Islamist insurgents, including al-Shabaab and the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS-S), are making territorial gains. These two groups represent distinct but overlapping threats—each transnational, each integrated into broader jihadist ecosystems, and each capable of destabilizing regional and global security if left unchecked. They are also quickly evolving, including by increasing connections with other groups and malign state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—creating larger geostrategic implications.

To address this evolution, the United States must remain engaged in Somalia; but that does not necessarily require escalation. Strategic engagement through a forward embassy, regional partnerships, and calibrated intelligence operations can disrupt the evolution of the terrorist threat in Somalia—and it costs far less than what it would take to contain fully metastasized, adaptive adversaries down the road.

Increasingly adaptive

For too long, ISIS-S has been treated as an afterthought in Somalia’s counterterrorism landscape, but the group can no longer be ignored: Since 2019, it has evolved significantly, becoming the Islamic State’s most agile, digitally integrated, and externally operational franchise. This has aligned with the Islamic State’s global shift toward a decentralized, node-based network managed by the General Directorate of Provinces. Formerly a localized insurgency attempting to replicate elements of the core caliphate in miniature, ISIS-S is now modular, externally focused, and nonterritorial, with unique technical capabilities that elevate its threat beyond that of traditional insurgent groups.

It does not seek to hold Mogadishu; rather, ISIS-S bypasses the Somalian capital to exploit ungoverned spaces through coordinated disruption. Its efforts destabilize governance; it coordinates its operations via encrypted messaging apps, blockchain-based payment systems, commercial off-the-shelf obfuscation tools, and artificial intelligence-generated multilingual propaganda that enables large-scale recruitment.

The ISIS-S threat is transnational and no longer confined to Somalia; that is apparent with the group’s implication in terror plots overseas, including in Sweden. Perhaps most critically for the United States, the ISIS-S al-Karrar office is understood to serve as a funding node for ISIS-Khorasan, which has proven capable of devastating terror plots, including the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan that killed thirteen US service members.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, has also proven to be far more than a local insurgency—it is a deeply entrenched and militarily assertive force in Somalia, capable of executing complex operations, controlling territory, and challenging both national and international security efforts. This transnational terrorist organization has already exerted influence beyond Somalia, having executed mass-casualty attacks in Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, its operatives struck US and Kenyan forces in Manda Bay, killing three Americans. The group explicitly targets US and Western interests throughout East Africa. Withdrawing now, as al-Shabaab regains momentum, risks allowing it to strengthen its position and expand its influence.

Metastizing menace

Of parallel concern is the mounting evidence of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. This partnership represents a dangerous escalation. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to strike maritime targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden boats. These asymmetric maritime attacks have disrupted vital shipping lanes, endangered commercial vessels, and necessitated multinational naval responses. They also offer a template for al-Shabaab’s future posture.  

Growing evidence exists that Houthi weaponry, supplied by Iran, has been transferred into Somalia and reached both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S. These transfers suggest an intensifying convergence of interests but not ideologies. While al-Shabaab, ISIS-S, and the Houthis remain doctrinally divergent, they share three critical traits: a reliance on illicit maritime logistics, the use of asymmetric tactics, and a willingness to cooperate when it serves operational goals. This alignment adds complexity to counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa, blurring the lines between ideological enemies and functional partners.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, just north of Somalia, is a critical chokepoint for global trade, funneling approximately 12 percent of seaborne oil trade flows. Increased attacks or insecurity in these waters would drive up insurance costs, increase shipping expenses, and worsen instability across East Africa and the Middle East. Should al-Shabaab or ISIS-S, either independently or in partnership with the Houthis, begin to harass this artery, it would have immediate implications for the global economy.

But in addition to the potential economic impact, there is also a clear strategic threat from this cooperation. Hostility to the West and asymmetrical warfare exercised by these groups and the militias included in Iran’s Axis of Resistance could pose an enduring threat to US allies and partners in the region. For example, the US Navy could see its operational freedom eroded, and militant activity in the sea lanes around the Horn of Africa—which connect the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific—could complicate the United States’ ability to surge naval forces in response to crises involving China in the Taiwan Strait or Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Continuity as containment

The 2021 US withdrawal from Somalia offered a preview of what disengagement would yield. Following the withdrawal, al-Shabaab and ISIS-S regrouped, expanded their respective operations, and forged deeper regional ties that present the greater challenges that the United States faces today. Although US forces returned in 2022, the withdrawal had already proved costly.

Today, ISIS-S internally exploits the geography of Somalia, clan connections, and instability to thrive. Al-Shabaab forces inch ever forward in their ongoing campaign to isolate and potentially capture the capital of Mogadishu. Each debate over whether to stay or go provides strategic space that the groups use to adapt.

The post-9/11 experience has demonstrated that power vacuums can be quickly filled by hostile actors. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq enabled ISIS’s rapid rise. Strategic ambiguity in Libya yielded terrain for jihadist experimentation. Afghanistan’s rapid collapse under the Taliban offered ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda a second wind. Somalia is not an exception: It would be the next domino.

But it’s not just a matter of being present. For example, the 2012 Benghazi attack was not a failure of presence; it was a failure of planning, coordination, and establishing an adequate security posture. Similarly, abandoning Somalia without a coherent containment strategy creates the risk of empowering a transnational terrorist organization with international ambitions while simultaneously allowing Iran to extend its strategic reach. 

To maintain its foothold at the most critical junction of East Africa’s security architecture, the United States must prioritize continuity. This includes keeping the US embassy in Mogadishu open, as it provides a platform for intelligence coordination, interagency operations, and diplomatic leverage. Without it, the United States cannot assess—let alone contain—a threat that is actively recombining in real time and posing risks to maritime security, the regional balance of deterrence, and potentially the US homeland.

The terrorist groups based in Somalia are adapting faster, making broader connections, and integrating deeper than Washington’s withdrawal advocates seem to realize. To misread that evolution as localized or static is strategic negligence. A decision to withdraw at this moment will not be remembered as a tactical recalibration but as an unforced error. To leave is to license the evolution of these terrorist groups; to stay is to disrupt it. 

Danielle Cosgrove is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group. She is a distinguished guest lecturer at Stanford University, a Stanford Medicine X scholar, and the founder of an acquired threat mapping startup.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent official US government positions.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Evolution of freedom

Since 2000, Ethiopia has achieved remarkable economic growth, driven by public investment in infrastructure and industrial expansion, positioning itself as one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. Coupled with extensive construction projects, the service and agricultural sectors also made modest contributions. However, since 2020, the country has faced significant setbacks, including internal conflicts that disrupted production and trade, alongside the global COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated supply chain disruptions and weakened demand for exports. These challenges were further compounded by rising inflation, which strained household incomes and increased the cost of living, and a severe shortage of international reserves, making it difficult to stabilize its currency. The recent decision to float the Ethiopian birr has added to the volatility, causing currency fluctuations that have increased uncertainty in trade and investment flows. These converging shocks have placed immense pressure on Ethiopia’s economic stability, underscoring the need for carefully managed reforms and international support to restore macroeconomic balance. 

The Freedom Index portrays a realistic picture of the politico-economic development of Ethiopia in the past three decades. The rapid improvement on the economic subindex around the turn of the century illustrates the country’s sustained strong economic growth in that period. More recently, this subindex reflects the euphoric momentum that came with a new administration in 2018, promising additional economic liberalization in trade and investment. I think the rise observed in the property rights component starting in the early 2000s is also a product of an effort to better protect foreign investment.  

Unfortunately, these improvements were not very long-lived, with scores on the investment freedom component dropping first, followed by declines in the trade and property rights components a few years later. 2020 appears to be a clear inflection point, with the expansion of internal conflicts in the country—starting with war in Tigray—that have been devastating for the economic climate. Along with the war, the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown and supply chain disruption exacerbated the economic development challenges. Some of the industrial zones in areas of conflict are now difficult to access, and the lack of stability makes it harder to retain and attract foreign investors. A dramatic example of the effects of these protracted conflicts since November 2020 is the fact that Ethiopia lost its beneficiary status under the African Growth and Opportunity Act in 2022. This dented the country’s ability to propel its economic development via export growth. 

The women’s economic freedom component shows an optimistic view of the situation for women in Ethiopia. In terms of legislation, especially at a federal level, it is true that the economic rights of women have come closer to that of males since 1995. Raising the legal marriage age to eighteen since 2000 has helped reduce child marriage rates, ensuring that young people have more time to complete their education and achieve better economic outcomes. The strict enforcement of the legal marriage age legislation is essential to tackle child marriage problems in some regions, such as Amhara, where the incidence of child marriage was persistently high in the past. Enforcement across all regions in the country contributes to improved health, educational attainment, labor market outcomes, and well-being for young women by allowing them to marry at a more mature age, thereby decreasing the risks and complications associated with early pregnancies. So, the improvement in the legal framework for women, particularly around economic issues, is probably what is being captured in this component, and it is also true that we now see a larger share of women in top government positions, including ministerial posts. 

Nonetheless, the implementation of gender equality more generally and at all levels of society is probably a much harder task. There is still significant cultural resistance in some regions and ethnic groups; for example, some impose informal limits on the assets that women can inherit. My own research on the topic shows that the school-to-work transition remains very challenging for many women, especially when they turn eighteen and the pressure to marry is intense, particularly in rural and remote areas. 

The political subindex clearly captures the excitement of the country when the current administration came to power. However, the regressive nature of the new government—responding both to internal and external factors—became immediately clear, in terms of civil liberties and political rights. In recent years, the country has been going through civil conflicts, a cost-of-living crisis, high levels of indebtedness, and tight monetary policy. These, combined with global factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine-Russia war, have been detrimental for Ethiopia and the welfare of its population. If the current trajectory continues, the near future is worrisome.  

The unexpectedly high score on the election component may stem from a limited interpretation of this variable. While elections do take place, the system does not yet fully embody a completely democratic political structure with guaranteed political and civil liberties and a robust system of checks and balances on the executive. Ethiopia has no history of a meaningful political opposition. The legislative constraints on the government are very low, which explains, in part, the developments of the past thirty years.  

The low level of the legal subindex components accurately shows the poor state of the rule of law in Ethiopia—a common problem in many African countries. I am somewhat surprised by the relatively good and rising performance of informality, which is probably due to the obvious difficulties in measuring the size of the informal economy and the share of the informal sector in employment. My own research, using the harmonized World Bank Enterprise Surveys, shows a persistently high level of informality in the enterprise sector. Another potential problem with this component is that informality is not a binary phenomenon, but a continuum, as firms navigate the formal and informal sectors simultaneously, making the actual share of the informal economy—and the number of individuals engaged in it—even harder to measure.  

The sharp drop in security starting from 2020 is explained by the proliferation of internal conflicts and fighting between the federal government and various groups in regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 may have slightly improved the situation by stopping the war in Tigray, but the ongoing conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and elsewhere could jeopardize those security improvements, and the overall future stability of the country.

Evolution of prosperity

The significant rise in the Prosperity Index since 1995 is noteworthy, but it is important to consider the very low initial levels in areas like income, education, and health. While the country remains one of the least prosperous globally and has yet to reach the average level for Sub-Saharan Africa, the substantial progress, especially since 2000, is undeniable.  

The rise in income starting around the turn of the century is substantial. When initial conditions are at a very low level of economic development, any form of growth and stability favors the reallocation of resources to more productive uses and rapidly shows up in gross domestic product (GDP) measures. Sectors like construction and infrastructure clearly benefit from a more stable macroeconomic framework, boosting income growth. For the first two decades of the twenty-first century, growth was propelled mainly by strong public investment. However, the most important question is whether the increase in GDP has been adequately and fairly distributed. The inequality component for Ethiopia, based on the Gini coefficient, is in line with other aggregate measures of inequality. Nonetheless, when you focus on the lower end of the income distribution, the bottom 20 percent, the situation is not so optimistic, and is probably worsening, pointing to the lack of inclusion and progressive redistribution. There are also important disparities across Ethiopia’s regions that are usually not well captured by data, as these are mainly collected in the larger cities. 

The extraordinary increase in Ethiopia’s health component can be attributed to the extensive work of grassroots service providers, expanding healthcare and coverage in line with policies since 2000 (e.g., the use of health extension workers). Broadly speaking, the country focused on improving primary and preventive healthcare, which produced a sharp drop in child mortality and adult morbidity over the past three decades, though maternal mortality remains a significant problem. The small dip on this component since 2019 is not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was not so severe in health terms as in Europe, but also to the deaths related to armed conflicts.  

In any case, while Ethiopia has been meeting the Millennium Development Goals and is even ahead of schedule for indicators such as child mortality, there is a long way to go if the country is to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Despite progress in terms of GDP growth, Ethiopia still faces complex economic challenges including the prevalence of poverty, inequality, malnutrition, and destitution.  

Regarding education, the graph clearly captures the significant improvement in schooling rates, which have increased in all levels of the educational system, for both males and females. However, quality has been an issue, and our graduates are not as well prepared as these data suggest. As an example, think of the investments carried out by the Chinese government in the last two decades. The Chinese investors came to Ethiopia because labor is relatively cheap, but they have realized that the skills and human capital of many of the workers they hired are very poor, to the extent that they have even needed to send them to Beijing to train. To make headway in education, the country needs to “invest in learning” and development of cognitive and other skills for better employability of graduates. This necessitates a paradigm shift away from the usual culture of “spending on schooling” which simply focuses on completing a given schooling cycle, with little attention paid to acquiring employable skills and other practical outcomes for learners. 

The very low level of the minorities component reflects a recurrent problem of the Ethiopian institutional environment: the close alignment of political power and access to services and opportunities. That is, economic growth has failed to be inclusive of all societal groups. The current administration must reverse this tendency so that the proceeds of economic growth reach the wider population. Children, youth, women, the disabled, and the elderly should not be neglected, and the economic management should give utmost priority to have a social protection angle in the ongoing reforms and policy measures. 

The path forward

The current and future challenges for Ethiopia are enormous. First and foremost, the various armed conflicts around the country are the biggest impediment to movement of labor, traded goods, and execution of productive activities. If peace and security are not restored in all regions of the country, there will be further deterioration of the socioeconomic situation nationwide. Agricultural and industrial production, and other employment-generating economic activities such as trade and investment, continue to suffer.  

It will be difficult to attract domestic and foreign investors, who are critical to revive the ailing economy in a situation of insecurity and uncertainty. Economic growth will not be able to maintain the pace of the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The debt problem in the country dented the confidence of investors and the country’s credit rating and/or worthiness suffer consequently. Macroeconomic management will be a major challenge in the context of very limited international reserves, devalued currency, and high levels of debt repayments with high cost of capital. The relatively easy access Ethiopia has enjoyed to international capital markets and bilateral lending from countries like China can suddenly become a problem. China, with its aid (e.g., lending for road and other infrastructure projects), might offer benefits in the present but at a very high cost in the future. But the debt problem Ethiopia faces is not only the making of China; it has been a problem for several years and borrowing from other sources such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank contribute to current debt levels.  

Another big challenge that Ethiopia faces is the alarming demographic trend. Even if there has not been a census in the country since 2007, some global estimates put the population at around 120 million and growing. This demographic situation poses a major challenge for attaining food security and creating enough jobs for the growing young and educated population. Each year, two to three million young Ethiopians enter the labor force, and it is clear that the labor market cannot absorb such a huge number of workers. Any hope of transforming the economy—or even of gaining a meaningful grip on it—is an elusive dream in a country where there are high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality, destitution, internal conflicts, food insecurity, and an ever-growing and underskilled youth population.  

Addressing the challenges facing Ethiopia requires more than just external assistance; it demands the implementation of robust public policies that focus on aiding the poor, youth, and women, all within a framework that fosters inclusive economic growth. While Ethiopia’s strategic importance to global powers, including the United States, might influence the flow of foreign aid from organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the impact of such aid (in the form of grants and/or loans) will depend heavily on the conditions attached to it and how Ethiopia uses the aid for growth enhancing, productive, and poverty-reducing activities. If strict fiscal consolidation is enforced, it could exacerbate inequality and worsen conditions for the most vulnerable populations, potentially leading to increased poverty and destitution. My concern for Ethiopia is profound, and I hope that an end to conflicts will soon allow the country to return to the better economic path it was on before 2020. 

Abbi Kedir is the director of research at the African Economic Research Consortium based in Nairobi, Kenya. Kedir was an associate professor in international business at the University of Sheffield, UK, from 2016 to 2023. Kedir has authored more than fifty journal articles and is an editorial board member of the Journal of Development Studies, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, Economies, and Frontiers in Environmental Science.

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

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However, with Turkey and Egypt normalizing their relations, the potential for alignment in Sudan has emerged. For Ankara, this rapprochement presents an opportunity for a more emboldened role in Sudan’s ongoing civil war by cooperating with Cairo, changing its cautious stance into a proactive one. Yet, this prospective shift is fraught with challenges as both nations navigate entrenched rivalries and divergent interests that continue to shape the broader geopolitical environment.

Turkey’s controversial Sudan policy during the Bashir era

Beginning in the mid-2000s, as a part of its Africa strategy, Turkey pivoted toward a conflict-ridden Sudan that was internationally isolated due to human rights abuses in Darfur and its terror support. Despite the fact that increasing interest in deepening relations with al-Bashir was criticized harshly domestically and internationally, Ankara attributed importance to its relations with Sudan, particularly in the strategic Red Sea and Horn of Africa regions. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğa visited Sudan in 2006 and again in 2017, culminating in twelve agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation, including establishing a High-Level Strategic Cooperation mechanism.

Turkey’s deepening engagement in Sudan exacerbated regional geopolitical competition, particularly against the Egyptian-Gulf axis. Turkey and Qatar’s involvement in Sudan, particularly through their support for the Muslim Brotherhood, raised concerns in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Egypt perceived Turkey’s actions as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood’s network, an ideological rival to Cairo, exacerbating already strained relations between Cairo and Khartoum.

Ankara’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Red Sea port city of Suakin challenged the strategic interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the region. In 2017, Turkey and Sudan signed an agreement to rehabilitate Suakin Island, a strategically significant site near key maritime routes linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. The project aimed to restore Ottoman-era buildings, develop tourism infrastructure, and potentially create logistical ports. Later, the two engaged in talks for military training centers planned to be established by Turkey in Sudan during the visit paid by Minister of National Defence Hulusi Akar, who was accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Yaşar Güler in 2018. This raised alarms in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Turkey’s cautious Sudan policy after the fall of Bashir

Following al-Bashir’s fall, Turkey adopted a cautious approach toward Sudan’s transitional government, which decided to reassess its agreements with Turkey and recalibrate its foreign policy, forging closer ties with Gulf states and distancing itself from Ankara to avoid further entanglement in regional power struggles. Ankara initiated several diplomatic engagements with the Sudanese leaders to bridge the gaps. In August 2019, then-Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu attended the signing of the Constitutional Declaration in Khartoum, and Erdoğan met Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok during the UN General Assembly.

When the war erupted between the SAF and RSF, Turkey chose not to side with either of them. Instead, Ankara avoided becoming embroiled in Sudan’s internal power struggles and showed an interest in a mediation role. Erdoğan engaged both the president of the Sovereign Council of Sudan and commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as well as RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, urging dialogue and offering to host negotiations. Ankara showed its interest in mediating through its intelligence diplomacy, led by Hakan Fidan, then-chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization and current minister of foreign affairs. As these efforts fell short, Turkey tilted toward Sudan’s Sovereign Council, particularly al-Burhan, who visited Turkey twice amid the conflict.

Ankara has prioritized expanding economic relations with Sudan. Turkey’s exports to Sudan grew by 22.25 percent in 2020, making Sudan the sixth largest export partner in Africa, worth over $300 million. In 2021, the two countries set a $2 billion target in the next five years. Also, al-Burhan visited the Presidency of Defense Industries in Ankara, showing the SAF’s interest in Turkish military equipment.

However, Turkey’s commercial projects in Sudan have been facing setbacks. The construction of Khartoum’s new international airport by Turkish firm Summa was suspended in 2019, with negotiations ongoing but no timeline established. The Turkish company MV Karadeniz Powership Rauf Bey left Sudan in 2022 due to unpaid debts, highlighting the financial challenges. Similarly, initiatives in energy and mining, including agreements by Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and other Turkish firms, stalled since 2019. Ankara has been focusing on convincing Sudanese authorities to revive the agreements signed on mining, energy, and infrastructure. For instance, the director of the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration of Turkey, commonly known as MTA, visited Khartoum in 2022 to convince the Sudanese energy minister to reconsider the agreements signed before.

Despite all these challenges, Turkey’s strategic use of its soft powers, blended with humanitarian engagement and medical diplomacy, allows Ankara to remain relevant in Sudan’s complex political landscape. During the COVID-19 pandemic and severe floods in 2020 and 2021, agencies like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) provided critical assistance, maintaining Turkey’s ties in Sudan. Also, the large hospital Turkey built in Nyala, near Khartoum, plays a crucial role in treating patients affected by the conflict.

Cairo-Ankara thaw: Strategic implications for Sudan

Enhanced relations with Egypt may help Turkey overcome these challenges in Sudan. To begin with, Ankara probably expects that the recent rapprochement with Cairo, following the UAE and Saudi Arabia, would encourage the new Sudanese government to become more receptive to cooperation with Ankara as the regional rivalry has eased. Yet, significant challenges remain for resuming the stalled cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere. Ankara’s key priorities include reactivating stalled projects in energy, mining, and strategic infrastructure to boost economic ties. However, despite an upward trend in trade, many agreements remain stagnant due to not only the Sudanese Sovereign Council’s hesitation to reengage with Ankara but also Sudan’s financial constraints and the protracted conflict, which hampers large-scale investment opportunities.

The thaw between Turkey and Egypt opens avenues for strategic alignment in Sudan. Egypt, driven by concerns over Nile water security and geopolitical interests, seeks a stable government in Khartoum that aligns with its interests. Similarly, Turkey, with its significant investments in Sudan, favors a stable environment to safeguard its economic activities.

Ankara is likely to view supporting Cairo’s mediation in Sudan as strategically advantageous, particularly given Turkey’s previous unsuccessful attempts at mediation. Egypt has actively pursued diplomatic efforts, including hosting a summit of Sudan’s neighboring countries in July 2023 to establish a conflict resolution framework. However, initiatives led by Gulf partners, such as the US-Saudi-facilitated Jeddah platform, the Manama talks in January 2024, and the recent Geneva talks, have overshadowed Egypt’s role, highlighting the challenge of maintaining influence amid competing mediation efforts. A strategic partnership between Cairo and Ankara could enhance their effectiveness but would require careful navigation to avoid direct competition with the Gulf states.

As Iran tries to gain ground in Sudan, which will help Tehran to expand its influence in Africa and the Red Sea region, Ankara may use this to navigate complex regional dynamics unfolding in Sudan between the Gulf powers and Egypt. Reports suggest that, on the one hand, Iran supplied drones to the SAF, aiding them in reversing the gains of the RSF; on the other hand, it is arming both warring parties with its anti-tank missiles. Having renormalized diplomatic relations with Sudan after eight years of severed ties, Iran’s involvement may tip the regional power dynamics. Cairo and Ankara may find it in their interest to collaborate in Sudan to shift the balance of power in the war in favor of the SAF, helping it sit at the negotiating table from a stronger position and counterbalancing Iran.

If Cairo and Ankara can achieve such a strategic partnership and yield results, this could also have implications for Libya. Ankara is wary of the possible spillover impact of Sudan’s conflict on Libya, considering the close ties between Libyan National Army (LNA) chief Khalifa Haftar and Hemedti. As the battle for control over oil resources, on the one hand, and the revenues generated from oil, on the other, resurfaces in Libya amidst the CBL crisis, the military offensives of the LNA in Ghadames, and mobilization of Tripoli forces, Ankara will likely seek ways to contain the risk of conflict and preserve the fragile stability in Libya.

However, aligning too closely with Cairo will also pose some challenges for Ankara, particularly in managing its relationship with Ethiopia, a key regional partner with substantial Turkish investments, arms deals, and security cooperation. Ethiopia has already been embroiled in disputes with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Their tension is increasingly reverberating in the wider geopolitics as Somalia and Egypt allied following the port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland.  As Ankara deepens ties with Cairo, balancing this relationship with its strategic interests in Ethiopia will be crucial, potentially limiting the extent of Turkey’s alignment with Egypt in Sudan.

In conclusion, while the Turkey-Egypt rapprochement offers potential for coordinated action in Sudan, entrenched regional rivalries, conflicting strategic interests, and the involvement of external actors will impact the depth and sustainability of this cooperation. Navigating these challenges will require careful diplomacy and a recalibration of both countries’ regional strategies.

Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar is an IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. Her research interests include Turkish foreign policy, North Africa, Tunisia, Libya, democratization, authoritarianism, civil wars, the Arab Spring, and regional and interstate conflicts. 

This piece is part of a collection of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies.

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Turkish-Egyptian relations in the post-Islamist era

The improvement in Turkish-Egyptian relations indicates a gradual strategic alignment resulting from practical assessments by the respective political leaderships. Three main factors have influenced the gradual normalization process between Egypt and Turkey. Two factors resulted from practical assessments within the two countries, while the third was more influenced by international dynamics. After the 2019 local elections, Turkey’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic. Nationalism has gradually replaced its former Islamist character. In addition, Ankara revised its stance on equidistance between the West and Russia. Until 2021, balancing relations with the “West and the Rest” through greater strategic autonomy had both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, Ankara increased its presence in various regional and international crises, positioning itself as a possible broker. On the other hand, the cooling of relations with traditional Western partners had an economic impact. Therefore, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan appeared to set out with a goal to significantly improve relations with the West while maintaining Turkey’s strategic autonomy in multiple scenarios. After normalizing relations with former rivals such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (2020–22), Turkey has reengaged with neighbors such as Syria, Greece, and Egypt over the last two years. Ankara sees improving regional relations as crucial to boosting economic growth and domestic stability. Egypt is an important market for Turkish goods and a country with which to discuss various issues, including the Horn of Africa. Therefore, Turkey decided to partially sacrifice its relations with Islamist movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in order to revive bilateral relations with Cairo. After Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2014, Turkey hosted many Muslim Brotherhood members who set up media networks to criticize the Egyptian government. Cairo expressed dissatisfaction, citing Turkey’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood as an obstacle to improving bilateral relations. For this reason, cooling ties with the Muslim Brotherhood was a Turkish signal to el-Sisi.

From Egypt’s perspective, restoring relations with Ankara is seen as a driver for improving the country’s economic conditions. Egypt’s political leadership views Turkey as an important regional trading partner, with particular interest in the defense and agricultural sectors. Egypt has actively sought to expand its security cooperation. With this aim, Cairo has intensified its defense cooperation with Russia. However, Turkish defense products are increasingly seen as a viable alternative. Since 2023, Egyptian delegates have met several times with Haluk Görgün, the head of Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, to finalize supply agreements. Besides Turkish-made drones, Cairo has expressed strong interest in various advanced defense products, including the TRLG-230 missile; mini smart munitions such as MAM-C, MAM-L, and MAM-T; and the L-UMTAS anti-tank missile system. Indeed, an agreement with Ankara is seen as less politically problematic than with Russia or China, as it raises fewer concerns among Egypt’s Western allies, especially the United States. Furthermore, Turkey has been an investor in sectors such as textiles, construction materials, and agribusiness. Egypt looks favorably on any Turkish investment in these sectors. The conflict in Ukraine and other regional crises have put additional pressure on Egypt’s public finances. Egyptian leaders are seeking both short-term and long-term solutions to avoid the uncontrolled price increases and inflation that can lead to instability. Turkish entrepreneurs, many of whom have a long history of working in Egypt, are seen as a valuable resource for increasing industrial investment in Egypt.

Converging interests amid regional shifts

In addition to domestic factors, two regional developments have helped bring Turkey and Egypt closer. The first was Israel’s military action against Hamas in response to the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. Both Turkey and Egypt have had to navigate their positions carefully. While the Turkish and Egyptian public are strongly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, Ankara and Cairo’s longstanding institutional ties with Israel, particularly in the areas of intelligence and security, have created some ambiguity. Turkish President  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and el-Sisi’s strong condemnations of Israeli actions in Gaza, backed up by regular public statements, have collided with their general political and diplomatic inertia. This inconsistent approach has not only irritated the domestic population but also caused friction, at least verbally, with Israel. In an attempt to break out of this ambiguity, Turkey and Egypt have jointly called for a ceasefire and the delivery of substantial humanitarian aid for the Palestinian people. But their position appears weak. One consequence of the Gaza conflict has been increased insecurity in the Red Sea due to Houthi attacks on commercial maritime shipping. If free transit through the Red Sea is not restored in the coming months, the impact on the Egyptian economy could be devastating. Indeed, a significant portion of Egypt’s revenue comes from the transit of ships through the Suez Canal. Consequently, a reduction in traffic means a reduction in revenue.

The second regional development that has led to a convergence of interests between Turkey and Egypt is the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland. The agreement between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa has intensified the rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt. If implemented, this agreement will facilitate trade between Ethiopia and the port of Berbera. There are also plans for Ethiopia to establish its naval headquarters on Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognizing the country’s independence and providing shares in state-owned companies. Egypt and Turkey view the MoU as a negative development for the region, but for different reasons. Turkey, which has strong ties with Ethiopia, finds the agreement troubling because of the potential recognition of Somaliland. Ankara has been actively involved in Somalia’s state-building efforts for many years. From the Turkish perspective, preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity is considered essential for the country’s future stability. Turkey’s intransigence is driven primarily by domestic political considerations. Indeed, the Kurdish issue forces Ankara to oppose any claims of independence, including those of Somaliland. Conversely, Egypt’s main concern is Ethiopia’s potential access to the Red Sea. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt, previously confined to the Nile basin, has recently widened. With the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia gains leverage over Egypt and the ability to supply cheap energy to other energy-hungry countries in the region, thereby increasing its influence. As a result, Cairo has had to adjust its approach and enlarge the scope of the struggle. El-Sisi has strengthened ties with many regional states to create a united front against Ethiopia. Cairo has engaged in shuttle diplomacy, including high-level visits to leaders in the Horn of Africa. These efforts have included Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly’s participation in the inauguration of Somalia’s Mohamud. Cairo also conducts anti-Ethiopian lobbying in regional and continental organizations. Therefore, Egypt’s foreign policy in the region has gradually focused on the Red Sea. Egypt has traditionally viewed the sea between Suez and Aden as an Egyptian lake and has, therefore, sought to expand its footprint in a region that it considers part of its sphere of influence. Although Egypt’s inability to address the Houthi threat has exposed the weakness of the Egyptian Navy, it remains the most advanced and well-equipped in the region.

Amid tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mogadishu sought support, and Egypt saw an opportunity to establish a presence in the region. Egypt quickly provided diplomatic support to Somalia, while Turkey, maintaining a delicate balance with Ethiopia, intervened on Somalia’s side by signing a defense cooperation agreement. As a result, Turkey and Egypt found themselves on the same side after the Addis-Hargeisa MoU. Both countries reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, differences in their motives emerged when Egypt opposed Ankara’s call for diplomatic mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia and adopted a rigid stance. Egypt’s decision to sign a security and defense cooperation agreement with Somalia could exacerbate existing differences with Turkey. Mohamud’s visit to Cairo last August set the stage for unprecedented cooperation between Egypt and Somalia. Shortly thereafter, Egypt sent its first consignment of small arms and light weapons, armored vehicles, and a few officers, with plans to increase the deployment to ten thousand troops in the coming months. Egypt’s initiative clashed with Turkey’s plans. Ankara’s attempts to mediate differences between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu over the port deal signed with Somaliland were unsuccessful due to Somalia’s stubbornness. Egyptian support contributed to the Somali delegation’s uncompromising stance during the August meetings in Ankara. There are still many concerns about Egypt’s decision to send troops to Somalia. One major concern is whether Egypt has the capacity and effectiveness to maintain a presence in such a volatile environment. In addition, Egypt’s eagerness to lead the African Union’s upcoming peacekeeping mission may clash with the fact that Egyptian troops lack operational expertise. There is also concern about Turkey’s relationship with the Egyptian troops on the ground. The Turkish government has remained relatively quiet about Egypt’s decision to send troops but is beginning to show its disapproval of Cairo’s actions. Some Turkish officials believe that Egypt’s involvement has hampered mediation attempts between Ethiopia and Somalia. From a Turkish perspective, Cairo’s actions could escalate tensions with Ethiopia and destabilize Somalia’s political landscape, posing a greater risk to Turkish political and economic investments.

Regional rivalries and divergent agendas: Challenges to Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement

The trend in Turkish-Egyptian relations in recent months has been toward rapid normalization. However, rapprochement does not mean overcoming differences on all hot-button issues. On some regional issues, such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the two countries remain distant and have contradictory positions. In light of the above, Turkey and Egypt’s political maneuvering in the Red Sea region could pose a new challenge to the full normalization of relations. Initially, both states presented a united front in their support for Somalia, albeit with different underlying agendas. Egypt used the opportunity to open a new front in its rivalry with Ethiopia. Turkey needed to maintain its commitment to the Somali nation-building process. Nevertheless, a divergence emerged when Egypt decided to increase its military presence in Somalia. It is therefore no coincidence that Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s openness to de-escalation, enshrined in the Ankara Declaration, coincided with Egypt’s difficulties in maintaining its commitment to Mogadishu. Although the Turkish-sponsored negotiations do not solve the Somali-Ethiopian problems, they serve as a means for both actors to stall and possibly rethink their strategies. Undoubtedly, the Turkish diplomatic line has so far had the upper hand over Egyptian intransigence. Although not evident at present, two other major regional actors—Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are likely to influence future developments. The two historic regional allies are increasingly at odds over several issues, including Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Riyadh could intervene to support Egyptian efforts to thwart Emirati economic and political initiatives (especially the Addis Ababa-Berbera Corridor). This situation could bring Turkey closer to the UAE, with which it has long cooperated in Ethiopia. Many future developments will depend on several factors, including the stance of the Trump 2.0 administration, the policy choices of the new government in Somaliland, and the growing internal tensions in Somalia between Mogadishu and the federal states (e.g. Jubaland), all of which will create a delicate phase in the region. Under these circumstances, the Horn of Africa is likely to witness a rupture between Egypt and Turkey, but also a resurgence of regional competitive dynamics. In sum, the shifting dynamics between Turkey and Egypt underscore the complex nature of regional politics in the Horn of Africa. As both countries pursue their interests while dealing with external pressures, their interactions will affect not only their bilateral relationship but also the broader geopolitical stability of the region.

Federico Donelli is an assistant professor of international relations in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Trieste, Italy. He is also a senior research associate at the Istituto di Studi di Politica Internazionale in Milan and a nonresident fellow at the Orion Policy Institute in Washington, DC. He is a consultant on political and security issues for various governments, private companies, and international organizations.

This piece is part of a collection of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies.

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This intercepted arms supply speaks to a broader reality: Sudan’s war is far from a contained domestic struggle. While often framed as a “civil war” between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, it is instead shaped by extensive foreign interference that prolongs violence. While foreign actors help drive Sudan’s suffering, an international effort to bring an end to the war—and bring needed aid to the people of Sudan—has been lacking. Unraveling the web of outside interests is essential to cultivating an adequate international response to this crisis.

Although Abu Dhabi denies doing so, there is ample evidence that the UAE has been supplying weapons and ammunition to the RSF. Before the conflict erupted, Dubai was already a key destination for the RSF’s gold smuggling, providing financial lifelines to the militia. There are also reports of the UAE covertly providing weapons to the RSF under the guise of humanitarian aid, as well as UAE-manufactured armored vehicles outfitted with French-designed defense systems. The Colombian passport is evidence of international mercenaries’ deployment, a hallmark of UAE operations in other regional conflicts. The UAE’s support—combined with its investments in mining and agriculture—signals a calculated bid to shape Sudan’s political and economic trajectory. This interventionist strategy mirrors those employed by the UAE in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict and in Libya, where Abu Dhabi expanded its influence through military aid and economic ventures.

The Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organization, provides another example of foreign interference. Active in Sudan since 2017, Wagner secured lucrative gold mining concessions in exchange for political and military support to Omar al-Bashir’s regime. Wagner evolved into a key player in Sudan’s war, funneling weapons and aid to the RSF. Moscow has also deepened ties with the SAF, offering military aid in exchange for a naval base at Port Sudan. Adding to this, Sudan has become a proxy battleground for the Russia-Ukraine war, with reports of Ukrainian special forces targeting Russian operatives over the past year. Together, these dynamics reflect Russia’s broader strategy in Africa: exploiting instability to expand influence while profiting from resources and military alliances.

While Russia and the UAE dominate headlines, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia also shape Sudan’s conflict. Egypt, heavily dependent on Nile water security and historically aligned with Sudan’s military, cautiously supports the SAF as a counterweight to RSF-aligned actors. By providing military aid, Cairo seeks to protect its southern border and preserve regional influence while hosting diplomatic initiatives to facilitate ceasefires and a military-led transition in Sudan.

Turkey, meanwhile, has bolstered the SAF’s air capabilities. Following SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s visit to Turkey in late 2023, Cairo reportedly delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to the SAF. These deliveries, partly enabled by the rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey, included training for Sudanese personnel in Egypt to operate the drones. This reflects Ankara’s broader strategy to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, leveraging defense and economic partnerships alongside infrastructure projects to strengthen its foothold in Sudan.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia focuses on stabilizing the Red Sea corridor, hosting peace talks in Jeddah, and emphasizing soft-power initiatives—such as Red Sea tourism projects—to counterbalance the UAE’s militarized strategy for influence and to secure strategic advantages and investment opportunities.

Other regional conflicts have also played a role in shaping the crisis in Sudan. For example, during Libya’s post-revolutionary era, Darfuri rebel groups served as mercenaries—mostly for General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. Even after Sudan’s October 2020 ceasefire, Darfuri rebels remained in Libya, drawn by the steady flow of financing and supplies that made conflict more lucrative than peace.

Haftar—a key ally of Egypt, the UAE, and Russia—is leveraging Sudan’s instability to expand his own influence. While sporadically making headlines for covertly supporting the RSF, he mainly focuses on rerouting resource flows into Sudan, reaping economic dividends and political capital vis-à-vis his many backers. Since the conflict’s outbreak, Haftar has also used Sudan’s refugee crisis to attract international aid, positioning his government in eastern Libya as a necessary partner for migration and humanitarian assistance. By posing as a stabilizer, he has gained support while fueling the very crisis he perpetuates.

Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby employs a similar strategy. As Sudan’s war drives more than 700,000 refugees into Chad, Déby appeals for international aid, emphasizing the strain on host communities. He carefully navigates the rivalry between Russia and the West, deepening ties with both to extract concessions and support. At the same time, he offers the UAE plausible deniability for its role in Sudan’s war, securing military backing to shore up his position amid mounting pressures.

Porous borders between Sudan, Chad, and Libya—across which people, arms, fuel, and fighters move—further embed Sudan’s war within a larger network of regional instability. Unlike in Libya, whose oil sustains a tenuous power balance, Sudan’s zero-sum contest over resources—combined with deep ethnic and regional grievances—amplifies its complexity.

Yet amid this web of external interference, Sudanese military elites have continued to gamble their nation’s future for the fleeting promise of dominance, leaving devastation in their wake. Conservative estimates say that the war has killed more than twenty thousand people—with other estimates significantly higher—and displaced more than eleven million. Refugees fleeing RSF-controlled areas face extortion, sexual violence, and exploitation while neighboring countries such as Chad, Libya, and Egypt struggle to manage the influx. Organized crime, including human trafficking, thrives in the chaos, compounding the suffering of the displaced. Sudan now faces famine and economic collapse in contested areas, leaving millions more vulnerable and deepening the crisis.

Despite these dire consequences, the international response remains inadequate. Arms embargoes are routinely violated, and sanctions targeting groups such as Wagner have proven insufficient. A coordinated global approach is urgently needed to disrupt the illicit networks sustaining Sudan’s war. Sanctions targeting foreign companies that finance or equip warring factions—particularly through gold smuggling—could curb interference. Enforcement of the US Magnitsky Act, its European Union equivalent, and similar frameworks could address human rights violations tied to external actors. Financial tracking to freeze assets linked to illicit networks, alongside stricter enforcement of arms embargoes, is critical to stemming the flow of weapons and resources. Mobilizing the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and appointing a UN special rapporteur for Sudan could provide much-needed oversight and diplomatic momentum.

Addressing the humanitarian fallout is equally critical. Refugees and displaced persons require immediate assistance, and neighboring countries need financial and logistical support. However, aid must be managed carefully to avoid inadvertently bolstering the networks fueling Sudan’s suffering. Efforts to combat human trafficking and protect vulnerable populations must also be prioritized.

International efforts must go beyond rhetorical condemnations and piecemeal sanctions. A unified strategy, combining economic, political, and diplomatic pressure—and drawing on lessons from conflict zones such as Sierra Leone and Liberia—should target all actors violating arms embargoes and profiting from Sudan’s instability. The European Union and United States should jointly commit to exposing these networks, declassifying information on violations, and holding complicit states accountable through targeted sanctions and public admonishments. Imposing tangible costs on violators providing arms, smuggling resources, or exploiting Sudan’s humanitarian crisis would curb interference and set a precedent for accountability. Only a unified and decisive approach can disrupt the ambitions fueling Sudan’s suffering and prevent the region from descending further into chaos.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland. Such recognition would be beneficial for several reasons—it reflects the reality on the ground, acknowledges and rewards Somaliland for building a successful democracy, and could help deepen regional trade with key US partners such as Ethiopia. It could also encourage a pro-Somaliland cadre of nations to follow suit and would allow the United States to develop a beneficial security partner in a challenging region of the world.

However, the United States should also proceed with caution. Moving too quickly could destabilize the Somalia security sphere, empowering al-Shabaab and angering other US partners, such as Turkey, Egypt, and the African Union. Moving forward without bipartisan support could also give the impression that the matter of Somaliland’s recognition is backed exclusively by the Republican Party, jeopardizing the effort.

In lieu of recognition, the United States should consider deepening the US-Somaliland partnership across other sectors: for example, security, diplomatic, business, and trade. That would be a good first step, and such a partnership (even without full recognition) would still be positive for Somaliland.

Over the past eight years, Somaliland’s strategic location along the Gulf of Aden has led US officials from both the Trump and Biden administrations to look more closely at the US-Somaliland relationship. Somaliland is located at the intersection of several converging US interests, as it is host to hundreds of miles of peaceful coastline along one of the world’s busiest trade routes. It is also strategically located near Yemen, where the Houthis have become increasingly emboldened against US allies and disruptive for Red Sea maritime trade since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war. A deeper partnership with Somaliland would also allow the United States to keep a watchful eye on the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. It could also help relieve the military congestion in Djibouti, freeing up the United States to more flexibly operate against national security threats in the wider Red Sea security arena.

However, there are several factors that could hinder the prospects for an expanded US-Somaliland partnership. The United States’ focus on other regions, US relations with Egypt’s anti-Somaliland leadership, and the potential for Somaliland to become a partisan US political issue all risk derailing the potential benefits of deeper cooperation between Washington and Hargeisa.

Opportunity for renewed support

Under the first Trump administration, Somaliland was embraced by the United States to an unprecedented degree. Several officials working on Africa under Trump were advocates of recognizing Somaliland. Simultaneously, Somaliland was able to build bases of support with congressional Republicans and conservative policy institutions close to the president. Though Trump formally supported a “One-Somalia” policy (standard US policy, though often championed by Democrats), his National Security Council praised Taiwan’s recognition of Somaliland and the president withdrew US forces from Somalia, a sign interpreted by Somalilanders as a pivot toward a new Somalia doctrine in Washington.

Under the Biden administration, bipartisan US-Somaliland ties continued to grow. Top officials from Somaliland’s government, including a delegation led by Abdi, visited Washington to meet with leaders in Congress and the administration. Furthermore, both houses of the US Congress introduced key Somaliland-related legislation, including provisions for greater collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland in the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Additionally, the commander of US Africa Command visited Hargeisa, meeting with Abdi, in 2022; and a delegation of congressional staffers (from senior policy analysts to chiefs of staff) visited Somaliland in June. Just this month, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley and Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Major General Brian T. Cashman were in Somaliland for meetings with both Abdi and Irro.

However, Democrats in Washington continued to leave Somalilanders frustrated. Though bipartisan, most of the US support for recognizing Somaliland continues to be led by Republicans and conservative policy analysts. Republicans introduced pro-Somaliland legislation to Congress, but the bills were ultimately rejected in both the House and the Senate. Additionally, the Biden administration continued to favor Somalia over Somaliland rhetorically and in practice, once again deploying US troops to Somalia, training Somalia’s Danab special forces, and building new bases for the Somali military. The Biden administration also excluded Somaliland representatives from the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit and was publicly critical of the Somaliland government. 

With Trump returning to office in January and Republicans resuming control of the House and the Senate, many in Somaliland are optimistic that their cause could take a prominent place in US foreign policy. One can expect the Trump administration to again install pro-Somaliland aides and advisers to positions of influence. With wars raging in the Middle East, just north of the Horn of Africa, the new US administration may be motivated to deepen security ties with Somaliland.

With control of both houses of Congress, Republicans will also have a better chance of passing pro-Somaliland legislation. Additionally, countering Chinese influence is likely to be a cornerstone of Trump’s second-term foreign policy. Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan—and rejection of Chinese engagement—could potentially therefore play a role in the years to come. What’s more, Trump has a proven track record of making untraditional foreign policy decisions, such as when he recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara in 2020 (a move that happened in the context of Morocco normalizing relations with Israel). While the context behind the Western Sahara case differs from that around Somaliland, Trump’s willingness to reverse longstanding US policy regarding Africa could favor Somaliland come January. The Trump administration is also likely to be frustrated with Somalia, where stalled counterterrorism efforts, an increase in al-Shabaab activity, and electoral reform issues paint Somalia as an unreliable partner. If Trump feels that the United States is not benefiting from its investment in Somalia, he may look for partners elsewhere in the region.

Challenges ahead

Nevertheless, it is the unpredictability of Trump’s politics that directly challenges Somaliland’s progress in its quest for recognition. Increasingly, isolationist foreign policy has become a trend within the Republican Party. On the one hand, questioning and challenging the institutions and precedents that hold back Somaliland’s recognition prospects may help its cause. But completely withdrawing from those institutions, or being unwilling to cooperate with them, could leave Somaliland, and the entire African continent, behind.

Engagement with Africa was not a pillar of the first Trump administration’s “America first” foreign policy. But the Biden administration pushed for the African Union to be a permanent member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and advocated for African nations to be given permanent seats in the UN Security Council. Based on his first administration’s foreign policy, Trump is very likely to deprioritize bolstering Africa’s inclusion in international institutions, as he will be focusing on the wars raging in Europe and the Middle East, challenges around the US-Mexico border, and increasing tension with China. For Somaliland to play a role in global affairs, and sell itself as a partner worth investing in, it will have to garner attention from the Trump administration at a challenging time.

Additionally, Egypt may be another major roadblock to Somaliland’s relationship with Trump. For several reasons—such as Ethiopia’s building a dam on the Nile River and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year—Egypt has become a major supporter of Somalia. Included in this support are weapons and training for Somalia’s military. Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi also have a close relationship, with the former calling the latter a “good man” and claiming the Egyptian leader has done “a fantastic job” with his country in 2019. With Egypt under pressure internally and externally, Trump looking to quickly end the war in Gaza, and both Sisi and Trump looking to expand and deepen relations between the United States and Egypt and its partners, these two leaders are almost certain to strengthen their ties. It is unlikely that Trump would want to squander relations with Sisi over Somaliland in the near future.

Relatedly, as of last week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin working on resolving their tension over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, which granted landlocked Ethiopia sea access. After talks on December 11, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to set up commercial arrangements that would allow Ethiopia “reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea.” However, it is still unclear whether these new commitments—negotiated by Turkey, a key partner to Somalia and Egypt—will impact the MOU and Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. However, if relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are to improve, the Trump administration may step further away from greater engagement with Somaliland out of concern over adding to destabilization in the region.

Longstanding US policy priorities—most importantly the fight against al-Shabaab—might also prevent the Trump administration from fully shifting course. Despite its many challenges, the Federal Government of Somalia still remains an active US partner in the fight against al-Shabaab and other militant groups in the Horn. Additionally, the recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Somalia, with the affiliate setting up base in Puntland, may cause the Trump administration to proceed with caution as it approaches Somalia policy. Moreover, at the end of this year, the African Union mission in Somalia is undergoing a transition, with new forces coming in and a new mandate taking place. This period of transition will be very fragile, and a new Trump administration may not be willing to make immediate moves that would jeopardize the success of any apparatus aimed at fighting Islamic militants in the Horn. On top of all of this, Somalia is currently facing its own internal problems, with tensions rapidly rising between the federal government and the government of Jubaland. All of this is to say that, while the Trump administration has good reason to engage with Somaliland, the fear of further destabilizing an already precarious situation in Somalia may cause the White House to use caution around the issue of recognition.

Finally, Somaliland’s core supporters in the US government are Republican politicians and conservative analysts in mostly right-wing policy spaces. While this support is important, if Somaliland becomes a focal point of Trump’s foreign policy, it risks its recognition becoming a partisan issue and could face backlash the next time the Democratic Party retakes the White House. If Somaliland works to bolster support for its cause only among the Republican Party, it could hurt its own quest for recognition.

The path forward

Despite these challenges, politics within Somaliland may provide the necessary boost to surpass the challenges of the moment. Following the election, it was announced that Irro and the Waddani party won with 64 percent of the vote. The election has been praised by international partners, including the United States, as being free, fair, and well-executed. Irro ran on the notion of unifying Somaliland amid internal division and on reforming the economy to stabilize the country’s finances. On foreign policy, Irro has expressed frustration with the lack of transparency around the memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia and is expected to take a more nuanced approach to the agreement, while still supporting it. Moreover, he has stated a commitment to resolving the conflict in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, an issue that has not only divided the country and hurt it economically but also drew concern from international partners, particularly the United States. Irro has expressed interest in continuing to build relations with Washington, and he offered Trump congratulations for his election victory.

The Irro administration will have a chance to reenergize relations with the United States and overcome any hurdles it might face with Trump. As far as US partners in East Africa, Irro could be an appealing choice for the Trump administration, as the new US president will be looking for opportunities to end conflict and resolve regional tension, and Irro is likely to lead a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. With key Trump allies having contributed to the praise of Somaliland’s elections, a successful democratic transition in the coming months will send a big signal to the incoming US administration of Somaliland’s reliability as a partner.

This isn’t to say that US-Somaliland relations still don’t face an uphill battle. Somalilanders will need to undertake robust and active diplomacy with both Republicans and Democrats to capitalize on the momentum of their election. The Irro administration will need to double down on its efforts to demonstrate Somaliland’s value to the United States and make a larger push to appeal to Democrats and diversify their base of support. Meanwhile, the United States needs to take Somaliland’s success as a democracy seriously. There are real opportunities for partnership across sectors. The United States must take advantage of Somaliland’s key strategic positioning against US adversaries, including China, or else lose the opportunity to develop a democratic partner in an important region.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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FOCAC was established in 2000 at the insistence of the African Union, which sought to increase and institutionalize China’s presence on the continent. The forum is held every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African capital city. FOCAC’s several sub-forums formalize cooperation across sectors like youth leadership, health, poverty reduction, and development, among others. Africa is always the first destination of the year for China’s foreign minister, a three-decade-old tradition. This year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi kicked off diplomacy with a visit to Egypt, Tunisia, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire from January 13-18. Beijing’s presence in Africa is such that journalist and professor Howard French has described it as “China’s second continent.”

Within FOCAC are nine Arab League member states—Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia—meaning the forum has an impact in the Middle East as well. Interestingly, these FOCAC participants also have institutionalized multilateral engagement with China through the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), which was established in 2002, following a framework similar to FOCAC’s. The most recent CASCF Senior Officials’ Meeting was held in Beijing on May 29. Several developments between China and North African participants were announced, and momentum has only increased since then.

At the CASCF meeting in May, China and Tunisia announced that they had established a strategic partnership. This Chinese diplomatic mechanism pledged to increase cooperation in areas of mutual interest without making any formal commitments beyond that. This type of partnership typically results in increased trade and contracting. Since the China-Tunisia relationship has never been especially significant—or strategic—there is much room to grow. For example, bilateral trade between the two countries in 2022 was relatively insignificant at just $3.94 billion, according to data from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics, with the bulk of that being $3.89 billion in Chinese exports. 

The American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker shows a similarly modest Chinese footprint, with only a single construction contract, worth $110 million, since 2005 and no investment. That Tunisia was deemed a strategic partner is puzzling. Iraq, for example, is also a strategic partner, and bilateral trade between Iraq and China in 2022 was valued at $52 billion. Since 2005, investment has totaled over $14 billion, while contracting has been worth $20 billion. Clearly, not all strategic partnerships are created equally, but conferring this status on Tunisia seems to indicate that Beijing wants a stronger diplomatic presence across North Africa.

Other developments at CASCF confirmed this. This year, Libya, which had seen little in the way of Chinese cooperation since Beijing had to evacuate 36,000 citizens in 2011, sent a delegation to participate in the first Libyan-Chinese Economic Forum, attended by eighty-four Chinese companies that were encouraged to return to Libya to help with reconstruction. Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, the head of Libya’s interim Government of National Unity, met with Foreign Minister Wang on the sidelines of this year’s CASCF, and the two discussed activating eighteen bilateral agreements, including facilitating the return of Chinese companies.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was one of the four heads of state at CASCF—his eighth visit to China since he took office in 2014. While in Beijing, Sisi held a summit with Xi Jinping to mark the ten-year anniversary of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Egypt. The two declared 2024 the “China-Egypt year of partnership,” and discussed deeper cooperation in information and communications technology, artificial intelligence, renewable energy, food security, finance, and cultural exchanges. 

It would be easy to dismiss all of this as typical summitry, but since the CASCF, there has been serious momentum in China’s Maghreb relations in areas that indicate long-term regional ambitions. 

The bilateral relationship with Libya has also continued to expand. In June, Libya’s Economy and Trade Minister Mohamed al-Hwej announced that the Libyan-Chinese Joint Economic Chamber was being activated to “help build bridges and enhance investment communication between the two countries.” In August, Libyan official Badr al-Deen al-Toumi met with a delegation from China and described three priorities: cooperation with China on Belt and Road Initiative projects; the reactivation of contracts that were stopped due to conflict; and enhanced bilateral cooperation in renewables, infrastructure, industrial technology, and urban planning. Chinese companies have been invited to discuss infrastructure construction, with a delegation visiting al-Zawiya in August to pitch the development of a seaport. Given this momentum, it was unsurprising that during FOCAC, Libya became the most recent Arab country to announce a strategic partnership agreement with China.

Separately, Algeria has made inroads in economic and military cooperation with China. In August, the Chinese embassy in Algiers announced that three Chinese carmakers—JAC, Chery, and Geely—would be setting up factories in Algeria, producing cars for the domestic and African markets. The Chery factory’s capacity is projected to be 100,000 vehicles per year within three years, and the Geely factory is said to represent a $200 million investment that will be operational in 2026. On the military front, Algeria inducted Chinese YJ-12B anti-ship missiles in August, complementing the CX-1 ASCM cruise missiles it acquired from Beijing in 2018. It has since kicked the treads on Chinese VT-4 battle tanks, an action that “aligns with its broader strategy of incorporating various Chinese military assets into its defense arsenal.” 

Morocco has also seen substantial movement from China. There was a major infrastructure announcement in September, with China Railway Engineering signing a $350 million contract to develop a high-speed rail line between Kenitra and Marrakech. On the sidelines at FOCAC, a Chinese textile company, Sunrise, announced that it will invest $422 million to establish industrial complexes. Maghreb Agence Presse claimed the investment, projected to create 11,000 new jobs, will “revitalize the national textile sector.” It is in the auto industry where Morocco has been especially interesting, however.

In June, Gotion High Tech announced its plans to build an electric-vehicle (EV) battery gigafactory for $1.3 billion, an investment it says will eventually reach $6.5 billion. This came on the heels of several announcements in 2024 about Chinese EV battery factories in Morocco. Hailiang, Shinzoom, and BTR New Material Group have each announced plans to build plants near Tangiers, and CNGR Advanced Material has plans for one in Jorf Lasfar. CITIC Dicastal has established an aluminum alloy wheel manufacturing plant, the largest Chinese investment in Morocco. Taken together, Morocco’s goal of becoming a major EV producer, combined with its proximity to the European Union (EU) and its trade deals with the EU and the United States, make it an important location for Chinese EV firms to invest, potentially circumventing tariffs.    

Of the Maghreb countries, Egypt has been China’s most varied—and most important—partner. There has been an uptick in security-focused cooperation. In August, China and Egypt held a joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean Sea north of Alexandria, where they carried out training courses in communications coordination, formation maneuvering, and maritime replenishment positioning. Shortly after, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force sent eight planes to an air show in Egypt. In mid-September, China’s defense contractor ELINC signed a contract with Egypt’s Arab Organization for Industrialization to work with Egypt on manufacturing advanced defense systems. And, of course, there has been a wide range of economic and developmental bilateral cooperation. At FOCAC, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly was on hand for a billion-dollar signing ceremony for projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone that involved manufacturing chemical products, food products, and energy components. On the sidelines, China announced it would inject $14 million into Egypt to invest in joint projects. Chinese forums are a godsend for a country with an economy like Egypt’s, which has appeared moribund at several points in recent years.

North Africa is frequently described as one of the least integrated regions in the world. However, when considering Chinese engagement across the Maghreb, it becomes clear how the seeds Beijing is planting today could result in intra-regional industrial chains and business clusters in the not-so-distant future.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an association professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE.   

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Nine months later, the situation has been exacerbated by decisions made by countries outside of the Horn, such as Egypt’s signing of a security agreement with Somalia. The agreement includes the delivery of weapons, troops, and military hardware, the first tranche of which was sent to Somalia on August 27. The involvement of other players in the Horn of Africa’s security landscape is a prime example of how middle-power politics and diplomacy in one region could, over time, create a tinderbox of conditions: one in which even a small mistake could cause a rapid escalation.

A nine-month downward spiral

In 2018, Ethiopia and Somalia had seen a détente in relations thanks to Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed’s attempt to reshape regional alliances and exert Ethiopian influence. But the MOU—which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in an address days after the signing, said is a denial of his country’s territorial sovereignty—has set back nearly all progress made.

Somalia has reacted in various ways: In his address, Mohamud declared Ethiopia one of the greatest enemies of the state, on par with Al-Shabaab. He also signed a law that he said nullified the MOU. In the nine months that followed, negative rhetoric against Somaliland worsened, and Mohamud began a diplomatic blitz to rally support against the MOU. Nevertheless, the MOU lives on, with Somaliland and Ethiopia strengthening their relations, exchanging ambassadors, training security forces, and regularly setting up meetings between leaders.

Over the past nine months, other countries have made moves that have had implications for the already inflamed turmoil in the region. In February, Turkey and Somalia, reaffirming their long-standing security partnership, signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The agreement is formally aimed at helping “Somalia develop its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters,” but no doubt also serves as a counterweight to any growth in Ethiopian naval capabilities. Upon signing this deal, Somaliland warned Turkey against any form of naval deployment in its territorial waters; but in July, Turkey’s parliament approved a deployment of the Turkish military to Somalia (including Somalia’s territorial waters). Beyond hard power, the Turks have been flexing their political muscles in the Horn, not only offering vocal support to Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU but also hosting negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia at Abiy’s request. The negotiations in Ankara amounted to little success.

Starting in January, Egypt was a vocal opponent of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has spoken up for Somalia, declaring that “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security.” Following the signing of the MOU, Egypt hosted Mohamud for high-profile meetings with Egyptian and Arab League officials in January, and since then, Sisi has been a staunch Somalia advocate. In August, Somalia and Egypt signed their security agreement.

There are several likely reasons that can explain why Egypt is strengthening its ties with Somalia: For example, the countries’ shared Islamic identity and Arab League affiliation, Egypt’s genuine desire to support Somalia in its fight against terrorism, or the trade opportunities that could come from a safer Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, a significant motivation for Egypt is likely its animosity with Ethiopia. The two countries, among the largest military and economic powers on the African continent, have been at odds since 2011, when Ethiopia began construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. While Ethiopia argues the dam would generate significant economic and development gains for the country, Egypt asserts that the dam jeopardizes its access to water and threatens Egyptian agriculture, a major part of its economy. Despite many rounds of negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia have yet to find a solution, pushing Egypt to look for additional channels to pressure the Ethiopians. Adding to the pressing nature of this conflict, the Egyptian foreign minister said on September 1 that he had written to the UN Security Council with serious concerns about Ethiopia’s approval of the fifth phase of dam construction.

The Al-Shabaab throughline

Throughout all of this, Al-Shabaab has grown stronger and still poses a threat to all the countries of the region. Despite Mohamud having launched what he called in 2022 an “all out war” against the militant group, Al-Shabaab has regrouped and made significant gains since the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, with reports saying the group has had an influx of financial capital and a surge in recruiting, particularly drawing in people who do not like Ethiopia. In February, Al-Shabaab attacked an Emirati-run military base in the region, and the following month attacked several Somalian military sites in the Lower Shabelle region. In June, it was reported that US intelligence learned of discussions between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab about the former providing weapons to the latter. In August, Al-Shabaab killed thirty-two and injured more than sixty in a suicide bombing at a beach in Mogadishu.

At the same time, the current international mandate to fight Al-Shabaab, the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia, is in the final stages of its drawdown, and a proposal was submitted to replace it with the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on January 1, 2025, pending approval by the African Union in November. Though Ethiopia has played a massive role in fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia—with three thousand troops deployed under the current AU mission and 5,700 troops deployed throughout the Somali security sphere—Somalia requested that Ethiopia not contribute forces to AUSSOM and said it would expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia unless it cancels the MOU with Somaliland. Meanwhile, Egypt plans to commit five thousand troops to AUSSOM at the start of the deployment and another five thousand troops separately.

This is a slap in the face for the Ethiopian troops who sacrificed over the past nineteen years in the name of regional security. For the Egyptians, this is an opportunity to exert regional influence and pressure the Ethiopians. Moreover, regional infighting among political leadership risks the viability of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia ahead of its pivotal transition to AUSSOM. Lack of cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt, and Somaliland undermines the effectiveness of the counterterrorism effort—and a weakened counterterrorism environment is fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to gain footing in its efforts to destabilize the Horn of Africa.

What to expect in the short-term

In the near future, regional tensions bring into doubt the future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. Ethiopia took a big risk by embarking on a deal with an unrecognized state. Though the risk could produce a high return on investment—increased trade revenue in the region, greater security in the Gulf of Aden, and for both Ethiopia and Somaliland a boost to national pride—the pressure is on for Ethiopia to take a different path. Despite progress with Somaliland, there is still room for Ethiopia to walk its commitments back. Already bogged down in conflict in the Ethiopian region of Amhara and scarred by his mishandling of the war in Tigray, Abiy is looking for a win in building the Ethiopian navy back up. Yet facing pressure from actors on all sides, he may be keen to look for another avenue to naval power, such as Djibouti’s recent proposal to give Ethiopia access to a new port and trade corridor. Supporters of the Somaliland MOU must think strategically about how to ensure the reward of coastal access is worth the risk posed to Ethiopia, and all eyes should be focused on the next round of negotiations in Ankara.

If Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia all continue down this path, there may soon be a situation in which Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are stationed opposite one another along the Somalian border, the Ethiopians in their territory and the Egyptians in Somalia as a part of AUSSOM. With two powerful militaries stationed across from each other, increased proximity heightens the risk, even if small, that mistakes could escalate into skirmishes or worse—interstate conflict in the Horn. Even if Egypt and Ethiopia were to go to war directly, it’s easy to fathom a situation in which the various regional players end up on different sides of proxy wars. Conflicts in and near the Horn of Africa have long been hotbeds for proxy conflicts, as typified by the ongoing Sudanese civil war.

Instability between regional countries could also empower Al-Shabaab to escalate its aggression in the Horn. The militant group has benefited from the past nine months of instability, and periods of transition between military deployments are always fragile. According to the nonprofit organization Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the first nine months of 2024 have already seen 127 events of violence targeting civilians perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, with 187 reported fatalities. This year has also seen an increase in recruitment efforts by the militant group, fueled by the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. With Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia at odds, it will be incredibly challenging to successfully transition the current mission to AUSSOM without things falling through the cracks. Moreover, if Ethiopia (with its extensive experience fighting Al-Shabaab) does not contribute to the deployment, a critical base of institutional knowledge will be missing. An emboldened Al-Shabaab with ties to the Houthis, in a region where leaders are unable to cooperate with each other on matters of security, would pose a threat to countries around the world. If left unmanaged, there could be much larger consequences for the international community down the line.

Looking toward the future

Though the moment feels catastrophically tense, increased violence is not inevitable. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia may walk their rhetoric back, negotiations may succeed in Ankara, and the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU could still go through and lead to many positive outcomes for the parties and the region. Yet those invested in the Horn of Africa must keep a close eye on how things develop. Though different in many ways, the leaders of the countries involved in Horn geopolitics share one thing in common: They are all opportunistic leaders who are looking for a chance to gain the upper hand in a battle for power, influence, and opportunity at a time when the global system is under immense strain.

Ultimately, noncooperation in this part of the world will lead to many lost opportunities. Immense potential in the Horn remains untapped while the region suffers from clashes. Restoring peace to the region, reducing the threats posed by violent extremism, addressing critical challenges around food and energy security (amid climate change, no less), and harnessing the political and economic opportunities of the Red Sea all depend on greater collaboration and cooperation—not fragmentation and hostility. Cooperation will not only benefit the people of the region and the security interests of the international community but will also address the needs of those same leaders looking to stitch themselves into the fabric of their countries’ national ethos.

The past decade has seen a rise in middle-power politics around the world. The situation in the Horn of Africa is not unique, but it is a prime example of where this new form of competition could serve as a tinderbox, igniting regional war, if not handled properly.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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The post Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the fighting between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) erupted almost eighteen months ago after they allied in 2019 to topple President Omar al-Bashir and coordinated the 2021 military coup that removed the former transitional prime minister, thousands of civilians have been killed. The war has displaced almost 11 million people, with 2.1 million families either fleeing to neighboring countries or Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, where they face difficulties obtaining legal refuge or permanent residency. This has worsened their economic vulnerability, making it harder for them to feed their households. Others remain internally displaced, dealing with the rapidly deteriorating public services and the drastic shortage of essentials. Furthermore, the heavy rain season and flooding have destroyed displacement shelters, exacerbating the spread of transmittable diseases, damaging crops, and aggravating the humanitarian crisis.

Since the conflict’s outbreak, joint mediation efforts by the United States and Saudi Arabia have been unsuccessful in reaching and enforcing the implementation of the May 2023 Jeddah Declaration, which aimed for a ceasefire, the establishment of humanitarian corridors, and civilian protection. Efforts that followed remained ineffective in reviving the stalled negotiations, including the most recent Geneva Talks in August, orchestrated by US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. While RSF sent a delegation, SAF boycotted and refused to attend. The Geneva Talks, which continued with conflicting parties through a mediating team composed of representatives from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others, concluded the establishment of the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) Group to establish immediate humanitarian corridors. Despite the boycott, the conflicting parties expressed their commitment to guarantee humanitarian access to relief famine in Darfur and Northern Sudan through the al-Dabbah and Adre routes.

By announcing permission to allow humanitarian access, the RSF and SAF might intend to intensify their rivalry to gain nonexistent international legitimacy, given the coinciding of the Geneva Talks with the convening of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly this month. Sudan’s critical humanitarian and civilian protection situation was strongly present at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which unanimously extended the renewal of sanctions against the country. Concurrently, the United Nations International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Sudan called for the deployment of civilian protection forces in light of the outcomes of a visit to Sudan by Radhouane Nouicer, the designated expert on Sudan of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and amid continuing calls from Sudanese human rights defenders for the extension of the FFM mandate. Conceivably, the RSF and SAF strive to prolong their impunities despite UN accountability mechanisms.

International and regional geopolitical miscalculations led to conflict outbreak

The international community’s continued fumbles to establish a durable solution to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan mirror its long-standing miscalculations in addressing the complex entanglement of Sudan’s internal and regional geopolitics. The root cause of the current political impasse and humanitarian crises goes back to the period of Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government (2019–2021). At that time, the international community underestimated the support Sudan needed to survive the transitional period before it collapsed due to a military coup committed by the RSF and SAF, former allies that became conflicting parties, on October 25, 2021.

While the United States and its Western allies offered tremendous support for the transition government, such support primarily focused on the removal of Sudan from the States Sponsors of Terrorism List (SSTL), the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and economic assistance through the International Monetary Fund’s debt relief and development funds. Nevertheless, the critical responsibilities of the political transition and the power-sharing agreement between civilians and the military allies the political transition internal arrangements were entirely delegated to and brokered by regional powers: the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in 2019; Ethiopia, which has a prolonged territorial dispute with Sudan; and US allies in the region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Egypt, a longtime ally of the Sudanese Armed Forces led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, continues to benefit economically from the corrupt Islamic leaders linked to the former National Congress Party (NCP) and from SAF-affiliated kleptocratic businesses that smuggle Sudanese livestock and gum Arabic resources. Despite the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees and displaced people stifling Egypt economically and raising security concerns, Cairo will only support a peace process that ensures the Sudanese people’s nonstop demands for a democratic system will not inspire Egyptian calls for anti-government protests. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain profound influence over the warring parties in Sudan, which were previously recruited to lead a proxy war in Yemen under the Saudi-led coalition. The UAE is taking advantage of RSF leaders’ internal and regional political ambitions to expand its hegemony in the Red Sea and Sub-Saharan Africa by providing RSF General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, with logistical support, using humanitarian aid as a cover to smuggle arms to fuel the war, and facilitating money laundering for RSF affiliates smuggling gold to the UAE in cooperation with the Wagner Group. Consequently, the UAE has a steadfast interest in prolonging Sudan’s political and security unrest.

As a result of the conflict, Russian hegemony in the Red Sea region is on the rise. Moscow hedges its bets by striking deals with the SAF and RSF, and by leveraging its geopolitical presence in the Red Sea through its military base in Port Sudan. Accordingly, Russia extends support for both conflicting parties in Sudan to preserve its strategic position in the region and support Iran and Houthis allies through the Red Sea in Yemen. This situation might pose a threat to the peace and security of the states previously allied under the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

A way forward to end deadlock for peace solution and humanitarian aid

It is time for the international community to reevaluate its approach to Sudan. Any future efforts to resolve the crisis must involve the United States and its regional allies and must be guided by a rigorous analysis of regional powers’ interest in Sudan. This would improve the international community’s desire for a durable solution in Sudan, leading to a ceasefire agreement that ensures the flow of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians.

Moreover, it is crucial to assess the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the United States and its Western allies against corporations and individuals affiliated with both conflicting factions. The fact that both sides continue financing the war through their networks underscores a significant gap in current accountability mechanisms. It is imperative to identify and implement more effective mechanisms to control and dismantle the SAF and RSF cartels in the region to pave the way for expediting the enforcement of regional and international accountability and ending corporations’ complicity in financing war and enabling human rights violations.

Prolonging the war in Sudan not only costs its people through famine and a humanitarian crisis but also threatens regional peace and security. To break this deadlock, coordinated international and regional efforts are needed, coupled with an unwavering willingness to take decisive actions to end the armed conflict in Sudan.

Maha Tambal is a senior program manager at DT Institute and a former fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

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On August 27, Egypt sent two C-130 military planes carrying weapons and ammunition to Mogadishu—the first military aid from Egypt to the Horn of Africa country in more than four decades. The move irked Addis Ababa and provoked a stern rebuke from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who warned that Ethiopia would not stand idle while other actors take measures to “destabilize the region.”

Two weeks earlier, on August 14, Cairo signed a defense pact with Mogadishu that would see Egypt send five thousand soldiers to Somalia by the end of the year to participate in the new African Union-led Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) that will replace the current African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS), which has been in Somalia since 2022. The planned dispatch of troops to Somalia will be Egypt’s first contribution to African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions in the country. The new mission will implement peace-building measures such as institutional reforms and capacity building for Somali civil servants. Under the security agreement, Cairo reportedly plans to dispatch five thousand more soldiers to be deployed separately. It remains unclear whether the Egyptian forces will, in fact, replace the approximately ten thousand Ethiopian troops whom are part of the ATMIS. While the remaining seven thousand are stationed in several regions under a bilateral agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia, Mogadishu will likely reject a future Ethiopian contribution to the AUSSOM once ATMIS ends its mission as it has already threatened to expel the Ethiopian troops.

In addition to sending troops, weaponry, and ammunition to Somalia, Egypt plans to conduct joint military exercises with the country. The planned exercises—which will include ground, air, and naval forces—are perhaps intended as a show of force to send a warning message to neighboring Ethiopia over the dam filling, as Hassan Nafaa, political science professor at Cairo University, told me.

“It is not surprising that Egypt would seize the opportunity to deploy troops in Somalia,” Nafaa said. He noted that Cairo hoped the deployment of Egyptian soldiers along Somalia’s shared border with Ethiopia would serve as “a deterrent” to pressure Addis Ababa to reconsider its position vis-à-vis Egypt and refrain from harming Cairo’s interests. “It will also give Egypt a privileged position in the event of a confrontation erupting should Ethiopia make any further moves to harm Egypt or if the flow of the Nile is disrupted.”

Why Addis Ababa is concerned

Egypt’s cozying up to Somalia has alarmed Addis Ababa, which is at odds with Mogadishu over a maritime deal that Ethiopia sealed with Somalia’s breakaway region, Somaliland, on January 1. The agreement gives landlocked Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden for commercial purposes and leases 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) of its coastline for fifty years to Ethiopia to set up a naval base. Somaliland authorities hope that, in return for the use of its port, Ethiopia will recognize Somaliland as an independent state, thus becoming the first United Nations (UN) member state to do so since the breakaway province declared its independence in 1991. Unsurprisingly, Ethiopia’s controversial maritime deal sparked anger in Somalia, which slammed it as an “act of aggression” and prompted Mogadishu to recall its ambassador from Addis Ababa. 

Seemingly emboldened by Egypt’s support, Somali authorities have gone further, threatening to support armed groups fighting against the Ethiopian government if Addis Ababa goes ahead with its port agreement with Somaliland. Talks mediated by Turkey to resolve the dispute between the two neighboring countries have thus far failed to reach a breakthrough despite Ankara declaring that notable progress has been achieved. A third round of negotiations slated for September 17 has been postponed by Somalia, dashing hopes for the easing of tensions anytime soon. No official reason has been given for the cancelation, but Borkena, an Ethiopian online news site cautioned “Egyptian political and military moves to exploit the tension between Somalia and Ethiopia might further complicate the Ankara-initiated talks.”.

Ethiopia’s port agreement with Somaliland has also ruffled feathers in Egypt. “Cairo is worried about Ethiopia having a naval base in Somaliland that would likely bolster its influence in the Horn of Africa; the port deal would give the rival country Red Sea access, which constitutes a threat to Egypt’s national security,” Nafaa explained.  

It is no surprise that Egypt has thrown its weight behind Somalia in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia, not least because of the North African country’s widening rift with Ethiopia over the GERD. Cairo has exhausted all avenues in its efforts to dissuade Ethiopia from unilaterally filling the dam, which it sees as an existential threat. Negotiations with Ethiopia have failed to gain traction despite US and World Bank-led mediation between 2019 and 2020 under the Donald Trump administration and South African mediation      thereafter. Egypt has also raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), sending a letter to its head on September 1 in which it accused Ethiopia of violating international law by continuing to fill the dam without agreement from downstream countries. It also accused Addis Ababa of lacking the political will to resolve the dispute.

Ethiopia, in turn, rejected the accusations as “a litany of unfounded allegations” from Cairo in a letter it sent to the UNSC in response to the Egyptian complaint. Addis Ababa also urged Cairo to”abandon its aggressive approach” toward the hydroelectric dam which will generate much-needed electricity and, therefore, is crucial for Ethiopia’s development. Still, Egypt’s 116.9 million-strong population relies almost entirely on the Nile for its freshwater needs. With Ethiopia having completed its fifth filling of the dam in mid-August, Cairo’s concerns are growing that the filling of the dam will disrupt the flow of Nile waters, undermining Egypt’s essential water supplies.

What Egypt is concerned about   

Egypt’s long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD is not the only reason behind the warming of ties between Cairo and Mogadishu. “Somalia is a member of the League of Arab States (while Ethiopia is not); as a Muslim country, it has more in common with Egypt than Ethiopia,” Nafaa noted.

Religion aside, Egypt has strategic interests in Somalia. Major General Samir Farag, senior strategist at the Security and Defense Advisory Board of Egypt, told me that securing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located north of Somalia and at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, is ”a national security priority” for Egypt as the waterway secures the Suez Canal, which is significant for Egypt. Farag lamented the losses incurred by Egypt as a result of the Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in the wake of the Hamas-Israel war which have forced shipping companies to seek alternate—albeit longer and costlier—routes around Africa, leading to a significant reduction of more than 50 percent in Suez Canal revenues.

Farag added that Somalia’s security and stability are an important pillars for the security of the entire region. He cited piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia as posing ”an ominous threat to global trade during times of conflict and instability.” Armed Somali pirates have taken advantage of the instability in the Red Sea to make a comeback in recent months, seizing ships and hijacking their crews for ransom. This occurred after NATO-led international naval forces that had patrolled the Gulf of Aden moved their ships toward Yemen in the wake of the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, leaving a security vacuum for the pirates to exploit. 

“Under the defense pact signed by Egypt and Somalia, Egypt will train and help strengthen the Somali army to enable it to counter terrorism in the country,” Farag said in reference to the threat posed by al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist group based in Somalia and which has also been wreaking havoc elsewhere in East Africa.

Over the last decade, the Egyptian military and police have battled against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated militants who had sought to establish an Islamic state in the Sinai Peninsula; the authorities have also cracked down fiercely on members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic group that rose to power in an election after President Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down in 2011. Since the ouster of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi by military-backed protests in 2013, tens of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters remain behind bars in Egypt; hundreds of others have been killed with impunity or forced into exile. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime, which sees itself as a bulwark against Islamists, believes it can help the Somali government rid the country of al-Shabaab, whose goal is to overthrow the central government and ultimately establish an Islamic state in accordance with its strict version of Sharia.

In comments made during a January 21 press conference in Cairo with his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Sisi reiterated his country’s readiness to defend Somalia against any threats.

“We will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia,” Sisi said. “I am saying this very clearly, don’t test Egypt and try to threaten its brothers, especially if our brothers ask us for support.” 

Ahmed responded with veiled warnings to Egypt and Somalia that there would be “a severe retaliation” if any country attempted to invade Ethiopia. At a ceremony marking Ethiopia’s Sovereignty Day on September 8, Ahmed said that Addis Ababa has no intention of creating conflict. Still, he warned that his country would “humiliate” any nation that threatened its sovereignty—without naming a specific country—though his threats were clearly directed at Egypt and Somalia.

While it is doubtful that Ethiopia would wage war directly on either of its rivals, some analysts have warned that deploying Egyptian troops along Somalia’s border with Ethiopia could lead to a proxy conflict between Cairo and Addis Ababa, with Somalia as the battleground. However, Farag dismissed the speculation and ruled out any prospective use of force against Ethiopia. He affirmed that Egypt would continue to pursue all legitimate channels, including diplomacy, to protect its interests. 

That remains to be seen, especially as Sisi has declared that Egypt’s water share is a national security issue and a red line that cannot be crossed. In an address to mark the launch of the national megaproject Haya Karima in 2021, Sisi said, “Cairo has various options to protect its national security.” Still, he did not rule out the military option—hinting at the possible use of force against Ethiopia should the circumstances require military intervention.  

Nevertheless, Egypt’s intervention in Somalia—intended to promote regional peace and security—has instead inflamed regional tensions. It does, however, signal a shift toward a more assertive role for Cairo in African affairs and diplomacy after decades of Egypt turning its back on Africa following a failed 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa by gunmen allegedly supported by elements in the Sudanese intelligence under the Islamist-backed  Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Egypt might just be flexing its muscle to pressure Addis Ababa to reach an agreement on the GERD. What is certain is that Egypt is seeking to thwart Ethiopia’s Red Sea access, which Cairo views as a national security threat and fears could  further destabilize maritime trade in the vital waterway. For Egypt, which is in the midst of a profound economic crisis, taking these significant foreign policy positions means averting default and getting  back on its feet. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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Sudan is experiencing its worst levels of food insecurity ever recorded, with more than 25.6 million people across ten states facing heightened risk of famine. Seventeen months into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, the internal conflict has spread across the country and is marked by widespread death, war crimes, recruitment of children as soldiers, rape and violence against women, disease, intentional destruction of the country’s food reserves, and now heavy rains causing flooding.

The full scope of international attention on Sudan

On August 14, a delegation, including countries supporting the RSF, claiming to want to improve the humanitarian situation in Sudan met in Geneva. The Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) Group, whose members included the United States, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the African Union, and the United Nations, convened to develop immediate actions to alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people. The ALPS facilitated ten days of peace talks between the warring parties. The RSF attended the talks in person and the SAF attended virtually.

At the end of the negotiations, two access points for food, medicine, and humanitarian aid were opened—the Western border crossing into Darfur at Adre, Chad, and the Dabbah Road crossing, allowing access to the north and west from Port Sudan. This is a small step, but the Sudanese people need much more.

The atrocities in Sudan have not received enough attention. The lack of sustained international scrutiny, especially from the United States, has allowed the conflict to deepen. The crisis is exacerbated by the global community’s diminished will to address the root causes of the war. Corruption and personal gain are fueling the conflict. Foreign malign actors, in a fight for Sudanese natural resources and the ability to exploit the country’s strategic location, supply funds and weapons to the RSF and the SAF.

Corruption appears in many forms. According to the United States Agency for International Development, “corruption employs sophisticated schemes to siphon off the wealth of a country from its rightful owners: the people.” One form of corruption, strategic corruption, as demonstrated in Sudan, involves the improper influence by international actors in collaboration with domestic actors to weaponize practices of foreign policy or access to natural resources. Activities such as gold mining are prioritized to the benefit of domestic power and corrupt foreign interests above the interests of the people.

Sudan’s civil war has a large cast of foreign malign actors. A June 2024 report by Amnesty International found that despite the Darfur embargo, recently manufactured guns, ammunition, drone jammers, mortars, and rifles have been imported into Sudan in large quantities from Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE. Paul Sullivan, an analyst who focuses on the Middle East and North Africa, told Voice of America last year that China is interested in Sudan’s gold deposits and the Port Sudan location on the Red Sea in relation to growing world trade.

Sudan-Russia talks that began in 2007 under Omar al-Bashir were revived in June 2024, with Sudan’s RSF agreeing to give Russia a Red Sea base in exchange for weapons, ammunition, and replacement parts for Russian-made warplanes. Russia’s extended ties to Sudan also include gold mining that is presently organized by the Kremlin’s Africa Corps (and which was formerly run by the Wagner Group).

In March 2024, Iran petitioned Sudan to establish a naval base at the Port of Sudan on the Red Sea. The SAF rejected Iran’s request. Despite the rejection, Iran has reportedly supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 drones.

Finally, there is the UAE. In violation of the Darfur arms embargo, the UAE is supplying weapons and ammunition to the RSF, as documented by a 2024 United Nations report to the Security Council. (The UAE strongly denies arming any group in Sudan.) The UAE is also the largest buyer of Sudanese gold. The RSF commits grievous violence against civilians using funds and weapons reportedly supplied by the UAE in return for gold from the country’s massive gold supplies. In 2023, Sudan was the third largest gold-producing country in Africa, yet Sudanese civilians are dying of hunger at the hands of corrupt military factions.

How the United States should respond

Foreign malign influence in Sudan is widespread, and strategic corruption is a relatively new and complex concept. In addition, some US government agencies do not yet have a clear definition of strategic corruption that would allow them to categorize its extent.

For this reason, the United States should develop a government-wide definition for strategic corruption. Doing so could help facilitate a whole-of-government response and allow agencies to better identify the full extent of illicit activity and the foreign actors involved in Sudan and the region.

With this clearer sense of foreign malign influence in Sudan, the United States could then consider wider sanctions against states and individuals involved in the crisis, and it could encourage partner countries to do the same. In addition, Washington should continue to garner international cooperation to end the war.

The August peace talks facilitated by the ALPS Group in Switzerland have ended. The hosting delegations have returned home. The flurry of articles on the conflict, and with it the world’s attention to the floods, famine, and atrocities in Sudan, have lessened. The Sudanese people, now more than ever, need the help of the United States and the international community to bring an end to the war; identify and hold accountable everyone enabling the violence; bolster sustained engagement for greater access to humanitarian aid; and continue to advocate for peace, stability, and the restitution of the rule of law.

Andrea Currie-Edwards is a senior technical advisor for anti-corruption and illicit finance with Millennium Partners, and former consultant to the World Bank Group.

The post The Sudan crisis has become a magnet for foreign malign influence and strategic corruption appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kenya is a prime example: In 2007, a local telecommunications provider launched a form of mobile money called M-PESA, which enabled peer-to-peer money transfers between mobile phones and became wildly successful. Within five years, it grew to fifteen million users, with a deposit value approaching almost one billion dollars. To address rising security concerns, in 2013, the Kenyan government implemented a law requiring every citizen to officially register the SIM card (for their cell phone) using a government identification (ID). The measure was enforced swiftly, leading to the freezing of millions of SIM cards. Over ten years later, SIM card ID registration laws have become common across Africa, with over fifty countries adopting such regulations. 

But that is not the end of the story. In parallel, a practice called third-party SIM registration has become rampant, in which cell phone users register their SIM cards using someone else’s ID, such as a friend’s or a family member’s. 

Our recent research at Carnegie Mellon University, based on in-depth user studies in Kenya and Tanzania, found that this phenomenon of third-party SIM registration has both unexpected origins and unintended consequences. Many individuals in those countries face systemic challenges in obtaining a government ID. Moreover, some participants in our study reported having privacy concerns. They felt uncomfortable sharing their ID information with mobile money agents, who could repurpose that information for scams, harassment, or other unintended uses. Other participants felt “frustrated” by a process that was “cumbersome.” As a result, many users prefer to register a SIM card with another person’s ID rather than use or obtain their own ID.

Third-party SIM registration plainly undermines the effectiveness of the public policy and has additional, downstream effects. Telecommunications companies end up collecting “know your customer” information that is not reliable, which can impede law enforcement investigations in the case of misconduct. For example, one of our study subjects shared the story of a friend lending their ID for third-party registration, and later being arrested for the alleged crimes of the actual user of the SIM card. 

A core implication of our research is that the Kenyan government’s goals did not fully take into account the realities of the target population—or the feasibility of the measures that Kenya and Tanzania proposed. In response, people invented their own workarounds, thus potentially introducing new vulnerabilities and avenues for fraud.

Good policy, bad consequences 

Several other case studies demonstrate how even well-intentioned regulations can have unintended consequences and practical problems if they do not appropriately consider security, privacy and usability together. 

• Uganda: Much like our findings in Kenya and Tanzania, a biometric digital identity program in Uganda has considerable unintended consequences. Specifically, it risks excluding fifteen million Ugandans “from accessing essential public services and entitlements” because they do not have access to a national digital identity card there. While the digitization of IDs promises to offer certain security features, it also has potential downsides for data privacy and risks further marginalizing vulnerable groups who are most in need of government services.
  
• Europe: Across the European Union (EU), a landmark privacy law called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been critical for advancing data protection and has become a benchmark for regulatory standards worldwide. But GDPR’s implementation has had unforeseen effects such as some websites blocking EU users. Recent studies have also highlighted various usability issues that may thwart the desired goals. For example, opting out of data collection through app permissions and setting cookie preferences is an option for users. But this option is often exclusionary and inconvenient, resulting in people categorically waiving their privacy for the sake of convenience.
  
• United States (health law): Within the United States, the marquee federal health privacy law passed in 1996 (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known as HIPAA) was designed to protect the privacy and security of individuals’ medical information. But it also serves as an example of laws that can present usability challenges for patients and healthcare providers alike. For example, to comply with HIPAA, many providers still require the use of ink signatures and fax machines. Not only are technologies somewhat antiquated and cumbersome (thereby slowing information sharing)—they also pose risks arising from unsecured fax machines and misdialed phone numbers, among other factors.
  
• Jamaica: Both Jamaica and Kenya have had to halt national plans to launch a digital ID in light of privacy and security issues. Kenya already lost over $72 million from a prior project that was launched in 2019, which failed because of serious concerns related to privacy and security. In the meantime, fraud continues to be a considerable problem for everyday citizens: Jamaica has incurred losses of more than $620 million from fraud since 2018.
  
• United States [tax system]: The situation in Kenya and Jamaica mirrors the difficulties encountered by other digital ID programs. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had to hold off plans for facial recognition based on concerns about the inadequate privacy measures, as well as usability concerns—like long verification wait times, low accuracy for certain groups, and the lack of offline options. The stalled program has resulted in missed opportunities for other technologies that could have allowed citizens greater convenience in accessing tax-related services and public benefits. Even after investing close to $187 million towards biometric identification, the IRS has not made much progress.
  

Collectively, a key takeaway from these international experiences is that when policymakers fail to simultaneously balance (or even consider) usability, privacy, and security, the progress of major government initiatives and the use of digitization to achieve important policy goals is hampered. In addition to regulatory and legislative challenges, delaying or canceling initiatives due to privacy and usability concerns can lead to erosion in public trust, increased costs and delays, and missed opportunities for other innovations.

Policy as product design

Going forward, one pivotal way for government decision makers to avoid pitfalls like the ones laid out above is to start thinking like product designers. Focusing on the most immediate policy goals is rarely enough to understand the practical and technological dimensions of how that policy will interact with the real world.

That does not mean, of course, that policymakers must all become experts in creating software products or designing user interfaces. But it does mean that some of the ways that product designers tend to think about big projects could inform effective public policy.

First, policymakers should embrace user studies to better understand the preferences and needs of citizens as they interact digitally with governmental programs and services. While there are multiple ways user studies can be executed, the first often includes upfront qualitative and quantitative research to understand the core behavioral drivers and systemic barriers to access. These could be complemented with focus groups, particularly with marginalized communities and populations who are likely to be disproportionately affected by any unintended outcomes of tech policy. 

Second, like early-stage technology products that are initially rolled out to an early group of users (known as “beta-testing”), policymakers could benefit from pilot testing to encourage early-stage feedback. 

Third, regulators—just like effective product designers—should consider an iterative process whereby they solicit feedback, implement changes to a policy or platform, and then repeat the process. This allows for validation of the regulation and makes room for adjustments and continuous improvements as part of an agency’s rulemaking process.

Lastly, legislators and regulators alike should conduct more regular tabletop exercises to see how new policies might play out in times of crisis. The executive branch regularly does such “tabletops” in the context of national security emergencies. But the same principles could apply to understanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities or user responses before implementing public policies or programs at scale.

In the end, a product design mindset will not completely eliminate the sorts of problems we have highlighted in Kenya, the United States, and beyond. However, it can help to identify the most pressing usability, security, and privacy problems before governments spend time and treasure to implement regulations or programs that may not fit the real world.

Karen Sowon is a user experience researcher and post doctoral research associate at Carnegie Mellon University.

JP Schnapper-Casteras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the founder and managing partner at Schnapper-Casteras, PLLC.

Giulia Fanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post Tech regulation requires balancing security, privacy, and usability  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

South Asia’s political parties need internal reforms to revitalize regional democracy

By Steve Cima, Geoffrey MacDonald, James Storen

This paper is the third in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

Unloved but indispensable: Political parties in Europe

By Paul McCarthy, Thibault Muzergues, Patrick Quirk

The experience of the past decade has shown that despite their unpopularity, political parties remain indispensable for the functioning of democracies in Europe—when they are present, plural, and organized, democracy is doing well. To prove this assertion, this paper will look at four telling examples in recent European history.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Nov 19, 2024

The shift from party to personality politics is harming Latin American democracies

By Christine Zaino, Sofia Herrera

This paper is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Americas Democratic Transitions

State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world. 

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.  

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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The post Sudan is an abject disaster. Is anyone listening? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite various peace initiatives undertaken by the international community—including efforts by the United States, Arab countries, and other African nations—regional and international responses have thus far failed to produce any meaningful resolution. In seeking to resolve the war, the absence of accountability for supporters of Burhan and Hemedti looms large, and foreign powers have a crucial role to play. Peace efforts have been unsuccessful because mediator Arab countries—like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—are not acting in good faith but are supporting opposing sides. Halting external support to the generals is crucial to achieving peace in Sudan and setting it on the path to civilian-led rule. 

A fertile ground for foreign meddling

Sudan’s civil war is a battle for legitimacy and power between two ambitious generals, each wielding a distinct advantage but without sufficient power to achieve victory. Currently, al-Burhan positions himself as Sudan’s legitimate ruler and has Cairo’s support. Conversely, Hemedti—with backing from the UAE and control over Sudan’s goldmines—leverages the advantage gained from former President Omar al-Bashir’s coup-proofing policies, which gave the RSF independence from civilian and SAF control. He not only rejects Burhan’s claim, but is determined to emerge as the sole ruler of Sudan.  

The intricate power dynamics of smaller, independent militias in Sudan add layers of complexity and uncertainty, creating an anti-peace equation that outside forces could easily exploit through proxies.

While Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have proven ineffective in stopping Sudan’s war, they play a significant role in its continuation. All three countries have vital interests in Sudan, motivating them to choose sides that will maximize their benefit, even if it undermines Sudan’s. 

Egyptian President Fattah el-Sisi sees Burhan as a stable partner to safeguard its regional interests, particularly in the Nile River, which the countries share. While Egypt has participated in mediation efforts and started the Neighbors of Sudan Initiative, it hasn’t been able to leverage its relationship with Burhan to progress toward a peace deal. Instead, it has assisted the SAF’s military efforts by providing drones and warplanes. 

In contrast, the UAE supports Hemedti and the RSF by providing military and financial assistance disguised as humanitarian aid. Abu Dhabi serves as a financial haven for Hemedti’s gold business, hosting RSF front companies and bank accounts. Despite being part of peace efforts, the UAE has directed its influence toward assisting Hemedti’s diplomatic efforts rather than fostering negotiations.  

Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia views Burhan as a reliable ally to protect its investments in Sudan’s key sectors and its strategic interests in the Red Sea region. However, Riyadh finds it more beneficial to bolster its image as a neutral mediator, potentially giving it an advantage over the UAE in establishing regional dominance and emerging as a credible international partner.  

Key US lawmakers have highlighted the UAE’s involvement in supporting the RSF, as seen during the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee for Africa hearing on December 5, 2023. Earlier, members of Congress urged Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) to UAE cease support for the RSF via a formal letter. Most importantly, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the need to ensure peace in Sudan with MBZ in January. While Egypt’s support for SAF has also faced criticism, the involvement of Cairo and Riyadh with the warring sides has not received sufficient attention. The external meddling of these countries has run counter to their involvement in peace efforts. This must be stopped to achieve any solution in Sudan.

 US response and course correction 

Several peace efforts are in place, but progress remains elusive. The RSF and SAF consistently violate agreements, resulting in brief ceasefires and escalating civilian casualties. Even opportunities flaunted as promising—such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s meeting on January 18, before Burhan suspended Sudan’s membership in the East African bloc—have met persistent challenges. There is pressure from the United Nations as well as the United States for a ceasefire, but calls for a Ramadan truce were rejected by Burhan. These efforts, inclusive of US sanctions for human rights abuses and undermining peace and security in the region, have been unable to stop external support, let alone the war.   

As the war continues, there is still an opportunity for course correction. US Special Envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello’s recent trip to African countries, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt from March 11–23 was a step in this direction. The objectives of this trip highlighted the need to align mediation efforts that are spread across various international platforms, including the IGAD, the African Union, and the respective initiatives led by Arab countries. It also emphasized engaging civilian actors, including resistance committees, trade unions, protest groups, women, and the youth in democratic transition and peace talks. Thus, this trip could be the catalyst needed to advance key priorities in Sudan.   

The upcoming Jeddah talks on April 18 could be another opportunity to build on the objectives outlined on Perriello’s trip. The most significant is unifying various peace efforts and making these talks inclusive. This would signal to all parties involved that mediators are willing to collectively pressure the generals, adding seriousness to the peace talks. Additionally, bringing mediating countries together will prevent the creation of competing circles of influence. It will ensure a unified front, rather than fragmented efforts, toward achieving the desired goal. 

However, aligning mediation efforts would only be fruitful if the United States were also adamant about aligning mediators’ priorities vis-à-vis Sudan. This begins with prioritizing Sudan in its foreign policy agenda and maintaining a consistent approach. Despite other global priorities like the Israel-Hamas war, and potential time constraints posed by the upcoming US presidential election, the United States must continue building momentum in its engagement in Sudan. One way to do so is to support Perriello and ensure his office is fully staffed. In a recent interview, Perriello acknowledged that “a lot more international engagement is needed” and mentioned “raising the heat on all those who are fueling the conflict.” While commendable, this is a belated recognition of the situation’s gravity, similar to Perriello’s late appointment as special envoy. The key now is for the United States to add weight to its words with constructive actions, which could mean serious backchannel dialogues with its Gulf allies and Egypt to stop their support of the RSF.

As peacekeeping efforts aim for an immediate ceasefire, deploying United Nations peacekeepers in Sudan to ensure the safety of its people and eventually oversee the transition process (akin to the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan) should be considered. This proposed UN mission should be granted access to effectively monitor Sudan’s entry points, including seaports, air routes, and land borders, to curb weapons smuggling and establish humanitarian corridors. To facilitate humanitarian assistance, international efforts should utilize existing networks of local emergency responses. Most importantly, the United States and the international community must provide the much-needed funding to support these efforts. The upcoming humanitarian conference in France could be the chance to hit the nail on its head.  

Past efforts have underscored that, unless the underlying issue of mediator support for the generals is addressed, these well-intentioned efforts risk being futile. They will fail to deter ongoing atrocities and leave a power vacuum that attracts actors like Iran and Russia, which also have interests in establishing naval bases on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.  

It must be made clear that those providing weapons and funding for Sudan’s civil war are accessories to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the country. If the international framework lets them fall through the cracks with no accountability, its ripple effects will be felt globally in the form of a refugee crisis and an increase in proxy warfare in the region. 

Manal Fatima is a program assistant with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Follow her on X: @mafasaad.

The post A diplomatic solution in Sudan demands greater US engagement with its Arab allies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Aggregate freedom in Kenya has increased substantially and constantly since 1995, but the data correctly show a marked structural change in 2010. This was a crucial year in the recent politico-economic history of the country as it marked the inauguration of the new constitution, which has been the driving force behind many of the trends shown in the Freedom Index and subindexes. The 2010 Constitution reformed Kenya’s highly centralized institutional architecture, creating a devolved and highly decentralized system. This ensured that lower levels of government (regions and counties) receive much higher levels of funding, that can be better allocated according to the needs of local populations.

The economic freedom subindex clearly presents a jump around 2010, mainly attributable to a significant increase in women’s economic freedom. Legal changes that accompanied the constitutional reform had important effects on women’s empowerment and freedom. The endorsement of the 2010 Constitution established vital rights and encouraged additional reforms towards greater legal gender equality, including reserving seats for women’s political participation and encouraging nondiscrimination and equality. For example, the constitution outlined new principles relating to land policy, including the elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs, and practices related to land. Financial inclusion of women is an important area of improvement, and the Central Bank data—based on various FinAccess Surveys—clearly show that women are becoming much more economically included and empowered. Also, when you look at the disaggregated data for different regions of the country, you find that the gender gap in financial access is actually declining in many counties in Kenya. The growing economic empowerment of women is also evidenced by increasing employment rates of women and a reduction in the gender wage gap in many professions. Legislative changes have allowed women to hold and manage property, and placed them on a more equal legal footing with men in matters relating to property. For example, the passage of the Land Act and Land Registration Act in 2012 increased women’s rights over marital property. Regarding access to education, the gender gap is closing very fast. For example, in many university courses, the proportion of women and men enrolling is now much more equal than was the case a decade ago. The new decentralized constitutional framework has been crucial in creating the conditions in which women’s freedoms can improve. The situation of women is significantly worse in rural areas, but now local and regional governments have the autonomy and resources to provide and generate economic opportunities for women at a devolved level.

The economic freedom subindex also shows a sustained increase in property rights protection, which seems to reflect the judicial reforms that have been introduced since the 1990s. In the last three decades, there has been a significant improvement in the speed of judicial processes, and in the reliability of the guarantees given to domestic and foreign owners. For example, since the inauguration of the new constitution in 2010, parliament has enacted four major land laws aimed at improving land property rights: the Land Act of 2012, the Land Registration Act of 2012, the National Land Commission Act of 2012, and the Community Land Act of 2016. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index also undoubtedly incentivized Kenyan governments in this period to improve the institutional architecture of the country in order to facilitate economic activity. For example, the move towards “e-government”—the myriad reforms aimed at digitalizing interactions between citizens and government agencies—received a big push in order to improve Kenya’s position in the Doing Business ranking. This was, in fact, achieved in several successive years. The recent digitization of land records in Kenya is a means to improving security, by requiring a landowner to approve all applications relating to a specific property. Digitized records will also reduce the cost and time of land transactions. Section 9 of the Land Registration Act of 2012 facilitated the coming wave of digitalization and e-government by providing the Registrar of Lands with the right to maintain relevant documents in a secure and accessible format, including in electronic files.

Political freedom shows a substantial increase during the 1990s, which captures the movement from a one-party political system to a multiparty system. This was a generalized change in Sub-Saharan Africa, with levels of political freedom increasing in several countries. But such changes are always complicated, because it is easy to introduce political competition on paper, but always difficult in practice. This was a period of great political agitation in Kenya, reflecting broader political liberalization across Africa, with a very intense push for constitutional reform from civil society, resulting in significant achievements. External pressures to liberalize the political space were also crucial.

Kenya is probably one of the countries in Africa with the highest levels of civil and political liberties. However, the data show a significantly lower score for civil liberties than for the rest of the indicators of political freedom. It is likely that this relates to the protests, campaigning, and activism before and after electoral periods, which reached a peak with the serious electoral violence of 2007–08. But in general, Kenya is a society in which civil and political freedom is high, where citizens can express freely their political views, with a vibrant opposition in evidence. Electoral results have been challenged various times in recent years, accompanied by judicial reviews of the electoral results after several recent elections.

The large increase in legal freedom observed in 2010 is single-handedly driven by improved judicial independence and effectiveness, and this again is a product of the new constitution. The judicial system has proven to be very independent from political pressures; the challenges to—and judicial reviews of—the electoral results are a clear sign of this. The clarity of the law also improved significantly during the constitutional reform discussions that crystalized in 2010, and that is also evident in the data. In 2015, the judiciary adopted a nationwide case-tracking tool which enhanced the level of judicial accountability. There has been an attempt to standardize and speed up the handling of cases.

But the decentralization of power brought about by the new constitution has also had a negative side, at least in the short term. This is because now there is an additional level of government, the regional level, which necessarily increases the bureaucracy in the country. Moreover, three levels of government means a significant effort of coordination is required in order to efficiently provide the public services that were concentrated in the central government. These difficulties explain why bureaucracy quality does not show a significant change after 2010. Also, more bureaucracy opens the door for more corruption, especially with such a large structural change in the institutional framework. In recent years, there has been a clear aim to improve bureaucratic quality—for example, with the push for e-government—but Kenya has still a lot of room for progress.

From freedom to prosperity

The rapid growth in income in Kenya starts in 2002, a critical year for the country. In 2002 the country experienced a major political transition when the president, who had run the country for twenty-five years, stepped down. The new leadership was very keen on detailed government planning. They introduced a long-term development plan, called Vision 2030, with the objective of making Kenya an upper middle-income country by the year 2030. It was based on some crucial pillars, one of them being innovation. Kenya has led the region in some critical sectors thanks to this forward-thinking approach. Today, approximately 54 percent of Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by the services sector, parts of which are particularly vibrant and innovative, like tourism and financial services. The latter is a great example. Thanks to the innovative tool of mobile money, financial inclusion increased from 25 percent of the population in 2006 to about 84 percent in 2021, according to the 2021 FinAccess Survey, one of the highest levels in the whole Sub-Saharan Africa region. Mobile money in Kenya, which gained local popularity through the M-PESA application, allows users to deposit, withdraw, transfer money, make payments for goods and services, and access credit through cell phones. Mobile money products have evolved considerably since their introduction to Kenya in 2007, with a considerable range of innovative products and mobile service providers emerging. The agricultural sector, even though it is still very important in terms of employment, has been declining in terms of its contribution to GDP in Kenya and in several Sub-Saharan African countries. For several decades it represented about 30 percent of GDP in Kenya, but this has declined to about 20 percent—a fact reflected in the country’s debasing of GDP, which was carried out in 2021. Kenya is also trying to diversify its exporting industries towards nontraditional sectors. Today, 40 percent of Kenya’s exports are within the region, and these are mostly manufactured goods. With a strong base in manufacturing, Kenya is uniquely placed to benefit from the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area.

Regarding inequality, the country clearly benefited from the constitutional change of 2010, because the devolved system of government significantly reduced regional disparities. Historically, the northern part of the country, for example, has lagged behind in terms of development because of its severe (semi-desert) climatic conditions. With the new system, funds are more easily transferred and more effectively administered by the regional and local governments, and inequality between rural and urban areas has clearly been reduced. The process of financial inclusion mentioned above, which was given major impetus by the introduction of mobile money in 2007, has been a second driver of reduced inequality. Segments of the population at the lower end of the income distribution have benefited most from this process, because it has opened the door to financing opportunities to start businesses, increase human capital, and so on.

Minority rights are also better protected with the decentralized system of government. The 2010 Constitution enables the state to put in place affirmative action programs to protect minorities and marginalized groups. Communities and ethnic groups that were somewhat marginalized before have been empowered in different regions. Even at a political level, it is clear that there is an effort to include previously silenced communities. The work carried out by civil society organizations has also been crucial on this point, in terms of creating an awareness about minority rights and demands in different parts of the country. This was demonstrated by the broad-based civic education carried out during the constitutional review process that culminated in the 2010 Constitution.

One of the primary goals of the political leadership that took power after 2002 was to improve the level and quality of education in the country. The aim was to reach 100 percent enrollment in primary education, and to increase significantly the enrollment levels in secondary and university education. However, the starting point was very low, so there is still a long way to go, particularly in secondary and tertiary enrollment. According to UNICEF, before the COVID-19 pandemic, nationwide enrollment in primary education in Kenya was at 93 percent while secondary school enrollment was only at 53 percent. Another important aspect is that increasing enrollment at a very fast pace requires vast resources to ensure that the quality of the education pupils receive is high. And this is not always the case in Kenya, even though education forms a very large part of the government budget. Some educational indicators, like the number of teachers, have not kept up with the levels of enrollment. The pupil-to-teacher ratio remains very high in some Kenyan counties. For example, in Turkana County in northern Kenya, it is at 77:1 according to UNICEF. So, the big challenge for the country at present is to improve both quality and quantity.

Once again, the 2010 Constitution will have major effects on life expectancy, and health more generally, but these are probably going to take longer to materialize in the data. Moreover, the slowing of progress on the health indicator in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic may be explained by the same reason. The implementation of healthcare is now decentralized and run by the regional governments, even though healthcare policy is still in the hands of the central government. It is not easy to start running a regional health service from scratch, and there is obviously a learning period when indicators may even deteriorate. Inadequate resources provided by the national government to the counties and understaffed health facilities in many areas remain critical challenges. But in the medium and long run, once the implementation constraints begin to ease, it seems likely that healthcare services will be delivered more efficiently, and health statistics will show the results.

The future ahead

One of the critical issues that Kenya faces now is how to keep improving productivity. I see manufacturing as an obvious area for improvement, and this should include growing its share of GDP. Today, it is slightly below 10 percent, and Kenya should almost double that. I think we have a big opportunity in Africa with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It would create tremendous opportunities for countries like Kenya that have some manufacturing base. Kenya is competing with manufactured goods from Asia and other places that have major cost advantages. Bigger markets, such as those that will become available through the African Continental Free Trade Area, can generate productivity improvements through export competition and also provide economies of scale benefits.

An important challenge for Kenya relates to the large share of informal employment. Moving part of these workers and firms towards formalization will ensure that economic opportunity and development are more stable. And, obviously, higher levels of formal employment and production generate larger and more stable sources of government revenue, as tax compliance is easier with formal sector firms. This will help the already firm path of fiscal consolidation that Kenya has followed in recent years. The current account deficit has also been declining, partly because of reduced imports, but also due to stronger and more competitive exports. This is a very promising path for Kenya, and the country now needs to take advantage not only of regional value chains, but also global value chains, particularly in areas like tourism where Kenya has long-standing experience and a diversity of tourist attractions.

But economic reform and development needs to be accompanied by continued institutional reform and transformation. Further pushing the inclusivity of institutions is the only way to ensure that increasing prosperity in Kenya is based on solid foundations and is therefore sustainable in the long run.

Robert Mudida is currently the director of the Research Department of the Central Bank of Kenya. He was a full-time academic for seventeen years, having taught and carried out extensive research at two leading universities in Africa: the University of Nairobi and Strathmore University. At Strathmore University he was full professor of political economy. He has published four books and numerous articles in top international peer-reviewed journals in the areas of political economy, financial economics, macroeconomics, and industrial organization.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Stabilizing revenue will lead Kenya to greater prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties. 

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MOU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MOU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MOU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counterterrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

The post What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The direct impacts of increased shipping time and fuel costs have captured the attention of market watchers and policymakers—but these are just the tip of the iceberg. As the disruption continues, firms will face challenges with increased insurance costs, decreased ship security, and wider ESG impacts, among others. The longer it lasts and the wider the area covered, the more numerous the challenges become.

The situation in the Red Sea also provides a small taste of the future of geopolitical risk. The Red Sea is one of the main trade routes between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with Clarksons estimating that 10 percent of world trade by volume utilizes this route. This includes 20 percent of all container shipping, nearly 10 percent of seaborne oil, and 8 percent of LNG. However, the Red Sea is not unique in its importance: Strategic chokepoints for maritime trade exist all around the globe, from canals to naturally occurring straits and funnels. As actors observe the impacts of Houthi threats and attacks, others will begin to consider their ability to orchestrate something similar. Of particular concern would be the potential for a global economic crisis if these methods were to be mimicked on other high-volume routes, in particular the South China Sea.

To prepare for and prevent these disruptions, policymakers need to understand the long shadow of disruptions to major shipping routes. And to do that it helps to explore the impact that the Red Sea disruption will have, depending on how long it lasts.

Effects of a disruption lasting one week to one month

Ship availability

In the medium term, one of the largest issues will be ships simply being in the wrong place. Supply chains have evolved to meet just-in-time strategies. This creates a delicate balance between each part of the supply chain, which is especially pressured between containers and ships.

Ports have limited berths, many of which are size specific, and limited physical space. Berths are booked months in advance to schedule appropriate port-side support for offloading, reloading, and refuelling. The ground delivery of containers and other goods are scheduled around these berth bookings.

As ships reroute or take alternative routes, the delays create a knock-on effect at the ports. When ships do not arrive at their berths on time, containers and goods fill the ports waiting for onward shipment. By rerouting or anchoring vessels, not only are supply chains slowed, but availability of transport options from ports is disrupted. Rerouted ships can overwhelm alternative ports, leading to back-ups at berths and clogged passage in/out of the ports.

As during the covid pandemic, containers quickly pile up in ports due to delays in ship arrival. This is exacerbated as vessels are repeatedly rerouted or ordered to anchor in an attempt to wait out the risk.

Insurance

Vessels “going dark”, when ships turn off transponders connected to tracking systems, has long posed a major risk. This is done to enable a wide range of illicit activities from evading sanctions to circumventing IMO rules or contractual limitations. The Red Sea has long been a hotspot for this activity due to its central positioning to countries bound by international trade sanctions. This is reflected in insurance premiums for vessels travelling through the area. Yet premiums will likely increase as the technique is utilised by ships to attempt to evade attacks from Houthi forces.

As ships go dark they become invisible to others in the area, both friend and foe. Ships are increasingly using this technique in the Red Sea as they anchor in place to avoid targeting. By masking their location, activity, and information from all parties they avoid detection by hostile forces, but also make the shipping lanes more dangerous. Transponders are utilised by other vessels to understand traffic, identify other ships in the area, and determine safe routes, particularly in crowded areas. An area such as the Red Sea filled with “dark” vessels would be equivalent to driving on a crowded highway in the dark without headlights. Without the information provided by trackers the risk of a major accident between large vessels increases substantially. That added risk will increase the cost of insurance.

Insurance costs will also be affected by the fact that the trip around the Cape of Good Hope is inherently riskier than Red Sea routes. Logistically, ships are required to not only navigate a longer route, but one battered by challenging weather patterns. Though ports across the Western coast of Africa are often better equipped to receive Capemax ships, this also enables possibilities for illicit activities based from and at ports. Geopolitically, vessels face increased danger from West African piracy, which is known for being particularly violent. This is further complicated by high levels of unrest across the area and limited state power should an incident occur.

Effects of disruptions lasting one to three months

Increase in shipping costs

Backlogs in ports, diversions, a decrease in ship availability, and the increase in insurance and other running costs will trigger pricing pressures. Shipping costs, which have already risen in the immediate term, will continue to rise. This is without considering the potential pricing impact if any vessel is significantly damaged during this period. Firms are likely to pass any price increase onto consumers to avoid substantial losses. This will hinder policymakers’ efforts to tame rising prices in an already high inflationary environment.

Carbon footprint

Shipping is already one of the most polluting industries in the world, contributing to nearly 3 percent of all global GHG emissions. “The sector, whose greenhouse gas emissions have risen 20 percent over the last decade, operates an ageing fleet that runs almost exclusively on fossil fuels,” according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. But prolonged avoidance of the Red Sea will make that footprint worse.

The Cape of Good Hope route is not only considerably longer than the Red Sea-Suez Canal route—it also requires ships to burn significantly more fuel due to distance and the physical dynamics of the route. As more firms decide to send ships around the Cape, the carbon footprint of the industry is bound to increase.

For businesses, this comes as the EU rolls out their Emissions Trading System (ETS). As of January 1, maritime emissions are now included in the EU ETS for vessels calling at EU ports. The EU ETS levies a carbon tax based on the distance between the last port of call outside of the EU (excluding UK, Tangier and Port Said) and the first call into the EU. The charges are based on 50 percent of vessel emotions, half of the journey from a non-EU country into and out of the EU. As vessels increase the length of their routes and alternative ports become clogged, they will likely increase this distance and hence increase their tax liability. As the EU ETS system continues its rollout in the coming years, this added cost will only increase.

Effects of disruptions lasting three months or more 

Increasing pressure to “friendshore”/onshore

Outsourcing and importing of goods have long been a focus of ire for politicians. An increase in shipping lead times and impact of foreign actors on the availability of critical items only exacerbates this. As the disruption in the Red Sea continues, the pressure for policies which encourage onshoring, and where not possible “friendshoring”, crucial trading goods will increase. In the next year sixty-four countries will hold elections, including the United States and the UK. A geopolitical environment which already turned domestic first following recent supply chain pressures will prove ripe for politicians looking to further onshore activities.

The future is green, or is it?

One of the biggest challenges facing the maritime industry is decarbonising the global fleet. Though many options are being explored, there is still no easy solution or currently fully viable and agreed upon solution or fuel alternative.

Firms are investing vast sums to test and explore the practicality of alternative fuel options. Requiring ships to reroute quickly, for whatever reason, has the potential to undermine these efforts.

The first hurdle of the transition is costs. The massive costs and challenges inherent in outfitting ships limits the ability of firms to investigate their viability. Building ships capable of operating on alternative fuels takes a significant amount of time and money. If the baseline costs of shipping increase, specifically insurance and fuel consumption of existing vessels in the fleet due to longer routes and time at anchor, the availability of capital will be squeezed further. The transition in shipping cannot happen without vast sums of money and any cut in profit will be felt first in R&D for future ships.

Alongside this, alternative fuels, such as LNG, LPG, methanol, biofuel, electric, and hydrogen, are currently distance and route limited. Though there are numerous initiatives being trialled across the globe, testing remains in the very early stages.

For some options, current technology means longer routes are just not feasible. This includes electric alternatives which are only used for short-distance routes at the moment. For others, such as hydrogen or LNG, the distance may not be a hindrance, but refuelling is. The port infrastructure to support alternative fuels is in its infancy and availability is spotty at best. This limits viable refuelling stops for vessels along every route. Redirection further limits these options until routes become impractical. Increasing the complexity of testing by changing pre-established routes, along which the refuelling prospects and sea conditions may be vastly different, can prohibit firms from further exploring alternative fuels.

Going forward the maritime industry needs to seriously consider how to finance the transition to greener fuels and ensure their availability, regardless of route. The current reality is far from this.

Long-term security of shipping routes

Current ship security is based on armed personnel and, in extreme cases, state-sponsored military support. These systems were based on a history of small-scale, sea-based operatives and independent actors posing the greatest threats to vessels.

Recent attacks in the Red Sea open a new frontier in shipping security risk. The Houthis have relied heavily on drones and ballistic missiles for their attacks. These are more complicated, difficult to counter, and at times, more precise than small-boat piracy, which has been accepted as “standard.”

On-board armed security is no longer enough, nor are smaller military vessels without the ability to tackle these threats. As this technology becomes more easily accessible, ensuring ship safety will be more costly and require more advanced technology.

The future of shipping risk

Despite recent efforts by Western powers to restore shipping in the Red Sea, the genie is now out of the bottle. The widespread redirecting of global trade has illustrated the power non-state and state actors can exert.

Even if a lasting ceasefire is agreed to immediately, ships cannot simply turn around and go back to their original routes. The substantial change in situational risk of the route will require a significant amount of contract renegotiation between shipowners and operators. Some owners may even restructure contracts to bar their vessels from being utilised on these routes. Nor will insurers and financiers be particularly willing to return to pre-ceasefire risk assessments. The Houthi attacks have opened the possibility of more sophisticated attacks through relatively accessible technology in busy shipping lanes.

There is a real risk that this model could be repeated by actors bordering other high-volume shipping routes. An area of similar, if not larger, risk would be a repeat of these actions in the South China Sea. It carries up to a third of all trade by volume and is a main energy transport route; any redirection there would have massive effects on global trade. Unlike the Red Sea, which acts as a funnel towards the Suez Canal, a high concentration of South China Sea routes require transport through the relatively narrow Strait of Malacca. Acting as a strategic chokepoint, this area is incredibly vulnerable. Though alternative routes exist, the physical limitations of these waterways make it a practical impossibility for the vast majority of ships. The combination of high volume and narrow passage means a disruption of this route of comparable scale could easily trigger a global economic crisis.

The coming weeks will determine whether we are facing a minor inconvenience or a larger challenge for international shipping. However, like the COVID-19 pandemic, this incident has underlined not only the importance of maritime trade routes but provided insight into the future of geopolitics. The ability to apply pressure to global trade structures is steadily becoming more accessible. States must adapt their international strategies to mirror the reality of the outsized impact certain actors, state and otherwise, can have on global trade.

Alex Mills is an international trade expert focused on services trade, international investment, maritime law, and ESG. They have nearly a decade of experience across the private and public sector, including in UK and US politics and the financial sector.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post The long shadow of the Red Sea shipping disruption appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the aftermath of the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the Caribbean republic has seen escalating gang violence that has threatened the political system and security. Between January and August of this year, 2,439 Haitians were killed, 951 were kidnapped, and 902 were injured. On October 3, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolution 2699, which approved a multinational mission, led by Kenya, to help the Haitian National Police defeat the onslaught of criminal gangs perpetrating violence and other crimes. Although the mission is UN-authorized, it is not an official UN peacekeeping mission. Kenya plans to lead the mission by sending over a thousand officers, a number that will be supplemented further by the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua and Barbuda.

An intervention in a Caribbean state by an African country could perplex some given the vast physical distance between the regions and a lack of historic military and security support. However, the planned deployment aligns closely with Ruto’s foreign relations agenda.

Under Ruto’s presidency, Kenya has stepped up to play a more active role in regional and international politics and to secure for itself a leadership role in championing African interests. Kenya hosted the first Africa Climate Summit in September which concluded with the Nairobi Declaration, a document laying out a consensus among participating African countries about their climate priorities. Ruto also recently announced that Kenya will no longer require visas for visitors from all countries beginning January 2024 in an effort to boost tourism and international connectivity.  

A policing mission to Haiti could further raise Kenya’s profile as a champion of African interests. While there has been little collaboration between African countries and Haiti historically, many Haitians are a part of the African diaspora. Since Haiti’s 1804 revolution and independence, the country has experienced repeated bouts of instability further worsened by nearly two decades of occupation by the United States (from 1915 to 1934), and subsequent UN-approved intervention missions, including one led by Brazil that ran from 2004 to 2017. For Kenya to achieve its newly oriented foreign-policy goals through this intervention, it would have to avoid repeating the failures seen in past missions and steer clear of channeling US paternalism.

In October 2022, Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry authorized a request for foreign intervention through a written appeal to international partners. However, observers including the National Haitian American Elected Officials Network and the Family Action Network Movement are highly skeptical of further intervention and are concerned that supporting the unelected Henry government could worsen the nation’s political crisis. Those organizations have called on the Biden administration to withdraw US support for the mission.

Critics in Kenya have been asking another question: Who asked Kenya, specifically, to intervene? Officially, Kenya volunteered to lead the security force on July 29 in a statement by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Mutua. According to Mutua, the commitment came after a request by the “Friends of Haiti Group of Nations.” However, some observers argue that Kenya is leading the intervention to be a good “friend” to the United States. In September, the United States pledged one hundred million dollars in support to the intervention; days later, the United States and Kenya signed a defense agreement that included resources and support for security deployments.

Putting theories and unknowns aside, it is clear that Kenya is taking a newly proactive approach to the crisis in Haiti. That new approach underscores Ruto’s atypical foreign policy strategy, which aims to distinguish Kenya from its African peers globally and add to Nairobi’s list of accomplishments as a pan-African leader. Success in achieving that strategy could pave the way for greater influence in regional and international politics, setting Kenya up to challenge South Africa and Nigeria, who have historically been regional hegemons. But success in Ruto’s foreign policy approach depends, in part, on the success of this mission to Haiti—one that will be hard to come by.

To be sure, Ruto’s plan has faced numerous domestic challenges. On November 16, Kenya’s high court extended an order blocking the mission’s deployment pending a final decision in January 2024. Despite the court order, the mission was approved by the Kenyan Parliament.

There have also been signs that public support is mixed, as some people have questioned Nairobi’s priorities, arguing that it should focus on protecting lives in Kenya first. Currently, insurgencies are underway along the Somalia border and cattle banditry and clashes between nomadic pastoralists have challenged communities in Northern Kenya.

Amnesty International has also condemned the deployment, not just because of a “troubling history of abuses” associated with past interventions in Haiti, but also because of extrajudicial killings and excessive force used by the Kenyan police. These concerns about human rights violations raise questions as to whether the Kenyan police will be able to succeed in Haiti where other missions have failed.

Regardless, the first batch of police officers have begun training for their planned mission in Haiti. In preparation for the deployment, the director general of the Haitian National Police, alongside a delegation from the Haitian government, visited Kenya last week. However, in early November, Interior Minister Kithure Kindiki asserted that police officers will not be deployed to Haiti “unless all resources”—perhaps including extra funding from the United Nations, recently requested by Kenya—“are mobilized and availed.”

Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta oriented Nairobi’s foreign policy more closely towards China. Ruto, on the other hand, appears more interested in seeking out partnerships with the West—particularly the United States. This year alone, at least six high-level US officials have visited Kenya: First Lady Jill Biden, United States Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Trade Representative Katherine Tai, Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. Kenya and the Millennium Challenge Corporation also signed a sixty-million-dollar threshold program focused on urban mobility and growth in September.

At the same time, Ruto’s administration has also developed a new policy focused on pan-Africanism and, in its dealings beyond the continent, South-South cooperation. If Kenya were to achieve success in Haiti, which would require learning from the tough lessons of past interventions while incorporating the aspirations of Haitians, its global profile could benefit, and Nairobi could secure a status as a reliable ally to the United States both on the continent and beyond.

It remains to be seen whether Kenyan police will eventually be deployed to Haiti. If the deployment occurs, watch the mission closely: Success in helping Haiti secure its future, if attained properly and without repeating mistakes of the past, could see Kenya amplify its bid to claim a bigger seat on the world stage.

Sibi Nyaoga was a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post What Kenya’s proposed mission to Haiti says about Nairobi’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Strike on Ukrainian cafe leaves more than forty dead

Tracking narratives

Website impersonating Ukrainian news agency spreads narratives aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale

Media policy

Russia increasingly using criminal charges for online activities, says digital rights group

Russia’s federal budget draft indicates a funding boost for state media

International affairs

Putin meets South Sudanese President Salva Kiir

Strike on Ukrainian cafe leaves more than forty dead

An attack on the village of Hroza in northeast Ukraine left more than four dozen people dead, according to a Telegram statement from Ukraine’s Office of the General Prosecutor. According to the statement, the attack occurred around 1:25 p.m. local time on October 5, destroying a local cafe shop. It also noted local prosecutors have launched a pre-trial investigation. In a separate Telegram post, which included graphic imagery, Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Kuleba blamed Russia for the attack, stating, “A terrorist country deliberately kills peaceful Ukrainians. The world needs to see what true evil is.”

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) also condemned the attack. “Intentionally directing an attack against civilians or civilian objects is a war crime,” UN OCHA Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine Denise Brown stated. “Intentionally launching an attack knowing that it would be disproportionate is a war crime.”

Meanwhile, a Reuters report published on October 3 claimed that the Russian army has embedded so-called “Storm-Z” units within conventional Russian units to conduct counterattacks against Ukrainian gains in crucial front sectors. Reuters reported that the Storm-Z units comprise 100-150 personnel, including civilian penal recruits and Russian soldiers under punishment. The Russian army and defense ministry have not confirmed the existence of the Storm-Z units.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington DC

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Website impersonating Ukrainian news agency spreads narratives aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale

The DFRLab has identified at least one Facebook ad promoting a website impersonating a Ukrainian news agency. The now-defunct Facebook page “Onaqaq online shop” published the ad. It accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukrainian leadership of corruption and misusing aid provided by the United States. The ad featured a caricature of the president alongside text noting the creation of a US team to monitor how aid to Ukraine is being used. The ad declared that all of Ukraine’s elite are corrupt and shared a debunked claim about a former “commander-in-chief,” likely a reference to Oleksii Reznikov, buying a villa for his daughter. 

The ad included a link to the website thumbra.com, which when accessed by the DFRLab redirected to unian.in, a page masquerading as the website for the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, unian.ua. At the time of writing, the website no longer redirected to the copycat website. Much of the content on the copycat website links back to UNIAN’s actual website, including share buttons. The link in the ad led to a forged story regarding Ukraine’s allies becoming skeptical of its ability to succeed in the war against Russia. The article cited decreased military aid as an indicator that allies are abandoning Ukraine.

Multiple aspects of the forgery point to it likely being of Russian origin. The strongest indicator is that the URL address includes “skepsis-i-podozritelnost,” which is transliterated from Russian, not Ukrainian. Second, the article is written in Ukrainian, but the tone and style differ from that of the information agency. Third, the faux article’s banner image, a stock photo, does not have a caption, as is standard for UNIAN. The image was also edited to include a text overlay, which reads “Allies don’t believe in us anymore?” UNIAN does not edit the stock photography it uses for banner images.

These types of forgeries are not unique. On September 18, a Ukrainian researcher found a similar forgery replicating the UNIAN website, which spread a narrative claiming that Ukraine’s allies are decreasing weapons shipments to Ukraine to force it to negotiate with Russia. The article stated that Ukraine’s losses were “in vain” as its allies plan to “sacrifice” the country for their own self-interest. 

Campaigns such as this are likely intended to decrease the morale of Ukrainians. The DFRLab has previously covered similar attempts by Russia to impersonate media, including Operation Doppelganger, in which Russian assets impersonated prominent European news outlets.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Russia increasingly using criminal charges for online activities, says digital rights group

In its latest monthly digest, Russian digital rights organization Roskomsvoboda examined high-profile cases in which Russian politicians or activists were punished, via administrative or criminal charges, for their online activities. According to Roskomsvoboda, the cases illustrate an increasing use of criminal charges rather than administrative ones, a reversal of what it observed in 2022.

The report also noted instances of Russians being punished for Telegram posts that “disrespect” or “discredit” Russian authorities or the army. One person was criminally charged for giving an interview to Ukrainian media, while another was charged for “participating in an extremist community.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia’s federal budget draft indicates a funding boost for state media

On September 29, the Kremlin submitted the 2024-2026 draft federal budget to the State Duma. According to the independent Russian news outlet Verstka, the Kremlin plans to increase funding for its state-run platforms, which are known to sow disinformation and propaganda. The increase coincides with Russia’s 2024 presidential elections. 

The budget reportedly allocates 315 billion rubles ($3 billion) to support Russian media for the next three years. The budget assigns 121.3 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) for 2024, 94.1 billion rubles ($945 million) for 2025, and 99.5 billion rubles ($1 billion) for 2026. Overall, the draft media budget represents a decrease of 20 billion rubles ($200 million) from the previous budget; according to Verstka, the draft indicates that state-owned media will receive the largest funding stream in the election year, after which funds will decrease.

The report also noted that in 2024, RT will receive 1.8 billion rubles ($18 million) more than it received last year, and Vladimir Solovyov’s channel Solovyov LIVE will receive 750 million rubles ($7.5 million).

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Putin meets South Sudanese President Salva Kiir

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir travelled to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday, September 28, where the two reportedly agreed to strengthen the relationship between the two countries, particularly focusing on trade, energy, and oil.

According to a transcript posted by the Kremlin, Putin told Kiir, “This is only the beginning. We have many good opportunities in a variety of fields, including energy.”

Oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 with Kiir at the country’s helm. South Sudan was admitted to the United Nations in the same year. The country has had a tenuous relationship with the international body, however, which extended an arms embargo against South Sudan in 2022; Russia abstained from that vote. Given that Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Kiir may look to Russia as an ally in his bid to have the embargo lifted. Notably, Kiir told Putin that Russia was a “strong friend” of South Sudan. 

In his statement, Putin claimed Russia would also support South Sudan on the domestic front. Kiir is facing mounting pressure from the international community to move forward with a peace deal signed in 2018 and prepare for elections in 2024.

Putin’s meeting with Kiir comes off the back of the July 2023 Russia-Africa summit, in which Russia attempted to strengthen and solidify its relationships with African countries. In May 2023, the African Union warned that African countries should “resist all forms of instrumentalization” in a conflict that threatens to “transform Africa into a geostrategic battleground,” adding that it would come at the detriment of the continent.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

The post Russian War Report: Civilian cafe attacked and a fake Ukrainian news site is exposed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

In August 2022, British anti-surveillance group Privacy International filed a complaint against the United Kingdom (UK) government for the use of GPS tagging and ankle monitors on refugees and migrants arriving in the country via the Channel. The group argued that the practice—leveraging tactics used to manage criminal populations—traumatizes and stigmatizes refugees and migrants, and by extension, criminalizes the search for asylum. Some of the victims of the practice asserted that it made them feel “like prisoners,” and others showed psychological impacts such as reluctance to engage with outsiders or even to leave their homes.

This is just one of the many instances of the growing use of technology to manage refugee and migrant populations around the world. In 2021, there were an estimated 281 million migrants globally, comprising: refugees and asylum seekers; students; those fleeing environmental and natural disasters; and those who relocated for employment or leisure. By this count, an estimated 3.6 percent of the world’s population was on the move in one year—the highest in history and a rate likely to continue if circumstances remain unchanged.

Policymakers and analysts have interpreted data on the rising number of global migrants and refugees to mean that there is a crisis underway that requires increasingly elaborate methods of policing and control, leading many to turn inward toward law enforcement or security-based technologies. However, data and research suggest that there is not so much a crisis of migrants as there is a crisis within policymaking, where the humanitarian instinct to protect those in search of safety and opportunity is being displaced by a desire to project power at the expense of vulnerable populations. Without critical evaluation of these claims, governments are increasingly accepting, normalizing, and indeed championing claims about fears of invasion and replacement that are, by extension, making dangerous room for extremist rhetoric that undermines democracy globally. Put differently, the absence of policy space for humane conversations around refugees and migrants is directly undermining democracy.

Technology has become a major mechanism to manage the movement of people both domestically and internationally, triggering ethical debates about its impact, particularly when employed by democratic governments in ways that are at odds with universal human rights. Countries are deploying tools to address the questions of digital citizenship and digital identity, but the leap between legal and technical definitions of identity is not insignificant and has major social implications, as discussed here. The rise of technosolutionism, or reliance on technology to solve complex social and political issues better suited to social approaches, reinforces exclusionary ideologies such as ethnonationalism and racism. That same technology, developed in securitized immigration contexts with fewer legal protections, is then often redeployed more broadly within democratic societies, or sold overseas to governments with less responsive governance structures, muddying citizens’ expectations of due process, civil rights, and democratic protections.

This paper intends to better inform the conversation around technology’s impact on democracy by evaluating technosolutionism and its application to the management of human mobility.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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The post Digital identities and border cultures: The limits of technosolutionism in the management of human mobility appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

In recent years, Sudan has seen significant political upheaval, from the 2019 ouster of autocratic ruler Omar al-Bashir and the October 2021 military coup that unseated the transitional government, to the outbreak of violent conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023. The result is a country—and its hopes for a democratic transition—now derailed, despite years of civil protests that themselves were disrupted by police maneuvering and the threat of full-blown civil war. This societal discord is manifested not just in real life but also in the country’s online information environment. This report examines the state of digital affairs in Sudan in the lead-up to the current conflict, focusing on the period from the October 2021 coup through December 2022.

While online networks played a crucial role in exposing brutalities committed by al-Bashir’s security apparatus and in organizing protests, almost 70 percent of the Sudanese population remained offline as of January 2022.

Despite less than a third of the country having access to the internet, both the al-Bashir regime and the subsequent ruling councils viewed online communication as a potentially dangerous tool in the hands of protesting citizens. Between December 2018 and December 2022, Sudanese citizens were subjected to 138 days of internet disruptions.

Overall, the legal infrastructure was typical of autocratic regimes in that it was designed to limit free speech and enable punitive actions against dissenters and opposition figures. Authorities used deliberately vague laws to enforce internet disruptions and confiscate protesters’ cell phones. For example, the Criminal Act of 1991 criminalized the spreading of false information, while the 2020 amendment to the Cybercrimes Law, which was passed in secret, made the spread of disinformation punishable with up to four years in prison, flogging, or both. While many laws from al-Bashir’s time remain in place, there have also been tangible improvements to Sudan’s legal infrastructure since his removal. Independent citizens took to the courts to fight against internet shutdowns, and journalists defied the Press and Publications Act to create a media union.

Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service formed a Cyber Jihad Unit to monitor online dissent and spread disinformation. During the 2018–19 protests that led to al-Bashir’s ouster, internal disinformation from the regime painted protesters as violent. After al-Bashir’s removal, internal campaigns worked to promote the military apparatus and target the transitional government.

Yet activists who spoke to the authors indicated they were primarily concerned with being identified by intelligence agents for sharing legitimate evidence of violence committed against protesters. Despite the danger, activists used Facebook Live to stream evidence of the regime’s brutality and ensured the evidence could not be easily dismissed as old or fake by including the time, date, and location of incriminating incidents in social media posts.

An important form of online resistance took place on women-only Facebook groups. Previously used to identify cheating men, the groups turned into investigative platforms where women posted images of suspected plain-clothed members of the intelligence services accused of abusing protesters. The groups were so successful at unearthing personal information about undercover intelligence officers that many officers took to wearing masks to hide their identities.

Foreign entities orchestrating disinformation campaigns primarily focused on promoting their relationship with Sudan or pushing Sudanese politics in a way to their own benefit. Yevgeny Prigozhin, who oversees Russian private military company the Wagner Group, told al-Bashir to spread disinformation depicting protesters as violent, while later Russian campaigns focused on promoting Russia’s own interests around a naval base in Port Sudan. Public relations firms from Gulf states that were supportive of the coup that toppled al-Bashir spent thousands of dollars promoting the military, seeing a greater opportunity of a beneficial relationship with the latter.

Meanwhile, rumors spread offline posed a threat to grassroots organizations that struggled to combat false information shared via word of mouth. Sudan’s unique information environment features a combination of a media ecosystem attempting to build a trustworthy reputation after years of censorship, a legal system designed to limit it further, and, despite these things, a populace striving toward greater governmental representation and democracy in spite of the autocratic rivalries that have violently hijacked it. In light of the ongoing conflict, with Sudanese civil society caught in the middle, the near horizon remains bleak, but in the long term, only greater transparency and accountability around the free flow of information in conjunction with a cessation in violence will provide the stepping stones necessary to build a resilient democracy in Sudan.

الملخص التنفيذي

ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻷﺧﻴﺮة، ﺷﻬﺪ اﻟﺴﻮدان اﺿﻄﺮاﺑﺎت ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻛﺒﻴﺮة، ﻣﻦ اﻹﻃﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺎﻛﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻋﻤﺮ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎم ،٢٠١٩واﻧﻘﻼب ٢٠٢١اﻟﺬي أﻃﺎح ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ، ﻹﻧﺪﻻع اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﻌﻨﻴﻒ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ وﻗﻮات اﻟﺪﻋﻢ اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻊ اﻟﺸﺒﻪ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﺑﺮﻳﻞ .٢٠٢٣ﻣﻤﺎ أﺛﻤﺮ ﻋﻦ ﺧﺮوج اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺎرﻫﺎ وآﻣﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﻮل اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ، ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻌﻄﻠﺖ ﻫﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﻣﻨﺎورات اﻟﺸﺮﻃﺔ واﻟﺘﻬﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺤﺮب أﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ. ﻻ ﺗﻨﺤﺴﺮ اﻧﻌﻜﺎﺳﺎت ﻫﺬا اﻟﺨﻼف اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﻲ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﻴﺔ ﻓﺤﺴﺐ، ﺑﻞ أﻳﻀً ﺎ ﻋﲆ ﺑﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ. ﻳﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺒﻘﺖ اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ، ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺰ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة ﻣﻦ اﻧﻘﻼب أﻛﺘﻮﺑﺮ ٢٠٢١ﺣﺘﻰ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ٢٠٢٢.

ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻌﺒﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺷﺒﻜﺎت اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ دورا ًﺣﺎﺳﻤًﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت واﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻷﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻮﺣﺸﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ارﺗﻜﺒﻬﺎ ﺟﻬﺎز أﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، ﻇﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺮب ﻣﻦ ٪٧٠ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻜﺎن اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻨﻘﻄﻌﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرًا ﻣﻦ ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ ٢٠٢٢.

ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ أن أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻠﺚ اﻟﺴﻜﺎن ﻳﻤﻠﻜﻮن إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﱃ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، اﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ واﻟﻨﻈﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ اﻟﻼﺣﻘﺔ أن اﻻﺗﺼﺎل ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ أداة ﺧﻄﺮة ﻓﻲ أﻳﺪي اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﻴﻦ. ﺑﻴﻦ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ٢٠١٨ ودﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ،٢٠٢٢ﺗﻌﺮض اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻮن اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﻮن إﱃ ١٣٨ﻳﻮﻣًﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ.

ﻋﻤﻮﻣﺎً، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻧﻤﻮذﺟﻴﺔ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ أﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺼﻤﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﻴﺮ وﺗﻤﻜﻴﻦ اﻹﺟﺮاءات اﻟﻌﻘﺎﺑﻴﺔ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻴﻦ. ﺣﻴﺚ وﻇﻔﺖ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎت ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻨﺎً ﻏﺎﻣﻀﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻋﻤﺪ ﻟﻔﺮض ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﻣﺼﺎدرة اﻟﻬﻮاﺗﻒ اﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻋﲆ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل، ﻳﺠﺮّم اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻌﺎم ١٩٩١ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ، ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ ﻋﺎم ٢٠٢٠ ﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ، واﻟﺬي ﺗﻢ إﻗﺮاره ﺳﺮاً، أﻗﺮ أن ﻋﻘﺎب ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﺠﻦ ﻟﻤﺪة ﺗﺼﻞ إﱃ أرﺑﻊ ﺳﻨﻮات أو اﻟﺠﻠﺪ أو ﻛﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ. ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻬﺪ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ ﻻ ﺗﺰال ﺳﺎرﻳﺔ، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﻨﺎك أﻳﻀًﺎ ﺗﺤﺴﻴﻨﺎت ﻣﻠﻤﻮﺳﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻨﺬ إﻗﺎﻟﺘﻪ. ﻟﺠﺄ ﻣﻮاﻃﻨﻮن ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻮن إﱃ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛﻢ ﻟﻤﺤﺎرﺑﺔ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﺤﺪى اﻟﺼﺤﻔﻴﻮن ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺼﺤﺎﻓﺔ واﻟﻤﻄﺒﻮﻋﺎت ﻹﻧﺸﺎء ﻧﻘﺎﺑﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ.

ﺷﻜﻞ ﺟﻬﺎز اﻷﻣﻦ واﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻲ وﺣﺪة ﻟﻠﺠﻬﺎد اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ ﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ. ﺧﻼل اﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت ٢٠١٩-٢٠١٨اﻟﺘﻲ أدت إﱃ اﻹﻃﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، وﺻﻔﺖ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﻒ. وﺑﻌﺪ إﻗﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، ﻋﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﺠﻬﺎز اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي واﺳﺘﻬﺪاف اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ.

أﺷﺎر اﻟﻨﺸﻄﺎء اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﺛﻮا إﱃ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻲ اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ إﱃ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻛﺎﻧﻮا ﺣﺬرﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻤﻼء اﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات ﻣﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻫﻮﻳﺎﺗﻬﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺘﻬﻢ أدﻟﺔ ﻣﺸﺮوﻋﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﻜﺐ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺨﻄﺮ، اﺳﺘﺨﺪم اﻟﻨﺸﻄﺎء Facebook Live ﻟﺒﺚ أدﻟﺔ ﻋﲆ وﺣﺸﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﺗﺄﻛﺪوا ﻣﻦ أﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻜﺬﻳﺒﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﻬﻮﻟﺔ ﺑﺎدّﻋﺎء أﻧﻬﺎ ﻗﺪﻳﻤﺔ أو ﻣﺰﻳﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﻀﻤﻴﻦ وذﻛﺮ وﻗﺖ وﺗﺎرﻳﺦ وﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺣﻮادث ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرات وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘﻮاﺻﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ.

ﻇﻬﺮ ﺷﻜﻞ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﻓﻴﺴﺒﻮك اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺴﺎء ﻓﻘﻂ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﺗُﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﺳﺎﺑﻘًﺎ ﺑﻐﺮض اﻟﺘﻌﺮف ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﺟﺎل اﻟﺨﺎﺋﻨﻴﻦ ﻟﺰوﺟﺎﺗﻬﻢ، ﺛﻢ ﺗﺤﻮﻟﺖ إﱃ ﻣﻨﺼﺎت ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﺗﻨﺸﺮ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﺴﺎء ﺻﻮرًا ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺘﺒﻬﻴﻦ ﺑﺄﻧﻬﻢ أﻋﻀﺎء ﺟﻬﺎز اﻷﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺗﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻼﺑﺴﺎً ﻣﺪﻧﻴﺔ وﻣﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ ﺑﺈﺳﺎءة ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﻧﺎﺟﺤﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺿﺒﺎط اﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻟﺪرﺟﺔ أن اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺒﺎط ﺑﺪأوا ﺑﺎرﺗﺪاء اﻷﻗﻨﻌﺔ ﻹﺧﻔﺎء ﻫﻮﻳﺎﺗﻬﻢ.

رﻛﺰت اﻟﻜﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻷﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻢ ﺣﻤﻼت اﻟﺘﻀﻠﻴﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻋﲆ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﻼﻗﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻮدان أو دﻓﻊ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﺬي ﻳﺨﺪم ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﺎ. ﻗﺎم ﻳﻔﻐﻴﻨﻲ ﺑﺮﻳﻐﻮزﻳﻦ، اﻟﻤﺸﺮف ﻋﲆ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ روﺳﻴﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻓﺎﻏﻨﺮ، ﺑﺈﺧﺒﺎر اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ أن ﻳﻨﺸﺮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﻀﻠﻠﺔ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﻋﲆ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻋﻨﻴﻔﻮن، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ رﻛﺰت اﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻟﺮوﺳﻴﺔ ﻻﺣﻘًﺎ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ روﺳﻴﺎ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺣﻮل ﺑﻨﺎء ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﺑﺤﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺗﺴﻮدان. ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻔﻘﺖ ﺷﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ دول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ داﻋﻤﺔ ﻟﻼﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺬي أﻃﺎح ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ آﻻف اﻟﺪوﻻرات ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ، ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ رأت اﻟﻔﺮص اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﻔﻴﺪة ﻣﻌﻪ.

ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻷﺛﻨﺎء، ﺷﻜّﻠﺖ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻌﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺸﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﺗﻬﺪﻳﺪًا ﻟﻠﻤﻨﻈﻤﺎت اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﺎﻓﺢ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ ﻣﺤﺎرﺑﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﻠﻬﺎ ﺷﻔﻬﻴﺎً.

ﺗﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪة ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﺑﻤﺰﻳﺞ ﻳﺠﻤﻊ ﻧﻈﺎم إﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﻳﺤﺎول ﺑﻨﺎء ﺳﻤﻌﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺮة ﺑﺎﻟﺜﻘﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﺔ، وﻧﻈﺎم ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﻣﺼﻤﻢ ﻟﻠﺤﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻹﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﺗﻠﻚ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﺷﻌﺐ ﻳﺴﻌﻰ إﱃ زﻳﺎدة اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻤﺜﻴﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻲ. ﻓﻲ ﺿﻮء اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺮ، ﻻ ﻳﺰال اﻷﻓﻖ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻗﺎﺗﻤﺎ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ، ﻟﻦ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻧﻘﺎط اﻻﻧﻄﻼق اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻟﺒﻨﺎء دﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻣﺮﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ أﻛﺒﺮ ﻗﺪر ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ ﺣﻮل اﻟﺘﺪﻓﻖ اﻟﺤﺮ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺰاﻣﻦ ﻣﻊ وﻗﻒ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ.

Related content

Issue Brief

Aug 8, 2023

A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment

By Cameron Hudson

A brief on how the United States and Sudan can collaborate on combatting disinformation and building up the African nation’s democratic potential.

Africa Disinformation

Report launch

Online Event Tue, August 8, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

Democracy derailed: Sudan’s precarious information environment

The DFRLab hosts the launch of its newest report, Democracy Derailed: Sudan’s Precarious Information Environment. The report looks at the intricacies of Sudan’s information and media ecosystem between 2019 and 2022 in light of the current conflict.

Africa Digital Policy Disinformation East Africa

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

The post Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lessons learned for improving the timeliness and effectiveness of combatting disinformation and supporting civilian rule

There are few African countries that have received the same degree of high-level and sustained attention from the US government, during the administrations of both Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as the Republic of Sudan. While this engagement stems in large part from a long history of Washington leading diplomatic efforts to isolate the Sudanese government for its support for terrorism during the 1990s, advance the peace process in the country’s north-south civil war, and eventually punish the government for the Darfur genocide, Washington’s renewed diplomatic engagement at the time of Sudan’s 2018 popular uprising reflected a sense of opportunity that real change was potentially coming to the country.

The historic events during the spring and summer of 2019, beginning with longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir’s arrest and removal by senior army officers and the brokering of a civilian-military hybrid government, created both an opportunity and what many in Washington saw as an obligation to help Sudan’s transition succeed. After decades of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the installation of a civilian-led government created the minimal condition that allowed Washington and Western allied governments to begin the task of providing a trusted local partner with the assistance to begin reforming the political system, stabilizing the economy, and transforming the armed forces that would eventually enable a full transition to democracy, one of the popular demands of the revolution.

By late 2019, during a historic visit to Washington by Sudan’s newly named prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, the Trump administration announced a process to normalize diplomatic relations with Sudan through an exchange of ambassadors, among other steps. Privately, the Trump administration also set about the task of constructing an assistance package that would meet the moment and provide the technical, financial, and development assistance needed to demonstrate a true “democracy dividend” to the vast majority of average Sudanese who were by this time struggling under the weight of financial collapse brought on by the one-two punch of regime neglect and, soon, COVID-19 shutdowns.

Washington, however, was both ill-postured and slow to foresee the monumental political opening occurring in the early days of the revolution and then further delayed by an interlocking web of restrictions and prohibitions, some of them self-imposed and some imposed by the US Congress, that limited its ability to scale up resources in a timely manner. In addition to the challenges of having to undo more than twenty-five years of bureaucratic restrictions and red tape, Washington also needed to scale up its human resources inside Sudan that had largely dwindled over the years.

Many of those we spoke with both inside and outside the US government and on the ground in Sudan acknowledged that the speed of change in late 2018 and early 2019, leading to the April 2019 arrest and removal of al-Bashir from office, was so dizzying that Washington was forced into a “wait-and-see” approach. As such, it was more inclined to stand back and assess events as they unfolded and only act to prevent what many feared could result in a mass atrocity against civilian protesters instead of actually trying to shape an outcome that would more immediately deliver on the aims of the protesters. This posture was aided by the fact that the US government had no recent history of partners and programming around the kind of democracy and governance issues that were needed in the early days of the revolution. Nor was the US government postured to provide other forms of assistance owing to its own existing restrictions on the al-Bashir regime. 

Many of these issues were exacerbated by the lack of an ambassador at post; the state sponsor of terrorism label that until December 14, 2020, still applied; and the personal restrictions imposed on US diplomats in Khartoum that meant critical positions were left unfilled at the time of the revolution, leaving them to be filled by an acting junior officer or those who did not have a deep understanding of the unique challenges in countries seeking to transition from autocracy to democracy. Illustrating the severity of this point, through the popular wave of protests until six months after a civilian government was installed in September 2019, the US government remained unable to initiate any new Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) programming related to ongoing restrictions from the al-Bashir era, a lack of policy direction from Washington, and a dearth of programmatic staff in the field.

One observer noted in testimony to the US Senate in February 2022, “While assistance opportunities may have been limited in post-secession Sudan, there has not been adequate staffing up [of the embassy] since the 2019 revolution…. More personnel could be devoted to messaging and public affairs outreach, both in person in Sudan and on social media.”

This problem persisted until early 2020 when, after Hamdok’s visit to Washington in December 2019, US officials accelerated their efforts to shore up the new prime minister’s standing vis-à-vis the security services, which remained the dominant force in the country, while helping Hamdok deliver some early wins to his government that could be passed on to the Sudanese people. In fact, some of Washington’s caution was well-intended, if not well-founded, as it struggled to ensure that the civilian component was in fact functioning as an independent and responsible arm of the Sudanese government and was not operating under duress or influence of the military. In retrospect, however, that delay in programming ultimately provided Russia and other malign external influencers more time to cement their operational and influential roles with Sudan’s security services, giving the other powers an advantage in setting and controlling the narrative around the new government, as was only later evident.

Comfortable in the view that the West could work with the civilian government, by November 2019, the first assessment team from the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was on the ground in Sudan identifying needs and opportunities. According to its website, OTI “provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs. Strategically designed for each unique situation, OTI has laid the foundation for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, supporting emerging independent media, and fostering peace and democracy through innovative programming. In countries transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, from violence to peace, or following a fragile peace, OTI’s programs serve as catalysts for positive political change.” Starting with the OTI team’s arrival in February 2020, it would lead all US government programmatic activity around these areas, including the growing concern around disinformation.

During its time in Sudan, the OTI team took its programmatic direction from the prime minister’s office in the belief that, as the central reformist figure and symbol of the change brought about by the revolution, those around the prime minister would know how best to design and manage the technical resources that OTI provided. However, as one USAID employee said, echoing a point made by several colleagues in interviews, “our programming needed to be sensitive to the politics of the country, but the cabinet of technocrats were themselves not sensitive to the politics of their own country, especially the PM.” Themes quickly emerged as a large impediment to effective US programming and messaging, specifically those of government leaders being divorced from the politics and public opinions in Sudan and, therefore, unable to tailor messages to them or adequately respond to active disinformation campaigns led by the security services and their foreign backers.

Nearly six months after OTI’s engagement began, a United Kingdom-based contractor was engaged via a US contract to provide the prime minister’s office, as well as the US government, a window into the kinds of disinformation, public attitudes, and trending news items that were circulating on a daily basis across Sudanese social media networks. The project also aimed to identify which ministries and ministers were being particularly targeted with disinformation campaigns so that efforts could be made to counter those stories, prepare ministers to get ahead of trending news events, and empower individual social media influencers with accurate information for dissemination. Through the firm’s weekly social media monitoring reports and more frequent spot reports, civilian leaders and those inside the US Embassy with access to the reports had a real-time view as to which issues were trending among local social media users, a measure of evolving public attitudes toward those issues, and which local and foreign accounts were responsible for driving these narratives.

While these efforts to share and disseminate this “intelligence” were viewed inside of USAID as having mixed levels of success inside the prime minister’s office and with other ministries, depending on the quality of the people on the inside responsible for acting on and sharing these reports, it was nonetheless viewed as critical that these efforts and this contract transition to a wholly owned and operated program of the civilian government. By mid-2021, efforts were being made to create a disinformation unit inside of the Ministry of Information and Culture that would move the center of gravity on this issue away from the prime minister’s office, which was often inundated with reports and visitors and had difficulty making decisions in a timely way, to a central command center where information could be more effectively disseminated across the cabinet in a more timely manner and where policy questions could perhaps get a decision faster.

In talks with representatives of the British contractor, on many occasions civilian government officials were presented with data on manipulated content emanating from collections of accounts driven by, inter alia, pro-Islamist, pro-military, and pro-Hemedti accounts and given options that the contractor could pursue on the government’s behalf, including notifying Facebook to shut the accounts down and offering counter-messaging. [Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and commonly known as Hemedti, served as deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council after al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.] In many instances, “decision-making paralysis” often meant that timely decisions on fast-moving messaging issues went unaddressed. However, in one instance, the contractor was able to notify Facebook of the inauthentic behavior, prompting the platform to shut down more than one thousand accounts. Several months later, Facebook shut down an additional tranche of inauthentic accounts without prompting from the Sudanese or their contractor, suggesting to the contractor at least that Sudan had been “put on the map” for Facebook as a place of concern that they should continue to monitor. In response, however, one former OTI staffer noted that “shutting down Facebook accounts is great, but they keep churning out new ones. It only helps if it is in service of a larger strategy, which we didn’t have.”

Beyond these efforts, with the help of outside contractors, the government was able to train journalists, including citizen journalists, to identify misinformation and perform their own investigative work to push back against false narratives circulating about the civilian government. Contractors also compiled a list of the most influential social media voices in the country and worked with government officials to ensure those influencers were engaged with regularly to ensure they had access to accurate information and could promote it. These efforts also included financial support to a Sudanese-operated nongovernmental organization that actively fact-checked news reports and published deep-dive analyses behind military and foreign-backed disinformation campaigns. One policy request, not acted upon, was the creation of a network of “500 or more newly trained journalists who could sit inside the Ministry of Information and push out factual information, reasoning that if the Islamists and military had troll farms churning out fake news why couldn’t the government counter that with its own team pushing out real news?”What the government routinely failed to realize was that it had the power to defuse these narratives and their accounts if it only used the tools and took their contractor’s advice.

However, just as these nascent efforts were beginning to take hold, two simultaneous events derailed those efforts: the October 25, 2021, military coup in which Hamdok was detained and the civilian cabinet dissolved and the simultaneous internet shut down, which not only halted most of the information sharing but also limited pro-democracy groups’ ability to use online tools to organize and coordinate their activities. And since the US government programming came well after the internet shutdowns that defined the early days of the popular revolution, its efforts to empower online activism were immediately and completely undermined by the military’s renewed control over the internet after the coup.

According to several USAID employees at the US Embassy in Khartoum at the time, there was initially serious consideration and effort given to bringing in internet hardware from outside the country to create a parallel, albeit temporary, internet infrastructure that would get around the junta’s shutdown of the service. One former OTI official interviewed noted “there were three to four weeks of intense effort given to identify the technology, the resources, and the requirements of the system,” but that Washington ultimately decided that it would be too difficult to procure and to get into the country without being discovered.

But while some on the USAID side felt that the risk to reward was worth it, more conservative voices within the US Department of State worried that, if their efforts were discovered by the military, it could result in the expulsion of US diplomats and a worsening of the military’s response against protesters. The effort was ultimately abandoned with no other serious conversation beginning that could help to empower civilian protesters with virtual private networks (VPNs), burner phones—sometimes call “protest phones”—or other means of circumventing the junta’s control over private communications.

Indeed, as the internet controls became more widespread post-coup, resistance committees and others reverted to previous, decidedly low-tech communication and organization efforts, including the use of printed pamphlets and flyers or word-of-mouth organization. Here, too, there was little the United States or others could offer in the way of support to these efforts.

Recommendations

Washington was caught flat-footed in 2019 when al-Bashir was removed from office after nearly thirty years in power. No day-after plan existed for supporting a transition, nor had any efforts been foreseen to untie the hands of US policy so that the full diplomatic toolkit of rewards, incentives, and punitive measures could be deployed in a timely manner. This was as true in efforts to push back against online disinformation efforts as it was in providing technical assistance to ministries or direct financial and organizational support to pro-democracy organizations still on the frontlines. In the ten months from the fall of the National Congress Party regime to the first deployment of OTI advisers to Sudan, Russia and other malign actors demonstrated an ability to build relations, become operational, and begin to influence the media and political environment in favor of their allies in the security services. This left the United States and its Western allies playing an even bigger game of catch-up when their staffing was in place and when their programs were finally ready to be rolled out.

In watching the events in Sudan unfold through the revolution and speaking to Sudanese stakeholders and US government officials on the ground since that time, a number of important insights and recommendations, specifically around countering online influence from malicious actors, have emerged:

1. Invest in resources, strategies, and lessons learned for combatting disinformation. The United States needs a specific strategy for combatting disinformation. The United States has never had a strategy for pushing back against online content that is intended to weaken civilian and pro-democracy governance and empower security actors. Both Sudanese actors, working closely with the United States, along with US staff-level officers from across USAID variously described US efforts as “ad hoc,” “inconsistent,” and “haphazard,” in some cases responding to requests from the prime minister’s office and in some cases surmising what was needed. While one former OTI staffer noted that, while OTI was still “brand new to the communications and disinformation space, there must have been some case studies or resident knowledge somewhere in the US government that could have served as a kind of playbook.” Given the explosive growth in the use of disinformation and online authoritarianism and the shrinking of internet freedom in Sudan and across the region, the United States would be well-served to invest in further developing its expertise in this space, while at the same time conducting a lessons-learned process of what worked and what did not in Sudan and other analogous settings for future use.
2. Do not just detect misinformation, respond and combat it. The United States must make better use of the information that it collects about online disinformation and get it into the hands of those who need it in time to be useful. In particular, many in USAID noted that US diplomats did not know how to make use of the information and insights in the reports they were generating, viewing the information merely as “interesting data points” rather than intelligence that could better inform policy choices or programmatic efforts. One former OTI staffer sounded a similar note that “the products were useful and provided us with ongoing sentiment analysis of the protest movement, but we could never operationalize what we were learning.” Interviewees mentioned similar arguments regarding Sudan’s civilian government, which had difficulty deciding what it should do since acting on advice to shut down, for example, pro-Islamist accounts could have unleashed a backlash those officials could not foresee. In those cases, the United States would be well advised to consider its own ability to act in support of its allies in the civilian government and authorize action against inauthentic networks in a bid to “decontaminate the information space for the sake of civilian rule and democracy.”
3. Shine a light on disinformation. The United States should make public its findings and research on the information space in Sudan. While the training of journalists, promotion of media freedom, and advocacy around free speech is important, the speed at which fake accounts and fake news can be put up, taken down, and spread, to paraphrase Mark Twain, happens before the truth can put on its boots. Part of an offensive would be the more immediate and regular release of disinformation reporting that is being collected to shine a light on bad actors in real time. To a large extent, this requires treating that information not as intelligence, with a limited and tightly controlled distribution, but simply as public information. Creating a stand-alone website or dashboard or sharing that information in real time with a trusted Sudanese source for posting and dissemination would have compelled not just governments to act, but empowered civil society, including many young people, who might have made better use of the information.
4. Improve working relationships with Sudanese civil society. The United States needs to develop more effective ways of working with local civil society organizations. This holds true in regard to both US efforts in the counter-disinformation space and its entire engagement in support of pro-democracy forces throughout the revolution. It is clear that government-to-government ties and assistance relationships are the most natural and comfortable way for the United States to engage, but in circumstances like in Sudan, where civilian leaders were either too constrained or too paralyzed to act, empowering civil society actors must become a more available alternative. While some of that was accomplished through the sharing of disinformation reporting with local influencer and fact-checking organizations, more could have been done to creatively support their efforts to circumvent military shutdowns of the internet or the near continuous churn of new disinformation campaigns that actively sought to undermine civilian rule and the popular revolution.

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Report
Aug 8, 2023
Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy
By Tessa Knight, Lujain Alsedeg
An examination of the time from December 2018, when protests against then-president Omar al-Bashir first broke out, and December 2022, when a framework agreement between civilian and military leaders came into play.
Africa Civil Society

---

Report launch

Online Event Tue, August 8, 2023 • 8:00 am ET
Democracy derailed: Sudan’s precarious information environment
The DFRLab hosts the launch of its newest report, Democracy Derailed: Sudan’s Precarious Information Environment. The report looks at the intricacies of Sudan’s information and media ecosystem between 2019 and 2022 in light of the current conflict.
Africa Digital Policy Disinformation East Africa




The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

The post A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/podcast/mercenary-bloodline-the-war-in-sudan/ Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:19:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661879 Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Africa experts Cameron Hudson and Munzoul Assal about the mercenary pedigree of the Rapid Support Forces.

The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

“The origin story of the wealth is really sending the RSF out into the region as a mercenary force… Hemedti has now been able to return back to his fighting roots but doing it with a war chest that has allowed him to recruit and to resupply in such a way that he is now a rival to the authority of the country.”

Cameron Hudson, Former US government expert on Sudan

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice













About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Further reading


MENASource Jun 28, 2023
The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?
By Mark N. Katz
The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]
Conflict Europe & Eurasia

MENASource Jun 1, 2023
Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan? 
By Shahira Amin
With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.
East Africa Middle East

MENASource May 11, 2023
Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here
By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper
Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.
Africa East Africa



Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

Learn more

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cbdc-tracker-cited-by-statista/ Wed, 28 Jun 2023 16:11:23 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661596 Read the full piece here.

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]]> Read the full piece here.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cbdc-tracker-cited-by-decrypt/ Mon, 26 Jun 2023 16:17:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661600 Read the full piece here.

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]]> Read the full piece here.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-sudan-military-invasion/ Thu, 01 Jun 2023 14:27:15 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=650746 With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.

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]]> The crisis in Sudan, which has now entered its second month, has serious implications for neighboring states. This is particularly the case for economically-challenged Egypt, which is watching a humanitarian crisis unfold on its side of the border as tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees flee the conflict. 

Since the fighting erupted in mid-April, at least 259,000 people have crossed over from Sudan into neighboring countries—namely Egypt, Chad, Eritrea, and the Central Africa Republic—according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). But Egypt—which shares its southern border with Sudan—is the worst affected.  

A primary destination for people fleeing the violence, Egypt has received more than fifty thousand people from across the border. Hundreds of thousands more are expected to cross into the country in the coming months if the fighting continues. The mass influx not only threatens to aggravate the humanitarian crisis on Egypt’s side of the border, but it also threatens to overstretch the country’s resources at a time when it faces a deepening economic crisis, which risks further disgruntling its disaffected population.   

But the Egyptian government has a lot more to worry about than rising public discontent caused by the immense economic pressure. The possible infiltration of extremist groups into Egypt is currently a prime concern for authorities. It’s a case of once bitten, twice shy.

Over the past decade, the Egyptian army and police have been the target of multiple terrorist attacks by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated jihadists that crossed into Egypt from the shared eastern border with the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, troops have been deployed along Egypt’s Western border with Libya to curb terrorist infiltration and a repeat of similar attacks. The recent release of pro-Muslim Brotherhood figures from a prison in Sudan has heightened Cairo’s fears of the opening of a new front in Egypt’s war on terrorism. 

Another major concern for Egypt is the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) strong ties with Ethiopia. Egypt has sought the backing of Sudan in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the downstream country’s share of Nile waters. This, following the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), considered by Egypt to be an “existential threat.” Should Egypt decide to use the military option against Ethiopia at any time in the future, it may have to do so unilaterally, as it would no longer have Sudan on its side.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has ruled out any intervention in Sudan, arguing that the Sudanese crisis was an “internal” matter. He has also pledged that Egypt would not take sides in the conflict and has offered to mediate between Sudan’s rival factions. However, skeptics suggest that Egypt is already deeply involved in Khartoum. They affirm that the Egyptian military backs the Sudanese army with which it forged strong ties following the overthrow of the Islamist-leaning former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.  

Some analysts argue that the stakes are too high for Cairo to stand idly by and watch as the situation deteriorates.

It is no secret that Cairo has long backed the Sudanese army with the conviction that it is the sole institution that can restore stability in Sudan. Egypt cemented its ties with the Sudanese army by conducting joint military exercises with Sudan after Bashir was deposed by the military in the wake of mass protests in Sudan. Egyptian authorities are looking to Abdel Fattah El-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto military leader, to quash the nascent pro-democracy movement that emerged during Sudan’s 2019 mass uprising and to restore security and stability in Sudan—moves that Cairo perceives as serving its interests. 

The capture of two hundred Egyptian soldiers—the majority of whom were air force personnel—at a military base in the northern Sudanese town of Meroe by the RSF in mid-April, as well as a leaked video showing the soldiers in a state of defeat, were perceived as an act of provocation by Cairo. The humiliating episode also provoked an outcry on social media platforms. 

The RSF believed Egyptian soldiers were siding with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) but later apologized for releasing the video. Meanwhile, in an apparent attempt to save face, Sisi insisted that the Egyptian troops were in Sudan “for training purposes” and gave the RSF a seventy-two-hour ultimatum to return the soldiers home safely. The troops were indeed sent back to Egypt on April 19, but some analysts believe that the incident has not been forgotten and are guessing Cairo may be waiting for the right moment to retaliate.      

There have been unconfirmed reports that Egypt has provided the SAF with military intelligence and tactical support. Sources have also cited unconfirmed bombings of RSF positions by Egyptian fighter jets and say Egypt is contemplating invading Sudan to fight the powerful paramilitary forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemetti. 

If the reports are accurate, this will this pit Egypt against the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Egypt’s longtime ally and principal financial backer—which has thrown its weight behind the RSF. It would also pit Egypt against Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar,  another RSF supporter, whose forces control much of eastern Libya and who was backed by Egypt and the RSF during his failed onslaught on Tripoli in 2019.

All of this puts Egypt in a dilemma. On the one hand, it would like to see stability and security restored in Sudan for fear of violence spilling over into its territory. On the other, Sudan’s northern neighbor does not wish to risk ruffling the feathers of the UAE by overtly taking an opposing side in the conflict. Cash-strapped Egypt has been selling government-owned assets to the wealthy Gulf nation to shore up its troubled economy. Agitating the UAE may cause it to halt its investments in Egypt, denying the North African country the cash it badly needs to plug a financing gap of $17 billion over the next four years.  

It is safer for Egypt to continue to support the SAF covertly or indirectly without publicly announcing its anti-RSF position. Still, with the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are rife that a full-scale Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent—assuming the conflict drags on. According to some analysts, invading Sudan would give Egypt an opportunity to reassert its leadership role in the region.

By brokering a truce between rival factions in Sudan, Egypt also stands to win favor with global powers—the United States in particular—which had been pinning their hopes on a  handover of power to a civilian government. A return to civilian rule had been a bone of contention between Burhan and the RSF, with the latter accusing Sudan’s military leaders of clinging to power. 

Helping end the conflict in Sudan would also allow Egypt to align its foreign policy and interests with the United States, reversing a previous trend of having conflicting viewpoints on regional issues. This would pave the way for greater cooperation between the US and its longtime Middle Eastern ally, and would undoubtedly help in defusing tensions over opposing stances on several issues, including Egypt’s backing of Haftar during the civil war in Libya and recently leaked reports of Egypt’s secret plans to supply rockets to Russia.  

Egypt’s strategic relations with Russia have irked the United States the most. It may now be the time for Cairo to show the Biden administration that Egypt’s cooperation with Russia—which has included arms deals and a contract for a civilian nuclear facility—is not an attempt to turn its back on US support, but rather, diversify its sources of support. 

Thus, while there are many complex factors that might dissuade Egypt from intervening overtly in Sudan, the possibility of an invasion cannot be ruled out. The chance to smooth over ties with the US is a juicy incentive, as are the benefits that would arise from bringing stability and security to the surrounding region. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-us-and-g7-allies-target-russias-evasion-and-procurement-networks/ Thu, 25 May 2023 13:42:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=649118 Tackling export controls circumvention by Russia; the enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap; the failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

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]]> A few days ago, the Group of Seven (G7) allies met in Hiroshima and reasserted their determination to further economically isolate Russia and impose costs on those who support Russia’s war effort. To do so, they will have to close loopholes in existing sanctions and export control regimes, which in turn requires enhancing interagency coordination within the US government and developing a common vernacular among allies on the targeting of sanctions and export control evasion networks. 

In this edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we cover:

• New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit.
• How the United States is tackling export controls circumvention and what should improve moving forward.
• The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap.
• The failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment from 2022 indicated that forty out of fifty-two components recovered from the Iranian Shahed-136 drone that was downed in Ukraine last fall had been manufactured by thirteen different American companies, while the remaining twelve were made in Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, and China. The case revealed that it was not enough to impose sanctions and export controls on Russian defense companies. Not only was Iran providing drones to Russia, but also certain entities and individuals in countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have procured materials on Russia’s behalf. This is why the United States released a new sanctions package ahead of the G7 summit, targeting a much wider international network of Russia sanctions and export controls evasion. 

Finland, Switzerland, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore—these are just a few locations associated with individuals and entities included in the Treasury Department’s newest designations against Russia. Entities and individuals located in these countries have aided Russia’s circumvention efforts or provided materials for Russia’s military procurement. Among the sanctioned individuals are Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti and his colleagues in Germany and India, who have sold advanced technology to Russian state-owned enterprises. Liechtenstein-based Trade Initiative Establishment (TIE) and its network of two companies and four individuals have been procuring semiconductor production equipment for sanctioned Russian entities since 2012. 

Along with the United States, the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions against eighty-six individuals and entities from Russian energy, metals, financial, and military sectors who have been enhancing Russia’s capacity to wage the war. Additionally, the European Union (EU) is developing its eleventh package of sanctions which will reportedly, for the first time, target Chinese entities facilitating Russia’s evasion efforts. Coordinating the designation and enforcing processes among the G7 allies will be key in synchronizing the targeting of Russia’s evasion and procurement networks.

Export controls circumvention: How the US is tackling it and what should improve moving forward

While sanctions aim to cut entities and individuals procuring technology for the Russian military out of the global financial system, export controls are designed to prevent them from physically acquiring components. G7 allies have levied significant export controls on Russia, but enforcing export controls is easier said than done. Third countries from Russia’s close neighborhood have stepped up to fill Russia’s technology shortages caused by other countries complying with export controls. Central Asian and Caucasus countries had a significant uptick in exports of electronic components to Russia, while Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan have been supplying semiconductors to Moscow. Even if exported electronic components are not designed for military application, Russians have been able to extract semiconductors and electronic components for military use even from refrigerators and dishwashers. The sudden boost in electronic equipment exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Russia can only be explained by Russia’s efforts of repurposing them for military use. 

In response to Russia’s efforts to obtain technology by all means possible, the US Departments of Commerce and Justice have jointly launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. The goal of the Strike Force is to prevent Russia and adversarial states such as China and Iran from illicitly getting their hands on advanced US technology. The Strike Force recently announced criminal charges against individuals supplying software and hardware source codes stolen from US tech companies to China. The Strike Force embodies the whole-of-government approach the United States has been taking in investigating sanctions and export controls evasion cases. The prosecutorial and investigative expertise of the Justice Department, coupled with the Treasury’s ability to identify and block the sanctions evaders from the US financial system, will amplify the impact of the Commerce Department’s export controls and enhance their investigations and enforcement.  

The US Department of Commerce has also teamed up with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to publish a joint supplemental alert outliniing red flags for potential Russian export controls evasion that financial institutions should watch out for and report on, consistent with their compliance reporting requirements. The red flags include but are not limited to:

• Payments for dual-use goods to companies located outside of the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) countries. 
• A new customer who trades in the nine Harmonized System (HS) codes, is located outside of the GECC countries and was incorporated after February 24, 2022. 
• A consumer who refuses to provide details to banks about end users or company ownership. 

Providing information to the public in the form of alerts and advisories is an effective step to increase awareness, financial institution reporting, and compliance with Western sanctions and exports controls. The Disruptive Technology Strike Force should consider issuing a multilateral advisory on export control evasion with G7 allies to bring in foreign partner perspectives, similar to the multilateral advisory issued in March on sanctions evasion by the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force (REPO)

Regarding third-country intermediaries suspected of supplying Russia with dual-use technology, G7 allies should prioritize capacity building and encouraging political will in these countries to strengthen sanctions and customs enforcement. Building up their capacity to monitor and record what products are being exported to Russia could be the first step towards this goal. For example, Georgian authorities returned goods and vehicles destined for Russia and Belarus in 204 cases. However, registration certificates did not identify the codes of returned goods in fifty cases, and clarified that the goods were sanctioned only in seventy-one cases. Developing a system for identifying controlled goods and making the customs data easily accessible to the public could both salvage Georgia’s reputation and enhance export control enforcement against Russia.

The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap

The US Department of the Treasury recently published a report analyzing the effects of the oil price cap, arguing that the novel tool has achieved its dual objective of reducing revenue for Moscow while keeping global oil prices relatively stable. A recent study by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute backs up this statement with detailed research of the Russian ports and the payments made to Russian sellers. However, Russian crude oil exports to China through the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino might be examples of transactions where the price cap approach does not hold.

In response, the Department of the Treasury warned US ship owners and flagging registries to use maritime intelligence services for detecting when tankers are disguising their port of call in Russia. Meanwhile, commodities brokers and oil traders should invoice shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs separately, and ensure that the price of Russian oil is below 60 dollars. 

Despite China’s imports of Russian crude oil, the world average price for Russian crude oil in the first quarter of 2023 was 58.62 dollars, which supports the claim about the success of the oil price cap, at least for now. Notably, Russia’s energy revenues dropped by almost 40 percent from December 2022 to January 2023, likely in part due to the price cap combined with lower global energy prices.

Beyond Russia: The failure of US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

While the world has been focused on the G7 summit, the crisis worsened in Sudan. In April 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order 14098 (EO 14098) authorizing future sanctions on foreign persons to address the situation in Sudan and to support a transition to democracy and a civilian transitional government in Sudan. The use of sanctions to support policy goals in Africa is not new. In the case of EO 14098, policymakers seek to use future sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan, undermining Sudan’s democratic transition, as well as committing violence against civilians or perpetuating other human rights abuses. 

Much has been written and studied about the effectiveness of sanctions programs in Africa with many programs suffering from being poorly designed, organized, implemented, or enforced. Sudan faced statutory sanctions from its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 to 2020 and US Treasury sanctions from 1997 to 2017 both of which produced limited results due to ineffective enforcement and maintenance of the program. A near-total cut-off of Sudan from the US financial system pushed Sudan to develop financial ties beyond the reach of the US dollar.

Sanctions in Sudan can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in these relevant countries. Cutting off those links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply weapons, and pay their soldiers, which could force them back to the negotiating table.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @KDonovan_AC.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Castellum.AI partners with the Economic Statecraft Initiative and provides sanctions data for the Global Sanctions Dashboard and Russia Sanctions Database.



Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore Here



At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/quirk-in-just-security-on-adapting-the-us-strategy-towards-hybrid-regimes/ Fri, 19 May 2023 14:06:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=647646 On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US' commitments to democratic values.

The post Quirk in Just Security on adapting the US strategy towards hybrid regimes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> original source

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Failing to address the democratic deficiencies of hybrid regimes sets up the United States for long-term strategic failure and hinders American economic prosperity. To avoid these outcomes, the United States must carve out a new path forward that preserves near-term US interests while also pressing these States to make democratic progress.

Patrick Quirk


Fellow
Patrick Quirk
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Freedom and Prosperity Center GeoStrategy Initiative
Civil Society Conflict

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/what-is-driving-the-adoption-of-chinese-surveillance-technology-in-africa/ Mon, 15 May 2023 13:49:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=818066 When examining the proliferation of Chinese surveillance systems and cyber capabilities in Africa, research disproportionately focuses on the motivations and ambitions of the supplier. This perspective, while it highlights Chinese diplomatic ambitions and corporate opportunities, ignores local features that drive the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools.

The post What is driving the adoption of Chinese surveillance technology in Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

Table of Contents

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Go global
• The use of Chinese public security systems in Africa
• A case from Kenya
• Comparisons across the continent 
• Global insecurities and US interests
• US-China competition’s impact on Africa
Download PDF

Executive summary

When examining the proliferation of Chinese surveillance systems and cyber capabilities in Africa, research disproportionately focuses on the motivations and ambitions of the supplier. This perspective, while it highlights Chinese diplomatic ambitions and corporate opportunities, ignores local features that drive the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools. This paper discusses African demand factors through an examination of the primary case study of Kenya and examples from South Africa and Uganda. By drawing attention to local efforts to procure and collaborate with Chinese firms to establish public security systems, this work seeks to address the motivations behind the adoption of Chinese information and communication technology (ICT) systems, which include artificial intelligence (AI) surveillance tools and other biometric identification systems, and illustrates the consequences of the proliferation of digital surveillance tools for local and global communities. The paper emphasizes African volition—recognizing its salience—as a way to go beyond myopic representations of Africa as a passive recipient and partner in Africa-China relations.

This work examines the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools as a dynamic multilateral process. To stem the proliferation of surveillance tools, US policy must understand African demand and accordingly help address local priorities. Accordingly, this paper assesses how demand factors contribute to the proliferation of surveillance technologies, addressing an underexplored facet of the proliferation process, while underscoring the risks of these tools’ buildup. Local procurement is critically driven by public security ambitions and justified as a means of achieving development and security aims. While these tools arrive on ostensibly permissible grounds, their acquisition and application come without public consent or robust accountability measures. It is this gap between the adoption of novel digital surveillance technologies and robust regulatory measures that inspires trepidation. Despite growing concerns over human rights violations domestically and the real risk of installed backdoors in hardware and software, African leaders continue to procure surveillance tools from the People’s Republic of China. This decision is predicated on the availability and financial feasibility of Chinese platforms as well as on the technology’s supposed capacity to address infrastructure gaps and local public security threats. Discussions of African agency that fail to underscore some of the impediments to its expression only romanticize African volition.


Issue Brief
Oct 17, 2022
China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools
By Bulelani Jili
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives.
Cybersecurity

Introduction

Countries across Africa are procuring and employing surveillance tools from China. This trend is a product of China’s diplomatic strategy, its technological ambitions, and growing corporate power and reach, as well as African domestic demands. Thus, both supply and demand factors contribute to the growing proliferation of surveillance tools. A companion paper to this issue brief focused on the key “push factors” from China and their significance for Global South actors.¹ This paper focuses on a diagnostic account of the pull factors in African states.

This paper is divided into three sections. It begins with a brief overview of China’s global expansion into African markets.² This study’s focus on the proliferation and procurement of Chinese surveillance tools does not presume the party-state’s exceptional nature in the distribution of digital surveillance tools or seek to obfuscate the broader international market for surveillance tools and cyber intrusive systems, which involves Western firms. Rather, this close examination of the proliferation of Chinese public security systems is an attempt to understand China’s growing role in African ICT markets. An investigation into the spread of Chinese digital surveillance technologies in Africa offers a grounded basis for examining how party-state ambitions and corporate firm activities are entangled and, critically, meditated by local vectors. Principally, it expands our understanding of the local and global risks that the adoption of these systems entails while providing greater insight into the client decision-making process, a crucial and underexamined feature of this proliferation.

Then, this paper examines the factors driving the adoption of digital infrastructure in Africa and the consequences for civil liberties. The size and scope of this inquiry do not permit an exhaustive review of the global ecosystem of surveillance technologies. Instead, primary attention is given to the spread of public security technology from China to Africa. Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda are salient examples of broader China-Africa dynamics, and have been selected to help explore how China’s growing cyber footprint is driven by local realities in Africa, how Chinese diplomatic engagements and corporate expansion are mediated by local adoption patterns, and how these local demand factors have their own inertia that drives outcomes. The paper emphasizes African volition—recognizing its salience—as a way to go beyond myopic representations of Africa as a passive recipient and partner in Africa-China relations.

The paper draws attention to drivers for the adoption of digital infrastructure in Africa and the consequences for civil liberties. By privileging the perspective of recipient countries and their local milieu, it demonstrates not only how China promotes its products abroad but precisely how local actors adopt and help drive the proliferation and use of Chinese digital surveillance technology.³ In light of this, the paper seeks to offer both a grounded study and a systematic analysis of the global and local features at play.

Finally, this paper aims to investigate the features that motivate the procurement of these digital surveillance tools. In so doing, it demonstrates that China’s proclivity to provide aid and support to African state actors financially, regardless of their human rights record, thus rendering citizens vulnerable to the misuse of these surveillance technologies. The final sections emphasize that the risks of using these surveillance tools without adequate regulatory frameworks are vast, particularly in a region with established challenges at the intersection of crime, penury, policing, governance, and race. This paper examines the implications of the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools, including the deeper, hidden costs of their adoption, how these new digital tools challenge global norms and standards around data protection, and how American policymakers should respond to the global adoption of these tools. Addressing these questions has significant implications for international security, digital development, and global cybersecurity.

Go global

This section highlights some of the key factors that motivate the supply of ICT products into African markets. Current analysis on the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools and cyber capability platforms scrutinizes China’s diplomatic activities and questions the degree to which the party-state, with the aid of private firms, enables autocratic digital practices across the globe. These accounts speculate on the level of coordination between Beijing and its corporate actors. While the degree of coordination cannot be empirically fixed, financial incentives in the form of aid and loans are used to incentivize African state procurement and the proliferation of surveillance technologies.

Accordingly, several interconnected economic policy initiatives that helped Chinese firms gain overseas infrastructure development experience were primary contributors to China’s global expansion into African ICT markets. Surplus capital is lent abroad to create novel commercial opportunities for Chinese firms.⁴ The aim of assisting the internationalization of domestic firms was in part about improving Chinese brand recognition globally, easing fierce domestic competition, and exploiting commercial opportunities made available in part by the absence of US investment in Africa.⁵

A 2011 foreign aid white paper precisely outlines Beijing’s approach to global expansion and development aid.⁶ Naming this initiative “South-South cooperation,” the party-state aims to foster a remunerative orientation with African countries while also simultaneously seeking to carve out a distinct auxiliary role when compared to traditional Western development partners. Therefore, rather than promoting politically conditioned foreign aid that asks for democratic reforms or value-driven commitments like gender equity, Beijing offers aid without political conditions. While this posture suggests a “no strings attached” approach to development, it obfuscates the economic asymmetries that condition relations.⁷ China’s resource-backed lending finances projects while also demanding that borrowing countries commit to repaying loans with future revenues earned from their infrastructure projects or their natural resources.⁸ The posture of “no strings attached” to loans seeks to augment legitimacy for Beijing’s development work in the Global South while also effacing the broad economic features that prompt its engagement and responsibility for the consequences of its financial involvement on the ground.

While China’s surveillance system is confined to its national borders, the private firms that make its surveillance architecture possible are selling their tools to an African customer base. With the aid of state funding, Chinese tech firms expanded into African ICT markets. Firms like Huawei initially worked to expand internet connectivity in Kenya, but in 2014 they began selling their smart city products. Proponents of this move argue that public security systems provide vital intelligence to authorities while acting as a deterrent to criminals. Adam Lane, deputy chief executive of government affairs at Huawei Kenya, echoes this sentiment by contending that “authorities can now conduct panoramic video surveillance of Nairobi’s urban center, as well as maintain a highly agile command and dispatch setup that runs on satellite-based GPS and software-based geographic information system.”⁹ Yet, this sanguine outlook does not account for the real risk of exacerbating established problems like the misuse of public security systems and debt stress levels.¹⁰ While Chinese firms promise a technological fix to traditional problems like public safety and state security, they under-deliver in those areas. More significantly, investigative reporting and digital rights organizations have raised concerns about cybersecurity threats, digital surveillance tools, and biometric data collection by these Chinese surveillance tools. These groups contend that the ubiquitous and underregulated use of these technologies threatens privacy rights.¹¹ Needless to say, they believe that the adoption of digital tools without robust institutional checks and balances, renders citizens more vulnerable to state surveillance and suppression. It is this gap between novel technological adoption and regulatory framework implementation that creates emerging risks.

The use of Chinese public security systems in Africa



This section underscores the demand for digital surveillance tools and their domestic applications. Namely, African states seek out and acquire surveillance systems for a number of reasons, largely as part of a wider effort to augment state security response and capability. Africa’s significant digital infrastructure gap is being addressed through Chinese investment and state support. Annually, there is an estimated infrastructure funding gap of up to $107.5 billion a year.¹² China plays a monopolistic role in Africa’s telecommunications sector, supplying approximately 70 percent of the continent’s digital infrastructure.¹³ Surveillance tools are typically purchased as part of a package of ICT systems, which include data centers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, and high-tech biometrics that are integrated and used in tandem with AI products—thus supporting public security authorities and development ambitions.¹⁴

Digital infrastructure investments, including the promotion of public security systems, in Africa’s telecommunications sector have largely been built by China, mostly through state-to-state engagements, but also supplemented by the growing involvement of Chinese private sector actors. According to a review of datasets and reports on the acquisition of Chinese digital surveillance tools in Africa, about 22 African states have contracted with companies like Huawei to adopt digital surveillance technology.¹⁵ Usually procured under the banner of smart city initiatives, these systems collect, integrate, and analyze data from various sources, like national diametric databases that are made available by state partners. The system supports crime prevention and recovery operations. African demand drives the procurement and application of these tools, specifically, to address Africa’s digital infrastructure gap.¹⁶ African state and city officials in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and other countries are reaching out to Chinese firms to aid their varying domestic aims. Together these examples illustrate the establishment of local digital governance regimes. They are not simply a derivative of a Beijing concocted vision, rather, Chinese firms are acquiescing to the ambitions of their host. Crucially, these surveillance regimes are embedded within local private-public ventures. As such, we must consider a more balanced approach that helps to tease out the degree to which local agency is helping shape geopolitical relations while also examining the interplay between Chinese firms and party-state activities on the continent. It is this more balanced approach that offers a vantage point from which to defamiliarize and reimagine politics on the ground.


Issue Brief
Oct 17, 2022
China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools
By Bulelani Jili
This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives.
Cybersecurity

A case from Kenya

China’s principal entry into Kenya’s telecommunication market came through the docking of fiber-optic cables. Led by Huawei and ZTE, two giant Chinese technology firms that specialize in telecommunication, the docking of submarine cables enabled the Kenyan government to liberalize their ICT market, which allowed for a more competitive telecommunication section.¹⁷ In an interview with the author, a former ICT official said, “ [the ministry] then set in motion a series of policies, including the National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy, that aimed at the liberalization of the telecommunications sector that created opportunities for more actors to be involved. With financing that came from US banks and the Export-Import Bank of China, we looked to close the infrastructure gap that hampered growth.”¹⁸ To establish the country’s first National Optic Fiber Backbone Infrastructure, which brought high-speed connectivity, the government jointly contracted Huawei and ZTE.¹⁹ Each company was expected to manage a different region across the country. ZTE laid the cables for the west, and Huawei handled Nairobi and the central parts of the country.²⁰ This novel digital capacity empowered the state to pursue e-government projects, which include public security systems and cyber intrusion platform solutions.

As such, the Kenyan government primarily enlists these surveillance tools as a means to scale public security capabilities, national security prerogatives, and data security. The adoption of surveillance tools is made possible through the sale of Chinese equipment and soft loans from the Export-Import Bank of China, which are crucial in making public security platforms financially attainable for Nairobi and other African governments. Beyond Huawei, Chinese companies like Dahua, Hikvision, and others are involved in the adoption of digital surveillance systems.²¹ In 2012, the Kenyan government awarded Nanjing Les Information Technology, a high-tech provider that offers urban traffic management and urban governance tools, a tender to supply digital surveillance cameras.²² The goal of the initiative was to augment public security and intelligent traffic management systems in downtown Nairobi. According to official figures, the platform cost the government 463,960,697 Kenyan shillings, which amounts to $3.8 million.²³ The expected date of completion was June 2013, but, due to delays, the project was not completed until April 2014.²⁴ Constant power shortages and access to privately owned buildings for installation purposes were the main reasons for delays. No less important, the adoption plan for these tools did not include corresponding data protection measures to promote and maintain privacy rights, rather inadequate planning before the start of the program presaged the delays and data policy omissions.

China’s oversized role in African ICT markets engenders a dependence on their products and expertise. Digital public security systems are embedded within state-driven processes that are contingent on private-public ventures. The use and effectiveness of these tools, though nominally operated by and for the purposes of Kenyan government officials, are heavily reliant on Chinese contractors to operate public security platforms. An audit by the auditor-general’s office found that senior staff sent by the Kenyan government to China to learn how to operate public security systems did not acquire the necessary skills.²⁵ Instead, the staff spent time inspecting the parts of the system to be delivered. During that visit, no attempts were made to learn or teach how to operate the system.²⁶ For this reason, questions remain about Kenya’s ability to operate and maintain its public security systems. Furthermore, technical matters having to do with the upkeep of the system are managed by the contractor. The National Police, who are tasked with the responsibility of operating the system, had not even developed the capability to work the control room.²⁷ To complicate matters, the manual language of the control room was in Chinese. Most of the digital surveillance cameras installed within Nairobi’s central business district stopped working months after they were installed. Even more worrying is that there were limited security protocols for accessing the system, which increased the possibility of unauthorized access or the launch of malicious code on the server by unauthorized users.

To supplement its earlier public security system, Huawei was invited to install its public security system in Kenya. In Kenya, as in the rest of the continent, Huawei promised that its new product, the safe city, would improve public security. The safe city is a form of a smart city, which is a computational model of urban planning that aims to utilize technological innovation to enhance operational efficiencies. The safe city platform utilizes a series of interconnected technologies like video cameras, tracking devices, software, and cloud storage systems to link technologies and processes as a means to integrate them into a larger and more cohesive whole to advance public initiatives like managing traffic, policing, and streamlining service delivery.²⁸ The first safe city system by Huawei was able to connect 1,800 high-definition cameras and 200 high-definition traffic surveillance infrastructures across Nairobi.²⁹ A command center was also installed, which supports over 9,000 police officers in 195 police stations.³⁰ The Kenyan government is pursuing smart city initiatives as a way to resolve public security challenges and address the country’s digital infrastructure gap. Digital surveillance platforms are part of a wider state-led initiative to utilize technologies to help resolve structural challenges and, thus, make development more attainable.

Comparisons across the continent  

This section highlights the motivations for and incentives of local surveillance procurement in Uganda and South Africa. It lends weight to an examination of the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools in Africa as a dynamic process shaped by demand and supply factors. Uganda, like Kenya, is also procuring public security systems from Huawei. The Kampala police procured AI facial recognition systems from Huawei in 2019, supposedly to address the city’s growing crime rate.³¹Uganda is working with Huawei to help close digital infrastructure gaps and address domestic challenges with crime. In contrast, Kenya’s particular history with terrorist attacks by Islamist militants has motivated the state’s adoption of surveillance systems. As in Kenya, Huawei claims that safe city tools meet several service delivery demands, including real-time surveillance, evidence collection, and video browsing that support policing initiatives.

Opposition leaders in Uganda, civil society, and international observers highlight the misuse of surveillance tools, and how these platforms are instead used to monitor and target political opposition to the administration of President Yoweri Museveni.³² To be sure, the misuse of public security platforms is not the only reason for concern. Facial recognition technologies require mass biometric data for training data collection, software integration, and algorithm development. As a result, acquiring and using these tools without strong privacy safeguards poses a threat to privacy rights.

South Africa’s experience with high rates of crime is the primary motivation for the state to adopt public security platforms as a means to manage the perennial threat. While demand is a response to concerns about crime and governance, it also due to state efforts to close infrastructure gaps and bolster state digital capabilities. Smart city initiatives in South Africa seek to resolve structural challenges while also offering solutions to social challenges like crime. Former Rustenburg mayor Mpho Kunou explains that “the Rustenburg Smart City project aims to develop the economy, enhance citizen participation, improve public safety and transportation, expand the scope of government services, and implement digitalized public utilities through leading technologies.”³³ The increased presence of Chinese surveillance technology in South Africa has raised concerns in Washington about the party-state’s influence over South Africa’s digital infrastructure.³⁴ In addition to Huawei, in South Africa, local company Vumacam is a leading provider of digital surveillance tools. For example, in the city of Johannesburg, Huawei digital cameras are paired platforms from Vumacam and Hikvision, another Chinese digital surveillance tool provider.³⁵ The various surveillance tools are deployed by the police, local municipalities, and private security firms. This example, like the previously mentioned public security systems in Kenya, illustrates African states’ tendency to use multifarious governance and surveillance platforms.

The lack of evidence that public security systems reduce crime does not deter the promotion of public security platforms. In fact, in the case of Kenya, crime rates have risen in areas supported by these technologies.³⁶With the growing concern over the promotion and misuse of surveillance tools, Adam Lane, deputy chief executive of government affairs at Huawei Kenya, dismisses these concerns by contending that “Huawei’s role is to develop, install, deploy, and maintain the technology according to the request and need of the National Police Service. The National Police Service is responsible for operating it and using it according to their policies in line with any national laws.”³⁷This popular framing is reductive, if not completely misleading. It rests, somewhat simplistically, on an all-or-nothing approach to responsibility for negative outcomes. The argument draws attention to the behavior of the National Police but says nothing about the consequences of the sale of these systems or whether regulations are necessary to mitigate negative outcomes. The company position de-emphasizes its role in enabling state actors to surveil citizens, instead placing sole blame and responsibility on state actors for any misconduct.

Government officials, including Kenyan, South African, and Ugandan state representatives, see digital surveillance systems as possible solutions to the traditional challenges that their countries face. This contention challenges presuppositions about the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools as strictly a reflection of Beijing’s efforts to promote digital authoritarianism. Rather, African governments assemble hybridized surveillance systems, in part from Chinese companies, as part of a broader digital infrastructure initiative that seeks to address infrastructure gaps while connecting various heterogeneous tools whose application promises to ameliorate domestic problems like violent crime and terrorism. These objectives, however, are not supported by robust legal measures to protect civil liberties. With the introduction of public security platforms, policymakers are faced with challenge to devise appropriate data policies and privacy measures to deal with the intensification of datafication and surveillance.

Global insecurities and US interests

This section examines the consequences of the global proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools. Precisely, it raises a series of questions for both the international community and local stakeholders, especially about transparency and accountability. For example, most African governments, including Kenya and Uganda, have limited transparency with respect to the acquisition of surveillance tools, despite provisions in their federal laws that demand state transparency.³⁸ More saliently, there is a need for more transparency around the use of Chinese loans and procurement of public security platforms, as well as technologies that have the potential to be repurposed deployed for surveillance purposes. The party-state’s willingness to support digital infrastructure projects that include public security platforms is problematic in the context of authoritarian states like Uganda or Zimbabwe, which have a history of utilizing cyber intrusion systems to undercut human rights and conduct unwarranted state surveillance.³⁹ The adoption of public security platforms enhances the state’s capabilities to conduct surveillance. Even in a relatively healthy democracy like South Africa or Kenya, skewing power toward the state can result in unwarranted surveillance practices that lead to the atrophy of rights, especially in the absence of robust institutional checks and balances.⁴⁰ It is this gap between the adoption of public security systems and regulatory frameworks that poses a critical risk to civil liberties. As such, transparency and accountability measures must extend to digital infrastructure development, which creates room for the misuse of public security products to advance surveillance and other modalities that incentivize democratic backsliding.

The global spread of Chinese surveillance tools could pose threats to privacy and cybersecurity. Several researchers and observers have warned about misuses and various cybersecurity vulnerabilities with Hikvision surveillance products.⁴¹ The incessant product vulnerabilities have led researchers to claim “backdoors” are intentionally designed to enable Chinese intelligence collection.⁴² This position is further bolstered by the fact that the party-state recently introduced several laws—the national intelligence law of 2017, the data security law of 2021, the national security law of 2015, and the cybersecurity law of 2016—that establish obligations for private firms to comply with state demands for data while also offering limited means to reject or appeal unwarranted requests from the Beijing government.⁴³ Vitally, however, this kind of argument still presumes a level of party-state intention and collaboration with firms. At this time, there is no empirical evidence from Kenya, South Africa, or Uganda that establishes coordination and collaboration between Chinese state authorities and Hikvision that results in intentional data theft. Similar allegations leveled against other companies, such as Huawei, cannot be emphatically proven. However, the absence of concrete evidence or attribution does not categorically dispel escalating concerns and vulnerabilities. In fact, it further demonstrates the need for ensuring supply chain security and integrity given the ever-present potential for furtive insertions like backdoors in software and hardware products.

US-China competition’s impact on Africa

This section details the United States should respond to the proliferation and adoption of Chinese surveillance tools. Currently, the growing adoption of Chinese surveillance tools in Africa and the United States’ ambition to mitigate this spread are encouraging the bifurcation of the world, staging Africa and the Global South generally as the theater for a dispute between China and the United States. This division between procurers and non-procurers does not support US interests or the health and inclusive posture of the international liberal order. Indeed, it further ignores the real political challenges and financial motivations behind nation-states’ procurement of Chinese tools. To stem the proliferation of these technologies and the real harm felt locally and globally, the United States must develop a more nuanced posture on the proliferation of Chinese surveillance and cyber-offensive systems, one that responds to the real political challenges and financial motivations behind nation-states’ procurement of Chinese tools.⁴⁴

 American and international observers must pay greater attention to the contextual motivations for the growing demand for Chinese digital infrastructure and public security systems. Precisely, it is important to consider how local factors mediate and condition China’s geopolitical footprint. To curtail the spread and misuse of surveillance technologies, Washington and its European allies should focus not on the “supply” side but on the factors driving African demand for public security platforms.

The primary driver of procurement of surveillance technology in Kenya is contingent on their promise to close digital infrastructure gaps and address traditional challenges like crime and terror. This most prominent example of terrorism in the country is the 2013 al-Shabaab militant attack on an upscale shopping center in Nairobi, killing 67 people and injuring hundreds more. This argument suggests that the United States cannot afford to take a parochial approach and message to the risks posed by the adoption of Chinese technologies. The message shared with the world must speak to the challenges confronting African leaders and partners. Working with African authorities to build digital infrastructure, implement data protection measures, and address challenges like terrorism are ways to mitigate the negative consequences of the proliferation of public security systems. Indeed, a policy that meets African stakeholders where they are with regard to their development challenges is needed. This kind of message will inform a more nuanced approach and understanding, which will help the United States and its allies work within and against the challenges, priorities, and incentives that drive the adoption of Chinese public security systems.

An approach that centers on dissuading African countries from working with companies like Huawei, which are believed to pose cybersecurity threats, risks misunderstanding the objectives and priorities that drive the adoption of Huawei’s tools. For instance, the appeal of Huawei’s safe city project is its financial feasibility, its comprehensive offerings, and its promise to resolve traditional problems like crime. A message that stresses the risks involved is pivotal, but alone, this point runs counter to local priorities. To limit the proliferation of surveillance tools, US policy must better understand African demand and accordingly help address local priorities by offering attainable and safer alternatives to assist local initiatives, while emphasizing that these tools are not automatic remedy for domestic challenges but rather auxiliary instruments. In fact, their adoption can exacerbate challenges in a region with established concerns around crime, governance, corruption, and policing, particularly in the absence of robust checks and balances.

Initiatives like the smart city blur the distinction between service delivery initiatives and invasive surveillance practices. Accordingly, the adoption of these tools has implications for civil liberties, particularly in legal environments that lack robust regulatory frameworks.⁴⁵ This raises questions about the need for mechanisms that govern the distribution and use of these platforms. Chinese firms and actors have been swift in its attempts to establish norms for the application of these systems. As stated before, this effort is pursued through the development of several domestic laws, training programs involving recipient nations, diplomatic exchanges with African partners, and ventures to influence global standards around the regulation of these platforms.⁴⁶ Such endeavors include active participation and leadership in intergovernmental institutions like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is responsible for influencing the global standards and regulatory frameworks for the use of surveillance platforms. To counter the concerted push along this front from the Chinese government, the US government must actively promote standards, regulations, and norms that mirror its democratic values and interests domestically and in multilateral institutions like the ITU. Meanwhile, working alongside likeminded democracies can also help strengthen and promote human rights and democratic values.

The United States and its European partners can play a significant role in helping build local data protection and cybersecurity capacity in regulating the use of public security systems. Many countries on the continent, including Kenya, still lack a comprehensive legal and policy framework to address cybersecurity risks. For example, the Data Protection Act (2019) empowers regulators and requires mandatory registration by data processors, yet it remains unclear what authority the data protection commissioner has to enforce state privacy abuses emerging.⁴⁷ Likewise, there are no means to audit the algorithms that power facial recognition technology or to halt the harvesting of biometric data from the population without an adequate system of checks and balances. Kenya, like many countries in the continent, must work toward building a more conducive legal and policy environment to address growing cybersecurity threats.

In giving an intelligible account of China’s expanding geopolitical footprint, it is important to underscore party-state ambitions and activities in Africa while also illuminating how these aims are mediated by local state and substate actions. Digital surveillance tools on the continent are enlisted to address social challenges like crime, but also a way to index and catalyze digital development. Indeed, while African governments’ ambitions are laudable on the surface, without checks and balances, surveillance activities pose a threat to civil liberties, particularly in a region that struggles with challenges at the intersection of policing, governance, surveillance, race, and crime. Work must be done to advance legal measures to mitigate the negative consequences of intensified surveillance practices.

About the author 

Bulelani Jili is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. His research interests include ICT development, Africa-China relations, cybersecurity, post-colonial thought, and privacy law. He is also a Meta Research PhD fellow at Harvard University, visiting fellow at Yale Law School, cybersecurity fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, scholar-in-residence at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, visiting fellow at Hong Kong University Law, and research associate at Oxford University.

Acknowledgments 

Without friends and colleagues’ support, it would have been an arduous task to bring this work to conclusion. It is their advice, research, and critical reflections that enable this work and its insights.

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The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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1    Bulelani Jili, China’s Surveillance Ecosystem & The Global Spread of Its Tools, Atlantic Council, October 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/chinese-surveillance-ecosystem-and-the-global-spread-of-its-tools/.
2    See, for example: China’s Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Samantha Hoffman, nonresident fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre); Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.
3    A privileging of the local, while illuminating, can also overlook the broader political and economic forces that shape the particular. However worthy it may be to pursue a strictly grounded study, inquiry risks misidentifying the global forces that—increasingly, with varying degrees of efficacy—are besetting the local.
4    Kevin Cai, ”Outward Foreign Direct Investment: A Novel Dimension of China’s Integration into the Regional and Global Economy,” The China Quarterly (1999), 856.
5    Nathaniel Ahrens, China’s Competitiveness Myth, Reality, and Lessons for the United States and Japan, Center for Strategic and International Studies February 2013, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130215_competitiveness_Huawei_casestudy_Web.pdf.
6    Ministry of Commerce State Council Information Office, China’s Foreign Aid White Paper (中国的对外援助白皮书), last updated May 1, 2011, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ywzn/dwyz/zcfg/201911/20191102911291.shtml.
7    Bulelani Jili, “Chinese ICT and Smart City Initiatives in Kenya,” Asia Policy (2022):  44, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/asiapolicy17.3_africa-china_relations_rt_july2022.pdf.
8    Zainab Usman, What Do We Know About Chinese Lending in Africa?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/what-do-we-know-about-chinese-lending-in-africa-pub-84648.
9    N.D. Francois, “Huawei’s Surveillance Tech in Kenya: A Safe Bet,” Africa Times,December 18, 2019, https://africatimes.com/2019/12/18/huaweis-surveillance-tech-in-kenya-a-safe-bet/.
10    Although Beijing does not impose any political conditions on investment, there are economic conditions to its loans. Accordingly, this strategy has permitted resource-rich and high-risk countries the means to secure funds. With the collapse of commodity prices, borrowers in Africa have managed all the risk of debt default. Debt in a way has emerged as the dominant tenure that structures Africa-China relations. Thus far, the party-state has not weaponized debt for geopolitical ends. Rather, it continues to refinance lending terms at lower rates and for longer payment durations. While this willingness to renegotiate does not resolve the problems of accumulating debt, it maintains China’s image as an agreeable development partner for Africa.
11    See, for example: Grace Githaiga and Victor Kapiyo, Kenya’s Cybersecurity Framework: Time to Up the Game! KICTANet, December 2019, https://www.kictanet.or.ke/mdocs-posts/cybersecurity-in-kenya-policy-brief-december-2019/; Karen Allen and Isel van Zyl, Who’s Watching Who? Biometric Surveillance in Kenya and South Africa, Enact,November 2020, https://enactafrica.org/research/research-papers/whos-watching-who-biometric-surveillance-in-kenya-and-south-africa; Tevin Mwenda and Victor Kapiyo, Personal Data and Elections 2022, KICTANet, February 2022, https://www.kictanet.or.ke/policy-brief-personal-data-and-elections-2022/.
12    African Development Bank Group, “Africa’s Infrastructure: Great Potential but Little Impact on Inclusive Growth,” Chapter 3 in African Economic Outlook 2018, January 24, 2018, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2018AEO/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN_Chapter3.pdf. See the full report: https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/africaneconomic-outlook-aoe-2018-99877.
13    Halligan Agade, “China’s Telecommunications Footprint in Africa,” CGTN, September 2, 2021, https://africa.cgtn.com/2021/09/02/chinas-telecommunications-footprint-in-africa/; Amy Mackinnon, “For Africa, Chinese-Built Internet Is Better Than No Internet at All,” Foreign Policy, March 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/for-africa-chinese-built-internet-is-better-than-no-internet-at-all/.
14    See, for example: Huawei, Huawei Hosts Safe City Summit in Africa to Showcase Industry Best Practices [Press Release], October 17, 2016, https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2016/10/safe-city-summit-africa; “Safe City Summit in a Safe City,” Hi-Tech Security Solutions, February 2017, http://www.securitysa.com/56445n.
15    Bulelani Jili, The Rise of Chinese Surveillance Technology in Africa, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), August 25, 2022, https://epic.org/the-rise-of-chinese-surveillance-technology-in-africa-part-4-of-6/; Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Dealing with the Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports, The Brookings Institution,April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas-global-surveillance-exports/; Jonathan Hillman and Laura Rivas, Global Networks 2030, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2021, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210329_Hillman_Global_Networks_2030.pdf?U9r90Zabm5MGoAuHQkVsmqH33SasTi70; Samantha Hoffman, “‘Mapping China’s Tech Giants: Covid-19, Supply Chains and Strategic Competition,’ The Strategist,June 8, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-tech-giants-map-update-3-launch-major-updates/.
16    Huawei, Rustenburg: World Platinum Capital Deploys Smart City ‘Gold Mine’ [Case Study] (2017),  https://e.huawei.com/topic/leading-new-ict-ua/rustenburg-smartcity-case.html.
17    Bitange Ndemo and Tim Weiss, Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making (London: Springer Nature, 2017).
18    An one-one interview with the official was conducted with the author during  a 11 month fieldwork study in Nairobi.
19    Iginio Gagliardone, China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet (London: Zed Books, 2019).
20    Muriuki Mureithi, Telecommunication Ecosystem Evolution in Kenya, 2009-2019: Setting the Pace and, Unbundling the Turbulent Journey to a Digital Economy in a 4IR Era, Institute of Economic Affairs, March 2021, https://ieakenya.or.ke/download/telecommunication-ecosystem-evolution-in-kenya-2009-2019-setting-the-pace-and-unbundling-the-turbulent-journey-to-a-digital-economy-in-a-4ir-era/.
21    Bulelani Jili, “Chinese ICT and Smart City Initiatives in Kenya.
22    Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report of the Auditor-General on Integrated Urban Surveillance System for Nairobi Metropolitan Area , February 2017, https://www.oagkenya.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Integrated-Urban-Surveillance-System-for-Nairobi-Metropolitan.pdf.
23    Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.
24    Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.
25    Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.
26    Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.
27    Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.
28    Huawei. “Huawei Hosts Safe City Summit in Africa to Showcase Industry Best Practices” October 17, 2016, https://www.huawei.com/us/news/2016/10/safe-city-summit-africa; Frank Hersey, “Digital ID in Africa this Week: Biometrics for Tea Workers, Financial Inclusion with a Thumbprint,” Biometric Update, August 23, 2019, https://www.biometricupdate.com/201908/digital-id-in-africa-this-week-biometrics-for-tea-workers-financial-inclusion-with-a-thumbprint.
29    Bulelani Jili, The Spread of Chinese Surveillance Tools in Africa, Oxford University China, Law and Development Project,June 30, 2020, https://cld.web.ox.ac.uk/files/finaljilipdf.; Hi-tech security, “Safe city summit in a safe city,” Hi-tech security, February 2017, http://www.securitysa.com/56445n ; China’s Strategic Aims in Africa: Goals of China’s Africa Policy and Consequences of Beijing’s Influence, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,  116^th Cong. (2020) (statement of Steve Feldstein, nonresident fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
30    See, for example: Jili, The Spread of Chinese Surveillance Tool.
31    Tom Wilson and Madhumita Murgia, “Uganda Confirms Use of Huawei Facial Recognition Cameras,” Financial Times, August 20, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e20580de-c35f-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9.
32    Elias Biryabarema, “Uganda’s Cash-Strapped Cops Spend $126 Million on CCTV from Huawei,” Reuters,August 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-crime-idUSKCN1V50RF.
33    Huawei, Rustenburg: World Platinum Capital.
34    Opposing the Republic of South Africa’s hosting of military exercises with the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and calling on the Biden administration to conduct a thorough review of the United States-South Africa relationship, ‘H.R. Res.145, 118^th Cong. (2023).
35    Karen Hao and Heidi Swart, “South Africa’s Private Surveillance Machine is Fueling a Digital Apartheid,” MIT Technology Review, April 19, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/19/1049996/south-africa-ai-surveillance-digital-apartheid/.
36    National Police Service of the Republic of Kenya, Annual Crime Report 2018, September 12, 2019, http://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/crime-statistics.html.
37    N.D. Francois, “Huawei’s Surveillance Tech in Kenya: A Safe Bet,” African Times, December 18, 2019, https://africatimes.com/2019/12/18/huaweis-surveillance-tech-in-kenya-a-safe-bet/.
38    Christopher Musodza, Kuda Hove, and Otto Saki, Digital Influence in Africa, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, November 2022, https://shop.freiheit.org/download/P2@1351/661343/China’s%20digital%20influence%20in%20Africa_Friedrich%20Naumann%20Foundation.pdf; “Mapping and Analysis of Privacy Laws in Africa,” Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), November 2021, https://cipesa.org/?wpfb_dl=479.
39    Allen Munoriyarwa , and Sarah H. Chiumbu, “Big Brother is Watching: Surveillance Regulation and its Effects on Journalistic Practices in Zimbabwe,” African Journalism Studies (2019), 26-41.
40    Bulelani Jili, “The Spread of Chinese Surveillance Tools in Africa: A Focus on Ethiopia and Kenya.’” in Africa–Europe Cooperation and Digital Transformation, ed. Chux Daniels, Benedikt Erforth and Chloe Teevan. (London: Routledge, 2022), 32-49.
41    John Honovich, “Hikvision has ‘Highest Level of Critical Vulnerability,’ Impacting 100+ Million Devices,’ IPVM,September 20, 2021, https://ipvm.com/reports/hikvision-36260#:~:text=Hikvision%20has%20admitted%20a%209.8,it%20impacts%20100%2B%20million%20devices; Valentin Weber and Vasilis Ververis, “China’s Surveillance State: A Global Project,” Top10VPN, August 2021, https://www.top10vpn.com/assets/2021/07/Chinas-Surveillance-State.pdf; Wilson and Murgia, “Uganda Confirms Use of Huawei Facial Recognition Cameras”.
42    Heidi Swart, “Joburg’s New Hi-Tech Surveillance Cameras: A Threat to Minorities that Could See the Law Targeting Thousands of Innocents,” Daily Maverick, September 28, 2018, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-28-joburgs-new-hi-tech-surveillance-cameras-a-threat-to-minorities-that-could-see-the-law-targeting-thousands-of-innocents/.
43    “National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China.” (“中华人民共和国国家情报法”), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, June 12, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201806/483221713dac4f31bda7f9d951108912.shtml; “Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.” (“中华人民共和国数据安全法”), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, June 10, 2021, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202106/7c9af12f51334a73b56d7938f99a788a.shtml; “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.” (“中华人民共和国国家安全法”), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, July 7, 2015, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c10134/201507/5232f27b80084e1e869500b57ecc35d6.shtml; “Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China” (“中华人民共和国网络安全法”),  November 7, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201611/270b43e8b35e4f7ea98502b6f0e26f8a.shtml.
44    Greitens, Dealing with the Demand.
45    Bulelani Jili, ‘Africa: Regulate Surveillance Technologies and Personal Data,’ Nature (2022), 445–448.
46    Emma Rafaelof, Rogier Creemers, Samm Sacks, Katharin Tai, Graham Webster, and Kevin Neville, China’s ‘Data Security Law, New America, July 2, 2020, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-data-security-law-draft/; Li Wanyi, “Delegation of South African Parliament Police Committee Visits Shanghai (南非议会警察委员会代表团访问上海),” Jiefang Daily, October 4, 2107, http://shzw.eastday.com/shzw/G/20171014/u1a13342865.html; Li Zhengwei, “The China-Africa Internet Development and Cooperation Forum Held (中非互联网发展与合作论坛举办),” Guangming, August 24, 2021, https://m.gmw.cn/baijia/2021-08/24/35106965.html; Ministry of National Defense People’s Republic of China, Wei Fenghe Meets with Representatives of the First China-Africa Defense and Security Forum (魏凤和会见首届中非防务安全论坛代表) [Press release],  July 10, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2018-07/10/content_4818896.htm.
47    Office of the Data Protection Commissioner of Kenya, Data Protection Act, 2019, https://www.odpc.go.ke/dpa-act/.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/experts-react-sudan-at-the-crossroads-where-the-conflict-goes-from-here/ Thu, 11 May 2023 13:09:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=644644 Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

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]]> On April 15, fighting broke out in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary force, Rapid Support Forces (RSF). General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of SAF, and General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the leader of the RSF, had run Sudan together since the 2021 coup d’état (when the military took full control), which dissolved the transitional government that was put in place after nonviolent pro-democracy protests in 2019. The current conflict between the two leaders—each of whom is seeking full control of Sudan—has permeated to urban civilian areas, creating a humanitarian crisis with a rising death toll and more than seven hundred thousand internally displaced people.

As the scope of fighting widens and the number of Sudanese refugees grows, neighboring countries fear the impact on their populations, potentially igniting political turbulence. While there have been diplomatic efforts to coordinate a ceasefire, it’s unclear whether it will hold and what could be done otherwise to stop the fighting.

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Benjamin Mossberg: ‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

Alia Brahimi: Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Thomas Warrick: ‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

Shahira Amin: Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

R. Clarke Cooper: The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

The significant policy failure that the United States faces in Sudan cannot be understated. The importance of Sudan’s stability to Africa, Europe, and the Middle East is closely linked to the events inside the country as it faces ongoing fighting, the potential for a significant humanitarian disaster, and human rights abuses. While there is no easy solution to help Sudan exit this period of instability, the international community must act.

There appears to be little popular support for the violence facing the people of Sudan, as a majority of the Sudanese people face significant challenges in securing food, water, electricity, and shelter. Significant pressure must be brought to bear on General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the commander of the RSF, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the SAF, to encourage a firm cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations over the civilian-led future of the country.

The announcement of an Executive Order—“Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition”—on May 3 by the United States can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers who do not work on Africa specifically must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in the relevant countries. Cutting off these links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply their arms, and pay their soldiers, which would force them back to the negotiating table. 

The United States must continue prioritizing the Sudanese people and rely on Sudanese leaders that have support and roots in the country. While it is unlikely that either the SAF or RSF can win a decisive military victory, the United States should not abandon the country regardless. Geopolitical competition by China, Russia, and others continues to play out in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. It is critical that the United States continue to assert its values, communicate its interests, share its redlines consistently, and avoid the transactional nature of relationships that its geopolitical competitors value.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Libya is particularly exposed to developments in Sudan. The first point of vulnerability is the heavily partisan role of General Khalifa Haftar, who controls the east of Libya and large parts of the south and is a central node in the alliance between the UAE, Hemedti, and the Wagner Group. External support to the RSF ideally runs through southeastern Libya, a vast area largely in the grip of Haftar proxies. The border between Libya and Sudan, for example, is manned by Subul al-Salam, a Salafist militia in the pay of Haftar’s fourth son, Saddam. Additionally, Haftar’s 128th Brigade controls many of the transit routes in central and southern Libya. It is led by Hassan al-Zadma, who has strong personal links with Darfuri militias and has taken charge of sourcing mercenaries for Haftar from Sudan and Chad.  

Haftar’s role in the resupply of the RSF is more than a detail in this conflict—it is important to the war’s viability. There have already been documented reports of ammunition shipments, missile deliveries, and intelligence sharing. However, fuel is the critical resource for Hemedti’s Darfur-based fighters who must cross great tracts of the desert by truck to reach Khartoum. Thus, Saddam Haftar has personally overseen the effort to divert Libyan fuel towards the RSF, redirecting the refining capacity at the Sarir oil field—ten thousand barrels a day—over the border to Hemedti. 

The second point of danger is Libya’s status as an optimal rear base. Libya is a major black market logistics hub—for weapons, food, fuel, fighters, fresh dollars—and, thus, an ideal base to launch attacks into Sudan or Chad. If Hemedti retreats from Khartoum to Darfur, tribal fighting within the Darfur region and the collapse of the peace deal there threatens to pull Libya into a regional conflagration. 

The third source of vulnerability is a lesson that might be drawn from the descent into war in Sudan. The international community may rightly conclude that the strategy of dealing with warlords—empowering them as legitimate “stakeholders” in democratic transition—has been exposed as deeply flawed by Sudan. Most Libyans would agree. At the same time, Haftar will note that Hemedti was an integral part of the United Nations-approved power-sharing deal and a party to official political agreements. However, his position was ultimately insecure. Haftar and his sons may, therefore, recommit to growing their military power and leveraging their relationship with the Wagner Group to obtain a preponderance of military power in Libya. This would upend the delicate balance in Libya and portend a regional war.  

Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs.

‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

I have two memories of Sudan. The first is in 2016, when I was just about to fly out to Khartoum to lead the first high-level US government delegation to Sudan in a decade. My boss called me into his office to give me the benefit of his experience leading such a delegation more than a decade earlier. “The people are warm and friendly towards Americans,” he recalled, “but their government has a history of disappointing them.”

My second memory is of when I was there to discuss rebuilding counterterrorism ties with the Sudanese government. They helicoptered us to an important remote base in the northwest that lay astride one of Africa’s major human smuggling routes from east Africa to southern Europe. As we flew out of Khartoum, a US official with years of experience there pointed out the two bridges over the White Nile: “You do realize that the government’s remit stops at the west end of that bridge?”

Seven years later, and after a brief period of hope, governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges. The popular support for civilian leaders who came to power in 2019 was undercut by generals vying for power, each afraid that “second place” meant “last place.” Yet Sudan remains strategically important to the United States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East because of its role at a crossroads. During the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) time controlling parts of Syria and Iraq, Sudan was a transit country for ISIS operatives and money transiting in and out of Libya. Human traffickers carried Ethiopians and others toward Libyan ports, taking advantage of false hopes of leaving behind drought and food crises.

Sustained pressure now needs to be brought by the Quad—the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and UAE—and others on the countries supporting the warring generals in order to reach a resolution that will benefit the Sudanese people. They deserve better than another decade of disappointment.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

Concerns are rising in Egypt as the fighting in neighboring Sudan rages on. Since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April, tens of thousands of Sudanese fleeing the violence have crossed over into Egypt through a shared southern border with Sudan. The mass influx threatens to put an additional strain on Egypt, which is already facing an acute economic crisis.

But the added burden on Egypt’s already-overstretched resources isn’t Cairo’s only concern. Egyptian leadership is even more worried about prospects of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence next door, which may, subsequently, pave the way for infiltration over the border. This follows the April 26 release of imprisoned, key figures from Sudanese ex-President Omar al-Bashir’s deposed regime. The SAF reportedly ordered the release of members of the former Islamist regime after protests by inmates broke out inside Kober prison, where they had been jailed after Bashir’s overthrow by the military in 2019. 

Egypt’s army is already stretched thin: troops have been deployed on Libya’s western border to guard against foreign infiltrators. Moreover, after more than a decade of battling an insurgency fueled by Islamic State militants—many of whom had allegedly crossed into Northern Sinai from the Gaza Strip by way of underground tunnels—the last thing the Egyptian military wants is a new front in its war on terrorism.  

The ongoing conflict also pits Egypt against its longtime ally, the UAE, which backs the RSF (the powerful paramilitary forces embroiled in a power struggle with the SAF, which is backed by Egypt). Supporting opposing sides may cause tensions between the two countries at a time when Egypt is in dire need of financial backing to shore up its ailing economy. The sale of Egyptian assets to Gulf countries, including the UAE, has provided Egypt with the lifeline it needs to avert economic collapse and a looming debt default (so far, at least).

Egypt has also relied heavily on Sudan’s support in the ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which sources say threatens to exacerbate Egypt’s water shortage challenge. There are growing concerns in Egypt that the instability in Sudan may overshadow or even derail the negotiations with Ethiopia.

While the Egyptian leadership has insisted it is not taking sides in the conflict, Cairo is watching the developments in Sudan with trepidation, as the unfolding crisis may have far-reaching implications for its northern neighbor. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states. Some internally-displaced Sudanese may eventually return home, while others will seek permanent refuge anywhere outside of Sudan—be it on the African continent or further afield in Europe or North America. Exasperating an already fragile security environment, the disruption from the weeks-long conflict is already enabling a more permissive environment for transnational crime and illicit trafficking and terrorism.

Unfortunately, in the multilateral space, there is diminishing capacity to properly address Sudan’s increasingly dire humanitarian and security issues. War in Ukraine, earthquake recovery in Turkey, and flood relief in Pakistan already occupy significant amounts of attention and resources from United Nations agencies, various NGOs, and the national governments of the world. Still, beyond the immediate humanitarian appeal to help the civilian populous of Sudan, this latest iteration of civil conflict also requires global attention in the peacekeeping, security, and conflict resolution space. If ignored, Sudan’s humanitarian and security crisis will manifest itself elsewhere in the world well beyond the Middle East and North Africa.

Absent conflict resolution led by a group of responsible states or a multilateral body, there is an increasing risk that the conflict will become a regional war. Neighboring states have already aligned with either of the two generals and, bizarrely, in some cases, aligned with both sides. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has the affirmed support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The UAE, and General Haftar of Libya, however, support the RSF. As other international actors assess where to align, a united front of regional and Western states is required to stop the march toward greater conflict, and the time for such a united front is now. 

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/when-it-comes-to-great-power-competition-in-africa-one-equation-is-missing-iran/ Tue, 09 May 2023 18:56:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=643727 One area the United States completely ignores is Iran's growing influence on the African continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action there.

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]]> In mid-December 2022, President Joe Biden invited the leaders of African countries to a summit in Washington. There, they discussed cooperation with the United States regarding solutions to the economic, civil, and security problems accompanying the African continent.

The summit and recent visits by high-ranking Biden administration officials to Africa were the culmination of an effort led by the White House to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the African continent in a wide variety of aspects.

This approach by the Biden administration is quite different from the one adopted by the Donald Trump administration, which saw the continent as a playground for superpower rivalry between China, Russia, and the United States. As part of this great power competition, the Biden administration seeks to enhance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to block Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.

However, one area both administrations completely ignore is Iran’s growing influence on the continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action in Africa.

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979—and even more so following the heavy political pressure on Tehran—Africa has become an attractive continent for the Islamic Republic. Iran views the African continent as a “battleground” for influence, power, and territory against Saudi Arabia, and has also sought to counter Western influence—particularly that of the United States—within Africa, working with elements that are opposed to colonialism and seeking to chart a more independent course.

Moreover, Iran seeks to utilize their worldwide network of religious and cultural organizations, including universities and charities, to increase its influence over the vast Shia minorities in Africa, using them for political support, fundraising, and even to recruit to terrorist cells.

But Iranian terrorist activities in Africa are not the only problem. Iran is not hesitating to interfere in the internal affairs of many African countries to preserve its interests and protect the individuals who serve its policies. A prominent example is the unprecedented Iranian involvement in 2019 to free Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky from his detention in Nigeria, with Iran using its control on Hausa TV to push for his release.

The Iran-West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, which was held on March 7, is another indication that Iran is seeking to enhance its relations with African countries and strengthen its foothold, especially in the west of the continent. This is part of President Ebrahim Raisi’s vision regarding relations between West African countries and Iran, which was exemplified in his visit to Guinea-Biassau in August 2021, when he pledged to continue expanding ties between Iran and the continent. In many regards, this activity resembles the policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Africa, which sought to improve relations significantly.

Apart from Iran’s traditional interests in Africa, several new ones have emerged that must be considered in the context of preventing Iran from consolidating its interests in the continent.

First and foremost is the campaign that Tehran is waging against US allies in Africa that dared to take part in the normalization efforts with Israel: Sudan and Morocco. In order to achieve this goal, Iran has enhanced its military and diplomatic ties with Algiers and increased military aid to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. The latter contribution has improved the front’s ability to inflict severe damage on the Moroccan army and challenge Moroccan control over the territory. Iran is also working in Mauritania and sees this country as a priority zone for its influence schemes in the Sahara region, which is extremely important for Moroccan security.

In the case of Sudan, Iran’s bid to further its influence in the strategic Horn of Africa suffered after Khartoum joined the Abraham Accords. In order to change this negative trend, Iran is blaming Israel for causing political instability in Sudan’s domestic issues. Furthermore, Iran is still actively trying to spread its Shia doctrine in the country while conspiring to create a political vacuum in Sudan that will weaken the forces who agreed to sign a normalization agreement with Israel.

Through its actions, Tehran is demonstrating that there is a price for joining the Abraham Accords and that it can pose a direct or indirect threat to Sudan and Morocco. Iran is also conducting a powerful political campaign to prevent Israel from enhancing its relations with other African countries and improving its diplomatic presence in various African institutions, such as the African Union.

In addition to the illegal arms smuggling network that Iran managed to build in the Horn of Africa, which allows Tehran to smuggle weapons to the countries of the continent, it also appears to be planning to significantly increase its sales of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) to the African continent. Evidence of this can be seen in Iran’s involvement in the civil war in Ethiopia and the sale of Mohajer-6 UAVs to the Ethiopian army.

Against the background of Iranian involvement in Ukraine and Tehran’s desire to increase sales of its military equipment in the war in Ukraine, Africa is a natural continent for this desire, and the transfer of these capabilities to the Polisario Front constitutes another indication of that.

Third, there is a need to pay close attention to the plots that were revealed in several African countries after the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020—the foiled plot to assassinate the US ambassador in South Africa, chief among them. During the past year, several plans were discovered in which Iran sought to harm American or Israeli interests in Africa or use its presence in the continent to recruit terrorists.

In order to protect its allies in Africa and preserve its interests in the continent, the Biden administration cannot focus solely on the growing presence of China and Russia. It must also consider Tehran’s deepening foothold in Africa, which is a growing challenge to US policy on the continent. The administration must prepare an orderly work plan with the cooperation of African countries—and possibly Gulf countries—that are very disturbed by Iranian expansion. The goal of this would be to reduce Iranian influence in Africa and prevent Iran from using African countries to achieve its interests.

Looking to the future, Africa will continue to be an attractive target for Iranian policy under Raisi. Without a well-thought-out action plan, the US will have minimal ability to push Tehran out of Africa and prevent it from coordinating with China and Russia, with the latter having engaged in an unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran in recent months. Thus, countering Iran’s influence in Africa must become a priority for the Biden administration sooner rather than later.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/kroenig-and-ashford-debate-responses-to-advancements-in-north-korean-nuclear-capabilities/ Tue, 02 May 2023 17:26:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=640646 On April 7, Foreign Policy published its biweekly "It's Debatable" column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate responses to advancements in North Korean nuclear capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> original source

On March 10, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, they discuss the recent leak of sensitive government documents, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and North Korea’s recent advancements in nuclear weapon capabilities. Specifically, in light of the developments in North Korea, the pair debate the utility and feasibility of nuclear disarmament.

Washington should stick to its long-standing policy that North Korea must completely disarm. Striking an arms control agreement is contrary to that principle. It would essentially say that the world is willing to live with a nuclear North Korea. It would also undermine nuclear nonproliferation more broadly.

Matthew Kroenig

North Korean disarmament is a nonstarter, at least while the Kim family regime rules. And the result has been bad when it comes to proliferation: It shows that a determined state can succeed in building a nuclear program under sanctions; it creates a bad actor willing to sell its technology to other states for hard currency; and it has prompted debate in South Korea about whether it needs to develop its own nuclear program in response.

Emma Ashford


Staff
Matthew Kroenig
Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
China Defense Policy

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/to-stop-the-fighting-in-sudan-take-away-the-generals-money/ Mon, 01 May 2023 13:25:35 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=641030 It is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power.

The post To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> International partners are scrambling to limit the humanitarian disaster created by the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan that erupted on April 15 while the last steps of discussions leading to a civilian and democratic transition were expected. Now, it is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power between the SAF and RSF that stymied the eighteen-month-long negotiations for a return to a civilian government—the type of government that most people in Sudan are demanding.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power. 

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

The post To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/tackling-food-insecurity-in-africa-will-require-securing-womens-rights-here-are-two-ways-to-start/ Thu, 20 Apr 2023 18:47:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=638530 Policymakers should equalize inheritance rights and support women's entrepreneurship as ways to enhance food security.

The post Tackling food insecurity in Africa will require securing women’s rights. Here are two ways to start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Large parts of Africa are currently facing record levels of hunger, and the trend is heading in a more worrying direction. West and Central Africa are seeing increasing food insecurity year after year, and tens of thousands of people across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are expected to experience “catastrophic” hunger in the coming months.

The situation is, in part, being made worse by climate change, which is increasing temperatures and changing weather patterns, compounding the hardship already caused by droughts. According to the International Monetary Fund, a third of the world’s droughts occur in Sub-Saharan Africa; meanwhile, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Horn of Africa is experiencing the longest and most severe drought on record. These conditions are weakening food systems across Sub-Saharan Africa, an area in which agriculture, forestry, and fishing make up 17.2 percent of the gross domestic product—and substantially more in countries like Sierra Leone and Chad.

But there’s more to this food insecurity trend than climate change; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused uncertainty in the global food market, disrupting the production and trade of key commodities. Russia and Ukraine are significant suppliers of oil, wheat, and maize, and disruptions to the supply chain, combined with local conflicts in some countries, have caused inflation to soar, with food prices increasing as much as 55.6 percent in the Horn of Africa.

Fighting these rising levels of food insecurity requires a whole-of-nation approach. But countries in these food-insecure regions aren’t doing enough to harness the economic and agricultural potential of half their populations: women. For example, discriminatory laws that hamper women’s access to land and financial services are still in place in some countries. In order to fight food insecurity in full force, these countries must ensure that women are equipped with the exact same resources as men: both land itself and the decision-making power to determine how to use that land in the most productive way possible. Policymakers in these food-insecure countries should take the following actions:

Equalize inheritance rights

Some countries in these food-insecure regions have made significant strides recently in passing reforms that impact women’s lives in some respects—but they have faltered in passing meaningful reforms related to improving access to assets and entrepreneurship opportunities for women.

According to the Center for Global Development, agriculture accounts for 56 percent of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and women account for 57 percent of agricultural workers. The informal sector accounts for 50 to 80 percent of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa—activity that includes the sale of food. And like the agricultural sector, the informal sector is a major employer of women: In Africa, 89.7 percent of employed women work in the informal sector. Yet despite the roles that women play in these sectors, only 30 percent of women own land in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The discrepancy in land ownership extends in part from inheritance laws. In some of these food-insecure countries, inheritance plays the primary role in determining land ownership. Some inheritance laws across the region are—or were initially—patriarchal, favoring men in the division of property. There have been some signs of progress in protecting women’s rights to inherit property; for example, in Uganda, lawmakers recently amended the Succession Act to ensure equal inheritance rights between men and women.

However, Uganda’s Succession Act was the first inheritance reform implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa since Mali’s in 2011, according to the World Bank, demonstrating the slow pace of progress. More countries must follow suit by implementing their own amendments or fresh, new laws on inheritance rights.

Support women’s entrepreneurship

Owning land goes hand-in-hand with access to financial services. In countries across these food-insecure regions of Africa, farmers must have land titles in order to access the credit necessary to increase agricultural productivity by hiring workers, purchasing animals or farming equipment, and covering transportation and storage costs of their goods. Credit supports entrepreneurship, which promotes innovation and the accumulation of wealth—both of which are integral to fighting food insecurity in the region. However, just as women’s rights to own land are hindered in some countries, their rights to enterprise are sometimes hindered as well.  

According to the World Bank, 71 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have laws that prohibit financial institutions from discriminating based on gender, and women often face more stringent loan arrangements than men when they do access credit. Furthermore, according to the International Monetary Fund, in Sub-Saharan Africa, just 37 percent of women own bank accounts compared to 48 percent of men. If a woman must rely on a man to open a bank account, take out a loan, or register a business, she cannot fully exercise her rights as an entrepreneur to hire workers or freely determine the agricultural methods she uses with the hopes of increasing output.

All countries in these food-insecure regions of Africa should criminalize gender-based discrimination with regard to credit. Allowing women an equal opportunity to receive loans encourages entrepreneurship, leading to more production and competition in the agricultural market. Benin’s Order No. 2349-5—which was implemented in 2022 and prohibits credit, banking, and decentralized financial systems from using discriminatory practices in granting access to credit—can serve as a model for other countries.

Putting the law into practice

Laws are only part of the solution. Guaranteeing equal access to land and credit requires systemic change. Localities and financial institutions need to make a concerted effort to ensure that women are aware of their rights and encourage them to embrace the opportunities to own land or become entrepreneurs.

Activists and government officials should work with local leaders to hold seminars for women, outlining their rights to own land and offering to process land titles. In the private sector, financial institutions can create campaigns specifically marketed towards women, publishing advertisements in print, social, and broadcast media that encourage women to apply for credit.

By taking concrete steps to ensure that women have equal access to land and entrepreneurship, countries can empower their full populations, bringing major benefits for the economy, agricultural productivity, and food security.

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James Storen is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cohen-in-the-hill-russias-fingerprints-are-on-sudan-coup-attempt/ Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:12:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=669429 The post Cohen in the Hill: Russia’s fingerprints are on Sudan coup attempt appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/as-sudans-transition-to-democracy-accelerates-reforming-the-security-forces-must-be-a-top-priority/ Wed, 12 Apr 2023 20:21:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=635383 The Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan.

The post <strong>As Sudan’s transition to democracy accelerates, reforming the security forces must be a top priority</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Sudan’s political factions are negotiating the formation of a new transitional government, a major step toward a civilian-led government that is long overdue nearly eighteen months after a military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Once the parties do form a new government—talks are continuing past a previously announced April 11 target date—perhaps its most critical task will be to clarify what role Sudan’s security forces will have in the country going forward.

To ensure that Sudan’s transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudan’s leaders and those who support Sudan’s transition to democracy can take now.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

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Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/episode-seven-dr-nasredeen-abudlbari/ Mon, 27 Mar 2023 20:20:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=628866 The post Episode Seven – Dr. Nasredeen Abudlbari appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/china-in-sub-saharan-africa-reaching-far-beyond-natural-resources/ Mon, 06 Mar 2023 16:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=619198 What are the implications of China's expanding involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa's investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape?

The post China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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download pdf

This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. 

The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent.

In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively.

The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). 

Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.

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The post China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/how-the-international-community-can-help-restore-sudans-democracy/ Mon, 30 Jan 2023 19:18:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=606534 A number of challenges confront Sudan on its road to democracy. How the country's leaders and the international community address them could either make or break the dreams of the 2019 revolution.

The post <strong>How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy </strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> The 2019 Sudanese revolution was a uniquely inspiring moment for the world. The road to Sudan’s new dawn was paved by the extraordinary courage and tenacity of its citizens to liberate themselves from dictatorship and civil war, address historical wrongs, and rebuild their state on the principles of democracy and justice.

The international community then committed to supporting Sudan’s transition toward democratization, reconstruction, and sweeping reforms across politics, economics, and the security structure to meet the aspirations of the country’s people after the revolution.

Yet the transitional process began to unravel almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, amid turmoil and instability. The Transitional Military Council—the military junta that took power after Bashir’s ouster—and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian and rebel groups—agreed on the Constitutional Charter and on the formation of a Sovereignty Council to lead the country during the transition to democracy through fresh elections. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the transitional government and rebel groups in October 2020 appeared to be cementing those gains toward peace and democracy.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

1. Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
2. Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
3. Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

• arrangements for international monitoring
• implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
• the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
• the enactment of a Political Parties Law
• the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

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Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-sudanese-bar-association-drafted-a-transitional-constitution-how-can-it-be-improved/ Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:03:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=588580 The initiative demonstrates the importance of professional institutions and trade unions in bringing political organizations together and restoring the democratic transformation process. However, there are key issues that require further discussion and inclusion in the draft constitution.

The post The Sudanese Bar Association drafted a transitional constitution. How can it be improved? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Following the recent declaration on July 4 by the Sudanese military leadership that it would accept the establishment of a civilian government and fully withdraw from politics pending a civilian consensus, the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) prepared a draft transitional constitution that Sudan’s pro-democracy forces could unite around.

The initiative has been applauded by domestic groups, stakeholders, and the international community. It demonstrates the importance of professional institutions and trade unions in bringing political organizations together and restoring the democratic transformation process. The draft constitution provides that the new transitional government be entirely civilian, thereby avoiding one of the mistakes of the 2019 Constitutional Charter, which established a civilian-military partnership. However, there are key issues that require further discussion and inclusion in the draft constitution.

The transitional constitution, by definition, is intended to govern the transitional period, during which the government should embark on a proper comprehensive, inclusive, transparent, and participatory constitution-making process to construct a permanent and democratic constitution. The current SBA constitution-production process does not, in any event, substitute the proper democratic constitution-making process that the transitional government should organize.

The most important point that the constitution drafters and reviewers should consider is that any re-established transitional period should not be a conventional transitional period. Rather, it is a foundational transitional period that should address as many fundamental problems of Sudan as possible. Historically speaking, during transitional periods, caretaker governments have only been empowered to organize elections and run the country in the interim, before handing power over to the party or parties that won the elections. Similarly, the discussion of the fundamental problems of the Sudanese state, such as the relationship between state and religion, language policies, and the constitutional relationship between the central government and the peripheries, has been pushed back to the post-transitional period.

However, experiences of other African nations—such as Ethiopia and South Africa—demonstrate that addressing these issues during the transition contributes to laying the foundations for democracy, peace, and stability. Learning from their experiences, conventional Sudanese political organizations, which tend to be politically conservative, should, therefore, not be allowed to make Sudan’s next transitional period another failure in the political and constitutional history of the country.

What a draft constitution must entail

Another equally important point is the need for the draft constitution to reasonably address and rectify the shortcomings of the previous transitional period, which had partially resulted from the deficiencies of the 2019 Constitutional Charter. A clear example was the charter’s silence on the powers of the state or regional governments and their relationship with the central government; this proved to be extremely problematic, as neither level had clear limitations on the powers they exercised, creating confusion and tensions between them.

It seems that the SBA draft constitution has not learned from the 2019 charter in this regard, as it also fails to mention this significant distribution of powers. This exclusion is particularly perplexing given that the SBA explicitly establishes a federal state in which the exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and state or regional units should be expressly set out.

The draft constitution should contain a detailed article on citizenship, which is the indispensable foundation of any modern democratic state. For a nation that has been destabilized and embroiled in civil wars because of ethnic and religious dichotomies, enshrining universal citizenship principles and rules in the transitional constitution would be a necessary indication that the ethnic, religious, cultural, and regional policies that have fragmented the Sudanese nation and caused the deterioration of the state have no place in Sudan.

Relatedly, the article on the nature of the state should provide for establishing an impartial state that does not adopt a religious, ethnic, cultural, or regional identity. The drafters and reviewers of the new transitional constitution should consider the historical demands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by Abdulaziz Alhilu, calling for the separation of state and religion. In this regard, the progress made during the transitional period, namely, the signing of a declaration of principles that separated the state from religion, should be reflected in and reaffirmed by the draft constitution.

Finally, the draft constitution should not overlook the linguistic diversity of the country—both ensuring that ethnic groups have the right to use their vernacular languages and dedicating a separate foundational article that conspicuously recognizes the right of state and regional governments to adopt a vernacular language as a working or official language. It should recognize the right of any state or region to adopt such a language as the language of instruction in its local schools.

In this regard, Sudan should learn from the Malaysian experiment, where the use of vernacular languages is constitutionally recognized, while at the same time promoting English and Malay as linguae francas and mediums of instruction in higher education institutions. To support these efforts, the draft constitution should establish a board, similar to that established by the South Africa Constitution, to ensure the continuous promotion of the use of vernacular languages as well as its development.

Technocratic government

The experience of the second government (February 2021-October 2021) during the previous transitional period (August 2019-October 2021) indicated that the participation of political parties in the government would spark unnecessary, paralyzing political differences and conflicts. It is, therefore, important that the draft constitution unequivocally provide that the transitional government be technocratic. That is the only way to avoid the repetition of the political differences and conflicts that the transitional governments witnessed in the months that preceded the October 25, 2021 coup, which would have probably been impossible had those differences and conflicts not existed.

The SBA draft constitution provides that political forces sign the political declaration, according to which the draft constitution shall be adopted, and nominate individuals for the senior positions of prime minister, Sovereignty Council member, and cabinet roles, among others. The draft constitution, surprisingly, goes as far as enabling those forces to nominate and appoint the members of the independent commissions, chief justice, president, members of the Constitutional Court, and judges of the Supreme Court.

Vesting the power to nominate the prime minister and members of the Sovereignty Council in the political forces that sign the political declaration will, undoubtedly, ignite deep and irreconcilable political differences that might make the establishment of the transitional government impossible. Furthermore, the nomination of the members of the independent commissions, the chief justice, the president and members of the Constitutional Court, and the judges of the Supreme Court is obviously incompatible with the principles of democracy, as well as the independence of these institutions and positions.

To avoid political differences or impossibility of agreement between the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change and other political groups, and to ensure the independence of the institutions that should be independent in a democratic and open society, the draft constitution should consider creating independent and impartial mechanisms, such as a committee or council of wise persons, that will have the power to select the prime minister and nominate individuals for the other high constitutional positions. 

More significantly, providing for a federal system without constitutionally enshrining the detailed exclusive and concurrent powers of each level or unit of the federal union undermines the very idea of federalism. It is, therefore, extremely important that the draft constitution contain three comprehensive lists of exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and regional or state governments: one for the federal government (exclusive federal powers); a second for the state or regional governments (exclusive state or regional powers); and a third for both levels of government (concurrent powers).

Finally, the Bill of Rights of the draft transitional constitution, which is, in fact, taken almost verbatim from the 2005 Interim Constitution and the 2019 Constitutional Charter, should be more elaborate and comprehensive, explicitly providing for the procedures and principles that ensure the actual protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms by state institutions, especially the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court. It should also empower lower courts across the country to admit and decide human rights cases in some specific situations, as is the case in the United States.

In this regard, an alternative comprehensive and detailed new bill of rights, ideally based on and adapted from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution Bill of Rights, should seriously be considered by the Sudanese Bar Association or the reviewers of its draft constitution. The Kenyan Constitution’s Bill of Rights is one of the most comprehensive and elaborate bills of rights on the African continent.

In essence, the initiative undertaken by the Sudanese Bar Association and its production of a draft constitution has created robust political momentum. Additionally, it has created real possibility for uniting pro-democracy forces at a critical point in history—something that would put the pro-democracy civilian camp in a strong position to establish an entirely civilian government.

For this draft constitution to be a solid foundation for a new democratic transformation process, its provisions should be based on an important assumption that the transitional period is a foundational period and not merely conventional transitional period, where a caretaker government runs the state and organizes elections within a year or so. The resolution of some of Sudan’s historical problems—such as the relationship between state and religion, addressing its diversity management issues, and rectifying the deficiencies and shortcomings of the previous transitional period and those of the 2019 Constitutional Charter—should be genuinely considered as much as possible by the SBA draft constitution. 

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is Sudan’s former justice minister.

Mutasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

The post The Sudanese Bar Association drafted a transitional constitution. How can it be improved? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-to-watch-next-on-ethiopias-peace-deal-in-tigray/ Fri, 04 Nov 2022 18:17:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=582786 What are the chances that this deal will hold? What role should international institutions play? Our regional experts help sketch out the answers.

The post What to watch next on Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> This week, negotiators from the Ethiopian government and rebels in the Tigray region reached a truce to end their two-year war—one that has killed hundreds of thousands of people through fighting and starvation, and included accusations of war crimes. With the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) reportedly agreeing to lay down its arms and the government agreeing to restore essential services to its battered northern region, what are the chances that this deal will hold? What role should international institutions play? Our regional experts help sketch out the answers.

1. What do you make of this peace deal, and what should we be watching to see if it holds?

Less than forty-eight hours before the two-year anniversary of the conflict, it is a step forward that has created great hope. It is also a salutary break for the civilian populations after almost two years of conflict. Since November 2020, the war has displaced more than two million Ethiopians and plunged hundreds of thousands into famine. But this agreement is not yet peace: It is the cessation of hostilities. The composition and determination of the members of the committee responsible for the implementation of the agreement will be decisive. Above all, major questions remain unresolved, including the question of Eritrea. The neighboring nation’s role in the peace deal is not clear after it joined the war on Ethiopia’s side, which is cause for concern considering all the crimes Eritrean soldiers have committed in Tigray over the past two years. Can there be peace without justice? This is the question that Tigrayan civilians must ask themselves these days.

—Rama Yade is senior director of the Council’s Africa Center.

The peace deal is excellent news; bringing an immediate end to this particularly cruel war is good for everyone. It remains to be seen, however, if the Tigrayans will uphold their promise to disarm, and if the Ethiopians will open access so that aid organizations can bring desperately needed help to civilians. We also have to watch the actions of the Eritreans, who are a party to the conflict but have not been included in the peace deal. Are they going to suspend their military operations? Will they go home and demobilize?

—Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center.

2. What role will outside countries in Africa or the West, or institutions such as the African Union and United Nations, need to play going forward? What guidance would you give them?

This is a success for African Union head and Senegalese President Macky Sall, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who all helped broker the deal. The implementation of the road map will be crucial. While the agreement claimed that TPLF combatants will be “disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated,” fighting has been continuing in Tigray, where Ethiopian federal troops, backed by the Eritrean army and forces and militias from the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions, have been advancing since mid-October.

—Rama Yade

The West and international organizations like the UN and AU can play a vital role in monitoring the three sides of the conflict (the third being Eritrea) and holding them accountable. They of course need to be balanced, but that does not mean they can’t be tough—they shouldn’t pull their punches.

—Michael Shurkin

3. How can and should Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed move forward with governing the country as a whole? What kind of mark does this conflict leave for him?

Among the main points of the declaration signed by the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, the two sides committed to “safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia” and “restore constitutional order in the Tigray region.” This is a fundamental question. It is up to Abiy to prove that the Nobel committee was not wrong by awarding him its most prestigious recognition: The Peace Prize.

—Rama Yade

Abiy has to try to calm militants on all sides and ensure that everyone benefits from what should come next: reconstruction and development. On a regional level, a successful end to the war does not resolve other issues such as Ethiopia’s development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan oppose. That was put on the back burner because of the war but may now return to the fore.

—Michael Shurkin

The post What to watch next on Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/middle-eastern-nations-should-learn-from-history-and-back-sudans-democratic-forces/ Tue, 23 Aug 2022 17:18:18 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=559077 The Middle Eastern countries that are interested in establishing political relations with Sudan, such as Israel, and those that are interested in investing, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should stand on the side of pro-democracy civilian forces.

The post Middle Eastern nations should learn from history and back Sudan’s democratic forces appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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اقرأ باللغة العربية

دولُ الشرق الأوسط ينبغي أن تتعلم من التاريخ وتدعم القوى الديمقراطية في السودان

بقلم

نصرالدين عبدالباري* ومعتصم علي**

لقد كان مَثَل الحكومة الانتقالية السودانية، التي كُوِّنت في أعقاب اسقاط نظام الرئيس السابق عمر البشير، كمَثَلِ طائرة أقلعتْ بعسر فاستوت لتنطلق عندما تم ضربها واسقاطها. إن الحكومة الانتقالية، تحت قيادة رئيس الوزراء السابق عبد الله حمدوك، كافحت من أجل التصدي لتحديات أمنية واقتصادية متنوعة، تمثلت في الصراعات القبلية، وتعدد الجيوش، وانخراط الجيش في الصناعات غير العسكرية، وضعف الحوكمة وسيادة حكم القانون، وعجز النظام التنظيمي للاقتصاد. كان السودانيون، الذي خرجوا إلى الشوارع مُتُحَدِّين بشجاعة دكتاتورية وحشية استمرت ثلاثين عاماً، يتوقعون تحسناً فورياً في الوضع الاقتصادي بعد انهيار وسقوط نظام البشير. لكن الأوضاع الاقتصادية، التي تفاقمت بسبب التهريب الواسع للوقود والسلع الأخرى وعدم استقرار سعر الصرف، استمرت في التدهور. في ظل تلك الظروف، انخفضت قيمة الجنيه السوداني أكثر، وظل نقص الوقود في كافة أرجاء البلاد مريعاً، تماماً كما كان في ظل حكم البشير. 

بعد قيام حكومة حمدوك بتوحيد سعر الصرف في مارس 2021 ورفع الدعم عن الوقود في يونيو من ذلك العام، تغيَّر الوضع كثيراً. إذ اختفت صفوف الوقود، ولمدى سبعة أشهر على التوالي من مارس إلى أكتوبر، استقر الجنيه السوداني وحافظ على قوته في وجه الدولار الأمريكي—وذلك لأول مرة منذ انفصال جنوب السودان في العام 2011. 

بتشجيع من هذه الإصلاحات المحلية، بدأ البنك الدولي، وصندوق النقد الدولي، والولايات المتحدة، والاتحاد الأوربي تقديم مساعدات مالية للسودان. وأصبح من المتوقع أن تستلم البلاد أكثر من أربعة مليار دولار بنهاية السنة المالية 2022. كان من شأن هذا الاستقرار السياسي والاقتصادي أن يشجع استثمارات القطاع الخاص بالبلاد. ومن ناحية أخرى، كانت جهود الإصلاح الدستوري والعدالة الانتقالية، وكذلك خطط البنيات التحتية لوضعِ حدٍ للانقطاع المزمن للتيار الكهربائي وزيادة إنتاج النفط، قد وصلت أطواراً متقدمة.

لقد أنهى الانقلاب العسكري، الذي وقع في الخامس والعشرين من أكتوبر من العام 2021، التقدم الذي كان السودانُ يحرزه ببطءٍ. والسؤال الذي يطرح نفسه هو: لماذا خاطر الجيش بتعريض البلاد للرقابة والعزلة الدوليتين بالانقلاب على الحكومة الانتقالية واسقاطها؟ لربما اعتقد قادةُ الانقلاب بأنهم سوف يتلقون دعماً من دول شرق أوسطية يُعتقد أنها تربطهم بها علاقات لصيقة—وهي على وجه التحديد المملكة العربية السعودية، والإمارات العربية المتحدة، وإسرائيل، ومصر. لذلك فإن دور هذه الدول محوريٌ في استمرار تقويض أو استعادة عملية التحول الديمقراطي في السودان. 

وفي هذا الصدد، فإن أهم دولتين شرق أوسطيتين، المملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة، قد اتخذتا إلى الآن موقفاً سبب بكل تأكيد إحباطاً لزعماء الانقلاب في السودان. إذ لم تقدم أي من الدولتين دعماً مالياً معلناً للتعويض عن فقدان دعم المؤسسات المالية الدولية ودعم الشركاء الغربيين كالولايات المتحدة، والمملكة المتحدة، وأوروبا.

بدلاً عن ذلك، انضمت الدولتان إلى الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة في الأول من نوفمبر من العام 2021 ل “تؤكد على وقوفها إلى جانب شعب السودان، وتؤكد على أهمية دعم تطلعاته نحو إقامة دولة ديمقراطية وسلمية.” وقد دعا البيان “…إلى الاستعادة الكاملة والفورية للحكومة والمؤسسات الانتقالية بقيادة مدنية.” فضلاً عن ذلك، انضمت المملكة السعودية إلى الولايات المتحدة لتيسير اجتماع بين قادة الانقلاب والمجلس المركزي لقوى الحرية والتغيير، وهي تحالف من المنظمات والجماعات السياسية والمدنية التي قادت الاحتجاجات التي أدت إلى سقوط البشير. وكان تحالف الحرية والتغيير قد رفض قبل ذلك الانضمام إلى ما يسمى بمفاوضات الآلية الثلاثية، التي تيسرها الأمم المتحدة، والاتحاد الأفريقي، والهيئة الحكومية للتنمية (إيقاد)، وذلك بسبب مشاركة قوى سياسية كانت قد شاركت في حكومة البشير الأخيرة، مما قوَّض من مصداقية تلك المفاوضات، دون تقويض مصداقية العملية برمتها.

على الرغم من ذلك، فإن المجتمع الدولي ينبغي عليه مراقبة دول الشرق الأوسط التي ربما تَوَقَّع الانقلابيون منها دعماً. إذ وردت تقارير في العشرين من يونيو بأن الإمارات العربية المتحدة، بالتعاون مع رجل أعمال سوداني، سوف تستثمر ستة مليار دولار لبناء ميناء في السودان وتزويد البنك المركزي بثلاثمائة مليون دولار كوديعة، مما يمكن أن يخفف الضغط الذي يواجه قادة الانقلاب. لكن شركة موانئ أبو ظبي نفت ببيان مكتوب توقيع اتفاقيات لبناءِ ميناءٍ في السودان، لكنها بينت بأن هنالك مناقشات أولية مع السلطات السودانية. إن مجرد وجود مثل هذه المناقشات هو أمرٌ مثير للقلق، لأنها، إذا نجحت، سوف تقوِّي من موقف العسكريين في أي مفاوضات مع القوى المدنية.

إن الموقف الذي لا زال أكثر غموضاً بخصوص الانقلاب هو موقف إسرائيل، إذ فسرت القوى الديمقراطية في السودان فشل إسرائيل في إدانة الانقلاب بأنه دعم ضمني للحكومة العسكرية ومؤشر على نيتها للمضي قدماً في مسار التطبيع، الذي بدأ في عهد الحكومة الانتقالية في العام 2020. وبينما يُعتقد بأن إسرائيل لازالت محافظة على اتصالاتها مع القادة العسكريين السودانيين، إلا أنه ليس هنالك ما يشير إلى أنها تعمل بنشاط على إكمال عملية التطبيع في الظروف الحالية. وهذا يتسق مع موقف الولايات المتحدة، التي حثت على ايقاف عملية التطبيع إلى أن يعود السودان إلى مسار التحول الديمقراطي بقيادة مدنية. 

في هذه الأثناء، يبقى موقف مصر غامضاً للغاية، على الرغم من أن دعمها من غير المرجح أن يحدث فارقاً كبيراً، لأن مصر نفسها متورطة في أزمة اقتصادية لم يسبق لها مثيل، لا يسمح لها بتقديم أي مساعدات مالية للانقلابيين في السودان. علاوة على ذلك، فإن تأثير مصر الجيوسياسي قد تضعضع، وذلك في مقابل صعود المملكة العربية السعودية، والإمارات العربية المتحدة، وقطر، وتركيا، التي باتت الآن تلعب أدواراً إقليمية متزايدة. بناءً على ذلك، من الأهمية بمكان أن تُنَسِق دول الترويكا—التي دعمت باتساق الحكم الديمقراطي المدني في السودان—جهودها بشكل مشترك مع هذه الدول. وبهذا الخصوص، على دول الترويكا اشراك المملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة في جهودها لاستعادة مسار الانتقال الديمقراطي. وعليها كذلك تشجيع إسرائيل، التي ما زالت تحتفظ باتصالاتها مع قادة السودان العسكريين، على الرغم من عدم وجود علاقات دبلوماسية، على تعزيز رسائل المجتمع الدولي بأن تقويض ديمقراطية السودان أمر لا يمكن قبوله وبأنه ينبغي اتخاذ خطوات عملية لتأسيس حكومة مدنية كاملة، ومسنودة شعبياً.

إن التنسيق بين الترويكا وهذه الدول الثلاثة ينبغي أن يركز على ما لا ينبغي القيام به، وكذلك على ما ينبغي القيام به لمساعدة السودانيين على استعادة مسار التحول الديمقراطي. فالإمارات العربية المتحدة يجب أن تمتنع عن الانخراط في أي نقاشات بشأن استثمارات محتملة مع حكومةِ أمرٍ واقعٍ يقاومها باستمرار وإصرار السواد الأعظم من الشعب السوداني. وينبغي أن توقف المناقشات التي تجريها مع السلطات السودانية لبناءِ ميناءٍ في السودان. بدلاً عن ذلك، على الإمارات العربية المتحدة أن تنضم إلى الولايات المتحدة والمملكة العربية السعودية في جهودهما لإنهاء الأزمة السياسية الحالية، وهو خطوة مهمة لاستقرار وتنمية السودان، ومهمة كذلك لخلق بيئة مناسبة للاستثمار الأجنبي المستدام. 

إن دول الترويكا، بانضمام المملكة العربية السعودية وربما الإمارات العربية المتحدة، يجب أن تبذل جهوداً لإحياء وتعزيز الآلية الثلاثية، وذلك بتعزيز مشاركة أكبر للمبعوثين الخاصين وممثلين لهذه الدول. ويمكن بدلاً عن ذلك أن تكون هنالك مبادرة دولية جديدة لتسهيل التفاوض بين الأطراف السودانية. وفيما يتعلق بإسرائيل، فإن قرارها بعدم إكمال التطبيع يستحق الإشادة وينبغي تشجيعه بقوة. 

إن إحياء وتعزيز الآلية الثلاثية أو إنشاء بديلاً لها أمرٌ مهم للغاية بعد إعلان قيادة الجيش مؤخراً بأنها لن تكون جزءاً من أي حوار مع المدنيين، وأنها سوف تسلم السلطة للمدنيين فقط إذا توصلوا إلى توافق. إن الغاية من هذا الموقف هي تقويض المساعي الإقليمية والدولية الجارية لتيسير المفاوضات بين القوى الديمقراطية التي تناضل من أجل الحرية والحكم المدني، من ناحية، والعسكريين، الذي قوَّضوا الانتقال، من ناحية أخرى.  إنه يشير إلى أن العسكريين لا ينوون التخلي عن السلطة، لأن التوصل إلى توافق في الظروف الراهنة أمرٌ مستحيل. ومن المرجح أن تستخدم القيادة العسكرية هذه الاستحالة كمبرر لتكوين حكومة تتحكم هي عليها. ولربما، في سيناريو مرجح آخر، تنظم انتخابات، البلادُ غير مستعدة لها، وهي ممارسة شائعة لشرعنة الأمر الواقع. 

يبيِّن تاريخ السودان أن الشعب دائماً منتصر في معركته ضد الدكتاتوريين من أجل الحرية والديمقراطية. وعلى دول الشرق الأوسط، التي ترغب في تأسيس علاقات سياسية مع السودان، كإسرائيل، أو تلك الراغبة في الاستثمار، كالمملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة، الوقوف بجانب القوى المدنية المناصرة للديمقراطية. وعلى أقل تقدير، عليها ألا تعرقل النضال المستمر للشعب السوداني لهزيمة الانقلاب والعودة إلى التحول الديمقراطي. 

* نصرالدين عبدالباري يعمل باحثاً رفيعاً ببرامج الشرق الأوسط بالمجلس الأطلسي.

** معتصم علي يعمل مستشاراً قانونياً بمركز راؤول ويلينبيرج لحقوق الأنسان، ويقيم في واشنطن، دي سي.

 

إن النسخة الإنجليزية الأصلية من هذا المقال نُشرت بموقع المجلس الأطلسي بتاريخ 23 أغسطس، 2022.

Sudan’s transitional government, formed in 2019 following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir, was like an airplane that after a rocky takeoff, was just about to level off when it was shot down. Under former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the transitional government struggled to address a variety of deep security and economic challenges, such as tribal conflicts, multiple armies, the involvement of the military in non-military industries, poor governance and rule of law, and an inefficient economic regulatory regime. The Sudanese people, who had taken to the streets in bold defiance of a brutal thirty-year dictatorship, expected an immediate improvement in their economic situation after the collapse of al-Bashir’s regime. However, economic conditions, aggravated by extensive smuggling of fuel and other commodities and instability in the local currency, continued to deteriorate. The Sudanese pound depreciated further, and national fuel shortages remained as dire as they had been under al-Bashir’s regime.

After Hamdok’s government unified the exchange rate in March 2021 and lifted subsidies that June, the situation changed significantly. Fuel queues disappeared and for seven continuous months from March to October 2021, the Sudanese pound stabilized and maintained its strength in the face of the US dollar—for the first time since South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011.

Encouraged by these domestic reforms, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and the European Union started providing financial support. It was expected that the country would receive more than four billion dollars in assistance by the end of the 2022 fiscal year. This economic and political stability would have encouraged private sector investment in the country. The government’s constitutional reform and transitional justice efforts, as well as infrastructure plans to end chronic power outages and increase oil production, were in advanced stages.

The military coup on October 25, 2021, upended the progress Sudan was slowly making. So why did the military risk international censure and isolation by overthrowing the transitional government? The coup leaders might have thought that they would be supported by Middle Eastern countries with whom, it is believed, they have close ties—namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, and Egypt. The role of these countries is, therefore, pivotal as far as the undermining or restoration of Sudan’s democratic transitional process is concerned.

The two most important Middle Eastern countries in this regard, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have thus far taken positions that have certainly disappointed the military. Neither country has provided any public financial assistance to compensate for the withdrawal of aid from international financial institutions and Western partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe.

Rather, both countries joined the United States and United Kingdom in affirming on November 1, 2021, the four “countries’ stance with the people of Sudan and emphasiz[ing] the importance of supporting their aspirations for a democratic and peaceful nation.” The statement called for “the full and immediate restoration of… civilian-led transitional government and institutions.” Saudi Arabia also joined the United States in facilitating a meeting between the leaders of the coup and the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a political coalition of the political and civil society organizations and groups that led the protests leading to al-Bashir’s ouster. The FFC had previously refused to join the so-called Tripartite Mechanism talks mediated by the United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), due to the participation of political forces previously part of al-Bashir’s government, which undermined the credibility of the talks, but not that of the whole process.

Still, the international community must keep its eyes on the Middle Eastern nations that the coup leaders might have expected help from. It was reported on June 20 that the UAE, in collaboration with a Sudanese businessman, would invest six billion dollars to build a port in Sudan and provide a three-hundred-million-dollar deposit to the Central Bank of Sudan, which would help to slightly ease the economic pressure faced by coup leaders. The Abu Dhabi Port Company denied that it signed any agreements to build a port, but stated that preliminary discussions are taking place with Sudanese authorities. The existence of such discussions is worrisome, as they, if successful, would embolden the military in any negotiations with the civilian forces.

More ambiguous still is Israel’s stance vis-a-vis the coup, as pro-democracy forces in Sudan interpreted Israel’s failure to condemn the coup as tacit support for the military government and a sign of its intention to proceed with normalization efforts, started under the transitional government in 2020. While Israel is thought to have remained in contact with Sudanese military leaders, there is no indication that it is actively working on finalizing the normalization process under the current circumstances. This is in line with the US position, which has urged for the process to be halted until Sudan returns to a democratic transformation process under the leadership of a civilian government.

Egypt’s position meanwhile remains quite unclear, although its support is unlikely to make a huge difference as it is itself embroiled in an unprecedented economic crisis and is not in a position to offer the Sudanese military financial support. In addition, Egypt’s geopolitical influence has declined vis-a-vis the rise of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey, which are now increasingly playing bigger regional roles.

Against this backdrop, it is extremely important that the Troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway—which has consistently supported democratic civilian rule in Sudan—jointly coordinate its efforts with these states. The Troika should involve both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in efforts to help restore the transition process. It should encourage Israel, which maintains communications with Sudan’s military leaders, despite not having diplomatic relations, to reinforce the messages of the international community that the undermining of Sudan’s democracy is unacceptable and that practical steps must be taken to establish a purely civilian, popularly supported government.

This coordination between the Troika and these three states should focus on what shouldn’t be done, as well as on what should be done to help the Sudanese people restart the democratic transition process. The UAE should refrain from engaging in any potential investment discussions with a de facto government that is continuously and persistently resisted by the vast majority of the Sudanese people. It should halt discussions with Sudanese authorities to build a port in Sudan. Instead, the UAE should join the United States and Saudi Arabia in their efforts to end the current political crisis, an important step for the stability and development of Sudan, as well as for the creation of a suitable environment for sustainable foreign investments.

Efforts by the Troika, joined by Saudi Arabia and possibly the UAE, should also be undertaken to revive and strengthen the Tripartite Mechanism by fostering greater involvement by the special envoys and representatives of these countries. Alternatively, there should be a new international initiative to facilitate negotiations between the Sudanese parties. As for Israel, the decision to not finalize the normalization of relations with Sudan is also one that should be applauded and strongly encouraged.

The revival and strengthening of the Tripartite Mechanism or establishment of an alternative one is profoundly important following the recent announcement by the military leadership that it won’t be a part of any dialogue with civilians and that it would hand over power to civilians only if they reach a consensus. The aim of this position is to undermine regional and international endeavors to facilitate negotiations between the pro-democracy forces that struggle for political freedom and civilian rule, on the one hand, and the military that upended the transition, on the other. It indicates that the military does not intend to give up power, as reaching a consensus under the current circumstances is impossible. The military will most likely use this impossibility as a justification for establishing a government that it can control. It might, in anonther likely scenario, hold elections for which the country is not ready, which is a common practice to legitimize the status quo.    

The history of Sudan demonstrates that the people have always won the battle for freedom and democracy against dictators. The Middle Eastern countries that are interested in establishing political relations with Sudan, such as Israel, and those that are interested in investing, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should therefore stand on the side of pro-democracy civilian forces. At the very least, they should not hinder the continued struggle of the Sudanese people to defeat the coup and return to a democratic transition.

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Mustasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/whats-next-for-kenya-after-a-contested-election/ Wed, 17 Aug 2022 14:15:42 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=556821 As the contest between William Ruto and Raila Odinga appears headed to court, Africa Center experts paint a bigger picture of what this East African powerhouse faces.

The post What’s next for Kenya after a contested election? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> While Kenyan Vice President William Ruto was finally declared this week the winner of that country’s August 9 presidential election, the dust has yet to settle: Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who reportedly received 48.85 percent of the vote to Ruto’s 50.49 percent, has dug in by officially challenging the result.

Odinga has said he will challenge the result in court—adding to Kenya’s spotty recent history of contested elections. But in the meantime, we asked Atlantic Council Africa Center nonresident senior fellows Constance Berry Newman and Aubrey Hruby to paint a bigger picture of what this East African powerhouse faces in the longer term.

This election has been characterized as a test of democracy in East Africa. Why? 

Since East Africa includes politically troubled countries such as Eritrea, South Sudan, and Somalia, where would one go to seek a model of democracy? Maybe Kenya. Since 1992, it has had uneven election experiences—some in which the results were contested, yet in the end were accepted by citizens—but it has had a functioning multiparty democracy since 2002. Even the election crisis of 2007-08 resulted in a workable democratic compromise through a government of national unity, which laid the basis for a new reform constitution. So there is reason to hope that Kenyan democracy and its elections will become models. More broadly, the country is home to many positive trends, including one of the highest literacy rates in Africa, a growing middle class, and some of the most vibrant media on the African continent.

—Constance

Given the concerns around democracy that emanate from Kenya’s neighbors, mainly Uganda and Rwanda, it is natural to look to Kenya as a democratic stronghold in East Africa. Yet still, seeing this election as a test of democracy is a bit too general; more accurately, it is a test of the institutional reform (particularly in the judiciary) that came in the new constitution promulgated in 2010 after the post-election political violence in 2008 that killed 1,200 Kenyans. As Odinga challenges the election outcome in court, the judiciary will have to stand strong against heavy political pressure and maintain its independence and faith in the integrity of the process.  

—Aubrey 

The economy drove many voters’ concerns. Is Ruto equipped to reverse Kenya’s fortunes? 

As a candidate, Ruto indicated his commitment to building one hundred thousand affordable housing units for poor Nairobi residents, creating four million jobs a year, and providing national hospital health insurance for all Kenyans—including those in the informal sector—within the first one hundred days of his presidency. These are extremely ambitious commitments for Kenyans who are all too familiar with disappointment. But Ruto knows the good, the bad, and the ugly of Kenya; therefore if anyone can manipulate the levers of government and the private sector to make life better for the Kenyans, it is him.

—Constance

Like many countries around the world, Kenya is struggling with high inflation and slower growth as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the reduction in tourism in African markets, and the war in Ukraine. Inflation crested 8 percent in July—a more than five-year high—and youth unemployment is rampant. Growth slowed in 2022 and is expected to end up somewhere between 5 and 6 percent, down from the 7.5 percent of 2021. Election uncertainty will be the enemy of business in all of East Africa, which is why the heads of neighboring states moved quickly to congratulate Ruto. As investment has slowed and the strong dollar has made additional borrowing on the Eurobond market prohibitively expensive, it will be critical for the new president to play a strong commercial-diplomacy role abroad with the aim of attracting investment into critical sectors such as agriculture and financial services. Domestically, he will need to focus on expanding credit for small and medium-sized enterprises and making agriculture more productive and climate resilient. 

—Aubrey 

What else should the new administration expect to accomplish in the coming weeks and months? What challenges will they face? 

Key to effective elections is the citizens’ acceptance of the results; this is the responsibility of the election commission, media, opposition, and, importantly, the citizens themselves. Because the results of the election will likely be challenged in court, Ruto must encourage calm while the judicial process unfolds. Depending on the results of the process, whoever is inaugurated will face the challenge of fostering national unity by demonstrating genuine commitment to govern in the interests of all Kenyans. The general population will be concerned about social spending (for example, education and health care) and public discussions about the options could be encouraged. Although debt relief is not a bread-and-butter issue, it will affect all citizens—while the new administration will likely be required to restructure public expenditures, thanks to the terms of a $2.3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in 2021.

—Constance

Early indications show Nairobi quite calm despite the challenges to the election, perhaps as a result of the still-fresh memories of 2007. Given that Kenya has been a fast-growing economy over the past decade, whether or not Ruto can deliver economic advancement for the “hustler nation” in the near term will be determined by three factors: how long election uncertainty lasts (and if the election has to be rerun), how quickly he can earn the trust of the Nairobi business and political elite, and his ability to effectively attract investment to fuel Kenya’s return to growth. 

—Aubrey 

What does a stable and functional Kenya mean for the rest of the region? 

The following words describe the role of a stable Kenya: “peacebuilder,” “critical trader,” and “strategic partner.” The country is usually thought of as the regional player to address conflicts (except when it needed help in addressing its own conflict in 2007). In 2005, for example, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the civil war in Sudan was largely brokered because of Kenyan perseverance. It has also had historically close political ties with the United States, China, and India, which makes its stability important for East Africa.

—Constance

Kenya is the dominant player of East Africa, constituting more than 40 percent of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) and playing home to Mombasa—the coastal city through which most trade with the region happens. As much as 85 percent of Ugandan imports and exports go through Mombasa, and the further expansion of the standard gauge railway in the region will serve to deepen the economic connections. That’s why a stable Kenya is absolutely critical for the region. It is not only the connector of the Horn to the mineral richness of eastern Congo, but also the economic, financial, and logistical hub of East Africa more broadly.

—Aubrey

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/amb-rahmani-in-extinction-rebellion-ensuring-women-have-equal-rights-to-inheritance-and-property-ownership-is-key-to-tackling-climate-change/ Wed, 22 Jun 2022 19:55:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=540164 The post Amb. Rahmani in Extinction Rebellion: Ensuring women have equal rights to inheritance and property ownership is key to tackling climate change appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-bidens-limited-somalia-deployment-is-the-right-move/ Fri, 03 Jun 2022 10:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=532306 Given the persistent terror threat from al-Shabaab, Washington's decision to send US troops into Somalia deserves credit and support.

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]]> In counterterrorism and security, failures make front-page news while quiet successes seldom get the credit they deserve. Last month’s deadly gun attacks in Buffalo, New York, and Uvalde, Texas, are prime examples of the former. But there was also a prime example of the latter around the same time: a key announcement by the Biden administration on May 16 that could lead to hundreds of lives being saved from terror attacks.

The US deployment of about 450 Special Operations troops back to Somalia will help Washington’s local counterterrorism partners pressure the increasingly dangerous al-Shabaab terrorist group—which most Americans do not realize has become al-Qaeda’s largest, wealthiest, and deadliest franchise. Apart from the decision to send US forces to shore up NATO’s defenses against Russian aggression in Europe, the Somalia deployment may represent the largest new commitment of US forces overseas by President Joe Biden.

As counterterrorism professionals with more than fifty-five years of national-security experience between us—in the White House and three cabinet departments, and under four presidents from both parties—we are increasingly concerned about the popular perception that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have been defeated. As far back as 2018, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism foresaw that groups such as ISIS and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia, would continue to threaten US interests, and that terrorists would seek to gain control of safe havens in countries whose governments are too weak or distracted to contain them without outside help. Premature declarations of victory are dangerous. 

This is why Somalia is an important story. The recent election of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud represents progress, but al-Shabaab—whose leaders frequently call for attacks on Americans—is gaining power in southern and central Somalia and is close to being able to mount external operations targeting the United States. One such plot was already disrupted: In December 2020, the Department of Justice unsealed an indictment for a plot by al-Shabaab’s leaders to carry out a 9/11-style aircraft hijacking in the United States. The Philippines extradited an alleged al-Shabaab operative to the United States to stand trial for the scheme.

Al-Shabaab also has a history of luring young Somali-Americans to Somalia to fight foreign invaders, then using them for terrorist attacks against civilians. Such attacks have reached beyond Somalia, killing sixty-seven at a shopping mall in 2013 and 147 at a university in 2015, both in Kenya. A plot to bring down a passenger plane in February 2016 failed only by good luck and a skillful aircrew. And in 2020, Al-Shabaab killed three Americans who were training Kenyan counterterrorism forces.

For all these reasons, Biden’s order to resend US service members—which reversed a December 2020 decision by the Trump administration to withdraw the then-remaining 750 US military personnel in Somalia—was the right move. Conditions on the ground in 2020 did not justify confidence that Somali forces were ready to take on al-Shabaab without help. Early that year, US Africa Command said publicly (and repeated it just before then President Donald Trump’s decision) that al-Shabaab “remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.” 

Since the US withdrawal, al-Shabaab has grown in power and wealth. Open sources estimate that the group has grown to seven thousand fighters and receives annual revenues of $130 million from criminal activities, which have included forcing Somalis to give their charitable contributions to al-Shabaab instead of actual charities. For comparison, the Somali government’s total revenue in 2019 was $342 million. Given the number of people living in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, that makes the terrorist organization more than twice as rich per capita as the Somali government.

In February, when the United States carried out a drone strike in defense of Somali military forces being attacked by al-Shabaab, US forces advised and assisted Somali partners from outside the country. But this is hardly the best approach to working effectively with partner counterterrorism forces. 

The Biden administration’s decision will allow US troops to once again train and work alongside the Danab, Somalia’s most effective counterterrorism unit. This will result in better battlefield intelligence collection, especially the kind of gritty tactical intelligence from local human sources needed to successfully counter al-Shabaab. A persistent presence also enhances security for US diplomats and civilian specialists to carry out their vital work. 

A small footprint, especially of US Special Operations Forces, will strengthen and rebuild Somali counterterrorism capabilities in ways that an “over-the-horizon” presence never could. This will keep the pressure on al-Shabaab, limiting the group’s ability to plan and mount external operations that threaten Americans in the US homeland and overseas.

Experience has shown that we ignore growing terrorism threats in contested spaces at our peril. Biden’s decision to send a small number of US troops into Somalia with a limited mission needs to be given the credit and support it deserves. American lives may well depend on it.

---

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, director of the Future of DHS Project, and co-director of the Future of Counterterrorism Project. He is a former senior official at the US Department of State and deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

Christopher P. Costa is the executive director of the International Spy Museum and a former career US Army intelligence officer. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018. 

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/shapiro-quoted-in-sudan-tribune-on-how-israel-would-need-us-support-for-normalization-between-israel-sudan/ Fri, 27 May 2022 16:42:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=536978 The post Shapiro quoted in Sudan Tribune on how Israel would need US support for normalization between Israel-Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/the-days-of-elite-deals-in-sudan-should-be-over/ Mon, 11 Apr 2022 18:34:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=511598 It is not too late for Washington to correct the course on Sudan and help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact.

The post The days of elite deals in Sudan should be over appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> It was only a year ago that Sudan—newly removed from the US terrorism list—was negotiating the terms of its upcoming debt-relief package and proposing ways to invest more than one billion dollars in promised international financial assistance toward propping up democracy. At the time, the world was still talking about the country as a potential model for others to follow on the road from dictatorship to democracy. 

Today, the country is on a knife’s edge. 

The promised road to reform is now fully blocked by security forces bent on what they claim is an effort to “save” the country from civilian leaders. But as these forces hold ever tighter to power, they are squeezing the life out of the country: Since their October 25 coup that effectively brushed aside the civilian transition and reignited a popular revolution, the economy has gone into a death spiral. Inflation is rising above 250 percent, the value of the country’s currency has plummeted against the dollar, and the price of key imported commodities in Sudan, such as wheat and fuel, have risen by more than 30 percent. 

In other words, a loaf of bread that cost two Sudanese pounds when civilians assumed office two years ago now costs more than fifty. The United Nations World Food Program projects that 40 percent of the country’s population will face “acute food insecurity” later this year if nothing changes, leading donors to begin planning for a new humanitarian emergency in the country’s urban areas.

As Sudan’s supporters watch this calamitous economic situation unfold, they are desperately searching for any defensible reason to restart lending and debt-relief programs to help avoid the coming financial collapse and humanitarian emergency. But, here too, the military has given no reason to show any leniency: Since the October coup d’état, dozens of leading political figures and protest leaders have been targeted for disappearance or arrest, while ninety-three pro-democracy demonstrators have been killed by security forces (which continue to use a nationwide state of emergency as justification for their brutality).

Last week, the country’s military leader, General Abdallah Fattah al-Burhan, even threatened to expel the head of the country’s UN peace-support mission for “lying publicly” and failing to report to the UN Security Council the supposed progress under the junta’s rule.

As the junta hunkers down internally, its emissaries are on a globetrotting tour of friendly capitals, from Moscow to Abu Dhabi, seeking political backing and a financial rescue. So far, no one has been willing to wager on the military or against the will of the Sudanese people, whose demands for democratic change have not abated.

But that could soon change. A series of recent meetings in Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi suggest that Sudan’s longtime friends are rapidly losing patience with the political deadlock and impending economic collapse, and are searching for a way to create a soft landing (even if it comes at the expense of the Sudanese population’s democratic aspirations).

For Gulf partners, who bought up Khartoum real estate and commercial holdings at fire-sale prices in the waning days of the Omar al-Bashir regime (and since his ouster), Sudan’s unraveling would spell disaster for their investments. Egypt, which continues to view Sudan as its vassal, fears a mass exodus of Sudanese northward and political chaos on its southern border. Khartoum’s ability to stay in political lockstep with Cairo in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations with Ethiopia—Egypt’s single biggest foreign-policy priority—is also a major question.

Considering Sudan’s political history, the time appears ripe for another notorious elite deal, with regional buy-in, that walks the country back from the financial brink—but, in the process, short-circuits any hope that the bottom-up political movement will lead to genuine civilian rule and democracy.

Washington needs to get serious

For weeks, Khartoum has been awash in rumors that the hapless former prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, seen as capable of putting financial markets at ease, could return. The re-establishment of a civilian and technocratic—but compliant—cabinet, which puts a more acceptable face on the regime, might also follow. But most concerning is the discussion of the establishment of a new Security and Defense Council that would ensure security interests remain firmly in the military’s hands and separate from civilian-led ministries. This would leave the military with ultimate executive authority. 

Such a set-up would pave the way for quick elections, which the military and its political allies would surely dominate, and thereby provide new surface-level legitimacy for unreformed security interests and their foreign backers. As they likely see it, the only real losers under such a deal are the 44 million Sudanese not in the military or associated with the previous regime, who will once again see their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic future dashed by political expediency and regional stability.

Sudan’s dedicated pro-democracy movement would categorically reject any deal engineered with outside backing and did not emerge from a process they were fully a part of—but that doesn’t mean that the military and their allies might not still try. Importantly, it is not too late to prevent this scenario. But it requires the United States and partners to step up and demonstrate a strategic focus on long-term change and a return to core principles that bring it into greater alignment and allegiance with Washington’s true partners: the Sudanese people.

First, the international community must remind itself that Sudan’s revolution was never merely about overthrowing a dictator or dismantling his party; it was about undoing the corrupt, racist, and authoritarian power structures that have governed Sudan since independence. 

Western calls for the military to enact “confidence-building measures” only plays into the existing discriminatory power dynamics in the country and elevate the security services as an equal, if not legitimate, part of Sudan’s political future (and therefore undermines a core tenet of the revolution). Instead, the military should be getting constant reminders that their days are numbered and a return to the pre-coup, pre-revolution status quo is both impossible and unacceptable.

Second, Washington needs to improve its public messaging in the face of the military’s political double-dealing. It is no longer enough for the United States to say it’s “on the side of the protesters.” If it were, it would call out every single abuse and death suffered by pro-democracy activists at the hands of the security services, as well as demand an investigation of crimes committed under the coup government. Instead, Washington’s numbness to the sustained deluge of crimes normalizes the deaths of innocent people and reinforces the military’s hold on power.

Third, the United States needs to start listening to the demands of the people and let them inform its public statements. Calling for a “return to civilian-led transitional government” or the “full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement,” as recent US and Troika statements have, reflects deafness to popular calls for a new way forward, tells allies on the ground that stability is more important than transformation, and suggests that Washington would rather save face by salvaging formulas it once endorsed rather than seeing the writing on the wall and changing tack.

Lastly, it is well past time that the United States rebalance the negotiating table by imposing targeted sanctions on the individuals directing these abuses and profiting from the current stalemate. Since the military’s coup, those most responsible for the disruption of the transition and human-rights abuses have suffered no direct consequences for their actions. While symbolic, the recent sanctioning of Sudan’s Central Reserve Police by the US Treasury was short on impact and rang hollow with both the victims and the perpetrators: With no dollar-denominated bank holdings or large physical presence outside of Sudan, the sanctions have little to no practical effect. And by targeting an institution with far less responsibility for Sudan’s failing state than the military, even the symbolism of the action was lost on most. 

Instead, Washington continues to betray a lack of real understanding of what is happening on the ground, who is responsible, and how to impact the calculations of the principal belligerents. But it is not too late to correct the course. Making clear the conditions required to restart lending and avoiding sanctions, conceived in consultation with its democratic allies on the streets, could help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact and demonstrate that Washington is giving real weight to the popular will.

In the long run, this is what is required to achieve actual stability—not the cheap imitation Sudan has always known.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

The post The days of elite deals in Sudan should be over appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-social-platforms-crack-down-on-kremlin-media-as-kremlin-demands-compliance/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 20:41:51 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=494112 Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online.

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Social platforms crack down on Kremlin media as Kremlin demands compliance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian Hybrid War Report.

Exploitation of social platforms

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops

Documenting dissent

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires  

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

Security

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire 

Regional reactions

Ugandan general tweets support for Russia

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context 

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online. At the request of the European Union, Meta will restrict access to Kremlin-owned outlets RT and Sputnik across the EU. Earlier, Meta announced it would also restrict access to several Russian state media accounts in Ukraine at the government’s request. In addition, the company has demonetized the accounts of Russian state-owned media organizations and prohibited them from posting ads on Facebook and Instagram.  

In a similar move, Google has blocked RT and Sputnik’s YouTube channels across Europe. It will also prevent RT and other relevant outlets from receiving funding from ads on their websites and apps.  

Meanwhile, Twitter announced actions to reduce the spread of articles from Russian state-affiliated media. Links to Kremlin media will now include a “stay informed” label. Since the start of the invasion, there has been an uptick in the sharing of Kremlin media articles on Twitter, with more than 45,000 tweets a day directing users to state-affiliated outlets. 

https://twitter.com/yoyoel/status/1498343849273425921?s=20&t=bbY92V0jXWxei_PNFobwow

Twitter also said that advertisements in Ukraine and Russia are on pause to ensure that critical public safety information is “elevated.” To this end, users in the two countries will no longer see tweet recommendations from accounts they don’t follow. 

Responding to social media companies’ increased moderation efforts, the Russian government ordered companies to comply with a new law that mandates social media platforms operating in Russia must set up local offices and register with Russia’s media watchdog, Roskomnadzor.  Under this legislation, local representatives could be held liable if Russia feels platforms are not abiding by local laws. These actions have been widely condemned by digital rights experts, as the law could be used as justification to intimidate employees with the threat of arrest and pressure companies to engage in censorship. 

Both Russian independent news outlets and Tik Tok have already fielded requests from the government to take down content related to the war in Ukraine. In response to what Russia claims is “censorship” by social media companies, Roskomnadzor announced restrictions on access to Facebook, and access to Twitter appears to be limited as of February 26. 

Over the weekend, Facebook and Twitter removed two covert influence operations targeting Ukrainians. One operation was tied to Russia, and another had connections to Belarus. Facebook also said the pro-Belarus hacking group Ghostwriter was targeting Ukrainians, including the military.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington, DC

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops 

Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, approved a proposal by the Security and Anti-Corruption Committee to draft a law introducing criminal liability for sharing “fake” content related to Russia’s armed forces. Members of the ruling United Russia party previously proposed introducing such a bill, citing “a lot of disinformation” on social media.  The bill passed its first reading on March 2 and is expected to be presented for its second reading in several days.

The draft law states that the punishment for sharing fake content about Russian troops would be fifteen years in prison. The move could be a reaction to the increasing amount of footage showing Russia targeting civilian areas in Ukraine, which Russia denies. The law might intimidate Russian internet users and discourage them from sharing or saving such footage, particularly anything documenting war crimes. Meanwhile, Karim Khan, a prosecutor with the International Criminal Court, announced that he would investigate Russia for possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Ukraine. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

On March 1, Wikipedia shared a notice they received from Russia’s Roskomnadzor information agency threatening to block the crowdsourced platform due to its Russian-language article on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notice cited the inclusion of information about Russian military personnel casualties and Ukrainian civilian victims. In response, Wikipedia shared workarounds for users if Wikipedia does become blocked in Russia. 

That same day, Russian users found themselves unable to access the websites for the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the independent broadcaster TV Rain. Around the same time, the Russian Prosecutor General’s office released a statement on Telegram saying they had submitted demands to Roskomnadzor to restrict access to both channels. The statement accused the outlets of calling for extremism and violence, spreading “false information” regarding Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, and calling for “mass public events.” 

The Prosecutor General’s office stated that the restrictions could legally be put in place due to Article 15.3 Federal Law No. 149-FZ Paragraph 1, “On Information, Information Technologies and Data Protection,” which covers the restriction of access to information inciting mass riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass public events. According to Article 15.3, the Russian government must first notify the online publication hosting the problematic content and request that it be removed; if the content is not immediately removed, they may then proceed with restricting access to the online publication.

TV Rain posted on Telegram that the Prosecutor General’s office did not identify specific materials on their website that violated Russian laws. It also said it strictly followed legal standards and used trusted sources when covering events in Ukraine.

Both Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain began trending on Twitter in Russia as these events unfolded. 

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC 

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets  

On February 24, Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor stated that Russian media outlets were “obliged” to rely on information received from Russian official sources while covering Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine. The statement also argued that Roskomnadzor would block all attempts of disseminating “knowingly false information” on the internet. Considering the fact that Russia has generally avoided disclosing information about the exact number of casualties and military loss in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor’s announcement might be an attempt to prevent independent media from reporting casualty statistics. Having said that, Kremlin outlet RBK reported on March 2 that Russia had experienced a total of 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries since the invasion, according to the Ministry of Defense.

On February 28, Roskomnadzor claimed that it found instances of Google Ads being used to spread “unreliable socially significant information” about Russian and Ukrainian casualties. Consequently, Roskomnadzor demanded that Google restrict access to such materials, and warned Russian Internet sites against distributing such ads to avoid administrative fines or website bans. Roskomnadzor did not specify what false information it had found, but its statement suggests it wishes to prevent the distribution of any kind of information about Russian casualties to prevent public outrage. 

Russian authorities have already taken actions against multiple independent media outlets. On February 28, Roskomnadzor blocked to access to Current Time and Krym.Realii, both projects of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as the New Times. Following the ban, Current Times wrote that they were accused of “spreading unreliable socially significant information about the Russian military allegedly killed and captured within the territory of Ukraine.” RFE/RL President Jamie Fly assessed the Kremlin’s move as “an attempt to hide the terrible truth about the human price of Putin’s criminal war against Ukraine.”  

On top of blocking internet resources, journalists at independent media outlets also face physical threats. On February 24, Interfax journalist Dmitry Gavrilov was arrested during an anti-war rally in Saint Petersburg while he was taking a photograph of an anti-war banner. Gavrilov showed his press credentials to police but was nonetheless detained.  The following day, Russian police arrested three RFE/RL journalists covering anti-war protests in Moscow, even though they too had all the necessary credentials to work during mass protests.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland  

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine

Videos of a February 27 protest in Belarus have surfaced on social media. The protests were in response to several recent developments in the country, including Belarus joining the war against Ukraine, serving as a transit point for Russian weapons, and Belarus revoking its non-nuclear status after a February 27 constitutional referendum. Crowds gathered near the defense ministry chanting “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Long live Belarus.” The Belarusian government responded aggressively, sending in riot police to detain protesters.   

Meanwhile, Belarusians living in Vilnius, Lithuania climbed over the fence of the Belarusian embassy and replaced the official state flag hanging outside the building’s entrance with the opposition nationalist flag and a Ukrainian flag.  

Lastly, a video of Belarusian lieutenant colonel Sakhashchik Valery Stepanovich discouraging soldiers from joining the war in Ukraine went viral online. “This is not our war,” he said. “Find a way not to follow criminal orders. Sometimes saying ‘no’ takes the most courage.”

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the cyber activist collective Anonymous announced their “war against the Kremlin.” Over the next several days they took credit for successful attacks on public services and state-controlled media in Russia and Belarus. As there is no official Anonymous account on Twitter, the collective used hashtags #OpRussia and #OpKremlin to share news and updates about the cyber-attack campaign.

On February 26, Anonymous claimed they had hacked Kremlin-owned TV channels, which suddenly started showing footage from Ukraine that contradicted the official Kremlin narrative. Many anonymous Twitter accounts reported on the hack.

The following day, Anonymous took credit for taking down a long list of Russian government websites, including the Russian pension fund, the State Service, the presidential administration, customs, the national government site, Moscow’s mayor, and the Chechnya Republic. As of March 2, many of these sites – Mos.ru, government.ru, customs.gov.ru, kremlin.ru, gosuslugi.ru, and pfr.gov.ru – remained offline. Chechnya.gov.ru had been restored, but now required users to demonstrate they were not automated bots using “captcha” tests before being allowed to proceed to the site.


On February 28, Anonymous claimed they had downed Russian propaganda websites, three Belarusian banks, and multiple Belarusian government sites, including the Information Ministry, Military Industry Authority, and Defense Ministry. While one Belarusian bank, Belinvestbank.by, has been restored, belarusbank.by and priorbank.by remained compromised at the time of writing, alongside the government sites mil.by, vpk.gov.by, and mpt.gov.by.

In additional to shutting down websites, Anonymous also took credit for leaking information from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and the Russian Nuclear Institute. 

Anonymous is not the only cyber activist collective attacking Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The DFRLab previously reporting about the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacking the Belarus Railway company, while the IT Army of Ukraine is also engaging in cyber activism.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia 

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

On March 1, a large rally in Tbilisi demanded the Georgian government’s resignation and snap elections. The latest protest took place in solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after he announced that Ukraine was recalling its ambassador to Georgia due to the government’s “immoral position” on sanctions and barring Georgian volunteers from flying to Ukraine.

Georgia has seen four consecutive days of protests, as thousands take to the street to express their solidarity with Ukraine and condemn the Georgian government’s position on Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky expressed support for the protesters when he tweeted on February 26, “Incredible Georgian people who understand that friends must be supported! Grateful to everyone in Tbilisi and other cities who came out in support of Ukraine and against the war. Indeed, there are times when citizens are not the government, but better than the government.”  

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Multiple Russian TikTok users published now-deleted videos with the hashtag #давайзамир (#letsgoforpeace), in which they included near-identical phrases such as “All are blaming Russia, but close their eyes that Donbas has been under fire for eight years,” and “Please check all the news, we’re fighting for peace.” Notably, the text in many of these videos was also extremely similar, and on some occasions identical, strongly suggesting either coordination or the distribution of talking points for Russian video creators. Indeed, some Russian TikTok users pushed back publishing messages claiming they were offered payment to post peace symbols and express the message that Russia is stopping the war rather than starting it, and that the world has ignored the Donbas for eight years.

The scope of the narrative operation caught the eye of other TikTok users, who compiled videos of TikTokers voicing similar statements, then shamed them for being corrupt. Some of these TikTokers muted comments to avoid criticism, while others ultimately deleted their videos.

Not long after this first wave of similar narratives, a second wave appeared, when multiple users published videos featuring the lines, “In 2015, a new memorial named Alley of Angels was built in Donetsk” and “Russia wants to bring peace.” These videos were available at the time of publishing but may soon be deleted as well.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires

Georgian far-left groups are promoting the narrative that the war in Ukraine is a battle between two empires over Ukrainian resources. The narrative portrays the US and Russia as equal threats to Ukraine. On February 24, Politicano, a Facebook page known for Soviet Union nostalgia and affiliated with the Kremlin-linked News Front Georgia, posted that Ukraine has become a battleground for Western and Russian empires. Another Facebook page, “ნაპერწკალი“ (“Spark”), which describes itself as an “independent Marxist collective initiative,” posted that the war in Ukraine is a conflict between Russian and Western imperialists, fighting over spheres of influence and resources. 

The narrative that Ukraine is stuck between the imperial interests of the West and Russia aligns with messaging coming from far-right Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. On February 27, Dugin posted, “This is not a war with Ukraine. This is a confrontation with globalization…on all levels, including geopolitical and ideological.” According to him, Russia is creating a global resistance zone. “When we win, everybody benefits from it,” he said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

On February 28, the KGB of South Ossetia issued a statement claiming that there is raise of neo-Nazi and nationalistic sentiments in Georgia. The claim refers to Georgians willing to join Ukraine’s international legion of territorial defence, that allows foreign volunteers to support Ukraine’s defense efforts. The South Ossetia KGB described Georgian volunteers as “aggressive Georgian volunteers from the ranks of [former President] Mikheil Saakashvili’s radical followers.” It continued, “Instead of recognising its responsibility for crimes committed against humanity from 1920s till 2008, the Tbilisi regime expresses support for Ukrainian Banderovtsi [followers of the 20^th century Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera] who in turn are nurturing their own revanchist goals.”

That same day,  South Ossetia’s information agency published a story with the headline, “South Ossetia and Russia unite against Nazism.” The article claimed that citizens of South Ossetia launched a flash mob on social networks with the hashtag #Мирбезнацизма (“World without Nazism”). As of March 2, the DFRLab could not find a single public post on either Facebook or Twitter featuring the hashtag during the alleged time span of the flash mob.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire

On the morning of February 28, the Kyiv Independent reported that the first Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft was expected to deploy Belarusian paratroopers into Ukraine. Meanwhile, reports of ballistic missiles launched from Belarus into Ukraine continue to surface, with some reports suggesting the use of Iskander missiles. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka later confirmed missiles were launched from Belarus on February 27.  

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Ugandan General tweets support for Russia

Ugandan Lieutenant General Mahoozi Kainerugaba, son of President Yoweri Museveni and leader of the country’s land forces, tweeted on February 28, “The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine.”  The DFRLab previously identified a network of inauthentic Facebook assets working to prime Lt. Gen. Kainerugaba as the next president of Uganda.



The Ugandan Embassy in Moscow called on nationals living in Ukraine to remain cautious and follow instructions issued by the Ukrainian government. The embassy said, “It is our prayer that the situation will be short lived, and that normality will soon be restored.” The presidency has yet to issue any further comment on the war. 

On February 24, Vladlen Semivolos, Russia’s ambassador to Uganda, spoke to Uganda’s permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Waiswa Bagiire, about developing bilateral cooperation in the United Nations. 

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context

The deputy head of Sudan’s military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, was quoted by Russian media outlet FAN as having recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Daglo, who visited Moscow last week, was quoted saying, “The whole world must realize that it is [Russia’s] right to defend herself.” However, the Sudan Tribune reported a statement from Sudan’s Foreign Ministry claiming Daglo’s quote was taken out of context and used as a “cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters.”  

On February 27, Sudan’s state news agency reported that the meeting between Sudanese and Russian officials had been scheduled prior to the war in Ukraine, and that Sudan called for de-escalation “on both sides.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-belarus-joins-conflict-against-ukraine/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 03:13:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=491721 The Council's open-source researchers break down the Kremlin's latest moves online and on the battlefield in its war in Ukraine.

The post Russian Hybrid War Report: Belarus joins conflict against Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> As the crisis in Europe over Ukraine heats up, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian Hybrid War Report.

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Not long after dawn on February 24, tanks were recorded moving into Ukrainian territory from southwestern Belarus, crossing over at the Senkivka checkpoint. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Russian heavy flamethrower systems can be identified in the videos. Videos showing missiles being launched from the Mogilev area towards Ukraine have also surfaced, yet have not been specifically geolocated as of now. CNN and Newsweek reported that Belarusian troops are also taking part in the attack against Ukraine, despite previous insistence from Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus would not participate in any military action against the country.

In an urgent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka announced that they had agreed to keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus. Lukashenka previously denied that Belarusian troops would take part in the Ukrainian invasion. He also proclaimed that Ukraine is losing the war and offered to host talks in Minsk.

New Maxar satellite imagery released the day before the attack showed Russian military deployment changes on February 21 and 22. The new images revealed Russia had deployed more than one hundred vehicles and dozens of troop shelters at Bolshoi Bokov airfield in southern Belarus, near the city of Mazyr. This new deployment is less than twenty kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The same set of new images also documented ground being cleared southwest of Belgorod, Russia, in the general vicinity of where Russia later began its attack on Kharkiv.

That same day, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service announced the implementation of a number of security measures along its borders with Russia and Belarus. The new measures included limiting vehicle traffic; using radio stations, drones, and filming and taking pictures; as well as keeping non-residents away from the border zone. Meanwhile, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya urged Western countries to impose tougher sanctions on both Russia and Belarus to deter them from further aggression. According to her, the current sanctions packages are not enough, as Russia and Belarus are not showing any responsiveness to them.

Viktor Gulevich, head of the Belarusian army, previously stated on February 21 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus would depend on regional NATO troop withdrawals. According to Reuters reporting, Gulevich said Minsk believed it was within its rights to demand that US and NATO member forces withdraw from near Belarusian borders, including from near borders with neighboring countries Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Lastly, new footage has surfaced of Russian Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-24P combat helicopters in the Gomel region of Southeastern Belarus, potentially near the R-35 highway; however, this video has not yet been geolocated. Additional as-yet-unverified videos suggest that the southern Belarusian border where Russian troops are stationed is becoming more muddy, which might impact the tactical capabilities of Russian ground troops in the region.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

A pair of cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites during the twenty-four hours leading up to the Russian invasion. Targets included the web pages for the Ukrainian parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Cabinet of Ministers.

According to the internet monitoring website IsItDownRightNow.com, the websites for the MFA and Cabinet of Ministers were temporarily taken offline on Wednesday. Over several hours, the DFRLab also observed that Ukraine’s security services website would only partially load. 

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, confirmed a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack had occurred. He claimed that unknown actors attacked Ukrainian banks, state servicer provider Diia, and the websites for the Ukrainian parliament, the MFA, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Fortunately, many of the services continued working despite the ongoing attack.

Fedorov confirmed that cyberattacks continued throughout the night and were ongoing. He claimed that all information sources in Ukraine were under attack, but assured citizens that the situation was under control. As of Thursday morning, the websites were accessible from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, open-source research collective InformNapalm also reported a DDoS attack on their webpage. A similar attack was directed at Censor.net, a popular Ukrainian online media outlet. The organizations successfully defended against the attacks and webpage performance was not impacted.

Lastly, cybersecurity firms Symantec and ESET said they had discovered a new destructive malware wiping data from Ukrainian machines.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

On February 24, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reported that columns of Russian tanks entered the Luhansk region of Eastern Ukraine through Krasna Talivka, Milove, and Horodyshche. According to the Border Guard, the columns were led by white cars bearing the logo for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored the conflict on a daily basis for years.

The OSCE previously announced on February 13 that it was pulling out its staff from eastern Ukraine. At the time, Kremlin outlet RT reported that OSCE had evacuated their car fleet but left behind armored vehicles.

At the time of writing, the OSCE had not commented on the matter and the DFRLab cannot independently confirm whether the OSCE vehicles allegedly being used by Russia are authentic or were Russian vehicles with OSCE logos affixed to them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Twitter cited “human error” after suspending the accounts of several open-source researchers on Wednesday. The social media company dismissed rumors that the removals were the result of a mass reporting campaign. “A small number of human errors as part of our work to proactively address manipulated media resulted in these incorrect enforcements,” said Yoel Roth, head of site integrity at Twitter. “We’re fixing the issue and reaching out directly to the affected folks.”

Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters published a thread listing more than a dozen legitimate accounts that Twitter had suspended. Those with suspended accounts included Roman Burko, the founder of the open-source research collective InformNapalm; Kyle Glen, OSINT researcher and cofounder of Conflict News; Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian right-leaning activist from Odesa; and Maria Avdeeva, research director at the European Expert Association. By Thursday, all of the accounts cited by Waters except @ukrwarreport had been restored.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Shortly after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics on February 21, a pro-Russia online flash mob began tweeting using the hashtags #СвоихНеБросаем (#WeDoNotAbandonOurPeople) and #МыВместе (#WeAreTogether). The campaign expressed support for people living in Donetsk and Luhansk, alleging that they are suffering under Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Twitter campaign created the impression that there is public support for Putin’s decision.

Open-source evidence suggests Putin’s United Russia party could have initiated the flash mob. United Russia started using the #СвоихНеБросаем hashtag on February 20, the day before the Putin’s announcement, calling on its audience to give humanitarian assistance to people evacuated from Donbas to Rostov Oblast. Later, United Russia continued to use the hashtag for other purposes. 

The DFRLab analyzed the hashtags on Twitter and found 59 percent of the mentions were original tweets (1005 out of 1709). Each tweet received an average of 26.4 engagements, suggesting the campaign failed to go viral. The most popular tweet had 223 engagements.

Analyzing the hashtags on Facebook using the monitoring tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab found that the most engaged–with content came from United Russia accounts or the accounts of their prominent members. The highest number of engagements a post received was 1,300 reactions, 140 comments and 124 shares, which is not considered particularly high. A CrowdTangle query identified 202 posts on Facebook pages, public groups, and verified profiles that received an average of 39 engagements. Meanwhile, a CrowdTangle analysis of Instagram found that 509 posts have used the hashtag since February 20, receiving an average of 720 engagements.

The DFRLab found the hashtag was also used on other social media platforms, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, but has yet to determine their levels of engagement. 

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, announced a “combat alert” after an emergency security council meeting on Thursday. According to Bibilov, all units of the Ministry of Defense “must be ready to advance to concentration points.” Bibilov also ordered full cooperation with the Russian military base in the region. He cited the Treaty of Alliance and Integration between South Ossetia and Russia, signed in 2015, when reiterating South Ossetia’s “full support” for Russia’s actions.

Bibilov also said security forces were monitoring the situation along the Georgian border “to ensure readiness to respond to all provocations potentially originating from Georgia.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

On February 22 in Moscow, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration regarding allied cooperation. Azerbaijan’s state information agency Azertag published a Russian version of the declaration, which reiterated cooperation between the two states in different fields, including the economy, energy, transportation, trade, health, and education.

Notably, three sections of the declaration mention military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia:

• Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan will suppress activities of organizations and entities on their territory, targeting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each party.
• According to paragraph 13, “The parties will deepen cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat trainings, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.”
• Lastly, in paragraph 16, they state, “In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military support on the basis of the UN Charter, different international agreements and considering the existing international-legal obligations of each party.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov called on all Ukrainians “who are ready and able to hold a weapon” to mobilize. According to a statement posted on Facebook early Thursday morning, Ukraine has entered “total defense mode.” Reznikov said all that is required to join the ranks of the armed forces is a passport. “The enemy is attacking, but our army is indestructible,” he added.

Following the defense minister’s statement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted a similar statement: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country. Be ready to support Ukraine in the squares of our cities.”

Also Thursday, Ukraine banned all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. “This regulation will remain in effect for the period of the legal regime of martial law,” the State Border Guard Service said.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty Thursday, triggering consultations with Alliance members. Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Following initial consultations, NATO issued a statement saying “we have decided, in line with our defensive planning to protect all allies, to take additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defense across the alliance.”

This comes as NATO held an emergency meeting to discuss Russia’s assault on Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia’s attack on Ukraine “is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

On February 24, the official website of the Russian presidency published a video in which Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine, announcing that he was ordering the Russian armed forces to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.

After the video’s release, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta wrote on Facebook and Twitter that the speech had been recorded on February 21, based on an analysis of the recording’s metadata. The story was quickly picked up by the Russian edition of Delfi Estonia media outlet on Facebook, by Ekho Moskvy on Twitter, and Turkish state-controlled media TRT’s Russian language Facebook page.

However, CNN journalist Gianluca Mezzo wrote that when he checked the metadata of Putin’s video, he concluded that it was recorded on February 24 at 03:35:44. He also published a screenshot of metadata info of a file from the website metadata2go.com.

The DFRLab team could not download a video from Kremlin’s website to independently verify its metadata; at the time of writing, Kremlin.ru was no longer functional.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Facebook restricted the page of Zvezda TV, the Russian state-owned TV channel run by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Zvezda published a screenshot of a restriction notice from Facebook on its website, saying that the page is restricted from the platform for ninety days for “repeatedly publishing false information.”

StopFake, the Ukrainian fact-checking organization, had previously flagged two publications from Zvezda on Facebook as false information. The first article claimed that Russia had already suppressed the air-defense forces of Ukraine, while the second reported that Ukrainian military border guard units did not resist Russian forces.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

The commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as “Hemedti,” arrived in Moscow for bilateral talks with senior Russian government officials on February 23. According to the RSF Twitter account, Dagalo will act in his capacity as deputy head of the military-led ruling council, leading a delegation of ministers. Dagalo and the RSF led a military coup in Sudan last October, which has seen sustained violent protests over the last four months.

According to VOA News, Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Khalid Farah said, “This visit was scheduled ahead and has nothing whatsoever to do with what is happening in Ukraine.” Similarly, Dagalo tweeted in Arabic that he hopes the trip will “advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons and strengthen the existing cooperation” between the two countries.

The DFRLab previously uncovered a network of inauthentic accounts with links to the Internet Research Agency that worked to amplify pro-Russian content in Sudan, promoting Russia as a friend to the Sudanese people.

—Tessa Knight, DFRLab Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, issued a statement warning the media and online outlets against spreading “unverified information.” Roskomnadzor referred to Article 49 of Russia’s Mass Media Law, which obliges editors to verify the authenticity of their reporting prior to publishing it.

According to Roskomnadzor, “When preparing their materials and publications related to the conduct of a special operation in connection with the situation in the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, they are obliged to use information and data obtained from official Russian sources.”

Roskomnadzor also noted, “The dissemination of knowingly false information entails liability under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of up to 5 million rubles.” The statement warned that failure to follow this law would result in “immediate blocking of such materials by Roskomnadzor in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ, ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.’”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

The official Telegram channel of Venezuela’s government-owned TV network posted a news update about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, written in alignment with Kremlin messaging. The post stated, “Russia launches special operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Last Monday, after recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Vladimir Putin announced the dispatch of Russian troops with the aim of demilitarizing and denazifying the regions.” 

The post by the Venezuelan government TV network also aligned with President Nicolas Maduro’s February 22 Twitter broadcast, in which he stated, “The Bolivarian Revolution is with Russia…. We know that Putin is defending the right to peace and dignity of the Russian people and the peoples of the world and the world balance.” He continued, “Imperialism and NATO have tried to bury diplomatic agreements based on international law to disrespect Russia. Patiently, President Putin has raised the breach of these agreements and the danger that NATO deploys its weapons offensive, including its atomic weapons aimed at Russia.”

—Iria Puyosa, DFRLab Visiting Fellow, Ann Arbor, Michigan

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-risks-losing-its-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa-heres-how-to-get-it-back/ Tue, 11 Jan 2022 10:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=473180 Evolving crises in Ethiopia and Sudan have exposed Washington’s lack of a clear and coherent policy for the region.

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]]> Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his freshly resigned Sudanese counterpart, Abdalla Hamdok, are arguably the most pro-US leaders in the Horn of Africa (HoA)—if not the entire continent. 

But today, the evolving crises in their countries have exposed Washington’s lack of a clear and coherent policy for the region. Whether in Ethiopia’s year-old insurgency or amid Sudan’s military coup, the United States was ill-prepared to respond.

As a keen observer of the region through my regular contacts with officials in both Ethiopia and Sudan, and as a longtime colleague of Hamdok’s, I’ve seen this dynamic up close. By not being visible and sufficiently engaged, Washington could lose the capacity to influence policy and action to address the region’s many vexing problems. 

As the HoA undergoes dramatic changes, including sustained economic growth, a rising middle class, and a transition to stable democracy, Washington would be wise to rethink its approach to regional cooperation and use of sanctions—among other issues—and lay out a more inclusive, values-driven, and future-oriented strategy for the region. 

‘Either you’re with us or against us.’ 

During the Cold War, US engagement in the region centered on containing communist encroachment. In the ensuing years, US policy became static over several administrations and lacked strategy and coherence—not a good fit for a rapidly changing region. Then, shortly after the collapse of communism, the tragic fallout from the US intervention in Somalia stunted enthusiasm for engaging more actively in the region. 

American attention was only refocused after a string of terrorist attacks—including the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11 attacks—and incidents of maritime piracy. The superseding objective became disrupting local Islamic extremists linked to a global jihadi network, and the full might and resources of the United States and its Western allies descended on the region. 

But combating terrorism and promoting trade held preeminence over all pretense of interest in addressing what Africans deemed to be more pressing priorities, such as combating drought and desertification, alleviating poverty, and promoting good governance. 

The implicit US mantra of “either you’re with us or against us” coaxed countries to choose sides in a conflict which did not offer neutrality as a position. In return for prioritizing counterterrorism and trade, countries were offered ample humanitarian aid, assistance for democratic governance, and enhanced foreign direct investment (FDI). As the war on terrorism intensified, the United States established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002 as the region’s operational centerpiece.

In the absence of an overarching framework to understand and address complex regional priorities, the United States pursued singular agendas and responded to challenges and crises when and where they arose—preferring to focus on individual countries rather than adopting a comprehensive regional strategy. This broad agenda was deficient in depth and obligation, and as a result, long-term vision and regional diplomacy declined. 

Without clear direction and purpose, Washington was accused of abetting African despots bent on prolonging their power, either through election-rigging or violating term limits, in exchange for their cooperation in the war on terror. This dented US credibility and its ability to inspire popular policymaking and civic-minded diplomacy among the local populations. 

For example, the United States cozied up to the Meles Zenawi regime in Ethiopia and that of his successor—fully aware of their stained human-rights records and reprehensible governance. A 2018 mass uprising that drove out the US-backed Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front caught Washington flat-footed and short on credibility to influence the turn of events. Abiy Ahmed, the charismatic new leader installed in Addis Ababa, lost no time in seeking broad international support and championing Ethiopia’s interest. 

Why messaging matters

Another consequence of the lack of a clearly articulated US regional policy is the inadvertent message Washington conveys to both democratically installed governments and insurgents-in-waiting: Coming to power through free and fair elections matters—but other interests and priorities take precedence over democratic governance. 

In Ethiopia, for instance, US hesitancy to vigorously condemn a rebel assault on a democratically installed government and constitutional order was the oxygen that fueled the conflict there. The muted response by Washington and Brussels to the aggression emboldened the rebels to set their eyes on Addis Ababa, and the forcible ouster of Abiy became their end game. 

On a continent where political leaders and regional institutions have, at least officially, banned all forms of unconstitutional power grabs, the subdued US response to the unfolding rebel attempt was diplomatically unsettling and politically misguided. 

Ethiopia: The trouble with sanctions

Today, Ethiopia is mired in internal conflict with Tigrayan forces seeking to forcibly replace a democratically elected government. Faulting the United States for overt and covert assistance to one side over the other, both warring parties are snubbing Washington’s appeals and warnings at will. Daily pleas from the Pentagon and White House to cease fire and come to the negotiating table continue to fall on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the new White House special envoy to the region, Jeffrey Feltman, learned the hard way that being the US president’s emissary no longer carries the same sway it once did—and he announced this month that he’s stepping down.

While the war has quieted down somewhat as the rebels have withdrawn to Tigray, sporadic airstrikes and artillery exchanges continue to cause collateral damage. In what is nothing less than a diplomatic mea culpa, US President Joe Biden spoke directly to Abiy by phone on Monday. Biden expressed his concern about recent civilian deaths from the conflict and Abiy briefed him on efforts to address humanitarian assistance, human rights, and reconstruction. Such a gesture, though highly welcome, is unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict and events in the region, given the United States’ limited leverage.

Before expending sufficient diplomatic energy to reconcile the conflict, the United States has expelled the Abiy government from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for violating that trade pact’s prohibition on human-rights abuses—a clear case of punitive economic policy gone astray. 

First, many of the allegations have since been investigated by the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which accuse all sides of the conflict of committing them. Investigators also accused all sides of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid and stated that they could not verify whether starvation was used as a weapon of war, as previously alleged by the UN and the US State Department. Investigators were barred from entering certain parts of Tigray and proposed further investigation into claims of forced starvation by government forces as well as gross human-rights violations in areas under rebel control. 

Second, the enforcement of AGOA violations has been selective and inconsistent. Past US administrations have been mute in the face of similar violations committed by other AGOA beneficiaries. This is why the haste to terminate Ethiopia’s eligibility before giving bilateral and multilateral diplomacy a sufficient chance to succeed has far-reaching consequences, including on US business and strategic interests in the region. 

The American-Ethiopian Public Affairs Committee estimates that termination potentially means a loss of some two hundred thousand jobs, with young factory workers—mostly poor young women and the heads of households—hard-hit, along with the mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises that supply and service those factories. An AGOA termination “would deal a serious blow to the welfare of millions of low-income workers,” Mamo Mihretu, Ethiopia’s chief trade negotiator, wrote in Foreign Policy.

Moreover, the impact will disproportionately fall on the poorest of the poor, who can least survive such a punitive action and who can least influence the war. In the longer term, this will significantly set back Ethiopia’s long-term trajectory to become the region’s manufacturing hub. 

Beyond Ethiopia, the termination would also disrupt countless livelihoods in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland—neighbors whose ports Ethiopia uses for the import and export of raw materials and finished products. 

It is not lost on US policymakers that effective economic punishments must be smart and purposely targeted. Coupling trade agreements with imprecise political conditions is counterintuitive and achieves neither objective. Coming at a period of turbulence in the HoA, the termination of the trade deal throws into question the resourcefulness of US foreign policy to resolve political disputes through mature diplomatic insight before resorting to punitive measures. 

It is worth pointing out that smart sanctions and other economic tools can address specific policy goals and objectives. But sanctions should never be the first tool out of the box to resolve bilateral disputes; rather, they should be a diplomatic standby of last resort. Nor should they be applied uniformly in vastly different circumstances around the world. 

In the final analysis, hastily designed and poorly targeted economic penalties attest to the failure of diplomatic endeavors and portray a global power gradually losing influence over events and actors on the ground.

Sudan: Tuning out the US

The unfolding crisis in Sudan, where longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a 2019 revolution, is proving to be just as risky for the United States. 

The Trump administration’s endorsement of a debt-relief package helped the country financially recover, while the Biden administration helped strengthen the transition by supporting a hybrid Sovereignty Council. The West, along with Sudan’s Gulf neighbors, lavished Hamdok (who resigned on January 2) with promises of economic aid and FDI—on the condition, of course, that he implement painful structural reforms including removing food and fuel subsidies, harmonizing the exchange rate, cracking down on corruption, signing the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel, and transitioning to elections in 2023. 

Legions of US, EU and other international officials—including Feltman, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, and US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power—descended on Khartoum for endless consultations. The pace and substance of the transition excited the world about the promise of a new Sudan. Meanwhile, the country’s political and military posture, guided mainly by the generals in the Sovereignty Council, pulled further away from traditional allies in the Horn and closer to Egypt. 

They conducted provocative military exercises with Cairo just miles away from Sudan’s borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea—a move that ratcheted up regional tensions at a time when Egypt and Ethiopia are feuding over a dam on the Nile River. The Trump administration’s botched attempt to mediate the Nile dispute was oddly led by the US Treasury at the exclusion of the State Department. The White House attempt to coerce Ethiopia into signing a three-way peace agreement caused the latter to withdraw from the negotiations and disqualified the United States as an honest broker. The collapsed mediation process was replaced by an African Union (AU) initiative focused on the pursuit of African solutions for African problems. 

The US strategy in Sudan is being defined without input from Ethiopia and Eritrea, consequential neighbors with a long history of influencing peace in Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan are presently in a low-intensity dispute over their long and unmarked border. This is not the first time such disputes have arisen, and both countries are committed to peacefully resolve the conflict through the Joint Border Commission. But, regrettably, neither party can mediate in each other’s internal matters. 

However, there is a bigger lesson here for Washington: Short-lived and frequently recurring rows among neighbors should not cause the United States to exclude regional influencers and neighborhood peacekeepers from its national and regional calculus, or from the list of countries to consult. 

Following a round of “successful” meetings with both sides of the Sovereignty Council, and hours after Feltman’s departure from Khartoum, the generals staged a successful coup d’état in late October. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power, arrested the prime minister, dissolved the council and suspended the coalition government. 

Working with limited intelligence on the ground and fewer friends in the region, Washington strategists were once again caught off guard. Condemned by the United States and its allies—with the exception of Egypt—and threatened with sanctions and other punitive measures, the generals continued to pay only lip service, claiming that the army had acted to prevent a civil war.

Within weeks of Hamdok’s reinstatement as prime minister and amid a deadlock with the generals over the appointment of a technocratic government, the differences in the end proved insurmountable. He finally resigned his position on January 2, and in a televised address, he told his people that Sudan’s very survival was questionable and that he had tried “to avoid the country from sliding into disaster” and wanted to “give a chance to another man or woman.” 

The voices of democracy continue to denounce any power-sharing with the military and call on it to immediately hand over power to a civilian government. For its part, the military on December 30 announced the reinstatement of the notorious national intelligence service—now rebranded as the General Intelligence Service. This can only mean more civil unrest on the streets in the coming days and the grim prospect of the use of deadly force to squelch it. 

Once again, escalating tensions in Khartoum expose a US Africa policy with limited diplomatic sway and few allies in the region who could be implored to mediate peace in Sudan. The United States must expend robust diplomatic energy to fully grasp the problems in their totality. It must also work with countries in the region in pursuit of a lasting solution. Barring that, the threat of sanctions and punitive economic measures in lieu of effective diplomacy will simply ring hollow and not give it the eminence and influence it seeks. 

Meet the new powers

The US goal of regaining commanding heights in foreign policy within the first one hundred days of Biden’s administration was an ambitious target. It is now evident that it takes more than an “America is back” mantra to reverse Washington’s eroded leadership position in the HoA.

Non-traditional partners, driven by geo-strategic interests and economic opportunism, have branded themselves as credible alternatives in the economic, political, and security spaces.

Gulf countries, plus Turkey, India, and Iran, view the Red Sea as a lifeline of global maritime logistics and seek to gain a military and commercial foothold in the region. Turkey, in particular, is quickly gaining new commercial and military traction. Distant powers such as China and Russia view the Red Sea and countries in the vicinity as an opening into the rest of Africa, a potential source of tomorrow’s raw materials, and a market for their goods and services. Supporting voices in global politics and establishing strategic military footholds are also a consideration.

In return, these new partners offer African countries financial and technical assistance, defense agreements, and access to their markets. But most important—and perhaps a key differentiator from the United States—is their policy of “non-interference” in their partners’ internal affairs. While these partners are not even a distant second to the United States in terms of foreign aid and technical, financial, and military superiority, they provide sufficient support to cause African countries to believe they have a choice of credible alternative partners. 

For instance, with thirty-nine African countries signed up, China’s dominance in infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative is a case in point. This is an alarming trend the United States cannot afford to ignore. 

After decades of alliance with the United States on regional and global matters—consider, for instance, Ethiopia’s UN Security Council vote to approve the 1991 Gulf War when the evidence wasn’t compelling—most African countries regrettably claim they’ve gained little in return for their longstanding ties to Washington. In 2021, the same Security Council discussed the Tigray conflict almost a dozen times, but the United States did not once support Ethiopia’s position. 

A forward-looking US-HoA engagement policy must embrace strategic competition and cooperation with new partners that have gained a new foothold in the region. As in the recent past, containing the advance of an adversary—China, in this case—is no longer a sufficient objective for engaging with the region. 

In a geo-strategic theater with competition from China and other entrants, it’s essential for the United States to assert its values and clearly communicate the interests it stands for (including the red lines in any relationship that cannot be crossed). Africans must know this with a degree of certainty, and well beyond the four-year election cycles. Consistency and predictability are imperative in international relations. 

Since early December, the US embassy in Addis Ababa, out of an abundance of caution following the collapse of Kabul, has flooded US citizens with alerts about the deteriorating security situation and encouraged them to leave the city. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China flew into the same Addis Ababa and reaffirmed his government’s support for the government and people of Ethiopia, while also discussing other regional interests. Then after a sweeping visit to several countries in the region in early January, Wang announced that China would name a new special envoy to the Horn of Africa, garnering an enthusiastic reception. This is the contrasting friendship and influence that the United States is missing out on. 

The way forward

A progressive reset of US relations with the continent is long overdue. A new Africa policy between partners, anchored in a framework of shared principles and a vision centered on economic, social, and environmental justice, as well as the democratic aspirations of citizens, would be a good place to begin. There should be relationships in which both parties recognize that each side has something to offer and gain. 

Compelling Africans to choose between the United States and new partners is a relic of the Cold War; twenty-first century Africans are capable of defining and articulating their interests and partners of choice. The Prosper Africa trade initiative is an example of a positive pivot away from the traditional donor-recipient model to bilaterally negotiated trade and investment pacts. It allows countries to benefit from their US ties and also uphold their right to cooperate with other partners. But for this to work, all sides must actively invest in building the capacity of African countries and institutions to negotiate from a position of strength and close the knowledge and information asymmetry. 

A defining feature of the HoA is its high degree of interconnectedness, both organically and by design. In 2020, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia agreed to form a new regional bloc—the Horn of Africa Cooperation, with other neighbors to possibly join later. A regional bloc within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—built on a convergence of economic and social interests as well as political, military, and security priorities—it deserves weighty consideration in Washington as part of its HoA engagement strategy. 

Going forward, a US-HoA policy must pay particular attention to the role of African institutions at various levels. It must focus on strengthening the capacity of African-led regional bodies such as the AU, IGAD, and the African Continental Free Trade Area. Such institutions serve to develop and enforce neighborhood consensus and standards of good governance while also collectively repelling assaults on democracy and constitutional orders. 

Biden’s remarks at the February 2021 AU summit struck the right foreign-policy chords, centering on democracy, human rights, and mutual prosperity. The administration has since declared a policy focus on counterterrorism and security, climate change, the pandemic, inclusive democracy and constitutional rule, and rebuilding post-COVID economies. But these lofty pronouncements must now be backed by resources and action on the ground. 

An Afrobarometer survey in 2019-20 showed that Africans prefer to follow the United States’ development model rather than China’s by 32 percent to 23 percent. Meanwhile, 68 percent of African citizens prefer democracy over other forms of government. Despite its convergence of values with Africans, the United States still lags behind the new partners. 

The Biden administration is well-placed to reverse past missteps and set HoA-US relations on the right course. But the fast-changing region will not wait for the United States to catch up; US rhetoric must be backed with action and signal a perceptible change of course, anchored on mutual trust and tilted toward shared values. 

Building loyal allies and gaining influence in the Horn will take time. Even then, the United States may not win over all the countries nor solve all the region’s problems. But either way, tomorrow’s US foreign policy must sufficiently exploit the HoA-US values convergence, a unique advantage not enjoyed by new entrants. This requires a shift from the transactional brand of yesterday and building on shared values and principles. 

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Gabriel Negatu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, managing director at Invest Afrique Inc., and a former Eastern Africa director general for the African Development Bank.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/alyemany-in-the-independent-arabia-red-sea-council/ Mon, 03 Jan 2022 20:39:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=480969 The post Alyemany in the Independent Arabia: Red Sea Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-democratic-transition-is-over-now-its-time-to-support-the-revolution/ Mon, 03 Jan 2022 19:33:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=472412 The resignation of Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok offers new clarity: The United States should take a hard line against the military and back pro-democracy protesters.

The post Sudan’s democratic transition is over. Now it’s time to support the revolution. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> To anyone who has watched Sudan’s civilian leaders attempt to wrest power away from the country’s all-powerful security services over the past two years, the resignation late Sunday of beleaguered Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok should have come as no surprise.

Yet there’s no road map for what comes next.

Since the October 25 military coup that led to Hamdok’s detention, Sudan’s democratic transition has existed in name only. Upon seizing power, the military stacked state and federal institutions with generals and other allies, dismantled civilian committees aimed at seizing the former regime’s assets, reinstated the powers of the domestic intelligence services to arrest and detain, and, most significantly, ratcheted up pressure on pro-democracy protesters. Since the coup more than fifty unarmed protesters have been murdered, dozens have been raped, and hundreds more injured and illegally detained.

With billions of dollars in international assistance suspended and the country’s historic debt-relief process in serious doubt, the military succeeded in undoing two years’ worth of progress in a matter of weeks and shredded an internationally recognized political road map that would have seen civilians gradually assume greater executive authority in the lead-up to national elections in 2023.

Donor governments were quick to welcome the surprise reinstatement of Hamdok in late November, which seemingly resuscitated the political deal into which they’d invested so heavily and allowed the military to keep up the guise that Sudan’s was still a civilian-led transition. But lasting damage to both the transition and Hamdok’s personal standing—thanks to the deal’s seeming absolution of the military’s many crimes—had been done.

In retrospect, Hamdok faced an uphill battle from the outset. With his lack of political acumen and inability to harness and transform the raw power of the streets into a true agenda for bold action, the affable former United Nations bureaucrat became a political prisoner within a system he helped establish—caught between political forces unable to reach consensus on the way forward and a military regime increasingly bent on undermining the democratic process.

Either way, Sudan’s formal transition to democracy is over, even though its revolution lives on in the hearts of millions of peaceful pro-democracy protesters. Washington and its international partners have now lost the final pretense of what allowed them—for too long—to frame their engagement in terms of supporting a “civilian-led transitional government.”

Time to get tough

With no political agreement or civilian leader left to undermine, Washington and its allies should now pursue a more hardline approach toward the military that holds it accountable for the October coup and the deadly response to peaceful protests since then. That should mean sanctions against figures such as Yasser Mohammed Osman, the director of military intelligence; Jamal Abdelmagid, the director of the General Intelligence Service; and Abdarahim Daglo, the deputy commander of the notorious Rapid Support Forces. All played a direct role in orchestrating the deadly crackdown on demonstrators.

Beyond punitive measures, Washington needs to more actively shape an outcome that meets the demands of the Sudanese people, supports US strategic interests in the region, and reflects President Joe Biden’s own purported commitment to democracy and human rights. 

First, the Biden administration must announce a nominee to serve as US ambassador to Sudan—a promise made two years ago by then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo but still not fulfilled—and challenge the Senate to fast-track the confirmation process. For too long, Washington has done itself a great disservice by not sending an appropriately senior official to ensure international consensus on the ground and to navigate Sudan’s complicated political environment.

In the meantime, the administration should dispatch Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman, who has been largely underutilized in the current crisis, to Khartoum with a letter from Biden explaining the logic behind US sanctions and giving the generals a choice: Engage in a credible, transparent, and inclusive political dialogue to select a new prime minister; refrain from any further abuses against peaceful protesters; and return to full implementation of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration—or face a new wave of sanctions targeting regime leaders and their vast network of financial interests and military companies. 

But to be credible, this choice must have the backing of Sudan’s other international partners, from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to Cairo and Ankara.

Lastly, Washington must move beyond tired bromides claiming to “stand with the people of Sudan” and unabashedly throw its weight behind the country’s pro-democracy movement in tangible and meaningful ways that will begin to swing the balance of power more in the protesters’ favor. That involves funneling some of the currently frozen financial assistance to resistance committees and neighborhood committees to help them better organize, communicate, and develop their own political platform—to become a more formal part of the political process. 

Ultimately, Sudan’s people will decide what the road ahead looks like. But Washington can give them a fighting chance by seeing this moment of peril for what it is: an opportunity to rebalance its approach, recommit to the fundamental ideals of the revolution, and expose the military for what it has always been—not a partner in politics or a defender of the revolution, but a malign force bent on its own wealth and survival at the expense of the country’s well-being.

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Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-holiday-edition/ Thu, 16 Dec 2021 15:55:24 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=468578 Coordinated actions against Belarus and global human rights abusers, sanctions on African states, and anti-kleptocracy reform.

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]]> In our previous edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we covered the US Treasury Department’s targeting of criminal cryptocurrency exchanges and what the Pandora Papers say about the efficacy of sanctions. For this month’s ‘holiday edition,’ we zoom in on coordinated actions against Belarus, global human rights abusers, and examine targets in Africa across multiple regimes. But our story would not be complete without the greatest gift of all—anti-kleptocracy reform. 

Last week, the White House unveiled the first-ever United States Strategy on Countering Corruption, which outlines a plan to curb abuse of US jurisdiction for illicit financial purposes. The announcement from the White House came just days before the Summit for Democracy on December 9th, giving political legs to overdue regulatory reform, such as tightening reporting requirements for the real estate sector, a notorious loophole to stash ill-gotten cash or to launder criminal proceeds. Real estate reporting requirements dovetails with ongoing efforts to implement the beneficial ownership legislation that came out of the 2021 defense authorization.

Preventative measures go hand in hand with sanctions enforcement. US authorities have had little ability to track whether sanctioned actors move money within the US despite best efforts by commercial banks. This is a question of government priorities. In focusing on punitive measures versus prevention, the US has effectively operated as if the hard work is issuing the sanction itself when in reality, that is the easy part. Implementation and compliance are actually where the success of any policy hangs in the balance, as well as the ability and willingness of the private sector to cooperate. 

Democracy Summit

The Summit pledged a hefty $424 million in anti-corruption assistance last week, while Treasury rolled out a series of high-profile designations against nationals from Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. On the same day, the State Department—pursuant to its Section 7031(c) visa restriction authority—designated nine individuals over similar corruption charges. Amongst State’s designees were Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former Angolan dictator José Eduardo dos Santos and formerly the richest woman in Africa, and Oleksandr Tupytskyi, the former Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. 

In recognition of the annual global Human Rights Day, OFAC designated fifteen individuals and ten entities from Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia over their involvement in widespread human rights abuses. Notably, these designations included two officials linked to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau—the entity responsible for facilitating the ongoing genocide in China’s westernmost province. OFAC released Global Magnitsky sanctions every single day last week, underscoring that financial corruption erodes the validity of democratic governance and civil society.

Focus Africa

As the crisis in Tigray worsened in September, President Biden issued Executive Order 14046, authorizing sanctions on those responsible for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Last month, OFAC sanctioned four entities and two individuals for undermining the stability and integrity of the Ethiopian state, including the Eritrean Defense Force and Eritrea’s ruling political party—the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, criticized EU member states for not following suit. But the EU did introduce a new Mali sanctioning authority as French troops withdrew from the region after eight years, implicitly replacing military involvement with the spectre of financial remediation.

The EU has also sanctioned eight individuals and three entities linked to the Russian private military contractor, Wagner Group (including a sanction against the group itself). The organization, led by Vladimir Putin’s close associate Yevgeny Prigozhin, recently expanded its operations to conflict zones in Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and the Central African Republic. According to EU officials, three of the Wagner mercenaries sanctioned were designated for their activities in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions were welcomed by Washington, where Wagner and its affiliated individuals have been sanctioned since 2017. But it was the Group’s expansion into Africa that in the end triggered the EU designation. 

Sanctions on African state or semi-state actors can be very impactful because many countries maintain limited access to Western financing, particularly through correspondent banking relationships. Sanctions by the US and Europe can sever financial systems overnight, but they also risk exacerbating humanitarian crises and incentivize banks to de-risk from countries or entire regions because they see greater liability than profit. Our projection map shows a complicated web of sanctions by a wide array of global actors. 

Belarus

After flying in over 8,000 migrants in an effort to force them into the Schengen area through Poland, the US, EU, and UK took coordinated action against those responsible in Minsk. In a remarkably quick response, the EU also agreed to impose sanctions on Belavia, the airline primarily responsible for flying the migrants in from the Middle East. OFAC joined its European partners with sanctions against 20 individuals, 12 entities, and three aircraft. After over a decade of Western sanctions and pause in IMF assistance, the US has relatively little leverage over Belarus and must decide carefully when to pull the levers it does have. US prohibitions on debt and equity in secondary markets and on the potash sector shows that a fabricated migration crisis was reason enough.

More crypto sanctions… 

In coordination with both Latvian and Estonian authorities, Treasury designated another virtual currency exchange. The designation against the Latvia-based Chatex follows an inaugural round against Russia-based Suex. According to Treasury, the two exchanges have direct ties with each other, and Chatex has been “using Suex’s function as a nested exchange to conduct transactions.” Both exchanges have been used to launder the proceeds of ransomware by cyber criminals. 

These actions are part of the Biden administration’s broader efforts to counter a number of recent ransomware attacks. As part of this package, OFAC also designated Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Russian national Yevgeniy Polyanin, both of whom perpetuated recent ransomware attacks carried out by REvil—the group responsible for the attack against the IT firm Kaseya Limited in July of this year. These actions are further examples of sanctions used as tools of law enforcement. 

On the radar

As fears swell regarding a second possible incursion by Russian military forces in Ukraine, the United States and its partners are finalizing a slate of punitive measures they hope will deter the Kremlin from following through. Much analysis has been written over the past weeks that many of our readers are surely following. The most impactful is likely to be potential restrictions on Russian debt on the secondary market, which would inhibit the ability to clear dollar-denominated transactions. As touched upon previously in our Dashboard, sanctions against Russian oligarchs are also an untapped resource given their ties to Russian state assets. The US and EU partners are projecting a more decisive response now than in 2014– but escalation options are tricky to work out if the Kremlin doesn’t choose war, but something in between. And none of these options come without repercussions. Western investors see a downside risk now that they have re-entered Russian markets. As the US ramped up pressure on Iran, Venezuela and China over the past five years, investors came to view Russia as a relatively stable emerging market. In fact, US markets may be even more exposed to financial market restrictions than they were before little green men touched the Donbas the first time. 



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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ashford-in-inkstick-debating-the-efficacy-of-us-sanctions-on-venezuela-and-ethiopia/ Mon, 13 Dec 2021 17:19:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=469231 On December 13, Emma Ashford was featured in Inkstick’s Adults in a Room column, writing on the Biden administration’s review of sanctions policy. “The Biden administration’s recently released sanctions review was emblematic of a core problem faced by advocates of sanctions reform. To the surprise of many, the review laid out extremely clearly some of […]

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]]> original source

On December 13, Emma Ashford was featured in Inkstick’s Adults in a Room column, writing on the Biden administration’s review of sanctions policy.

“The Biden administration’s recently released sanctions review was emblematic of a core problem faced by advocates of sanctions reform. To the surprise of many, the review laid out extremely clearly some of the problems with existing sanctions frameworks. It then created a clear, if vague, set of guidelines for implementing future sanctions that are more likely to be effective, and less likely to have substantive humanitarian impacts. In a town where it can be hard even to get people to acknowledge that a policy has failed, this should be viewed as a win for reformers. At the same time, the review did not address the question of existing sanctions regimes.”

More about our expert


Former staff
Emma Ashford
Former Resident Senior Fellow, New American Engagement Initiative
New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Conflict Economic Sanctions

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-democratic-transition-is-inevitable-says-the-countrys-just-resigned-foreign-minister/ Tue, 23 Nov 2021 19:40:38 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=460708 Al-Madhi warned that the political agreement signed Sunday by Hamdok and Sudan’s top general “was more supportive to the coup” than the pro-democracy movement.

The post Sudan’s ‘democratic transition is inevitable,’ says the country’s just-resigned foreign minister appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> The Sudanese military’s reinstallation of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok “seems to have shaken the picture,” and for some people, the situation may be “a little more hazy” than it was since the October coup, said former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariam al-Mahdi. Despite that uncertainty, al-Madhi warned that the political agreement signed Sunday by Hamdok and Sudan’s top general “was more supportive to the coup” than the pro-democracy movement.

Al-Mahdi dissected the evolving political crisis in her country at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on Monday. She said she heard the news of the agreement on television before meeting with Hamdok and other members of his cabinet Monday to express her surprise and disagreement. In the end, all except five of the ministers who attended the meeting submitted their resignations, al-Madhi told the Atlantic Council.

In doing so, they reminded Hamdok that “the democratic transition is inevitable,” Mahdi recounted.

Kholood Khair, managing partner of Khartoum-based think tank Insight Strategy Partners, and Mohanad Hashim, former director of content for Sudan’s national radio and TV broadcaster, also joined in to share their perspectives on how Sudan’s protest movement is reacting to the recent developments, as well as to offer advice on how the United States and western allies can better support the pro-democracy movement.

Below are more highlights from the event, which was moderated by Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, including an update on pro-democracy protests and al-Mahdi’s message to international supporters.

The road to democracy

• Sunday’s agreement “didn’t take into consideration” serious developments on the ground in Sudan, such as the escalation of violence by authorities at street protests, said al-Mahdi. On November 17, for example, security forces killed at least fifteen people. She added that the agreement marked a “setback in trust” specifically from Sudanese youth—who are driving the pro-democracy movement and now have more trust in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) political coalition, which refused to recognize the deal.
• Khair added that the “agreement itself is not that significant” because it “doesn’t really mention the ‘how’s’ or the timeframes” for the promised political transition, making it “difficult to implement.”
• Khair, meanwhile, explained that although the agreement met the international community’s demands, the street protesters were left unsatisfied. “The deal itself is kind of unstable,” she said. “The international community needs to get behind the street or get out of its way.”
• Hashim added that the base which provided the prime minister legitimacy “has just walked away” from him because of the deal. “They view that this… is a continuation” of the prior 2019 coup. “Hamdok might have miscalculated this big time,” he said.

Call for back-up

• Al-Mahdi said international support for the people of Sudan is “overwhelming,” particularly because partners were “well-prepared by the first coup attempt” in September. Even countries she suspected “wanted to support the coup”—such as Egypt and Israel—didn’t do so outwardly.
• The White House and US Congress seemed united in “one line in support of the revolution of Sudan and the transition,” al-Mahdi said, praising the United States for its support. That support, she said, went beyond mere words and extended to key meetings between US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman and Sudanese leaders.
• Hashim argued that US support “seemingly is cautious, perhaps even timid,” pointing to the fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the region last week but didn’t visit. “There hasn’t been a clear US policy for Sudan,” he said.
• But “we need for the United States to continue with us,” al-Mahdi urged, and the United States must tell the military—“while not frightening them”—that it “cannot mess with political parties” because it would pose a “serious threat to democratic transformation” in Sudan.

What’s to come

• Al-Mahdi explained that the coup “was not really, in essence, a surprise” and that she had a sense it could take place “at any moment since the early months of 2020.” But it was still a crime: “All the violators should be put into jail and…condemned,” she said.
• In order to secure this transition period, the FFC should work with the military to clarify its role to protect the state and constitution and at the same time “stop the killing in the street.” And after the first post-coup election, it’ll be important for “everyone to go and abide by their role as agreed [upon] by everybody” to build a strong state and continue Sudan’s democratic transition, al-Mahdi said.

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-ethiopia-is-on-the-brink/ Wed, 03 Nov 2021 15:57:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=452622 What moves does Abiy have left? What role is US policy playing? What other dominos may fall in the region? Our experts keep you ahead of the curve on this fast-moving story.

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]]>

GET UP TO SPEED

The tide is turning quickly. Northern rebels are rapidly advancing on Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares a state of emergency and issues a call to arms for regular citizens. The reversal in the country’s brutal year-long war comes as the United States is moving to revoke Ethiopia’s trade privileges because of the government’s human-rights violations in the Tigray region, detailed in a new United Nations report. What moves does Abiy have left? What role is US policy playing? What other dominos may fall in the region? Our experts keep you ahead of the curve on this fast-moving story.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former director of African affairs at the National Security Council
• Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and investor in African start-ups
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center

On the march

• Originally involving limited strikes against Tigrayan separatist leaders, Abiy’s war has since spiraled out of control—with Ethiopia now facing potentially tragic consequences. “State-sponsored genocide and even state collapse remain frighteningly real scenarios,” Cameron tells us. 
• Abiy, the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize-winner, appears to have overplayed his hand by underestimating his opponents, who have traditionally been among the Ethiopian army’s best fighters and tacticians. “The government has slowly seen its overwhelming strategic advantage eroded against a rump force more adept at insurgency combat and clearly more motivated by a fight for its literal survival,” Cameron adds.
• Meanwhile, a government blockade of the Tigray region has left nearly one million civilians in danger of famine as the conflict has expanded to neighboring regions—as “hateful and dehumanizing speech” villainizing Tigrayans more broadly suggests that Abiy and his loyalists may be “inciting genocide as part of [their] last-ditch defense effort,” Cameron believes. Case in point is Abiy’s speech today, in which he declared: “We will bury this enemy with our blood and bones and make the glory of Ethiopia high again.” 

Sullied success story

• That’s all the more tragic considering Ethiopia has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, Aubrey notes, averaging nearly 10 percent growth per year for the past decade. But the war’s crippling effect on the economy has led to soaring food prices while “scarce foreign exchange has halted production and curtailed access to basic imported goods,” she adds. The National Bank of Ethiopia ordered the suspension of commercial lending, drying up credit and choking off investment.
• In response to Abiy’s offensive, the United States slapped sanctions on his government in September and this week moved to terminate duty- and quota-free access to the US market as part of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Aubrey believes that while the trade restrictions probably won’t compel Abiy to end the fighting, they “will likely result in the loss of around two hundred thousand direct jobs, mainly for women working in factories, and a million or so additional jobs servicing export-oriented factories—another cause of suffering for everyday Ethiopians.”
• At this point, Cameron adds, any US effort to bring about a ceasefire through the threat of additional sanctions “rings hollow in what has emerged as an existential battle for survival for both sides.”
• And the “dire economic consequences” of the violence won’t stop at Ethiopia’s borders, Aubrey warns, with the recent military takeovers in Guinea and Sudan combining to spook investors: “The already-skewed perception of risk in African markets will sadly only intensify.”

A new geopolitical order

• A year ago, Abiy appeared to be aiming for a swift and limited “blitzkrieg” in Tigray, Rama tells us. But “from day one, it has been a regional war,” drawing in neighboring Eritrea and sending tens of thousands of refugees spilling across borders.
• The outcome is all the more jarring, Rama says, because Ethiopia has long been a “hub of stability in a volatile area” afflicted by conflicts in the Sudans, Somalia, and Eritrea. Now that Ethiopia has become the main source of instability in the Horn of Africa, she expects to see a broader “blast effect.”  
• Zooming further out, Rama points to how rampant instability in the region has created an opening for outside influence beyond traditional players like the United States and European powers. These new influencers, she says, include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Israel, and China, which is heavily invested in a railroad linking Addis Ababa to the sea via its Belt and Road Initiative.
• “What the increasingly noisy presence of these (re)emerging regional powers reveals is not a simple destabilization,” Rama tells us, “but a new global geopolitical order” with a focus on Africa.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-coup-wasnt-a-failure-of-us-diplomacy-it-was-the-dawn-of-a-new-era-in-africa/ Fri, 29 Oct 2021 21:24:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=451079 In a context where Washington’s voice is diluted amid competing powers vying for influence in Africa, Sudan has emerged as the ultimate battleground.

The post Sudan’s coup wasn’t a failure of US diplomacy. It was the dawn of a new era in Africa. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> US diplomats had barely cleared Sudanese airspace when the country’s military began deploying across the capital, Khartoum, in the early hours of Monday and rounding up the civilian leaders it believed betrayed the democratic revolution that toppled long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

By Monday morning, a state of emergency had been imposed, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was detained, and critical parts of the country’s transitional constitution were suspended.

Since June, Hamdok, a civilian technocrat, had been warning about exactly this turn of events. In perhaps its most transparent act of its takeover, the military had even signaled to observers at home and abroad that a coup d’état remained a lifeline of last resort, as pressure mounted on the military to transfer its chairmanship of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council to civilian leadership. That message came in the form of a foiled coup attempt earlier this month which many observers viewed as a trial balloon to test local and international reaction.

The response could not have been more clear: International envoys descended on Khartoum, warning of aid suspensions, targeted sanctions, and delays in international assistance on critical needs such as debt relief.

The public’s response was equally swift and clear. More than one million pro-democracy protesters took to the streets across Sudan. Demand for civilian rule hasn’t dimmed since 2019. If anything, military efforts to blame civilian leaders for the slow implementation of reforms and sclerotic economic progress have failed—instead fueling demand for democratic governance as the only way out of the country’s morass.

The only surprise from this week’s development is the timing—coming just hours after Sudan’s military head of state assured US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman that he remained committed to the core tenets of the transition to civilian rule, and was prepared to work cooperatively with Sudan’s fractious political parties to advance the most controversial and unimplemented aspects of the transitional charter.

That promise unraveled quickly. 

New realities in Africa

Few could argue the United States was insufficiently engaged in Sudan, or that it hadn’t brought its highest-level actors to bear on the events leading up to the coup. Between multiple visits from Feltman and high-level calls from both National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Washington has rarely been as coordinated and consistent in its message as it has been with Khartoum.

Instead, this may reflect a new era for US diplomacy in Africa—one in which the United States is one of many powerful actors vying for influence to shape political outcomes. In a context where Washington’s voice is diluted amid competing powers, Sudan has emerged as the ultimate battleground. Although Sudan has always sat at a strategic crossroads, the revolution has re-shuffled the political deck in the country, and opportunity has emerged for new global players eager to exploit more than just the country’s rich gold deposits or strategic location.

Egypt has long looked paternalistically at Sudan, and while its official statements have called for calm, no one expects Cairo to demand a restoration of civilian rule or adherence to the transitional constitution considering the circumstances of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s own rise to power. Similarly, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have long seen Sudan as a national-security imperative—not only as a vital security partner across the Red Sea, but as a principal source of the livestock and grain that those desert societies demand in abundance. 

Though late to the party, Russia has shrewdly engaged Sudanese security officials through negotiations over a naval basing agreement and growing informal ties between Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces militia and the Russian mercenary group Wagner. Underpinning Moscow’s engagement has been a sustained and sophisticated information campaign—which has provoked three Facebook takedown actions so far—intended to sow doubt in the minds of Sudan’s youth over the efficacy of civilian rule.

The not-so-hidden hand of Turkey, Qatar, and Kuwait—all in search of bigger military contracts, investment opportunities, or political leverage against larger Gulf states—has only widened the options available to Sudanese leaders searching for a lifeline.

All these influences now explain the flurry of phone calls to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others from US officials seeking guarantees that these countries’ leaders gave no nod to the military’s move. While US influence in Sudan may be diluted, there still seems to be hope that Washington can impress upon backers of factions among Khartoum’s power players that Sudan won’t know stability—and that their interests there will remain at risk—as long as popular demands for democratic rule remain unmet.

But it feels like misplaced hope to expect genuine assistance from countries that have never hidden their preference for like-minded military rulers and which likely fear the domestic consequences of civilians successfully overthrowing a military in the Arab world. Even more misplaced would be the expectation that the streets of Khartoum would accept a deal bearing Riyadh or Abu Dhabi’s fingerprints.

Time to get tough

After the West failed to prevent the seemingly inevitable coup last week, the prospects for reversing it now appear even more dim.

That’s because the military, which was fully aware of the consequences of its takeover, believes it has chosen the only path available to ensure its own security. Knowing the United States would suspend its $700 million financial assistance program—the vast majority of which was going to subsidize incomes and basic foodstuffs for Sudan’s poorest—it has once again cravenly put its own survival above that of its people.

For the United States and its partners, this black eye will not quickly fade and could well create lasting ripple effects across the region. If hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid and intensive diplomatic engagement can’t convince Sudan’s military to stay the democratic course, what chance does Washington have in countries like Guinea, Mali, or Chad—where Western diplomats are also pushing back against military takeovers in favor of civilian regimes?

That’s why it’s critical that Washington rejects any other deal among international elites that relieves the growing near-term pressure, but which ultimately betrays the demands of the millions of Sudanese calling for genuine change. While it has a painful history of thirty years of sanctions in Sudan, the United States must seriously consider targeted measures against military leaders and their political allies (and even external actors) that have aided the takeover and undermined civilian rule.

The United States must also redouble its efforts to support Sudan’s vibrant civil society groups, which have become virtually the last hope for the country’s revolution, by funneling money to sustain their work and skirt the military’s insidious control of the internet.

Another attention-grabbing move would be a US State Department designation of the country’s Rapid Support Forces—a paramilitary force responsible for the arrests and torture of several prominent politicians and activists this week—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, a precedent set when the Trump administration designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Further isolating and discrediting Sudan’s ultimate bad actor would show solidarity with the streets and would help remove a perennial spoiler from the country’s political future.

Lastly (and as odious as it may be), the United States must remain open to the possibility of facilitating a soft landing for military leaders in exchange for their exit from the political and economic space they control. While they clearly can’t imagine a Sudan they don’t totally control, Sudan’s military brass likely also can’t imagine a future for themselves in which the threat of accountability hangs over them as it does now. Legislation absolving military leaders of past crimes and granting them immunity is a betrayal to Sudan’s many victims of atrocity and oppression, to say nothing of the blow it levels against international criminal justice. But it may be required to send the army back to the barracks.

As Sudan rests on a knife’s edge, there are no simple solutions. But as the United States contemplates a way forward, it should learn from hindsight—namely, that if two years of transition hasn’t changed the military’s fundamental nature, nor will two more years of shared governance with civilians. 

US policy must recognize that Sudan’s military is bent on its own survival above all else. The military fooled Washington once—and cannot be allowed to do so again.

---

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-whats-behind-the-coup-in-sudan/ Mon, 25 Oct 2021 19:17:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=448309 What’s next for Sudan and the global partners in its state-building project? Our experts weigh in.

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]]>

GET UP TO SPEED

On Monday, Sudan’s military arrested the country’s civilian leaders—including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok—in an apparent coup that’s likely to stymie the country’s already-slow progress toward political reform. The move comes just weeks after a failed takeover attempt by loyalists to ex-dictator Omar al-Bashir and amid repeated warnings that tensions between Sudan’s civilian and military leaders were reaching their breaking point. What’s next for Sudan and the global partners in its state-building project? Our experts weigh in.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center
• Will Wechsler (@WillWechsler): Director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs

Out of balance

• The delicate balancing act of Sudan’s political transition had “hit a wall” lately, Cameron tells us. And the writing for the coup was on that wall. For months, the transitional governing structure—split between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir in 2019 and Sudan’s powerful security services—had been unraveling, with the military particularly fearful of losing its grip on power.
• “Civilian leaders had essentially reached the limits of their ability to reform the political and economic space without the military giving an inch,” Cameron adds.
• Now, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken charge, dissolving that structure and declaring a state of emergency. The military says it will install a new technocratic government until the country holds elections in July 2023. Which makes Rama wonder: “Who will run? A soldier? A Sudanese Sisi?” referring to the Egyptian strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

Money matters

• As Sudan’s economy spiraled in recent weeks—inflation, for instance, has topped 400 percent—the military seized the moment to “accuse the government of ignoring the people’s needs,” Rama notes.
• While foreign aid has helped Sudan muddle along, Cameron adds, “a full-fledged recovery… was never going to be achieved without the military relinquishing its control over the major revenue-generating parts of the economy,” from port operations to gold mining to livestock exports.
• As for the Western countries expressing shock and dismay at the upheaval in Sudan, Rama recommends they look in the mirror, considering the strictures that came with Sudan’s International Monetary Fund loans in recent years. “On the economic front, they should perhaps have supported this government rather than suffocating it with tough austerity measures that ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup,” she tells us.  
• And even tougher economic times are likely ahead as a result of the coup, Cameron predicts, since “international assistance will be quickly suspended, including Sudan’s debt-relief process” with the IMF.

Regional rumblings

• The military’s power grab will reverberate far beyond Sudan, Will says. Most regional powers “with interests in Sudan have never fully shared Washington’s commitment to a democratic transition,” he notes, and “some neighbors will undoubtedly quietly welcome the coup and its supposed promise of greater stability” in a country that has now suffered some sixteen coup attempts since 1956.
• It also throws into question the country’s much-vaunted normalization with Israel, Will adds. Sudanese Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari met with Israeli officials on the margins of our N7 Conference earlier this month, “the first multilateral gathering between Israel and the six Arab states that have announced normalizations,” Will points out. 
• But a formal normalization ceremony, for which the Biden administration had negotiated a substantial US aid package for Sudan, had been waylaid by scheduling problems, Will says. And now he thinks it won’t happen “anytime soon,” particularly since US law prevents most kinds of foreign assistance following a coup. The State Department announced Monday that it was halting $750 million in aid.
• Meanwhile, Cameron advises against any expectations that the West can push back against the coup. In fact, he says, just hours before the coup Burhan told Jeffrey Feltman, the US special envoy to the Horn of Africa, that he’d stay committed to civilian rule. “The military took this decision knowing full well the likely consequences of their actions,” Cameron explains. “So while the [international] condemnation will be quick and unanimous, it is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse this setback.”

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-pm-warned-of-a-failed-state-in-2019-now-hes-under-arrest/ Mon, 25 Oct 2021 15:45:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=448175 Here's what Abdalla Hamdok told the Atlantic Council during a 2019 visit to Washington.

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]]> Sudan’s post-revolutionary transition was thrown into question Monday after an apparent coup in which the military arrested leading civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Just months after the April 2019 ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Hamdok traveled to Washington—the first Sudanese head of government to be welcomed by US officials since 1985—where he appeared at the Atlantic Council.

In an address and subsequent discussion with nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, a hopeful Hamdok outlined his country’s challenging transition from dictatorship.

Perhaps most striking was his statement about the delicate governing structure between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir and the country’s powerful military. While praising the “homegrown” nature of the compromise, Hamdok also warned that any backsliding could lead to “a failed state.”

“It will be Yemen. It will be Libya. It will be Syria. It will be all those,” he warned.

Watch the full video:

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/time-is-running-out-for-abiys-new-beginning-in-ethiopia/ Thu, 07 Oct 2021 21:11:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=443155 Cheering crowds and soaring rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s troubles run deeper than just one restive region.

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]]> After being sworn in this week in front of tens of thousands of jubilant supporters, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promised “a new beginning” for Ethiopia as he begins a new five-year term. That’s precisely what Ethiopia needs after his first three years in office.

Inflation stands at a record-high 34 percent, the nation’s debt has reached a crippling $30 billion, and efforts to privatize some of the country’s corporate crown jewels, such as Ethio telecom, have floundered amid allegations of genocide and predictions of mass starvation as the conflict over the country’s Tigray region rages on. With the country’s trade benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act likely to be suspended by the end of the month, what was once one of the world’s fastest growing economies suddenly finds itself on life support.

Cheering crowds and soaring rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Abiy’s troubles run deeper than just one restive region.

Since war broke out nearly a year ago in the northern region of Tigray, Ethiopia’s ethnic patchwork has only unraveled even further. Ethnic-based violence in the regions of Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Oromia, Afar, Amhara, and Southern Nations all suggest that Abiy’s original political ideology of “medemer”—an Amharic expression to convey a coming together beyond ethnic identity—has failed. Facts on the ground demonstrate that a military response alone will not suffice in addressing these mounting security threats and the level of displacement they’ve engendered.

As part of his “new beginning,” Abiy pushed through a new parliament—94 percent of which is controlled by his Prosperity Party—as well as the appointment of new cabinet ministers at the finance, defense, and peace ministries, nominally from opposition groups, in a move spun by his office as his “commitment to inclusivity.” But in tapping close allies and former subordinates, the move has prompted many to instead view the personnel change as style over substance—a deliberate attempt to re-assert control over key ministries involved in the war effort in advance of a new offensive intended to achieve a total victory.

Abiy’s biggest promise this week to mollify domestic opponents and international critics has been to convene a national political dialogue, which he claims will address the shortcomings associated with his original vision of “medemer.”

But nothing suggests the dialogue will fundamentally alter the failed attempt to create a unitary Ethiopian state and dismantle the system of ethnic federalism that lies at the heart of Ethiopia’s current crisis. With his strongest opposition likely to be excluded from that dialogue—particularly armed groups from Tigray and Oromia, which have been labeled terrorist organizations—there is reason to question the sincerity of any reconciliation process that does not engage the specific grievances that caused Abiy’s foes to take up arms.

Lower on Abiy’s list of priorities, but no less important, should be an effort to re-establish some goodwill with the international community before actors such as the United States make good on the punitive measures they’ve long threatened. With the expulsion earlier this month of seven high-level United Nations (UN) officials from Ethiopia on grounds—labeled by the UN secretary-general himself as baseless—of meddling in the country’s internal affairs, Abiy has instead put himself on a collision course with countries that questioned the legality of that decision and have demanded the officials’ reinstatement.

Will Abiy budge?

If he fails to abide calls to bring back UN officials, it’s difficult to imagine that the United States won’t designate top Abiy aides under the sanctions regime it introduced last month. But it’s even harder to imagine Abiy publicly relenting at this point in the face of international pressure after ignoring so many off-ramps to avoid punitive measures.

His government’s continuing humanitarian blockade of Tigray—beyond the widespread human-rights abuses that prompted the US government to open a genocide investigation—means that any national reconciliation must be preceded by mediation, peace-building, justice, and accountability for all the transgressions of the past year.

Judging by the triumphalism of Abiy’s remarks this week, that feels like an unlikely scenario. As the rainy season ends this month, fueling fears of a massive new government offensive, the situation on the ground in Tigray is likely to get far worse before it gets better. As the already dire humanitarian and human-rights situations worsen, so too will Ethiopia’s foreign relations.

But with an electoral victory, a vast parliamentary majority, and a seeming mandate to lead, Abiy now has some of the political capital he might need to begin to escape from the corner into which he’s painted himself.

As a first step—and on the advice of the three African members of the UN Security Council—he could compel his compliant parliament to rescind the terrorist designations against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front, an essential first step toward ceasefire talks and eventual political dialogue. It is also entirely within his power to lift the blockade of Tigray and save as many as one million lives in the process.

To help him on this path, the African Union recently deployed a lifeline in the form of its new Horn of Africa envoy, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. Privately, Ethiopian officials seem open to an African solution to their decidedly African problem: They appear to have faith in Obasanjo’s ability to keep Western powers at bay while offering Abiy a face-saving way to de-escalate, going so far as to invite him to establish a backchannel to the TPLF. As he builds out his team, Washington would do well to communicate its support for Obasanjo’s mission—but also stay at arm’s length, since any American fingerprints on this process could well undermine it.

Abiy’s call for “a new beginning” suggests at least an acknowledgement that Ethiopia is at a perilous point in its history. Although he continues to blame and punish those who oppose him, we must hope he realizes that more of the same war-making, ethnic division, and human-rights abuses will only produce more of the same poor results for the economy and his foreign relations. Abiy still has the possibility to live up to the spirit of the Nobel Peace Prize he received in 2019 for making peace with neighboring Eritrea. Let’s see whether he can do the same within his own country.

---

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/biden-finally-gets-bold-on-ethiopia-sanctions-tigray/ Fri, 17 Sep 2021 20:47:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=435851 The Biden team has launched its final and most elaborate warning shot before cracking down with sanctions against human-rights abusers in the Tigray region.

The post Biden finally gets bold on Ethiopia. But will it bring peace? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> For months, the Biden administration warned that it would sanction the Ethiopian government and its allies for the human-rights abuses, war crimes, and other mass atrocities they have allegedly committed in their year-long war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). As the nationalist group has carried out its own reprisal killings, those warnings have expanded to include all parties to a conflict that’s left thousands dead and nearly one million people languishing in famine-like conditions. 

Then came today’s executive order—the latest in a long series of escalatory efforts by the White House to push the belligerents toward ceasefire talks and to allow in humanitarian aid. Repeated press statements expressing the administration’s “grave concern” looked more like platitudes than policy, which is why it faced increasing pressure from human-rights activists to act.

The administration chose to issue what the Treasury Department calls an “empty EO,” meaning a sanctions regime is now in place but the executive order does not designate any individuals or companies. Instead, the Biden team has launched its final and most elaborate warning shot, effectively giving both sides a few more weeks to engage in serious negotiations, cease their attacks on civilians, and open up the free flow of humanitarian assistance before sanctions are imposed. US officials have been clear to say that designations will come “in weeks not months” if progress isn’t made quickly.

The order goes further than sanctioning only human-rights offenses, as is allowed under the Global Magnitsky Act. Instead, the order is purpose-built to create a sanctions regime specific to the conflict in Ethiopia, giving the administration broad authority to target asset freezes at not just those committing rights abuses, but also those blocking humanitarian aid, inhibiting ceasefire negotiations, undermining democratic processes, engaging in corruption, and targeting civilians and international aid workers.

While we don’t know who will be targeted, it will likely include a representative sample of all the warring sides, including Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials, Amhara state representatives and militia leaders, as well as Tigrayan political and military figures.

Abiy under fire?

If the United States chooses to sanction Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his close associates before his expected reappointment as prime minister in the coming weeks, it could plant serious doubt about his leadership in the minds of his supporters. Such a move—though it’s unlikely—would probably also be met with renewed accusations that the United States was meddling in Ethiopia’s internal political affairs and effectively seeking regime change.

Because Washington has been accused of taking sides against Addis Ababa, today’s order takes great pains to appear even-handed by recognizing the complicity of all sides in committing rights abuses and prolonging the conflict. The order singles out not just Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials but also “the TPLF, the Amhara regional government or the Amhara regional or irregular forces,” essentially any party alleged to have committed abuses to date.

In a smart move, the administration also rolled out wide carveouts to those sanctions for “personal remittances to non-sanctioned persons, humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations, and longer-term assistance programs and commercial activities that address basic human needs.” That suggests it has learned from past cases, in which broad unintended consequences followed sanctions by hurting civilians.

Beyond the direct effect of sanctions, the reputational effect associated with them will also likely be substantial. Ethiopia will now be associated with neighbors such South Sudan and the Central African Republic on the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list of sanctioned countries—company it will surely not want to keep when just two years ago it found itself on a very different list: the International Monetary Fund’s ranking of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

Although today’s announcement is a serious step forward on pressuring the Abiy government, it still leaves open the possibility that progress on the ground can be made over the next several weeks and that the worst of Washington’s sanctions can be avoided.

Timing is everything

As fighting has become increasingly widespread over the last few months, many fear the war could quickly escalate and get dramatically worse for non-combatants, who have borne the brunt of the violence.

Moreover, East Africa’s rainy season will end in a few weeks, allowing for heavy weapons and larger troop deployments to wider, previously unreachable swaths of the country. While the TPLF currently appears to be on its back foot, the coming start of the dry season will level the battlefield once again. US officials estimate that all sides are preparing major new offenses next month.

Ethiopia will also be concluding parliamentary elections, which were delayed this summer in several regions due to the fighting. This will be followed almost immediately by a party congress for Abiy’s Prosperity Party, which he hopes will not only renew his mandate but also give him support to press forward with the war. To that end, the Biden administration’s order leaves Abiy with a choice: Use that new mandate to push for total victory, or initiate some type of political settlement.

Lastly, coming just days before the start of the United Nations General Assembly—and as former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo heads to Ethiopia as the African Union’s new Horn of Africa envoy—today’s effort could catalyze a new and concerted international diplomatic push for ending the fighting.

All sides have expected this announcement for some time. Still, US-Ethiopia relations are sure to nosedive even further as a result. Just hours after today’s sanctions announcement, Abiy issued an open letter to US President Joe Biden in which he stridently proclaimed that “Ethiopia will not succumb to consequences of pressure engineered by disgruntled individuals.”

However, viewed from Washington, diplomacy alone hasn’t worked either. The question is whether Abiy will see this latest move from Washington as the end of the road—or as an exit ramp to avoiding even greater pain.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading


AfricaSource May 25, 2021
Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it?
By Rama Yade
Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.
Africa Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Apr 21, 2021
A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net
By Jeremy Mark and Vasuki Shastry
The international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19, but much more is needed to assist low-income countries. While the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights are a good start, G20 nations must help restructure the debts of developing nations and fund vaccine distribution.
Africa China

AfricaSource Mar 3, 2021
The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan
Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.
Africa Conflict

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/blog-post/state-of-the-order-assessing-august-2021/ Wed, 15 Sep 2021 05:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=434037 The State of the Order breaks down the month's most important events impacting the democratic world order.

The post State of the Order: Assessing August 2021 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Taliban Takeover. Afghanistan’s Western-backed government collapsed as the Taliban took control of Kabul and declared the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, while President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Nearly twenty years after being toppled in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban returned to power having capitalized on the Biden administration’s (and previously, the Trump administration’s) decision to withdraw all US forces from the country. After evacuating most of their citizens, as well as tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted their mission, US and NATO troops completed their final withdrawal at the end of August.

• Shaping the Order. The return of the Taliban is a tragedy for Afghans who sought to live in an open society and a setback to the advance of a rules-based order — underscoring that despite two decades of sustained US and NATO combat support and economic aid, the establishment of a stable, democratic government proved out of reach. The developments in Afghanistan could embolden America’s adversaries, as China and Russia sought to portray the United States as a weak and defeated power upon which US allies cannot confidently rely.
• Hitting Home. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan puts an end to US involvement in the “forever war” that most Americans felt had dragged on far too long. But the re-emergence of the Taliban could provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups – potentially threatening the security of Americans in the region and even in the homeland.
• What to Do. The Biden Administration should make clear that its withdrawal from Afghanistan is not a sign of retreat from US global leadership nor an abandonment of efforts to advance democracy and a rules-based order. Building on Biden’s initial remarks after the fall of Kabul, the administration should reinforce its determination to work with NATO and its Asia-Pacific treaty allies to strengthen U.S. alliances, while taking affirmative steps to support front-line democracies, such as Ukraine, and pro-democracy movements around the world.

US-Israel Realigned. In his first meeting with Israel’s new prime minister Naftali Bennett, at the White House, President Biden provided a forceful recommitment to Israeli security, vowing that the US and Israel have an “unshakeable partnership.” The two leaders reportedly agreed on a common strategy to halt Iran’s nuclear program, creating a joint team at the national security advisers level, while Biden indicated his administration would be prepared to move to “other options” if diplomacy fails to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

• Shaping the Order. A strengthened US-Israeli partnership can serve as an anchor for stability in the Middle East, facilitating more effective cooperation to advance shared interests in regional security, nonproliferation, and a rules-based order. But the Israeli government’s unwillingness to relaunch peace talks with the Palestinians and work toward a two-state solution could be a thorny obstacle in the US-Israeli relationship.
• Hitting Home. A nuclear-armed Iran would constitute a direct security threat to the United States and its allies and could lead to a more dangerous world.
• What to Do. Working through their newly-created joint team, the US and Israel should expand cooperation to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, while countering Iran’s destabilizing influence across the region. To ensure a unified front, these efforts should also be coordinated with other regional allies, as well as the G7 or D-10.

Democracy Summit. The Biden administration announced that it plans to host a virtual Summit for Democracy this year, with invited heads of state coming together on December 9-10 to focus on three main themes: defending against authoritarianism, fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights. The White House aims to organize a follow-up summit one year later, in-person if feasible, providing a venue to take stock of commitments made during the initial convening.

• Shaping the Order. Coming on the heels of the fall of Afghanistan, the Summit could serve as a timely opportunity for the Biden administration to rally support for democratic norms and showcase common resolve among the world’s democracies, at a time when democracy has suffered significant setbacks around the world.
• Hitting Home. A more democratic world is likely to provide greater security and stability for the United States and generate increased trade and economic opportunities.
• What To Do. To ensure the Summit’s success, the Biden administration should limit the guest list to leaders of democracies (as opposed to friendly non-democracies) that are prepared to set forth meaningful commitments in support of the Summit’s core themes. The outcome should include a democracy charter, in which participating leaders pledge to take active measures to counter authoritarianism and bolster support for democratic norms.

Quote of the Month

“[W]e all recognize that the decision to leave Afghanistan was extremely difficult. It entailed risks. But that doesn’t change the fundamental value of U.S. and Europe being committed to each other, especially in a time where we see the rise of China and the shifting global balance of power that makes it even more important, both for Europe and United States, to stand together in an alliance as NATO.”

– Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General



State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• The fall of the Afghan government, despite nearly 20-years of military and economic support from the US and its NATO allies, represents a significant blow to efforts to advance democracy, especially in the Islamic world.
• With President Nicolas Maduro tightening his grip on the country, Venezuela’s main opposition parties announced an end to their three-year boycott of elections, abandoning one of the main tactics of their ongoing struggle against the country’s dictatorship.
• Poles took to the streets to protest a parliamentary bill widely viewed as an effort by the country’s nationalist ruling party to silence government criticism by an independent television network (owned by the US-based media company Discovery), a leading source of news for many in Poland.
• The United States imposed a new round of sanctions against Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka—timed to mark the one-year anniversary of his fraudulent re-election. The US also issued new sanctions against Cuban officials involved in the crackdown on anti-government protestors in July.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

• The re-emergence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan could provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups that could pose a direct threat to the United States and Europe, as well as India and other nations in the region.
• Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous nation and a longstanding US partner against Islamist militancy, descended into an escalating civil war between the ruling government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. In May, the Biden administration imposed sanctions against Ethiopian officials for their role in abetting human rights atrocities.
• Particularly in light of developments in Afghanistan, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

• The United Kingdom indicated that it aims to start negotiations on a free trade agreement with India by the end of the year, while India also expressed interest in free trade agreements with the European Union and Australia.
• The global economic recovery from the pandemic has begun to wane, as the widespread outbreak of the Delta variant negatively impacted manufacturing centers in East Asia.
• Overall, the global trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

• A major scientific study by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that human activity is changing the climate in unprecedented and irreversible ways, underlining the urgent need for global action as the United Kingdom prepares to host an upcoming global climate summit (COP26) in November.
• In its first Indo-Pacific naval voyage in twenty years, Germany deployed a frigate intended to cross the South China Sea in the coming weeks, joining the US and other democratic allies in efforts to reaffirm freedom of navigation amid China’s maritime ambitions.
• Overall, the global commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↓)

• The US withdrawal from Afghanistan drew criticism from US allies, particularly in Europe, where many expressed disappointment with the level of consultation ahead of the decision to withdraw. President Biden sought to assuage allies in a special G7 summit meeting convened virtually by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the wake of the Taliban takeover.
• Frustrated with the continuing US travel ban on European travelers, the European Union recommended reinstatement of restrictions on US travelers, citing the significant increase in coronavirus cases across the United States.
• As discussed above, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett’s visit to the White House strengthened relations between the two allies.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was weakened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Anne Applebaum, in The Atlantic, defends the value of fighting for liberal democracy, a potent ideology opposed by America’s adversaries.
• Anders Fogh Rasmussen, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that despite the Afghan government’s collapse, America and its allies cannot abandon the fight for democracy.
• Kevin Rudd, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that the success of the Indo-Pacific Quad poses a threat to Beijing’s long-term ambitions to dominate the East Asian region.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Barry Pavel, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could be even more dangerous than it was prior to September 11, 2001.
• Dan Fried, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that despite its failure in Afghanistan, the United States can come back strong to advance the cause of freedom and democracy, just as it did after its debacle in Vietnam.
• Amanda Rothschild offers recommendations to the Biden administration in The Dispatch on how to avert a growing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan.
• Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, suggest that the new series of US sanctions on Belarus will not be powerful enough to rattle the autocrat Lukashenka.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Jeffrey Cimmino – Assistant Director
Joel Kesselbrenner – Program Assistant
Paul Cormarie – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/kamal-alam-with-bbc-somali-reconciliation-of-war-how-will-the-taliban-deal-with-resistance-in-the-panjshir-valley/ Sun, 22 Aug 2021 22:44:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=427893 The post Kamal Alam with BBC Somali: Reconciliation of war: “How will the Taliban deal with resistance in the Panjshir Valley?” appeared first on Atlantic Council.
]]>
original source

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/china-and-sub-saharan-africa-trade-a-case-of-growing-interdependence/ Thu, 22 Jul 2021 20:02:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=415199 China’s total merchandise trade with Sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 1864% since 2001. Its increased presence in the region not only increases its access and influence, but also poses significant economic and security risks for the US and EU.

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]]> In the past two decades, the Chinese economy has been the most widely discussed economy in the world. When China began its economic reforms in the early 1980s, it was a poor country with a GDP per capita of less than $200 and a GDP of less than $200 billion. Forty years later, China has a GDP per capita of more than $10,000 – 50 times larger than in 1980 – and an economy of around $15 trillion, 75 times larger than it was in 1980. To put things in perspective, during the same period, the US economy grew by seven times (from around $3 trillion in 1980 to $21 trillion in 2020) and its GDP per capita by five times (from around $13,000 in 1980 to $65,000 in 2020). Smaller economies do tend to grow faster than more mature and larger economies, but China’s continuous average annual growth rate of 10 percent per year in the past four decades has been unparalleled in modern economic history. One important consequence of such rapid economic growth has been the lifting of more than 800 million Chinese citizens out of poverty, putting China in the upper-middle-income category of countries. Trade has been the main driver in the Chinese growth story. Chinese exports grew by more than 143 times between 1980 ($18.1 billion) and 2020 ($2.6 trillion). In other worlds, while China was responsible for less than 1 percent of global merchandise exports in 1980, today, it commands more than 15 percent of the total merchandise exports around the world.

Over the past two decades, the Sub-Saharan Africa region (SSA) has gained significant importance in Chinese state-directed industrial and trade policies, leading to an increasing share of China in SSA’s total trade and vice versa. China’s total merchandise trade (referred to for simplicity here as “trade”) with SSA has increased by a whopping 1,864 percent between 2001 and 2020. As shown in Figure 1, China has been emerging as a major trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, while the commercial ties of the European Union and mostly that of the United States with SSA has been on the decline. Specifically, the share of China in SSA’s total trade – imports and export – has increased from 4 percent in 2001 to 25.6 percent in 2020, while during the same period the share of the EU and the United States in SSA’s total trade declined from 30.3 to 22.3 percent and from 15.5 to 5.6 percent, respectively.

Minerals, metals, agricultural products, and crude oil are the main exports of SSA economies to China. Specifically, in 2019, SSA accounted for more than 16 percent of all crude oil imported by China, and the size of SSA crude exports to China grew by more than 100 percent between 2008 and 2019 – 0.7 million barrels per day in 2008 to 1.5 million barrels per day in 2019. 

It is critical to note here that China overtook the United States as a trading partner of SSA immediately after the 2007-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Less affected by the GFC, the size of China’s trade with SSA continued to increase during GFC, while that of the United States declined sharply and has continued to decline since 2011 (see Figure 2). In this way, there is a stark similarity between SSA and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions as China’s trade with MENA also overtook US-MENA trade immediately after the GFC (see Figure 2). One reason has been diverging trends in energy imports: while there has been growing demand in China for energy imports in the past two decades, US crude and natural gas imports started declining from their peak in 2007 as the United States took serious steps towards energy independence after the GFC through the expansion of shale oil and gas production – justified by the high oil prices through most of the 2007-14 period. Moreover, China’s investment has also been increasing in similar sectors across the two regions in the past decades: energy, metals, real estate, and transportation. The glaring similarity of China’s growing role in investment and trade in SSA and MENA points to a shifting of balance and realignment from West to East in these regions, at least in economic and trade fronts.

Not only has China become an increasingly strategic trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, SSA’s share in China’s total trade has also increased during the same period: from 1.48 percent of China’s total trade in 2001 to 3.18 percent in 2020. At the same time, SSA’s weight in the EU’s total trade stayed relatively the same – 1.3 percent in 2001 and 1.2 percent in 2020 – while it experienced a decline in the United States – 1.5 percent in 2001 to 0.85 percent in 2020 (see Figure 3). In other words, SSA’s weight in China’s total trade increased by more than two-fold in the past two decades, while it remained relatively constant for the EU and declined for the United States.

This is further illustrated by the fact that in 2019, out of the forty-two SSA countries with available trade data, China was the top exports destination and imports origin for thirteen and twenty-six SSA economies, respectively. Moreover, China was among the top three exports destinations and imports origins for twenty-two and thirty-nine SSA economies, respectively. In the same year, China accounted for more than 20 percent of a country’s imports and exports for sixteen SSA economies, while more than 50 percent of imports of eight SSA countries were originated from China (see Figure 4).

Finally, similar to the findings on Chinese investment and construction in SSA, on average, while SSA countries with access to seaports have an advantage over the landlocked ones when it comes to trade with China, the commercial ties of forty-five out of forty-nine SSA economies experienced substantial growth rates ranging from 439 to 184,101 percent in the past two decades (see Figure 5).

The evidence highlighted above suggests that SSA and China view each other as increasingly strategic trading partners, and the commercial ties between SSA and the US and EU has relatively declined in the past two decades. While the EU has negotiated a set of free trade agreements with most of SSA economies, such agreements have done little to slow down the growth of commercial ties between SSA and China, even though the EU has clear advantages over China in terms of geographic proximity and historical ties to the region. Moreover, Brexit has introduced some challenges in the ability of the EU to successfully negotiate as one common market with SSA. In the case of the United States, since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has provided eligible SSA economies with tariff-free access to 1,800 products in the US market. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), thirty-eight countries were eligible for AGOA program in 2020. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the commercial ties between the US and SSA have deteriorated, and China has been filling up most of this gap.

The increasing presence of China in SSA alongside the relative decline of commercial and economic ties of the United States and EU in this region have increased the risk of supply chain disruptions for the United States and the EU in many strategic commodities, such as Cobalt. At the same time, China’s growing economic activities and investments in SSA has meant greater access in the region, with Beijing eying many SSA countries as potential political and military allies, posing serious geo-security challenges for the United States and the EU in the long run. As a result, the growing strategic importance of SSA for the United States and the EU necessitates a common US-EU front to face China’s expanding commercial, investment, and construction activities in this region. The latest joint action of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EU to impose sanctions on Chinese entities who are believed to be associated with serious human rights violations in Xinjiang region of China, is an example of US collaborating with its close allies to confront China’s human rights violations. Although, this move has threatened the ratification of China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on both ends, it has sent a clear signal to China, that despite their disagreements, the United States and the EU are once again ready to partner in confronting China’s human rights violations and global ambitions. The recent launch of Build Back Better World (B3W) by President Biden and G7 leaders is an example of a partnership model that could show the commitment of the United States, the EU, and their allies to the development of SSA – and other less developed regions – while also confronting China’s seemingly limitless expansion in SSA and the developing world. Complementing B3W initiatives in SSA with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements could restore dwindling economic ties between the United States and strategic SSA economies. It is true that Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is eight years ahead of B3W and 139 countries – including Italy – are formally affiliated with it, but there remains significant infrastructure gaps in SSA for initiatives such as B3W to address. After all, it is better late than never.

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Development finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Chinese model
By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou
In recent years Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has outpaced distributions by the World Bank Group by more than $20 billion USD. These investments have been focused in energy, transport, metals, and real estate imply a modern bartering system is at play where developing countries in these regions pay for Chinese investment and construction in their economies through guaranteed long-term supply of hydrocarbons, agriproducts, or minerals.
Africa China



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The post China and Sub-Saharan Africa trade: A case of growing interdependence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/prof-severine-autesserre-says-that-its-time-for-the-peacekeeping-community-to-walk-the-walk-when-it-comes-to-localized-peacebuilding/ Wed, 30 Jun 2021 03:53:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=410372 On Tuesday, June 29, the Africa Center convened a private event with award-winning author Professor Séverine Autesserre for a discussion on localized peacebuilding and her new book, The Frontlines of Peace.

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Tuesday, June 29, the Africa Center convened a private event with award-winning author and Barnard College, Columbia University Professor Séverine Autesserre. The discussion centered around her recently published book The Frontlines of Peace, which examines the well-intentioned, but inherently flawed, top-down nature of international peacebuilding (referred to by the author as ‘Peace Inc.’) and posits that peace is actually achieved and maintained through grassroots efforts created, managed, and led by local actors. The Africa Center conversation focused on examples of localized and international peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somaliland.

Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.  

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (​MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Further reading


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/responding-to-acute-challenges-in-the-horn-of-africa-with-finnish-fm-pekka-haavisto/ Fri, 18 Jun 2021 18:29:25 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=406589 On Friday, June 18, the Africa Center hosted a private conversation on the situation in the Horn of Africa in advance of the June 21 Ethiopian general elections. The conversation featured Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Pekka Haavisto, who visited the region earlier this year under the mandate of European Union High Representative Josep Borrell.

The post Responding to acute challenges in the Horn of Africa, with Finnish FM Pekka Haavisto appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Friday, June 18, the Africa Center hosted a private conversation on the situation in the Horn of Africa in advance of the June 21 Ethiopian general elections. The conversation featured Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Pekka Haavisto, who visited Ethiopia and Gulf states earlier this year under the mandate of European Union High Representative Josep Borrell. Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Cameron Hudson moderated the discussion, and Director Amb. Rama Yade provided opening remarks.

In his remarks, the Minister provided a readout of his February and April trips to the region, describing stakeholder meetings and the status of humanitarian access and reporting. He also commented on the negotiations surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), due for its second filling this summer, and regional border disputes.

Throughout the subsequent discussion, participants engaged the Minister on election implications, expectations around Prime Minister Abiy’s post-election policy, the role of regional organizations, and the parameters for a credible national reconciliation. Hudson closed, remarking that the conversation is a reflection of the importance of US and EU cooperation on key regional issues.  

Further reading


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Responding to acute challenges in the Horn of Africa, with Finnish FM Pekka Haavisto appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/africa-is-americas-greatest-geopolitical-opportunity-does-the-us-know-it/ Tue, 25 May 2021 15:32:19 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=395286 Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.

The post Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Today the world celebrates Africa Day, which commemorates the founding of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963. On that day, as two-thirds of the continent obtained independence, thirty-two African nations met in Addis Ababa, hosted by Haile Selassie, in order to establish the institution.

“May this convention of union last 1,000 years,” the Ethiopian leader said, while Angola and Mozambique (still Portuguese colonies) along with South Africa and South Rhodesia (under apartheid rule) were fighting for their freedom.

Since then, that union has been succeeded by the 55-member African Union, “inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States,” according to its Constitutive Act.

If Africa seems geographically distant to Americans, it shouldn’t; the United States wouldn’t be what it is today without the labor force of Africans brought to the country as part of a bloody multi-century transatlantic trade. As the US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently pointed out, that experience is “just three generations back from me.”

Rather than being defeated by this mass depopulation—which cost it one-hundred million of its own, directly or indirectly, according to the macabre accounting of W.E.B Du Bois—Africa survived. Now it is the new frontier, full of all the promise presented by its youth, its dynamism, and its universalism despite the persistent presence of poverty on the continent.

As it re-engages with the world, Joe Biden’s United States will find a vigorous and uninhibited Africa, at least in the civil-society sector and among young generations, that does not expect leadership from the United States but rather a win-win partnership. With each passing day, Africa grows more critical for the United States in national-security and especially economic terms.

US policy in Africa has been thrown off course by China, which is methodically implementing a grand, 21st-century Marshall Plan for the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative. And Beijing is hardly to blame. As home to a large share of the world’s water resources, untapped arable land, and by 2050 nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, Africa has emerged as the most important piece on the geopolitical chessboard. Without a drastic shift in strategy, the United States is on the verge of being on the outside looking in for decades to come.

China is playing the long game in Africa and has strategically invested in infrastructure projects including railroads, ports, dams, and hydropower-generation sources. But these investments could be the warm-up act for China’s entry into fields traditionally dominated by the United States—namely technology and banking—where it aspires to compete with American heavyweights like Microsoft, Boeing, Google, and General Electric. Such game-changing moves would play into China’s larger ambition of unseating the US dollar.

All of these measures reflect the coming surge in economic demand from Africa. As the population grows, so too does its pool of potential consumers and clients. The African middle class, which stood at 355 million people in 2010, will reach 1.1 billion by 2060.

From Morocco to Ethiopia, Africa has become the workshop of the world. It was home to six of the world’s ten most dynamic economies in 2018. The world’s largest free-trade zone—the African Continental Free Trade Area—was launched in 2019 to put an end to the dramatic effects of the old colonial policy that prevented Africans from trading with each other. A cosmopolitan billionaire class has sprouted, largely from the tech sector, as Africa has experienced the largest telecommunications revolution in the world. Kenya is a global leader in developing mobile-payment systems. Smart cities are cropping up in Ghana and Angola. And companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon invested two billion dollars in African tech ventures in 2019.

Encouragingly, the new generation of Africans driving this change do not want to live in a Leninist system. They want democracy, an open market, and free trade. This gives the United States an opening—if it is willing to act on it.

The Biden administration has sent strong signals that it is eager to engage. Biden earned positive reviews following his appearance at the 34th African Union Summit—his first international forum in office—during which he committed to stand as Africa’s partner and support African nations’ entrepreneurship and innovation.

A new policy toward Africa needs to chiefly reflect the realities that competition among global powers (Russia, Turkey, and others are vying with China for influence on the continent) and the major changes underway in African societies have a significant impact on the strategic long-term interests of the United States. The continent should be viewed through the lens of opportunity rather than risk. The Chinese have maximized the opportunity by being explicit with their investments, which prioritize long-term projects that minimize risk. As Senegalese President Macky Sall puts it, “What handicaps the continent is prejudice and the stigmatizing gaze on it. When it comes to investing in Africa, the perception of risk is always exaggerated, which further increases the cost of investment and debt. In fact, the risk in Africa is no higher than in many other parts of the world.”

China’s rapid advance in infrastructure investments will be difficult for Americans and Europeans to match. But Americans should invest in an area where they don’t yet have a competitor: cultural soft power. Fashion, entertainment, and even sports convey values of fair play, freedom, and success. During the Cold War, they enabled the American way of life to spread everywhere. Culture proved stronger than nuclear weapons. And that’s a good thing: Africa’s cultural industries are in dire need of investment. From the African Development Bank to the African Export-Import Bank, pan-African investors are working to address this. To launch this cultural and geopolitical revolution, the United States has a tremendous asset: its African American community, whose interest in the African continent is growing. Cooperation is beckoning from both sides of the Atlantic—from one new world to another.

Biden can further build ties with Africa by working to give its nations more influence on the global stage. He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations—including the UN Security Council—but also because they offer innovative yet often unnoticed solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19. African marginalization is no longer an option, and its nations will not soon forget who gave them a long-overdue seat at the table.

A new start with Africa is possible for the United States. It turns out that the world’s oldest continent is also the youngest. In this dual capacity, Africa has much to say. It’s time to listen to it.

Ambassador Rama Yade is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @ramayade.

Further reading


AfricaSource Apr 23, 2021
Climate change will not be fixed without Africa
By Rama Yade
When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.
Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Apr 6, 2021
Keys to African recovery: Vaccines, debt, and commodities
By Rabah Arezki
In the wake of COVID-19, African markets are consumed by uncertainty about the economic recovery. Because of its large population—1.2 billion people—developments in Africa will weigh heavily on the world. The recovery from COVID-19 in Africa will depend on three factors—vaccines, debt, and commodities.
Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 22, 2020
African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead
By Africa Center
African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s […]
Africa Coronavirus

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-world-apart-how-wealthy-nations-can-strengthen-the-covid-safety-net/ Wed, 21 Apr 2021 20:23:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=380586 The international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19, but much more is needed to assist low-income countries. While the IMF's Special Drawing Rights are a good start, G20 nations must help restructure the debts of developing nations and fund vaccine distribution.

The post A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> By enabling the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide substantial amounts of foreign-exchange reserves to its 190 member countries, the international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19. But much more is needed to assist low-income countries that remain burdened by the pandemic’s economic and human costs.

This month, senior government officials who gathered virtually under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank authorized the issuance of $650 billion of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a reserve asset that will be exchangeable for hard currency. In addition, the Group of Twenty (G20) governments agreed to extend until the end of this year a moratorium on debt-service payments by the poorest countries on loans from G20 lenders. That moratorium already has freed up $5.7 billion for forty-three countries since it went into effect a year ago, with another $7.3 billion of deferral possible by the end of June, according to World Bank President David Malpass.

However, these measures will not be enough. Low-income countries were hit by the same recession that the advanced and emerging-market economies experienced in 2020, but the IMF projects that their rebound will be much slower. So the tens of millions of people in low-income countries who have fallen back into extreme poverty because of the pandemic have little hope for improvement in the coming year. More action is needed in several areas:

• No rich nations have stepped up to offer new country-to-country assistance to help poor nations counter the public-health and economic impacts of the pandemic. This presents a stark contrast to the willingness of Group of Seven (G7) countries to provide bilateral aid to African countries at the height of the 2008 global financial crisis.
• The G20 has made little concrete progress on implementing its framework for restructuring the debts of countries whose loan obligations have become unsustainable during the pandemic.
• The G20 so far has not responded to the failure of private-sector creditors—who hold a major portion of low-income country debt—to join its debt-relief and debt-restructuring initiatives.
• A broad swath of the globe has little prospect of gaining significant access to COVID vaccines before 2022, or even 2023, meaning that the virus and its variants could continue to spread, mostly affecting low-income countries.

These intertwined issues, if left unaddressed, could lead to a long delay in the resumption of growth across the developing world at levels that could offset the human impact of the crisis, meaning debt burdens will deepen. The IMF has offered a brighter economic outlook for 2021 than many would have expected a year ago, with global growth now expected to reach 6 percent this year, largely because of a resurgent US economy. But the fund issued a stark warning that the debts of countries that have achieved emerging-market status could become a serious burden if the pandemic continues. “The future presents daunting challenges,” wrote IMF Chief Economist Gita Gopinath. “The pandemic is yet to be defeated and virus cases are accelerating in many countries. Recoveries are also diverging dangerously across and within countries.”

The agreement to issue SDRs can help, although many bureaucratic obstacles remain. This summer the IMF will make available the equivalent of about $21 billion in SDRs to low-income countries as reserves—an allocation from the total $650 billion that represents their weighting in the global economy. But the assets will not be immediately available as currency. First, the fund’s membership will have to agree on the procedures for each country to make use of its allocations by exchanging them for other currencies. Second, the members will have to agree on how wealthier countries may redistribute their own SDR allocations to low-income countries. In the absence of significant bilateral assistance from wealthy countries—either grant aid or low-interest loans—the transfer of SDRs could be crucial to help low-income countries respond to the pandemic. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said that the United States looks forward to discussing ways to deploy SDRs to support low-income countries.

Debt restructuring remains another serious hurdle. Three African countries—Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia—have asked to restructure their debt burdens under a Common Framework for Debt Treatments agreed to by the G20 last year, and more countries are expected to follow. But that process has remained stalled by procedural issues like the composition of creditor committees that would negotiate with the debtor governments. Governments involved in the negotiations over the Common Framework are still unsure how much money and influence China—the largest bilateral creditor to low-income countries, with hundreds of billions of dollars in loans—is prepared to commit to the restructuring.

There are also differences over the role of private-sector lenders, which range from Eurobond holders in Ethiopia, Zambia, and other countries to the commodities trading and mining giant Glencore, which holds the largest single portion of Chad’s debt. Private-sector lenders have declined to participate in the G20 debt-service moratorium in the absence of country-by-country negotiations, and their role in debt restructuring remains unclear.

While the private sector’s role merited several mentions in the communiqués issued this month by the G20 finance ministers and IMF, there was little evidence at the respective meetings that the governments were prepared to take a harder line against the financiers. However, officials have suggested that private-sector participation in the Common Framework will be an integral and unavoidable part of the G20’s overall strategy in dealing with debt distress. It is likely only a matter of time before we see the official sector deploy the necessary carrots (and sticks) to bring a recalcitrant private sector into the restructuring process. Over the past year, senior officials have spoken of mandating the participation of private bondholders in any restructuring of sovereign debts. Private-sector misgivings about the Common Framework forcing them to disclose proprietary information have also been discounted because officials see the public and private interest best served through greater transparency on all debt owed by low-income countries, but officials are prepared to be flexible about how certain categories of debt data are released publicly. 

Finally, there is the issue of “vaccination, vaccination, vaccination,” as Swedish Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson declared during an IMF press conference. Only a tiny percentage of COVID vaccines so far have been made available to developing countries. Pandemic-fighting tools for low-income countries, including the COVAX Facility to supply vaccines, face a $19 billion funding shortfall, even after the Biden administration, the World Bank, and other donors have chipped in $14.1 billion. India’s commitment to provide millions of shots to other countries has ground to a halt as it struggles with a severe resurgence of the virus, and questions have arisen about the effectiveness of China’s Sinovac vaccine, which has been supplied to countries from Indonesia to Turkey and Brazil. By some estimates, dozens of countries across the Global South will not receive adequate supplies of vaccines until 2023.

While the IMF has made important progress in finding ways to assist low-income countries during the pandemic, many others—especially creditor governments and private lenders—have failed to respond adequately. That means the developing world faces a deepening crisis just as some countries begin to gain the upper hand against COVID-19. Those diverging fortunes do not bode well for a global recovery.

Jeremy Mark is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center. He previously worked for the IMF and the Asian Wall Street Journal. Follow him on Twitter @JedMark888.

Vasuki Shastry, formerly with the IMF, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Standard Chartered Bank, is the author of the book Has Asia Lost It? Dynamic Past, Turbulent Future. Follow him on Twitter @vshastry.

The post A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/the-unintended-consequence-of-ethiopias-civil-war-might-be-a-border-war-with-sudan/ Wed, 03 Mar 2021 14:18:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=360230 Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. In nearly four months of fighting across Ethiopia’s Tigray region, more than sixty thousand Tigrayan refugees have fled into neighboring Sudan and 80 percent of the region’s six million citizens have been cut off from life-saving humanitarian access. Despite rolling media and internet blackouts, a steady trickle of stories has emerged that paint a gruesome picture of mass atrocities, widespread rape, summary executions, and the wholesale destruction of the region’s critical infrastructure.  

In recent weeks, the United States and its European allies have launched a diplomatic campaign to convince Ethiopia’s once-venerated prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, to relent in his campaign to vanquish militarily his greatest political threat in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I once feared the onset of a bloody struggle for control over Tigray that would pit near-equally matched foes against each other in something approximating conventional, interstate war. But what has instead emerged is a widespread TPLF insurgency that could drag on and take as many lives through deprivation as it does through combat.

The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies. Indeed, it is this possible unintended consequence of Abiy’s “law and order operation” in Tigray that could well do the most extensive damage in the region. In contrast to the conflict in Tigray, however, it is not too late for the United States and its allies in the region and beyond to do something to prevent a border war that would amount to a historic strategic blunder.

The seeds of this potential calamity were planted at the start of the last century when the border between Ethiopia and Sudan was first agreed to, though never formally demarcated, by modern Ethiopia’s founding father, Emperor Menelik II, during the British-Sudanese condominium. Since 1993, a patch of agricultural land on the Sudanese side of the border, referred to as the al-Fashqa Triangle, has been occupied by Amhara farmers. Many of them were relocated there by the Sudanese government in recognition of historic claims to the area by this powerful minority group. Since 2008, a de-facto agreement has existed whereby Ethiopia has acknowledged the historic legal boundary putting al-Fashqa inside Sudan, while Sudan has granted Amhara farmers continued rights to cultivate the land. Efforts to definitively demarcate the border have been stalled since the last meeting of an ad-hoc border commission last year, but Sudan’s designs on the region have never abated. Indeed, as recently as August 2020, in remarks by the head of the Sudanese army and chairman of the transitional government’s Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to the Army General Command, he predicted that they would “raise the flag of Sudan above al-Fashqa… and not waste one inch of the homeland.”

What has broken that decade-plus status quo is the onset of conflict in Tigray and a series of strategic and tactical calculations by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Unlike many outsiders, senior-level Sudanese officials claim not to have been surprised by the brutal assault by the TPLF on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) Northern Command outpost in Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, on the night of November 4. Only a week prior, a delegation led by the deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, General Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo, met with Abiy in Addis, where the restive Tigray region, mounting border tensions, and the stalemated negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were all reportedly topics of discussion.

More surprising to the Sudanese was the Ethiopian government’s near-immediate need for supplementary troops—pulled in from Ethiopian deployments in Somalia and, most notably, the al-Fashqa Triangle—to respond to the TPLF attack in Mekelle. The subsequent entry into the Tigray conflict of Eritrean forces and Amhara state militias further indicated that the ENDF was unable to subdue the TPLF uprising on its own and was operating from a greater position of relative weakness than was perhaps anticipated. 

By December, as primarily SAF forces gathered along the Sudanese side of the border to monitor the crossing of Tigrayan refugees and possible retreating TPLF forces, SAF and ENDF troops found themselves in closer proximity than ever before—increasing the risk of clashes. Multiple ENDF surprise assaults on SAF army officers prompted SAF forces to move in on the night of December 29. In that incursion, SAF forces reportedly destroyed Ethiopian army outposts and administrative centers while also displacing Amhara farmers and destroying crops in their successful bid to reclaim the entirety of the al-Fashqa Triangle. 

Sudan has presented its tactical decision as a legitimate response in light of the ENDF’s own unprovoked incursions against Sudanese patrols and Khartoum’s historic and legal claims to the area. But there is no question that the SAF, which has witnessed its traditional importance in Sudan’s body politic decline substantially under the country’s civilian-led transitional government, see in their defense of Sudan’s territorial integrity an opportunity to once again assert its primacy as the protector of the Sudanese state. 

It is also true that in its effort to change facts on the ground, whether justified or not, the SAF has now further aggravated an inherently unstable situation in the region and may have disrupted the delicate balance among security forces inside Sudan that has kept the transition there on track.

As bellicose rhetoric by both sides has increased in recent weeks, Khartoum and Addis have come to frame the threat of territorial loss in national-security and even existential terms—similar in certain respects to how each side has recently described the contentious and protracted GERD talks. Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia was recently recalled to Khartoum, and various peace envoys and proposed mediators from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Sudan, and the African Union (AU) have all largely seen their willingness to help the parties achieve a negotiated solution rebuffed. Even Eritrea, whose peace agreement with Ethiopia has emerged as more of a mutual-security pact, tried unconvincingly to paint itself as a peacemaker in a letter last week from President Isaias Afwerki to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Sudan’s newly appointed foreign minister, Mariam al Saddig, suggested in late February that Sudan would be open to talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But that regional body, currently chaired by Hamdok and historically controlled by Ethiopia, has not yet offered its good offices and likely lacks the independence to offer impartial mediation.

In the absence of concerted external mediation, both sides risk turning their cold war much hotter. And with such intertwined politics and long histories, both sides have the points of leverage to do it. Ethiopia currently supplies the totality of troops (more than five thousand) to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Abyei, the highly contested region along the Sudan-South Sudan border that remains at the heart of the tensions between those two countries. Concerns abound that Ethiopia could withdraw those troops, potentially forcing the SAF to fill a security vacuum there that could well spark renewed conflict with Juba. There are also worries that Sudan could unilaterally expel those forces out of fear that Ethiopia could use these forces as a fifth column in the event of a sustained outbreak of violence along its border—opening a new front against Sudan and vastly expanding their zone of conflict. Addis, for its part, is right to fear Khartoum’s ability to re-arm and re-supply TPLF rebels should Sudan wish to open its own additional front in a border conflict.

Adding to the volatility has been an influx of allied armies and militias into the border zone between Sudan and Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian side, it is not just the ENDF, but also Amhara militias and Eritrean Defense Forces. Similarly, on the Sudanese side of the border, the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have also been identified in increasingly large numbers.

Given the lack of interoperability among many of these forces, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of this mobilization is occurring in a narrow band along the border that is only a few kilometers wide, the chances are high that the slightest misstep or miscalculation could result in a large-scale outbreak of violence and a rapid escalation among three national armies and many state and national militias. This is particularly true inside Sudan, where the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have even turned on each other in the past year in areas like Darfur and Kordofan when they have been deployed in close proximity.

Absent some kind of international monitoring, there are simply too many well-armed forces in too close proximity with too little experience working with each other to discount the risk of a cataclysmic conflict breaking out.  

The tense standoff has bred rumors that additional outside forces could light the spark that ignites that conflict. Egypt, which has grown increasingly frustrated with the state of GERD negotiations, is often identified as a prime potential instigator. But while there is no question that Egypt has sought to use its historic ties to Sudan to produce a GERD outcome to its liking, Egyptian officials privately express a clear-eyed understanding that an Ethiopia wracked by internal war and interstate conflict will be incapable of focusing on, let alone reaching, a binding political and technical agreement on the demanding issues that the GERD presents. 

So where do we go from here? It seems unlikely that ad-hoc bilateral demands for de-escalation and withdrawal from contested areas will be sufficient at this stage. Late last month, AU Commission Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat dispatched retired Mauritanian diplomat Mohamed Lebatt to Addis and Khartoum to probe each side’s willingness to accept outside meditation on the brewing border conflict. While no progress was made, it is a conversation worth building on.

Coordinated, high-level outside mediation is urgently required to avert the potentially dire consequences of a conflict for not just the civilian populations in the border area, but also the countries at the center of the dispute and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Sudan recently proposed outside mediation for the final phase of the GERD negotiations that would include the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union. Some sponsorship of border mediation by this grouping—under the leadership of an eminent, empowered figure—is worth pursuing given the substantial risks to international peace and security and the potential for the parties’ largest donors to bring financial leverage to efforts to reach a resolution.

While all these disputes are linked, there is no single process, individual, or institution that will be able to untangle the overlapping and complicated politics of the competing conflicts. What is essential is coordination. Any process that can be put in place to help with the de-escalation of war in Tigray should be kept on its own track. So too with the GERD. And so too with a process for unwinding the military buildup and tensions on the border, which should be narrowly defined and time-limited so as not to be exploited as a potential leverage point in any other mediation processes. But these must all be coordinated by a central Contact Group with the power, leverage, and legitimacy to advance options for resolution and enforce outcomes that contribute to overall peace.

Such processes must be jumpstarted now to avoid a downward spiral, and there are several immediate steps that Washington can take to do just that. In a fortunate coincidence, the United States took up the presidency of the UN Security Council in March. The newly installed US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, should prioritize a special session of the Security Council to discuss the manifold crises emerging in the Horn of Africa, with added attention to the still-unfolding conflict in Tigray and the stalemated GERD talks. Given the many competing interests at play in the Horn from all manner of external powers, the session should include discussion of an International Contact Group that can promote dialogue and transparency and ensure that potential spoilers remain in the tent rather than outside of it.

To support and complement this effort, the United States should also appoint a Horn of Africa envoy who is capable of both setting the policy agenda in Washington and corralling leaders in Europe and the region in the near term. In the long run, an envoy can only succeed if he or she is equipped with a clear set of policy objectives and the tools to advance them. In contrast to its approach in the Great Lakes or Sahel regions, Washington has for too long viewed the countries in the promising but volatile Horn of Africa in a vacuum or else simply provided wide berth to the area’s anchor state, Ethiopia, to project its power and influence to police regional disputes. With Addis having lost the ability to play that role any longer, the burden has shifted to Washington to become more actively involved in protecting its interests in the region. 

That process promises to be complicated and messy. But preventing a war is surely more attractive an enterprise than ending one.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading


AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021
Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.
Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021
WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip
By Africa Center
On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Africa Conflict

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/dr-berhanu-nega-speaks-on-expectations-for-ethiopias-upcoming-elections/ Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:56:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=357378 On Wednesday, February 24, the Africa Center welcomed back to the Atlantic Council platform Dr. Berhanu Nega, chairman of the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice party, for a private virtual roundtable focused on Ethiopia’s upcoming elections.

The post Dr. Berhanu Nega speaks on expectations for Ethiopia’s upcoming elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Wednesday, February 24, the Africa Center welcomed back to the Atlantic Council platform Dr. Berhanu Nega, chairman of the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ) party, for a private virtual roundtable focused on Ethiopia’s upcoming elections. Africa Center Senior Fellow Gabriel Negatu provided opening remarks, before ceding the floor to Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton to moderate.

Responding to questions, Dr. Nega described Ethiopia’s general election, slated for June, as a historic moment, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa region. He outlined his party’s unique non-ethnic platform and grassroots approach, while reflecting on the campaign environment, the timeline of the election, political participation, and how the United States and others could play a role in supporting the National Electoral Board’s capacity.

Dr. Nega concluded with the hope that by the end of June, the people of Ethiopia will have spoken and that the election results will reflect the will of the people. This would need to be built upon further but would represent a significant step in Ethiopia’s democratic growth.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Dr. Berhanu Nega speaks on expectations for Ethiopia’s upcoming elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/wfp-head-offers-readout-on-horn-of-africa-trip/ Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:16:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=351786 On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

The post WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton opened the event, before passing to Senior Fellow Cameron Hudson to moderate.

In his remarks, Gov. Beasley briefed participants on the humanitarian situation in the Horn and the latest from his conversations with regional leaders. He placed considerable weight on the developments in Ethiopia, where his visit facilitated an initial agreement on humanitarian access. This issue of access remained a point of interest for participants, representing the US government, diplomatic community, and humanitarian NGOs. Gov. Beasley also reflected on Sudan’s progress and the continued humanitarian need in South Sudan.

Looking ahead, Beasley underscored that the WFP has helped get the ball rolling but that more progress will be needed, toward which the United States and others can play a constructive role.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/sudans-outgoing-state-minister-of-foreign-affairs-reflects-on-regional-issues/ Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:16:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=351778 On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan.

The post Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton provided opening remarks, before ceding the floor to Senior Fellow Cameron Hudson to moderate.

Responding to questions, the Minister outlined Sudan’s position on issues including the status of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), tensions on the border with Ethiopia and the need to deescalate the situation in Tigray, and the security environment in Darfur. Particular interest was also given to the role the United States and other friends of Sudan could play in contributing to reform efforts.

Hudson closed by reflecting that Sudan remains at the heart of both the opportunities and challenges facing the Horn of Africa, but that he is reassured that US stakeholders, including those in attendance, are committed to seeing Sudan succeed.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/ethiopian-deputy-prime-minister-provides-humanitarian-update/ Thu, 28 Jan 2021 20:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=345541 On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

The post Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. Africa Center Senior Fellow Gabriel Negatu opened with introductions of the speakers, before ceding the floor to H.E. Demeke for an opening statement.

In his remarks, H.E. Demeke focused on the government’s humanitarian response and the status of regional refugees, while providing an update on the government’s law enforcement operation. He was joined for comments by H.E. Redwan Hussein, state minister for foreign affairs and state of emergency spokesperson, and H.E. Tesfahun Gobezay, director general of Ethiopia’s Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs. Among other contributions, H.E. Tesfahun reported on the status of four key refugee camps near the border with Eritrea and the latest efforts to restore full access and services.

In the ensuing discussion, participants across government, the diplomatic corps, and relevant non-profit organizations engaged the Deputy Prime Minister on a variety of topics. These included issues related to humanitarian and journalistic access, the alleged role of Eritrean forces, the potential for border conflict with Sudan, and the timetable on restoring telecommunications to affected areas. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton closed the session, thanking all speakers and participants for convening under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.  


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-financial-times-on-relations-between-sudan-and-western-countries/ Mon, 25 Jan 2021 17:00:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=412969 The post Hudson quoted in the Financial Times on relations between Sudan and Western countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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The post Hudson quoted in the Financial Times on relations between Sudan and Western countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-national-on-the-relationship-between-sudan-and-africom/ Mon, 25 Jan 2021 16:57:37 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=412970 The post Hudson quoted in The National on the relationship between Sudan and AFRICOM appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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The post Hudson quoted in The National on the relationship between Sudan and AFRICOM appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/atlantic-council-hosts-foreign-minister-of-somalia-for-a-high-level-roundtable/ Fri, 15 Jan 2021 22:24:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=340648 On Friday, January 15, the Africa Center and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative co-hosted a private roundtable featuring H.E. Mohamed Abdirizak, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia. In his remarks, Mr. Abdirizak addressed issues of security, governance, elections, and regional relationships from Somalia’s perspective.

The post Atlantic Council hosts foreign minister of Somalia for a high-level roundtable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Friday, January 15, the Africa Center and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative co-hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Mohamed Abdirizak, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative Director Kirsten Fontenrose provided introductory remarks before turning to Africa Center Senior Fellow Gabriel Negatu to moderate a discussion with Minister Abdirizak.

In his remarks, Mr. Abdirizak addressed issues of security, governance, elections, and regional relationships from Somalia’s perspective, emphasizing that Somalia itself must be the key actor in building a better future for the country. Regional ambassadors in attendance were offered the opportunity to respond to the Minister’s remarks, providing reflections of their own on regional relations and the role of regional institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Dignitaries in attendance included H.E. Ali Sharif Ahmed, ambassador of Somalia; H.E. Lazarus Amayo, ambassador of Kenya; H.E. Nureldin Satti, ambassador of Sudan; and Berhane Solomon, chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of Eritrea to the United States.

Others in attendance included current State Department officials, former US ambassadors to African countries, African and European diplomats, and the senior leadership of relevant non-profit organizations, among others. Participants took advantage of the forum to ask the Minister questions on a wide variety of topics, including civil society, journalistic freedom, regional integration, relations with key partners, and efforts to combat Al-Shabaab. Mr. Negatu closed the conversation by emphasizing his hope for stronger regional relationships through dialogue and collaboration on important challenges, as well as by pledging to continue further discussions on Somalia and the Horn of Africa throughout 2021 under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Golden
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Atlantic Council hosts foreign minister of Somalia for a high-level roundtable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-bloomberg-on-us-policy-in-the-horn-of-africa/ Sun, 10 Jan 2021 20:04:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=408128 The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on US policy in the Horn of Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on US policy in the Horn of Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-african-business-on-the-normalization-of-diplomatic-ties-between-israel-and-sudan/ Fri, 08 Jan 2021 16:37:28 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=412964 The post Hudson quoted in African Business on the normalization of diplomatic ties between Israel and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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The post Hudson quoted in African Business on the normalization of diplomatic ties between Israel and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-npr-to-discuss-us-support-of-sudanese-debt-relief/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 19:49:04 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=406569 The post Hudson joins NPR to discuss US support of Sudanese debt relief appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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The post Hudson joins NPR to discuss US support of Sudanese debt relief appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-pris-the-world-to-discuss-the-impact-of-debt-relief-on-sudans-transitioning-government/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 17:21:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=407391 The post Hudson joins PRI’s The World to discuss the impact of debt relief on Sudan’s transitioning government appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-bloomberg-on-increased-border-tensions-between-amhara-militias-and-sudan/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 16:07:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=399923 The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on increased border tensions between Amhara militias and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on increased border tensions between Amhara militias and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/african-outlook-2021-the-africa-center-reflects-on-2020-and-looks-ahead/ Tue, 22 Dec 2020 19:12:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=334329 African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s […]

The post African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s new Afro-Century Initiative, such as the Africa Finance Corporation and Trade and Development Bank—have helped to address what Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta described (in public remarks to an Atlantic Council audience in June) as an urgent need for fiscal space.

The Africa Center’s Coronavirus: Africa page documented the early impact of the pandemic, and our virtual convenings with the leadership of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Food Programme highlighted the early successes and agency of African stakeholders in combatting the crisis. The likelihood of greater pan-African collaboration in the wake of COVID-19 was a key finding of the Center’s report on great power competition in Africa in the post-COVID landscape. That report was the result of a newly-launched collaboration with the Policy Center for the New South, which seeks to explore and reframe perceptions of Africa through a series of paired research papers written from both North and South lenses.

COVID-19 did not slow the pace of political developments in Africa this year. Sudan’s transitional government achieved a watershed when the US State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designation was finally lifted and a massive aid package was bestowed on the nation in exchange for normalization of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv. The Africa Center’s convenings and analysis on this topic provided thought leadership across the political spectrum that helped steward the SST lifting to a successful conclusion. The Center’s robust analysis of the conflict in northern Ethiopia between the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and members of the former authoritarian regime helped to shape perceptions of the dispute both regionally and in Washington, DC.

Looking ahead, it’s clear that in 2021 the new Biden administration will be challenged by the need to repair and reinvigorate key bilateral relationships on the continent (including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa), and there is a major question mark over how many of the former administration’s initiatives will be abandoned. Prosper Africa’s launch was problematic, but in concert with the launch of the new US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its equity capability, it signaled a concrete shift in US priorities to “trade, not aid” that was long overdue. The Africa Center marked that transition with a summit-level conference hosted in cooperation with the DFC, which laid out the United States’ all-of-government approach to Africa policy and, importantly, underscored both the strong bipartisan support for Prosper Africa’s expanded toolkit and the essential role of African development finance institutions in the process.

An event under the auspices of our new Afro-Century Initiative—which unites a coalition of African development finance institutions in an effort to forge a more authentic, optimistic narrative on Africa—capped the Center’s year of programming. An esteemed panel of economists and business leaders offered the following observations and predictions for what 2021 has in store for Africa’s economies:   

What to watch for in 2021:

• African markets have an advantage in 2021 and beyond, says Renaissance Capital’s Global Chief Economist Charlie Robertson, because the continent has been the least hurt by COVID-19 relative to other regions (a story similar to that of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis). Consequently, low interest rates in the West could push more institutional investors to chase high yields in Africa by increasing portfolio exposure in African fixed income and equities.
• Getting Africa to “catch up” is the wrong framing, says AfroChampions Co-Founder Edem Adzogenu. To him, the attitude must rather be: “can you turn in a completely different direction and perfect another model that passes the others but also learns from them.”
• The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can be a “game-changer,” says the Africa Finance Corporation’s Chief Economist Rita Babihuga-Nsanze, but there is still a lot of work that needs to be done to build an enabling environment, especially when it comes to infrastructure.
• While China will remain a key financing partner, the scaling back of Belt and Road Initiative lending will provide space for new international lenders and other financial institutions to support the continent’s growth ambitions, says Standard Chartered Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa Razia Khan. According to Babihuga-Nsanze, African development finance institutions can play a critical role in closing the financing gap that emerges.
• Chinese growth—not lending—is going to lift the whole continent, says Robertson, but African countries need to invest in the right infrastructure. China’s GDP is likely to grow about $2.3 trillion next year and another $2.3 trillion the year after: equaling the size of the entire African market. This growth could help drive commodity price increases and create a lever for wealth creation in Africa, lifting the whole continent. Yet, key to cashing in on this Chinese growth will be Africa’s ability to build infrastructure to enable it, while forgoing projects that do not.
• Value addition and industrialization are two critical trends, according to Babihuga-Nsanze. The post-COVID reset will provide a push to shore up local supply chains and double down on the building of local industrial parks, which can promote investment.
• Ghana is a market set for growth, Khan and Robertson agree. But Nigeria must make good on its diversification promises, while South Africa’s political reforms will have investors watching.  
• Observers are missing the huge SME-driven informal sector, notes Adzogenu, as well as the huge creatives space. For African Development Bank Chief Economist and Vice President Rabah Arezki, the bottom-up wave of fintech and innovation will transform the continent, including in rural areas where growing digitization could be critical for improved agriculture. To Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, digitization is the single most significant trend coming out of 2020 for Africa.

The last word:

• “For a continent that has the youngest population, [Africa] should be the center of the world. I mean this should be the center for the freshest ideas for innovation and everything, and the center for which people can come and bring their ideas to bring growth that will benefit the entire world as well.” –Edem Adzogenu, AfroChampions

Explore highlights from the Africa Center’s year of programming


New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020
The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa
By David A. Wemer
Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.
Africa Future of Work

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2020
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta says his country needs ‘fiscal space’ amid the COVID-19 crisis
By Larry Luxner
“Coronavirus is mainly a health issue, and our key focus is ensuring that we keep our people safe,” Kenyatta said. “But this is also an economic crisis because it has resulted in some key sectors hugely affected by lockdowns. We were forced to close our airspace, which affected tourism, a very critical part of our economy.”
Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020
African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape
By Bronwyn Bruton
In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020
Reducing Africa’s infrastructure deficit: An interview with AFC President & CEO Samaila Zubairu
By Africa Center
The Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), a pan-African development finance institution, has been developing and financing infrastructure, natural resources, and industrial assets to increase economic prosperity and growth across the continent since 2007. Watch Samaila Zubairu, president and chief executive officer of the Africa Finance Corporation, join Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby for an interview to discuss AFC’s investment philosophy, innovation, and future growth, along with the critical role of African development finance institutions in improving economic prosperity.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 15, 2020
An interview with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy
By Africa Center
US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, joins Atlantic Council Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton to discuss bipartisan support for increased US trade and investment in African countries.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020
Financing African trade and development: An interview with TDB Group President & CEO Admassu Tadesse
By Africa Center
The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has been financing trade and development projects and promoting economic integration and prosperity in the region since 1985. Watch an interview below between Mr. Admassu Tadesse, president and chief executive officer of TDB Group and Ms. Aubrey Hruby, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Mr. Tadesse covers what makes TDB unique and different, the role African development finance institutions (DFIs) play in returning the African continent to economic growth post-COVID, how TDB can interface with US investors, and ways DFIs can be catalytic in increasing capital flows to African markets.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist May 8, 2020
WFP’s David Beasley warns of dire famines in Africa, Mideast if COVID-19 supply chains damage continues
By Larry Luxner
Up to 300,000 people could starve to death every day if the COVID-19 pandemic ruptures global food supply chains—even more than the roughly 275,000 people who have died of the disease worldwide so far.
Coronavirus International Markets

AfricaSource Nov 13, 2020
Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war
By Bronwyn Bruton
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven […]
Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Apr 29, 2020
Africa still sees a massive pandemic in its future, but partnerships may lessen blow
By Katherine Golden
With an uncertain future for the pandemic that lies ahead, the Africa CDC is encouraging pivotal partnerships to act quickly to secure Africa amid haphazardly understood policies, little access to water and sanitation, and resource constraints.
Africa Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020
Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis
By David A. Wemer
A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”
Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Jul 10, 2020
Dr. Dambisa Moyo, panel reinvigorate debate on a Marshall Plan for Africa
By Africa Center
On Friday, July 10, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on whether the time has come for a Marshall Plan for Africa. The panel featured Global Economist and Author Dr. Dambisa Moyo, former US Congressman Dr. David Brat, and Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Aubrey Hruby. The virtual conversation was moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, with opening and concluding remarks given by the Center’s Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton.
Africa Corruption



The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/fighting-for-influence-in-africa-report-launch-events-held-with-the-policy-center-for-the-new-south/ Wed, 16 Dec 2020 21:53:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=331865 On Monday, December 14, and Wednesday, December 16, the Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) hosted joint public events to launch twin reports on the evolving roles of the traditional and emerging external powers in Africa, with the events focusing regionally on the Red Sea and the Sahel.

The post Fighting for influence in Africa: Report launch events held with the Policy Center for the New South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Monday, December 14, and Wednesday, December 16, the Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) hosted joint public events to launch twin reports on the evolving roles of the traditional and emerging external powers in Africa.

The first session, viewable here, focused on external influence in the Red Sea region. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton moderated the panel, which included Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, alongside PCNS International Relations Specialist Ms. Maha Skah and PCNS Senior Fellow Dr. Khalid Chegraoui. The event served as an opportunity to highlight the role of foreign actors in multiple arenas across the region, including in negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, the lifting of Sudan from the US state sponsors of terrorism list, and maritime trade diplomacy, among other topics.

Dr. Chegraoui gave opening remarks by providing a comprehensive overview of how emerging powers—such as the Gulf countries, Turkey, Iran, and others—are wielding influence in different parts of the region, and how the new relations between Israel and Arab states could create a new security dynamic in East Africa. Mr. Negatu then followed up by discussing how the situation in Ethiopia marks the beginning of a post-TPLF-dominated Ethiopia, which creates the opportunity for an Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance that could redefine the region’s outlook. Though an inward-looking trend in Ethiopia, as the country reconstructs and rehabilitates the Tigray region, could open the Horn to further strategic competition as external powers look to capitalize. Lastly, Ms. Skah reflected on the role of Emirati port building, Turkey’s enhanced commercial role in Somalia, and how Horn countries are essential to Israel’s commercial and strategic interests, creating an impetus for further engagement. Ms. Bruton concluded the discussion by striking a hopeful tone that the shifting regional security arrangement will bring newfound economic prosperity to countries in the region.

The second session, viewable here, zeroed in on the Sahel region, another geostrategic flashpoint where external powers are wielding influence. PCNS Senior Fellow Dr. Khalid Chegraoui moderated the panel, which included Africa Center Senior Fellows Dr. Pierre Englebert and Mr. Abdoul Salam Bello alongside PCNS Senior Fellow Mr. Rida Lyammouri. The event presented an opportunity to discuss the ongoing security situation in the region, how local, state, and regional governments are responding, and the role foreign actors are playing in the military and economic spheres.

Mr. Bello opened his remarks by framing the conversation around population growth trends and how they are putting pressure on Sahel countries to provide basic services to their population. The role of state governments is weakened by their inability to provide security, education, healthcare, and jobs, creating a void for non-state actors—including prominent terrorist groups—to gain legitimacy by providing some basic services to populations in rural areas. Dr. Englebert then followed up by emphasizing how foreign military interventions in the region, such as France’s Operation Barkhane, are band-aid solutions to the structural crisis posed by weak state institutions. Dr. Englebert suggested short and long-term solutions to improve security and governance in the region, both of which include granting more agency and capacity to African institutions rather than relying on external powers. Mr. Lyammouri reiterated these points by emphasizing that international solutions to address the Sahelian crisis have largely failed, contributing to a pervasive sense of mistrust between citizens and state governments.

Dr. Chegraoui then stepped in to pose various questions to the panelists around where external powers—namely China, Russia, and the United States—are engaged in the region, if France can remain the major external player in the Sahel, and how the COVID-19 pandemic may affect humanitarian efforts. Dr. Chegraoui concluded the discussion by thanking the panelists and expressing his hope further collaboration between the Africa Center and PCNS.


AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020
Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis
By David A. Wemer
A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”
Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 9, 2020
Startup Acts are the next form of policy innovation in Africa
By Jordan Wolken
Africa’s COVID recession certainly hasn’t hit the continent’s tech industry. In fact, as countries adapt to the expanding digital universe created by COVID-19, technology ecosystems across the continent are booming—and global investors have noticed. Attempting to cash in, African countries are trying to bolster their own innovation ecosystems through supportive legislation.
Africa Economy & Business

The post Fighting for influence in Africa: Report launch events held with the Policy Center for the New South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-sudans-terror-delisting-really-means/ Tue, 15 Dec 2020 00:49:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=330660 The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

The post What Sudan’s terror delisting really means appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Leaving aside for a moment the last-ditch effort by the Trump Administration to exploit Sudan’s efforts to remove the terror designation to expand its own Middle East peace plan, the Administration should be acknowledged for betting on the prospects of democratic transition in Sudan. From the early days of the transition, Washington and many other capitals were skeptical that the civilian half of the transitional government was strong enough to stay the course and to keep at bay revanchist forces within the security sector. Equally questionable was the prospect that Sudan’s security forces would not overstep their constitutional limits and remain partners in steering Sudan toward a definitive, civilian-led future. While the transition is not yet complete, and faces increasingly stiff headwinds, today’s removal of the terror designation should be seen as affirmation that the sometimes-competing wings of the transitional government have and are largely abiding by the principals of the revolution: Freedom, Peace, and Justice.

Procedurally, today’s announcement is the culmination of a process of bilateral negotiations that started early this year that saw Sudan meet policy and statutory requirements demonstrating that it no longer supported international terrorism and would work with US counterterror efforts going forward. It removes perhaps the greatest sticking point and inconsistency in US policy and the bilateral relationship: the US treatment of Sudan as both a reliable counterterror partner and a terrorist state. For nearly two decades, this has been the first and last talking point of every Sudanese official in any bilateral conversation with an American diplomat. With this hypocrisy removed, the chances for deeper and more serious bilateral relations are at last possible.

Statements today from Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Risch both suggest that with the terror restrictions out of the way, the United States will lean forward on arrears clearance, bridge loans, and ultimately debt relief to revive Sudan’s failing economy. This represents perhaps the most tangible and immediate prize associated with Sudan’s delisting. Other promises—such as trade delegations, investment summits, and subsidized staple imports, offered as part of the Administration’s Israel gambit—may not materialize in the waning days of Trump’s term. But setting in motion a multilateral process that allows Europeans and the international financial institutions to move forward this critical engagement is what is most necessary now.

But despite today’s news, challenges in this terror saga still remain. Negotiations are still ongoing over when and how Sudan will have its sovereign immunity restored and be granted the legal peace it seeks to be protected against future terror-related claims. The greatest impediment to sovereign immunity stems from a claim from a group of 9/11 victims who have tried to argue that because of Sudan’s complicity in other al-Qaeda orchestrated terror attacks, like the USS Cole and the US Embassy bombings, Sudan should now also be tried for its possible involvement in the September 11 attacks. 

Ironically, these claims have emerged now because 9/11 victims felt for the first time that Sudan had recognized the legitimacy of the US justice system over them and were prepared to pay large sums of money to meet the political demands for getting off the terror list. Under Omar al-Bashir, 9/11 families never thought their suits would go anywhere and never thought Sudan could be compelled to pay, so they chose not to pursue their suits when the opportunities were abundant. But that all changed under the transitional government, which has showed a willingness to negotiate and make amends. The idea that the Sudanese are now being potentially punished for their cooperation is regrettable. That these groups have found champions among the Senate’s Democratic leaders is even more disheartening. 

Good faith efforts to resolve the obstacle to a final settlement appear to be continuing within the Senate and among victim groups. The Trump Administration has even offered substantial financial settlements—from US taxpayer funds—to compensate victims who don’t even have a legal court judgement in their favor. If they don’t succeed, Sudan could be faced with future lawsuits from terror claimants and US businesses could have liens placed on the repatriation of revenues coming from Sudan. This would undermine and deter the kind of reputational cleansing and investment promotion removal from the terror list was intended to promote. It would also represent another self-inflicted wound to US policy of the kind that today’s announcement was trying to correct.

But in the end, today’s announcement ultimately moves the US out of the way of Sudan’s own success or failure. As inflation soars and the Sudanese pound continues its precipitous decline, what Sudan makes of this opportunity is now up to its leaders.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.


AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021
Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.
Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021
WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip
By Africa Center
On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Africa Conflict

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-national-on-hurdles-to-the-finalization-of-sudans-removal-from-the-us-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list/ Sat, 05 Dec 2020 17:28:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346505 The post Hudson quoted in the National on hurdles to the finalization of Sudan’s removal from the US state sponsors of terrorism list appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-pbs-news-hour-to-discuss-the-impact-of-conflict-in-ethiopia-on-regional-stability/ Sat, 05 Dec 2020 17:23:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346499 The post Hudson joins PBS News Hour to discuss the impact of conflict in Ethiopia on regional stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-abc-news-on-how-allegations-of-atrocities-will-affect-the-trajectory-of-ethiopias-stability/ Fri, 04 Dec 2020 17:18:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346495 The post Bruton quoted in ABC News on how allegations of atrocities will affect the trajectory of Ethiopia’s stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-joins-the-skimm-to-discuss-conflict-in-ethiopias-tigray-region/ Thu, 03 Dec 2020 17:14:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346493 The post Bruton joins the Skimm to discuss conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-bbc-world-to-discuss-the-capture-of-mekelle-by-ethiopian-forces/ Sun, 29 Nov 2020 22:33:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335682 The post Hudson joins BBC World to discuss the capture of Mekelle by Ethiopian forces appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-voice-of-americas-nightline-africa-to-discuss-conflict-in-tigray/ Sat, 28 Nov 2020 22:31:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335680 The post Hudson joins Voice of America’s Nightline Africa to discuss conflict in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-asharq-to-discuss-the-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-somalia/ Fri, 27 Nov 2020 22:28:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335675 The post Hudson joins Asharq to discuss the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-the-wall-street-journal-on-battle-between-ethiopian-forces-and-the-tplf-for-mekelle/ Thu, 26 Nov 2020 22:26:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335671 The post Bruton quoted in the Wall Street Journal on battle between Ethiopian forces and the TPLF for Mekelle appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-cnn-to-discuss-the-consequences-of-further-conflict-in-tigray/ Thu, 26 Nov 2020 22:23:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335663 The post Hudson joins CNN to discuss the consequences of further conflict in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-temperature-is-rising-the-fever-white-hot-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-as-flashpoint-between-egypt-and-ethiopia/ Wed, 25 Nov 2020 13:15:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=323625 Once considered unlikely by regional experts, military confrontation along the Nile is a growing possibility, as a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian stand-off recedes. Outside observers may not understand why Egypt considers the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) an “existential threat” to its existence, but, regardless, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his advisors see it as such.

The post The temperature is rising, the fever white hot: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as flashpoint between Egypt and Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Once considered unlikely by regional experts, military confrontation along the Nile is a growing possibility, as a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian stand-off recedes. Outside observers may not understand why Egypt considers the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) an “existential threat” to its existence, but, regardless, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his advisors see it as such.

A new Atlantic Council issue brief, “The Temperature is Rising, the Fever White Hot: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as Flashpoint between Egypt and Ethiopia,” authored by Christopher D. Booth, describes the relationship between water scarcity and government stability in Egypt. The current Egyptian government is aware of the the role that water scarcity may have played in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, and of the continuing threat that water issues pose nearly ten years later, particularly in light of Egypt’s political and economic challenges. 

Booth warns that, given the inconclusive diplomacy of the West regarding the threat the GERD poses to Egypt, the Egyptian regime may determine that it has no other choice but to take up arms against its “oppressors” and roll the dice in an attack against the dam.

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