-planning exercise informed this memo, but the memo is not meant to reflect the views of any participants other than the authors. There was, however, broad agreement that, independent of the results of the election, the winner will face incentives to negotiate the terms of governability, avoid a deepening of the crisis, and prevent another cycle of unrest and repression.

The post Memo to the president: Seizing the opportunity for a democratic solution in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Once the most vigorous democracy in Latin America, Venezuela started down a slow path toward autocracy twenty-five years ago. It also became a model for digital authoritarianism and an exporter of democratic backsliding to the rest of the Americas. Control of the information space, widespread surveillance, and digital repression are significant pillars of the current regime’s survival. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro is counting on this, along with electoral manipulation and judicial control, to remain in power as Venezuela holds a presidential election on July 28. Nonetheless, a cohesive democratic coalition mobilizing the population across the country has a serious chance of making this election the starting point for a transition toward re-democratization.

The media landscape in Venezuela is fragmented and marked by censorship. The rise of government-run media and state control through ownership changes or censorship mechanisms led independent journalists to migrate to small internet outlets. Venezuela’s media ecosystem shrank further when the country’s economy collapsed after 2015. The aftermath of the 2017 cycle of protests saw another significant shift in the media landscape, with surviving newscasts characterized by censorship and heavily biased coverage in favor of the ruling party. In addition, censorship has caused the closure of many radio stations, leaving many areas without access to local or regional news. The National Telecommunications Commission in Venezuela routinely censors the use of certain topics and words during programming, and also bans interviews with democratic opposition leaders. It prohibits public coverage of corruption allegations or human rights violations attributed to state officials or their family members, coverage of citizen protests or demonstrations against the regime, and discussion of international courts and other human rights entities.

In their new report, “Venezuela: A playbook for digital repression,” Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, and Daniel Suárez Pérez dive deep into the state of media in Venezuela, the role it played in the country’s slide toward authoritarianism, and whether other Latin American countries will adopt Venezuela’s model of digital repression.

Additional contributions by Marco Ruíz and Valentina Aguana

Edited by Iain Robertson and Andy Carvin

New Atlanticist Mar 13, 2024

Venezuela’s opposition is challenging Maduro in the next election. The only question is how.

By Geoff Ramsey

With leading candidate María Corina Machado barred from Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election, who will the opposition to Nicolás Maduro support?

Civil Society Elections

New Atlanticist Apr 18, 2024

Experts react: The US just reimposed sanctions on Venezuela. What does this mean for energy markets and Venezuela’s election?

By Atlantic Council experts

The United States will reimpose oil sanctions on Venezuela, faulting Nicolás Maduro’s government for failing to uphold the October 2023 Barbados Agreement.

Economic Sanctions Economy & Business

Report Aug 14, 2023

Protecting point-to-point messaging apps: Understanding Telegram, WeChat, and WhatsApp in the United States

By Iria Puyosa

A year-long project on protecting users’ data and privacy that analyzes the growing use of point-to-point messaging platforms in the United States and the implications their design and governing policies have for user privacy and free speech.

Civil Society Digital Policy

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

This report was made possible with support from the government of Canada.

The post How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The US must ensure sanctions carve outs benefit the Venezuelan people, not just elites

Geoff Ramsey: The US balances democracy promotion with a ‘complex geopolitical reality’

David Goldwyn: The US is seeking a Goldilocks solution to sanctions on Venezuela

Ellen Wald: With US sanctions waivers withdrawn, expect China to dominate Venezuela’s oil exports

Jesse Sucher: Sanctions should change behavior. The US chose to reinforce that principle.

The US must ensure sanctions carve outs benefit the Venezuelan people, not just elites

Maduro’s ban on Machado is unjustified and unconstitutional, and left the US government with very little choice but to snap back the sanctions. But the truth is that, amid turmoil in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, Venezuela policy is running up against a desire to avoid further upending delicate geostrategic balances. Washington is interested in allowing US and European energy companies to continue to operate in Venezuela, while also promoting competitive elections and ensuring that the money does not end up directly in Maduro’s pocket. As the United States offers a new path for consideration of specific licenses to energy companies interested in operating in Venezuela, it will be essential to work to ensure that dollars from oil and gas transactions are circulated among everyday Venezuelans, not kept in the hands of the elite. Any successful approach to Venezuela will have to find ways to address global energy concerns and undercut Russian and Chinese influence, while still advancing a democratic solution.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The US balances democracy promotion with a ‘complex geopolitical reality’

Yesterday’s announcement represents a compromise approach. By snapping back sanctions on Venezuela while still carving out space for Western energy companies to maintain operations, the Biden administration is trying to adjust its approach to promoting democracy and human rights in Venezuela to an increasingly complex geopolitical reality. This is a recognition that it is simply not in the US interest to sit back and watch as Russia and China deepen their footprints in the country with the largest oil reserves on the planet. At the same time, it will be crucial for the Biden administration to continue to find ways to incentivize lasting political agreements in ongoing negotiations between the opposition Unitary Platform coalition and the Maduro government. Fortunately, the US government continues to retain a degree of leverage. The White House can loosen or tighten the sanctions regime moving forward, and can float diplomatic recognition and other incentives as carrots ahead of Venezuela’s election on July 28.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The US is seeking a Goldilocks solution to sanctions on Venezuela

The United States made a subtle and constructive diplomatic step on Venezuela sanctions on Wednesday. It has allowed General License 44 to lapse, ending the period of open access for Venezuelan crude to reach the market, including the United States, through multiple modalities. For now, Venezuela has been punished for its abrogation of the Barbados agreement.

But the US Treasury Department was clear that it welcomes, within the next forty-five days, requests for specific licenses that serve US interests. This leaves a bureaucratically cumbersome but clear path for companies to request the ability to swap Venezuelan crude for debt they are owed, for diluent or other products to relieve humanitarian distress in Venezuela, and under conditions similar to Chevron’s existing license, which minimizes the fiscal return on exports to PDVSA. 

So the path remains open to ensuring that the Maduro government is punished, but a relief valve for migration pressure inside Venezuela is available. The new policy does not discriminate against US allies by imposing harsher conditions on them than on US companies, as was the case before General License 44. In the event that there is progress on a framework for free and fair elections from Maduro in the days ahead, the potential for a further general license remains open. 

The impact on the global oil market remains to be seen. Much depends on how many private companies apply for debt or product swaps and on whether the small but significant oil projects in Venezuela apply for licenses as well. (If they do not, then we will return to the destructive “maximum pressure” policy, which had the impact of providing cheap oil for China, a product market for Iran, and humanitarian distress leading to illegal migration to the United States and elsewhere in the region.) 

Much also depends on the ability of the US Treasury to respond to those license requests swiftly. But with this one move, the United States has avoided blame for interference in the Venezuelan elections, preserved diplomatic capital for a future day, and this time managed to punish the aggressor more than the victims. Given the grim circumstances, this was the best outcome available.

—David L. Goldwyn served as special envoy for international energy under President Barack Obama and assistant secretary of energy for international relations under President Bill Clinton. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Council’s Global Energy Center.

With US sanctions waivers withdrawn, expect China to dominate Venezuela’s oil exports

Biden’s decision to withdraw the sanctions waiver for Venezuelan oil comes at a time when crude oil prices are coming off the highest prices seen this year. Just last month, Venezuela’s crude oil and petroleum product exports hit a four-year high. However, the amount of oil in question is relatively minor on the global scale and should not impact oil prices. In September 2023, the month before the Biden administration issued the waiver, Venezuela exported a total of 797,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil, fuel oil, and methanol (according to TankerTrackers.com). More than 50 percent of its petroleum went to China. Other notable customers included the United States, Spain, Indonesia, and Cuba. By March 2024, Venezuela’s total exports had only increased by about one hundred thousand bpd, but it had significantly diversified its customers. Chinese exports dropped to 39 percent and notable cargoes went to India, the Netherlands, Singapore, Brazil, and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba. (Note: Data on oil exports comes via TankerTrackers.com.)

Now that the waivers have been withdrawn, we should expect China to dominate Venezuela’s oil exports. US oil supplies should not be impacted since the total amount of Venezuelan oil and oil products imported by the United States before and after the waivers were issued was nearly identical. Venezuela will probably continue to export at the 895,000 bpd level because China will probably purchase additional cargoes that other nations stop buying now that sanctions are back in place. Overall, Venezuelan revenue may drop slightly as China will likely negotiate lower prices now that the competition for Venezuelan oil is significantly reduced. 

 —Ellen Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the co-founder of Washington Ivy Advisors.

Sanctions should change behavior. The US chose to reinforce that principle.

When the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 44 in October 2023, the Biden administration warned that Maduro would need to show concrete steps toward democratic elections for the license to be extended. Evidently, there was insufficient progress, meaning the Biden administration has effectively decided that preserving sanctions’ integrity and US credibility are as important as the outcomes for Venezuela. Given the centrality of sanctions to numerous US foreign policy objectives, I’m not surprised to see a choice that reinforces the principle that the goal of sanctions is to change behavior.

International oil companies must now decide how much they enjoyed the fleeting access to Venezuelan crude. Venezuela had stood to gain an estimated $8 billion more in oil revenue in 2024 over the previous year’s earnings. One must wonder if Maduro can replicate that figure without the United States offering sanctions relief. 

Companies that do not wind down previously authorized transactions by the end of May expose themselves to US sanctions risks, and we could see a crackdown on third parties evading the reimposition of these sanctions. Some key players to watch are Indian and Chinese oil companies. OFAC is no doubt learning from its parallel enforcement efforts with respect to the Russian oil price cap.

—Jesse Sucher is a former official at the US Department of the Treasury, where he was a deputy director of the Office of Investment Security, and a section chief and investigator for the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect or represent those of the US government or any organization with which the author is or has been affiliated.

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Watch the event

Public Event Tue, March 19, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

General Laura Richardson on security in the Western Hemisphere

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Gen. Laura J. Richardson, Commander of US Southern Command, discusses her vision for US security partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Americas Caribbean Latin America Security & Defense

The United States isn’t ruling out deploying military forces to Haiti in response to the country’s crisis—as long as such a measure is part of an “international solution” that incorporates Haiti’s perspective, said General Laura Richardson, commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

“We wouldn’t discount that at any time,” she said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday hosted by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. “We are prepared if called upon by our State Department and by our Department of Defense.”

But while the United States isn’t currently planning to put boots on the ground, Richardson clarified, SOUTHCOM has a wide range of contingency plans that it is responsible for maintaining. For example, to prepare for potential mass migration from Haiti, Richardson said that SOUTHCOM readied its naval station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to process a possible influx of migrants.

“We want to be able to do exactly what’s right and humane and be able to take care of populations that are trying to escape,” she said.

Richardson said that it is important to ready these plans as the situation continues to evolve in Haiti. Meanwhile, she said that the US State Department is working with the fifteen-member Caribbean Community and Haitian leaders to get a transitional presidential council in place—which will pave the way not only for the selection of an interim prime minister but also for the deployment of a Kenya-led international force to restore security.

Below are more highlights from Richardson’s conversation with Politico National Security Reporter Alexander Ward, which touched upon challenges seen in other countries around SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility and China’s influence in the region.

Causes for concern

• Last month, satellite images showed the Venezuelan military bolstering its presence near the border with Guyana. Richardson reiterated the United States’ support to Guyana, saying that the United States is continuing “all of our activities, our operations, activities, and investments,” with the country and that it is important for its allies to come together and “to show strong support for Guyana in this situation.”
• With Ecuador now in a state of emergency after an escalation of violence between the government and criminal groups, Richardson said the United States has “doubled down” on its operations and activities there and has delivered emergency security equipment—it recently donated a C-130 military transport aircraft that is on the way. “As they wrestle with those hard challenges and security and instability, we have to continue with our economic investment,” she said.

China stepping in

• Richardson touched upon China’s rising influence in the Panama Canal, a Chinese military-run space station in Argentina, and reports last year that China is enhancing its spy capabilities in Cuba. “What’s happening in Latin America and the Caribbean is not new,” Richardson said. “It’s not new to the globe, and it’s not new to [China’s] . . . vision and strategy.”
• She argued that China has noticed the vast resources available in Latin America and the Caribbean—and also the relative vulnerability of the countries there, which are “still digging out” from the economic impact of COVID-19 and the “insecurity and instability” created by organized crime. “There’s not one country that’s being spared from all the challenges from the transnational criminal organizations.”
• Richardson noted that when China makes agreements with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as within the Belt and Road Initiative, they’re often “tit for tat” and accompanied by demands such as not recognizing Taiwan. “There’s always a hook,” she said.

The counteroffer from “Team USA”

• With China increasing its presence in the region, Richardson said that the United States is sharing information with partner countries about China’s aims and activities so that they, in turn, can make their own decisions about working with Beijing.
• “We don’t do things for strings attached; we don’t have the fine print on things,” Richardson said. “We do it because we’re a like-minded democracy . . . and we would like this region to remain free, secure, and prosperous.”
• Richardson also called upon US companies to offer competitive alternatives to China’s critical-infrastructure projects in the region. “We’re not competing as much as we should,” she said. “Strategic competition is alive and well in the hemisphere. But if you’re going to compete, you’ve got to be on the ground. You’ve got to have your jersey on. You’ve got to have your number. You’ve got to be out there competing.”
• The general admitted that the United States “could have done a little bit better” in paying attention to the region in recent years. “Certainly, when there are crises that require our attention in other parts of the world, that’s where the focus is,” she said. But “we can’t just focus on one or two places. We have got to continue to focus on our partners in the hemisphere that we’re part of.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

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On March 5, after weeks of speculation over when the presidential election might be scheduled, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) announced that the vote will be held on July 28. Both the timing of the announcement and the election date were no coincidence. March 5 was the anniversary of the death of Hugo Chávez, strongman Nicolás Maduro’s predecessor and founder of the ruling United Socialist Party, and July 28 is his birthday. Venezuela’s Unitary Platform opposition coalition now faces the difficult task of coming up with a united strategy ahead of the election in which the deeply unpopular Maduro will have an unfair systematic advantage–and the symbolism of the announcement shows Maduro has no shame in letting that be known.

The clock is ticking. According to the electoral timetable announced by the CNE, the opposition has until March 25 to register a candidate in the election. While it can name a placeholder to buy time and reserve a slot on the ballot, the name of the candidate that will appear on voting day must be finalized by April 20.

María Corina Machado, the winner of the opposition primary held five months ago, remains banned from participating in the presidential election. While the Barbados Agreement that the government signed in October 2023 with the opposition announced the creation of a “procedure” to review bans on interested candidates, the Maduro-friendly Supreme Court has doubled down on Machado’s ban. The CNE’s own website makes clear that she is banned from participating in any elections until 2036.

In the face of this reality, there are competing views on the way forward for Venezuela’s opposition. Machado has publicly rejected the government’s ban and insisted at campaign events around the country that she will run anyway. However, reports began surfacing since late in 2023 that she is more flexible in private and would be open to naming a successor if she ultimately could not run. Her public position remains firm, however, and at an Atlantic Council event on February 26, she acknowledged that she is holding her cards close to her vest. Although she said that she remains committed to “the electoral route,” she refused outright to reject the possibility of calling for abstention. Yet polls suggest an electoral boycott, such as the ones the mainstream opposition organized in the 2018 presidential election, would be deeply unpopular. According to a recent survey by the independent Caracas-based pollster Datincorp, 70 percent of Venezuelans say that if her ban remains in place, then Machado should name an alternate candidate to run instead.

In addition to being unpopular, calling for an electoral boycott would likely exacerbate divisions within the Unitary Platform that have long simmered under the surface. While some elements of the opposition coalition have rejected any talk of a substitute candidate, others have hinted that they will move to a “plan B” with or without Machado. The opposition governor of Barinas state, who himself won a deeply unfair election after the previous opposition winner had been banned from taking office, said in January: “Our position has always been clear, we are not going to stop for her [Machado], we will choose among all of us a new candidate, to be the president of all Venezuelans.” There have been reports that some members of the coalition are calling for Zulia state governor Manuel Rosales to be named as the alternate candidate.

The apparent willingness of some coalition members to field a candidate essentially guarantees that someone from the Unitary Platform will run for president in the July 28 election. The only question is whether it will be a united front. However reticent Machado may be to accept the idea of a substitute, it is almost certain that she would not endorse one who attempts to go around her back. And given her overwhelming popularity—Datincorp suggests she would beat Maduro by 40 points in a head-to-head match—Machado’s backing is essential for any replacement to stand a chance on July 28. With the deck stacked against it, the opposition needs every vote.

That leaves only one viable choice: Find a consensus candidate that has the full backing of the entire opposition spectrum, starting with Machado herself. This is easier said than done, but there is a way to ensure that a “plan B” scenario respects the outcome of the opposition primary and harnesses Machado’s popularity at the same time. In Venezuela, like in the United States, the vice president is next in the line of succession. Unlike the United States, however, candidates for vice president do not appear on the ballot. The position is appointed directly by the chief executive. Machado could, in theory, support a placeholder candidate—or a series of placeholder candidates, in the case that they face bans as well—with the understanding that this trusted individual would name her as vice president upon winning, and then resign from office. This would trigger new elections, or it would allow the vice president to assume the role of head of state if the resignation occurred in the last two years of the term.

This strategy would allow Machado to cement her image as not just a candidate, but as the leader of a broad and diverse majority of Venezuelans working to restore the country’s democratic institutions. Working alongside a renewed Unitary Platform coalition, she could energize and mobilize Venezuelans across the country, creating the best opportunity that the opposition has had in years to overcome an electoral system designed to work against them. The Datincorp poll shows that just 15 percent of Venezuelans would vote for Maduro, in line with other surveys which find that an extraordinary 85 percent of the country believes a change in government is necessary.

Even then, victory is far from guaranteed. At least four representatives of Machado’s campaign have been detained across the country in recent weeks, and rights groups say there are more than 250 political prisoners in Venezuela. This includes Rocío San Miguel, a well-known civil society activist whose arbitrary detention has sparked international condemnation. The government closed twelve radio stations across seven states last year, and the independent press faces an environment of constant censorship and repression. While the CNE has said it will invite credible electoral observers such as the European Union and the Carter Center to oversee the vote, the terms of these observation missions would have to be carefully negotiated. At this stage, it is entirely clear that Venezuela’s authoritarian reality will present the opposition with an uphill battle.

The path forward is narrow, and the opportunity is slim. But if the opposition can get behind a single candidate who can run in the election, the Venezuelan peoples’ overwhelming consensus against Maduro could be enough to—finally—bring democratic change.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Most immigrant traffic to the United States goes through and comes from Latin America. A lack of economic opportunities, climate vulnerabilities, political instability, and the pervasive influence of organized crime are often cited as push factors for these migrants. However, recent migration patterns also reveal a diversification of nationalities at the US southern border, underscoring the global nature of the challenge. In addition to regional events such as the collapse of Venezuela, political instability in Haiti, violence in Ecuador, and the ongoing and unrelenting crackdown in Nicaragua, conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war in the Middle East are also fueling the migration crisis. Most migrants at the US southern border in recent years originated in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. However, despite the persistent conception of most migrants coming from Central America, in December, more than half of migrant encounters at the US-Mexico border involved citizens of other countries, such as Russia, India, Brazil, Afghanistan, Romania, Turkey, and others.

As such, Latin American countries and the United States should work together to develop and implement policies and strategies that address the driving causes of migration that are specific to the region and mitigate the region-wide risks of such a large migrant flow—much of which now comes from outside the region.

Specifically, the United States should work with the countries originating high numbers of migrants to improve conditions and thus prevent the need for people to leave their countries—whether from Latin America and the Caribbean or other parts of the world. That starts with a holistic security strategy to address the challenges of human, drug, and arms trafficking. Supporting local economic growth and human capital development, employing climate change mitigation and adaptation programs, and fostering coordinated, multifaceted responses to the drug supply chain would create a more secure hemisphere and decrease the number of people fleeing violence.

Additionally, the United States needs to recognize that its current policies aimed at deterring migration are ineffective and often harmful. The hardline policies that were put in place by the Trump administration and have largely been continued by the Biden administration have done little to nothing to curb migration flows. At the US-Mexico border, migration crossings have hit a record high, with more than three hundred thousand Border Patrol encounters with migrants in December. This context demands a reevaluation of current strategies aimed at deterring migration.

Instead of continuing its failed effort at deterrence, Congress should focus on developing humane, legal pathways to migration, recognizing pull factors in the United States, which will decrease the frequency of irregular migration. A straightforward recommendation is for clear, realistic timelines for US judges to expeditiously deliver decisions on asylum cases.

The United States should not take on all of the burden. There are opportunities to work in the region and support regional partners on integrating displaced migrants in third countries, from the region or from other parts of the world, to help alleviate the migration flow to the US border. A new report by the Atlantic Council also puts forward the idea of the United States supporting a regional task force “with the goal of jointly addressing the factors behind irregular migration and insecurity.” The idea builds on the existing work of countries such as Costa Rica and Panama, which are working hand in hand to establish more streamlined, efficient, and unified border crossings. Last week, these two countries, with the assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, inaugurated a one-of-a-kind border facility. Building on the Atlantic Council’s recommendation for a regional task force to address these challenges, the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala are already moving in this direction. The three nations have just “committed to establish an operationally focused trilateral working group aimed at enhancing security, law enforcement processes, and infrastructure along their international borders”—a concrete manifestation of a collaborative approach to solving regional challenges.”

Migration and security are inherently interlinked issues, and the urgency for a collaborative, multifaceted approach to both cannot be overstated. The United States must work with and support other countries in the hemisphere to holistically mitigate the root causes of migration and create safer conditions for citizens across the region.

María Eugenia Brizuela de Avila is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former minister of foreign affairs of El Salvador.

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Following global trend lines, significant shifts in Latin America and the Caribbean—including presidential elections in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Argentina, unprecedented agreements with the Venezuelan government, a worsening security situation in many countries, and a pressing focus on climate change—set the stage for even more change to come in 2024.

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we explore top questions that may shape this upcoming year in the hemisphere.

What will the region’s newest presidents accomplish? How might Latin America’s ties with countries such as China and Russia evolve? What might be the role of the United States in an election year? Will the Caribbean see new, international attention to the specific threats faced by major climatic events?

Take our quiz to find out if you agree with what we’re predicting!

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More about our expert

Staff

Geoff Ramsey

Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

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Below, our experts share their insights on this agreement and its implications for Venezuela’s future. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: A step forward for quiet diplomacy

Geoff Ramsey: The opposition got significant concessions. Now comes the hard part.

Ellen R. Wald: Heartening progress for freedom, but no quick fix for Venezuela’s oil industry

David Goldwyn: A new direction for US sanctions on Venezuela comes not a moment too soon

William Tobin: Rebuilding Venezuela’s oil industry has a hefty price tag

A step forward for quiet diplomacy

The restart of negotiations between the Venezuelan government and the opposition is a significant development that brings renewed, but cautious, hope for an eventual peaceful and democratic resolution to the systemic injustices in the country. Reports of an agreement by the United States to progressively ease certain sanctions in exchange for concrete democratic guarantees is a pragmatic step forward—though vigilant monitoring of any deal will be essential, as Maduro is not one whose words can be trusted.  

This development, reached in Barbados in the presence of representatives of twelve countries and the European Union, comes amid news that last year’s major United Nations humanitarian accord to benefit the Venezuelan people will finally be implemented—an accord that we at the Atlantic Council have sought to advance since its signature. Releasing political prisoners and ensuring competitive conditions for the upcoming 2024 presidential elections are vital steps toward an inclusive process that can be internationally recognized. But these steps must mean all the international pre-, post- and day-of electoral conditions for a free and fair process be respected, including allowing the opposition to run a candidate without restrictions.   

The road to reconciliation and genuine democratic progress remains a challenging one. Much work will be necessary to ensure vigilant monitoring and enforcement of any agreement to ensure that Maduro upholds his side of the bargain. The United States and the broader international community will have to keep a watchful eye, holding Maduro accountable for his promises and actions moving forward.

The resumption of talks is a step forward for quiet diplomacy and comes after months of groundwork. The global community should offer its support and assistance to democratic actors at the negotiating table in any way possible to help ensure that these negotiations lead to lasting peace and a brighter future for Venezuela. This calls for optimism and international cooperation, but also realism and greater multilateral coordination as we wait to see if this marks a potential turning point.

—Jason Marczak is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The opposition got significant concessions. Now comes the hard part.

In the agreement signed Tuesday in Barbados, opposition negotiators managed to secure some very significant concessions, including a commitment from the government to hold next year’s presidential elections in the second half of 2024—giving the opposition more time to prepare—and a commitment to allow credible international electoral observation. They also obtained key technical conditions that are vital to making the vote more competitive, including an audit of electoral systems and an update of the voter registry. 

By signing this agreement, the opposition has managed to force the government to budge ever so slightly. Now it’s up to the opposition, with the help of the United States and international community, to use this wiggle room to put Maduro off balance. The opposition, in its upcoming primaries on October 22, has a chance to reconnect with voters who have grown weary of politics in the absence of change. What Maduro fears most, more than any one political opponent, is a disciplined opposition that is popular, organized, and ready to mobilize its base in 2024. The prospect for renewed mobilization, in combination with the conditions achieved by the opposition in Tuesday’s agreement, create a golden opportunity.

In some ways, the most important agreements are still private. It’s an open secret that the Biden administration will announce some form of sanctions relief in response to Tuesday’s agreement and resumption of talks with the opposition. And reports indicate that the Maduro government will free multiple political prisoners in the coming days. These developments, if they occur, are unlikely to be isolated exchanges. The past few months of quiet backchanneling, in coordination with opposition negotiators, will almost certainly produce further agreements as the US-Venezuela relationship keeps shifting.

Now comes the hard part. Moving forward, the White House will have to monitor compliance and implementation in order to ensure that Maduro holds up his end of the bargain. But questions remain about whether and how the United States can snap back the pressure if the regime veers off course.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Heartening progress for freedom, but no quick fix for Venezuela’s oil industry

Although it is heartening to see progress towards freedom in Venezuela, the likelihood that these developments will materially impact the oil market is negligible. The troubles faced by the Venezuelan oil industry predate US sanctions and will continue to plague the country long after sanctions are eased. Even if sanctions were eased immediately, Venezuelan oil output might only increase by a mere 200,000 barrels per day (bpd). According to S&P Global, Venezuela produced only 770,000 bpd in September 2023. This is actually much improved since Venezuela hit a low of 500,000 bpd in 2020 but still far below the 2.6 million bpd Venezuela produced in 2005. 

Venezuela has the largest oil reserves of any country in the world, but most of that oil is a sludgy, heavy, sour crude that is locked in the Orinoco belt. To increase Venezuela’s oil production and bring that oil to market will require huge amounts of investment and expertise. Venezuela’s heavy oil must be run through upgraders that mix it with diluents just to transport it through pipelines to ports. Many of the companies that used to work with Venezuela’s state oil company, PdVSA, will likely be hesitant to reinvest their money and manpower in Venezuela given the likelihood that sanctions could be reimposed or that foreign nationals could be imprisoned. Even if the Maduro government does meet the Biden administration’s conditions and the sanctions are eased, there is no quick or easy fix for Venezuela’s oil industry. 

—Ellen R. Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.

A new direction for US sanctions on Venezuela comes not a moment too soon

The Venezuelan-led political agreement reached in Barbados, and its subsequent joint statement, will now open the door to a long overdue redirection of the current US sanctions regime against Venezuela.

The series of economic sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, a “maximum pressure” strategy intended to dislodge the Maduro regime beginning in 2017, have had the perverse effect of causing both significant humanitarian distress inside Venezuela and undermining US strategic interests in the region and elsewhere. The sanctions, which prohibited trade in Venezuelan crude oil and products, even in exchange for debt owed by the regime, have been deeply unpopular with the Venezuelan public including those opposed to the regime because they caused enormous privation throughout Venezuelan society.

As a result, Venezuela has been short of crucial fuel supplies—fuel to transport food from farms to tables, fuel to power the electric grid, and gasoline essential for public mobility. The sanctions have not dislodged the regime, of course, but they have had the effect of increasing migration pressure on Venezuela’s neighbors as well as on the United States at a time of already significant immigration challenges in US cities. 

Meanwhile, the sanctions have led to the redirection of nearly all exports of Venezuelan crude to China (at significant discounts) and created a major role for Iran as supplier of condensate needed to produce domestic gasoline. Deprived of access to Venezuelan crude, countries such as India (also barred from importing Iranian crude) saw increased demand for Russian crude, which matches the grade and quality their refineries require for domestic consumption. While China and Russia have been able to retire a significant part of the Venezuelan debt owed to them and improve living conditions in Venezuela, US and European creditors have been barred from doing so. Although Chevron has been allowed to resume operations to produce crude oil under conditions that provide minimal benefits to the regime, current US sanctions prohibit companies in France, Spain, and Italy from doing the same. Importantly, these countries have been key diplomatic partners in the effort to ensure the Venezuelan opposition can compete in legitimate elections in 2024, and they share the wider strategic goals and interests of the United States.

A refresh of the US sanctions program thus comes at a crucial moment—and not a moment too soon. Importantly, this revision should not be seen as a concession to the Maduro regime. Rather, it is a timely effort to mitigate the humanitarian crisis inside Venezuela and reduce migration pressure to the United States and its allies in Latin America. Furthermore, this necessary revision will enable Western companies (those which act with integrity) to return to Venezuela and increase crude oil production, which can be used to repay the debt owed to them. All of this is possible while also depriving China of discounted crude oil and potentially lessening demand for Russian crude oil as well. This change in posture has notable benefits to Venezuela’s developing country neighbors such as Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad has just received an amended license from the United States that will allow it to pay Venezuela in cash for the natural gas it will import from Venezuela’s Dragon Field. This gas will keep Trinidad’s ammonia and liquefied natural gas industries afloat and support its role on regional food and energy security.

If the sanctions revisions come to pass, allowing trade in Venezuelan oil and products as long as Venezuela keeps its electoral commitments, there is great potential to relieve humanitarian distress inside of Venezuela and throughout the region. At the same time, Washington will have redirected its policy to one that serves US interests as well as Venezuela’s.

—David L. Goldwyn is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and co-chair of the Caribbean Energy Working Group at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Caribbean Initiative. He is the president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy.

Rebuilding Venezuela’s oil industry has a hefty price tag

The Venezuelan National Oil Company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), is poorly positioned to bring anything but cursory relief to tightening global oil markets in the near term.

The company has been subjected to a mass flight of technical and commercial expertise, epitomized when President Hugo Chávez fired 19,000 employees in 2003 following a general strike, filling vacant positions with regime loyalists. This purge comprised 55 percent of the company’s highly skilled professional and technical workers—including engineers skilled in the specialized extraction of the extra heavy crude found in Venezuela’s Orinoco basin—and 70 percent of the company’s executives, according to reports at the time.

Since these interventions, PdVSA has declined from a world-class oil and gas operator and the third-largest supplier of crude oil to the United States as recently as 2013 to an inkling of its former self. Its crude production has declined by 70 percent over the past decade.

Persistent underinvestment due to sanctions and a fledgling economy have left PdVSA’s production infrastructure in disrepair. To restore Venezuela’s oil industry to 1998 levels, when production totaled 3.4 million barrels per day (versus 730,000 barrels per day in August 2023), it is estimated that an investment of fifty-eight billion dollars would be required, perhaps more.

Most of this funding would need to be sourced from the international private sector. In any case, foreign investment and technical cooperation will be necessary to restore the country’s economic engine. This could yield both humanitarian and environmental benefits. In 2022, Venezuela’s oil production was the most carbon-intensive globally, and its “leakiness” pollutes local communities—a problem fixed only by reinvestment in the country’s infrastructure.

—William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

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Introduction
Venezuela’s social agreement
Delayed implementation and mixed messaging
Policy recommendations
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
About the authors

Introduction

Venezuela’s political, economic, and humanitarian crisis has generated one of the largest and most complex emergencies around the globe today. By implementing a historic humanitarian agreement reached between the Venezuelan opposition and the Maduro government, the United States has a unique opportunity to address human suffering on the ground while also working to advance a political solution. While the situation in Venezuela may have fallen from international headlines in recent years, the United States and its allies across the Americas have a clear interest in working to resolve the humanitarian and political emergency in Venezuela, which has generated an exodus of 7 million refugees and migrants and allowed US geopolitical rivals to deepen their influence.

In recent years the international community has reached a consensus that the best way to resolve Venezuela’s crisis is by incentivizing negotiations between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the democratic opposition. Progress has not been easy. Since Maduro came to power in 2013, four internationally backed attempts to encourage negotiations have begun and ended with no significant breakthroughs.

The current process, however, has proven to be an exception. Unlike previous attempts at negotiations, this round of talks has resulted in substantial agreements between the Maduro government and the opposition. Negotiations began in August 2021, when two nine-member delegations representing the Maduro government and the US-backed opposition Unitary Platform coalition met in Mexico City to agree to discuss an ambitious agenda to resolve the crisis—including addressing humanitarian needs, free and fair elections, restoring constitutional order, and reparations for victims. Since then, the parties have remained in regular communication behind the scenes, and negotiations are ongoing in Caracas with Mexico City serving primarily as a platform where the delegations announce finalized agreements reached in the process.

The most recent formal agreement in the negotiations, announced on November 26, 2022, marked a historic breakthrough. After years of protracted crisis, the Venezuelan negotiators signed the “Second Partial Agreement for the Protection of the Venezuelan People.” The accord has major ramifications for millions of Venezuelans experiencing the consequences of the country’s humanitarian crisis, including the 7.7 million that the UN estimates are in need of humanitarian assistance.

The agreement also has significant implications for the future of negotiations. If this humanitarian deal is not implemented, it will likely spell the end of current efforts to advance dialogue towards a political solution and raises the prospect that the Maduro government could access funds through other means that may be diverted by corruption and mismanagement. The stakes are high, and the international community faces a historic opportunity that could be lost unless the accord is implemented successfully.

In this context, the United States has an urgent opportunity: It can and should work to reinvigorate the Mexico City process by facilitating the creation of a United Nations-managed trust fund, fulfilling a November 2022 agreement, and helping to build trust between government and opposition negotiators.

Venezuela’s social agreement

The accord, referred to by the negotiating parties as the Social Agreement, established the basis for creating a series of humanitarian and development assistance programs funded by Venezuelan assets that have been frozen abroad by the United States’ financial sanctions. While no set amount is mentioned in the public version of the agreement, opposition sources close to the negotiations claim that the full implementation of the projects that are outlined in unpublished annexes of the deal would require approximately $3.2 billion. This amount was aspirational from the beginning, under the recognition that not all of the funds would be available at once. In theory, this amount could be gradually unfrozen and channeled into a UN-managed trust fund, referred to as the “Social Protection Fund,” which would benefit the Venezuelan people. In practice, however, the process of identifying, unfreezing, and transferring funds will take time, so US officials have cautioned that initial contributions to the fund will be significantly smaller.

2023 UN humanitarian response plan funding request vs estimated funding needs for full social agreement implementation

In the initial agreement, humanitarian and development programs would be implemented with the participation of United Nations agencies and monitored by two newly created bodies made up of three representatives each from both the government and the opposition. The first, named the Mesa de Atención Social, or the Social Attention Roundtable, was set up to oversee specific aid efforts, while the second, the Grupo Especial para la Atención de los Efectos del Sobrecumplimiento or the Special Group to Address the Effects of Overcompliance, was tasked with identifying and evaluating the effects of overcompliance with US sanctions in the international financial system. Since these initial talks, the conversation has evolved and the parties have now accepted an alternative structure of the fund that would be more in line with the UN’s traditional multi-donor trust fund model.

While US sanctions have included carveouts for humanitarian assistance, banks and other financial institutions have been traditionally risk-averse to doing business in Venezuela since the first sectoral economic sanctions were issued in August 2017. This has had a documented impact on humanitarian organizations in Venezuela, which have dealt with frozen transactions, bank closures, and other complications as an indirect result of sanctions.

The public-facing text of the Social Agreement outlined five key areas of focus for the assistance programs, each of which is connected to specific projects that have been designed and agreed upon by the parties and which are detailed in private annexes. These are:

• restoring the public health system
• rehabilitating the country’s broken electrical grid
• addressing malnutrition with an emphasis on children in need
• improving public education infrastructure
• providing relief for victims of recent floods in central Venezuela

These initiatives would be funded by Venezuelan assets frozen abroad and implemented with the significant involvement of agencies within the United Nations system, including the World Food Programme (WFP), the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

It is difficult to overstate the importance of this agreement. It represents a significant step in the negotiations process—one that could help build momentum to progress the remaining items on the negotiating agenda, such as electoral and judicial agreements. But the agreement also matters in more direct and tangible ways to Venezuela’s struggling population. For 2023, the United Nations Venezuela Humanitarian Response Plan is asking for roughly $719 million to fund all of its humanitarian activities across the board. The UN Humanitarian Response Plan has never received more than 40 percent of its funding, so the potential for additional resources through the Social Protection Fund could be life-changing for those suffering from a lack of basic necessities in Venezuela.

Delayed implementation and mixed messaging

In the months since the signing of the Social Agreement in November, progress in the transfer of funds or the implementation of assistance programs has been slow. Much of the initial delay appears to be due to bureaucratic hurdles within a range of institutions.

On one hand, the United Nations is concerned about the reputational risk of implementing a program that has drawn comparisons to the controversial Oil for Food Programme in Iraq—a program that was rife with mismanagement and corruption. Moreover, UN officials want guarantees of where the funds are, how the US and international community can help shield them in the transfer process, and how they can exist within the United States financial system in line with internal United Nations financial regulations.

On the other hand, there have been delays on the US side as well. In December 2022 the United States State Department sent a demarche to the United Nations that signaled that the US government could not fully guarantee that the Social Protection Fund could exist in the United States in ways that shielded it from creditors with claims to Venezuelan debt. Since then, the United States has reversed course, and in May 2023 the Biden Administration sent a second letter to United Nations representatives, this time guaranteeing that the fund could exist in the US financial system and that indicated the risk from creditor claims was minimal in order to benefit the Venezuelan people. US officials have also begun working with European banks to identify frozen funds for the agreement.

Understanding that the implementation of the fund will take time should not come as a surprise. The parties involved in signing the accord agreed that progress on broader negotiations “can not be conditioned, suspended, or delayed by any aspect derived from the execution of the present agreement.” This suggests that the parties recognized that the implementation of the Social Agreement would not be immediate. However, the United States and the international community should proactively look for avenues to help advance its realization.

This issue brief highlights five key recommendations for policymakers and civil society leaders in the United States and abroad to help shape the way for the successful and efficient implementation of Venezuela’s Social Agreement—in both the short and long term.  

Recommendations

1. Assist in identifying and unfreezing Venezuelan assets held abroad. Until the Fund is created, authorize direct transfers to United Nations agencies.
2. Establish and commit to a unified strategy and joint messaging to facilitate the implementation of Venezuela’s Humanitarian Accord.
3. Encourage the United Nations to build on its success in managing multi-donor trust funds to ensure transparency and oversight of the Social Protection Fund.
4. Ensure that creditors’ valid legal claims to repayment do not prevent assistance for the Venezuelan people.
5. Ensure coordinated international support for the negotiations process, reinforcing the need for the Maduro government to reach significant political agreements with the opposition.  

Recommendation 1: Assist in identifying and unfreezing Venezuelan assets held abroad. Authorize direct transfers to United Nations agencies

Starting with low-hanging fruit could be the best way to move forward in implementing the Social Agreement. There are large quantities of money in frozen assets held at financial institutions across the world that could be transferred to United Nations agencies efficiently and securely. While this short-term approach is a quick fix for delays currently weighing on United Nations and government agencies, it does send a message of support for the larger obstacles ahead.

However, transferring hundreds of millions of dollars worth of frozen funds is exponentially more complex than a regular wire transfer. First, each account needs to be located and the funds within them accurately estimated. While the Maduro government and opposition each have attempted to map out where and how much Venezuelan funds have been frozen by sanctions, estimates vary widely.

Once the figures are recognized, the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) should help financial institutions reduce the risk associated with transferring frozen funds by issuing detailed licenses and comfort letters guaranteeing that such transactions will not violate US sanctions.

However, outreach from OFAC should go beyond this as a measure to avoid over-compliance. Financial institutions that hold portions of Venezuelan assets respond to shareholder interests like any other business. In most cases, these interests include banking with an institution that does not finance autocratic regimes. Unless properly communicated, engaging in money transfers to Venezuela could generate adverse effects on investor holdings and consumer demand for banking services due to a decrease in public trust.

To avoid this scenario, OFAC should engage directly with local authorities to ensure they echo the authorization of the transfers, providing tranquility to shareholders and thus avoiding over-compliance concerns.

A final, and arguably difficult step is getting the Maduro government to formally request the funds to be transferred to the United Nations. As the nominal account holder of many of these bank accounts, the Maduro government would have to request that the money be transferred to the UN-established trust fund, even after such transfers are greenlit by US and local governments.

Recommendation 2: Establish and commit to a unified strategy and joint messaging to facilitate the implementation of Venezuela’s Humanitarian Accord

The successful implementation of Venezuela’s Humanitarian Accord depends entirely on the efficient and streamlined coordination of a variety of global stakeholders including the Maduro government, Venezuelan political parties, the United States government, the United States Treasury, the United Nations, financial institutions, and countries holding frozen funds.

While coordinating all these actors could be considered one of the greatest challenges for the successful implementation of the Social Fund, the need for internal coordination within each body adds a layer of complexity. Most of these institutions still disagree on what the correct approach to the crisis should be. In the United States alone, opposing views among Congress, State Department, US Treasury, and the White House have slowed down the country’s ability to display joint advances toward implementation policies.

Establishing a unified strategy that all actors commit to requires precise efforts to ensure that the greatest number of relevant voices are heard and incorporated into the process, including government agencies, Congress, banks, and smaller actors like Venezuelans in the diaspora and the families of people illegally detained in Venezuela. The United States, from its unique position as a key player, should spearhead coordination efforts by creating systematized mechanisms for fund identification, financial institution assurance, and official fund requests from within Venezuela.

A unified strategy offers multiple benefits beyond efficiency measures. Firstly, it provides an opportunity for the Unitary Platform and the international community to develop a robust messaging campaign aimed at educating the Venezuelan public about the fund and the specific programs that would be supported by the incoming capital. This communication campaign would not only celebrate the creation of the fund but also emphasize the victory of the opposition negotiators in obtaining it.

Furthermore, increased awareness of and engagement with the Social Agreement would generate critical buy-in from local and international communities, particularly as the regime faces incentives to claim sole credit for the incoming funds. By implementing a joint strategy and messaging approach, the opposition can generate broader buy-in, effectively demonstrating their ownership over the negotiation process while convincing third-party actors of its legitimacy.

Finally, adopting this strategy helps move the negotiations forward, but also highlights the potential consequences of inaction for the Maduro government. It could encourage them to pursue political advances, release political prisoners, engage in political dialogue, make democratic progress in terms of elections, and demonstrate goodwill toward other relevant actors.

Demands put forth through these channels would signal the international community’s commitment to supporting a credible and meaningful negotiation process in Venezuela, which could expedite the implementation of the agreement before its deadline.

Recommendation 3: Encourage the United Nations to build on its success in managing multi-donor trust funds to ensure transparency and oversight of the Social Protection Fund

The United Nations is well-suited to oversee the Social Fund. Since the controversy over the Oil for Food Programme in Iraq, the UN has drastically increased its transparency standards, creating a set of financial rules and regulations to avoid a repetition of the corruption, fund mismanagement, and illegal surcharges identified throughout the Iraq program.

The Financial Regulation and Rules portion of the United Nation’s Finance and Budget chapter establishes a framework for decentralizing decision-making, aligning authorities with responsibilities, strengthening accountability, and delegating necessary managerial authority to heads of entities for effective mandate delivery. Similarly, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation (PPBME) provides financial and budgetary directives for all activities and programs undertaken by the United Nations. The instruments used to successfully manage funds ensure coordination, accountability, and adequate resource utilization.

With these new regulations, planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation become an integral part of the United Nation’s general policymaking and management process. Regulation 4.2 of the PPBME in particular stipulates that a project’s objectives and strategies should be derived from policy orientations and goals set by intergovernmental organs that reflect Member States’ priorities. This regulation ensures alignment with legislative mandates and enhances the organization’s responsiveness to global challenges.

Moreover, the United Nation’s established procedures, governance mechanisms, grant-making processes, and experience in managing trust funds make it a reliable option to oversee the Venezuelan Social Protection Fund. Trust funds within the UN system are established through General Assembly resolutions or by the Secretary-General and adhere to financial regulations and rules. Governance of trust funds involves boards or steering committees comprising independent experts, UN agency representatives, donor countries, and civil society organizations. The secretariat for each fund, typically housed within a relevant UN agency, handles administrative services such as proposal evaluation, grant awards, disbursement, monitoring, and evaluation.

Over the years and with these new financial regulatory systems, the United Nations has gained extensive experience managing pooled financing mechanisms like multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), which are a specific modality used to channel donor contributions to multiple implementing entities for country-specific programs. They offer flexibility in implementation procedures, minimizing delays and transaction costs.

MDTFs are managed by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, which is administered by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The MPTF Office currently manages nearly 100 pooled financing mechanisms, representing over 95 percent of all funds channeled through UN-administered programs. While administering a multi-billion-dollar trust fund as envisioned in the Social Agreement would be a massive undertaking for the United Nations system, the UN should be encouraged to build upon its existing experience managing trust funds.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that creditors’ valid legal claims to repayment do not prevent assistance for the Venezuelan people

One of the most widely discussed challenges of implementing Venezuela’s Humanitarian Accord is the risk of funds being redirected to donors and creditors to service existing debt obligations.  

If creditors file claims against the funds being transferred, ongoing transactions are frozen until the legal dispute is resolved, which often takes years to settle. A series of delays such as this would have dire consequences on the steps being taken to ameliorate Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. While creditors should have their debts resolved promptly, the international community needs to establish pathways that safeguard money destined for the Social Protection fund against debt obligations, including through the creation of fiduciary funds. Fiduciary accounts protect funds from donors and creditors by ensuring that they can only be accessed by a principal, in this case, the United Nations. The reality is that as an international organization, the UN has comprehensive immunities that complicate lawsuits.

While groups of creditors such as the Venezuela Creditor Community have shown signs of good faith asserting they will not make claims to the Social Fund, it is important to be proactive to avoid delays in the case that claims are made. These creditors’ valid claims should be addressed, but  ideally in a way that does not hinder funding for humanitarian purposes.

Recommendation 5: Ensure coordinated international support for the negotiations process, reinforcing the need for the Maduro government to reach significant political agreements with the opposition

The United States can do more to coordinate with allies in Latin America and Europe in order to maximize the potential for free and fair elections in 2024. Building off of the closing statement of the April 25 international conference on Venezuela held in Bogota, which highlighted a wide international consensus in favor of negotiations. The conference also ended with a commitment for an undisclosed number of participating countries to send representatives to Caracas to meet with the government, as well as with “opposition parties and sectors, and civil society, [and share] the results of the conference for their evaluation and comments.” This creates an opportunity for US diplomats to ensure consistency in the messages that are transmitted to Venezuelan political actors.

One way to do this is to conduct active diplomacy with key allies across Europe and the Americas in order to identify a shared sense of benchmarks needed ahead of 2024. The Biden administration should seek further high-level engagement to discuss Venezuela-related issues, including with governments that have different approaches. In recent years, governments ranging from the Petro and Lula administrations in Colombia and Brazil to president-elect Santiago Peña of Paraguay have begun to re-engage with the Maduro government directly after years of participating in a US-led isolation campaign. The European Union, while remaining supportive of a return to democracy in Venezuela, has begun to explore natural gas opportunities in Venezuela given the shifting energy markets after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Communication with Caracas can be strategic but should reinforce efforts to press for negotiations that lead to free and fair presidential elections in 2024.  Latin American and European governments should also be encouraged to support the opposition’s negotiating team in their deliberations with the Maduro regime. Publicly expressing support for the timely implementation of the Social Agreement is a vital way to boost the negotiating team’s credibility, and to ultimately ensure that Maduro faces the right incentive to continue to engage with the opposition negotiators.

Discrediting the team or supporting alternate negotiation pathways can undermine the opposition’s authority, weaken its position at the negotiating table, and provide the Maduro regime with bargaining power stemming from engagement alternatives.

Communication with Caracas can be strategic but should reinforce efforts to press for negotiations that lead to free and fair presidential elections in 2024.

Conclusion

The agreement reached between the Maduro regime and the opposition in Venezuela represents a significant milestone in the ongoing negotiations to address the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in the country. The initiatives described in the Social Agreement aim to address critical areas such as public health, electricity, malnutrition, education, and flood relief. If fully implemented, the agreement has the potential to bring about massive change and improve the lives of millions of Venezuelans who are in dire need of assistance. 

However, the implementation of the agreement has faced bureaucratic hurdles and challenges on various fronts. While the United Nations has been cautious about ensuring transparency and avoiding mismanagement, the United States government has raised concerns about the protection of the funds from creditors with claims to Venezuelan debt. 

This issue brief proposes a series of recommendations to expedite the implementation of the Social Agreement. These include assisting in identifying and unfreezing Venezuelan assets held abroad, establishing a unified strategy and joint messaging among relevant stakeholders, encouraging the United Nations to utilize its expertise in managing multi-donor trust funds for transparency and oversight, ensuring that creditors’ legal claims do not hinder assistance for the Venezuelan people, and providing strong and stable support for Venezuela’s opposition negotiating team. 

By taking proactive steps to address these recommendations, the international community can help advance the realization of the agreement and provide much-needed support to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan population. The successful implementation of the Social Agreement could not only improve the humanitarian situation in Venezuela but also create momentum for progress in other crucial areas of the negotiations, such as electoral and judicial reforms. 

Acknowledgments

This issue brief was informed by a series of consultations with representatives from the public and civil society sectors. We thank the many individuals and institutions who contributed to the research process, including the Venezuelan opposition, the United Nations, the US State Department, US Congressional Offices, and others. We are deeply grateful to our colleagues at the Adrienne Arsht Latina America Center (AALAC) team who helped produce this report, particularly Jason Marczak, senior director of AALAC for his guidance and editorial support. Our gratitude extends to the Atlantic Council Editorial team, including Cate Hansberry, Mary Kate Aylward, and Nancy Messieh, for their diligent editorial work and exceptional design skills. Most importantly, we thank all those who believe in the power of transnational cooperation for the benefit of millions.

About the authors

Staff

Geoff Ramsey

Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

Former staff

Ignacia Ulloa Peters

Former Associate Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Democratic Transitions Latin America

Geoff Ramsey is a Senior Fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela and Colombia.  His work has been published and cited in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Economist, and other major media outlets.

Ignacia Ulloa Peters is an Assistant Director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center where she focuses on Venezuela, Mexico, and the southern Andes. Her work on Venezuela focuses on advancing transatlantic nonpartisan engagement on Venezuelan issues while promoting a deeper understanding of the complex crisis.

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This month’s topline events

G7 Unites on China. At a G7 summit meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, President Joe Biden and other democratic leaders came together on China, pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy and agreeing on a coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and an initiative to diversify supply chains. The G7 also called out Beijing’s militancy in the Indo-Pacific and political interference in democracies, while making clear it was prepared to “build constructive and stable relations” with China. With European allies eager to calm tensions, Biden also indicated he expected a thaw in relations with Beijing, as US officials began a new round of bilateral meetings with their Chinese counterparts.

• Shaping the order. The summit’s success in projecting a common front on China could set the table for meaningful policy coordination between the US and its allies, particularly on economic issues. The prospects of a more unified approach appear to have garnered concern in Beijing, which summoned Japan’s ambassador to rebuke the G7’s effort to “smear and attack China.” But as highlighted by French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Beijing, the US and its allies still have a ways to go to coordinate efforts on engaging with the world’s second largest economy.
• Hitting home. America’s economy will be more secure over time if the US and its allies are able to reduce dependence on Chinese products in critical industries and limit Beijing’s ability to engage in economic coercion.
• What to do. Building on the momentum generated by the summit, the Biden administration should seek to formulate a common allied strategy for how to deal with China over the longer term.

Ukraine Gets F-16’s. With Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky traveling to Japan to join the G7 leaders summit, President Biden indicated that the US had agreed to allow allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine and will participate in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots. The move comes as Russian forces appeared to take full control of Bakhmut, ending a monthslong battle for the eastern city and constituting Russia’s first battlefield victory in nearly a year. But the success may be fleeting, as Ukraine prepared for the launch of a major counteroffensive operation.

• Shaping the order. Biden’s decision on F-16’s marks another major shift on weapons support that could substantially bolster the ability of Ukrainian forces to push back Russian forces, though it will be several months before Ukrainian pilots will be able to use the planes in combat. More broadly, Zelensky’s appearance at the G7 summit served as a further demonstration of democratic solidarity and an indicator for how significantly relations with Russia – once a member of the G7 (then the G8) – have deteriorated.
• Hitting home. Americans will be safer if Ukraine succeeds in standing up to Russia’s aggression and flagrant assault on its democratic neighbor.
• What to do. The Biden administration should work with allies to expedite the training of Ukrainian pilots and facilitate the delivery of the F-16’s, while also reconsidering its position on providing ATACMS, the longer range missile system that could also bolster Ukraine’s ability to succeed.

Arab League Welcomes Assad.  After years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians to crush a popular uprising, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was warmly received by Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Sultan and other Arab leaders at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah. The move comes as Assad continues to consolidate his grip on power, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states enter a rapprochement with Iran.

• Shaping the order. The Arab League’s normalization of relations with Assad – a murderous dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians – is a demoralizing setback for efforts to advance a rules-based, democratic order. Assad’s resurrection appears to be part of a global trend of welcoming authoritarian leaders back from the cold, as Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro was invited by Brazil to participate in a South American leaders summit, sending the message to autocrats that violent repression ultimately pays dividends.
• Hitting home. The rehabilitation of autocrats like Assad undermines American values and US interests in a stable and prosperous world order.
• What to do. The US and its democratic allies should stand together in opposing Assad’s reintegration into the international community, and maintain sanctions and other efforts to ensure that Assad is ultimately held accountable for his actions.

Quote of the Month

“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine… has shaken the international order… [Japan] has a mission to uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and to demonstrate to the world its determination to fully defend peace and prosperity.”
– Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, speaking at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, May 21, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was given a warm welcome at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah, after years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians.
• After facing his biggest election challenge in over two decades, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan won re-election amidst a campaign process marred by pro-government media bias, limits on free speech, and other obstacles on the opposition.
• Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicolas Maduro was invited to participate in a summit of South American leaders in Brazil, as Brazilin president Lula de Silva joined Maduro in criticizing US sanctions against Venezuela.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

• President Biden agreed to allow NATO allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine, while pledging US participation in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots.
• The US signed a new defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea – the largest island nation in the Pacific – that will deepen security ties between the two nations, as Washington seeks to counter China’s rising influence in the region.
• In a show of solidarity, Chinese President Xi Jinping told visiting Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin that Beijing will maintain “firm support” for Moscow’s “core interest.”
• The US accused South Africa of secretly supplying arms to Russia, despite the country’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine – a claim South African leaders initially denied and then promised to investigate.
• Russia and Belarus signed an agreement formalizing the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move that appears intended as a warning to the West as it steps up support for Ukraine.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• The US and its G7 partners agreed to establish a new coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and launch a new initiative to diversify supply chains away from China, while pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy.
• The US and Taiwan reached a trade and investment agreement in an effort to liberalize and deepen economic ties between the two nations.
• China signed a free trade agreement with Ecuador, as Beijing looks to deepen its economic ties and influence in Latin America.
• G7 leaders agreed to new economic sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine, and the US announced a slate of new measures to restrict Russian trade. The UK followed suit, announcing a ban on Russian diamonds.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons ()

• G7 Leaders released a Clean Energy Action Plan, providing commitments across seven specific areas, including promoting clean energy technologies, with goal of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
• A joint report by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme contends that, unless immediate action is taken, acute food insecurity will likely be exacerbated over the next six months.
• The World Health Organization declared an end to the COVID-19 global health emergency, marking an end to one of the most deadly and devastating pandemics in modern history.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• Meeting in Hiroshima, President Biden and his G7 counterparts reaffirmed their solidarity to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky joined the summit in-person. G7 leaders also came together on China, pledging to counter economic coercion and voicing opposition to Beijing’s militarization of the Indo-Pacific.
• President Biden joined leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quad – US, Australia, India, and Japan – for a summit in Hiroshima, resulting in a joint pledge to cooperate toward a region where “where all countries are free from coercion” – an indirect reference to China.
• US Secretary of State Tony Blinken traveled to Oslo for a NATO foreign ministers meeting to discuss potential security guarantees for Ukraine, including the possibility of NATO membership, though allies remain divided on the issue.
• Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Liza Tobin, in Foreign Policy, argues that US policy toward China should be reoriented to achieve what should be American’s long-term goal of a democratic China.
• Emile Hokeinam, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that Syrian president Assad has turned a weak hand into a winning one, and that the Arab embrace of Assad will only encourage more brutality.
• Soner Cagaptay, in Foreign Affairs, opines that President Erdogan’s victory in the Turkish elections could solidify Turkey’s shift from an illiberal democracy to a Putin-style autocracy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that the drama of US debt ceiling negotiations underscores the enduring promise of America’s global leadership and the growing perils of its decline.
• Dan Fried and Aaron Korewa, in the New Atlanticist, explore the potential for Poland to serve as a leader in Europe amidst the ongoing political turmoil.
• Ash Jain was quoted in Foreign Policy on US efforts to win over countries in dealing with China, by not talking about China.
• Joslyn Brodfueher and Zelma Sergejeva, writing for the Atlantic Council, highlight the potential to fortify NATO’s unified front against Russian aggression as the alliance prepares for its upcoming summit in Vilnius.
• Matthew Kroenig, in Foreign Policy, suggests that even Machiavelli preferred democracy over tyranny, because democracies have stronger political institutions that provide the source for greater national power and influence.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Despite facing mounting opposition since taking office in August, Petro hopes to consolidate his government’s program with this new lineup announced on April 26. The reshuffle boots seven ministers from the administration, including market-friendly Finance Minister Jose Antonio Ocampo and the ministers of health, interior, transportation, agriculture, communications, and science. The question now is whether this surprise shake-up will prove to be a defining moment in Petro’s presidency or serve as a nail in the coffin for parts of his wide-ranging domestic agenda, which includes sweeping proposals for health, labor, and pension reforms. The stakes are high and come just as the United States and Colombia are trying to find ways of working together to coordinate on a range of issues—both inside Colombia and across Latin America.

At the top of the agenda is Venezuela. On April 25, Colombia hosted a high-level summit on Venezuela meant to widen the international consensus in support of political talks to resolve the country’s long-standing political and humanitarian crisis. Despite some friction, the conference highlighted the potential for US-Colombia collaboration on Venezuela—with implications for other regional diplomatic priorities in the future. While close coordination with Colombia could potentially advance US priorities across the hemisphere, this progress won’t come easily. It will largely depend on Colombia’s ability to navigate the current challenges with stability.

The conference came about after a White House meeting between US President Joe Biden and Petro on April 20. The two presidents discussed key issues in the bilateral relationship, such as counternarcotics, security, and US assistance. But in their joint statement, it’s also clear that the two leaders found a surprising amount of common ground on broader areas such as climate change, migration, and perhaps the leading human-rights issue in the Americas today: the crisis in Venezuela.

Colombia followed up the White House meeting by hosting high-level diplomatic delegations from twenty countries across the globe. The conference saw diverse participation, including EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, Brazilian presidential advisor Celso Amorim, and other leading decision makers from Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. While Colombia’s decision to invite representatives from South Africa and Turkey raised eyebrows, this did not dissuade the Biden administration from sending a high-level delegation to the meeting, including Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer, Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas Chris Dodd, National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Wells.

While the conference was held in private, remarks afterwards by Colombian Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva (who survived the cabinet shakeup) identified three points of consensus.

1. A solution to Venezuela’s crisis requires a timetable for free and fair elections. With presidential elections in Venezuela meant to occur in 2024 and legislative and regional elections slated for 2025, the focus of the international community is on ensuring competitive electoral conditions. This will not be easy given ongoing persecution of opposition candidates, widespread corruption, and Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro’s control of state institutions. In this sense, Borrell’s presence was significant. The European Union Electoral Observation Mission that oversaw regional and municipal elections in 2021 had significant access to Venezuela’s electoral authority on the ground. Its twenty-three recommendations make up a framework for the path to free and fair elections moving forward.
2. Negotiations to resolve the crisis are an urgent priority—and implementing a humanitarian accord is the best chance to build momentum. In 2021, the Maduro government and the opposition signed an ambitious plan in Mexico City to begin negotiations to resolve the country’s political crisis, aimed at electoral and judicial reforms. While the parties continue to negotiate in Caracas, progress in this process has been intermittent. In a breakthrough agreement in November 2022, the parties agreed to create a joint committee to channel an estimated three billion dollars in funds frozen by US sanctions to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuela. This fund, to be overseen by the United Nations, is meant to prioritize health care, malnutrition, and restoring basic infrastructure. However, implementation is lagging behind. For example, the United Nations has not yet created the fiduciary fund five months after the agreement, claiming that it lacks clarity on navigating US sanctions. This international consensus in support of implementing the humanitarian fund is a sign of buy-in for the idea of building momentum based on existing accords.
3. Agreements should be paired with clear US offers of sanctions relief in order to incentivize progress. In its readout on April 25, the White House made clear that it had spelled out a step-by-step approach for such progress, “where concrete actions toward restoring Venezuelan democracy, leading to free and fair elections, are met by corresponding sanctions relief by the United States.” Existing financial and oil sanctions give the US significant leverage, since Maduro is desperate for access to resources amid an ongoing economic crisis. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Venezuelan government can be incentivized to provide significant political agreements that may ultimately threaten its hold on power.

The fact that these three points emerged out of the conference is significant—but it was especially significant that Colombia signed on. Previously the Petro administration had issued mixed messages on Venezuela, voicing vague concerns on human rights while moving to normalize diplomatic and trade relations with Maduro. Indeed, Petro has been more comfortable talking about the impact of US sanctions than about authoritarianism, human-rights violations, and crimes against humanity in Venezuela. In Leyva’s remarks after the conference and in some of Petro’s comments after his meeting with Biden, the Colombian government’s position appears to have shifted to include a clearer emphasis on the need to pair sanctions relief with progress towards free and fair elections.

There are limits to US-Colombia coordination on Venezuela. The uncertainty and instability surrounding the Colombian government inspired by the recent cabinet shake-up and the government’s inconsistent messaging on other areas of prior consensus, such as the Trade Promotion Agreement with the United States, limits its credibility. Additionally, the Petro administration is focused on negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) to secure peace in Colombia, making it hard for Petro to take a bold stand against the Maduro regime, unless the United States offers significant support on this front. 

Colombia’s decision to expel former Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who was recognized by the United States as interim president until his mandate ended in January, did not gain the Andean country many points either. Guaidó arrived unexpectedly in Colombia on the eve of the conference. Rather than using the opportunity to recognize his contributions to the search for a democratic solution, the Colombian government wasted no time in ensuring that he made it on a plane to Miami. In doing so, the Petro administration generated unnecessary noise, raising concerns about their commitment to denouncing persecution and distracting from wider opposition support for jumpstarting negotiations.

Despite the friction, Colombia’s decision to host this conference—and ultimately to shift its position on Venezuela to be more in line with US priorities—represents an important step in exploring the future of diplomatic cooperation between Washington and Bogotá. This holds important lessons for other shared interests, including climate and migration policy, areas where the two countries have identified opportunities for future collaboration.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade.

Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Colombia, Mexico, and the Andes.

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​​​​​What you should know

• Nicaragua: On February 9, the Ortega-Murillo regime released and expelled 222 political leaders, priests, students, and other dissidents to the United States.
• US-Brazil relations: Presidents Biden and Lula da Silva met on February 10, during which they underscored the importance of strengthening democracy, promoting respect for human rights, and addressing the climate crisis.
• Ecuador: Ecuadorians rejected all eight items on a constitutional referendum backed by President Lasso, signaling anti-incumbent sentiments and the clout of pro-Correísmo opposition political forces.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

• Argentina: Annual inflation reached 98.8 percent, while activities in the construction and manufacturing sectors continued to decline.  
• Brazil: The government met with Mexico, Germany, Colombia, Chile, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to explore issuing green bonds this year. 
• Belize: The government launched two new projects in cooperation with Taiwan, a business support program focused on women and micro, small, medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and a flood warning system for disaster prevention.  
• Colombia: 2022 GDP growth is estimated to be 7.9 percent, down from 2021’s 10.8 percent growth. In 2023, growth is expected to further decline to 1.05 percent. 
• Peru: Continuing protests and supply shortages have led several mines to suspend or reduce operations, threatening copper production.  
• Suriname: President Santokhi expressed willingness to collaborate with neighboring Guyana on oil and gas exploration and development to position the Caribbean as an energy hub. 

In focus: Inflation and infighting

As regional inflation continues, political pressures are leading to criticism of central bank policy in Brazil and Colombia. Recently-elected presidents Lula and Petro have both questioned rate hikes as a method to tackle inflation, suggesting more flexible targets and alternative policies. The governor of Colombia’s Central Bank, Leonardo Villar, expects the region to require continuing tight monetary policy, which critics argue may complicate other policy goals such as growth. Roberto Campos Neto, president of the Central Bank of Brazil, has expressed his willingness to coordinate with the Lula administration to achieve growth and control inflation. 

Despite the public clashes, central bank policy in both countries remains independent. In Brazil, a 2021 law protects central bank autonomy and is unlikely to be repealed. In Colombia, the central bank has maintained a course independent of presidential advice for two decades. 

Health + Innovation

• Colombia: President Petro presented a health reform to Congress that seeks to improve primary care, expand access to treatment, raise healthcare worker salaries, and fight corruption by eliminating private sector management of payments.
• Brazil: Nearly three years since COVID-19 claimed the life of its first victim, the country has for the first time registered zero pandemic-related deaths in a day on February 12.
• Jamaica: The Bureau of Standards launched the Jamaican Standard Specification for Telemedicine, which provides the framework through which telemedicine may be safely practiced while upholding the integrity of the medical profession.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

• The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post Aviso LatAm: February 18, 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

​​​​​What you should know

• PAHO: Dr. Jarbas Barbosa took office on February 1 as the health organization’s new director, pledging to work in partnership with member states to end the pandemic and ensure that the region’s health systems recover stronger than before.
• IMF: The organization raised its global growth forecast to 2.9 percent, up from its original 2.7 percent. The outlook is also better for the region’s two major economies: up 0.2 percent for Brazil, to 1.2 percent, and a half point for Mexico, to 1.7 percent.
• Migration: The 250,000 migrants that irregularly crossed into Panama through the Darien Gap in 2022 represents a record high that is nearly double the 133,000 entries recorded in 2021.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

• Mexico: The national statistics agency reported that the economy grew 0.4 percent in Q4 of 2022 compared to the previous quarter.
• Argentina: The government will leverage new gas exports to Chile, and potentially Brazil, to improve its trade balance and pay down debt.  
• Brazil: Alongside Argentina, the government is floating the development of a common currency linking the two countries to facilitate trade. 
• Colombia: The Minister of Mines and Energy Irene Velez announced at Davos that the country will no longer approve new oil and gas exploration contracts.
• Jamaica: Third-quarter GDP grew by 5.9 percent over 2022 due to a resurgent tourism sector, which has boosted hotels, restaurants, and services, among other sectors.  
• Peru: Ongoing protests and road blockades have cost the country $550 million since the ousting of President Pedro Castillo last December. 
• Transatlantic ties: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, to discuss the EU-Mercosur trade agreement and support for Ukraine. 

In focus: Energy expansion in Trinidad and Tobago

On January 24, the United States licensed Trinidad and Tobago to develop a natural gas project off the coast of Venezuela in the Dragon field region. The project will support overall Caribbean energy security, with a requirement that some of the produced gas must be exported to Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. To comply with US sanctions, Trinidad will pay for the gas with humanitarian aid. 

Atlantic Council experts reacted immediately, emphasizing the importance of this move towards meeting Caribbean energy demand. You can read more here. 

Health + Innovation

• Haiti: As of January 17, the Ministry of Public Health and Population has reported over 24,400 suspected cholera cases.
• Education: A World Bank study shows that by 2045, nearly 5 million people across LAC would fall into poverty due to pandemic-induced learning losses.
• Brazil: The Health Ministry announced that it will roll out bivalent COVID-19 booster shots as early as February 27.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

• The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post Aviso LatAm: February 6, 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Goldwyn quoted in The Wall Street Journal on Venezuelan oil and gas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Goldwyn quoted in the Wall Street Journal on Venezuelan oil and gas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beyond Russia, Chevron recently made the first shipment of Venezuelan oil to Texas, while the White House is likely to announce an executive order on outbound investment screening after Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China in February. 

Russia’s draining budget

Western capitals imposed sanctions to run the Russian economy to the ground. But sanctions’ initial effects fell short of expectations. The ruble, rather than being reduced to rubble, reversed its initial depreciation and even became the best performing currency of 2022. It is misguided to use exchange rates as the main indicator of an economy’s health. However, the ruble’s good health tells us something about the relative value of Russia’s imports and exports, and the record-breaking balance of payments surpluses of Q2 and Q3 last year.

Even with high energy prices and additional income, Russia’s surging budget deficit shows that the invasion is causing Russia to spend much more than it is making in revenue. The Russian budget had a deficit of forty-seven billion dollars in 2022, one of the highest since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although the Russian government conveniently decided not to publish data on the government spending this year, it is safe to assume that military spending contributed to the bulk of the increase in spending. 

Going into 2023, Russia’s budget deficit may be higher than Russia claims. Moscow anticipates its budget deficit in 2023 to be 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), based on the assumption that Russia’s flagship crude blend Urals is traded at seventy dollars a barrel. However, if the oil price cap lowers the Russian oil price to the maximum of sixty dollars while spending remains the same, the deficit would be closer to 4.5 percent, according to Financial Times estimates. 

To keep filling in the budget deficit and financing the war in Ukraine, Moscow will have to redirect funds from other domestic programs. In 2022, additional budget revenue came from Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, the one-time taxing of Gazprom, and issuance of largest-ever Federal Loan Obligations. However, in 2023, as the European Union (EU) works hard to diversify away from Russian gas, Gazprom is likely to have less revenue, therefore less tax revenue. Meanwhile, diverting sovereign wealth fund money toward the war takes away Russia’s rainy day fund and might result in slashing funding for schools and hospitals next year. 

Oil price caps: Working for now, likely to face challenges

The price cap on seaborne Russian crude oil came into effect on December 5, 2022. It stipulates that unless buyers can prove that they have paid below sixty dollars for Russian oil, they will be denied Western maritime services, such as insurance and brokerage. The Russian flagship crude blend Urals price has not reached sixty dollars since December. Even Russian government officials admit that freight costs for Russian oil have increased. 

Russia cannot afford to follow through on the promise of blocking sales to countries complying with the oil price cap, but it will attempt to undermine the cap. Since the policy came into effect, at least seven Russian oil tankers with Western insurance have left from Russia’s Baltic ports for Indian refineries. These tankers would not be able to insure their cargo if they were selling above sixty dollars. Some assert that the price cap will continue to work because sixty dollars is an acceptable price for Russia. However, we should not reach premature conclusions as Russia will be actively looking for options to sell above the capped price. One of the options in the short term is for Russia to self-insure and use Indian or Chinese vessels not subject to US or EU jurisdictions, and build up a fleet of crude vessels in the longer term. 

Despite even more daunting enforcement challenges, Group of Seven (G7) partners will expand the price cap to Russian refined petroleum products, such as diesel and kerosene on February 5. Sanctioning Russia’s fuel exports is likely to cause the rerouting of Russian diesel to India from the EU. But the EU still needs diesel supplies and it will be purchasing them from the United States and India. Thus, Russian diesel supplies may travel a lot more before finally reaching the EU again, creating inefficiencies in the market. However, the EU is prepared to take this step while it is simultaneously banning almost all imports of Russian oil products. 

New year, new deal: Resumption of Venezuela oil exports to the US

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine started in 2022, the United States and EU have been looking for alternative oil suppliers. This presented an opportunity to Venezuela—a heavily sanctioned country which happens to have the world’s largest oil reserves—to fill in the oil gap created by the sanctions against Russia. President Nicolas Maduro’s domestic political concession—resuming negotiations with the opposition party—has won him the issuance of General License 41 by the Treasury Department. The six-month license allows Chevron Corporation to resume natural resource extraction in Venezuela. In January, Chevron delivered its first oil shipment of half-million barrels of oil to the refineries in Texas. 

The resumption of Venezuelan oil shipments to the United States is a temporary alignment of interests for both parties. The United States is trying to fill in the vacuum created in the world energy markets by banning Russian oil. Meanwhile, as oil export finances two-thirds of Venezuela’s budget, Maduro is capitalizing on the opportunity of reviving Venezuela’s dilapidated oil industry and bringing in much-needed revenue for his government.

However, the United States is treading carefully, as it should. The license is only for six months, and sanctions can be reimposed at any time within that period should Maduro appear to violate human rights or end dialogue with the opposition.

China may become the testing ground for another US economic statecraft tool: outbound investment screening

In contrast with Venezuela, US-China relations have only been on the downhill since last year. In addition to the tech export controls we discussed in the previous edition, the United States has recently issued sanctions on over 150 Chinese illegal fishing ships. Notably, for the first time, the Treasury sanctioned a Chinese company listed on a US stock exchange, Pingtan Marine Enterprise. But that’s not all. 

The United States is considering screening outbound investment to China, to ensure that US companies aren’t transferring technology and know-how to Chinese military-civil fusion companies. In the United States, an executive order on outbound investment in China is likely to come out after Blinken’s visit to China in February, which is expected to be followed by legislative action later. The US Senate is actively engaging with experts to examine outbound investment screening. Explore our joint publication with the Center for a New American Security to find out how such a mechanism should be designed. 

Meanwhile, in the EU, Germany is pushing for the creation of an EU outbound investment screening mechanism. The European Commission already included this issue in the 2023 agenda. However, at first, screening would happen on a small scale so the EU authorities would have a chance to observe the consequences. With close collaboration among the EU member states and both sides of the Atlantic, outbound investment screening has the potential of limiting the technology transfer to Chinese military-civilian companies.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore Here

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post Global Sanctions Dashboard: How sanctions will further squeeze the Russian economy in 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A welcome and necessary act of energy pragmatism

The Caribbean is suffering from the current energy crisis. Still dependent on heavy fuel oil and kerosene, high product prices translate to high electricity prices which undermine the competitiveness of Caribbean tourism and industry. One critical part of decarbonizing Caribbean energy and restoring energy security is enabling better access to natural gas, which helps provide cleaner electricity and cleaner fuels such as methanol and supports food security by producing ammonia for fertilizer. The Biden-Harris administration’s grant of a license to help Trinidad get access to Venezuelan gas, without a dime going to the Maduro regime, is a welcome and necessary act of energy pragmatism. Trinidad needs access to more gas as quickly as possible to produce liquefied natural gas (LNG) and clean fuels. Gas from new exploration could be seven to eight years in the future. The region needs a more secure supply of products now. And with Venezuela reviving the Petrocaribe agreement to again provide cheap loans for the sale of crude oil to its neighborhood, the United States needs to show it cares and can be relevant. Much more needs to be done to provide energy security to the Caribbean, but this license is a deft and critical first step.

—David Goldwyn is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and co-chair of the Caribbean Energy Working Group at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Caribbean Initiative. He is the president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy.

A win for the Caribbean while continuing to isolate the Maduro regime

The US green light for Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) to begin development of a gas field in Venezuelan waters is a much-welcome step forward for Caribbean energy security. The Caribbean faces enormous short- and long-term energy challenges and needs this gas for its people and its economies. It has again become clear while I’ve been here in T&T this week that the country is well-positioned to process this gas for export to its neighbors and beyond. In an increasingly uncertain world, the stability of the United States’ Caribbean neighbors and a robust US partnership is increasingly critical for US security interests.

Importantly, the US license and the T&T authorities have stipulated that no cash payments will go to the Maduro administration as part of the Dragon gas field development. The Maduro administration must not financially benefit from any transaction while it continues to perpetuate its violations of human rights and its prohibition of personal liberties or of the free and fair democratic will of the Venezuelan people. This new US license is a win for the Caribbean while still keeping Maduro financially isolated.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

What the agreement means for negotiations between Maduro and the opposition

There is no doubt that the new agreement will enhance the Caribbean’s energy-security policy, both the policy itself and the speed of its implementation, given other geopolitical factors including the recent announcements by the Maduro government to revive the PetroCaribe program with former Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia Félix Plasencia appointed to lead the revival. However, Venezuelan experts and political representatives have been cautious about this new sanction exception given that crucial details from the negotiation between Trinidad and Tobago and the Biden administration, as well as the negotiations with the Venezuelan government, are still unknown.

Venezuelans are wary in reaction to this news due to the local context and the developments of the negotiation process between the Maduro government and the opposition. The first humanitarian agreement signed between the two parties last November requires a complex process to be implemented. And the Maduro government has used this obstacle as an excuse to try to reconfigure the terrain for the future of the negotiations, which should move to a second phase—but without further sanction relaxation, this is unlikely to happen. Without sanctions relief, the Venezuelan government’s economic adjustment program will be shipwrecked, a result that is already being seen in the return of hyperinflation, innumerable salary protests, and the end of last year’s optimism. Today, the government seems to be aggressively armoring its position ahead of future negotiations by threatening to intervene in the National Electoral Council and proposing a new law to further restrict nongovernmental organizations.

Therefore, the agreement coincides with an unclear political climate, which may influence the public’s perception that the sanctions relief is geared toward US interests rather than a solution that can be contributed to negotiations in Venezuela.

—Colette Capriles is a member of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Working Group and a professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University.

The US delivers a major win for the Caribbean

US commitment to Caribbean energy security took a significant leap forward on Tuesday. Granting Trinidad and Tobago a license to develop the Dragon gas field is momentous for the country, and it creates endless opportunities across the region. In the short term, perhaps over the next half-decade, a portion of the gas will be used to service the energy needs of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Over a longer period, given the considerable oil and gas reserves Guyana and Suriname hold, the Caribbean is poised to become a globally competitive hydrocarbon player, potentially anchoring Caribbean energy security and meeting demand across the world. The license also opens the door to other gas fields bordering Dragon that Trinidad and Tobago can exploit over the next decade, which would provide the country and the region more time to facilitate its energy transition.  

For the United States, the timing is important. Granting the license finally brings a tangible deliverable to Caribbean nations after a year of promises and discussions. With the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) inter-sessional meeting just around the corner—where all Caribbean leaders will convene—the US-Caribbean energy cooperation will be front and center of the Community’s agenda.  

—Wazim Mowla is the associate director of the Caribbean Initiative at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Experts react: The US opens up Caribbean energy supplies with a sanctions exception for Venezuela. What does it mean for the region? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

​​​​​What you should know

• Brazil: The Supreme Court will investigate whether former President Jair Bolsonaro incited the January 8 attack on Congress and other government buildings in Brasilia.
• Peru: People—mainly from remote Andean regions—descended on the nation’s capital to protest against President Dina Boluarte in support of her predecessor and demand elections and structural change in the country.
• Trade: The value of goods exported from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) increased at an estimated rate of 18.8 percent in 2022, a downward trend from 27.8 percent in 2021, due to higher prices and low volumes.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

• Argentina: The government will buy back overseas bonds equivalent to over $1 billion to improve its debt profile, looking to send a positive signal to markets despite low reserves levels.
• Brazil: Vice President Alckmin said that Lula’s administration wants to remove a key tax on manufacturing and importing, the IPI, as part of a broader tax reform package. 
• Guyana: The government announced $43.4 billion in funding for a new natural gas power plant, alongside distribution infrastructure improvements, to promote business and development. 
• Multilaterals: During his inauguration, new Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) president Ilan Goldfajn announced three key priorities for the bank: social issues, climate change, and sustainable infrastructure. 
• Mexico: The 2023 North American Leaders Summit concluded with new agreements to promote sustainability, strengthen supply chains, and respond to migration. 
• Peru: The national statistics institute (INEI) said the economy expanded 1.7 percent year-on-year in November, marking a slight slowdown from the rise of 2.0 percent in October.

In focus: LAC in Davos

Latin American and Caribbean public- and private-sector leaders gathered alongside their counterparts from across the world in Davos, Switzerland, for this year’s Global Economic Forum. Colombia’s finance minister Jose Antonio Ocampo used the opportunity to push for a stronger agreement on minimum taxes for multinational companies. Brazil’s finance minister, Fernando Haddad, and environmental minister, Marina Silva, discussed Brazil’s positive economic outlook, environmental stewardship, and desire for regional integration. 

Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez also delivered a speech, in which he emphasized Spain’s role in building ties between Europe and Latin America, as Spain prepares to take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union later this year. 

Health + Innovation

• Vaccines: The Canadian government will donate $33.4 million to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) to increase access to COVID-19 immunizations for populations across the region. This donation is in addition to a prior contribution of $40 million in 2021.
• Belize: The country will celebrate 34 years of relations with Taiwan through the construction of a new general hospital in San Pedro.
• Nutrition: A new United Nations report found that 22.5 percent—or 131.3 million people—of the region’s population cannot afford a healthy diet, citing a country’s income level, the incidence of poverty, and level of inequality as contributing factors.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

• The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post Aviso LatAm: January 21, 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

​​​​​What you should know

• Brazil: On January 1, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as president for a third term after defeating incumbent Jair Bolsonaro.
• Outlook: According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), economic growth will continue to slow in 2023 and reach 1.3 percent.
• Venezuela: The opposition-led legislature dissolved the interim government led by Juan Guaidó. The vote signaled that members of the opposition had lost faith in Guaidó’s ability to oust Maduro. The United States will continue recognizing the 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

•  Brazil: In 2022, trade surplus reached a record high of $62.3 billion. Total exports also reached a 335 billion high, helped by a boost in prices in the agriculture and livestock sector.
• Argentina: The IMF disbursed a tranche of $6 billion from its $44 billion program with Argentina, citing positive indicators including falling inflation, a better trade balance, and foreign reserves. 
• Colombia: Minimum wage will increase by 16 percent this year, to $242.7 per month. President Petro said the move would boost an economy slowed by inflation. 
• Dominican Republic: The S&P upgraded the country’s credit rating from “BB-“ to “BB,” highlighting its strong recovery from the pandemic and long-term growth potential. 
• El Salvador: The government will receive a $150 million loan from the CAF development bank, designed to strengthen its education system in the wake of the pandemic.  
• Peru: The government launched a $1.6 billion plan to increase welfare and investment in regions gripped by protests following the ouster of former president Pedro Castillo. 

In focus: Nearshoring opportunities in the Americas

With the next North American Leaders Summit (NALS) set for this incoming week (January 9 and 10), nearshoring – the relocation of supply chains closer to the United States – is rising in importance.

Rising costs of and delays during shipping, coupled with the pandemic, have made businesses in the United States wary of relying on supply chains across the Pacific. As a result, some 400 companies explored reshoring to Mexico from Asia in 2022. Mexico’s manufacturing sector is now larger than it was before the pandemic, and Mexican exports to the United States have rapidly increased. Firms such as Walmart have already relocated some business to Mexico, while Tesla is planning a new factory in northern Mexico. NALS will pay particular attention to the electric vehicle production chain in North America.

Health + Innovation

• Chile: In an effort to curb the spread of the BF.7 COVID-19 subvariant, travelers coming from China are now required to show a negative PCR test.
• Haiti: Over 14,700 suspected cholera cases have been reported since December. Nine in every ten cases are from areas hit hard by food insecurity.
• PAHO: Most countries in LAC invest less than the minimum 6 percent of GDP in health and allocate less than 30 percent of the health budget to the first level of care as recommended by the regional health organization.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

• The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post Aviso LatAm: January 7, 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. Why did Biden expand the parole program to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti?

Putting in place the tools for a more orderly asylum process at the US-Mexico border is pivotal with the surge in encounters. Today’s announcement of an expansion of the Venezuela parole program to Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Haitians will hopefully help to dissuade asylum seekers from risking their lives to make the trek north. 

In October and November 2022, more Cubans (sixty-five thousand) and Nicaraguans (fifty-five thousand) arrived at the southwest border than in fiscal years 2020 and 2021 combined. The twelve thousand Haitian arrivals in those two months amount to one fifth of their total fiscal 2022 arrivals. 

But people won’t stop leaving while they have little hope for a better life in their own countries. That is the case in Cuba (where inflation is soaring and repression escalating), Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua (where democratic freedoms no longer exist), Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela (with its own soaring inflation and repression), and gang-controlled Haiti. So border policies must be accompanied by new US and partner country strategies to improve livelihoods in these migrants’ countries of origin. And the United States must hold those like Ortega accountable for his actions to weaponize migration by doing things such as lifting the visa requirement for Cubans in order to more easily facilitate passage to the United States. 

But the border is about more than migration. It is a vital source of commerce that promotes the creation of US jobs. Our recent work shows that just a ten-minute reduction in border wait times could have a $5.4 million annual impact on the US economy and create nearly nineteen thousand jobs in Mexico. Greater commerce translates into greater security as well. Economic growth creates jobs, making it less desirable to leave home. It is absolutely achievable to have a border that is more secure and more efficiently promotes commerce. That should be the goal.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. What impact will this have at the border?

Biden’s visit to the border ahead of the North American Leaders Summit next week is an important step toward the amelioration of a crisis that has long afflicted the US-Mexico border. Smart border policies that streamline crossing processes not only benefit issues around migration, but also help decongest communities that are regularly choked by vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

Initiatives such as the New Migration Enforcement Process for Venezuelans have already decreased the percentage of attempted migrant crossings by nearly 90 percent. The expansion of such programs to additional groups could have similar effects, thus alleviating burdens on the health care and sanitation industries, among others.

Additionally, as border agencies utilize their resources to confront surges in pedestrian traffic, wait times for vehicles exponentially increase. Subsequent carbon emissions deteriorate the air quality around ports of entry, directly affecting the health outcomes of local communities. Further, vehicles waiting in line for miles constrict local mobility, hindering residents’ ability to travel back and forth between school, work, hospitals, and more.

It is important to keep people at the center of border policy, and initiatives that aim to enhance secure and efficient crossings should be celebrated by not only the United States and Mexico but the region as a whole.

—Ignacia Ulloa Peters is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

3. Will Biden’s plan work?

The Biden administration’s announcement that it will surge resources to the southwest US border and speed up processing for asylum applicants is a most welcome response to the extraordinary surge of people from troubled countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Nothing will satisfy some critics, but those who support security, economic prosperity, values, and the US history of welcoming refugees from troubled lands should see today’s announcement as good news.

One absolute essential is the need for additional resources and personnel to make this plan work. The administration needs to send Congress an urgent supplemental budget request and to invoke some of the president’s extraordinary authorities to get additional personnel at the border to achieve the goal of making definitive, binding determinations of asylum eligibility in days, not weeks. The administration needs additional resources to (1) integrate legitimate asylees and their families to make important social and economic contributions to US society or (2) return ineligible people to a place of safety under existing laws. The administration and Congress now need to put forward the resources needed to satisfy US values, security, and prosperity. This would be historic, and it is achievable.

—Thomas Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

4. What should happen next?

The American people have a right to expect secure borders. Crucial to this is a fair, orderly, and efficient process for those seeking to come and for determining who may stay. Unfortunately, the United States’ current system is utterly broken, and this is particularly true of the asylum system—weighed down by a 1.6 million-case backlog, with each case taking years to resolve. This has encouraged thousands with marginal claims to make dangerous journeys to the US border every month, expecting that the United States will not only let them in but also allow them to stay and work during the years it will take for their asylum claims to be resolved.

The measures announced today by Biden are the latest in a series of efforts aimed at gaining control over this untenable situation—establishing orderly processes for those with legitimate asylum claims; providing opportunity for those desiring to escape repressive or criminal regimes in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, or Haiti; and working with Mexico and other nations to strengthen enforcement against those choosing not to use these legal processes and, instead, trying to sneak in.  

These are excellent steps, but band-aids. Congress needs to get involved—not only to provide the resources and legal fixes needed to expedite the resolution of asylum claims and better secure the border, but also to reform the immigration system more broadly, giving lawful status to those who have been here a while, expanding lawful channels for those wanting to come, and creating more efficient mechanisms for employers to hire the workers the US economy needs. Biden and Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas deserve great credit for muddling through with the limited tools they have, but to truly get control of the border, Congress needs to put politics aside and fix the broken system.

—Seth Stodder is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and a former assistant US secretary of homeland security for borders, immigration, and trade policy.

The post Biden just tightened US migration policy. Can he calm the surge at the border? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While many countries are still on the rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic, new crises—and their effects—are emerging, and are expected to continue into the next year. From global inflation to a costly energy crisis, and from food insecurity to new political shifts, how can the region meet changing dynamics head-on? And how might risks turn into opportunities as we enter a highly consequential 2023?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll to see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might new regional collaboration take shape across Latin America and the Caribbean with a wave of new leaders? What decision points might shape government policy? Will Bitcoin continue to see the light of day in El Salvador? Are the harmful economic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the rearview mirror for the region, or is the worse yet to come? Will China’s new foreign policy ambition translate to closer relations with LAC?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

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The post What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up appeared first on Atlantic Council.

​​​​​What you should know

• Peru: President Castillo was ousted by lawmakers after he sought to dissolve Congress ahead of an impeachment vote.
• Brazil: The Economy Ministry rejected assertions by President-elect Lula’s transition team that Bolsonaro’s outgoing administration was leaving government finances “bankrupt.”
• Social outlook: A recent Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report projects that by the end of 2022, LAC will have 201 million people living in poverty – an increase of 15 million compared to the pre-pandemic situation.
• ICYMI: On December 7, the Atlantic Council launched a paper on improving tax policy in LAC. Read it here.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

• Argentina: signed a new information-sharing agreement with the US designed to root out tax evasion. It could increase tax revenue for Argentina by $1 billion US.
• Barbados: concluded new funding arrangements with the IMF, $113 million US to continue its fiscal reform package and $189 million US towards its climate change response.
• Brazil: President-elect Lula announced that Fernando Haddad, former minister of education and mayor of São Paulo, would be his finance minister.
• Mexico: announced that additional consultations on the USMCA energy dispute would be held through early January, to ensure continued investment and confidence.
• Peru: was placed under a state of emergency after protests gripped the country. Political upheaval led S&P to lower the country’s economic outlook to “negative.”
• Transatlantic relations: Argentina called for reviewing the potential EU-Mercosur trade agreement, highlighting threats to local auto industry and barriers to agricultural exports.
• Uruguay: criticized Mercosur’s inaction on trade agreements with large economies, drawing criticism for its own independent negotiations with China and to join the TPP.

In focus: Guyana’s carbon credits

Guyana is the first country to issue carbon credits designed to prevent forest loss and the first under the ART’s REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard to ensure integrity and independent verification. The Hess Corporation, which is a partner in an oil consortium led by ExxonMobil that operates in Guyana, will purchase $750 million US of these credits. This move reflects how resilient growth, balancing between the opportunities in the energy sector and protecting its valuable environment, has become a priority in light of climate change and stresses like the COVID-19 pandemic.

These credits will support Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy, with 15 percent of the revenues set aside for indigenous communities. With some 18 million hectares of forest, Guyana is a major carbon sink, and has previously worked with Norway to protect this resource. The new credits reflect Guyana’s status as a “High Forest, Low Deforestation” country, another first.

Health + Innovation

• Argentina: Transport Ministry officials recommended all passengers travelling on public transportation to return to wearing face-masks amid a spike in COVID-19 cases.
• Universal Health Day: The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) director called on the region to redouble efforts towards achieving universal health as they begin to rebuild from the pandemic.
• Mexico: The state of Nuevo Leon reintroduced the mandatory use of face masks in closed public spaces as the number of COVID-19 infections and other respiratory diseases rise.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

• The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post Aviso LatAm: December 17, 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

​​​​​What you should know

• Economic outlook: The head of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) said that the region’s stagnation is ”worse than the 1980s” due to weak investment, low productivity, and inadequate education.
• Mexico: Remittances sent from workers abroad surpassed $5.35 billion in October, beating economists’ forecast on US job strength.
• #ProactiveLAC: On Wednesday, December 7, the Atlantic Council will host a virtual conversation on LAC’s economic outlook, fiscal policy, and small and medium-sized enterprises in uncertain times. Register here.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

• Argentina: Upcoming legislation is set to encourage investment in its liquified natural gas sector, as demand, driven by the war in Ukraine, continues to grow. 
• Bolivia: The country lowered its 2023 growth forecast from 5.1 to 4.8 percent, as an ongoing strike in Santa Cruz has led to over $780 million in losses.  
• Chile: During the recent high-level dialogue with the United States covering migration and sustainable development, both parties agreed to relaunch their bilateral Science, Technology, and Innovation Council. 
• Dominican Republic: The United States will block sugar imports from Central Romana, the Caribbean nation’s largest employer, accusing it of using forced labor. 
• Ecuador: The government is considering a new financing deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 2023, as its current agreement is set to expire at the end of 2022.  
• Guyana: According to new ECLAC data, the country recorded the highest FDI growth in the Caribbean in 2021, and now accounts for half of all Caribbean FDI, thanks to its booming hydrocarbon sector.  
• Peru: Farmers and truckers set up roadblocks to protest rising gas and fertilizer prices, driven up by the war in Ukraine.  
• FDI: In a 2022 ECLAC report, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) rose by 40.7 percent in 2021 but fell short to achieve pre-pandemic levels.

In focus: Venezuelan thaw

Last weekend, the United States granted Chevron a six-month license to expand operations in Venezuela after the Maduro government agreed to resume talks in Mexico City with the country’s opposition. The two sides signed an agreement to use frozen Venezuelan assets for humanitarian relief as well.  

The United States has framed this policy shift as a “targeted” response to promote “concrete steps” forward by the parties meeting in Mexico City. At the same time, the energy crisis driven by Russia’s war in Ukraine has elevated Maduro’s–-and Venezuela’s –-importance in a time of rising oil demand.  

Health + Innovation

• ICYMI: On November 16, the Atlantic Council launched a report with actionable recommendations for improving immunization program outcomes and financing in the region. Read it here.
• Uruguay: Health authorities issued a recommendation that immunocompromised patients and over 50 year-olds should take their fifth dose of the COVID-19 vaccine.
• Food insecurity: An ECLAC report found that 56.5 million people in LAC are impacted by hunger.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

• The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

The post Aviso LatAm: December 3, 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s next for Venezuela? What’s behind the US decision? Our experts drill down on the details.

Jump to an expert reaction:

Jason Marczak: There’s a light at the end of the tunnel for Maduro—but only if he follows through on reform

Iria Puyosa: A win for both Maduro and the opposition, but with strings attached

Érika Rodríguez: What the Venezuelan negotiations mean to Colombia—and the wider region

Diego Area: The evolution of Florida politics helps explain Biden’s shift

There’s a light at the end of the tunnel for Maduro—but only if he follows through on reform

The long-awaited Biden administration decision to peel back oil-sector sanctions is reflective of the new reality in Venezuela. It comes three years after the Trump administration halted all drilling activities as part of a maximum pressure campaign designed to force political change. Maduro, of course, still remains in power, but a new willingness to sit down with the opposition Unitary Platform has now opened the door for limited sanctions relief.

Two important steps to ease the suffering of the Venezuelan people, although still insufficient, provide hope that the country may be turning a corner: 

1. The announcement of a joint agreement between the Unitary Platform and the Maduro government asking the United Nations (UN) to administer a humanitarian relief program. The program would draw on the approximately three billion dollars in frozen Venezuelan assets that could only be unlocked with agreement by the opposition. 
2. The resumption of far-reaching political and humanitarian negotiations in Mexico City—stalled for the past year—that include discussions on the 2024 Venezuelan elections. 

Why is this happening now? For one, although Maduro has historically used negotiations to stall, without any intention of agreement, this time may be different. The interim government—a US-backed parallel entity led by Juan Guaidó that has failed to provide a viable alternative to Maduro—will cease to exist come January, providing further incentive for a recalibrating opposition to ease up on some of its demands. But the opposition still holds the key to billions of dollars in frozen Venezuelan assets abroad.

For Maduro, who only weeks ago was shaking hands at a UN-sponsored gathering (the climate-change summit, COP27) for the first time in years, the global energy crisis and the renewed focus on containing Russia are twin developments that make him less of a global outlier. He will want to capitalize on that momentum in a bid to get sanctions removed.

Two months ago, seven wrongly detained Americans finally returned home, though more still unfairly languish behind bars in Venezuela.*

Although severely dilapidated, Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but with production at less than a quarter of what it was a decade ago. In the years to come, and with significant investments, that oil will play a role in alleviating energy pressures.

US domestic politics generally play a role in its policy toward the Western Hemisphere. And Venezuela is no exception. Following the midterms, the clear shift in Florida politics provides political space for the easing of oil-related sanctions. Now that Florida is a reliably Republican state, US policy no longer needs to revolve around the more hard-line interests of voters in the state that is home to over half of Venezuelan immigrants in the United States.

What should we look out for? The US Treasury Department’s issuance of General License 41 is meant to show Maduro that sanctions relief is possible when it makes concrete agreements—that are then monitored and upheld—with the opposition. But the license is only for six months and is limited in scope. Sanctions can also be snapped back at any point. This shows Maduro that there is a light at the end of the tunnel, but that light can be quickly extinguished if he does not act in good faith. 

So expect close scrutiny of progress at the negotiation table. In addition, the UN humanitarian relief agreement is a verbal one. If it falls apart in the details, then the re-imposition of sanctions is likely. But if progress continues to be made, the continued easing of oil and other sanctions—first imposed in 2006—is possible.

—Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A win for both Maduro and the opposition, but with strings attached

At the beginning of 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States approached the Maduro regime for direct talks centered on the liberation of US citizens held as political hostages in Caracas and easing US sanctions to enable Chevron to reactivate its oil operations in Venezuela. These direct talks were widely interpreted as a shift of US policy, which had supported the interim government, headed by Juan Guaidó, as the legitimate Venezuelan government.

Nonetheless, now we are observing a great deal of coordination between the Biden administration and the Venezuelan Unitary Platform. The return to the Norway-mediated negotiations was choreographed alongside granting the US Treasury license to allow Chevron to resume operations in Venezuela. Obviously, the license was the carrot to get Maduro’s delegation to the table for negotiating electoral conditions on the path toward the country’s democratization.

The negotiations also came with the announcement of a fiduciary fund comprising Venezuelan resources frozen abroad that United Nations agencies will administer. The agreement will allow funds protected abroad to be invested in programs supporting health care, food distribution, and electrical infrastructure. The nearly three-billion-dollar fund is not humanitarian aid but Venezuelan assets that will be reinvested in the country within three years. The possibility of using these funds for social investment is undoubtedly an achievement of the interim government’s asset-protection policy. That’s real good for a “lame duck,” since the interim government is expected to end in 2023.

As can be foretold when dealing with masters of propaganda, the Maduro regime is spinning the agreement as if it recovered Venezuelan assets that foreign governments arbitrarily retained. Moreover, the regime is heralding the complete end of sanctions and advertising the Venezuelan recovery. In fact, Maduro and his party desperately need foreign investment, and they are betting on European companies to ask for their licenses to resume operations in Venezuela.

Nonetheless, the Office of Foreign Assets Control license for Chevron’s operations in Venezuela is more restrictive than was anticipated by oil-market analysts. It includes some constraints that will make it cumbersome for Maduro to seize profit. The terms also prohibit Chevron from making transactions involving goods and services from Iran and Russia, which are currently the main partners of the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Of major political significance is that the license is valid for six months. Its renewal can be contingent on Maduro’s acceptance of conditions for free and fair elections and advancement in human rights. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), immediately warned that if Maduro fails to comply with negotiations, the United States must snap back sanctions to their full force.

Besides, oil experts indicate that it would take Chevron two or three years to recover the fields managed by its joint ventures. Coincidently, the next Venezuelan presidential and legislative elections are due two and three years from now. Indeed, sanctions relief, political negotiations, and electoral calendars can be nicely tied.

The Unitary Platform has been cautious about claiming a political victory for returning to Norwegian-mediated negotiations. Indeed, there is a long history of previous negotiations broken by Chavismo. But this time could be different. Communicating to the Venezuelan population the importance of these advances on the road to democratization would give the Unitary Platform more significant political clout. Of course, the Venezuelan information ecosystem, characterized by censorship and misinformation, poses severe obstacles to the communication of the process and its progress. This is a challenge that the Unitary Platform must overcome.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

What the Venezuelan negotiations mean to Colombia—and the wider region

For Colombian President Gustavo Petro, redefining his country’s relationship with Venezuela has been a priority. He has sought a leading role in international support for the return to the negotiating table in Mexico.

When French President Emmanuel Macron hosted delegates from the Venezuelan government and the opposition in Paris on November 11, Petro was in attendance as well—a strategic move designed to make visible his support for the dialogue. He had so much interest that he even made the mistake of getting out ahead of the official announcement of a return to negotiations with his own statement.

Despite this, it is remarkable that he spoke so clearly at the Miraflores Palace in Caracas during a landmark November 1 visit about the need for the country to return to democracy and the standards that it must have.

For Colombia, the previous government’s strategy of closing the borders and cutting off the dialogue between the two countries has been costly and counterproductive. On the border of more than 1,300 miles between Venezuela and Colombia, the structural challenges have deepened without either of the two countries having the capacity to manage them on their own. The National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas (who have fought Colombia’s government for decades) have become binational, criminal groups have consolidated and started trafficking migrants, and commercial and political opportunities have disappeared. Business leaders and the population living between the two countries demanded the opening of the border—which finally happened in September after being shut off for seven years. Venezuela had become a stumbling block for Colombia’s internal politics, diminishing the quality of the political debate and harming regional integration.

Now, with Petro’s normalization push, things are shifting. Venezuela is now playing host and guarantor to negotiations between Colombia’s government and the ELN guerrillas that launched a few days ago. 

But the beginning of a new phase for the region will have to go far beyond any talks in Mexico. The governments of this new cycle of the Latin American left should begin a dialogue and seek joint answers on how to provide better treatment and protection to Venezuelan migrants who have resettled in their countries. If these governments are proclaiming a return to social welfare policy, let it be for everyone.

—Érika Rodríguez is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, a member of the Center’s Venezuela Working Group, and a special advisor for Latin American affairs to the high representative and vice president of the European Commission.

The evolution of Florida politics helps explain Biden’s shift

The Biden administration’s decision to ease sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector prioritizes US geostrategic interests over domestic political pressure. Hard-line anti-socialist Latinos in Florida have historically played an outsized role influencing US policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. But after a Republican sweep in the midterm elections, Florida—once seen as key to securing the presidency—is now considered a Republican stronghold rather than a swing state. The global energy crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Latin America’s turn against incumbents, electing a new wave of leftist leaders, are added factors that led to this change of policy.

The announcement made by the US Treasury Department came after months of secret talks in Caracas negotiating a UN-managed humanitarian deal that would unlock around three billion dollars in frozen assets abroad for health, infrastructure, and education programs.

Now that Maduro’s and the opposition’s delegations are officially back to the negotiation table in Mexico and with a new Republican-led US House of Representatives, we can expect a spike of scrutiny over the administration’s policy toward Venezuela in 2023. The new House leadership will likely organize hearings and draft new legislation seeking to delay and handcuff any potential easing of the more hard-line policy toward the country. The new Congress should work on an updated bipartisan framework for democratic transition in Venezuela that defines a clear path to achieve the conditions for free and fair elections in 2024, an independent electoral process and judicial institutions, freedom of expression, the unconditional release of political prisoners, and respect for human rights.

—Diego Area is the deputy director for strategic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A previous version of this article inaccurately stated that all wrongly detained Americans were returned home from Venezuela this fall.

The post Experts react: As the US eases oil sanctions, is Venezuela coming in from the cold? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 23, Christopher Preble co-hosted a new iteration of the Net Assessment podcast in the War on the Rocks network about the Summit of the Americas.

By all accounts, the Summit was poorly organized, and attending leaders were unimpressed with the lack of consultation before the event and with the initiatives set forth by the US during the conference. Does the planning and execution of the Summit tell us anything about the Biden administration’s foreign policy more broadly? What should our policies towards Central and South American countries be? And are President Biden and his team unwilling to make hard choices in foreign policy because the decisions will be unpopular with important domestic constituencies?

More about our expert

Former staff

Christopher Preble

Former Co-Director, New American Engagement Initiative

New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Preble on Net Assessment: Is Biden’s approach to Latin America a problem? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

24 de mayo de 2022 – Hoy, las mujeres de la Red de Apoyo, activistas sociales, actores políticos democráticos y organizaciones no gubernamentales dentro y fuera de Venezuela y quienes suscriben la presente declaración, proponen un plan de acción conjunto, y en sintonía con la resolución 1325 del Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de Naciones Unidas, para exigir la garantía de la participación plena y efectiva de las mujeres venezolanas en los procesos de toma de decisiones y en su liderazgo en la redemocratización y cambio político sostenible en Venezuela.

En el marco de la primera “Cumbre de Mujeres por Venezuela,” un encuentro organizado por el Centro para América Latina Adrienne Arsht del Atlantic Council y la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello con el apoyo del Gobierno de Canadá, este grupo de mujeres presenta una propuesta de acciones que buscan avanzar concretamente hacia la redemocratización con una visión plural, amplia, paritaria e igualitaria de Venezuela y que tiene como firmes objetivos:

• Garantizar la participación plena y efectiva de las mujeres y expandir significativamente su representación en la política, la sociedad civil y todos los espacios de poder y decisiones en el camino hacia la reinstitucionalización en Venezuela;
• Asegurar que la agenda política incluya una perspectiva de derechos, de género e interseccional en las estructuras de liderazgo, en las políticas públicas y todas las instancias de toma de decisiones.

En función de estos objetivos, quienes respaldan esta declaración, se comprometen a promover, acompañar y avanzar en las siguientes acciones en el plazo de un año, a más tardar el 24 de mayo de 2023:

Propuesta de Acciones Iniciales

1. Exigir a las juntas directivas de los partidos políticos que garanticen el liderazgo igualitario de las mujeres en las decisiones políticas incorporando propuestas programáticas específicas que deben ser incluidas como parte del proceso de renovación de estos partidos y la democracia en Venezuela.
2. Elaborar un reglamento modelo dentro de estos partidos que asegure la inclusión y el liderazgo femenino, así como la igualdad, la no discriminación y eliminación de todo tipo de violencia por razones de género, y crear un grupo de trabajo encargado de implementar, monitorear y dar seguimiento a este reglamento.
3. Agrupar y coordinar movimientos de mujeres, dentro de Venezuela y en la diáspora, con sectores y partidos políticos comprometidos con principios democráticos, la sociedad civil y aliados internacionales para promover las reivindicaciones de las mujeres venezolanas.
4. Establecer mecanismos de monitoreo y seguimiento de la participación igualitaria y la perspectiva de género en todos los procesos de diálogo, negociación y construcción de acuerdos con representación de la diversidad de sectores políticos, económicos y sociales.
5. Liderar acciones afirmativas de incidencia ante la comunidad internacional para impulsar los objetivos de esta declaración.

Se comprometen en avanzar estas acciones las siguientes personas y entidades: 

Declaration for gender equality in the process of building democracy and peace in Venezuela

May 24, 2022 – Today, the women of the “Red de Apoyo,” social activists, democratic political actors and non-governmental organizations inside and outside Venezuela, and those who subscribe to this declaration, propose a joint plan of action, and in tune with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, to demand the guarantee of full and effective participation of Venezuelan women in decision-making processes and in their leadership in the redemocratization and sustainable political change in Venezuela.

In the framework of the first “Venezuela Women’s Leadership Summit,” a meeting organized by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council and the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello with the support of the Government of Canada, this group of women presented a proposal of actions that seek to advance towards redemocratization with a plural, broad, balanced, and egalitarian vision of Venezuela, with the following objectives:

• To guarantee the full and effective participation of women and significantly expand their representation in politics, civil society and all spaces of power and decision-making on the road to reinstitutionalization in Venezuela;
• Ensure that the political agenda includes rights, gender, and intersectional perspective in leadership structures, public policies, and all decision-making bodies.

Based on these objectives, those who endorse this declaration, commit to promote, accompany, and advance the following actions within one year, no later than May 24, 2023.

Proposal for initial actions

1. Demand that the boards of directors of political parties guarantee the equal leadership of women in political decisions by incorporating specific programmatic proposals that must be included as part of the renewal process of these parties and democracy in Venezuela.
2. Elaborate a model regulation within these parties that ensures female inclusion and leadership, as well as equality, non-discrimination, and elimination of all types of gender-based violence, and create a workgroup in charge of implementing, monitoring, and following up on this regulation.
3. Bring together and coordinate women’s movements, within Venezuela and in the diaspora, with political sectors and parties committed to democratic principles, civil society, and international allies to promote the demands of Venezuelan women.
4. Establish mechanisms to monitor and follow up on equal participation and the gender perspective in all processes of dialogue, negotiation, and building of agreements with representation from the diversity of political, economic, and social sectors.
5. Lead affirmative advocacy actions before the international community to promote the objectives of this declaration.

The following individuals and entities are committed to advancing these actions:

Individuos / Individuals

Organizaciones / Organizations

Apoya la propuesta de acciones iniciales como resultado de la Cumbre de Mujeres por Venezuela y suscríbete en el formulario:

El Centro para América Latina Adrienne Arsht amplía la comprensión de las transformaciones regionales y propone soluciones constructivas para informar como los sectores públicos y privados pueden promover la prosperidad en el hemisferio.

Entienda más

The post Declaración por la igualdad de género en el proceso de construcción de la democracia y la paz en Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In February 2021, the Atlantic Council hosted a virtual roundtable for its Red de Apoyo project to discuss how Venezuelan women leaders could learn from women organizers during the 1970s and 1980s dictatorships in South America’s Southern Cone. Led by experts Francesca Lessa of the University of Oxford and Tamara Taraciuk of Human Rights Watch’s Americas Division, Red de Apoyo participants analyzed key differences between the cases of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay and potential lessons learned for Venezuela today.

Both experts emphasized that women’s participation in restoring democracy was not a tangential topic to be discussed in isolation from national efforts led by the majority-men political elite. Rather, women’s participation must be a central component in rebuilding institutions that reflect a more diverse, just, and equal society. Both speakers also highlighted the important task of triangulating between domestic institutions, foreign institutions, and multilateral institutions to achieve tangible policy outcomes. This triangulation serves to amplify existing women-led advocacy at the local level and galvanize action from influential stakeholders.

From the Southern Cone case studies, the Red de Apoyo members received the following actionable recommendations to implement in their role as democratic political leaders and civil society activists:

1. Collect and document information as evidence of crimes committed by the Maduro government;
2. Organize social mobilization activities including marches and protests;
3. Assemble networks of activists at the national and transnational level to change public policy;
4. Collaborate with academics and scientists in pro-democracy work;
5. Practice strategic litigation of human rights cases in front of national and foreign courts;
6. Present petitions and complaints in front of international institutions and non-governmental organizations;
7. Share best practices and exchange experiences within and outside networks in Venezuela;
8. Engage with foreign governments and raise awareness about human rights violations to influence foreign policy;
9. Use social media to enhance the objectives above; and
10. Use subnational engagement (state, municipal, and local) outreach to enhance the objectives above.

Given the recommendations outlined above for Venezuelan democratic leaders, US policymakers should consider responding through the following policy actions:

• Establish a bicameral congressional working group on Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis that elevates the evidence of crimes committed by the Maduro government to other international actors;
• Invite Venezuelan female democratic leaders to participate in briefings for the above working group;
• Facilitate meetings during working group events for Venezuelan female democratic leaders and international academics, civil society leaders, and leaders of multilateral organizations;
• Secure funding to support capacity-building efforts led on-the-ground in Venezuela; and
• To the extent permitted by Foreign Agents Registration Act, utilize the working group platform to draw media attention to strategic litigation efforts, petitions, and complaints that Venezuelan democratic activists are undertaking independently.

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The post Red de Apoyo: Venezuelan women today can learn from women leaders who fought dictatorships in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In April 2022, the Atlantic Council hosted a virtual roundtable for its Red de Apoyo project to discuss how Venezuelan women leaders could learn from Colombian women’s leadership leading up to and during the 2016 Colombian Peace Accords. Led by experts Marina Gallego of the Colombian NGO Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres and Selene Soto of the international NGO Women’s Link, Red de Apoyo participants analyzed key similarities and differences between the Colombian conflict and the Venezuelan crisis. 

Both experts emphasized that women’s participation in the Colombian peace process was crucial to its political viability, particularly through institutionalized venues like the peace process’s sub-commission on gender. The Colombian peace process highlighted the essential role of women in promoting long-term political and social stability and included women from each conflicting party. As part of the reconciliation process, Colombian women held thematic forums, a women’s summit, sent proposals to the negotiation table between the government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), secured female participation in the country’s Truth Commission, and strengthened ties with the international community. 

From the Colombian case study, the Red de Apoyo members identified the following actionable recommendations to implement in their role as democratic political leaders and civil society activists:

1. Disaggregate the population of women whose needs they are advocating for and trying to serve. Acknowledge the socioeconomic and/or racial diversity that exists within Venezuela’s women.
2. Consider how different constituencies of women may have different policy needs during a peace or transition process and create tailored policies to address marginalized groups.
3. Depoliticize, to the extent possible, the conversations or organizations surrounding the defense of human rights, and advocate for the increased presence of women in leadership roles.
4. Engage male leaders in politics and civil society to establish a consistent channel of communication and advocacy for female inclusion in peace negotiations. 
5. Work together with male leaders in politics and civil society to create a shared gender-based agenda for peace that prioritizes women’s policy needs. 

Given the recommendations outlined above for Venezuelan democratic leaders, US policymakers should consider responding through the following policy actions: 

1. Work with international allies to create forums for conducive dialogue between male and female democratic leaders in Venezuela and the diaspora.
2. Legitimize negotiation tables that include women from all sides of the political spectrum through international recognition and support.
3. Send congressional delegations composed of US female lawmakers from different ideological and ethnic backgrounds to Venezuela for bilateral trust-building discussions with the Maduro government’s senior female leaders and female leaders from the democratic opposition. 
4. Encourage male democratic politicians in Venezuela to meet with and incorporate feedback from their female counterparts by making this a precondition of meeting with senior US officials.

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The post Red de Apoyo: Lessons from the Colombian peace process for Venezuelan female democratic leaders  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Staff

Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

The post Marczak quoted in the Boston Globe on using oil as leverage to restore democracy in Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Last week, UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ann Linde joined us for two #ACFrontPage events, followed by a conversation with commander of US Space Command General James H. Dickinson and Venezuela experts to discuss the social, economic, and geopolitical impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

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AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT – UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss joined the Atlantic Council for the 2022 Christopher J. Makins Lecture for a special conversation about the British and Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

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Russia’s invasion and geopolitical implications for Venezuela: Oil, sanctions, and aid

As the Kremlin’s invasion rattles energy markets and the US moves forward with banning Russian oil, US and European policymakers explore solutions to increase global oil supply and mitigate transatlantic energy dependency on Russia. On March 5, senior US government officials met with the Nicolás Maduro administration in Caracas, Venezuela.

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The post AC Selects: War in Ukraine: Perspectives from the UK, Sweden, Venezuela, and US appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

• Introduction
• Why the United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq should not be replicated
• Unpacking the Oil for Venezuela proposal
• An assessment of the Boston Group Proposal
• Recommendations
• Conclusion
• Acknowledgments

Introduction

The humanitarian crisis in Venezuela reached unprecedented levels in 2021. In state-dependent and oil-dependent Venezuela, mismanagement and corruption in the Nicolás Maduro administration, as well as the loss in income from oil sales, has accelerated the existing economic crisis and deepened humanitarian suffering. According to the latest National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI), 95 percent of Venezuela’s twenty-eight million citizens live in poverty, while 77 percent live in extreme poverty—a 10-percent increase from last year. Despite an increasing dollarization of its economy and multiple currency reconversions by the Maduro administration, Venezuela’s annual inflation reached 1,743 percent.

The health and economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic, compounded by nationwide fuel shortages, continue to worsen the country’s multidimensional crisis, especially for Venezuelans living off a $2.50 minimum monthly wage. According to UNICEF data collected between 2019 and 2020, 32 percent of Venezuelan households are food insufficient, 40 percent of households have recurrent interruptions in water service, 25 percent of households do not have sustainable access to potable water, the under-five mortality rate is 24.2 per thousand live births, and maternal deaths have ballooned to such alarming numbers that statistics are no longer publicly disclosed. Amid such suffering, almost six million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015.

Efforts by the international community to alleviate Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis—namely, the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)—have been commendable. However, contributions are lacking in both speed and size. Only 29 percent of the $700 million allocated for 2021 under the HRP has been executed (the execution rate was 24 percent in 2020 and 34 percent in 2019). Even a full execution of the allocated funds would be insufficient for a crisis that humanitarian experts say requires multiple billions of dollars in humanitarian aid.

Into this gap enter oil-funded humanitarian frameworks. Such frameworks could provide sustained humanitarian relief without requiring the time-consuming and bureaucratic allocation of funds from the United Nations (UN). An important benefit of an oil-funded program is the continued presence of compliant, accountable, and transparent Western firms in the Venezuelan oil sector. Providing mechanisms for Western and allied operators to remain in Venezuela can also help to maintain and rebuild critical infrastructure for Venezuela’s long-term economic development. In the short term, an oil-funded mechanism could help European gas operators continue supplying natural gas inside Venezuela, guaranteeing reliable electricity, cooking gas, and fuel for medical and goods delivery for the local population.

Before they were paused by Maduro following the extradition of Alex Saab to the United States, the Norway-mediated negotiations between the Venezuelan democratic platform and Maduro representatives in Mexico City offered an opportunity to build political agreements necessary for an oil-funded humanitarian framework. The negotiations are not a permanent space for reaching agreements, but the trust that can be generated among political factions can unlock the political support that a well-structured, transparent, and effective humanitarian mechanism would require.

To date, two public efforts by separate entities have proposed oil-funded humanitarian frameworks leveraging Venezuela’s crude-oil proceeds to purchase aid. Both proposals attempted to mold frameworks for Venezuela taking into account lessons learned from the failed UN-managed Oil-for-Food program in Iraq, another heavily sanctioned country with corruption-related challenges. The first proposal originates from Oil for Venezuela, a foundation led by Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez. The second originates from the Boston Group, a nonpartisan policy platform with members across Venezuela’s political spectrum, oil-industry experts, and civil-society groups.

This policy brief is an effort by the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Working Group (VWG) to analyze the two existing oil-funded humanitarian proposals on Venezuela, and provide recommendations for future humanitarian proposals’ governance structure, financing mechanisms, transparency controls, political agreements, legal requirements, and multilateral participation to achieve the most optimal possible outcome for the Venezuelan people.

Note from the VWG: The VWG and the Atlantic Council do not seek to sponsor or promote any of the humanitarian programs and proposals under study. The VWG is aware of other private efforts to devise and promote oil-funded frameworks for Venezuela and restore fuel swaps, but for this publication, the VWG considered only the two public humanitarian proposals. As part of this process, the VWG held multiple meetings and consultations with the US government, members of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, international and multilateral organizations, and private-sector actors in Venezuela. The authors also note that further analysis is required, especially surrounding the nuances of international humanitarian agencies’ and nongovernmental organizations’ administration and distribution of humanitarian aid in Venezuela. This analysis will be considered for future VWG programming.

Why the United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq should not be replicated: Lessons for Venezuela

In 1995, the adverse humanitarian effects of the UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iraq led to the implementation of exceptions to authorize oil exports to fund humanitarian aid, particularly food, in a program known as Oil-for-Food.

The implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq was based on the UNSC’s authority. UNSC Resolution 986 (995), authorized “the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto. For that purpose, after years of negotiations, the UNSC and Saddam Hussein’s government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1996. The two main components of the MOU were that the UNSC would oversee the oil imports, procurement of goods to satisfy humanitarian needs, and the distribution of those goods; and that the Iraqi government would conduct all the transactions related to oil purchase agreements, procurement, and distribution.

According to the UN, some 3.4 “billion barrels of Iraqi oil valued at about $65 billion were exported under the Program between December 1996 and 20 March 2003. Of this amount, 72 per cent of the total was allocated towards humanitarian needs nationwide after December 2000 (…) about $31 billion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipment were delivered to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Program between 20 March 1997 and 21 November 2003, including $1.6 billion worth of oil industry spare parts and equipment.

Since 2004, investigations revealed fraudulent schemes within the program that boosted corruption in Iraq and abroad. The Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC), appointed in 2004 by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, conducted an independent investigation, which concluded that the Iraqi government “manipulated the Program to dispense contracts based on political preferences and deliver illicit payment from companies that obtained oil and humanitarian goods contracts.” The estimate of total illicit income—including oil surcharges and humanitarian kickbacks—was $1.8 billion, plus billions of dollars smuggled in oil and humanitarian goods that were rerouted. Despite those deviations, the Oil-for-Food Programme had positive—but still limited—humanitarian impacts. While exact numbers are unavailable, a 2005 IIC report concluded the program helped to mitigate the severe food crisis in Iraq, especially during the 1999–2001 drought.

Even though the roots of the program’s pitfalls are varied and long-standing, including the systemic corruption in Iraq, our analysis identifies the following five design failures that created incentives for rent-seeking behaviors and illicit payments.

• The program was too dependent on the government of Iraq, which had incentives to increase political support by distributing economic gains through the illicit rerouting of resources.
• The UN-executed oversight mechanisms lacked enforcement capacity against the Iraqi government’s opportunistic and illicit behaviors. As a result, the program’s accountability was flawed, even when the MOU established sophisticated oversight institutions on paper.
• The tasks that the UN assumed surpassed its institutional capabilities, and revealed inconsistent procurement practices. The Iraq experience demonstrated that the humanitarian intervention of international organizations could fail due to the limited oversight and enforcement capacity of those organizations.
• The program was conceived as temporary relief, but lasted almost eight years. This overextended timeline for a program designed with shorter time horizons allowed for increasing governance challenges, the gradual weakening of the program’s oversight mechanisms, and graft.
• The pressure to alleviate the humanitarian relief created incentives to tolerate the program’s failures as the “lesser evil.”

Based on this experience, any proposal for Venezuela that leverages oil revenues to purchase humanitarian aid should consider these main guidelines.

• Humanitarian programs require complex political negotiations. The Iraqi government initially rejected the implementation of the humanitarian program, calling it a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty. After years of negotiations, in 1995, Iraq finally agreed to implement the program. In the Venezuela case, it is necessary to consider the incentives of the different stakeholders related to the Venezuela program, mainly the Maduro administration and the interim government.
• While US sanctions routinely contain humanitarian exemptions for basic food or medical transfers, such as in the case of Cuba, an additional exemption would be required in an oil-for-food context given that US-governed actors would be engaging with the Maduro administration.“ From that perspective, any humanitarian framework for Venezuela should be part of a broader humanitarian strategy, and not simply part of private-public partnerships. Private-public partnerships are designed exclusively on economic incentives, while humanitarian programs should be based on four basic principles that are not economic driven: humanitarian perspective, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The recent failures of some public-private agreements to implement oil-for-food programs in Venezuela demonstrate the relevance of the humanitarian framework.
• Given Maduro’s sanctioned administration, any humanitarian framework will require special arrangements between Maduro and the US-backed democratic forces to overcome legal and transparency hurdles. Otherwise, the Maduro administration would seize any opportunity for illicit behavior in the implementation of a humanitarian program.
• The failures of the Iraq program can be explained, in part, by its eight-year duration despite evidence of stakeholders’ malpractice. Humanitarian programs should be designed as temporary mechanisms with an incremental scope, subject to scrutiny and conditional renewal. Therefore, they should have specific content that allows for a gradual expansion as the program’s capabilities are built.
• In the Venezuela case, there is another difference: the crisis has not been addressed by the UNSC. The UNSC adopted the Iraq sanctions program, but Venezuelan’s was adopted by the US government. Therefore, any program aimed to allow oil sales in the United States or as compensation to Western operators—currently prohibited by sanctions—should be authorized by the US Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The involvement of an international organization is not necessary to authorize prohibited transactions, although it could improve the program’s accountability.
• Special permissions must be granted for local gas production in Venezuela. Most of the natural gas from those operations is used for the generation of electricity in the country, therefore playing a critical humanitarian role. As the Western investors managing the key productive assets were paid in kind with crude oil, they have received no compensation during the last twelve months due to the sanctions imposed on the oil sector. Should the Western operators of natural-gas projects continue to be banned from receiving in-kind debt payments for past and ongoing natural-gas output, this could lead to the shutdown of the operations. Shuttered operations would have significant humanitarian consequences, such as a lack of cooking gas or domestic fuel.

The Iraq experience shows that to avoid incentives for opportunistic or corrupt behaviors, any humanitarian framework for Venezuela involving oil should consider the following: the duties that derive from international humanitarian law; the constraints derived from Maduro’s mismanagement and corruption, and international recognition of the interim government; the design of a simple and specific humanitarian program with a narrow scope; and the limited capacity of international organizations to assume broad oversight duties.

Note from the VWG on next section: In considering the analysis of the two humanitarian proposals below, the reader should note that any proposal design should have at least four characteristics, including

• the US government, the Maduro administration, and the Venezuelan democratic opposition must be parties to the agreement;

•the Maduro administration must have incentives to participate, and has to be an active participant given that it controls the territory and infrastructure, but the other parties must be guaranteed that revenues will be used transparently for appropriate humanitarian purposes;

• if the Maduro administration controls the sale of oil, or the procurement or distribution of imports, the previous objective would not be achieved given the lack of transparency, corruption, and limited capacities of the state; and

• any increase in oil investment and production that results from the revenues made possible by the program should not lead to revenues used outside the program.

Unpacking the Oil for Venezuela proposal

Overview

In 2019, the organization Oil for Venezuela, led by Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez, presented a proposal to create an oil-for-humanitarian-imports program. The purpose was to create a mechanism allowing some oil exports from Venezuela to the United States, guaranteeing that the revenues generated would be used toward imports with humanitarian purposes. The plan would require that the Maduro administration and the interim government negotiate an agreement to create an institutional framework for its implementation, and that the US government agrees to provide a general license allowing some Venezuelan oil exports to the US market. The program would be governed by an administrative board with equal memberships from both political sides and some additional members appointed by the international community (e.g., the UN Security Council). The board would have three subcommittees to oversee oil sales, import procurement, and food distribution. Export proceeds would be deposited in escrow accounts, under the control and supervision of the US government.

The administrative board would have the power to determine the type of humanitarian assistance included in the mechanism, which could also include investments to recover infrastructure for clean water supply and stable power generation that are deemed critical for mitigating the humanitarian crisis. Energy infrastructure is also included among the most critical areas for humanitarian assistance. Addressing the lack of maintenance on gas pipelines and its negative impacts on electricity production is among the suggested priorities in Rodríguez’s proposal.

Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and the joint ventures with foreign partners would participate in the program in one of two ways: partial participation, which would require allocating only some of their exports to the program, or full participation, by which they commit all the sales revenue to the program. For the exporting entities to be able to use some of the revenues to import capital goods or intermediate goods for their projects in Venezuela, full participation would be required.

In their proposal, Rodríguez and his team explicitly discuss how to avoid some of the pitfalls of the Iraqi experience. A contribution of their work has been identifying some of the problematic features of the UN Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq, and proposing some alternative institutional designs to mitigate them in the context of the Venezuelan case. For example, the Iraqi government oversaw oil sales and used the discretional allocation of oil to buyers to obtain significant side payments and kickbacks. In addition, Iraqi authorities seized kickbacks from providers of humanitarian goods, while smuggling a significant amount of oil outside the program—thanks, in part, to the increased production capacity that the program made possible. To mitigate these problems, Rodríguez’s proposal requires that the oil be auctioned by a technical subcommittee of the administrative board. It also requires that projects must fully commit to the program in order to use part of the revenue to reinvest in oil projects. Any humanitarian framework or proposal for Venezuela would benefit from Rodríguez’s assessment of the risks and opportunities from Iraq’s program.

Expert analysis

One of the stated objectives of Oil for Venezuela is to streamline the mechanism used in Iraq to safeguard against excessive bureaucracy and implementation delays while, at the same time, reduce corruption. However, the proposal would require the creation of a complex institutional structure if it is to handle a large program that can have nationwide impact and reach the humanitarian needs of Venezuela’s most vulnerable populations. Rodríguez convincingly argues that, without an administrative board with checks and balances—like the one he proposes—the program could be undermined by corruption practices like those seen in the Iraqi case. For example, if PDVSA or the joint ventures that it controls are authorized to sell oil under their own discretion, the Maduro administration could find opportunities to line its pockets through on-the-side fees.

The ambitious and complex features of the Oil for Venezuela proposal are both a virtue and a major handicap. While the proposal unambiguously seeks to avoid being considered a replica of the failed UN program in Iraq, critics will inevitably draw negative comparisons, and perhaps disregard some of the proposal’s technical merits that could be adjusted to make the mechanism more viable.

Comparisons with the Iraq program could prove politically costly for members of the Joseph Biden administration and the US Congress who support the proposal, particularly during a midterm election year in which swing states with Hispanic and Venezuelan constituencies will have an influential role. The Venezuela interim government would also have a hard time persuading its domestic constituents and its partners in the international community if the proposal is unable to guarantee full transparency and accountability. Another complicating factor is the diverging viewpoints on sanctions adjustments within Venezuela’s broader democratic coalition.

Rather than unrolling a massive, time-consuming humanitarian proposal that would require broad political capital and trust among all participating actors, it seems more appropriate to devise a program that is more limited in scope and uses existing governance structures, including: OFAC’s license regulations; the inclusion of international oil companies that are already present in Venezuela and subject to anticorruption compliance mechanisms; and the use of established procurement and distribution channels like the UN World Food Programme (WFP).

For example, a well-crafted OFAC authorization might permit some exports from private partners of joint ventures in Venezuela to finance ongoing humanitarian programs administered by reliable international entities like COVAX and the WFP. To avoid overreliance on international multilateral organizations, other OFAC-blessed organizations, specialized by sector, should also play a role in the administration. And, as discussed above, local gas production in Venezuela plays a key humanitarian function. It does not generate revenue for the government and, therefore, is not subject to secondary sanctions restrictions. A specific program should be adopted to allow payment in kind for this critical activity, for the needs of the Venezuelan people and to ensure a basic standard of humanitarian assistance.

An assessment of the Boston Group proposal

Overview

The Boston Group was founded in 2002 by parliamentarians from the United States and Venezuela, and served as a venue for members to reflect on topics critical to the advancement of Venezuelan society. Over time, the participation of elected leaders waned. Today, the Boston Group is composed of Maduro government officials, regulators, oil-industry practitioners, lawyers, economists, and political advisers representing both the democratic opposition and the Maduro administration. While the current group composition could weaken its ability to ensure policy implementation, the participation of influential government and opposition supporters could lead to consensus and, therefore, reasonable political viability of the group’s humanitarian-aid proposal at a time when solutions-oriented dialogue with actors from across the political spectrum has faltered.

The Boston Group has worked on its oil-for-humanitarian-aid proposal for Venezuela’s social and economic recovery since 2020. The proposal is divided into two phases, and includes a general set of guidelines for the use of proceeds from the sale of certain volumes of Venezuelan oil to fund humanitarian aid. It also includes guidance on the establishment of an escrow account to manage said proceeds, and the creation of an oversight committee.

Expert analysis

The Boston Group proposal considers the sale of 2–3.5 million barrels of oil per month. The oil would come from joint ventures that produce synthetic crude by upgrading extra-heavy oil, such as the Petropiar operation in the Orinoco Oil Belt in eastern Venezuela.

The proposal suggests that 50 percent of the revenue generated from the sale of each cargo shipment be deposited in an escrow account. The other 50 percent would be earmarked for the joint-venture minority partner. OFAC would need to issue a specific license to allow for the sale of the oil. The proposal aims to execute a one-year supply contract, with an option for extension.

While it is generally assumed that the 50 percent of oil sales earmarked for the escrow account would include payment to the government for royalties, income tax, and other fiscal liabilities, it would be useful if the plan specified how the distribution would break out. It would also be helpful if the document clarified how the eventual declaration of PDVSA dividends would be managed. There is no suggestion of the mechanism by which the Maduro administration would formally cede its revenue. This clarification is fundamental to understanding the role of the US government in the flow of the dividends and securing unified support and trust from the interim Venezuelan government. In practice, these issues should be relatively easy to define in an agreement executed by the parties, including the Maduro administration, the US government, PDVSA, and the joint-venture private interests involved in the transaction.

Similarly, it would be useful to disclose a breakdown of how revenue would be distributed to minority partners. It is expected that this allowance would go to the repayment of debt that the joint venture has accrued, along with capital and operating expenditures needed to maintain operations. Additional details would clarify how the proposal may impact crude-oil production. This additional level of detail can help to galvanize trust and support from all involved parties, by detailing how transparency and accountability will be ensured throughout the transactions between PDVSA and the minority partner.

In addition, other oil-producing joint ventures in which Western companies are present (like PetroQuiriquire, or PetroCarabobo) should participate in the program, and the crude oil could have a final destination in countries other than the United States, as long as the shipment can be traced to places such as Spain, Italy, and India.

The Boston Group proposes that Venezuelan legislation and sanctions restrict exports to synthetic crude alone, as natural crude can only be marketed by a state-owned company (per articles 27 and 57 of the Organic Hydrocarbon Law). This synthetic crude restriction could pose serious challenge to the rest of the proposal given how little synthetic crude is being produced due to significantly deteriorated upgraders and lack of diluents. It should be noted as well that if the Maduro government wants to assign all non-synthetic crude oil from a joint venture to the foreign operator for marketing, they can do so, per the Hydrocarbon Law.

An effort to ensure the proposal’s compatibility with local legislation, while simultaneously broadening participation to all private investors—including joint ventures that do not directly export their production—would be useful. If applied more broadly, the program could eventually support increased transparency of 25–35 percent of Venezuelan exports. Such a shift would support the US government’s effort to improve accountability, and its general preferences regarding sanctions and equitable treatment for US and non-US persons.

The second phase of the Boston Group proposal focuses primarily on the creation of a consultative board to interact with a multilateral organization (the group expresses a clear preference for the United Nations). The board would be composed of three representatives each from the Maduro administration and the democratic opposition; two representatives from the Boston Group; and one additional representative jointly selected by the other eight representatives. In a hyper-polarized environment with a lack of trust among players, the board should prioritize technical expertise, reputation, and credibility of the members over political affiliation. It would be beneficial to limit the number of political players, and to include representatives from competent and reputable local nongovernmental organizations.

Recommendations

Following expert review and analysis of the two humanitarian proposals, and the failed Iraq experience to fund humanitarian aid through oil proceedings, the Atlantic Council’s VWG sees six key considerations that could be incorporated in a potential humanitarian framework for Venezuela: participating actors, governance, transparency, multilateral agencies, a legal framework, and US licenses. While humanitarian-specific considerations such as procurement, administration, and distribution of aid are beyond the scope of this publication, the VWG members recognize the importance of studying them in the future. The recommendations below are a result of multiple meetings and consultations that the VWG held with the US government, members of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, international and multilateral organizations, and private-sector actors in Venezuela.

The VWG is fully aware of the potential pitfalls in any humanitarian framework for Venezuela that includes participation from the Maduro administration. The VWG also recognizes the limited capabilities of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to ensure full oversight and transparency in a humanitarian program, especially in Venezuela’s protracted multidimensional crisis. Nonetheless, VWG members and the key stakeholders agree that the considerations below can stimulate constructive debate and forward-looking analysis for out-of-the-box mechanisms to alleviate Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis—the most severe in the modern history of the Western Hemisphere.

A political agreement between Venezuelan democratic forces and the Maduro administration is required for any oil-funded humanitarian framework. While currently suspended, the Norway-mediated negotiations in Mexico offer a unique consensus-building space to achieve such agreement. A political agreement that includes a majority of Venezuela’s political factions is a necessary first step to avoiding or reducing partisan interference across the humanitarian mechanism, especially in the selection of beneficiary programs and the agreement’s execution. The humanitarian framework, including its specific details around the design of governance structure, transparency mechanisms, and roles of participating actors, should be made public as part of a Venezuelan-led agreement to support the Venezuelan people—and not as an achievement of one of the political factions.

Any oil-funded humanitarian framework for Venezuela should be framed under internationally recognized humanitarian principles. The program would seek to finance humanitarian aid with oil proceeds, as part of the relief that Venezuela’s complex humanitarian emergency requires. Top areas of focus for immediate aid should be the water supply, as well as power generation and transmission. As a result, all program transactions—from oil sales to the distribution of humanitarian aid—must meet general humanitarian principles such as neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Importantly, an initial humanitarian program should not aim to address structural challenges in Venezuela’s oil industry or broader economy, or facilitate public-private agreements with the Maduro administration that fail to comply with humanitarian principles and could result in malpractice.

This does not mean, however, that future programs cannot have a broader focus that helps to rebuild key sectors of the Venezuelan economy. In fact, an initial humanitarian program can help to establish a precedent of trust among participating actors, transparency, and legal frameworks for additional programs to operate successfully in Venezuela. Rather, this approach is a short-term endeavor to invest in basic service provision, which can hopefully help to restart a longer-term recovery process for the country.

Avoid political interference and corruption by ensuring a balanced governance structure that includes equal representation from actors across the political spectrum, civil society, and the international community. Based on the neutrality principle, the program must have a transparent and plural governance body with specific ethical requirements for its members. All members of this body—including representatives from the interim government, the Maduro administration, nongovernmental organizations, and the international community—should be held accountable for their decisions as part of this program, and should undergo continuous mandatory training on governance, transparency, ethics, and humanitarian-aid best practices. Independent and experienced organizations such as Transparency International could provide these mandatory trainings.

Rely on existing humanitarian organizations to design and disburse humanitarian aid according to best practices. The broad spending categories of the humanitarian aid to be disbursed under any program should be defined ex ante. The program’s governance structure should not define the specific humanitarian projects that will receive funding; rather, areas of expenditure should be defined based on the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) diagnosis of the financing needs of Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. The governing body should then deliberate and decide the allocation of funds into those broad categories, including health, food and water assistance, fuel, and infrastructure. That allocation should follow guidance from national and international humanitarian experts—rather than politicians—who understand Venezuela’s humanitarian needs, based on population groups and geography. Ongoing beneficiary programs that could be considered for funding include: the COVAX facility and traditional immunization programs, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2021, and programs directed to water sanitation and hospital infrastructure. International humanitarian organizations such as World Food Programme, Pan-American Health Organization, UNICEF, and the International Federation of the Red Cross should have a central role in the administration and distribution of both existing and new beneficiary programs, especially considering Venezuela’s fragile infrastructure and weak administrative capacity. Importantly, these organizations must work in tandem with independent and reputable civil-society groups to provide monitoring and evaluation that can be reported back to the governing body.

An oil-funded humanitarian framework should have a specific scope, timeline, and outcome. Less complex programs could be more acceptable to all potential participants, especially the United States, the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations. The program can then be scaled by learning from its successes and avoiding its pitfalls. At the current price, limited oil volumes—at the level that current joint ventures can produce in the short term—could yield large revenues for Venezuela. These revenues could then benefit a significant portion of the population through targeted humanitarian-aid programs. Finally, humanitarian relief must be considered just a temporary solution. To solve the root cause of Venezuela’s complex humanitarian emergency, it is necessary to implement deep economic and social reforms that are outside the scope of this proposal.

An optimal humanitarian framework should include the open and transparent participation of compliant US and non-US oil and gas operators. As stated above, an initial humanitarian program would not seek to solve the long-standing economic constraints in Venezuela’s oil industry but, rather, to finance humanitarian aid with oil proceeds. Therefore, the program should allow the open and equal participation of compliant US and non-US oil-industry operators.

For example, a PDVSA-Western-based oil venture can be established for the humanitarian program, but the oil company must maintain control over the flow of money. This is a crucial requirement to avoid potential malpractice from PDVSA and the Maduro administration. The oil company would be allowed to use a portion of the oil-sale proceeds for operational and financial expenditures, including servicing debt. In exchange, the oil company would be required to pay taxes, royalties, and dividends into the escrow account to fund the humanitarian program.

To guarantee the continued supply of much-needed gas—a basic resource needed to avoid further deepening the country’s humanitarian crisis—any humanitarian program should consider allocating a portion of the escrow-account expenditures to pay for gas operations of firms such as Eni, Repsol, and Total, or otherwise allow them to receive direct payments in kind. International oil and gas companies can play a crucial role in ensuring that energy exports from Venezuela are carried out with respect for OFAC compliance standards and in full transparency. Moreover, allowing foreign partners to get paid has the advantage of keeping them in the country, making possible a faster recovery of the oil sector over the long term, which would be crucial for any economic-recovery plan.

Provide open and transparent information throughout the program. To be eligible, oil companies participating in this program must be willing to provide information about how much oil was extracted, how much oil was sold and at what price, how much oil revenue was reinvested to sustain operations, and verifiable calculations of the royalties, taxes, and dividends deposited in escrow. It is of critical importance to have mechanisms for monitoring payments, transparency, accountability, and civil-society inclusion before, during, and after the execution of the program. OFAC should serve as the oversight body to enforce standards of compliance and transparency across oil exports, and sale transactions across the framework.

The US Treasury Department should consider issuing a special authorization. Currently, US executive orders prohibit hydrocarbon exports from PDVSA to the United States. All US-destined oil exports would require a license issued by OFAC. Other countries with similar approaches to Venezuela would likely need to issue their own special authorizations as well.

OFAC´s 2019 humanitarian guidance provides the framework for granting a license to use oil revenues for humanitarian purposes. A critical component to facilitate the issuance of this license is the transparency and credibility of the humanitarian program. Sound institutional mechanisms that reduce the risk of malpractice in terms of resource deviation or politicization will increase the viability of granting a humanitarian license. If it is issued, the license should at least authorize

• corporations operating in Venezuela, such as joint ventures or private partners, to export oil to the United States and to other allied countries—such as Spain, Italy, or India—where the traceability of the shipment is guaranteed to any reputable oil buyer or destination approved by OFAC;
• US and Western corporations to operate in Venezuela, and to buy and pay for permitted Venezuelan oil exports;
• the distribution of oil payments related to payments of taxes, royalties, and dividends to be deposited in an escrow account, with the remaining balance used for operational and capital expenditures necessary to keep up production;
• the use of proceeds deposited in the escrow account for humanitarian purposes through accredited humanitarian organizations; and
• a governance mechanism to ensure transparent and effective accounting of all funds deposited in escrow; the OFAC license cannot be used to cover private-public agreements not based on humanitarian principles, and should include a snapback provision that is triggered if any of the parties involved fail to comply with the special authorization.

A humanitarian program should not move forward without all of the conditions for its transparent and effective execution being met. An oil-for-aid program should not go forward if distribution, transparency, and related issues are not resolved. To avoid repeating structural issues identified with the Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq and potential malpractices from the Maduro administration, any of the following conditions should be considered grounds for program suspension, including

• attempts to alter the impartial, multiparty composition of the governance structure;
• attempts to modify or conceal data relating to the quantity of oil extracted, the quantity sold, and the price at which it was sold;
• attempts to modify or conceal data relating to the quantity of humanitarian-aid items purchased and the price at which they were obtained;
• attempts to funnel funding into specific humanitarian projects that align with one or more actors’ personal benefits;
• failure to establish and follow a specific timeline for winding down what should be a temporary program; and
• revocation or expiration of the US Treasury Department’s special authorization.

Conclusion

Entering 2022, Venezuela finds itself at a crucial crossroads. While the interim government’s mandate has been renewed, opposition fractures are evident, the Maduro government remains entrenched, and the country’s humanitarian crisis drags on with no end in sight.

Against this backdrop, it is particularly urgent for the international community to leverage the legal, financial, and diplomatic resources at its disposal to provide relief to the most vulnerable Venezuelans. While the policy recommendations in this publication are not meant to be fully exhaustive, taken together, they present possible avenues for designing, developing, and executing an out-of-the-box humanitarian-relief framework that places the needs of the Venezuelan people first. But, to do so, political actors in Venezuela and the United States should foster the conditions for trust, consensus building, and unity among diverse stakeholders, which can open pathways for sustainable and transparent humanitarian agreements.

Acknowledgments

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council would like to thank the Venezuela Working Group members for their invaluable input and expertise. In particular, the Center would like to thank Jose Ignacio Hernandez, Francisco Monaldi, and Patricia Ventura for leading the research and writing of this report. The Center would also like to thank Diego Area and Domingo Sadurni for leading the six month-long effort of individual consultations and research that were critical for the report’s analysis and recommendations. Thank you to Isabel Bernhard for her research and editing support. As well, thank you to Jason Marczak for his leadership in making this publication possible.

Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Working Group

Venezuela Working Group members provided critical insight and ideas as part of the drafting of this report. Findings and recommendations of this publication, however, do not necessarily reflect the personal opinions of the individuals listed below or the organizations to which they are affiliated.

*Endnotes are accessible by downloading the PDF

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The post Exploring humanitarian frameworks for Venezuela appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

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Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Not long after dawn on February 24, tanks were recorded moving into Ukrainian territory from southwestern Belarus, crossing over at the Senkivka checkpoint. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Russian heavy flamethrower systems can be identified in the videos. Videos showing missiles being launched from the Mogilev area towards Ukraine have also surfaced, yet have not been specifically geolocated as of now. CNN and Newsweek reported that Belarusian troops are also taking part in the attack against Ukraine, despite previous insistence from Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus would not participate in any military action against the country.

In an urgent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka announced that they had agreed to keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus. Lukashenka previously denied that Belarusian troops would take part in the Ukrainian invasion. He also proclaimed that Ukraine is losing the war and offered to host talks in Minsk.

New Maxar satellite imagery released the day before the attack showed Russian military deployment changes on February 21 and 22. The new images revealed Russia had deployed more than one hundred vehicles and dozens of troop shelters at Bolshoi Bokov airfield in southern Belarus, near the city of Mazyr. This new deployment is less than twenty kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The same set of new images also documented ground being cleared southwest of Belgorod, Russia, in the general vicinity of where Russia later began its attack on Kharkiv.

That same day, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service announced the implementation of a number of security measures along its borders with Russia and Belarus. The new measures included limiting vehicle traffic; using radio stations, drones, and filming and taking pictures; as well as keeping non-residents away from the border zone. Meanwhile, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya urged Western countries to impose tougher sanctions on both Russia and Belarus to deter them from further aggression. According to her, the current sanctions packages are not enough, as Russia and Belarus are not showing any responsiveness to them.

Viktor Gulevich, head of the Belarusian army, previously stated on February 21 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus would depend on regional NATO troop withdrawals. According to Reuters reporting, Gulevich said Minsk believed it was within its rights to demand that US and NATO member forces withdraw from near Belarusian borders, including from near borders with neighboring countries Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Lastly, new footage has surfaced of Russian Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-24P combat helicopters in the Gomel region of Southeastern Belarus, potentially near the R-35 highway; however, this video has not yet been geolocated. Additional as-yet-unverified videos suggest that the southern Belarusian border where Russian troops are stationed is becoming more muddy, which might impact the tactical capabilities of Russian ground troops in the region.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

A pair of cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites during the twenty-four hours leading up to the Russian invasion. Targets included the web pages for the Ukrainian parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Cabinet of Ministers.

According to the internet monitoring website IsItDownRightNow.com, the websites for the MFA and Cabinet of Ministers were temporarily taken offline on Wednesday. Over several hours, the DFRLab also observed that Ukraine’s security services website would only partially load. 

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, confirmed a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack had occurred. He claimed that unknown actors attacked Ukrainian banks, state servicer provider Diia, and the websites for the Ukrainian parliament, the MFA, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Fortunately, many of the services continued working despite the ongoing attack.

Fedorov confirmed that cyberattacks continued throughout the night and were ongoing. He claimed that all information sources in Ukraine were under attack, but assured citizens that the situation was under control. As of Thursday morning, the websites were accessible from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, open-source research collective InformNapalm also reported a DDoS attack on their webpage. A similar attack was directed at Censor.net, a popular Ukrainian online media outlet. The organizations successfully defended against the attacks and webpage performance was not impacted.

Lastly, cybersecurity firms Symantec and ESET said they had discovered a new destructive malware wiping data from Ukrainian machines.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

On February 24, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reported that columns of Russian tanks entered the Luhansk region of Eastern Ukraine through Krasna Talivka, Milove, and Horodyshche. According to the Border Guard, the columns were led by white cars bearing the logo for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored the conflict on a daily basis for years.

The OSCE previously announced on February 13 that it was pulling out its staff from eastern Ukraine. At the time, Kremlin outlet RT reported that OSCE had evacuated their car fleet but left behind armored vehicles.

At the time of writing, the OSCE had not commented on the matter and the DFRLab cannot independently confirm whether the OSCE vehicles allegedly being used by Russia are authentic or were Russian vehicles with OSCE logos affixed to them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Twitter cited “human error” after suspending the accounts of several open-source researchers on Wednesday. The social media company dismissed rumors that the removals were the result of a mass reporting campaign. “A small number of human errors as part of our work to proactively address manipulated media resulted in these incorrect enforcements,” said Yoel Roth, head of site integrity at Twitter. “We’re fixing the issue and reaching out directly to the affected folks.”

Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters published a thread listing more than a dozen legitimate accounts that Twitter had suspended. Those with suspended accounts included Roman Burko, the founder of the open-source research collective InformNapalm; Kyle Glen, OSINT researcher and cofounder of Conflict News; Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian right-leaning activist from Odesa; and Maria Avdeeva, research director at the European Expert Association. By Thursday, all of the accounts cited by Waters except @ukrwarreport had been restored.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Shortly after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics on February 21, a pro-Russia online flash mob began tweeting using the hashtags #СвоихНеБросаем (#WeDoNotAbandonOurPeople) and #МыВместе (#WeAreTogether). The campaign expressed support for people living in Donetsk and Luhansk, alleging that they are suffering under Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Twitter campaign created the impression that there is public support for Putin’s decision.

Open-source evidence suggests Putin’s United Russia party could have initiated the flash mob. United Russia started using the #СвоихНеБросаем hashtag on February 20, the day before the Putin’s announcement, calling on its audience to give humanitarian assistance to people evacuated from Donbas to Rostov Oblast. Later, United Russia continued to use the hashtag for other purposes. 

The DFRLab analyzed the hashtags on Twitter and found 59 percent of the mentions were original tweets (1005 out of 1709). Each tweet received an average of 26.4 engagements, suggesting the campaign failed to go viral. The most popular tweet had 223 engagements.

Analyzing the hashtags on Facebook using the monitoring tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab found that the most engaged–with content came from United Russia accounts or the accounts of their prominent members. The highest number of engagements a post received was 1,300 reactions, 140 comments and 124 shares, which is not considered particularly high. A CrowdTangle query identified 202 posts on Facebook pages, public groups, and verified profiles that received an average of 39 engagements. Meanwhile, a CrowdTangle analysis of Instagram found that 509 posts have used the hashtag since February 20, receiving an average of 720 engagements.

The DFRLab found the hashtag was also used on other social media platforms, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, but has yet to determine their levels of engagement. 

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, announced a “combat alert” after an emergency security council meeting on Thursday. According to Bibilov, all units of the Ministry of Defense “must be ready to advance to concentration points.” Bibilov also ordered full cooperation with the Russian military base in the region. He cited the Treaty of Alliance and Integration between South Ossetia and Russia, signed in 2015, when reiterating South Ossetia’s “full support” for Russia’s actions.

Bibilov also said security forces were monitoring the situation along the Georgian border “to ensure readiness to respond to all provocations potentially originating from Georgia.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

On February 22 in Moscow, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration regarding allied cooperation. Azerbaijan’s state information agency Azertag published a Russian version of the declaration, which reiterated cooperation between the two states in different fields, including the economy, energy, transportation, trade, health, and education.

Notably, three sections of the declaration mention military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia:

• Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan will suppress activities of organizations and entities on their territory, targeting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each party.

• According to paragraph 13, “The parties will deepen cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat trainings, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.”

• Lastly, in paragraph 16, they state, “In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military support on the basis of the UN Charter, different international agreements and considering the existing international-legal obligations of each party.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov called on all Ukrainians “who are ready and able to hold a weapon” to mobilize. According to a statement posted on Facebook early Thursday morning, Ukraine has entered “total defense mode.” Reznikov said all that is required to join the ranks of the armed forces is a passport. “The enemy is attacking, but our army is indestructible,” he added.

Following the defense minister’s statement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted a similar statement: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country. Be ready to support Ukraine in the squares of our cities.”

Also Thursday, Ukraine banned all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. “This regulation will remain in effect for the period of the legal regime of martial law,” the State Border Guard Service said.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty Thursday, triggering consultations with Alliance members. Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Following initial consultations, NATO issued a statement saying “we have decided, in line with our defensive planning to protect all allies, to take additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defense across the alliance.”

This comes as NATO held an emergency meeting to discuss Russia’s assault on Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia’s attack on Ukraine “is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

On February 24, the official website of the Russian presidency published a video in which Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine, announcing that he was ordering the Russian armed forces to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.

After the video’s release, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta wrote on Facebook and Twitter that the speech had been recorded on February 21, based on an analysis of the recording’s metadata. The story was quickly picked up by the Russian edition of Delfi Estonia media outlet on Facebook, by Ekho Moskvy on Twitter, and Turkish state-controlled media TRT’s Russian language Facebook page.

However, CNN journalist Gianluca Mezzo wrote that when he checked the metadata of Putin’s video, he concluded that it was recorded on February 24 at 03:35:44. He also published a screenshot of metadata info of a file from the website metadata2go.com.

The DFRLab team could not download a video from Kremlin’s website to independently verify its metadata; at the time of writing, Kremlin.ru was no longer functional.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Facebook restricted the page of Zvezda TV, the Russian state-owned TV channel run by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Zvezda published a screenshot of a restriction notice from Facebook on its website, saying that the page is restricted from the platform for ninety days for “repeatedly publishing false information.”

StopFake, the Ukrainian fact-checking organization, had previously flagged two publications from Zvezda on Facebook as false information. The first article claimed that Russia had already suppressed the air-defense forces of Ukraine, while the second reported that Ukrainian military border guard units did not resist Russian forces.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

The commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as “Hemedti,” arrived in Moscow for bilateral talks with senior Russian government officials on February 23. According to the RSF Twitter account, Dagalo will act in his capacity as deputy head of the military-led ruling council, leading a delegation of ministers. Dagalo and the RSF led a military coup in Sudan last October, which has seen sustained violent protests over the last four months.

According to VOA News, Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Khalid Farah said, “This visit was scheduled ahead and has nothing whatsoever to do with what is happening in Ukraine.” Similarly, Dagalo tweeted in Arabic that he hopes the trip will “advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons and strengthen the existing cooperation” between the two countries.

The DFRLab previously uncovered a network of inauthentic accounts with links to the Internet Research Agency that worked to amplify pro-Russian content in Sudan, promoting Russia as a friend to the Sudanese people.

—Tessa Knight, DFRLab Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, issued a statement warning the media and online outlets against spreading “unverified information.” Roskomnadzor referred to Article 49 of Russia’s Mass Media Law, which obliges editors to verify the authenticity of their reporting prior to publishing it.

According to Roskomnadzor, “When preparing their materials and publications related to the conduct of a special operation in connection with the situation in the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, they are obliged to use information and data obtained from official Russian sources.”

Roskomnadzor also noted, “The dissemination of knowingly false information entails liability under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of up to 5 million rubles.” The statement warned that failure to follow this law would result in “immediate blocking of such materials by Roskomnadzor in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ, ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.’”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

The official Telegram channel of Venezuela’s government-owned TV network posted a news update about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, written in alignment with Kremlin messaging. The post stated, “Russia launches special operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Last Monday, after recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Vladimir Putin announced the dispatch of Russian troops with the aim of demilitarizing and denazifying the regions.” 

The post by the Venezuelan government TV network also aligned with President Nicolas Maduro’s February 22 Twitter broadcast, in which he stated, “The Bolivarian Revolution is with Russia…. We know that Putin is defending the right to peace and dignity of the Russian people and the peoples of the world and the world balance.” He continued, “Imperialism and NATO have tried to bury diplomatic agreements based on international law to disrespect Russia. Patiently, President Putin has raised the breach of these agreements and the danger that NATO deploys its weapons offensive, including its atomic weapons aimed at Russia.”

—Iria Puyosa, DFRLab Visiting Fellow, Ann Arbor, Michigan

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Belarus joins conflict against Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This week, Scowcroft Center experts discussed how the United States will meet future defense challenges in cooperation with allies and partners. The Eurasia Center convened its experts to contemplate Russia’s endgame in Ukraine, and what might the Kremlin hope to achieve by escalating its invasion? Finally, the Latin America Center explored how Venezuela’s opposition might overcome internal fissures to regain the path toward democratic restoration.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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