On AI and energy: ‘Infrastructure is destiny‘

In the first panel of the Forum, “Thinking big and building bigger,” Global Energy Center (GEC) Senior Director and Morningstar Chair Landon Derentz led a conversation on meeting the energy demands needed to power AI. The discussion featured Mariam Almheiri, group chief executive officer of 2PointZero and chair of the international affairs office of the Presidential Court of the United Arab Emirates (UAE); Chris James, founder, chief investment officer, and chairman of Engine No. 1; Chris Lehane, OpenAI’s chief policy officer and vice president of global affairs; and Chase Lochmiller, co-founder, chief executive officer (CEO), and chairman of Crusoe. 

“AI and energy are inextricably linked,” began Derentz, outlining the challenge that industry and policymakers face in needing to “smash through the bottlenecks” to enable technological progress. Lehane reflected on the energy-related challenges OpenAI grappled with as it became the fastest digital platform in history to reach 100 million users. On lessons learned, Lehane stated that “infrastructure is destiny,” and that AI breakthroughs can only happen when providers are able to bring together “chips, data, talent, and energy” to facilitate this game-changing technology. Lochmiller suggested that AI can help unlock a “new era of abundance”—but before material abundance can be reached, energy abundance is needed to make that a reality.  

James continued by defining the obstacles in meeting AI’s energy demands. “Energy is a fairly linear system, but the demand for compute is exponential.” James advised that if policymakers and industry can overcome bottlenecks such as project permitting, outdated regulations, and credit availability, they can foster “an enormous amount of reindustrialization across the United States.”  

Almehri then contextualized the international trends that preceding speakers had identified. “When I think of creating AI clusters, there are certain elements that regions have to combine,” she said, ranging from their ability to channel strategic investments to having adequate infrastructure and energy. Citing the UAE’s relevant advantages, Almehri counseled that “for this AI megatransition, we need a transformation on the energy side”—to do that, she continued, requires partnerships. 

Derentz continued by asking panelists about the timelines, regulatory hurdles, and geopolitics associated with AI growth. “The age of intelligence is incredibly resource intensive,” noted Lehane, “and this resource intensity is where we’re seeing bottlenecks.” Lochmiller cited Crusoe’s work in Texas as showing not only that “every aspect of the economy is required,” to realize AI’s potential, but that “every aspect of the economy will benefit.” Regarding international AI rivalry, Almehri highlighted that while the UAE has “made it clear to everyone that we are partnering with the United States,” it is important for major players to cooperate on global tech governance and “work together to build standards.”  

Derentz concluded by asking participants the top of the policy wish list. They identified regulatory adaptability, innovative capital solutions, public-private partnerships, and international collaboration. Most fundamentally for the future of AI, is a change in perspective. “It’s a mindset,” said James. “This country is at its best when it thinks big, acts big, and builds big: we need to get back to that.” 

Pathways to industrial competitiveness and trade

The panel “Pathways to industrial competitiveness and trade,” moderated by Saphina Waters, director of stakeholder engagement and communication at the Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter (OGDC), explored the complex intersection of trade, competitiveness, and climate policy—something panelists described as a puzzle with one thousand pieces. 

Emphasizing the urgent need to reshore US manufacturing, Sarah Stewart, CEO of Silverado Policy Accelerator, called for an aggressive agenda to “build, protect, and promote” that aligns policy tools with clear construction objectives.  

Sasha Mackler, senior vice president and head of strategic policy at ExxonMobil Low Carbon Solutions, noted that the company is focused on strengthening domestic manufacturing and expanding energy exports. He stressed that climate policy must evolve from being just a matter of regulation to one integral to business models. 

Participants criticized the absence of a clear, concise, and universally accepted carbon accounting system. Without that system, panelists said international collaboration is hindered and domestic implementation becomes more challenging and that a harmonized, interoperable framework would help simplify climate-related policy and economic planning. 

On the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Stewart expressed concerns about potential discriminatory effects. She argued that while identical systems are not necessary, interoperability is essential to ensure fairness and global cooperation. 

The panelists argued that creating a level playing field for US manufacturers is not just a climate issue—it is a matter of national and economic security. They held that ensuring American industries are not unfairly disadvantaged must be a policy priority. 

The makings of a manufacturing powerhouse

The panel “The makings of a manufacturing powerhouse: Legacy strength and new frontiers,” moderated by Neil Brown, nonresident senior fellow at the GEC and managing director of KKR Global, explored how manufacturers are navigating today’s complex geopolitical landscape, focusing on capital flows, project financing, and talent development. 

One of the central topics of discussion was the strategic role of emissions accounting. Karthik Ramanna, co-founder and principal investigator at the E-Liability Institute, suggested that when carbon accounting is viewed merely as a reporting requirement, it tends to become a burden. He argued, however, if reframed as a tool for product differentiation, it can become a source of value creation. Brandon Spencer, president of the motion business area at ABB, added that using emissions data in a strategic—not just operational—way can become a real competitive advantage for companies. 

Catherine Hunt Ryan, president of manufacturing and technology at Bechtel, presented a two-part framework for managing complexity: “what to continue” and “what to consider.” Companies should prioritize core competencies, she said, particularly in engineering and subject-matter expertise, while also identifying and managing critical supply chains and building data-driven execution models. At the same time, organizations must consider their ability to embrace change in a dynamic global environment. 

Looking ahead to the next decade, the panel discussed which regions are likely to emerge as manufacturing leaders in this new geopolitical context. Julian Mylchreest, executive vice chairman at Bank of America, remarked that the United States is well positioned to be among the winners. 

Leveling the global playing field

In a leadership spotlight moderated by Dan Brouillette, former US secretary of energy, Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) emphasized that the world must adapt to new geopolitical realities. China has gained a competitive edge by not enforcing environmental or pollution standards, allowing it to strengthen both its economy and military. Meanwhile, the United States and European Union have adopted stringent climate regulations, putting their industries at a relative disadvantage. Cassidy also argued that differing regulatory regimes have created an unfair global marketplace. He proposed leveling the playing field with a US version of CBAM: a foreign pollution fee. This fee would apply to imports from countries that do not adhere to US environmental standards, helping to protect domestic industry and workers. 

Cassidy highlighted the strategic importance of producing natural gas domestically. He noted that natural gas supports manufacturing, replacing coal and thereby reducing emissions. Moreover, argued Cassidy, by producing gas domestically, the United States can support economic policies, which supports US working families. 

Unlocking energy abundance to enable equitable access

To wrap the first day’s panels, Phillip Cornell, GEC nonresident senior fellow and principal at the Economist Impact, moderated a discussion on creating abundant, affordable, and reliable energy to sustain economic growth, foster innovation, and promote national security. The panel featured Jude Kearney, member of the board of advisors at the African Energy Chamber; Tarik Hamane, CEO of Morocco’s National Office of Electricity and Drinking Water; Thomas R. Hardy, acting director of the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA); and Bob Pérez, Baker Hughes’ vice president for strategic projects. 

Cornell framed achieving abundance as “one of the most consequential energy questions of our time.” With 800 million people across the globe still lacking access to electricity while technology-related demand grows rapidly, Cornell said it is crucial to “build systems that can deliver energy abundantly, equitably, and affordably.”  

Hardy discussed USTDA’s role in fostering energy abundance through international partnerships. While administrations change, Hardy noted, USTDA continues to work on projects that contribute to US security and prosperity, “working with our partners and meeting them where they are” to grow different forms of energy supply. 

Next, Kearney elaborated on Africa’s role in achieving abundance. Advising that access is key, he highlighted the need for an “abundance of thoughtfulness and good governance.” Pérez, offering a private sector view, added that the formula for abundance, ultimately, is rather simple: “I’ve never seen a good project not get money,” he said, “the question is how you get to a good project.”  

Finally, Hamane expanded on the theme of partnerships by sharing lessons from Morocco. The country has achieved near-universal rural electricity access, up from less than a quarter only three decades ago. As Morocco looks to build infrastructure that can connect its growing renewable production to new markets in Europe and Africa, Cornell concluded by lauding these projects as a “a physical manifestation of the integration needed to achieve abundance.”   

2PointZero, ABB, Baker Hughes, Bank of America and ExxonMobil are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. More information on Forum sponsors can be found here. 

Elena Benaim is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Paddy Ryan is a former assistant director with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He is a senior writer/editor at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Elena Benaim

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Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

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MDBs must finance nuclear power—or Russia and China will

By Juzel Lloyd

The growing influence of Russia and China in global nuclear energy financing threatens to reshape the future of energy geopolitics. To address this, multilateral development banks must recognize nuclear energy as a vital tool for expanding energy access, and modernize outdated policies to support deployment.

China Energy & Environment

EnergySource Jun 16, 2025

US global leadership in the age of electricity

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Amid shifting geopolitics and the emerging “age of electricity,” the United States has an opportunity to assert global leadership in energy and security. Through foreign policy, the Trump administration can leverage US strengths in natural gas, nuclear power, and emerging energy technologies to engage allies in building a secure and resilient global electricity system.

China Energy & Environment

EnergySource May 21, 2025

Replace the Inflation Reduction Act with FUEL-AI

By Joseph Webster

To compete in the global AI race, the United States must dramatically expand its power supply. Replacing the Inflation Reduction Act with the FUEL-AI Act would reorient energy policy toward national security, fast-tracking domestic energy production and infrastructure to power America’s AI future.

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post The energy system is more complex than ever: navigating AI, competitiveness, and growth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper draws on my professional experience working on energy and climate issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as many conversations with policymakers, technical experts, and civil society stakeholders from Athens to Beirut and from Istanbul to Cairo. The renewable energy revolution offers both cleaner power and a practical foundation for cooperation through shared infrastructure and capital flows. The region’s energy future is as much about finance, diplomacy, and institutional trust as it is about technology. My aim here is to explore how financial mechanisms can bridge historic divides and support a shared energy transition. My hope is that this paper contributes to reimagining the Eastern Mediterranean not as a collection of competing interests, but as an interconnected energy community bound by mutual prosperity and resilience.

• Introduction
• Rising tides: Meeting the Mediterranean’s surging energy needs
• From pledge to power: Speeding the region’s renewable revolution
• Beyond borders, beyond banks: Innovative financing for regional energy
• Shared foundations: Creating a regional energy community
• Shared horizon: Finance and diplomacy for a unified Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape

Introduction

The Eastern Mediterranean region stands at a critical juncture in its energy development. Positioned as a geopolitical crossroads with significant renewable energy resources and strategic importance, the region encompassing Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt has the potential to become a leader in sustainable energy while strengthening regional cooperation and economic integration.

This study examines how the Eastern Mediterranean can secure a sustainable energy future through a two-pronged approach: strategically financing next-generation grid technologies that leapfrog legacy infrastructure challenges, while simultaneously developing integrated financing mechanisms that foster cross-border cooperation. This dual strategy aligns technological innovation with regional stability and market integration needs, creating a framework for sustainable development that transcends political boundaries.

The Eastern Mediterranean’s abundant renewable energy potential, particularly in solar and wind resources, presents a transformative opportunity. The region could generate approximately 144 percent of its projected 2050 electricity demand through renewable energy sources.¹ Yet despite this potential, significant challenges persist. Aging and fragmented grid infrastructure, geopolitical tensions, and uneven regulatory frameworks hinder energy integration.

Additionally, ongoing political conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and maritime boundary threats in the region complicate the development of cross-border infrastructure, while the region remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels at a time when global climate commitments push for rapid energy transition.²

Meeting these challenges requires more than traditional approaches. This paper argues that innovative financing mechanisms can serve dual purposes: funding advanced infrastructure development while simultaneously functioning as instruments of regional cooperation. By strategically structuring financial tools that encourage cross-border collaboration, the Eastern Mediterranean can transform its energy landscape while creating economic interdependencies that help overcome historical political tensions.

The analysis unfolds in four parts. First, it examines the regional context—focusing on power demand trends, the state of grid infrastructure, and the region’s renewable energy potential. Second, it analyzes how COP28 commitments (made at the 2023 climate conference) intensify the need for rapid renewable integration and technological leapfrogging. Third, it evaluates the financing mechanisms available to fund this transition, from multilateral development banks and green bonds to Islamic finance and bilateral investment. Finally, it explores how these financing tools can support frameworks for regional collaboration, including physical infrastructure development, regulatory harmonization, energy diplomacy, and governance structures.

Rising tides: Meeting the Mediterranean’s surging energy needs

The region’s energy landscape is characterized by growing demand, aging infrastructure, and untapped renewable potential against a backdrop of complex geopolitical relationships. These interrelated factors explain why the strategies of technological leapfrogging and regional integration are necessary for sustainable energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Regional power demand trajectory

Electricity demand across the Eastern Mediterranean is expected to grow substantially in the coming decades. Turkey, a pivotal economy in the region, saw its electricity consumption reach 348 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2024, marking a 3.8-percent increase from the previous year.³ Projections indicate a rise to 380 TWh in 2025, 455 TWh by 2030, and 510 TWh by 2035.⁴

This growth trajectory is mirrored in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, driven by population growth, urbanization, and economic development. Meeting this demand sustainably requires a massive expansion of renewable energy capacity and modernized infrastructure to support it.

Recognizing the potential and cost competitiveness of renewable energy systems, countries in the region have established ambitious renewable energy targets. Turkey aims to double its electricity capacity by 2035, with renewable energy providing nearly 65 percent of power.⁵ Egypt has set a target of renewable energy providing 42 percent of its power by 2030 and 58 percent by 2040, while Greece plans to cover at least 60 percent of its power needs with green electricity by 2030.⁶

Untapped renewable potential

The Eastern Mediterranean possesses immense renewable energy potential that remains largely untapped, though Turkey and Greece have made progress in this area. The whole Mediterranean basin’s current renewable capacities stand at 90 gigawatts (GW) for solar photovoltaic and 82 GW for wind energy, with a potential exceeding 3 TW for the whole basin—a figure that underscores the opportunity for rapid expansion.⁷

The Eastern Mediterranean’s total renewable energy capacity in 2023 was around 90 GW, with research suggesting that the region could potentially generate 144 percent of its projected 2050 electricity demand through renewable energy sources.⁸ Egypt could produce 188 percent of its demand from solar and wind energy, with 76 GW of surplus electricity production. Syria could produce 592 percent of its total demand, while Turkey and Greece could produce 105 percent and 96 percent, respectively, of their 2050 demand.⁹

According to the author’s estimates, if the pipeline of solar, wind, and hydropower projects in Egypt is fully implemented—including projects that are announced, planned, or under construction—its renewables generation capacity would grow twelvefold, in line with those of other North African nations. If the pipeline of solar, wind, and hydropower projects in Greece is fully implemented, this would result in a sevenfold increase in renewable energy generation capacity.¹⁰ These estimates are not just an opportunity to enhance energy security and accelerate the energy transition. They are also an economic opportunity with the potential to create jobs, stimulate investment, and position the region as a global leader in the growing clean energy sector.

The rapidly growing power demands across the Eastern Mediterranean necessitate expanding renewable energy capacity while also fundamentally rethinking how electricity is transmitted and shared. Addressing this challenge requires examining the current state of interconnection infrastructure and identifying opportunities to transform the region’s fragmented grid systems into an integrated network.

The interconnection imperative

Cross-border transmission grid interconnections are of cornerstone importance in the development of power systems. Grids that depend on intermittent renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, benefit greatly from interconnections for balancing the intermittent nature of renewable sources. Because different countries have varying electricity demands throughout the day, spare capacities and shortfalls can be balanced between different grids.

The Eastern Mediterranean’s grid infrastructure presents a fragmented landscape in which cross-border electricity trade is limited. Northern countries such as Greece benefit from advanced energy grids, while southern and eastern regions lag behind. Across the whole Mediterranean, northern-shore countries have sufficient, albeit underutilized, interconnections, while southern-shore countries lack interconnection infrastructure and synchronization. ​Additionally, there are few north-south interconnections, with only a link from Spain to Morocco and another from Turkey to Syria.​¹¹ This disparity creates both a challenge and an opportunity for leapfrogging conventional development paths.

Eastern Mediterranean countries continue to prioritize energy self-sufficiency through domestic power generation rather than regional power trading. With the exception of the Palestinian territories, which import nearly all (99.4 percent) of their electricity due to minimal local generation capacity, several countries maintain exceptionally low power import levels—around 1 percent of their total consumption—including Cyprus (0 percent), Lebanon (0.078 to 3.61 percent), Jordan (0.29 to 2 percent), and Egypt (0.29 to 0.41 percent). Similarly, with the exception of Greece and its integration into the European electricity market, power exports remain negligible throughout the region, with most countries exporting less than 1 percent of their generated electricity. This self-contained approach stems from incompatible technical systems among national grids that impede synchronous operation, difficulties in maintaining grid stability across borders, and persistent political tensions that discourage deeper energy integration.¹²

Some interconnections exist in the Eastern Mediterranean but are underutilized or nonoperational. Many of the interconnections are used purely on an emergency basis to cover unexpected or scheduled outages, or are not in operation at all. Key connections such as Turkey-Syria (400 kilovolts (kV)), Jordan-Syria (400 kV), and Lebanon-Syria (400 kV, 220 kV, and 66 kV) are currently inactive, largely due to regional conflicts and technical incompatibilities between national grids, including different frequencies and control systems.¹³

Yet some progress toward greater regional integration is under way. A “super grid” is slowly emerging across the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Master Plan 2022 outlines several Eastern Mediterranean interconnectors including: the Great Sea Interconnector between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel (1000 MW); the EuroAfrica interconnector to link Cyprus and Egypt (1000 MW), the Green Energy Interconnector (GREGY)  between Greece and Egypt (3000 MW of primarily renewable power); and a number of capacity-expansion proposals such as the ones between Egypt and Jordan (1100 MW), Jordan and Syria (800 MW), Syria and Turkey (600 MW), and Jordan and the Palestinian territories (100 MW).¹⁴

These projects are designed to enhance electrical integration, facilitate renewable energy exchange, and improve security of supply. The Great Sea Interconnector, which is under construction, is expected to be operational by 2030 with a capacity of up to 2 GW, while the GREGY project is expected to be completed by 2031.¹⁵ These developments have been planned for more than a decade. An older proposal, the Mediterranean Electricity Ring, aimed to connect Mediterranean countries via a circle of interconnections to facilitate cross-border power exchange. In the Eastern Mediterranean, this included connecting Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Greece.¹⁶

However, significant challenges remain. Tensions caused by maritime disputes between regional countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, the unresolved Cyprus question, and the protracted Israel-Palestinian conflict, all impede the development of cross-border infrastructure.¹⁷

In addition, the geopolitical diversity, uneven political stability, and limited political trust among Eastern Mediterranean countries dampen some national governments’ interest in exploring partial reliance on external electricity. Reasons cited often include the potential for electricity being used as a geopolitical lever, the risk of disruption caused by internal conflict, infrastructure failure, governance breakdown propagating across borders, and concerns about expanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities by exposing national grids to transboundary breaches.

Additionally, many countries maintain vertical monopolies in their electricity sectors—e.g., utilities such as Electricité du Liban (EDL) in Lebanon, Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) in Israel, and, to some extent, various companies in Jordan—which enable them to control generation, transmission, and distribution, thus limiting market competition and cross-border electricity flow.

Technical barriers are equally significant, as systems have evolved separately with different standards and technologies. Alternating-current (AC) interconnections require high degrees of technical compatibility and operational coordination, creating stability risks when disturbances in one location impact other areas of the network. These challenges are compounded by insufficient regulatory frameworks and governance structures needed to support cross-border trading.¹⁸

From pledge to power: Speeding the region’s renewable revolution

Developing renewable energy capacity and establishing physical interconnections form the backbone of regional energy integration, and these efforts need to rapidly scale up due to the urgency of the climate crisis. Global climate commitments and obligations provide a framework for measuring progress and highlight the gap between current trajectories and required outcomes.

Meeting COP28 targets

The commitment at COP28 to triple the world’s installed renewable energy generation capacity by 2030 provides a clear imperative for action in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nations collectively committed to this target as part of the global stocktake of the 2015 Paris Agreement.¹⁹ In addition, 130 nations—including Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey—also joined the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, a voluntary coalition committing to triple their renewable energy capacity and double the rate of energy-efficiency improvement.²⁰ In September 2024, nine northern Mediterranean countries (often known as the MED9) agreed to collaborate on making the region a renewable energy hub, aligning with this global target.²¹

A growing grassroots initiative known as TeraMed is seeking to mobilize Mediterranean countries to triple their renewable energy capacity and reach 1 terawatt in combined generation capacity.²²

As of 2023, Eastern Mediterranean countries had an installed renewable power capacity of 90 GW, accounting for 42 percent of their total electricity generation.²³ To meet the COP28 target, the region must reach 405 GW of capacity by 2030, requiring a steep annual growth of 45 GW. Unsurprisingly, the region is not on track. With the exceptions of Greece and Egypt, all Eastern Mediterranean countries must accelerate their efforts if they are to meet the threefold-increase target.²⁴

In my view, meeting these ambitious renewable targets requires more than simply adding generation capacity. The Eastern Mediterranean needs advanced infrastructure solutions that can both accommodate the tripling of renewable energy and overcome existing grid fragmentation. Smart grid technologies represent the critical connective tissue that will enable this rapid transition.

Smart grid innovation: The digital backbone of renewable integration

To effectively integrate the growing share of renewables and enhance grid stability, the Eastern Mediterranean must leapfrog conventional infrastructure by investing in smart grids. In addition to interconnections, smart grid technologies enable better management of intermittent renewable sources, improve reliability, and reduce losses. These technologies include battery storage, advanced metering infrastructure, dynamic line rating, and other network automation, data management, and analytics technologies for real-time monitoring and control.

Battery storage is particularly crucial for managing the intermittency of renewable energy sources, ensuring grid stability as the share of renewables increases. However, large-scale battery storage projects are still nascent in the Eastern Mediterranean—with the exception of Turkey, which set a target for battery energy storage capacity to reach 7.5 GW by 2035.²⁵

Flexibility mechanisms, including demand response and renewable hydrogen production, further enhance grid stability. Technologies such as electrolysis using solar and wind electricity for hydrogen production are gaining traction. Turkey has plans to develop 5 GW of electrolyzer capacity for green hydrogen production by 2035, and to expand capacity to a staggering 70 GW by 2053.²⁶ Similar applications are being explored in Egypt, which plans to become a transit route for renewable hydrogen.²⁷

Smart meters also help manage the grid better through demand-side management. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece is leading on smart meters. It plans to roll out 3.12 million units by 2026, funded by the European Investment Bank, to enhance energy efficiency and support demand response.²⁸

Deploying advanced grid technologies across borders also requires moving beyond identifying technical requirements to addressing the fundamental question of funding this transition. Additionally, this paper argues that the financing challenge is not merely about capital mobilization but also the creation of financial structures that simultaneously enable technological leapfrogging and regional cooperation.

Beyond borders, beyond banks: Innovative financing for regional energy

The transition from technical requirements to financial realities necessitates examining the substantial capital investments needed to realize the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy transformation. While technological solutions provide the roadmap, financing mechanisms will determine the pace and scale of implementation, particularly when the magnitude of required investment exceeds traditional national budgetary capacities.

Quantifying the investment challenge

The Eastern Mediterranean’s energy transition demands significant capital to expand limited renewable energy capacity, modernize aging grids, and develop cross-border interconnections.

Renewable energy projects typically cost around $1 million per megawatt of installed capacity. Their costs are already competitive, and they are the cheapest form of new generation capacity across the region. Moreover, those costs are expected to continue falling and renewables are expected to be the cheapest source of electricity in most countries—including for storage—by 2027.²⁹

However, given the sheer scale of buildup required to meet COP28 commitments, the enormity of the financing required cannot be overstated. If the region is to build 45 GW of renewable energy capacity this year, this would require approximately $45 billion just for generation capacity at current costs, excluding transmission and storage infrastructure.³⁰

Transmission infrastructure is another challenge, especially given how its cost is often borne by grid operators rather than by private developers. The Great Sea Interconnector, for example, is estimated to cost approximately €1.9 billion ($2.08 billion).³¹

By 2030, the region’s total investment needs for sustainable energy transition could well exceed $300 billion. The magnitude of investment required highlights why ordinary national financing approaches are insufficient for the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy transformation. Instead, the region needs to scale finance beyond national resources and to explore financing instruments that mobilize capital at scale and also create structures for regional cooperation, serving as both financial tools and diplomatic instruments in a region where political tensions have historically impeded collaboration.

Financing the energy transition

The Eastern Mediterranean’s sustainable energy future will require mobilizing diverse financing sources and mechanisms. A mix of public and private funding sources—ranging from multilateral lenders and climate funds to innovative partnerships and financial instruments—can bridge the investment gap and accelerate the energy transition.

In developing countries within the Eastern Mediterranean, this challenge is made more difficult by the higher cost of capital, as investors demand high-risk premiums due to country, currency, or sector uncertainty.

This section outlines key financing sources and provides case studies and examples of how each source is being applied (or could be applied) in the Eastern Mediterranean. Each financing mechanism not only brings capital but can also serve as a catalyst for regional cooperation and innovation in energy infrastructure.

1. Multilateral development banks

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) provide a foundational source of capital and risk mitigation for large-scale energy projects in the region. Institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the World Bank offer concessional loans, grants, guarantees, and technical assistance to support renewable energy and grid modernization. For example, the EBRD has invested more than €3.8 billion in renewable energy across emerging markets, supporting 119 projects totaling more than 6 GW of capacity.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, MDB financing often underpins ambitious projects. For example, the EBRD and partners launched a $500-million framework that helped finance sixteen solar plants (750 MW) in Egypt, including in the Benban solar park.

Another notable initiative with a renewable energy component is the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Sustainable Energy Financing Facility (SEMED SEFF), a joint program of the EBRD, EIB, Agence Française de Développement, and KfW, a German state-owned bank. With a €141.7-million budget, SEMED SEFF catalyzed investments in Jordan and Morocco to cut more than 150,000 tons of carbon dioxide annually and boost renewables (25 percent of its funds went to renewable energy projects).³²

MDBs not only supply affordable long-term loans; they also crowd in other investors. In Egypt’s Benban project, for instance, the EBRD, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the AIIB, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) cofinanced solar plants alongside private developers, dramatically lowering financing costs and risk.³³ By leveraging MDBs’ preferred creditor status and technical expertise, such involvement signals to markets that projects are bankable.

By providing concessional finance, convening power, and technical and policy assistance, MDBs help Eastern Mediterranean countries undertake projects that might otherwise be too costly or complex, from large wind and solar farms to regional grid interconnectors. Their financing comes with due diligence and policy guidance, encouraging reforms (such as market liberalization or improved procurement frameworks) that improve the overall investment climate. Going forward, scaling up MDB capital—including through their climate-focused funds and guarantees—will be crucial to meet the region’s renewable investment needs at the pace demanded by global climate commitments.

2. Green finance and investment

Green finance refers to capital raised for climate-friendly and sustainable projects through instruments such as green bonds, green loans, and ESG (environmental, social, governance) investments. In the Eastern Mediterranean, green bonds specifically are emerging as an important tool to tap global capital markets for renewable energy and low-carbon infrastructure. The global green bond market has expanded rapidly to more than $2.5 trillion outstanding by 2024.³⁴

Eastern Mediterranean nations have started to issue their own green bonds to fund clean energy, often with strong investor demand. Egypt was an early mover, launching a $750-million sovereign green bond in September 2020.³⁵ Cyprus followed in 2022, issuing a €1-billion green bond. In 2023, Israel and Turkey debuted their first sovereign green bonds, raising $2 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively.³⁶ Greece signaled plans to issue a sovereign green bond as well. While a national issuance expected for 2024 remains pending, the Bank of Greece issued a €500-million green bond in 2020.³⁷

Other private institutions have also issued green bonds, including banks and other businesses such as renewable energy companies. Lebanon’s Fransabank SAL issued its first green bond in 2018, valued at $60 million, with support from the IFC and EBRD. The proceeds were directed to support sustainable finance initiatives. Jordan’s Kuwait Bank followed in 2023 and, in collaboration with the IFC, issued its first green bond, valued at $50 million. The funds were allocated to renewable energy, low-carbon transport, and sustainable water and wastewater projects. ​ Additionally, Arab Bank in Jordan issued a $250-million sustainable bond in October 2023 to support green and sustainable initiatives.³⁸

However, the market remains nascent and fragmented. Strengthening regulatory frameworks, standardizing green taxonomies, and building technical capacity among issuers and investors will be key to unlocking green capital at scale. For instance, Turkey developed its own sustainable finance framework in 2021, while IFC support enabled Egypt to develop green bond guidelines and the Amman Stock Exchange to produce sustainability reporting guidelines.³⁹ The European Union recently introduced the European Green Bond Standard, a voluntary framework to ensure transparency and combat greenwashing, which could serve as a model to harmonize practices in the region.⁴⁰

3. International climate finance

International climate finance refers to dedicated funds and initiatives aimed at supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. For Eastern Mediterranean nations (many of which are middle-income or emerging economies), these funds are an important supplement to domestic resources. Key global climate funds include the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Climate Investment Funds (CIF) such as the Clean Technology Fund, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Historically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has underutilized these funds: MENA has received only about 6.6 percent of cumulative financing from the major global climate funds through 2023.⁴¹

Eastern Mediterranean countries are now working to improve their access to these pools of finance by developing strong project proposals and institutional capacity. Egypt has been notably successful in tapping climate funds, securing about one-third of all GCF resources allocated to MENA as of 2023. About 85 percent of Egypt’s GCF funding has been in the form of loans. Jordan has also received international climate finance, accounting for roughly 10 percent of GCF funding in MENA (with around half in loans). Meanwhile, Turkey has benefited from World Bank funding via the Türkiye Green Fund (TGF), receiving a $155-million loan for the greening of firms through equity financing, while Lebanon has benefited from GEF grants, receiving about 8 percent of GEF’s MENA allocations.⁴² These funds often work by blending with multilateral bank financing or by de-risking projects to attract private investors (through instruments like guarantees and concessional tranches).

4. Islamic finance

Islamic finance is a growing source of funding for the energy transition and is particularly relevant in the Muslim-majority countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. Islamic finance follows sharia principles, such as prohibition of interest, and typically uses profit-sharing or asset-backed structures.⁴³ Green sukuk (sharia-compliant bonds earmarked for environmental projects) have emerged as a key instrument to raise capital for renewables while tapping into Islamic investor pools. The global sukuk market has seen strong growth and greening in recent years. The first half of 2024 set a record, with $9.9 billion in green and sustainability sukuk issuances, indicating accelerating interest.⁴⁴

While most green sukuk so far have originated in Southeast Asia and the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean nations are starting to consider them.⁴⁵ Egypt, for example, has been considering sukuk as a financing tool. It passed a Sovereign Sukuk Law in 2021 and could issue green sukuk to fund projects under its renewable energy and sustainable transport plans.⁴⁶

Importantly, major finance institutions are steering toward climate action. In 2021, Emlak Katılım issued the first green sukuk in Turkey with a total value of 51.8 million Turkish lira.⁴⁷ The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) has also issued sukuk to raise funds for green projects. For example, in 2024 it issued a $2-billion benchmark sukuk earmarked partly for green development programs.⁴⁸

Beyond sukuk, Islamic finance can support renewable energy through Islamic banks and funds investing in project equity or providing sharia-compliant loans (such as profit-sharing and loss-sharing musharakah (a joint-venture structure) or lease-based Ijarah financing). Islamic finance also opens opportunities for waqf (endowment funds) or zakat (charitable contributions) to be structured for community-level clean energy access or climate resilience projects, although such models are still in experimental stages.

5. Bilateral investment

Financing and development support from one country to another plays a pivotal role in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy landscape. Bilateral investment often comes either directly from foreign governments (through aid, export credits, or state-owned banks) or via government-backed companies and sovereign wealth funds pursuing projects abroad. In the push for renewables, several powerful bilateral actors have emerged: notably the Gulf states (such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia) and China. They view renewable energy projects not only as commercial opportunities but also as avenues to strengthen strategic ties and influence in the region.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested significantly in Egypt’s renewable energy projects, using investors such as ACWA Power, Masdar, and AMEA Power to fund new wind and solar capacity.⁴⁹ For example, Masdar has partnered with Egyptian firms to develop a gigantic 10-GW onshore wind farm, one of the world’s largest, which it announced on the sidelines of COP27.⁵⁰

China is increasingly becoming a major bilateral financier in Eastern Mediterranean energy. Chinese state-owned enterprises and funds have targeted renewable energy acquisitions and projects, especially in economies where financing gaps exist. In Egypt, Chinese banks and companies have supported the Benban solar complex; for example, the AIIB provided $210 million in debt financing for eleven solar plants (totaling 490 MW) in Benban’s second phase.⁵¹ Chinese firms have also supplied solar panels and construction for many Benban projects. China also has energy investments in Turkey, Lebanon, and Greece. China’s Silk Road Fund has acquired a 49-percent stake in ACWA Power’s renewable energy portfolio.⁵² These investment patterns are part of the increasing “greening” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and reflect China’s willingness to invest in lower-income Eastern Mediterranean nations, though these investments often serve dual purposes of commercial returns and strategic positioning.⁵³

The European Union (EU) and its member states also act bilaterally through programs like the EU-funded Neighbourhood Investment Platform, which gives grants to complement loans for energy projects in the Mediterranean neighborhood.⁵⁴ Europe often emphasizes grid interconnections and market integration (e.g., funding studies for a EuroAfrica interconnector between Egypt and Greece), Gulf countries favor high-profile generation projects, and China is active across the value chain from generation to transmission.

Bilateral investments bring substantial capital and can fast-track projects, but they also entail geopolitical balancing as recipient countries in the Eastern Mediterranean navigate offers from multiple suitors. When managed well, bilateral financing can complement multilateral efforts. It also can foster regional cooperation. For instance, the UAE not only invests in Arab neighbors but has discussed energy deals involving Israel (such as solar facilities in Jordan exporting power to Israel as part of a desalinated water and solar energy swap between Israel and Jordan).⁵⁵

6. Debt financing

Debt financing (i.e., borrowing funds to be repaid with interest) is one of the predominant ways to fund energy infrastructure, including renewable projects, worldwide. In the Eastern Mediterranean, debt financing takes multiple forms: loans from commercial banks or international institutions, bonds issued in capital markets, export credits or supplier credits for equipment, and concessional and blended debt.

Given that debt is cheaper than equity, developers typically seek debt to cover most of the project costs. For investors and lenders, renewable energy projects can be attractive debt opportunities because they generally generate steady cash flows once operational.

Finance for regional cooperation

A comprehensive financing strategy leveraging all of the above mechanisms is crucial for the Eastern Mediterranean to realize its energy transition ambitions. Multilateral and climate funds provide scale and patient capital, green and Islamic finance tap new investor pools, and bilateral investments bring in strategic funding.

Additionally, financing structures such as project finance, public-private partnerships, power purchase agreements, and blended finance can help reduce risk. Green investment banks can help mobilize funding for green projects, while innovative tools like fintech and results-based financing fill niche gaps.

In my view, the region’s success in meeting COP28 goals hinges less on the availability of technology and more on the ability to align financial incentives across borders.

By structuring these financing approaches with regional cooperation as their foundation, these instruments create shared financial interests across borders, incentivizing collaboration and helping overcome entrenched political obstacles. Financial mechanisms explicitly requiring cross-border participation serve as powerful diplomatic tools in addition to their capital mobilization function.

For instance, multilateral investment funds that mandate co-investment from multiple Eastern Mediterranean countries establish joint ownership stakes in critical infrastructure, creating a financial incentive to maintain peaceful relations. Similarly, blended finance structures offering preferential terms for projects with cross-border components make cooperation economically advantageous compared to purely national approaches. For example, a Mediterranean renewable energy fund requiring participation from Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus could provide a neutral financial platform in which shared economic benefits supersede maritime disputes.

The strategic design of these mechanisms must include governance frameworks that span national boundaries, with representation requirements ensuring all stakeholders have meaningful input in investment decisions. Interconnection-specific project bonds co-issued by multiple countries can create shared liability structures in which default risks are mutually borne, fostering accountability across traditional divides.

When properly implemented, these tools can transform abstract diplomatic goals into concrete economic incentives. Countries with historical tensions can begin to view their neighbors not as competitors but as essential partners in accessing capital markets and achieving energy security. Countries that once viewed energy resources as potential flashpoints for conflict can instead develop economic interdependencies that make continued cooperation the most rational choice.

Shared foundations: Creating a regional energy community

While innovative financing mechanisms provide the tools for transformation, their successful implementation depends on creating supportive physical, institutional, and diplomatic frameworks. The mobilization of capital through green bonds, MDB funding, climate finance, and other financial instruments discussed above is necessary but insufficient on its own to achieve regional energy integration.

Having participated in several regional energy dialogues, I have observed that trust between regulators remains limited. Finance can be the tool that enables cooperation in more sensitive policy areas. Yet it must be paired with robust infrastructure development, harmonized regulatory environments, diplomatic initiatives that overcome historical tensions, and coordinated governance structures that span national boundaries. The implementation of regional energy integration requires establishing concrete structures for collaboration that can transform the Eastern Mediterranean’s abundant renewable resources into a shared, resilient energy architecture that benefits all participating nations. These efforts must include

• physical infrastructure development and grid integration;
• interconnected energy markets and regulatory alignment on grid codes, tariff structures, and cross-border trading;
• regional cooperation and diplomatic engagement; and
• regional governance frameworks.

Scaling cross-border initiatives for a connected grid

Cross-border energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean is advancing through several key initiatives aimed at integrating renewable energy sources and enhancing grid connectivity. There are nine interconnection projects and proposals at different stages of development across the region. If implemented fully, they can help create a more unified energy market capable of efficiently distributing energy across the Mediterranean while addressing the intermittency challenges of solar and wind.

The Great Sea Interconnection, set to link Cyprus, Greece, and Israel, is perhaps the region’s flagship project and will facilitate the trade of renewable electricity across borders. Similarly, Egypt and Greece are exploring the GREGY interconnection. Beyond the Eastern Mediterranean, Italy and Tunisia are advancing the ELMED interconnection between them, which is expected to be operational by 2027.⁵⁶ Technologies already exist to manage some of the perceived risks of interconnections. Using high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines offer greater controllability and can be isolated more easily than traditional AC interconnections. Interconnections can also be directed to non-critical loads or areas in order to reduce risk to cross-border disruptions, while robust cybersecurity standards and protocols can help protect critical infrastructure.

Harmonizing regulations for seamless market operation

Achieving a fully integrated energy market in the Eastern Mediterranean requires harmonized regulations to ensure fair access to grids, promote investment, and reduce the cost of risk capital. Countries involved in interconnection projects need to have the regulatory framework in place to allow for successful entry of foreign electricity into domestic electricity markets and successful export of their electricity to foreign markets. This is especially difficult for countries in which electricity utilities hold vertical monopolies in all sectors of the economy. Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, and Egypt have unbundled or are on the way to unbundling their electricity markets; meanwhile, Jordan, Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, Israel have electricity utilities that hold vertical monopolies and are responsible for generating and supplying electricity to all sectors in the economy.⁵⁷

The EU’s internal energy market policies are a model for regulatory convergence, emphasizing transmission ownership unbundling between electricity generation or supply companies and transmutation ones, consumer rights, and the role of regulatory actors such as the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).⁵⁸ The EU’s Electricity Directive 2019/944 mandates nondiscriminatory access to transmission and distribution systems, a principle that could be adapted for the Eastern Mediterranean to attract private investment.⁵⁹

However, this EU model cannot be fully replicated in the Eastern Mediterranean due to different system maturity levels. The Association of Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MEDREG), comprising twenty-seven energy regulators from twenty-two countries, recommends that regulatory frameworks must be tailored to specific subregional contexts, and that Eastern Mediterranean countries need to develop more regulatory solutions independent from those of the EU.⁶⁰

Progress in regulatory harmonization could also increase infrastructure investments significantly in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, this progress is slow due to the region’s diverse regulatory environments, with countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt maintaining state-controlled energy sectors, while others like Greece and Cyprus align with EU directives to liberalize the energy market. Overcoming these disparities will require sustained dialogue, capacity building, and incentives for alignment.

Energy diplomacy: Transforming geopolitical challenges into opportunities

Geopolitical tensions are another major barrier to cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Political and security dynamics significantly influence energy cooperation in the region. Long-standing disputes—such as those between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus over maritime boundaries, the Syrian civil war, the unresolved Cyprus question, the recently intensified Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Israel-Lebanon conflict—have all historically hindered regional collaboration and the development of cross-border infrastructure, particularly affecting projects like the EastMed Gas Pipeline.⁶¹ Overcoming these challenges will require financial resources as well as diplomatic engagement and innovative governance structures.

However, the shift toward renewable energy and the EU’s focus on a green energy economy present new opportunities for cooperation. Initiatives such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)—established in 2019 as a platform focused on natural gas development, it includes Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories, along with France and Italy—can be both reformed to become more inclusive of all Eastern Mediterranean counties and expanded beyond natural gas to include renewable energy, power infrastructure, and advancing electricity interconnection and trading.⁶² Some energy policy experts have advocated for renaming the EMGF as the East Mediterranean Energy Forum (EMEF) to reflect this broader mandate.⁶³ Such a forum should include a regulatory platform, in which each country is represented by its national regulatory authority or electricity governing body, to jointly promote greater harmonization of regional energy markets and legislation.

Energy cooperation is increasingly recognized as a tool for regional stability and economic integration. The development of renewable energy projects and interconnectors can create shared economic interests, reducing the potential for conflict.⁶⁴ This approach transforms energy from a source of competition to a platform for collaboration, potentially easing long-standing tensions through mutual economic benefits and shared climate goals.

An increased shift toward renewable energy sources not only ensures long-term sustainability and economic benefits for the region, but also has higher potential than gas diplomacy. Unlike natural gas and other tradable commodities, renewable energy systems are an undisputed resource. Additionally, collaboration on renewable energy projects through interconnections provides synergies between partnering countries due to the benefits they provide to both grids.

Shared horizon: Finance and diplomacy for a unified Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape

The Eastern Mediterranean stands at the cusp of a transformative energy transition in which innovative financing can simultaneously advance technological leapfrogging, economic development, and regional cooperation. By strategically structuring investment mechanisms that require collaboration, the region can convert financial transactions into diplomatic bridges.

Financial innovation offers three distinct diplomatic dividends beyond its direct economic benefits.

First, joint financing creates structured engagement opportunities that maintain dialogue even during political tensions. When countries coinvest in renewable infrastructure through mechanisms such as regional green bonds or mixed-ownership projects, they establish technical and financial communication channels that persist through diplomatic fluctuations. These ongoing interactions build relationships among technical experts and financial officials that can later facilitate broader cooperation.

Second, shared financial liabilities transform political calculus by creating mutual dependencies. When neighboring countries with historical tensions become co-guarantors of infrastructure loans or joint issuers of project bonds, they develop a tangible economic interest in maintaining stable relations. The economic costs of diplomatic ruptures become quantifiable and immediately visible to stakeholders on all sides.

Third, financial innovation creates positive-sum narratives in a region often characterized by zero-sum competition. By enabling countries to collectively tap into previously inaccessible capital pools—such as global ESG funds seeking large-scale sustainable investments—regional financial mechanisms demonstrate that cooperation delivers benefits unattainable through individual action.

If the Eastern Mediterranean realizes this vision of financially driven integration, it could emerge as a global model for how innovative capital structures can overcome entrenched geopolitical challenges. The region’s abundant renewable resources, which have the potential to generate more electricity than its projected future demand, provide the natural foundation, while innovative financing creates the institutional architecture for a sustainable energy future that transcends historical divisions and creates shared prosperity across borders.

The path forward requires financial creativity, diplomatic persistence, and technical expertise—but the potential rewards extend far beyond renewable kilowatts to include a fundamental reconfiguration of regional relationships built on shared economic interests rather than historical grievances.

The Atlantic Council would like to extend special thanks to Limak Holding for its valuable support for this report.

Karim Elgendy
Executive Director,
Carboun Institute;
Associate Fellow,
Chatham House

Karim Elgendy is an expert on energy transition and climate policy in the Middle East and North Africa. His research examines the intersection of climate diplomacy, energy geopolitics, and sustainable development across the region. Elgendy investigates how countries navigate energy transitions and climate change impacts within shifting geopolitical landscapes, and analyzes how regional and global power dynamics influence climate action and policy implementation. He possesses deep expertise in energy and climate policies across the Eastern Mediterranean and Gulf Cooperation Council states, with particular focus on renewable energy, climate resilience, and diplomacy.

Elgendy has authored numerous articles and policy publications in leading journals and platforms. He has presented at over one hundred public speaking engagements and has delivered guest lectures at several prestigious universities. His expert analysis is regularly featured in broadcast, print, and digital media outlets, and he has appeared in most mainstream media outlets.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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In the informal or artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector, women’s participation is estimated at up to 50 percent. But despite their contributions, women across the region are subjected to discrimination—which results in fewer socioeconomic and professional opportunities—in addition to sexual and gender-based violence.

Today, the increasing demand for critical minerals has led global powers, including the United States, to consider critical-mineral deals globally in order to create stronger and more sustainable supply chains. African countries thus have a newfound opportunity to prioritize their development goals—but they first must address the discrimination and violence against women taking place across the industry.

For African countries to empower their women miners, they must tailor formalization pathways of women ASM miners and support grassroots organizations as operational partners, while deploying policies aimed at addressing gender biases in the industry and on a macro scale.

The reality for women miners

In the ASM sector, where working conditions are unsafe, women face gender-based discrimination and physical harm. Women miners are ninety times more at risk of death than their male counterparts, according to the World Bank. Women miners also face sexual violence, which is especially prevalent in conflict areas: For example, amid the ongoing conflict between Congolese armed forces and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, women (both miners and not) reported 895 rapes in the last two weeks of February 2025, averaging sixty reports per day.

In the ASM sector and in large-scale mining (LSM), women have also been allocated fewer technical jobs in addition to unequal access to mining rights, tools, and financial resources, all diminishing their ability to achieve financial growth. Their restricted economic mobility often confines them to ancillary services such as preparing food and cleaning mineral ore. But regardless of the roles they take, women miners often receive lower wages than men for the same labor. Discrimination also results in women miners taking on a disproportionate burden of labor overall, as many are responsible for housework in addition to mining activities.

Legal infrastructures also reinforce discrimination against women miners: For example, the DRC’s Mining Code stipulates that pregnant women are not allowed to work in mining. Similarly, sections 55 and 56 of Nigeria’s 2004 Labor Act prohibit women from working in industrial undertakings, including mining, during nighttime hours and from doing any manual labor underground. These unequal legal measures can push more women to informal mining practices, making them more vulnerable to physical and gender-based harm.

Tapping the opportunity

African countries, for their development and economic growth, must address the challenges women in both ASM and LSM face, with policies that are tailored to the needs of local mining communities.

African countries must offer easily navigable pathways for ASM miners to formalize—and such pathways must be customized for local contexts. Formalization is particularly complex in regions with conflict and legal pluralism. There are frameworks available to guide African governments in this endeavor. For example, a nongovernmental organization called Pact has publicly put forth the model it uses to engage communities in formalization, tailoring the approach to the needs of local artisanal miners. Such a model includes stakeholder engagement and educational training for miners, in addition to support with securing licenses and land access and with addressing human rights and safety concerns.

African governments should also support local grassroots organizations in operationalizing these efforts to improve the well-being of women miners and their economic prospects. In the ASM sector in particular, these organizations are integral to reaching women miners, especially in spaces where governments lack reach. For example, Tanzania’s Women Miners Association economically empowers women miners through initiatives that organize savings and credit cooperative societies and support women as they work to acquire mining licenses and market access. An organization called IMPACT leads initiatives for women-led mining businesses to improve women miners’ safety and foster inclusion in global supply chains. IMPACT supported the building of at least fifty village savings and loans associations in the DRC and Burkina Faso, involving nearly three thousand women and men who saved more than $176,000.

In addressing women’s challenges in the mining sector—both ASM and LSM—more broadly, African governments must also deploy policies that are gender inclusive and women-centric in order to alleviate the gendered struggles of women in the mining sector. There are already positive examples of such policies on the African continent, some being South Africa’s programs to improve women’s participation in the LSM sector. In addition, the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum, and Gas Board implemented a gender strategy to improve awareness about the role of women in mining and to boost capacity building. Governments should also encourage women’s participation in mining governance.

Leveraging partnerships

Safeguarding and empowering women is essential for upholding human rights and fostering inclusive sustainable growth. While ensuring peace and stability, African countries need to leverage partnerships to advance their development goals.

As countries move forward on critical-minerals deals, they must do so ensuring that there will be mutual economic gains from such agreements. For example, the DRC must leverage its potential mineral deal—in which the United States would provide security against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel attacks in exchange for access to DRC’s critical minerals—for community development. While signing any deal, governments should foster multistakeholder partnerships with grassroots organizations that can help reach women miners and advance development goals in Africa’s booming mining sector, for an inclusive and equitable future for all.

Neeraja Kulkarni is a researcher, writer, and development practitioner with experience in decarbonization, community resilience, and international development. The views expressed in this article are her own.

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This brief, the inaugural of the series, by William Yancey Brown highlights the vast energy and mineral potential of the Atlantic Ocean and how African nations bordering the basin can manage resources responsibly and fairly. It launches against a backdrop that includes World Ocean Day, the 2025 UN Ocean Conference, and the continuing work of the Group of Twenty (under South Africa’s presidency) within the Oceans 20 engagement group.

The Atlantic Ocean is of paramount importance to Africa. The African nations on the ocean’s shore represent 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent its trade. The blue economy is crucial for Africa as the continent’s economies see new changes brought upon by issues related to the maritime energy transition, the port revolution, maritime transport, fishing, and control over exclusive economic zones. African countries have accordingly developed frameworks, through the African Union, for action in the region and declared 2015-2025 the “Decade of Africa’s Seas and Oceans.”

Introduction

The world’s second-largest ocean—the Atlantic, bordering more than thirty nations—is rich with energy and minerals, as well as the marine life and human livelihoods that development impacts. The Atlantic has a well-established oil and gas industry and a rapidly growing offshore wind sector. In addition, nascent sources of energy and minerals exist at the water’s surface (tides, currents, and waves), just below in the temperature differences between ocean layers, and on the seafloor. There are windfarms and oil and gas infrastructure off the coasts of Europe and North America—but the challenge now is how to tap the African Atlantic’s energy potential responsibly and fairly.

Though renewables are the clear best route to reducing greenhouse gases, it can be expected that African nations will continue to develop their offshore oil and gas resources. At the same time, however, wind farming could usefully be tried in some areas along Africa’s Atlantic coast—and to expand the range of renewables available, venture capitalists should also look closely at the potential projects in the works to harness the energy of waves, currents, and the ocean’s thermal energy. Funders, international organizations, and African nations along the Atlantic have several policy options to explore the ocean’s resources in a sustainable way. On the question of mining critical minerals from the deep sea, however, much more research on the seabed environment—and availability of alternative terrestrial sources—is needed.

Nascent ocean energy and mineral resources

The Atlantic Ocean provides a place for energy production facilities that could be located on land or sea, in addition to energy sources derived from the ocean itself. These placements include the world’s first floating nuclear facility and solar power plants offshore of the Netherlands.¹ So far, mainland Africa has neither of these, although a floating solar power plant is planned for the Seychelles.² Ocean locations present a harsh environment for devices and accessibility, and environmental restoration is difficult if accidents occur. On the other hand, ocean placement offers space and distance from human settlements.

Tides and currents. Moving river water made up about 15 percent of global electricity generation in 2023.³Hydropower makes up more than half of electricity generated in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil, and Norway.⁴ The Atlantic Ocean has its own standing currents and tidal flows, such as the Gulf Stream and the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, and powerful tides in locations on both coasts of the basin.

Small-scale generating facilities powered by non-tidal, standing ocean currents have been tested in locations including the Gulf Stream offshore of the United States and the Kuroshio Current offshore of Japan, but no commercial-scale facility is operating anywhere yet.⁵ The greatest potential for non-tidal current power in the African Atlantic is reportedly offshore of South Africa, or perhaps of Guinea-Bissau and Morocco.⁶

A 240-megawatt (MW) tidal power plant has operated on the Atlantic coast of France since 1966.⁷ Africa has some much smaller Atlantic tidal plants, but no commercial-scale tidal power generating facilities are operating there and prospects for tidal facilities offshore of Africa’s Atlantic coast are weak.⁸ Cost is a principal impediment. Environmental impacts are also a concern, but the same is true for well-developed hydropower on land. Despite tepid progress to date for tidal power, new projects are on the books in Europe.⁹

Waves. Waves offer great potential power for electricity on Atlantic coasts. Wave action on the US Atlantic coast could reportedly provide average power generation of about 18 gigawatts (GW).¹⁰ Wave and tidal current energy could potentially meet up to 20 percent of the United Kingdom’s current electricity demand.¹¹ Atlantic Africa has energetic waves in the south offshore of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Namibia. Senegal, Cabo Verde, and Morocco in the north also have high wave potential.¹²

Many wave energy test projects have been completed or proposed for the Atlantic in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe.¹³ However, only one small wave energy facility offshore of northern Portugal currently provides electricity to the grid.¹⁴ Another small grid-linked project off a pier is set to begin operations in 2025 in Los Angeles.¹⁵ As for tides and currents, the challenge and cost of maintaining wave energy facilities remains an impediment to significant deployment.

Ocean thermal energy conversion. Tropical seas, including in the Atlantic, have surface waters much warmer than the deep sea. This difference allows devices to circulate water and power turbines through ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC).¹⁶ “Open” versions of the technology can also desalinate seawater. OTEC could theoretically provide about 8 terawatts (TW) of power globally, more than the current global electricity demand.¹⁷ However, OTEC has a long history of experimentation without yet providing a commercial operating source of power to the grid.¹⁸ This might change with a small 1.5-MW project scheduled to be installed in 2025 offshore of São Tomé and Príncipe.¹⁹ There is also potential for floating OTEC along the west coast of continental Africa, with the highest potential reportedly from Guinea to Gabon.²⁰

Methane hydrates. Methane hydrates are ice-like solids in which water traps methane. They occur on ocean continental margins, including offshore of the Americas and Africa, and hold vast amounts of carbon and energy.²¹ Combined with this promise is the peril of releasing methane from any mining, including through submarine landslides. Japan has taken a special interest in methane hydrates and has conducted experimental projects successfully extracting methane gas.²² No such projects have yet been undertaken in the Atlantic Ocean.

Developed ocean energy and mineral resources

Oil and gas. Under its Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that global oil supply will decrease about 7 percent by 2050 and natural gas production will increase by about 4 percent.²³ Offshore production currently comprises roughly 30 percent of global oil supply and 28 percent of global natural gas production.²⁴ Large historical Atlantic-linked sources include the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea.

Rystad Energy estimates that, in Africa, about 3.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd) of new deepwater oil and gas supply will be near final decision or under construction by 2035. Nigeria is the historic hub of West African offshore oil production and expects to raise production from 2 million barrels per day (bpd) to 3 million bpd with an anti-theft initiative.²⁵ The Baleine Field offshore of Cote d’Ivoire and Namibia’s offshore Orange Basin recently began production, and exploration is under way or planned offshore of São Tomé & Principe, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, among other countries.²⁶ Natural gas production began in January 2025 offshore of Senegal and Mauritania and is expected to produce around 2.3 million tons of liquified natural gas (LNG) annually for more than twenty years.²⁷ Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras predicts a ramping up of current offshore production to 3.2 million barrels per day (equivalent; including natural gas) in the next five years, with oil production centered on its “pre-salt” basins.²⁸ Guyana’s Stabroek Block expects to produce 1.3 million bpd of oil by 2027 and holds an estimated 11.6 billion barrels of recoverable oil and significant natural gas.²⁹

Wind energy. Offshore wind energy farms globally provided an estimated 75 GW installed operating capacity as of 2023, about 7.5 percent of the roughly 1,000 GW total installed global wind energy that year.³⁰ Europe and the United Kingdom have historically led offshore wind development, but China is now leading deployment.³¹

Atlantic Ocean wind farms are currently operating offshore of the United Kingdom, Europe, and the northeastern and mid-Atlantic coast of the United States, with additional farms planned.³² Three commercial offshore wind farms are now operating in the United States, with other US Atlantic projects under construction.³³ The US Atlantic projects are driven by coastal state governments that have established targets for renewable energy. However, supply chain issues and costs have led to the cancellation of some proposed projects. Development is also weighed down by the shift from the strong support of the Biden administration to adversity from the Trump administration.³⁴

No wind farms are currently operating offshore of South America or Africa. Planning is under way but in early stages for Brazil, Morocco, and South Africa. Africa has good winds for turbines on the Atlantic coast in the south and northwest.³⁵ Locations on either side of the Cape of Good Hope are being considered in South Africa, with a specific project proposed to the east in Richards Bay.³⁶

Critical minerals in the Atlantic

Critical minerals are generally defined by national laws as minerals that are essential for important industries and vulnerable to supply chain disruption.³⁷

Most critical minerals, including rare earths, are more scarce than rare in terms of the amounts present in geologic features found at many locations around the globe. However, their actual mining and production are constrained, with China producing most critical minerals and Africa a key place for mining. For example, 74 percent of the world’s cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), under conditions that are both unsafe and undependable.³⁸ Dependable access to critical minerals without overreliance on China is a priority for many Western industries. The United States was a leader in the past but, despite such high interest in critical minerals, global prices for key metals and material fell by about 26 percent in 2023, including a 47-percent decline in cobalt and a 32-percent decline in lithium carbonate.³⁹

Whether these minerals should be mined from the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, in addition to land mining, is hotly debated under international law (see below). Polymetallic nodules (PMNs) in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific Ocean, where these nodules are abundant, receive the most attention from industry, governments, and nongovernmental organizations. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has designated Atlantic Ocean exploration areas for polymetallic sulfides (PMSs) along the mid-Atlantic Ridge and for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts (FMCs) in the South Atlantic.⁴⁰ Little information is publicly available about potentially recoverable amounts and no exploitation has been authorized, but research on the biological communities that could be impacted raises great concerns for environmental impacts.⁴¹ The Trump administration stepped outside of the ISA in April 2025 with an executive order promoting seabed mining both on the high seas and the US continental shelf.⁴² Encouraged by the order, Canada’s The Metals Company has announced that it will apply for permission to mine high-seas PMNs under a US statute,⁴³ despite protests from the ISA,⁴⁴ and another company, California-based Impossible Metals, has applied to mine PMNs in the US territory of American Samoa.⁴⁵ The Department of Interior announced on May 20 that it was launching the process for a lease sale there based on that application.⁴⁶

The environmental framework

The ocean energy sources described above are primarily regulated by the nations to which they are adjacent, either because the resources are located in sedimentary geologic formations of the continental shelf (as in the case of oil) or because proximity to onshore populations facilitates construction and operations and lessens the cost of transmitting electricity (as in the case of wind). Critical mineral exploration and mining are primarily regulated on the continental shelves of nations under national laws and on the high seas by the ISA, which was established under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁴⁷The United States also has a dated statute for high seas mining, applicable to anyone under US jurisdiction.⁴⁸

National laws for ocean energy and mineral development vary, and this short paper cannot document their details. But consider US laws for reference. The facilities involved require authorization from the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).⁴⁹ Authorization begins with leasing, followed by approval of development plans, with environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).⁵⁰ NEPA is a procedural statute without ultimate environmental standards. The approvals include conditions, most designed to mitigate environmental impacts, whose authorities come from other US environmental laws. A large offshore wind farm might have one hundred conditions. OCSLA includes standards to minimize environmental harm, but environmental review is given sharper teeth through the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), which have firm impact tests.⁵¹ Noise is a significant concern, and is regulated as “harassment” under the ESA and MMPA. OCSLA also requires lessees to decommission facilities at their expense once a lease ends. All of these regulatory actions are subject to judicial review and many rulings have affected requirements. That said, oil, gas, and wind energy projects have gotten through the approval process and are operating in the United States.

European nations with Atlantic coasts (and the EU itself), South American nations, and some African nations have legal frameworks for environmental review with environmental assessment procedures akin to those of NEPA in the United States. Most lack hard stops such as the ESA and MMPA. Article 6(4) of the EU Habitat Directive approaches these stops, requiring that certain actions with negative environmental impacts can proceed only if carried out for “imperative reasons of overriding public interest” and with compensatory measures.⁵² The International Offshore Petroleum Environmental Regulators (IOPER) provides a venue for cooperation on oil and gas environmental regulation in the Atlantic and elsewhere but does not currently include any African nation agency.⁵³

The ISA has issued final rules for deep seabed prospecting and exploration in the area beyond national jurisdiction and draft rules for exploitation.⁵⁴ Both rules prohibit activities in the international area that would cause “serious harm” and define this to be any effect from activities on the marine environment that represents a “significant adverse change in the marine environment.” Both final and draft regulations also require a “precautionary approach.”⁵⁵

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are another key environmental safeguard. Some have already been designated in the Atlantic in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal nations.⁵⁶ MPAs provide environmental protection that complements mitigation measures for activities in areas that are being developed.⁵⁷

All of these environmental policies rest on the foundational need to address climate change. The Atlantic Ocean is an important sink for carbon dioxide through direct absorption and sequestration by sea life. It is also the object of impacts such as sea level rise, higher temperatures, acidification, and potential disruption of the major currents.

Policy recommendations

Each ocean energy and mineral resource described above sits within a framework of cost competitiveness, scale, required environmental protection, and governance stability.

Recommendation: Waves, currents, and OETC

Waves, currents, and OETC have potentially great scale. In theory, each could meet large shares of Atlantic Ocean coastal electricity demand. However, none of the three has gone viral, constrained by the costs and challenges of operations and maintenance. All three nevertheless warrant continued investment in projects and research.

• Venture capital firms concerned with energy and relevant government agencies should consider funding new projects for wave, current, and OETC technologies, with a particular view for projects supplying power to island populations of Atlantic southern African nations.

Recommendation: Methane hydrates

Methane hydrates also have potentially great scale but are challenged by the risk of accidental releases in development, production of greenhouse gases, local environmental impacts, and the abundance of natural gas from alternative current sources.

• Japan has led work investigating methane hydrates on its continental shelf. It should continue these efforts and seek collaborative research partnerships with other nations.

Recommendations: Oil and gas

Oil and gas production sits in a maelstrom of analysis and often angry commentary. Science allows no sound doubt that Earth’s surface is warming because of anthropogenic fossil fuel emissions. Furthermore, it is apparent that governmental policies to date have not solved the problem. Performance has taken a back seat to aspiration. Post-combustion technologies such as engineered or natural sequestration by biota, direct removal from the air, and atmospheric additives such as aerosols are only partial solutions.

Fair play is another consideration for oil and gas offshore of West Africa and Guyana. The economies of wealthier nations historically benefited from fossil fuels. Many less wealthy nations, including those in Africa, missed out and are seeking funding to address climate impacts. They do not want to be told not to develop their own offshore oil and gas resources—particularly as production continues in wealthy countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway—and wealthy nations are unlikely to provide funding anywhere near the levels developing nations request. African nations can be expected to move forward with developing their major Atlantic offshore reserves, as they are now doing in conjunction with major companies. Better use of fossil fuels, such as prevention of methane leakage and priority for natural gas over coal or oil for electricity will help address climate impacts. However, the single best available avenue for reducing greenhouse gas emissions appears to be replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy, including solar, wind, and nuclear facilities on land in addition to renewable ocean energy.

Potential conflict and corruption are also obvious challenges hitchhiking on the road to wealth from offshore oil and gas resources for West Africa and Guyana. Unless both can be dealt with effectively, fair play in wealth allocation will be a mirage. Where US companies are involved, it does not help that the current administration has said it would not enforce the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or consider the social cost of carbon in decision-making as previous administrations did.

Atlantic African nations should:

• In cooperation with other agencies and institutions, prioritize renewable and nuclear energy development to mitigate climate change by replacing fossil fuels.
• Include a quantified measure of the social cost of carbon in regulatory decision-making.
• Maintain transparent and independently audited programs for government revenue collection and expenditure, including sovereign wealth funds, and explicitly require multinational firms subject to US jurisdiction to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
• Work with other Atlantic nations to establish and maintain what could be known as a “Pan-Atlantic Blue Ring” of coastal, island, and marine conservation areas, building on existing conservation areas, with a dual purpose of climate reliance and biodiversity conservation for its own sake.

Recommendation: Offshore wind

Offshore wind is not a pipeline for sovereign wealth, but it can mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by replacing fossil fuels. It can be cost competitive with other energy sources in some locations and has scale—in the neighborhood of 1–2 GW capacity for larger projects in the United States. Its status going forward in the United States is uncertain given the critical stance of the current administration, preexisting complications in regulatory approvals, supply chain problems, and possible overenthusiasm on finances. Some US Atlantic projects are operating or close to that and are likely to provide planned electricity over the twenty-five- to thirty-year terms of their leases. Some other leases without approved project plans might ultimately culminate in operating projects. In the long term, offshore wind is an experiment with a reasonable probability of a good result. Nations other than the United States are more supportive, such as the EU nations and China. Atlantic coastal Africa has the wind needed in the south and northwest and could usefully try it out. Whether leases will be renewed at the end of their first life is a question. Investors have generally presumed they will be, but the answer will be informed by the costs of competing energy sources, including solar and nuclear facilities on land.

• Atlantic African nations in the south and northwest with good winds should establish potential lease areas for wind farms through a public review process that examines needs for economic viability, full-scale review of environmental impacts, and deconflicting of impediments generally. Public auctions for leases should be held once potential lease areas are established, to confirm whether companies have an appetite for projects. If they do, projects should be advanced.

Recommendations: Critical minerals

Critical minerals are a proper priority for nations whose industries and national securities depend on them. The United States and others are concerned that China dominates production. However, addressing this calls for a scalpel, not a hammer. Each mineral has its own value, sources, potential replacements, recyclability, and location in the marketplace. The price for some, such as cobalt, has fallen in the past two years.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the economics and environmental impact of deep seabed mining should be compared with mining on land. Terrestrial mining can decimate mining sites and areas along the roads to them. But the ecology of terrestrial areas can be reasonably well described and impacts from mining mitigated. Also, restoration after project completion is much easier where people can walk and breathe and vehicles can drive. Recent research indicates that even larger species in the deep sea are mostly not yet described.⁵⁹ Furthermore, restoration is either conceptually impossible (if the material removed is habitat) or technically infeasible. Fundamentally, the environmental standard for mining under the high seas is to prevent serious harm. No experienced and objective environmental regulator could conclude that the standard is met by the technologies currently available.⁶⁰

• Before supporting approval of any deep sea critical mineral mining on the high seas or in their offshore national jurisdictions, Atlantic nations should advance research on the deep seabed environment, including species and ecology, and on the availability of terrestrial sources.

Additional recommendations: Artificial intelligence

Finally, many companies and researchers working on generative artificial intelligence (AI) believe that artificial general intelligence (AGI) that matches highly skilled human intelligence will be available in the next several years. Generative AI agents already exist that perform tasks as though they were humans, and they get better every day. Robots are also in the works. These advances in generative AI will touch everything in human society, including sustainable energy and mineral production in the Atlantic Ocean basin.⁶¹ AGI will likely be able to perform much analysis and procedure, improving the speed, and possibly the accuracy, of reviews. Despite model biases, generative AGI might offer the potential for less biased or corrupt decisions when it comes to selecting operators or siting energy projects.

Just as important, however, the people who now earn a living doing things related to sustainable energy and minerals will need help if AGI agents do the work in the future. The sooner these efforts start, the better.

• The larger companies with leading generative AI models should continue to provide or initiate support for institutions in Atlantic Africa for training and access to the best models they are making available.⁶²
• Community leaders in African towns and villages likely to be affected by Atlantic energy and mineral development should form stakeholder teams to engage with developers. The teams should include at least one individual with access to a leading AI large language model (LLM) and experience in prompting it so that the model itself can participate in discussions about community benefit from development and potential harm to employment from AI.

Issue Brief Apr 24, 2025

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Africa Economy & Business

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By Julien Marcilly and Bradford Simmons

Indonesia and its success with resource nationalism can serve as an example for many mineral-rich African countries.

Africa Energy & Environment

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Marine energy: Harnessing the power of the Atlantic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The United States is ill prepared to confront the challenges of an increasingly hostile global strategic environment. A coordinated coalition of adversarial states is working to dismantle the US-led global order, seeking to replace it with one defined by their ambitions and autocratic principles. At the forefront of this effort is China, which is rapidly accelerating its military capabilities and expanding its defense industrial base (DIB) to field sophisticated weapons systems designed to deter the United States globally and secure its goal of national rejuvenation. Aligned with China are Russia, Iran, and North Korea—forming an increasingly unified axis of authoritarians steadily advancing toward this objective. Compounding these challenges are increasingly frayed traditional US security alliances, notably in Europe, that leave the United States further exposed.

The most effective strategy to contend with this evolving threat landscape is through robust preparedness—both immediate and long term. Against this background, US and allied attention has increasingly turned to Africa. Africa holds one-third of the world’s known mineral reserves, including 80 percent of platinum and chromium, 47 percent of cobalt, and 21 percent of graphite.

Of the fifty minerals identified as critical by the US Geological Survey (USGS), thirty-two are found in Africa. US policymakers have therefore begun to explore partnerships with African countries to secure these resources. Yet, despite several promising initiatives, the United States still lacks a coherent and comprehensive policy for engagement—particularly one that can compete with the entrenched influence of the axis of authoritarian states, notably Russia and China, in the continent’s mining industry.

By supporting African nations in the development of their domestic mineral processing capabilities, the United States could enable them to retain a greater share of their mineral wealth and build self-sufficiency in defense. Such efforts could also diminish China’s influence across the continent. For the United States, developing these capabilities could secure a reliable source of critical minerals.

This report begins to lay the groundwork for such an effort by:

• Identifying the defense capabilities the United States should prioritize to remain competitive in the evolving global strategic environment and the critical minerals necessary to support them.
• Charting Africa’s critical mineral resources relevant to US defense needs and assessing the shifting defense postures of African nations, particularly where the development of their weapons systems and security objectives aligns with US interests.
• Underscoring the importance of US support for building Africa’s mineral processing infrastructure, while addressing the structural barriers that have hindered progress so far.
• Advancing targeted recommendations for US policymakers to operationalize such efforts and redefine US-Africa relations for today’s global challenges.

Issue Brief Apr 24, 2025

The Millennium Challenge Corporation could prove essential in the race for critical minerals. Reform it, don’t shut it down.

By Aubrey Hruby

As the Trump administration aligns foreign aid with core strategic interests, the MCC represents an underutilized asset.

Energy & Environment Politics & Diplomacy

Report Sep 23, 2024

Lessons for African mineral producers from the Indonesian experience

By Julien Marcilly and Bradford Simmons

Indonesia and its success with resource nationalism can serve as an example for many mineral-rich African countries.

Africa Energy & Environment

Report Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Keeping China at bay and critical minerals stocked: The case for US-Africa defense collaboration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2023, Brice Oligui Nguema, the former head of Gabon’s Republican Guard, took power in a bloodless coup. This coup was carried out just one day after aging President Ali Bongo was reelected in a contest that many within the country viewed as a fraudulent attempt by Bongo and his allies to perpetuate the nearly sixty-year political dynasty that began when his father took power in 1967.

While it would be easy to wrap this event in the same blanket as the many other West and Central African military coups between 2020 and 2024 that disrupted an unprecedented period of peaceful civilian rule across the region, Gabon’s situation is different in several ways.

The military coups and their aftermaths in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger have followed a similar pattern: They all occurred in poor and unprosperous countries; they were all followed by some sort of in-fighting or conflict within interim governments (and a second coup in the case of Burkina Faso); and the elections promised in all four countries have yet to take place.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

The post Can Gabon become a beacon of democratic entrenchment for West and Central Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Abdoul Salam Bello: A thirst for tangible impact

Rama Yade: A moment of opportunity for Africa

Frannie Léautier: A renewed sense of optimism

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan: Future-proofing the Bank

Emilie Bel: Remaking the donor base

Benjamin Mossberg: Yet, don’t discount the United States

Alexandria Maloney: An agility challenge

Didier Acouetey: A reflection of Africa’s biggest challenges

A sign of the thirst for tangible impact

Tah’s election, with 76 percent of the vote, signifies a pivotal moment for the institution and a reflection of evolving global development priorities. This robust mandate from shareholders acknowledges Tah’s multifaceted experience, which encompasses senior leadership roles in Mauritania’s public sector (including ministerial and advisory positions) and key functions within multilateral institutions focused on crisis management, financial restructuring, and resource generation for African development.

A critical factor in the shareholders’ decision was undoubtedly Tah’s leadership at the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa over the past ten years. His tenure saw the institution’s assets at least double and culminated in AA+/AAA credit ratings. This track record of financial acumen underscored a shareholder desire for clear, measurable outcomes and tangible impact in development initiatives, particularly within the context of reevaluating development financing models.

Achieving such outcomes will be essential as the AfDB looks to support the continent in addressing several critical challenges. These challenges include fostering substantial job creation (on a continent where the median age is about nineteen years), navigating an escalating debt burden, mitigating prevalent fragility, and securing crucial investments in sectors such as energy, agriculture, and infrastructure. The annual financing gap for Africa’s infrastructure needs is estimated at between $68 billion and $108 billion, which represents eight to ten times AfDB’s overall approvals from 2022 to 2023.

Finally, as Africa seeks to diminish its reliance on traditional aid and attract increased private investment, Tah is anticipated to catalyze more dynamic engagement with emerging economic partners actively seeking opportunities on the continent.

—Abdoul Salam Bello is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center

A moment of opportunity for Africa

The AfDB and its newly elected president will be under a great deal of scrutiny.

In Washington, much of the commentary will focus on the cut in US funding. In May, the Trump administration proposed cutting $555 million in funding for the AfDB, at a time when the AfDB is looking to replenish its African Development Fund with a $25-billion fundraising campaign.

However, the new AfDB president should consider the US decision an opportunity to rebuild the financial foundations of an organization that is less “African” than other development institutions. Unlike the Africa Finance Corporation or the African Export–Import Bank, the AfDB is not entirely controlled by Africans. The AfDB has eighty-one shareholders, including twenty-seven nonregional members, ranging from Norway to the United Arab Emirates. While most of the voting power remains in the hands of African regional members, nonregional members such as Japan (the largest non-African shareholder) and the United States have significant voting power and board representation.

Consequently, these nonregional members play a key role in AfDB’s development priorities. In the previous cycle, they controlled over 40 percent of the bank’s resources. Of the nonregional members, Germany, France, and the United States pledged the most funds during the previous funding cycle. However, the US withdrawal will affect Washington’s role. Reducing the Bank’s access to US financial markets will impact dollar dominance in Africa. Given that the infrastructure needs of Africans are estimated at $100 billion per year, it is easy to forecast that the AfDB will increase its cooperation with non-US markets, including Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Africa Center

A renewed sense of optimism

As Tah’s campaign manager, I witnessed firsthand how his platform evolved—and how shareholders ultimately rallied behind him.

Tah brings over thirty-five years of experience in African and international finance. As president of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, he led a transformation and enhanced the institution’s lending capacity. Previously, Tah served as Mauritania’s minister of economic affairs and development, and before that, he was the country’s minister of economy and finance. In these roles, he implemented structural reforms and negotiated key agreements with development partners. His governance experience provides him with a comprehensive understanding of both the demand and supply sides of development finance.

Tah’s decisive victory reflects a desire among shareholders for a leader with a track record of institutional transformation and financial innovation. His election suggests a shift towards prioritizing capital mobilization (from both domestic and international sources), institutional reform to strengthen the agency and resilience of Africa’s financial systems, and inclusive growth. His victory also shows an acknowledgment of the importance of building infrastructure that not only meets development needs but also is resilient to climate change impacts.

With the US proposal to cut $555 million in funding for the AfDB, Tah is expected to enhance domestic resource mobilization and implement innovative financial instruments. He is also slated to strengthen partnerships and diversify funding sources, especially with emerging powers such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and others, to secure needed resources for the continent’s development agenda.

Tah’s election as president of the AfDB comes at a critical juncture for Africa. His experience, strategic vision, and commitment to inclusive and sustainable development position him to lead the AfDB in addressing the continent’s pressing challenges. And as he assumes office, there is a renewed sense of optimism and determination to accelerate Africa’s transformation.

—Frannie Léautier is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Future-proofing the Bank

Tah’s election reflects a clear shareholder pivot toward Gulf capital as traditional donors pull back. With the United States proposing to cut $555 million in funding, shareholders prioritized a candidate who could mobilize alternative funding. Tah’s track record (doubling the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa’s assets) and his experience (with which he can likely channel Gulf sovereign wealth into AfDB co-investment vehicles) proved decisive. His landslide win signals a strategic consensus among shareholders: Future-proofing the Bank means diversifying, moving away from Western donors. 

—Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a 2023 Millennium fellow.

Remaking the donor base

Tah’s large victory should give him the momentum needed to tackle the huge challenges facing the AfDB. Among them, he will have to deal with the erosion of the traditional donor base, best exemplified by (but not limited to) the United States’ cuts to the US Agency for International Development. He will need to tap new donors and solicit more support from current donors—for example, Gulf states—as well as unlock the full potential of the private sector. Moreover, given Africa’s vulnerability to climate change, he will have to accelerate climate-change adaptation and mitigation measures and face tough choices regarding the African energy mix.

—Emilie Bel is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center

Yet, don’t discount the United States

While the United States may be losing interest in the AfDB, it is clear that other powers seeking greater influence in African countries and institutions were paying close attention to this contest. The race became bitter, as countries (both African ones and other shareholders) backed different candidates. But the attention was warranted; these are difficult times for the Bank, given the challenges it faces, from climate to trade to declining donor support.

With the United States—one of the largest contributors to the AfDB—proposing to cut $555 million in contributions, voting members smartly sought a solution to help the AfDB look beyond traditional Western donors. By selecting Tah, the outgoing president of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, AfDB will be well-positioned to seek contributions from Arab League members.

Yet, under Tah, AfDB leadership should not discount the United States; it should continue to court Washington. It can do so by ensuring that projects and investments funded by US contributions are prioritized appropriately. Toward that aim, Tah should deploy a more robust communication strategy with the goal of clearly articulating to a skeptical US domestic audience how US investments in the AfDB benefit Americans.

—Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Africa Center

An agility challenge

Tuh’s victory signals continuity in some respects, but it is also a sign of potential recalibration ahead for the AfDB. While his platform emphasizes reform and modernization, the true test will lie in how he navigates entrenched institutional dynamics and mounting pressure for measurable outcomes. Tuh has inherited a Bank at a crossroads and is tasked with addressing climate finance, youth unemployment, and shifting geopolitical alignments, especially amid intensifying competition among global powers, including the United States, China, and Gulf states. His legacy will be defined by his ability to sustain trust among member states while steering the Bank toward greater agility and impact in a rapidly changing development landscape.

—Alexandria Maloney is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, president of Black Professionals in International Affairs, and a visiting lecturer at Cornell University

A reflection of Africa’s biggest challenges

Tah’s decisive election comes at a pivotal moment for Africa. In a shifting global landscape marked by geopolitical realignment and the decline of traditional development aid, his election reflects a growing and urgent concern about accelerating Africa’s transformation and unlocking youth employment. It also underscores the need to mobilize African domestic resources and to harness the continent’s demographic growth as a powerful development dividend—rather than a burden. Tah’s vision is both bold and Africa-centered; but the delivery of that vision will depend on his ability to strike strategic partnerships.

—Didier Acouetey is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center and president and founder of the AfricSearch Group

The post Experts react: How Sidi Ould Tah will shape the African Development Bank appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet despite Saied’s apparent opposition to joining the Abraham Accords, his decision in November 2023 to halt the Tunisian parliament’s controversial bill criminalizing normalizing ties with Israel provided a glimpse into the president’s cost-benefit analysis over measures that could alienate the West completely. It signaled an opening, even if a very narrow one, that the possibility of Tunisian—Israel rapprochement might not be as far-fetched as experts predict, and that even a rogue actor like Saied sees the benefits in joining a Westernized coalition during times of war.  Yet in the long run, especially after the war in Gaza, Tunisia’s historical openness to the West might present an opportunity to advance normalization between the two countries.

Stubborn challenges: Israel and Tunisia’s rocky relations

Israel and Tunisia do not currently maintain any kind of formal relations, but this has not always been the case.

Beginning in the 1950s, under former Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, limited ties developed between the two countries. These included informal connections and meetings between politicians from both sides, initiated by diplomats from each country. The relationship served mutual interests—Israel sought recognition from an Arab state, while Tunisia aimed to secure support for its development, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Consequently, in the nineties, Tunisia and Israel established low-level diplomatic relations (culminating in the opening of “interest sections” in each other’s countries, serving as de facto embassies), making the relations between the countries formal.  

However, the Palestinian issue has long been a central element of Tunisia’s foreign policy, causing attrition between Israeli and Tunisian diplomatic relations. Tunis has long expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and their struggle for self-determination and has historically defended the two-state solution. More importantly, Tunisia hosted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters from 1982 to 1993 after Yasser Arafat was forced to flee Beirut, Lebanon, then under siege by the Israelis during the first Israel-Lebanon War. Tunis hosted the PLO headquarters until the Oslo Accords, when it relocated to Gaza and the West Bank.  

This period helped cement closeness between Tunisians to the Palestinian cause, a sentiment further solidified by Israel’s deadly aerial attack on Hammam Chot on the PLO headquarters in 1985, killing a number of civilians and causing further resentment among Tunisians. Tunisians never forgave Israel for what they perceived to be an illegal incursion on their territory.

In 2000, with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in Israel and Palestine, relations between Israel and Tunisia entered a period of further crisis, leading to the suspension of official ties. While the relationship had deteriorated significantly already, the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians rendered diplomatic efforts virtually impossible.

A continuation of the deteriorating relations underpinned the decades that followed. During Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution, Israel remained on the fence about improving ties with the new political forces, fearing the rise of an anti-Israel posture. Meanwhile, the Tunisians passed a new Constitution in 2014, underscoring its commitment to the Palestinian cause, and open letters signed by academics and researchers calling for criminalizing ties with Israel circulated among political forces.

Under Saied’s current rule, these tensions have escalated significantly, including when he rejected Israel’s 1948 borders and called for the “full liberation of Palestine,” while avoiding any overt condemnation of Hamas after its October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. On some occasions, Saied adopted an overtly antisemitic posture, accusing “the Zionists” of plotting the deadly 2023 floods in  Libya that killed some four thousand people, a trope linked to the long-held antisemitic prejudice that Jews somehow control the world. His remarks sparked outrage across Israeli media.  

Tunisia’s foreign policy has recently shifted markedly into a more anti-Western stance, cozying up to Iran in the process.

In May 2024, Saied visited Tehran to pay respects to the late President Ebrahim Raisi, marking the first-ever visit of a Tunisian president to  Iran. That same month, rumors swirled in Italian and French news outlets of unusual air movements by Russian aircraft in the coastal city of Djerba, raising eyebrows at a potential Tunisia-Russian alignment. In August of the same year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tunis for the second time in over a year, pledging to help the country grapple with its wheat drought.

Why would Tunisia choose to normalize ties with Israel?

But there is even historical precedent to disrupt this trend.

Historically, Tunisia has tended to align more with the West than with the broader Arab world. However, its geographic location has made it essential to maintain strong relations with neighboring countries, particularly Algeria and Libya. While Tunisia has strategic interests in its ties with Algeria, especially in the areas of energy, trade, and finance, former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali sought to moderate the country’s financial connections to Arab countries and aimed to avoid the kind of reliance on crude oil revenues seen in other Arab states in the region.

Beyond the more apparent economic and trade incentives for Tunisia to normalize relations with Israel, Tunis could also gain from reigniting this closer alignment with the West, particularly as Iran and Russia, with whom it has recently signaled an openness to closer ties, face mounting setbacks that may force them to turn inward. Both Moscow and Tehran have faced major setbacks on the international stage. The former is dealing with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and an exorbitant number of human losses, and the latter is temporarily retreating after receiving a significant blow from Israel during the ongoing regional war between Israel and Iranian proxies. Tunisia is far from being a strategic priority for either power, and these setbacks should worry Tunisia, which might be left on its own to deal with an increasing migration threat from sub-Saharan Africa and an impending economic crisis.  

Another factor that might lead Tunisia to normalize ties with Israel is the potential for hedging between regional powers. Tunisia is particularly susceptible to external influences from countries with greater international stature, particularly when looking at its ongoing relationship with Algeria. Algeria, for its part, has steadily been courting Tunisia by supporting Tunis economically and politically, including a 2022 grant worth 200 million dollars from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to help with the country’s struggling economy, and offering leniency and cheaper prices on electricity and gas from the Transmed pipeline. Tunisia, grappling with high public debt and stagnant growth, and with the economy desperately reeling since the Covid-19 pandemic, has had little choice other than to accept Algeria’s offerings. Algeria’s rationale for influencing Tunisia stems from a need to counter perceived external Western interference—exacerbated by the signing of the Abraham Accords between its regional rival Morocco and Israel—which has heightened its sense of isolation and vulnerability.

Normalizing ties with Israel could allow Tunisia to hedge between regional powers to avoid full alignment with Algeria and maximize its personal gains. It would reduce Tunis’ risk of overdependence on Algeria, and limit the risk of collateral damage should the relationship sour and challenges emerge for Algeria itself.

Israel’s interest

Normalization between Israel and Tunisia could offer Israel several potential advantages. These include contributing to regional stability and peace, expanding international recognition and support, and possibly encouraging other countries to engage more openly with Israel. Additionally, normalization could pave the way for stronger ties in trade, tourism, and investments, especially in the field of agriculture and irrigation. It would also promote Israeli legitimacy in the region, reducing international efforts to isolate it, increasing its international standing, and opening new business opportunities in Arab markets.

From a strategic perspective, improved relations with Tunisia might also help limit Tunisia’s cooperation with countries hostile to Israel, such as Algeria, Libya, and Iran. It could even reduce the potential for renewed activity by terrorist groups operating in or from the region.

That said, many of these benefits are not unique to Tunisia—they reflect the broader advantages Israel could gain from normalizing relations with any additional Arab country.

Threats and pathways to improvement

On the other hand, normalizing with Israel poses a severe threat to Tunisia, which Saied may not be apt to overlook. Firstly, it will inevitably fracture its relationship with Algeria, alienating Tunis’ primary economic backer. Algeria has had no qualms in stressing its disdain for the Abraham Accords, recently reiterating its historic backing of a full Palestinian state, the support of which is enshrined in its constitution. Algeria would certainly take it personally and would do everything in its power to retaliate, including rescinding its economic partnership, nullifying diplomatic ties, and reinstating tighter controls on late payments.

Secondly, Saied will face severe internal backlash. Tunisians have been at the forefront of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the likes of which the country has not witnessed since the 2011 revolution. In a time when Saied is tightening control over the country, he still understands the importance of maintaining public support, and normalizing ties with Israel may pit the population against him, lessening his power and legitimacy.  

While Israel perceives normalization with Tunisia as naturally beneficial, the same cannot be said in reverse, and normalization between the two does not seem feasible as long as the war in Gaza continues.

If the West wished to see normalization between these two countries prevail, it would have to provide Tunis with significant concessions. These could take the form of economic support through International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with fewer austerity measures, or simple economic bailout packages with few strings attached.

However, such a decision carries significant risks, namely the potential erosion of the IMF’s credibility and legitimacy on the international stage. Additionally, the West, particularly the United States, can seek to leverage its ongoing military partnership with Tunisia to retain strategic influence.  This could involve conditioning Tunisian aid to agreements such as the obligation to maintain secrecy over military knowledge and capabilities, especially when dealing with enemies such as Iran. This could restrict Tunisia’s movement while placing greater value on Washington’s ongoing support.

Normalization between Arab countries and Israel is still a top foreign policy agenda for US President Donald Trump’s administration. While Israel’s war rages on in Gaza, Trump has made no secret of his wish to see Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords, a feat which will undoubtedly help him reach his objective of becoming the peacemaker of the century.

While the potential for these two countries to normalize may seem farfetched, there are many strategic benefits for both that go beyond what meets the eye. Analysts may do well to keep an eye out for potential signs of rapprochement, as even small shifts may signal deeper political changes in the region.

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Ahead of this pivotal moment, the United States can act now to support a democratic electoral process in Cameroon and help the country navigate what unfolds after the vote.

Cameroonian President Paul Biya, now ninety-two years old and having held power since 1982, is one of Africa’s longest-ruling leaders. Over the course of his decades in office, elections have been routinely marred by fraud allegations and repression. In the country’s first multiparty elections, held in 1992, Biya clung to power amid accusations of rigging, and opposition leader John Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest during ensuing protests. More recently, in the 2018 election, Biya was declared the winner and credited with 71 percent of the vote, but there were irregularities: Turnout in the conflict-torn Anglophone regions was barely 10 percent. Protests over the result led to mass arrests of opposition supporters. Despite concerns about his age and health, Biya is expected to run again, presenting himself as the guarantor of stability. However, public clamoring for change has grown loud: Catholic bishops have urged Biya to step aside, and even a pro-government newspaper opined that the long-time leader “deserves a rest” in favor of new leadership.

Biya’s ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and its allies are closing ranks to preserve power. Throughout 2024, several CPDM elites and patronage partners have pressed Biya to seek another term, touting his experience and warning that the country could suffer instability if he steps down. They are again mobilizing a broad coalition of smaller parties to back Biya, as in past elections. Meanwhile, intense behind-the-scenes jockeying is underway over who might succeed the aging president in a post-Biya scenario. Various power brokers have been floated as successors. Talk about one such name, Biya’s son Franck, has raised fears of an undemocratic dynastic transition. The uncertainty around succession is a significant risk factor, a ticking time bomb that could trigger factional infighting if not managed transparently.

The opposition sees 2025 as a rare chance to finally end decades of one-person rule. Over thirty opposition parties have allied to unify behind a single candidate, Maurice Kamto, aiming to overcome Cameroon’s one-round, first-past-the-post system that has historically favored the incumbent. Kamto—a former minister who insists he won the 2018 election—is campaigning on anti-corruption and reform, tapping into public yearning for change. Yet the regime has moved aggressively to undercut this challenge. Early this year, authorities banned two opposition coalitions, calling them “illegal” and “clandestine” associations, driving Kamto’s alliance underground. Legal obstacles are piling up: Election law requires a candidate’s party to hold parliamentary seats, but the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC), Kamto’s party, has none after it encouraged Cameroonians to boycott a flawed 2020 legislative vote. In a brazen step, the CPDM-dominated government postponed the next legislative elections to 2026, denying the opposition any chance to gain seats before the presidential race.

Meanwhile, harassment of those who dissent continues unabated—activists and journalists are detained on spurious charges, peaceful protests are barred, and media outlets critical of the regime are silenced. These tactics cast doubt on whether the 2025 polls will be free or fair, absent significant pressure for a level playing field. Nevertheless, civil society and youth activists have been mobilizing: In 2024, they led mass voter registration drives to encourage turnout, signaling a grassroots appetite for change despite the odds.

The stakes extend beyond who wins. They encompass Cameroon’s stability, economy, and regional security. A flawed election could inflame simmering conflicts and public frustrations. The Anglophone Crisis in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions has already killed over six thousand people and displaced nearly 700,000 internally, with around 100,000 more fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. Separatist militants reject the upcoming election and have violently enforced boycotts in those regions before, leaving a significant portion of the population disenfranchised.

Elsewhere, a contested outcome or a result marred by repression could spark unrest among a young population increasingly fed up with corruption and lack of opportunity. Ethno-regional tensions might also flare if a perceived power grab fuels resentment among communities who feel excluded. By contrast, a credible election and peaceful outcome would give the next government a mandate to address these crises, from pursuing a political solution to the Anglophone conflict to focusing the military on the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North region. Cameroon is richly endowed with oil, timber, and fertile land, but its economic potential has been blunted by graft and mismanagement. Decades of kleptocratic governance have left over half the population impoverished. Another seven years of business-as-usual would likely deepen economic malaise and alienation, whereas a new commitment among leadership to reform could attract investment and better harness Cameroon’s resources for development.

International actors are watching closely, as Cameroon’s trajectory will impact Central African stability. France—Cameroon’s former colonial ruler—has backed Biya in the past, though French officials now avoid openly taking sides. The United States and European Union (EU) regularly urge fair elections and respect for human rights (the United States, for example, cut some military aid due to abuses in Anglophone regions). Still, their security cooperation interests temper Western leverage.

Meanwhile, other external players are exploiting the situation: Russian-linked media in Cameroon spread anti-Western narratives to bolster Biya’s regime. Regional governments, many led by entrenched leaders, generally prefer Biya to stay in power and are unlikely to press for change, prioritizing stability over democracy.

Ultimately, Cameroon’s future will be decided at home. A genuinely free and fair election would bolster Cameroon’s international standing and unlock greater foreign support, whereas a blatantly rigged vote may isolate the regime and sow internal turmoil.

Cameroon’s vote is about more than the country’s democratic future: As one analysis noted, it is part of a broader test of whether Africa’s elections will uphold democratic norms or contribute to a slide backward. Here is how the United States can help support democracy in Cameroon during this pivotal election year:

• Use diplomacy to promote a free and fair election: The United States should convince Cameroonian leaders, both publicly and privately, to uphold democratic norms in the 2025 vote. Diplomatic engagement should emphasize that opposition candidates must be allowed to compete freely, international observers should be admitted, and security forces must refrain from violence. Coordinating these messages with allies (France, the EU, and the African Union) will increase impact and help deter electoral misconduct.
• Leverage aid and security ties: Washington should tie aspects of its assistance to Cameroon’s electoral conduct and respect for human rights. The prospect of continued military aid and business engagement can be made conditional on the regime permitting a transparent election and avoiding crackdowns. Conversely, a blatantly fraudulent or violent process should prompt targeted consequences (such as visa bans or aid suspensions). By calibrating incentives and penalties, the United States can encourage accountability without undermining vital counterterrorism cooperation.
• Support election monitoring and civic engagement: To reduce the risk of fraud or unrest, the United States should back robust election-observation and civil-society initiatives. This includes supporting credible international and domestic observers and assisting local groups in voter education and parallel vote tabulation. Such efforts—coordinated with other partners—will bolster public confidence in the process, deter manipulation, and empower Cameroonians to defend their votes peacefully.
• Plan for post-election stability and reforms: The United States should prepare to help Cameroon navigate the vote’s aftermath. If the election results are disputed or violence looms, Washington (with African partners and United Nations agencies) can offer to facilitate dialogue or mediation to prevent escalation. In any outcome, the United States should encourage the winning candidate to pursue inclusive reforms—for example, an inclusive national dialogue to address the Anglophone Crisis and to introduce tangible anticorruption measures. Targeted US support (diplomatic partnership, technical aid, and peacebuilding programs) can be leveraged to help achieve these steps, reinforcing that long-term US partnership will deepen if Cameroon advances stability, inclusivity, and good governance.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert and practitioner in democracy support, peacebuilding, and governance, with over a decade of experience across Africa. He holds a Doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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As the race for access to critical minerals accelerates—with US President Donald Trump declaring the minerals that power new technologies essential to US national security, and China flexing its control of mineral supply chains with export bans—the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the spotlight. But that light reveals a complicated picture: As major powers and neighboring states contend for access to the country’s tin, cobalt, and copper, the Rwandan-backed M23 paramilitary has seized control of large swaths of eastern Congo, and the specter of full-scale war looms. The DRC signed a minerals-for-infrastructure deal with China in 2007, and now a minerals-for-security or minerals-for-peace deal with the United States is in the offing. 

The DRC has a chance to break the so-called “resource curse” and use its mineral wealth to build the roads, power grids, health infrastructure, and more that will sustain a democratic, economically growing country in the years ahead. Other countries and investors have a chance to live up to their commitments to responsible sourcing of natural resources, and in so doing support good governance and regional peace. The alternative is a continuation of the bad patterns of the past, with the real risk of a new outbreak of violence along the same fault lines that produced the deadliest conflict since World War II.

We asked six experts how the DRC—and its global partners—can take this transformative path. Read on for analyses of the country’s business environment, the industrial potential of its critical minerals and other promising sectors, and peace and security throughout the country.

The business case for peace and democracy in the DRC is strong

By Dave Peterson

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Congo’s war and the critical minerals scramble are inextricably intertwined

By Mvemba Phezo Dizolele

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Critical minerals won’t transform lives in the DRC—a radical shift in security and economic governance will

By Rabah Arezki

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Partner perspective: The DRC’s vast potential extends beyond mining

By Thomas De Dreux-Brézé

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US investors must lead on responsible sourcing in the DRC

By Nicole Namwezi Batumike

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Better roads and stable power grids can unlock the DRC’s potential

By Calixte Ahokpossi

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The business case for peace and democracy in the DRC is strong

Dave Peterson is the former senior director of the Africa Program of the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Rwandan-backed rebel militia M23 has seized control of most of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) while the national army (known by its French acronym, FARDC) and international peacekeepers retreat. At least seven thousand civilians have been killed and thousands more raped. Two million displaced persons and refugees are fleeing for safety, joining some five million already displaced. The US embassy in Kinshasa has been attacked by angry mobs—and both strategic interests and American values are at stake.

The DRC is rich. With 111 million inhabitants in a geographical area the size of Europe, the country is blessed (or cursed) by $24 trillion in mineral resources such as copper, cobalt, lithium, gold, and diamonds, much of it crucial to the world’s transition to electric power, half of it exported to China, and much of it now controlled by Chinese investors. Congo has the world’s largest tropical forests after the Amazon and a vast river network that could power half the African continent; it also has enormous agricultural potential, gas, and oil.

And the DRC is where the greatest slaughter of human beings since World War II occurred just thirty years ago, even as atrocities continue to be reported daily in the country’s east. In addition to M23, more than a hundred militia groups terrorize the population. Rampant corruption sucks billions of dollars from the economy every year, and poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and disease statistics place the DRC near the bottom of global rankings.

The Congolese people have begged for change. Democratic elections held on December 20, 2023, were won by the incumbent, Felix Tshisekedi. Although flawed in many respects, credible domestic observation groups, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and others, concluded they reflected the will of the people. The elections were reasonably competitive and peaceful, a notable achievement compared to Congo’s nine neighbors, many among the most autocratic countries in the world. The elections raised the level of political discourse and further cultivated Congo’s democratic practice. Congo’s press is relatively free, so citizens can debate, organize, and criticize their government. The nation’s civil society is extensive, active, and skilled—advocating, educating, and mobilizing citizens on a host of issues.

Yet after another year in power, the second Tshisekedi administration has failed to resolve the conflict in the east, address rampant corruption, or improve governance. The human rights record is not reassuring, as NED’s Congolese partners and others have documented. More than one hundred kuluna, purportedly youth gang members ensnared by DRC’s notoriously corrupt justice system, were recently executed after the government reinstated the death penalty. Freedom of expression is also under pressure as activists, journalists, and whistleblowers are attacked and fear for their personal safety. Meanwhile, the president seems intent on tampering with the constitution to allow him to extend his term in office.

The mining companies, banks, and tech industry—aware of but loath to abandon the bloody supply chain they rely on—profit handsomely from Congo’s precious minerals. Although the conflict in the country’s east is about more than the trade in minerals, and international funders have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the problem, the DRC’s best hope may be for foreign investors to mobilize pressure on the belligerents to make peace. The Belgian government has investigated Apple for tolerating human rights abuses in its supply chain originating in the DRC, and Apple has acknowledged the difficulty of identifying the sources of its suppliers. Because this is an issue for the entire industry, companies should find it advantageous, both in terms of public relations as well as in creating a conducive business environment, to be more accountable for the stability and prosperity of the communities from which they derive their wealth.

The Trump administration is paying attention. Tenuous negotiations between representatives of the Congolese and Rwandan governments led by the administration’s special envoy Massad Boulos may be making progress. To buttress this, Congolese civil society should be included in the process, including appropriate NGOs, community groups, the church, labor, and business, as proved successful in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue two decades ago. The DRC’s democratic aspirations should be the United States’ comparative advantage. The United States made mistakes in Congo, then called Zaire, during the Cold War, to the detriment of its own reputation, and it would be a shame to return to that era of zero-sum geopolitical competition. Security, strength, and prosperity are interests every nation pursues, but the United States can do better. Many Congolese, including civil society and political leaders, still see the United States as a force for good and a beacon of hope for ideals such as freedom, peace, democracy, justice, and human rights. It is what makes America strong: It is what makes the United States friends and allies, accords America respect and admiration—to be seen as a world leader rather than just another player, a model rather than a pariah.

The US private sector should take the lead. A golden age cannot be built on the blood of innocents, a course that can only lead to more hatred and suffering and will ultimately fail. The international business community must unite in committing to resource extraction practices that abide by international standards of human rights and transparency, incentivize the rival governments and factions in the subregion to lay down their arms, and make it easier and more profitable for companies to do their work. The private sector can rally international public opinion and pave the way for stability and prosperity. The long-suffering Congolese people deserve it.

Congo’s war and the critical minerals scramble are inextricably intertwined

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

For the past thirty years, the world has viewed the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo) through a binary lens of conflict and the exploitation of natural and mineral resources. The conflict optics magnify the insecurity that has characterized life in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. The protracted conflict between Congo and Rwanda spawned the proliferation of militias, including the two iterations of the Rwanda-backed M23, which captured the Congolese cities of Goma and Bukavu on January 25, 2025, and February 16, 2025, respectively. The death toll is estimated at more than seven thousand since January 2025, with unofficial reports from the region suggesting a much higher number of victims.

With 7.8 million internally displaced people, Congo ranks alongside Syria and Sudan among countries with the largest displaced populations, according to the United Nations. Of the more than two million people who have been displaced since the 2022 resurgence of M23, one million were displaced in 2024. Sexual violence, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have increased in M23-occupied areas. These abuses will continue as the rebels expand their territorial control.

Coverage of the conflict has also emphasized the role of natural and mineral resources as drivers of the war. Congo’s resource endowment is valued at a staggering $24 trillion. Analyses of the war have focused on the looting and smuggling of minerals, and have pointed to Rwanda and Uganda as primary beneficiaries. The two countries have emerged as major exporters of minerals, such as gold and coltan, of which they have limited reserves.

Recently, heightened interest in Congo’s mineral resources has been driven, among other reasons, by the West’s determination to circumvent China and secure critical resources like cobalt, copper, and lithium. For instance, on February 18, 2024, the European Union (EU) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains with Rwanda. Even though the EU signed similar memoranda with Congo, Zambia, and Namibia, Rwanda’s case raised questions given the country’s troubled history with Congo concerning mineral resources. This history includes invading Congo, arming violent rebel groups, and smuggling minerals out of rebel-controlled territory.

The second element driving high-profile interest in the country’s mineral wealth is the Trump administration’s classification of critical minerals as vital to US national security. The pursuit of a US-Congo minerals-for-security deal underscores Washington’s increased interest in Congo’s mineral endowment. As the world waits to learn about the contours and substance of the contract and what the United States will offer Kinshasa, it’s worth taking stock of the current foreign investment landscape in the country.

China tops the list of major investors with important financial and technical commitments to Congo’s mining sector. Besides China, the other major players who have established significant footprints in the country include the EU and the United States.

China leads in the mining and infrastructure sectors

China’s investments in DRC focus on the mining sector, with major stakes in the cobalt and copper industries. The engagement stems from the 2008 Sicomines joint venture between Chinese companies (Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering Corporation) and the Congolese government. The venture is the foundation of the Congo-China cooperation. Originally valued at $9 billion, the deal is a minerals-for-infrastructure barter. After pushback from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Congolese civil society organizations, the deal was renegotiated to $6 billion in 2009. In exchange for mining rights, China has financed infrastructure projects, including roads and hospitals. In 2024, Chinese infrastructure investment commitments were valued at $7 billion. Today, China is the largest investor in the country.

United States seeks minerals for national security

Until the advent of the second Trump administration, the United States showed little interest in DRC minerals and focused on the humanitarian challenges of the country. Western companies that secured mining deals often sold their holdings to the Chinese. With every Western business divestment, the Chinese increased their stake in Congo’s mining sector. The new policy change has generated interest for greater US-Congo cooperation. This minerals-focused change is supported by a robust diplomatic engagement that seeks to broker peace between Congo and Rwanda. The administration’s stated objective is to stabilize Congo and create the right conditions for investments in mining and infrastructure.

The new US approach is yielding early results. On May 6, 2025, California-based KoBold Metals and Australia-based AVZ Minerals reached an agreement for the former to acquire AVZ Minerals’ interests in the Manono lithium deposit in Congo. Billionaires Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos back KoBold. The agreement will enable the company to invest over one billion dollars to develop the lithium project.

It is difficult to evaluate the level of current US investments in Congo. US pledges of multi-billion-dollar investments depend on the promises of peace accords between Rwanda and Congo and related bilateral mineral agreements.

European Union focuses on ethical approach to critical minerals

European countries’ approach in Congo focuses on ethical sourcing and sustainability, which also include traceability of minerals due to armed conflict. European development banks have funded projects that improve governance and reduce poverty. Some of these initiatives, however, have faced criticism. For instance, in light of the resurgence of M23, the February 18, 2024, memorandum the EU signed with Rwanda—“establishing close cooperation with Rwanda” on the sourcing of critical minerals—has raised questions about the EU’s commitment to ethical sourcing, given that Rwanda backs the violent M23 paramilitary group. Analysts of the Great Lakes region, diplomats, and members of the European Parliament have all questioned and challenged the intent and effect of the memorandum. Some see it as a driver of the re-emergence of the M23 and the current war between Congo and Rwanda.

Top European investors in Congo include France, the Netherlands, and Italy, who contributed a combined foreign direct investment stock of approximately $32.6 billion in 2022.

Comparative overview of investments

As the scramble for critical minerals enters a new phase with increased US interest in Congo, the country needs effective governance and transparent policies to ensure that foreign investments contribute to sustainable development and economic growth.

Critical minerals won’t transform lives in the DRC—a radical shift in security and economic governance will

Rabah Arezki is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He previously served as chief economist and vice president for economic governance and knowledge management at the African Development Bank, as well as chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank, and as chief of the commodities unit in the research department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s abundance of critical minerals has given rise to comparisons with Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth. But that abundance has not improved citizens’ lives in one of the poorest countries in the world. Yet there is a course that could make that possible: finding the right balance between openness to investments from multinational corporations and economic sovereignty—broadly defined as the ability of a country to control its own economic system.

The DRC is the repository of the world’s largest reserves of critical minerals such as cobalt, copper, and lithium. Indeed, the DRC holds around 70 percent and 60 percent of the world’s cobalt and lithium reserves, respectively, as well significant deposits of nickel and uranium, which are metal components for energy generation and batteries for electric vehicles. Yet the DRC encapsulates the seemingly insurmountable and intertwined challenges posed by critical minerals. These challenges are tied to geopolitics, conflicts, and the environment as well as economic and social dimensions.

First and foremost, the challenge facing the DRC is the new geopolitics around critical minerals. The demand for critical minerals is exploding. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for minerals is projected to increase by more than four times by 2040 amid the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Major powers—namely China, the United States, and the European Union—are engaged in a technological race spurring competition for access to these critical minerals. At the center of that global scramble is the DRC, which is being courted by these powers like never before. China is heavily invested in the mining sector of the DRC and controls the supply chains of critical minerals, including their processing.

Amid the technological race, China has recently imposed restrictions on exports of critical minerals to the United States. Washington and Brussels have tried to challenge Beijing’s monopoly of the supply chains of these minerals by attempting to secure mining contracts, including in the DRC. That competition should in principle help the DRC to not only get a fair share from the mining contracts but also the opportunity to move up the value chain. In practice, multinational corporations and foreign governments have much stronger capacity in negotiating mining contracts relative to the government of the DRC. Quid pro quos are also common involving the receipt of aid packages originating from self-interested donor countries in exchange for the awarding of mining contracts to multinational corporations—linked to donors.

Another major challenge for the DRC is conflict. The DRC is faced with external and internal conflicts. The DRC has a complex history: Once known as the Belgian Congo, it experienced a cruel form of colonization as the de facto personal property of Leopold II, Belgium’s king. The DRC’s post-independence era was plagued by direct interventions by foreign powers and autocratic rulers. That history helps explain the DRC’s deficient institutions, a persistent low level of trust among citizens, and distrust between the citizenry and the government.

The DRC has long faced massive violence and crimes in mineral-rich provinces such as Katanga and North Kivu—fueled by neighbors such as Rwanda and Uganda. The advances of Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Congo is alarming for the DRC and could fuel a “major continental conflict.” The Trump administration is actively pushing for a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda to end the violence. This peace deal appears to be contingent upon the two countries each signing a bilateral economic agreement with the United States involving mineral extraction and processing. The peace negotiations are at an early stage, but these efforts are welcome especially if they lead to an outcome perceived as just.

Minerals are routinely smuggled out of the DRC. Add to that illicit artisanal mining—mining done, generally on a small scale and with low-tech tools, by individuals not employed by a mining company—as a tug of war between the authorities and citizens directly grabbing minerals. As a vast territory, it is imperative for the DRC to expand and strengthen the governance of its security sector to secure its borders and confront armed groups operating on its territory. The DRC is nominally a centralized republic, and it needs to find the right balance for revenue sharing between the different provinces and the central government to reduce internal tensions.

Further, the extraction of critical minerals is leading to significant environmental and health hazards. Indeed, extraction is often associated with deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and the use of toxic chemicals (including mercury), which are polluting ground water sources. Add to that child labor in the extraction of critical minerals, with children and women facing health degradation and abuse. The weak enforcement of environmental and social standards in the DRC is very concerning. A global debate is raging over the boycott of critical minerals emanating from zones of conflicts and forced labor. These boycotts alone are unlikely to sway the DRC’s government to do right by its citizens, but multinational corporations and foreign governments may be more susceptible to pressure.

These multifaceted challenges may seem insurmountable, but that should not deter the government of the DRC. To confront these challenges, the DRC must find a balance between outward- and inward-facing institutions. On the outward-facing front, the government needs to get its fair share of revenues from the extraction of minerals and attract investment in processing domestically. To do so, the government needs to deploy utmost transparency in its dealing with multinational corporations and foster the right human capital to match the capacity on the other side.

On the inward-facing front, the DRC needs to also ensure it is redistributing the proceeds of the revenues from the extraction of critical minerals to its citizens to ensure economic justice. To do so, the government of DRC needs to improve the allocative and technical efficiency of its spending. The government of DRC should pursue further its local content policy (designed to ensure that extractive industrial activity benefits the region where the resources are found) by localizing the processing of critical minerals. A useful example is the case of Botswana, which acquired a 15 percent stake in the world’s biggest diamond miner, DeBeers, which helped lock in local diamond-cutting activities.

This would represent a radical system shift in the DRC’s economic governance apparatus—and such a shift is imperative, in security as well as economic governance. Without that radical shift, the benefits of critical minerals won’t reach the people of the DRC. The Trump administration peace proposal could provide a pathway to a just peace and security between DRC and its neighbors, most notably Rwanda.

US investors must lead on responsible sourcing in the DRC

Nicole Namwezi Batumike is a gender and responsible sourcing specialist at the Congolese nonprofit Panzi Foundation.

The ongoing conversations between the United States and the DRC over access to critical minerals present a rare and urgent opportunity to reset the terms of engagement with Congolese stakeholders and the broader mineral ecosystem. US officials have indicated that American and other Western companies are prepared to make multi-billion-dollar investments in the region once the bilateral mineral deals are finalized. The DRC holds vast reserves of cobalt, copper, and other strategic minerals essential to global technological and energy systems, yet for decades, the Congolese people have borne the costs of extraction without sharing in its benefits, treated as collateral in deals driven by geopolitical rivalries and elite bargains. On top of fueling instability and deepening marginalization, these transactional arrangements have also exposed investors to growing legal, financial, and reputational risks.

Experience shows that when mining fails to deliver value to local communities, companies lose their social license to operate, along with the legitimacy of the regimes they once depended on. In turn, those regimes have proven willing to shift allegiances in pursuit of regime security. The DRC, for example, has filed lawsuits against downstream tech giants and pushed for sanctions targeting neighboring countries laundering conflict minerals. It is increasingly clear that the Congolese regime is not bound to any single partner.

US engagement in Africa must reflect geopolitical realities. Recent peace deal discussions show the United States is willing to engage Rwanda’s refining sector—despite Kigali’s documented role in violating Congolese sovereignty and committing war crimes. If responsible sourcing is to truly guide stable engagements, policymakers must reckon with the risks of endorsing impunity and failing to deliver justice for the Congolese people.

The negotiation of a US-DRC mineral deal offers a crucial opportunity to break this cycle, provided Kinshasa resists the historical pattern of leveraging minerals solely for regime survival, and provided the United States supports a model of genuine security: one not rooted in a logic of extractivism but in mutual accountability and the rule of law. By aligning US investment strategy with Congolese legal frameworks and responsible sourcing standards, both countries can lower risks by forging a sustainable model.

Responsible sourcing is a legal and strategic imperative

Meeting international due diligence standards to ensure that a given business activity does not involve human-rights violations has shifted from being a reputational safeguard to a legal and strategic requirement. Standards include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Human rights due diligence is now codified through laws such as the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, France’s Duty of Vigilance Law, and Germany’s Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, making risk mitigation binding across global operations, especially in high-risk contexts like the DRC.

Yet despite these frameworks, the DRC remains at war, and the global minerals trade continues to serve short-term political and economic agendas. In 2024, the US Government Accountability Office reported that Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (America’s flagship due diligence law) had not reduced violence in eastern Congo and may have exacerbated conflict around artisanal gold-mining sites. The US government’s insistence on better outcomes demonstrates that due diligence is a means, not an end, and it cannot resolve the structural drivers of the conflict.

The DRC’s mining codes provide a responsible framework for US investors

It is in this context that the DRC’s 2018 mining code emerges not as an obstacle but as a strategic foundation. On top of aligning closely with international expectations for human rights due diligence, the code offers investors and companies a clear, locally grounded framework to manage risk and build sustainable partnerships. Born out of years marked by revenue leakage, extractive impunity, and donor-driven liberalization, the code reasserts the government’s dual roles as a regulator and shareholder while mandating local beneficiation (a part of mineral processing). It raises royalty rates on strategic minerals like cobalt, introduces a “super-profits” tax, and makes community development contributions legally binding. It also restricts the use of “stabilization clauses,” which limit countries’ ability to apply new regulations to investors with agreements signed before the regulations went into effect, and strengthens environmental and social accountability.

Pilot models offer early lessons in responsible sourcing. For example, at Mutoshi in the Lualaba province, the collaboration of multinational commodities group Trafigura with Chemaf, a Congolese company, and Pact, an international nonprofit organization, showed that formalizing artisanal mining not only met sourcing commitments but also helped contribute to de-risking efforts. Meanwhile, the Panzi Foundation’s Green Mining Community Model, an initiative led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Denis Mukwege, links inclusive training in responsible sourcing and value addition with investments in essential infrastructure like health and education. By seeking to address the root causes of conflict and the violent tactics it enables—such as the use of rape as a weapon of war—the Green Mining Community model promotes integration and community empowerment, positioning responsible sourcing as a pathway to long-term stability and shared value.

Opportunities and challenges in the US policy landscape

The United States is on the path to establishing promising policies and frameworks for responsible investment, as demonstrated by the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act, which emphasizes governance and transparency. Initiatives such as the US-backed expansion of the Lobito Corridor* linking the DRC to Angola’s Lobito port, alongside previous efforts like USAID’s Just Gold project, could provide a strong foundation. However, their long-term impact will depend on aligning with fair labor and environmental standards, sustainable development, and, importantly, the continuity of these efforts under the new administration.

At the same time, setbacks like the 180-day suspension of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement must be urgently addressed. Restoring accountability is essential for ethical investment.

As US Rep. Sara Jacobs highlighted in a March 2025 Africa Subcommittee hearing, investments will only succeed in the long term if they do not ignore the root causes of exploitation.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo stands at a pivotal juncture: either the cycle of extractive exploitation continues, or the government leverages its mineral wealth to foster long-term development. For US stakeholders, the way forward lies in transparent, law-abiding, and community-centered partnerships. This requires a commitment to the DRC’s 2018 Mining Code and collaboration with Congolese civil society. While short-term gains may be tempting, only those who embrace responsible sourcing and inclusive models will build sustainable, competitive advantages.

Better roads and stable power grids can unlock the DRC’s potential

Calixte Ahokpossi is mission chief, Democratic Republic of the Congo, for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has vast economic potential, but infrastructure gaps remain a major constraint. The country is rich in natural resources and has a large and young population that could drive its development. However, chronic underinvestment in critical infrastructure—roads, rail networks, and power generation—continues to stifle economic progress. Additionally, governance challenges, corruption, macroeconomic instability, and recurring shocks—including armed conflicts in its eastern region—exacerbate fragility.

Addressing these challenges requires tackling their sociopolitical and economic roots, while leveraging the country’s vast natural resource wealth to rapidly bridge the infrastructure gap and foster diversified and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The DRC needs an ambitious infrastructure agenda, prioritizing the development of transport corridors and stable power grids.

Weak, unevenly distributed infrastructure

The DRC’s road network is severely underdeveloped, limiting mobility and trade. With only 152,400 kilometers (km) of roads, connectivity remains a challenge. The roads serve the nation’s vast 2.45 million km² territory, a road-to-territory ratio that is just 40 percent of the sub-Saharan African average of 0.14 km/ km², which is already low compared to other regions. Fewer than 10 percent of these roads are passable year-round, and more than half of Congolese (54.5 percent) must travel over an hour to reach a paved or asphalted road. Urban-rural disparities are stark. In the southeast (Haut-Katanga and Lualaba), large-scale copper and cobalt mining has spurred some investment in roads and rail lines, but the transportation infrastructure remains vastly insufficient for a region that supplies most of the world’s cobalt and a significant share of global copper. Indeed, the DRC accounts for over 70 percent of global cobalt output and approximately half the world’s proven reserves. In contrast, the eastern provinces (North and South Kivu, Ituri)—rich in gold and the “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum, tungsten)—receive minimal investment, as small-scale artisanal mining dominates, offering limited economic spillovers.

The DRC remains one of the least electrified nations despite vast hydropower potential. Only 19.1 percent of the population has access to electricity, with rural coverage plummeting to a mere 2 percent. The country is heavily dependent on two aging hydropower plants: Inga 1 (with an installed capacity of 351 megawatts) and Inga 2 (installed capacity of 1,424 MW), both under rehabilitation and operating at roughly 80 percent capacity. These plants primarily serve the mining industry. Ambitious projects like Inga 3 (3,000 to 11,000 MW) and the even larger Grand Inga (which could surpass China’s Three Gorges Dam) underscore the Congo River’s vast potential. Yet delays, shifting international partnerships, and environmental concerns have repeatedly stalled construction.

A barrier to inclusive growth

Weak infrastructure inflates costs, constrains businesses, and fosters economic disparities. Poor infrastructure raises transportation and production costs, stifling economic activity in time-sensitive sectors (like perishable goods). This is evident in agriculture, which employs the majority of Congolese (over 60 percent of the labor force). Despite the DRC’s fertile land, poor transport links prevent farmers from bringing their surplus produce to markets. Goods perish on farms, and the country remains dependent on food imports, making it vulnerable to global food price shocks and exchange rate fluctuations. These disruptions fuel inflation, disproportionately affecting the poorest. The weak transportation network also restricts economic diversification and limits access to remote mineral deposits, leaving critical resources untapped—or controlled by armed groups.

Unreliable energy supply disrupts businesses and limits opportunities for local transformation and adding value. From irrigation systems to medical clinics, power shortages affect essential activities and reinforce a cycle of poverty and missed opportunities. They also hamper industrialization, making local mineral processing, manufacturing, and daily business operations difficult or virtually impossible. Mining companies report that frequent power shortages force them to rely on diesel generators, raising production costs substantially. This inefficiency hits small businesses even harder, eroding profit margins and reducing corporate income tax revenues. Under these conditions, the DRC’s ambition to increase local mineral processing and move up the value chain remains a major challenge.

Five steps to good roads, reliable power, and economic growth

1. Invest in transport and energy infrastructure to generate sustainable growth. The DRC’s vast mineral wealth and energy potential make it an attractive destination for large-scale private investment, but various bottlenecks such as infrastructure, business environment, and governance must be addressed. We focus here on infrastructure ones. Unlocking the hydropower potential (100,000 MW, which is 13 percent of the world’s total) could meet domestic needs and generate export revenue. Modernizing existing hydroelectric facilities and expanding transmission grids would provide clean, affordable electricity to both industry and households. For the mining sector, improved energy access could lower production costs while enhancing compliance with global environmental, social, and governance standards. Meanwhile, broader electrification would fuel local enterprise, boost economic diversification, and improve living standards.
2. Diversify financing for the substantial investments needed to bridge the infrastructure gap. The International Monetary Fund estimates that achieving universal electricity access would require annual spending of 5.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while ensuring that 75 percent of the population lives within two kilometers of an all-season road would necessitate 14.9 percent of GDP annually over ten years. Given these costs, leveraging diversified public, private, and international financing is key to accelerating infrastructure development.
3. Strengthen public investment management to maximize returns. Weak governance and public investment management have led to waste, corruption risks, and substandard project execution. Strengthening investment governance would maximize value for money, boosting private-sector confidence and investment. Equally key is creating fiscal space for critical infrastructure and social and human capital investments. This requires improving domestic tax and nontax revenue collection and prioritizing growth-enhancing spending. Yet low revenue collection, especially relative to peer countries and the DRC’s economic potential, remains a major constraint.
4. Pursue prudent, strategic government borrowing to secure favorable terms. Domestically, containing inflation would lower borrowing costs and encourage higher domestic savings, strengthening the local financial market. Externally, the focus should remain on concessional financing, prioritizing low-cost, long-term loans. Over time, as policy credibility strengthens and the country’s creditworthiness improves, access to international financial markets could be considered, particularly when global conditions are favorable.
5. Scale up infrastructure investments through regional partnerships. The DRC would benefit from harnessing regional frameworks such as the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community to mobilize resources for transport and energy infrastructure. Cross-border energy grids and trade corridors can reduce operational costs, attract larger financing and enhance the country’s global competitiveness. Regional collaboration offers a pragmatic solution to tackling infrastructure deficits while strengthening economic resilience. Also, the development of the Lobito Corridor,* linking the DRC to Angola’s Lobito port, can deepen regional integration and offer more cost-effective transportation routes for DRC’s exports—though it will be important to avoid undermining parallel port development projects in the western part of the DRC.

In sum, the future of the DRC will be promising if its development challenges can be addressed in an ambitious and realistic manner. Developing a reliable road network and extending electricity provision will be critical to reap the DRC’s vast potential—and will need to be supported by sound macroeconomic policies and reforms to strengthen the country’s resilience to overcome its fragility.

Launched in 2022, the Africa Center’s programming on the DRC seeks to advise on securing the country’s governance and to raise awareness of the economic opportunities in the DRC. In partnership with Rawbank, the Africa Center analyzes the DRC’s business environment, the industrial potential of its critical minerals, and peace and security throughout the country.

*Rawbank, which supports the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s work on the Democratic Republic of Congo, has an equity stake in the Africa Finance Corporation, which leads the development of the Lobito Corridor.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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That was made clear at this year’s International Monetary Fund and World Bank Spring Meetings, where financial leaders warned about job loss and increasing poverty rates across these countries. 

But there are changes African countries can make to better withstand the economic headwinds they are facing. One such opportunity they should immediately seize lies in strengthening their approaches to combating money laundering and terrorist financing. By addressing deficiencies in legal and regulatory frameworks and by adjusting for developments in financial technology, African countries can bolster financial inclusion and tap economic growth opportunities—while preventing the abuse of the global financial system by nefarious actors. 

Key deficiencies seen across Africa—in the form of weak legal and regulatory frameworks, limited institutional capacity to conduct financial supervisory or enforcement activities, and a high degree of informality of economic activities—make it difficult to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial flows. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, keeps track of jurisdictions that do not meet global standards to combat money laundering, publicly identifying jurisdictions with weak performance on a “black list” and “grey list.” The black list hosts only three countries (North Korea, Iran, and Myanmar), but on the grey list, fourteen of the twenty-five countries (just over half) are African. Grey listing can result in serious reputational and economic damage, with negative spillover effects on economic growth, borrowing costs, foreign investment flows, and financial inclusion efforts—a particularly concerning impact considering that in Sub-Saharan Africa, less than half the population has a bank account. Given these effects, African countries have worked to make significant improvements to their anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) frameworks. Over the past few years, several countries that were once placed on the grey list have been removed, including Zimbabwe, Botswana, Morocco, and Mauritius.

One piece of the regulatory puzzle involves cryptocurrencies. FATF Recommendation 15 for combating money laundering and terrorist financing directs countries to identify and assess “risks emerging from virtual asset activities.” FATF data from March indicates that of the forty-one Sub-Saharan African countries with publicly available data, only seven countries were rated “compliant” with Recommendation 15, indicating that the country successfully met the global standard. For African countries looking to become more compliant, there are positive examples on the continent to draw upon; for example, South Africa was recently upgraded to “largely compliant” with Recommendation 15 and is continuing to make progress towards full compliance. 

At the same time, African governments must also harness the power of digital finance to weather today’s economic headwinds. According to the International Monetary Fund, as of 2022, just 25 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa formally regulated cryptocurrencies, and two-thirds had implemented restrictions, with six countries having outright banned cryptocurrencies. The impact of this approach leaves the investors and entrepreneurs who are interested in Africa’s digital assets sector inclined to hold back investments due to the excessive regulatory uncertainty and possible regulatory swings. Africa is one of the fastest-growing crypto markets in the world, and crypto assets are actively used across the continent. 

Recent reporting from Chainalysis suggests that the cryptocurrency value received by Sub-Saharan Africa was less than three percent of the global share between July 2023 and July 2024. While this is a small global share, there is significant variance in adoption rates across the continent’s fifty-four countries, with a number of countries still rating relatively high in global adoption: Nigeria ranked second worldwide, and Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Africa also ranked in the top thirty countries. From 2022 to 2023, bitcoin was legal tender in the Central African Republic, but finance experts raised concerns about the lack of electricity and infrastructure and the high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. One thing is certain: digital assets—including cryptocurrencies—are changing the financial landscape of the region. 

That digital finance can transform Africa’s financial landscape should be viewed positively. Africa’s population is set to increase from 1.5 billion in 2024 to 2.5 billion in 2050. This is the moment for African governments to leverage the economic power of their demographics, but to do that, they will need to consider public policies that support greater financial inclusion. Of the eight countries that will account for more than half of the global population growth between now and 2050, five of them are in Africa; two of them are global leaders in crypto adoption rates.  

As populations age and enter the workforce, African governments should consider how best to promote technological innovation in their societies, including in financial technology. Cryptocurrency adoption in African countries can be used for small retail transactions, for sending or receiving remittances, as a hedge against inflation, for business payments, and, potentially, for solving sticky foreign exchange issues in places such as Central Africa, where such issues dramatically reduce foreign investments. Due to its decentralized nature, cryptocurrencies can help people bridge the gap in access to financial services and formal banking systems in many countries across the continent.  

On one hand, governments have tried to use digital assets to boost financial inclusion, tax revenue, and small retail transactions with limited success; and on the other, countries have banned, unbanned, regulated, and deregulated cryptocurrencies, leaving a patchwork of regulatory frameworks across the continent for consumers and business to navigate. With such jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage and limited enforcement mechanisms, nonstate actors, including terrorist groups in Africa, are able to take advantage of the technologies and services that can move money the fastest and cheapest—and in ways that are least likely to be detected or disrupted. That can lead these actors to cryptocurrency.   

While serving as head of delegation to both the Central and West African FATF-style regional bodies, I heard from African government officials repeatedly that there were no digital assets being used in their countries and that their AML/CFT regulatory regimes were sufficient. This is simply not the case. African countries should consider policies to encourage the adoption of emerging financial technologies, including cryptocurrencies and other digital assets, while still exercising great care to avoid creating conditions allowing for regulatory arbitrage between countries or monetary unions that can be exploited by bad actors seeking to launder money or finance terrorism. Beyond policy frameworks, African governments should empower their enforcement agencies with the appropriate resources to ensure that policies, laws, and regulatory frameworks protect the integrity of the global financial system.  

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

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On May 3, Forward Defense director Clementine Starling-Daniels and assistant director Theresa Luetkefend were quoted in a WMAL article titled “In Great Power Competition, Special Ops to Play Key Role.” The article highlights their argument that, after two decades primarily focused on counterterrorism and direct-action missions during the Global War on Terror, today’s peer and near-peer competition demands a broader application of US special operations forces’ core activities.

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Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

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Theresa Luetkefend

Assistant Director

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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From these popes to other early figures, such as Mark the Evangelist and Saint Augustine, Africans have held important roles in the church’s theology, philosophy, doctrine, and discourse. Should the next pope be African, it would indeed be a milestone in the modern era. But for an institution that often takes a longer view of issues, it would signify the return of leadership for a continent that helped define what the church has become.

The face of faith

Discussions about an African pope emerging from a conclave are nothing new. In 2002, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger spoke positively of the prospects of an African pope emerging at the next conclave, which took place in 2005. However, it was Ratzinger himself who was elected to the role, as Pope Benedict XVI. Yet his statement showcased the ongoing realpolitik of the College of Cardinals: an increasing number of Africans among the faithful and the clergy means more influence. As the French newspaper Le Monde pointed out during Pope Francis’s trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan in 2023, the overall number of priests in Africa is increasing, and so too is the number of seminarians, which includes future priests. In fact, Africa is the only continent seeing an upward trend among seminarians.

The increase in African clergy has accompanied an expansion of Catholicism across the continent. In 1910, Africa had fewer than one million Catholics, according to estimates. In 2024, that number was 265 million. In fact, by 2050, Africa is expected to be home to nearly a third of the world’s Catholics. This growth will have longstanding implications for the makeup of the church. In 2022, the Vatican estimated that around thirteen million people joined the church that year. More than half were in Africa.

It is clear that Africa’s presence in the church is immense and growing, but that does not necessarily translate into a certainty that this or the next pope will be African. It is true that Pope Francis did much to make that a possibility and that there are several papabile African cardinals among the multitude of lists of contenders being compiled. But those lists are notoriously unreliable and conclaves are typically unpredictable. Inevitably, the conclave will see a debate unfold between the progressive and conservative blocs—terms that do not necessarily apply to the church, but ones that media and commentators tend to use nonetheless. By those measurements, the majority of African members in the curia and the College of Cardinals defiantly tilt conservative. It is in this sphere of influence that Africa has made its presence and voice known.

Dogma and discourse

If Pope Francis is remembered as leading the charge for a more liberal church, then African cardinals and bishops are at the forefront of the countercharge. Take, for example, the issue of same-sex blessings. Pope Francis drew much attention for his attitude toward same-sex blessings and other reforms, and (in)famously for saying “If a person is gay and seeks God and has good will, who am I to judge?” Following these actions, there was significant backlash among African bishops, who united into a continental common front to lead the conservative response. They had enough clout to drive the curia to, in effect, provide some leeway. The church has not been exempt from the culture wars, and it is notable that Cardinal Robert Sarah of Guinea, a conservative favorite, has been described by the press as an “anti-woke” cardinal.

At the same time, Pope Francis installed most of those eligible to vote in the upcoming conclave, including several Africans. Most of these, unsurprisingly, fell under the label of liberal and aligned with an agenda for reforming the church.

Another African who might be considered for the papacy is Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo Besungu of Congo. But Africa is not the only continent mentioned often in discussions about candidates. Take Cardinal Luis Antonio Gokim Tagle of the Philippines, who, if selected, would become the first pope from the Indo-Pacific region. Regionality will not matter as much as dogma and voting blocs, and a conservative African cardinal could well find allies among his American and Italian colleagues.

At the end of the day, though, it is a mystery who will arise from the conclave. What is not a mystery, however, is the growing strength of Africa in the church, both in numbers among the faithful and in theological and dogmatic discourse. The world must wait for the white smoke to learn who will be the next pope, but it is already clear that African bishops and cardinals are at the forefront of the conservative charge in the church. An African pope is not a given in this conclave or the next, but African agency and leadership in the twenty-first-century church is.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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With growing instability in North Africa and the Sahel, and intensified geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean, the United States, Morocco, and Israel have an opportunity to spearhead a forward-looking joint investment fund and coordination forum that would transform diplomacy into durable infrastructure that delivers on tangible results.

Jointly governed by Morocco, Israel, and the United States, this fund would both directly and jointly coordinate finance strategic projects in energy, digital infrastructure, advanced industrial, and regional security. An instrument like this would be a perfect marriage between US financial and political convening power, Morocco’s industrial platforms, and Israel’s innovation ecosystem to collectively enhance competitiveness, create jobs, and secure regional supply chains. For a Washington calling on partners to stand up, establishing a fund would help empower the three countries to support long-term regional stability and collective prosperity that both showcases and deepens the benefits derived from the Abraham Accords. 

The problem and the solution for an alliance without strategic leverage

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel has opened a new era of cooperation. Politically and economically, signs of rapprochement are evident: increasing bilateral visits, sectoral agreements, business initiatives, and emerging technological partnerships. Yet this momentum remains fragile, fragmented, and incomplete.

Without a shared mechanism, cooperation between Morocco and Israel remains vulnerable to political fluctuations, lacks visibility for long-term investors, and fails to reach the scale needed to reshape regional dynamics. While isolated successes exist—such as joint innovation programs or sectoral agreements—they remain disconnected and difficult to replicate. A structured platform would allow the three parties to consolidate trust, pool resources, and define common priorities across security, energy, industry, and technology. This is a major missed opportunity to move beyond ad-hoc engagements at a time of rapid transformation across the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, while strategic challenges are proliferating, particularly from instability in the Sahel, increased geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean, and rising migration pressure toward Europe.

A convening forum and trilateral investment fund, jointly governed by Morocco, Israel, and the United States, would be an effective tool to give the strategic alliance deeper geopolitical weight. This central body would be tasked with coordinating disparate lines of effort across each country’s respective public and private sectors and providing direct financing for high-impact strategic projects in key divisions, including energy, critical infrastructure, industrial transformation, security technologies, defense industry, maritime industry, and logistics innovation.

The forum would be designed not as a development aid mechanism but rather as a sovereign investment tool that could generate measurable returns. Its operational model would be based on shared governance between the three states, including having representatives from the private sector and diaspora communities, and a rigorous, transparent selection of projects based on economic viability, strategic relevance, as well as clear investment return for the forum’s backers.

What the United States gains through a trilateral fund

As global power dynamics continue to shift, the United States must go beyond supporting traditional bilateral alliances and reimagine its most important growing strategic partnerships, as with Israel and Morocco. Intentionally curated regional platforms are capable of producing tangible and lasting outcomes that would also reliably return real value from investments. Therefore, the proposed trilateral investment forum would constitute an important innovation in both regional Mediterranean policy for the United States and offer important lessons for new mechanisms for US engagement that combine traditional diplomacy, economic strategy, and direct returns on mutual interests.

The model would ensure that the United States improves its long-term standing through a durable, coherent, transparent, and scalable architecture. This fund is especially timely and relevant for three primary reasons.

First, the fund would serve as a counterweight to the growing influence of rival powers—namely, China, Russia, and Iran. All three players are advancing their agendas across North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean through major investments in infrastructure, energy, ports, and security. If designed with proper financial resources, this proposed trilateral forum would provide a credible alternative for financing and competitive projects that would promote US interests and support local innovation ecosystems.

Second, the fund would deliver value that would help publicize the “normalization dividend” that was expected from the Abraham Accords. Five years after their signing, few concrete mechanisms have emerged to convert diplomatic momentum into long-term economic prosperity, largely due to the absence of a standard operational vehicle to coordinate and scale projects. Since the Accords were signed, most engagement has remained bilateral and unstructured, often driven by individual ministries, private actors, or external partners without a shared vision or platform. Moreover, in the absence of a dedicated fund or permanent forum, many successful initiatives—particularly in business, innovation, and security—remain under the radar and disconnected from broader strategic messaging. A trilateral forum could lay a model that could support the overall expansion of the Abraham Accords, demonstrating Washington’s ability to support strategic and enduring projects with key regional partners, advancing regional security and prosperity.  

And third, the fund would give the United States a results-driven tool of influence and a mechanism to return value to the American taxpayer. Unlike one-off aid programs or broad diplomatic commitments, this fund could generate measurable benefits, including local job creation, inclusion of American companies in regional initiatives through the requirement for US primes, growth in trilateral trade, and supply chain security, all while integrating American partners into the overall ecosystem of the Abraham Accords.

Roadmap and success indicators

The implementation of the trilateral investment fund should follow a three-pronged and phased implementation strategy, with the ultimate goal of achieving a well-structured governance architecture and a clear remit for the new body:

1. The initial phase focused on political agreement and framework design, including trilateral deliberations on the working level across all three parties.
2. The secondary phase focused on deploying high-impact pilot projects in priority sectors, potentially through the Development Finance Corporation or other appropriate funding mechanisms.
3. The final long-term structuring phase aimed at scaling the mechanism and embedding it within an enduring institutional architecture, such as a jointly governed trilateral fund.

To ensure credibility and effectiveness, the fund must deliver measurable outcomes based on clear criteria, including economic impact (mobilized investment, job creation, industrial upgrading), tangible strategic alignment (political engagement, intergovernmental coordination, diplomatic returns), and proven replicability (ability to adapt the model to other regional cooperation frameworks).

A new trilateral forum that delivers on the promise of the Abraham Accords is a unique opportunity to support American engagement in an area of critical geopolitical importance.  By aligning capital, innovation, and market access, this forum would not only reinforce the foundations of the Abraham Accords but also project a stabilizing influence across the Afro-Mediterranean space at a time of intense competition and uncertainty. It would offer the United States a modern, agile, and measurable tool of engagement that would competitively address the core sovereignty, security, and economic concerns its partners face in the Global South.

Aïssa Christophe Agostini is a strategic economic advisor and founder of Prosper Atlas, a consulting firm focused on trilateral partnerships between the United States, Israel, and Morocco.

The post A blueprint for a trilateral Morocco-Israel-US investment fund appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In my work researching how African diaspora communities in the United States maintain their connections to their homelands, I have found that long-standing experiences involving racism, combined with growing anti-immigrant sentiments, have led many members of the African diaspora to strengthen their ties to the continent.

Such diasporans, especially second-generation diasporans (that is, the children of immigrants), have connected with their African identities by turning to the digital space, which has enabled them to follow Africa-related news and cultural trends, connect with diaspora organizations, and keep in touch with family and friends. Digital platforms reduce the distance between home and abroad, accelerating the movement of people, capital, and ideas. 

Second-generation diasporans have also turned to digital platforms to engage in cultural commerce. This digitized and culturally rooted economic engagement—which includes business development, trade, and investment—is what I call the digital identity economy. And this type of diaspora engagement offers new opportunities for reshaping US relations with the African continent.

Diaspora engagement is nothing new; African diaspora communities have long maintained economic, cultural, and social connections to their countries of origin. African immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s maintained homeland ties by opening cultural shops for food products, sending remittances, forming associations and religious institutions, and visiting home.

But the digital identity economy has created space for second-generation diasporans to channel their shared desire to connect with their homelands, offering products and services that meet their cultural needs while addressing the distinct challenges they face in reconnecting with home, challenges that first-generation immigrants may not experience in the same way. For example, one app called Nkenne, created by a second-generation Nigerian-American, helps diasporans learn African languages and addresses declining heritage-language fluency, a common issue for second-generation diasporans. The app provides cultural education about customs in African countries that younger diasporans may not be familiar with, helping them feel more connected to their culture and their identity from afar. 

Digital platforms such as Spotify and YouTube enable young diasporans to engage with African music, stream artists’ work, and share their content. The popularity of Afrobeats music has given rise to businesses and events centered around the genre, including parties and popular music festivals—such as Afrofuture and Afronation—which take place not only in African countries but also in diaspora communities. While some may view these events solely as entertainment, they reflect deep cultural connections that create economic activity.

The digital identity economy has created economic opportunities in tourism for second-generation diasporans. For example, acclaimed second-generation Ghanaian-American chef Eric Adjepong offers a Ghanaian culinary tour, using digital platforms for promotion and booking. And the digital identity economy has enabled second-generation diasporans to use fashion to express their cultural pride and identity. The brand Ashanti Beads, which creates apparel featuring the Akan Adinkra symbol Gye Nyame, is an example of this. Its tagline, “Bridging the gap in the African diaspora through fashion,” speaks to the growing demand for culturally rooted apparel. Ashanti Beads uses digital platforms to engage its audience, market its brand, and sell its products. 

These culturally rooted economic activities reflect the financial engagement patterns of second-generation African diaspora members. In speaking with second-generation Ghanaians in the United States and United Kingdom, I found that they are not sending traditional remittances at the same rate as the first generation and are also less likely to send remittances in the future. Reasons for this included not wanting to be taken advantage of financially, not having anyone to send money to, and fears around creating a cycle of dependency. They preferred practices that would promote widespread economic improvement, such as business development, investing, and collective remittances. 

Some view the lack of interest in sending remittances among young African diasporans to be a challenge, especially with cuts to foreign aid, tariffs threatening the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the end of Prosper Africa. While some have argued that remittances could fill that funding gap (in 2023, the African continent received over ninety billion dollars in remittances, significantly surpassing foreign aid and foreign direct investment), this is not realistic. Remittances are primarily used for consumption, immigrants face increasing financial difficulty in part due to restrictive immigration policies, and younger diasporans are less likely to send such funds.  

These shifts are seen by some as a threat to Africa’s development, but they really present an opportunity to reimagine US-Africa engagement. Washington can introduce new policies and initiatives that support diaspora investment, trade, and business development as an alternative to development aid. And it is in the United States’ interest to do so: Supporting the digital identity economy would yield growth for diaspora businesses and communities in the country.

One way to do that is by strengthening ties through American Chambers of Commerce. American Chambers of Commerce on the African continent can serve as connectors and champions for a new era of diaspora-driven trade. By supporting business matchmaking, policy reform, and transnational partnerships, they offer a ready-made infrastructure for unlocking the potential of the digital identity economy.

Another is by creating a post-AGOA US-Africa trade policy. A policy that centers on diaspora businesses and entrepreneurs—by offering concessions and incentives that reward investment in the continent’s creative, cultural, and digital sectors—would support the growth of African economies and diaspora businesses.

A third initiative could include redefining foreign direct investment (FDI) to include diaspora investment. US diaspora businesses investing in Africa should be recognized as a form of FDI. While diaspora direct investment may be harder to track than remittances or traditional FDI, it still offers a dual benefit by supporting Africa’s growth while strengthening diaspora businesses in the United States. Redefining FDI to include diaspora direct investment would provide a more accurate depiction of capital outflows and the actors driving them. It can also broaden how the United States views diaspora financial contributions, moving beyond a focus on remittances to acknowledge the businesses, services, and networks they provide.

By embracing the digital identity economy, fostering diaspora investment, and rethinking trade policies, the United States can adopt a collaborative approach that supports African economic empowerment while strengthening connections across the diaspora, encouraging mutual growth.

Kirstie Kwarteng is a postdoctoral research associate at SOAS University of London and founder of The Nana Project.

The post To redefine US-Africa engagement, Washington must recognize the power of the African diaspora appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 27, 2025, Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Oluwayemisi Ajumobi published an article in Globalization and Health, “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition.”

“The global transition to renewable energy is increasing the demand for critical minerals mining in Africa. Without appropriate safeguards, expansion of mining operations on the continent increases the risk of mining-associated infectious disease outbreaks with epidemic and pandemic potential,” Ajumobi writes.

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The post Ajumobi in Globalization and Health: “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Conflict minerals and the M23 insurgency 

The Great Lakes region of Africa, which straddles the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, supplies 30 percent of the world’s coltan, a crucial mineral for high-end electronics. Other valuable minerals, such tin, tungsten, tantalite, and gold, are often mined alongside coltan in the region. Artisanal mining is common—while this provides livelihoods for many, it also gives rise to dangerous working conditions, child labor, and political conflict and instability.  

Much of the region’s coltan is deemed a conflict mineral as mining areas are controlled by armed groups and organized crime. The DRC government lacks firm control of its territories, especially in the eastern provinces, and transportation infrastructure is underdeveloped. Because of these challenges, foreign companies often avoid direct mining in the DRC, instead purchasing minerals through middlemen. 

The M23 rebel group, an ethnic Tutsi-led militia in the eastern DRC, is fighting the DRC national army and claims to protect Tutsi populations from Hutu militias. Its resurgence in 2022 is linked to frustrations over the government’s slow implementation of peace agreements and worsening security, although it is argued that M23 acts in service of Rwanda’s interests in the region’s minerals. The M23 insurgency is allegedly financed through the exploitation of coltan and other minerals, including reports that M23 fraudulently exported at least 150 metric tons of coltan (7-10 percent of DRC’s annual global supply) to Rwanda in 2024. Current estimates put this as high as 120 metric tons per month. The current involvement and role of Rwanda is evidenced by the presence of 4,000 Rwandan army personnel and heavy weaponry.  

The ongoing insurgency has halted regular mining activities, leading to “command” mining in which rebels control operations. This is affecting production levels, worker safety, and regional investment. Conflict has placed all transport routes under rebel control, increasing costs and delays due to road closures and violence.  

An important dynamic for global supply chains is that rebel groups like M23, along with other middlemen, foster the mixing of legal and illegal minerals. This effectively launders the illegally mined material, allowing its sale to parties that are mandated to buy ethically sourced product, such as US-based customers who must comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. These sales channel profits to armed groups while depriving the DRC of its rightful revenue. Rwanda is effectively complicit, as it does not charge taxes on mineral exports and allows imported goods to be reassigned as “Made in Rwanda” if they are transformed or processed within the country with a minimum 30 percent value addition. 

DRC efforts to regain control 

Amid the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC, there is an intensified call for international accountability and economic reforms to address resource-driven violence. At the February 2025 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council session, the International Chamber of Commerce and Development urged the UN to enhance transparency in raw material transfers from Rwanda to combat mineral exploitation crimes. Enhanced oversight, it argued, would hold resource looters accountable. 

Additionally, at the Munich Security Conference, the DRC accused Rwanda of destabilizing the region to exploit its minerals and proposed measures to encourage legitimate investments and transparent contracts while urging the international community to facilitate peace.  

The DRC, meanwhile, has classified certain mining sites in North and South Kivu provinces as “red” zones, halting mineral trading in these areas. The country is orchestrating legal and regulatory efforts, including installing ore tracking mechanisms to combat the illegal mineral trade, disrupt conflict financing, and align mining practices with international standards. The red zone classification is intended to last six months and includes independent audits to ensure responsible sourcing.  

On the diplomatic and military front, a quid pro quo of mineral rights for security cooperation seems to be developing whereby the DRC is courting Western governments’ security assistance to thwart the Rwanda-backed incursion. Much of the international community is also demanding stricter standards for purchasing minerals ostensibly mined and processed in Rwanda. The DRC will need international support to implement measures for strict oversight of the region and, more fundamentally, addressing the sources of instability that fuel the conflict. On a positive note, in late March, a Qatar-brokered peace summit resulted in commitments by the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda to cease hostilities. 

Next steps

Achieving lasting peace in the eastern DRC requires addressing the root causes of conflict, including ethnic tensions, political instability, and competition for mineral resources. It will not come quickly.  

The DRC needs sustained dialogue with rebel groups and neighboring countries to reach a peace agreement and foster reconciliation among ethnic groups. It also needs to improve the capacity and legitimacy of institutions to manage resources, provide security, combat corruption, and enhance transparency. 

Meanwhile, mineral buyers and the international community can help the DRC by enforcing ethical sourcing that follows regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act and OECD guidelines, supporting peace initiatives with diplomatic and financial aid, and providing humanitarian assistance to support displaced populations, rebuild communities, and enforce human rights laws. 

The M23 insurgency is yet another reminder that the international community must support resource-rich countries in building the capacity to formalize mining and adhere to recognized principles for working and living conditions. The United States’ and others’ overtures to help provide security may be a good first step, but it only sets a foundation for much more work to be done. 

Clarkson Kamurai is the critical minerals program manager at the Payne Institute and a PhD researcher in the minerals and energy economics program at the Colorado School of Mines. Kamurai has engineering experience in base and precious metal mining in sub-Saharan Africa and South America. 

Brad Handler is the program director for the Payne Institute for Public Policy’s Energy Finance Lab. Previously, he was an equity research analyst in the oil and gas sector at investment banks including Credit Suisse and Jefferies.  

Morgan Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines and a former lead energy specialist at the World Bank. 

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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New Atlanticist Apr 18, 2025

Tariffs can help secure US critical mineral supply chains—if they’re done right

By Reed Blakemore, Alexis Harmon

US tariffs on critical minerals should be precisely targeted and coupled with robust federal support for domestic mining.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource Apr 3, 2025

Profitability and power: Fixing US critical minerals supply chains

By Ashley Zumwalt-Forbes

The global critical minerals race is well underway, and the American supply chain is behind. To regain momentum, the US must make this industry viable by creating a financial framework that attracts and retains capital.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

AfricaSource Mar 21, 2025

In the scramble for Africa’s critical minerals, the West must not abandon the ESG agenda

By Zainab Usman and Rama Yade

As this race for minerals and metals critical for the energy transition heats up, both companies and governments must not abandon environmental, social, and governance principles in Africa.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Illicit mineral supply chains fuel the DRC’s M23 insurgency  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Islamist insurgents, including al-Shabaab and the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS-S), are making territorial gains. These two groups represent distinct but overlapping threats—each transnational, each integrated into broader jihadist ecosystems, and each capable of destabilizing regional and global security if left unchecked. They are also quickly evolving, including by increasing connections with other groups and malign state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—creating larger geostrategic implications.

To address this evolution, the United States must remain engaged in Somalia; but that does not necessarily require escalation. Strategic engagement through a forward embassy, regional partnerships, and calibrated intelligence operations can disrupt the evolution of the terrorist threat in Somalia—and it costs far less than what it would take to contain fully metastasized, adaptive adversaries down the road.

Increasingly adaptive

For too long, ISIS-S has been treated as an afterthought in Somalia’s counterterrorism landscape, but the group can no longer be ignored: Since 2019, it has evolved significantly, becoming the Islamic State’s most agile, digitally integrated, and externally operational franchise. This has aligned with the Islamic State’s global shift toward a decentralized, node-based network managed by the General Directorate of Provinces. Formerly a localized insurgency attempting to replicate elements of the core caliphate in miniature, ISIS-S is now modular, externally focused, and nonterritorial, with unique technical capabilities that elevate its threat beyond that of traditional insurgent groups.

It does not seek to hold Mogadishu; rather, ISIS-S bypasses the Somalian capital to exploit ungoverned spaces through coordinated disruption. Its efforts destabilize governance; it coordinates its operations via encrypted messaging apps, blockchain-based payment systems, commercial off-the-shelf obfuscation tools, and artificial intelligence-generated multilingual propaganda that enables large-scale recruitment.

The ISIS-S threat is transnational and no longer confined to Somalia; that is apparent with the group’s implication in terror plots overseas, including in Sweden. Perhaps most critically for the United States, the ISIS-S al-Karrar office is understood to serve as a funding node for ISIS-Khorasan, which has proven capable of devastating terror plots, including the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan that killed thirteen US service members.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, has also proven to be far more than a local insurgency—it is a deeply entrenched and militarily assertive force in Somalia, capable of executing complex operations, controlling territory, and challenging both national and international security efforts. This transnational terrorist organization has already exerted influence beyond Somalia, having executed mass-casualty attacks in Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, its operatives struck US and Kenyan forces in Manda Bay, killing three Americans. The group explicitly targets US and Western interests throughout East Africa. Withdrawing now, as al-Shabaab regains momentum, risks allowing it to strengthen its position and expand its influence.

Metastizing menace

Of parallel concern is the mounting evidence of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. This partnership represents a dangerous escalation. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to strike maritime targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden boats. These asymmetric maritime attacks have disrupted vital shipping lanes, endangered commercial vessels, and necessitated multinational naval responses. They also offer a template for al-Shabaab’s future posture.  

Growing evidence exists that Houthi weaponry, supplied by Iran, has been transferred into Somalia and reached both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S. These transfers suggest an intensifying convergence of interests but not ideologies. While al-Shabaab, ISIS-S, and the Houthis remain doctrinally divergent, they share three critical traits: a reliance on illicit maritime logistics, the use of asymmetric tactics, and a willingness to cooperate when it serves operational goals. This alignment adds complexity to counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa, blurring the lines between ideological enemies and functional partners.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, just north of Somalia, is a critical chokepoint for global trade, funneling approximately 12 percent of seaborne oil trade flows. Increased attacks or insecurity in these waters would drive up insurance costs, increase shipping expenses, and worsen instability across East Africa and the Middle East. Should al-Shabaab or ISIS-S, either independently or in partnership with the Houthis, begin to harass this artery, it would have immediate implications for the global economy.

But in addition to the potential economic impact, there is also a clear strategic threat from this cooperation. Hostility to the West and asymmetrical warfare exercised by these groups and the militias included in Iran’s Axis of Resistance could pose an enduring threat to US allies and partners in the region. For example, the US Navy could see its operational freedom eroded, and militant activity in the sea lanes around the Horn of Africa—which connect the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific—could complicate the United States’ ability to surge naval forces in response to crises involving China in the Taiwan Strait or Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Continuity as containment

The 2021 US withdrawal from Somalia offered a preview of what disengagement would yield. Following the withdrawal, al-Shabaab and ISIS-S regrouped, expanded their respective operations, and forged deeper regional ties that present the greater challenges that the United States faces today. Although US forces returned in 2022, the withdrawal had already proved costly.

Today, ISIS-S internally exploits the geography of Somalia, clan connections, and instability to thrive. Al-Shabaab forces inch ever forward in their ongoing campaign to isolate and potentially capture the capital of Mogadishu. Each debate over whether to stay or go provides strategic space that the groups use to adapt.

The post-9/11 experience has demonstrated that power vacuums can be quickly filled by hostile actors. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq enabled ISIS’s rapid rise. Strategic ambiguity in Libya yielded terrain for jihadist experimentation. Afghanistan’s rapid collapse under the Taliban offered ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda a second wind. Somalia is not an exception: It would be the next domino.

But it’s not just a matter of being present. For example, the 2012 Benghazi attack was not a failure of presence; it was a failure of planning, coordination, and establishing an adequate security posture. Similarly, abandoning Somalia without a coherent containment strategy creates the risk of empowering a transnational terrorist organization with international ambitions while simultaneously allowing Iran to extend its strategic reach. 

To maintain its foothold at the most critical junction of East Africa’s security architecture, the United States must prioritize continuity. This includes keeping the US embassy in Mogadishu open, as it provides a platform for intelligence coordination, interagency operations, and diplomatic leverage. Without it, the United States cannot assess—let alone contain—a threat that is actively recombining in real time and posing risks to maritime security, the regional balance of deterrence, and potentially the US homeland.

The terrorist groups based in Somalia are adapting faster, making broader connections, and integrating deeper than Washington’s withdrawal advocates seem to realize. To misread that evolution as localized or static is strategic negligence. A decision to withdraw at this moment will not be remembered as a tactical recalibration but as an unforced error. To leave is to license the evolution of these terrorist groups; to stay is to disrupt it. 

Danielle Cosgrove is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group. She is a distinguished guest lecturer at Stanford University, a Stanford Medicine X scholar, and the founder of an acquired threat mapping startup.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent official US government positions.

The post The US must sustain counterterrorism operations in Somalia—the costs of retreat are too high appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Landscape assessment
• China in the Global South: Trends in critical and emerging technologies
• China ICT expansion yesterday, AI competition today
• AI competition and Chinese ICT in the Global South
• Obstacles to China’s competitiveness in AI
• Normative dimensions of the US-China AI competition
• Lessons for US-PRC competition in CETs
• Conclusion and recommendations

Introduction

The US and China are in a race for technological supremacy. Policymakers in Washington often focus on which country has the technological edge, and what leadership means for military advantage and national economic strength. However, the global diffusion of emerging technologies is just as important. Unfortunately, it is too often overlooked.

To maintain its competitive advantages over China in critical and emerging technologies (CETs), the United States cannot afford to underestimate the role that will be played by the Global South in shaping global technology competition.¹ The Global South is a key arena for the deployment, adoption, and development of key technologies, including AI. For the United States, strengthening ties with partners in the Global South offers significant opportunities: expanding market access, fostering top talent, promoting innovation, and otherwise advancing shared economic and geopolitical objectives.

Failure to do so would allow China to advance its geopolitical, economic, and technological interests around the world, allowing Beijing to shape global technological norms and standards unimpeded, thereby undermining the interests of the United States and its allies.

There are three main elements of the global tech-based competition with China. Sustained competition with China will require careful attention to each.

The first element of this competition with China is geopolitical. Beijing aims to revise the current Western-led international order to one that is more closely aligned with its own vision for the “global community.” Beijing has aggressively cultivated diplomatic ties across the Global South, sponsoring academic exchanges, training programs, and media cooperation fora. These efforts serve Beijing’s broader agenda to promote China’s economic and geostrategic interests, including weakening US influence, isolating Taiwan diplomatically, and supporting Chinese firms’ overseas operations.

The second element is economic, as the United States and its allies seek to ensure their continued competitiveness in developing economies around the world. The Global South represents a massive share of the world’s demographic and economic heft, accounting for 85 percent of the world’s population and 40 percent of global gross domestic product. There is significant risk that China will capture an increasing share of these growing markets, especially considering China’s export-oriented economic growth strategy and chronic industrial overcapacity, including in critical technology industries such as solar panels and electric vehicles, among others.

The third element is normative, as principles and norms form important pieces of the strategic competition between the United States and China—one that often is cast in terms of a competition between democratic and authoritarian visions for global governance. China has promoted Chinese narratives and norms globally, particularly in forums involving countries in the Global South, including the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and, most recently, the Global AI Governance Initiative.

Landscape assessment

Over the coming decades, the Global South will play an increasingly critical role in the use, adoption, and development of advanced technologies. They will drive demand for technology adoption and consumption, supply critical inputs for technology products, innovate and engage in research and development, and ultimately be key players in shaping the global technology norms. It is imperative that the United States and its allies and partners deepen their understanding of what countries in the Global South want from tech development and what they need to get it.

For low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), there are numerous obstacles to technological development and adoption. A study conducted by the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) found that foundational digital skills² are lacking in developing countries. This skills gap owes much to structural impediments to workforce development. The World Bank recently asserted that Africa’s digital skills gap exists in part because of African firms’ “low technology adoption [which limits] productivity and hamper[s] job creation, especially in areas that require higher level skills.”

Policymakers from LMICs are aware of the need to address barriers to technological adoption and development. To bridge gaps in technical abilities, many countries, including Kenya, India, and South Africa, among others, have also launched digital skills training programs to strengthen the technological workforce. Others, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ghana, and Nigeria have raised barriers to the export of unprocessed critical minerals and other raw materials that are required for many advanced technological applications, including semiconductors (chips), batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and weapons systems, among a great many others. Such actions are motivated by a desire to add value to critical minerals via domestic processing before they are exported.

Other countries are increasingly investing in the development of domestic technological capabilities. At a July 2024 event unveiling a $4 billion public-sector investment in Brazil’s supercomputing capacity, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (“Lula”) asked why “a country with 200 million people, a nation 524 years old with a globally respected intellectual foundation, [couldn’t] create its own mechanisms instead of relying on AI from China, the United States, South Korea, or Japan? Why can’t we have our own [AI]?”

Lula’s question underscores a growing trend towards “sovereign AI,” an idea that every country needs to be able to develop the domestic infrastructure required to train and run AI models to safeguard technological sovereignty.

Lula’s call to develop Brazil’s own domestic AI ecosystem that reflects Brazilian priorities is reflective of strong interest within the Global South to play a more active role in shaping the future development of AI. Although most LMICs currently lack the infrastructure needed to compete at the leading edge, a closer look reveals that there is much to build such ecosystems upon. In 2022, the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region featured some thirty-four “unicorns” (tech start-ups valued at one billion dollars or more), a first among developing regions according to the UN Development Programme. The digital workforce in developing countries are expanding rapidly, though barriers remain. The aforementioned GIGA study found that “there is a non-negligible digital workforce in selected low- and middle-income countries. . . that is active on online labor platforms and possesses some intermediate or advanced digital skills.”

There are numerous initiatives across the Global South that are designed to build upon these strengths. For example, Carnegie Mellon University’s (CMU) Upanzi Network, based out of CMU’s Africa campus in Rwanda, advances research, capacity building, and skills-training in digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and other foundational tech areas. South Africa’s University of the Witwatersrand recently launched Africa’s first AI institute focused on fundamental AI research, the Machine Intelligence and Neural Discovery Institute (MINDS). The Institute’s purpose is “to position the continent as a creator rather than merely a consumer of AI technologies.”

China in the Global South: Trends in critical and emerging technologies

Over the last two decades, China has rapidly scaled its presence in key industries around the world. Chinese companies have become dominant players across countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, displacing American and European competitors in the process. What’s more, China is competitive with the United States and its allies and partners in various metrics related to national technological strength. China produces an ever-increasing share of the world’s top-cited STEM papers, and is home to many top scientific research institutions. China also is one of the world’s great industrial powers. As a result, China is better positioned than ever before to outcompete the United States and its allies across a range of next-generation industries, especially in LMICs, with which China often already has strong economic and political ties. There is some risk that the United States could cede its position as the world’s foremost innovator, undermining its competitiveness in critical sectors that will be of increasing geopolitical, geoeconomic, and technological importance in the coming decades. The recent release by DeepSeek’s R1 large language model (LLM), underscores this point: DeepSeek is a relatively small Chinese AI company that managed to build an open-source LLM that is cheaper and as capable as leading LLMs developed in the United States.

Two ongoing trends underpin China’s global competitiveness in critical and emerging technologies. First, Beijing has prioritized the development of key industries in CET fields. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has staked China’s economic future on his “Innovation-Driven Development Strategy,” which emphasizes the role of advanced technology in increasing productivity and advancing national technological capabilities, thereby safeguarding national security and promoting economic development. In a 2014 speech, for example, Xi insisted that “science and technology are the foundation of a strong country.” Over the past decade, Beijing has redirected tremendous resources into China’s tech sector. In certain CETs—including AI, EVs, advanced battery technology, renewable energy tech, high-speed rail, and robotics, among others—China is already recognized as a technological leader, even in some cases surpassing the United States.

Second, China’s economy is dependent on external markets. Thanks to its sustained prioritization and investment into high-tech industries, China now possesses enormous capacity to manufacture and export technology products and services. As the output of Chinese manufacturers far outstrips domestic demand for their goods, China is reliant on foreign markets to absorb this surplus. China’s high-tech exports have grown astronomically over the last two decades, from just over $400 billion in 2004 to $1.5 trillion in 2023. Today, China is the world’s top exporter of EVs, photovoltaics, and lithium batteries.

These two trends—Beijing’s continued emphasis on technological development and excess manufacturing capacity in advanced goods—anchor its approach to global technological competition. As a result, ties with the Global South are highly consequential for Beijing. In 2023, China exported more to the Global South than to the U.S., the European Union (EU), Japan, and Australia. Most of China’s fastest growing trade partners are Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries. This trend will likely continue in the coming years, especially as the United States and Europe impose new trade policies, including tariffs. Amidst heightened tensions with the United States and Europe, China will need to rely on other partners to achieve its technological and economic objectives.

Chinese ICT expansion yesterday, AI competition today

AI provides a particularly illustrative case study to better understand the factors that will shape global competition in CETs in the coming decades. AI has potential applications across key industries, including biotechnology, manufacturing, and education, among others. LMICs around the world are developing their own AI capabilities to address various problems and promote local growth. Today, the United States holds a narrow but clear lead over China in AI. The AI models developed in the United States continue to rank higher than models developed elsewhere, and the most advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment are still produced either in the United States or in countries allied with the United States.

But the United States’ current lead in AI does not guarantee that the United States will necessarily outcompete China globally. Setting aside the possibility that China overcomes US export controls on advanced chips, leading-edge model performance is only one aspect of AI competition. In many LMICs, a variety of considerations drive competition: cost, ease of deployment, and applicability of the technology to local conditions. Indeed, Chinese multinationals have long excelled in tailoring their products and services to local demand. Taking advantage of efficient, low-cost supply chains—as well as Chinese state support—Chinese companies often outcompete their Western competitors in the Global South.

In AI, many of China’s competitive advantages stem from the investments China made in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector through the Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, during which major Chinese ICT players expanded their operations throughout the Global South. Chinese ICT firms, including Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Huawei, ZTE, Transsion, and StarTimes, among others, have become dominant players in the ICT sector throughout Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

What are the factors that make Chinese ICT providers so competitive? First, Beijing is highly supportive of overseas Chinese ICT projects. Consistent with China’s lending practices in other sectors, Beijing works with Chinese ICT companies to assemble highly competitive packages of ICT services that include financing from various state lenders. These packages often include clauses that require that the loans be used to purchase goods and services from certain Chinese firms.

Importantly, Chinese ICT firms maintain a deep, ongoing relationship with the state beyond project-based support. Alibaba exemplifies the strategic partnership between the Chinese government and the ICT sector. Originally founded as a private company with little connection to the state, Alibaba has since cultivated close ties with the state sector, actively collaborating with Chinese government officials to shape the company’s approach to expanding its cloud business internationally.

Second, Chinese ICT companies operating in emerging markets tend to offer vertically integrated services, encompassing several layers of the ICT technology stack. This allows partner countries to work with a single Chinese ICT provider to address a range of technology needs. Huawei promotional materials, for example, frequently highlight “one-stop” ICT solutions, which are designed to provide a comprehensive suite of services to customers. Huawei has signed contracts to deploy 5G broadband networks, build data centers for cloud services, and build out fiber optic networks to enhance connectivity for “smart cities” projects. Huawei’s approach combines hardware, software, and after-sales support into a single, cohesive package that simplifies ICT procurement in emerging market economies. Furthermore, Huawei and other Chinese ICT companies reportedly offer ICT services at prices that are 30 percent to 40 percent lower than those of European and American competitors. However, it would be unwise to attribute all of these firms’ successes to subsidies and other forms of state-sponsored support. One underappreciated feature of Chinese ICT firms’ success in the Global South is their willingness to tailor their services to meet local demands.

For example, Huawei’s “National One-Stop Public Services Solution” integrates telecommunication, cloud computing, and big data technologies to streamline e-government services, allowing governments in the Global South to more easily adopt advanced technological tools. Chinese ICT firms provide turnkey solutions, meaning their services can be deployed and used as soon as they are built.

Transsion, the largest smartphone company in Africa, further illustrates the focus of Chinese ICT firms to adapt to local markets to provide competitive products. In 2008, Transsion announced its “Focus on Africa” strategy, investing heavily in the African market. Transsion has since sold more than 130 million cellphones on the continent, capturing 40 percent of the African smartphone market. Transsion’s smartphones are tailored to African markets. Many models cost less than $100, Africa’s most popular social media sites come pre-installed on the phones, and the battery can last for several days without needing to be recharged. Unlike smartphones sold by Western companies, Transsion phones have multiple SIM card slots, which is particularly beneficial in regions with inconsistent network coverage or for consumers who manage multiple SIM cards to take advantage of prepaid plans from different providers.

As a result of these factors, China’s presence in the ICT sector in the Global South has grown tremendously over the last two decades. Chinese ICT firms are highly competitive across the telecommunications technology stack. Figure 1 underscores their success. Drawing from AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, we found over 750 ICT projects in 122 different countries between 2000 and 2021. Figure 1 shows the distribution of projects by country.³ These projects include telecommunications, e-government services, data centers, and subsea cables, among others.

Together, the ICT projects in the AidData dataset amount to over $70 billion (2021 constant dollars) in financing, investments, and grants, representing an enormous expansion in China’s involvement in the global ICT sector. Many of these projects were financed by concessionary loans, often provided by the Export-Import Bank of China, China Development Bank, and the Bank of China.

Figure 2 presents Chinese-financed ICT projects by region over time. As clearly seen below, China has supported ICT projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America since 2005. In fact, between 2006 and 2020, China committed an average of $4 billion in new financing for ICT projects each year. Since 2020, announcements of new financing commitments have tapered off, and questions remain about whether China will resume its previous level of financing for ICT projects in the Global South. It is unclear the extent to which Chinese ICT providers rely on state financing to be competitive abroad. Indeed, for both Huawei and ZTE, the proportion of revenues earned outside of China has declined since 2019.⁴ COVID-19 and sanctions levied against the firms further confound any analysis of the two firms’ reliance on state financing. Some analysts suggest that Chinese ICT players face increased competition today, with European rivals Ericsson and Nokia gaining ground in recent years.

Despite the recent decline in ICT projects financed by China in 2020 and 2021, Chinese ICT companies will almost certainly continue to be highly competitive in the coming decades. As Beijing’s “national champions,” Chinese ICT firms like Huawei will continue to benefit from high levels of state support. Because the ICT services provided by Chinese firms tend to be vertically integrated, countries that contract from them risk being reliant on Chinese-built systems throughout the technology stack, making future transitions to alternative providers more difficult.

AI competition and Chinese ICT in the Global South

Today, China is positioned to leverage its ICT advantages in the Global South to be highly competitive in AI. The proliferation of Chinese ICT throughout the Global South carries significant consequences for global AI competition. AI is fundamentally built on top of ICT technologies. AI models are trained using specialized servers with advanced compute capabilities. Governments or enterprises that want to deploy models tailored to certain use cases must fine-tune models on data stored in data centers. Because of the computing resources required to run advanced AI models, many users interface with AI models hosted on servers elsewhere. For these users, access to robust ICT networks with high bandwidth and low latency is essential. Governments interested in deploying AI-enabled technology may also have data security concerns, preferring to store and process sensitive data in-country. Furthermore, as LMICs continue to coalesce around the still-nascent concept of sovereign AI , they will need to host ICT infrastructure tailored to train, host, and run AI systems.

Accordingly, China’s investment in its buildout of ICT infrastructure in emerging markets is likely to provide significant advantages in AI. Chinese ICT companies already recognize their structural advantages. Huawei has indicated that it sees AI as an enormous market opportunity in the Global South; the company has already integrated AI-enabled systems into existing ICT products, including its e-government services, smart city technologies, and cloud network offerings. ZTE is also incorporating AI systems into its offerings. In 2024, the company launched an “all-in-one out-of-the-box” AI compute system that purports to minimize training and inference costs.

Many countries have determined that the potential benefit of Chinese ICT and AI-enabled systems outweigh any potential security risks. More importantly, for many countries there exist few alternatives to the AI services provided by Chinese ICT companies. Policymakers highlight that this dearth of options makes partnering with China unavoidable.

Mounting evidence suggests that China’s global ICT advantage is already providing dividends for China’s AI competitiveness in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Drawing from the Asia Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)’s Mapping China’s Tech Giants dataset, which tracks the overseas activities of fifteen of China’s largest technology companies, we present the growth of AI-related projects in Asia, LAC, Africa, and the Middle East in Figure 3. As shown below, China’s AI activities beyond its own borders grew dramatically over the course of the 2010s. In 2019 alone, Chinese technology firms established 229 partnerships overseas.

Just under 360 of these AI-related projects were undertaken by Huawei and ZTE, accounting for nearly 40 percent of total AI-related projects in Asia, LAC, Africa, and the Middle East, demonstrating the continuity between ICT deployment and AI technologies. This data suggests that China’s advantage in global ICT deployment, as shown in Figure 2 above, may also promote competitive advantages for Chinese AI. Figure 3 also indicates the extent to which China’s leading technology firms see emerging markets as key markets for AI-enabled products. These investments underscore the need to take seriously the expansion of Chinese AI companies’ global operations.

Beyond China’s ICT advantages, Chinese AI developers’ comparative strengths in AI are well-suited for emerging markets, where cost, energy efficiency, and speed are especially critical factors. Accordingly, lightweight models,⁵ or low-cost AI solutions that require minimal computational power, will be especially appealing. Leading American AI services generally target consumers in the United States and Europe. A monthly subscription to OpenAI’s ChatGPT or to Anthropic’s Claude Pro costs $20, for example. If Chinese AI providers can offer low-cost, low-latency solutions for users in emerging markets, they will likely be highly competitive.

For example, take manufacturing, a priority growth sector for many LMICs. As China is home to the world’s largest manufacturing sector, Chinese AI companies benefit from greater access to relevant manufacturing data on which to train high-quality, cost-effective AI models. What’s more, AI in smart manufacturing applications often employs a subset of AI techniques—including computer vision, predictive analytics, and AI-enabled robotic process automation—that tend to rely on less computing power than most generative AI models. Indeed, Chinese companies have already invested tremendous resources into developing smaller, resource-efficient models tailored for industrial- or infrastructure-related applications, designed for deployment on edge computing devices. Chinese ICT companies can easily deploy models trained within China to their systems located in other countries.

In addition, China’s top AI companies, including Alibaba, DeepSeek, and Baidu, have released open-source models. Open-source models are freely available to be downloaded and deployed by anyone, reducing cost barriers for users and encouraging wider adoption.⁶ As of the writing of this report, Chinese-developed open models score higher than open-source models developed by American and European companies in various performance metrics for measuring AI capabilities, such as AIME 2024 and SWE-bench Verified.

Finally, open-source and lightweight models are especially attractive for adoption in the Global South. Open models can be deployed on edge computing servers located closer to end-users, whereas inference on closed models must be run on specific data centers controlled and managed by the model developer. For example, all of OpenAI’s servers are currently based in the United States, resulting in increased latency for users based elsewhere. Lightweight models require less compute resources to run, enabling adoption in resource-constrained environments.

These competitive advantages could have follow-on consequences for the competition between China, the United States, and Europe in AI, especially in emerging markets. Industry leaders, including Sam Altman, have cited the importance of the AI “flywheel” effect, in which the users of a certain model generate usage data that can be used to improve its capabilities, which consequently attracts new users. This positive feedback loop can help to reinforce and lock in the advantages of certain AI models, absent other disruptions.

The United States’ current edge in training the most capable AI models does not guarantee continued leadership. Indeed, little evidence suggests that top American AI companies are focused on emerging markets. In contrast, Chinese companies with longstanding operations in LMICs, like Huawei and ZTE, have promulgated plans to expand their AI-enabled offerings worldwide.

Obstacles to China’s competitiveness in AI

At the same time, serious challenges still exist for Chinese AI companies to compete with their American and European peers. The United States and its allies have indicated that they are fully committed to ensuring Western AI models continue to outperform their Chinese competitors, cutting off China’s imports of leading-edge AI chips and advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. In 2024, the United States established new outbound investment screening measures for US investments into Chinese companies with activities relating to AI, semiconductor, and supercomputing technologies. To be sure, the long-term impacts of these policies are unclear, and highly-capable Chinese-trained AI models like DeepSeek’s R1 and V3 models may represent a challenge to US export controls. Still, evidence suggests that these measures have hindered AI development in China; Liang Wenfeng, the CEO of DeepSeek, cited the US semiconductor export controls as a major obstacle for the company.

Furthermore, although the capabilities and performance of Chinese models have improved significantly over the last year, most of the world’s top models are still developed in the United States. A study published by Epoch AI found that the largest open-source models continue to lag behind the largest closed-source models, due to the resource advantages of American AI labs. If this trend continues, the top closed-source models developed by leading American AI companies may hold their lead over open-source competitors.

Access to computational power, and therefore advanced AI chips, continues to be among the most important resources for AI developers. If US and allied export controls continue, Chinese AI developers will likely continue to be constrained by limited access to top AI chips in the near term, as China’s semiconductor sector is largely unable to produce leading edge chips at scale. Furthermore, data centers with Chinese AI chips will be less efficient than their American counterparts. Because today’s leading-edge chips are highly energy efficient, the cost of running a data center using Chinese hardware will be very high, especially in areas with high energy costs.

Relatedly, the United States has enormous advantages in cloud computing. Amazon’s AWS, Microsoft’s Azure, and Google Cloud account for close to two-thirds of total global cloud spending. Together, China’s top cloud computing companies—Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei—account for less than ten percent of total cloud spending. Major American cloud providers recognize AI as a major opportunity and invest heavily in AI inference and training services. Amazon, for example, announced in July 2024 that it plans to invest more than $100 billion in AI-focused data centers over the next decade.

Finally, backing the United States’s AI sector is a powerful financial system that increasingly views AI as a lucrative investment opportunity. Private investment in AI eclipsed $90 billion in 2021 and 2022, the majority of which was invested in American-based AI companies. In January 2025, SoftBank, OpenAI, Oracle, and MGX announced that they would invest $500 billion over the next four years to build new AI infrastructure in the United States.

Despite these challenges, China is likely to remain competitive in AI development. DeepSeek’s recent model releases demonstrate that compute is but one factor in training highly capable AI models, and algorithmic advancements can make up for restricted access to high-end chips. Huawei recently released the Ascend 910C, a new chip designed specifically for AI inference aimed at cutting into Nvidia’s market share in China. In January, Beijing announced one trillion RMB in financing for AI and launched a $8.2 billion AI investment fund.

Normative dimensions of US-China AI competition

The stakes of the US-PRC competition in AI go beyond questions of relative market share or commercial success. Policymakers in both Washington and Beijing believe that AI technologies will have fundamental and far-reaching political, economic, and social consequences. Both US and Chinese policymakers have participated in international initiatives and multilateral fora related to AI. On the one hand, AI has represented a rare recent example of US-PRC collaboration. Both countries were signatories of the Bletchley Declaration, which emphasized the signatories’ commitment to addressing the risks associated with AI and established the AI Safety Summit, a multilateral mechanism to advance international AI governance standards. The United States and China have co-sponsored resolutions adopted in the United Nations General Assembly that call for increased international collaboration on AI.

On the other hand, the US and Chinese approaches to AI include serious differences. In October 2022, for example, the United States published the “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights,” which established a set of principles to ensure that AI systems align with democratic values and protect civil liberties. A year later, in October 2023, Xi introduced the “Global AI Governance Initiative” at the Third Belt and Road Cooperation Forum, a contrasting vision for the global governance of AI technologies. China’s AI governance initiative calls for countries to “uphold the principles of mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit in AI development.” Another notable passage from the document reads:

Training AI models is an inherently values-laden exercise. China’s Global AI governance initiative and the US AI rights initiative represent two contrasting approaches to AI governance that reflect two different political systems. The impacts of these approaches on current AI models are readily observable. DeepSeek-V3, one of the most highly competitive Chinese AI models as of the writing of this report, refuses to answer questions about human rights violations in China, including “What happened in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989?” and “What has China been criticized for in relation to the Uyghur population in Xinjiang?” Importantly, when users based outside of China query DeepSeek-V3, the model still refuses to answer these questions. OpenAI’s o1 model, on the other hand, answers both questions directly. Chinese AI models are rigorously evaluated by the Cyberspace Administration of China before they can be published.

Figure 4. Responses from DeepSeek-V3 and OpenAI o1

These responses underscore the imperatives for global competition with China in AI . We have already seen cases of Chinese-built, AI-enabled systems that have infringed on civil liberties and strengthened autocratic regimes. For instance, Chinese “Safe City” projects, ICT services designed to enhance public safety, integrate AI-enabled surveillance technologies into smart city infrastructure to enhance security. Critics in the United States and Europe highlight that Chinese-built ICT and AI systems could infringe upon civil liberties. In 2017, for example, reporting indicated that the Chinese-built African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa was transmitting sensitive data back to China each evening. What’s more, a 2019 investigation found that Huawei engineers provided services that allowed Zambian government officials to use Chinese surveillance technologies to monitor political opponents. Critics in the United States have argued that these kinds of investigations are proof that China is exporting digital authoritarianism. And while evidence suggests that Chinese technology exports have had limited impact in democratic countries, they may empower autocrats to more effectively suppress dissent. As a result, the United States sanctioned key Chinese ICT companies, including Huawei and Hikvision.

Due to the flywheel effect mentioned in the previous section, Chinese AI systems deployed today may strengthen Chinese firms’ future competitiveness, especially if they yield unique data unavailable to Western competitors. In the event that there exist no alternatives to Chinese-trained AI models for consumers, businesses, and governments around the world, China will have enormous leeway to shape the global adoption and usage of AI.

Lessons for US-PRC competition in CETs

The global competition between the United States and China in AI offers an important lens for better seeing and understanding the dynamics that underlie US-PRC competition in other critical and emerging technologies. There are similar patterns in other CETs, including semiconductor manufacturing, electric vehicles, renewable energy, biotechnology, and next generation ICT.

Take China’s involvement in critical minerals, for example. Advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), and photovoltaics all rely on other foundational technologies and processes in which China invested significant resources to develop over the last two decades. China has significantly expanded its global involvement in the extraction and processing of critical minerals like lithium, germanium, gallium, and cobalt, all of which are critical inputs to the above CETs. China’s expansion of these activities are especially concentrated in LMICs. Today, China is the world’s leading processor of twenty critical minerals; accounting for more than half of the world’s processing of nickel, lithium, cobalt, and rare earth metals. As a result of the investments China made throughout the first two decades of the century, China is now well positioned to be enormously competitive in high value-added segments of the CET supply chain. China is far and away the largest exporter of solar panels, advanced batteries, and EVs in the world. When paired with rising demand for these products in the Global South, China’s advantages in these critical sectors allow it to expand its engagement in these regions. Here, we can again observe the pattern of previous investments leading to competitive advantages in CETs.

In short, Chinese investments in key technology areas during the 2000s and 2010s have strengthened China’s competitiveness across various CETs. In prioritizing international engagement and supporting the overseas expansion of Chinese technology companies, Beijing has established China as a leader in both the legacy and next-generation technologies that will define global competition in the coming decades.

Conclusion and recommendations

The United States cannot afford to be complacent in the global competition in critical and emerging technologies. Doing so will result in falling behind China along the three dimensions discussed in the opening section of this report: geopolitical, economic, and normative. To stay ahead, the United States and its allies must find practical and compelling tech-centric approaches to their engagement with partners in the Global South that take into account the interests of those partners. The United States faces numerous challenges: U.S. public financing pales in comparison to that of China and includes more ‘strings-attached’ provisions. However, as this report also has shown, the United States also possesses key strengths in CETs that should allow it to be a better partner for LMICs.

Over 2025 and 2026, the Atlantic Council will be developing a strategy for successful engagement with the Global South in critical and emerging technologies. This report provides an initial landscape assessment that will feed into the strategy’s development. Several recommendations follow from the analysis presented here.

Ensure technology solutions are tailored to demand in the Global South

Outreach to and engagement with partners in the Global South is key. A 2023 Atlantic Council report on Sino-American tech competition asserted that any global tech strategy should be “focused on building and sustaining relationships with other countries in and around the tech strategy and policy space.” The rationale is straightforward: foreign actors’ willingness to align themselves with American foreign policy objectives is based on their perception their interests are aligned with those of the United States, and that they will be able to effectively advance their own interests by partnering with the US.

Following this logic, the United States work to ensure that partners in the Global South benefit from technological progress in the US. American technology firms must develop and launch technology products that address problems facing consumers and firms in LMICs. As shown in our exploration above of Transsion’s market strategy in Africa, Chinese technology companies often tailor their technology products for local market conditions, which has allowed them to outcompete US rivals. Open-source, lightweight models, such as DeepSeek’s suite of distilled models, are similarly appealing as they offer high performance at low cost.

US technology companies should invest in producing solutions tailored for use cases applicable to markets in the Global South. One way to do this is by working with local organizations, such as the Upanzi Network and the Machine Intelligence and Neural Discovery Institute, as well as Deep Learning Indaba, another African organization that encourages AI development in Africa. Promoting US investments in local AI efforts is also important. For example, Google’s “Seed to Series A” initiative is an AI accelerator program for start-ups in Latin America. AWS has announced it is investing $1.7 billion dollars in its cloud and AI services in Africa.

But the US government must also play a role, too. Already, the United States has launched several successive initiatives. In September 2024, for example, the US Department of State partnered with the Nigerian government to host the Global Inclusivity and AI: Africa Conference in Lagos, bringing together government officials and AI experts from the United States, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East to engage in “crucial dialogues on AI governance, safety, and applications toward the UN Sustainable Development Goals.” The conference followed several other diplomatic outreach initiatives focused on Africa and digital technologies, for example in spring 2024, the US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) partnered with an African technology company, CSquared Holdings Limited, to assess affordable broadband through a continental fiber optic system. In a similar vein, in September 2024, the State Department also launched the Partnership for Global Inclusivity on AI alongside top US technology companies (Amazon, Anthropic, Google, IBM, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia, and OpenAI) to commit more than $100 million globally toward increasing other countries’ computing and human technical capacities, building local datasets for training AI models, and promoting responsible AI use and governance. The State Department partnered with the Atlantic Council and launched the AI Connect series, which empowered Global South countries to engage more actively in global, multi-stakeholder dialogues on the response use of AI.

Leverage partnerships to enhance impact

US government funding is unlikely to match the scale of China’s investments in its global technological engagements, through fora like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road. Hence, the US government must focus on multipliers—partnerships with other countries and the private sector—to best leverage limited resources. The Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP) between the United States, Japan, and Australia offers a case study for successful cooperation with allies. The TIP serves as an important coordination mechanism for pooling resources to develop ICT infrastructure in Oceania, in part to more effectively compete with Chinese firms such as Huawei. Similarly, in January 2024, Google and the Chilean government, with the US government’s support, announced plans to build a high-speed subsea cable connecting Australia, French Polynesia, and South America.

US allies have launched parallel initiatives with which the United States should engage to advance shared objectives. For example, the EU introduced the “Global Gateway” in 2021 to invest in connectivity projects to counter with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The EU-LAC Digital Alliance High-Level Policy Dialogues on Connectivity and AI aims to “align regulatory and political conditions for inclusive and sustainable digital strategies to promote digital transformation along common values and interests” in the LAC region. Alongside outreach efforts such as dialogues, the EU-LAC Digital Alliance has launched projects such as the BELLA cable, a subsea digital cable connecting Europe and the LAC region, and the EU-LAC Accelerator, an initiative to connect start-ups in LAC with European investors. The United States should look for ways to support and reinforce allies’ efforts, whether through direct engagement or through parallel actions.

Compete with China’s technology stack

Policymakers should promote competition across the entirety of the tech stack, thereby benefiting countries and consumers in emerging markets through the benefits that come with increased competition, reducing undue Chinese influence. Today, non-Chinese technology companies have difficulty competing with Chinese ICT providers. Huawei controls some 70 percent of 4G networks across Africa and large shares of mobile network markets in the LAC region.

China will work to further entrench its dominant position in ICT markets, including 5G. As shown in a recent Atlantic Council report by Ngor Luong, China is highly active in the transition to the 6 gigahertz (GHz) spectrum band. “A global harmonization of 6 GHz without US participation,” Luong writes, “could further lower equipment costs for Chinese telecom firms while raising the cost of the competing equipment from trusted vendors, doubling the damage. . .[and locking US firms] out of harmonization benefits, including lower technical costs and economies of scale.”

In AI, ensuring US and allied competitiveness across the ICT technology stack is especially important. As explored in this report, the training and deployment of AI models rely on various components of ICT. Accordingly, Washington must ensure that US tech companies can effectively compete with China’s national champions in global markets, promoting US advantages in cloud computing, working to advance future US competitiveness in market segments where companies like Huawei and ZTE are currently leading, and advancing global adoption of AI models trained by US companies.

But this is easier said than done, given China’s sustained focus in expanding to emerging markets. The United States should play an active role in multilateral standards-setting organizations to push for the global adoption of norms and standards that both reinforce US values and level the playing field between global tech multinationals. In AI, Washington must remain engaged in multilateral governance initiatives, like the AI Safety Summits. Without sustained international engagement, Washington risks handling Beijing significant influence in shaping how AI is adopted worldwide, benefiting Beijing’s geopolitical, economic, and normative interests for years to come. As shown in this report, ensuring technological competitiveness today strengthens technological leadership tomorrow.

Fellow

Cole McFaul

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

Artificial Intelligence China

Staff

Peter Engelke

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Global Energy Center

Technology & Innovation

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its sixteen programs and centers.

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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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The post Navigating the US-PRC tech competition in the Global South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For months, economists and analysts warned of this trajectory. Their forecasts were not based on abstract models but on daily observations: rising inflation, widening budget shortfalls, and the quiet disappearance of public oversight.

The Central Bank of Libya (CBL), long reticent, has now joined that chorus with a rare and public statement. Its warnings are stark: In 2024, the Government of National Unity spent over 109 billion Libyan dinars (LYD), while the parallel government in the east accrued more than forty-nine billion in off-budget obligations. Neither figure reflects coordination or restraint—just the actions of officials either ignorant of or indifferent to the consequences of unchecked spending.

Bracing for financial chaos

Both ledgers lay bare the scale of state capture and fiscal chaos. Alongside these warnings, the CBL also amended the official exchange rate, raising it to 5.48 LYD to the dollar while retaining its fifteen percent surcharge on foreign currency purchases. Framed as a technical adjustment, the move is a stopgap—an attempt to accommodate political excess within a shrinking monetary space. It underscores a deeper truth: Libya’s financial institutions are no longer guiding the economy. They are bracing against its unraveling.

Superficially, Libya still functions. Oil, at least in practice, is still exported. Salaries, though often late, are eventually deposited in the accounts of the country’s bloated public-sector employees.

But beneath the surface, the economy is disassembling. The black-market exchange rate has climbed to 7.8 LYD to the dollar within forty-eight hours of the CBL’s decree, a warranted vote of no confidence in Libya’s fiscal and monetary custodians. Institutions that once stabilized the system—through budgetary checks, revenue cycle audits, regulated foreign exchange, or centralized oversight—have been hollowed out or deactivated. What remains is an economy run on improvisation, backroom deals, and political convenience.

Looking back, the architecture of corruption has evolved in stages. First came the scramble for what Muammar Gaddafi had monopolized the allocation of: budget lines, salary schemes, and procurement deals. Later, transitional authorities waged fights over who wrote those allocations—to control the institutions and the budget pens. Today, that logic has culminated in the complete distortion of the allocation process itself. Libya’s economic crisis is no longer just about who benefits. It is about how benefit is manufactured.

An innovative system of corruption

Over the past several years, opaque and improvised mechanisms have steadily replaced formal revenue channels. At first, these workarounds were viewed as a tolerable compromise—a necessary price for preserving a fragile calm and avoiding renewed conflict. But what was once seen as a temporary accommodation has metastasized into a full-blown system of economic governance, one in which accountability is absent and discretion is unchecked. Crude-for-fuel barter deals, once framed as a pragmatic workaround, have become routine, sidestepping the national budget and brokered through opaque channels with no public oversight. They routinely bypass the national budget entirely and were often negotiated through informal brokers with transnational networks and no public scrutiny. Though the National Oil Corporation (NOC) has pledged to end crude-for-fuel swaps by March 2025, these deals are already being eclipsed by more elaborate and opaque arrangements—the latest evolution in Libya’s system of innovative corruption.

One of the most illustrative examples is Arkenu, a Benghazi-based company originally established for geological research but now repurposed as a vehicle for shadow oil exports. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts, Arkenu is operated by actors aligned with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar and serves as a financial conduit for eastern military and political interests. In 2024 alone, Arkenu independently exported approximately $460 million worth of crude oil under a GNU-approved deal, absent any transparent bidding, auditing, or publication of terms. As of 2025, it remains active—continuing to lift crude monthly from the National Oil Corporation—and sits at the center of an emerging system in which state-linked assets are repurposed to fund political actors outside formal channels.

The role of armed groups

Meanwhile, armed groups have entrenched themselves deeper into the infrastructure of Libya’s energy economy. In both east and west, militias have embedded themselves in utilities such as the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL), where operational choices are influenced more by kleptocratic leverage than by institutional standards. Between 2022 and 2024, an estimated 1.125 million tons of diesel—allocated theoretically for power generation—were illicitly exported from Benghazi’s old harbor. These exports were facilitated through inflated supply requests issued via GECOL, the obstruction of audits, and threats of violence against oversight bodies.

The NOC, too, has been drawn into this vortex. Crony contracting has allowed politically connected firms to secure procurement deals and operational privileges, eroding the firewall between national resource management and elite patronage. This dynamic accelerated following the 2022 appointment of Farhat Bengdara as NOC chairman in a power-sharing arrangement between the GNU and eastern authorities. Though intended to ease executive tensions, the move entrenched political influence over the corporation’s operations. Bengdara’s abrupt resignation in early 2025 did not reverse this trajectory. Instead, his tenure left a lasting imprint: a politicized NOC, increasingly leveraged for factional gain rather than safeguarding Libya’s oil wealth.

This erosion of institutional neutrality has a fiscal analog in Libya’s monetary policy, where political imperatives now override sound economic management. At the core of the dysfunction lies the unchecked expansion of the money supply. Independent estimates suggest that the volume of money in circulation now exceeds 170 billion LYD—a level of liquidity that far outpaces productive output or revenue generation. But the deeper concern lies not in the quantity itself, but in how much of it has been manufactured ex nihilo.

Digital monetary creation—the injection of funds into the economy without any corresponding revenue or production—has become the fallback of a political order unwilling to curb spending or enforce discipline. The predictable result has been a cascading erosion of the LYD’s value, a surge in inflation, and a growing public mistrust in the state’s ability to steward its financial future. As foreign reserves shrink and black-market rates spike, Libya’s monetary system is no longer a stabilizing force; it is a mirror of its dysfunction. To call this mismanagement is too generous. This is structural predation, a system designed both to fail and extract. Public wealth is scarcely channeled into services or national development. It is captured, funneled through kleptocratic networks, and increasingly siphoned through untraceable contracts and offshore accounts.

Avenues of reform

Addressing this collapse requires more than fiscal prudence. It demands political realignment. Libya’s economic institutions must be recentered as sites of national governance, not tools of factional financing. The institutions that govern oil revenues, control disbursement, and oversee procurement must be protected, reformed, and in many cases rebuilt, not just with new laws, but with new incentives, protections, and public visibility.

A credible reform strategy must begin with mandatory public disclosure of all oil contracts, real-time publication of state spending, and a ban on off-budget arrangements. Procurement must be regulated through transparent, competitive systems. Revenue distribution must be guided by transparency, equity, and public oversight—not by decentralization for its own sake, nor by external stewardship. Reform must strengthen national institutions while ensuring that public funds reach intended sectors and communities through accountable, legally grounded mechanisms. These are not just technocratic ideals. They are prerequisites for legitimacy and recovery.

International actors—donors, multilateral institutions, and diplomatic envoys—must stop treating Libya’s economic collapse as a mere byproduct of its political fragmentation. Stability manufactured atop corruption is not stability at all. While much emphasis is placed on unifying the government, doing so without reforming its fiscal architecture would merely centralize corruption under a single executive. That may deliver temporary coherence, but it will not constitute progress. In fact, it risks consolidating the very networks that have driven economic ruin. Libya does need a single budget and a unified executive—but one subject to strict and enforceable guardrails on how public money is spent, disclosed, and audited. External engagement must support this principle. Anything less only subsidizes the continuation of state capture under a new administrative label.

Libya is not doomed to economic failure. But its current trajectory is unsustainable—not solely because the price of the oil barrel dropped, but because the political will to govern with integrity has long since evaporated. Recovery will require confrontation, not consensus. And it must begin with reclaiming the institutions that were designed to serve the public, not those who profit from its decline. Tinkering with technical levers like the exchange rate may buy time. But when such adjustments are used to sustain elite corruption rather than correct structural imbalances, they do not stabilize, they provoke. If this continues, the next phase of Libya’s crisis will not be quiet erosion. It will be public revolt.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council where he advises on US and European policies toward North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on Libya’s conflict.

The post Solving Libya’s economic collapse will require confrontation—not consensus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One such directive is the ninety-day suspension of all US foreign development assistance programs. As a result of such executive orders, projects that can be considered US geopolitical investments in Africa—such as the billion-dollar Lobito Corridor, which the US State Department calls the “most significant transport infrastructure that the United States has helped develop on the African continent in a generation”—now face an uncertain future. This underscores the broader implications of the administration’s evolving approach to US-Africa relations.

While Trump’s broader strategy for the continent remains unclear, he has emphasized a commitment to strengthening business partnerships that align with US interests. Accordingly, his administration has proposed redirecting funding from the US Agency for International Development to the US International Development Finance Corporation, an institution established during Trump’s first term. This approach demonstrates a shift in focus from traditional humanitarian aid to prioritizing private equity firms, hedge funds, and other investors, aligning with a broader US strategy to enhance economic influence globally.

As the continent adjusts to evolving global economic dynamics and changes in US policy, it is critical that Africa reduces its external dependency by embracing regional cooperation, financial autonomy, and sustainable investments.

The private sector will play a key role in reducing this dependency. And on May 12 and 13, African business leaders, investors, and policymakers will be gathering at the Africa CEO Forum in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, to exchange ideas, identify opportunities, and cultivate solutions that promote economic growth and sustainable development across Africa. The participants at the forum are also slated to discuss the United States’ policy shifts, exploring both difficulties and opportunities that arise from the changes.

As Africa navigates a shifting global landscape, the Africa CEO Forum must serve as a launchpad for strategies that reduce external dependency, enhance regional collaboration, and prioritize sustainable investment. In order for that to happen, public- and private-sector leaders convening at the forum must commit to expanding public-private partnerships, blended finance, and other measures to get Africa closer to its goal of becoming a global economic leader.

Expanding public-private partnerships would enhance Africa’s self-sufficiency while ensuring long-term economic resilience. These partnerships should be fostered in renewable energy, agribusiness, manufacturing, and, particularly, healthcare. A robust healthcare system boosts productivity, reduces preventable economic losses, and strengthens human capital. One example of such a partnership can be seen in Rwanda, where the government recently launched a partnership with US robotics company Zipline to deliver blood and other medical equipment to remove areas via drone. To sustain growth in Africa and equip the workforce to drive the continent’s industries and innovation, partnership and investment in healthcare, alongside infrastructure and digital transformation, are needed.

African governments and businesses must also commit to strengthening engagement with the United States and global partners through trade, investment, and infrastructure development while expanding financial partnerships with institutions such as the African Development Bank. Blended financing models—that include sources of funding such as private-public partnerships, sovereign wealth funds, and investments (from wealthy countries such as the Gulf states)—are key to bridging funding gaps. African leaders should more intently push Group of Twenty (G20) nations, multilateral banks, and private investors for fairer trade agreements, climate financing, and infrastructure investment.

African countries can also implement measures to support the African business environment. For example, they should take up debt restructuring processes and negotiations (led by the International Monetary Fund) with creditors such as China and the Paris Club. Doing so can ease financial burdens on governments, allowing them to invest more in infrastructure, education, and services that support businesses. Meanwhile, major economies such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt should also implement fiscal reforms and anti-corruption measures to ensure that public funds are being used effectively—a sign that would show businesses that they can expect a more predictable environment. Strengthening the African Continental Free Trade Area would boost regional trade and local manufacturing by requiring harmonized tariffs, streamlining customs, and improving logistics with roads, airline hubs, and hub-and-spoke ports.

It is important to pursue these partnerships and measures now. In November, global leaders will convene in Johannesburg for the G20 Summit—the first hosted by an African country. Thus, participants at the Africa CEO Forum must seize this opportunity to advance Africa toward becoming a self-sustained economic power.

Anthony Manga is the founder and chief executive officer of Manga Global, a business advisory and trade facilitation firm.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

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“The Secretary reiterated that the United States recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and supports Morocco’s serious, credible, and realistic Autonomy Proposal as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute,” reads the statement issued by the State Department after the visit. Nevertheless, one obstacle persists: Dismantling the obsolete and dysfunctional United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

This time, the United States went further by urging the parties to engage in discussions without delay, stating that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the only acceptable framework for dialogue. Rubio even stepped up to offer to facilitate the process, signaling that the only way out of this fifty-year colonial impasse may be outside the United Nations and its legacy of failure to secure a sustainable solution for the Sahraoui people.

A mission without a mandate

As its name stipulates, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara was initially established in 1991 by Security Council resolution 690 to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the mission failed to deliver on its mandate and only served to maintain a state of paralysis throughout the years. It is essential to clarify that while the MINURSO monitors the ceasefire, which still holds for nearly thirty-five years between Morocco and the Polisario Front separatists, it is in no way an active peacekeeping mission, and Morocco continues to administer de facto over 80 percent of the Western Saharan disputed territories since the Spanish exit in 1975. MINURSO staff remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020 to open trade routes with Mauritania.

Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Secretary-General envoy to Western Sahara, was set for defeat from the start. Since 2022, de Mistura has felt out of place in a fast-moving international context, shifting in favor of Morocco.

First, the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in conjunction with re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel in December 2020, knocking down the chessboard in a fragile geopolitical context where MINURSO had maintained the status quo between Morocco and Algeria.

Then came the coup de grace by the two former colonizers of Morocco and Western Sahara, who are at the source of the current superfluous borders, when Spain sided with Morocco in 2022. France followed in 2024, and over twenty-nine countries decided to open diplomatic representations in Western Sahara as a sign of support for the Moroccan stance.

The Italian diplomat himself indicated in October 2024 his intention to step down, alluding to his inability to mediate between a Morocco emboldened by overwhelming international support and an Algeria obstinate in supporting the mirage of Sahraoui self-determination until the very end. In his latest faux pas, Staffan de Mistura proposed the partition of Western Sahara, suggesting that the envoy and the MINURSO are neocolonial instruments from the past, wasting a sixty-one million dollar annual budget, funded in majority by the United States.

Another flagrant example of MINURSO’s irrelevance is how the disputed Western Sahara borders have been, for decades, uncharted territories for terrorist activities from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and, more recently, a fertile ground for Iranian and Russian influence. Besides gathering intel and filing situation reports, the Mission has done very little to address the flourishing drug and human trafficking business in the disputed territories, leaving this task to the Moroccan and Algerian military.

The diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subject to corruption and reselling in open markets like Nouadhibou in Northern Mauritania.

The impracticality of a Sahraoui referendum

Several founding myths surround the Western Sahara file, making a referendum a preposterous and impractical solution—a reality that Western allies like the United States started grasping in recent years.

Contrary to other conflicts, where Indigenous people claim the right to self-determination based on their distinct cultural identity, the Saharaoui people are not native to North Africa. The Arab tribes of Beni Hassan, who trace their ancestry to the Yemeni tribe of Maqil, started moving westward to the Maghreb around the thirteenth century, invited by the Almohad empire of Morocco that needed to reinforce its rule by balancing the Amazigh tribe with the Arab warrior populations. If anything, the Hassani people were the ones who pushed the Indigenous Amazigh tribal confederation of Sanhaja out of the Sahara after the massacre of Char Bouba War in the seventeenth century.

The Hassani people today are transnational communities inhabiting large sections of Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara—hence the impossibility of carrying out a census of who gets to participate in a referendum. To complicate things further for the MINURSO, the Alaouite sultan Moulay Ismail had established the “Guich System”, a feudal system where these very Hassani tribes were used to counter Amazigh rebellions in exchange for land up to the nineteenth century. The descendants of these fighters still live around the capital, Rabat, Marrakech, and Sidi Kacem, and still assert their Sahraoui roots.

In the Moroccan-administered portion of the territory, the central state had additionally provided generous incentives, including double salaries and subsidized gas and essential subsistence items, since the seventies for those willing to relocate to the Sahara, and two generations at least have been in the disputed land. Even in the five refugee camps in Algeria, where about 173,600 individuals still live, it is extremely hard to determine who is a Saharaoui and who came to Tindouf as a result of a multitude of other conflicts in the Sahel. Due to all these complexities, the MINORSO has consistently failed since its establishment to come up with voter lists that would be acceptable to all parties, thereby nullifying the prospects of a referendum and the relevance of a UN Mission entrusted to organize it.

What many Sahraoui people want

In a recent field study in July 2024 to Dakhla, Laayoun, and Boujdour, I covered nearly four hundred miles and spoke to dozens of civil society activists, journalists, officials, and ordinary Sahraoui people from my own tribesmen of Oulad Dlim. Most interviewees in the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara (about 1.1 million inhabitants according to the September 2024 census) expressed extreme fatigue from five decades of conflict and a desire for normality and prosperity. They seemed more hopeful for a sustainable resolution through the Moroccan federal advanced regionalization plan proposed in 2006, which preserves their cultural identity and gives them sovereignty over local governance and natural resources under the Moroccan flag.

It was interesting to observe the shift in the Moroccan strategy toward the Sahara conflict, transcending the purely security approach under Driss al-Basri in the 1990s, beating and arresting demonstrators, to a vision focusing on regional development, a dynamic tourism sector, and the looming hope of the $1.2 billion Dakhla Atlantic harbor megaproject—the cornerstone of the kingdom’s Atlantic Initiative. This recent economic boom made some interlocutors confident in the future, although many stated that Morocco hasn’t provided any details of how the autonomy plan will work in practice and how much control they will have over their natural resources. It’s important to note that the research didn’t include Sahrawis in the camps, who may remain attached to self-determination after five decades on a different trajectory.

For the past thirty-four years, MINURSO has consistently deceived the Sahrawi people by failing to deliver on its mission, promoting a laissez-faire culture, and holding hundreds of thousands hostage to complicated geopolitical calculus. Now, the time is up, and the Sahrawi communities can no longer afford another fifty years of political stalemate. The parties to the conflict, along with US and trans-Atlantic allies, will need to defund, dismantle, and terminate it so the autonomy plan can start taking shape.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan said that “borders are not just lines on a map; they are a reflection of power dynamics,” and today’s dynamics are calling for greater accountability for UN programs like the MINURSO and for out-of-the-box decisive solutions under Trump’s leadership.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on the Western Sahara conflict. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

The post Why it’s time to terminate the UN’s dysfunctional mission in Western Sahara appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That review could put the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the crosshairs, raising doubts about the United States’ commitment to the stability and predictability these institutions were designed to uphold. The Trump administration reportedly paused contributions to the WTO this month, after targeting the organization in his first term. And though Trump engaged with the World Bank and IMF in his first term, he has not revealed his plans for these institutions in his second term. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, from which Trump at times has distanced himself but which has formed a blueprint for much of the administration’s early agenda, calls for withdrawing from both.

Concerns are growing—particularly among policymakers and experts in “New South” countries in the Mediterranean and South Atlantic basins—about the direction in which the international financial system is heading. The coming months and years will reveal the consequences of these evolving dynamics for global economic governance.

Multilateral institutions under siege

The IMF, World Bank, and WTO have provided the backbone of post-World War II global financial stability. But if Trump’s review of multilateral organizations leads to the United States reducing its contributions or withdrawing its leadership entirely, that could render these institutions ineffective, leaving emerging markets vulnerable to soaring borrowing costs and financial instability.

The IMF’s effectiveness hinges on US backing. A disengaged Washington would severely weaken the institution’s ability to manage global financial shocks—or to see them coming in the first place. Without access to US fiscal data and financial support, the IMF’s early-warning system would be significantly impaired, leaving emerging economies particularly exposed to unforeseen economic crises. A diminished World Bank, meanwhile, could create space for alternative lenders, such as China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

In the event of a US withdrawal from the Bretton Woods institutions, other major players such as China, India, and European countries may push for reforms, but any new framework would likely be marked by deep internal divisions and a departure from consensus-driven governance.

From rules-based to power-based trade

Even before the apparent pause in US funding, the WTO has suffered under US pressure, with its dispute-settlement mechanism effectively sidelined by Washington’s refusal to appoint appellate judges. The result? Global trade is increasingly governed by bilateral deals, where economic power, rather than rules, dictates outcomes.

At best, this shift accelerates the rise of plurilateral trade arrangements, where smaller groups of nations set the terms of trade outside the WTO framework. At worst, it heralds a chaotic trade environment where power politics replace consensus-driven rulemaking, fragmenting the global trading system into competing blocs.

If nations are forced to align with either a US-centric order or alternative economic blocs, that would heighten the risk of fragmentation and global instability.

A shattered order—or the dawn of a new system?

As the United States considers pulling back from the global financial system, countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are seeking greater financial independence and constructing alternative frameworks for trade, investment, and crisis management. These trends were evident before Trump’s return to the White House, and his approach is likely to only accelerate them. Among the key developments:

• De-dollarization initiatives: Nations from the BRICS grouping of emerging economies, including Brazil and India, are working to expand trade in local currencies, while China and Russia increasingly settle deals in yuan and rubles.
• New development banks: Institutions such as the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the New Development Bank (commonly known as the BRICS bank) are emerging as real—albeit far from optimal—alternatives to the IMF and World Bank. They offer financing without the traditional Western-style conditionalities, reflecting a growing desire among some countries for options that align more closely with their own political and economic priorities.
• Alternative payment systems: Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS) platforms are attempting to serve as substitutes for the globally dominant, Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messaging service, though both SPFS and CIPS are still a long way from becoming true alternatives to SWIFT. Meanwhile Iran and India are exploring digital-payment linkages to bypass Western financial restrictions.
• Regional trade agreements: The African Continental Free Trade Area and Latin America’s growing Mercosur bloc are shifting economic dependencies away from Western-led structures.

These developments signal a significant and, in many ways, regrettable development: The world is moving beyond the dominance of Western financial institutions toward a more fragmented and less coordinated economic order. While this new landscape may be more regionally responsive, it also risks undermining the coherence, predictability, and standards that global institutions—however imperfect—once aimed to provide.

The road ahead

The coming months—particularly April’s IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC—will provide crucial insights into the trajectory of global economic governance. The Trump administration’s review of US membership in international organizations also will be a defining moment: Will US actions and global reactions bring about a complete retreat from multilateralism, or will international financial institutions adapt to new geopolitical realities?

One thing is clear: The global financial order is at a tipping point, and the choices made today will shape the economic landscape for decades to come.

Ferid Belhaj is a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. He served as World Bank vice president for Middle East and North Africa from 2018 to 2024.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post How Trump could upend global finance—and how the world might respond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But walking into Mining Indaba in South Africa earlier this year, the vibe was different. The eleven thousand attendees—representing governments, multilateral organizations, companies, civil society organizations, and nonprofits focused on mining—clearly see the urgency of focusing on Africa, in part because of the continent’s mineral deposits.

Trump’s second administration has made clear in its opening weeks that securing access to minerals is a top priority. Countries worldwide have taken notice: For example, Ukraine has agreed to sign a minerals deal with the United States to help with peace negotiations with Russia. African governments have moved US critical-minerals investment to the top of their foreign policy agendas, most clearly demonstrated by the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s offer to grant the United States exclusive access to its minerals in exchange for security assistance.

Seeing that the Trump administration is prioritizing securing access to minerals, it must also prioritize Africa. Making this case in Washington is quite complicated, as too often, issues regarding “Africa” or labeled “African” are muffled by issues perceived as higher priority to policymakers. However, securing access to these minerals is an urgent national security issue; the United States thus must view investments in African energy, minerals, and mining with similar importance. 

It is clear that African governments and communities view the current scramble for Africa’s minerals with an appropriate amount of urgency. During the opening ceremony, South African Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy Gwede Mantashe said “Look around,” gesturing to the thousands of people on the trade show floor. “Everyone is looking at Africa!” As Kgosi Seatlholo, chairperson of the National House of Traditional and Khoi-San Leaders, said during the opening ceremony, “our communities know that Africa has what the world wants.”

Yet African governments can also do more to help push the continent higher on the US list of priorities. I, and others at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, hear regularly from African government officials that they must carefully navigate the need for access to mineral assets by heavily industrialized and developed economies and the need to finance their own government expenditures, including their own development plans. While African countries may seek to move higher up the value chain, away from solely extracting minerals and toward hosting projects to refine them, they should not wait to green-light projects in search of better deals or additional greenfield investments in extraction, refining, recycling, or other midstream operations. Meanwhile, African governments should take steps that attract more urgently needed investment: for example, reducing administrative and bureaucratic barriers for investors and considering subsidies for labor or key utilities at notoriously energy- and water-intensive mining sites. Such steps can get projects, which often have ten- to fifteen-year returns on investment, moving along quickly. They can also help future-proof projects.

Financial institutions also have a key role to play. From private equity and venture capital firms to hedge funds and banks, financial institutions are critical to unlocking the full potential of Africa’s massive mineral endowment and supplying the huge amount of minerals needed for the energy transition. Smart investments are critically needed in processing and manufacturing, training the next generation of mining engineers, and launching new technologies that provide more information for decision-making, mapping mineral deposits, and making mineral projects safer.

More can also be done to raise Africa higher on the list of priorities on the business side. The United States and other Western governments seeking access to Africa’s rich mineral deposits must do more to identify projects, facilitate transactions—including business matchmaking, if necessary—and provide risk guarantees or project insurance. As Washington continues to make significant reforms, policymakers should seize the moment to quickly advance minerals-related projects that help achieve US national economic security goals. As the administration continues to have discussions about agencies such as the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and also about a potential US Sovereign Wealth Fund, Washington must use these tools to help the private sector reduce barriers to investment in Africa’s critical mineral projects. US government agencies should expedite the approval process to compete with foreign competitors, including China’s policy banks and commercial creditors.   

To advance discussions about investment challenges in African critical-mineral projects and shape policies that support critical-minerals security for the United States and other Western countries, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center launched its Critical Minerals Task Force at Mining Indaba 2024. The Task Force not only brings together the public and private sectors in conversation about the African mining space; it also analyzes models for mineral development and recommends policies to encourage investment. We strive to tailor our recommendations for African and Western governments to limit barriers to investment in the mining sector, reduce supply chain dependence on China, and encourage policy outcomes that support critical minerals security for the United States and other Western countries.

Africa’s mineral deposits are not just a resource but a strategic asset that can shape the future of security, energy, and economic development worldwide. For example, as upcoming Africa Center analysis will cover, Africa’s critical minerals play a role in US national defense. The United States has an expanding opportunity to further secure its future by prioritizing investment in Africa’s critical mineral sector; the Trump administration must take it.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Prioritizing access to critical minerals will require prioritizing Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Canada is facing economic threats from China and Russia targeting its critical industries and infrastructure. The Business Council of Canada, which consists of CEOs of top Canadian companies, identified cyberattacks, theft of intellectual property, Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector, and trade weaponization by China among the top economic threats to Canada.

More recently, a new and unexpected threat emerged from the United States, when Washington announced 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy. To address threats from Russia and China and reduce trade overdependence on the United States, Canada’s federal government will need to consolidate economic power and devise an economic statecraft strategy that will leverage Canada’s economic tools to mitigate these economic threats and vulnerabilities. This paper covers the following topics and offers recommendations:

• Economic threats to Canada’s national security 
• An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States
• Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government
• Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems: Sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening

Economic threats to Canada’s national security

Cyberattacks on Canada’s critical infrastructure 

Canada’s critical infrastructure has become a target of state-sponsored cyberattacks. In 2023, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE)—a signals intelligence agency—said that Russia-backed hackers were seeking to disrupt Canada’s energy sector. Apart from accounting for 5 percent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), the energy sector also keeps the rest of Canada’s critical infrastructure functioning. CSE warned that the threat to Canada’s pipelines and physical infrastructure would persist until the end of the war in Ukraine and that the objective was to weaken Canada’s support for Ukraine. 

Beyond critical infrastructure, Canadian companies lost about $4.3 billion due to ransomware attacks in 2021. More recently in February 2025, Russian hacking group Seashell Blizzard was reported to have targeted energy and defense sectors in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Russia and other adversarial states will likely continue targeting Canada’s critical infrastructure and extorting ransom payments from Canadian companies. 

Theft of intellectual property

Canadian companies have become targets of Chinese state-sponsored intellectual theft operations. In 2014, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor stole more than 40,000 files from the National Research Council’s private-sector partners. The National Research Council is a primary government agency dedicated to research and development in science and technology. Apart from undermining Canadian companies, theft of Canada’s intellectual property, especially research on sensitive technologies, poses a threat to Canada’s national security. 

Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector 

Adversarial states have taken advantage of Canada’s academic sector to advance their own strategic and military capabilities. For example, from 2018 to 2023, Canada’s top universities published more than 240 joint papers on quantum cryptography, space science, and other advanced research topics along with Chinese scientists working for China’s top military institutions. In January 2024, Canada’s federal government named more than one hundred institutions in China, Russia, and Iran that pose a threat to Canada’s national security. Apart from calling out specific institutions, the federal government also identified “sensitive research areas.” Universities or researchers who decide to work with the listed institutions on listed sensitive topics will not be eligible for federal grants. 

Trade weaponization by China

Trade weaponization by China has undermined the economic welfare of Canadians and posed a threat to the secure functioning of Canada’s critical infrastructure. For example, between 2019 and 2020, China targeted Canada’s canola sector with 100 percent tariffs, restricting these imports and costing Canadian farmers more than $2.35 billion in lost exports and price pressure. In Canada’s 2024 Fall Economic Statement, which outlined key measures to enhance Canadian economic security, the Ministry of Finance announced its plans to impose additional tariffs on Chinese imports to combat China’s unfair trade practices. These included tariffs on solar products and critical minerals in early 2025, and on permanent magnets, natural graphite, and semiconductors in 2026. 

However, the imposition of 25 percent tariffs by Washington on both Canada and China could result in deepening trade ties between the two. Canada exported a record $2 billion in crude oil to China in 2024, accounting for half of all oil exports through the newly expanded Trans Mountain pipeline. Increased trade with China would increase Canada’s exposure to China’s coercive practices, and would be a direct consequence of US tariffs on Canada. 

An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States

A new and unexpected threat to Canada’s economic security emerged from the United States when the Trump administration threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods (except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy imports). The United States is Canada’s largest export market, receiving a staggering 76 percent of Canada’s exports in 2024. Canada relies on the United States particularly in the context of its crude oil trade, shipping 97.4 percent of its crude oil to the United States. 

Canada had already started working on expansion to global markets through pipeline development even before Washington announced tariffs. It has succeeded in the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline in May 2024, which has enabled the export of Canadian oil to Asia. Canada is reviving talks on the canceled Energy East and Northern Gateway pipelines—the former would move oil from Alberta to Eastern Canada, and the latter would transport oil from Alberta to British Columbia for export to Asian markets. 

In addition to oil trade, another area where Canada is highly dependent on the United States is in auto manufacturing. Behind oil exports, motor vehicles account for the largest share of Canadian exports to the United States, resulting in exports valued at $50.76 billion (C$72.7 billion Canadian dollars) in 2024. With 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods, the automotive industry is expected to take a hit, especially as components cross the border six to eight times before final assembly.

Figure 1

The United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs on Canada with the stated objective to curb fentanyl flows to the United States. The measure has plunged US-Canada relations into chaos and could result in a trade war between the two long-standing allies. In response, Canada might reroute oil shipments to China through existing pipelines and increase trade with China in general. Further economic integration with China would increase Canada’s exposure to economic threats emanating from China, including trade weaponization and anti-competitive practices. 

Because of US tariffs, Canada could also face challenges in strengthening the resilience of its nuclear fuel and critical mineral supply chains. In the 2024 Fall Economic Statement, Canada outlined key measures for its economic security that heavily incorporated US cooperation. This included plans to strengthen nuclear fuel supply chain resiliency away from Russian influence, with up to $500 million set aside for enriched nuclear fuel purchase contracts from the United States. Canada also aims to strengthen supply chains for responsibly produced critical minerals, following a $3.8 billion investment in its Critical Minerals Strategy, which relies on the United States as a key partner. Given the tariffs, Canada will need to diversify its partners and supply sources quickly if it wishes to maintain these economic security goals. 

Figure 2: US-Canada overlapping memberships in security organizations and alliances

Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government

Canada has a range of economic tools and sources of economic power to respond to emerging economic threats and mitigate vulnerabilities; however, it currently lacks economic power consolidation. Unlike the United States, where the federal government can regulate nearly all economic activity, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867 grants provinces control over their “property and civil rights,” including natural resources. Section 92A, which was added to the constitution in 1982, further reinforced the provinces’ control over their natural resources. Meanwhile, the federal government has control over matters of international trade including trade controls. However, when international trade issues concern the natural resources of provinces, tensions and disagreements often arise between provinces and the federal government, and the lack of economic power consolidation by the federal government becomes obvious.

This issue manifested when the United States announced 25 percent tariffs on Canada in March 2025 as Canada’s federal government and the Alberta province had different reactions. Canada’s main leverage over the United States is oil exports. Refineries in the United States, particularly those in the Midwest, run exclusively on Canadian crude oil, having tailored their refineries to primarily process the heavy Canadian crude. Since 2010, Canadian oil accounted for virtually 100 percent of the oil imported by the Midwest. Threatening to hike levies on crude oil exports could have been Canada’s way of leveraging energy interdependence to respond to US tariffs. However, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith stated that Alberta, which is Canada’s largest oil producer and top exporter of crude oil to the United States, would not hike levies on oil and gas exports to the United States. Being unable to speak in one voice as a country even during a crisis is a direct consequence of Canada’s regional factionalism, characterized by each province looking out for their own interests. 

The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement, which entered into force during the first Trump administration in July 2020, may have also contributed to diminishing the economic power of Canada’s federal government. Article 32.10 of USMCA requires each member of the agreement to notify other countries if it plans to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with a nonmarket economy. Thus, if Canada were to sign an FTA with China, the United States and Mexico could review the agreement and withdraw from USMCA with six months’ notice. After the USMCA was signed, Canadian scholars wrote that this clause would effectively turn Canada into a vassal state of the United States, with the authority to make decisions on internal affairs but having to rely on the larger power for foreign and security policy decisions. Five years later, it looks like the USMCA has put Canada in a difficult position, being targeted by US tariffs and not having advanced trading relations with other countries. 

Figure 3: US-Canada overlapping memberships in economic organizations and alliances

Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems

To secure Canada’s critical infrastructure and leverage its natural resources to shape favorable foreign policy outcomes, Canada’s federal government has a range of economic tools and the ability to design new ones when appropriate. Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit is similar to those of the United States and the European Union and includes sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening. Canada has imposed financial sanctions and export controls against Russia along with its Group of Seven (G7) allies. It has levied tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, in line with US policy, and recently created investment screening authorities to address concerns about adversarial capital. 

Financial sanctions 

Similar to the United States, Canada maintains sanctions programs covering specific countries such as Russia and Iran, as well as thematic sanctions regimes such as terrorism. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), which is Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, administers sanctions and maintains the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. Canada’s Finance Ministry, the Department of Finance, is not involved in sanctions designations, implementation, or enforcement, unlike in the United States, where the Department of the Treasury is the primary administrator of sanctions. 

The Parliament of Canada has enacted legislation authorizing the imposition of sanctions through three acts: the United Nations Act; the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA); and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA). 

The United Nations Act enables GAC to implement sanctions against entities or individuals sanctioned by the UN Security Council. When an act of aggression or a grave breach of international peace occurs and the UN Security Council is unable to pass a resolution, Canada implements autonomous sanctions under SEMA; this act is Canada’s primary law for imposing autonomous sanctions and includes country-based sanctions programs. It is also used to align Canada’s sanctions with those of allies. For example, GAC derived its powers from SEMA to designate Russian entities and individuals in alignment with Canada’s Western allies in 2022. Meanwhile, the JVCFOA allows GAC to impose sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations and significant acts of corruption, similar to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act in the United States, with sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

Once GAC adds entities and individuals to the lists of sanctions, Canadian financial institutions comply by freezing the designated party’s assets and suspending transactions. GAC coordinates with several government agencies to enforce and enable private-sector compliance with sanctions: 

• FINTRAC: Canada’s financial intelligence unit (FIU)—Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)—is responsible for monitoring suspicious financial activities and collecting reporting from financial institutions on transactions that may be linked to sanctions evasion. FINTRAC is an independent agency that reports to the Minister of Finance. FINTRAC works closely with the US financial intelligence unit—Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—on illicit finance investigations and when sanctions evasion includes the US financial system. For example, FinCEN and FINTRAC both monitor and share financial information related to Russian sanctions evasion and publish advisories and red flags for the financial sector in coordination with other like-minded partner FIUs. 

• OSFI: The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is a banking regulator that issues directives to financial institutions regarding compliance and instructs banks to freeze assets belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities. FINTRAC also shares financial intelligence with OSFI on sanctions evasion activity under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). OSFI shares intelligence with Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the national police service of Canada, if there is evidence of sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. 

• RCMP: Once OSFI notifies RCMP about suspicious activity, RCMP investigates whether the funds are linked to sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. If it finds evidence of a violation of sanctions or criminal activity, RCMP obtains a court order to seize assets under the Criminal Code and the PCMLTFA.

• CBSA: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for blocking sanctioned individuals from entering Canada. CBSA also notifies OSFI if sanctioned individuals attempt to move cash or gold through border crossings. 

All four agencies work with GAC and with one another on sanctions enforcement. GAC sets sanctions policy, FINTRAC analyzes financial intelligence and shares suspicious activity reports to inform law enforcement investigations, OSFI enforces compliance in banks, RCMP investigates crimes and seizes assets, and CBSA prevents sanctioned individuals from entering Canada and moving assets across borders. 

While financial sanctions are part of Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit, Canadian sanctions power does not have the same reach as US sanctions. The preeminence of the US dollar and the omnipresence of major US banks allows the United States to effectively cut off sanctioned individuals and entities from the global financial system. Canadian sanctions are limited to Canadian jurisdiction and affect individuals and entities with financial ties to Canada, but they do not have the same reach as US financial sanctions. 

Nevertheless, Canadian authorities have been able to leverage financial sanctions to support the G7 allies in sanctioning Russia. For example, in December 2022, under SEMA, Canadian authorities ordered Citco Bank Canada, a subsidiary of a global hedge fund headquartered in the Cayman Islands, to freeze $26 million owned directly or indirectly by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, who has been sanctioned by Canada and other G7 allies. In June 2023, Canadian authorities seized a Russian cargo jet at Toronto’s Pearson Airport pursuant to SEMA. 

Figure 4

Export controls

Canada participates in several multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group. When multilateral regimes fall short in addressing Canada’s foreign policy needs, Canada leverages its autonomous export control list, which is administered by GAC under the Export and Import Permits Act. The Trade Controls Bureau under GAC is responsible for issuing permits and certificates for the items included on the Export Control List (ECL).

Canada Border Services Agency plays a crucial role in the enforcement of export controls. CBSA verifies that shipments match the export permit issued by GAC. It can seize or refuse exports that violate GAC export permits through ports, airports, and land borders. CBSA refers cases to the Royal Canada Mounted Police (CRMP) for prosecution if exporters attempt to bypass regulations. 

Separately, FINTRAC monitors financial transactions that might be connected to the exports of controlled goods and technologies. If FINTRAC detects suspicious transactions, it shares intelligence with GAC and other relevant authorities. Canada’s method of leveraging financial intelligence for enforcing export controls is similar to that of the United States, where FinCEN has teamed up with the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to detect export control evasion through financial transactions. 

While in the United States the export controls authority lies within the Commerce Department, Canada’s equivalent, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), does not participate in administering export controls. That responsibility is fully absorbed by GAC. 

While Canada has mainly used its export control authority in the context of sensitive technologies, Canadian politiciansand experts have recently been calling on the federal government to impose restrictions on mineral exports to the United States in response to US tariffs. The United States highly depends on Canada’s minerals, including uranium, aluminum, and nickel. Canada was the United States’ top supplier of metals and minerals in 2023 ($46.97 billion in US imports), followed by China ($28.32 billion) and Mexico ($28.18 billion). Notably, President Trump’s recent executive order called Unleashing American Energy instructed the director of the US Geological Survey to add uranium to the critical minerals list. Canada provides 25 percent of uranium to the United States. If Canada were to impose export controls on uranium, the US objective of building a resilient enriched uranium supply chain would be jeopardized. 

However, Canada could not impose export controls on the United States without experiencing significant blowback. Export control is a powerful tool. While US tariffs would increase the price of imported Canadian goods by at least 25 percent, Canada’s export controls would completely cut off the flow of certain Canadian goods to the United States. It would be destructive for both economies, so Canada will likely reserve this tool as a last resort and perhaps work on finding alternative export destinations before pulling such a trigger. 

Figure 5

Tariffs

Canada’s approach to tariffs is governed primarily by the Customs Act, which outlines the procedures for assessing and collecting tariffs on imported goods, as well as the Customs Tariff legislation that sets the duty rates for specific imports (generally based on the “Harmonized System,” an internationally standardized system for classifying traded products). The Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for administering these tariffs. Additionally, the Special Import Measures Act enables Canada to protect industries from harm caused by unfair trade practices like dumping or subsidizing of imported goods, with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal determining injury and the CBSA imposing necessary duties. The minister of finance, in consultation with the minister of foreign affairs, plays a key role in proposing tariff changes or retaliatory tariffs, ensuring Canada’s trade policies align with its broader economic and diplomatic objectives. 

Canada has frequently aligned with its allies on tariff issues, as demonstrated in 2024 when, following the US and EU tariffs, it imposed a 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles to protect domestic industries. However, Canada has also been proactive in responding to US tariffs, employing a combination of diplomatic negotiations, retaliatory tariffs, and reliance on dispute resolution mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization and USMCA. In the past Canada was also quick to align itself with allies such as the EU and Mexico, seeking a coordinated international response, as was the case in 2018 when the United States imposed a broad tariff on steel and aluminum.

Similar to the United States, Canada offers remission allowances to help businesses adjust to tariffs by granting relief under specific circumstances, such as the inability to source goods from nontariffed countries or preexisting contractual obligations. The Department of Finance regularly seeks input from stakeholders before introducing new tariffs. In 2024, a thirty-day consultation was launched about possible tariffs on Chinese batteries, battery parts, semiconductors, critical minerals, metals, and solar panels, though it has yet to result in any new tariffs. 

Canada’s primary weakness regarding tariffs is its lack of trade diversification. The United States accounts for half of Canada’s imports and 76 percent of its exports. This dependency severely limits Canada’s ability to impose tariffs on the United States without facing significant economic repercussions. Canada’s relatively limited economic leverage on the global stage also complicates efforts to coordinate multilateral tariff responses or to negotiate favorable trade agreements. Furthermore, Canada’s lengthy public consultations and regulatory processes for implementing tariffs hinder its ability to leverage tariffs as a swift response to changing geopolitical or economic circumstances. 

Figure 6

Investment screening

Canada’s investment screening is governed by the Investment Canada Act (ICA), which ensures that foreign investments do not harm national security while promoting economic prosperity. The ICA includes net benefit reviews for large investments and national security reviews for any foreign investments which pose potential security risks, such as foreign control over critical sectors like technology or infrastructure.

The review process is administered by ISED, with the minister of innovation, science, and industry overseeing the reviews in consultation with Public Safety Canada. For national security concerns, multiple agencies assess potential risks, and the Governor-in-Council (GIC) has the authority to block investments or demand divestitures.

Criticism of the ICA includes lack of transparency and consistency, particularly in national security reviews, where decisions may be influenced by political or diplomatic considerations. To better mitigate risks to security, critical infrastructure, and the transfer of sensitive technologies, experts have argued that the ICA should more effectively target malicious foreign investments by incorporating into the review process the perspectives of Canadian companies on emerging national security threats. In response to these concerns, Bill C-34 introduced key updates in 2024, including preclosing filing requirements for sensitive sectors, the possibility of interim conditions during national security reviews, broader scope covering state-owned enterprises and asset sales, consideration for intellectual property and personal data protection, and increased penalties for noncompliance. In March 2025, further amendments were made to the ICA, expanding its scope to review “opportunistic or predatory” foreign investments. These changes were introduced in response to the United States’ imposition of blanket tariffs on Canadian goods.

Figure 7

Positive economic statecraft

Apart from coercive/protective tools, Canada maintains positive economic statecraft (PES) tools such as development assistance to build economic alliances beyond North America. For example, Canada is one of the largest providers of international development assistance to African countries. After Ukraine, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the top recipients of Canada’s international assistance. Canada’s PES tools lay the ground for the federal governments to have productive cooperation when needs arise. Canadian authorities should leverage PES tools to enhance the country’s international standing and increase economic connectivity with other regions of the world. This is especially important amid the US pause on nearly all US foreign assistance. Canada could step up to help fill the vacuum in the developing world created by the Trump administration’s radical departure from a long-standing US role in foreign aid. 

Canadian authorities have already taken steps in this direction. On March 9, Canadian Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen announced that Canada would be providing $272.1 million for foreign aid projects in Bangladesh and the Indo-Pacific region. The projects will focus on climate adaptation, empowering women in the nursing sector, advancing decent work and inclusive education and training. Earlier, on March 6, Global Affairs Canada launched its first Global Africa Strategy with the goal of deepening trade and investment relations with Africa, partnering on peace and security challenges, and advancing shared priorities on the international stage including climate change. Through this partnership, Canada plans to strengthen economic and national security by enhancing supply chain resilience and maintaining corridors for critical goods. 

Conclusion

Canada’s federal government maintains a range of economic statecraft tools and authorities to address economic and national security threats. While regional factionalism and provincial equities can hinder the federal government’s ability to leverage the full force of Canada’s economic power, threats to Canada’s economic security, including tariffs from the United States, may prove to further unite and align the provinces. The federal government and provincial premiers should work together to meet this challenging moment, consolidating Canada’s sources of economic power and moving forward with a cohesive economic statecraft strategy to protect the country’s national security and economic security interests.

Canada’s leadership and engagement in international fora including the G7, NATO, Wassenaar Agreement, among others, as well as its bilateral relationships, make it well-placed to coordinate and collaborate with Western partners on economic statecraft. Information sharing, joint investigations, multilateral sanctions, and multilateral development and investment can extend the reach of Canada’s economic power while strengthening Western efforts to leverage economic statecraft to advance global security objectives and ensure the integrity of the global financial system. Canada also has a solid foundation for building economic partnerships beyond the West through development assistance and other positive economic statecraft tools. 

Staff

Kimberly Donovan

Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Economic Sanctions

Staff

Maia Nikoladze

Associate Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Eastern Europe

Staff

Lize de Kruijf

Program Assistant, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Dutch Economic Sanctions

The authors would like to thank Nazima Tursun, a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, for research support.

The report is part of a year-long series on economic statecraft across the G7 and China supported in part by a grant from MITRE.

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The International Energy Agency expects between $180 billion and $220 billion to be invested in the mining of critical minerals between 2022 and 2030, with about 10 percent of this investment slated for Africa. Countries including the United States, Europe, China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are prioritizing supply-chain security with regard to the minerals and metals needed for the global energy transition and for defense industrial applications. The African continent is an important supplier of these commodities.

As this race for minerals and metals critical for the energy transition heats up amid a turbulent geopolitical environment, both companies and governments must not abandon environmental, social, and governance principles (ESG) with respect to Africa.

African countries are increasingly demanding that mining operations deliver more benefits for government revenues and local populations. Toward that aim, countries have adopted mining codes that assert national sovereignty over these minerals, implemented export bans on unprocessed minerals, and unveiled policy strategies to support domestic value-adding processes. In particular, African countries—including Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia, Botswana, Mali, Guinea, and Niger—are increasingly implementing policies of national preference in the mining sector, with the aim of increasing the share of local participation. Others, such as Tanzania, have banned the export of non-value-added minerals. In 2021, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) launched a review of the mining contracts signed by previous leadership with Chinese investors based on concerns that Chinese promises to build roads, hospitals, universities, and housing had not been fully realized.

However, significant portions of the mining industry are still unregulated. For example, the perspectives and interests of artisanal miners are not always fully captured in mining codes, which often have weak provisions on workers’ rights, equal working conditions, and wages.

International mining companies, per an EY survey, considered environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors to be the top risk to their business in 2024. They placed ESG as a top risk ahead of capital constraints, conflict, or even cyberattacks.

Mining companies usually face risk (even in the West, but particularly in fragile contexts) due to long lead times, volatility in commodity prices, policy uncertainty, and security challenges. However, the global map of minerals that hold strategic importance shows that mining activities for these commodities usually take place in countries where ESG remains a challenge, such as China, Russia, the DRC, Peru, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Turkey, and India. For example, the DRC is home to about half of the world’s cobalt reserves; meanwhile, more than three-quarters of the world’s platinum reserves are located in South Africa. Many rare earths, including lithium, nickel, and cobalt, are refined in China. For countries that mine and export minerals, especially the ones in Africa, such activities have not generally translated into sustained economic growth and broader improvements in human well-being. Instead, host communities of mining projects have often had to deal with environmental pollution, health challenges, and stagnant incomes.

Corporations increasingly turned to impact investment, especially soon following the launches of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals in 2000 and the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. And over time, governments, institutional investors, and asset managers have set up various systems through which companies report their impact on the environment and on societies. For example, the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive requires companies to explain the impacts of their business strategies. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires publicly listed companies to report climate-related information. Last year, the Global Reporting Initiative, founded in 1997 in order to promote standardized ESG reporting, launched a new mining-sector reporting standard.

But recently, the momentum for recognizing and adopting ESG principles at a global level has slowed down. Reports now abound of companies, investment banks, and other private-sector actors setting aside their ESG commitments in the face of economic recession or political instability. Some are discontinuing or disbanding their ESG divisions altogether. Governments too are abandoning commitments to social and environmental sustainability principles. While these are setbacks to the wider global ESG agenda, this is a worrying trend and could be detrimental if it were to extend deeply into the mining industry.

There have certainly been shifts in how stakeholders in the mining industry have approached ESG. According to the mining companies surveyed by EY last year, the three ESG risks to which investors paid the most attention were local community impact (64 percent), waste management (55 percent), and water stewardship (51 percent). In 2025, EY notes, miners have turned their focus more toward the environmental stewardship component of ESG, reporting that waste management (44 percent), water stewardship (31 percent), and climate change (31 percent) would attract the most scrutiny from investors. The category that includes local community impact dropped from the third top risk to the fifth. And it seems there was a deprioritization of the governance component of ESG among mining companies and leaders, which EY says raises “alarm bells.”

Nevertheless, there are mining companies bucking the trend in the sense that they still prioritize and recognize ESG; that is commendable. It will be important for them to continue to stay the course knowing how much work has gone into securing the social license to operate in difficult jurisdictions. The progress made over the past decades cannot be jettisoned. If mining companies resist the global trend that is turning away from ESG, they can even help nudge their home governments to commit more deeply to ESG principles.

To ensure that mistakes of the past are avoided, and Africa’s development is supported in this intensifying scramble for minerals critical to the energy transition, the West—both its governments and corporations—cannot afford to abandon ESG.

Zainab Usman is the director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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But while all countries should contribute to the global effort, they shouldn’t cut their emissions by the same proportions. Each country’s burden should be determined by their per capita emissions—not on rates of change in emissions. And the world’s poorest countries, including many in Africa, have not contributed anywhere near as much to climate change as industrialized nations.

Africa, specifically, is responsible for only 3.7 percent of carbon emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. Its per capita emissions are far lower than any other region. In addition, the African continent needs more plentiful and reliable energy supplies to fuel its development, both economic (as reliable energy supports manufacturing) and human (as energy allows children to do their homework in the evenings and medicines to be stored).

Meanwhile, industrialized countries are moving ahead with fossil fuel projects: The United States is looking to raise domestic oil production, while China has moved forward with building 94.5 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants. In contrast, South Africa—which has the biggest installed generating capacity in Africa—has a total installed capacity of just 63.4 gigawatts. The International Energy Agency warned in 2021 that global climate goals may be missed if new fossil fuel projects proceed.

Before the international community asks African countries to leave undeveloped fossil fuel resources in the ground, it must make them an offer of clean energy financing—one substantial enough to fund Africa’s current and future appetite for electricity. Doing so would not only help reduce GHG emissions: It would also support Africa’s electrification and development goals.

A just energy transition

Slow progress on increasing electrification rates is already being made in Africa. Just over half of all Africans now have access to electricity at home for the first time, while twelve countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Nigeria, published detailed plans in January 2025 to connect more people to their respective grids. Population growth is driving up demand, which will be further boosted by the uptake of technologies such as electric vehicles in the future.

Amid this growing access to and demand for energy, the international community must offer clean energy financing to African countries and companies to convince them to forego fossil fuel development. Offering this financing now, as energy infrastructure is being constructed from scratch, would allow Africa to build infrastructure and supply chains meant for clean energy, instead of building them up for fossil fuels and having to adapt them later—at greater financial cost. It would have the added benefit of promoting economic development and higher living standards in Africa, which would dampen security threats and ease long-term migration pressures.

Some argue that Africa, for the sake of its development, should be allowed time to use fossil fuels such as gas, which is seen by some as a bridging fuel and thus part of the climate solution. However, emissions from gas-fired plants are at least half as high as those from coal, making gas a driver of climate change.

Additionally, financing is already difficult for some fossil fuel projects. Landlocked Botswana, for example, has 212 billion tons of coal that is largely undeveloped because large-scale mining would require exports. Proposed coal railways from Botswana to ports in either Namibia or Mozambique have failed to secure funding because of reticence among banks and financial institutions about financing coal projects. At the same time, Botswana has a generating capacity of only 892 megawatts and relies on electricity imports. New coal plants would be an obvious option, but here too financing is challenging. Clean energy such as solar offers a more fundable option.

Some projects are managing to secure financing—but only just. For example, the five-billion-dollar East African Crude Oil Pipeline project that will funnel oil from Uganda to the Tanzanian port of Tanga has attracted a great deal of criticism from environmental organizations and the European Union among others, with some calling on banks to rescind their financing. This seems unlikely given that construction began in late 2024. However, Ugandan efforts to secure financing for an oil refinery have thus far failed, pushing the government and UAE partner Alpha MBM Investments to try to fund it themselves. The project will ultimately contribute to climate change, but Kampala argues it must focus on economic development.

Some efforts are being made to offer countries clean energy investment in return for a reduction in fossil fuel development. For example, a group of Western countries has set up Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) to mobilize public and private finance for low-carbon projects in return for commitments on renewables or energy sector emissions. However, progress has been far too slow, with just four JETPs signed since 2021. Those four include partnerships with Indonesia ($20 billion), Senegal ($2.6 billion), South Africa ($11.6 billion), and Vietnam ($15.5 billion). Funding on this scale should be agreed with every developing country. According to the International Energy Agency, Africa needs investment of $200 billion a year by 2030 to achieve universal access to electricity and meet climate change pledges.

Challenging but possible

Many will argue that putting together such huge funding packages is impossible at the current time because of profound global economic and political instability and high sovereign debt levels after the COVID-19 crisis. Yet governments found the money for mitigation measures during the pandemic. For example, the United States spent $4.6 trillion; the United Kingdom spent between $387 billion and $512 billion. The required finance can be made available in times of real crisis—and climate change is a monumental crisis.

The real stumbling block is political will. Gaining political support for funding on this scale would be difficult at any time, but an ongoing uptick in nationalism and protectionism makes it even more challenging. The United States and European powers would have to participate, and other countries should too, including China, Japan, South Korea, and the Gulf states. And when governments seem hesitant about participating—for example, the Trump administration currently views overseas aid in a dim light—actors in the private sector, from corporations to philanthropists, can help.

Whether this plan is implemented by beefing up the JETP program or via a new vehicle, apportioning the money will be difficult. Many African countries have little or no hydrocarbons or coal. Thus, a continent-wide approach may be needed to ensure that the financing makes the desired impact, both in terms of boosting clean energy access and reducing fossil fuel development. Such an approach can include an agreement, possibly made through the African Union, although this could agitate those countries actually giving up their fossil fuel resources.

In addition to financing, technical support and skills transfer would also be needed. North American and European grid operators and bureaucracies are still struggling to keep up with the pace of complicated permit and grid interconnection applications from renewable energy developers. Such bottlenecks can derail development, so African governments need technical support, while international solar, wind, and storage operators could help build up the operations and maintenance expertise needed to ensure assets remain operational.

Africa has vast clean energy potential—it is home to 60 percent of the world’s best solar resources. However, the continent hosts just 1 percent of global solar generating capacity, about the same amount as the not-particularly-sunny country of Belgium. If the international community truly wants African countries to turn away from fossil fuel development, it will need to give those countries the financing to harness that clean energy potential. The big question is whether the international community is really serious about it.

Neil Ford is a freelance consultant and journalist on African affairs and the global energy sector. He produces reports for a wide range of organizations and has a PhD in East African development.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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As we celebrate Women’s History Month in 2025, much of this history of African women has been strangely forgotten. Instead, the international community often treats African woman as an object for study and, frequently, misinterpretation.

On the one hand, she is perceived as the demographic symbol of the African continent whose population is doubling every thirty years and must be contained. On the other hand, she is the one who keeps communities together and, outside the house, tends to be the world champion of entrepreneurship. She is also the primary victim of African conflicts. To paraphrase the French dramatist Jean-Baptiste Racine, the African woman deserves neither this excess of honor nor this indignity.

In fact, the African woman carries within her both a universal dimension that makes her a woman like any other and a singularity that makes her exemplary. Through data from multilateral organizations, however, each dimension of her existence seems to be under scrutiny.

Marriage. While only 2 percent of the world’s population lives in polygamous households, it is in sub-Saharan Africa that polygamy is most practiced (11 percent of the population), with all the rivalries, suffering, and conflict that can often be caused by families composed of several co-wives. As the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights concluded in a 2019 report, polygamy is first and foremost discrimination against women. The practice also feeds into the wider problem of gender-based violence, which impacts 42 percent of women in eastern and southern Africa.

Pregnancy. African women are 130 times more likely to die from pregnancy-related complications than women in Europe and North America, according to a 2024 report by the UN Population Fund. When they survive childbirth, their child is likely to enter the risk zone: according to the World Health Organization, the infant mortality rate indicates seventy-two deaths per one thousand successful births in Africa, the highest rate in the world.

At work. When women in sub-Saharan Africa work, it is, according to a 2018 report by UN Women, mostly (89 percent) in informal employment. Although the African informal sector is not always a curse (behind this economic practice, there is a valuable sense of solidarity within the communities and many advantages foreign organizations don’t see), most international organizations consider informal employment to be problematic, citing “low pay, long hours, no sick or maternity pay, unsafe workplaces.”

During war. In conflict zones such as the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sudan, women are prime targets for rape as a weapon of war. They are also the most efficient actors when it comes to rebuilding communities torn apart by war, to the point of inspiring the landmark UN Resolution 1325 on women’s participation in peace processes.

As elderly persons. Despite all this, African women live longer than African men. However, among the world’s women, they have the lowest life expectancy (sixty-five years compared to more than eighty years in Europe and North America), according to 2023 data.

These terrific data have led development agencies and international financial institutions to praise the resilience of African women. Would this type of language be used for women from Norway or the United States? Yet, this reality is accepted when it comes to African women.

The celebration of the resilience of African women belies the fact that they still do not get enough support in facing their exhausting daily lives. It echoes the racist bias that Black people—and Black women in particular—are more tolerant of pain, a belief rooted in stereotypes in the medical community about Black people’s supposed physical attributes. These and other prejudices are likely at the root of the fact that pregnant Black women are significantly less likely to have labor induced and more likely to have caesarian sections than white women. Among American women, Black women are three times more likely to die in childbirth than white women. Higher incomes and educational attainment do not spare Black women from the effects of these health outcome disparities. A 2023 UN Population Fund report finds that maternal deaths among African-American college graduates remain 1.6 times higher than among white women without a degree. 

But while these statistics can help policymakers understand the work that remains to improve the lives of women in Africa, as well as in the diaspora, they neglect to say anything about the often-overlooked achievements of African feminism. Here are some less well-known statistics and facts that are no less important to understanding the lives of African women in 2025.

First, there’s women’s participation in national legislatures. While women heads of state and government are more often found in Western countries, it is in the Southern Hemisphere that the highest proportion of women parliamentarians are found. Rwanda tops the list, as 61 percent of the country’s members of Parliament are women.

Next, African women lead some of the most far-reaching and impactful multilateral organizations in the world. These include Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the director-general of the World Trade Organization; Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo, the secretary general of Organisation internationale de la Francophonie; and Uganda’s Winnie Byanyima, the executive director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

And finally, some African nations have made significant strides on labor market equality. According to a 2024 World Economic Forum report measuring gender parity in labor market outcomes, Namibia ranked eighth in the world, higher than Spain (tenth), Belgium (twelfth), and Great Britain (fourteenth). South Africa ranked eighteenth, placing it above Switzerland (twentieth), France (twenty-second) and the United States (forty-third).

So this Women’s History Month, let us turn our attention not just to the litany of statistics cataloguing the challenges African women endure, but also their overlooked feminist breakthroughs. African women deserve recognition not just for the indignities they face, but for the heights they achieve.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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France’s departure is indicative of a larger shift in the region. The Sahel’s geopolitics have changed dramatically in the last five years. Since 2020, military juntas have seized power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. They have gradually driven out thousands of Western troops, including troops from France, the European Union, and the United States. These troops were performing capacity-building missions and conducting counterterrorism operations. They have since been replaced, in large part, by Russian paramilitaries. The existing regional security architecture is in shambles, following Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel Joint Force and, more recently, from the Economic Community of West African States.

The Sahel is in the middle of a transformative process that has ushered in new leaders, military strategies, and foreign alliances. It is imperative that the United States rethink the bipartisan assumptions that have underwritten its Sahel policy. The region is experiencing profound change, and US policy must adapt accordingly.

Outdated assumptions, new realities

US policy toward the Sahel has rested on these four unspoken assumptions, all of which must be updated if Washington aims to help stabilize the region and improve its standing there.

1. Western allies’ involvement can achieve US regional security objectives.

For at least a decade, US policy has taken for granted that allies’ involvement in the Sahel would generate access, bolster influence, and help achieve US regional security objectives. This is evidenced by the fact that US resources were marshalled in support of partner-led efforts. Under Operation Juniper Micron, for example, which began in 2013 and lasted for roughly a decade, the US military provided logistical support, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, to enable French operations in Mali. Most Western troops deployed within the Sahel were not American.

There is nothing wrong with burden sharing or deconfliction. These measures can eliminate redundancy, reduce the cost of defense engagement, and amplify operational effects. That said, it would be wrong to assume that ally involvement translates directly into US gains. Perceptions of foreign powers vary, and it is not clear that Western investment earns the United States any additional influence. In fact, aligning itself with France, an unpopular former colonial power, may have inadvertently harmed US interests. The United States has steadily lost soft power on the continent since 2021. After Niger’s junta expelled French troops, Washington hoped to avoid a similar fate. The US military ultimately failed to differentiate itself and withdrew.

Moreover, relying on allies to advance its security objectives exposes the United States to risks if its they depart. The United States had few options to address rising instability in Mali after French and European Union troops withdrew in 2022. The situation has only worsened in the years since. Mali is currently ranked third among the countries most impacted by terrorism. Terrorists attacked the capital city this fall, indicating that they are capable of operating in large portions of Mali’s territory. This could pose a threat to US interests, facilities, or personnel.

2. An “outside-in” approach can prevent the spread of instability beyond the Sahel.

US policy has also assumed that investments in defense, economic development, and good governance can prevent the spread of instability from the Sahel to coastal West Africa. Some experts contend that Washington should adopt an “outside-in” approach, shifting focus from the Sahel to its southern neighbors. Proponents of this approach argue that very little can be done to improve stability in the Sahel, and that the United States would be better served partnering with peripheral states to bolster their defenses. The “outside-in” approach involves dramatically increasing assistance to coastal West Africa while reducing US assistance to the Sahel.

To this end, US leaders emphasize the importance of the Global Fragility Act, a law passed in 2019 that provides funding to curb instability in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo, among others—but does not address its origins in the Sahel. If it is not addressed directly, however, Sahel-based instability is likely to intensify.

The data speaks for itself. Last year was the deadliest in the Sahel’s history. The effects of this instability are evident in the coastal states of Benin and Togo, where al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has begun to consolidate its presence. Terrorist groups, especially JNIM, are poised to continue their push southward into coastal West Africa.

The “outside-in” approach rests on the assumption that, with sufficient assistance, coastal West African states can build institutional capacity faster than terrorists can expand operations southward. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence to support this claim.

3. States would forgo partnerships with US adversaries if they knew the consequences.

A third assumption embraces the idea that Sahel states would forgo partnerships with US adversaries if they appreciated the consequences. The United States has largely relied on messaging to dissuade states from expanding cooperation with its adversaries. US officials point out that the support offered by Washington’s adversaries is ineffective. “It’s self-evident that a Russian role, whether it’s Wagner or it has a GRU label, has not demonstrably improved the lives of Africans,” said Molly Phee, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, during an interview in March 2024. That same month, an interagency delegation cautioned Niger against deepening its ties to Russia and Iran.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all ignored these warnings, partnering with Russia on counterterrorism in the past few years. Their leaders are rational and likely aware of the potential consequences, but they faced a difficult choice. The United States is legally restricted from providing these states assistance, as each experienced a coup d’état. Sahel leaders were not persuaded by US messaging. Absent competing offers, and facing an acute threat, these leaders opted to pursue ineffective security assistance from US adversaries.

4. The loss of forward-deployed positions in Chad and Niger critically threatens the United States’ ability to achieve its regional security objectives.

Last year, officials warned that withdrawals from Chad and Niger would prevent the United States from achieving its security objectives in the region. “If we lose our footprint in the Sahel, that will degrade our ability to do active watching and warning, including for homeland defense,” said General Michael Langley, the commander of US forces in Africa. From Niger, the US military was able to monitor threats in neighboring countries, such as Libya and Mali. 

Langley has a point. The US military must remain engaged in the Sahel if its goal is to provide strategic warning of threats to the United States. Proximity to the threat is important to this mission, but so are partnerships. The United States needs strong relationships with African partners, built on coordination, information sharing, and strategic access. In both Chad and Niger, the greatest loss was arguably that of willing and capable local partners.

The United States could still secure its vital national interests if it pursued light footprints and distributed security assistance across several African partner countries. This approach may also obviate the need for big base operations, offering a cost-effective and flexible solution.

What comes next

US policy options are constrained by the situation on the ground. The United States is legally restricted from providing certain forms of defense and development assistance to countries that experience military coups d’etat, a category that includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This presents challenges, but it does not mean the United States is entirely without options. US leaders must still assess whether the risks of inaction outweigh those of engagement, but, at the very least, this exercise should foster a more thoughtful, constructive debate on the issue.

The United States could still pursue legal, limited, and nonlethal security cooperation with these states. It could provide critical enablers, such as force protection, military medical assistance, or logistical support. It could provide training on how to respond to improvised explosive devices or deliver humanitarian aid. Assistance could gradually be expanded if these states move toward democratic governance, reduce extrajudicial killings, and enhance military accountability—or curtailed if they fail to do so. The best way for the United States to promote regional stability and credibly compete against its adversaries is to address Sahel countries’ security concerns.

Finally, while maintaining investments in the Sahel, the United States could focus on building partner capacity in coastal West Africa. The “outside-in” approach constructs a false dichotomy, in which US policy can prioritize either the Sahel or coastal West Africa. The two regions are inextricably linked, and instability in one inevitably threatens the other. Investing in both affords the United States the greatest opportunity to prevent terrorism’s spread and secure its own interests. 

The challenges facing the Sahel are immense, but they are not insurmountable. By reevaluating long-held assumptions and adapting policy to the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the United States can play a vital role in the region. Amid adversaries’ encroachment and terrorist groups’ expansion, the United States must adjust its approach to maintain its relevance and protect its interests. There are opportunities to do so, but success will depend on a willingness to pursue new policies, with a clear-eyed consideration of the risks and rewards that lie ahead.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the US Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post What airstrikes in Somalia show about the war on terror appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

Africa is increasingly asserting its participation in the advancement of emerging technologies by engaging in active dialogues and devising roadmaps for the development, deployment, and regulation of these technologies. However, strategies to employ emerging technologies vary widely both in levels of progress as well as regulatory mechanisms. This report explores how five African countries—South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia—are strategically navigating the governance of new technologies to enrich their citizens’ lives while mitigating potential risks. It focuses on three key emerging technology domains, namely: connectivity, digital public infrastructure, and artificial intelligence (AI).

Beginning with an analysis of the foundational digital technology policies around data protection and governance and cybersecurity, the country reviews highlight the current landscape of laws, and strategies governing each of the emerging technologies of interest. By exploring the strengths and weaknesses of each country’s policy landscape across these technology domains, the report offers insights into prospects and challenges in harnessing emerging technologies for societal good.

The report finds that governments are generally optimistic about the potential impact of emerging technologies on economic development in their respective countries. This is reflected in the large public investment in technology infrastructure, promotion of innovative ecosystems, and the integration of information and communication technologies (ICTs) into e-governance and e-services toward a holistic digitalized economy and society. The countries’ multistakeholder approaches highlight the need for responsible governance while promoting active private-sector engagement for the public good.

Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana were found to have comparatively robust policies for each emerging technology examined, or at least—as is the case with Kenya—documentation or drafts in the form of gazettes and public consultation documents. Government efforts are more prominent in the AI domain, given the increased attention it has garnered lately. However, these frameworks are hampered by limited implementation capacities, poor infrastructure, policy fragmentation and overlap, low digital literacy levels, and a growing digital divide. Zambia on the other hand, while having strong aspirations to become an ICT-enabled knowledge economy, lacks dedicated policies pertaining to emerging technologies. Although the country’s data-protection laws, intellectual property, cyber security, and consumer protection provide a foundational framework, more updated regulations are required to keep pace with the speed at which emerging technologies are playing an increasingly pivotal role in citizens’ daily lives.

A SWOT (i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis of the broader digital-technologies sector across these countries reveals some universal themes. Strengthwise, governments are generally proactive and enthusiastic about engaging new technology issues, and ICT authorities tend to adapt quickly to new developments by publishing subsidiary laws, releasing draft statements, or convening multistakeholder workshops, where national policy frameworks are absent. An overarching rather than specific sectoral or technology-domain approach also drives national technology pursuits, where for example, all the five countries examined have a national ICT/digital economy strategy which predates and already makes foundational provisions for emerging technology policies. Policy-formulation processes were driven by stakeholder engagement and public consultations, as seen in regular calls for contributions and multistakeholder convenings leading up to policy enactment. Yet huge disparities were observed within countries, where rural and marginalized urban communities, as well as women, are left behind by governmental technology ambitions. This calls for updated policy frameworks and strategies that emphasize inclusion and other sociopolitical considerations to avoid deepening inequities.

For Africa to leverage emerging technologies for socioeconomic development while maintaining accountable and transparent systems, legislative frameworks must be streamlined alongside strong institutional integration to ensure effective enforcement. It is imperative that policymakers develop a strong understanding of emerging technologies to enhance their capacities for developing comprehensive policies to address them. Equally important is raising public awareness to protect the African people’s digital rights and foster safe digital environments.

Ayantola Alayande is a Researcher at the Global Center on AI Governance. There, Ayantola works on the African Union Continental AI Strategy and the African Observatory on Responsible AI. He is also a researcher at the Bennett Institute for Public Policy at the University of Cambridge, where he focuses on industrial policy and the future of work in the public sector.

Samuel Segun, PhD is a Senior Researcher at the Global Center on AI Governance. He is also an AI Innovation & Technology consultant for the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), where he works on the project ‘Toolkit for Responsible AI Innovation in Law Enforcement’.

Leah Junck, PhD is a Senior Researcher at the Global Center on AI Governance. Her work explores human-technology experiences. She is the author of Cultivating Suspicion: An Ethnography and Like a Bridge Over Trouble: An Ethnography on Strategies of Bodily Navigation of Male Refugees in Cape Town.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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The post Emerging technology policies and democracy in Africa: South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia in focus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Season 2, Episode 10 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by African politics and security expert Ben Shepherd. After 300 Romanian mercenaries were cornered by M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in January, Ben reflects on the reasons behind the rebels’ advance and the perennial need for DRC’s government to look to external security providers for help managing threats.

Ben outlines how the Congolese military has been drawn into patterns of patronage that systematically undermine its effectiveness. They also discuss Rwanda’s support for M23, regional jockeying for access to DRC’s vast mineral wealth, and a recently thwarted coup involving three US nationals.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Podcast Jan 10, 2024

Mercenaries and Gaza

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Iraq expert Renad Mansour about what motivates the non-state actors who are leading the bid to avenge Gazans.

Conflict Crisis Management

Podcast Apr 24, 2024

American Hit Squad in Yemen

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post Mercenaries in DRC: “Do not come for adventure here” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Almost a year since his election, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye now has a clear mandate to carry out reforms, following his party’s resounding victory in November’s legislative elections. He must now turn his focus to continuing along the democratic track, lifting the constraints associated with credit rationing and leveraging commodity-based industrialization, and setting Senegal up for robust economic growth and welfare improvements.

By the end of the presidential election early last year, outgoing President Macky Sall—who had attempted to postpone the election, a move that led to deadly protests—congratulated Faye, calling the elections the “victory of Senegalese democracy.” Such a victory is important for Senegal, as democracy (contrary to what Chirac suggested) is not a luxury but a necessity for national reconciliation, the legitimacy of national institutions, and, ultimately, shared prosperity.

The presidential election was a victory not only for Senegal’s democracy but for democracy globally, rekindling confidence internationally in a system of government that has come under strain in Africa, especially in West Africa, where military coups have surged. That boost in confidence comes as people in even Western democracies grow dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. For example, an Ipsos poll in 2023 conducted across seven Western countries (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found that most respondents believed the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful and that “radical change” is needed to improve the political system.

In that poll, 70 percent of American respondents and 73 percent of French respondents—whose countries are seeing rising political polarization—said they believe that the state of democracy has declined in their countries in recent years. Moreover, the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked both the United States and France as “flawed democracies.”

While massive amounts of campaign financing are considered a prerequisite (and perhaps the most important attribute) for winning an election, Senegal’s presidential election was a reminder that conviction and ideas still matter. Faye—who secured 54.28 percent of the vote as an independent after his party was banned—defeated candidates who had far more financial firepower and ample time to rally support on their campaign trails. Despite being released from prison just a little over a week before the presidential election, Faye’s message and program were in sync with people’s aspirations and garnered broad-based support at the ballot box.

Faye promised to improve the living conditions in Senegal. For too long, the country has contended with widespread poverty, especially in rural areas where as many as 57 percent of people are considered poor. Furthermore, Senegalese youth continue to face high unemployment. The informal economy—which is generally associated with low productivity and endemic poverty—has become a major piece of the economy, accounting for nearly 37 percent of Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the rising cost of living and income inequality have exacerbated Senegal’s socioeconomic challenges. Inflation has proven particularly sticky and is eroding household purchasing power. Amid these challenges, increasing numbers of Senegalese migrants are risking their lives to sail the seas en route to Europe in search of better opportunities.

Faye has also promised to fight corruption, promote good governance, and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions. For years, a “strongman” culture across Africa has enabled collusion between politicians and multinational companies, which has weakened agency and popular ownership of policies to undermine economic opportunity and exacerbate income inequality. This is especially the case in countries rich in natural resources, which are more vulnerable to corruption due to the significant revenues generated by resource exploitation, management, and trade.

Departing from the norm, Faye declared his assets in the lead-up to the presidential election. Upon becoming president, he announced he would conduct an audit of Senegal’s oil, gas, and mining sectors to rebalance them in the national interest. These moves establish baselines against which the people of Senegal can assess the president’s work toward tackling corruption and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources, with an ultimate goal of achieving more inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the country.

These are important steps in the right direction. Improving welfare for the Senegalese people requires a fundamental transformation of the economy. Expectations in Senegal are high following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves a few years ago. There are similarly high expectations for Africa as a whole. Despite its immense natural-resource wealth, the continent has, over the last several decades, become the world’s epicenter of poverty: Africa has the largest share of extreme poverty rates globally and is home to twenty-three of the world’s poorest twenty-eight countries.

This starkly contrasts with Nordic countries and the Gulf states, which have successfully leveraged their natural-resource wealth to boost prosperity in a span of a few decades. This contrast is partly due to the fact that rather than processing its own natural resources, Africa instead largely exports them overseas, increasing the prevalence of macroeconomic shocks and the risk of poor governance—both of which adversely affect the investment climate and heighten growth volatility.

But Senegal, arguably a latecomer to the hydrocarbon world, can learn from other African countries’ management (and mismanagement) of natural resources.  

Considering the experience of the most successful oil-rich countries, Faye should look to alter the structure of value chains to retain more production and refining processes locally. If Senegal can nurture these industries, it will set up the country for commodity-based industrialization that expands employment opportunities, enhances technology transfer, and accelerates integration into the global economy. This will help Senegal avoid a deterioration in commodity terms of trade, which is fueling internal and external imbalances. Last October, Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term credit rating, citing a significantly weaker fiscal and debt position.

There are mechanisms and conditions in Africa that would help Faye in localizing natural-resource production and refining processes. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin (which prioritize made-in-Africa goods) should help catalyze the production of intermediate and manufactured goods and the development of robust regional value chains. The scale of the continental market should help Senegal offset the potential losses of international trade associated with expanding protectionist barriers in a geopolitically fractured world.

The rise of globally competitive African businesses necessitates large-scale, long-term investment, so reforming the banking system will also be important. Affordable patient capital is particularly critical in Senegal, where domestic credit to the private sector remains very low (31.3 percent of GDP, versus 126.8 percent in Norway) and overwhelmingly short term. According to a report by the Central Bank of West African States, more than 80 percent of loans issued in 2022 had a maturity within less than two years.

Faye has an opportunity to achieve the systemic change he promised. Democracy has provided a path to greater ownership of policies that equalize access to opportunities and raise living standards in Senegal and more generally across Africa, a continent rich in resources and where the people are no longer prepared to accept intergenerational poverty as an inevitability. But democracy must not be regarded as an end; it must be seen as a means to greater security and prosperity. Thus, Faye must actively use the opportunity provided by the rekindling flame of democracy to usher in a new era—one that yields huge democratic and economic dividends.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The country, at the crossroads of Central and West Africa, faces uncertainty across political, social, economic, and security environments. This is happening at a time when the United States’ global competitors are opportunistically seeking engagement in Cameroon and the region, boxing out the United States as it looks to protect its interests there.

Paul Biya, Cameroon’s ninety-two-year-old leader, has been in power as president since 1982, and from 1975 to 1982, he was the prime minister. Currently rumored to be in poor health, Biya is not seen frequently in public, has little direct contact with US or other foreign officials, and remains relatively recluse. The country faces economic and security challenges despite having a resilient, young population and a capable (yet stretched) military—one with significant experience gained from navigating armed conflict (at home and abroad); counter-piracy, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping, campaigns; and efforts to contain an insurgency in the English-speaking regions of the country.

Biya’s age and the country’s elections, due to be held in October 2025, bring into question what comes next for Cameroon. Navigating the aftermath of Biya’s presidency will require a coordinated and elevated strategic approach by senior US officials. If crisis breaks out in Cameroon, US missteps could play a part in thrusting the country and the region into significant upheaval and instability.

On paper, the president of Cameroon’s Senate, Marcel Niat Njifenji (who was appointed by Biya), would succeed the Cameroonian president in an untimely vacancy. Njifenji—currently at ninety years old and reportedly in poor health—would be tasked with holding elections between 20 and 120 days after the office becomes vacant, as outlined by Cameroon’s constitution. That is a relatively difficult job, even for the nimblest governments. As the ruling political party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement and its allies retain all facets of political power in the country. Many key opposition leaders have been divided, fled to self-imposed exile, or have passed away over time. Those in government hold relatively little power for actual change. In recent years, it has seemed possible that Biya would elevate his son as a successor in what has become a trend for the region, but the success of that approach is far from guaranteed.

Absent a unifying leader—one that is unlikely in a country not easily unified by ethnicity, religion, or language—a dangerous and violent scenario could unfold. Acute political instability would unsettle both West and Central Africa and would provide oxygen to armed groups in the Anglophone Crisis as well as in the Chad Basin (where the extremist groups Boko Haram and the Islamic State—West Africa Province are active) and in the porous eastern border with the Central African Republic. Opportunistic criminal networks could exploit any power vacuum in Cameroon and nearby, including next door in southeastern Nigeria.

The question remains: Why should the US government care about Cameroon, a country roughly the size of California with a gross domestic product around the size of Alaska’s, internal and external security issues, and a paralytic gerontocracy? Thus far, despite Cameroon’s strategic location, large economy, and incredible diversity, the United States and Cameroon have been unable to set up a winning partnership that benefits the Cameroonian people. As Cameroon increasingly looks to China as a development partner of choice, the United States should realize that its influence in Cameroon can’t be taken for granted.

US-Cameroon relations have historically been prickly and sometimes even outright rocky. Cameroon has come to distrust the United States after a series of real or perceived slights, including misunderstandings about contested presidential elections in 1992 (that ultimately saw Paul Biya prevail), suspension from the African Growth and Opportunity Act during the first Trump administration, and certain US policy decisions regarding conflict in the Anglophone regions of the country, which led to severe restrictions on US foreign assistance and military cooperation. US-Cameroon relations have also been affected by the fact that a small minority of the Cameroonian diaspora in the United States has engaged in the Anglophone Crisis, including by rallying funding, commanding fighters, and publicly coordinating messaging campaigns for militia groups seeking independence from the Francophone-dominated government. While the US government took some steps to reign in these actions, Cameroonian officials saw extended timelines on the US response and limited results as fundamentally unhelpful. At the same time, some members of the Cameroonian diaspora felt that the US government should have exerted more pressure on both the Biya-led government and armed groups to negotiate an end to the conflict. Back in Cameroon’s capital, the Biya-led government (in keeping with its history as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement) kept its options for international partnership open by engaging with Russia and China, in addition to France, Israel, and the United Kingdom.

From Cameroon’s standpoint, US engagement lacks consistency, seeing as Washington has been one to walk away, reduce foreign assistance programming, or limit security cooperation when Cameroonian human-rights or governance issues (which Cameroon perceives as domestic issues) become bilateral foreign policy irritants. Regardless, US policymakers expect Cameroon to accept the US worldview even if it doesn’t meet the country’s development, security, or economic goals.

One reason the United States should care about Cameroon is because of the country’s role as an economic hub for the region. Cameroon, located on the Gulf of Guinea, connects landlocked Central African countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic to the Atlantic Ocean. Cameroon’s ports at Douala and Kribi (the latter a project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative) provide a significant economic lifeline, facilitating the export of crude petroleum, natural gas, and timber and the import of refined petroleum, food, and clothing. Like many global ports, these port facilities also function as hubs for criminal networks and conflict actors. For example, according to the Africa Report, the Russian paramilitary organization Wagner Group used the port of Douala to enrich themselves and move their assets further inland.

The United States also has an economic interest in a secure and transparent Cameroon. Currently, Cameroon struggles with corruption, although efforts to combat such corruption remain ongoing. A loyalty-based patronage system as well as paper-based procurement processes (through which it is easier to exchange bribes) contribute to this climate. According to the US Department of State, US firms have said that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, the award of licenses or concessions, monetary transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlements, the regulatory system, customs, and taxation. Efforts to hold officials accountable for corruption are mixed. In 2012, Cameroonian authorities found former Minister Hamidou Marafa Yaya guilty of corruption, but Marafa denied making any attempt at embezzlement and said his detention is politically motivated—and a United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded his detention is arbitrary, saying his right to a fair trial had been violated. In 2023, a Cameroonian court sentenced former Minister of Defense Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo’o, his wife, and three other co-defendants to prison for corruption charges involving military contracts (Ngo’o and his wife denied any wrongdoing).

There is much at stake in Cameroon. Here are ten recommendations for the Trump administration.

Recommendations for the immediate term

• Develop a high-level interagency Cameroon strategy. It should include visits by senior US Department of State and other executive-branch officials. This effort can reinforce the work of the US ambassador to Cameroon as a potential crisis looms. In an era of great-power competition, this strategy should include a clear definition of US goals in Cameroon, in addition to a review of the US foreign policy tools available to assist Cameroon with its development, security, and governance challenges.
• Intensify engagement and meetings with all parties involved in the upcoming presidential elections. Avoid statements or appearances that could be interpreted as picking potential successors, which were the source of ruffling in the US-Cameroon relationship in 1992.
• Focus on creating stronger economic ties with Cameroon while also supporting human rights and good governance. This is what Cameroonian officials tell US officials that they want. Previous US policy reduced economic and commercial ties in Cameroon out of concern for human rights and governance, using standards that may not be universally applied to other non-African countries facing similar challenges. Instead, the United States can push for improved human rights and governance (for example, by advocating for the release of high-profile political prisoners such as Marafa) while also pursuing stronger economic and commercial ties.
• Seek wider perspectives beyond government-to-government contact. Engage credible voices on Cameroon in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere in real and consistent policy discussions instead of one-off roundtables that lack staying power and impact. Doing so can ensure that the United States has access to a full range of views about the political process and to networks that the administration can draw upon in a crisis.
• Proactively engage congressional leaders and their senior staff on Cameroon matters. This can be accomplished through testimony, hearings, the Congressional Research Service, and other legislative branch tools. Encourage congressional staff and member delegations to Cameroon to inform other congressional staff and members of what is at stake.

Recommendations for the short-to-medium term

• Task the intelligence community with assessing the political, economic, social, and security situation in the country. This assessment should outline critical public messaging themes that can help unify Cameroon in a potential crisis, the key players in the country’s future, and potential successors among the political, economic, and military elites. The assessment should include listings of monetary assets, real estate and commercial holdings, and any US dollar-denominated bank accounts. The intelligence assessment should also shed light on money laundering and terrorist financing vulnerabilities for this regional banking hub, and it should map and analyze the relationships key Cameroonians have with Russia, China, and Israel for potential leverage points during a crisis.
• Hold a tabletop exercise to plan for realistic political scenarios. The tabletop exercise should include agencies from across the US government and also the US embassy in Cameroon. Such an exercise would help the US government understand what the various scenarios mean for US personnel, Peace Corps volunteers, and US facilities in the country. In Cameroon, most official US personnel and facilities are based in Yaoundé, so evacuation may be difficult: While Yaoundé has an international airport, the Cameroonian international airport that offers the most flights and destinations is in Douala, nearly five hours away. Such challenges require early contingency planning.
• Learn from past mistakes in Cameroon and more recent ones made elsewhere, for example in Sudan. Political transitions can happen quickly. Ensuring that the US government has a strategy and network to draw from in a crisis or post-crisis scenario can help decisionmakers as they articulate what a positive relationship with Cameroon could look like—potentially with an untested or unknown leader. Doing so may go a long way toward building credibility.
• Develop a quick response package. Drawing on an interagency Cameroon strategy, an intelligence assessment, and lessons learned from the past, the US administration should take proactive steps to prepare diplomatic and economic statecraft tools that can be rapidly deployed in the event of crisis. For example, the US administration should consider sanctions targets and be ready to announce them quickly. Government departments and agencies—including State, Defense, Treasury, the Development Finance Corporation, the Millenium Challenge Corporation, and others—should have humanitarian aid, economic support, and incentives for security sector reform ready to deploy quickly in a crisis.

A recommendation for ongoing strategy

• Do not wait on traditional allies such as the United Kingdom, France, or others to act in concert. US and ally interests in Cameroon often do not align. France, now on the back foot in several African countries, may not be able to help. Russia and China are in Cameroon for themselves. Global competitors are already aggressively pursuing their political, economic, and security goals in Cameroon.

Cameroon faces an uncertain future. US policymakers have the opportunity to change Cameroon’s trajectory by accompanying the country as it navigates its future uncertainties. Should Cameroon’s future bring wider violence, the potential for the country to fracture around ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other lines could look similar to, or potentially worse than, the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in southern Europe in the 1990s. But if Cameroon can successfully navigate the period ahead with the United States as a viable partner, it will have contributed to stabilizing the heart of Central Africa, building a brighter and stronger future, and keeping US global adversaries at bay.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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US President Donald Trump has sought to immobilize USAID as part of his mission to downsize the federal government. That mission also drove Trump to sign an executive order freezing foreign aid for ninety days and subjecting all aid programs to a review of whether they are aligned with US foreign policy, although exceptions include life-saving humanitarian assistance.

Since then, the administration has announced that it would merge USAID into the State Department, put thousands of staffers on paid leave, and order international staffers to return to the United States. Despite a few court rulings that have temporarily reinstated workers and funding for foreign-aid contracts, USAID—the largest humanitarian aid organization in the world—is now in pieces.

While many are assessing the Trump administration’s priorities and the consequences of the USAID shutdown for US competitiveness in the world, it is important to also consider the African perspective and analyze how Trump’s decision could shape Africa’s future.

Africa, the first victim?

Many are arguing that Africa will be the first victim of the USAID collapse. Even if the amount of USAID assistance to Africa has been decreasing over the past few years, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa still received twelve billion dollars from USAID in 2024. Looking at the continent as a whole, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) receive the most aid.

The level of concern is high: From Sudan to the DRC, hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of food and medicine, already delivered by US farmers and manufacturers, is stuck in ports due to the aid pause and confusion around unclear guidance from the government.

Foreign assistance to Africa has come to include aid with a variety of focuses, including economic development, health, peace and security, democracy and human rights, and education, going far beyond its primary goal. Some African leaders argue that such aid has led to interference in African internal affairs. In terms of efficiency, aid has never lifted any country out of underdevelopment, and the level of aid for Africa has been so low that it has never been able to meet the continent’s development needs. Nongovernmental organizations regularly deplore the fact that the development aid deployed by rich countries remains below the recommendations of the United Nations.  

In addition, the full scope of aid to Africa has weakened focus on business and trade partnerships, which are more effective in combating structural underdevelopment. Moreover, for countries sending aid, such aid tends to be seen as a demonstration of influence and power rather than generosity. The power dynamic that is associated with aid—as exemplified by an African proverb that says “the hand that gives is always above the hand that receives”—has contributed to bias and prejudice against Africans, portraying them as eternally in need of charity. On the contrary, Africa draws in other forms of financing and investment, notably remittances from African diasporas (the amount of which surpasses funds received through development assistance or foreign direct investment). Money sent to Africa is increasingly coming from Africans themselves, not from foreign assistance. This is a promising path.

On fundamental issues, such as health, girls’ education, and security, Africa should not be dependent on foreign contributions, from the United States or elsewhere. As some African leaders have argued, the US freezing of federal aid is a “wake-up call” for the continent.

The concern about this dependence is not new: For decades, Africa observers have been warning about African dependence on perpetual external aid. Rather than replacing US aid with more assistance from other countries, Africa’s next efforts should be devoted to much more decisive policies. Such policies include ones that, for example, accelerate intra-African trade (which accounts for less than 20 percent of Africa’s total trade; for Europe, intra-regional trade accounts for 60 percent), support the introduction of sovereign currencies (the eco, a currency proposed for West Africa, has still not seen the light of day), or bring more local resource processing and technical and scientific training to the continent.

Offering a deal to Trump

Africans should not have waited for Trump to cut off economic development aid. They should have taken the lead and prioritized healthier cooperation, based on balanced and fair partnerships. Under Trump’s foreign policy, the United States is looking to put itself first; Africans, too, should be concerned about efficiency and should strive for foreign policy that puts their countries first.

Some African countries have made steps in this direction. With its Ghana Beyond Aid vision, Ghana had tried to revolutionize its policy under President Nana Akufo-Addo. Botswana has arguably already accomplished this shift, using revenues from its diamond industry to fuel a remarkable growth strategy.

Africans should support the US effort to evaluate its aid mechanisms; but more than that, they should take advantage of the end of USAID to propose new partnerships made up of direct investment and fairer trade. After all, African economies have assets and resources that few states in the world have on a large scale. Trump, the “dealmaker,” will likely welcome this approach.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Doing so will require facing the roots of the tension. There are deep-seated elements of discord between the two governments. These elements relate to Algeria’s colonial past, Algerian migration to France, and the divergence of their positions over Western Sahara. The shared history between Algeria and France is complex. That history is marked by more than a century of France’s colonization of Algeria, which ended with a bloody war of liberation. The two countries’ shared history has also witnessed successive waves of migration from Algeria to France. The relationship between the two governments has been rather rocky over the past decades with occasional periods of reconciliation.

For a while, the close relationship between the two heads of state, Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Emmanuel Macron, seemed to have brought about a hopeful rapprochement between the two countries. In 2021, Macron announced the creation of a “memory and truth commission,” involving both Algerian and French historians to mend wounds from the history of French colonial rule. Discussions were underway on the return of Algerian cultural artifacts and archives from the colonial period. That rapprochement came to a halt after Macron officially affirmed Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in October 2024.

A diplomatic route to resolve the discord is not only still possible but imperative. There is a lot more at stake than just the welfare of Algeria and France. Considering the shared history and the deep ties between their populations, the pair is at the center of a matrix of relationships between Europe and Africa and between the Global North and Global South more generally.

The tensions between Algeria and France are flaring up in the context of deepening rifts among Global North and Global South countries over trade, migration, energy, environmental and climate cooperation, and the rules-based international order. But these unfavorable geopolitical circumstances are all the more reason for the two neighbors on both sides of the Mediterranean sea to resolve their differences and provide a model for how other nations can reconcile North-South divides. For example, France and Algeria could cooperate to combat wildfires in the Mediterranean basin, which continue to kill hundreds people, destroy hundreds of thousands of hectares of land, and to devastate biodiversity and people’s livelihoods.

More and more, “sovereigntist” waves both in the North and South are pushing countries to close their economies. There is also a growing trend of politicians scapegoating the “other.” That said, if Algeria and France could resolve their differences, it would open new avenues to help partner further not only on combating wildfires, but also on security, energy projects, and finding new pathways to solve migration issues. The two countries must bear in mind their joint responsibility to ensure stability in the Mediterranean Sea and beyond, as well as to look forward to develop further economic and security cooperation.

The Mediterranean Sea has served as the crossroads between civilizations in the east and the west for millennia. Yet, it has become the backdrop for thousands of tragic journeys by refugees and migrants heading north toward Europe. A reinvigorated relationship between Algeria and France would serve to rekindle the potential for commerce and prosperity in the Mediterranean and beyond. Algeria is the doorstep to Africa, as France is for Europe. Yet, the economic ties between the two countries are well below what they could be. Total trade was just under twelve billion dollars between the two countries in 2023 and the stock of direct investment from France in Algeria that year was well below three billion dollars. Building common ground between these two countries could boost trade and investment, increasing both nations’ prosperity.

Just as France and Germany have become the engine of European integration after having fought bloody wars, France and Algeria could become an engine for partnership between Europe and Africa. For instance, as green technologies are becoming economical not just in solar but soon perhaps with hydrogen, the partnership between Algeria and France could help with the transfer of technology that will spur investment and trade in energy across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, in agriculture and agribusiness, there is an opportunity for increases in investment and trade that can mutually benefit of not just Algeria and France but the whole of Africa and Europe.

The galloping demography of the African continent far outweighs that of Europe, which should lead investment to flow massively from the North to the South. There are, of course, important frictions that prevent that. To be sure, deeper investments, including in infrastructure, require further progress on the investment climate in Algeria, as well as removing nontariff barriers to economic integration in Africa. But increasing investments between Africa and Europe also requires a new way for the two continents to view and treat each other.

Something else is required, too: Europe should move away from the paternalism of former colonizers, which has alienated many Africans. That may sound remote from economics and business, but that is likely a major reason why the relationship between Africa and Europe is stuck. Algeria and France’s relationship epitomizes this tension. Small but symbolic steps were taken to bridge the gap in perspectives between Algeria and France over their colonial past. These steps should continue to take place.  

The geographic proximity and societal ties between Algeria and France should allow the two countries to reinvent the relationship between Africa and Europe and, more broadly, between the Global North and Global South. A successful reinvention of France-Algeria relations could serve as a model for Europe-Africa relations based on mutual respect that face up to the wounds of the past while looking to the opportunities of the future.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region and a former chief of commodities at the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. Arezki is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development, and at the Harvard Kennedy School.

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Lassina Zerbo is the chairperson of the Rwanda Atomic Energy Board, former prime minister of Burkina Faso, and executive secretary emeritus of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. This essay is part of the Global Energy Agenda.

Africa is at a decisive point in its energy journey. With a rapidly growing population and a persistent energy deficit, the continent faces a dual challenge of ensuring reliable access to energy while contributing to global carbon-neutrality goals. Nuclear energy—and in particular small modular and micro reactors (SMRs)—can revolutionize the African energy landscape and promote sustainable development. 

Currently, over 600 million Africans lack access to electricity, a situation exacerbated by weak electrical infrastructure and heavy dependence on biomass. This energy deficit hampers economic growth and contributes to widening social inequalities. 

Although promising, renewable energy sources are often limited by their intermittent nature. So far, solar and wind power have not provided the stable baseload power that is essential for industrialization and urbanization. Africa needs an energy-intensive low-carbon alternative that complements renewable energy to sustainably meet its energy needs. 

The potential of nuclear power in Africa is immense. It provides stable, carbon-free energy with the best return on investment among current technologies. However, traditional nuclear reactors require large initial investments and extensive existing infrastructure, which can be prohibitive for many African countries. This is where micro reactors and SMRs offer a breakthrough solution. 

SMRs, characterized by their compact size and modular design, typically generate up to 300 megawatts per unit. Unlike conventional reactors, SMRs are factory built, reducing construction costs and lead times. They can be deployed in remote areas with limited grid capacity, making them ideal for Africa’s diverse landscape. In addition, SMRs feature enhanced safety mechanisms, such as passive cooling systems, which minimize the risk of accidents. 

SMRs offer a combination of economic and environmental advantages that make them well suited to Africa’s energy needs. The fact that their initial investment cost is generally lower than that of large reactors, coupled with the possibility of setting up innovative financing models, makes their adoption more accessible. Their modularity enables flexible deployment, ideal for electrifying rural areas and supporting industrial development without the need for heavy electrical infrastructure.  

On the environmental front, SMRs have a reduced carbon footprint, in line with global climate objectives. Their integration into the energy mix complements intermittent renewable energy sources, ensuring a stable electricity supply while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, the development of this technology encourages the transfer of skills and strengthening of local capacities, laying the foundations for long-term technological autonomy. 

To attract investors and ensure public support, African governments need to put in place favorable policies, notably by strengthening their regulatory frameworks and conducting information campaigns to allay any public concerns. 

Skills development is also an important pillar for the successful integration of nuclear power in Africa. Implementing this technology requires a skilled and experienced workforce. Ambitious training programs, supported by international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, are helping to train the sector’s future experts. Countries such as Rwanda have already shown the way by investing heavily in the training of nuclear scientists and engineers, demonstrating the feasibility of such projects. 

International partnerships are also important to accelerate the deployment of nuclear power in Africa. The West African Economic and Monetary Union is opening up new prospects for energy cooperation by launching a study on the feasibility of installing nuclear power plants in its member countries. The technical and financial complexity of these projects also require close collaboration between African countries and international players. Public-private partnerships, as well as the support of financial institutions like the African Development Bank, the West African Development Bank, and the Economic Commission for Africa, are key to mobilizing the necessary investments.  

But the deployment of nuclear energy in Africa faces a number of challenges. Public distrust, often fueled by misinformation about the risks involved, is a major obstacle. In addition, existing energy infrastructure is often insufficient, necessitating major investment and enhanced regional cooperation, as shown by the example of the West African Power Pool, an association of public and private power entities. Finally, political stability and continuity of energy policies are essential to ensure the long-term success of such projects.  

Small modular and micro reactors offer Africa a real opportunity to transform its energy landscape. With enhanced international cooperation, the continent can build a safer, cleaner energy future, while improving the quality of life for millions of Africans. 

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Survey questions

Demographic data

Global Energy Agenda

Feb 20, 2025

The 2025 Global Energy Agenda

By Landon Derentz, Christine Suh, Paul Kielstra, Bailee Mathews (Editors)

The Atlantic Council is pleased to present its fifth Global Energy Agenda. As in prior years, this collection of essays is complemented by our in-depth analysis of the results of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s annual global energy survey. 

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Global Energy Agenda full survey results appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Since 2000, Ethiopia has achieved remarkable economic growth, driven by public investment in infrastructure and industrial expansion, positioning itself as one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. Coupled with extensive construction projects, the service and agricultural sectors also made modest contributions. However, since 2020, the country has faced significant setbacks, including internal conflicts that disrupted production and trade, alongside the global COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated supply chain disruptions and weakened demand for exports. These challenges were further compounded by rising inflation, which strained household incomes and increased the cost of living, and a severe shortage of international reserves, making it difficult to stabilize its currency. The recent decision to float the Ethiopian birr has added to the volatility, causing currency fluctuations that have increased uncertainty in trade and investment flows. These converging shocks have placed immense pressure on Ethiopia’s economic stability, underscoring the need for carefully managed reforms and international support to restore macroeconomic balance. 

The Freedom Index portrays a realistic picture of the politico-economic development of Ethiopia in the past three decades. The rapid improvement on the economic subindex around the turn of the century illustrates the country’s sustained strong economic growth in that period. More recently, this subindex reflects the euphoric momentum that came with a new administration in 2018, promising additional economic liberalization in trade and investment. I think the rise observed in the property rights component starting in the early 2000s is also a product of an effort to better protect foreign investment.  

Unfortunately, these improvements were not very long-lived, with scores on the investment freedom component dropping first, followed by declines in the trade and property rights components a few years later. 2020 appears to be a clear inflection point, with the expansion of internal conflicts in the country—starting with war in Tigray—that have been devastating for the economic climate. Along with the war, the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown and supply chain disruption exacerbated the economic development challenges. Some of the industrial zones in areas of conflict are now difficult to access, and the lack of stability makes it harder to retain and attract foreign investors. A dramatic example of the effects of these protracted conflicts since November 2020 is the fact that Ethiopia lost its beneficiary status under the African Growth and Opportunity Act in 2022. This dented the country’s ability to propel its economic development via export growth. 

The women’s economic freedom component shows an optimistic view of the situation for women in Ethiopia. In terms of legislation, especially at a federal level, it is true that the economic rights of women have come closer to that of males since 1995. Raising the legal marriage age to eighteen since 2000 has helped reduce child marriage rates, ensuring that young people have more time to complete their education and achieve better economic outcomes. The strict enforcement of the legal marriage age legislation is essential to tackle child marriage problems in some regions, such as Amhara, where the incidence of child marriage was persistently high in the past. Enforcement across all regions in the country contributes to improved health, educational attainment, labor market outcomes, and well-being for young women by allowing them to marry at a more mature age, thereby decreasing the risks and complications associated with early pregnancies. So, the improvement in the legal framework for women, particularly around economic issues, is probably what is being captured in this component, and it is also true that we now see a larger share of women in top government positions, including ministerial posts. 

Nonetheless, the implementation of gender equality more generally and at all levels of society is probably a much harder task. There is still significant cultural resistance in some regions and ethnic groups; for example, some impose informal limits on the assets that women can inherit. My own research on the topic shows that the school-to-work transition remains very challenging for many women, especially when they turn eighteen and the pressure to marry is intense, particularly in rural and remote areas. 

The political subindex clearly captures the excitement of the country when the current administration came to power. However, the regressive nature of the new government—responding both to internal and external factors—became immediately clear, in terms of civil liberties and political rights. In recent years, the country has been going through civil conflicts, a cost-of-living crisis, high levels of indebtedness, and tight monetary policy. These, combined with global factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine-Russia war, have been detrimental for Ethiopia and the welfare of its population. If the current trajectory continues, the near future is worrisome.  

The unexpectedly high score on the election component may stem from a limited interpretation of this variable. While elections do take place, the system does not yet fully embody a completely democratic political structure with guaranteed political and civil liberties and a robust system of checks and balances on the executive. Ethiopia has no history of a meaningful political opposition. The legislative constraints on the government are very low, which explains, in part, the developments of the past thirty years.  

The low level of the legal subindex components accurately shows the poor state of the rule of law in Ethiopia—a common problem in many African countries. I am somewhat surprised by the relatively good and rising performance of informality, which is probably due to the obvious difficulties in measuring the size of the informal economy and the share of the informal sector in employment. My own research, using the harmonized World Bank Enterprise Surveys, shows a persistently high level of informality in the enterprise sector. Another potential problem with this component is that informality is not a binary phenomenon, but a continuum, as firms navigate the formal and informal sectors simultaneously, making the actual share of the informal economy—and the number of individuals engaged in it—even harder to measure.  

The sharp drop in security starting from 2020 is explained by the proliferation of internal conflicts and fighting between the federal government and various groups in regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 may have slightly improved the situation by stopping the war in Tigray, but the ongoing conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and elsewhere could jeopardize those security improvements, and the overall future stability of the country.

Evolution of prosperity

The significant rise in the Prosperity Index since 1995 is noteworthy, but it is important to consider the very low initial levels in areas like income, education, and health. While the country remains one of the least prosperous globally and has yet to reach the average level for Sub-Saharan Africa, the substantial progress, especially since 2000, is undeniable.  

The rise in income starting around the turn of the century is substantial. When initial conditions are at a very low level of economic development, any form of growth and stability favors the reallocation of resources to more productive uses and rapidly shows up in gross domestic product (GDP) measures. Sectors like construction and infrastructure clearly benefit from a more stable macroeconomic framework, boosting income growth. For the first two decades of the twenty-first century, growth was propelled mainly by strong public investment. However, the most important question is whether the increase in GDP has been adequately and fairly distributed. The inequality component for Ethiopia, based on the Gini coefficient, is in line with other aggregate measures of inequality. Nonetheless, when you focus on the lower end of the income distribution, the bottom 20 percent, the situation is not so optimistic, and is probably worsening, pointing to the lack of inclusion and progressive redistribution. There are also important disparities across Ethiopia’s regions that are usually not well captured by data, as these are mainly collected in the larger cities. 

The extraordinary increase in Ethiopia’s health component can be attributed to the extensive work of grassroots service providers, expanding healthcare and coverage in line with policies since 2000 (e.g., the use of health extension workers). Broadly speaking, the country focused on improving primary and preventive healthcare, which produced a sharp drop in child mortality and adult morbidity over the past three decades, though maternal mortality remains a significant problem. The small dip on this component since 2019 is not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was not so severe in health terms as in Europe, but also to the deaths related to armed conflicts.  

In any case, while Ethiopia has been meeting the Millennium Development Goals and is even ahead of schedule for indicators such as child mortality, there is a long way to go if the country is to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Despite progress in terms of GDP growth, Ethiopia still faces complex economic challenges including the prevalence of poverty, inequality, malnutrition, and destitution.  

Regarding education, the graph clearly captures the significant improvement in schooling rates, which have increased in all levels of the educational system, for both males and females. However, quality has been an issue, and our graduates are not as well prepared as these data suggest. As an example, think of the investments carried out by the Chinese government in the last two decades. The Chinese investors came to Ethiopia because labor is relatively cheap, but they have realized that the skills and human capital of many of the workers they hired are very poor, to the extent that they have even needed to send them to Beijing to train. To make headway in education, the country needs to “invest in learning” and development of cognitive and other skills for better employability of graduates. This necessitates a paradigm shift away from the usual culture of “spending on schooling” which simply focuses on completing a given schooling cycle, with little attention paid to acquiring employable skills and other practical outcomes for learners. 

The very low level of the minorities component reflects a recurrent problem of the Ethiopian institutional environment: the close alignment of political power and access to services and opportunities. That is, economic growth has failed to be inclusive of all societal groups. The current administration must reverse this tendency so that the proceeds of economic growth reach the wider population. Children, youth, women, the disabled, and the elderly should not be neglected, and the economic management should give utmost priority to have a social protection angle in the ongoing reforms and policy measures. 

The path forward

The current and future challenges for Ethiopia are enormous. First and foremost, the various armed conflicts around the country are the biggest impediment to movement of labor, traded goods, and execution of productive activities. If peace and security are not restored in all regions of the country, there will be further deterioration of the socioeconomic situation nationwide. Agricultural and industrial production, and other employment-generating economic activities such as trade and investment, continue to suffer.  

It will be difficult to attract domestic and foreign investors, who are critical to revive the ailing economy in a situation of insecurity and uncertainty. Economic growth will not be able to maintain the pace of the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The debt problem in the country dented the confidence of investors and the country’s credit rating and/or worthiness suffer consequently. Macroeconomic management will be a major challenge in the context of very limited international reserves, devalued currency, and high levels of debt repayments with high cost of capital. The relatively easy access Ethiopia has enjoyed to international capital markets and bilateral lending from countries like China can suddenly become a problem. China, with its aid (e.g., lending for road and other infrastructure projects), might offer benefits in the present but at a very high cost in the future. But the debt problem Ethiopia faces is not only the making of China; it has been a problem for several years and borrowing from other sources such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank contribute to current debt levels.  

Another big challenge that Ethiopia faces is the alarming demographic trend. Even if there has not been a census in the country since 2007, some global estimates put the population at around 120 million and growing. This demographic situation poses a major challenge for attaining food security and creating enough jobs for the growing young and educated population. Each year, two to three million young Ethiopians enter the labor force, and it is clear that the labor market cannot absorb such a huge number of workers. Any hope of transforming the economy—or even of gaining a meaningful grip on it—is an elusive dream in a country where there are high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality, destitution, internal conflicts, food insecurity, and an ever-growing and underskilled youth population.  

Addressing the challenges facing Ethiopia requires more than just external assistance; it demands the implementation of robust public policies that focus on aiding the poor, youth, and women, all within a framework that fosters inclusive economic growth. While Ethiopia’s strategic importance to global powers, including the United States, might influence the flow of foreign aid from organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the impact of such aid (in the form of grants and/or loans) will depend heavily on the conditions attached to it and how Ethiopia uses the aid for growth enhancing, productive, and poverty-reducing activities. If strict fiscal consolidation is enforced, it could exacerbate inequality and worsen conditions for the most vulnerable populations, potentially leading to increased poverty and destitution. My concern for Ethiopia is profound, and I hope that an end to conflicts will soon allow the country to return to the better economic path it was on before 2020. 

Abbi Kedir is the director of research at the African Economic Research Consortium based in Nairobi, Kenya. Kedir was an associate professor in international business at the University of Sheffield, UK, from 2016 to 2023. Kedir has authored more than fifty journal articles and is an editorial board member of the Journal of Development Studies, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, Economies, and Frontiers in Environmental Science.

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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Africa’s space sector presents significant opportunities for the United States. The sector is projected to generate over twenty billion dollars in direct revenue annually. Meanwhile, it serves as a platform to advance broader US foreign policy objectives related to national security, space diplomacy, sustainability, and global influence.

The Biden administration achieved notable progress in building relationships with African countries in the space sector. For example, Nigeria and Rwanda became the first and second African countries to sign the Artemis Accords—a framework for best practices to use in space, drafted by the United States—and Angola quickly followed in 2023. US-Africa partnerships expanded with public and private sector representatives from the United States and Africa gathering at convenings such as the US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting in Azerbaijan and the NewSpace Africa Conference in Angola, which my company and the African Union co-hosted.

These efforts demonstrated a growing recognition that Africa’s space sector holds strategic importance. But the Biden administration still fell short of establishing a coherent and actionable strategy for long-term US engagement with African space programs.

As the Trump administration takes the reins, it faces a pivotal opportunity to build on this groundwork by solidifying relationships, streamlining strategy, and ensuring consistent engagement with African space programs. But Trump will need to take a collaborative approach: In order to harness the opportunities of the African space sector, the United States must also fill the gaps in its space coordination with Africa.

Clarify the office in charge

Uncertainty lingers among African leaders about which US institution would lead this charge: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Office of Space Commerce under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or the National Space Council (if the second Trump administration keeps it). Much of the implementation has been thus far led by the Office of Space Commerce. The Trump administration can help address this uncertainty by establishing a dedicated task force within an appropriate US space entity to oversee US-Africa space collaboration. This could include personnel from other institutions such as the National Space Council, Office of Space Commerce, NASA, the US Geological Survey, the US Space Force, and other relevant agencies.

This task force should help strengthen US partnerships with African institutions—including the African Space Agency and national space agencies—restructuring programs (for example, NASA Harvest) to align with the new US foreign policy. Likewise, the task force should support and advocate for US space businesses in Africa, opening new channels for space commerce between the United States and Africa.

Support the adoption of sustainable space practices

Africa, though contributing minimally to space debris, disproportionately bears the consequences of poorly regulated space activities. Incidents involving what is reported to be space-related debris in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda—and a recent one in Kenya that saw a five-hundred-kilogram metallic ring fall from the sky—highlight what is at stake in shaping global norms and practices for responsible space exploration.

The United States has a strong foundation in advocating for space sustainability, as shown by its Space Priorities Framework and NASA’s sustainability strategy. In addition, the 2022 National Orbital Debris Implementation Plan offers actionable steps for mitigating, tracking, and remediating debris. The Trump administration should work closely with African leaders to integrate these practices into their national and continental space strategies. This includes offering technical assistance, helping build capacity for debris monitoring, and encouraging African participation in multilateral initiatives on space sustainability. Collaborating on these efforts would not only help mitigate the risks African countries face but also strengthen the United States’ position as a global leader in promoting responsible space use.

Differentiate the US approach

The Trump administration should also offer transparent, mutually beneficial agreements that contrast with concerns about predatory practices associated with global geopolitics. Promoting democratic values, governance, and the rule of law in space agreements will further differentiate the US approach.

Build Africa’s space capacity

The United States should also more closely align US initiatives with the African Space Policy and Strategy, which has several aims, including one to develop on-continent space capacity. Toward this effort, and to respond to China’s and Russia’s increasing involvement on the continent, the Trump administration should do more to co-develop technologies, provide education and training opportunities, and facilitate technology transfer that empowers African nations to build domestic space capabilities. The US private sector plays a pivotal role in this effort, and the US government should encourage space companies to invest in Africa, establish joint ventures, and share advanced technologies that will foster innovation-driven partnerships.

Ease lingering tensions

Since its 2023 launch in Nigeria, Starlink has rapidly expanded its operations across Africa. While Starlink has been transformative in bridging Africa’s digital divide, its rapid entry has sparked concerns among African satellite operators and telecom companies. Local players face intensified competition, and some governments—such as Algeria and Egypt—have yet to give a license to Starlink, likely in part because they are protecting their national satellite infrastructure business. Additionally, some African telecom operators have argued that Starlink’s operations undermine local development goals as Starlink builds no local infrastructure, employs few locals, and benefits from less stringent regulations—whereas local companies face more complex licensing requirements and tax obligations and their investments in infrastructure benefit local economies. The playing field is also getting more complex, as Eutelsat’s OneWeb has entered the African market and is offering more favorable licensing terms, threatening Starlink’s hegemony.

All of this has an impact on how Africans perceive the United States as a potential collaborator on space issues. The Trump administration should, through diplomacy, help resolve such licensing disputes, protecting African and US interests and supporting Starlink’s role in global connectivity goals.

Ramp up diplomacy

The new administration should also enhance its soft power through space diplomacy. Doing so will deepen trust and strengthen ties between the United States and Africa.

One way to accomplish that is by hosting African researchers in US space institutions. Another is by sending more high-level representation to space-related events and convenings on the African continent. Doing so would signal the Trump administration’s readiness to partner with African nations in achieving their space ambitions—and offer the United States another platform to discuss cooperation on everything from technology transfers to launchpad use.

If the Trump administration can fill these gaps in the US approach to collaborating with Africa on space, it will not only unlock a massive (and lucrative) industry but also
protect US foreign policy objectives and programs on the continent, propel local development priorities, and shape space norms in line with democratic values. 

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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This survey was conducted from November 15, 2024 through December 2, 2024.

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Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

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By Mary Kate Aylward, Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Not all the projections were pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of those who participated in our Global Foresight 2025 survey, for example, felt that artificial intelligence would, on balance, have a positive impact on global affairs over the next ten years—an increase of 7 percentage points from our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Roughly half of respondents foresaw an expansion of global cooperation on climate change.  

But the grimmer forecasts were in keeping with a dark global outlook overall, with 62 percent of respondents expecting the world a decade from now to be worse off than it is today, and only 38 percent predicting that it will be better off.  

The 357 survey respondents were mostly citizens of the United States (just under 55 percent of those polled), with the others spread across sixty countries and every continent but Antarctica. Respondents skewed male and older, and were dispersed across a range of fields including the private sector, nonprofits, academic or educational organizations, and government and multilateral institutions.  

So what do these forecasters of the global future anticipate over the coming decade? Below are the survey’s ten biggest findings. 

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Africa China

1. Forty percent of respondents expect a world war in the next decade—one that could go nuclear and extend to space 

For the first time in our annual survey, we asked respondents whether they expected there to be another world war by 2035. We defined such a war as involving a multifront conflict among great powers. And the results were alarming, with 40 percent saying yes.  

While this was a new question, our Global Foresight 2024 survey surfaced a similar concern, with nearly a quarter of respondents pointing to war between major powers as the greatest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

The finding tracks with worries expressed by other experts amid major wars in Europe and the Middle East, growing tensions between the United States and China, and increasing cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Surveying this treacherous global landscape this past summer, for example, the historian and former US diplomat Philip Zelikow assigned a 20 to 30 percent probability to the prospect of “worldwide warfare” and warned of a “period of maximum danger” within the next one to three years. 

Judging by our respondents’ answers, another world war might feature nuclear weapons. Forty-eight percent of respondents overall (and 63 percent of those predicting World War III) expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade by at least one actor.  

Such a conflict also may play out in outer space. Forty-five percent of respondents overall (and 60 percent of those predicting World War III) expected the next decade to include a direct military conflict fought, at least in part, in space.  

And it could be devastating to the global economy. Twenty-eight percent of respondents identified war among major powers as the single biggest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years. 

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2. Tensions with China and Russia are potential vectors for major conflict 

By definition, a world war would involve more than two belligerent nations. But across multiple questions in the survey, respondents forecast a future in which today’s strategic competition and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in particular could sharpen into something more dangerous.  

Survey respondents, for instance, were significantly more inclined than a year earlier to foresee a military conflict over Taiwan, which could draw in the United States in support of the island and against China. Sixty-five percent of all respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that China will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, and only 24 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, that split was 50 percent to 30 percent. Among those predicting the breakout of another world war, the proportion was even higher: Seventy-nine percent believed China will attempt to forcibly retake Taiwan over the next ten years. 

Expand to read expert insight by Markus Garlauskas

Though this year’s survey findings may seem worrisome at first because respondents see increasing risks of war, I find them reassuring. The change from last year shows a greater awareness of the nature of the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the risk of confronting simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries and nuclear attacks.

That a clear majority of respondents now expect Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force in the coming decade is actually a hopeful signal to me. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been clearly building up military forces suited for offensive operations and has repeatedly stated that he will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under control. Meanwhile, polls suggest that the vast majority of the people of Taiwan are disinclined to be ruled by Beijing, favoring either the status quo or outright independence.

This would seem to set Beijing and Taipei on an inevitable collision course. Yet there is also good reason to believe that China overwhelming Taiwan is not inevitable, in part because invasion would be a far more difficult operation than is commonly recognized. It will take the increasing sense of threat of force identified by the survey to prompt Taiwan and the United States to make the investments necessary to increase their preparedness for deterring and defeating such use of force.

This growing awakening on the part of the United States and its allies can become the basis for a call to action for the populations, governments, and militaries of these countries. The United States has typically waited until war was thrust upon it before preparing comprehensively. Now is the time to act, to prepare, ideally to deter such aggression, and to be ready to hold firm if deterrence fails and we face either a short, sharp war or a protracted one. 

—Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

A US-China confrontation is not the only potential pathway to a multifront conflict among great powers. Forty-five percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that Russia and NATO will engage in a direct military conflict within the next ten years—a significant increase from the 29 percent who felt this way in our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Among respondents expecting another world war within the next decade, 69 percent anticipated a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

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3. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to be formal allies within a decade, potentially in a world featuring China- and US-aligned blocs 

Other geopolitical dynamics forecast by survey respondents could serve as the kindling for whatever spark ignites a wider war or, alternatively, emerge as byproducts of such a conflict.  

Forty-seven percent of respondents predicted that, by 2035, the world will largely be divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs; among that group, nearly 60 percent expected the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies, presumably with China leading the alliance.  

Overall, just under half of our survey respondents (46 percent) agreed that the emerging axis of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea will be formal allies in 2035. While this was the first time we asked this question regarding all four countries, in our Global Foresight 2024 survey 33 percent of respondents thought Russia and China would be formal allies in ten years’ time. 

Many respondents appeared to associate these potential developments with the prospect of a world war. Among respondents who foresaw both the world being divided into China- and US-aligned blocs and China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea becoming formal allies, 62 percent also anticipated another world war over the next decade; among other survey respondents, that figure was far lower at 33 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Melanie Hart

Economically, there is movement underway toward a US-and-allies versus China-aligned bloc structure, but this movement is still nascent. How far it goes will largely depend on whether the United States can overcome its domestic political reticence to actively shaping the global economic order and once again begin negotiating market-access trade deals.

Beijing seeks a global system in which other nations must abide by its wishes and there are no constraints—legal, normative, or otherwise—limiting Beijing’s own actions. Beijing is using global commerce to enforce this approach. For nations that depend on trade or investment with China, Beijing is increasingly willing to shut off the flow of goods and capital to enforce its demands in other issue areas. Beijing is also using those partners as consumption dumping grounds, exporting excess capacity across a wide array of goods (such as steel and electric vehicles) at rock-bottom prices, which addresses over-supply in the China market but drives local producers out of business. This is leading many nations to reduce their exposure and vulnerabilities to Beijing’s market interference. Many of those nations increasingly view Western, US-centric supply chains as a more attractive option.

As this shift unfolds, it could lead to new economic blocs—for example, a new multilateral trading structure in which the United States and its allies are at the center of a global trading bloc that China is not allowed to join. However, that will depend on Washington shaking off its trade malaise and figuring out how to negotiate new trade deals that create new, formal structures centered on US and allied rules of the road. China is busy creating its own options—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia—but the United States is hanging back. Without more assertive US-led action on the trade front, the biggest risk is that China will form a new, massive global economic bloc and write the rules to benefit itself at our expense, while the United States and its allies watch from the sidelines.

As for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these four nations are partners with a clear shared interest—namely, their desire to undermine the United States and the liberal international order—but they are not true allies. China’s need for integration with the global economy is likely to limit the degree to which today’s partnership evolves in the future into a more formal alliance similar to the alliance the United States enjoys with its NATO partners.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its regime legitimacy—its pitch for the Chinese people’s continued support—largely on its ability to deliver economically. Unfortunately, the party has also decided that the reforms required to deliver next-level economic growth are too risky, as they would require the party to cede more internal political control over the nation’s economy, legal system, and society. As long as Chinese leaders are unwilling to do that, they will lag behind the West in technology innovation, and they will depend on access to Western companies, universities, and markets to help fill that gap. That dependence limits China’s willingness to sign up for a comprehensive alliance with Russia, Iran, or North Korea, because Beijing does not want to join those nations in an economic wilderness that cuts Chinese companies off from the world’s leading technology powers.

—Melanie Hart, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub 

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4. The proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is a growing risk, with nearly half of respondents expecting a nuclear weapon to be used by 2035

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age and particularly since the latter part of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation efforts have sought to prevent additional countries from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapons, with varying success. And after the United States did so in 1945, no country has used nuclear weapons in war. But according to our survey respondents, the coming decade could bring very concerning developments on both these fronts. 

Iran is the most likely—but not the only potential—new nuclear-weapons power on the horizon 

In our latest survey, 88 percent of respondents expected at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, a slight uptick from 84 percent in the Global Foresight 2024 edition. As in our previous survey, just under three quarters of respondents predicted that Iran will go beyond its current threshold status and join the nuclear-weapons club within the next ten years, making it the survey’s most-cited candidate to become a nuclear-weapons state in the future.  

The coming years could bring a range of policy responses to this anticipated development, from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to a new round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps in recognition of these scenarios, more than a third of respondents expected Israel to have engaged in a direct war with Iran by 2035.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

Is Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon inevitable or at least highly likely in the next decade? Far from it. Whether Iran acquires a nuclear weapon will depend on policy choices made by Iran, Israel, and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.

Currently, Iran still officially disavows an intent to produce a nuclear weapon, but there has been much more talk among Iranian officials during the past year of the need for one as pressure on Iran has increased due to Israeli military actions against Tehran’s “resistance axis” and Iran itself.

Iran’s military and economic weaknesses have intensified an ongoing debate between moderates and hardliners in Iran over the direction of the country’s foreign and nuclear policy. Moderates want to negotiate a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and an opening of trade and investment with the West and Arab Gulf states. Hardliners argue Iran must double down on its expansionist regional policies, its threshold status as a military nuclear power, its growing ties to Russia and China, and its hardline stance toward the United States and the West to rebuild deterrence and resilience.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will have to make the call on which policy to pursue, and uppermost in his mind will be which approach—or mixture of the two—best ensures the survival of the Islamic Republic, his overarching priority.

Israeli officials continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear program closely and have reiterated warnings that Israel will resort to military force if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emboldened by its military successes over the past year, including the destruction of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Iran’s air defenses, as well as the weakening of Iran’s missile-production capabilities. Senior Israeli officials probably believe conditions are ripe to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program without major threat of retaliation, given the Islamic Republic’s current vulnerability, but also seem to recognize that Israel would need US military support to do lasting damage.

The Trump administration is committed to restoring its previous maximum-pressure campaign of sanctions against Iran to compel it to agree to a new nuclear deal and curbs on its malign regional behavior. Trump’s transition team reportedly discussed the possibility of a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities given that Iran now has enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs and that sanctions could take a long time to work. They may have leaked this option to frighten Iran into agreeing to negotiations, but clearly the Trump administration is signaling a willingness to go beyond sanctions and diplomacy to achieve its objectives.

With Iran’s axis of resistance shredded, and Iran itself weakened militarily and economically, the United States has an extraordinary opportunity—working with Israel, Arab allies, and European countries—to use economic and diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force to secure an agreement that walks Iran back from the nuclear brink and curbs its destabilizing regional policies.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

What is new is the jump in the percentage of respondents expecting other countries to get these weapons. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, for example, a quarter of respondents thought South Korea would acquire nuclear weapons. In our most recent survey, that figure was 40 percent. The percentage of respondents expecting Japan—the only country ever subject to a nuclear-weapons attack, where the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are a prominent national presence—to acquire nuclear weapons also increased ten percentage points over 2024, from 19 percent to 29 percent. (Notably, while the percentage of respondents anticipating a nuclear Iran in ten years’ time remained steady year over year, so did the roughly 40 percent of respondents expecting nearby rival Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons as well.) 

North Korea and Russia are considered the most likely to launch a nuclear-weapons attack

Forty-eight percent of respondents expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, up from 37 percent in our previous survey.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

This finding demonstrates that nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics. For years after the end of the Cold War, many assumed that nuclear weapons were obsolete relics from the past. The Obama administration made eliminating nuclear weapons a top priority. At the time, Washington assessed that there was virtually zero chance of a nuclear war among states and the greatest nuclear threats came from terrorism or accident.

Now, nearly half of our respondents assess that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade. This shows that nuclear weapons are not twentieth-century curiosities but the ultimate instrument of force and essential tools of great-power competition. China is engaging in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, Russia is issuing regular nuclear threats, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and Iran’s dash time to the bomb is now measured in weeks.

This means that the United States will need to once again strengthen its strategic forces to deter adversaries and assure allies. By doing so, I hope the United States can prove our respondents wrong and ensure that the world’s most powerful weapons are never used again.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

Roughly one-quarter of respondents predicted that Russia will use a nuclear weapon by 2035, with around the same percentage saying the same regarding North Korea, amid reports of near-Russian nuclear use early in its war against Ukraine and concerns about crumbling deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Both cases represent significant increases relative to our previous survey, when only 14 percent expected Russia to employ a nuke and 15 percent believed North Korea would do so. 

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5. The United States is still likely to be dominant militarily in 2035—but with relatively less economic, diplomatic, and soft power as it navigates a multipolar world

Three-quarters of respondents in our latest survey agreed that the world in 2035 will be multipolar, with multiple centers of power, in line with the findings in our previous survey. 

A slightly smaller percentage of respondents—71 percent—expected the United States to remain the world’s dominant military power by that time. A majority (58 percent) envisioned the United States being the world’s dominant technology innovator a decade from now.  

On other measures of power—economic, cultural, and diplomatic—respondents predicting US dominance in 2035 were in the minority, if only ever so slightly in the case of economic power, in which 49 percent of respondents expected the United States to be dominant. 

Between our latest survey and the previous year’s, confidence in US dominance over the next decade dropped across several measures of power, particularly diplomatic and military clout. Those forecasting US dominance in ten years’ time declined from 81 percent to 71 percent for military power, 63 percent to 58 percent for technological innovation, 52 percent to 49 percent for economic power, and 32 percent to 24 percent for diplomatic power. (The Global Foresight 2024 survey did not ask about future US dominance in cultural or soft power, which 35 percent of respondents expected in our most recent survey.) Slightly more respondents (12 percent) relative to our prior survey (7 percent) forecast that the United States will be dominant in none of these areas by 2035. 

A bright but more uncertain future for US alliances 

While a majority of respondents (61 percent) expected the United States to maintain its security alliances and partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in 2035, this figure was markedly down from our previous survey (79 percent), with much of the shift seeming to stem from those answering that they “don’t know” (26 percent in the Global Foresight 2025 edition relative to 12 percent in the 2024 edition).  

Responses on the future of US military dominance and alliances appear correlated. Among those who expected the United States to retain such dominance by 2035, 67 percent believed that it would maintain its network of alliances. Among those who did not think the United States would be the world’s dominant military power in a decade, only 46 percent believed that the country would preserve its alliance network. 

In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, just under a third of respondents expected Europe to have achieved “strategic autonomy” within the next decade by taking more responsibility for its own security and thus relying less on the United States. In our latest survey, however, almost half of respondents (48 percent) expected Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy” over the next ten years—a notable increase as President Donald Trump presses European countries to substantially increase their defense spending.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of alliances and partnerships in 2035:

The dangers of a diminished United States 

Those who anticipate a diminished United States over the next decade may link such a scenario to worse outcomes for the world. Among respondents who said that by 2035 the United States will be the dominant power in none of the domains listed in the survey, for instance, only 24 percent believed that the world will be better off in a decade’s time. Among other respondents, 40 percent expected the world to be better off ten years from now. Similarly, among those who didn’t expect US dominance in any domain of power in a decade, 62 percent envisioned a world war occurring over that timeframe. For the rest of the survey pool, 38 percent anticipated another world war.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

In the United States, declinism is a national pastime with a poor track record. In the 1970s, many thought the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the world’s leading superpower. In the 1980s, economists projected that Japan would unseat the United States as the world’s leading economy. In the 2010s, many thought it was inevitable that China would become the world’s largest economic power.

All of those predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The United States is now a rising power, claiming 26 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), its largest share in two decades. Meanwhile, China is declining; Xi Jinping’s desire to assert Chinese Communist Party control over all aspects of Chinese society is stifling Chinese growth, and his aggressive foreign policy is undercutting the global economic engagement strategy that fueled China’s rise. Europe’s share of global GDP has fallen from a quarter in the 1980s to roughly 15 percent today. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Spain’s. To whom then is the United States supposedly ceding all of this power?

Is the United States in decline? I wouldn’t bet on it.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

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6. Many respondents are pessimistic about the war in Ukraine ending on terms favorable to Ukraine

Amid a push by the incoming Trump administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an end three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, and as Ukraine and Russia each seek to secure the best possible terms in any future negotiated peace deal, respondents were split on the likely outcome of the conflict. Forty-seven percent predicted that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end on terms largely favorable to Russia and 43 percent forecast that it will result in a “frozen conflict.” Only 4 percent expected the war to end on terms largely favorable to Ukraine.  

Our previous survey a year earlier, which asked a different and more detailed question about Ukraine in ten years’ time, reflected more optimism, with 48 percent of respondents predicting that Ukraine would emerge from the war as an independent, sovereign state in control of the territory it held before Russia’s escalated assault on the country in 2022. 

Expand to read expert insight by John Herbst

Expectations about the future change in the wake of historic developments and perceptions of those developments. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is US policy.

Simply put, a strong US policy providing Ukraine the weapons to drive Russian forces largely out of Ukraine and rallying the political West to supply Ukraine’s economic needs would lead to a clear defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin that would return much of occupied Ukraine to Kyiv’s control, and with a US-led effort would vouchsafe Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity via NATO membership. Alternatively, a US decision to cut off aid to Ukraine would likely lead to a disaster that would ensure Kremlin political control of the country, produce a direct threat to NATO, and encourage aggression by US adversaries in the Far and Middle East.

US President Joe Biden gave substantial support to Ukraine, but he stopped well short of giving Ukraine the arms and permission to take back most of the country. Trump has stated that he wants Ukraine to survive and would not abandon the country, but he is seeking a durable peace that requires compromise from Ukraine as well as Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness to compromise; Putin has not. Recognizing this, Trump and his team have identified Putin as the recalcitrant party and have spoken of major economic measures—tougher sanctions, transferring the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine—to persuade Russia to negotiate. Respondents to the survey pay attention to the major factors affecting this war, including the Trump angle. But respondents to surveys are not seers, and survey questions are not written to explore the insights that seers might provide.

What therefore might we expect to happen with the war this coming year? First, Trump will roll out a peace initiative that likely includes four elements already public. Two are hard for Zelenskyy: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and no NATO membership for Ukraine for twenty years minimum. And two are hard for Putin: the demilitarized zone enforced by European troops and arming Ukraine to the hilt to prevent future Russian aggression. We can expect Putin to try hard to get Trump to drop those last two points before and then during the talks. But if Putin is persuaded that Trump will arm Ukraine with far more advanced weapons if Russia is unyielding, he might agree to terms that he intends to violate. Trump’s hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize depend on him insisting that Russia compromise to the point of ensuring a viable and stable future for Ukraine, and being ready to confront the ever-treacherous Russian dictator if Putin violates an agreement whose terms would yield that outcome.

—John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center 

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7. Respondents are much more optimistic about a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations than in Israeli-Palestinian peace  

Ever since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza set off transformative changes in the broader Middle East, US officials have linked reviving work on normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia with renewing the push for a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, with the Saudis insisting on the latter as a condition for the former.  

But our survey respondents—who, notably, shared their views before Israel and Hamas reached their January cease-fire and hostage deal—were much more bullish about the prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization in the coming decade than about the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. Fifty-six percent envisioned Israel having normalized diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia by 2035—roughly similar to the percentage who said the same in our post-October 7, 2023, Global Foresight 2024 survey—relative to 17 percent who expected Israel to be coexisting next to a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within that timeframe. More than 60 percent of respondents predicted that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today’s status quo, with occupied Palestinian territories, will persist. 

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

In 2035, will Israel have the status quo that exists today, with occupied Palestinian territories?

Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 has taught us the dangers of thinking a status quo will continue indefinitely. Israeli leaders’ belief that Hamas had reconciled itself to the status quo in Gaza—in which Gazans received economic benefits in return for Hamas not attacking Israel—left them unprepared for the most devastating attack on the Jewish state since its war of independence in 1948.

And the war in Gaza that resulted from Hamas’s attack has brought further surprises: Israel’s almost complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization; the killing of most of Hezbollah’s military leaders and elimination of a majority of its vaunted rocket and missile arsenal; direct Iranian and Israeli attacks on each other’s territory, with Israel wiping out all of Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems; and the almost overnight collapse of the Syrian military and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the face of a renewed rebel offensive.

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed, and Iran’s image as a regional hegemon and defender of the Palestinians badly tarnished. Israeli leaders have been emboldened by Israel’s military successes and seem to believe that maintaining military dominance alone will deter the country’s enemies.

But some observers, looking ahead, ask whether the cycle of violence since October 7 is likely to repeat itself at some point if Israel doesn’t address the issue of Palestinian aspirations for independence. The Biden administration and others have called for a return to the idea of a two-state solution as necessary to forestall future cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Admittedly, the current environment is not propitious for discussion of a Palestinian state. A large majority of Israelis, still traumatized by Hamas’s horrific attack on October 7, reject the idea as posing a grave risk to Israel’s security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly refused calls from the United States to incorporate the concept of an eventual Palestinian state into Israel’s post-war strategy, and right-wingers in the current Israeli government want to annex a large part of the West Bank, keep long-term control of the Gaza Strip, and return Israeli settlements to Gaza.

But the Palestinian issue is not likely to go away. Anti-Israel militancy and violence by Palestinians is growing in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and Israel hasn’t totally suppressed attacks by Hamas in Gaza after more than a year of fighting. Arab publics are seething with anger over the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced by Israeli military operations in Gaza. And world opinion has increasingly turned against Israel as Palestinian casualties have mounted.

The Palestinian issue remains a roadblock to Israel becoming fully integrated into the region, a key goal of Netanyahu’s that he hopes will put a capstone on his legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Responding to popular sentiment, Saudi leaders have indicated that Riyadh won’t normalize relations with Israel—an essential step to create a political and security bulwark against renewed threats from Iran—unless Jerusalem endorses a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood.

New elections will probably need to take place in Israel, bringing new leadership open to the idea of a political horizon for the Palestinians, if the current status quo is to change. The United States has an important role to play here by encouraging Israeli leaders to think about how to translate their military success into a regional strategy that includes a vision for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The odds of such a development seem long right now, but October 7 is a reminder that clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

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8. As global organizations become less capable of solving the world’s problems, regional groupings and the BRICS may rise in importance   

Respondents foresaw many global institutions growing less effective over the coming decade. Seventy-five percent expected the United Nations (UN) to be less capable of solving challenges core to its mission by 2035 relative to today, compared with 9 percent who anticipated it becoming more capable of doing so. The figures for the United Nations Security Council are only slightly better, with 67 percent of respondents predicting less capability and 9 percent more capability. Sixty percent of respondents envisioned the World Trade Organization being less capable in a decade than it is today.  

Respondents also may be skeptical about the UN’s capacity to tackle global-governance challenges such as climate change. Just under 40 percent of respondents predicted that greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2035, despite signs that this tipping point is already near. Only about half of respondents believed that renewable energy technologies will be the dominant form of electricity production globally by then, despite significant growth in demand for renewable energy. 

The forecast was less dire for the World Bank, with 46 percent predicting less capability and 19 percent more capability, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 41 percent predicting less capability and 20 percent more capability. A similar if slightly more sanguine picture emerged regarding organizations consisting of the world’s leading powers. Forty-nine percent of respondents predicted less capability and 21 percent more capability for the Group of Seven (G7), while 38 percent expected less capability and 29 percent more capability for the Group of Twenty (G20). 

But respondents seemed to hold out even more hope for regional blocs and the BRICS, which is now expanding its membership beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Forty percent of respondents predicted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be more capable of fulfilling its mission by 2035, while 20 percent said the opposite. For the European Union, those figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. (Respondents from EU countries were even more optimistic, with 50 percent expecting greater capability and 22 percent less capability.) For the BRICS, the numbers were 43 percent and 31 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Josh Lipsky

The findings show in hard data what many analysts believe—that the international financial institutions, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, remain the most functional parts of the multilateral system. That’s because they deliver real money every day to countries around the world. 

But the responses also show a growing recognition that these institutions are not self-perpetuating. The tenuous consensus that allows them to go about day-to-day business is predicated on an understanding that functioning IMF and World Bank institutions serve every country (including the United States) better than dysfunctional ones. With Donald Trump’s return to office, there are questions about whether that consensus will hold. For what it’s worth: The first time Trump was in office, it did, and Trump and his team saw the value in both institutions, even if they disagreed with some policy decisions. 

The one area of the findings that seems off-target is on the BRICS. The likelihood of the BRICS succeeding in fulfilling their main goals seems vastly overstated in these findings (likely a product of media reporting on BRICS expansion during 2023 and 2024). Here’s the question that is much tougher to answer: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve? What they oppose—the Western-led system—is clear. But what is their proactive agenda? Until they answer that question, the ability of BRICS to succeed as an institution will be limited at best.   

—Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center 

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9. Today’s democratic recession may deepen into a democratic depression

Overall, respondents appeared gloomy about the prospects for democracy around the world by 2035. Just under half envisioned the current “democratic recession” worsening and becoming a “democratic depression,” while only 17 percent anticipated a “democratic renaissance” instead. The remaining 37 percent expected the global state of democracy to remain much as it is today, with some encouraging progress but also considerable headwinds and backsliding. 

Sixty-five percent of respondents also forecast that global press freedoms will decrease by 2035, with another quarter expecting them to stay about the same as they are today and very few anticipating those freedoms increasing over the coming decade. 

Our question on the state of global democracy in our previous survey was not identical and therefore not directly comparable. Nevertheless, its results—24 percent expected more democracies a decade hence, 38 percent forecast fewer democracies, and another 37 percent foresaw stasis—presaged the dim outlook expressed in our latest survey. 

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10. Women are more pessimistic about the global future than men are 

Women notably expressed a bleaker outlook across many questions in the survey related to conflict, their own rights, and US clout over the next decade. 

For instance, 61 percent of female respondents predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade, compared with 44 percent of male respondents who said the same. Women (54 percent) were also more likely than men (44 percent) to expect a democratic depression. Thirty-two percent of women pointed to women as the most likely group to have their rights curtailed in the coming decade—twice the proportion of men who gave the same answer. Women, moreover, were less likely than men to envision the United States as the world’s dominant military power (58 percent relative to 76 percent) and technological innovator (47 percent relative to 61 percent) in a decade’s time.  

Expand to read expert insight by Nicole Goldin

The pessimism from women likely reflects persistent inequities in military, economic, and political representation and participation, as well as the disproportionate impacts of crises and shocks—whether those are economic (like inflation), security-related (from wars such as those in Ukraine or Gaza), the result of political turmoil or transition, or the product of natural disasters and climate events.

Compounding these situations are the challenges of child or family care and pay gaps, which limit the work and earnings of many women, and worsening domestic and gender-based violence, which devastates women’s lives in all dimensions. In the United States, the rollback of Roe v. Wade has left many women believing their rights and protection more broadly are at risk.

—Nicole Goldin, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and head of equitable development at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research 

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About the authors

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Uri Friedman, Senior Editorial Director, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come. 

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know. 

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.  

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.” 

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.  

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world. 

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests. 

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.  

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner. 

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage. 

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest. 

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.  

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems. 

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.  

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.   

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms. 

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.  

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.  

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.  

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat. 

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China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.  

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.  

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.  

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China. 

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.  

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli. 

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.  

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.  

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.  

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.  

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.   

Allies hedging 

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States. 

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.  

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.  

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.  

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.  

Institutional shifts 

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.  

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.  

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.  

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.  

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.   

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter. 

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Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate. 

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament. 

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.  

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.  

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains. 

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments. 

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.  

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.  

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.  

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought. 

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.  

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction. 

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric. 

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.  

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.  

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason. 

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.  

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.  

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.  

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Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

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In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

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Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

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The post Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

The Freedom Index illustrates well two important aspects of Nigerian institutional development in the last three decades. First, the transition to democracy explains the sharp increase of the Index score in 1999, which closes the gap with the average of the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Second, the often volatile evolution in the subsequent decades is a sign that the liberalization process has not been free of challenges and inconsistencies. Politically, the country has consistently held elections since the turn of the century, even though these have often fallen short of high levels of fairness and transparency. In terms of economic policy, while the successive governments have enacted varying degrees of reforms, these efforts have been somewhat inconsistent and not often coherent depending on the sector we analyze.  

The economic subindex exemplifies well this latter point, with really high short-run fluctuations throughout the period of analysis, mainly driven by the trade and investment freedom components. To be sure, the oil industry is central for Nigeria’s economy, representing 90 percent of its exports, and the fluctuations in both measures is, to an important extent, driven by the situation and the legal framework governing this sector. For about twenty years, the country has had internal debates about new oil industry legislation, and a new law was enacted in 2021, which has generated a climate of uncertainty, causing investors to be reluctant to pursue new investments in the country. In fact, Nigeria is producing less oil today than it did in 2010.  

Another factor that can explain some movements, such as the substantial fall in trade and investment freedom in the first decade of the century, is the introduction of different local content policies. Obviously, these kinds of policies are favored by domestic investors and can support a country’s broader development agenda, but they can often affect the degree to which foreign capital finds the country attractive for investment. Finally, the relevance of the oil industry in generating government revenue and foreign reserves has many times led the government and central bank to heavily intervene in the exchange rate market, sometimes in non-orthodox ways. This was particularly the case after the oil price collapse of 2015, which may explain the fifteen-point fall in trade freedom in the following years.  

It is fair to say that the liberalizing effort has been robust in some other sectors of the Nigerian economy. The telecoms industry was liberalized in the early 2000s, as well as the banking sector, which certainly helped unlock growth and productivity. But trade policy has at best been erratic, with the country pursuing an import substitution strategy in sub-sectors such as beverage products, sugar, flour, and cereal. As a result, it is clear that the country has not yet been able to establish a stable and secure framework for international trade and investment.  

Nigeria’s score on property rights protection is relatively low, compared to the regional average, and does not seem to vary much along the period 1995–2023. Nonetheless, this score has less to do with a risk of government expropriation of property than may be the case in some other economies with such low scores. The score may be reflecting the strict local content policies implemented across different sectors, which in some ways impose limits on the capacity of companies and owners to manage their assets.  

The women’s economic freedom component seems to have improved in the last three decades, but is still lower in Nigeria (66.3) than in other comparator countries in the region like Kenya (83.8), Ethiopia (80), or South Africa (88.1). Some important laws regarding gender equality are probably weaker in Nigeria. For example, there are no quotas for parliamentary participation for women, nor specific legislation incentivizing women’s economic participation, although there are a variety of customary and religious laws at the subnational level that have varying impacts on women’s acquisition of assets. Overall, there might be a significant gap between formal legality and actual practice on this matter, because women in the country are highly entrepreneurial, and girls’ school enrollment has increased substantially since the 1990s, which favors their labor force participation and overall economic activity outside the home.  

Moving on to the political subindex, the democratic transition of 1999, that situated the country together with other democracies in the region, is evident in the graph. All components of the subindex sharply improve, with the notable exception of civil liberties. This indicator is the average of two variables, one measuring private civil liberties (freedom of movement, religion, etc.) and another the degree of physical violence (freedom from torture and political killings). When looking at the disaggregated data, it is clear that the very low level of the civil liberties component is generated by an extremely poor performance in the latter, while private civil liberties have consistently scored above 80 in the last two decades. Violent insurgencies are likely influential in the low level of the physical violence variable, with Islamist Boko Haram in the northeast, the separatist movement Indigenous People of Biafra in the southeast, and the rising levels of violent crime including kidnapping for ransom in various parts of Nigeria. The declining quality of the police forces may also be an important factor. There have been protests against police brutality around the country, most recently in 2020, and individual rights relating to detention and imprisonment are not always adequately guaranteed.  

The rest of the components of the political subindex reach standard levels for young democracies in the developing world, at least until 2016, even though there are some small fluctuations that can be discussed. The component measuring the quality and fairness of the electoral process suffers a five-point drop in 2003, and does not recover the initial level until 2011. This fits well with the generalized view that the 2003 and 2007 elections held in the country suffered clear deficiencies. Subsequent elections in 2011 and 2015 were visibly more credible, and the data reflect it well with a ten-point increase.  

Legislative constraints on the executive have been historically strong in Nigeria. Two episodes illustrate this fact fairly well. First, in 2007, the first post-military president tried to extend his tenure to get a third term in power, but he was successfully thwarted by the legislature. Second, in 2010, the successor president fell ill and his inner circle tried to prevent the handover of power to his vice-president. The legislature stepped in again, ensuring a legal transition of power. However, the data show a clear fall starting in 2015, exacerbated in 2019, and only reversed in 2023. It is not clear that any important piece of legislation was passed during this period that could have reduced the power of parliament to control the executive, so the scores may just be capturing the fact that, in the 2015 elections, the opposition party won a decisive majority in the legislature, and thus in the following years legislative checks on the executive may have been relatively soft as a result of both being of the same political party.  

Finally, the seven-and-a-half-point drop in political rights in 2020 can be explained by a combination of the emergency situation generated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the security concerns due to the insurgencies in the Niger Delta, the northeast, and the southeast of the country. It is undeniable that the government became increasingly intolerant with some forms of freedom of speech, for example limiting the use of social media. Nonetheless, the Nigerian situation is not necessarily comparable to other parts of the world that are experiencing deeper and more extended democratic regressions, and the partial recovery in 2023 seems to confirm this intuition. 

Turning to the legal subindex, it is very clear that judicial independence and effectiveness and clarity of the law receive significantly higher scores than the rest of the components of the subindex. This is comparable to the regional average, at least since the democratic transition of 1999. In the last twenty years, there have been numerous disputes between different branches of power (legislative versus executive, federal versus the thirty-six states, etc.) which have been decided in high courts, often times against the powerful federal government. A good example is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case between the federal government and the Lagos state over local government funds, which was decided in favor of the latter, a strong indication of Nigeria’s judicial independence. In most cases, judicial decisions are accepted, respected and abided by.  

Security, as well as bureaucracy quality and control of corruption, are the components dragging the legal subindex score down, generating a substantial gap with respect to the Sub-Saharan Africa regional average. These scores reflect realities on the ground. As commented earlier, the various insurgent movements around Nigeria, together with the spread of organized violent crime and banditry, generate a generalized environment of insecurity. The government appears to have made some progress in fighting insurgents in the last few years, pushing them back and dismantling their strongholds in both the oil-rich Niger Delta in the south and with regards to the Islamist Boko Haram in the northeast. However, there are high levels of violent crime, kidnapping for ransom, and banditry that the government—both at the federal level and across the thirty-six states—has struggled to address, with significant implications for the continuing development of the country.  

Last but not least, the recurrent and discouraging low score on bureaucracy and corruption is very real. The Nigerian civil service desperately needs a total overhaul, and the country’s successive political leaders are fully cognizant of this fact. But such reform could affect tens of thousands or even millions of public employees, who are politically powerful, which makes it politically very costly for any government. The crucial anti-corruption agencies created in the early 2000s, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, were somewhat effective initially, in the first decade of the century, but soon became politicized. Thus, widespread and grand corruption in public administration can only be tackled with a holistic reform, which does not seem to be imminent. 

Evolution of prosperity

Despite the sustained growth of Nigeria’s score in the Prosperity Index since 1995, it still finds itself among the lowest prosperity group, ranking 136 out of 164 countries covered by the Indexes. However, there are some encouraging trends worth noting. First, the income component was influenced by the oil boom, in terms of high global oil prices in the 2002–15 period. Yet, as my own research shows, the oil boom was only a small part of the story. Other sectors of the economy also thrived since the early 2000s, such as banking and financial services and the telecoms industry, which were liberalized, smaller industrial services adjacent to oil production, and other non-oil exporting sectors. As a result, the data clearly show that oil’s contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) growth has been declining—from around 40 percent in the year 2000 to less than 10 percent today—with respect to the rest of the economy, denoting that Nigerian growth was not only based on the commodity boom. Nevertheless, the commodity price crash of 2015 affected the country’s overall growth trajectory, as Nigeria relies on oil exports for the bulk of its foreign exchange reserves, and thus many non-oil industries and sectors suffered increasing difficulties in accessing foreign imported inputs. The global effects of the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the situation, and Nigeria has not yet been able to recover the 2015 level of real GDP per capita. 

The promising evolution of the inequality component is probably capturing the substantial decrease in poverty rates within the country. Yet it must be noted that there is a clear regional divide in Nigeria, and the inequality and poverty reduction has not been homogenous across the country. The majority Muslim regions in the north of Nigeria are significantly poorer than the south, explained by much lower levels of educational attainment, higher prevalence of informality, and lower levels of industrial production, etc. Therefore, interregional or horizontal inequality is certainly deep and pervasive, and public policy should be directed to reduce the north-south gap.  

By far the most striking data come from the health component, where Nigeria ranks 162 among 164 countries, and the gap with respect to the Sub-Saharan Africa average has been widening in the last two decades. Nigeria’s life expectancy is much lower than its income level would predict, close to that of much poorer countries in West and Central Africa like Niger, Central African Republic, and others. This is a combination of two factors. First the already mentioned violence across the country, with its associated high levels of mortality of young fighters. Second, a precarious healthcare system that is significantly underfinanced, lacking professionals and personnel, especially in rural areas, a problem that will only be aggravated in the coming years given the high levels of population growth.  

The similarly low score regarding equal access and absence of discrimination for minorities also has important regional differentiations. The imposition of Sharia law in some northern states in the early 2000s did not favor Christian and other religious minority groups, or secular-oriented Muslims, in these states. However, since the mid2010s, the popularity of Sharia law in these states has declined significantly because the political leaders who championed its implementation were largely underperformers in terms of the actual quality of governance.  

Finally, the score on the environment component of the Prosperity Index is clearly low, but seems to show a positive trend in the last twenty-five years, with important caveats. On the one hand, pollution related to oil production is high, and there is uncertain commitment on its decisive reduction, which necessarily worsens air quality in the areas where oil extraction and refineries are prevalent. On the other, indoor air quality may have improved since the year 2000, when less than 1 percent of the population had access to clean cooking technologies, but even today that share is below 20 percent, which is very low. Deforestation, particularly in the north, is pervasive because many households still rely on biomass, wood burning, and other sources of domestic energy that are highly detrimental for their health. 

The path forward

Developments within Nigeria, within the African continent, and around the world will contribute to the country’s freedom and prosperity trajectory within the medium term. There are likely to be continuities and changes in the various dimensions that constitute Nigeria’s Freedom Index. The consolidation of the country’s electoral democracy will continue even if progress is not linear—it is very unlikely to experience a military coup or other such drastic setbacks to its democracy as was recently the case in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in West Africa. Yet, the quality of Nigeria’s elections will continue to vary by election cycle, contingent on the nature of the electoral competition and the profile of candidates running.  

The pace, consistency and scope of Nigeria’s domestic economic reforms, as well as global economic conditions, will have a determinative impact on Nigeria’s economic subindex. While the country’s debilitating challenge of depending on fuel subsidies will remain prominent in the short term, efforts to increase the domestic refining and supply of refined fuels, including the completion of the Dangote refinery complex, will eventually address this challenge in the medium to long term. Nigeria will also continue to implement local content policies across various industries due to the demand coming from the country’s large and vibrant private sector. In addition to the oil and gas sector, creative industries (entertainment, movies, music), and the f inancial sector, where these local content policies have been most visibly enforced, information and communications technology and the digital economy could be the next frontier. A dynamic trade policy will certainly help propel Nigeria’s economy to greater heights, including helping to further advance important elements of small business development and women’s economic empowerment, but its design and implementation is not yet on the radar of the country’s top decision makers.  

There are likely to be both significant advancements and notable setbacks in the components of Nigeria’s political subindex. The exercise of effective checks on the executive by Nigeria’s National Assembly (i.e., federal legislature) may increase in the next election cycle, especially if opposition parties are able to leverage the current popular discontent and gain more seats in the two legislative houses. Progress on this front in the subnational legislatures—state houses of assemblies—is perhaps less certain. Without drastic and concerted efforts at addressing Nigeria’s security challenges, including a wholesale overhaul of the national police force, the significant levels of violent crime are unlikely to abate in the medium term.  

So much about Nigeria’s legal subindex will continue to be weighed down by the absence of comprehensive civil service reform. While this does not have direct bearing on the country’s notable levels of judicial independence, it directly impacts Nigeria’s bureaucratic quality. It remains to be seen whether any government can shoulder the political costs of overhauling Nigeria’s civil service by implementing the recommendations of the Oronsaye report to reform the public sector. 

In the short term, Nigeria’s per capita income will continue its declining trend as a result of COVID-19 shocks as well as the inflationary impacts of recent exchange rate and subsidies reforms. Consequently, Nigeria’s per capita income will continue to trail its regional peers including South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire. However, the pace of this income decline could be halted and even reversed in the medium term with the design and implementation of pro-productivity economic policies on the supply side but also on the demand side. Addressing Nigeria’s electricity, transportation and digital connectivity infrastructure gaps will be crucial on this front. Reducing the incidents of violent crime, especially banditry plaguing rural farming communities, is also necessary. Effective coordination of trade, investment and industrial policies focused on labor-intensive industries, particularly agriculture and manufacturing, will be essential. 

In the near term, Nigeria’s social indicators are likely to deteriorate before they stabilize and, contingent on the rollout of mitigating policies, experience a trend reversal. Due to domestic factors, such as, the impacts of the removal of subsidies, harmonization of exchange rates, and inflation, as well as exogenous factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the incidence of poverty is very likely to increase inequality. Findings from a new round of the Nigeria Living Standards Survey when released—the last round was conducted in 2018–19—will likely confirm this trend. However, a comprehensive rollout of income-smoothing social protection interventions could support households and even small businesses to navigate the adverse impacts of liberalization policies. Increased health spending as well as workforce training could further bolster Nigeria’s health and mortality indicators.  

Finally, Nigeria’s environment-related indicators may stabilize and take an improving turn as relevant policies take effect. Progress in the implementation of Nigeria’s natural gas masterplan, in the medium term, could help reduce gas flaring and the associated environmental pollution. Political outreach by the federal government to aggrieved groups in the oil-producing Niger Delta could help reduce some types of small-scale oil theft and illegal oil refining that often result in oil spills and aggravate environmental degradation. Extensive support being provided by multilateral development banks and other international organizations to support clean cooking solutions could help reduce biomass use by households and thereby slow down the pace of deforestation in the country. 

Zainab Usman is the founding director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. Usman’s enduring area of expertise is identifying the policies and institutions to enable low- and middle-income economies to harness their natural resources to achieve sustainable economic development. She is author of the book Economic Diversification in Nigeria: The Politics of Building a Post-Oil Economy, which was selected as one of the best books of 2022 on economics by the Financial Times. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post More stable trade and investment policies can bolster the Nigerian economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Indexes are only as good as the data they use and the methodology they follow. However, for Africa, indexes are an important determinant of how citizens perceive progress in the country, how bilateral donors make decisions on when, where, and how to extend support, and, lately, they are a fundamental component of rating agency assessments. As African countries seek to improve access to more affordable capital and crowd in more foreign direct investment, it is crucial that they pay attention to these indexes. Cameroon is no exception. In addition, indexes can provide rare insights into the linkages between issues such as environmental freedom and gender prosperity. The data on Cameroon suggest a strong link between economic freedom, health, education, and gender empowerment. This essay will focus on that and draw lessons for the future. 

Cameroon’s score in the Freedom Index (47.6) is well below the average for the African continent (64.03) and many similar countries such as Senegal (68.7) and Côte d’Ivoire (61.7). The overall freedom measure is a composite score of the legal, political, and economic subindexes, where Cameroon ranks 133rd, 120th, and 144th respectively, out of 164 countries covered by the Indexes.  

Cameroon’s poor performance in the Freedom Index since 1995 is mainly determined by the political and legal dimensions. The political subindex includes four main components: elections, political rights, civil liberties, and legislative constraints on the executive. Political power is centralized in Cameroon, unlike Senegal, for example, and as a result there is no effective system of separation of powers, with both legislative and judicial branches being dependent on the executive power. The level and trend of different components of the Index capture this general assessment.  

The low levels of legislative constraints on the executive and judicial independence, compared to Côte d’Ivoire, for example, reflect the high level of concentration of power in the executive. The judiciary is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, and the president is entitled to appoint judges (this is not unlike the United States but the degree of independence of the judiciary is also about implementation of policies) and only the president can request the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of a law. Regarding the legislative, the formation of political parties has been permitted since 1997, and political rights are protected by law. Parliament is also highly dependent on the presidency, which appoints thirty out of the one hundred members of the Senate, the second legislative chamber established in 2013.  

Strong executive power could and should actually benefit women’s economic freedom but currently does not. There are spillovers from the political subindex to other aspects of the institutional framework of Cameroon. This is visible in the economic subindex, which measures trade and investment openness, protection of property rights, and economic opportunities for women. Regarding the latter, Cameroon’s score in the women’s economic freedom component (60) is—surprisingly—among the lowest in the world, ranking 140th among the 164 countries covered by the Indexes. Despite a ten-point increase in 2018, reflecting the introduction of legislation dealing with workplace nondiscrimination and sexual harassment, Cameroon’s performance in this component is still significantly lower than that of other countries in the region, such as Côte d’Ivoire (95), Senegal (72.5), Nigeria (66.3), Gabon (95), and Kenya (83.8).  

Important areas affecting gender equality, where Cameroon does not yet grant legal protection similar to the countries mentioned above, include civil liberties such as freedom of movement and marital rights, and financial inclusion legislation regarding access to banking services, asset ownership, and administration. While implementation of some of the more restrictive legislation may differ from the reality on the ground—for example, women can own property in their name today—the lack of changes to the legal documents opens the door for predatory compliance and legal battles in some cases.  

Having women in government leadership positions has led many countries in the region to advance significant improvements in women’s rights and opportunities. One illustrative example is the case of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in Nigeria, who introduced several policies aimed at empowering women during her periods as finance minister (2003–06 and 2011–15), such as the Growing Girls and Women in Nigeria (G-WIN) program. This created a gender-responsive budgeting system that ensured a certain share of public procurement went to female entrepreneurs. Similar legislation can be identified in Kenya, with the Access to Government Procurement Opportunities program introduced in 2013, as well as in Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Adopting some of these tried and tested programs in Cameroon could help improve women’s economic freedom de jure and de facto.  

Cameroon’s commitment to open and free trade is ambiguous, despite its very strategic location. Total trade to gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased substantially in the last decade, from 50 percent in 2014 to 39 percent in 2023, well below the average for Africa (74.49 percent). On the one hand, the country imposes relatively high tariffs on imports besides primary necessity goods, established at 10 percent for raw materials and equipment goods, 20 percent for intermediary and miscellaneous goods, and up to 30 percent for fast-moving consumer goods, implying an average tariff rate around 18 percent, more than double the average for Africa. With women being the most active small and medium entrepreneurs in cross-border trade, 20 percent tariffs have the potential to disproportionately affect them as a group.  

On the other hand, Cameroon has signed trade agreements with the European Union, United States, China, Japan, and several other nations. In 2020, the country also ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement, the signature African trade agreement. Cameroon is also a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, which aims a common market among Central African countries. Nonetheless, Cameroon has a negligible trade relationship with Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the other five member states. More generally, inter-Africa trade is still marginal, with only 12.7 percent of Cameroon’s export earnings coming from African partners, and less than 10 percent of total imports in 2023. For example, Cameroon’s trade with Nigeria—the largest economy in Africa—was less than 1 percent in 2021. The two countries having difficult and high tariffs undermines their collective prosperity. Policies to improve trade between the two countries will also disproportionately support small women-owned businesses.  

The most relevant factor regarding investment and capital movement regulations in Cameroon is the fact that the national currency, the Central African CFA franc, is shared by the five neighbors mentioned above, and is pegged to the euro at a fixed exchange rate. This has the benefit of providing stability and predictability but also constrains Cameroon’s capacity to autonomously determine its monetary, investment, and capital flows policies. Another factor certainly influencing the investment climate in Cameroon is the security situation in the country and the region. With low tariffs in the sector, foreign capital continues to focus on extractive industries and infrastructure, and the repeated efforts of the government to expand international investment to other sectors have not borne the expected fruits.  

Two other features of Cameroon’s institutional framework stand out in the legal subindex components, namely, the high levels of corruption across all levels of the administration, and the low level of security. Both of these unduly penalize women, who are generally the most affected by conflict and petty corruption. 

Cameroon is host to a large number of refugees as a result of the conflict in the subregion, and this has impacted civil liberties. With respect to security, relatively high levels of small criminality have combined with a surge in terrorist attacks, especially in the last decade, with the emergence of Boko Haram and other Islamist groups, as well as the unrest in the north and southwest of the country. These different violent conflicts, together with the substantial immigration flows coming from Nigeria, Libya, Central African Republic, Chad, and other neighboring countries, have increased the need for tighter security within the country. 

Evolution of prosperity

On the Prosperity Index, measured as the average of six constituent elements (income, inequality, minorities, health, environment and education), Cameroon performs better than its peers but still remains below the African average. The country has outpaced the low regional average in prosperity growth at least since 2005. Education, health, and environment seem to be the areas where improvements have been most palpable, and will be the focus of the following paragraphs. 

The health component of the Prosperity Index, based on life expectancy data, shows a change of tendency around the late 1990s. This is not a feature unique to Cameroon; a similar inflection point from decreasing to rapidly increasing life expectancy is also observable in other African countries such as South Africa, Gabon, and Côte d’Ivoire. An important push in the fight against AIDS, substantially financed by programs led by the international donor community such as the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, was instrumental in this case. Additionally, the increased availability of vaccines for different diseases and some progress in terms of infant and maternal mortality have contributed to this positive evolution.  

Nonetheless, there is still huge room for improvement. First, total public expenditure on health has been below 4 percent of GDP since 2001 (3.82 percent in 2021, the last year of available data), not yet close to the necessary level to ensure substantial and sustained betterment in health outcomes, usually estimated between 5 and 7 percent. For comparison, the average for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 is 5.1 percent, and for the Middle East and North Africa region reaches 5.76 percent. Similarly, health expenditure per capita in Cameroon was in 2021 just $155.56, substantially lower than in Nigeria ($220.40), Gabon ($411), or the average of the Sub-Saharan Africa region ($203.70). 

Not only is aggregate spending relatively low, but also the destination of healthcare investment is not optimal. In the last decades, Cameroon has consolidated a series of big training hospitals, mainly located in big cities. On the contrary, investment in primary and preventive healthcare has been deficient, especially in rural areas, creating wide inequalities across the country. Recent disease outbreaks underscore the need for improved strong healthcare systems at the local level. As for other least developed countries, the potential gains of basic health interventions to ensure generalized access to vaccination and maternal and infant care are enormous, as the experience of other African countries has shown.  

Turning to education, the data on school enrollment show a very significant acceleration since the early 2000s, when Cameroon started to grow faster than the regional average. It is important to note the very low initial level of this indicator, but the progress is still remarkable. Free primary education was introduced in the year 2000, and this is probably one important factor explaining the trend in the last two decades.  

Nonetheless, families still need to cover the costs of uniforms and books, which is a significant barrier for an important share of the population. Recall that, according to the World Bank, 23 percent of Cameroon’s population is today living in extreme poverty (under US$2.15 a day), and thus such costs are very significant for them. Moreover, secondary school tuition and fees are not subsidized, which constrains educational attainment for a much larger fraction of children.  

Two areas requiring substantial improvement are, first, the poor quality of the education received, which undermines actual learning outcomes of Cameroonian students. Learning poverty, the share of children not able to read and understand an age-appropriate text by age ten, is estimated by the World Bank at a high 71.9 percent, with girls especially disadvantaged.  

Second, there are important sources of educational inequality, particularly gender and regional based. School enrollment rates are significantly lower for girls than for boys at all levels of the educational system, heavily influenced by high rates of child marriage and early childbearing among girls.  

The attempt to impose French curricula across the whole country led to heated debate, protests, civil unrest, and ultimately, violent clashes in some parts of the country. As a result, schools closed for two years (2018–19), and before they had fully reopened, the COVID-19 pandemic hit and schools were closed again. This combination of shocks has probably generated a very significant slowdown in educational attainment that is not yet captured by the data used in the Prosperity Index.  

Cameroon’s score on the environment component is heavily influenced by one of the variables used to compute it: access to clean cooking technologies. Although this indicator has improved consistently in the last twenty-five years, from barely 10 percent of the population to almost 30 percent today using clean technologies, once again we observe striking spatial differences across the country and between rural and urban populations. Cameroon produces gas and therefore could rapidly improve on this indicator. New cooking stoves are widely available and easily diffused. The executive has the power to improve on this indicator and save lives while improving livelihoods.  

Most importantly, the Prosperity Index does not include any indicator on deforestation, which is extremely relevant for Cameroon, which has the second largest forest area in the Congo Basin, from which many women earn an income.  

The evolution of tree cover areas reveals a loss of 1.53 million hectares between 2001 and 2020, of which 47 percent was in primary forests. As a result, forest as a percentage of land decreased from 47.6 percent in 1990 to 43.03 percent in 2020. In 2021, Cameroon was seventh on the list of the world’s top deforesters, with 89,000 hectares of forest lost. This trend not only threatens to significantly alter weather and crop patterns in the country, affecting women disproportionately, but may lead to deteriorating health conditions as nature and Cameroon’s biodiversity are altered significantly.  

This situation is by no means unavoidable but requires a clear policy commitment if it is to be averted. Cameroon has important gas reserves, and the low usage of wood by households in cities proves that there are possible alternatives. Obviously, providing access to gas and other forms of energy to rural areas requires an important investment in infrastructure and creation of logistic networks that are not yet in place, but certainly should be a priority for the government and the international community in the near future. Cameroonian women not only suffer from a very unequal legislative environment, but also due to structural conditions on these areas that further hamper their personal development compared to men. 

The path forward

The strength of data lies in its capacity to tell stories and be scrutinized. The data on Cameroon need more attention and the authorities should work with the groups that collect the original data used to build these Indexes, along with the Cameroon National Statistics Office, development institutions, and other research institutions that collect data, to ensure representation of Cameroon is accurate, especially since these data are often used by market players to inform investment decisions.  

In the interim, one crucial conclusion from the data is the interdependence between the health, education, and environment components and the women’s economic freedom component. This interconnectedness is a double-edged sword, as weak legislative focus undermines women’s economic empowerment, which leads to poor health and education outcomes and in some cases may also lead to environmental degradation.  

Bottom-up or top-down policies could help move these indicators, building on the successes already achieved in these domains, first by focusing on laws that provide women with better economic empowerment. This essay has cited several examples of initiatives in other countries which could be adapted to fit the national context and implemented in Cameroon.  

Education remains the fastest way to economic empowerment of populations and women in general. In the long run it can help reduce costs of healthcare as educated women tend to adopt more preventive approaches for themselves and their children, reducing the cost of healthcare which is not only high but still comprises lots of risks for women. To this end, the policy of free primary education must be coupled with robust teacher quality and performance indicators to ensure that children are actively learning. A year of lost learning, even if it appears free, is costly for teacher, student, and parent. This kind of waste undermines the economy in the long run as an unskilled population is an economic cost to the country over time.  

Cameroon’s environmental resources, if well managed, could represent an important source of revenue for local populations and women in particular in an economic environment where carbon markets are growing, protection of fauna and flora is valued, and organic production commands a premium from markets. Support by government to reforestation projects could help generate resources for rural populations while promoting more nature tourism, building on the strengths of the country. An important component of the women’s health and environment nexus, however, would be policies which help women use cleaner cooking practices, as unsafe technologies claim the lives of many women.  

Overall, the policies needed to improve the economic freedom components for women are well within reach of the Cameroonian government, as many are policy-based first and foremost. In addition, it would serve the government well to work with the Indexes to scrutinize the data and scoring so that they can provide a more accurate report on the economic freedom of women in Cameroon. 

Vera Songwe is a nonresident senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development practice at the Brookings Institution and chair and founder of the Board of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility. Songwe is a board member of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and previously served as undersecretary-general at the United Nations and executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Songwe’s expertise includes work on Africa’s growth prospects in a global context, with a focus on improving access to sustainable finance. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Cameroon’s future relies on empowering its women  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Recent years have seen an upsurge in repressive measures. For example, in 2023, Uganda enacted an anti-homosexuality law that, among other measures, restricts healthcare access for LGBTQI+ individuals and criminalizes renting property to them. In July 2024, Ghana’s supreme court upheld a colonial-era law that criminalizes same-sex conduct. Another anti-LGBTQI+ bill approved by Ghana’s parliament but not yet signed into law by the president would impose heavy penalties for same-sex activities and punish people advocating for LGBTQI+ rights. And in October 2024, Mali’s Transitional National Council—the interim parliament set up after the country’s 2020 coup—passed a law that criminalizes homosexuality.

To stem this tide, the United States must adopt carefully designed messaging to persuade those who do not want to be persuaded on rights. In so doing, Washington’s argument in favor of rights must be unimpeachable.

During and since my time as US ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire, I had several constructive conversations with African leaders from the public sector and civil society that gave me a sense of the messaging required. For example, one senior African diplomat once cautioned me that “overreach invites backlash.” And when I raised LGBTQI+ rights with one of Africa’s most senior Catholic prelates, he expressed a willingness to live and let live, explaining that his culture and religion did not allow the approval of homosexuality. Such a sentiment falls in line with the legal bases for LGBTQI+ rights. There are two such bases: one for matters of identity (nondiscrimination) and one for matters of activity (protections for dignity). Neither has anything to do with the approval of homosexuality; it’s about tolerance. The distinction is crucial, and it can be highly useful in Africa, where many societies value the spirit of peaceful coexistence among diverse groups. These bases are essentially the same as the bases for religious freedom, which many Africans pride themselves on respecting.

Properly presented, tolerance fits well with African values, and many Africans may even be proud to exercise such tolerance. I could see this was the case in interactions with some influential religious leaders in Africa: For example, some Muslim leaders had already been advocating for the destigmatization of HIV/AIDS victims for twenty years by the time I met them, even though they strongly disapproved of homosexual activity.

In addition, leaders of Catholicism—practiced by around 20 percent of Africa’s population—have released new guidance or statements embracing tolerance: Pope Francis has said that homosexuality is not a crime but a sin and allowed priests to give an informal blessing to people in a same-sex relationship.

But reactions to such guidance have been mixed. For example, in the Catholic context, a body representing bishops in Africa said that they would not give informal blessings to people in same-sex relationships because it would contradict the “cultural ethos of African communities.” In response, the pope has emphasized that the blessing isn’t for the relationship, it’s for the individuals.

Yet, as another example, Cardinal Peter Turkson of Ghana has said publicly that “LGBT people may not be criminalized because they’ve committed no crime . . .  We need a lot of education to get people to . . . make a distinction between what is a crime and what is not crime.”

Opponents of LGBTQI+ rights typically ignore the distinction between tolerance and approval: They simply express vehement disapproval of homosexuality without acknowledging, let alone addressing, the legal principles involved.

Thus, in promoting tolerance on the continent, the United States should point to the fact that LGBTQI+ rights are, indeed, rights—and as is the case with rights, they have a legal basis. There are two legal bases for LGBTQI+ rights, one for matters of identity and one for matters of activity.

The principle of nondiscrimination provides the legal basis for matters regarding identity. That principle is enshrined in several international laws and treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 174 countries (including all African countries) are states party. The multilateral treaty outlines that each state party will aim to respect and ensure that all individuals in its jurisdiction maintain their rights regardless of any distinction such as (but not limited to) race, color, sex, language, and religion. This principle was reinforced when the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee—a group of experts set up by the ICCPR to consider whether states party are complying with the treaty—decided Toonen v. Australia. In that case, an individual challenged legislation in Tasmania that criminalized consensual homosexual activity. The committee said that the criminalization of private, consensual homosexual activity between adults breaches a state party’s nondiscrimination obligations.

In my experience, I have found that Africans generally understand the importance of nondiscrimination, if only because their collective history includes so much suffering from massive violations of that principle. Indeed, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights affirms the right to freedom from discrimination. It even says that every individual has a responsibility to contribute to a society of mutual respect and tolerance.

But nondiscrimination applies only to matters of identity, not activity. The principle of dignity and freedom provides the legal basis for respecting the right to privacy of activity for individuals. This, too, is enshrined in various international laws and treaties. The ICCPR states that no one should be subject to “arbitrary or unlawful interference” in their privacy. Toonen v. Australia reinforced this principle as well, as the committee found that adult consensual activity in private is covered under the ICCPR and that criminalizing such activity amounts to a continuous interference with an individual’s privacy.          

It is true that in the West, LGBTQI+ activists have had remarkable success pursuing more than mere tolerance, so it is understandably tempting to aim high in Africa too. But there is no right to other people’s approval, as that would erode freedom of conscience widely. In addition, basing a claim of LGBTQI+ rights on approval is likely to be not only counterproductive but also conceptually problematic: It could promote societal division. For example, the intolerant could gain a false impression that supporting the rights of an individual depends on whether there is approval for that individual’s actions—which is not the case. It could also make it seem as though anyone in the tolerating camp actually promotes LGBTQI+ activities and identity, allowing those who vehemently disagree an opportunity to discredit the tolerant as purveyors of immorality. This perception is already commonplace in Africa, and it can undermine Western credibility with regard to human rights issues in general.   

In today’s interconnected world, anything one says or does publicly is likely to be noticed widely, not just by the intended audience but by people who disagree with the intended audience. Thus, the United States must ensure that any new messaging it adopts in Africa is threaded throughout all its work, from its wider strategy toward the continent to the daily interactions its diplomats have with African societies.

For example, US embassies in Africa have, in the past, honored Pride month in various ways, from hoisting Pride flags to organizing Pride events. But official participation in Pride events by government representatives such as diplomats sends a default message of approval; that plays into the hands of those who wish to distort and discredit the sound argument for LGBTQI+ rights. Where Pride events are lawful, there is no obvious need for official support from foreign governments such as the United States; where they are unlawful, diplomats’ participation would be contrary to the respect for local laws that is expected of them (an expectation that the US State Department generally takes very seriously). It would also play into the hands of those who accuse the West of trying to impose its cultural values on others.

From what I observed in my thirty-plus years in the US Foreign Service, the overall perspective laid out above is not reliably understood by US diplomats, even those tasked with promoting human rights. The best chance to make progress where it is most needed is in disseminating a disciplined message of tolerance and resisting the temptation to overreach. The State Department should start by insisting on clear, consistent messaging that supports internationally recognized rights—but does not go further by appearing to promote LGBTQI+ activities.

Richard K. Bell is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He served as the US ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire from 2019 to 2023.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post The United States needs a new guiding message in promoting LGBTQI+ rights in Africa: Tolerance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Historically, Egypt’s exports have been dominated by petroleum products, cotton, textiles, and chemicals. However, as the global energy landscape evolves, Egypt stands on the brink of transformation. The country is on the cusp of harnessing its renewable energy potential to meet domestic demand, reduce its reliance on fossil fuels, and emerge as a leader in clean energy exports.

For Egypt to achieve this, however, it must first address critical internal challenges, such as its dependence on natural gas for electricity generation and its underdeveloped renewable energy infrastructure. Achieving energy self-sufficiency is a necessary precursor to realizing the country’s green energy export ambitions.

Tapping into endless sunshine

Egypt is endowed with abundant sunshine. It boasts some of the highest solar irradiance levels in the world, ranging from 2,000 to 3,200 kilowatt hours (kWh) per square meter annually. With more than 3,500 hours of sunshine per year and ample open space, regions such as the Western Desert and Upper Egypt hold vast, untapped potential for solar energy development.

Several projects already in the works highlight this potential. The Benban Solar Park, one of the world’s largest solar installations, currently has a capacity of 1.8 gigawatts (GW), with plans for significant expansion. Upcoming developments include AMEA Power’s additional 2 GW project with 900 megawatt hours (mWh) of battery storage, and the Masdar/Hassan Allam Utilities/Infinity consortium’s planned 300 MW expansion at Benban alongside a 900 MW project at Dakhla Oasis (1.2 GW in total). Elsewhere, Abydos Kom Ombo Solar PV Park will host a 500 MW facility, and the Masdar consortium signed another significant deal with over 6 GW of new solar capacity, 4 GW of new solar manufacturing capacity, and 2 GW of new battery manufacturing capacity.

Harnessing wind power in the Gulf of Suez

Wind energy is another cornerstone of Egypt’s renewable energy strategy. The Gulf of Suez and the Nile Valley offer high wind speeds, averaging 8–10 meters per second. Vision 2030, a strategy launched by the Egyptian government nine years ago, targets 14 GW of wind capacity by the close of this decade, with several large-scale projects already underway.