Islamist insurgents, including al-Shabaab and the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS-S), are making territorial gains. These two groups represent distinct but overlapping threats—each transnational, each integrated into broader jihadist ecosystems, and each capable of destabilizing regional and global security if left unchecked. They are also quickly evolving, including by increasing connections with other groups and malign state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—creating larger geostrategic implications.

To address this evolution, the United States must remain engaged in Somalia; but that does not necessarily require escalation. Strategic engagement through a forward embassy, regional partnerships, and calibrated intelligence operations can disrupt the evolution of the terrorist threat in Somalia—and it costs far less than what it would take to contain fully metastasized, adaptive adversaries down the road.

Increasingly adaptive

For too long, ISIS-S has been treated as an afterthought in Somalia’s counterterrorism landscape, but the group can no longer be ignored: Since 2019, it has evolved significantly, becoming the Islamic State’s most agile, digitally integrated, and externally operational franchise. This has aligned with the Islamic State’s global shift toward a decentralized, node-based network managed by the General Directorate of Provinces. Formerly a localized insurgency attempting to replicate elements of the core caliphate in miniature, ISIS-S is now modular, externally focused, and nonterritorial, with unique technical capabilities that elevate its threat beyond that of traditional insurgent groups.

It does not seek to hold Mogadishu; rather, ISIS-S bypasses the Somalian capital to exploit ungoverned spaces through coordinated disruption. Its efforts destabilize governance; it coordinates its operations via encrypted messaging apps, blockchain-based payment systems, commercial off-the-shelf obfuscation tools, and artificial intelligence-generated multilingual propaganda that enables large-scale recruitment.

The ISIS-S threat is transnational and no longer confined to Somalia; that is apparent with the group’s implication in terror plots overseas, including in Sweden. Perhaps most critically for the United States, the ISIS-S al-Karrar office is understood to serve as a funding node for ISIS-Khorasan, which has proven capable of devastating terror plots, including the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan that killed thirteen US service members.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, has also proven to be far more than a local insurgency—it is a deeply entrenched and militarily assertive force in Somalia, capable of executing complex operations, controlling territory, and challenging both national and international security efforts. This transnational terrorist organization has already exerted influence beyond Somalia, having executed mass-casualty attacks in Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, its operatives struck US and Kenyan forces in Manda Bay, killing three Americans. The group explicitly targets US and Western interests throughout East Africa. Withdrawing now, as al-Shabaab regains momentum, risks allowing it to strengthen its position and expand its influence.

Metastizing menace

Of parallel concern is the mounting evidence of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. This partnership represents a dangerous escalation. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to strike maritime targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden boats. These asymmetric maritime attacks have disrupted vital shipping lanes, endangered commercial vessels, and necessitated multinational naval responses. They also offer a template for al-Shabaab’s future posture.  

Growing evidence exists that Houthi weaponry, supplied by Iran, has been transferred into Somalia and reached both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S. These transfers suggest an intensifying convergence of interests but not ideologies. While al-Shabaab, ISIS-S, and the Houthis remain doctrinally divergent, they share three critical traits: a reliance on illicit maritime logistics, the use of asymmetric tactics, and a willingness to cooperate when it serves operational goals. This alignment adds complexity to counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa, blurring the lines between ideological enemies and functional partners.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, just north of Somalia, is a critical chokepoint for global trade, funneling approximately 12 percent of seaborne oil trade flows. Increased attacks or insecurity in these waters would drive up insurance costs, increase shipping expenses, and worsen instability across East Africa and the Middle East. Should al-Shabaab or ISIS-S, either independently or in partnership with the Houthis, begin to harass this artery, it would have immediate implications for the global economy.

But in addition to the potential economic impact, there is also a clear strategic threat from this cooperation. Hostility to the West and asymmetrical warfare exercised by these groups and the militias included in Iran’s Axis of Resistance could pose an enduring threat to US allies and partners in the region. For example, the US Navy could see its operational freedom eroded, and militant activity in the sea lanes around the Horn of Africa—which connect the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific—could complicate the United States’ ability to surge naval forces in response to crises involving China in the Taiwan Strait or Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Continuity as containment

The 2021 US withdrawal from Somalia offered a preview of what disengagement would yield. Following the withdrawal, al-Shabaab and ISIS-S regrouped, expanded their respective operations, and forged deeper regional ties that present the greater challenges that the United States faces today. Although US forces returned in 2022, the withdrawal had already proved costly.

Today, ISIS-S internally exploits the geography of Somalia, clan connections, and instability to thrive. Al-Shabaab forces inch ever forward in their ongoing campaign to isolate and potentially capture the capital of Mogadishu. Each debate over whether to stay or go provides strategic space that the groups use to adapt.

The post-9/11 experience has demonstrated that power vacuums can be quickly filled by hostile actors. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq enabled ISIS’s rapid rise. Strategic ambiguity in Libya yielded terrain for jihadist experimentation. Afghanistan’s rapid collapse under the Taliban offered ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda a second wind. Somalia is not an exception: It would be the next domino.

But it’s not just a matter of being present. For example, the 2012 Benghazi attack was not a failure of presence; it was a failure of planning, coordination, and establishing an adequate security posture. Similarly, abandoning Somalia without a coherent containment strategy creates the risk of empowering a transnational terrorist organization with international ambitions while simultaneously allowing Iran to extend its strategic reach. 

To maintain its foothold at the most critical junction of East Africa’s security architecture, the United States must prioritize continuity. This includes keeping the US embassy in Mogadishu open, as it provides a platform for intelligence coordination, interagency operations, and diplomatic leverage. Without it, the United States cannot assess—let alone contain—a threat that is actively recombining in real time and posing risks to maritime security, the regional balance of deterrence, and potentially the US homeland.

The terrorist groups based in Somalia are adapting faster, making broader connections, and integrating deeper than Washington’s withdrawal advocates seem to realize. To misread that evolution as localized or static is strategic negligence. A decision to withdraw at this moment will not be remembered as a tactical recalibration but as an unforced error. To leave is to license the evolution of these terrorist groups; to stay is to disrupt it. 

Danielle Cosgrove is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group. She is a distinguished guest lecturer at Stanford University, a Stanford Medicine X scholar, and the founder of an acquired threat mapping startup.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent official US government positions.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

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Turkish-Egyptian relations in the post-Islamist era

The improvement in Turkish-Egyptian relations indicates a gradual strategic alignment resulting from practical assessments by the respective political leaderships. Three main factors have influenced the gradual normalization process between Egypt and Turkey. Two factors resulted from practical assessments within the two countries, while the third was more influenced by international dynamics. After the 2019 local elections, Turkey’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic. Nationalism has gradually replaced its former Islamist character. In addition, Ankara revised its stance on equidistance between the West and Russia. Until 2021, balancing relations with the “West and the Rest” through greater strategic autonomy had both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, Ankara increased its presence in various regional and international crises, positioning itself as a possible broker. On the other hand, the cooling of relations with traditional Western partners had an economic impact. Therefore, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan appeared to set out with a goal to significantly improve relations with the West while maintaining Turkey’s strategic autonomy in multiple scenarios. After normalizing relations with former rivals such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (2020–22), Turkey has reengaged with neighbors such as Syria, Greece, and Egypt over the last two years. Ankara sees improving regional relations as crucial to boosting economic growth and domestic stability. Egypt is an important market for Turkish goods and a country with which to discuss various issues, including the Horn of Africa. Therefore, Turkey decided to partially sacrifice its relations with Islamist movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in order to revive bilateral relations with Cairo. After Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2014, Turkey hosted many Muslim Brotherhood members who set up media networks to criticize the Egyptian government. Cairo expressed dissatisfaction, citing Turkey’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood as an obstacle to improving bilateral relations. For this reason, cooling ties with the Muslim Brotherhood was a Turkish signal to el-Sisi.

From Egypt’s perspective, restoring relations with Ankara is seen as a driver for improving the country’s economic conditions. Egypt’s political leadership views Turkey as an important regional trading partner, with particular interest in the defense and agricultural sectors. Egypt has actively sought to expand its security cooperation. With this aim, Cairo has intensified its defense cooperation with Russia. However, Turkish defense products are increasingly seen as a viable alternative. Since 2023, Egyptian delegates have met several times with Haluk Görgün, the head of Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, to finalize supply agreements. Besides Turkish-made drones, Cairo has expressed strong interest in various advanced defense products, including the TRLG-230 missile; mini smart munitions such as MAM-C, MAM-L, and MAM-T; and the L-UMTAS anti-tank missile system. Indeed, an agreement with Ankara is seen as less politically problematic than with Russia or China, as it raises fewer concerns among Egypt’s Western allies, especially the United States. Furthermore, Turkey has been an investor in sectors such as textiles, construction materials, and agribusiness. Egypt looks favorably on any Turkish investment in these sectors. The conflict in Ukraine and other regional crises have put additional pressure on Egypt’s public finances. Egyptian leaders are seeking both short-term and long-term solutions to avoid the uncontrolled price increases and inflation that can lead to instability. Turkish entrepreneurs, many of whom have a long history of working in Egypt, are seen as a valuable resource for increasing industrial investment in Egypt.

Converging interests amid regional shifts

In addition to domestic factors, two regional developments have helped bring Turkey and Egypt closer. The first was Israel’s military action against Hamas in response to the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. Both Turkey and Egypt have had to navigate their positions carefully. While the Turkish and Egyptian public are strongly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, Ankara and Cairo’s longstanding institutional ties with Israel, particularly in the areas of intelligence and security, have created some ambiguity. Turkish President  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and el-Sisi’s strong condemnations of Israeli actions in Gaza, backed up by regular public statements, have collided with their general political and diplomatic inertia. This inconsistent approach has not only irritated the domestic population but also caused friction, at least verbally, with Israel. In an attempt to break out of this ambiguity, Turkey and Egypt have jointly called for a ceasefire and the delivery of substantial humanitarian aid for the Palestinian people. But their position appears weak. One consequence of the Gaza conflict has been increased insecurity in the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks on commercial maritime shipping. If free transit through the Red Sea is not restored in the coming months, the impact on the Egyptian economy could be devastating. Indeed, a significant portion of Egypt’s revenue comes from the transit of ships through the Suez Canal. Consequently, a reduction in traffic means a reduction in revenue.

The second regional development that has led to a convergence of interests between Turkey and Egypt is the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland. The agreement between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa has intensified the rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt. If implemented, this agreement will facilitate trade between Ethiopia and the port of Berbera. There are also plans for Ethiopia to establish its naval headquarters on Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognizing the country’s independence and providing shares in state-owned companies. Egypt and Turkey view the MoU as a negative development for the region, but for different reasons. Turkey, which has strong ties with Ethiopia, finds the agreement troubling because of the potential recognition of Somaliland. Ankara has been actively involved in Somalia’s state-building efforts for many years. From the Turkish perspective, preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity is considered essential for the country’s future stability. Turkey’s intransigence is driven primarily by domestic political considerations. Indeed, the Kurdish issue forces Ankara to oppose any claims of independence, including those of Somaliland. Conversely, Egypt’s main concern is Ethiopia’s potential access to the Red Sea. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt, previously confined to the Nile basin, has recently widened. With the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia gains leverage over Egypt and the ability to supply cheap energy to other energy-hungry countries in the region, thereby increasing its influence. As a result, Cairo has had to adjust its approach and enlarge the scope of the struggle. El-Sisi has strengthened ties with many regional states to create a united front against Ethiopia. Cairo has engaged in shuttle diplomacy, including high-level visits to leaders in the Horn of Africa. These efforts have included Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly’s participation in the inauguration of Somalia’s Mohamud. Cairo also conducts anti-Ethiopian lobbying in regional and continental organizations. Therefore, Egypt’s foreign policy in the region has gradually focused on the Red Sea. Egypt has traditionally viewed the sea between Suez and Aden as an Egyptian lake and has, therefore, sought to expand its footprint in a region that it considers part of its sphere of influence. Although Egypt’s inability to address the Houthi threat has exposed the weakness of the Egyptian Navy, it remains the most advanced and well-equipped in the region.

Amid tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mogadishu sought support, and Egypt saw an opportunity to establish a presence in the region. Egypt quickly provided diplomatic support to Somalia, while Turkey, maintaining a delicate balance with Ethiopia, intervened on Somalia’s side by signing a defense cooperation agreement. As a result, Turkey and Egypt found themselves on the same side after the Addis-Hargeisa MoU. Both countries reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, differences in their motives emerged when Egypt opposed Ankara’s call for diplomatic mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia and adopted a rigid stance. Egypt’s decision to sign a security and defense cooperation agreement with Somalia could exacerbate existing differences with Turkey. Mohamud’s visit to Cairo last August set the stage for unprecedented cooperation between Egypt and Somalia. Shortly thereafter, Egypt sent its first consignment of small arms and light weapons, armored vehicles, and a few officers, with plans to increase the deployment to ten thousand troops in the coming months. Egypt’s initiative clashed with Turkey’s plans. Ankara’s attempts to mediate differences between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu over the port deal signed with Somaliland were unsuccessful due to Somalia’s stubbornness. Egyptian support contributed to the Somali delegation’s uncompromising stance during the August meetings in Ankara. There are still many concerns about Egypt’s decision to send troops to Somalia. One major concern is whether Egypt has the capacity and effectiveness to maintain a presence in such a volatile environment. In addition, Egypt’s eagerness to lead the African Union’s upcoming peacekeeping mission may clash with the fact that Egyptian troops lack operational expertise. There is also concern about Turkey’s relationship with the Egyptian troops on the ground. The Turkish government has remained relatively quiet about Egypt’s decision to send troops but is beginning to show its disapproval of Cairo’s actions. Some Turkish officials believe that Egypt’s involvement has hampered mediation attempts between Ethiopia and Somalia. From a Turkish perspective, Cairo’s actions could escalate tensions with Ethiopia and destabilize Somalia’s political landscape, posing a greater risk to Turkish political and economic investments.

Regional rivalries and divergent agendas: Challenges to Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement

The trend in Turkish-Egyptian relations in recent months has been toward rapid normalization. However, rapprochement does not mean overcoming differences on all hot-button issues. On some regional issues, such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the two countries remain distant and have contradictory positions. In light of the above, Turkey and Egypt’s political maneuvering in the Red Sea region could pose a new challenge to the full normalization of relations. Initially, both states presented a united front in their support for Somalia, albeit with different underlying agendas. Egypt used the opportunity to open a new front in its rivalry with Ethiopia. Turkey needed to maintain its commitment to the Somali nation-building process. Nevertheless, a divergence emerged when Egypt decided to increase its military presence in Somalia. It is therefore no coincidence that Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s openness to de-escalation, enshrined in the Ankara Declaration, coincided with Egypt’s difficulties in maintaining its commitment to Mogadishu. Although the Turkish-sponsored negotiations do not solve the Somali-Ethiopian problems, they serve as a means for both actors to stall and possibly rethink their strategies. Undoubtedly, the Turkish diplomatic line has so far had the upper hand over Egyptian intransigence. Although not evident at present, two other major regional actors—Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are likely to influence future developments. The two historic regional allies are increasingly at odds over several issues, including Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Riyadh could intervene to support Egyptian efforts to thwart Emirati economic and political initiatives (especially the Addis Ababa-Berbera Corridor). This situation could bring Turkey closer to the UAE, with which it has long cooperated in Ethiopia. Many future developments will depend on several factors, including the stance of the Trump 2.0 administration, the policy choices of the new government in Somaliland, and the growing internal tensions in Somalia between Mogadishu and the federal states (e.g. Jubaland), all of which will create a delicate phase in the region. Under these circumstances, the Horn of Africa is likely to witness a rupture between Egypt and Turkey, but also a resurgence of regional competitive dynamics. In sum, the shifting dynamics between Turkey and Egypt underscore the complex nature of regional politics in the Horn of Africa. As both countries pursue their interests while dealing with external pressures, their interactions will affect not only their bilateral relationship but also the broader geopolitical stability of the region.

Federico Donelli is an assistant professor of international relations in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Trieste, Italy. He is also a senior research associate at the Istituto di Studi di Politica Internazionale in Milan and a nonresident fellow at the Orion Policy Institute in Washington, DC. He is a consultant on political and security issues for various governments, private companies, and international organizations.

This piece is part of a collection of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies.

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Nine months later, the situation has been exacerbated by decisions made by countries outside of the Horn, such as Egypt’s signing of a security agreement with Somalia. The agreement includes the delivery of weapons, troops, and military hardware, the first tranche of which was sent to Somalia on August 27. The involvement of other players in the Horn of Africa’s security landscape is a prime example of how middle-power politics and diplomacy in one region could, over time, create a tinderbox of conditions: one in which even a small mistake could cause a rapid escalation.

A nine-month downward spiral

In 2018, Ethiopia and Somalia had seen a détente in relations thanks to Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed’s attempt to reshape regional alliances and exert Ethiopian influence. But the MOU—which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in an address days after the signing, said is a denial of his country’s territorial sovereignty—has set back nearly all progress made.

Somalia has reacted in various ways: In his address, Mohamud declared Ethiopia one of the greatest enemies of the state, on par with Al-Shabaab. He also signed a law that he said nullified the MOU. In the nine months that followed, negative rhetoric against Somaliland worsened, and Mohamud began a diplomatic blitz to rally support against the MOU. Nevertheless, the MOU lives on, with Somaliland and Ethiopia strengthening their relations, exchanging ambassadors, training security forces, and regularly setting up meetings between leaders.

Over the past nine months, other countries have made moves that have had implications for the already inflamed turmoil in the region. In February, Turkey and Somalia, reaffirming their long-standing security partnership, signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The agreement is formally aimed at helping “Somalia develop its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters,” but no doubt also serves as a counterweight to any growth in Ethiopian naval capabilities. Upon signing this deal, Somaliland warned Turkey against any form of naval deployment in its territorial waters; but in July, Turkey’s parliament approved a deployment of the Turkish military to Somalia (including Somalia’s territorial waters). Beyond hard power, the Turks have been flexing their political muscles in the Horn, not only offering vocal support to Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU but also hosting negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia at Abiy’s request. The negotiations in Ankara amounted to little success.

Starting in January, Egypt was a vocal opponent of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has spoken up for Somalia, declaring that “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security.” Following the signing of the MOU, Egypt hosted Mohamud for high-profile meetings with Egyptian and Arab League officials in January, and since then, Sisi has been a staunch Somalia advocate. In August, Somalia and Egypt signed their security agreement.

There are several likely reasons that can explain why Egypt is strengthening its ties with Somalia: For example, the countries’ shared Islamic identity and Arab League affiliation, Egypt’s genuine desire to support Somalia in its fight against terrorism, or the trade opportunities that could come from a safer Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, a significant motivation for Egypt is likely its animosity with Ethiopia. The two countries, among the largest military and economic powers on the African continent, have been at odds since 2011, when Ethiopia began construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. While Ethiopia argues the dam would generate significant economic and development gains for the country, Egypt asserts that the dam jeopardizes its access to water and threatens Egyptian agriculture, a major part of its economy. Despite many rounds of negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia have yet to find a solution, pushing Egypt to look for additional channels to pressure the Ethiopians. Adding to the pressing nature of this conflict, the Egyptian foreign minister said on September 1 that he had written to the UN Security Council with serious concerns about Ethiopia’s approval of the fifth phase of dam construction.

The Al-Shabaab throughline

Throughout all of this, Al-Shabaab has grown stronger and still poses a threat to all the countries of the region. Despite Mohamud having launched what he called in 2022 an “all out war” against the militant group, Al-Shabaab has regrouped and made significant gains since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, with reports saying the group has had an influx of financial capital and a surge in recruiting, particularly drawing in people who do not like Ethiopia. In February, Al-Shabaab attacked an Emirati-run military base in the region, and the following month attacked several Somalian military sites in the Lower Shabelle region. In June, it was reported that US intelligence learned of discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab about the former providing weapons to the latter. In August, Al-Shabaab killed thirty-two and injured more than sixty in a suicide bombing at a beach in Mogadishu.

At the same time, the current international mandate to fight Al-Shabaab, the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia, is in the final stages of its drawdown, and a proposal was submitted to replace it with the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on January 1, 2025, pending approval by the African Union in November. Though Ethiopia has played a massive role in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia—with three thousand troops deployed under the current AU mission and 5,700 troops deployed throughout the Somali security sphere—Somalia requested that Ethiopia not contribute forces to AUSSOM and said it would expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia unless it cancels the MOU with Somaliland. Meanwhile, Egypt plans to commit five thousand troops to AUSSOM at the start of the deployment and another five thousand troops separately.

This is a slap in the face for the Ethiopian troops who sacrificed over the past nineteen years in the name of regional security. For the Egyptians, this is an opportunity to exert regional influence and pressure the Ethiopians. Moreover, regional infighting among political leadership risks the viability of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia ahead of its pivotal transition to AUSSOM. Lack of cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, and Somaliland undermines the effectiveness of the counterterrorism effort—and a weakened counterterrorism environment is fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to gain footing in its efforts to destabilize the Horn of Africa.

What to expect in the short-term

In the near future, regional tensions bring into doubt the future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Ethiopia took a big risk by embarking on a deal with an unrecognized state. Though the risk could produce a high return on investment—increased trade revenue in the region, greater security in the Gulf of Aden, and for both Ethiopia and Somaliland a boost to national pride—the pressure is on for Ethiopia to take a different path. Despite progress with Somaliland, there is still room for Ethiopia to walk its commitments back. Already bogged down in conflict in the Ethiopian region of Amhara and scarred by his mishandling of the war in Tigray, Abiy is looking for a win in building the Ethiopian navy back up. Yet facing pressure from actors on all sides, he may be keen to look for another avenue to naval power, such as Djibouti’s recent proposal to give Ethiopia access to a new port and trade corridor. Supporters of the Somaliland MOU must think strategically about how to ensure the reward of coastal access is worth the risk posed to Ethiopia, and all eyes should be focused on the next round of negotiations in Ankara.

If Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia all continue down this path, there may soon be a situation in which Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are stationed opposite one another along the Somalian border, the Ethiopians in their territory and the Egyptians in Somalia as a part of AUSSOM. With two powerful militaries stationed across from each other, increased proximity heightens the risk, even if small, that mistakes could escalate into skirmishes or worse—interstate conflict in the Horn. Even if Egypt and Ethiopia were to go to war directly, it’s easy to fathom a situation in which the various regional players end up on different sides of proxy wars. Conflicts in and near the Horn of Africa have long been hotbeds for proxy conflicts, as typified by the ongoing Sudanese civil war.

Instability between regional countries could also empower Al-Shabaab to escalate its aggression in the Horn. The militant group has benefited from the past nine months of instability, and periods of transition between military deployments are always fragile. According to the nonprofit organization Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the first nine months of 2024 have already seen 127 events of violence targeting civilians perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, with 187 reported fatalities. This year has also seen an increase in recruitment efforts by the militant group, fueled by the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. With Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia at odds, it will be incredibly challenging to successfully transition the current mission to AUSSOM without things falling through the cracks. Moreover, if Ethiopia (with its extensive experience fighting Al-Shabaab) does not contribute to the deployment, a critical base of institutional knowledge will be missing. An emboldened Al-Shabaab with ties to the Houthis, in a region where leaders are unable to cooperate with each other on matters of security, would pose a threat to countries around the world. If left unmanaged, there could be much larger consequences for the international community down the line.

Looking toward the future

Though the moment feels catastrophically tense, increased violence is not inevitable. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia may walk their rhetoric back, negotiations may succeed in Ankara, and the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU could still go through and lead to many positive outcomes for the parties and the region. Yet those invested in the Horn of Africa must keep a close eye on how things develop. Though different in many ways, the leaders of the countries involved in Horn geopolitics share one thing in common: They are all opportunistic leaders who are looking for a chance to gain the upper hand in a battle for power, influence, and opportunity at a time when the global system is under immense strain.

Ultimately, noncooperation in this part of the world will lead to many lost opportunities. Immense potential in the Horn remains untapped while the region suffers from clashes. Restoring peace to the region, reducing the threats posed by violent extremism, addressing critical challenges around food and energy security (amid climate change, no less), and harnessing the political and economic opportunities of the Red Sea all depend on greater collaboration and cooperation—not fragmentation and hostility. Cooperation will not only benefit the people of the region and the security interests of the international community but will also address the needs of those same leaders looking to stitch themselves into the fabric of their countries’ national ethos.

The past decade has seen a rise in middle-power politics around the world. The situation in the Horn of Africa is not unique, but it is a prime example of where this new form of competition could serve as a tinderbox, igniting regional war, if not handled properly.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On August 27, Egypt sent two C-130 military planes carrying weapons and ammunition to Mogadishu—the first military aid from Egypt to the Horn of Africa country in more than four decades. The move irked Addis Ababa and provoked a stern rebuke from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who warned that Ethiopia would not stand idle while other actors take measures to “destabilize the region.”

Two weeks earlier, on August 14, Cairo signed a defense pact with Mogadishu that would see Egypt send five thousand soldiers to Somalia by the end of the year to participate in the new African Union-led Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) that will replace the current African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS), which has been in Somalia since 2022. The planned dispatch of troops to Somalia will be Egypt’s first contribution to African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions in the country. The new mission will implement peace-building measures such as institutional reforms and capacity building for Somali civil servants. Under the security agreement, Cairo reportedly plans to dispatch five thousand more soldiers to be deployed separately. It remains unclear whether the Egyptian forces will, in fact, replace the approximately ten thousand Ethiopian troops whom are part of the ATMIS. While the remaining seven thousand are stationed in several regions under a bilateral agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mogadishu will likely reject a future Ethiopian contribution to the AUSSOM once ATMIS ends its mission as it has already threatened to expel the Ethiopian troops.

In addition to sending troops, weaponry, and ammunition to Somalia, Egypt plans to conduct joint military exercises with the country. The planned exercises—which will include ground, air, and naval forces—are perhaps intended as a show of force to send a warning message to neighboring Ethiopia over the dam filling, as Hassan Nafaa, political science professor at Cairo University, told me.

“It is not surprising that Egypt would seize the opportunity to deploy troops in Somalia,” Nafaa said. He noted that Cairo hoped the deployment of Egyptian soldiers along Somalia’s shared border with Ethiopia would serve as “a deterrent” to pressure Addis Ababa to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Egypt and refrain from harming Cairo’s interests. “It will also give Egypt a privileged position in the event of a confrontation erupting should Ethiopia make any further moves to harm Egypt or if the flow of the Nile is disrupted.”

Why Addis Ababa is concerned

Egypt’s cozying up to Somalia has alarmed Addis Ababa, which is at odds with Mogadishu over a maritime deal that Ethiopia sealed with Somalia’s breakaway region, Somaliland, on January 1. The agreement gives landlocked Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden for commercial purposes and leases 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) of its coastline for fifty years to Ethiopia to set up a naval base. Somaliland authorities hope that, in return for the use of its port, Ethiopia will recognize Somaliland as an independent state, thus becoming the first United Nations (UN) member state to do so since the breakaway province declared its independence in 1991. Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia’s controversial maritime deal sparked anger in Somalia, which slammed it as an “act of aggression” and prompted Mogadishu to recall its ambassador from Addis Ababa. 

Seemingly emboldened by Egypt’s support, Somali authorities have gone further, threatening to support armed groups fighting against the Ethiopian government if Addis Ababa goes ahead with its port agreement with Somaliland. Talks mediated by Turkey to resolve the dispute between the two neighboring countries have thus far failed to reach a breakthrough despite Ankara declaring that notable progress has been achieved. A third round of negotiations slated for September 17 has been postponed by Somalia, dashing hopes for the easing of tensions anytime soon. No official reason has been given for the cancelation, but Borkena, an Ethiopian online news site cautioned “Egyptian political and military moves to exploit the tension between Somalia and Ethiopia might further complicate the Ankara-initiated talks.”.

Ethiopia’s port agreement with Somaliland has also ruffled feathers in Egypt. “Cairo is worried about Ethiopia having a naval base in Somaliland that would likely bolster its influence in the Horn of Africa; the port deal would give the rival country Red Sea access, which constitutes a threat to Egypt’s national security,” Nafaa explained.  

It is no surprise that Egypt has thrown its weight behind Somalia in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia, not least because of the North African country’s widening rift with Ethiopia over the GERD. Cairo has exhausted all avenues in its efforts to dissuade Ethiopia from unilaterally filling the dam, which it sees as an existential threat. Negotiations with Ethiopia have failed to gain traction despite US and World Bank-led mediation between 2019 and 2020 under the Donald Trump administration and South African mediation      thereafter. Egypt has also raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), sending a letter to its head on September 1 in which it accused Ethiopia of violating international law by continuing to fill the dam without agreement from downstream countries. It also accused Addis Ababa of lacking the political will to resolve the dispute.

Ethiopia, in turn, rejected the accusations as “a litany of unfounded allegations” from Cairo in a letter it sent to the UNSC in response to the Egyptian complaint. Addis Ababa also urged Cairo to”abandon its aggressive approach” toward the hydroelectric dam which will generate much-needed electricity and, therefore, is crucial for Ethiopia’s development. Still, Egypt’s 116.9 million-strong population relies almost entirely on the Nile for its freshwater needs. With Ethiopia having completed its fifth filling of the dam in mid-August, Cairo’s concerns are growing that the filling of the dam will disrupt the flow of Nile waters, undermining Egypt’s essential water supplies.

What Egypt is concerned about   

Egypt’s long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD is not the only reason behind the warming of ties between Cairo and Mogadishu. “Somalia is a member of the League of Arab States (while Ethiopia is not); as a Muslim country, it has more in common with Egypt than Ethiopia,” Nafaa noted.

Religion aside, Egypt has strategic interests in Somalia. Major General Samir Farag, senior strategist at the Security and Defense Advisory Board of Egypt, told me that securing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located north of Somalia and at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, is ”a national security priority” for Egypt as the waterway secures the Suez Canal, which is significant for Egypt. Farag lamented the losses incurred by Egypt as a result of the Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in the wake of the Hamas-Israel war which have forced shipping companies to seek alternate—albeit longer and costlier—routes around Africa, leading to a significant reduction of more than 50 percent in Suez Canal revenues.

Farag added that Somalia’s security and stability are an important pillars for the security of the entire region. He cited piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia as posing ”an ominous threat to global trade during times of conflict and instability.” Armed Somali pirates have taken advantage of the instability in the Red Sea to make a comeback in recent months, seizing ships and hijacking their crews for ransom. This occurred after NATO-led international naval forces that had patrolled the Gulf of Aden moved their ships toward Yemen in the wake of the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, leaving a security vacuum for the pirates to exploit. 

“Under the defense pact signed by Egypt and Somalia, Egypt will train and help strengthen the Somali army to enable it to counter terrorism in the country,” Farag said in reference to the threat posed by al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist group based in Somalia and which has also been wreaking havoc elsewhere in East Africa.

Over the last decade, the Egyptian military and police have battled against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated militants who had sought to establish an Islamic state in the Sinai Peninsula; the authorities have also cracked down fiercely on members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic group that rose to power in an election after President Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down in 2011. Since the ouster of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi by military-backed protests in 2013, tens of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters remain behind bars in Egypt; hundreds of others have been killed with impunity or forced into exile. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime, which sees itself as a bulwark against Islamists, believes it can help the Somali government rid the country of al-Shabaab, whose goal is to overthrow the central government and ultimately establish an Islamic state in accordance with its strict version of Sharia.

In comments made during a January 21 press conference in Cairo with his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Sisi reiterated his country’s readiness to defend Somalia against any threats.

“We will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia,” Sisi said. “I am saying this very clearly, don’t test Egypt and try to threaten its brothers, especially if our brothers ask us for support.” 

Ahmed responded with veiled warnings to Egypt and Somalia that there would be “a severe retaliation” if any country attempted to invade Ethiopia. At a ceremony marking Ethiopia’s Sovereignty Day on September 8, Ahmed said that Addis Ababa has no intention of creating conflict. Still, he warned that his country would “humiliate” any nation that threatened its sovereignty—without naming a specific country—though his threats were clearly directed at Egypt and Somalia.

While it is doubtful that Ethiopia would wage war directly on either of its rivals, some analysts have warned that deploying Egyptian troops along Somalia’s border with Ethiopia could lead to a proxy conflict between Cairo and Addis Ababa, with Somalia as the battleground. However, Farag dismissed the speculation and ruled out any prospective use of force against Ethiopia. He affirmed that Egypt would continue to pursue all legitimate channels, including diplomacy, to protect its interests. 

That remains to be seen, especially as Sisi has declared that Egypt’s water share is a national security issue and a red line that cannot be crossed. In an address to mark the launch of the national megaproject Haya Karima in 2021, Sisi said, “Cairo has various options to protect its national security.” Still, he did not rule out the military option—hinting at the possible use of force against Ethiopia should the circumstances require military intervention.  

Nevertheless, Egypt’s intervention in Somalia—intended to promote regional peace and security—has instead inflamed regional tensions. It does, however, signal a shift toward a more assertive role for Cairo in African affairs and diplomacy after decades of Egypt turning its back on Africa following a failed 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa by gunmen allegedly supported by elements in the Sudanese intelligence under the Islamist-backed  Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Egypt might just be flexing its muscle to pressure Addis Ababa to reach an agreement on the GERD. What is certain is that Egypt is seeking to thwart Ethiopia’s Red Sea access, which Cairo views as a national security threat and fears could  further destabilize maritime trade in the vital waterway. For Egypt, which is in the midst of a profound economic crisis, taking these significant foreign policy positions means averting default and getting  back on its feet. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

The post Egypt is cozying up to Somalia to thwart Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties. 

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MOU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MOU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MOU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counterterrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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The US deployment of about 450 Special Operations troops back to Somalia will help Washington’s local counterterrorism partners pressure the increasingly dangerous al-Shabaab terrorist group—which most Americans do not realize has become al-Qaeda’s largest, wealthiest, and deadliest franchise. Apart from the decision to send US forces to shore up NATO’s defenses against Russian aggression in Europe, the Somalia deployment may represent the largest new commitment of US forces overseas by President Joe Biden.

As counterterrorism professionals with more than fifty-five years of national-security experience between us—in the White House and three cabinet departments, and under four presidents from both parties—we are increasingly concerned about the popular perception that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have been defeated. As far back as 2018, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism foresaw that groups such as ISIS and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia, would continue to threaten US interests, and that terrorists would seek to gain control of safe havens in countries whose governments are too weak or distracted to contain them without outside help. Premature declarations of victory are dangerous. 

This is why Somalia is an important story. The recent election of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud represents progress, but al-Shabaab—whose leaders frequently call for attacks on Americans—is gaining power in southern and central Somalia and is close to being able to mount external operations targeting the United States. One such plot was already disrupted: In December 2020, the Department of Justice unsealed an indictment for a plot by al-Shabaab’s leaders to carry out a 9/11-style aircraft hijacking in the United States. The Philippines extradited an alleged al-Shabaab operative to the United States to stand trial for the scheme.

Al-Shabaab also has a history of luring young Somali-Americans to Somalia to fight foreign invaders, then using them for terrorist attacks against civilians. Such attacks have reached beyond Somalia, killing sixty-seven at a shopping mall in 2013 and 147 at a university in 2015, both in Kenya. A plot to bring down a passenger plane in February 2016 failed only by good luck and a skillful aircrew. And in 2020, Al-Shabaab killed three Americans who were training Kenyan counterterrorism forces.

For all these reasons, Biden’s order to resend US service members—which reversed a December 2020 decision by the Trump administration to withdraw the then-remaining 750 US military personnel in Somalia—was the right move. Conditions on the ground in 2020 did not justify confidence that Somali forces were ready to take on al-Shabaab without help. Early that year, US Africa Command said publicly (and repeated it just before then President Donald Trump’s decision) that al-Shabaab “remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.” 

Since the US withdrawal, al-Shabaab has grown in power and wealth. Open sources estimate that the group has grown to seven thousand fighters and receives annual revenues of $130 million from criminal activities, which have included forcing Somalis to give their charitable contributions to al-Shabaab instead of actual charities. For comparison, the Somali government’s total revenue in 2019 was $342 million. Given the number of people living in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, that makes the terrorist organization more than twice as rich per capita as the Somali government.

In February, when the United States carried out a drone strike in defense of Somali military forces being attacked by al-Shabaab, US forces advised and assisted Somali partners from outside the country. But this is hardly the best approach to working effectively with partner counterterrorism forces. 

The Biden administration’s decision will allow US troops to once again train and work alongside the Danab, Somalia’s most effective counterterrorism unit. This will result in better battlefield intelligence collection, especially the kind of gritty tactical intelligence from local human sources needed to successfully counter al-Shabaab. A persistent presence also enhances security for US diplomats and civilian specialists to carry out their vital work. 

A small footprint, especially of US Special Operations Forces, will strengthen and rebuild Somali counterterrorism capabilities in ways that an “over-the-horizon” presence never could. This will keep the pressure on al-Shabaab, limiting the group’s ability to plan and mount external operations that threaten Americans in the US homeland and overseas.

Experience has shown that we ignore growing terrorism threats in contested spaces at our peril. Biden’s decision to send a small number of US troops into Somalia with a limited mission needs to be given the credit and support it deserves. American lives may well depend on it.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, director of the Future of DHS Project, and co-director of the Future of Counterterrorism Project. He is a former senior official at the US Department of State and deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

Christopher P. Costa is the executive director of the International Spy Museum and a former career US Army intelligence officer. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018. 

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Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.  

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (​MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Further reading

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Golden

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In his remarks, Mr. Abdirizak addressed issues of security, governance, elections, and regional relationships from Somalia’s perspective, emphasizing that Somalia itself must be the key actor in building a better future for the country. Regional ambassadors in attendance were offered the opportunity to respond to the Minister’s remarks, providing reflections of their own on regional relations and the role of regional institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Dignitaries in attendance included H.E. Ali Sharif Ahmed, ambassador of Somalia; H.E. Lazarus Amayo, ambassador of Kenya; H.E. Nureldin Satti, ambassador of Sudan; and Berhane Solomon, chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of Eritrea to the United States.

Others in attendance included current State Department officials, former US ambassadors to African countries, African and European diplomats, and the senior leadership of relevant non-profit organizations, among others. Participants took advantage of the forum to ask the Minister questions on a wide variety of topics, including civil society, journalistic freedom, regional integration, relations with key partners, and efforts to combat Al-Shabaab. Mr. Negatu closed the conversation by emphasizing his hope for stronger regional relationships through dialogue and collaboration on important challenges, as well as by pledging to continue further discussions on Somalia and the Horn of Africa throughout 2021 under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.

Event Recap May 25, 2021

Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister

By Africa Center

Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”

Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021

Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement

By Africa Center

On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.

Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Golden

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

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On November 18, Forward Defense and Middle East Center non-resident senior fellow Thomas Warrick wrote an op-ed for the Houston Chronicle titled “Trump gambles with national security by removing troops.” In this piece, Warrick argues that President Trump is taking significant risks by withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, which will most likely not pay off.

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, Africa Center director of programs and studies and deputy director, moderated the ensuing discussion in which participants engaged Faratoon on the Puntland–Somaliland dispute, oil and gas exploration, and the effects of Chinese, Russian, and Gulf State interests in Somaliland and the wider region.

Among those in attendance and participating in the discussion were Ambassador Lange Schermerhorn, former US ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti, Ambassador Stephen Schwartz, former US ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia, and Ambassador David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, as well as representatives from US government agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

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Another somber anniversary will be marked in the first week of October. In 1993, in a battle fought over two days—October 3 and 4—Somali gunmen loyal to the warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed killed eighteen US soldiers, wounded seventy-three others, and shot down two US Army Black Hawk helicopters. The battle prompted the United States to abandon a mission originally intended to support United Nations humanitarian operations in Mogadishu.

Fast-forward to 2018. US forces—working with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali security forces—have steadily ratcheted up counterterrorism operations in Somalia.

Noting the precision of these operations, J. Peter Pham, vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, said: “Long gone are the days when US forces narrowly, but all too regularly, missed a guy here or there.”

“There are instances where US missiles have struck large groups of Shabaab gathered in one place as well as successfully hitting high-value terrorist targets,” Pham said.

Bronwyn Bruton, director of programs and studies and deputy director of the Africa Center, said the impact of US operations—and of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission—has been mixed in Somalia. “Al-Shabaab has been forced to surrender its hold on most of the territory of southern Somalia. But Shabaab forces still move throughout the country with ease and impunity, and are still highly capable of spoiling Western efforts to expand the government’s control of territory,” Bruton said.

“Beyond the short-term goal of reducing Shabaab’s hold on territory, however, US and AU efforts have been a profound failure,” she said. “The desire to resist US and AU efforts to impose a government on Somalia has been the unifying force behind a very disparate group of Islamist, clan, criminal and anti-government actors, and perceptions of a foreign ‘invasion’ of Somalia have certainly fueled al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts, both locally and internationally. When AU forces eventually withdraw—as they must, sooner or later—it’s likely that al-Shabaab will quickly retake every inch of ground that it has lost.”

While contending that the US operation has succeeded in decimating al Shabaab’s senior leadership, Pham said, the Somali government still needs to be empowered to fill the vacuum on the ground. “US operations can clear the ground, but someone local has to fill that space,” he said, adding, “that’s incumbent on the Somali government.”

Pham said while the current Somali president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, has done better than his predecessors “that is a pretty low bar.”

“By any objective standard,” said Bruton, “the Somali government remains the most corrupt and incompetent government in the world.”

The al-Shabaab threat

The State Department, in its Country Report on Terrorism 2017 released this week, said al-Shabaab remains a threat to regional security in East Africa. “It retained safe haven, access to recruits and resources, and de facto control over large parts of Somalia through which it moves freely,” the report says. “Al-Shabaab maintained its allegiance to al-Qaeda, remaining intent on limiting the influence and reach of the northern Somalia-based group of ISIS-linked fighters responsible for local suicide bombings and other attacks against Somali security forces.”

Al-Shabaab is an organization that “has historically had links to global terrorism and networks like al Qaeda,” said Pham.

According to the State Department report, despite facing “significant military pressure during 2017” al-Shabaab “still maintained control over large portions” of Somalia. The group, for example, was believed responsible for an October 2017 bombing in Mogadishu that killed more than 500 people and wounded several hundred.

Al-Shabaab primarily operates inside Somalia with sporadic attacks across the border in Kenya. Some of these attacks—Westgate and a subsequent attack on Garissa University College in 2015—have been spectacular. In April 2015, al-Shabaab militants attacked Garissa University College in northeastern Kenya. At least 147 people, mostly children, were killed.

The State Department report said Kenya witnessed a “significant increase” in al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in the region bordering Somalia in 2017. It goes on to describe Kenya as “a strong US partner in counterterrorism investigation, prosecution, and incident response, and continued to play an important role in regional counterterrorism cooperation.”

“What we don’t pay attention to is how much Kenya has borne the cost of this war,” said Pham. “Kenya, for a number of years, suffered weekly, if not daily, incursions from Shabaab.”

The Kenyan government has “fought the hard fight,” Pham added.

Calibrating the US response

On the military level, the United States needs to encourage the Somali government to take the lead on counterterrorism operations, said Pham, suggesting that Washington dial back its operations in Somalia.

“The recalibration of US operations in Africa as a whole, which is taking place on the orders of [US] Secretary [of Defense James] Mattis, is necessary because we have eliminated high-value targets and it is neither the job of the US military nor is it sustainable over the long term that the US chase after every single terrorist,” said Pham. That is the job of the Somali armed forces, he contended.

“The ubiquitous nature of the US involvement can often be a crutch that prevents the Somali armed forces” from stepping up to the plate, he added.

On the political level, Pham suggested that the United States encourage the Somali government to build a sustainable political framework. After all, he said, “the only way you defeat an insurgency of any kind is through a political solution.”

“The Somali government needs to be encouraged to share power and resources with regional and local authorities who are closest to the Somali people,” said Pham, noting the prevailing crisis between the regional states and the federal government. “That very political stalemate creates the space for groups like ISIS, which has more recently established a presence in Somalia, and Shabaab.”

According to Bruton, the current Somali government “is still not regarded as a credible institution by the majority of Somalis, and it will not survive the withdrawal of African Union peacekeeping troops from Somalia.”

“US support for the Somali government—from the Bush administration onwards—has always been tepid and inadequate,” she said. “However, it is not clear that it would be desirable from a policy perspective for the Trump administration to do more to support an institution that is unlikely to become viable.”

Ashish Kumar Sen is deputy director of communications, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @AshishSen.

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While it is imperative to keep up military pressure on the militants, ultimately insurgencies like Somalia’s can only be defeated by political legitimacy—and, as I pointed out late last year, this is one test that, more than a quarter of century after the collapse of the last central government to really exercise sovereinty over the country, the authorities in Mogadishu still struggle to achieve a passing grade on: recall that the FGS’s own auditor estimates that $20 million changed hands in the process that led to the establishment of the current administration in February 2017, a fact that does not exactly stir patriotic adherence to or otherwise bolster the regime’s credibility with ordinary Somalis.

Protected in the seaside capital by the 22,000-strong military force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)—made up of troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda whose salaries are paid by the European Union and whose operations are supported by a United Nations logistical package and various bilateral donors led by the United States—Somalia’s political elites wile away their time in internecine power struggles. Earlier this month, the speaker of the country’s parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari, was forced to resign ahead of a no-confidence vote, after losing out in a fight with President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, a.k.a. “Farmajo” (from the Italian formaggio, or cheese) a dual US-Somali national who worked as a Buffalo-based diversity contracting officer for the New York State Department of Transportation in between stints in politics. At least this standoff was resolved without recourse to physical violence: just a week before, parliamentary police loyal to the speaker squared off against state security forces aligned with the president in the legislative chamber itself, necessitating an intervention by Ugandan Brigadier Paul Lokech and AMISOM troops under his command to separate the combatants.

Amid this political infighting, extremist Islamist elements—including veterans of some of al-Shabaab’s predecessor groups or fellow travelers such as al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), the Islamic Courts Union, and al-Islah—have begun to coalesce around a new banner, “al-Citisam” (“those who seek protection” [from God]), with support from certain segments of the FGS. During a trip to the region last month, a well-placed senior African interlocutor with years of diplomatic and intelligence experience in Somalia shared with me a dossier that suggests that al-Citisam’s reach may go as far as President Farmajo’s chief of staff, Fahad Yasin. From what I learned, Yasin—who, prior to his entry into politics as the manager of Farmajo’s successful bid for the presidency last year, worked for Doha, Qatar-based Al Jazeera’s Arabic-language channel as a correspondent—has links to several prominent figures in AIAI, which has been designated a terrorist group by the US State Department under the USA PATRIOT Act. 

A respected Horn of Africa researcher summarized al-Citisam in this way: “It is garnering broader alliances of businessmen and clerics, and this had produced telling jokes in Mogadishu: ‘al-Shabaab with money is in the making and delivered al-Citisam,’ and the group is stealthily trying to capture the state… The importance of al-Citisam lies in the fact that it has the capacity to become a force to be reckoned with quickly, progressively assuming the upper hand among the rank and file of the [Somali Federal Government], although the group’s target is the 2020 elections in Somalia… The whole plan is designed in such a way as to constitute the core of the [Somali National Army, SNA]… When the full training and organization of these [first] 1,000 soldiers is completed, they will take over the running of the security of Villa Somalia… Following the adjustment of Villa Somalia’s security arrangements, the next batch of 1,000 soldiers consisting of [former] al-Shabaab operatives will deal with the security of the city.” According to this analyst, recruitment for this plan is being overseen by a committee headed by Sheikh Abdullahi Ahmed Omer, formerly of Jabhatul Islamiya (a.k.a, the Somali Islamic Front, JABISO), a group that merged into the Hizbul Islam insurgency during the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006.

All this is taking place under the very nose of President Farmajo—perhaps even with his tacit approval. It is worth recalling that Farmajo’s 2009 master’s thesis at the State University of New York at Buffalo not only claimed that the genocidal Siad Barre regime had “won the hearts and minds of the people by promoting a new self-reliance and self-supporting mentality” and lamented the dictatorship’s ignominious collapse as “another unfortunate page in an unfortunate epoch,” but described US policy in the region as “failed” while slavishly praising then-Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, an Islamist, as “the very best person for today’s Somalia.”

This is the context which perhaps sheds some light on an otherwise obscure set of recent developments. On April 8, Somali officials stopped an airplane at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport carrying forty-seven military personnel from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to a statement from the UAE’s Foreign Ministry, the Emirati personnel were held at gunpoint and assaulted, while a large amount of cash meant “to support the Somali army and trainees and pay their salaries” was seized (the Associated Press reported that the funds totaled $9.6 million). A week later, on April 14, in the northern port city of Bosaso, another Emirati plane, this one carrying trainers for the maritime police force in the semi-autonomous Puntland region, was detained before it was eventually allowed to depart.

Since 2014, the UAE has provided military and police counterterrorism trainers for Somalia and pays the salaries of some 2,407 Somali soldiers (roughly 10 percent of the SNA’s official payroll, although a significantly higher proportion of its deployable effectives). In addition, the Emirati government and charities underwrite various aid projects, including the Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Mogadishu (named for the UAE’s founding president, the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan), which opened in 2015 and has since provided free treatment to hundreds of patients daily. The UAE is also, after Saudi Arabia and Oman, the largest market for Somalia’s primarily agricultural exports, especially livestock and hides. Dubai-based DP World is also committed to investing $442 million in a joint venture with the government in the Somaliland region to manage and develop a multi-use port in Berbera, on the Gulf of Aden, one of the largest natural deep harbors on the African continent’s eastern littoral. (The government of Ethiopia acquired a 19 percent stake in the project in March 2018, planning to make Berbera the gateway for an inland infrastructure corridor.)

In response, the UAE announced on April 15 that was ending its military-training mission, which up to now has trained thousands of Somali soldiers and police at three training centers that it also constructed. According to the Foreign Ministry in Abu Dhabi: “The decision comes in response to Somali security forces’ seizure of a UAE-registered civil aircraft at Mogadishu Airport and confiscation of money destined to pay the soldiers… The UAE has expressed its denunciation of the seizure incident which flies in the face of diplomatic traditions and ties between world countries and contravenes the agreements signed by both countries.”

On April 21, Somali officials formally took over what had until just days before been the UAE-run training center in Mogadishu (SNA chief Abdullahi Ali Anod claimed that the government will turn the facility into a military academy, although he did not explain how it was going to pay for the transformation). As if on cue, al-Shabaab militants launched a heavy assault in the early hours of April 22 against the army barracks in the capital’s Warta Nabada (formerly Wardhigley) district, home of the Villa Somalia presidential compound and the parliament building. While the attack was repulsed with some casualties, that it could take place in the heart of Mogadishu, a city from which the insurgents were driven more than six years ago by AMISOM, only underscores how badly the FGS forces need the training and support that they won’t be getting any more from the Emirati mission—for whose absence the thirty buses donated by the government of Qatar after Mogadishu’s rupture with the UAE won’t quite make up.

What has transpired is that the diplomatic conflict between Qatar and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council—especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain—has spilled over into a proxy conflict in the Horn of Africa. That much could have been anticipated, but what is both surprising and, from the point of view of the United States and other allies, more worrisome, is that the FGS has apparently taken sides. Moreover, Mogadishu’s choice appears to be driven, in some measure, by a cabal within the already-fragile regime with a clear Islamist agenda—as if the very real threat of terrorism in and from Somalia were not more than enough to be concerned about.

J. Peter Pham is vice president of the Atlantic Council and director of its Africa Center.

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The strikes also underscore the shift in ISIS’ center of gravity following the group’s losses not only in Iraq and Syria this year, but also the routing of its affiliate in Libya last December. These developments have sent surviving fighters and arms flowing into more remote areas, including the Sahel, where the killing of four US Special Forces troops in an ambush in Niger in October focused attention on the new front lines of the fight. While most of the counterterrorism focus is on North and West Africa, where many ISIS recruits originally came from, the eastern side of the continent presents its own vulnerabilities.

The militants who were the target of the operations on November 3 are based in the northeastern part of Somalia, in the Galgala district of the semi-autonomous Puntland region. Here, in late 2015, a number of al-Shabaab militants led by Abdulqadir Mumin pledged allegiance to ISIS’ self-proclaimed caliph, Abubakar al-Baghdadi. Mumin, a Somali-born radical preacher, lived for years in Sweden and the United Kingdom before fleeing back to Somalia after coming under the scrutiny of MI5, the United Kingdom’s domestic counterintelligence and security agency. His remote mountainous camp enabled Mumin and his small band of followers to survive al-Shabaab’s ruthless campaign against ISIS encroachments in Somalia, but also enabled him to gather additional recruits to his Abnaa ul-Calipha group (or “Islamic State in Somalia” as it has been dubbed) from sub-clans marginalized by the Puntland regional authorities. When al-Shabaab sent a force to rein in the turncoat, local clan forces ambushed them, allowing Mumin to get away.

While al-Baghdadi has to date not accepted Mumin’s bay’a (pledge of allegiance)—ISIS has often waited until new groups proved themselves before granting formal recognition—Somali security officials have reported that the ISIS affiliate in Yemen has provided training, weapons, and other materiel. In August 2016, citing his expansion of “his cell of ISIL supporters by kidnapping young boys aged 10 to 15, indoctrinating them, and forcing them to take up militant activity,” the US State Department declared Mumin a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT).

Late last year, Mumin and his followers managed to seize and briefly hold Qandala, a port town on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden with a population of nearly 20,000 in the Bari district of Puntland. Thus, albeit for only a few months before Puntland forces pushed them out, the black flag of ISIS flew over a not-insignificant territory in Somalia.

In March 2017, US President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Policy Guidance giving AFRICOM commanders enhanced authorities to carry out anti-terrorism operations in Somalia. To date, AFRICOM commander Gen. Thomas Waldhauser and his team have used the expanded targeting authorization judiciously to take out terrorists, including on November 3. Undoubtedly, they will be called upon to do so again, both against Mumin’s ISIS-branded group and against the larger al-Shabaab militants. (In a separate—but certainly not unrelated—development over the weekend, the US diplomatic mission, located inside the heavily-fortified international airport at Mogadishu, ordered non-essential personnel to leave the Somali capital because of a “specific threat.”)

While it is imperative to keep up the tempo of counterterrorism operations in order to eliminate threats and degrade the capabilities of militants, ultimately insurgencies like Somalia’s can only be defeated by political legitimacy—a test with which the internationally-recognized and rather generously-supported Somali government struggles. It’s hardly promising when a regime’s own auditor estimates that $20 million changed hands in the process that culminated in the selection of the current president, a fact that can hardly be expected to stir patriotism or otherwise inspire heroic efforts. Credible benchmarks and the political will to enforce them are desperately needed if the international community is to have a reliable partner to work with in Somalia, rather than just an additional liability.

J. Peter Pham is Atlantic Council Vice President for Research and Regional Initiatives and Director of the Council’s Africa Center.

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“The weekend’s attacks highlight the limits of the military assistance [that the Somali government] has received,” said J. Peter Pham, vice president and director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. “As the enemy has shifted, so too must the emphasis now move to building up police and intelligence capacities.”

However, this is not a call for an increased US role in Somali state-building. “We need to recognize that what we can realistically do is minimize the threat that al-Shabaab and other militants can pose to regional security,” said Pham, adding: “What we cannot do is make Somalia ‘work’—only Somalis can do that.”

On October 14, two truck bombings in the Somali capital of Mogadishu killed over 300 people and wounded hundreds of others in the deadliest single attack in the fragile nation’s history. As rescue workers clear the scene, the death toll continues to rise.

The Somali government has attributed the attack to al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-linked militant group which has carried out a number of similar bombings in Somalia, killing 723 in 2016 alone, since it infiltrated the country in 2007. While the group has not yet claimed responsibility for the October 14 attack, large truck bombs have been its method of choice in the past.  

US President Donald J. Trump has increased commitment of US forces and airstrikes to aid the Somali government’s counterterrorism efforts. US Special Operations forces have launched fifteen airstrikes against al-Shabaab since the outset of 2017.

“The horrific twin attacks by al-Shabaab underscore a key truth about the terrorists,” said Pham: “Time and again throughout its history, the al-Qaeda-linked militant group has shown itself to be remarkably resilient, adapting to the shifting strategic and political landscape of Somalia and its neighborhood.”

Issuing a statement condemning “in the strongest terms,” the attacks on October 14, the US Mission to Somalia claimed that “such cowardly attacks reinvigorate the commitment of the United States to assist our Somali and African Union partners to combat the scourge of terrorism to promote stability and prosperity for the Somali people and their regional neighbors.”

However, according to Pham, increased airstrikes may prove insufficient. “Despite the recent setbacks [al-Shabaab] has suffered in terms of airstrikes by the United States and defections from its ranks—both of which indeed have measurably weakened it, but not entirely wiped it out—it has shifted once again, moving from a posture of insurgency to increasingly more lethal terrorist operations,” he said.

The group has steadily lost territory since 2011, but has revamped its terror attacks on the crowded Somali capital. According to Pham, the attacks over the weekend are the thirty-fourth time a car bomb has been detonated in the Somali capital this year.

These violent operations are “aimed at undermining the modicum of security that has slowly returned to Somalia for the first time in years,” said Pham.

Somalia has struggled to re-establish a secure state and governance structure since the collapse of its central government twenty-five years ago. Improvements have been made under the new government of Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed such that “the current regime probably enjoys the best prospects of any Somali entity in a long time,” said Pham. However, the persistence of al-Shabaab and the scale of the recent attacks demonstrate the level of work left to do in order to make Somalia more secure.

While improved governance in Somalia could advance counterterror efforts, Pham insisted that “the role of the United States and its allies is not to nation-build in Somalia. That is the responsibility of the Somalis themselves.”

“However,” he added, “it is… in the interest of the United States and other international partners to support—to the extent that they demonstrate an effective capacity—those national or regional entities in Somalia which stand opposed to our common enemies and can thus contribute to local and regional security.”

While responsibility for stabilizing Somalia should not fall with the United States, Somalia cannot do it alone. “The current Somali government is not without its defects,” said Pham, “and the international community needs to be very clear-eyed about that reality and factor in the limitations of what the government can realistically be expected to accomplish.” According to Pham, increased and revised strategic counterterror efforts from both Washington and Mogadishu are necessary in order to effectively counter the increasingly violent insurgency of al-Shabaab.

Rachel Ansley is an editorial assistant at the Atlantic Council.

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Al Shabaab was once a radical youth militia on the fringes of Somali politics, but it was transformed into a national resistance movement when policymakers in Washington decided to bankroll and provide political cover for Ethiopia’s brutal invasion and occupation of Somalia. Ethiopia’s occupation enraged the Somali people, who turned to the only armed group that was capable of resisting the Ethiopian army and the unpopular, foreign-created government that it was attempted to install in Mogadishu.

Since 2007, al Shabaab and the Somali government have been locked in a symbiotic relationship. Washington’s fear of al Shabaab ensures that the Somali government will continue to receive financial and political support, as well as tens of thousands of African peacekeepers. These peacekeepers fight al Shabaab—but they also protect the government, which does not have the capacity to protect itself.

Al Shabaab also depends on the government: the Somali people’s perception that the government has been captured by one clan at the expense of all the others, ensures that al Shabaab retains a base of support among disenfranchised clans. Thus, al Shabaab fighters continue to weave effortlessly in and out of Mogadishu, planting bombs, undermining Somalis’ sense of security, and making a mockery of the government’s claims that it is in control of the country. One decade, more than a billion dollars, and tens of thousands of peacekeepers later, the Somali government is clearly not in control—not of its capital city, not of the top two-thirds of the country, not of most of the rural areas, and not of the areas that have effectively been annexed by the Kenyan military. Somalia is a mess.

The tragedy is that the Somali people are helpless, bloodied pawns in an artificial stalemate. Al Shabaab would have little reason to launch attacks in Mogadishu were it not for the presence of the Somali government. American and European policymakers vaunt the progress that the Somali government has made over the past 10 years, but the reality is that almost nothing has changed. When the African Union peacekeepers leave—as sooner or later they must—this “internationally recognized” government will utterly and immediately collapse, and there will be nothing to show for the decade of effort that the troop-contributing countries have poured into Somalia. The only legacy of the peacekeeping mission will be the weapons, intelligence, and training that Washington has lavished on the authoritarian leaders of Burundi, Uganda, and Ethiopia to pursue this fight.

Policymakers in Washington need a new set of priorities. They should stop promoting the Somali government at all costs, and focus instead on ending this bloodshed (which has already spread to Kenya and is poised to seep across the rest of the region). Al Shabaab cannot be defeated militarily: the problem requires a political solution. And a political solution requires Washington to deal directly with al Shabaab, and with the many clan factions that feel threatened by the current government. It cannot continue hiding behind the fiction that the government is in control, or will be anytime soon.

Washington’s proposed solution to this crisis—to create an army for the Somali government that can defeat al Shabaab without foreign assistance—is laughably unrealistic. Stepped-up efforts to create an army for the Somali government have led to a dramatic escalation in violence in Mogadishu over the past few months, as the government has attempted to disarm and decommission many soldiers, particularly from the Darod clan. The weekend’s truck bombing is part and parcel of this escalation, and there is no end in sight.

Soldiers defect from the Somali army faster than they can be trained. [More than 60,000 have defected so far—only about 5,000 remain loosely under arms. Most of those remain loyal to militia commanders and may or may not choose to fight al Shabaab when called. Indeed, Somali soldiers have deserted their positions when alerted to a pending attack.] Even if Washington and its allies were able to stop the flood of desertions and build something approximating a functioning army, it is unclear to whom any real Somali army would report. Rival administrations have sprung up all over Somalia, and they may well resort to another round of civil war rather than hand real military power to the regime in Mogadishu.

If civil war is not what Washington wants to see in Somalia, it needs to change course now.

Bronwyn Bruton is deputy director and director of programs and studies in the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @BronwynBruton.

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In his remarks, Shire emphasized Somaliland’s continued status as an island of peace and stability in the troubled Horn of Africa region, its consolidation of security and governance gains, and its relative success in spurring economic development, despite the world’s longstanding refusal to grant Somaliland recognition as an independent nation. (Somaliland declared independence from Somalia two and half decades ago, in 1991). A severe drought has inflicted terrible damage on Somaliland’s economy, killing a majority of the country’s livestock and aggravating youth unemployment. Shire affirmed the government of Somaliland’s commitment to holding elections in November 2017, after a three-year delay. Shire voiced concern at Somaliland’s inclusion in the Trump administration’s proposed travel ban, but expressed his hope that Somaliland could continue to work toward both independence and regional stability.

Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies and Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton introduced Shire and moderated the ensuing discussion, which included attendees from the US government, non-profit sector, and academia. 

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Somalia recently concluded its presidential selection process, and now faces the challenge of completing a constitutional review and finalizing details for the country’s re-constituted security forces. All this takes place amid renewed international conversations about the status of the African Union-led peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), a key player in the fight against al-Shabaab.

In his remarks, Keating detailed the UN’s role in supporting Somali and AU security forces, and in providing humanitarian assistance to the millions of Somalis in need of emergency food aid. He also commended the recent agreement between the Somali federal government and  the country’s federal member states to form a National Security Council and undertake a series of security-related reforms.

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Anzalone’s overview was followed by a response from Stig Jarle Hansen, author of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. He detailed al-Shabaab’s ability to put its own “twist” on real-world events, often capitalizing on regional governments’ sometimes-brutal counterterrorism campaigns, to successfully attract new followers.

Bruton moderated the ensuing question and answer session, which focused on the influence of the Islamic State in Somalia, al-Shabaab’s increasingly sophisticated use of social media and its attempt to export its ideology to Somalia’s neighbors. 

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This is not the first time that the Kenyans have made overtures to close Dadaab, though the call usually comes in the wake of a devastating terror attack, as was the case after both al Shabaab’s April 2015 assault on Garissa University College and its September 2013 attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi. Previous calls for Dadaab’s closure were largely dismissed as attempts to score cheap political points with a portion of Kenyan population that harbors an unfavorable opinion of Somali refugees, or to compel international donors to increase funding. This month’s announcement may be another such ploy.

There are, however, troubling signs that the Kenyan government may be more serious this time. Hosting more than half a million refugees is no small feat, and Kenya is rightly frustrated by the economic, security, and environmental costs of hosting a massive refugee population, particularly amid an increasingly limited global appetite to fund such humanitarian initiatives in Africa. Unlike in previous cases, Kenya recently disbanded its Department of Refugee Affairs and set aside $10 million for closing Dadaab, announcing that the first waves of resettlement will happen in November, with all repatriation finalized by May 2017.

Kenya points to the growing threat posed by Somali terror group al-Shabaab, including claims that the group operates, recruits, and smuggles contraband through Dadaab, to justify the complex’s closure. To some extent, this has been true in the past—in 2011 and 2012, humanitarian aid workers withdrew from Dadaab following a series of kidnappings, attacks, and roadside bombs orchestrated by al Shabaab operatives. But the security situation in the camps has improved since then, and the government has never provided any proof linking Dadaab to the Garissa or Westgate attacks.

More importantly, closing the Dadaab camps is not a silver bullet for Kenya’s security woes. Al Shabaab has proven its ability to operate in northeastern Kenya time and again, as well as its appeal to youth—both Kenyan and Somali. Without also significantly improving the political and security atmosphere inside Somalia, there is little to suggest that closing Dadaab would make Kenya safer. If anything, a hasty dismantling of Dadaab, which could forcibly relocate some 350,000 refugees—some of whom have spent their entire lives in Dadaab and never set foot in Somalia—might increase insecurity in Kenya. Nearly 60 percent of Dadaab’s refugees are under the age of seventeen, and nearly half of the youth are boys, traditionally the most vulnerable population to extremist recruitment. The difficulty of securing Kenya’s porous 425-mile border with Somalia remains a serious challenge for both countries. Notwithstanding a Kenyan proposal to build a physical wall between the two countries, there are few plans to sustainably control migration following a large-scale return of refugees to Somalia.

Already, Al Shabaab employs allegations of discrimination and harassment against ethnically Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees in its recruitment efforts. Closing Dadaab would further exacerbate the existing grievances of Somali communities living elsewhere in Kenya, thereby strengthening al Shabaab’s hand.

To justify their decision legally, the Kenyan government cited a Tripartite Agreement between Somalia, Kenya, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. While this agreement does, as Kenya claims, provide a framework for repatriation of refugees, the agreement stresses the voluntary nature of any refugee returns to Somalia. As forced repatriation violates the non-refoulement principle of the Geneva Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, it is unclear how the Kenyan government would deal with those refugees who do not wish to return (to date, only 5,000 refugees have taken advantage of the agreement to voluntarily return to Somalia), and how it would keep repatriated refugees from re-entering Kenya. Of note is Interior Principal Secretary Karanja Kibicho’s defiant statement, “Our national interest is superior to our international obligations.”

There are also logistical complexities to closing Dadaab. Families with several generations who have been born, grown up, and acquired property live in the camp, which has its own governance structures and service providers. Moving a city roughly the size of Minneapolis, Minnesota, will be enormously complicated—all the more so if most of the residents do not want to leave. The question of what happens to the camp’s basic infrastructure—thousands of buildings, tents, and water, sanitation, and waste disposal  infrastructure—is an important one, and how the transition will affect Kenyans living in nearby Dadaab town merits serious consideration.

Closing Dadaab could also prove costly, as many Kenyan businesses supply the international aid organizations working there, thereby contributing to a beneficial ripple effect throughout the Kenyan economy. Estimates suggest that closing the camp could cost the country 10,000 jobs and some $99 million annually in foreign currency flows. From the sale of livestock alone, Kenyan host communities earn around $1.8 million annually from camp consumers. Dadaab itself does some $25 million in internal business every year.

The international community is not blameless in this scenario. Annual financial appeals for humanitarian efforts in Kenya have been consistently underfunded (only 38.9 percent in 2015) and there is no doubt that supporting Dadaab saddles Kenya with a heavy burden. Kenya is clearly taking cues from the West’s contentious debate on refugees, noting specifically Europe’s “unprecedented efforts to limit refugee flows” from Syria in wake of security concerns and suggesting that Kenya must take the same drastic measures.

Furthermore, while the internal security situation in Somalia remains volatile, in 2013 the United States recognized the country’s government for the first time since 1991 and quietly lifted the two-decade suspension on deporting Somalis back to the country. The United Kingdom and France have also recognized the government, and both countries now have Ambassadors to Somalia. This surge in diplomatic relations—at least rhetorically—now presents the international community with a conundrum: Kenya is calling the West’s bluff, suggesting that Somalia is safe enough for refugees to return.

Is Kenya serious about dismantling Dadaab this time? The country appears more determined than ever before to move forward with its plan. But it faces an uphill battle not only amid resistance from the international community and Somali refugees, but also from the acute and complex challenges posed by the world’s largest refugee camp. More important still, it’s unlikely that breaking down the camps will achieve the objective of “securing Kenya.” Instead, it will garner substantial international condemnation, especially from Europeans who will be worried that uprooted refugees forced back to Somalia will continue toward Europe, and distract from the broader challenges which terrorism and extremism pose to Kenya.

Kelsey Lilley is Associate Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and Julian Wyss is a Program Assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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After drawing attention to the drafting of Somalia’s first new foreign policy strategy since independence in 1960, Omer focused on the evolving security situation within the country, including providing an updated on the fight against Al-Shabaab, the status of border security efforts, and the efforts to enhance maritime policing. In particular, Omer underscored the importance of harnessing Somalia’s natural resources—including the longest coastline in Africa, 8.9 million hectares of arable land, and a young and increasing education workforce—to protect livelihoods and foster economic growth, a process which is essential for the long-term security and stability of the country. Finally, Omer highlighted the increased burden that the influx of refugees from Yemen has placed on the country in recent months.  

A full transcript of Omer’s remarks can be found below.

Other participants in the event included H.E. Ahmed Isse Awad, Ambassador to the United States of the Federal Republic of Somalia; the Honorable David Shinn, US Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1996-1999); LTG William E. Ward, Commander of US Africa Command (2007-2011); current and former senior US and foreign officials; and representatives of think tanks and non-governmental organizations.

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US strike on terrorist group exposes ‘serious strategic challenge,’ says Atlantic Council’s J. Peter Pham

A US airstrike that killed more than 150 al Shabaab fighters at a training camp in Somalia over the weekend emphasizes the extent of the terrorist threat in a country that US President Barack Obama once cited as a counterterrorism success story, said the Atlantic Council’s J. Peter Pham.

“The airstrike was a tactical and operational success, but it also underscores that there is a very serious strategic challenge,” said Pham, who is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The airstrike hit a training camp about 120 miles north of the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis said a “large-scale” attack was being planned. “We know they were going to be departing the camp and they posed an imminent threat to US and [African Union] forces,” he said according to reports.

While al Shabaab has not managed to carry out attacks in the West, it has attacked Western targets in Somalia as well as, indirectly, in the region. In a video posted online in early 2015, it did, however, call for attacks on shopping malls in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The video listed the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, as a target. Minnesota is home to the United States’ largest Somali community.

Al Shabaab appeals to a “very small minority” of the Somali diaspora in the United States, said Pham. Nevertheless, it does have a network that has facilitated people traveling from the United States to Somalia to fight alongside the group.

“Unlike the isolated, so-called ‘self-radicalized’ ISIS sympathizer, this is a group that has a network that has successfully served as a pathway from the United States, and presumably, and this is a risk, a path back to the United States,” he said.

Shirwa Ahmed, the United States’ first suicide bomber in the modern era, came from the Somali-American community in Minnesota.

Al Shabaab’s leader Ahmed Abdi Godane pledged allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in February of 2012. Godane was killed in a US airstrike in September of 2014. Al Shabaab also has ties to two al Qaeda affiliates—al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Al Shabaab has resisted overtures from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Instead, it has conducted a ruthless campaign to root out those calling for alignment with ISIS, said Pham.

J. Peter Pham spoke in an interview with the New Atlanticist’s Ashish Kumar Sen. Here are excerpts from our interview.

Q: What is the significance of the US airstrike on al Shabaab targets in Somalia?

Pham: The airstrike was a tactical and operational success, but it also underscores that there is a very serious strategic challenge. The airstrike, which is reported to have killed 150 al Shabaab militants, is quite significant for two reasons: some good news and some bad news.

The good news is that someone in the United States was keeping an eye on the ball. We had good enough intelligence that the group had assembled, and we were able to react quickly and eliminate the terrorists.

The bad news is that the group could assemble 150 people in one spot and was not afraid to do so. These are not signs of a group that is supposedly on the run or defeated.

Less than two years ago, President Obama cited the supposed success stories in Yemen and Somalia. Yemen today is definitely not a success story and Somalia’s success story has been overblown. But there have been some successes in Somalia. In the last five or six years, al Shabaab has been pushed out of Mogadishu as an occupying force, although it still carries out attacks there. It no longer controls two-thirds of south-central Somalia. But the group has proven to be remarkably resilient and now, freed of the burden of having to hold and govern territory, it carries out a wide range of attacks ranging from suicide bombings to conventional assaults. Less than two months ago, al Shabaab successfully overran the forward operating base in El Adde, Somalia, manned by Kenyan troops serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), killing scores of peacekeepers.

Another important news story out of Somalia today was the announcement from the Australian Navy that the HMAS Darwin stopped a fishing boat en route from Oman to Somalia with 100 RPGs on board worth roughly $2 million, 2,000 automatic rifles, and assorted other armaments. The sheer size of the arsenal is problematic as is the fact that the group has the resources to pay for it. A group that is “on the run” doesn’t need an arsenal that large—which begs the question of the judgment of those who advanced the supposed “success” of the “Somali model” for confronting Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

Q: Does the United States have a credible security partner in Somalia?

Pham: The United States and its European allies can take credit for training and equipping the AMISOM force that has helped push Shabaab out of territory in major urban centers like Mogadishu. Our efforts to train an effective Somali security force to assume responsibility have, however, been less successful. Part of the reason for this is you cannot build a sustainable security force without building a government that will be responsible for that security force.

The fact is that despite our good intentions, the Somali government is still wracked by corruption. Last year, Reporters Without Borders rated the internationally-backed Somali government as having one of the worst records on freedom of expression, ranking down at the very bottom of the World Press Freedom Index with the likes of Eritrea, North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Syria. US federal courts will routinely refuse to deport people back to Somalia because they find conditions so abysmal as to be a violation of our treaty obligations to compel people to go there. Until a government is built that is truly legitimate in the eyes of Somalis, it is a Sisyphean endeavor to try to build a security force.

Q: Despite overtures from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al Shabaab has been reluctant to declare its allegiance to the group. Why is that?

Pham: In the last six months, Shabaab leaders have been internally repressing any dissident elements calling for a realignment with the so-called Islamic State. The group has unleashed its intelligence and security branch, the so-called Amniyat, on its own membership to root out, and in some cases kill, those who advocate ties with Daesh.

Shabaab has had longstanding relations with al Qaeda, which go back to the late leader of al Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane. He trained in Afghanistan and fought with al Qaeda-linked forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and perhaps Kashmir, long before 9/11.

Q: What support does al Shabaab derive from the Somali American diaspora?

Pham: Al Shabaab’s appeal has been to a very small minority in the Somali American community. That being said, if one goes by the prosecutions and convictions that have been secured by the US government, it does have an infrastructure that has facilitated people going and joining the fight as well as people sending support to the group. In that sense, it is one of the few foreign terrorist organizations that has succeeded in building an infrastructure within the American homeland, however small. Thus al Shabaab does have that reach.

Unlike the isolate, so-called “self-radicalized” ISIS sympathizer, this is a group that has a network that has successfully served as a path from the United States to Somalia, and presumably, and this is a risk, a path back to the United States.

Q: Does al Shabaab have the capacity to carry out an attack in the West?

Pham: We tend to focus too much on outrageous comments like those calls [to attack the West] that are meant as much to get our attention and to bolster the group’s standing among extremists. While we shouldn’t ignore the possible threats, I don’t think it’s helpful to allow al Shabaab’s propaganda to determine our allocation of limited intelligence and other counterterrorism resources. Instead we should focus on the real threat of Shabaab that not only remains, but has changed and is growing in East Africa.

Ashish Kumar Sen is a staff writer at the Atlantic Council.

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The Pentagon continues to fly drones over Somalia from another regional base, in Djibouti, making the loss of the Ethio­pian base easier to take, said J. Peter Pham, an Africa analyst at the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank.

“There’s less of a strategic reason to have a base there, so it makes sense to pack up and move to where there’s more of a need,” he said. “There’s been a great deal of progress [against al-Shabab], or at least as much progress as one can get from a drone program.”

Read the full article here.

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Sidikou, who participated in a transition seminar last September at the Atlantic Council before leaving for his current post, was optimistic in his assessment of Somalia’s progress on the consolidation of peace and state-building efforts. However, he noted two major challenges to the consolidation of peace and security: discord between the executive and legislative branches, evidenced most recently by a motion of impeachment against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud by members of Parliament; and the integration of the Somali National Army and police.

The discussion, moderated by Pham, centered on the importance of intelligence in degrading al-Shabab’s capabilities, allegations of civilian casualties and sexual abuse against AMISOM troops, and Somalia’s upcoming presidential elections.

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Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, a think tank in Washington, D.C., said the support thrown behind Mohamud has much less to do with his abilities as a leader and a lot more to do with the international community’s unwillingness to deal with another political transition in a country that has lacked a federal government for more than two decades and has gone through more than 10 prime ministers in the past decade.

“By any objective standard, he should be impeached,” she told FP in a phone call. “He is very corrupt, and he is guilty of several major abuses of power. If this was a normal functioning government, there’s no way he should be allowed to stay in his office.”

[…]

Bruton, on the other hand, shied away from even labeling the 2016 process an election at all. Whatever happens in 2016, she told FP, will not be an election — but “an election-like event.”

Read the full article here.

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J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, said the opening of Somalia’s embassy here “represents yet another instance where form wins out over substance, wishful thinking trumps reality, and time and resources are squandered on frivolous displays of so-called progress while lives are lost and threats to security grow” because of the lack of a clear strategy and meaningful commitment.

One of the biggest problems, according to Pham, is that the Federal Republic of Somalia’s claim to territory is disputed both by al-Shabaab and by regional entities like the breakaway Republic of Somaliland, which have declared their independence and over which the Mogadishu government has no control.

Read the full article here.

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But experts caution that the gains made by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which accelerated after the United Nations (UN) Security Council topped up the peace enforcement mission with an additional 4,000 Ethiopian troops after the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, have not degraded the al-Shabab threat as thoroughly as some have claimed. “Al-Shabab is simply retreating, conceding ground,” said Bronwyn Bruton, Deputy Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. “They are not actually confronting AMISOM head-on anymore, which means that their forces and weapons are mostly intact. They have shifted from a conventional force to a pure terrorist one that is increasingly focusing its attention on attacks outside of Somalia, in Kenya, and elsewhere in the region.”

[…]

The conditions under which Bancroft and other private military contractors operate, however, offer little in the way of transparency or safeguards against abuse. Vast swaths of Somalia are effectively lawless, and communications links between rural communities are weak. Neither feature of the terrain augers well for accountability. “Even the glossiest [private security companies] — think Blackwater back in the day — are prone to excesses of force,” said the Atlantic Council’s Bruton. “In the Somali context, those excesses are likely to go unreported, which makes abuse all the more likely.”

Read the full article here.

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“It’s not going to solve the remittance problem. There’s more to it,” said Peter Pham, head of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. For instance, it wasn’t until last 2014 that the first automated teller machines were installed in the capital city of Mogadishu.

“To make it useful, you would have to have fairly significant infrastructure. Over time it’s possible, but certainly not in the short term,” Pham said. He added that, while it may be a very difficult transition period, the move could certainly lay the groundwork for future development, even if it takes a long time.

Read the full article here.

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J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, says the Ethiopians felt they couldn’t let the militants continue to gain influence in Somalia, but that it’s a common misconception to link the rise of al-Shabab – which has been linked to al-Qaida and is listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States – to the invasion.

“There’s no doubt that the Ethiopian intervention helped Shabab gain a nationalist narrative,” Pham says. “The fact is al-Shabab and its precursor groups have existed for quite some time, for more than a decade, before the Ethiopians invaded.”

Read the full article here.

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Since Kenya’s armed forces invaded Somalia in 2011 in pursuit of the terrorist organisation al-Shabaab, the country has endured more than one hundred terror attacks. Al-Shabaab’s latest major attack came on 2 April 2015 when four gunmen entered Garissa University in eastern Kenya and murdered nearly 150 students. It was the deadliest attack in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in the capital Nairobi.

The attack increased pressure on the government to find a solution to the wave of violence. On 11 April 2015, Deputy President William Ruto demanded that the United Nations remove Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp from the country within three months, continuing a longstanding government practice of blaming domestic insecurity on the country’s refugees. Dadaab is a sprawling complex of five camps in Kenya’s northeast near the border with Somalia. Today it shelters more than 330,000 Somali refugees.

Read the full article here.

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The Garissa attack, says one expert, is proof that al-Shabaab is a far more organized terror effort than previously believed. J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center for the Atlantic Council, said in August that al-Shabaab appeared to be “morphing more and more into a transnational regional terrorist organization,” not a ragtag group of insurgents, and that “intelligence capabilities,” not just airstrikes in Somalia, would be necessary to stop their spread.

Read the full article here.

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J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, said Kerry’s stop in Somalia “is a political necessity” during a visit to neighboring Kenya. Kerry and others in the Obama administration have referred to their multinational approach in Somalia as a successful model for U.S. intervention, but the results are still far from conclusive, Pham said.

While security has improved, Somalia is still unstable and legitimate local governance is spotty, he said. In fact, the State Department in November canceled participating in a donor conference for Somalia in Denmark, citing “political division” among Somali leaders.

Read the full article here.

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However, a military defeat of al-Shabab would not equate to a total defeat of the group, said Peter Pham, the Africa Center Director at the Atlantic Council.

“The movement has transformed itself from less a territorial entity seeking to control parts of Somalia into a transnational terrorist entity,” said Pham.

The group “has to be fought not just with purely military means but also police, intelligence and also social, economic and political development and inclusion,” he said.

Read the full article here.

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Some experts believe ISIS’s influence may also have played a part in al-Shabaab’s massacre of 147 people, mainly Christian students at a Kenyan university, on April 2. The Atlantic Council’s Bronwyn Bruton pointed out that al-Shabaab had previously moved away from attacks on students due to public backlash in Somalia, and the fact that it was re-embracing the tactic could be “a sign of a final evolution where it is no longer interested in maintaining political credibility or gaining the support of local communities.” The Somali group has reportedly been losing ground to the Islamic State in the competition for foreign recruits, so the attack may have been an effort to re-establish its credibility to an international audience. This could be part of an effort by the traditionally al-Qaida-linked group to either compete with ISIS or pivot to an alliance with it.   

Read the full article here.

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“In Somalia, al-Shabab is on the back foot. In Kenya, the group is gaining prominence,” Bronwyn Bruton, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Centre, wrote.

Read the full article here.

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“They may say that their national security interests trump the need to abide by the international convention they signed,” said Joshua Meservey, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

[…]

The desire to repatriate the Somali refugees was one of the reasons for the Kenyan invasion, said Meservey, but the move would exacerbate tensions between Kenya’s political elite and Muslim groups that support the refugees.

“The feeling is very much that these are overwhelmingly Muslim refugees, and the Christian government is trying to kick them out of the country,” he said. “They’re scapegoating them for the government’s own security failings.”

Read the full article here.

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“Al-Shabab has never been monolithic. It’s a rather confusing coalition of overlapping ideological groups and clan interests,” said Peter Pham, head of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. The group has its own internal factions. While some members are focused on gaining territory and power in Somalia, a growing faction is more interested in being part of a global jihad movement. The hard-line jihadists are taking over and pushing al-Shabab to increasingly desperate measures to prove themselves members of a more global movement — which may result in more large-scale attacks as it finds itself cornered.

“I would definitely expect that the attack in Garissa, dreadful and brutal as it was, is but the first of many,” Pham said.

Read the full article here.

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“Their objective right now is to get attention,” said Peter Pham, an Africa expert at the Atlantic Council, adding that the terror group is “changing its model” from a “major insurgent threat” to, increasingly, “a transnational terrorist group.” 

A presidential visit would, for a brief period, put the international spotlight on Kenya. Pham said al-Shabaab, while good at hitting “soft targets,” so far has avoided government buildings and other fortifications and would likely not attempt to “storm any majorly defended target” like the meetings Obama would be attending. 

However, that might not stop them from plotting an attack against Kenyans while the president is in the country, for the kind of attention they’re seeking. 

“It doesn’t necessarily need to be associated directly to the presidential visit, other than the timing,” Pham said. “Anything they do … will get them what they want, which is more media and exposure to the big leagues so to speak. The more reporters in the country heightens the risk.” 

Read the full article here.

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Sadly, the al Shabab attack on Kenya’s Garissa University College that killed at least 147 people was nothing new. Since October 2011, when Kenya invaded Somalia to fight the terrorist group in its home territory, the group has launched more than 100 attacks inside Kenya that have claimed hundreds of lives and sent the country’s tourism industry into a tailspin. Many of the attacks have been as ruthless as this latest outrage: the group killed at least 67 in an attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013, and in June 2014 took over a Kenyan town and systematically executed its non-Muslim residents.

Even so, al Shabab has been wounded by a sustained offensive from the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and its deeds are increasingly eclipsed by the lurid exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Boko Haram. As the group feels its stature weaken, it is more likely to lash out, carrying out high-profile and gratuitously brutal attacks like the one in Garissa. The United States and the rest of the international community must do all they can to support Kenya as it weathers al Shabab’s grisly turn.

Read the full article here.

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J Peter Pham, Director of the Africa Center for the Atlantic Council, said that Al-Shabaab is “morphing” “into a transnational regional terrorist organization” on Monday’s “CNN Newsroom.”

“In recent years, the United States, the European Union, the international community have assisted building up a military capacity to defeat Shabaab on the battlefield as an insurgent group. We haven’t paid as much attention to building up police capacity, intelligence capabilities to beat Shabaab as a terrorist organization. And this attack is a wake-up call. we may have won the battle the against insurgents, but the same group is morphing more and more into a transnational regional terrorist organization. And we need to up the game. it’s shifted tactics but it’s not completely done yet” he stated.

Read the full article here.

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Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Africa Center of the Atlantic Council, a research institute in Washington, said she suspected the Shabab were “beginning to play with class distinctions.”

“Westgate and, to a lesser extent, Garissa University College are both enclaves of privilege in a country where youths, especially Muslim youths, are frustrated by the lack of economic opportunity,” she said. “Eventually, Shabab is going to have to find a way to connect with non-Somali Muslims.”

[…]

“Stopping the Shabab is going to be tough,” Ms. Bruton said, adding that the region’s security services desperately needed reform, and “that will take years.”

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The Obama administration’s strategy to combat al-Shabab resembles its approach in countries such as Yemen, where drone strikes have emerged as the face of American power. But the horrific attack last Thursday have raised questions whether this strategy will ultimately prove successful.

“Al-Shabab is not defeated,” J. Peter Pham, the director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, told the Washington Post. “It has just changed.

Read the full article here.

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Some critics said that the international community’s insufficient response had allowed al-Shabab to survive. “Al-Shabab is not defeated, it has just changed,” said J. Peter Pham, director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Instead of trying to hold territory, like an army or militia, it functions today almost entirely as a regional terrorist group.

“Arguably, their terror attacks have gone up as they lost territory,” Pham said.

Read the full article here.

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These recent military setbacks suffered by Al-Shabab help explain why the group is targeting vulnerable populations within in Kenya, said Joshua Meservey, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. “They [Al-Shabab] can’t control as much territory as they once did,” Meservey said. “They can’t fight AMISOM in a conventional military battle, so really they’re left with terror attacks.”

Read the full article here.

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Early on the morning of April 2, gunmen from the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab attacked Garissa University College in northeastern Kenya. After launching several hand grenades, gunmen moved door to door inside the campus dorms, separating Christians and Muslims. Reportedly, Christians were shot on the spot, and some victims were beheaded. Hostages were taken, and Kenyan authorities report that at least 147 people, including four attackers, have been killed. Many others are injured or still missing.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta quickly condemned the attack, and the government put out a bounty of 20 million shillings ($215,000) for information on the incident’s alleged mastermind, Mohamed Mohamud (known as “Dulyadin”).

Read the full article here.

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Atlantic Council’s Bruton says Somali terror group embracing more deadly tactics

Al-Shabaab’s deadly April 2 assault against a Kenyan university—the country’s bloodiest attack in 17 years—is a sign that the Somali terrorist group is trying to pivot toward the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), said Atlantic Council analyst Bronywn Bruton.

“A schoolyard massacre like this really is the signature of Boko Haram,” Bruton, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, told the New Atlanticist. “Al-Shabaab engaging in this is essentially al-Shabaab saying to IS, ‘Hey, don’t forget us.’”

Boko Haram, the terrorist group currently under attack from troops in northern Nigeria, has pledged allegiance to the leader of ISIS.

At least 147 people were killed in al-Shabaab’s attack in Garissa, a town in eastern Kenya.

Bruton spoke with the New Atlanticist’s Ashish Kumar Sen. Excerpts below:

Q: Al-Shabaab attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013. Today it attacked a university in eastern Kenya. Why is the Somalia-based terrorist targeting Kenya?

Bruton: Ostensibly, al-Shabaab is attacking Kenya because Of Nairboi’s invasion of Somalia in late 2011. Kenya has also informally annexed a very strategic piece of Somali real estate—the port of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab says that its attacks on Kenya are a retaliation for this occupation and meddling in Somali affairs.

Though al-Shabaab started out in Somalia as a populist resistance movement, it now has an eye to becoming an international terrorist organization. Somalia was at best a steppingstone towards that goal, since, although it is strategically located on the Gulf of Aden, it is isolated and doesn’t have any Western targets to speak of. Kenya is a much richer target since it has Western tourist and business interests. It is the ability to strike Western targets that would make al-Shabaab a more valuable affiliate to al-Qaeda or ISIS than, say, Boko Haram, which is largely confined to northern Nigeria.

Q: Does the group target Westerners?

Bruton: Al-Shabaab has rarely attacked Western targets. Throughout its entire existence it has almost exclusively focused on African victims. The Westgate Mall attack is the closest that it has come, so far, to deliberately targeting Western victims.

Q: To what extent are al-Shabaab’s attacks a consequence of the growing influence of groups like ISIS, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

Bruton:I think it is. When al-Shabaab bombed a medical graduation ceremony in 2009 and killed the first class of graduating Somali doctors in two decades, it caused an enormous public backlash. After initially claiming responsibility for the attack, al-Shabaab disowned it. The fact that al-Shabaab is turning again to an attack on students is a sign of a final evolution where it is no longer interested in maintaining political credibility or gaining the support of local communities. If anything, this is an attack based on the Boko Haram model. Boko Haram is famous for going into schoolyards and massacring students and kidnapping children. In so deliberately evoking Boko Haram, a-Shabaab is probably signaling an intention to realign itself with Islamic State, whose tactics are very different from the tactics of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is not associated with murdering schoolchildren.

Q: What links does al-Shabaab have with other terrorist groups?

Bruton: Al-Shabaab is affiliated to al-Qaeda, but this attack today is probably a sign of a pivot to the Islamic State. I would think they are deliberately sending that message. Al-Qaeda does not prey on local communities. Al Qaeda wants Muslim communities to feel that it is a vehicle to express their grievances. Boko Haram and the Islamic State are famous for preying on local populations. This is a kind of movement that says ‘We are the enemy of the public, and we are engaging in tactics that are so brutal, we don’t want political credibility; we just want to inspire terror.’ That the Islamic State has taken Boko Haram as an affiliate, and understanding that a schoolyard massacre like this really is the signature tactic of Boko Haram, al-Shabaab engaging in this is essentially al-Shabaab saying to IS, ‘Hey, don’t forget us.’

Q: How big is al-Shabaab and what does it want?

Bruton: Al-Shabaab is a movement in flux. It has cells and fighters in Somalia and those fighters are engaged in a tactic of spoiling progress. They do things like roadside bombs, assassination, sort of mosquito-bite attacks that are intended to promote instability but are not signature strikes.

Most of al-Shabaab’s energy has shifted toward Kenya. More and more, al-Shabaab is trying to reimagine itself as not a distinctly Somali group but as an East African terror organization.

I think al-Shabaab has abandoned its territorial ambitions. Its defeat in Somalia, the loss of its territory, the fact that it no longer has to worry about governing has made it free to become just a pure terrorist group.

Q: What is the United States doing to counter al-Shabaab?

Bruton: The United States is working with Kenya and Somalia. In Somalia, al-Shabaab is on the back foot. In Kenya, the group is gaining prominence. It is becoming ever more virulent. It is being greatly assisted by the brutality of the Kenyan police and military. They have conducted dragnets in which hundreds of people have been swept up for no other reason than they look Somali. The Kenyan brutality is counterproductive not only in terms of limiting the amount of intelligence they can get hold of, but it also reaffirms al-Shabaab’s radicalization messages.

Q: Has that had an impact on US support for Kenya, as it did in Nigeria?

Bruton: The United States is certainly aware of the problem, but unlike in Nigeria where the Leahy Amendment prohibited support for some small period of time until the forces could be vetted, I don’t think we have done enough in the Kenyan context. The United States is trying hard to train Kenyan troops and make them more responsible, but the corruption and lack of professionalism is just so endemic, they are not able to make any progress.

Ashish Kumar Sen is a Staff Writer at the Atlantic Council.

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But al-Shabaab has suffered a steady decline over the last four years at the hands of a multinational force called the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that has pushed the group from all its major strongholds, including the lucrative port cities of Mogadishu, Kismayo, Marka, and Brava.

Al-Shabaab once attracted scores of foreigner fighters to Somali—including at least several dozen Somali-Americans—and raked in donations from around the world. But its battlefield setbacks and brutality against fellow Somali Muslims has withered much of the support it once enjoyed, relegating it to second tier status among international terrorist organizations. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram in Nigeria has exacerbated the trend. Both dominate international headlines, and ISIS is attracting thousands of foreign fighters, including Somali-Americans who were previously al-Shabaab’s constituency alone.

Al-Shabaab almost certainly feels the need to compete with these upstarts, something counterterror theorists call “outbidding.” One might think it is a good thing when terrorist groups compete, but it is not. One of the ways terrorist groups bid for money and recruits is to garner publicity, and the best way to do that is to carry out more, high-profile, and/or especially brutal attacks. One of the reasons ISIS so fastidiously broadcasts its atrocities around the world is because they bring international attention, including that of potential recruits and funders.

Throughout its existence al-Shabaab would have gladly attacked a Western target if the opportunity presented itself, but doing so has never been a focus of its efforts. All three countries al-Shabaab has attacked outside of Somalia are important troop contributors to AMISOM. For years its propaganda called would-be jihadists to Somalia and did not bother to call for them to carry out terror attacks in the West.

The pressures converging on al-Shabaab may be motivating the group to concentrate more on high-profile attacks, however, and there is little more high-profile than striking a Western target, particularly an embassy.

Strikes on international targets are also in keeping with the leadership’s ideology. For years the group was split between those who wanted to keep their jihad focused on the Somali war and those who viewed their terror campaign as part of a larger civilizational clash between Muslims and infidels. That debate was ended definitively in June 2013 when the then-emir of al-Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane—a committed international jihadist—purged the group of anyone who was a threat to his leadership. Godane was killed in a drone strike in September 2014, but his successor, Ahmad Umar, was part of his inner circle and almost certainly has the same international orientation.

There has not been an overwhelming shift in the targets al-Shabaab chooses since the purge, but there have been a few worrying developments. During the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya in September 2013, the gunmen were reportedly looking especially for Kenyans and Americans during their rampage. It has since 2013 also issued at least three calls to its supporters to stage attacks in the West, including two since the beginning of this year, which is a departure from business as usual for the group. The threats over the last several years that have caused embassy closures, drawdowns, and warnings to US citizens in East Africa might be part of an emerging trend.

Fortunately, al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out a complex international attack is much diminished from the days when it struck Kampala and the Westgate Mall. Many of its high-level leaders have been killed; since December last year, US drone strikes have killed two men responsible for the group’s external operations and one who planned the Westgate Mall attack, a significant loss of expertise. It also brings in less revenue than it once did, and its diminished standing makes its appeals to supporters to launch lone wolf terror attacks unlikely to gain much traction.

But while al-Shabaab is wounded, it remains dangerous. It still has a sophisticated skill set as evidenced by the complex and effective attacks it launches in Somalia and Kenya. It continues to raise money from charcoal smuggling and taxation, and has a regional network of affiliates in Tanzania and Kenya. The steps the United States has taken with its embassies are heartening signs it is taking the group seriously, as it must; al-Shabaab’s declining fortunes and its need to outbid ISIS and Boko Haram may be making it more intent on attacking US interests than ever before.

Joshua Meservey is Assistant Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter at @jmeservey.

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