As the race for access to critical minerals accelerates—with US President Donald Trump declaring the minerals that power new technologies essential to US national security, and China flexing its control of mineral supply chains with export bans—the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the spotlight. But that light reveals a complicated picture: As major powers and neighboring states contend for access to the country’s tin, cobalt, and copper, the Rwandan-backed M23 paramilitary has seized control of large swaths of eastern Congo, and the specter of full-scale war looms. The DRC signed a minerals-for-infrastructure deal with China in 2007, and now a minerals-for-security or minerals-for-peace deal with the United States is in the offing. 

The DRC has a chance to break the so-called “resource curse” and use its mineral wealth to build the roads, power grids, health infrastructure, and more that will sustain a democratic, economically growing country in the years ahead. Other countries and investors have a chance to live up to their commitments to responsible sourcing of natural resources, and in so doing support good governance and regional peace. The alternative is a continuation of the bad patterns of the past, with the real risk of a new outbreak of violence along the same fault lines that produced the deadliest conflict since World War II.

We asked six experts how the DRC—and its global partners—can take this transformative path. Read on for analyses of the country’s business environment, the industrial potential of its critical minerals and other promising sectors, and peace and security throughout the country.

The business case for peace and democracy in the DRC is strong

By Dave Peterson

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Congo’s war and the critical minerals scramble are inextricably intertwined

By Mvemba Phezo Dizolele

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Critical minerals won’t transform lives in the DRC—a radical shift in security and economic governance will

By Rabah Arezki

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Partner perspective: The DRC’s vast potential extends beyond mining

By Thomas De Dreux-Brézé

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US investors must lead on responsible sourcing in the DRC

By Nicole Namwezi Batumike

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Better roads and stable power grids can unlock the DRC’s potential

By Calixte Ahokpossi

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The business case for peace and democracy in the DRC is strong

Dave Peterson is the former senior director of the Africa Program of the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Rwandan-backed rebel militia M23 has seized control of most of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) while the national army (known by its French acronym, FARDC) and international peacekeepers retreat. At least seven thousand civilians have been killed and thousands more raped. Two million displaced persons and refugees are fleeing for safety, joining some five million already displaced. The US embassy in Kinshasa has been attacked by angry mobs—and both strategic interests and American values are at stake.

The DRC is rich. With 111 million inhabitants in a geographical area the size of Europe, the country is blessed (or cursed) by $24 trillion in mineral resources such as copper, cobalt, lithium, gold, and diamonds, much of it crucial to the world’s transition to electric power, half of it exported to China, and much of it now controlled by Chinese investors. Congo has the world’s largest tropical forests after the Amazon and a vast river network that could power half the African continent; it also has enormous agricultural potential, gas, and oil.

And the DRC is where the greatest slaughter of human beings since World War II occurred just thirty years ago, even as atrocities continue to be reported daily in the country’s east. In addition to M23, more than a hundred militia groups terrorize the population. Rampant corruption sucks billions of dollars from the economy every year, and poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and disease statistics place the DRC near the bottom of global rankings.

The Congolese people have begged for change. Democratic elections held on December 20, 2023, were won by the incumbent, Felix Tshisekedi. Although flawed in many respects, credible domestic observation groups, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and others, concluded they reflected the will of the people. The elections were reasonably competitive and peaceful, a notable achievement compared to Congo’s nine neighbors, many among the most autocratic countries in the world. The elections raised the level of political discourse and further cultivated Congo’s democratic practice. Congo’s press is relatively free, so citizens can debate, organize, and criticize their government. The nation’s civil society is extensive, active, and skilled—advocating, educating, and mobilizing citizens on a host of issues.

Yet after another year in power, the second Tshisekedi administration has failed to resolve the conflict in the east, address rampant corruption, or improve governance. The human rights record is not reassuring, as NED’s Congolese partners and others have documented. More than one hundred kuluna, purportedly youth gang members ensnared by DRC’s notoriously corrupt justice system, were recently executed after the government reinstated the death penalty. Freedom of expression is also under pressure as activists, journalists, and whistleblowers are attacked and fear for their personal safety. Meanwhile, the president seems intent on tampering with the constitution to allow him to extend his term in office.

The mining companies, banks, and tech industry—aware of but loath to abandon the bloody supply chain they rely on—profit handsomely from Congo’s precious minerals. Although the conflict in the country’s east is about more than the trade in minerals, and international funders have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the problem, the DRC’s best hope may be for foreign investors to mobilize pressure on the belligerents to make peace. The Belgian government has investigated Apple for tolerating human rights abuses in its supply chain originating in the DRC, and Apple has acknowledged the difficulty of identifying the sources of its suppliers. Because this is an issue for the entire industry, companies should find it advantageous, both in terms of public relations as well as in creating a conducive business environment, to be more accountable for the stability and prosperity of the communities from which they derive their wealth.

The Trump administration is paying attention. Tenuous negotiations between representatives of the Congolese and Rwandan governments led by the administration’s special envoy Massad Boulos may be making progress. To buttress this, Congolese civil society should be included in the process, including appropriate NGOs, community groups, the church, labor, and business, as proved successful in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue two decades ago. The DRC’s democratic aspirations should be the United States’ comparative advantage. The United States made mistakes in Congo, then called Zaire, during the Cold War, to the detriment of its own reputation, and it would be a shame to return to that era of zero-sum geopolitical competition. Security, strength, and prosperity are interests every nation pursues, but the United States can do better. Many Congolese, including civil society and political leaders, still see the United States as a force for good and a beacon of hope for ideals such as freedom, peace, democracy, justice, and human rights. It is what makes America strong: It is what makes the United States friends and allies, accords America respect and admiration—to be seen as a world leader rather than just another player, a model rather than a pariah.

The US private sector should take the lead. A golden age cannot be built on the blood of innocents, a course that can only lead to more hatred and suffering and will ultimately fail. The international business community must unite in committing to resource extraction practices that abide by international standards of human rights and transparency, incentivize the rival governments and factions in the subregion to lay down their arms, and make it easier and more profitable for companies to do their work. The private sector can rally international public opinion and pave the way for stability and prosperity. The long-suffering Congolese people deserve it.

Congo’s war and the critical minerals scramble are inextricably intertwined

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

For the past thirty years, the world has viewed the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo) through a binary lens of conflict and the exploitation of natural and mineral resources. The conflict optics magnify the insecurity that has characterized life in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. The protracted conflict between Congo and Rwanda spawned the proliferation of militias, including the two iterations of the Rwanda-backed M23, which captured the Congolese cities of Goma and Bukavu on January 25, 2025, and February 16, 2025, respectively. The death toll is estimated at more than seven thousand since January 2025, with unofficial reports from the region suggesting a much higher number of victims.

With 7.8 million internally displaced people, Congo ranks alongside Syria and Sudan among countries with the largest displaced populations, according to the United Nations. Of the more than two million people who have been displaced since the 2022 resurgence of M23, one million were displaced in 2024. Sexual violence, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have increased in M23-occupied areas. These abuses will continue as the rebels expand their territorial control.

Coverage of the conflict has also emphasized the role of natural and mineral resources as drivers of the war. Congo’s resource endowment is valued at a staggering $24 trillion. Analyses of the war have focused on the looting and smuggling of minerals, and have pointed to Rwanda and Uganda as primary beneficiaries. The two countries have emerged as major exporters of minerals, such as gold and coltan, of which they have limited reserves.

Recently, heightened interest in Congo’s mineral resources has been driven, among other reasons, by the West’s determination to circumvent China and secure critical resources like cobalt, copper, and lithium. For instance, on February 18, 2024, the European Union (EU) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains with Rwanda. Even though the EU signed similar memoranda with Congo, Zambia, and Namibia, Rwanda’s case raised questions given the country’s troubled history with Congo concerning mineral resources. This history includes invading Congo, arming violent rebel groups, and smuggling minerals out of rebel-controlled territory.

The second element driving high-profile interest in the country’s mineral wealth is the Trump administration’s classification of critical minerals as vital to US national security. The pursuit of a US-Congo minerals-for-security deal underscores Washington’s increased interest in Congo’s mineral endowment. As the world waits to learn about the contours and substance of the contract and what the United States will offer Kinshasa, it’s worth taking stock of the current foreign investment landscape in the country.

China tops the list of major investors with important financial and technical commitments to Congo’s mining sector. Besides China, the other major players who have established significant footprints in the country include the EU and the United States.

China leads in the mining and infrastructure sectors

China’s investments in DRC focus on the mining sector, with major stakes in the cobalt and copper industries. The engagement stems from the 2008 Sicomines joint venture between Chinese companies (Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering Corporation) and the Congolese government. The venture is the foundation of the Congo-China cooperation. Originally valued at $9 billion, the deal is a minerals-for-infrastructure barter. After pushback from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Congolese civil society organizations, the deal was renegotiated to $6 billion in 2009. In exchange for mining rights, China has financed infrastructure projects, including roads and hospitals. In 2024, Chinese infrastructure investment commitments were valued at $7 billion. Today, China is the largest investor in the country.

United States seeks minerals for national security

Until the advent of the second Trump administration, the United States showed little interest in DRC minerals and focused on the humanitarian challenges of the country. Western companies that secured mining deals often sold their holdings to the Chinese. With every Western business divestment, the Chinese increased their stake in Congo’s mining sector. The new policy change has generated interest for greater US-Congo cooperation. This minerals-focused change is supported by a robust diplomatic engagement that seeks to broker peace between Congo and Rwanda. The administration’s stated objective is to stabilize Congo and create the right conditions for investments in mining and infrastructure.

The new US approach is yielding early results. On May 6, 2025, California-based KoBold Metals and Australia-based AVZ Minerals reached an agreement for the former to acquire AVZ Minerals’ interests in the Manono lithium deposit in Congo. Billionaires Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos back KoBold. The agreement will enable the company to invest over one billion dollars to develop the lithium project.

It is difficult to evaluate the level of current US investments in Congo. US pledges of multi-billion-dollar investments depend on the promises of peace accords between Rwanda and Congo and related bilateral mineral agreements.

European Union focuses on ethical approach to critical minerals

European countries’ approach in Congo focuses on ethical sourcing and sustainability, which also include traceability of minerals due to armed conflict. European development banks have funded projects that improve governance and reduce poverty. Some of these initiatives, however, have faced criticism. For instance, in light of the resurgence of M23, the February 18, 2024, memorandum the EU signed with Rwanda—“establishing close cooperation with Rwanda” on the sourcing of critical minerals—has raised questions about the EU’s commitment to ethical sourcing, given that Rwanda backs the violent M23 paramilitary group. Analysts of the Great Lakes region, diplomats, and members of the European Parliament have all questioned and challenged the intent and effect of the memorandum. Some see it as a driver of the re-emergence of the M23 and the current war between Congo and Rwanda.

Top European investors in Congo include France, the Netherlands, and Italy, who contributed a combined foreign direct investment stock of approximately $32.6 billion in 2022.

Comparative overview of investments

As the scramble for critical minerals enters a new phase with increased US interest in Congo, the country needs effective governance and transparent policies to ensure that foreign investments contribute to sustainable development and economic growth.

Critical minerals won’t transform lives in the DRC—a radical shift in security and economic governance will

Rabah Arezki is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He previously served as chief economist and vice president for economic governance and knowledge management at the African Development Bank, as well as chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank, and as chief of the commodities unit in the research department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s abundance of critical minerals has given rise to comparisons with Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth. But that abundance has not improved citizens’ lives in one of the poorest countries in the world. Yet there is a course that could make that possible: finding the right balance between openness to investments from multinational corporations and economic sovereignty—broadly defined as the ability of a country to control its own economic system.

The DRC is the repository of the world’s largest reserves of critical minerals such as cobalt, copper, and lithium. Indeed, the DRC holds around 70 percent and 60 percent of the world’s cobalt and lithium reserves, respectively, as well significant deposits of nickel and uranium, which are metal components for energy generation and batteries for electric vehicles. Yet the DRC encapsulates the seemingly insurmountable and intertwined challenges posed by critical minerals. These challenges are tied to geopolitics, conflicts, and the environment as well as economic and social dimensions.

First and foremost, the challenge facing the DRC is the new geopolitics around critical minerals. The demand for critical minerals is exploding. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for minerals is projected to increase by more than four times by 2040 amid the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Major powers—namely China, the United States, and the European Union—are engaged in a technological race spurring competition for access to these critical minerals. At the center of that global scramble is the DRC, which is being courted by these powers like never before. China is heavily invested in the mining sector of the DRC and controls the supply chains of critical minerals, including their processing.

Amid the technological race, China has recently imposed restrictions on exports of critical minerals to the United States. Washington and Brussels have tried to challenge Beijing’s monopoly of the supply chains of these minerals by attempting to secure mining contracts, including in the DRC. That competition should in principle help the DRC to not only get a fair share from the mining contracts but also the opportunity to move up the value chain. In practice, multinational corporations and foreign governments have much stronger capacity in negotiating mining contracts relative to the government of the DRC. Quid pro quos are also common involving the receipt of aid packages originating from self-interested donor countries in exchange for the awarding of mining contracts to multinational corporations—linked to donors.

Another major challenge for the DRC is conflict. The DRC is faced with external and internal conflicts. The DRC has a complex history: Once known as the Belgian Congo, it experienced a cruel form of colonization as the de facto personal property of Leopold II, Belgium’s king. The DRC’s post-independence era was plagued by direct interventions by foreign powers and autocratic rulers. That history helps explain the DRC’s deficient institutions, a persistent low level of trust among citizens, and distrust between the citizenry and the government.

The DRC has long faced massive violence and crimes in mineral-rich provinces such as Katanga and North Kivu—fueled by neighbors such as Rwanda and Uganda. The advances of Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Congo is alarming for the DRC and could fuel a “major continental conflict.” The Trump administration is actively pushing for a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda to end the violence. This peace deal appears to be contingent upon the two countries each signing a bilateral economic agreement with the United States involving mineral extraction and processing. The peace negotiations are at an early stage, but these efforts are welcome especially if they lead to an outcome perceived as just.

Minerals are routinely smuggled out of the DRC. Add to that illicit artisanal mining—mining done, generally on a small scale and with low-tech tools, by individuals not employed by a mining company—as a tug of war between the authorities and citizens directly grabbing minerals. As a vast territory, it is imperative for the DRC to expand and strengthen the governance of its security sector to secure its borders and confront armed groups operating on its territory. The DRC is nominally a centralized republic, and it needs to find the right balance for revenue sharing between the different provinces and the central government to reduce internal tensions.

Further, the extraction of critical minerals is leading to significant environmental and health hazards. Indeed, extraction is often associated with deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and the use of toxic chemicals (including mercury), which are polluting ground water sources. Add to that child labor in the extraction of critical minerals, with children and women facing health degradation and abuse. The weak enforcement of environmental and social standards in the DRC is very concerning. A global debate is raging over the boycott of critical minerals emanating from zones of conflicts and forced labor. These boycotts alone are unlikely to sway the DRC’s government to do right by its citizens, but multinational corporations and foreign governments may be more susceptible to pressure.

These multifaceted challenges may seem insurmountable, but that should not deter the government of the DRC. To confront these challenges, the DRC must find a balance between outward- and inward-facing institutions. On the outward-facing front, the government needs to get its fair share of revenues from the extraction of minerals and attract investment in processing domestically. To do so, the government needs to deploy utmost transparency in its dealing with multinational corporations and foster the right human capital to match the capacity on the other side.

On the inward-facing front, the DRC needs to also ensure it is redistributing the proceeds of the revenues from the extraction of critical minerals to its citizens to ensure economic justice. To do so, the government of DRC needs to improve the allocative and technical efficiency of its spending. The government of DRC should pursue further its local content policy (designed to ensure that extractive industrial activity benefits the region where the resources are found) by localizing the processing of critical minerals. A useful example is the case of Botswana, which acquired a 15 percent stake in the world’s biggest diamond miner, DeBeers, which helped lock in local diamond-cutting activities.

This would represent a radical system shift in the DRC’s economic governance apparatus—and such a shift is imperative, in security as well as economic governance. Without that radical shift, the benefits of critical minerals won’t reach the people of the DRC. The Trump administration peace proposal could provide a pathway to a just peace and security between DRC and its neighbors, most notably Rwanda.

US investors must lead on responsible sourcing in the DRC

Nicole Namwezi Batumike is a gender and responsible sourcing specialist at the Congolese nonprofit Panzi Foundation.

The ongoing conversations between the United States and the DRC over access to critical minerals present a rare and urgent opportunity to reset the terms of engagement with Congolese stakeholders and the broader mineral ecosystem. US officials have indicated that American and other Western companies are prepared to make multi-billion-dollar investments in the region once the bilateral mineral deals are finalized. The DRC holds vast reserves of cobalt, copper, and other strategic minerals essential to global technological and energy systems, yet for decades, the Congolese people have borne the costs of extraction without sharing in its benefits, treated as collateral in deals driven by geopolitical rivalries and elite bargains. On top of fueling instability and deepening marginalization, these transactional arrangements have also exposed investors to growing legal, financial, and reputational risks.

Experience shows that when mining fails to deliver value to local communities, companies lose their social license to operate, along with the legitimacy of the regimes they once depended on. In turn, those regimes have proven willing to shift allegiances in pursuit of regime security. The DRC, for example, has filed lawsuits against downstream tech giants and pushed for sanctions targeting neighboring countries laundering conflict minerals. It is increasingly clear that the Congolese regime is not bound to any single partner.

US engagement in Africa must reflect geopolitical realities. Recent peace deal discussions show the United States is willing to engage Rwanda’s refining sector—despite Kigali’s documented role in violating Congolese sovereignty and committing war crimes. If responsible sourcing is to truly guide stable engagements, policymakers must reckon with the risks of endorsing impunity and failing to deliver justice for the Congolese people.

The negotiation of a US-DRC mineral deal offers a crucial opportunity to break this cycle, provided Kinshasa resists the historical pattern of leveraging minerals solely for regime survival, and provided the United States supports a model of genuine security: one not rooted in a logic of extractivism but in mutual accountability and the rule of law. By aligning US investment strategy with Congolese legal frameworks and responsible sourcing standards, both countries can lower risks by forging a sustainable model.

Responsible sourcing is a legal and strategic imperative

Meeting international due diligence standards to ensure that a given business activity does not involve human-rights violations has shifted from being a reputational safeguard to a legal and strategic requirement. Standards include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Human rights due diligence is now codified through laws such as the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, France’s Duty of Vigilance Law, and Germany’s Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, making risk mitigation binding across global operations, especially in high-risk contexts like the DRC.

Yet despite these frameworks, the DRC remains at war, and the global minerals trade continues to serve short-term political and economic agendas. In 2024, the US Government Accountability Office reported that Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (America’s flagship due diligence law) had not reduced violence in eastern Congo and may have exacerbated conflict around artisanal gold-mining sites. The US government’s insistence on better outcomes demonstrates that due diligence is a means, not an end, and it cannot resolve the structural drivers of the conflict.

The DRC’s mining codes provide a responsible framework for US investors

It is in this context that the DRC’s 2018 mining code emerges not as an obstacle but as a strategic foundation. On top of aligning closely with international expectations for human rights due diligence, the code offers investors and companies a clear, locally grounded framework to manage risk and build sustainable partnerships. Born out of years marked by revenue leakage, extractive impunity, and donor-driven liberalization, the code reasserts the government’s dual roles as a regulator and shareholder while mandating local beneficiation (a part of mineral processing). It raises royalty rates on strategic minerals like cobalt, introduces a “super-profits” tax, and makes community development contributions legally binding. It also restricts the use of “stabilization clauses,” which limit countries’ ability to apply new regulations to investors with agreements signed before the regulations went into effect, and strengthens environmental and social accountability.

Pilot models offer early lessons in responsible sourcing. For example, at Mutoshi in the Lualaba province, the collaboration of multinational commodities group Trafigura with Chemaf, a Congolese company, and Pact, an international nonprofit organization, showed that formalizing artisanal mining not only met sourcing commitments but also helped contribute to de-risking efforts. Meanwhile, the Panzi Foundation’s Green Mining Community Model, an initiative led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Denis Mukwege, links inclusive training in responsible sourcing and value addition with investments in essential infrastructure like health and education. By seeking to address the root causes of conflict and the violent tactics it enables—such as the use of rape as a weapon of war—the Green Mining Community model promotes integration and community empowerment, positioning responsible sourcing as a pathway to long-term stability and shared value.

Opportunities and challenges in the US policy landscape

The United States is on the path to establishing promising policies and frameworks for responsible investment, as demonstrated by the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act, which emphasizes governance and transparency. Initiatives such as the US-backed expansion of the Lobito Corridor* linking the DRC to Angola’s Lobito port, alongside previous efforts like USAID’s Just Gold project, could provide a strong foundation. However, their long-term impact will depend on aligning with fair labor and environmental standards, sustainable development, and, importantly, the continuity of these efforts under the new administration.

At the same time, setbacks like the 180-day suspension of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement must be urgently addressed. Restoring accountability is essential for ethical investment.

As US Rep. Sara Jacobs highlighted in a March 2025 Africa Subcommittee hearing, investments will only succeed in the long term if they do not ignore the root causes of exploitation.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo stands at a pivotal juncture: either the cycle of extractive exploitation continues, or the government leverages its mineral wealth to foster long-term development. For US stakeholders, the way forward lies in transparent, law-abiding, and community-centered partnerships. This requires a commitment to the DRC’s 2018 Mining Code and collaboration with Congolese civil society. While short-term gains may be tempting, only those who embrace responsible sourcing and inclusive models will build sustainable, competitive advantages.

Better roads and stable power grids can unlock the DRC’s potential

Calixte Ahokpossi is mission chief, Democratic Republic of the Congo, for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has vast economic potential, but infrastructure gaps remain a major constraint. The country is rich in natural resources and has a large and young population that could drive its development. However, chronic underinvestment in critical infrastructure—roads, rail networks, and power generation—continues to stifle economic progress. Additionally, governance challenges, corruption, macroeconomic instability, and recurring shocks—including armed conflicts in its eastern region—exacerbate fragility.

Addressing these challenges requires tackling their sociopolitical and economic roots, while leveraging the country’s vast natural resource wealth to rapidly bridge the infrastructure gap and foster diversified and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The DRC needs an ambitious infrastructure agenda, prioritizing the development of transport corridors and stable power grids.

Weak, unevenly distributed infrastructure

The DRC’s road network is severely underdeveloped, limiting mobility and trade. With only 152,400 kilometers (km) of roads, connectivity remains a challenge. The roads serve the nation’s vast 2.45 million km² territory, a road-to-territory ratio that is just 40 percent of the sub-Saharan African average of 0.14 km/ km², which is already low compared to other regions. Fewer than 10 percent of these roads are passable year-round, and more than half of Congolese (54.5 percent) must travel over an hour to reach a paved or asphalted road. Urban-rural disparities are stark. In the southeast (Haut-Katanga and Lualaba), large-scale copper and cobalt mining has spurred some investment in roads and rail lines, but the transportation infrastructure remains vastly insufficient for a region that supplies most of the world’s cobalt and a significant share of global copper. Indeed, the DRC accounts for over 70 percent of global cobalt output and approximately half the world’s proven reserves. In contrast, the eastern provinces (North and South Kivu, Ituri)—rich in gold and the “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum, tungsten)—receive minimal investment, as small-scale artisanal mining dominates, offering limited economic spillovers.

The DRC remains one of the least electrified nations despite vast hydropower potential. Only 19.1 percent of the population has access to electricity, with rural coverage plummeting to a mere 2 percent. The country is heavily dependent on two aging hydropower plants: Inga 1 (with an installed capacity of 351 megawatts) and Inga 2 (installed capacity of 1,424 MW), both under rehabilitation and operating at roughly 80 percent capacity. These plants primarily serve the mining industry. Ambitious projects like Inga 3 (3,000 to 11,000 MW) and the even larger Grand Inga (which could surpass China’s Three Gorges Dam) underscore the Congo River’s vast potential. Yet delays, shifting international partnerships, and environmental concerns have repeatedly stalled construction.

A barrier to inclusive growth

Weak infrastructure inflates costs, constrains businesses, and fosters economic disparities. Poor infrastructure raises transportation and production costs, stifling economic activity in time-sensitive sectors (like perishable goods). This is evident in agriculture, which employs the majority of Congolese (over 60 percent of the labor force). Despite the DRC’s fertile land, poor transport links prevent farmers from bringing their surplus produce to markets. Goods perish on farms, and the country remains dependent on food imports, making it vulnerable to global food price shocks and exchange rate fluctuations. These disruptions fuel inflation, disproportionately affecting the poorest. The weak transportation network also restricts economic diversification and limits access to remote mineral deposits, leaving critical resources untapped—or controlled by armed groups.

Unreliable energy supply disrupts businesses and limits opportunities for local transformation and adding value. From irrigation systems to medical clinics, power shortages affect essential activities and reinforce a cycle of poverty and missed opportunities. They also hamper industrialization, making local mineral processing, manufacturing, and daily business operations difficult or virtually impossible. Mining companies report that frequent power shortages force them to rely on diesel generators, raising production costs substantially. This inefficiency hits small businesses even harder, eroding profit margins and reducing corporate income tax revenues. Under these conditions, the DRC’s ambition to increase local mineral processing and move up the value chain remains a major challenge.

Five steps to good roads, reliable power, and economic growth

1. Invest in transport and energy infrastructure to generate sustainable growth. The DRC’s vast mineral wealth and energy potential make it an attractive destination for large-scale private investment, but various bottlenecks such as infrastructure, business environment, and governance must be addressed. We focus here on infrastructure ones. Unlocking the hydropower potential (100,000 MW, which is 13 percent of the world’s total) could meet domestic needs and generate export revenue. Modernizing existing hydroelectric facilities and expanding transmission grids would provide clean, affordable electricity to both industry and households. For the mining sector, improved energy access could lower production costs while enhancing compliance with global environmental, social, and governance standards. Meanwhile, broader electrification would fuel local enterprise, boost economic diversification, and improve living standards.
2. Diversify financing for the substantial investments needed to bridge the infrastructure gap. The International Monetary Fund estimates that achieving universal electricity access would require annual spending of 5.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while ensuring that 75 percent of the population lives within two kilometers of an all-season road would necessitate 14.9 percent of GDP annually over ten years. Given these costs, leveraging diversified public, private, and international financing is key to accelerating infrastructure development.
3. Strengthen public investment management to maximize returns. Weak governance and public investment management have led to waste, corruption risks, and substandard project execution. Strengthening investment governance would maximize value for money, boosting private-sector confidence and investment. Equally key is creating fiscal space for critical infrastructure and social and human capital investments. This requires improving domestic tax and nontax revenue collection and prioritizing growth-enhancing spending. Yet low revenue collection, especially relative to peer countries and the DRC’s economic potential, remains a major constraint.
4. Pursue prudent, strategic government borrowing to secure favorable terms. Domestically, containing inflation would lower borrowing costs and encourage higher domestic savings, strengthening the local financial market. Externally, the focus should remain on concessional financing, prioritizing low-cost, long-term loans. Over time, as policy credibility strengthens and the country’s creditworthiness improves, access to international financial markets could be considered, particularly when global conditions are favorable.
5. Scale up infrastructure investments through regional partnerships. The DRC would benefit from harnessing regional frameworks such as the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community to mobilize resources for transport and energy infrastructure. Cross-border energy grids and trade corridors can reduce operational costs, attract larger financing and enhance the country’s global competitiveness. Regional collaboration offers a pragmatic solution to tackling infrastructure deficits while strengthening economic resilience. Also, the development of the Lobito Corridor,* linking the DRC to Angola’s Lobito port, can deepen regional integration and offer more cost-effective transportation routes for DRC’s exports—though it will be important to avoid undermining parallel port development projects in the western part of the DRC.

In sum, the future of the DRC will be promising if its development challenges can be addressed in an ambitious and realistic manner. Developing a reliable road network and extending electricity provision will be critical to reap the DRC’s vast potential—and will need to be supported by sound macroeconomic policies and reforms to strengthen the country’s resilience to overcome its fragility.

Launched in 2022, the Africa Center’s programming on the DRC seeks to advise on securing the country’s governance and to raise awareness of the economic opportunities in the DRC. In partnership with Rawbank, the Africa Center analyzes the DRC’s business environment, the industrial potential of its critical minerals, and peace and security throughout the country.

*Rawbank, which supports the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s work on the Democratic Republic of Congo, has an equity stake in the Africa Finance Corporation, which leads the development of the Lobito Corridor.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Beyond critical minerals: Capitalizing on the DRC’s vast opportunities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Conflict minerals and the M23 insurgency 

The Great Lakes region of Africa, which straddles the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, supplies 30 percent of the world’s coltan, a crucial mineral for high-end electronics. Other valuable minerals, such tin, tungsten, tantalite, and gold, are often mined alongside coltan in the region. Artisanal mining is common—while this provides livelihoods for many, it also gives rise to dangerous working conditions, child labor, and political conflict and instability.  

Much of the region’s coltan is deemed a conflict mineral as mining areas are controlled by armed groups and organized crime. The DRC government lacks firm control of its territories, especially in the eastern provinces, and transportation infrastructure is underdeveloped. Because of these challenges, foreign companies often avoid direct mining in the DRC, instead purchasing minerals through middlemen. 

The M23 rebel group, an ethnic Tutsi-led militia in the eastern DRC, is fighting the DRC national army and claims to protect Tutsi populations from Hutu militias. Its resurgence in 2022 is linked to frustrations over the government’s slow implementation of peace agreements and worsening security, although it is argued that M23 acts in service of Rwanda’s interests in the region’s minerals. The M23 insurgency is allegedly financed through the exploitation of coltan and other minerals, including reports that M23 fraudulently exported at least 150 metric tons of coltan (7-10 percent of DRC’s annual global supply) to Rwanda in 2024. Current estimates put this as high as 120 metric tons per month. The current involvement and role of Rwanda is evidenced by the presence of 4,000 Rwandan army personnel and heavy weaponry.  

The ongoing insurgency has halted regular mining activities, leading to “command” mining in which rebels control operations. This is affecting production levels, worker safety, and regional investment. Conflict has placed all transport routes under rebel control, increasing costs and delays due to road closures and violence.  

An important dynamic for global supply chains is that rebel groups like M23, along with other middlemen, foster the mixing of legal and illegal minerals. This effectively launders the illegally mined material, allowing its sale to parties that are mandated to buy ethically sourced product, such as US-based customers who must comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. These sales channel profits to armed groups while depriving the DRC of its rightful revenue. Rwanda is effectively complicit, as it does not charge taxes on mineral exports and allows imported goods to be reassigned as “Made in Rwanda” if they are transformed or processed within the country with a minimum 30 percent value addition. 

DRC efforts to regain control 

Amid the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC, there is an intensified call for international accountability and economic reforms to address resource-driven violence. At the February 2025 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council session, the International Chamber of Commerce and Development urged the UN to enhance transparency in raw material transfers from Rwanda to combat mineral exploitation crimes. Enhanced oversight, it argued, would hold resource looters accountable. 

Additionally, at the Munich Security Conference, the DRC accused Rwanda of destabilizing the region to exploit its minerals and proposed measures to encourage legitimate investments and transparent contracts while urging the international community to facilitate peace.  

The DRC, meanwhile, has classified certain mining sites in North and South Kivu provinces as “red” zones, halting mineral trading in these areas. The country is orchestrating legal and regulatory efforts, including installing ore tracking mechanisms to combat the illegal mineral trade, disrupt conflict financing, and align mining practices with international standards. The red zone classification is intended to last six months and includes independent audits to ensure responsible sourcing.  

On the diplomatic and military front, a quid pro quo of mineral rights for security cooperation seems to be developing whereby the DRC is courting Western governments’ security assistance to thwart the Rwanda-backed incursion. Much of the international community is also demanding stricter standards for purchasing minerals ostensibly mined and processed in Rwanda. The DRC will need international support to implement measures for strict oversight of the region and, more fundamentally, addressing the sources of instability that fuel the conflict. On a positive note, in late March, a Qatar-brokered peace summit resulted in commitments by the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda to cease hostilities. 

Next steps

Achieving lasting peace in the eastern DRC requires addressing the root causes of conflict, including ethnic tensions, political instability, and competition for mineral resources. It will not come quickly.  

The DRC needs sustained dialogue with rebel groups and neighboring countries to reach a peace agreement and foster reconciliation among ethnic groups. It also needs to improve the capacity and legitimacy of institutions to manage resources, provide security, combat corruption, and enhance transparency. 

Meanwhile, mineral buyers and the international community can help the DRC by enforcing ethical sourcing that follows regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act and OECD guidelines, supporting peace initiatives with diplomatic and financial aid, and providing humanitarian assistance to support displaced populations, rebuild communities, and enforce human rights laws. 

The M23 insurgency is yet another reminder that the international community must support resource-rich countries in building the capacity to formalize mining and adhere to recognized principles for working and living conditions. The United States’ and others’ overtures to help provide security may be a good first step, but it only sets a foundation for much more work to be done. 

Clarkson Kamurai is the critical minerals program manager at the Payne Institute and a PhD researcher in the minerals and energy economics program at the Colorado School of Mines. Kamurai has engineering experience in base and precious metal mining in sub-Saharan Africa and South America. 

Brad Handler is the program director for the Payne Institute for Public Policy’s Energy Finance Lab. Previously, he was an equity research analyst in the oil and gas sector at investment banks including Credit Suisse and Jefferies.  

Morgan Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines and a former lead energy specialist at the World Bank. 

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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New Atlanticist Apr 18, 2025

Tariffs can help secure US critical mineral supply chains—if they’re done right

By Reed Blakemore, Alexis Harmon

US tariffs on critical minerals should be precisely targeted and coupled with robust federal support for domestic mining.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource Apr 3, 2025

Profitability and power: Fixing US critical minerals supply chains

By Ashley Zumwalt-Forbes

The global critical minerals race is well underway, and the American supply chain is behind. To regain momentum, the US must make this industry viable by creating a financial framework that attracts and retains capital.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

AfricaSource Mar 21, 2025

In the scramble for Africa’s critical minerals, the West must not abandon the ESG agenda

By Zainab Usman and Rama Yade

As this race for minerals and metals critical for the energy transition heats up, both companies and governments must not abandon environmental, social, and governance principles in Africa.

Africa Energy & Environment

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Illicit mineral supply chains fuel the DRC’s M23 insurgency  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Season 2, Episode 10 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by African politics and security expert Ben Shepherd. After 300 Romanian mercenaries were cornered by M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in January, Ben reflects on the reasons behind the rebels’ advance and the perennial need for DRC’s government to look to external security providers for help managing threats.

Ben outlines how the Congolese military has been drawn into patterns of patronage that systematically undermine its effectiveness. They also discuss Rwanda’s support for M23, regional jockeying for access to DRC’s vast mineral wealth, and a recently thwarted coup involving three US nationals.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Podcast Jan 10, 2024

Mercenaries and Gaza

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Iraq expert Renad Mansour about what motivates the non-state actors who are leading the bid to avenge Gazans.

Conflict Crisis Management

Podcast Apr 24, 2024

American Hit Squad in Yemen

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post Mercenaries in DRC: “Do not come for adventure here” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In recent years, governments, industry, and civil society have come to the realization that technical solutions alone are insufficient to stymie evolving cyber threats and that a capable workforce who can smoothly integrate policy and technical responses is imperative. Furthermore, there’s a recognition that Africa will be home to a significant portion of the future global workforce, highlighting a need for investment in cyber capacity building and the development of diverse skillsets that can support the protection of critical infrastructure, foster collaboration on cybersecurity issues with allies and partners, and develop policies that promote the development of more secure technologies.   

When the Atlantic Council established the Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge in 2012, the intent was not just to train tomorrow’s cybersecurity leaders, but also to broaden the pipeline of students considering a career in cybersecurity, connect students with potential mentors and employers, and increase connectivity between the technical and policy communities. 

To learn more about the ways scenario exercises can apply to African cybersecurity challenges and their impact on emerging cybersecurity policy leaders on the continent, we spoke to seven participants from the 2024 Cape Town Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge: 

Why did your team decide to compete in the Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge? What did you expect when signing up to compete in a policy-focused scenario exercise?

The Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge challenges students to engage in crisis management and develop strategies to bolster cyber resilience and the protection of critical infrastructures after a major attack. This not only aligned with our interests but is also crucial for developing countries, especially African nations like Senegal.

While researching the competition, we noticed that many prestigious universities from the United States and Europe had competed in Cyber 9/12, which motivated us to sign up as young researchers with interests in deploying security solutions, identifying vulnerabilities, and crisis management. Some of our team members had previously participated in the initial rounds of NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography competitions in 2017 and 2022, but this was the first time we had the opportunity to compete in an international cybersecurity competition.

Several aspects have motivated our team’s participation, including:

• Challenging ourselves as young researchers who have exclusively studied in Senegal by competing internationally;
• Seizing the opportunity to showcase our creativity and team spirit through the challenges presented in the scenario;
• Enhancing our skills by competing against high-level teams from around the world;
• Increasing the visibility of Francophone cyber talent in the international cybersecurity community;
• Connecting with experts, professionals, entrepreneurs, and passionate young individuals from across the globe;
• Enjoying the experience of participating in a friendly competition in a field we are passionate about: cybersecurity;
• Exploring new places, such as the iconic country of South Africa;
• Gaining credibility and highlighting the need for African countries and the private sector to invest in training, research, and implementing policies and partnerships in cybersecurity, aiming to protect internet users, personal data in cyberspace, and critical infrastructure.

EagleSen Team of Cheikh Anta Diop University, Senegal

How did/does Cyber 9/12 inform your career goals in both cybersecurity and policy?

The Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge was an invaluable opportunity for each of us, offering more than just exposure to cybersecurity and policy. Our aim in applying was to learn as much as we could, and the experience showed us the critical role that strategy and policy play in mitigating cyber threats and highlighted the importance of understanding both the technical and policy aspects of cybersecurity. It helped align our individual career paths within these fields in meaningful ways.

For Emmanuella, Ama, and Eli—with our backgrounds in Computer Science—the challenge emphasized how critical it is to design secure systems that are both resilient and adaptable to evolving cyber threats. We’ve become more committed to exploring careers where we can bridge the gap between technical security solutions and policy implementation. For Jessica, as an AI student, the competition underscored the growing intersection between artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; how AI can be leveraged for threat detection, and even support policy decisions. This has encouraged Jessica to explore roles where AI can be applied to bolster cybersecurity measures and support data-driven policymaking.

Throughout the competition, combining our unique backgrounds in AI and Computer Science gave us a durable foundation for tackling complex cybersecurity challenges from different perspectives. This collaboration proved invaluable and reinforced our belief that working at the intersection of these disciplines is key to developing innovative solutions and robust cybersecurity strategies.

Cyber Legends of the Academic City University College, Ghana

Who evaluated your scenario response and what kinds of questions did they pose for you to respond to? What feedback did you take from the experience?

On the first day, Dr. Kester Quist-Aphetsi, Adam Hantman, Rachel Adams, and Dr. Tendani Chimboza evaluated our team’s briefing and policy recommendations. On the second day, Jo Gill, Dr, Kester Quist-Aphetsi, Aisha Kamara, and Adam Hantman evaluated our updated briefing and policy recommendations. The judges’ questions focused on how the cybersecurity recommendations our team had developed may affect other sectors. More specifically, we were challenged to consider the socio-economic ramifications of our suggested responses, among other things. Their feedback really helped us hone our approach to incident response. The feedback underscored how crucial it is to think multi-dimensionally, not being restricted to technicalities, as cybersecurity is intersectional.

Cryptic Crusaders of the Malawi University of science and Technology, Malawi

How did your team decide to approach this year’s scenario and balance your responses to the different issues presented?

Our team’s approach to this year’s competition began with an in-depth analysis of the scenario, aiming to identify both prominent and subtle issues that could shape the incident’s trajectory. This comprehensive view helped us grasp the full scope of the challenge. Each member then focused on researching specific aspects of the scenario, concentrating on solutions that would meet both the immediate needs of the incident and support sustainable, long-term mitigations. This two-pronged approach enabled us to propose solutions that balanced both immediate action with preventative strategies.

To develop well-rounded responses, we emphasized a holistic perspective, examining the problem from multiple angles to address the technical, operational, economic, and policy facets. This approach involved accounting for resource allocation, system vulnerabilities, and the impact of proposed solutions on operational efficiency, state security, and diplomacy in assessing the incident to provide effective recommendations. By considering these factors, we aimed to ensure our recommendations were feasible, adaptable, and capable.

Our team’s adaptability played a critical role in addressing the dynamic nature of the challenge. By encouraging each team member to analyze the scenario through their specific lens, we were able to identify gaps in each other’s findings, allowing us to refine our solutions collaboratively. Time management was crucial to our approach, and our focus on efficiency allowed us to implement our strategy effectively within the limited timeframe. This collaborative, time-sensitive approach strengthened our team’s responses and contributed to our overall success in tackling the challenge.

Trojan Turtles of Namibia University of science and Technology, Namibia

Some of your team members have competed in other Cyber 9/12 competitions—how did you leverage those past experiences to inform how you wanted to prepare for the Cape Town competition?

Drawing from our experience at previous Cyber 9/12 competitions, we’ve refined our approach by understanding the competition’s structure and timing, allowing us to manage our resources more effectively. These experiences have also emphasized the importance of assigning clear team roles, ensuring that each member contributes based on their strengths in policy analysis or technical problem-solving.

While past experiences have been highly informative and prepared us to be agile in responding to a wide range of cyber scenarios, the unique perspectives of different judges can still make it challenging for a team to anticipate their responses. It can be discouraging when a judge disagrees with our recommended approach. After each competition, our post-mortem analysis helps us assess our performance, as well as sharpen our decision-making and teamwork, helping us make strategic choices and maintain composure under pressure—essential lessons that guide our preparation for upcoming competitions.

Cybertrons of the University of Cape Town, South Africa

What kinds of lessons might you apply from your Cyber 9/12 experience if you found yourself in a real cyber crisis? How so?

What I learned from listening to and critiquing students’ briefings and policy responses:

• Leverage multidisciplinary teams to analyze and solve cyber issues;
• Structure the problem to ensure that all aspects are addressed (e.g. the scenario presented challenges in regional relations, legal, policy, cybersecurity, logistical, and data management issues);
• Analyze risks and prioritize solutions to address the highest risk issues first, such as the restoration of port operations, neutralization of internal threats, cooperation with affected regional partners, and responsible public communication, in addition to the usual cybersecurity response of discover, isolate, replace and/or repair, restore, defend, and deter;
• Ensure that, beyond the solution of the immediate challenges, long-term lessons are also learned, and local and regional policies, strategies, cybersecurity, Information and Communications Technology (ICT), institutional arrangements, and capacity-building activities are identified, designed and implemented;
• Implement cooperation and communication frameworks to ensure that related institutions adequately resolve aspects of the cyber issue that fall within their mandate, whether it be law enforcement, data regulators, ICT (software, hardware etc.) manufacturers, vendors, and integrators;
• For developing countries, the ICT sector may have gaps, where legacy systems which are inadequately secured and poorly upgraded to align with the emerging ICT context, persist in various sectors. Regulators should keep tabs on such products and motivate their manufacturers to harden their products against emerging threats.

– Dr. Kate Getao, Senior Advisor at Diplo Foundation

After seeing teams from across the region respond to the scenario presented to them, what do you see stakeholders doing well when it comes to cyber education and workforce development? Where do we have room to improve?

My impression as a judge in the Cape Town Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge is that stakeholders are doing a great job at developing analytical and presentation skills on cybersecurity issues and mitigation. Stakeholders are also doing a good job developing the cyber workforce to translate cyber incidents into policy and strategic responses.

My observation at the Cape Town competition is that the focus for most of the teams was on the identification of technical issues in the scenario and less on the the policy and strategy issues presented. There’s an opportunity here to increase our support for teams in developing their understanding cyber policy and strategy, and how to translate technical issues or occurrences into policy options to avert future crises.

Eric Akumiah, Africa Regional Liaison at Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams

As a former competitor and now, a judge, of the Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge, in what ways do you think the competition prepares students for careers in cybersecurity? As a practitioner in the field yourself, are there any specific skills that have translated well to your professional career?

At every Cyber 9/12 competition I’ve attended, whether as a competitor or a judge, teams arrive ready to dive deep into technical responses to the scenario designed by the Atlantic Council. There’s talk of patch rollouts, potential exploits, and remediation plans. As the competitors are grilled on their responses, they begin to realize that Cyber 9/12 is, in fact, a cyber policy and strategy challenge. Their lens cracks and their assumptions crumble as they begin to understand that the landscape of cybersecurity is much vaster than they realized; that cybersecurity impacts and is impacted by a host of different issues. It’s profound seeing that epiphany come in real time and it’s amazing how quickly the best competitors can change their approach. I can’t overemphasize the importance of that lesson in the practice of cybersecurity; and it’s one every Cyber 9/12 competitor walks away with.

Ben Ballard, Cybersecurity Engineer at MITRE

Safa Shahwan Edwards (she/her) is the director of Capacity Building and Communities within the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the the Atlantic Council Tech Programs.
Emerson Johnston (she/her) is a young global professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Tech Programs.

The Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge is a one-of-a-kind cyber competition designed to provide students from across academic disciplines with a deeper understanding of the policy and strategy challenges associated with management of tradeoffs during a cyber crisis.

Learn more

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

learn more

The post In it to win it: Understanding cyber policy through a simulated crisis  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Freedom and democracy are in decline globally, according to the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index. Political freedom in particular has slumped sharply since 2019, bringing the world to a twenty-four-year low. The biggest backsliders—the places with the sharpest declines in political freedom—span every major geographic region and many are particularly relevant to US national security.  

There are several fundamental reasons for the United States to support strategies that aim to halt such backsliding and foster democratization, including ones that go beyond the moral obligation to support humanitarian values. For instance, research shows that democracies are less prone to enable and export transnational crime or terrorism, and democracies are better at adapting to adverse economic events and avoiding large-scale disasters, and are more reliable trading partners, offering better business opportunities by upholding the rule of law and protecting investments from the arbitrary predation of political elites. Most notably, the vast majority of people around the world continue to prefer to be governed democratically.

Democracy support also strengthens the US position more broadly in the strategic contest against the autocratic rivals of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Robust democratic institutions—transparent judiciaries, capable legislatures, responsive political parties, an active civil society, and a free press—make it harder for the rulers in the autocratic bloc to co-opt elites in other countries and advance their malign agendas.

But with the world experiencing a global democratic recession, questions arise as to whether supporting democracy is a losing battle. Despite the bleak recent data on global democratic progress, democracy assistance is still crucial, not only in countries undergoing political openings and democratic consolidation but also—and perhaps even more so—in countries that are backsliding.  

Case studies in the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa suggest that using foreign assistance (in addition to and in concert with diplomacy and investment) to support democracy champions wherever they are is an effective strategy, even if the payoff is not immediately apparent at the level of a country’s political system.  

Report Sep 5, 2024

Supporting credible elections to advance democracy globally in 2024 and beyond

By Katherine Ellena, Mario Mitre, and Patrick Quirk

The US and its allies support free and fair elections to strengthen democracy, ensuring global stability and security. This paper explores how US foreign aid for elections is a wise investment, highlighting priority elections in 2024 and 2025 where focused assistance can uphold democratic values and foster citizens’ trust in the democratic process.

Africa Elections

Report Jul 3, 2024

Advancing freedom, defeating authoritarianism: A democracy agenda for 2025-2029

By Patrick Quirk

This report provides actionable and measurable policy recommendations for the upcoming administration’s foreign policy to advance democracy and strengthen the US position in international development.

Economy & Business Freedom and Prosperity

Issue Brief Sep 19, 2023

Less freedom, weaker states, more conflict: can that cycle be broken?

By Patrick W. Quirk and Owen L. Myers

Why and how advancing freedom (political, economic, and judicial components) is the surest way to advance sustainable stability and associated prosperity.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Even in authoritarian countries, democracy advocates are worth investing in appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Benjamin Mossberg: Biden’s trip shows the success of Angola’s reforms

Joseph Lemoine: The Lobito Corridor reveals how the US focus is shifting from aid to investment

Alexandria J. Maloney: Trump should anticipate the need for US engagement in Africa

William Tobin: The Lobito Corridor shows that the United States can deliver on the right kinds of investment

Alexander Tripp: The US can outcompete China in Africa—it just needs to do so more frequently

Biden’s trip shows the success of Angola’s reforms

With his first trip to Africa, just twenty-nine days before the end of his term, Biden is highlighting the positive news story that is Angola. Historical narratives of Angola, including a difficult period of Portuguese colonialism, a decades-long civil war, and nearly forty years of authoritarian dictatorship under José Eduardo dos Santos, trend toward the negative. Following the 2017 election of João Lourenço as president, Angola has worked to implement an economic reform program to increase macroeconomic stability, strengthen public sector governance, and attract greater levels of foreign direct investment. The visit of a US president to Angola shows that the narrative today is different and that Angola is focused on the future.

I joined Brian Nelson, the US Treasury Department’s under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, on his first trip to Angola in March 2022. While there, I saw the impact of these reforms firsthand. At home, Angola made strides to implement reforms to combat corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing. Abroad, Angola worked with its neighbors and international partners to provide mutual assistance and improve coordination.

These credible efforts show the private sector that Angola is open for business. Without these reforms, projects that Biden is set to visit, such as those in the Lobito Corridor or in the telecommunications sector, would not be possible. These positive signals should continue. Risk-rating agencies and financial institutions should look to Angola to further integrate the country into the global financial system. US executive branch agencies should continue to work with their Angolan counterparts to strengthen the country’s capacity to fight corruption and money laundering while encouraging more US firms to seriously consider investing in Africa’s seventh-largest country. Angola’s leaders are writing a new narrative, and the visit of a sitting US president shows that the United States is serious about the future.

—Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

The Lobito Corridor reveals how the US focus is shifting from aid to investment

Collaborating with African nations is vital for US economic and national security interests and should be balanced with promoting peace, stability, and a brighter economic future on the continent. Demand for critical minerals such as copper, cobalt, and lithium is surging, driven by their essential role in powering electronics and advancing green energy technologies. Africa, with its abundant reserves, is increasingly becoming a focal point for US efforts to secure these resources. 

Biden’s upcoming two-day trip to Luanda, Angola—his first official visit to Sub-Saharan Africa—marks a significant moment in his presidency. It is the result of intensifying US-China competition on the continent, as Beijing currently dominates many African mining sectors. His meeting with Lourenço is aimed at reaffirming bilateral ties and advancing the Lobito Corridor project. Launched in 2023 as a partnership between the United States, European Union (EU), Angola, and other African entities, the corridor aims to connect Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito via rail. With more than three billion dollars already mobilized, the project is envisioned as the first step toward a new transcontinental railway linking the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

The Lobito Corridor is a flagship initiative under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), the rebrand of Biden’s “Build Back Better World” initiative. It was adopted by the Group of Seven (G7) in 2022 in a bid to create infrastructure investment partnerships between G7 countries and developing nations. The PGII serves as an opportunity to strengthen US-Africa relations by shifting the focus from aid to investment, spurring trade, commerce, and private financing with the aim of generating economic growth in all participating countries. The effort also serves as a counter to China’s own infrastructure projects in the region—Chinese companies have invested more than twelve billion dollars in Angola over the past decade to construct canals, railways, and other infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

As President-elect Donald Trump prepares to take office, sustaining investment in the Lobito Corridor is imperative. This initiative strengthens US-Africa trade, promotes local economic development, and serves as a strategic tool to counter China’s influence. It also aligns with the Trump-era Blue Dot Network’s commitment to high-quality global infrastructure standards, delivering mutually beneficial outcomes for all stakeholders involved.

—Joseph Lemoine is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank.

Trump should anticipate the need for US engagement in Africa

A productive US foreign policy toward Africa under the Trump administration would focus on relationships and investments that align with US strategic and commercial interests. Biden’s trip emphasizes Angola’s growing geopolitical importance as a regional power and key partner in the diversification of the global supply chain, particularly for critical minerals vital to today’s technologies. Angola has been a prime strategic partner to the United States in the region, through infrastructure initiatives such as the multibillion-dollar, EU-supported Lobito Corridor project. Given Trump’s “America first” stance on lessening multilateral engagement, there probably will be a shift toward more bilateral programs, such as through Prosper Africa and the Export-Import Bank of the United States. 

The Trump administration should anticipate the need for US engagement in Africa in response to China’s continued influence on the continent. With the expansion of the BRICS grouping, nations in the Global South are furthering economic ties despite rivaling interests. This dynamic can be expected to deepen economic relations among BRICS nations across Africa while increasing competition with US markets. US policy toward humanitarian aid should be expected to shift toward a more “self-reliant” model for African nations and an overall reduction of US financial commitments to foreign aid. Under the new Trump administration, counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will likely emphasize combating extremism through military and diplomatic channels. 

If the Trump administration is serious about security, trade, and advancing long-term US economic interests, it will consider major US strategic involvement and investments with African nations.

—Alexandria J. Maloney is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Lobito Corridor shows that the United States can deliver on the right kinds of investment

The Biden administration has championed the notion that the United States must prioritize investment, not aid, and put a focus on commercial diplomacy with African nations. In this respect, Biden’s visit to Angola does more than deliver, belatedly, on the pledge he made to visit the continent during the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit. In addition, the visit offers the president the opportunity to showcase that the United States is capable of delivering on the kind of relationship that leaders on the continent desire: one that delivers investment of the nature that can close the infrastructure gap, estimated to be roughly $100 billion by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 

This was recognized in the White House’s US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, released in 2022, which articulated the aim to “advance shared prosperity, leverage the best of America’s private sector, and promote equitable growth.” In Angola, Biden will showcase the United States’ ability to partake in this model, through the Lobito Corridor, a public-private railway project linking the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito. 

The United States has supported this effort with a $553 million loan to the Lobito Atlantic Railway and a $250 million loan to the Africa Finance Corporation. These investments, along with contributions from partners such as the EU and the African Development Bank—as well as private sector concessionaires such as Trafigura, Mota-Engil, and Ventricles— have leveraged more than four billion dollars in financing.

Still, the United States must do more to prove it can be the economic partner of choice for Africa’s capital-starved governments and enterprises. The United States has yet to devise a strategy that can enable the US private sector to compete on the same level of Chinese firms on the continent. Since 2013, when the Belt and Road Initiative was launched, China has outpaced the United States in new foreign direct investment to Africa. The United States has long strides to walk in improving its economic ties with the continent. The Lobito Corridor, featuring Angola’s Port of Lobito, offers the hope that at least it can be done. 

—William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

The US can outcompete China in Africa—it just needs to do so more frequently

As can be clearly seen from Biden’s laggard trip to Africa, the continent is not at the forefront of US foreign policy concerns. This trip was already overdue when it was postponed in October. Now, post-election, there is a risk that it will symbolize little more than keeping a promise made roughly twenty-four months ago.

However, on a strategic level, the Lobito Corridor represents a win for the Biden administration and the United States. Angola has historically not been aligned with the United States, with Cold War legacies front and center. As the Washington Post put it in January, Angola “long turned to China for infrastructure and to Russia for tanks and missiles.” So, the fact that it is now partnering with the United States, over China and Russia, is significant. And it is no doubt helped along by the Biden administration’s strategy of not approaching relations with African nations under the guise of great-power competition.

It cannot be overstated that this represents a US success. China has long dominated these types of deals on the continent, and economic power can transfer into hard power. As was recently demonstrated in Peru, with the opening of the deep-water megaport of Chancay, US absenteeism opens the door for Chinese influence. These Chinese ports, as well as bringing in economic opportunity, also bring in potential strategic threats. Today’s port could be tomorrow’s naval base.

As such, the Lobito Corridor is more than just a railway line across the continent connecting the globe with some of the most valuable minerals in a twenty-first-century economy. It is also leading to what will become a major global trading port. 

Washington should recognize that Beijing’s interest in the continent far outmatches its own. China’s first overseas military base was built in Djibouti, in East Africa, and rumors persist that it is looking for an Atlantic base in the west as well. 

The Lobito Corridor seems to have kept China’s “String of Pearls” at bay for now, but it is only one project on a continent that covers roughly 20 percent of the Earth’s landmass and whose population will be 25 percent of the world’s total by 2050. The Lobito Corridor is so far a success, but it will need to be the first of many. Notably, the United States has been keen to emphasize that the Lobito Corridor will bring with it plenty of local economic opportunity. If anything, the Lobito Corridor shows that the United States can outcompete China—it just needs to do so more frequently. Add in the withdrawal of EU and US troops in the Sahel and their replacement by Russian forces, and the Lobito Corridor is a much-needed win for US presence on the continent. 

—Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Experts react: What Biden’s trip to Angola says about US Africa policy, China, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030 Agenda outlines an ambitious plan to transform the nation into an upper-middle-income country by 2030, aligning with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. The plan focuses on both economic growth and social progress, highlighting the need for a comprehensive development approach. Nations with more open and efficient economic, political, and legal systems typically experience greater prosperity and well-being.

A key component of Vision 2030 is creating an effective business environment that fosters entrepreneurship and attracts foreign direct investment (FDI). Gender equality and women’s empowerment are integral to this vision, as harnessing the full potential of the population can drive economic productivity and innovation. By fostering an environment that attracts FDI and supports entrepreneurship, Zimbabwe aims to create a robust economic foundation for durable prosperity.

Nina Dannaoui is the deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Joseph Lemoine is the senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

William Mortenson is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

James Storen is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Feb 26, 2024

2024 Atlas: Freedom and prosperity around the world

The contemporary geopolitical landscape is marked by a series of crises—economic downturns, geopolitical tensions, and global pandemics—that have reshaped the role of governments worldwide. This comprehensive volume, featuring insights from twenty leading economists and diplomats, serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Report Jun 25, 2024

The path to prosperity: The 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

By Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea

In this “year of election,” freedom continues to decline globally. Political rights, judicial independence, and checks and balances are eroding. Prosperity growth has slowed, particularly in developing countries. The data underscores a strong link between freedom and prosperity, highlighting the need for data-driven policy reforms.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

Issue Brief Apr 15, 2024

How Bangladesh can achieve its vision of prosperity

By Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Joseph Lemoine, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

Bangladesh is forging ahead with its Vision 2041, aiming to transform into a developed and prosperous country by 2041.

Bangladesh Freedom and Prosperity

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post How Zimbabwe can achieve its vision of prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That risk is due to a number of factors, but one glaring reason is the limited availability or mining of these minerals in the United States. That is increasingly problematic as demand for these minerals rises, considering the role they play in building a green economy globally.

In contrast, across the Atlantic, Africa is home to over 30 percent of the world’s known reserves of critical minerals. While international interest and investment in the African critical-minerals industry have been lagging, it is rapidly picking up; this is welcome news for resource-rich African nations.

But history shows that mining interest and investment—even if welcome—can have inadvertent negative effects. In recent years, mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and South Africa have been found to be polluting waterways, contributing to acid rain, and poisoning residents. Thus, the US public and private sectors should develop strategies surrounding mining projects that ensure African workers’ health is protected, the environment is not damaged, and the opinions of local communities are sought out, heard, and respected.

Acknowledge the checkered history of mining in Africa

It is important for mining companies and foreign governments to be cognizant of the historical context that surrounds the African mining industry.

For example, in South Africa in the nineteenth century, the discovery of diamonds and gold brought Africans and Europeans alike to mining areas such as the Witwatersrand and mining towns such as Kimberley. After the initial boom, the South African government passed the Natives Land Act in 1913, which restricted Black Africans from buying or occupying land outside of specified areas, except as employees. This policy restricted many Africans from benefiting from the proceeds of mining minerals, and for these people, their main access to any financial gain from the mines came only from working as miners.

While the legislation was repealed in 1991—and others like it are firmly in Africa’s past—it created the conditions for a variety of socioeconomic challenges, including poverty, inequality, and landlessness. Thus, as the US public and private sectors look to get more involved on the continent with mining projects, they should integrate into their strategies a plan for increasing economic opportunity for local communities.

The US government seems to be headed in this direction already with its support for and investment in the Lobito Corridor project, which aims to update the infrastructure along an economic route stretching from the DRC and Zambia to an Angolan port in order to improve the flow of mining-related trade and also to create jobs for local communities. Concerns still remain, but this form of holistic engagement is essential to ensuring mutual prosperity in mining projects.

Don’t exacerbate the “resource curse”

Many African countries have been associated with a “resource curse,” a term that refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to fully benefit from their natural resources.

For example, Cabo Delgado, a small province in Mozambique’s north, is one of the country’s poorest regions, despite the region’s many natural resources. This has led many in Cabo Delgado to feel marginalized and angry at the central government. A 2011 discovery of a massive natural gas field off the northeastern coast of Mozambique further exacerbated this dissatisfaction. Specifically, youth in the region felt sidelined as foreigners and Mozambicans from elsewhere in the country benefited from the jobs and wealth associated with the discovery.

As the government formalized the mining sector and centralized control of it, artisanal miners were displaced. A widely held sense of injustice gave rise to an Islamist militant group, Mozambique’s al-Shabaab, which took advantage of these grievances to gain popularity among youth in the region. The activities of various armed groups in Cabo Delgado have resulted in around five thousand deaths and the displacement of 582,000 people since 2017.  

In conducting mining projects on the continent, the US public and private sector should add to their strategies specific plans to ensure that the benefits of natural-resource endowment reach local communities.

Botswana provides a positive example. In recent years, the country—one of the world’s leading producers of diamonds and also among the least corrupt on the African continent—has developed a “pro-equity based extractive sector strategy,” taking revenues from extractive sectors and investing them in health and education infrastructure and also into long-term savings through an asset fund. There are also various mechanisms and institutions set up to prevent or catch corruption, such as a constitutionally independent body in charge of cases of corruption. Botswana shows that strong business and the fight against corruption are perfectly compatible.

As part of any strategy, US stakeholders should support African countries in their anti-corruption endeavors and empower human-rights organizations that risk much to protect the resources of these countries and ensure benefits from mining reach local communities. Doing so would encourage African countries to take corruption issues seriously and, in the long run, would create a more attractive environment for sustainable investments. That contradicts the naive belief of some people—such as Israeli businessman Dan Gertler, who was sanctioned by the Trump administration for what it called “corrupt mining and oil deals” in the DRC (he has denied wrongdoing)—that lifting sanctions would be a way to bring back foreign investors.

Strategize for stability

Over time, mismanaged mining projects have contributed to instability, violence, and conflict across Africa.

That dynamic can be seen not only in the Mozambique case but also in Kivu, a region in the DRC’s east. The DRC is central to the production of several critical minerals. For example, as much as 70 percent of global cobalt comes from the DRC. A conflict has gripped the region for almost three decades, and armed groups have wrestled control of mining areas to finance their operations. The DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and China have often put their interests ahead of those of the residents, who are hoping to see their quality of life improve. Currently, six million people are internally displaced within the DRC, and since the start of the conflict in 1996, six million people have been killed.

With this history in mind, US mining companies with projects on the continent must strategize on how to limit the role mining plays in exacerbating conflicts and tensions. They can do that by bringing more of the supply chain—specifically, value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing—to the continent.

Industrializing the mineral sector in Africa

Historically, mining in Africa has been exploited by foreign partners. China, for example, controls 80 percent of the world’s raw mineral refining and owns fifteen of the seventeen cobalt mining operations in the DRC.

But the US public and private sector can change this status quo by bringing more of the value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing to the African continent, rather than extracting the minerals and bringing them immediately overseas for processing. Not only would this appeal to local populations—as it would encourage industrialization—but employing this different strategy would offer the United States a comparative advantage over China.

A strategy that brings value-adding steps of the value chain to the continent should promote local job creation, prioritize environmental protection in areas with high floral and animal biodiversity, and protect workers’ health. It should also prioritize the deployment of cleaner mining techniques (including those mobilizing artificial intelligence) and encourage countries to adopt a tax that allows for a more fair and just distribution of revenues from mining.

Economic communities—such as the Southern African Development Community—should also play a role in promoting regional value chains. Through such groupings, countries should take advantage of opportunities to share information and data, build capacities, and harmonize legal frameworks.

Stakeholders from the United States must remember that this is about more than curbing Chinese and Russian influence on the continent; rather, it is about avoiding past wrongdoings on the continent, by supporting local communities and preventing mining operations from contributing to various forms of instability and conflict.  

But there’s also a bigger picture to keep in mind: By getting mining investment right, the United States can set a new precedent for its collaboration with African countries in other areas, such as in health, security, and technology.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

Sibi Nyaoga is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center where he supports the center’s work on critical minerals and migration. 

The post Critical minerals investment must avoid the mistakes of the past in African mining appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The higher demand for critical minerals is expected to cause a significant expansion in the extraction and production of an array of mineral resources. For example, the World Economic Forum projects that the production of minerals including graphite, cobalt, and lithium could increase by nearly 500 percent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean-energy technologies. Estimated to hold approximately 30 percent of the volume of critical-mineral reserves, the African continent is situated at the very center of the energy transition.

A considerable amount of minerals—for example, 25 percent of tin and 26 percent of tantalum production—is sourced by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM): low-tech, labor-intensive mining operations in which workers (largely unskilled labor) use rudimentary tools and techniques to access mineral ore. ASM is an important source of rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated ten million people in the region working as artisanal and small-scale miners—sourcing critical minerals but also other minerals such as gold. These workers are often driven to the sector by poverty. At least sixty million other individuals facilitate these informal supply chains.

However, many of these artisanal and small-scale miners work informally and face harsh conditions. Before critical-mineral production ramps up even further, African communities, stakeholders, and governments must take steps to formalize these workers—and the international community, including the United States, should help.

What is the problem?

In contrast with ASM, large-scale mining (LSM) is industrial and long-term, utilizing heavy machinery to extract resources. Furthermore, LSM has more geological information available to it and better access to capital and finance. Most importantly, LSM generally operates within the rules of law and adheres to international standards and regulations. It is accompanied by many challenges, however, including causing ecological and habitat damage; polluting the water, air, and soil; and threatening human health. Even where mining operations are conducted legally and formally, they still pose significant environmental and socioeconomic problems.

Although vastly different types of mining, ASM and LSM often take place in overlapping spaces, with ASM operations appearing on the periphery of larger industrial sites. Artisanal miners frequently live and work in areas earmarked for large-scale mining projects, blurring the line between the two. This is exemplified by the presence of illicit or licit networks of middlemen who transport ore from ASM sites to LSM companies and processing facilities. Middlemen often aggregate minerals from various sources, including both ASM and LSM operations, making it especially difficult to trace the origin of the minerals. The fragmented and opaque nature of the mineral supply chain complicates the traceability of products from upstream suppliers to downstream companies.  

There are many challenges associated with artisanal mining. At least 90 percent of artisanal miners work informally, without the necessary licenses or permits required by law. Securing permits improves miners’ access to services they are unable to access in the informal economy—such as microfinance credit, grants, and government loan facilities, which, in turn, place the miners in a better position to accumulate wealth. In many cases, ASM activities are found in regions that are out of reach of regulators, where the institutional presence of the government is weak. By operating outside of state recognition, it becomes impossible for the government to establish and enforce health and safety standards and regulations.

With informal mining operations flying under the radar of the government, either by the design of mining site owners or willful ignorance on the part of the government, workers are routinely exposed to poor labor conditions and dangerous situations. Artisanal miners often work without proper tools and protective gear in unsupported and poorly ventilated underground shafts where, as Amnesty International points out, temperatures can be extremely high. Exposure to the dust and mineral waste generated from these mines can lead to potentially fatal diseases and health conditions, and the dust and waste also contributes to pollution and environmental degradation in the area surrounding the mine.

Across the African continent, artisanal mining has been linked to human-rights violations, forced labor, crime, and conflict. These issues, compounded with artisanal miners’ lack of legal rights, exacerbates their vulnerability and the cycles of poverty and exploitation they face.

More at stake

The problems in ASM often present a significant barrier to sustainable foreign investment in African critical minerals. The aforementioned problems in the artisanal sector have made Western business interests hesitant to invest in Africa’s critical minerals. Poor labor practices and human rights violations associated with ASM could expose global companies to reputational and regulatory risks. These concerns—combined with pressure from non-governmental and human-rights organizations—make investment in ASM a complicated and risky proposition.

This barrier is present in artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt is a critical component of many lithium-ion batteries, including ones used to power electric vehicles, produce components for wind and solar energy technologies, and power portable electronic devices such as smartphones. The DRC accounts for more than 74 percent of global cobalt mining, and 20 to 30 percent of that is via ASM.

In some regions of the DRC, artisanal miners are exploited by armed groups that seek to control mining areas and siphon revenue to finance their operations, purchase weapons, and sustain conflicts. Militias have abducted and trafficked children to extract cobalt as well as copper, in a bid to fund their groups. In addition, some ASM cobalt operations employ children. It was once estimated that forty thousand children were mining for cobalt, working in life-threatening conditions and exposed to violence, extortion, and intimidation.

Such problems associated with informality, including the absence of regulatory standards and the occurrence of human-rights violations, make it difficult for potential investors to justify long-term investments. Without clear, enforceable laws, investors face a high-risk business environment and unpredictable changes in mining policies, which undermine investor confidence.

In addition to posing these immediate risks to artisanal miners and their communities, informal mining exacerbates economic and market instability on a macroeconomic level. Informal miners typically earn a meager and unstable income, which is subject to fluctuation based on the market prices and demand for cobalt. Miners’ economic instability translates into broader economic uncertainty for the sector and limits opportunities for community development. The presence of such substantial unregulated economic activity leads to significant tax revenue losses for the government, because these transactions primarily occur outside of official channels. This undermines the state’s capacity to invest money in necessary social programs, build infrastructure, and quell violence in other regions of the DRC. In spite of these challenging economic implications, African governments might resist formalization efforts, unwilling to disrupt the vital role ASM plays in the livelihoods of many individuals and communities across Africa.

While artisanal cobalt mining in the DRC provides a case study, some of these issues associated with informality are also prevalent in the mining of critical minerals in other African nations, such as lithium production in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Across the continent, the volatility of ASM creates a less attractive investment environment, given that investors seek dependable production to ensure stable supply chains and therefore profitability.

What might formalization look like?

Despite the complications associated with the informal production of many critical minerals, the solution is not to disengage from ASM; it employs 90 percent of the mining workforce. Rather, the solution lies in formalizing and legalizing ASM, which will help mitigate the risks inherent to these mining operations while fostering a more regulated and stable environment for international investment in Africa’s critical minerals.

Integrating the ASM sector into the formal economy would help improve local security, stabilize incomes, and ensure that safer and more environmentally sustainable practices are implemented. It would also help create national regulations and international standards, pressuring the ASM sector to improve practices to become compliant.

Formalization means that miners are registered with proper mining titles. Even in some countries where ASM is recognized by law, governments have not made it possible for miners to obtain the necessary permits and licenses. But in addition to these permits and licenses, formalization also includes—according to the Washington-based nonprofit Pact—efforts by the mining industry to enact chain of custody and supply chain transparency measures; health, safety, and environmental protections; security and human-rights protections; measures that improve access to finance; and requirements to use proper mining techniques. In addition, formalization includes sound industry policies, procedures, and due diligence systems, which should be in place throughout the life cycle of a mine. These components of formalization create a framework within which artisanal miners can operate safely and legally, contributing positively to community-wide and country-wide development goals and global supply chains.

Given the complexity of the informal economy, there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to formalization. We can, however, look for strategies that have been effective in other countries or industries and use them to guide the approach towards formalizing ASM. For example, Rwanda’s 2010 Land Tenure Reform Programme initiated a systematic registration effort to promote land access and address tenure insecurity. This program registered over ten million land parcels in less than five years and enabled landowners to use their property as collateral for loans, facilitating access to credit. The program has been widely regarded as successful in integrating the informal economy, particularly due to its simple registration process and involvement of community members and stakeholders in the reform. Transitioning ASM to the formal economy must also use an integrated whole-of-society approach, centering African communities, stakeholders, and governments. This might mean starting small at a grassroots level by engaging local communities in social dialogue, allowing informal miners to express their views and defend their interests. Their inclusion at an early stage of the formalization process will ensure that policies address informality efficiently and enhance the effectiveness of such measures.

There have been some efforts in recent years to support the formalization of ASM workers and improve social and environmental practices in the sector. For example, as the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) explains, international Fairtrade and Fairmined standards set minimum standards for responsible mining, which support formalization. Furthermore, chain of custody initiatives trace supply chains from mine to market to ensure that supply chains are not associated with any conflicts or human rights abuses and that they meet international regulations. These are certainly steps in the right direction but, as the IGF explains, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of these initiatives and whether they are reaching the most marginalized communities.

Formalization is a very complex but necessary process that can improve the lives of miners and address issues in the critical-mineral supply chain—and therefore attract more sustainable investment to the sector, contributing to the broader development goals of African countries.

How the international community can help

As mineral extraction in Africa is only expected to increase in the foreseeable future, it would be strategically unwise for the international community, and in particular the United States, to sit idly by on the issue of formalizing artisanal mining.

Going forward, the United States can focus on capacity building and simplifying trade processes and market access to help formalize artisanal mining in Africa, which could lead to increased global investment in critical minerals. To build the foundation for policies and programs that provide legal protection for ASM miners, the United States could fund and support training programs for artisanal miners, local authorities, and government officials on sustainable mining practices, health and safety standards, regulatory compliance, and business skills. By strengthening local and national institutions responsible for overseeing the ASM sector, governments would be better able to enforce regulations, protect the rights of artisanal miners, and formalize the sector.

The United States could also work with African governments and international organizations—such as the African Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—to simplify trade procedures, enabling miners to participate legally and more fully in global supply chains. In December 2022, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the DRC and Zambia to develop a productive electric-battery supply chain—from the extraction of minerals to the assembly line. The agreement also serves as a commitment to respect international standards and to prevent, detect, and fight corruption and build a sustainable industry in Africa that benefits workers and local communities, as well as the US private sector. At this time, it is more political than actionable, although it creates a framework for future negotiations and strengthened partnerships. Deepening ties with African nations and collaborating with international organizations can help leverage the resources, expertise, and global networks to ensure a more conducive environment for investment and sustainable growth. Increasing institutional capacity would also allow governments to strengthen tenure security and clarify property rights for ASM, particularly reducing the incidence of ASM-LSM conflict.

The creation of more legal channels for miners to sell their products could enhance supply chain transparency and promote more sustainable market practices. Implementing an international certification mechanism, similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), offers the ASM sector an opportunity for empowerment and a pathway towards legitimacy. Originally established to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, the KPCS mandates that member countries adhere to strict certification requirements, import and export controls, regular audits, and controlled trade. The principles of the Kimberly Process might be adapted to the extraction of critical minerals so as to increase the security of artisanal miners and their access to legal markets.

Not only would these policy actions benefit African countries in the context of the critical-minerals boom and improve the livelihoods of miners, but they would allow the United States to strengthen its economic and strategic partnerships with African countries. As critical minerals will continue to advance the clean-energy transition, decisive action is essential to make the future of mining a pathway for inclusive, sustainable development for the countries that supply minerals to the world.

Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

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The post Dollar Dominance Monitor featured by Reuters on BRICS de-dollarization efforts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

South Asia’s political parties need internal reforms to revitalize regional democracy

By Steve Cima, Geoffrey MacDonald, James Storen

This paper is the third in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

Unloved but indispensable: Political parties in Europe

By Paul McCarthy, Thibault Muzergues, Patrick Quirk

The experience of the past decade has shown that despite their unpopularity, political parties remain indispensable for the functioning of democracies in Europe—when they are present, plural, and organized, democracy is doing well. To prove this assertion, this paper will look at four telling examples in recent European history.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Nov 19, 2024

The shift from party to personality politics is harming Latin American democracies

By Christine Zaino, Sofia Herrera

This paper is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Americas Democratic Transitions

State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world. 

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Research questions
• Methodology
• Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing
• Assessment
• Recommendations
• Acknowledgments
• About the author
• Appendix 1

Introduction

In the United States, the military procurement bureaucracy tends to sponsor development of new technologies to fill requirements. The bureaucracy also largely seeks domestic sources for all new charismatic military megafauna: aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems. Security “cooperation” in US policy and practice is largely a one-way process, neglecting the benefit of learning and sourcing from other countries. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s concomitant threats from India to Korea, point to the need for coordinating the industrial capabilities of allies. As the United States faces simultaneous competition with two revisionist, nuclear-armed, major-power rivals, not to mention a challenging budgetary and fiscal environment, the additional research and development (R&D) costs assumed by the Department of Defense through its disregard of foreign suppliers, while never ideal, are no longer tenable.

Law, regulation, and policy can conspire against good economic thinking, though with clear exemptions. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1983 prohibited the construction of naval vessels in foreign shipyards, unless the president first informs Congress of a national security need otherwise (10 U.S.C. §§ 7309–7310). The Buy American Act of 1933 demands preference for domestic manufactures in federal procurement, though this is waived for imports from dozens of allied countries through reciprocal agreements (41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305). Note, though, that these laws say nothing of where products are designed, merely where they are manufactured. Further, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 mandates a “preference for commercial products . . . to the maximum extent practical,” with “market research . . . before developing new specifications for a procurement” (10 U.S.C. § 3453). Official policy periodically reemphasizes this mandate for off-the-shelf procurement.¹

Much of the procurement bureaucracy in the Defense Department seems not to understand the exemptions and the mandates for off-the-shelf procurement of military capabilities. In contrast, the US Special Operations Command, imbued with its own procurement authority, has been far more open to procuring military systems off the shelf, and then heavily customizing them against specific military needs. The US Coast Guard, housed under the Department of Homeland Security, has also long preferred off-the-shelf solutions, often of foreign design and even manufacture—and with much less customization. Indeed, decades of procurement debacles and the economics of international commerce indicate that broad domestic preference is wrongheaded. At least three reasons point to the need for broader sources of supply:

• Quality: With military off-the-shelf solutions, many of the qualities are observable, from performance in testing to actual use in battle. In developmental programs, quality is not so observable ex ante, and may disappoint ex post. Global procurement invites buyers to find the best equipment available anywhere, and often from countries with competitive advantages in particular industries.
• Urgency: Off-the-shelf solutions may be sought as interim solutions to immediate military problems. If not restrained by production capacities or bottlenecks, they will arrive presently. What is purchased immediately may then suffice for anticipated problems, becoming enduring solutions, if the political and technological conditions do not too greatly change in the long run. In contrast, technological development requires greater lead time, delaying fielding.
• Economy: Off-the-shelf solutions may come at lower upfront prices, if the development costs are spread among multiple national customers, or otherwise already amortized. With domestic development, the cost is disproportionately borne by the sponsoring government, and this roughly averages 20 percent of the life-cycle cost of more advanced systems. Spending on R&D competes with spending on procurement, but, in fielding capabilities, the measure of merit is procurement. Simultaneously, when immediate needs are adequately filled by off-the-shelf procurements, monies can be husbanded for developing systems targeted at more challenging, long-range problems. Later, the wider supply base for the off-the-shelf system, which should remain largely interoperable with foreign versions, will contribute to lower sustainment costs.

Because autarky is illusory, greater “friend-sourcing” can provide US forces with quick access to proven, economical solutions, while maintaining the option for domestic production when that is strategically desirable.² Informal consortia of allied buyers could then naturally divide responsibilities for development and production, through an emergent but controlled market process. Allowing US forces more opportunities to acquire military technologies abroad would then restructure security cooperation as a two-way process, with the avid participation of friendly countries. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently described Kyiv’s emerging military-industrial cooperation with the United States, “Ukraine does not want to depend only on partners. Ukraine aims to and really can become a donor of security for all our neighbors once it can guarantee its own safety.”³ Access to that sort of battled-hardened experience is part of the return on US assistance.

Research questions

Historical case studies can provide tangible evidence as to how well friend-sourcing approaches have fared in the recent past. The results can demonstrate whether actual procurements should more closely follow this course of action, already supported by law, policy, and economic theory. This study then poses two important and timely research questions. In the United States, since the end of the Cold War, how has the procurement of off-the-shelf systems developed for allied militaries:

• Affected the quality, availability, and cost of national military capabilities?
• Affected the long-term market for national, military-industrial R&D?

Methodology

To answer these questions, this paper seeks to identify all recent cases of off-the-shelf military procurements in the United States, subject to some boundaries. The set is limited to major end systems—aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems—because the international trade in subsystems among friendly countries is already much more liberal. Also, the set includes only those US procurements undertaken since the end of the Cold War because global security dynamics changed radically at that point. Note that this excludes from consideration, for example, the US Army’s procurement of its Austrian-designed Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, and the US Marine Corps’ procurement of LAV-25 armored vehicles, as these both began in the 1980s.

This paper further restricts the set to systems already in use by US forces, so that a firm decision for adoption, and some record of operation, can be observed. The study includes, however, customizations of off-the-shelf systems, as most countries have needs for subsystems (radios, racks, left- or right-hand drive, etc.) specific to their own military services, and modest customization is common in the international arms trade.

After review of histories and the author’s consultations with a wide set of experts on US military procurement, this paper identifies only nine cases—two missile systems, four aircraft, one ship, and two armored vehicles—in this set (see Appendix 1 for a summary):

• The RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile (NSM)
• The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
• The UH-72A Lakota helicopter
• The MH-139A Grey Wolf helicopter
• The HC-144 Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft
• The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft
• The Sentinel-class Fast-Response Cutter
• The RG-31 mine-protected vehicle
• The Stryker LAV III Interim Armored Vehicle

Neither the author nor the Atlantic Council intends to endorse or oppose the specific platforms mentioned or the procurement choices made. Rather, the following section outlines how these systems were procured and what advantages the acquiring service derived from the purchase. The following assessment section gathers lessons from the case studies in aggregate to inform how the Department of Defense should consider friend-sourcing more military procurement.

Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing

RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile

The RGM-184A NSM is a 400 kilogram, jet-powered, sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile. In September 2014, seeking a lightweight but lethal anti-ship missile for its littoral combat ships (LCSs), the US Navy test-fired Kongsberg’s NSM from the USS Coronado. In 2015, the Navy undertook a competitive procurement to equip its LCSs. Kongsberg and Raytheon announced a teaming arrangement to bring the Norwegian missile to the United States.⁴ Boeing initially offered an extended-range RGM-84 Harpoon, and Lockheed Martin a surface-launched version of its AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The latter two firms, however, withdrew their entries in 2017. In May 2018, the Navy selected the NSM for its Independence-class LCSs, its Freedom-class LCSs, and its Constellation-class frigates. The Marine Corps subsequently selected the NSM to equip its new land-based, mobile anti-ship missile batteries, with two NSMs mounted on each robotic Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (see below), deemed the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS).

The missiles are mostly built in Norway, as they have been in production there since 2007, and they cost “slightly less than the Raytheon Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile.”⁵ In a press release, Raytheon noted that undertaking final assembly and testing of an already operational missile “saves the United States billions of dollars in development costs and creates new high-tech jobs in this country.”⁶ More labor, at possibly higher cost, would be required in the United States if production were fully domesticated, and Kongsberg and Raytheon have discussed a second production line to deliver yet more missiles.⁷ Navigation is provided by satellite, inertial, and terrain contour matching; terminal guidance relies on imaging infrared and a target-image database. With the latter technologies, the NSM is designed to strike specific, vulnerable points on an enemy ship, and detonate with its void-sensing fuse at the point of maximum damage. A single missile can thus render even a large warship hors de combat.

The NSM was initially developed by and for Norway. Missiles for mobile coastal defense batteries were quickly sold to Poland. Since then, the NSM has been adopted as well by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Indonesia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In summary, with the NSM, the Navy and Marine Corps obtained one of the best anti-ship missiles in the world, from a running production line, and at a cost below that of its best alternative in inventory. The US Navy and Air Force have continued to fund development of other, longer-range cruise missiles.

Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System

The NASAMS (pronounced NAY-sams) is a ground-based, anti-aircraft missile system. NASAMS was developed in the 1990s by Kongsberg and Hughes Aircraft to replace the Nike Hercules batteries of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Raytheon acquired Hughes Aircraft in 1997.) NASAMS integrates Raytheon’s MPQ-36A Sentinel trailer-mounted radar and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) with Kongsberg’s launcher and battle-management system. In an apparently sole-source deal, the US Army procured several launchers for the medium-range air defense of Washington, DC, in 2005, and they have served in that role ever since, at a variety of locations in Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland.⁸ The NASAMS case is remarkable in that the Norwegian-US team integrated two off-the-shelf components from a US manufacturer into its system before providing that system as an off-the-shelf product back to the US military.

The United States was the third user of NASAMS, after Norway and Spain. NASAMS is now in service with thirteen countries, including Australia, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Oman.“⁹ In 2022 and 2023, the United States, Norway, Lithuania, and Canada all provided NASAMS units to Ukraine.¹⁰ The Canadian purchase is notable because Canada itself had no ground-based air defenses; the Canadian federal government simply identified a cost-effective and already-available system to send.¹¹

In summary, with the NASAMS, the US Army obtained a medium-range air defense system that remains at the forefront of air defense against the most challenging (Russian) threats, from a running production line, and at a cost that global customers still willingly pay. The US Army and Navy have continued to fund several other families of medium- and long-range air defense missiles.

UH-72A (EC145) Lakota utility helicopter

The EC145 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying nine passengers. In its Light Utility Helicopter program of 2005, the US Army sought a proven helicopter for logistical and medical missions within the United States. In its request for proposals (RFP), the Army specifically sought only off-the-shelf aircraft, and received such offers from Bell, AgustaWestland (now Leonardo), and Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters). In June 2006, the Army selected a version of Eurocopter’s EC145, and designated it the UH-72A Lakota. The EC145 first flew in 1999 and was itself developed from the MBB/Kawasaki BK 117, which had first flown in 1979.

All UH-72s have been assembled at Airbus’s factory in Columbus, Mississippi. The program has experienced no significant delays. The UH-72 was competitively sourced, and the Army has been sufficiently satisfied with its performance and cost-effectiveness that the service has purchased 481 of the aircraft. Along the way, the Army awarded Airbus further orders under the original contract to fully recapitalize its fleet of training helicopters.¹² The Army’s Lakota was subsequently upgraded into the UH-72B, as Airbus continued to develop its EC145 into the H145M.¹³

Military versions of the EC145 have also been in service with the military forces of thirteen other countries: Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Serbia, Thailand, and the Cayman Islands. The US Army has several times rebuffed suggestions that the domestic-service helicopters could be deployed overseas, asserting that adding armor and decoys would be uneconomical. However, in December 2023, Airbus and the German Defense Ministry announced a deal for at least sixty-two H145Ms, configured as either commando transports or missile-firing anti-tank helicopters.¹⁴ In this way, the case provides an example of a US military service overestimating its need for technological development when an off-the-shelf product would suffice.

In summary, with the EC145, the US Army obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a price that won a competitive tender. The US Army continued to fund rotorcraft development, though more notably of tilt-rotor aircraft through its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program.

MH-139A (AW139) Grey Wolf helicopter

The AW139 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying up to fifteen passengers.

In the late 1960s, Bell Helicopter developed its UH-1 Huey helicopter, a workhorse of the Vietnam War, into the twin-engine UH-1N Twin Huey, to meet a requirement of the Royal Canadian Air Force.¹⁵ The US Air Force began buying Twin Hueys in 1970, for a variety of utility functions. About forty-five years later, the USAF was ready to replace them, seeking up to eighty-four aircraft for passenger transport and other utility functions. The aircraft had two particularly important roles: flying commandos to any missile silos in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota that might come under attack, and evacuating government officials from Washington, DC should the capital city again come under attack.¹⁶ The USAF initially planned a sole-source award to Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky for UH-60s. Under the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. § 1535), an agency can select a system already in service with another branch of government in lieu of a competitive procurement. Congressional objections soon scuttled that idea, whether to provide others an opportunity to bid or simply because the UH-60 might not have been the best-value solution.¹⁷ In September 2016, the USAF released a request for information (RFI) from industry, and in December, a draft RFP.¹⁸

The Air Force asked for a proven helicopter, and in response, five companies or teams offered four types of aircraft. Sikorsky offered its HH-60U Pave Hawk, already in service with the USAF. Sierra Nevada offered to rebuild existing, out-of-service US Army UH-60As to a -60U configuration. Airbus offered its UH-72A, already (see above) in service with the US Army. Textron’s Bell Aircraft offered its UH-1Y, already in service with the US Marine Corps, which was developed in the 1990s under a perhaps questionable sole-source contract.¹⁹ Leonardo teamed with Boeing to offer a military version of the Italian company’s AW139. That aircraft had been developed initially by Agusta (later AgustaWestland, now Leonardo) and Bell in the late 1990s, though Agusta bought Bell’s interest in the program in 2005.

The Air Force rejected the Airbus and Bell offerings outright as too small and short-ranged for the missile security mission. In September 2018, the service chose the AW139. At the announcement, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told the assembled that “strong competition drove down costs for the program, resulting in $1.7 billion in savings to the taxpayer.”²⁰ In this instance, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act beat the Economy Act at economy. At first delivery, in December 2019, the service named it the MH-139A Grey Wolf.²¹ Flight testing started in 2020, but did not conclude for several years. Leonardo and Boeing agreed to some requested modifications, and the aircraft had some unexpected difficulties with FAA certification.²² Low-rate production started in Philadelphia in March 2023.“²³ The Grey Wolves are today built on the north side of Philadelphia, where Leonardo has been building AW139s since 2007, and they are then customized on the south side of Philadelphia, by Boeing.

Prior to the Air Force’s purchase, AW139s were flying with at least three air services in the United States: the New Jersey State Police (since 2012), the Maryland State Police (2012), and the Los Angeles City Fire Department (2013). Miami-Dade Fire Rescue joined that group in 2020. Air forces or other public flying services in twenty-four other countries also operate AW139s.

In summary, with the AW139, the US Air Force obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, with a two-year delay, though at a price that won a competitive tender. The Air Force had not spent significant sums previously on rotorcraft development, and, with relatively few requirements for rotary-wing aircraft, the service has not since.

HC-144 (CN-235) Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft

The CN-235 is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying fifty-one passengers or thirty-five paratroopers. In May 2003, the US Coast Guard selected the CN-235-300M maritime patrol aircraft from the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) as part of its “Deepwater” program to recapitalize much of its aircraft and ship fleets.“²⁴ In February 2004, Deepwater contractor Lockheed Martin ordered the first two aircraft from EADS on the Coast Guard’s behalf.²⁵ The service had specifically requested a proven, off-the-shelf aircraft to replace its HU-25 Guardian jets, Dassault Falcon 20s similarly purchased off the shelf in the early 1980s and originally developed in the early 1960s. The CN-235 was developed, starting in 1980, by a joint venture of Spain’s Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA, then part of EADS, now Airbus) and Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, now Indonesian Aerospace). The first flight was in 1983, and production began in 1986.

Deliveries to the USCG proceeded slowly, with the availability of funding. The first unit arrived in December 2006, and the eighteenth in October 2014, at which point the Coast Guard retired its last HU-25. The aircraft were largely built in Spain but fitted out with equipment specific to the Coast Guard at EADS’s facility in Mobile, Alabama. The USCG had initially intended to procure thirty-six, but the availability of surplus C-27Js (see the next case study) led the service to reduce its plan by half. By September 2017, the Coast Guard’s HC-144 fleet had flown for one hundred thousand hours—more than that of any country with CN235s besides France and South Korea. At that point, more than two hundred CN-235s were flying in more than twenty-four countries.²⁶

The US Air Force also flies a few CN-235s within its Special Operations Command.²⁷ Notably, Air Force Special Operations also flies twenty Dornier 328 twin-engine turboprops, termed C-146A Wolfhounds; and a few CN212 Aviocars from CASA, termed C-41As.²⁸

In summary, with the CN-235, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, at the pace it desired, and at an ongoing total cost that the service continues to support. The Coast Guard has generally not spent significant sums on aircraft development, and specifically not multiengine, fixed-wing aircraft development, preferring off-the-shelf purchases.

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft

The C-27J Spartan is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying sixty passengers or forty-six paratroopers.

In the early 2000s, the US Army and the US Air Force individually were seeking ideas for twin-engine turboprop transport aircraft. The Army sought to replace its C-23 Sherpas, C-12 Hurons, and C-26 Metroliners with a common fleet. The USAF sought to supplement its C-130s with a smaller aircraft capable of flying from shorter fields, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2006, Under Secretary of Defense Ken Krieg instructed the two services to combine all these requirements into plans for a single airplane, the JCA.²⁹

Lockheed Martin offered a shortened version of its four-engine C-130. In August 2006, the Army (which was managing the program for the Air Force as well) eliminated that aircraft from the program. CASA, teamed with Raytheon, offered its C-295 aircraft, a larger derivative of the CN-235, developed in the 1990s. Alenia, teamed with L3 Communications, offered its C-27J Spartan. The latter had begun development in 1996 as an improvement of the Aeritalia (later Alenia, later Leonardo) G.222. The USAF had purchased ten G.222s in 1990, designating them C-27As. The C-27J would feature more powerful engines and the glass cockpit of the C-130J, which explains the choice of modifying letter. The first flight was in September 1999, and the Italian air force ordered twelve that November.“³⁰

In June 2007, the US Army and US Air Force jointly chose the C-27J as the JCA.³¹ The Army planned to buy seventy-five for the National Guard, and the Air Force seventy for both the Air National Guard and its component of Special Operations Command. The Army soon found the aircraft very useful for relieving the workload of its Chinook heavy helicopter fleet.³² The Air Force, however, was never enthused about splitting the mission with the Army, and questions of the economy of the arrangement persisted.³³ In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided to transfer all the aircraft to the Air Force. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta decided just to retire the entire fleet, as the United States reefed back its enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. Over the next two years, fourteen of the surplus aircraft were provided to the US Coast Guard, and another seven went back to the Army for its Special Operations Aviation branch.³⁴

Prior to the US order, the C-27J had been ordered by Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Australia, Chad, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zambia ordered aircraft subsequently.³⁵

In summary, with the C-27J, the US Army and Air Force initially obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a competitive price that they were willing to pay. Those aircraft continue to fly for the United States, just with different services or branches than initially intended. That is more a matter of changing requirements than the quality, availability, or cost of the aircraft. Regarding development funding, the US Air Force has only once spent a large sum on new multiengine fixed-wing aircraft since the C-17 Globemaster III program in the 1990s. Its recent orders for KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling aircraft included development funds, but under the fixed-price deal, Boeing (the contractor) would eventually come to assume most of that cost through repeated overruns.

Sentinel-class (Damen Stan 4708) fast response cutter

The Damen Stan 4708 is a 42 meter patrol ship designed for a variety of naval and maritime constabulary missions.

In March 2007, the US Coast Guard terminated its contract with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to modify its 110-foot Island-class cutters with a 13 foot midship hull extension, intended to produce a more capable ship with an extended service life. The Island-class ships had been built in the 1980s by Bollinger Shipyards of Louisiana to an off-the-shelf design of the 1960s by Britain’s Vosper Thornycroft, which had been sold to several other naval forces, including those of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Singapore.³⁶ The concept was reasonable in principle, as hull plugs are not uncommon in naval architecture and shipbuilding. The problem was that the Island-class ships were already proving susceptible to late-in-life hull cracking, but neither the service nor the contractors were fully forthcoming with one another about the difficulties. After taking delivery of eight of the rebuilt ships, the Coast Guard terminated the program, and indeed withdrew the eight from service.³⁷

In September 2008, the USCG awarded a contract, after an open competition, to Bollinger to build a replacement class of “fast response cutters.” The Coast Guard had expressly requested an off-the-shelf solution, with at least two vessels from the parent design in patrol boat service for one year, or one vessel in patrol boat service for at least six years. Bollinger brought a design based on the Damen Stan (“Standard”) 4708 patrol vessel, by Damen Shipyards of the Netherlands. With options, the fixed-price contract called for twenty-four to thirty-six cutters. The first, USCGC Bernard C. Webber was launched in April 2011 and commissioned in April 2012. The Coast Guard was sufficiently pleased with the cost and quality that the service now has fifty-four in service, and another eleven in sea trials, under construction, or planned. Bollinger’s work has been noticed, bringing forth suggestions that the US Navy could also purchase 4708s to replace its Cyclone-class patrol boats, and perhaps for other uses.³⁸

Three ships of the design had entered service in 2004 and 2005 in South Africa as the Lilian Ngoyi class of environmental inshore patrol vessels. In its explanation of the decision, the Coast Guard described Damen as an “internationally recognized ship designer with more than 30 shipyards and related companies worldwide [and] 4,000 vessels in service since [it was] founded in 1929.”³⁹ The 4708 was itself a development of the Damen Stan 4207, which has served in the navies, coast guards, or maritime constabularies of Albania, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bulgaria, Canada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

In summary, with the Sentinel class, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven patrol ship whose preceding designs were in wide military service around the world, and at a price that led to procurement of scores more. The first ship was not available for forty-three months after contract signing, which is neither particularly fast nor slow by historical US standards. By avoiding much development spending with the Damen Stan 4708, the USCG saved those funds for its next-larger class of cutters in the Deepwater recapitalization program, of a wholly new design: the Heritage-class offshore patrol cutter.

RG-31 Charger (Nyala) mine-resistant armored vehicle

The RG-31 Nyala is a four-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, specifically designed for resistance to land mines. In 1996, the US Army purchased a few RG-31 mine-protected vehicles to equip its land-mine disposal squads on peacekeeping duty in Bosnia. Later described as a “rolling bank vault” of a troop carrier, the RG-31 had been developed in South Africa from the Mamba, an earlier mine-protected troop carrier that was built on a Unimog truck chassis and powered by a Mercedes-Benz six-cylinder diesel.⁴⁰ The “Bush Wars” of the 1970s and 1980s had culminated by the 1994 election that marked the end of apartheid, but part of the legacy was a remarkable industrial capability for developing armored vehicles. However, through a series of licensing arrangements and corporate mergers, the marketing rights for the RG-series vehicles in North America resided with GDLS-Canada. The vehicles were thus built in South Africa, but fitted out in Ontario, at the same plant that produced Strykers (see below).⁴¹

By the middle of 2003, the US-led coalition’s occupation of Iraq had elicited attacks by insurgents with leftover land mines and more improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Eager to get into the market of supplying the bomb squads, General Dynamics Land Systems looked globally in 2003 for an off-the-shelf solution and remembered its license for the RG series of vehicles.⁴² The US Army then ordered a small number of additional RG-31s. Service on the ground in Iraq created impressions of quality. In an urgent request to Quantico in 2003, the 1st Marine Brigade in Anbar Province requested one thousand mine-protected armored vehicles “similar to the South African RG-31, Casspir, or Mamba.”⁴³

In June 2004, General John Abizaid, the commander of US Central Command, which oversaw all military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining his situation and requesting help. His most poignant statement was that “IEDs are my No. 1 threat. I want a full court press on IEDs . . . a Manhattan-like Project.” In November 2004, the Army ordered a further fifteen RG-31s. The vehicles were priced well below $1 million each—far below the price of a Stryker or Bradley troop carrier. The Army’s enthusiasm grew in February 2005, when the service entered into a $78 million contract for another 148 RG-31s from Canadian Commercial Corporation, the national armaments marketing firm, on behalf of GDLS. In that contract, the armored trucks were oddly termed “ground effect vehicles,” and the Army’s official nickname would be Charger. Deliveries took some time, as the supply line stretched almost the length of the Atlantic Ocean. Deliveries were scheduled to continue, however, through December 2006.⁴⁴

The first fatality in an RG-31 did not occur until May 2006. Early on, the US armed forces also ordered vehicles from Force Protection Industries of South Carolina. These were not off the shelf, but rather, had been developed domestically with technology licensed from the South African government. Eventually, the Army and the Marine Corps ordered over one thousand RG-31s, and thousands of other vehicles termed MRAPs—Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles—from multiple domestic producers.

In 2005, the Army and the Marines began work on an ambitious project for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV)—a vehicle only slightly larger than a Humvee, but with the protection of an MRAP. Developing the JLTV would ultimately require ten years, and full-rate production would not begin until 2019. During this time, US troops were protected from land mines by MRAPs, including RG-31s, and the origins of all that work reside in South Africa.

In summary, with the RG-31, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle long proven against land mines, relatively quickly, and at a price far below that of its other troop-carrying armored vehicles. While procuring the RG-31, and afterward, the US Army and Marine Corps would spend large sums developing the JLTV.

Stryker Light Armored Vehicle III

The LAV III is an eight-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, designed for higher road speeds and lighter weight than comparable tracked vehicles.

In June 1999, less than a week after assuming office, US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki signaled his intention to restructure much of the service.⁴⁵ The immediate impetus came from the Army’s difficulty over the preceding several months with deploying its Task Force Hawk, of attack helicopters and accompanying ground troops, from Germany to Albania for the Kosovo War. As analysts at RAND later described the problem, the Army needed to “expand ground force options to improve joint synergies.”⁴⁶ As Shinseki would more clearly say, its light forces were too light for fighting opponents with heavy weaponry, and its heavy forces too heavy for strategic mobility.⁴⁷ Neither bookend of capability had properly contributed to the overall war-fighting effort.

In October 1999, Shinseki described a plan to rebuild the Army around motorized formations equipped with wheeled armored vehicles small enough to fit on C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.⁴⁸ In February 2000, General Motors (GM) Canada and GDLS announced that they would together enter the pending competition with a version of the Canadian LAV III, itself a development of the Piranha series of armored vehicles, first developed in the early 1970s by the Swiss firm MOWAG (Motorwagenfabrik AG). Back in 1983, the US Marine Corps had procured a version of the Piranha I, armed with a 25 millimeter (mm) cannon, for reconnaissance and screening duties.

GM Canada held the license from MOWAG to build the vehicles in London, Ontario. The Army would later also receive offers from United Defense LP (UDLP) for a combination of remanufactured M113A2 tracked troop carriers and M8 medium tanks, from ST Engineering for Bionix tracked troop carriers, and another from GD for six-wheeled, Austrian-designed Pandur armored vehicles. Neither UDLP nor ST Engineering seem to have taken account of Shinseki’s strong and openly stated preference for wheels, though UDLP did suggest that a split purchase could include its tracked tank.

In March 2000, the Army reequipped the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division—a heavy brigade with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—at Fort Lewis, Washington, with LAV IIIs borrowed from the Canadian Army, and a variety of other vehicles under consideration.⁴⁹ In April 2000, the Army released an RFP for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). The program was so named because almost simultaneously, the Army launched its Future Combat Systems (FCS) program to reequip all its heavy brigades (and eventually the “interim” brigades as well) with a common fleet of medium-weight vehicles of entirely new design. In March 2002, the Army selected a team of Boeing and SAIC to oversee development of the fourteen different vehicular and aerial systems, manned and unmanned, within the FCS.⁵⁰

In November 2000, after reviewing the four more-of-less off-the-shelf proposals, the Army awarded GM and GD a contract for 2,131 vehicles, in a variety of variants of the LAV III, to equip six brigades by 2008. Shinseki had wanted the first vehicles by the end of 2001, but at contract award, that schedule was clearly infeasible.⁵¹ The US Army’s order was far larger than any yet received, and the US vehicle required a significant redesign from the Canadian standard, with more armor (resistant to 14.5 mm armor-penetrating rounds) but less firepower (a remote 12.7 mm machine gun rather than a manned 25 mm turret). Thus, the first new-production Strykers to equip further brigades would not arrive until 2003. In those numbers, the price was considered reasonable, at roughly $1.42 million each. This considerably exceeded the procurement price of the M113 alternative, but the Stryker’s life-cycle costs were expected to be lower.⁵²

In November 2003, the 3rd Brigade from Fort Lewis deployed to Iraq with Strykers. Also that year, GD consolidated the design-and-production arrangement by buying both GM Defense Canada and MOWAG. The next year, Shinseki’s successor as chief of staff, General Peter Schoomaker, became similarly enthused about the Stryker. In seeking what he called an “infantry-centric army,” in which troops were not defined by their means of conveyance to the battlefield, he specifically noted that Stryker brigades brought twice as many dismounts to the field as brigades equipped with Abrams and Bradleys.⁵³ The Strykers were also performing well in combat. Through early 2004 in Iraq, they had survived attacks from at least fifty-five IEDs, twenty-four RPGs, and a 500 pound car bomb without a single fatality.

On the other hand, the Army’s effort to field a version of the Stryker with a 105 mm assault gun did not fare as well. The service purchased enough to equip each of eventually eight Stryker brigades with twelve guns, but retired all the vehicles in 2022. Then again, the Army’s goal of “Future Combat Systems” as survivable as Abrams tanks but somehow fitting on C-130 aircraft did not survive past 2005.⁵⁴ Development continued for several years, but without tangible progress. In April 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled most of the FCS program, which had not produced any operational vehicles, despite $19 billion in spending and six years of effort.⁵⁵

Because the vehicles were considered an interim solution, the Army initially chose to forego developing its own maintenance depot for Strykers, and to instead rely substantially on GDLS through an arrangement the US military calls contractor logistics support (CLS). The Army’s reliance on CLS was, in retrospect, a costly one, but it did subsequently facilitate modifying the vehicles for greater survivability, after battlefield lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁶ After the FCS program was clearly terminated, the Army began assuming more of the maintenance burden organically.

While only the US Army employs its customized Stryker series, LAV IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Piranha IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Denmark, Moldova, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2011, GDLS began producing an upgraded version, the LAV 6, for the Canadian Army and the Saudi National Guard. In 2019, GDLS began building a development of the LAV 6, the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV), to replace the Canadian Army’s M113s and LAV IIs. In 2022 and 2023, the United States sent surplus Strykers to Ukraine, and Canada sent new ACSVs.⁵⁷ In November 2023, the United States offered a coproduction deal to build Strykers, including air-defense variants, in India for the Indian Army.⁵⁸

In summary, with the LAV III, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle in wide service around the world, though somewhat more slowly than hoped, and at a price and life-cycle cost deemed acceptable. The Army’s heavy reliance on contractor logistics support was, in retrospect, a costly decision, but one which centralized management of upgrades at an important juncture. The Army spent a modest sum on development of the LAV IIIs, which required customization for its particular preferences. However, this was a small fraction of the funds spent developing the Future Combat Systems, the later and then-cancelled Ground Combat Vehicle, and the current effort with the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. None of these programs have delivered vehicles to the field, but Strykers continue to serve.

Assessment

systems were procured starting between 2003 and 2008, during the comparatively free-trading George W. Bush administration, for which military-industrial cooperation with allies was a priority. Two of the systems were adopted in 2018, during the comparatively protectionist Trump administration. Plans for accepting off-the-shelf concepts for those two requirements, however, got their start during the preceding Obama administration. While the US Air Force’s twenty-year drama of aerial tanker procurements from Boeing—and not Airbus—does provide a counterpoint, all the military services but the Space Force have smoothly adopted at least one major system of foreign design. The summary record of these procurements has been largely positive.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military proven systems of lasting quality.

In the first seven cases described, the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard bought off-the-shelf systems to provide enduring capabilities, in lieu of developing new systems, and all seven are still in US service. The Army bought the RG-31 to provide a present capability, while also funding (with the Marine Corps) the development of enduring capabilities, culminating in that of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. For years along the way, the RG-31 provided very valuable protection to US troops against land mines. The Army similarly bought the Stryker LAV III to provide an interim capability, but it never succeeded in developing an enduring replacement. The Stryker thus continues in the Army’s force structure and inventory more than twenty years on. As the Army’s first program manager for Stryker recently put it, “The Army likes the vehicle, and still likes the vehicle”—for if it did not, it would not persist in service.⁵⁹

Note also that the Defense Department would not have entrusted the air defense of the federal capital to NASAMS for eighteen years if it had meaningful questions about its capabilities.

This finding in evidence comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally feature observable quality. Indeed, if one is trying to sell an important system to the Americans, it is wise to bring a quality product. Any US military service is an important customer to whom a sale conveys great reputation.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has mostly fulfilled US military needs comparatively quickly.

The RG-31 was procured in an emergency and was available in small quantities within months. The NASAMS was not quite procured in an emergency, but its immediate availability was appreciated, with fresh memories of the aerial attack on the Pentagon in 2001. The NSM was sought urgently, in that the rising threat from the Chinese navy could not be adequately opposed with the US Navy’s existing anti-ship missiles. The Stryker (or any interim armored vehicle) was sought quickly, because the Army chief of staff was embarrassed by his service’s failure to contribute during the Kosovo War. Its service in Iraq was impressive, but only because it was available three years after contract award. That proved adequate under the circumstances, but General Shinseki initially had much quicker delivery in mind.

In all the other cases, the driving motivation for an off-the-shelf procurement was either economy or assured quality. This does not mean that speed was wholly unimportant. The MH-139A arrived after a flight-testing delay of a few years, and the Sentinel-class cutters also did not arrive quickly. In none of those cases, however, did the procuring service experience operationally damaging delays.

This finding also comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally can be provided more quickly, sometimes because the production process is running, and always because significant product development lead time is not required.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military cost-competitive matériel.

Three of the cases were not fully competitive procurements. The NSM was chosen as the Navy’s next anti-ship missile after Boeing and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the competition, apparently because neither could quite offer the combination of capabilities the Navy sought in a ship-killing missile for a small ship. The case of the NASAMS seems to have been a sole-source procurement, without a record of a competition. The case of the RG-31 was similarly a sole-source emergency purchase.

The remaining six cases were all competitive procurements, which indicates that foreign-designed systems have repeatedly delivered value for money to the US armed forces.

This finding further comports to the logic of the market. Any US military service is a customer with great buying power. As noted above, concluding the sale reinforces the seller’s reputation, which can be leveraged for many years in pursuing other sales. For these two reasons, offerers have strong incentives to bring good deals to American buyers.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has had no strong effect on US capacity for military-industrial R&D.

The nine off-the-shelf procurements neatly fall into five industries. None have seen a strong effect from this pattern of spending.

• In the two cases of missile manufacturing, the United States purchased two different missile systems, the NSM and NASAMS, from the same original designer, Kongsberg of Norway. On both projects, Kongsberg has cooperated with one of the US national champions in guided missiles, Raytheon Technologies. Over that time of the ongoing procurement, the US Defense Department has spent many more billions on missile development, for both offensive and defensive missions.
• In two cases of rotorcraft manufacturing, the Army bought hundreds of EC145s, and the Air Force is planning to buy scores of AW139s. The Army could have paid a contractor to design a wholly new aircraft for utility and training purposes, but the marginal advantage in an industry with a slow cycle of technological development could not be cost effective. The Air Force’s requirements may have been somewhat more demanding, but a new design for a fleet of less than one hundred helicopters would be similarly foolish.
• In two cases of fixed-wing transport aircraft manufacturing, the Coast Guard, the Army, and the Air Force took delivery of just eighteen CN-235s and twenty-one C-27Js. Developing new aircraft for small fleets would be a very bad use of money. The special operations commands of the US services understand this well, and thus sources most of their aircraft from existing designs.
• In the one case of shipbuilding, the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf purchase of the 300 ton Sentinel-class cutter freed up money for the development of the 3000 ton Heritage-class cutter—a much larger project. Additionally, none of this spending by the Coast Guard seems to have affected the Navy’s spending on ship design and development.
• In two cases of armored vehicle manufacturing—those of the RG-31 and the Stryker—the Army did continue to spend large sums on follow-on systems: the JLTV and the FCS.

Recommendations

Since the end of the Cold War, the US armed forces have quite successfully taken into service nine major, off-the-shelf systems of foreign design. Again, this is good because a preference for the already available for federal procurement is federal law. Most of these products have been manufactured in the United States, and all have been serviced there. This is reasonable because the United States has huge industrial capacity and some strategic interest in domestic servicing. More pointedly, this technology transfer has effectively constituted security assistance from allies—a valuable concept too often overlooked by military policymakers.

Formulating a strategic framework

The federal government can better avail itself of the advantages in quality, speed, and economy offered by allies’ proven solutions, by adopting a two-part analytical framework for considering their procurement.

Consider the global extent of the market

Seven of the nine systems in this study were widely adopted by military forces around the world before a US military service purchased them. In all other cases, the procuring services had long lists of satisfied customers to consult for insights into the equipment. For future procurements, if the needs of the service do not genuinely exceed the global state-of-the art, the best design should be sought from any friendly source. As several of these cases demonstrate, for large production runs, production can be brought to the United States, if desired.

Measure the technological speed of the industry

Seven of the systems in this study represented modest technological developments. Only the naval strike missile constituted a great advancement over preceding options on the market. In all other cases, the procuring services were purchasing systems from industries with modest cycle speeds of technological development. Four of the procurements were from industries with substantially commercial underlying technologies and observably slow paces of change: helicopters and multiengine fixed-wing aircraft. If firms around the world are investing over the long-term for gradual technological progress, then a program to develop a wholly new system is duplicative.

Educating the procurement bureaucracy

Despite the logic, the procurement bureaucracy—outside US Special Operations Command and the Coast Guard—may remain disinclined to seek proven solutions, and especially those of foreign provenance. In the short run, this puts the onus of securing best value on the political leadership of the military departments and defense agencies. For better quality, speed, and economy, these leaders must meet military desires for novel equipment with demands for frank justification and global market research. This approach fits within the civil-military model of military innovation, which holds that beneficial change most often comes when “statesmen intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers from within the service.”⁶⁰

This last point addresses a longer-term approach. In the apparatus of any administrative state, career bureaucrats greatly outnumber appointees.⁶¹ Even if they are economically minded, the politicians cannot oversee everything. The “positive arbitrariness” of their occasional intervention can produce useful results, but it is also no way to build enduring institutional capacity.⁶² Officials beyond the mavericks need further schooling in the mandate for and economy of buying military systems off the shelf. This means education in the market research techniques of routinely surveying global markets for military off-the-shelf solutions that can inform processes for developing requirements for new procurements. In theory, educational opportunities exist through the Defense Acquisition University, the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University, and the military acquisition elective courses at the various other war colleges.

The benefits could be far-reaching. Procuring what others have already developed can permit the military to focus its R&D funds on its most challenging problems. Then, when war comes, procuring agencies and industrial enterprises will better understand, as organizations, how to put others’ designs into production here to meet the immediate needs of mobilization.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Airbus for its generous sponsorship of this paper.

About the author

James Hasik is a political economist studying innovation, industry, and international security. Since September 2001, Hasik has been advising industries and ministries on their issues of strategy, planning, and policy. His work aims to inform investors, industrialists, technologists, and policymakers on how to effect, economically, a secure future.

Appendix 1

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In 2017, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Gertler, accusing him of “opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals” that cost the DRC more than $1.36 billion in revenues from 2010 to 2012 alone. Gertler has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and, through a representative, said that he would abide by sanctions. The news that the Biden administration may ease these sanctions should be viewed positively, as an indication that US sanctions can achieve both economic and geopolitical goals.

Eased sanctions, whether a formal delisting or the issuing of a general license to Gertler, would allow for the sale of currently sanctioned entities. Following the easing of sanctions in this case, US firms could gain access to new investment opportunities by investing in mining projects that currently have links to Gertler, leading to economic growth in the United States and the DRC. In addition, the DRC has an opportunity to showcase the improvements that the country is making in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. While some senior officials, human-rights defenders, and anticorruption fighters have valid concerns about easing sanctions on Gertler, the decision could be a win for the DRC and the United States.

The choice—and the history behind it

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have gone back and forth over the tightening and easing of sanctions on Gertler. That has drawn much attention, but what hasn’t is the fact that the United States has quietly used sanctions effectively in this case to get its way.

In 2019, The Sentry—an investigative organization that aims to hold to account predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—conducted a six-month-long study on the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study found that better strategies for achieving identified goals in each sanctions program must be developed if sanctions effectiveness was to improve. The Sentry study set the stage for the Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, which drew conclusions on how to modernize US sanctions and make them more effective. Treasury recommended a “structured policy framework” that “links sanctions to a clear policy objective.” The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to improve access to critical minerals, diversify its supply chains, and work with US partners to achieve those goals. Since 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output is owned by Chinese companies, US policymakers should be seeking ways to reduce barriers to entry in the DRC’s mining sector and to actively promote investment there. 

As the United States seeks to gain greater access to critical minerals and diversify its supply chains away from Chinese influence, Biden administration officials hope that granting Gertler a general license to sell his holdings in the DRC would increase US or Western firms’ willingness to invest in the country. That’s because those firms have been largely boxed out as Gertler, according to the US Treasury, used his closeness with government officials to secure below-market rates for mining concessions for his companies. Beyond Gertler, the business environment of the DRC ranks 183 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Easing sanctions, through a coordinated US government effort that seeks to maximize this move, could send an important signal to Western investors that the DRC is open for business. Western firms could lift their bottom lines while stimulating the DRC economy by paying market rates.

The potential delisting of Gertler and his companies is a good example of an instance in which sanctions—or, in this case, the easing of sanctions—are being used in support of a specific policy objective.

Delisting would be good—but more must be done

Building on a potential delisting, the Biden administration should work with Congress to expeditiously pass the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act—which helps the United States secure access to critical-mineral supply chains and sets human-rights and democracy benchmarks for strengthening the US-DRC relationship. These moves could be further timed or calculated to magnify the impact of ongoing foreign assistance programs led by the United States Agency for International Development or other US government agencies.

The United States should coordinate additional moves to support the DRC. In October 2022, the Financial Action Task Force, the standard-setting international organization that seeks to strengthen the global financial system, placed the DRC on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—also known as the “grey list”—for the country’s dismal record in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. While many African countries are on the grey list, the impact is considerable, as it limits capital inflows, makes investors wary of doing business, and leads to reputational damage and a reduction of correspondent banking relationships, among other consequences. The US Treasury should look to bolster the DRC government’s approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) by equipping the country with the knowledge, know-how, and capacity that it needs.  

Regardless of whether the delisting happens or whether the BRIDGE Act becomes law, the DRC must do more to help itself. News of a failed coup attempt in Kinshasa on May 19 certainly does not help, especially since—according to local reports—the assailants were linked to exiled DRC politician and US citizen Christian Malanga, who was killed by the country’s security forces in a firefight. Three US nationals were allegedly also involved in the attempt to overthrow the government of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The DRC must continue to take concrete steps to improve the business environment and reduce its political and economic risk factors. Since 2022, the DRC built on its high-level political commitments to improve its AML/CFT regime, finalize its three-year national AML/CFT strategy, and improve its macroeconomic performance—boosting its credit rating. The DRC has an opportunity to continue to make progress in its fight against corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing that threaten the stability of the country from Matadi on the Atlantic seaboard to Goma in the Great Rift Valley.

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A win in the heart of Africa

Delisting Gertler would not only help the United States get its way, but it would show that its sanctions policy in Africa can be effective; its industrial and national security policies can be successfully implemented; and that all of this can be done in a manner that can help an African partner generate greater economic growth, jobs, and the foreign investment it seeks.

The United States can’t do it alone. It must also partner with the DRC in a serious manner to help strengthen the DRC’s framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, improve Kinshasa’s image, and reduce barriers to investment such as perceived political and economic risk.

The DRC occupies a central role on the African continent and with its economic potential could serve as a future hub for transportation, logistics, mineral processing, and more. If the DRC wins, all of Africa benefits—as do the United States and the West.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

The post In a Congolese mining case, Biden can secure a win for US sanctions policy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 27, 1994, nearly twenty million South Africans voted in the country’s first-ever democratic election, electing Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) as the country’s president. Propelled into a new era, South Africa ushered in a new constitution, formed a multiparty National Assembly, and officially ended the policy of racial apartheid that had plagued the country for much of the twentieth century.

Thirty years later, up to twenty-eight million South Africans will cast ballots in the country’s seventh national election, one that could be the most consequential since the 1994 vote. The ANC, the party that pushed for the end of apartheid and has led South Africa’s government since 1994, has undoubtedly been responsible for many of the country’s accomplishments. But with growing concern among South Africans about issues such as corruption and inequality, the ANC risks losing its majority.

With South Africa’s political landscape poised to shift once again, it provides a perfect opportunity to examine how the country has fared in the thirty years since overcoming apartheid and becoming a democratic state. Data from the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, two separate indexes measuring 164 countries around the world according to nineteen different indicators of freedom and prosperity, provide a snapshot into the progress made, the progress lost, and the ongoing challenges and opportunities facing the rainbow nation.

Women’s economic freedom, one of the thirteen indicators in the Freedom Index, stands out as one of South Africa’s most successful accomplishments. Between 1995 and 2022, women’s economic freedom in the country rose from 63.9 to 94.4 out of one hundred, jumping eighteen points between 1995 and 1999 and improving incrementally since. South Africa outpaces its neighbors Botswana and Namibia, two other countries that achieved independence from colonial rule and have since maintained democracy, scoring eighteen points above Namibia and forty-seven above Botswana in 2022.

Notably, women’s economic freedom in South Africa surpassed the average of the world’s freest countries in 1999. Today, South Africa scores just as highly as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and higher than the United States and Singapore. While disparities in legislation still exist, South Africa has made impressive strides in strengthening women’s economic freedom through numerous reforms. These include the Employment Equity Act of 1998, which prohibits gender-based discrimination in the workplace, the increase of paid maternity leave to fourteen weeks in 2003, and legislation protecting women from sexual harassment in the workplace in 2013. Transitioning from an apartheid state that heavily discriminated on the basis of both race and gender to a democratic country with one of the highest women’s economic freedom scores on the globe, South Africa can serve as an example of progress in this metric.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is inequality, one of the six indicators in the Prosperity Index. In the Index, inequality is measured through the share of a country’s pretax income accrued to the top ten percent of earners. With ten percent of the population owning more than 80 percent of wealth, South Africa suffers from significant income inequality, with wide disparities owing to one’s race, education level, and land ownership. With a score of just 13.3 in 2022, South Africa ranks last worldwide in inequality. As the graph below shows, both Botswana and Namibia struggle with inequality as well. In fact, all three countries ranked in the bottom eight in 2022 and are more than forty-five points behind the free country average. Yet South Africa stands alone in that inequality has worsened rather than improved. In 1995, South Africa’s inequality score stood at 50, twenty-six points below the score of free countries and over forty-five points above Botswana and Namibia. By 2022, South Africa’s score had plummeted by nearly 37 points, while Botswana and Namibia saw improvements and the free country average remained relatively the same.

While the nature of the apartheid system actively fostered inequality with a minority of the population controlling the country’s government and wealth, South Africa’s democratic era exacerbated rather than remedied the issue. The country may be more equal politically, but from an income standpoint, power is more concentrated and unequal than ever.

In the middle lies education. Another of the Prosperity Index’s six indicators, education is measured through both expected and mean years of schooling. South Africa’s education score has improved in the past thirty years, increasing from 37.2 in 1995 to 54.5 in 2022. Additionally, the country scores higher than its neighbors; however, its score remains well below that of free countries.

As the data show, South African education has undoubtedly come a long way since the country became a democracy. South Africa has achieved universal enrollment for primary school students, now has fully integrated schools after decades of segregation, and has established a unified department of education. But numerous challenges persist that keep South Africa’s education from reaching the level of the freest countries; while nearly all South Africans enroll in primary school, just 54 percent pass matric (the equivalent of graduating high school). In addition, many schools suffer from a lack of adequate building and sanitation facilities, and transportation to and from school for students is nonexistent in a number of both rural and urban areas. South Africa’s education trajectory is particularly important as about a third of the population is under the age of eighteen.

As South Africans prepare to cast their ballots on May 29, they will not only decide on who will best represent their interests in the future but have the chance to reflect on how their country has changed since transitioning to democracy in 1994. Overall, freedom and prosperity have seen little fluctuation—South Africa’s freedom saw a slight decrease from 72.5 in 1995 to 70 in 2022, and prosperity remained essentially the same, changing from 60.1 to 60. But this data also points to several important areas that the next administration will likely need to address, especially education and inequality.

James Storen is the program assistant at the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Nina Dannaoui is the associate director at the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

The post Thirty years of South African democracy, visualized appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

The gradual deterioration of freedom in South Africa, which started in the early 2000s and is reflected in the Freedom Index, encapsulates the evolution of the country. Regarding economic freedom, the severe drop in investment freedom is very likely due to the introduction of legislation requiring foreign investors to have local partners, and to give away equity on a large scale. The application of such requirements to more and more sectors explains the continuing erosion of investment freedom up until today.

The ability to move capital in and out of the country has been static or has slightly improved. Similarly, trade freedom has not suffered big changes during the period of analysis, and that is well captured by the flat trend of this indicator. The short-run fluctuations are probably due to the changing trade agreements with the European Union (EU), but these are modest. The slide in property rights protection that started around 2012 is explained by the introduction of efforts to amend the constitution to allow for “expropriation without compensation” of agricultural land. While a strong majority favored the amendment, parties could not agree on the specific way such a policy would be carried out, and it was finally left aside. Nonetheless, it obviously continues to be a major threat in the near future, as the African National Congress (ANC) is likely to lose its majority and may revert to a populist alliance that would raise the issue again.

The significant increase in women’s economic rights, up to an almost perfect score, may be correct at a legislative level. Nonetheless, the real situation may be worse for at least two reasons: First, the levels of criminality, and particularly gender-based violence, are today at an all-time high, which clearly reduces women’s actual freedom. Second, even if there are no legal restrictions on women’s participation in economic affairs, social and traditional norms may still severely limit their opportunities in some areas of the country. Consequently, the positive push that this indicator gives to the aggregate economic freedom subindex may be somewhat artificial, implying that the real trend in overall economic freedom is probably worse than currently shown.

The political freedom subindex shows a very flat trend, but with a mild deterioration apparent in the last few years. The evolution of the indicators in this subindex can shed some light on what is going on. Elections and political rights scores are very high in South Africa, and the slight negative trend may be attributed to political polarization, but overall, the electoral process and its guarantees are not severely affected. The “legislative constraints on the executive” indicator has a clear upward bump in the 2013–19 period, which probably reflects the failure of parliament to act on allegations of state capture during the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The publication of the State of Capture report in 2016 resulted in a national scandal, and the rejection of its conclusions by Zuma, who was later chastised by the Constitutional Court, and this may explain the initial increase on this indicator. The establishment of the Zondo Commission in 2018 can account for the additional increase up until 2020. The post-2020 fall can be explained by the failure of the state to take action against the many individuals exposed for corruption before the Commission, and the impunity with which COVID-19 funds were looted by senior officials. Hence, the fall after 2020 is capturing the failure of the government to implement the recommendations of the Commission in any meaningful way. Nonetheless, the very marked upward bump shown in the data, between 2015 and 2019, seems rather unrealistic as no specific legislative changes were introduced on this front.

A second clear fact highlighted in the political freedom data is the significant worsening of civil liberties since 2019. Government actions during the COVID-19 pandemic are surely behind the initial drop. The empowerment of the army to stop and search individuals as a means of restricting the spread of the disease generated many abuses, and even deaths in some encounters. The health restrictions imposed in South Africa—such as the prohibition on buying certain goods, and the severe lockdowns and limitations on free movement—were probably among the strictest in the world. It is not surprising that, even after lifting the COVID-related restrictions, South Africa’s score on civil liberties protection has not rebounded and has actually worsened. This is because, in recent years, there has been a strong move against civil society in proposed legislation. For example, legislation is planned that would require nongovernmental organizations to apply for state security clearance to prove that they are not acting in favor of foreign powers.

The visible deterioration of legal freedom in South Africa since 2008 is notable. In 2009 Jacob Zuma acceded to the presidency and, very early in his mandate, he started to appoint close collaborators to senior positions across the criminal justice system in an effort to protect himself and his cronies against prosecution. The indicator on bureaucracy quality and corruption adequately shows the erosion and capture of the state apparatus. Judicial independence being relatively high and constant throughout the period of analysis may be faithfully reflecting the fact that the High Court and the higher levels of the judicial system have been able to prevent their capture by the executive. But it is also very true that the judicial system in South Africa is not as efficient for the average citizen, and this fact may not be fully captured by this indicator. It could be that the decline in the clarity of the law since 2010 is picking up the overall uncertainty and opacity of the judicial process in regular cases, due to inefficient and very slow courts.

From freedom to prosperity

The Prosperity Index seems to portray a picture that is the complete opposite of my reading of South Africa’s recent development trajectory. The Index shows a fall in prosperity between 1995 and the global financial crisis of 2007–08, followed by a recovery in the last fifteen years. Instead, I believe that the first half of the period of analysis was relatively positive for the country, while the last ten to fifteen years saw a clear deterioration. A closer look at the indicators that make up the Prosperity Index shows that it is mainly the evolution of the health indicator that is shaping overall prosperity. Therefore, it is probably more enlightening to analyze each indicator separately than to rely on the aggregate score.

The evolution of income per capita somewhat vindicates my argument. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth was strong and stable up until 2007, thanks to a substantial reordering of the public sector budget. On the one hand, there was some fiscal tightening and consolidation through reduced overspends. On the other, President Mandela (in power 1994–99) introduced several social programs that had an important redistributive effect. President Mbeki (1999–2008) continued this policy path and South Africa achieved positive GDP growth rates for several years in the early 2000s. Another crucial factor that fueled South Africa’s economic success in this period was a substantial decline in the cost of borrowing. With the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 and the transition to a fully democratic system, South Africa’s credit rating was upgraded from close to junk to AAA. The increased borrowing capacity of the South African government helped create a quite substantial movement into the middle class, especially among black South Africans, who gained access to public sector jobs with rising wages. The resignation of Mbeki and the accession to power of Jacob Zuma, together with the worsening international environment during the 2007–08 financial crisis, halted abruptly the positive economic growth rates of the previous decade, and started a period of stagnation. The rating of South African debt deteriorated again and made further pay increases for public servants and other redistributive policies unsustainable.

The drastic dynamics of the health indicator are driven by the extremely different approaches to AIDS of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. The former was a denialist and refused to deal with AIDS for most of his term, relenting only once the courts ruled against him near the end of his presidency. When Zuma took office, the government finally accepted that AIDS was a major problem, and a comprehensive health policy was instituted to begin fighting the disease. This shift—combined with the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which began in 2003—played an important role as well in the dramatic increase in life expectancy from 2006. The severe impact of COVID-19 in South Africa, clearly greater than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, does not necessarily imply a worse handling of the pandemic in the country. This is because COVID-19 disproportionately affected individuals with preexisting conditions, who represent a much greater share of South Africa’s population than is the case for the rest of the region. South Africa has a relatively higher cohort with so-called “first-world diseases” like diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, and so on, all of which contributed to higher mortality rates during the pandemic.

South Africa is a very unequal country, and the significant deterioration in terms of inequality during the first half of the period of analysis is very plausible. The main reason for such poor numbers is the dysfunctional labor market, including high levels of unemployment. There is a great divide in South Africa between those with a job and those without one. The expansionary policies of Mandela and Mbeki were intended to reduce inequality; they succeeded in expanding middle-class wealth but failed to deal with the growing number of people “outside” the labor market. Today South Africa has roughly three million civil servants, which represent close to half of the total number of taxpayers in the country. This somewhat artificial middle class that emerged since 1994 pulled away from those with limited job opportunities, worsening inequality. There were also some cases of incredible wealth creation among a very tiny elite, which widened the distribution even further.

The improvement in environmental quality is not impressive, clearly slower than the rest of the region. This is probably due to the fact that fossil fuels and solid fuels are still heavily used, especially among poorer households with no access to cleaner energy sources, as electricity generation has foundered. South Africa still operates a large fleet of coal-fired power stations and a fleet of carbon-intensive diesel generators, as the country has been unable to effectively transition to renewable sources of energy. So, the rise in this indicator may be more attributable to the fall in large industrial operations in the country than to a comprehensive policy focus towards a cleaner environment.

The important increase in the education indicator, of more than 20 points in the last twenty-five years, captures the massive push to increase enrollment rates at all levels of the educational system. Preschool has been an important policy focus, but also there has been a very substantial increase in fee subsidies for university students, so years of schooling are increasing at the intensive and extensive margins. Nonetheless, when we look at the quality of education, the assessment is not so positive. The standards required to pass to the next grade have been dramatically lowered. The deterioration in the quality of the education received by pupils is evidenced by the scores in global benchmarking tests, which paint a very different picture to the steady rise shown when measuring years of schooling.

The future ahead

The near future for South Africa will be determined by the evolution of the political situation. It is all about getting the politics right. The upcoming election in 2024 is going to be crucial for the country. It is very likely that we are going to see a change from a dominant party system to a coalition system. This may lead to some political instability in formal politics and parliament, but it will also lead to greater accountability and more political competitiveness. The direction the country will take is not obvious and will depend on which party or parties enter into coalition with the ANC, which is likely to remain the single largest party. The risk of the radical left party entering government is clear, with its support for arming Russia with South African weaponry, expropriation of whole sectors of the economy, and so on. If the ANC continues looking to the Communist Party and the trade unions for support, and builds a coalition with the populist left, there is a substantial risk of heading towards a downward political spiral, a rise of populism, and a sharp fall into a situation similar to that of Venezuela. Instead, if the political center is able to hold its electoral territory and becomes a suitable partner for the ANC, it would offer a completely different trajectory for South Africa. There is, for the first time, a serious effort to build a pre-­election pact between opposition parties, which may change the overall political calculation in favor of the center. Therefore, the electoral results of 2024, and the coalition outcomes, will be the key determinant of where South Africa will be in ten years.

South Africa’s fiscal situation is also a pressing problem that needs to be addressed if we are to avoid a major crisis. We are now on the verge of a fiscal cliff, with rising debt that will soon further constrain government spending. This will likely lead to a deterioration of the social climate, with worsening outcomes in areas like health and education. Again, a sensible government that can introduce structural reforms in the public sector and stabilize the fiscal situation, is of fundamental importance for South Africa.

Finally, South Africa’s global alignment will play a crucial role in its evolution in terms of freedom and prosperity. The importance given to being part of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is not helping South Africa as it weakens the country’s standing with other nations with whom it has a more favorable trade balance and to which it exports more finished products. The expansion of the BRICS group to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina, and Ethiopia reinforces this negative trend. Moreover, China’s economic slowdown is leading to falling external demand for South African goods, especially minerals, threatening foreign exchange earnings. And being close to Russia and China is negatively impacting South Africa’s relations with other democracies—in the West and elsewhere—and making it more difficult to develop an exporting sector that is not so heavily dependent on China.

Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, a think tank that seeks to strengthen African economic performance. He has directed numerous reform projects with African heads of state across the length and breadth of Africa. His latest books include Rich State, Poor State (2023), The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan (2022), and Expensive Poverty (2021), as well as a volume on South African scenarios, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (2023).

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The ICJ’s January 26 order dealt exclusively with provisional measures, and so it did not determine if Israel is committing a genocide. However, it did find “that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible.” In addition to the attention this order cast on the case between Israel and South Africa, it also raised anew the question of whether other, so-called “third states” might find themselves drawn into the case.

For example, some third states have already drawn criticism for actions such as supplying military aid to Israel and the suspension of funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). As demonstrated in Judge White’s ruling, the ICJ’s finding could inspire possible proceedings against those third states for complicity in and failure to prevent genocide—both at the ICJ and elsewhere.

Could a case be brought before the ICJ?

Any state that is party to the Genocide Convention has standing to bring a case for an alleged breach, even if that state is not involved in the genocide. The ICJ established this precedent in 2020 in a case The Gambia brought against Myanmar, and it is how South Africa brought the current case against Israel.

The Genocide Convention requires preventing genocide, and prohibits commission of, conspiracy to commit, direct and public incitement to commit, attempt to commit, and complicity in genocide. A third state could, theoretically, be found responsible for any of these violations. In the case of South Africa v. Israel, two violations in particular have been raised: complicity in genocide and failure to prevent genocide. For complicity, the ICJ has explained that it includes “the provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of the crime,” such as furnishing “aid or assistance.” The state needs at least to have acted knowing that the perpetrator of the genocide had a special intent, or dolus specialis, “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” The ICJ left open the possibility that the complicit state would also need to share this special intent. However, courts have not required complicit parties to share the special intent in international criminal cases, suggesting that the ICJ might not require it.

The ICJ distinguished failure to prevent genocide from complicity by noting that failure to prevent genocide does not require that states take action. Instead, it is a matter of a state failing to take action. It does not require specific results—meaning that a failed attempt to prevent genocide does not incur liability. But in analyzing whether a state has fulfilled its obligations under the Genocide Convention, the ICJ does look at “the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide.” Unlike complicity, the state need only be “aware, or should normally have been aware of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed”—a lower mental threshold.

In its 2007 judgment in a case brought against Serbia and Montenegro, the ICJ confirmed that for it to find either complicity in or failure to prevent genocide, a genocide has to have occurred. However, it is not necessary for the ICJ to determine that a genocide occurred before an application against a third state can be filed. Any state party to the Genocide Convention, therefore, could have standing to file an application, including requesting provisional measures, against a third state for at least complicity in or failure to prevent genocide by Israel.

What acts could merit a case before the ICJ?

In the context of Israel and Gaza, two main possible acts have been raised as constituting complicity in or failure to prevent genocide: the provision of military aid and the suspension of funding to UNRWA.

First, countries such as the United States and Germany supply military equipment and aid to Israel, despite public reports on the risk of genocide. The case in the US District Court for the Northern District of California alleging genocide was filed against US officials on November 13, indicating that the Biden administration was on notice of the risk before the January 26 ICJ order. In December 2023, Biden twice used an emergency determination, avoiding congressional review requirements, to provide more than $250 million in military equipment to Israel.

Such actions might constitute the furnishment of aid or assistance for complicity. Experts have also argued that the United States has sufficient influence over Israel that its actions—and inaction—violate the duty to prevent genocide. However, the United States has a reservation to the Genocide Convention, upheld by the ICJ, that mandates that the United States must give its consent to be brought before the ICJ on any claims under the Convention—and it is unlikely to give such consent.

Second, at least twelve donor countries “temporarily suspended funding” for UNRWA after the January 26 announcement that it had identified several employees who were involved in Hamas’s October 7 attack, and that it was investigating and terminating the contracts of those involved. UNRWA said it will likely be forced to shut down by the end of February given the funding cuts. The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator noted that “[their] humanitarian response for the Occupied Palestinian Territory is completely dependent on UNRWA being adequately funded and operational.”

International law professor Douglas Guilfoyle, among others, has argued that the provisional measures ordered by the ICJ indicate that the provision of humanitarian aid is necessary to prevent genocide, and so the suspension of funds could be considered failure to prevent genocide. Given notice of the influence the funding has on UNRWA—and therefore the provision of humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza overall—suspending that funding while knowing the risk could constitute “deliberately worsening ‘conditions of life’ found plausibly to be ‘calculated to bring about. . . physical destruction.’”

Conversely, Israel has accused UNWRA as an institution—as opposed to individual members—of “working with, or at least turning a blind eye to, Hamas operatives in Gaza.” Should investigations lead to credible findings—for example, a determination comparable to that of the ICJ’s January 26 order or a well-evidenced complaint—then states such as the United States might face potential legal liability for funding UNRWA and would need to pursue alternative methods of using their influence to help supply humanitarian aid to Gaza.

Already, Nicaragua—itself accused of an ongoing genocide of indigenous communities—is reportedly considering filing an application with the ICJ against the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada for the provision of weapons and other assistance to Israel. It has sent a note verbale to each government, which would help establish the “existence of a dispute,” a necessary component for the ICJ’s jurisdiction. South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor has likewise raised the possibility of future ICJ cases against such states.

However, while the January 26 ICJ order does provide notice of a plausible genocide, the mental requirements for complicity in genocide and, to a lesser extent, failure to prevent genocide are high. The ICJ could adopt provisional measures against third states based on the plausibility standard. A final judgment however, would require the ICJ to confirm that Israel is committing genocide—which states such as the United States and United Kingdom continue to deny—and that, for complicity, the third state at least knew of Israel’s special intent—or, in the case of failure to prevent, that the third state was or should have been aware of the serious danger that acts of genocide were being committed.

Third states may also choose to intervene in the proceedings between South Africa and Israel either if they have a legal interest in the result or they are a party to the Genocide Convention and have an interest in the ICJ’s interpretation of it. Nicaragua has applied to do so, requesting that the ICJ find that Israel has violated the Genocide Convention. While Germany offered to intervene in support of Israel in January, it has not yet applied but has called on Israel to comply with the ICJ’s provisional measures.

What cases could be brought elsewhere?

The International Criminal Court—which is legally distinct from the ICJ—has jurisdiction over crimes committed “in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014,” and is not limited by immunities. Under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, it can prosecute those who facilitate the commission of crimes, including through the provision of means. However, it has not yet publicly released any arrest warrants related to the situation in Gaza.

Domestic jurisdictions generally criminalize genocide, but immunities and other barriers such as prosecutorial discretion make it unlikely that state officials could be charged with complicity in genocide. After the recent hearing in northern California, Judge White dismissed the case, but for procedural reasons, finding that the specific claims “raise[d] fundamentally non-justiciable political questions.” He noted that: “There are rare cases in which the preferred outcome is inaccessible to the Court. This is one of those cases.” At the same time, this dismissal leaves open the possibility that groups could bring related but distinct claims—for example, against companies continuing to provide and transport military equipment to Israel. For such a case, the January 26 ICJ order could help establish that relevant actions after that date were taken despite knowing the risk of genocide. Indeed, a Japanese company’s aviation unit ended its “strategic cooperation” with an Israeli defense company “[t]aking into consideration” the ICJ’s order.

What does this mean for the US government?

Additional legal actions could further influence US policy. Some US government officials have already voiced their dissent over Biden’s Gaza policy, and more than eight hundred US, UK, and EU officials signed a public letter on February 2 to protest their governments’ position on the war in Gaza. International protests in support of Gaza are still continuing. Domestic US polls indicate disapproval among young voters of Biden’s handling of the conflict, of particular concern given the November 2024 election.

The Biden administration could, then, take actions in response to the January 26 order. For example, in order to fully address the legal risk, the administration could halt military aid to Israel or condition it on Israel’s compliance with the ICJ’s provisional measures, and could resume funding to UNRWA or find a way to fund other humanitarian aid initiatives that could viably fulfill UNRWA’s role in Gaza.

On top of the binding nature of legal judgments—including any ICJ additional orders—such proceedings could serve as additional pressure points on the Biden administration’s policies. The ICJ lacks enforcement power, and while measuring compliance isn’t always straightforward, states sometimes ignore provisional measures and final judgments. The United States, in particular, has a rocky history with ICJ compliance, and as indicated above, has a reservation on the Genocide Convention shielding it from findings of culpability. Legal actions—especially those at the ICJ, either against the United States or its allies—could trigger unintended domestic backlash in the United States against the institutions hosting the claims. For example, former President Donald Trump imposed targeted sanctions on International Criminal Court officials, including then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, over the Office of the Prosecutor’s investigation into US military actions in Afghanistan. The Biden administration has since revoked the executive order authorizing the sanctions. However, US members of Congress have already introduced a bill calling for a “full review” of US-South Africa relations over the ICJ case, to assess whether “South Africa has engaged in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests.”

While legal actions run the risk of delegitimizing the ICJ for some within the United States, others are likely to view them as strengthening the legitimacy of international law. Genocide “is singled out for special condemnation and opprobrium,” which is why the “gravity of genocide is reflected in the stringent requirements” of criminal convictions and ICJ judgments. Even if the United States avoids an ICJ finding of complicity in or failure to prevent genocide, such a judgment against its peers for acts the United States has also undertaken would influence public perception of the conflict and the United States’ role. While not as unequivocal as a finding of US complicity, it may further push US policy on the issue.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Celeste Kmiotek: The ICJ puts the countries supporting Israel on notice

Thomas S. Warrick: A blow to the argument that death and destruction are sufficient to establish genocide

Tuqa Nusairat: The ruling shows how isolated the US is in its support of Israel

Shalom Lipner: The ruling is unlikely to change Israel’s warfighting or narrative

Elise Baker: Israel’s continued failure to ease the humanitarian crisis in Gaza risks genocide

Nathan Sales: The ICJ’s criticism comes against a backdrop of UN hostility toward Israel

Gissou Nia: The ICJ’s decision pushes talk about ‘genocide’ from the rhetorical to the factual and legal

Lisandra Novo: The ICJ’s order to preserve evidence could impact war crimes cases elsewhere

Alexander Tripp: South Africa is putting its ideals on the world stage

Alyssa T. Yamamoto: The ICJ embraces another case brought by a state not directly affected by violations

Akila Radhakrishnan: It didn’t call for a cease-fire, but the ICJ did rule that Israel must drastically curtail its operations

Rayhan Asat: This case could have implications for a future genocide case against China

The ICJ puts the countries supporting Israel on notice

While today’s decision did not—and was not intended to—answer the question of whether Israel is committing genocide, the court held that “at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention.” Further, “the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible.” This allows the case to proceed to a decision on the merits. It also puts other states—namely, those offering support to Israel—on notice.

The provisional measures “have binding effect and thus create international legal obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed,” which in this case is exclusively the state of Israel. However, the measures are based on existing obligations under the Genocide Convention—which mandates punishment for not only acts of genocide but also complicity, and requires the prevention of genocide. South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor stated that should the ICJ find there to have been genocide, the states that have aided and abetted it would be considered a party to the commission of the crime under the Convention.

Human rights organizations have already launched domestic legal proceedings against US officials and UK officials over aid to Israel. While legally distinct from the ICJ case, they are rooted in the same law. The former is based on the Genocide Convention as implemented in US law, and the latter is based on the Strategic Licensing Criteria, which prohibits the export of weapons “where there is a clear risk they might be used in violations of international law.” Should the ICJ determine that Israel is committing genocide, the states that have aided Israel could also face cases before the ICJ.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

A blow to the argument that death and destruction are sufficient to establish genocide

Today’s ICJ decision can be summarized with this sentence: The court does not have the evidence to decide whether or not Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, but directs Israel to comply with its obligations under the Genocide Convention—to which Israel, as a party to the Genocide Convention since 1950, has long committed itself.

Today’s decision goes only to “provisional measures,” a technical term that recognizes the ICJ’s proceedings usually take years but that gives the court the ability to issue orders in clear-cut cases. As Israel’s defense showed, South Africa’s claims are certainly not clear-cut, especially given Israel’s right to defend itself after Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel. The court did not try to order Israel to end the war in a way that would leave Hamas in power in Gaza.

Today’s decision is an important blow to the argument advanced by Israel’s critics that death and destruction in Gaza are sufficient to establish a violation of the Genocide Convention. This misunderstands the Convention, which requires the intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such, in whole or in substantial part. By taking this case seriously, Israel presented evidence that its intent was focused on defeating Hamas, which had attacked it on October 7. South Africa will now have to establish an intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza in whole or in substantial part—not by inference alone, but by proof of actual intent. Though it will take years for the court to render a decision on the merits, South Africa is likely to fail in this.

Two other points of note in today’s order. First, the court makes clear that Israel’s leaders have the responsibility to speak with authority and an understanding of Israel’s international legal obligations. Inflammatory statements only give ammunition to Israel’s adversaries. Second, the requirement that Israel report within one month on the measures taken to comply with the Genocide Convention is an opportunity, not a sanction, to provide more evidence—such as recently declassified cabinet minutes—explaining the intent behind Israel’s war to remove Hamas from power in Gaza.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The ruling shows how isolated the US is in its support of Israel

The ICJ ruling is a significant step in the direction of reestablishing the credibility of international institutions and the application of international humanitarian law. Multiple earlier efforts to hold Israel accountable for crimes committed against the Palestinian people have been thwarted by its allies in the West, much to the dismay of many in the international community. Beyond the legal implications, the geopolitical implications of South Africa bringing the case to the world court are significant. 

In undertaking the effort to put on public display the extent of damage caused by Israel’s offensive against Gaza, South Africa is leading the Global South in rejecting the notion that international law has selective applicability. The case also rejects the idea that Western leaders can continue to derail efforts to bring about an end to the current suffering of innocent civilians in Gaza and address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more broadly in venues such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). South Africa succeeded in bringing the world’s attention to the utter destruction Israel is inflicting on Gaza, forcing Israel to stand trial for crimes much of the world has been witnessing over the past 110 days.

The court’s initial decision puts to rest the Biden administration claim that the case is “meritless,” and should force the United States to come to terms with the fact that its support for Israel is not only rejected by much of the international community, but it is now subject to possibly defending itself against accusations of supporting a possible genocide in Gaza. The fifteen-to-two vote by the court on almost all the provisions speaks to how united much of the world is in its view of how Israel has conducted its military operations in Gaza. That should make everyone in the US government, which has been overwhelmingly uncritical in its support of Israel’s operations, take seriously any further diplomatic, economic, and military support it intends to provide as Israel continues its onslaught on Gaza. 

The court stopping short of calling for a cessation of hostilities may be more important because it keeps the focus on the urgency of preventing genocidal acts pending further investigation, rather than call for a cease-fire that is unenforceable, in no small part due to US veto power at the UNSC. Indeed, the only power capable of using its significant political leverage to prevent Israel from further implicating itself in the crime of genocide is the United States.

—Tuqa Nusairat is an expert on US policy in the Middle East and the director for strategy, operations, and finance at Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

The ruling is unlikely to change Israel’s warfighting or narrative

It’s fair to assume that Israel’s government breathed a sigh of relative relief after reviewing the operational sections of the ICJ’s interim ruling on Friday. Notwithstanding the court’s determination that provisional measures are warranted—in order to prevent “irreparable harm” from occurring while the justices deliberate further on the merits of South Africa’s case against Israel—the practical implications of its decision are unlikely to compel any drastic reconfiguration of Israel’s war deployment or narrative.

The Israel Defense Force’s mission to dismantle the military and governance infrastructure of Hamas in Gaza, and to secure the freedom of Israeli hostages in Hamas captivity, does not inherently clash with the court’s stipulations that Israel must “take all measures within its power” to prevent inflicting death or injury on “the Palestinians in Gaza” per se and must also provide them with “basic services and humanitarian assistance.” Israel has argued consistently, in fact, that it continues to perform in precisely this manner, despite the complex circumstances of fighting a terrorist group embedded among a civilian population. Most critically from Israel’s perspective, the ICJ refrained from issuing any call for an immediate cease-fire.

Meeting the court’s standard for action to “prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide” may prove more difficult for Israel, against the backdrop of the October 7 atrocities, in which 1,200 Israelis were murdered and which have elicited the harshest possible characterizations of the perpetrators and their enablers. In this respect, Israel’s leadership would be well-advised to avoid recourse to unhelpful, incendiary rhetoric and to concentrate instead on the security tasks at hand—an approach that could only ameliorate their country’s standing before the court and the international community.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Israel’s continued failure to ease the humanitarian crisis in Gaza risks genocide

Today, the ICJ ordered that Israel must do everything within its power to prevent genocidal acts against Gazans. Such acts include, among others, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about Gazans’ physical destruction, carried out with the intent to destroy the Gazan people. To further mitigate the risk of genocide, the court also ordered Israel to immediately and effectively enable the provision of humanitarian aid and basic services to Gaza.

The ICJ’s order is legally binding on Israel, as are the Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, there is no doubt that Israel must take concrete actions to ease what the court found to be a “catastrophic humanitarian situation” and restore conditions that can support life in Gaza, not risk its destruction. Specifically, Israel must allow food, water, medical aid, fuel, and other humanitarian essentials into Gaza, without delay or arbitrary restrictions on quantities or types of aid. Israel must cease telecommunications blackouts to ensure aid can be delivered to and distributed across Gaza. Israel must stop denying humanitarian aid distribution within Gaza. Israel must limit its military operations in Gaza to ensure that humanitarian aid can be delivered to and distributed across all of Gaza. Israel must not attack civilians waiting for humanitarian aid.

Failure by Israel to take these steps places Gazans at further risk of genocide.

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project.

The ICJ’s criticism comes against a backdrop of UN hostility toward Israel

The ICJ’s ruling is more noteworthy for what it did not say than for what it did. The court did not hold that Israel is violating international law. Nor did it order Israel to end the war against Hamas—which is what South Africa sought and what the court previously ordered with respect to Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Instead, the ICJ simply instructed Israel to comply with the Genocide Convention—which, as a signatory of that convention since 1950, it is already obliged to do. While Pretoria’s allegations against Israel may have been, as the Biden administration put it, “meritless, counterproductive, and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever,” the ICJ’s split-the-baby approach was perhaps the best outcome Jerusalem reasonably could have expected.

Indeed, the ICJ’s criticism of Israel must be understood against the backdrop of the chronic hostility shown by other organs of the United Nations (UN) to the Jewish state. On the very day the court’s ruling was released came the stunning news that the UN’s organization for Palestinian refugees—the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, or UNRWA—fired twelve employees because of their possible involvement in Hamas’s barbaric October 7 terrorist attack. UN Women took weeks to condemn Hamas’s widespread use of rape and sexual violence against Israeli women and girls on October 7, only to delete its statement when parties hostile to Israel objected. (The organization did eventually issue a statement that was not retracted.) And, of course, the UN Human Rights Council for years has singled out Israel for disproportionate criticism. Since its creation in 2006, the council has adopted more than one hundred resolutions about Israel; notorious human rights abusers such as China, Cuba, and Zimbabwe have been the subject of zero resolutions.

—Nathan Sales is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former US ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism.

The ICJ’s decision pushes talk about ‘genocide’ from the rhetorical to the factual and legal

Today, the world’s top court ruled that South Africa’s claim that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza is indeed plausible. Noting the “catastrophic humanitarian situation” in the Gaza Strip, the Court also found “urgency” and “real imminent risk” that irreparable damage will be done to Palestinians before the case concludes. On this basis, the court found it necessary to order a series of provisional—or “emergency”—measures to protect the population based on South Africa’s pleadings. Those include ordering Israel to refrain from committing acts under Article II of the Genocide Convention, to prevent and punish incitement to genocide, to allow humanitarian assistance, to prevent destruction and preserve evidence of crimes, and to report back to the court in a month on the implementation of these measures. However, the order stops short of calling for a cease-fire.  

So what happens next? Procedurally, the court may hear challenges from Israel on jurisdiction to hear the merits, before any consideration of the merits themselves, which will take years. Politically, the weight of the ruling is in the reception by Israel and its backers in its military operations. Some observers note that implementing these provisional measures is impossible without cessation of kinetic activity—and that the court has thereby essentially ordered a cease-fire without explicitly calling for one. Others take a different view. What is clear is that with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying Israel will continue the war until “absolute victory,” the hope will lie with third states to recognize the gravity of the ICJ order and to urge compliance. The US government may use the explicit lack of a cease-fire order as political cover, and claim that it has abided by what the provisional measures order throughout the conflict by undertaking efforts to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches Gazans. Concerned governments and advocates should push back on any such cynical framing. While the early days of the conflict saw the use of the word “genocide” as a rhetorical device, the court’s order—while not addressing the merits at this stage—firmly pushes the debate from the rhetorical to the factual and legal.  

Adding to the weight of the decision is that it was delivered from an impartial bench. ICJ judges are independent and do not officially work under orders from their home governments. However, going into the hearing, members of the broader public speculated that Donoghue’s past service as a legal advisor in the US State Department would compromise the court’s ability to rule objectively. The final breakdown of judges’ nationality in favor of provisional measures reveals this to not be the case. Most provisional measures were ordered by a fifteen-to-two split, with both Donoghue and Judge Georg Nolte of Germany in favor, despite the official policies of their home governments taking a different view. Tellingly, even the ad hoc judge appointed by Israel, Aharon Barak, voted in favor of the provisional measures to order Israel to prevent and punish incitement to genocide and for the provision of humanitarian assistance. In fact, the only dissenting judge on all provisional measures was Judge Julia Sebutinde from Uganda, whose government was quick to distance themselves from her rulings. 

—Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The ICJ’s order to preserve evidence could impact war crimes cases elsewhere

In its provisional measures decision today, the ICJ ordered Israel to “take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of” genocidal acts against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. This is to ensure that relevant evidence will not be destroyed or lost before the merits phase of the case, which could be years away. This relates to acts such as killings, serious bodily or mental harm, conditions of life calculated to destroy the group in whole or in part, measures to prevent births and conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and complicity in committing genocide, among others.

The ICJ is not a criminal court and, as such, it will not find anyone “guilty” of genocide. The court can only assess whether Israel is responsible for violating specific provisions under the Genocide Convention. However, the same evidence that is relevant for that assessment, which Israel now has a binding legal obligation to preserve, would also be relevant before other courts. South Africa, along with other like-minded states, has already referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, which can find individuals criminally responsible so long as it has jurisdiction. Many countries around the world also have extraterritorial jurisdiction over genocide and can initiate cases domestically. Lastly, it is worth noting that the ICJ only has jurisdiction over states, not over acts committed by Hamas and other Palestinian groups. It thus could not have issued orders to preserve evidence related to crimes that may have been committed by these groups in this case. Nor does the ICJ have the power to issue an order relating to evidence of war crimes or crimes against humanity. To ensure future accountability, Israel should seek to preserve evidence relating to all atrocity crimes in this conflict.

—Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council and was previously a judicial fellow at the ICJ.

South Africa is putting its ideals on the world stage

Legal analysis aside, one of the key aspects of this case is who actually brought it up. An African nation pursuing a case of global importance before the ICJ is itself notable.

South Africa, with the historical backdrop of apartheid, has long supported the Palestinian cause. The country’s long-standing support, and its cultural and historical identification with the Palestinian people, should serve as a counter to anyone who might claim that South Africa only undertook this process for publicity or a desire on the part of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) to look good before the elections later this year. South Africans have taken pride in the fact they are prosecuting this case at the highest level, with South African lawyers welcomed home with patriotic flag waving.

It’s clear that South Africa’s motivation to bring this case before the ICJ comes from a genuine sense of identification and purpose.

In addition, while this case obviously matters most and has the largest implications for those in the Levant, do not overlook the implications for Africa. What is clear from this case, regardless of the result, is that an African nation was willing to put the resources behind advocating its positions and ideals on the world stage toward resolving a global issue—and the world has been forced to pay attention to that view. At the very least, this shows that African nations can engage with and lead on world issues with confidence.

As South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa said today: “Some have told us we should mind our own business and not get involved in the affairs of other countries, and yet it is very much our place as the people who know too well the pain of dispossession, discrimination, state-sponsored violence.”

As African nations continue their economic rise, do not be surprised to see more of them involving themselves and advocating for their beliefs at the highest levels of international politics.

—Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The ICJ embraces another case brought by a state not directly affected by violations

Today’s binding provisional measures order is highly consequential, marking a significant step by the ICJ to mitigate the increasingly urgent and untenable situation in Gaza. It is the latest in a long history of the court weighing in on the situation of Palestine, dating to its inception. Notably, the court affirmed, at least preliminarily, South Africa’s erga omnes partes standing—the ability to bring the case as a fellow party to the Genocide Convention, despite not being directly affected by the allegations—even though Israel didn’t even challenge it. The court appears to be embracing its increasingly prominent role as arbiter for grave international law violations of common interest to us all.

At the same time, it is important not to overstate the order’s import. Any provisional measures request requires an assessment of three criteria: prima facie jurisdiction, plausibility, and risk of irreparable prejudice. Here, the court found (1) prima facie jurisdiction—i.e., at least a possible basis to rule on the merits—because Israel’s alleged genocidal acts and omissions are “capable of falling” under the Genocide Convention; (2) the plausibility of at least some of the asserted rights, including the right of Palestinians in Gaza as a protected group; and (3) a real, imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to these rights, as evidenced by UN reporting on the humanitarian catastrophe. But none of these findings can prejudge the court’s future judgment on jurisdiction and the merits. The court will be obligated to adjudicate the case anew once the full case is presented, and this will take years. 

The court has acted now in the face of an emergency, and only regarding the limited scope of the proceedings before it: a case against Israel alone, under the Genocide Convention alone. In parallel, a panoply of complementary justice avenues will no doubt unfold, recognizing the other bodies of international law that apply—including international humanitarian law and international human rights law—and the urgent need for more comprehensive accountability.  

—Alyssa T. Yamamoto is the senior legal and policy advisor at the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

It didn’t call for a cease-fire, but the ICJ did rule that Israel must drastically curtail its operations

Even as the ICJ ordered Israel to comply with a range of measures, many of the headlines have focused on what the court didn’t do, namely order a cease-fire. This shouldn’t be read as a rejection by the court of the idea that hostilities need to cease, or at a minimum change in manner and character.

In finding that there is a risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency to the rights of Palestinians in Gaza and South Africa’s own rights under the Genocide Convention, the court recalls a series of dire statements from UN actors on the situation in Gaza, including the UN secretary-general’s letter to the UNSC on the continuation of “devastating levels of death and destruction.” Based on the facts, the court then states that the “civilian population in the Gaza Strip remains extremely vulnerable,” that Israel’s military operations have resulted in “tens of thousands of deaths and injuries and the destruction of homes, schools, medical facilities and other vital infrastructure,” that many Palestinians have “no access to the most basic foodstuffs, potable water, electricity, essential medicines or heating,” and that “maternal and newborn death rates are expected to increase.” The court concludes by stating that “the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is at serious risk of deteriorating further.”

This recitation of facts is important in understanding the context for the measures the court then ordered, and what might be required to comply with them. It’s hard to imagine that Israel could comply with orders to prevent the commission of genocidal acts, including by its military forces, and ensure the provision of humanitarian aid, without halting or at least drastically curtailing its military operations. So, the focus should not be on what the court didn’t do, but rather on what is now going to be required to give effect to the court’s orders.

—Akila Radhakrishnan is the strategic legal advisor for gender justice for the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

This case could have implications for a future genocide case against China

Today’s ruling holds immense significance, with far-reaching implications for addressing atrocities worldwide and sending a resounding message to potential wrongdoers. From the highest court’s bench, the world heard Donoghue citing the disturbing and dangerous rhetoric employed by Israeli leaders when describing the Palestinian people. “It is an entire nation out there that is responsible. It is not true this rhetoric about civilians not being aware, not involved,” said Israeli President Isaac Herzog in October 2023, adding “we will fight until we break their backbone.” These deeply offensive and harmful words have cast a dark shadow over the entire Palestinian population.

Much has transpired since the horrific attack perpetrated by Hamas against innocent civilians. Israel’s collective punishment of Palestinians tarnishes the devastating memory of the October 7 tragedy. As the court noted, the lives of the hostages are still at grave risk, and Hamas must free the innocents. At the same time, it is imperative that Israel and its allies rigorously adhere to the court’s decision to minimize civilian harm.

It will be important to watch as this case goes forward how statements, speeches, or directives issued by senior government officials might serve as legal evidence against them. This could have implications for potential future cases at the ICJ, including if a morally courageous state brings a case against China for what it has said and done to Uyghurs. 

Chinese officials are on record as using calling for “absolutely no mercy” against Uyghurs and using expressions such as “stamping out roots and branches of the Uyghurs.” They have stated an intention to “break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections.” Chinese prison guards have told Uyghurs, “You are not humans,” “There is no such ethnic group as the Uyghurs,” “Being an Uyghur is a crime,” and “You don’t look like a human.”

Given China’s reservation stating that it is not bound by Article 9 of the Genocide Convention, which provides a concerned state party a vehicle to bring a case for violations of community interest protected by ergo omens partes obligations, such an endeavor would necessitate innovative legal arguments to overcome jurisdictional challenges. But if that moment arrives, the world will bear witness to the compelling evidence of genocidal intent, as found in the statements above. These words will be heard worldwide, emphasizing the genocidal intent of the Chinese state.

—Rayhan Asat is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project and an international human rights lawyer.

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Private firms around the world are the ultimate decision makers regarding the international use of the dollar and they respond to the incentives facing them, namely access to and costs of dollar financing. And, for the first time in nearly 20 years, it is substantially cheaper to conduct short-term borrowing in renminbi (RMB) rather than dollars. In other words, a portion of the dedollarization trend is driven not only by geopolitics but also by interest rate differentials.

Fluctuations in the dollar’s global dominance is not a recent phenomenon. As a reserve asset, for example, the dollar composed nearly 80% of global reserves in 1970. By 1980, that number fell below 58 percent. It then plummeted to 47 percent in 1990. The dollar recovered to around 71 percent of global reserves in 1999, though it has since declined gradually to 59 percent in 2020—not in favor of any replacing currency, but a number of smaller currencies including the RMB.  Current trends in dedollarization in global payment must be seen with this historic context. While this is an important trend for policy makers to watch, given its underlying drivers, they should be careful not to attribute all the motivation to geopolitical tension, possibly leading to wrong policy conclusions.

The dedollarization story so far

The reluctance to use the dollar has not been driven by the rise of a competing currency such as the RMB, but more importantly by the growing trend of using local currencies in bilateral cross-border payments. However, because of China’s large footprint in international trade and investment, the RMB’s usage in international transactions has captured increasing attention as the primary challenger to the dollar, following a rapidly growing number of bilateral cross-border payment arrangements. 

Analysts, including our Dollar Dominance Monitor, have pointed to a range of signs indicating a growing risk to the dollar. Last year, global payments settlements using RMB nearly doubled, albeit from a low base of 1.91 percent at the start of 2023 to 4.61 percent in November 2023. The SWIFT data may underestimate the RMB’s true international usage because it may fail to reflect uses of RMB in bilateral cross-border payments facilitated by central banks’ currency swap arrangements. On the other hand, about 80 percent of the use of RMB outside of China takes place in Hong Kong—without Hong Kong, the international use of the RMB remains quite small. More importantly for China, about half of its bilateral cross-border trade and investment transactions are now settled in RMB, reducing its vulnerability to US financial sanctions.

Some of this shift is in response to G7 sanctions imposed following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Those measures reanimated concerns across global capitals around the risks of overreliance on Western financial infrastructure and the US dollar and generated urgent demand for alternatives to the US-led financial system. But this is not the only explanation and too much focus on it can lead analysts to overestimate the costs of those sanctions. In fact, the dollar was also facing macroeconomic headwinds and its use in cross-border payments likely would have declined to some extent even without the Russia sanctions.

Macroeconomic headwinds for the dollar 

Countries at risk of sanctions, like China and Russia, are the largest individual contributors to dedollarization but they are not alone. As Bloomberg’s Gerard DiPippo points out, Russia-China trade accounts for only 27 percent of the increase in trade settlement in RMB. The remaining 70 percent is likely RMB-denominated trade with Beijing’s neighbors primarily in Asia, but also abroad such as Argentina, Brazil, and the Gulf countries. Without the imminent threat of US sanctions on Beijing, this shift to RMB trade is likely motivated more by lending costs and availability. 

It’s important to understand the integral role trade finance plays in facilitating global commerce. Payments are not made instantaneously; there is a gap from the time firms receive payments for the goods they ship and when they need to pay suppliers for those same goods. Firms often turn to banks to provide loans to help bridge the gaps. Because of this, firms seeking to minimize financing costs pay close attention to the relative cost of capital and available dollar liquidity. Rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve (Fed), which coincidentally began to take full effect in the months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have caused borrowing in dollars to become more expensive and scarcer, encouraging emerging market firms to seek dollar alternatives—namely the RMB. 

Relative costs of capital 

For the first time in nearly 20 years it is substantially cheaper to conduct short-term borrowing in RMB rather than dollars. Borrowing costs, as measured by the proxy of a one-year government bill, imply short-term borrowing in RMB is around two percentage points cheaper than analogous borrowing in dollars. This is pushing firms, particularly those engaging with Chinese individuals and firms on either end of the transaction, towards RMB-denominated debt for trade financing to take advantage of efficiency gains.

This surge in dollar borrowing costs reflects the US Federal Reserve’s rapid rate hike campaign to rein in US inflation, which had hit 8.5 percent. China has not experienced the same sort of surging inflation, so was able to leave its short-term rates largely constant. Notably, this flip in relative financing costs happened in close proximity to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This may have caused some commentators to solely attribute firms shifting their trade finance arrangements from dollars to RMB to the overuse of US sanctions. 

Dollar liquidity squeezes

A second, related, macrotrend disincentivizing dollar use in international trade is the appreciation of the dollar and its impact on dollar liquidity in emerging markets. In early 2022 the value of a dollar against a basket of global currencies jumped 19.8 percent from right before the start of the invasion to its peak in October 2022. While its value has dropped in the year since, the dollar’s value still remains elevated by around 10 percent compared to its pre-invasion average. This was also caused by Fed rate hikes; higher rates increased the value of dollar-denominated assets, which created strong incentives for global investors to buy dollars to buy those assets. The war amplified this. Investors also increased their dollar holdings as they view the dollar as a “safe haven asset” and expect the currency to retain, or even gain value during periods of global instability and economic downturn.

An appreciating dollar severely restricts dollar funding availability, particularly for emerging market firms who are more reliant on dollar-denominated credit. This is because a stronger dollar comes with incentives for lenders with large dollar liabilities to curb their willingness to provide new short-term dollar loans (such as the borrowing required for firms seeking to finance trade) and raise the rates they are willing to lend at—further amplifying the relative cost of capital effects discussed earlier. 

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) finds that after the dollar appreciates, “banks with high reliance on dollar short-term funding reduce supply of credit more to the same Firm relative to banks with low short term dollar funding exposures.” The BIS continues, pointing out, “firms that borrowed from short-term dollar-funded banks will suffer a greater decline in credit following dollar strengthening.” 

Without abundant dollar financing alternatives, such as during the 2008 financial crisis, the impact of this would have subdued global trade. However, following concerted efforts by Beijing to promote RMB-denominated lending, firms seeking short-term finance can now turn to RMB lenders or RMB-denominated debt markets. Indeed, in the past year overseas units of Chinese firms, as well as Western companies like BMW and Crédit Agricole, have raised a record 125.5 billion RMB ($17.33 billion) selling RMB-denominated bonds during the January-October 2023, a 61 percent increase from the same period last year.

As rising dollar borrowing costs and decreasing dollar liquidity push firms to adopt the RMB for their trade financing needs, they are also more willing to engage with the alternative global financing infrastructure China is developing. In 2015, Beijing launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) to connect and control its own plumbing in the global financial system. The intention was to construct a new financial architecture to clear and settle transactions in RMB and facilitate the use of the currency in international business. Since 2015 CIPs has rapidly grown, settling just over 480B RMB ($75 billion) in Q4 2015 to 33.4T RMB ($4.6 trillion) in Q3 2023. While CIPS’ utilization growth has been largely steady since its inception, it does seem to experience substantial spikes following contractions in dollar lending availability. And though geopolitical trends may be integral in informing the strategic thinking around firms’ actions, outside of firms engaging with Russia, availability of liquid debt and efficient markets are a more likely proximate explanation for recent trends among emerging-market dedollarization.  

Importantly, geopolitics and macroeconomic trends can work together to support dedollarization efforts. One example is China’s push to denominate more of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lending in RMB. Since its inception in 2013, China has hoped to use the BRI as a tool to promote the international use of its currency. In its first five years Beijing had mixed success at best, with the majority of BRI debt denominated in dollars. This can be explained in part by discrepancies in borrowing costs over the same period. Similar to the large difference in short term lending which provided a cost advantage to US denominated debt throughout most of the 2010s, longer term borrowing was also skewed in the dollar’s favor. A $5 billion loan Beijing offered to Indonesia in 2017 demonstrates this. The loan is split between RMB and dollars with 60 percent denominated in US dollars, carrying a 2 percent interest rate, and 40 percent in RMB, carrying a 3.4 percent rate. 

However, as rates converged in 2018 and onward, China had more success encouraging RMB-denominated debt. By 2020 loans in the Chinese currency overtook dollar denominated debt. While a convergence in interest is not the sole explanation for Beijing’s success, it’s undoubtedly easier to encourage countries to adopt debt in RMB if they cannot point to high opportunity costs by not borrowing in dollars. 

The future of dedollorization 

There are important structural limitations to the international use of the RMB. Prime among them is that the RMB is not freely convertible. Foreign firms that hold RMB or RMB-denominated assets are operating under the direct oversight of the Chinese government, whose interests may not always align with their own. This will give pause, particularly to firms based in advanced economies. China’s legal system also gives firms pause. As Chinese President Xi Jinping has centralized authority, the Chinese system has become increasingly opaque and volatile, offering little protection or recourse for firms who are harmed by central government actions. Finally, China’s financial markets remain less well developed and supervised than their Western counterparts. In particular, China’s bond markets are still far less developed and less liquid than US treasury markets. Though they have been valued at around $8 trillion in recent years, they pale in comparison to the US which is pushing $30 trillion.

Even so, in the coming year macroeconomic trends will likely continue to push emerging market firms towards RMB-denominated debt for trade financing in particular, amplifying the use of the RMB in international trade. While the Fed will likely begin to cut key rates later this year, decreasing the cost of US capital and borrowing, it’s unlikely Washington returns to the near-zero target rates that supercharged cost advantages for borrowing in dollars. 

It will be key for policy makers to disaggregate these macro effects from the very real geopolitical backlash against sanctions and similar tools that are also pushing countries to explore dollar alternatives. Without understanding the relative importance of both trends, US and allied policy makers risk overestimating global sanctions backlash, possibly imperiling the G7 economic response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. 

Niels Graham is an associate director for the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center where he supports the center’s work on China’s economy and US economic policy.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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1. Why is South Africa bringing this case at the ICJ?

First, the ICJ was created in 1945 by the United Nations Charter after World War II. It is the main judicial body of the United Nations (UN) and all member states can bring cases before it under treaties, by agreement, or another form of consent. Certain organizations can also ask the court to issue a nonbinding advisory opinion on a legal question. The ICJ rules on questions of state responsibility—that is, on when a state has violated a rule of international law or an international legal obligation. It is not a criminal court. It does not decide, for example, on individual criminal responsibility. A different, unrelated court in The Hague, the International Criminal Court, serves this function, and South Africa, with other like-minded states, has already referred the situation in Gaza to it for investigation.

South Africa brought this case at the ICJ against Israel under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, also known as the Genocide Convention, of which both states are parties. But what does South Africa have to do with what is happening in Gaza? The Genocide Convention allows any state party to bring a case against another state party to the ICJ on issues including responsibility for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, or attempt to commit genocide. The ICJ recently confirmed this in a case brought by The Gambia, which accused Myanmar of committing genocide against the Rohingya population. Furthermore, South Africa’s ruling African National Congress has long shown its support for Palestinians and backed their right to self-determination, considering them to be subject to a long-standing regime of apartheid, like South Africa was.

2. How are the judges chosen?

The ICJ has fifteen judges, who are elected by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to serve nine-year terms. Judges are nominated by UN member states through a special group, not through the state’s government. There cannot be more than one judge from any specific country at a time, and the intention is to have the judges represent different legal systems and cultures around the world. It is important to understand that even though judges are nominated by UN member states, they do not act as representatives of their country. They must perform their duties in an independent and impartial manner. 

The current elected judges are from the following countries: Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Morocco, Russia, Slovakia, Somalia, Uganda, and the United States. In February 2024, four judges (from Jamaica, Morocco, Russia, and the United States) will finish their terms and be replaced by incoming judges from Mexico, Romania, South Africa, and the United States. This marks the first time that nationals from Romania and South Africa have been elected as judges and that a national from Russia has not. 

When the parties to a specific case do not have a judge of the same nationality on the bench of elected judges, they are allowed to choose someone to sit as a judge ad hoc. That means a person who will serve as an ICJ judge for that specific case only. The person the state chooses as its judge ad hoc does not need to have the nationality of that state. In this case, however, both Israel and South Africa appointed judges ad hoc who hold their respective nationalities: Dikgang Ernest Moseneke, former South African Constitutional Court deputy chief justice, and Aharon Barak, former Israeli Supreme Court president. 

3. What are the allegations and what will the court rule on?

The Genocide Convention defines genocide as specific “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Some of the acts against members of the targeted group include killings, serious physical or mental harm, measures designed to prevent future births, or conditions purposefully designed to physically destroy the group or part of the group. For a situation to constitute genocide, therefore, both the specific acts and the specific intent to destroy a group must be proven. It is not enough to show that atrocities have been committed—the intention by the responsible actors to destroy a group, completely or in part, must be demonstrated. 

After clearly condemning the attacks carried out by Hamas on October 7 and recognizing the significance of bringing a case on genocide against Israel, South Africa states in its application to institute proceedings that “[n]o armed attack on a State’s territory no matter how serious—even an attack involving atrocity crimes—can, however, provide any possible justification for” violations of the Genocide Convention. It claims that Israel has committed and failed to prevent genocidal acts, including killings, serious bodily and mental harm, and imposing conditions “intended to bring about the destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group, that being the part of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip.” South Africa also claims that Israel has failed to “prevent or punish the direct and public incitement to genocide by senior Israeli officials and others.” In its oral argument, it recounted that 23,000 Palestinians have died thus far, described the destruction of homes and infrastructure in Gaza, and lamented the lack of humanitarian assistance reaching a besieged civilian population. 

South Africa has asked the court to rule that Israel has violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention; that it must stop any genocidal acts; ensure that people committing or inciting genocide are punished; collect and preserve (or allow for the collection and preservation of) evidence of genocidal acts against Palestinians in Gaza; and issue reparations, including allowing displaced Palestinians to return to their homes, reconstruct what it destroyed in Gaza, and ensure respect for the human rights of Palestinians in Gaza, among others. More for the public than for the court, which understands this point well, South Africa’s legal team explained that they are not bringing a case against Hamas because it is not a state and thus cannot be a party to the Genocide Convention, nor can it be brought before the ICJ (where only states can be parties to cases, not groups or individuals).

During its oral argument on January 12, Israel recalled that it was the Holocaust that pushed the international community to create the Genocide Convention and observed that the Hamas October 7 attacks are the worst violence committed against the Jewish people since the Holocaust. It vehemently denied all allegations that it was responsible for genocide and said South Africa’s account of the facts was partial and decontextualized.

Israel framed its actions under the right of self-defense in the conflict against Hamas and said the proper legal framework is the law of armed conflict but acknowledged that Hamas’s atrocities do not absolve Israel of its legal obligations. It provided numerous quotes from officials saying the fight was not against the Palestinian people to dispute arguments regarding genocidal intent. Speaking to South Africa’s request that the ICJ rule on the obligations of state parties to the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide, Israel argued that the failure to prevent genocide is indeed in question, but with respect to states that have supported and praised what Israel has qualified as genocidal attacks carried out by Hamas. It said the request for a provisional measures order for Israel to end its military operations would render it helpless against ongoing attacks. Finally, Israel urged the court to deny all provisional measures requested and dismiss the case.

4. How long will the case take?

The case itself will likely take many years to conclude. Prior cases under the Genocide Convention at the ICJ against Serbia, for example, took more than a decade before a final decision was issued. Right now, however, the court is addressing South Africa’s request for provisional measures. That is what the January 11-12 hearings in The Hague are about. Provisional measures are emergency measures the court can order the parties to take to prevent irreversible damage to a right directly linked to the case at issue. 

Importantly, the court will not be ruling on whether Israel has committed genocide at this phase—it will only rule on provisional measures. The party requesting the provisional measures only needs to convince the court that its allegations are plausible. South Africa has requested the court to order Israel, among other things, to suspend its military operations, take all measures necessary to prevent genocide, and to refrain from killing, injuring, or committing other acts constituting genocide against Palestinians. Orders from the court, including on provisional measures, are binding on the parties but the court does not have its own enforcement mechanism. The ICJ, for example, has previously ordered Russia to cease its military operations in Ukraine in its provisional measures decision in the case brought by Ukraine, but thus far Russia has ignored it.

Due to the urgency of provisional measures and the risk of irreparable harm, this phase takes priority over all others and is typically resolved in a matter of weeks. In the case Ukraine brought against Russia, the hearing on provisional measures was held on March 7, 2022, and the court issued its decision on March 16, 2022. In the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar, the hearing began on December 10, 2019, and the court issued its decision on January 23, 2020.

Given Israel’s comments during its January 12 arguments on the existence of a dispute between the parties, a requirement for jurisdiction, it seems likely it will raise preliminary objections on jurisdiction or admissibility, claiming the court cannot hear the case on procedural grounds. If so, the court would first turn to those issues. Myanmar, for example, raised preliminary objections on jurisdiction and admissibility on January 20, 2021, after which The Gambia presented its brief in April 2021 and then oral hearings were held at the end of February 2022. The court issued its decision on preliminary objections on July 22, 2022. Now in the merits phase, written pleadings are still expected as late as December 2024, after which the court will announce the next steps.

If Israel does not raise preliminary objections, or the court dismisses them, the case will proceed to the merits phase, that is, whether Israel has violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention. During that final phase, South Africa will present its case on why Israel has committed or failed to prevent genocide in Gaza, and Israel will present its defense on why it has not. The court will then analyze all the pleadings submitted to it as well as evidence or any testimony presented during hearings and make a final decision.

5. What are other states saying?

Unsurprisingly, the response from other states to this case has been divided. On the same day South Africa filed its application, the Palestinian Authority’s foreign ministry welcomed the case and called for the international community to support the proceedings. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation was similarly supportive, calling on the court to “take urgent measures to stop this mass genocide.” UN human rights experts also welcomed the case and praised South Africa “for bringing this case to the ICJ at a time when the rights of Palestinians in Gaza are being violated with impunity.” Other states that support South Africa’s application include Malaysia, Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Bolivia, Colombia, and Brazil.

Israel, of course, also has its strong supporters. Germany, one of Israel’s closest European allies, has called the claim that Israel is committing genocide false and said it is not covered by the Genocide Convention. Hungary has also expressed its opposition to the case. The United States, for its part, has said the allegations against Israel “are unfounded” and called the submission at the ICJ “meritless, counterproductive, and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever.” It has been reported that UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron said that he did not think the case at the ICJ was helpful and that the United Kingdom’s view is that “Israel has a right to defend itself.” In Latin America, Guatemala and Paraguay have also backed Israel and affirmed its right to self-defense.

So far, no state has filed a formal declaration to intervene in the case. However, on Tuesday, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister Petra De Sutter said she would encourage Belgium to officially support South Africa in the case. Conversely, Ireland and Austria have said they do not intend to intervene. In the case brought by Ukraine against Russia under the Genocide Convention, for example, a record-breaking thirty-two states have intervened in the case as non-parties. It is too soon to tell whether any of those same thirty-two states, all parties to the Genocide Convention, will intervene in the case brought by South Africa.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. She was previously a judicial fellow at the ICJ, a Fulbright scholar in Spain researching post-conflict transitional justice, and a visiting professional at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

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This month’s topline events

Ukraine’s Continued Counteroffensive. The Ukrainian army continues to make incremental advances in its counteroffensive against Russia in key regions and has ramped up longer-range attacks on Russian targets in Crimea and elsewhere. NATO’s Secretary General Stoltenberg, speaking at a joint press conference with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, confirmed that Ukrainian forces are “gradually gaining ground” against Russia. Faced with Ukrainian military gains and dwindling munition stores, Moscow has pursued various means to strengthen its military posture, including engaging North Korea to procure artillery shells and planning to increase its 2024 defense budget by nearly 70%, which the Russian Ministry of Finance said is a “significant strain on our budget” but “our priority.” Domestically, Zelensky has taken steps to root out corruption that might hinder Western support including, most recently, ousting Deputy Defense Minister Hana Maliar. US and allied support to Ukraine continued, despite opposition among some in Congress and a Polish-Ukrainian dispute over Ukrainian grain sold in Poland. Despite inconsistent signals, the Biden administration is reportedly prepared to provide Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles, which will boost Ukraine’s offensive capabilities. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Ukraine and pledged over $1 billion in additional aid. The aid package includes provisions for equipment to clear Russia-laid mines, which have impeded Ukraine’s counteroffensive, as well as $203 million in funding to address corruption and elite capture within Ukrainian institutions.

• Shaping the order. Ukrainian’s counteroffensive could shift the strategic balance of the war if its forces can advance enough to put Russian supply lines in southern Ukraine and to Crimea at risk. Intensified US and allied support could make an important difference as the battle hangs in the balance. Ukraine’s success, even a relative success, would strengthen advocates of a rules-based order and mark a major defeat for the most virulently aggressive great power challenger to that order.
• Hitting home. The counteroffensive’s outcome, fairly or not, may shape US and allied confidence in Ukraine’s ability to succeed in its fight for national survival and could inform the sustainability of allied and even US support for Ukraine. As the United States heads into a contentious presidential election season, US aid to Ukraine is already an issue.
• What to do. The United States and its allies, regardless of the changing tide of politics brought by elections, must remain resolute in their support of Ukraine and resist short-term thinking. US military support for Ukraine has been impressive but marred by slow decision-making about supplying advanced weapons systems to Ukraine. Given the military balance, the US should be forward-leaning.

Azerbaijan dismantles Nagorno-Karabakh. Almost 20 years after losing control of its mostly-ethnic Armenian territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian forces, Azerbaijan launched a military attack in Nagorno-Karabakh that decisively defeated forces of the breakaway province. The small enclave had been the subject of extensive and fruitless negotiations including the US, France, and Russia, which had generally been regarded as Armenia’s protector; Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders had also participated in efforts to settle the conflict. Azerbaijan retook much of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. With Russia preoccupied by its war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, generally supported by Turkey, felt able to finish the job of reclaiming the territory. It began blockading Nagorno-Karabakh by closing the Lachin Corridor, which serves as the sole lifeline road connecting the enclave to Armenia. Azerbaijan further isolated Nagorno-Karabakh by shutting off energy supplies and internet access and finally launched an assault in September. In its aftermath, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev promised that the ethnically Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh population will be safe, as Azerbaijan citizens. But many and perhaps most ethnic-Armenians are fleeing to Armenia under terrible humanitarian conditions, including reports of ethnic cleansing, mass murders, and other atrocities. It is unclear if Azerbaijani forces have ended their assault; they could extend attacks to include incursions into Armenian territory.

• Shaping the order. The long conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has defied US and other Western-led efforts, persistent but usually second-order, to broker a settlement. It additionally demonstrated the limits of outside powers to ameliorate, much less settle, regional disputes with limited resources and leverage. While the latest turn in Nagorno-Karabakh is a blow to US efforts, Russia has not necessarily benefited from the current situation. Long viewed as Armenia’s protector, Russia appears to have lost credibility in Armenia.
• Hitting home. Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe even beyond what appears to be unfolding, as ethnic-Armenians flee Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan is a major oil and gas producer and transit corridor for Central Asian energy flowing West and the US has tried to balance its concerns about Aliyev’s dictatorial rule with its economic interests. Intensified war would make this harder.
• What to do. The United States and its European allies and partners must push Azerbaijan and Turkey to work to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. This may require limited cooperation with Russia, which has long invested in this conflict, for the sake of saving lives and promoting regional stability. In the long term, the US should support Armenia in the post-Nagorno-Karabakh period. If Azerbaijan feels it has restored its territorial integrity, it and Turkey may be willing to ease pressure on Armenia and, in the best case, lift Turkey’s long isolation of Armenia.

Frayed Canada-India Relations. Canadian President Justin Trudeau accused the Indian government of murdering Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh activist, on Canadian soil. Prior to his murder, Nijjar was a member of a Sikh separatist group that was deemed a terrorist organization by the Indian government following civil unrest in the 1980s. The news sent shockwaves throughout the international community, instigating ire and denial from India, and relative silence and inaction from other Western allies. India-Canada relations quickly deteriorated. India stopped issuing new visas for Canadians, and both countries expelled each other’s high-level diplomats. While allies, like the UK and the US, have expressed concerns over the allegations and urged India to cooperate with the Canadian investigation, they are so far opting to keep a low profile at least until the investigation draws to a close.

• Shaping the order. This situation poses a difficult dilemma for the United States. Just months ago, the Biden administration hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and reinforced its bilateral commitment to cooperation across several key sectors, including security. Much of the West considers India an ally in continued efforts to combat the regional and international influence of China. As a democracy, albeit with flaws, India seemed a natural partner in seeking to uphold a rules-based order that favors democracy. An India that murders those it considers enemies would be a more problematic partner. The tension between values and more immediate strategic calculations has risen in the case of India.
• Hitting home. This dilemma is similar to the one between the United States and Saudi Arabia following the violent murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Ultimately, after much international turmoil and contention, the United States effectively gave the Saudi government a pass in order to protect bilateral relations that prioritize security cooperation and access to energy stores.
• What to do. The Indian government’s democratic backsliding, potential human rights abuses, and domestic disputes may sully the fragile and still-blossoming relationship between India and several Western powers. The Biden administration must gauge how it will draw moral and ethical lines with India while leveraging its position to continue deterrence efforts against China. The Biden administration will need to develop a policy, and find public language, to integrate, albeit imperfectly, the conflicting objectives of strategic cooperation and values-based relations.

Quote of the Month

“Democracy is under threat. Authoritarianism is on the march. Inequalities are growing… Our world needs statesmanship, not gamesmanship and gridlock… It is time for a global compromise. Politics is compromise. Diplomacy is compromise. Effective leadership is compromise. Leaders have a [special] responsibility to achieve compromise in building a common future of peace and prosperity for our common good.”
– UN Secretary General’s Address to the UNGA, September 19, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy ()

• In an attempt to create the allusion of democracy, Russia is staging “elections” in occupied Ukrainian territories. Kremlim-approved United Russia candidates, the Russian ruling party that backs President Vladimir Putin, are expected to dominate the rigged elections in the Russian-controlled Ukrainian regions of Kherson, Zapirizhzia, Donestk, and Luhansk.
• A Chinese court sentenced Rahile Dawut, a leading scholar of Uyghur traditional culture who disappeared in late 2017, to life in prison for “splittism”, or endangering China’s state security. State documents reveal that Dr. Rahile made attempts to appeal her case in 2018, but was rejected.
• Burkina Faso’s intelligence and security services said they thwarted a coup attempt against Ibrahim Traoré, the country’s president, who himself obtained power through a coup just the year prior.
• South Korean opposition leader Lee Jae-Myung was arrested and charged with breach of trust, bribery, and other similar crimes. The charges follow a 149-136 National Assembly vote that lifted his immunity, where dozens of members of Lee’s party likely voted against him. Jae-Myung, who was recently hospitalized following a hunger strike in protest of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s government, denies any wrongdoing.
• As a result of increasing instability in the Sahel, African leaders across the continent are acting to “coup-proof” their governments and militaries. Some leaders, such as Cameroonian President Paul Biya—who has been in power for four decades—appointed several security advisers to their Ministries of Defense. Others, like Rwandan President Paul Kagame—who has maintained power for over two decades—forcibly retired dozens of generals and hundreds of senior officers.
• In exchange for the release of $6 billion in frozen funds and five Iranians in US custody, Tehran freed five Americans who had been imprisoned in Iran on trumped-up charges. While Tehran alleges that it has the flexibility to use the $6 billion backing the prisoner exchange on whatever it pleases, the Biden administration emphasizes that the purpose of the funds is limited to non-sanctionable purchases, such as food and medicine, and will be subject to strict oversight by the US.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

• US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, and other top diplomats in Malta as part of continued bilateral efforts to “thaw” tumultuous relations between the two powers. Much like other recent US-China talks, the two sides committed to “additional high-level engagement and consultation” in key strategic areas. Officials in attendance noted that while there were discussions of re-establishing military-to-military dialogue, Chinese officials offered “limited indications” of receptiveness.
• Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who had not made a public appearance since August, was detained by authorities for questioning. China’s Ministry of Defense has not commented on the detainment, and the Foreign Ministry claims to be unaware of the situation. Meanwhile, US officials claim that Li was removed from his post. In July, the former Foreign Minister, Qin Gang, was similarly removed from his post after a month-long disappearance.
• The Dominican Republic closed all its shared land, sea, and air borders with Haiti. This move follows continued disputes between the Dominican Republic and Haiti over the construction of a canal on Haitian soil that would tap water from a shared river between the two states.
• The Biden administration announced that it plans to redirect $85 million in military aid from Egypt to Taiwan. The decision comes as a result of heightened concerns about human rights abuses by Egypt, including the treatment of political prisoners.
• In his first international trip in nearly five years, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un traveled to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin. The pair met to discuss arms negotiations, including Russia’s bid for much-needed artillery ammunition. In turn, North Korea seeks assistance in modernizing its weapons technologies, as well as food and energy shipments.
• Japan’s Ministry of Defense asked for $53 billion (7.7 trillion yen) in spending for the upcoming 2024 fiscal year, marking a record-breaking 13% increase in defense spending. This is part of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s aim to boost the country’s military spending by 43 trillion yen by 2027 as it faces increased aggression from China and North Korea.
• French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France will withdraw its remaining troops in Niger, effectively ending its military presence in the West African state. Niger’s junta responded that the withdrawal is a “new step towards the sovereignty” of the country, but international concerns mount over the governance gap that will ensue and the potential for terrorism and insurgency to rise.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• China’s National Development and Reform Commission announced that it would establish a governing body to support the country’s private sector. This is widely viewed as an attempt for the nation to energize its slowing economic prospects and shore up confidence among international investors concerned.
• The US State and Treasury Departments announced sanctions on over 150 foreign entities accused of circumventing international sanctions and providing support to Russia. The entities sanctioned are primarily involved in the construction, oil, gas, and financial sectors. This is a continuation of the US-led push to cut off the flows of goods Russia needs to sustain its assault on Ukraine. Sanctions evasion by Russia and sanctions enforcement will continue.
• The United States and China created two bilateral working groups to tackle economic and financial issues. The first, dubbed the “commercial issues working group” tackles conflicts surrounding trade and technology, while the second, titled the “financial working group” tackles regulatory and financial stability concerns.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↓)

• Devastating flooding in eastern Libya left over 11,000 dead and tens of thousands more missing or displaced. The collapse of two dams sent 20-foot waves crashing through several towns. Reports indicate the dam collapses resulted from neglect and mismanagement.
• Morocco was rocked by a 6.8 magnitude earthquake, the strongest to hit the nation since 1960. Damage left 3,000 dead, with thousands more displaced or missing. Nearly half of the fatalities originated from the province of Al Haouz, a string of remote villages and settlements located south of the earthquake’s epicenter.
• In a first-of-its-kind case, six young Portuguese citizens ranging from ages 11 to 24 filed a lawsuit against 32 governments for their inaction in combatting the climate crisis, including failure to reach the Paris Agreement target of containing global warming to 1.5 celcius. Countries listed in the lawsuit include the entirety of the EU, the UK, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. None of the plaintiffs seek financial compensation.
• A study in the journal Nature concludes that the recent string of wildfires significantly reduced—and, in some US states, effectively reversed—decades of improvements in US air quality since the 1970 passage of the Clean Air Act.
• On the sidelines of the UNGA, the United States and 31 other Atlantic Countries—including several across the Global South—adopted the Declaration on Atlantic Cooperation to launch the new Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation. The Partnership is a foundation for increased US engagement with the Global South around noncontroversial transnational issues, such as climate and oceanic sustainability.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances ()

• World leaders convened in New York for the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly. President Joe Biden was the only UN Security Council leader in attendance, with the rest—Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Rishi Sunak, and Emmanuel Macron—choosing to skip the event.
• Leaders from around the world convened for the annual G20 Summit in New Delhi. Unsurprisingly, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin were absent. This marks the first G20 Summit that Xi has not participated in since assuming the Chinese Presidency in 2013. The Summit ended with the welcoming of the African Union, representing over 1 billion people, into the group. The G20 statement included language that was generally on Ukraine’s side in Russia’s war of aggression against it but weaker than the 2022 G-20 statement on the same topic.
• At the G20, the US, India, Saudi Arabia, and other powers announced plans to establish a transit corridor to connect Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This initiative is part of the US-led Western push to create attractive alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• President Joe Biden traveled to Vietnam as part of his administration’s efforts to increase engagement with other Asian powers to combat regional Chinese influence. While no formal alliances were announced, the US pledged initiatives to expand Vietnam’s semiconductor production base, as well as various other investments in trade.
• On balance, the alliance pillar was unchanged. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Ash Jain, in Foreign Policy, assesses the six schools of thought US leaders and practitioners fall into in their pursuit of foreign policy strategies: unilateral internationalists, democratic internationalists, realist internationalists, multilateral internationalists, retractors, and restrainers.
• Howard French, in Foreign Policy, argues that the Biden administration’s lack of strong response to the allegations of the Indian government’s involvement in the assassination of a Sikh leader on Canadian soil weakens Washington’s global credibility.
• Dominic Tierney, in Foreign Affairs, asserts that transatlantic disagreements are helpful guardrails in restraining Washington’s more dangerous impulses, deterring China from fully allying itself with Russia, and guarding Europe’s position as a capable power and partner to Washington.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that, regardless of China’s actions, the United States must act with greater purpose and consistency in supporting Ukraine, shorting up its alliances, advancing its critical technologies, and fixing its democracy.
• Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, posit five ways that Western democracies can increase pressure on Russia’s already weak and strained economy: increasing export control enforcement, tighten the oil price cap, use immobilized Russian foreign exchange reserves for Ukrainian reconstruction, target Russian oligarchs, and impose a full financial embargo with specific carve-outs.
• Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford, in Foreign Policy, debate the utility of the G-20 amidst increased global contention, great power rivalries, and disputes.
• Andrew Michta, in the Wall Street Journal, opines that Warsaw and other NATO eastern flank allies—such as Poland—are vital to the Alliance’s ongoing deterrence efforts against Russian aggression.
• Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, in The New York Sun, makes the case that the newly established Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation does not do enough to combat China’s rising influence in the Global South.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

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At the heart of these gatherings lie two profound concepts: freedom and prosperity. While freedom in particular is often associated with Western nations, the UNGA serves as a powerful reminder that this aspiration is not exclusive to any region or group; rather, freedom is a fundamental human right that deserves recognition and promotion worldwide. The events at the UNGA demonstrate efforts from countries across the globe toward creating a freer world. Data from the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes give credibility to these efforts and show that freedom is both present and actively pursued in all regions of the world.

The distribution of freedom across regions

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes use a diverse set of data to provide a unique and comprehensive measurement of both freedom and prosperity in 164 countries. The Freedom Index uses a total of thirteen indicators to measure economic (free-market economy), political (democracy and individual rights), and legal (the rule of law) freedom in each country.

The 2022 data show that freedom varies across regions of the world, with Europe (and especially Western Europe) appearing the freest. Thirty of the forty-five “free” countries (shown as dark green in the scatterplot) in the world are in Europe, including the top nine countries (Denmark and Sweden lead the world with scores of 95.1 and 93.5 out of 100, respectively). North America is also a free region, with the United States and Canada scoring in the “free” category and Mexico in the “mostly free” category.

In the middle of the pack, the regions of Central and South America and East Asia and the Pacific both score above the global average. The two regions, however, are quite different in terms of their distribution. Central and South America is relatively homogenous, with most countries scoring in the “mostly free category,” followed by a few “free” (Costa Rica, Chile, and Barbados) and “mostly unfree” (El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua) countries. By comparison, East Asia and the Pacific is much more varied in its distribution, with a large portion of countries in the “free,” “mostly free,” and “mostly unfree” categories. Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are some of the freest countries in the world, with scores of 90.8 (10th), 90.6 (11th), and 85.2 (23rd), while other countries in the region such as Cambodia, China, and Myanmar fare much more poorly with scores of 40.9 (140th), 39.6 (144th), and 26.8 (158th).

While also in the middle, Sub-Saharan Africa scores below the global average and contains several countries in the “mostly free,” “mostly unfree,” and “unfree” categories. South Sudan and Eritrea are some of the world’s least “free” countries with scores of 19.1 (162nd) and 17.5 (163rd). The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria fall into the “mostly unfree” category, while Kenya, South Africa, and Ghana are “mostly free.” Seychelles and Cape Verde are the region’s two “free” countries with scores of 79.8 (35th) and 78.8 (40th).

On the other end of the spectrum, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South and Central Asia are the least free regions, with their countries generally falling in the “mostly unfree” and “unfree” categories (shown as light and dark red in the scatterplot). Afghanistan and Turkmenistan are among the world’s least free countries with scores of 14.4 (164th) and 20.7 (161st), and Yemen and Syria have scores of 26.6 (159th) and 21.2 (160th).

Freedom exists and is being pursued in all corners of the world

Out of the 164 countries measured in our index, forty-five are considered “free.” Although the Freedom Index shows that the majority of the “free” countries lie mainly in Western Europe and North America, it is important to note that there are “free” countries throughout the world, showing that freedom can and does exist everywhere and is not unique to the West.

In fact, there are a handful of nations that have outperformed their regional peers in terms of institutional stability and quality (i.e., the extent to which these institutions are able to provide a stable, predictable, and transparent framework for economic, social, and political activities within a country) to reach the highest category of freedom. These include South Korea and Japan in East Asia and the Pacific with scores of 80.6 (34th) and 85.2 (23rd), Seychelles and Cape Verde in Sub-Saharan Africa with scores of 79.8 (35th) and 78.8 (40th), and Costa Rica and Chile in Central and South America with scores of 82.6 (28th) and 81.4 (31st). Though these countries are very different culturally and geographically, they are united in that they promote freedom through economic, political, and legal dimensions.

Even more countries are upgrading their freedoms and noticeably improving their scores. Our data track freedom from 1995 to 2022. During this time, the global average in freedom rose slightly, climbing around three points in our Freedom Index. Numerous countries around the world, however, experienced a larger increase in freedom, with the top improvers achieving gains of more than twenty-five points. Notably, these countries are not concentrated in one region, but are dispersed throughout the globe. In fact, examining the graph below shows that the countries with the biggest improvements in freedom hail from many different regions: Sub-Saharan Africa claims four of the top ten freedom improvers. Europe contributes three. And South and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Central and South America each have one. Notably, all ten of the countries that have advanced the most in freedom scored below the global average in 1995. But by 2022, nine of these countries had risen above the global average.

Largest advancements in freedom, 1995-2022

Freedom is being actively pursued and achieved across the entire globe, as the largest improvements in freedom are not confined to one region. Countries such as Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and Bhutan are proving that freedom is a valued concept regardless of culture or region, and that nations do not need to adopt Western practices or attitudes to obtain freedom. Freedom looks different in different places, and it is up to each country to find the best-fitting recipe to improve economic, political, and legal policies that guarantee a high degree of sustainable freedom.

Nina Dannaoui is the associate director for the Freedom and Prosperity Center at the Atlantic Council.

James Storen is the program assistant for the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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A country’s prosperity and development depend on the state’s strength, and the efficiency of the services it provides. Therefore, it is crucial to have strong institutions that, together with government policies, guarantee and defend society’s basic needs, such as freedom, education, security, or the rule of law. The role of elites with power is, therefore, fundamental to ensuring the country’s sovereignty and development; it is the duty of elites to empower society with the necessary tools to question nepotism and corruption. Moreover, for efficient state services, public policies that favor the welfare of its citizens, and strong institutions that guarantee the functioning of democracy and fundamental rights, a country’s elites must support these initiatives and use their power and influence to steer the country toward a path of prosperity. Elites have a responsibility to make decisions and draw up plans for development because they are the ones who have the capacity to make things change. 

When we refer to the elites, we are not only talking about people in charge of managing the government and politics of the country but also civil and economic elites and, in general, the people with real influence in decision making. These can be civil society leaders, businesspeople, cultural leaders, or politicians. In this essay, when I speak about elites in general, I’m referring to all of these people: those with power and influence. 

Through their actions, these leaders determine whether a state will develop strong institutions or instead be captured by powerful elites that hinder socioeconomic growth. For executive, legislative, and democratic institutions to function well and benefit the pathways to freedom and prosperity, elites must first act in favor of these objectives. As we will explain later, this happens when a development bargain exists. The participants in this bargain must acknowledge the primacy of the institutions themselves—recognizing that the institutions sit above the people who hold any political, public, or regular office. The elites are the ones with the power to make the necessary changes, but they also have the force to prevent change from happening at all, allowing corruption, civil conflict, or any other brake on a country’s development to continue. 

As Acemoglu and Robinson detail in their book The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies and the Fate of Liberty, the role of the elites is decisive: 

Achieving liberty is a process; you have to travel a long way in the corridor before violence is brought under control, laws are written and enforced, and the state starts providing services to its citizens. It is a process because the state and its elites must learn to live with the shackles society puts on them, and different segments of society have to learn to work together despite their differences.¹

In this essay, I highlight the ways in which elites in power can be decisive for stable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of all world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa has the biggest age gap between leaders and their populations, as well as with the world’s longest-serving head of state, President Paul Biya of Cameroon—eighty-nine years old at the time of writing, and in power since 1982. Acemoglu and Robinson point to Malawi as an example where leadership traditionally has been shortsighted and corrupt.² Still, in 2020 Malawi’s judiciary annulled an incumbent’s electoral victory, and the country now ranks eighth (of thirty-three) in the region in respect of the rule of law.“³ However, despite leadership goodwill, change doesn’t happen overnight: President Lazarus Chakwera had to dissolve his cabinet in 2022 due to corruption allegations, and the country remains one of the world’s poorest.“⁴

Some countries have managed to develop a functioning plan for stability. Kenya and Zambia, for example, show that despite some obstacles, steps toward freedom can be taken by empowering institutions that constrain elites’ power. In contrast, others persist in failure because their governments have not prioritized economic and political progress as the main objectives. Therefore, to explain and analyze the decisive role of the elites in achieving developed, democratic societies, we will need various illustrative examples of how their actions can favor or harm their people. 

Historically, each country has had different approaches to dealing with violence, corruption, or poverty. Carrying out a plan to improve, even a little, the labor conditions or fundamental rights of an underdeveloped nation is a very complex matter. There is no single formula or recipe; each country has achieved prosperity to a greater or lesser extent with different policies and types of government. Each nation has its conditions, history, time, culture, and way of thinking. That is why the route to prosperity depends on the case and it is impossible to speak of “formulas for development” that work in any context. Many attempts by international organizations and powerful foreign governments to help underdeveloped countries have failed. The plan must be drawn up and led by the elites: they are the only people overseeing the country and have the most significant capacity for real influence for change. 

Good results flourish when elites in power assume the responsibility of leading their people to paths of prosperity and freedom. And when the elites in question do not seek a way toward prosperity, freedoms remain minimal, and the population is at the mercy of their mismanagement; this does not help the country’s development. 

For this analysis I will focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically the case of Kenya. Kenya’s recent good performance—it is a regional leader on measures such as separation of powers, stability, and democracy—has set it on the road to freedom and prosperity. Specifically, I will talk about how advances and improvements in education (thanks to the bargain that emerged from previous governments and their policies) have helped Kenya along this road. 

Policies for improving access to regular, good-quality schooling in Kenya have been a perfect example of how political elites can contribute to developing prosperity and freedom, since education is a central factor in both. This analysis will focus on the elites’ contribution to these changes. Despite endemic corruption and ethnic conflict undermining its development progress in the past, the country’s leadership has, in recent years, stood out for favoring long-term progress through independence of its institutions, and for favoring stability. As a result, Kenya shows evident improvement in education, indicating that paths to prosperity are underway. 

In his book Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose, Stefan Dercon points out that what matters most for success is a “development bargain”: a shared commitment among those with the power to shape politics, economy, and society to strive for growth and development. The elites’ willingness to take advice and learn from mistakes is essential. Dercon also explores how these bargains come to be: 

Why aren’t the [Democratic Republic of the Congo] or other countries that haven’t succeeded practicing better economic policymaking focused on growth and development? My simple answer: if success requires an elite bargain that favours growth and development, then failure suggests the lack of this bargain. What is it about these countries? How does a development bargain emerge in some places and not others?⁵ 

This essay seeks to answer Dercon’s questions, framed as “Why have a development bargain and good policy emerged in Kenya and not in Uganda?” First, through a case study, I will decipher what has caused Kenya to take steps toward freedom, showing it to be an example of a job well done by the country’s decision makers. Then, focusing on education as a fundamental indicator to measure development, I will assess why policies targeting prosperity have succeeded in countries like Kenya, while elsewhere in the region, such policies have failed to progress and stagnation persists. 

Kenya: Long-term vision 

There are specific moments when a society hits rock bottom and faces a decisive point that could split the country or unite it toward a common goal. In Kenya, that moment was 2008, when 1,133 people died and 650,000 people were displaced from their homes due to major post-election ethnic clashes, according to the final Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, published five years after the events.⁶ 

Many felt the country might fall into a full-blown civil war and turn into yet another failed state, as had Kenya’s neighbors Somalia and Sudan (later South Sudan). However, when the country was at its worst, elites showed the traits that everyone expected of them: seriousness and professionalism, to leave differences aside and work together towards healing existing differences. 

Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga entered into a power-sharing agreement in 2008 that ended the immediate violence, although it would face problems later on. They set the path for future long-term agreements that have driven Kenya to become a regional example of stability, democracy, and growth. The proven commitment of Kenya’s political elites to accepting court rulings in political disputes, and their willingness to seek compromise with opponents at difficult moments, have seen them become vital continental peace brokers. For example, former president Uhuru Kenyatta played a vital mediating role in peace negotiations in South Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

All of that wouldn’t have been possible without the political will in 2008 to invest in the country’s future. Leaders in liberal democracies tend to prioritize short-term, quantifiable, and achievable goals which the electorate will recognize as theirs and spur their vote in the upcoming polls, rather than long-term structural changes that won’t be recognized and whose success depends on their successors upholding such policies. 

In his 1919 essay Democratic Ideals and Reality, British political geographer Halford J. Mackinder wrote: “Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until compelled to do so for purposes of defense.”⁷ The conclusion Mackinder reached a century ago is today increasingly felt across a globalized world where breaking events complicate long-term goals. A decade after the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic struck the entire globe. Once the economy started to regrow, the Russian invasion of Ukraine altered supply chains and immediate priorities. 

Despite such phenomenal world events, to which Kenya has been not a stranger, the country has followed a comprehensive plan to spur its growth into a “newly industrializing, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens . . .” That is the main goal set in the Kenya Vision 2030,⁸ agreed upon in June 2008, only four months after the power-sharing agreement. 

The post-election violence was the turning point that forced leaders to step up and deliver wide-ranging policies. Vision 2030 was not a mere document, but a strategic plan to swiftly overhaul the institutions of all levels of Kenyan society and upend a divisive path. More important than the document itself is that all leaders have committed to it as a national program; Kenya now has its third president since the Vision was launched. 

Vision 2030 has helped to evolve all pillars of Kenya’s society. Kenya has invested heavily in infrastructure to reap the benefits of regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area and become a continental powerhouse. The country is already seeing the results, shipping batteries and tea to Ghana⁹ and becoming a key route for exports in East Africa. Kenya has made its lack of natural resources a strength by diversifying its economy, sustaining annual growth of over 3 percent for every year since 2009 (except 2020).“¹⁰ Despite failing to achieve the probably unrealistic 10 percent annual target that was initially set, the country became in 2020 Sub-Saharan Africa’s third-largest economy, surpassing commodity-dependent Angola.¹¹ 

Leaders’ commitment to change is also visible in the political sphere. In 2010, leaders agreed to reform the constitution, making changes that some had sought for decades. For instance, amongst the amendments was a new provision for contested elections in the judiciary, which reduced the possibility of violence. The country’s institutional strength and separation of powers were shown in 2017, when the Supreme Court annulled the elections won by incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta, becoming the first country in Africa to do so. However, this would mean nothing if elites refused to accept or abide by the court ruling. After three election cycles, those who lost electoral court cases always accepted the final verdict, showing democratic maturity. 

In an effort to spur public spending toward peripheral areas, improve service delivery, and reduce ethnic tensions, the country also devolved powers to 47 newly created counties. The country’s decentralisation has been the most significant commitment of Kenyan national elites to the country’s long-term sustainability, as it meant them relinquishing some political power by transferring competences and funding to counties. 

Education: An elite decision toward prosperity 

Investing in good-quality education is the best decision democratic leaders can take to make a country grow in the long term. Over the years, several studies have directly linked economic growth and investing in educating a country’s human capital. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) calculated the cost of not investing in education. Its 2010 paper titled The High Cost of Low Educational Performance estimated that a 25-point increase in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores achieved through twenty years yields consistent economic growth through human capital value addition: “By the end of expected life in 2090 for the person born in 2010, GDP per capita would be expected to be about 25% above the ‘education as usual’ level.”¹² 

However, it is essential to commit to education in the right ways. Development economist Lant Pritchett has been investigating for many years how to improve students’ learning foundations, including through the Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE) program. Overall, the evidence from RISE and elsewhere has shown that focusing on a one-size-fits-all model imposed through a top-down bureaucratic system does not benefit learning. Some governments have tried to modernize their curricula by standardizing them for all in the name of equality, but as Pritchett proves, this only generates weak learning environments.¹³ Excessive public control of what is taught and how it should be taught only sets a barrier to each student’s uniqueness and curtails their freedom. 

Instead, governments should set a foundational basis after which schools and teachers can have their own freedom to set their values and foster tailored learning for their students. Ignoring societal differences and trying to assign the same pace of learning to all students will only leave behind those from the most unfavored backgrounds.¹⁴ To ensure good-quality learning, governments must first dedicate time and resources to teacher training to ensure they attend the workplace and are committed to their students’ education. 

Kenya’s Vision 2030 set the country’s educational reforms for the upcoming decades in terms of both quality and quantity. As a priority, leaders sought to bring education centers to arid and semi-arid land areas, especially in the north and east of the country, by constructing new schools, reforming primary education centers, and hiring more teachers. Without school buildings, teaching is impossible. 

Then, government officials decided to renew its curricula to focus on students’ qualities. By 2017, the country had developed a competency-based curriculum focused on learning practical competencies that could serve them for a future in the labor market, such as critical thinking and problem-solving, self-efficacy, and communication, amongst others. Pritchett’s investigation found that “re-centering teaching on students’ skills and abilities has enormous payoffs,” and is a “low-cost solution to improving learning.”¹⁵ 

This curriculum’s implementation has had its problems, for example in teacher training, resources and equipment, and public participation.¹⁶ Yet despite these shortcomings the reforms have helped Kenya to leapfrog its neighbors on several indicators of education; it is now a leader across east and southern Africa, both in attendance and performance. Primary completion is universal for female and male students; and lower secondary completion reaches 79 percent, 30 points higher than the regional average and above its income group, according to the World Bank’s latest Human Capital Index.¹⁷ Students also now get better grades and excel in mathematics and languages. 

Pritchett and the RISE program identify five actions that will allow an education system to flourish.¹⁸ Kenya has already implemented three of these: commit to universal, early foundational learning; align systems around learning commitments; and support teaching. Now, to ensure the success of the reforms and prove their commitment, elites must follow up with the last two measures: measure learning; and adapt the new curricula to what the data shows as time passes. 

These results were only possible with enough budget to implement the reforms. As of 2020, total government expenditure on education in Kenya as a share of GDP was 5.1 percent, higher than the 3.4 percent average across Sub-Saharan Africa, according to World Bank data.¹⁹ 

Reacting to unexpected events: Leadership in times of crisis 

Kenya’s educational leadership has also proven itself in its responses and plans for unexpected events. Kenya’s government, like most around the world, closed schools when the COVID-19 pandemic struck in March 2020. Four months later, the government decided to cancel classes and declare the school year invalid. 

The decision was controversial and understandably criticized, not only due to learning losses, but also due to the wider, known effects of school closures and restriction of movement. Calls to one phoneline to report violence against women and girls rose by a staggering 301 percent in the first two weeks of lockdown, and reports of gender-based violence increased by 87.7 percent during April–June 2020, according to data from the National Crime and Research Centre.²⁰ 

The government defended its decision, arguing that the deep inequalities between students who could afford to learn from home and those without the technology and space to do so would generate a knowledge gap. 

Despite this being a difficult decision to take—and one which, in retrospect, could have been enacted better—leaders invested their energies in planning to catch up with lost time. In October 2020, some classes came back and in January 2021, nine months after the lockdowns began, schools fully reopened with a new interim calendar and a plan to return to the pre-COVID school calendar within two years. The Ministry of Education decided to add one more term per year, making it four instead of three each year, meaning students would get taught one full year and an additional period the following year. To incentivize the return to classes, and to ease the economic burden of extra school fees on top of the pandemic, the government reduced school fees by 16 percent. As of 2023, students have already recovered the lost school year and will soon be back on the original school calendar. 

As with any other country, Kenya was not ready for such a disruption and made errors in its initial decisions. However, the effort taken in planning toward a regular return to classes shows the importance of having committed leaders with a long-term vision toward prosperity. 

The path of Kenya’s education sector through the pandemic compares favorably to neighboring Uganda, where leadership has failed to find creative solutions to short-term crises. Schools remained closed for two years due to COVID-19, only restarting in 2022. At that point, 10 percent of students did not report back to school²¹ and empirical studies predict that those who did would carry a learning deficit of 2.8 years.²² Furthermore, instead of working toward alternative plans to avoid further closures during health emergencies, in November 2022, the government of Uganda closed schools again for several weeks due to an outbreak of Ebola. The repeated use of school closures as a control mechanism hinders children’s education and shows a lack of leadership and care for a country’s prosperity. 

In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), the elites’ decisions, or lack thereof, are crucial for the well-being of a country. Kenya’s case—of leadership focused on a long-term vision while still providing solutions for short-term shocks—is an example in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Conclusion 

The work of the elites in political power is essential, and the role of institutions as the basis for controlling and sustaining the path toward development is an unquestionable pillar. In the case of Kenya, mainly focusing on the country’s education system, we have seen how the role of elites has been decisive in the country’s progress in prosperity and freedom. The route to development is, as Acemoglu and Robinson put it, a “narrow corridor”: a complex process that does not happen overnight. However, Kenya continues to walk that corridor for development. What is exciting and positive for the country is that the elites intend to learn to live with the shackles society puts on them. 

Stefan Dercon points out the importance of political elites being willing to take advice and learn from mistakes. We have been able to appreciate how this has been happening in Kenya. Thanks to elites in power favoring the will of society, a power-sharing agreement ended the terrible violence of 2008, beginning a new journey toward political and social stability. Moreover, accepting court rulings in political disputes and agreeing with the opposition in tense moments have turned Kenya’s elites into vital continental peace brokers. The year 2008 was a critical turning point. The elites, despite their differences, have been able to sustain a long-term vision that has helped it become a reference in the region, take a clear path toward prosperity, and overcome setbacks. 

Education is a crucial example of elite commitment to freedom and prosperity. American economist Theodore Schultz believed that investing in human capital is the most significant investment a country can make. The wealth of nations depends on their capacity to grow their human resources rather than their physical resources or particular policies. 

There is no recipe or formula, but situations can improve when things start pointing in the right direction, seeking liberty and growth. Kenya is a striking example that it is possible to move forward and improve the quality of life of its inhabitants. Of course, Kenya is not an “ideal” country; it continues to grapple with severe problems, above all, rampant corruption. But, notwithstanding that, its long path toward being the stable country it is today shows that when elites are committed, structural changes can happen through long-term planning and taking little steps towards a great common goal. 

Luis Ravina Bohórquez is a professor of economics at the University of Navarra (Spain). 

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This issue brief explores the status of current conversations in the financial community on scaling private investment, the growing recognition that guarantees are the most efficient financial instrument to attract private capital, a comparison of relevant existing guarantee proposals, and a description of EMCIC, a proposed vehicle designed to significantly scale up private investment in EMDE climate mitigation. A concept note that explains the EMCIC facility in more detail is also available and will be updated to incorporate feedback.

A previous version of this issue brief misstated which nation’s guarantee instrument RELP had based its structure upon. It was Argentina’s.

Enabling net-zero solutions

Through high-level convenings and publications, the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center promotes and advances strategies to achieve the net-zero energy system of the future.

A banker by background, Ian Callaghan has worked in project finance, investment banking, and sustainable finance for some 35 years. Since 2005 he has focused on what is now termed “impact investing” and, since 2015, on climate finance.   

As well as heading his own consultancy, Ian Callaghan Associates, he is the originator of the Climate Finance Accelerator, a UK government capacity building program addressing investable pipeline now operating in nine larger emerging markets.

In past roles, Callaghan has been involved in many aspects of sustainable finance in these markets, including as a senior adviser at Consilum Capital, a London-based corporate finance adviser focused on sustainable investments in emerging markets, as the founding Managing Director of Enclude Capital Advisory (since acquired by Palladium), and as a senior director of investments at the California-based Omidyar Network—one of the first and leading impact investing foundations. Prior to this, from 2006-2009, he was head of microfinance at the investment bank Morgan Stanley. At the outset of his career, with NatWest, he worked in project finance on the £7 billion financing of the Channel Tunnel.

Callaghan was born and brought up in West Africa (where his family worked for 25 years), and holds a BA degree from King’s College London. 

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George Frampton

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Ken Berlin

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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This month’s topline events

US, Japan, and South Korea Trilateral Commitments. President Joe Biden’s first Camp David Summit brought together Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to discuss trilateral security cooperation in the face of an increasingly aggressive China and assertive North Korea. The first high-level convening between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo came on the heels of a rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. The trio of leaders committed to new areas of cooperation across security, technology, and the economy including establishing security-related information-sharing networks, collaborating on ballistic-missile defense, and conducting annual joint military exercises. They agreed to hold annual summits and reaffirmed a commitment to maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as addressing China’s economic coercion. The White House clarified that, although the three countries have not agreed to a formal mutual defense agreement, they have agreed to a “three-way hotline” for government administrations to more effectively communicate and “engage in critical circumstances.”

• Shaping the order. The trilateral should, if realized, advance Japanese, South Korean, and American interests and security in the region. The three-way partnership adds to others that the US has forged in the region (e.g., the Quad) to shore up the international order and counter Beijing. The Camp David summit signals that the free world can organize and coalesce in the face of authoritarian threats.
• Hitting home. Trilateral U.S.-South Korean-Japanese cooperation can be another means to constrain Chinese efforts to impose hegemony, both security and economic, in East Asia. It may strengthen US efforts to reach a sustainable set of norms with Beijing, including on trade, hopefully avoiding both confrontation and a weak position.
• What to do. The Biden administration should maintain momentum coming out of the Summit by executing agreed immediate next steps. Chief among these will be scheduling and planning for the first of what are promised to be regular, named, multi-domain trilateral exercises to enhance coordinated military capabilities and cooperation.

Expanding BRICS. At its summit in Johannesburg, BRICS leaders from Brazil, Russia (Putin only remotely), India, China, and South Africa announced they would expand the group by inviting Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join in January 2024. This comes as Russia and China push to establish the partnership as a counterweight to Western groups such as the G7, and emphasize the group’s geopolitical ambitions, as a champion for the Global South. Unsurprisingly, Russia and China used the meeting to push for anti-Western moves, including calling for increased intra-BRICS coordination to decouple members’ economies from the dollar. Saudi Arabia pursued BRICS membership despite efforts by the US and other Western nations to convince them not to join the grouping.

• Shaping the order. The potential BRICS expansion signals that Russia and China continue to push for a counterweight to Western alliances like the G7. But it is not yet clear whether an expanded BRICS that includes both archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran would be functional.
• Hitting home. The expanded BRICS would collectively represent 43% of global crude oil production and control a combined 29% of global GDP as well as large portions of global critical mineral supplies, including 75 percent of manganese and 28 percent of nickel. Increased energy trading among the BRICS members could further bifurcate the oil market. BRICS nations, which have used individual critical mineral export restrictions over the last decade, could adopt a more coordinated response and thereby reduce American access to these raw materials.
• What to do. While an expanded BRICS has potential power, previous efforts to develop counterweights to Western-oriented groups, like the G-77, have generally fallen short. The Biden administration should continue to deepen its relationships with India and Brazil. Doing so advances American trade and security interests and, as a secondary byproduct, can undermine collective action with the BRICS. US engagement with Saudi Arabia should include steps to prevent Riyadh from more closely aligning with Moscow.

Ukraine’s Southern Push. Ukraine continued its counteroffensive against Russia, with the Zelensky government committing significant troops across the South and, as a result, slowly pushing back Russian forces, like in liberating the Southeastern settlement of Robotyne. Ukraine achieved this progress despite not having the ability to provide air cover to its advancing troops. Leaked intelligence reports indicated that the US and others are frustrated with how Ukraine has executed the counter-offensive, including its approach to allocating forces. Despite purported Western misgivings about Ukraine’s strategy, however, the counteroffensive resulted in several military setbacks for Russia. Reports continue of frustration among elite Russian circles that the war is headed in the wrong direction; the apparent assassination of Evgeniy Prigozhin, head of the Wagner military group, two months after his mutiny, also suggests a brittleness within the Putinist system.

• Shaping the order. The Ukrainian counteroffensive appears to be working, albeit slowly and at significant cost. It has helped the Zelensky government reclaim key territories, dealt military losses to Moscow, and seemingly is feeding discontent across elite circles in Russia. A successful offensive could change the balance of the war.
• Hitting home. A successful Ukrainian counter-offensive would boost US policymakers and public confidence in support for Ukraine. A failed or only marginally successful counter-offensive would sharpen the US debate as the Presidential election campaign intensifies.
• What to do. The US and allies must remain united in their support for Ukraine’s strategy, keep misgivings and questions behind closed doors, and focus on giving Kyiv the weapons it needs to win. The US was smart to greenlight F-16 fighter aircraft transfers from the Netherlands and Denmark and needs to make sure pilots have the training needed to operate the equipment when they arrive in 2024.

Quote of the Month

“Today’s world is increasingly complicated and condensed, and one in which humanity faces both peril and promise. We are in a transformative era marked by strategic competition, rapid technological change, and increasingly worrisome transnational threats.”
– CIA Director Bill Burns, reacting to the release of the 2023 National Intelligence Strategy for the Intelligence Community. August 10, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy ()

• In Thailand, Srettha Thavisin, real estate tycoon and populist Pheu Thai Party candidate, won the backing of parliament to become the country’s 30th Prime Minister. The eleven-party government formed to rule the country and end a months-long political deadlock, however, noticeably excluded the progressive Move Forward Party, which won the most votes in the national election.
• Fernando Villavicienco, an Ecuadorian presidential candidate who vocally denounced gangs and corruption, was assassinated weeks before the country’s elections. The elections head to a run-off in October, featuring leftist Luisa González—who secured 33% of votes—and center-right Álvaro Noboa—who secured 24% of the votes.
• Bernardo Arévalo, son of a former president of Guatemala, won Guatemala’s presidential election, defeating former first lady Sandra Torres. However, hours before Arévalo’s victory, Guatemala’s electoral registry suspended his Seed Movement party, a move that could hinder the transition to an Arévalo government.
• Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who deposed President Robert Mugabe in a 2017 coup, won a second term in office. The opposition, however, claimed the presidential election was beset by “gigantic fraud.” International observers, civil society groups, and even the African Union cast doubt on the validity of the election.
• Military officers seized power in Gabon and placed President Ali Bongo Ondimba under house arrest. The president, whose family has been in power for half a century, recently won a third term in a heavily disputed election.
• Vladimir Putin extended the prison sentence of democracy activist and opposition leader Alexei Navalny by nineteen years. This follows the Putin government introducing trumped-up charges that Navalny was guilty of founding and funding an extremist organization.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

• Niger remains at an impasse following last month’s military coup. ECOWAS threatened military intervention to restore democratic order but has not followed through. Mali and Burkina Faso pledged their support to Niger’s coup leaders.
• The Netherlands and Denmark, in a move approved by the United States, announced they will deliver F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, likely in early 2024.
• Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner paramilitary group chief, reportedly died in a mysterious plane crash in the northwest region of Moscow. US intelligence officials report that preliminary findings indicate that, although the plane was not shot down by a surface-to-air missile, it did crash as a result of an assassination plot.
• The Ukrainian navy announced a “humanitarian corridor” in the Black Sea to allow safe passage to cargo and civilian ships trapped in ports since the outbreak of the war. Ukrainian officials stressed that the corridor is a voluntary “humanitarian mission and has no military purpose.”
• Eleven Russian and Chinese naval ships conducted joint patrols near the Alaskan coast. The Chinese and Russian ships did not enter US territorial waters but were flanked by US destroyers and aircraft until their departure.
• President Biden issued an executive order restricting American investment in specific Chinese companies involved in the development of emerging technologies.
• For the second time, North Korea failed to successfully launch its Malligyong-1 spy satellite into orbit. The regime is committed to trying again, however, as the spy satellite program is a critical part of Kim Jong Un’s five-year weapons strategy initiative.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

• US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo visited Beijing to discuss US-China commercial ties and address challenges faced by US businesses in China. While the US and China did not announce any major breakthroughs, reports indicate Raimondo and her counterpart agreed in principle for Washington and Beijing to exchange export control information and establish a bilateral forum for dialogue on other economic and commercial issues.
• The American credit rating agency Fitch downgraded the US rating from the highest rating, AAA, to AA+, based on the growing US debt burden, recession concerns, and erosion of governance relative to other top economies in recent decades.
• Negotiations surrounding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework—a fourteen-country trade deal—were jeopardized by US pressure to have Japan accept anti-commercial whaling provisions. While both governments refused to comment on the issue, one senior Japanese official said the subject was a “non-starter” and “issue of contention” for Tokyo.
• On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

• Recent wildfires ravaged parts of Hawaii, Greece, and Canada. The Maui wildfires claimed over a hundred lives—with over 1,000 still unaccounted for—and displaced thousands more. The fire in Greece is the biggest in Europe this century.
• India is the first country to successfully land a spacecraft on the moon’s south pole, days after Russia’s attempt ended in an unsuccessful crash on the lunar surface.
• Record high temperatures and environmental catastrophes induced by the climate crisis are pushing up food prices and exacerbating global inflation. Olive oil, certain grains, and soybeans are only some of the commodities already being impacted.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• President Joe Biden’s first Camp David Summit brought together Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to discuss trilateral security cooperation in the face of an increasingly aggressive China and assertive North Korea. The leaders agreed to cooperate on a range of issues across the security, economy, and technology spheres.
• Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai visited Washington in an attempt to strengthen the country’s economic ties with the United States and diversify away from its autocratic neighbors, China and Russia. While in Washington, Prime Minister Luvsannamsrai and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken committed to a new Economic Cooperation Roadmap, as well as signed an Open Skies Agreement.
• Finland’s defense ministry announced that it would spend 2.3% of its GDP on defense in 2024. This followed all NATO members, in July, re-committing to spending a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defense. Prior to the July re-commitment, only seven NATO members had met this target.
• Vladimir Putin confirmed to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he will not be attending the G20 Summit in Delhi in September due to a “busy schedule”. Xi Jinping also confirmed he would not be attending the Summit.
• Ahead of the upcoming G20 Summit in Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed inviting the African Union to join the group. This is part of the Prime Minister’s vision to enhance the “inclusiveness” of the bloc.
• Saudi Arabia convened senior officials from nearly 40 countries to discuss potential avenues to reach a peaceful end to the war in Ukraine. Notably, Russian representatives did not make an appearance, but counterparts from the four other BRICS countries attended. While the meeting produced no significant breakthroughs, it does showcase Saudi Arabia’s rising prominence on the global stage.
• On balance, the alliance pillar was strengthened. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• C. Raja Mohan, in Foreign Policy, argues that the expansion of the BRICS alliance will likely galvanize increased Western engagement in the Global South, threatening China’s largely uncontested influence in key strategic regions.
• Kelly Sims Gallagher, in Foreign Policy, contends that, despite their respective differences, the United States and China can pragmatically collaborate to advance green financing and development in the Global South.
• Hannah Rae Armstrong, in Foreign Affairs, argues that the United States, unlike its European allies, must preserve the relatively positive reputation it has in the Sahel by pushing for peaceful mediation, rather than military intervention, in the aftermath of the coup in Niger.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Dan Fried, in The Ripon Forum, makes the case for Ukraine’s inclusion into the NATO Alliance, citing its shared interests in the West in defeating Russia and Putin.
• Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford, in Foreign Policy, debate the impetus of coups in fragile states, using the 2023 Niger coup as an emblematic case study.
• Andrew Michta, in the New Atlanticist, opines that the United States must reassess its strategy towards Europe to be more future-oriented and reflective of US interests on the continent.
• Imran Bayoumi, in the Globe and Mail, argues for the need to update Canada’s National Security Strategy to accompany the country’s newly created National Security Council.
• Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, in a Geopolitical Intelligence Service (GIS) report, details how India and China’s infrastructure-building competition along their disputed border region is heightening risks of conflict between the two nuclear-armed powers.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing August 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On August 26, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Stefano Stefanini wrote in Formiche arguing that the West should keep a close eye on the enlargement of the BRICS bloc (text in Italian).  

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Hung Tran: With six new members, BRICS is tilting toward China

Jonathan Panikoff: New Middle Eastern BRICS members highlight shifting geopolitical winds

Rama Yade: BRICS has big ambitions, but it also faces new challenges

Colleen Cottle: Beijing’s vision for the bloc is driving BRICS expansion

Michael Bociurkiw: On the ground in Johannesburg, Putin’s absence stuck out

Valentina Sader: The summit may have pushed US and Brazil further apart

Kapil Sharma: For the BRICS to be effective in the long term, India and China must resolve their disputes

Holly Dagres: With BRICS membership, Iran is furthering its ‘Look to the East’ strategy

Mrugank Bhusari: Expansion is a double-edged sword for BRICS’ ambitions

With six new members, BRICS is tilting toward China

At the BRICS Summit, the group has just agreed to admit six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE; and to consider other prospective countries. Strongly supported by China and Russia, the inclusion of Iran has strengthened the anti-US axis in the BRICS—probably making it more antagonistic and more challenging for the United States and the West to deal with it as an organization which contains two internationally sanctioned members. This decision reflects the sway of China together with Russia in the group and could not be very comfortable for moderate members like India and Brazil.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE would add important economic heft to the group, which now includes several important Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries members as well as Russia—giving it a relevancy in the geopolitics of the global oil market. Saudi Arabia and Argentina, both members of the Group of Twenty (G20), could enable the BRICS to help coordinate the views of most of the emerging market G20 members. In this sense, the group could serve as an informal counterpart to the G7, which coordinates developed countries’ positions in advance of G20 meetings. However, with a strong China-Russia-Iran axis, the group may end up pushing for anti-Western positions, making compromises in the G20 more difficult to reach.

The fact that Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE will be members would have been unthinkable until recently and shows another facet of the diplomatic reconciliation among the three countries—with intermediation by China.

The BRICS also agreed at the summit to accelerate the use of their local currencies to settle trade and investment transactions among themselves—continuing to reduce their reliance on the US dollar-based global payment and financial system.

Given these outcomes, it is understandable for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to say that “this is a historic occasion . . . that brings new rigor to the bloc.”

—Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

New Middle Eastern BRICS members highlight shifting geopolitical winds

The decision by the BRICS nations to invite four Middle East countries to join their ranks—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Iran—highlights shifting geopolitical winds as much as it reflects an opportunity for closer economic integration with those states.

For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, inclusion in the group is potentially symbiotic, as both are looking to engage and deepen cooperation with non-Western countries and diversify their economic partnerships as an additional hedge against the United States. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would probably view a decision to join as furthering their goal to be viewed as not just important regional leaders, but global ones. For the BRICS states, the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and the UAE would bring new investment and trade opportunities as the former seeks to quickly diversify and scale up its economy across a range of new, non-fossil fuel industries and the latter is home to the region’s leading financial hub in Dubai.

Egypt, which currently faces a massive financial and economic crisis, would not appear to be a prime candidate for inclusion on paper, but Moscow and Beijing probably view inviting Cairo as akin to taking a flier—enhancing relations now in hopes of being able to strategically leverage Egyptian assets in the coming decades. Cairo’s key strategic location, control of the Suez Canal, and newly discovered gas fields are all probably viewed by the BRICS group as potentially lucrative, both economically and politically, over the coming decades.

The decision to include Iran was almost certainly driven by Russia and China, as the country’s massive gas and oil reserves were likely a selling point for Beijing in convincing Brasilia, Pretoria, and New Delhi to go along with the invitation, knowing it will further fuel tensions with Washington. Inclusion in the BRICS won’t transform Iran’s economy overnight. Iran views relations with China as providing an economic lifeline, given the poor state of the economy, which continues to reel from a bevy of US sanctions. But over time, groupings such as the BRICS have the potential to undermine Washington’s power when it comes to punishing or isolating countries pursuing policies that contradict US interests, especially if they seek alternative systems and methods for trade and payment over which Washington lacks the same leverage that it has today over SWIFT, for example. 

In the view of the BRICS states, including the newly invited members, reducing global US economic and financial leverage would create a more level playing field, while countries such as Iran would view it as a way to further reduce the impact of sanctions. For Washington, it should be a warning: the need to strengthen and renew relationships with allies has never been more important. The emerging world might be multipolar, but some poles will be closer than others.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Program.

BRICS has big ambitions, but it also faces new challenges

They will be eleven now. Six new countries, including two African countries, Egypt and Ethiopia, will be added to the five BRICS members on January 1, 2024. It was a priority of this fifteenth BRICS Summit in Johannesburg. “The BRICS are starting a new chapter,” said South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who hosted the summit.

The current five-member BRICS group represents a quarter of the world’s wealth and brings together 42 percent of the world’s population. But now, the BRICS will face new challenges. First, this group is very diverse, with unequal growth and rivaling interests. The importance of China, which represents 70 percent of the group’s gross domestic product, is a problem for India. Some of the BRICS countries, including South Africa, want to save its trade relations with the United States and don’t want to be dragged into the Cold War strategy pursued by Russia. Meanwhile, Putin decided not to join the summit in person, most likely due to an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes committed in his brutal invasion of Ukraine. And with the new membership of authoritarian regimes such as Iran, the question arises: Do Africans really need the Middle East’s problems brought into this group? If they want to do business with Israel, what will Iran say?

Beyond this membership issue, the BRICS group should be taken seriously. The high-level attendance, from Xi to Modi, reveals a lot of the bloc’s big ambitions to build an alternative multilateralism, starting with challenging the dollar and strengthening the New Development Bank without conditionality. Washington is monitoring the situation closely: at the opening of the  summit, the Biden administration announced its willingness to strengthen the financing capacities of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on the occasion of the next G20 summit in India on September 9 and 10. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained on Tuesday: “Our IMF and World Bank proposals will generate nearly $50 billion in lending for middle income and poor countries from the United States alone. And because our expectation is that our allies and partners will also contribute, we see these proposals ultimately leveraging over $200 billion.” The emergency will probably require much more.

 —Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Beijing’s vision for the bloc is driving BRICS expansion

With the addition of six new members and a ninety-four-paragraph leaders’ statement teeming with coverage of priority issues for emerging and developing countries, the BRICS grouping is trying to cement its position as a platform for and champion of the Global South. This aligns particularly closely with Beijing’s vision for the grouping, and the six new members—Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—probably also accommodate Chinese preferences. Representation from the economic heavyweight region of Southeast Asia is notably missing, potentially reflecting Beijing’s strained ties in the region. Indonesia would have been a logical choice, having attended the “Friends of BRICS” event in June. Instead, four of the six new members hail from the Middle East, a region into which Beijing has steadily expanded its economic, military, and political ties in the past few years.  

Ironically, the expanded BRICS group will make it harder to operationalize its mission of advancing Global South interests. The BRICS has always been a grouping heavier on symbolism than on substance. Even its tangible outputs, such as the painstakingly negotiated and coordinated New Development Bank, have not notably shifted the global governance landscape in the ways the group hoped. Adding more diverging voices to the BRICS will only increase the challenge of reaching agreement on key areas the group hopes to make progress on, such as reducing the use of local currencies in trade and expanding their correspondent banking ties. 

Nonetheless, the group is clearly gaining traction across the Global South, with more than forty countries interested in joining the BRICS, according to this year’s chair, South Africa, and with BRICS leaders leaving open the possibility for further expansion in their joint statement. Perhaps simply offering developing countries the chance for a seat at the table—regardless of whether that seat comes with tangible benefits—will be enough for the group to continue appealing to and garnering support from the Global South.

—Colleen Cottle is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and previously spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency serving in a variety of roles covering East and South Asia.

On the ground in Johannesburg, Putin’s absence stuck out

Wednesday had delegates at the BRICS Summit—the first to be held in person since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic—here in Johannesburg looking up and down. With a proud Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi present, they applauded the landing of the Chandrayaan-3 spacecraft on the moon. And hours later, news broke of the crash of a private jet in Russia said to be carrying Wagner Group boss Yevgeniy Progozhin and his deputy.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin’s absence stuck out like a sore thumb, not to be outdone by the India lunar fest and Xi showering host country South Africa with money, he managed to steal the news cycle by neutralizing a main opponent just as leaders were sitting down to dinner yesterday. One wonders if any of them had food tasters present.

Fireworks aside, the summit managed to generate headlines on Thursday with an expansion that would more than double the group’s membership. Saudi Arabia and the UAE will be appreciated for their financial heft and ability to inject cash into the New Development Bank, the bloc’s lending facility. The expansion also furthers Saudi leaders’ efforts to become a global heavyweight and powerwash their image after the ghastly 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The admittance of Argentina, Egypt, and Ethiopia gives South America and Africa more representation. Iran’s membership helps burnish BRICS’s image as an all-inclusive club—one that lets in countries no matter how appalling their human rights record. Indonesia was expected to join, but is said to have asked for more time to prepare.

Over the longer term, BRICS leaders have pledged to sort out intra-African trade. Trade among African countries makes up only 14.4 percent of African exports, and there’s a push to get that to increase by facilitating trade between countries in their own respective currencies. For instance, if Kenya wants to trade with Djibouti, why does a third currency like the US dollar have to be involved? If BRICS can sort that out in a continent that uses more than forty different currencies, it will be a major achievement. 

Finally, with the G7, G20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation degenerating into boxing rings for tantrum diplomacy, where final communiques either get watered down or not issued at all, perhaps it is worth giving BRICS a chance to reinvent multilateral cooperation. This reinvention cannot come soon enough—especially for poorer countries who need help the most.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is in Johannesburg, South Africa, for the BRICS Summit.

The summit may have pushed US and Brazil further apart

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been walking a fine line in his foreign policy. The BRICS Summit might have just pushed Brasília and Washington further apart.

Lula’s foreign policy approach is consistent with priorities from his past two terms in office. These include the need for a more democratic global order in which countries such as Brazil, India, and South Africa have equal footing. But the current geopolitical dynamics have shifted significantly.

Lula and Finance Minister Fernando Haddad publicly defended the role of the BRICS not as a counterpoint to the United States or the hegemony of the G7, but as a contributor to a more diplomatic and inclusive global order. However, given current geopolitical sensitivities, to what extent aren’t alliances—as indirect as they may be—with countries such as Russia and Iran not harming Brazil’s credibility abroad further?

The expansion of the BRICS to include countries like Iran is challenging. Earlier this year, Brazil allowed Iranian warships to dock in its coast, which caused discomfort in Washington. And that is heightened by Brazil’s position with regard to Russia’s war on Ukraine, seen as not strong enough for Washington, and its friendly relationship vis-à-vis China.

Lula’s positions are consistent with Brazil’s long-term nonalignment and noninterventionist principles. Brazil was the only country of the BRICS to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations last year; China is Brazil’s main trading partner and former President Dilma Rousseff is the new president of the BRICS’ New Development Bank. On the other hand, Brazil pursues stronger ties on trade, investment, climate, and other mutual priorities with the United States, which Lula visited within his first month in office. Brazil has also been pursuing stronger ties with Europe, with continued negotiations of the Mercosur-EU trade agreement.

As Brazil pushes for a reshaped UN Security Council, Lula’s possible upcoming meeting with US President Joe Biden in New York becomes even more significant. What’s on Washington’s agenda?

—Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality, and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council.

For the BRICS to be effective in the long term, India and China must resolve their disputes

In the run-up to the BRICS Summit, Indian leaders had continually expressed their intentions for the platform, including issues like the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the supply chain and energy crisis, the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and the inability of Western-led multilateral platforms to manage global crises. For countries like India, the BRICS represent an important bloc that reflects 40 percent of the global population and $27.7 trillion of the global economy. However, with the concentration of economic power in Western-led institutions since World War II, India and other members of the Global South felt largely overlooked. Indian leaders believe that the BRICS Summit could be the platform that can bring a new and more equitable perspective to global cooperation and problem solving. Thus, India would position the 2023 BRICS Summit to raise the de facto voice of the Global South.

The timing of the BRICS Summit could not have been better for Modi. Nestled between his state visit to the United States and India’s G20 presidency, Modi has used the global stage to declare and reinforce India as the “voice of the Global South” and the new growth engine of the world.

Before this year, generally speaking, the BRICS was a grouping in name only. There was some headline overlap between the countries, but they diverged to different degrees in their long-term strategic and economic interests. The expansion of BRICS from five countries to eleven may result in India and the group gaining leverage (at least optically), as the expanded bloc includes a greater concentration of energy-producing countries, as well as potential collaboration on shifting trade transactions away from the dollar. The members will try to use the expansion to push for changes at the United Nations and other global institutions. However, for the BRICS to be effective over the long term, India and China will need to resolve their border challenges and collaborate on tough global issues as well as the deployment of capital for developing economies. If India is truly to take on the role of the “voice of the Global South,” managing these disparate interests with one voice may prove to be a greater task than what it bargained for.

—Kapil Sharma is the senior director and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

With BRICS membership, Iran is furthering its ‘Look to the East’ strategy

“Neither West nor East” was an ethos adopted by the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. However, Tehran leaned West after signing the 2015 multilateral deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). When the Donald Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018—despite Tehran not violating the deal at the time—it quickly became apparent that Iran could not rely on the West—that is, on European countries—to help circumvent reimposed US sanctions.

Tehran has since adopted a “Look to the East” strategy, which incorporates increased economic, political, and defense ties with China and Russia. Just this July, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (an Eurasian political, security, and economic organization founded by China and Russia) after obtaining observer status in 2005. It’s not surprising that a BRICS membership would follow suit. 

—Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Expansion is a double-edged sword for BRICS’ ambitions

Expansion will alter the fabric of the BRICS institution in two major ways. First, it could change the structure of negotiations internally. The new members vary tremendously in economic size, macroeconomic context, and their ties with non-BRICS economies. BRICS makes decisions through consensus, and achieving consensus among eleven countries with diverse economies, geographies, and interests is far more difficult that achieving it among five. The members may all agree on principles, such as increasing trade in non-dollar currencies. But the addition of new members will significantly slow down some of their more ambitious aspirations once they begin negotiating the nitty-gritty of those projects, for instance, that of a shared currency. To ensure utility and coherence of the institution over the longer term, BRICS may instead choose to stick with low-hanging fruit.

Second, the addition of new members could move the institution away from its geoeconomic origins of five countries on similar growth trajectories to a more geopolitically charged organization made up of different kinds of economies. Russia and China led the calls for accelerated expansion, and attempts to position BRICS as a counterweight to the G7 will make countries such as India and Brazil, which are already walking a delicate balance with the West, uncomfortable.  

The addition of six new full members will nevertheless make BRICS the premier convening for emerging markets, at least in the short term, when the disadvantages of scale will not yet be apparent. More than twenty countries had already formally applied to join BRICS prior to this year’s summit, and more will likely be interested for fear of missing out.

—Mrugank Bhusari is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

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Together, the BRICS countries have already overtaken the Group of Seven (G7) advanced economies in terms of their contribution to global gross domestic product, with the group now accounting for almost a third of worldwide economic activity measured by purchasing power parity. The consequences of this economic rise have reverberated through a number of areas, including trade. While trade between Russia and the G7 has fallen by more than 36 percent since 2014 under the weight of economic and financial sanctions, trade between it and the other BRICS nations has soared, increasing by more than 121 percent over the same period. China and India have become the largest importers of Russian oil following bans imposed by the European Union. China’s trade with Russia hit a record of $188.5 billion last year, a 97 percent increase from 2014 and around 30 percent greater than in 2021. The surge occurred as Russia more than doubled its rail exports of liquefied petroleum gas as part of a drive to diversify its exports under the harsh sanctions regime.

By opting not to comply with western-led economic and financial sanctions, the solidarity of BRICS has been a balm for Russia. The bloc has offered trade diversion and other relief to one of its founding members and, in the process, weakened the effectiveness of US-led sanctions as a tool for advancing economic and geopolitical interests.

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A multipolar magnet

Thwarting the sanctions regime has had consequences that reach far beyond the impact of the crisis in Ukraine. Bolstered by their success on the economic and geopolitical fronts, the BRICS group is increasingly viewed by a growing number of countries in the Global South as an attractive agent of multilateralism. More than forty nations—including Algeria, Egypt, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, but also key Group of Twenty (G20) countries such as Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia—have formally expressed their interest in joining the BRICS in the lead-up to this week’s summit.

If the effectiveness of trade diversion by BRICS nations in weakening the impact of western sanctions against Russia is any indication, sanctions could become less effective as a tool for advancing the economic and geopolitical interests of the G7 after the admission of new BRICS members. In a zero-sum global trading environment, the bloc’s expansion would also accelerate the diversification of demand away from G7 countries and reduce members’ exposure to future geopolitical risks.

The focus in Johannesburg will certainly be on the admission of new members, as well as trade and investment facilitation in a challenging global environment where the escalation of trade and tech wars—along with the “friendshoring” of supply chains—has increased the risk of global growth deceleration and a hard landing in China. BRICS members are likely to discuss sustainable development in the climate change era, global governance reform, and an orderly process of increasing trade in local currencies. On the latter point, more and more emerging economies are exploring ways to conduct trade in non-dollar currencies following the imposition of sanctions against Russia.

The dollar remains the global reserve currency, and the pace at which other currencies have chipped away at its dominance has been incremental. But a growing number of experts, including senior US government officials, recognize that the aggressive use of economic and financial sanctions to advance US foreign policy could threaten the dollar’s hegemony in the years ahead. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently emphasized this point: “There is a risk when we use financial sanctions that are linked to the role of the dollar that over time it could undermine the hegemony of the dollar.”

A new reserve currency?

The significance of dedollarization takes on greater importance in light of rumors that the bloc might attempt to develop a BRICS-issued reserve currency to be used by members in cross-border trade. While the BRICS nations—which collectively enjoy a comfortable balance of payment surplus—have the financial wherewithal to establish such a currency or unit of account, they lack the institutional architecture and the scale to sustainably achieve this end.

Even assuming that its members are fully aligned geopolitically and more inclined to co-operate than to compete, adopting a common currency presents several challenges. As the creation of the euro, now the world’s second largest reserve currency, illustrated, hurdles will include: achieving macroeconomic convergence, agreeing on an exchange rate mechanism, establishing an efficient payment and multilateral clearing system, and creating regulated, stable, and liquid financial markets.

The United States was able to persuade other countries to use the dollar owing to its hegemonic position as the world’s industrial powerhouse and single-largest trading nation following the end of World War II, reinforced in the decades since by the size of the market for US treasuries, which are often considered to be the world’s leading reserve asset. If they wish to provide a competitive alternative, the BRICS countries would need to agree upon a state-of-the-art bond market. It would need to be big enough to absorb global savings and provide assets with low risk of default where surplus funds could be parked when not used for trade.

Reflecting on these challenges, Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s ambassador-at-large to BRICS, reiterated in July that a BRICS currency will not be on the agenda during the summit, though expanding trade and settlement in local currencies will be. In fact, BRICS countries are already making strides in the use of local currencies in cross-border transactions. Their use is helping to sustain and boost cross-border trade between members, even amid a challenging operating environment of heightened geopolitical risks. It is also loosening the balance of payments constraints associated with dollar funding, bolstering local economies.

Although China and India may have diverging security interests, they each stand to benefit from the increased use of local currencies. BRICS nations are already using their own currencies for some bilateral trade payment settlement, and Saudi Arabia is considering signing a deal with China to settle oil transactions in renminbi. Meanwhile India is expanding the use of local currencies for bilateral trade payment and settlement beyond the BRICS group, inviting more than twenty countries to open special vostro bank accounts to settle trade in rupees. In a history-making move, India made its first oil payment to the United Arab Emirates in rupees earlier this month.

If the BRICS group expands its membership, then it could increase the risk of a divergence of interests and raise more coordination challenges—but it could also dramatically expand the group’s consumption power, with significant economic and geopolitical implications. Expansion could create scale and enhance the transition from bilateral to multilateral clearing, and perhaps ultimately toward a common BRICS currency. This would address one of the major challenges associated with the use of local currencies for bilateral trade payment settlement: the difficulty of deploying these currencies once imbalances arise. Lately, such challenges led to the suspension of bilateral trade arrangements that had allowed India to settle imports of Russian oil in rupees, with Russia accumulating billions of Indian rupees that it could not use.

Meanwhile, membership expansion could further weaken the effectiveness of US-led economic sanctions and accelerate the multipolarization of the global monetary order. Several members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries have already said they wish to join the BRICS group, which would increase the shared benefits associated with the use of local currencies for cross-border transactions and could further curtail the volume of global trade conducted in dollars.

To be sure, the stickiness of institutional arrangements, along with the breadth and depth of US financial markets is such that dollar dominance will remain a key feature of the global financial architecture for some time. But following membership expansion, the BRICS group could set in motion its transformation into an even more powerful geopolitical coalition that could accelerate the process of dedollarization and the transition to a multipolar world.

Hippolyte Fofack is the chief economist and director of research at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

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On August 22, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Stefano Stefanini was interviewed in Adnkronos, discussing the BRICS Summit and the future of the bloc (text in Italian).  

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If the BRICS group follows India’s approach, then it can promote cooperation among developing countries and, on that basis, engage with the G7 to discuss ways to reform the international economic and financial system and deal with global problems such as the impacts of climate change. This would seem to appeal to many developing countries, which want to reform the current international economic and financial system but do not want to explicitly take sides between the United States and China. On the other hand, if China prevails, the BRICS group will likely become another venue for anti-US political activism, probably risking its ability to deliver concrete benefits to many developing countries.

Given this backdrop, it is important for the G7 to develop an effective approach to the evolution of BRICS—finding ways to engage with its constructive proposals to seek common solutions to global problems, while pushing back against its negative tendencies.

The rise of BRICS

The acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to designate these four countries as attractive investment destinations, riding on a wave of enthusiasm about the prospects of emerging markets. In 2006, the four countries’ foreign ministers met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to formalize the group known as BRIC. In 2009, the first summit of leaders took place, followed by annual meetings ever since. In 2010, the group was expanded to include South Africa—becoming BRICS.

The BRICS group was organized around the goal of enhancing consultation and coordination between the five major developing countries to change the current Western-led world order into a multipolar system where developing countries have more influence, commensurate with their shares of the global economy. Despite the five members’ divergent economic trajectories in the years since—with China and India having grown impressively while the other three saw weak growth—the BRICS group has made significant progress.

Together, BRICS countries have 3.24 billion inhabitants—or 41 percent of the world population—and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $26 trillion, or 60 percent of the G7 countries’ combined GDP. However, on a purchasing power parity basis, BRICS countries’ GDP accounts for 31.5 percent of the global economy, overtaking the G7 share of 30.4 percent. Despite this, BRICS countries get only 15 percent of the voting power at the International Monetary Fund—a source of developing countries’ discontent over the governance of international financial institutions.

Competing visions

The BRICS group has revealed its internal divisions, however, as the rivalry between China and the United States has intensified. India has tried to resist China’s efforts to turn the BRICS group into a support organization for China’s geopolitical agenda, such as promoting Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, its Global Development Initiative, and explicit anti-US rhetoric. Instead, India has focused BRICS discussions and activities on South-South economic and financial cooperation projects, initiatives to reduce global reliance on the US dollar-based international financial and payment system, and reforms of international financial institutions to give developing countries more voice and representation. South Africa seems to have followed this approach in formulating the theme for the upcoming summit: “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism.” To reinforce its focus on Africa, South Africa has reportedly invited the leaders of all African countries to attend the summit.

China and India’s disagreement regarding membership expansion will shape the prospects of aspiring BRICS countries and the organization’s future. According to South African authorities, twenty-two countries have formally applied to join the BRICS group, and a similar number of countries have expressed their interest. While this has enhanced the group’s stature, it also poses a difficult problem for the organization: admitting too many new members risks diluting the BRICS group, making it ineffectual if it continues to operate on a consensus basis. China and Russia have wanted to quickly expand the BRICS group to strengthen their influence in important developing countries—many of which also see the organization as an opportunity to get closer to China economically. India, on the other hand, is concerned about losing its own influence if the BRICS group admits too many new members closely aligned with China’s agenda. After all, India has had a persistently bitter border dispute with China, as well as a rivalry with Beijing for regional influence. Against this backdrop, India has proposed to discuss and agree on the criteria for membership—as an item on the August summit agenda—before admitting new members.

An effective G7 approach

Confronted with the efforts of several countries in the Global South to establish a forum—likely to be based on the BRICS format—to coordinate their views and policies to deal with the developed countries, the G7 should find an effective approach to manage its interactions with the BRICS group.  If the BRICS group follows India’s agenda and comes up with concrete ideas to reform the international economic and financial system, the G7 should engage constructively and discuss in earnest those ideas—and not dismiss out of hand the demands for changes. However, if the BRICS group turns out to be a China-driven forum sponsoring anti-US and anti-West rhetoric and initiatives, then the G7 should push back against those criticisms—most effectively by suggesting ways to improve the current economic and financial system to address the shortcomings in meeting the development needs of countries in the Global South.

In any event, the BRICS forum is an idea whose time has come, and the world should be prepared to interact with it.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

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Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol. 

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge. 

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.” 

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner. 

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries. 

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny. 

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August. 

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.” 

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

South African officials will likely be relieved by Putin’s decision to skip the summit. For months, they have sought to prevent a potential confrontation with the Kremlin over the issue, with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa even reportedly requesting permission from the International Criminal Court for some form of exemption in order to avoid arresting Putin during the summit. with tensions mounting ahead of the summit, South Africa Deputy President Paul Mashatile admitted in a July 14 interview that the best option would be for Putin to stay away. “The Russians are not happy, though,” he commented. “They want him to come.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Moscow’s earlier eagerness for Putin to attend the summit is easy to understand. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s relationship with the Western world has reached its lowest point since the Cold War. The Kremlin has sought to counter perceptions of mounting international isolation by emphasizing continued engagement with non-Western nations such as the BRICS grouping, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With this in mind, Putin’s attendance of the August summit was seen as an important signal that Russia could not be isolated and remained a major force in global affairs.

With Russian prestige at stake, Kremlin officials reportedly pressed their South African counterparts hard over the issue. Indeed, in a court affidavit made public earlier this week, President Ramaphosa claimed any attempt to detain Putin could lead to war between Russia and South Africa. “I must highlight, for the sake of transparency, that South Africa has obvious problems with executing a request to arrest and surrender President Putin,” he said. “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war.”

Russia’s efforts to pressure South Africa clearly failed, leading to the July 19 announcement that Putin would not be attending. This exercise in damage limitation makes perfect sense. Speculation over Putin’s possible arrest in South Africa was rapidly becoming a PR disaster for the Kremlin, drawing attention to his status as a suspected war criminal and undermining his strongman persona. Meanwhile, headlines claiming Moscow had threatened South Africa with war if the country dared to arrest Putin for war crimes did little to enhance Russia’s reputation as a credible partner. With South African officials unwilling or unable to provide the necessary assurances, the only remaining option was to cancel the visit entirely.

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This forced cancellation is the latest in a series of very public humiliations for Putin, who is struggling to maintain his authority as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to unravel. The March 2023 ICC decision to charge him with war crimes dealt a powerful blow to Putin’s standing at a time when unprecedented sanctions and revelations of Russian atrocities in Ukraine had already made him a toxic figure. Weeks later, he was forced to cancel traditional Victory Day parades in cities across Russia amid rumors of shortages in both troops and tanks due to heavy losses in Ukraine.

Putin’s most humiliating moment came in late June, when units of Russia’s state-funded paramilitary Wagner Group staged a mutiny and briefly threatened to seize control of the country. The Wagner uprising ended as suddenly as it had begun, but not before mutinous troops had captured one of Russia’s largest cities without a fight and marched virtually unopposed to within 200 kilometers of Moscow. The mutiny exposed the fragility of the current regime and the lack of popular support for Putin himself; while crowds of ordinary Russians flocked to cheer Wagner rebels, nobody rallied to defend the country’s current ruler.

The Wagner episode may have played a role in this week’s decision to miss the forthcoming summit in South Africa. With Putin looking weaker than at any point in his 23-year reign, there is widespread speculation that it is only a matter of time before he faces fresh domestic challenges. Coups are often staged when dictators leave the security of their capitals and few in Moscow will have forgotten the failed KGB coup of 1991, which took place in August while Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was in Crimea.

The Kremlin’s inability to find a way for Putin to attend next month’s BRICS summit in South Africa is a clear indication of Russia’s declining influence on the global stage. Ten years ago, Putin was a respected statesman and the leader of a G8 nation. Today, he must plan his international travel based on the likelihood of being arrested for war crimes. Commenting on Putin’s canceled South Africa visit, US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said there was “no better illustration” of Russia’s vastly diminished standing in the world. “President Putin can hardly leave his own borders now,” he noted. “He’s an international pariah who can barely leave his own borders for fear of arrest.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 21, 2023

Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds

By Diane Francis

As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jul 13, 2023

After Wagner: Could the Russian army now turn against Putin?

By Mercedes Sapuppo

With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

Conflict Crisis Management

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post “Pariah” Putin forced to cancel travel plans over fears of war crimes arrest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

Putin in Peril. Russian President Vladimir Putin faced the most serious challenge to his authority since taking office, as the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, mounted an insurrection against the Kremlin’s military leadership. With heavily armed mercenaries seizing the city of Rostov and moving within a few hundred miles of Moscow, a looming conflict was averted as Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s chief, agreed to stand down and go into exile in Belarus. But Prigozhin’s whereabouts remained in doubt, as Putin sought to reassert control over the Wagner Group and consolidate his grip on power.

• Shaping the order. The sudden rebellion by Prigozhin, a longtime close ally of Putin, suggests that the war in Ukraine is placing serious strains on Russia’s political leadership. Though Putin appears safe for now, the insurrection could open the door to future challenges to his rule, with the potential to shake the global order. Moscow appears to be struggling to gain control over Wagner, which has provided a crucial source of funding for Russia’s operations in Ukraine and helped the Kremlin expand its influence across the Middle East and Africa.
• Hitting home. The fall of Putin could ultimately lead to a more peaceful Russia, but political instability inside the Kremlin could also pose new risks to US security interests.
• What to do. With Putin forced to shift his focus to domestic challenges, Washington should use this opportunity to accelerate weapons support for Kyiv as Ukrainian forces push forward with their critical counteroffensive.

Blinken in Beijing. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing, on a trip intended to “stabilize” relations between the two nations. While China refused a US request to resume military-to-military contacts, both sides appeared to view the talks as productive. But Chinese officials reacted bitterly to President Joe Biden’s subsequent reference to Xi as a “dictator,” calling the comments “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”

• Shaping the order. While it may temporarily help improve the atmospherics surrounding the US-China relationship, Blinken’s visit is unlikely to lead to a shift in the overall trajectory. Tensions will remain high in light of Beijing’s threats against Taiwan and other attempts to undermine the global order, as the US pursues efforts to shift supply chains in critical industries away from China, as part of a new “derisking” strategy.
• Hitting home. Seeking to maintain stable relations with the world’s second largest economy may be beneficial for the American people, but this will also require sustained efforts to defend against potential threats.
• What to do. The Biden administration should continue to coordinate with allies on strategies to counter Beijing’s assault on the global order, even as it tries to establish guardrails in the US-China relationship.

Modi’s State Visit. President Joe Biden hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House, as the administration sought to bolster economic and geopolitical ties with India. Amid media criticism of India’s backsliding on democracy, Modi was given a White House state dinner – only the third of Biden’s presidency – and invited to speak before a joint session of Congress. The two nations agreed to strengthen defense and technology cooperation, including building GE military jet engines in India and launching joint initiatives on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and other areas.

• Shaping the order. Washington’s warm welcome for Modi reflects a desire to cultivate a stronger relationship with India in the context of strategic competition with China. While joint concerns over China appear to be propelling the relationship forward, it remains unclear whether the two nations can reach a more meaningful strategic partnership, especially given New Delhi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In addition, Modi’s targeting of religious minorities and crackdown on political dissent have raised questions about the future of the relationship.
• Hitting home. A stronger US relationship with India could generate new business opportunities for US companies seeking to reduce supply chain dependencies on China.
• What to do. While seeking to build on the positive momentum coming out of Modi’s visit, Washington should also make clear that it sees a shared commitment to democratic norms as the foundation for closer ties between the world’s two largest democracies.

Quote of the Month

“Democracies must now rally together around not just our common interests, but also our shared values. Preserving and protecting the freedoms that are essential to peace and prosperity will require vigorous leadership…”
– US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in New Delhi, India, June 5, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• Guatemala’s ruling government sought to overturn the results of the country’s presidential elections after the results indicated that Bernardo Arévalo, a reformist candidate, gained enough votes to qualify for a run-off. The State Department warned that undermining the election results would constitute a “grave threat to democracy.”
• With the support of Pakistan’s ruling government, the country’s military began implementing a broad crackdown against the media and political opposition, in the wake of national protests following the arrest of former prime minister Imran Khan.
• As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a high-profile visit to Washington, US concerns over democratic backsliding in India appeared to take a back seat in an effort to cultivate closer relations between the two nations.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

• Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the paramilitary Wagner Group, mounted an insurrection against Russia’s military leadership, but agreed to stand down after his heavily armed mercenaries came within a few hundred miles of Moscow.
• China and Cuba reached a secret agreement to allow Beijing to establish a surveillance facility on the island targeting the United States, and are in the process of negotiating a deal to establish a new joint military training facility.
• A contingent of leaders from seven African countries, including South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Putin, in a bid to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, though neither side accepted the African proposal.
• In a further indication of Seoul’s tilt toward a harder line on China, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol directly criticized China’s ambassador in Beijing for his comments critical of South Korea’s joining US-led initiatives.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• The US and Britain issued the Atlantic Declaration, a new economic framework aimed at enhancing cooperation on critical and emerging technology, supply chains, clean energy, and other issues, as a potential counterpart to the US-EU Trade and Technology Council.
• The US and thirteen other members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework reached an agreement on supply chains – one of the framework’s four core pillars – that will result in several new bodies focused on advancing supply chain resiliency.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons (↑)

• The United Nations adopted the world’s first treaty aimed at protecting the high seas and preserving marine biodiversity in international waters, which constitute over two-thirds of the ocean.
• The US announced plans to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in an effort to counter China’s growing sway in multilateral fora. After the Trump administration withdrew the US from the organization in 2017, China became one of its largest donors.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

• French President Emmanuel Macron expressed opposition to a proposal by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to open a NATO liaison office in Japan, suggesting that the alliance should stay focused in the North Atlantic region.
• On his first trip to the White House since taking office, British prime minister Rishi Sunak met with Joe Biden, as the two leaders committed to closer cooperation on a range of political and economic issues.
• US-India relations appeared to enter a new chapter as Prime Minister Narendra Modi joined President Joe Biden for an official state visit in Washington.
• On balance, the alliance pillar was unchanged. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Lucan Ahmad Way, in Foreign Affairs, contends that revolutionary autocracies have demonstrated remarkable staying power, even in the face of mounting challenges.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Policy, suggests that Russia, China, Iran, and to some extent North Korea constitute a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.
• Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree, in Foreign Affairs, argue that in the face of Chinese aggression, a policy of continued non-alignment will not serve India well.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that Ukraine deserves NATO membership, as well as more robust weapons support.
• John Herbst and Dan Fried, in the Washington Post, suggest that the key to a Ukrainian victory in its war against Russia may lie in a successful advance to retake Crimea.
• Patrick Quirk and Caitlin Dearing Scott, writing for the Atlantic Council, argue for a fully developed foreign aid strategy to help the US succeed in strategic competition with China and Russia.
• Peter Engelke and Emily Weinstein, writing for the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series, set forth a comprehensive strategy for the US and its allies to retain its technological advantage over China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing June 2023 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2022, US imports of goods utilizing AGOA (or GSP) benefits was valued at $10.2 billion.  Like overall US imports from Africa, imports from AGOA beneficiaries have changed over time, driven mostly by the value of oil imports from countries like Nigeria and Angola.

Since 2000, the cornerstone of US trade policy for Africa has been the African Growth and Opportunity Act also known as AGOA.

Past work by the Atlantic Council suggests that Africa sits at the nexus of current development, climate, and security challenges. With global competition over resources, technology and influence growing, the strategic importance of establishing a new kind of relationship with Africa has become clear to the United States. With an African market of over 1.3 billion people and a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over $3.4 trillion, expanding US-Africa trade and investment is now a clear strategic priority for both the United States and African countries.

The Atlantic Council’s Africa Center is examining trade between the US and Africa to date and the impact of AGOA, and analyzing the future of AGOA after its potential expiration in 2025.  Our work draws on a survey and interviews conducted with leaders in government, business, international organizations, and civil society. The report identifies key constraints limiting trade expansion and examines emerging challenges and opportunities that will shape its future. Drawing on this analysis, the report provides actionable recommendations for policymakers and other key stakeholders on the future of AGOA.

AGOA has come to define much of United States’ commercial relationship with Africa. With AGOA set to expire in 2025 and the shifting world economy providing new challenges and opportunities, now is the time to decide the future of US-Africa trade. The analysis in this report, as well as the findings from survey responses and interviews, suggest recommendations covering three areas:

1. AGOA itself
2. the future of US-Africa trade more broadly, and
3. the even broader future of US-Africa relations.

How to seize the moment

AGOA has symbolized the shift in US perceptions of Africa, augmenting aid with trade and commercial opportunity. Recognizing that the next ten years will shape economic trajectories for decades to come, the US must build on its narrative investment by embedding greater certainty for US and African investors.

1. AGOA should be renewed by the US Congress for at least a ten-year period as soon as possible. Doing so could allow African economies to capitalize on efforts to diversify supply chains away from China, supporting US strategic interests and a more resilient global economy. 
2. AGOA’s extension should be combined with greater certainty about AGOA eligibility, with fewer short-term eligibility decisions wherever possible. Eligibility is necessary for a country to access AGOA benefits. Doing so will boost investor confidence and support long-term economic development, which is the best way for the US to achieve its broader commercial and political goals. Greater stability in AGOA eligibility will also enhance the United States’ support for African economic integration through the AfCFTA.
3. Existing US efforts, through USAID, USTR and other agencies, should continue and ensure that support through continental level initiatives is sufficiently attuned to local contexts and barriers. Support to countries and firms in Africa is needed to ensure that the benefits of AGOA in fueling long-term development are achieved. There is a need for stronger capacity building to translate AGOA eligibility into utilization and real export capacity. Investing in re-establishing regional trade hubs could do this, while also supporting regional trade integration and direct links between AGOA and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities. USAID should ensure all regions, including Francophone Central Africa, are supported in this work.
4. To realize the benefits of AGOA for long-term development, African governments should rapidly develop and regularly update realistic national AGOA strategies and embed them in their economic planning and public investment.The US Congress should ensure sufficient funding for US agencies to support this process, including dedicated staff to work with African governments to draft the plans, if necessary. Support for these strategies could help set the United States’ interaction with Africa apart from other countries like China and India.Selecting a few countries to support early could make a big difference.  This could include eligible countries that are finding it difficult to meet the criteria such as the Central African Republic, Liberia, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
5. To support greater investment in export-oriented sectors within African countries, the US DFC, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Prosper Africa initiative should align their financing and commercial facilitation with these AGOA strategies too. The future of US-Africa trade should be situated within a broader reorientation of the US-Africa relationship that builds true partnerships that not only yield economic opportunities and expanded trade but also serve longer-term social and political goals. New forms and arenas for collaboration between US and African actors could drive unique solutions in a multipolar world.  Such strategies could also include countries that are important to US-Africa trade but face eligibility constraints such as Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

With so much written about the future of AGOA itself, the future of US-Africa trade more broadly, and the even broader future of US-Africa relations, a thorough examination of AGOA eligibility in 2023 is an opportunity to begin a longer conversation about the future of AGOA and US-Africa trade and investment.

As the United States reorients its international economic policy and African countries build new approaches to economic integration and collaboration, the future of US-Africa trade is ready to be defined. While setting the course for a renewed AGOA is important for maintaining business confidence, many of the challenges that African countries, firms, and individuals face will require deeper structural responses. In the push to achieve inclusive growth across the continent, capacity and investment constraints are particularly clear.

There are also immense opportunities. The rise of digital, financial, and creative products and services will shape African economies going forward. The expansion of economic and political links across the continent will provide more unified markets and supply chains, with greater economies of scale. The resources, ideas, and human capital needed to deliver global public goods and the green energy transition are already making Africa central to the future economy. Taking steps to broaden and deepen US-Africa trade and collaboration in these directions will provide the basis for more inclusive, sustainable growth and serve strategic economic and political goals for both sides.

Like what you read? Check back for our full report, coming soon.

Fellow

Frannie Léautier

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Africa Center

Africa Economy & Business

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

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The initiative is rare enough to draw some sarcasm about African presidents who are seeking to stop a European war when they can’t stop wars closer to home. For those critics—who overlook the work done in an effort to end the conflict in Ethiopia last year—it is hard to remember the last time such a delegation of African presidents assembled together to respond to a war on African soil. They point to cases in Khartoum, Sudan, and Goma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where any conflict-resolution efforts were ineffectual.

Other observers see this new delegation of African leaders as an attempt by South Africa to distract people from troubles at home. The announcement of the delegation came just days after US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety’s allegation that a Russian cargo ship stocked up on ammunition and arms at a port in Cape Town in December 2022.

The recent (albeit cautious) support from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Washington, and European capitals—along with the varied geopolitical positions of these African countries—lent enough credit to the initiative to give it a chance. In the United Nations General Assembly’s recent vote to condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine—held on February 23 this year, around the one-year mark of the full-scale invasion—thirty African countries voted to condemn Russia, twenty-two countries abstained, and two supported Russia. These African leaders, representing both countries who voted to condemn Russia and countries who abstained, form the optimal group to propose a peace plan, as several of them see this as an opportunity to justify their varied positions—including neutrality—and find a diplomatic end to the war.

What does this peace plan say? Frankly, not much—at the moment. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa spoke of vague preparations and of having separate phone calls, but avoided critical details. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he was looking forward to seeing the delegation’s “concrete initiatives.”

What African leaders are weighing

Russia’s links to the African continent date back to the Cold War and a desire to support communist regimes (in places such as Guinea, Congo, and Ethiopia) and social-democratic or socialist political movements (in places such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe). The Soviet Union deployed forty thousand advisers across Africa between 1970 and 1975, and, over the course of the Cold War, received about sixty thousand African students—notably at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, which drew students from developing countries across the world. Some major African infrastructure projects are products of partnerships with the Soviet Union, Russia, or Russian companies. Those include the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Capanda hydroelectric dam, and power plants planned in Congo and Nigeria. These are all countries that Putin hopes to rely on in order to find the support he lacks in the Global North.

Yet, while the USSR and, later, Russia have supported Africa in these ways, Africans are unlikely to blindly align themselves with Russia. It is impossible to ignore that previous support was more inspired by a desire to compete against the United States than by a love for freedom or Africa. Today, outside observers and African publics alike cannot ignore the humanitarian cost posed by Russia’s Wagner Group militias in the Sahel, Libya, the Central African Republic, or Mozambique. It is also difficult to see African youth seduced by the Russian way of life rather than the American dream, the latter of which has been able to increase its appeal to African youth via Netflix and Silicon Valley.

In fact, even if the West can’t see what Russians could seriously offer to Africans now, it has not been very difficult for Russia to fuel the very real African resentment towards the West. For Russia and the West, Africa is a coveted asset—one that holds 28 percent of the votes at the United Nations. In the post-Cold War period, Ukraine had neither the resources nor the geopolitical interest to engage in Africa like Russia did. That gave Russian views justifying aggression a hearing in Africa that it otherwise would not have received.

The complicated relations between African countries and also between African countries and global competitors such as Russia, the United States, and others leaves African policymakers in a bind. Those policymakers must carefully balance their economic interests and historical ties.

Further complicating the choice for African policymakers is the overwhelming US and Western support for Ukraine, in contrast to the lack of support and attention for African countries facing conflict. African countries, out of national interest, are looking to diversify their partnerships; they will need to balance their specific needs and local contexts in this geopolitical chaos.

A change in the narrative

The delegation of African presidents aiming to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a unique opportunity for these leaders to be a part of the solution to a global problem and no longer rest on the sidelines of geopolitics as collateral victims.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a considerable increase in the price of grains, worsening food security particularly in the Horn of Africa; at the same time,it has also allowed Africa to step up as an alternative producer of some critical goods. For example in the energy sector, as Europe diversified away from Russian energy supplies, Africa helped fill the void, with Algeria now among the top four exporters of gas to Europe and with Egypt also bolstering its gas-export capacity, according to its Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in Senegal and Mozambique are set to come online in the years ahead. These significant actions show that Africa is playing a leadership role and refusing to sit on the sidelines as a victim of geopolitical fallout.  

Africa has the peace and conflict-resolution experience to put forward in ending Eastern Europe’s geopolitical crisis. Even if African efforts have not always been successful, these efforts are valuable; the leaders behind them still have crucial experience in conflict management. Some might argue that the existence of countless conflict resolution tools, demobilization programs, peace-building mechanisms, and strategic frameworks such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union indicate that African leaders fail to settle the conflicts and wars happening in their own countries; but in reality, the existence of these initiatives shows that African leaders have created dialogue where there were voids, demobilized fighters so they could return home, and, in some cases, helped societies address the horrors of war and build a lasting peace. Several of the leaders in the African peace delegation have participated in responding to violent conflict or have worked to end conflict. That experience may be usefully applied to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

By bringing the unique peace initiative together, African presidents are attempting to advance their leadership on the global stage. This is an incredible challenge for a continent that has often been applauded for its potential, but which must now deliver.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

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Africa International Financial Institutions

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Give Africa’s peace delegation for Ukraine a chance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This month’s topline events

G7 Unites on China. At a G7 summit meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, President Joe Biden and other democratic leaders came together on China, pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy and agreeing on a coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and an initiative to diversify supply chains. The G7 also called out Beijing’s militancy in the Indo-Pacific and political interference in democracies, while making clear it was prepared to “build constructive and stable relations” with China. With European allies eager to calm tensions, Biden also indicated he expected a thaw in relations with Beijing, as US officials began a new round of bilateral meetings with their Chinese counterparts.

• Shaping the order. The summit’s success in projecting a common front on China could set the table for meaningful policy coordination between the US and its allies, particularly on economic issues. The prospects of a more unified approach appear to have garnered concern in Beijing, which summoned Japan’s ambassador to rebuke the G7’s effort to “smear and attack China.” But as highlighted by French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Beijing, the US and its allies still have a ways to go to coordinate efforts on engaging with the world’s second largest economy.
• Hitting home. America’s economy will be more secure over time if the US and its allies are able to reduce dependence on Chinese products in critical industries and limit Beijing’s ability to engage in economic coercion.
• What to do. Building on the momentum generated by the summit, the Biden administration should seek to formulate a common allied strategy for how to deal with China over the longer term.

Ukraine Gets F-16’s. With Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky traveling to Japan to join the G7 leaders summit, President Biden indicated that the US had agreed to allow allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine and will participate in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots. The move comes as Russian forces appeared to take full control of Bakhmut, ending a monthslong battle for the eastern city and constituting Russia’s first battlefield victory in nearly a year. But the success may be fleeting, as Ukraine prepared for the launch of a major counteroffensive operation.

• Shaping the order. Biden’s decision on F-16’s marks another major shift on weapons support that could substantially bolster the ability of Ukrainian forces to push back Russian forces, though it will be several months before Ukrainian pilots will be able to use the planes in combat. More broadly, Zelensky’s appearance at the G7 summit served as a further demonstration of democratic solidarity and an indicator for how significantly relations with Russia – once a member of the G7 (then the G8) – have deteriorated.
• Hitting home. Americans will be safer if Ukraine succeeds in standing up to Russia’s aggression and flagrant assault on its democratic neighbor.
• What to do. The Biden administration should work with allies to expedite the training of Ukrainian pilots and facilitate the delivery of the F-16’s, while also reconsidering its position on providing ATACMS, the longer range missile system that could also bolster Ukraine’s ability to succeed.

Arab League Welcomes Assad.  After years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians to crush a popular uprising, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was warmly received by Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Sultan and other Arab leaders at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah. The move comes as Assad continues to consolidate his grip on power, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states enter a rapprochement with Iran.

• Shaping the order. The Arab League’s normalization of relations with Assad – a murderous dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians – is a demoralizing setback for efforts to advance a rules-based, democratic order. Assad’s resurrection appears to be part of a global trend of welcoming authoritarian leaders back from the cold, as Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro was invited by Brazil to participate in a South American leaders summit, sending the message to autocrats that violent repression ultimately pays dividends.
• Hitting home. The rehabilitation of autocrats like Assad undermines American values and US interests in a stable and prosperous world order.
• What to do. The US and its democratic allies should stand together in opposing Assad’s reintegration into the international community, and maintain sanctions and other efforts to ensure that Assad is ultimately held accountable for his actions.

Quote of the Month

“Russia’s aggression against Ukraine… has shaken the international order… [Japan] has a mission to uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and to demonstrate to the world its determination to fully defend peace and prosperity.”
– Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, speaking at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, May 21, 2023

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was given a warm welcome at an Arab League Summit in Jeddah, after years of diplomatic isolation following his use of chemical weapons and commission of widescale atrocities against civilians.
• After facing his biggest election challenge in over two decades, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan won re-election amidst a campaign process marred by pro-government media bias, limits on free speech, and other obstacles on the opposition.
• Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicolas Maduro was invited to participate in a summit of South American leaders in Brazil, as Brazilin president Lula de Silva joined Maduro in criticizing US sanctions against Venezuela.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security ()

• President Biden agreed to allow NATO allies to deliver US-built F-16 fighter planes to Ukraine, while pledging US participation in a joint effort to train Ukrainian pilots.
• The US signed a new defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea – the largest island nation in the Pacific – that will deepen security ties between the two nations, as Washington seeks to counter China’s rising influence in the region.
• In a show of solidarity, Chinese President Xi Jinping told visiting Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin that Beijing will maintain “firm support” for Moscow’s “core interest.”
• The US accused South Africa of secretly supplying arms to Russia, despite the country’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine – a claim South African leaders initially denied and then promised to investigate.
• Russia and Belarus signed an agreement formalizing the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move that appears intended as a warning to the West as it steps up support for Ukraine.
• On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↑)

• The US and its G7 partners agreed to establish a new coordinating mechanism to counter economic coercion and launch a new initiative to diversify supply chains away from China, while pledging to “derisk” without “decoupling” from China’s economy.
• The US and Taiwan reached a trade and investment agreement in an effort to liberalize and deepen economic ties between the two nations.
• China signed a free trade agreement with Ecuador, as Beijing looks to deepen its economic ties and influence in Latin America.
• G7 leaders agreed to new economic sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine, and the US announced a slate of new measures to restrict Russian trade. The UK followed suit, announcing a ban on Russian diamonds.
• On balance, the trade pillar was strengthened.

Commons ()

• G7 Leaders released a Clean Energy Action Plan, providing commitments across seven specific areas, including promoting clean energy technologies, with goal of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
• A joint report by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Programme contends that, unless immediate action is taken, acute food insecurity will likely be exacerbated over the next six months.
• The World Health Organization declared an end to the COVID-19 global health emergency, marking an end to one of the most deadly and devastating pandemics in modern history.
• On balance, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• Meeting in Hiroshima, President Biden and his G7 counterparts reaffirmed their solidarity to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky joined the summit in-person. G7 leaders also came together on China, pledging to counter economic coercion and voicing opposition to Beijing’s militarization of the Indo-Pacific.
• President Biden joined leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quad – US, Australia, India, and Japan – for a summit in Hiroshima, resulting in a joint pledge to cooperate toward a region where “where all countries are free from coercion” – an indirect reference to China.
• US Secretary of State Tony Blinken traveled to Oslo for a NATO foreign ministers meeting to discuss potential security guarantees for Ukraine, including the possibility of NATO membership, though allies remain divided on the issue.
• Overall, the alliance pillar was strengthened. 

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Liza Tobin, in Foreign Policy, argues that US policy toward China should be reoriented to achieve what should be American’s long-term goal of a democratic China.
• Emile Hokeinam, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that Syrian president Assad has turned a weak hand into a winning one, and that the Arab embrace of Assad will only encourage more brutality.
• Soner Cagaptay, in Foreign Affairs, opines that President Erdogan’s victory in the Turkish elections could solidify Turkey’s shift from an illiberal democracy to a Putin-style autocracy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Fred Kempe, in Inflection Points, contends that the drama of US debt ceiling negotiations underscores the enduring promise of America’s global leadership and the growing perils of its decline.
• Dan Fried and Aaron Korewa, in the New Atlanticist, explore the potential for Poland to serve as a leader in Europe amidst the ongoing political turmoil.
• Ash Jain was quoted in Foreign Policy on US efforts to win over countries in dealing with China, by not talking about China.
• Joslyn Brodfueher and Zelma Sergejeva, writing for the Atlantic Council, highlight the potential to fortify NATO’s unified front against Russian aggression as the alliance prepares for its upcoming summit in Vilnius.
• Matthew Kroenig, in Foreign Policy, suggests that even Machiavelli preferred democracy over tyranny, because democracies have stronger political institutions that provide the source for greater national power and influence.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Soda Lo – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Go global
• The use of Chinese public security systems in Africa
• A case from Kenya
• Comparisons across the continent 
• Global insecurities and US interests
• US-China competition’s impact on Africa

Executive summary

When examining the proliferation of Chinese surveillance systems and cyber capabilities in Africa, research disproportionately focuses on the motivations and ambitions of the supplier. This perspective, while it highlights Chinese diplomatic ambitions and corporate opportunities, ignores local features that drive the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools. This paper discusses African demand factors through an examination of the primary case study of Kenya and examples from South Africa and Uganda. By drawing attention to local efforts to procure and collaborate with Chinese firms to establish public security systems, this work seeks to address the motivations behind the adoption of Chinese information and communication technology (ICT) systems, which include artificial intelligence (AI) surveillance tools and other biometric identification systems, and illustrates the consequences of the proliferation of digital surveillance tools for local and global communities. The paper emphasizes African volition—recognizing its salience—as a way to go beyond myopic representations of Africa as a passive recipient and partner in Africa-China relations.

This work examines the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools as a dynamic multilateral process. To stem the proliferation of surveillance tools, US policy must understand African demand and accordingly help address local priorities. Accordingly, this paper assesses how demand factors contribute to the proliferation of surveillance technologies, addressing an underexplored facet of the proliferation process, while underscoring the risks of these tools’ buildup. Local procurement is critically driven by public security ambitions and justified as a means of achieving development and security aims. While these tools arrive on ostensibly permissible grounds, their acquisition and application come without public consent or robust accountability measures. It is this gap between the adoption of novel digital surveillance technologies and robust regulatory measures that inspires trepidation. Despite growing concerns over human rights violations domestically and the real risk of installed backdoors in hardware and software, African leaders continue to procure surveillance tools from the People’s Republic of China. This decision is predicated on the availability and financial feasibility of Chinese platforms as well as on the technology’s supposed capacity to address infrastructure gaps and local public security threats. Discussions of African agency that fail to underscore some of the impediments to its expression only romanticize African volition.

Issue Brief

Oct 17, 2022

China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

By Bulelani Jili

This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives.

Cybersecurity

Introduction

Countries across Africa are procuring and employing surveillance tools from China. This trend is a product of China’s diplomatic strategy, its technological ambitions, and growing corporate power and reach, as well as African domestic demands. Thus, both supply and demand factors contribute to the growing proliferation of surveillance tools. A companion paper to this issue brief focused on the key “push factors” from China and their significance for Global South actors.¹ This paper focuses on a diagnostic account of the pull factors in African states.

This paper is divided into three sections. It begins with a brief overview of China’s global expansion into African markets.² This study’s focus on the proliferation and procurement of Chinese surveillance tools does not presume the party-state’s exceptional nature in the distribution of digital surveillance tools or seek to obfuscate the broader international market for surveillance tools and cyber intrusive systems, which involves Western firms. Rather, this close examination of the proliferation of Chinese public security systems is an attempt to understand China’s growing role in African ICT markets. An investigation into the spread of Chinese digital surveillance technologies in Africa offers a grounded basis for examining how party-state ambitions and corporate firm activities are entangled and, critically, meditated by local vectors. Principally, it expands our understanding of the local and global risks that the adoption of these systems entails while providing greater insight into the client decision-making process, a crucial and underexamined feature of this proliferation.

Then, this paper examines the factors driving the adoption of digital infrastructure in Africa and the consequences for civil liberties. The size and scope of this inquiry do not permit an exhaustive review of the global ecosystem of surveillance technologies. Instead, primary attention is given to the spread of public security technology from China to Africa. Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda are salient examples of broader China-Africa dynamics, and have been selected to help explore how China’s growing cyber footprint is driven by local realities in Africa, how Chinese diplomatic engagements and corporate expansion are mediated by local adoption patterns, and how these local demand factors have their own inertia that drives outcomes. The paper emphasizes African volition—recognizing its salience—as a way to go beyond myopic representations of Africa as a passive recipient and partner in Africa-China relations.

The paper draws attention to drivers for the adoption of digital infrastructure in Africa and the consequences for civil liberties. By privileging the perspective of recipient countries and their local milieu, it demonstrates not only how China promotes its products abroad but precisely how local actors adopt and help drive the proliferation and use of Chinese digital surveillance technology.³ In light of this, the paper seeks to offer both a grounded study and a systematic analysis of the global and local features at play.

Finally, this paper aims to investigate the features that motivate the procurement of these digital surveillance tools. In so doing, it demonstrates that China’s proclivity to provide aid and support to African state actors financially, regardless of their human rights record, thus rendering citizens vulnerable to the misuse of these surveillance technologies. The final sections emphasize that the risks of using these surveillance tools without adequate regulatory frameworks are vast, particularly in a region with established challenges at the intersection of crime, penury, policing, governance, and race. This paper examines the implications of the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools, including the deeper, hidden costs of their adoption, how these new digital tools challenge global norms and standards around data protection, and how American policymakers should respond to the global adoption of these tools. Addressing these questions has significant implications for international security, digital development, and global cybersecurity.

Go global

This section highlights some of the key factors that motivate the supply of ICT products into African markets. Current analysis on the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools and cyber capability platforms scrutinizes China’s diplomatic activities and questions the degree to which the party-state, with the aid of private firms, enables autocratic digital practices across the globe. These accounts speculate on the level of coordination between Beijing and its corporate actors. While the degree of coordination cannot be empirically fixed, financial incentives in the form of aid and loans are used to incentivize African state procurement and the proliferation of surveillance technologies.

Accordingly, several interconnected economic policy initiatives that helped Chinese firms gain overseas infrastructure development experience were primary contributors to China’s global expansion into African ICT markets. Surplus capital is lent abroad to create novel commercial opportunities for Chinese firms.⁴ The aim of assisting the internationalization of domestic firms was in part about improving Chinese brand recognition globally, easing fierce domestic competition, and exploiting commercial opportunities made available in part by the absence of US investment in Africa.⁵

A 2011 foreign aid white paper precisely outlines Beijing’s approach to global expansion and development aid.⁶ Naming this initiative “South-South cooperation,” the party-state aims to foster a remunerative orientation with African countries while also simultaneously seeking to carve out a distinct auxiliary role when compared to traditional Western development partners. Therefore, rather than promoting politically conditioned foreign aid that asks for democratic reforms or value-driven commitments like gender equity, Beijing offers aid without political conditions. While this posture suggests a “no strings attached” approach to development, it obfuscates the economic asymmetries that condition relations.⁷ China’s resource-backed lending finances projects while also demanding that borrowing countries commit to repaying loans with future revenues earned from their infrastructure projects or their natural resources.⁸ The posture of “no strings attached” to loans seeks to augment legitimacy for Beijing’s development work in the Global South while also effacing the broad economic features that prompt its engagement and responsibility for the consequences of its financial involvement on the ground.

While China’s surveillance system is confined to its national borders, the private firms that make its surveillance architecture possible are selling their tools to an African customer base. With the aid of state funding, Chinese tech firms expanded into African ICT markets. Firms like Huawei initially worked to expand internet connectivity in Kenya, but in 2014 they began selling their smart city products. Proponents of this move argue that public security systems provide vital intelligence to authorities while acting as a deterrent to criminals. Adam Lane, deputy chief executive of government affairs at Huawei Kenya, echoes this sentiment by contending that “authorities can now conduct panoramic video surveillance of Nairobi’s urban center, as well as maintain a highly agile command and dispatch setup that runs on satellite-based GPS and software-based geographic information system.”⁹ Yet, this sanguine outlook does not account for the real risk of exacerbating established problems like the misuse of public security systems and debt stress levels.¹⁰ While Chinese firms promise a technological fix to traditional problems like public safety and state security, they under-deliver in those areas. More significantly, investigative reporting and digital rights organizations have raised concerns about cybersecurity threats, digital surveillance tools, and biometric data collection by these Chinese surveillance tools. These groups contend that the ubiquitous and underregulated use of these technologies threatens privacy rights.¹¹ Needless to say, they believe that the adoption of digital tools without robust institutional checks and balances, renders citizens more vulnerable to state surveillance and suppression. It is this gap between novel technological adoption and regulatory framework implementation that creates emerging risks.

The use of Chinese public security systems in Africa

This section underscores the demand for digital surveillance tools and their domestic applications. Namely, African states seek out and acquire surveillance systems for a number of reasons, largely as part of a wider effort to augment state security response and capability. Africa’s significant digital infrastructure gap is being addressed through Chinese investment and state support. Annually, there is an estimated infrastructure funding gap of up to $107.5 billion a year.¹² China plays a monopolistic role in Africa’s telecommunications sector, supplying approximately 70 percent of the continent’s digital infrastructure.¹³ Surveillance tools are typically purchased as part of a package of ICT systems, which include data centers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, and high-tech biometrics that are integrated and used in tandem with AI products—thus supporting public security authorities and development ambitions.¹⁴

Digital infrastructure investments, including the promotion of public security systems, in Africa’s telecommunications sector have largely been built by China, mostly through state-to-state engagements, but also supplemented by the growing involvement of Chinese private sector actors. According to a review of datasets and reports on the acquisition of Chinese digital surveillance tools in Africa, about 22 African states have contracted with companies like Huawei to adopt digital surveillance technology.¹⁵ Usually procured under the banner of smart city initiatives, these systems collect, integrate, and analyze data from various sources, like national diametric databases that are made available by state partners. The system supports crime prevention and recovery operations. African demand drives the procurement and application of these tools, specifically, to address Africa’s digital infrastructure gap.¹⁶ African state and city officials in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and other countries are reaching out to Chinese firms to aid their varying domestic aims. Together these examples illustrate the establishment of local digital governance regimes. They are not simply a derivative of a Beijing concocted vision, rather, Chinese firms are acquiescing to the ambitions of their host. Crucially, these surveillance regimes are embedded within local private-public ventures. As such, we must consider a more balanced approach that helps to tease out the degree to which local agency is helping shape geopolitical relations while also examining the interplay between Chinese firms and party-state activities on the continent. It is this more balanced approach that offers a vantage point from which to defamiliarize and reimagine politics on the ground.

Issue Brief

Oct 17, 2022

China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

By Bulelani Jili

This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives.

Cybersecurity

A case from Kenya

China’s principal entry into Kenya’s telecommunication market came through the docking of fiber-optic cables. Led by Huawei and ZTE, two giant Chinese technology firms that specialize in telecommunication, the docking of submarine cables enabled the Kenyan government to liberalize their ICT market, which allowed for a more competitive telecommunication section.¹⁷ In an interview with the author, a former ICT official said, “ [the ministry] then set in motion a series of policies, including the National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy, that aimed at the liberalization of the telecommunications sector that created opportunities for more actors to be involved. With financing that came from US banks and the Export-Import Bank of China, we looked to close the infrastructure gap that hampered growth.”¹⁸ To establish the country’s first National Optic Fiber Backbone Infrastructure, which brought high-speed connectivity, the government jointly contracted Huawei and ZTE.¹⁹ Each company was expected to manage a different region across the country. ZTE laid the cables for the west, and Huawei handled Nairobi and the central parts of the country.²⁰ This novel digital capacity empowered the state to pursue e-government projects, which include public security systems and cyber intrusion platform solutions.

As such, the Kenyan government primarily enlists these surveillance tools as a means to scale public security capabilities, national security prerogatives, and data security. The adoption of surveillance tools is made possible through the sale of Chinese equipment and soft loans from the Export-Import Bank of China, which are crucial in making public security platforms financially attainable for Nairobi and other African governments. Beyond Huawei, Chinese companies like Dahua, Hikvision, and others are involved in the adoption of digital surveillance systems.²¹ In 2012, the Kenyan government awarded Nanjing Les Information Technology, a high-tech provider that offers urban traffic management and urban governance tools, a tender to supply digital surveillance cameras.²² The goal of the initiative was to augment public security and intelligent traffic management systems in downtown Nairobi. According to official figures, the platform cost the government 463,960,697 Kenyan shillings, which amounts to $3.8 million.²³ The expected date of completion was June 2013, but, due to delays, the project was not completed until April 2014.²⁴ Constant power shortages and access to privately owned buildings for installation purposes were the main reasons for delays. No less important, the adoption plan for these tools did not include corresponding data protection measures to promote and maintain privacy rights, rather inadequate planning before the start of the program presaged the delays and data policy omissions.

China’s oversized role in African ICT markets engenders a dependence on their products and expertise. Digital public security systems are embedded within state-driven processes that are contingent on private-public ventures. The use and effectiveness of these tools, though nominally operated by and for the purposes of Kenyan government officials, are heavily reliant on Chinese contractors to operate public security platforms. An audit by the auditor-general’s office found that senior staff sent by the Kenyan government to China to learn how to operate public security systems did not acquire the necessary skills.²⁵ Instead, the staff spent time inspecting the parts of the system to be delivered. During that visit, no attempts were made to learn or teach how to operate the system.²⁶ For this reason, questions remain about Kenya’s ability to operate and maintain its public security systems. Furthermore, technical matters having to do with the upkeep of the system are managed by the contractor. The National Police, who are tasked with the responsibility of operating the system, had not even developed the capability to work the control room.²⁷ To complicate matters, the manual language of the control room was in Chinese. Most of the digital surveillance cameras installed within Nairobi’s central business district stopped working months after they were installed. Even more worrying is that there were limited security protocols for accessing the system, which increased the possibility of unauthorized access or the launch of malicious code on the server by unauthorized users.

To supplement its earlier public security system, Huawei was invited to install its public security system in Kenya. In Kenya, as in the rest of the continent, Huawei promised that its new product, the safe city, would improve public security. The safe city is a form of a smart city, which is a computational model of urban planning that aims to utilize technological innovation to enhance operational efficiencies. The safe city platform utilizes a series of interconnected technologies like video cameras, tracking devices, software, and cloud storage systems to link technologies and processes as a means to integrate them into a larger and more cohesive whole to advance public initiatives like managing traffic, policing, and streamlining service delivery.²⁸ The first safe city system by Huawei was able to connect 1,800 high-definition cameras and 200 high-definition traffic surveillance infrastructures across Nairobi.²⁹ A command center was also installed, which supports over 9,000 police officers in 195 police stations.³⁰ The Kenyan government is pursuing smart city initiatives as a way to resolve public security challenges and address the country’s digital infrastructure gap. Digital surveillance platforms are part of a wider state-led initiative to utilize technologies to help resolve structural challenges and, thus, make development more attainable.

Comparisons across the continent  

This section highlights the motivations for and incentives of local surveillance procurement in Uganda and South Africa. It lends weight to an examination of the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools in Africa as a dynamic process shaped by demand and supply factors. Uganda, like Kenya, is also procuring public security systems from Huawei. The Kampala police procured AI facial recognition systems from Huawei in 2019, supposedly to address the city’s growing crime rate.³¹Uganda is working with Huawei to help close digital infrastructure gaps and address domestic challenges with crime. In contrast, Kenya’s particular history with terrorist attacks by Islamist militants has motivated the state’s adoption of surveillance systems. As in Kenya, Huawei claims that safe city tools meet several service delivery demands, including real-time surveillance, evidence collection, and video browsing that support policing initiatives.

Opposition leaders in Uganda, civil society, and international observers highlight the misuse of surveillance tools, and how these platforms are instead used to monitor and target political opposition to the administration of President Yoweri Museveni.³² To be sure, the misuse of public security platforms is not the only reason for concern. Facial recognition technologies require mass biometric data for training data collection, software integration, and algorithm development. As a result, acquiring and using these tools without strong privacy safeguards poses a threat to privacy rights.

South Africa’s experience with high rates of crime is the primary motivation for the state to adopt public security platforms as a means to manage the perennial threat. While demand is a response to concerns about crime and governance, it also due to state efforts to close infrastructure gaps and bolster state digital capabilities. Smart city initiatives in South Africa seek to resolve structural challenges while also offering solutions to social challenges like crime. Former Rustenburg mayor Mpho Kunou explains that “the Rustenburg Smart City project aims to develop the economy, enhance citizen participation, improve public safety and transportation, expand the scope of government services, and implement digitalized public utilities through leading technologies.”³³ The increased presence of Chinese surveillance technology in South Africa has raised concerns in Washington about the party-state’s influence over South Africa’s digital infrastructure.³⁴ In addition to Huawei, in South Africa, local company Vumacam is a leading provider of digital surveillance tools. For example, in the city of Johannesburg, Huawei digital cameras are paired platforms from Vumacam and Hikvision, another Chinese digital surveillance tool provider.³⁵ The various surveillance tools are deployed by the police, local municipalities, and private security firms. This example, like the previously mentioned public security systems in Kenya, illustrates African states’ tendency to use multifarious governance and surveillance platforms.

The lack of evidence that public security systems reduce crime does not deter the promotion of public security platforms. In fact, in the case of Kenya, crime rates have risen in areas supported by these technologies.³⁶With the growing concern over the promotion and misuse of surveillance tools, Adam Lane, deputy chief executive of government affairs at Huawei Kenya, dismisses these concerns by contending that “Huawei’s role is to develop, install, deploy, and maintain the technology according to the request and need of the National Police Service. The National Police Service is responsible for operating it and using it according to their policies in line with any national laws.”³⁷This popular framing is reductive, if not completely misleading. It rests, somewhat simplistically, on an all-or-nothing approach to responsibility for negative outcomes. The argument draws attention to the behavior of the National Police but says nothing about the consequences of the sale of these systems or whether regulations are necessary to mitigate negative outcomes. The company position de-emphasizes its role in enabling state actors to surveil citizens, instead placing sole blame and responsibility on state actors for any misconduct.

Government officials, including Kenyan, South African, and Ugandan state representatives, see digital surveillance systems as possible solutions to the traditional challenges that their countries face. This contention challenges presuppositions about the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools as strictly a reflection of Beijing’s efforts to promote digital authoritarianism. Rather, African governments assemble hybridized surveillance systems, in part from Chinese companies, as part of a broader digital infrastructure initiative that seeks to address infrastructure gaps while connecting various heterogeneous tools whose application promises to ameliorate domestic problems like violent crime and terrorism. These objectives, however, are not supported by robust legal measures to protect civil liberties. With the introduction of public security platforms, policymakers are faced with challenge to devise appropriate data policies and privacy measures to deal with the intensification of datafication and surveillance.

Global insecurities and US interests

This section examines the consequences of the global proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools. Precisely, it raises a series of questions for both the international community and local stakeholders, especially about transparency and accountability. For example, most African governments, including Kenya and Uganda, have limited transparency with respect to the acquisition of surveillance tools, despite provisions in their federal laws that demand state transparency.³⁸ More saliently, there is a need for more transparency around the use of Chinese loans and procurement of public security platforms, as well as technologies that have the potential to be repurposed deployed for surveillance purposes. The party-state’s willingness to support digital infrastructure projects that include public security platforms is problematic in the context of authoritarian states like Uganda or Zimbabwe, which have a history of utilizing cyber intrusion systems to undercut human rights and conduct unwarranted state surveillance.³⁹ The adoption of public security platforms enhances the state’s capabilities to conduct surveillance. Even in a relatively healthy democracy like South Africa or Kenya, skewing power toward the state can result in unwarranted surveillance practices that lead to the atrophy of rights, especially in the absence of robust institutional checks and balances.⁴⁰ It is this gap between the adoption of public security systems and regulatory frameworks that poses a critical risk to civil liberties. As such, transparency and accountability measures must extend to digital infrastructure development, which creates room for the misuse of public security products to advance surveillance and other modalities that incentivize democratic backsliding.

The global spread of Chinese surveillance tools could pose threats to privacy and cybersecurity. Several researchers and observers have warned about misuses and various cybersecurity vulnerabilities with Hikvision surveillance products.⁴¹ The incessant product vulnerabilities have led researchers to claim “backdoors” are intentionally designed to enable Chinese intelligence collection.⁴² This position is further bolstered by the fact that the party-state recently introduced several laws—the national intelligence law of 2017, the data security law of 2021, the national security law of 2015, and the cybersecurity law of 2016—that establish obligations for private firms to comply with state demands for data while also offering limited means to reject or appeal unwarranted requests from the Beijing government.⁴³ Vitally, however, this kind of argument still presumes a level of party-state intention and collaboration with firms. At this time, there is no empirical evidence from Kenya, South Africa, or Uganda that establishes coordination and collaboration between Chinese state authorities and Hikvision that results in intentional data theft. Similar allegations leveled against other companies, such as Huawei, cannot be emphatically proven. However, the absence of concrete evidence or attribution does not categorically dispel escalating concerns and vulnerabilities. In fact, it further demonstrates the need for ensuring supply chain security and integrity given the ever-present potential for furtive insertions like backdoors in software and hardware products.

US-China competition’s impact on Africa

This section details the United States should respond to the proliferation and adoption of Chinese surveillance tools. Currently, the growing adoption of Chinese surveillance tools in Africa and the United States’ ambition to mitigate this spread are encouraging the bifurcation of the world, staging Africa and the Global South generally as the theater for a dispute between China and the United States. This division between procurers and non-procurers does not support US interests or the health and inclusive posture of the international liberal order. Indeed, it further ignores the real political challenges and financial motivations behind nation-states’ procurement of Chinese tools. To stem the proliferation of these technologies and the real harm felt locally and globally, the United States must develop a more nuanced posture on the proliferation of Chinese surveillance and cyber-offensive systems, one that responds to the real political challenges and financial motivations behind nation-states’ procurement of Chinese tools.⁴⁴

 American and international observers must pay greater attention to the contextual motivations for the growing demand for Chinese digital infrastructure and public security systems. Precisely, it is important to consider how local factors mediate and condition China’s geopolitical footprint. To curtail the spread and misuse of surveillance technologies, Washington and its European allies should focus not on the “supply” side but on the factors driving African demand for public security platforms.

The primary driver of procurement of surveillance technology in Kenya is contingent on their promise to close digital infrastructure gaps and address traditional challenges like crime and terror. This most prominent example of terrorism in the country is the 2013 al-Shabaab militant attack on an upscale shopping center in Nairobi, killing 67 people and injuring hundreds more. This argument suggests that the United States cannot afford to take a parochial approach and message to the risks posed by the adoption of Chinese technologies. The message shared with the world must speak to the challenges confronting African leaders and partners. Working with African authorities to build digital infrastructure, implement data protection measures, and address challenges like terrorism are ways to mitigate the negative consequences of the proliferation of public security systems. Indeed, a policy that meets African stakeholders where they are with regard to their development challenges is needed. This kind of message will inform a more nuanced approach and understanding, which will help the United States and its allies work within and against the challenges, priorities, and incentives that drive the adoption of Chinese public security systems.

An approach that centers on dissuading African countries from working with companies like Huawei, which are believed to pose cybersecurity threats, risks misunderstanding the objectives and priorities that drive the adoption of Huawei’s tools. For instance, the appeal of Huawei’s safe city project is its financial feasibility, its comprehensive offerings, and its promise to resolve traditional problems like crime. A message that stresses the risks involved is pivotal, but alone, this point runs counter to local priorities. To limit the proliferation of surveillance tools, US policy must better understand African demand and accordingly help address local priorities by offering attainable and safer alternatives to assist local initiatives, while emphasizing that these tools are not automatic remedy for domestic challenges but rather auxiliary instruments. In fact, their adoption can exacerbate challenges in a region with established concerns around crime, governance, corruption, and policing, particularly in the absence of robust checks and balances.

Initiatives like the smart city blur the distinction between service delivery initiatives and invasive surveillance practices. Accordingly, the adoption of these tools has implications for civil liberties, particularly in legal environments that lack robust regulatory frameworks.⁴⁵ This raises questions about the need for mechanisms that govern the distribution and use of these platforms. Chinese firms and actors have been swift in its attempts to establish norms for the application of these systems. As stated before, this effort is pursued through the development of several domestic laws, training programs involving recipient nations, diplomatic exchanges with African partners, and ventures to influence global standards around the regulation of these platforms.⁴⁶ Such endeavors include active participation and leadership in intergovernmental institutions like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is responsible for influencing the global standards and regulatory frameworks for the use of surveillance platforms. To counter the concerted push along this front from the Chinese government, the US government must actively promote standards, regulations, and norms that mirror its democratic values and interests domestically and in multilateral institutions like the ITU. Meanwhile, working alongside likeminded democracies can also help strengthen and promote human rights and democratic values.

The United States and its European partners can play a significant role in helping build local data protection and cybersecurity capacity in regulating the use of public security systems. Many countries on the continent, including Kenya, still lack a comprehensive legal and policy framework to address cybersecurity risks. For example, the Data Protection Act (2019) empowers regulators and requires mandatory registration by data processors, yet it remains unclear what authority the data protection commissioner has to enforce state privacy abuses emerging.⁴⁷ Likewise, there are no means to audit the algorithms that power facial recognition technology or to halt the harvesting of biometric data from the population without an adequate system of checks and balances. Kenya, like many countries in the continent, must work toward building a more conducive legal and policy environment to address growing cybersecurity threats.

In giving an intelligible account of China’s expanding geopolitical footprint, it is important to underscore party-state ambitions and activities in Africa while also illuminating how these aims are mediated by local state and substate actions. Digital surveillance tools on the continent are enlisted to address social challenges like crime, but also a way to index and catalyze digital development. Indeed, while African governments’ ambitions are laudable on the surface, without checks and balances, surveillance activities pose a threat to civil liberties, particularly in a region that struggles with challenges at the intersection of policing, governance, surveillance, race, and crime. Work must be done to advance legal measures to mitigate the negative consequences of intensified surveillance practices.

About the author 

Bulelani Jili is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. His research interests include ICT development, Africa-China relations, cybersecurity, post-colonial thought, and privacy law. He is also a Meta Research PhD fellow at Harvard University, visiting fellow at Yale Law School, cybersecurity fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, scholar-in-residence at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, visiting fellow at Hong Kong University Law, and research associate at Oxford University.

Acknowledgments 

Without friends and colleagues’ support, it would have been an arduous task to bring this work to conclusion. It is their advice, research, and critical reflections that enable this work and its insights.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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The post What is driving the adoption of Chinese surveillance technology in Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zambia has 2,800 megawatts (MW) of installed electricity generation capacity, with 85 percent of the electricity mix derived from hydropower, and  31 percent of the population has access to energy—the majority being in urban areas. The global disruptions to expected rainfall patterns, linked to the effects of climate change, has directly affected Zambian hydropower. Zambia’s loadshedding challenges made news this past December as their public utility, ZESCO, announced that consumers would experience up to twelve hours of loadshedding a day because of critically low water levels at the Kariba Dam, on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe. During this time, the dam on Zambia’s side of the border could not deliver even 40 percent of its 1,080 MW capacity, crippling the country’s ability to deliver energy to consumers.

There are notable low-hanging fruits in the development of Zambia’s electricity mix. While Zambia has the potential to generate 2,300 MW of solar and 3,000 MW of wind, only 76 MW of solar has been installed and no wind power to date. And while 67 percent of the urban population has access to energy, the connection is disrupted frequently due to loadshedding and service disruption caused by aforementioned low water levels in hydropower stations. While the rains in early February assisted in shoring up water levels, climate change will continue to impact rainfall levels and create future problems in energy generation unless the energy mix diversifies.

Attracting low-capital cost investment for new energy projects has, until recently, been a challenge. President Hichilema took office shortly after Zambia became the first African country to default on its sovereign debt in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic and found that his predecessors had accumulated $30 billion in unserviceable debt. Much of Zambia’s borrowing under former President Lungu’s leadership was part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), from which Zambia received $5.23 billion in the energy sector alone. The BRI led to considerable expansion of infrastructure and nearly a two-fold increase in electricity consumption over the previous decade, but left the country unable to balance its payments. 

Recognizing the need to diversify Zambia’s energy grid, the government has been working towards securing private sector investment to deploy solar projects throughout the country to close the energy poverty gap. The government has outlined a plan to achieve universal access to energy for all Zambians by 2030 by bringing additional solar, hydro, geothermal, and thermal energy online.

While developed nations look to decarbonize, countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Zambia, will need significantly more energy to power a high-growth society and achieve development goals. The vast majority of Zambia’s population is comprised of smallholder farmers, producing 80 percent of the country’s agricultural production. That same population is the most vulnerable to climate change impacts, as they rely on rain-fed agriculture. The process of realizing Zambia’s breadbasket potential will require a shift from traditional to modern farming practices, which will require significantly more energy to drive irrigation development and the mechanization of agricultural production. Furthermore, Zambia’s economy has the potential to expand its raw materials sector, and to bolster its GDP by adding value to its products through increased processing and smelting of minerals within Zambia’s borders. Doing this will require more power, and importantly, in continuous supply. 

Positively, Zambia has received a recent wave of investment in its power infrastructure, a result of Hichilema welcoming foreign investors and independent power producers. A few notable investments and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been announced by key partners from around the world, positioning Zambia as a high prospect for low-carbon energy investments and unlocking opportunities to deliver investments in 24/7 clean electricity systems necessary to power industrial activity such as minerals processing. A few weeks ago, seven British companies announced an investment commitment of $2 billion in renewable energy projects in Zambia, to produce 1,500 MW of clean energy. Earlier this year, ZESCO and the United Arab Emirates’ Masdar signed an MOU to develop solar projects worth $2 billion, meant to generate 2,000 MW. This investment, labeled a “capital injection” by President Hichilema, will nearly triple Zambia’s electric capacity in combination with the investment from the British coalition. Critically, these investments will bolster the Zambian grid’s ability to generate electricity at times when hydropower generation is low and solar irradiance is high.

Providing commitments to develop Zambia’s energy infrastructure is not a matter of aid or charity. It has the potential to bring Zambia into the fold of the global economy—a process which adds value for Zambians and Zambia’s trade partners—and provide critical inputs to the global energy transition.

Recognizing this, during the US-African Leaders Summit hosted by the Biden Administration this past December, the United States, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Zambia signed an MOU to strengthen cooperation to develop a cross-border integrated electric vehicle (EV) battery value chain. This MOU is a welcome example of the form of partnership which the United States and allies should adopt in their commercial partnerships with African nations. Notably, the MOU expresses a desire to support the DRC and Zambia in developing economic activity within the EV battery value chain from the mine to the assembly line, not solely in the extraction of raw materials. Such a partnership provides an area for the US private sector to share knowledge and provide project development services and enable local industry and capacity to grow while firming global supply for critical materials and technologies for the energy transition, a win for all partners involved. 

Zambia, as well as other countries across the continent, has held recent high-level diplomatic visits to establish a stronger relationship between the United States and Africa. Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen visited Zambia in January, and Vice President Kamala Harris has just begun her tour on the continent which includes a stop in Zambia. The trips to the continent have highlighted the US’s mutual interests in strengthening Africa’s security and economic prosperity, but discussions surrounding energy development, the backbone of a prosperous future in Africa, have remained vague. While the diplomatic engagements are notable, the trips should place a heavier emphasis on opportunities for the United States to further strengthen energy development throughout the continent, a critical missing link in driving economic growth and expanding opportunity for communities in Zambia and elsewhere on the continent.

As debt-burdened African nations expand engagement with higher-income countries beyond aid, Zambia serves as an important case study on opportunities to attract investor interest in energy development. In order to keep momentum up, investment transparency and translating MOUs into action will be critical to accelerate progress on achieving sustainable development goals. Notably, the investor interest that Hichilema’s administration is attracting is a positive signal for neighboring countries by showing the outcomes that are associated with a commitment to good governance.

Maia Sparkman is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

William Tobin is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Maia Sparkman

Former Associate Director, Climate Diplomacy

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Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

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This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. 

The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent.

In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively.

The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). 

Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.

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1. Why are Russia and China teaming up with South Africa?

Teaming up may be a misleading term, as South Africa has longstanding ties with both Russia and China. South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), received significant Soviet support during the anti-apartheid struggle, including both military and financial backing. South Africa became a member of the BRICS consortium of economies in 2014—which also includes Brazil, Russia, India, and China—and has had strong economic engagement with China since the early 2000s. Also, Russia, China, and South Africa have previously conducted bilateral and other multilateral joint training exercises. So defense cooperation among these nations is neither unprecedented nor wholly unanticipated.

In addition to the practical and diplomatic advantages of shared drills with South Africa, its location aligns strategically with Russian and Chinese efforts to project naval power in African waters. Russia has increased its activities in the Indian Ocean in recent years, for example with efforts to secure port access for its navy in Mozambique. China similarly wants to increase its ability to deploy the People’s Liberation Army Navy worldwide, including in the Indian and Atlantic oceans. To support its navy’s push, China must ensure logistics provision and access in ports or basing in countries along these coasts, such as in Kenya, the Seychelles, Tanzania, or Angola. Straddling both these coasts, of course, is South Africa.

—Sarah Daly is a nonresident fellow at the Africa Center.

As with the previous exercise between South Africa, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China in 2019, these trilateral naval exercises are likely to prove to be of limited warfighting value, but are incredibly valuable to the diplomatic interests of each country. As has been true throughout history, a navy that is capable of sustained global operations is a unique element of national strength that contributes heavily to advancing diplomatic efforts. This exercise in naval diplomacy enables South Africa to demonstrate its independent foreign policy, Russia to highlight its continued relations with nations of the Global South, and China to demonstrate the increasing global reach of its navy.  

The United States and like-minded allies and partners also understand the value of naval diplomacy. The US Navy has the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, an expeditionary sea base (ESB) that is permanently forward deployed to the region with one of its primary missions being to support ongoing diplomatic efforts and engage with countries in Africa. This ESB makes frequent visits to countries throughout the continent for engagement opportunities and most recently visited South Africa in August 2022.  

—LCDR Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. These views do not represent the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

South Africa is a regional hegemon in southern Africa and economically, diplomatically, and militarily among the giants of the African continent, making it an obvious focus for attention. It also has historically warm relations with China dating back to the struggle against apartheid. Finally, South Africa has an ambivalent relationship with the United States and the rest of the Western “international community.” The move is popular with many South Africans, especially those who align with the ruling ANC. 

—Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center.

2. What is South Africa’s political motivation in aligning with these two militaries?

South Africa has repeatedly emphasized its neutrality vis-à-vis Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has pushed for negotiations in official calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and asserted that he would be willing to mediate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. That said, South Africa is stretching the limits of neutrality. Hosting high-level bilateral meetings, describing relations as “friendly,” and participating in “routine” joint military drills indicate support for, rather than cordiality toward, Russia. South Africa’s friendly and routine relations are antithetical to the West’s aims to isolate, deter, and defeat Russia. In an increasingly polarized diplomatic environment, non-alignment can appear to be de-facto alignment with Russia.   

South Africa’s particular approach to non-alignment in this case contributes to the tension. While South Africa has officially acknowledged the illegality of the invasion, it has resisted pressure to enforce sanctions or cut ties. Its actions increasingly belie its stated desire to remain neutral and independent from ‘great power’ struggles, and some segments of the South African public are questioning the government’s stance.

From a military readiness standpoint, the exercise included joint tactical maneuvers as well as rescue and recovery drills; the latter align with threat risks presented by piracy and illicit activities in the Indian Ocean. These shared drills represent a legitimate training opportunity for the South African Defense Force (SADF). South Africa is not the primary partner or recipient of US naval training exercises in Africa, although SADF participated in Shared Accord last summer and other military-to-military assistance focusing on developing and improving medical capabilities. South Africa has previously participated in US Africa Command’s Indian Ocean drills, which focus on East African nations, although not in the past few years. Other US naval exercises in Africa focus on the Gulf of Guinea and the Mediterranean.

—Sarah Daly

3. What new lessons did we learn from this exercise regarding Russian and Chinese capabilities?

Russia brought a hypersonic missile, apparently for display purposes. This show and tell indicates Russia’s desire to demonstrate its technical strength to the world and prove that it can maintain external commitments despite the strain of its war in Ukraine on its armed forces, economy, and political stability. 

—Sarah Daly

China’s focus on the maritime domain, through a sustained investment in shipbuilding, is a key element of its strategic objective to disrupt the international order and challenge the United States. The exponential growth of China’s maritime forces has already resulted in it being the world’s largest navy with approximately 340 battle force ships, compared to 294 in the US Navy’s current inventory. This trilateral exercise, conducted thousands of miles from its shoreline, is further evidence of its strategic plan to become a global navy. As China’s sustained investment in shipbuilding results in expected growth to 400 warships by 2025 and 440 warships by 2030, policymakers must be aware of China’s intent to use its maritime force for worldwide power projection and expanded naval diplomacy.

—Marek Jestrab

4. What message does it send to have these drills coincide with the one-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine, and with reports of increased Chinese support of Russia in the war?

At the very least, it signals that South Africa is not concerned with Ukraine and not interested in towing the Western line. South Africa would prefer to highlight its independence and its willingness to conduct its international relations as it sees fit. 

—Michael Shurkin

Russia’s recent diplomatic and military push in South Africa signals that it can continue its foreign relations as a bilateral security partner despite the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Conducting drills with Russia and China at such a contentious time seemingly suggests that South Africa condones Russia’s actions in Ukraine—even if its stated stance is one of non-alignment. South Africa’s asserted neutral position is shared by fellow BRICS member India, which has also faced scrutiny for maintaining diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. India has continued to purchase Russian oil and participated in Russia’s Vostok 2022 military exercises with China in August. We should be circumspect about assigning greater meaning to the timing or “message” of these drills.

—Sarah Daly

The post What we learned from the Russia-China-South Africa military drills appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This problem is self-perpetuating. When energy infrastructure is weak, there is less signal to invest as individual projects are less viable and are deemed riskier, particularly by the private sector, which has historically provided around 10 percent of infrastructure funding across the continent. Infrastructure, in this sense, should be expanded beyond the state of electricity grids or gas pipelines to include public services such as trained utility workers, water resources, public safety and security forces, and much more.

It is becoming clearer that the paradigm of “aid,” which has underpinned Western countries’ development strategies in the African continent, is increasingly insufficient. Providing aid alone to African nations will not provide the tools and enablers of self-sustaining, endogenous growth. For that, the continent needs investment, not just aid. 

Investment in African nations is not a question of charity. It is increasingly a matter of global economic—as well as ethical—importance. Higher levels of GDP are correlated with greater electricity use, affordability, access, and reliability. The African population is the youngest and fastest-growing of all continents, and thirteen of the world’s largest twenty urban areas are projected to sit in Africa by the end of the century. As occurred in China over the past forty years, Africa’s young and growing population can provide the globe with a capable labor force, along with industrialization for the modern era that can drive job creation and opportunity in African communities while spurring global economic growth.

Placing the chicken before the egg?

Africa’s energy infrastructure is plagued by longstanding underinvestment. In the past decade, the continent received investment of about $41 billion in the energy sector. This number is low in absolute terms, and when compared to the rest of the world, represents only 3 percent of global energy investment. More startling, however, is the fact that 99.5 percent of energy investment on the continent was routed to energy generation. Only the remaining 0.5 percent was routed to transmission and distribution networks. Turning to the World Bank, between 2010-2020, 7.5 percent of the bank’s electricity infrastructure investment went to sub-Saharan Africa, with 98.2 percent going towards generation and 0.3 percent for transmission. 

This underinvestment perpetuates existing problems, including low cost-recoverability and low revenues for utilities, and high project costs for new generation assets. Coupled with sky-high and rising interest rates in African countries such as Ghana, where the benchmark bank rate is 17 percent, poor energy infrastructure makes the risk premium high for new investors.

Untapped potential

The ultimate result is that despite increased focus on the issue of energy poverty facing the continent, infrastructure deficits hinder efforts to increase energy generation and distribution throughout the continent. Fortunately, the continent is rich in both natural gas and renewable resources to power the continent’s industrial revolution, address energy poverty, and spur economic growth, as long as the continent is provided investments at the scale needed to recognize this untapped potential.

Under the IEA’s Sustainable Africa Scenario (SAS), the model assumes that the annual investment in electricity grids more than triples in the 2026-30 timeframe, reaching $40 billion per year on average, with distribution networks accounting for over two-thirds of the total. However, achieving these annual investments is far from simple. Today’s existing financing mechanisms are insufficient for investments in large-scale energy generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure projects. 

This does not bode well for the prospects of reaching the SAS’s $40-billion-per-year target, given that development banks and governments will need to step in to bridge the risk premium inherent in new investment on the continent. Despite the urgent need to invest, investment risk is high. But the only way to resolve this cycle will be to mobilize the capital necessary for the buildout of infrastructure which can sustain growth of more projects and more infrastructure. 

African governments will also need to step in to reform regulatory environments to build investor confidence, committing to both regulatory certainty and transparency in electricity markets. The SAS prioritizes regulatory reform to meet the continent’s energy goals, with a particular focus on cost-of-service electricity pricing reforms. To date, twenty-four countries in Africa have put such reforms in place or are under discussion to implement. Close coordination, collaboration, and transparency between African governments and utility companies will also be crucial to enhance cross-border interconnection.

Expanding engagement

On the matter of roads, ports, and railways, China has been Africa’s largest partner in developing infrastructure by far in the past 20 years. In fact, US influence in the region is waning, and trade between the United States and Africa decreased 55 percent from 2008 to 2021, to a sum of $64 billion. Africa’s trade with China in 2021 stood at $254 billion. As a response, President Biden and other G7 leaders announced the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment to mobilize $600 billion by 2027 for sustainable infrastructure developments in emerging markets, and to take steps to closing the financing gap. One of the four priority pillars included in this MOU is the commitment to build climate-resilient infrastructure, transform energy technologies, and develop clean energy supply chains. 

The US Development Finance Corporation (DFC)—the US government’s main tool to catalyze global infrastructure investments—is primarily designed to mobilize private capital for investment-ready projects, which are in short supply in Africa. The current structure of the DFC is insufficient in meeting the scale of infrastructure investments needed in low-income nations where it is most needed. In recent years, several public investment initiatives have emerged to crowd in, de-risk, and catalyze private investment in Africa. These include the African Development Bank’s New Deal on Energy for Africa and Desert to Power Initiative, USAID’s Power Africa, the Green Climate Fund, and CDC Group’s Gridworks Partners. Utilizing these initiatives to successfully mobilize private investment in energy infrastructure will be crucial in achieving the deployment of enabling infrastructure at scale.

Leveraging newfound attention to benefit African communities

Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine has sent Europeans scrambling to African capitals to identify new energy sources and completely rework European energy flows. In May, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Senegal, where a significant gas deposit has been discovered along Senegal’s border with Mauritania; Italy has signed gas deals with Angola and the Republic of the Congo since the start of the war; and President Andrzej Duda of Poland visited the Ivory Coast to sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on exporting energy supplies from Nigeria to Poland. President Macky Sall of Senegal, the present chair of the African Union, has also hosted delegates from Europe to discuss the bloc’s need for resources.

Europe has expressed more interest than ever before in African energy resources as the bloc weans itself off Russian gas. However, an outstanding question remains: will Europe invest and support downstream infrastructure for Africans to benefit from their own resources, or will Europe’s willingness to invest only go so far as to secure gas exports for Europeans?

Europe’s elevated interest in the region as an energy provider might be a signal that investors have been waiting for to unlock significant investment to build out the needed energy infrastructure throughout the African continent which would allow African communities to use their own resources to expand energy access. Before Russia’s war in Ukraine, there was growing tension between African leaders advocating for the continent’s right to exploit its energy resources to industrialize and develop. Tensions grew stronger as the United States and the European Union (EU) blocked financing opportunities for fossil fuel projects abroad. However, since the war in Ukraine, both the European Union and the United States have eased up on this position, with the United States even including “gas for power” in its “US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa“ released in August 2022, recognizing the role of gas to support Africa’s development efforts.

Aligning with African leadership

African leaders from resource-rich nations have vocally opposed restrictions towards financing gas infrastructure. Speaking on a panel in Dakar in September, H.E. Bruno Jean-Richard Itoua, Minister of Hydrocarbons of the Republic of the Congo, said the following: “For the next 25 years we will see energy demand growing. We cannot face this demand without gas.”  In September, African Ministers of Finance, Economy, and Environment gathered to ensure coherence and prioritize actions in the lead up to COP27. From this convening, the Ministers underscored “the need to avoid approaches that encourage abrupt disinvestments from fossil fuels, as this will, in addition to the impacts of climate change, threaten Africa’s development due to the unintended impact on jobs, the economy, energy, food security, and the ability to mobilize finance.” Transatlantic policymakers must recognize that African nations strongly desire to utilize their resources to achieve development goals.

Whether the buildout of downstream infrastructure is for gas or transmission to carry the electrons produced by renewables, there is strong demand for an increase of investment in all forms of enabling infrastructure to achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 7—access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable modern energy for all—and remain on the path towards a low-carbon future. Given recent developments including the G7 committing to support infrastructure developments in emerging markets, Europe turning to Africa to secure energy resources, and African leaders advocating for a just energy transition, there is significant opportunity for developed nations to invest in usable ”downstream” infrastructure to recognize the African continent’s important role as a respected partner to address climate change and energy security. After all, emerging global actors and competitors, such as China, have long been doing exactly that.

William Tobin is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Maia Sparkman is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

GEC at COP27: Ambitions for All

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Instead, over decades, an abysmal series of obstacles have repeatedly hindered the country’s development. A poorly managed decolonization process by Belgium, multiple rebellions, and the failure to promote good governance—combined with living in a state of war since 1996, particularly in the east—have resulted in profound setbacks in health, education, the economy, society, and governance.

Those obstacles led to deep and pervasive effects on Congolese society, and they make a good case for massive assistance. There is a model already in place for the United States and other friends of the DRC around the world to follow: the 1948­–1951 European Recovery Program, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan. Advanced by then US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the plan gave countries that were devastated by World War II mostly donations to restore industry, support agriculture, and increase international trade. The United States appropriated $13.3 billion over four years. In the end, the plan helped Western and Southern European countries boost industrial production by 55 percent and average gross national product by 33 percent, laying the foundations for a prosperous Europe. Since then, the expression “Marshall Plan” has been used to refer to massive assistance or economic stimulus programs worldwide, the latest case being the European Recovery Plan.

Comparable assistance focused on improving governance could help the DRC develop while laying a similar foundation for a prosperous African Great Lakes region—and even African continent. Yet, achieving this goal will require focusing the plan more on building strong institutions and less on building infrastructure, the beloved child of many development partners. Then US President Barack Obama emphasized a need for updated partnership programs with Africa in a July 2009 speech in Accra, Ghana, declaring: “The true sign of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape by… It’s whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.”

Decades of development lost

A bit like in the 1960s and 1970s, military conflicts and violence are entrenched in  the DRC. The death toll of near-weekly attacks by the allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an insurgent group with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), practically tripled between 2020 and 2022. Furthermore, the militant March 23 Movement, after a deceptive slumber, has occupied the strategic town of Bunagana since June.

After former President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-decade single-party rule and former President Joseph Kabila’s tumultuous terms from 2001 to 2019, Congolese people hoped that their political class would mobilize in favor of development. This has not yet fully happened; and far from rallying the much-needed unity required to end the conflict in the east, political parties seem preoccupied with the 2023 presidential election.

Despite recent social and economic progress—notably a solid annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate that has averaged above 5 percent over the last ten years—many long-term per capita indicators have worsened since the 1970s, according to the World Bank: Electricity consumption per capita (159 kilowatt hours in 1972 and 109 kilowatt hours in 2015) and the number of hospital beds per thousand people (3.2 in 1975 against 0.8 in 2006) have dropped. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita remains less than half of values in the 1970s ​​($1,372 in 1974 versus $518 in 2021, in constant 2015 US dollars).

There are several other indicators that raise concerns about the country’s economic and social progress: As of the beginning of this year, twenty-one diseases under surveillance in the DRC had the potential to become epidemics—and in the year before, six had done so, including measles, cholera, and COVID-19. According to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4.2 million people, including 2.4 million children under five years old, suffer from acute severe malnutrition. Roughly six million people are internally displaced, and 74,000 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were reported over the period, with the majority occurring in the eastern conflict-torn part of the country.

These economic and social indicators are a sign of an unhealthy ecosystem that cannot support development. Contributing factors include political instability, wars, a lack of economic diversification, an overreliance on natural resources, and the consequences of a conflict economy—in which investment is dampened by the uncertainty caused by wartime disruptions to local and national activities, and Congolese don’t benefit from the revenues created by their natural resources. These factors make it difficult to uproot corruption, mismanagement, and state capture, even more than half a century after the DRC’s independence, despite recent efforts, such as reforms within the central bank and the publication of mining contracts.

Thus, the country’s lack of development, caused by its political, social, and economic conditions, is likely to be long-lasting.

The “big push” to prosperity

In his farewell letter, Lumumba was optimistic about the destiny of his country because he believed that the DRC could overcome its afflictions, just as other countries that have experienced war and political instability have done.

Germany experienced such a period of economic and social adversity after World War II: In 1947, industrial output was only one-third and food production was one-half of the country’s 1938 levels. Nearly one-fifth of the country’s housing had been destroyed over the course of the war. Inflation had resulted in a wave of poverty, while the country’s price controls fueled the expansion of the black market.

But today, Germany has become a formidable economic force. The reasons for the German economic miracle, or “Wirtschaftswunder,” are subject to debate among economists, but some credit the Marshall Plan.

The initial Marshall Plan and its variants worldwide are in line with economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s “big push” theory that massive reforms and investments are more helpful than gradual actions in overcoming obstacles that preclude development in underdeveloped economies. In other words, a “big push” is required to undo the inertia of a stagnant economy. Such a “big push” would help the DRC get out of its rut, given the country’s numerous and multifaceted economic, social, and security challenges. But the push must address the real issues that Congolese face.

Institutions over infrastructure

Investment plans for African countries often focus on spending in areas like infrastructure and equipment—and ultimately, some costly and not terribly useful “white elephants.” A Marshall Plan for the DRC should avoid falling into those two pitfalls by taking a completely different approach: focusing on institutions rather than infrastructure.

After all, infrastructure projects in the DRC easily mobilize resources from a variety of public and private stakeholders. The Emirati company DP World, for example, is investing hundreds of millions of dollars over decades in the construction and management of the DRC’s first deep-sea port in Banana due to the economic potential there. Beyond that case, the country’s infrastructure potential and needs are so immense that all that the government would have to do is to design bankable projects and abide to the conditions set by international private or public partners.

Conversely, commitment to lasting and in-depth institutional reform is far below what the DRC and other poor nations need because a reformed institution is less immediately visible than a bridge or a school. In addition, reforming or even creating an institution is more time-consuming, more complex, and dependent on combining success factors such as overcoming vested interests and tailoring institutions to sociological realities. It involves mapping and optimizing processes, investing in training, and paying civil servants better—but also limiting abuses vis-à-vis users of public services, who are often not considered as customers but rather as sheep that can be sheared mercilessly.

Overcoming the DRC’s development obstacles will require a substantial investment in the country’s institutions. Strong institutions are the key to turning the DRC’s immense potential into tangible results, enabling the country to fish for itself instead of being offered fish by other countries.

A DRC with strong institutions would see civil servants better paid, unbiased decisions from the courts, vulnerable groups protected by the police, natural resources and projects managed without corruption, better-equipped schools, and a social safety net that protects the most vulnerable.

Preparing for the push

Initial work in designing the Marshall Plan should start with an in-depth inclusive discussion among Congolese and between Congo and its partners about the governance mechanisms of such an initiative.

This initial discussion is essential because of the colossal sums at stake and also the controversies that have plagued Congolese infrastructure projects: In order to avoid problems associated with the DRC’s poor public finance management and to increase the likelihood that the plan succeeds, this discussion should be structured around strengthening its absorptive capacity—the amount of foreign aid that the DRC can use productively. The DRC has faced difficulties in quickly implementing quality investment projects and ensuring that every dollar invested reaches its intended beneficiary. Shaping a new normal will require improvements in three areas.

1. Preparations for the Marshall Plan should include the recruitment and training of motivated and skilled people who can effectively design and manage reform projects in the long term.
2. The DRC must establish a stronger and more efficient control mechanism to ensure good fiduciary management of the plan’s projects in order to avoid misappropriation, collusion, and corruption. Such practices have long bedeviled public contract tenders and public funds management.
3. It will be necessary to meticulously prepare the various projects and investment plans in order to avoid mistakes of the past, including some famous white elephants, and to guarantee adequate social impact. To do this, leaders taking part in the plan should adopt an experimental approach in which they run small-scale test projects to better understand and correct their shortcomings before deploying them throughout the country.

Institution building is a serious matter. It requires time and stability. Besides, institutional quality is sensitive to policy changes that follow shifts in political leadership. Hence the need, as a foundation to the Marshall Plan, to build a clear, accountable, and trans-partisan consensus around institutional reform. If a platform for reform has buy-in from political parties and stakeholders across Congolese society, it would be immune to the negative side effects of changes in government. With new elections slated for 2023, now is an opportune political moment to start that dialogue. Presidential candidates, in particular, should explain how their pledges will contribute to the much-needed institutional transformation. The country’s burgeoning civil society could seize the opportunity to mobilize Congolese across party lines and identify priority sectors for institution building in preparation for the plan.

Such a process would empower the Congolese people, who have often been marginalized in designing development policies even though they’re meant to be the beneficiaries. It would foster crucial local commitment to institutional transformation. Plus, the preparation effort could help establish an equal relationship between the DRC and its financial partners in their mission to propel the country into the twenty-first century.

Doing the Marshall Plan math

How much should an institutional Marshall Plan for the DRC cost? Let’s start with a linear method to evaluate the original.  

From 1948 to 1952, sixteen countries received a total of $13.3 billion, representing roughly $159 billion in 2022. Distributing that among the total 1948 population (approximately 270 million) of the countries that received this aid yields a per capita endowment of $588 in today’s dollars to match the original Marshall Plan.

That would add up to approximately $55 billion for the DRC and its estimated 95.2 million people. The amount is practically the size of the DRC’s GDP and more than ten times what it receives in annual Official Development Assistance. It may seem enormous—but that is not the case considering the scale of the DRC’s weak social indicators and immense needs. The sum is about one-third more than the $40 billion the US Congress committed this year to aid Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and represents roughly three to four years of expenditures for Washington, DC, or Chicago.

The spillovers from the Marshall Plan would also be transformative; those resources would help provide the “big push” that the country needs to fight against the rise of the ADF in eastern DRC, meet its development challenge, rebuild, and, above all, consolidate its governance and move from a cyclical, natural-resource-led growth to a more balanced and sustainable momentum supported by strong institutions.

A Marshall Plan-style investment could quickly transform the DRC, which is projected to become the world’s eighth most populous country by 2050, into one of the globe’s most dynamic markets. The DRC, with its connections to world cobalt battery supply chains, could also become a home for green industries, with jobs available for youth in all sectors of a radically transformed economy.

Ultimately, an institution-centered Marshall Plan would dramatically transform the DRC over the next decades, helping new generations of Congolese achieve Lumumba’s vision of a bright future for the country, the region, and for Africa.

Jean-Paul Mvogo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Africa Center.

The post Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The public sector external debt to be restructured amounts to $17.3 billion, more than half of the total Zambian public debt. According to the Zambian Ministry of Finance (MOF), official bilateral creditors account for 15 percent of public debt, multilateral and plurilateral financial institutions for 11.5 percent, Eurobond investors for 11.7 percent, and non-bonded commercial lenders for 11.4 percent. About $6 billion is owed to Chinese commercial and state-owned lenders alone—constituting the largest creditor group by nationality and giving China significant leverage in Zambia’s ability to restructure its debt. The classification of this amount of debt between official bilateral and private sector lenders has been a contentious issue, contributing to the uncertainty in restructuring process. For example, there had been contention about how to classify debt owed to China Development Bank, as bilateral or private sector debt. Now the Zambian MOF has classified it as debt to private creditors.

Zambia was one of the first countries to apply to restructure its sovereign external debt under the Common Framework for Debt Treatment in early 2021. The Common Framework (CF) was launched by the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in November 2020, to provide a mechanism for low income countries to seek debt restructuring when unavoidable. Under the CF, an Official Creditor Committee for Zambia was formed, co-chaired by China and France. The Zambian OCC pledged to negotiate with Zambia to restructure its public external debt. Its commitment cleared the way for the IMF Board to consider and approve the assistance package for Zambia. These steps taken to restructure Zambia’s debt could form a template for future instances of sovereign debt restructuring under the Common Framework.

In addition to the progress made so far, according to the IMF, Zambia and the OCC aim to sign a legally non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) by the end of 2022. The MOU will set out the key parameters of Zambia’s debt restructuring terms regarding: the changes in nominal debt service over the IMF program period, the debt reduction in net present value (NPV) terms, and the extension of the duration of Zambia’s debt.

Zambia will then negotiate bilaterally with each official creditor for a restructuring deal, consistent with the key parameters set out in the MOU. Concurrently, Zambia will negotiate with private sector creditors, seeking comparable treatment as mandated under the Common Framework. The Zambia External Bondholder Committee has been formed, representing 45 percent of the outstanding value of Zambia Eurobonds, and presumably will engage in the negotiations.

The progress so far suggests that the OCC has found a compromise which is acceptable to China—which until now has insisted on bilateral negotiations with debtor countries instead of participating in multilateral restructuring efforts. The MOU will be legally non-binding, and the key parameters on NPV reduction and duration extension are consistent with many solutions containing various scenarios of interest rate cuts and maturity extensions that do not require a nominal reduction of the face value of the debt. Nominal haircut is something China has avoided in its previous bilateral debt restructuring agreements with debtor countries. As well, the actual restructuring deal will be negotiated bilaterally with each official creditor—something China has long insisted on. These features will presumably allow China to move forward with the other two cases under the Common Framework, Chad and Ethiopia. The Zambian case may therefore serve as the template for debt restructuring under the Common Framework.

However, even with such a promising , the current approach to sovereign debt restructuring is still plagued with many deficiencies. The process remains time-consuming and inefficient for the following reasons.

Firstly, the Common Framework is only open to 73 low-income countries. Middle-income countries also in debt distress, such as Sri Lanka, are excluded. Sri Lanka has reached staff-level agreement with the IMF for a $2.9 billion package, not yet approved by the Board. Aporoval of  the package  is contingent on progress in debt restructuring negotiations with Sri Lanka’s creditors. With more than $50 billion of external debt, about 47 percent with private sector creditors and bondholders, and 10 percent each with bilateral creditor China and Japan, Sri Lanka can benefit from the steps set out in the Common Framework to better manage its debt restructuring task. Therefore, the G20 should extend the Common Framework to middle-income emerging countries in debt distress.

Secondly, a way needs to be found to encourage countries in debt difficulties to use the Common Framework. Currently, countries fear being downgraded by credit rating agencies and losing capital market access if they take advantage of it. If the stigma around the Common Framework remains, many countries will avoid it; only three have applied so far (Zambia, Chad, and Ethiopia).

Thirdly, convincing private creditors to participate in debt restructuring on comparable terms with official bilateral creditors will remain difficult. Private creditors complain that the restructuring terms are reached in the OCC without their inputs, and their concerns are not taken into consideration. They do not receive the IMF and World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis, which is the basis for restructuring negotiations in the OCC until it is too late to contribute to the assessment. These concerns must be addressed before one can hope for more participation by private creditors in the debt restructuring process under the Common Framework.

Zambia shows that progress can be made to render the Common Framework more workable to restructure low-income countries’ sovereign debt. However, more needs to be done to refine a comprehensive, efficient, and effective sovereign debt restructuring procedure. The international community  needs change now, with many low income and emerging market countries close to or already in distress, especially following the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

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South Africa is the thirteenth largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, relying on coal for 70 percent of its total energy supply. Eskom, South Africa’s debt-ridden public utility, drives this coal consumption due to its vertical monopoly over the nation’s energy system, favoring its coal-fired power plants over private renewable generation. This top-down system drastically reduces the potential profitability of independent clean energy investments and, compounded with Eskom’s inability to fund clean energy projects, hinders South Africa from achieving its emissions reduction targets.

Enter the JETP. The JETP is an agreement between the governments of South Africa, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union to accelerate the decommissioning of South Africa’s coal-fired power plants. In October 2021, in anticipation of the funding commitment, the South African government revised its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to encompass more ambitious climate goals, including lowering its 2030 target emissions range by 32 percent. These revisions paved the way for the official JETP deal during COP26 in November 2021.

At face value, the JETP may appear insufficient to transition South Africa’s energy sector away from coal. Despite the partnership’s $8.5-billion offering, Eskom has estimated that it will require $27 billion to kickstart the shift away from coal-fired generation in coming years. Another analysis from Stellenbosch University predicted that South Africa will need at least $250 billion over the next three decades to expand clean energy infrastructure in line with United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. As such, to understand the significance of the JETP, one must not look at its size, but rather its substance.

As part of the JETP agreement, the South African government and the International Partners Group (IPG) have agreed to develop an investment plan to identify key decarbonization projects. These projects would be funded by an international financing package, likely composed of both concessional and non-concessional loans. But while this investment plan will dictate the allocation of JETP funds, its hidden value lies in the corresponding reforms South Africa must implement to maximize the package’s impact. These reforms, some of which are stated in South Africa six-month update on the JETP, have the potential to elevate the partnership from a one-time injection of infrastructure funding to a sustainable pipeline for private sector investment.

One example of an already successful reform is the liberalization of South Africa’s electricity generation market. In August 2021, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the threshold under which companies can produce their own electricity without a license would be increased from 1 megawatt (MW) to 100 MW. This change, which drastically reduced the obstacles to private clean energy investment, has spurred the development of approximately 4.5 gigawatts (GW) of projects since its adoption, including two 100-MW solar PV projects.

Another reform is a proposal to establish a South African independent system operator. As detailed in parliamentary legislation revealed in February, this plan aims to create a competitive market for electricity generation by transitioning from a single-buyer electricity market to a multi-market structure. While the legislative text has yet to be finalized, if successful, this plan would break up Eskom’s vertical monopoly on the electricity market, thereby ensuring the fair treatment of electricity generators and increasing investor confidence in South Africa’s clean energy sector.

Notably, these JETP reforms would be buttressed by supplementary policies, such as the introduction of a regulated green finance taxonomy, which would provide guidance to investors regarding environmentally sustainable assets and investments. Another policy, the strengthening of a progressive carbon tax, would put added pressure on energy producers to switch to lower-emitting generation sources. Altogether, the intended result would be the creation of a nationwide sustainable finance ecosystem that acts as a force multiplier for JETP funds while attracting investment from private and philanthropic financiers. In this way, the JETP amplifies public sector spending.

Interestingly, while the JETP investment plan will identify key decarbonization projects, it will likely entail differing roles for public and private sector funding. As evidenced by the liberalization of South Africa’s electricity licensing, there is sizable private sector interest in developing certain segments of South Africa’s energy sector, such as renewable power generation. However, there is little private sector interest in other projects that are less profitable, such as transmission and distribution. JETP funds will thus likely be used to finance projects that support South Africa’s overall energy transition but would not otherwise receive private funding.

Furthermore, the JETP financing package also presents an opportunity for multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) to experiment with novel financial mechanisms. Reacting to pressure to take action against climate change, global policymakers, such as US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, have urged MDBs and DFIs to take greater risk in their clean energy investments in emerging economies. Through financial mechanisms such as layered debt structures, these organizations can de-risk clean energy investments and, hopefully, attract developers for necessary transition projects. Nonetheless, MDBs and DFIs are not responsible for changing domestic policies, and these investments are insignificant without corresponding energy sector regulatory reforms.

Of course, the JETP is not without criticism. Despite being a core element of the JETP, the just transition elements of the agreement remain to be described in any significant detail. While the South African government has stated its intent to gain buy-in from all affected parties, it may prove exceedingly difficult to provide economic relief to the nearly 120,000 workers employed in coal mines and aging power plants. Other complaints have centered on the JETP’s lack of transparency and lengthy development period; before South Africa’s released its six-month update in June, there had been essentially no public communication regarding the JETP’s progress. Hopefully, the public will soon see increased communication from JETP leaders as the South African government and IPG release their draft investment plan in the coming weeks.

Policymakers are working to determine if the JETP can shape and influence similar partnerships with other carbon-intensive economies. However, the answer is complicated, as it depends on individual national circumstances. Indonesia, for example, runs a state-run energy monopoly that subsidizes coal-fired power plants and grants the coal industry vast control over mining permits. Indeed, until recently, Indonesia’s energy policy made it difficult for any new renewable energy projects to earn a positive return on investment. India, meanwhile, has a private sector that responds to clean energy initiatives but struggles to keep up with rapid economic growth. Notably, just transition partnerships are also country-driven and rely on individualized consultations between host-nation leaders and partner governments. For these reasons, it is impossible to totally “copy-and-paste” JETP agreements from country to country.

Moving forward, the JETP is slated to enter a critical development period as the partners aim to finalize the investment plan ahead of COP27 in November. This plan will illustrate crucial details about the nature of infrastructure projects and related financing structures. Nonetheless, these measures—and the success of the JETP—are contingent on domestic energy sector reforms that maximize the effect of public spending and induce the flow of private capital.

Christopher Cassidy is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

This work was conducted in cooperation with the Global Energy Transition Politics and Policy Research Group at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies.

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Russia’s imports decreased by 9.7% from February to March 2022, including losses from many of Russia’s top trade partners and politically neutral countries. Shipping container traffic to Russia decreased by 50% in March in St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, and Novorossiysk, Russia’s most highly-trafficked ports. This decrease in exports to Russia is a predictable symptom of war, but there are more factors in play. Initially, impediments to trade began in February and March as the ruble rapidly devalued, causing Russian buyers to become reluctant or unable to complete payments. Suppliers struggled to execute transactions following Russia’s cutoff from the SWIFT system, and international shipping ceased to service goods to Russia. Now, Russia’s maritime sector broadly faces issues with ship certification and insurance coverage. Some companies have inadvertently abandoned or scaled back business with Russia due to disrupted trade routes and a lack of input materials. The Russian economy as a whole has contracted since the invasion, impeding its purchasing and import abilities. 

Some exporters, like Pakistan, Brazil, and Jordan, have not experienced the same drops in trade with Russia as countries like Vietnam or India. The answer to this discrepancy lies in the exports themselves: Brazil’s exports to Russia are driven primarily by soybeans, cow meat, and ground nuts. Another supposed “fence-sitter,” Pakistan, is in a similar situation, with citrus as its top export to Russia. Agricultural products aren’t subject to sanctions, so these exports to Russia may continue unmarred. On the other hand, the majority of India, Vietnam, and China’s exports to Russia are technological products, which are more likely to be caught in the crossfire of Western sanctions. Companies face a choice: comply with sanctions and lose business with Russia, or risk losing business with the US. 

India’s trading relationship with the US is 12 times the size of its relationship with Russia, meaning that it’s in companies’ best interests to prioritize trade with the US. As a result, Indian companies such as Tata Steel have withdrawn or paused business with Russia. Meanwhile, the State Bank of India, the country’s largest lender, has blocked transactions with any entities on EU, US, or UN sanctions lists, irrespective of currency, out of fear that such transactions could lead to sanctions on the bank. Even China, Russia’s supposed economic lifeline, shaved off 30% from its exports to Russia in the past two months, before the worst of its lockdowns hit. The Chinese government, though pushing back against the West politically, has issued subtle warnings to Chinese companies to proceed with caution rather than violate sanctions and get caught in the crossfire between Russia and the West. Chinese banks have suspended business with Russia, and some tech companies including Lenovo Group Ltd. and Xiaomi Corp, SZ DJI Technology Co. have quietly scaled back or paused operations. So while foreign ministers offer even-handed statements, finance ministers are quietly signaling that Russia may become an increasingly risky place to invest.

One risk beyond sanctions involves reputational hazards. Chinese auto company Geely, for example, suspended its operations in Russia in March in order to evaluate potential reputational hazards to the brand. These reputational risks are legitimate, exemplified by Ukrainian vice prime minister Mykhailo Fedorov publicly calling on Chinese company DJI to halt its business in Russia.

Although countries and businesses face a range of reasons to halt business with Russia, the throughline is the West’s economic weight, which, through sanctions, has made transacting with Russia too risky and unwieldy. However, it’s possible that as time goes on, firms may find ways to circumvent the restrictions sanctions impose. Following the SWIFT cut-off, Indian firms were initially unable to purchase oil from Russia, but have since begun using spot deals to buy it at a discount. If that is any indication, workarounds may be possible, and there is a high incentive for their pursuit. But as sanctions lists continue to expand and come into effect, the risks of noncompliance will symmetrically increase. Despite the political statements of many “neutral” countries, the West’s desired outcome to punish Russia economically seems to be achieving global buy-in.

Josh Lipsky is the director of the GeoEconomics Center.
Sophia Busch is a Program Assistant with the GeoEconomics Center.

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What is the opportunity?

In 1956, jazz musician Dizzy Gillespie and his band were traveling across Europe and South Asia, playing concerts on a tour organized by the US Department of State (DoS). The band got a call from an official at DoS, who told them they were needed in Greece. Young Greeks had been protesting at the American Embassy against the decision by the United States to support continued British rule of Cyprus. DoS wanted to try to divert the protestors’ anger by showcasing America’s talented jazz musicians, whose mission was to promote US values.

The band played a sold-out show in Athens to a raucous crowd, which had a similar demographic composition as the crowd protesting outside the embassy. Quincy Jones, then the drummer for Gillespie’s band, recounts thinking that the crowd was going to attack the musicians. Instead, the thousands of young people packed into the venue were engrossed by the music and celebrated Gillespie after the show. The protests against the US Embassy quickly abated—and DoS viewed the use of the Jazz Ambassadors as a triumphant employment of US cultural diplomacy to end a crisis.

The show in Greece would not be the last time a Jazz Ambassador defused a situation. In 1960, during his extensive tour of Africa as a Jazz Ambassador, Louis Armstrong was sent to Leopoldville, Congo, to play a concert amidst the civil war taking place there. The tour had been organized by DoS, and sponsored by Pepsi, in order to leverage Armstrong’s popularity on the continent to promote the beverage. There was debate among DoS officials of whether to continue to brand the concert in Leopoldville with Pepsi, given the precarious political situation there. Ultimately, officials decided to continue to partner with the Pepsi brand in hopes it might not look as explicitly propagandic amidst a war where one side was backed by the United States and the other, the Soviet Union. The organizers hoped for 1,500 fans. More than 10,000 showed up, according to DoS cables. The result of the show, as Armstrong tells it, was a temporary truce between the warring sides as they came together to listen to this American musician from New Orleans.

Today, the United States has an opportunity to harness its globally popular musical superstars for diplomatic gains, building off the legacy of the successful Jazz Ambassadors program. A well-publicized concert series that brings US superstars to locales they would otherwise be unlikely to tour and are of diplomatic importance would be a useful tool for improving views of the United States abroad and spreading US values. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken put it,

America’s arts and culture are a major source of our national strength, our musicians captivate the world. Their work gets people to see each other’s humanity, build a sense of common purpose, change the minds of those who misunderstand us, and tell the American story in a way no policy or speech ever could.

Music—the universal language—can build bridges across cultures, and American music has been doing so for decades. The top of the Billboard Global 200 chart regularly features American artists—and this music has lasting power. As Ukrainians fled from the Russian invasion of their country, a video circulated of one refugee playing “What a Wonderful World” by Armstrong, more than six decades after the Jazz Ambassadors brought their music to European crowds.

The power of music should not be viewed by policymakers as some flimsy hobbyhorse of pacifists. The Eurovision Song Contest, which pits musicians representing countries from Europe (and some other select countries) against one another, has produced superstars like ABBA and Celine Dion, while providing visibility to issues like LGBTQ rights and the unique cultures and traditions of the competing countries. In 2021, 183 million viewers watched the competition, making it one of the most-viewed events globally. The ability to message to such a broad audience makes the competition a potent source of European cultural power.

“America’s arts and culture are a major source of our national strength, our musicians captivate the world.” —Secretary of State Antony Blinken

The United States does not presently have any program that features its superstar musical talent and promotes freedom of expression on a global scale. Although the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) continues to facilitate concerts abroad, they are far smaller than those of the Jazz Ambassador program. The Jazz Ambassador program was renamed the American Music Abroad program in 2005 and no longer features widely known and commercially successful musicians. Instead, they promote smaller groups that represent the rich musical landscape and history of the United States. Although these programs are valuable, they do not provide the visibility and commercial clout that major US artists like the original Jazz Ambassadors did. An independent evaluation of the Jazz Ambassadors program in 2006 assessed that the program was impressively effective. The report concluded:

The JA (Jazz Ambassadors) Program [was] a highly successful vehicle for conveying this uniquely American music—instilled with American cultural heritage and American values—to millions of people, worldwide. Virtually all those who participated in this evaluation, whether they were United States Ambassadors, Post Staff, accomplished American musicians, amateur and professional musicians in third world countries, managers of media outlets and cultural organizations, or young music students, agreed that this remarkable program accomplished far-ranging and important goals for US foreign policy.

Even though the Jazz Ambassadors program was deemed a success, no cultural diplomacy endeavor on the scale of the tours of the 1950s and 1960s has been replicated. Many foreign policy professionals recognize that the power of American culture has waned as a tool of diplomacy. The aphorism goes that politics is downstream of culture, and in the view of former diplomat John Brown, the citizens and leaders of many countries see culture as more important than politics. They perceive the United States to be lacking a rich culture because the US government does not aggressively promote its artists abroad. Brown writes of the paradox in the US approach to cultural diplomacy: “The neglect of arts diplomacy by the US government reflects certain long-term traits of the American national character: it is puritanical, democratic, void of a national culture, yet it influences the world through its mass entertainment.” Although the United States may not have a well-established and unified culture to promote abroad like China, Japan, or France, it does have an advantage in its cutting-edge art that is oriented toward a mass audience, best represented by its commercially popular musicians.

Why now?

While the United States faces increased competition for global influence, it has lost diplomatic clout during the past two decades. Failed wars and hubristic foreign policy have damaged the US image around the world and led many to doubt whether the United States should serve as a model. Although the image of the United States as a global leader is faltering, American artists and other cultural icons have enjoyed significant worldwide popularity. US musicians tour globally with great success, its designers are featured in top fashion shows, and its athletes are global brands.

In contrast with the Trump administration, which called for cuts to DoS, the Biden administration has signaled an interest in expanding nonmilitary forms of global engagement. These efforts mirror the desires of the American public to engage in the world without becoming involved in more conflicts. In recent polling by the Eurasia Group Foundation, almost three times as many Americans wanted to increase, rather than decrease diplomatic engagement with the world, with nonmilitary means of engagement ranked highest as their preferred means for global engagement.

With the American public desiring increased diplomacy, there is an opportunity to redefine how the United States engages with the world and change the perceptions foreign populations have of American values. One of the models of governance that the United States is competing against globally features restrictions on speech and expression; Washington has the ability to demonstrate the creativity and innovation that its more open and tolerant model allows. The Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy included a number of discussions on the importance of freedom of expression and speech; a popularized effort to spread these values would further the administration’s goals of promoting democracy globally.

How to make it happen

1. Create an America’s Best Concert series (ABCs). With relatively little funding appropriated by Congress, the State Department’s ECA could develop a concert series to bring some of the biggest stars from the United States to places where they would otherwise be unlikely to tour. This effort should be modeled on the original Jazz Ambassadors program, with coordination with local authorities managed through in-country embassy staff to ensure cultural sensitivity and an understanding of which artists would have the greatest appeal to local audiences. Rather than soliciting applications like the current American Musicians Abroad program, the ABCs should recruit top talent with competitive contracts, the opportunity to appeal to new audiences, and the chance to represent their country abroad. Costs of booking the artists and paying for the shows would be defrayed through partnerships with US companies, which would have the opportunity to advertise in growing markets where they may lack significant existing market saturation. 

2. Provide musicians full artistic discretion in what they perform and communicate to foreign audiences. Ultimately, artists would be representing the American value of freedom of expression; they should have the ability to criticize their own government and its policies even while representing their country. As Louis Armstrong said of his decision to be a Jazz Ambassador, “I sort of liked the idea of representing America, but I wasn’t going over there to apologize for the racist policies of America.” There is an inherent tension in a concert series meant to promote freedom of expression that also requires artists to avoid diplomatically sensitive subjects. This was an issue cited by Quincy Jones in his autobiography, where Jones said that an official from the American National Theater and Academy, an organization DoS had partnered with to administer the concerts, condescendingly told the musicians to “indulge in your various idiosyncrasies discreetly.” DoS should carefully consider which artists it promotes abroad and where, but ultimately it should emphasize the artists’ freedom to hold and express their own opinions as they engage with foreign audiences.

3. Develop better connections with the artistic community. DoS is limited in its ability to operate domestically, both because of its structure and US laws. This needs to change; the State Department must be deeply immersed in the country it serves. For US cultural power to be leveraged abroad, established relationships and an understanding of American culture need to be strong. Artists need to be able to trust that they are representing their own values and those of the country rather than being used for propaganda. Managers and promoters must trust that the concerts will be well managed and avoid hurting the reputations of artists.

One way to develop this capacity is to further build out the American Arts Incubator (AAI) program. Launched in 2014, AAI is an initiative of ECA that sends American artists abroad to collaborate with local communities. This is a small program that provides relatively modest grants to artists, but it is a proven model for DoS interfacing with the arts world. By scaling up AAI to allow it to develop broad relationships with artistic communities, and expanding into the commercial music industry, AAI could serve as a liaison with the State Department to help identify which artists would have the greatest appeal for ABCs.

4. Identify where diplomatic and commercial interests intersect. The State Department’s Office of Global Partnerships (OGP) aims to develop cross-sector collaboration to advance US foreign policy goals, but it has been limited in its ability to do so. As part of the ABCs, the OGP should be empowered to establish connections with major US companies that have an interest in sponsoring the ABCs. The promotion of American brands by US musicians performing in regions with low saturation of US companies could be an attractive opportunity for US businesses. Sponsorship for the ABCs provided by large US companies would both allow for superstar artists to be contracted, without having to charge money for the concerts to attendees, and would serve to promote US commercial interests abroad. OGP has partnered in the past with major companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon Web Services, mobilizing $3.7 billion in public and private commitments since 2008. This figure could be far higher if OGP was expanded and its mandate widened to focus more on leveraging US commercial power for diplomatic purposes, without neglecting its current focus on directing private funding to international development.

Washington has an opportunity to advance US diplomatic goals and commercial interests by bringing music to the world. What it takes to do that is an empowered DoS that can step into the limelight alongside American superstar musicians.

Photo by Mario Anzuoni. 62nd Grammy Awards – Show – Los Angeles, California, US, January 26, 2020 – Ariana Grande performs. REUTERS

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