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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Since the sinking of the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically developed naval drones and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s French and British partners to decimate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian Navy officials claim they have managed to damage or destroy around one-third of Putin’s entire fleet, while forcing the remaining Russian warships to retreat from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of ports in Russia itself. This has severely limited the Russian Navy’s ability to operate in the Black Sea. By spring 2024, Britain’s Defense Ministry declared that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive.”

Ukraine’s stunning success in the Battle of the Black Sea has yet to receive the international attention it deserves. By breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, it has allowed Kyiv to resume maritime exports and secure a vital economic lifeline.

Crucially, the Russian Navy’s humiliating retreat from Crimea has also made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines and has demonstrated the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. The Russian dictator has long championed the seizure of Crimea as his crowning achievement, and has repeatedly hinted that he is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of his conquests. But when confronted by the harsh military realities of Ukraine’s deadly naval drones, he withdraw the bulk of Russia’s fleet from Crimea with barely a murmur.

The Battle of the Black Sea is far from over, of course. While Ukraine develops groundbreaking new naval drones capable of hitting warplanes as well as warships, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian seaports and targets merchant shipping carrying Ukrainian exports to global markets. The Russian Navy is also producing marine drones of its own, and is adopting defensive measures to protect the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s Black Sea innovations are a reminder that Ukraine is an increasingly formidable military power in its own right and is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The primary role of drones in modern warfare is as weapons. Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favoring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

In addition to strike and surveillance functions, Ukraine has also employed drones in logistical roles. The Ukrainian army uses both aerial and ground-based unmanned systems to deliver ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies to troops operating in dangerous or inaccessible areas, thereby reducing the need to expose personnel to hostile environments. Drone-based solutions can also potentially facilitate the evacuation of the wounded when manned rescue is deemed to be too risky.

One of the most creative Ukrainian uses of drones on the battlefield has been to help take surrendering Russian soldiers prisoner. This method reduces the need for physical engagement with enemy troops and therefore limits the risks to the Ukrainian side. Drones are used to give instructions using printed messages or via loudspeakers to guide enemy soldiers and indicate safe directions that will allow them to surrender without coming under fire.

Ukrainian unmanned systems are also playing an important role in efforts to document Russian war crimes. Drones are able to record the time, location, and nature of potential crimes, along with the identity of the perpetrators in some cases. Over the past three years, Ukrainian drones have captured evidence of potential war crimes including the execution of unarmed POWs and attacks on civilians. This footage can be used in future prosecutions and increases the chances that those responsible for war crimes in Ukraine will be held accountable.

The growing role of drones in warfare creates a range of challenges in terms of the accepted norms governing military operations. With this in mind, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has drawn up and issued internal guidelines for drone operators and legal teams to ensure adherence to the laws of armed conflict. These guidelines incorporate real-world combat scenarios to help drone operators understand how to treat categories such as medical personnel, retreating enemy troops, and those engaged in the evacuation of the wounded. This initiative is a step toward establishing broader global standards for responsible drone warfare.

Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare offers valuable insights that will shape military doctrines for many years to come, while also helping to define international standards for the use of drones in a military context. It is already clear that drones are transforming the battlefield in ways the evoke the twentieth century rise of air power. As drone technologies continue to advance, Ukraine is likely to remain a key player in this new wave of military innovation.

Vitaliy Nabukhotny is a human rights lawyer and external legal advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Legal Department.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

According to Ukrainian sources, preparations for Operation Spider’s Web had been underway since late 2023. Ukraine was able to move a series of modified cargo containers into Russia along with more than one hundred first-person view (FPV) drones. The containers were then loaded with the drones and mounted on lorries before being moved into position close to Russian airbases. On Sunday morning, the green light was given and the drones were remotely activated, emerging from their containers to strike nearby Russian bombers.

The bombers targeted in these drone attacks play a key role in Russia’s air war and are regularly used to launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities. While Ukraine’s June 1 success will not bring this bombing campaign to an end, it may help save Ukrainian lives by reducing the number of available planes and forcing Russia to disperse its remaining strategic bombers to locations further away from Ukraine.

While any reduction on Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian civilians is welcome, the impact of Ukraine’s airbase attacks on the future course of the war is likely to be far more profound. Sunday’s Ukrainian strikes at locations across Russia have transformed the situation on Putin’s home front. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, Russians have grown accustomed to viewing the war as something that is taking place far away. That sense of security has now been shattered.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

This was not the first time Ukraine has struck deep inside Russia. For much of the war, Ukraine has been using its growing fleet of long-range drones to target Russian military bases and the country’s oil and gas industry. Russian Air Force hubs such as the Engels airbase in Saratov Oblast have been hit multiple times.

Ukraine’s attacks have gained momentum as the country’s long-range drone fleet has evolved and as Kyiv has developed its own missile capabilities. This mounting proficiency has not gone unnoticed internationally. Indeed, China reportedly asked Ukraine to refrain from attacking Moscow during the recent Victory Day parade on May 9, as Beijing was apparently unsure whether the Russians themselves could provide sufficient protection for the visiting Chinese leader.

Sunday’s operation represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. By deploying large numbers of drones surreptitiously across the Russian Federation and activating them remotely, Ukraine demonstrated an ability to strike anywhere without warning. The consequences of this are potentially far-reaching. Russia must now increase security at every single military base, military-industrial site, command center, and transport hub throughout the country.

In addition to ramping up defensive measures around military infrastructure, Russia must also introduce further checks at the country’s borders and closely monitor all activity along endless highways stretching from Europe’s eastern frontier to the Pacific Ocean. This is a logistical nightmare. For example, thanks to Ukraine’s attack, all cargo containers must now be treated with suspicion. There are already reports of bottlenecks emerging at locations across Russia as alarmed officials inspect lorries in the hunt for more Ukrainian drones.

Given the colossal size of the Russian Federation, addressing the threat posed by Ukraine’s Trojan Horse tactics is a truly Herculean task. Russia’s vastness has traditionally been viewed as one of the country’s greatest strengths. The new form of warfare being pioneered by Ukraine could now turn this size into a major weakness. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that Ukraine does not “have any cards” in its war with Russia, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy may just have played the ace of drones.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Q&A with Haluk Bayraktar

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. He began his tenure at Baykar in 2004 as an engineering manager, when Baykar’s autonomous technology efforts were still nascent, and has been involved in every aspect of the business’s growth into a leading firm in the Turkish defense sector: project management, logistics, and business development. Baykar’s pioneering role in the rise of the Turkish drone industry makes Bayraktar a fascinating and well-informed observer on security and alliance dynamics affecting Turkey, NATO, and the region.

This interview has been lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Thanks for taking the time to talk with us. Let’s start with developments of common interest to readers in Turkey, the United States, and Europe. Following the industrial and technology cooperation deal with Italian defense and aerospace group Leonardo, what’s next for Baykar in the Western market?

Bayraktar: Baykar has become the world’s biggest drone maker, with thirty-eight international partners now—from Europe and NATO to the Turkic countries, Africa, and the Middle East. Among NATO allies, we have partnered with Poland, Romania, Kosovo, Croatia, and of course, Turkey’s military, law enforcement, and disaster relief agencies. Turkey is a NATO ally, so all our products and technologies follow the technical standards and military specifications of the West and are entirely compatible with Western systems. The Western market is critical for us.

As for Leonardo, we are on the path to establishing a joint venture (JV). They are a major player in Europe, and their work areas are highly compatible with ours—a lot of synergies and complementarity. We were already working with them, integrating payloads and systems with our products: This has become a very strong bond or marriage. A JV is a great opportunity/potential to bring robust, field-proven systems to a broader market. Baykar has drones all around the world, including tactical and strategic platforms. Leonardo produces critical subsystems with great potential for Europe and broader markets where they have a presence, including South America and elsewhere, but Europe is our main focus. In Europe, there is no other mature alternative to what we have.

DJ: What differentiates your approach to manned technology? What is the key to your value proposition?

Bayraktar: We are a tech developer but not just tech. It’s about tech but also about ways to use that technology—about operational employment. Our approach centers on reliability, safety, and robustness. Our experience brings lots of feedback from various areas, which makes our products even more robust. So, we combine technology with real-world experience. Our fleet now exceeds 300,000 flight hours per year, so there is a lot to analyze. Our systems offer the highest performance-to-cost across the market. They are the most adaptable with continuous innovation, and they are equipped with the most advanced technology. In the defense sector, there are huge manufacturing capacity challenges everywhere, whereas there has been a great buildup in Turkey in the last twenty-five years. Over just twenty years, we’ve gone from roughly seventy to over 3,000 companies in the sector, with thousands of products. It’s a great ecosystem with important internal synergies. Baykar has established mass production capacity for unmanned systems. Our Istanbul base is the biggest facility of its kind in the world. So, potential customers know we can deliver quickly. We produce 250 Bayraktar TB2 [unmanned combat aerial vehicles] per year, fifty Akinci [high-altitude, long-endurance] UCAVs per year, and we’re ramping up to support larger capacity as the Bayraktar TB3 UCAV and the Kizilelma unmanned fighter jet move from development to production.

DJ: What is your conceptual and defense technological approach to Kizilelma? Do you see it as a loyal wingman to the fifth-generation Kaan fighter or a pathway to replace Kaan in the future?

Bayraktar: Kaan is a national manned fighter program, funded by the government. Kizilelma is Baykar’s own design and project. It is our final target on the unmanned family of products—a fighter with both subsonic and supersonic capabilities. We do not envision it as a loyal wingman, though it can work as an integrated adjunct in theory, if one were to couple it and use it with manned fighters in risky environments. US President Donald Trump recently introduced the American F-47 as a mothership controlling other fighters, and the consortium developing [the Global Combat Air Program involving Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan] conceived it in similar fashion. But we envision Kizilelma as operating on its own with a fleet control system. As a company, we don’t develop manned systems. We exclusively invest in drones. That is our focus. Kizilelma is an aircraft with aggressive maneuvering, autonomous operation, and controls that can be flown by few operators. It completed its first flight in 2022, and we see that as a revolution. Bayraktar TB3 has the capability to take off and land on short-runway aircraft carriers. Kizilelma will have this feature too.

Fighter pilots stationed at aircraft carriers have to fly every single day and complete a certain number of sorties annually to stay current. That’s perhaps fifty training flights per day. By contrast, unmanned platforms do not require as much effort or so many daily landings to be certified for carriers. Moreover, Kizilelma will integrate artificial intelligence to assist with delegation of command and other operational aspects.

DJ: How do you view the F-35 debate in the United States, especially Elon Musk’s view that manned aircraft are not the best path forward?

Bayraktar: There are about 13,000 manned fighters worldwide right now–Russian, Chinese, US, and other systems combined. We believe that all those platforms will eventually be converted to unmanned systems, even though one cannot prove that point just yet. But when you look at the field, it’s clearly headed in that direction. To be clear, they may not be replaced one for one. It may be more like three to five unmanned platforms to replace each manned fighter. Unmanned systems will be everywhere, and it will be a crowded airspace—not just unmanned fighters but smaller first-person view drones and loitering munitions. They will be everywhere, and every country will need the ability to build and use these things. For nations to defend themselves in this century, this is a necessary capability—much like the ability to produce bullets.

DJ: Turkey has shown great agility in what has been termed “drone diplomacy,” or complementing regional policy initiatives with defense sales. What is the nature of public/private partnership in Turkish drone diplomacy?

Bayraktar: Overall, the major players in the Turkish defense ecosystem are still government-owned institutional firms. The private sector is smaller but dynamic and growing. Of course, I think that the private sector’s dynamism is preferable. SAHA is the industry group representing the smaller and midsize firms that comprise most of our private sector, and I am currently serving as the chairman.

Still, the system operates similarly for public and private firms. Anyone wishing to export applies to the Ministry of National Defense, which in turn coordinates with the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence community to issue an export license. It is the government’s decision at the end of the day. The government doesn’t promote private-sector firms per se. The Defense Industry Agency (SSB) has foreign relationships and partnerships, and they generally favor government-affiliated companies. One of the objectives of SAHA has been to help small and medium-sized companies become more visible. Our annual exhibition helps smaller players. Baykar is an example of successful growth: We’ve gone from five employees in 2004 to over 6,000 today. We know how important it is to become more visible, and we support other firms doing that. We try to make it easier for the newcomers. That is my responsibility as SAHA chairman.

My view is that European countries are better at using governmental influence to promote national commercial products. Baykar’s products promote themselves through their unique utility as well as aggressive marketing and social media presence. The Turkish government doesn’t subsidize sales, although other countries may. But we don’t rely on public credit or government grants. This is unique to Baykar: We’ve developed an unmanned fighter with the company’s own money. At the end of the day, since companies are required to receive a permit to export, the government plays an important role. The higher levels [of government officials] do talk about it and the firms need approval. The government spending environment matters greatly for domestic firms, too. And while Turkey spent 4.5 percent of its [gross domestic product] on defense before 2000, that number has remained close to 2 percent for two decades now. It was just in the last two years that it approached 3 percent.

The bottom line is that drone diplomacy is a reality and the Bayraktar TB2, in particular, has proven that. But the government doesn’t lead: market demand leads, the company follows, and the government supports.

DJ: Can you talk a little bit about the price/performance balance for Baykar systems?

Bayraktar: The Bayraktar TB2 is a very good example for price/performance balance. The initial purchase price or acquisition cost is one factor, but the life cycle, including maintenance and durability, has to be considered as well because reliability affects long-term costs. Let’s say you procure an alternative to Bayraktar TB2 for half the price. In reality, this is not an advantage if this “alternative” has double the crash rate. So, Bayraktar TB2 has a reliability advantage because you don’t face as many crashes and the cost consideration changes.

Unmanned systems represent a new niche in the defense ecosystem. Aerospace is conservative, especially for manned systems: extensive certifications and regulations serve to protect human life. But unmanned [aerial] vehicles are a different paradigm—you can add new sensors, new technology, and new operational approaches rapidly. An example is the fact that manned systems still use mechanical gyros, whereas the technologically advanced UAVs are currently using even cheaper MEMS [i.e., microelectromechanical system) sensors, fiber-optic alternatives with high-end software systems. You can easily innovate in the unmanned realm with the latest technology, whereas you need to be conservative in the manned domain because you need to make sure that each new step complies with the certification and safety standards of manned aviation. You can qualify unmanned systems with very high-end software—even AI software—and hardware much more quickly.

Baykar has a price advantage because we are vertically integrated. We have strong in-house avionics, power systems, and ground element design. This allows us to tailor critical subsystems and enable attractive pricing with high-end capability. The TB2, with a six-unit ground system and everything, still costs less than a manned platform. Our TB2 fleet recently passed the one-million-hour milestone, so our operating cost is just several hundred dollars per hour—compared to a minimum of $20,000 per hour for a single manned F-16. When you can mass produce, availability and reliability turn into a potent combination. Additionally, customers benefit from the rapid in-service schedule compared to a manned system. A country can field a full UAV system with trained people within a year, providing a very quick and affordable defense capability compared to a manned system, which is a multiyear exercise.

DJ: You mentioned thirty-eight international partners earlier. Ukraine was one of your earliest: Have you been able to apply lessons from that partnership with newer programs, such as those with the Gulf countries?

Bayraktar: Ukraine was Baykar’s first export customer. Our cooperation with Ukraine opened up the strategic level of cooperation for us. We had been working with them since 2011, but things moved rapidly after 2014. In 2014, no one else would sell them armed drones. We didn’t yet have a mature system, but we agreed to help. They were in need, huge need, and searching. That was more than ten years ago. They couldn’t get what they wanted elsewhere either, so they came to Turkey. President Erdoğan’s leadership mattered at that point, as he considered Ukraine a neighbor and friend in need. With the government’s support, we supplied armed drones starting in 2019—the order was placed in 2018. They were very happy and this was very important. President Zelensky visited in August 2019 after taking office. At his request, we agreed to build a factory in Ukraine. He acquired more systems, and we discussed an offset-type obligation. I told them: “You have very good engines. Maybe we can figure out a way to use your engines on our platforms.” So, we created effective cooperation with Motor Sich and others. In a sense, Turkey and Ukraine are complementary countries. When the war escalated in 2022, we did our best to support Ukraine. You may remember the European crowd-sourcing campaigns for Europeans to buy TB2s on Ukraine’s behalf, but we never accepted the money. We donated the platforms, giving up over $110 million in income that we chose not to generate. We are not war profiteers. We delivered all Bayraktar TB2s free of charge as part of those campaigns and the campaign funds were used for humanitarian aid and other pressing needs to support Ukraine.

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. Follow him on X at @haluk.

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UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 May 2025 21:46:50 +0000

Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, according to a new report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The report comes following an extensive investigation into a campaign of Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian civilians over a ten-month period beginning in July 2024, with the probe focusing on an area of southern Ukraine stretching more than 100 kilometers along the right bank of the Dnipro River around the city of Kherson.

Members of the UN Commission determined that Russia was engaged in the deliberate targeting of civilians and concluded that the drone attacks were “widespread, systematic, and conducted as part of a coordinated state policy.” The report detailed how civilians were targeted “in various circumstances, mainly when they were outdoors, both on foot or while using any type of vehicles,” and noted that on a number of occasions ambulances had been struck by drones in an apparent bid to prevent them from reaching victims and providing vital medical assistance.

During the ten-month period covered by the United Nations probe, Russian drones killed almost 150 Ukrainian civilians in and around Kherson, while leaving hundreds more injured. The constant threat of attack has created a pervasive climate of fear throughout the region, with people afraid to leave their homes. Terrified locals say they feel hunted and refer to the drone attacks as a “human safari.”

In addition to daily drone strikes, Russia has sought to maximize the psychological pressure on residents of the Kherson region via social media channels. UN investigators reported that video footage of drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians is regularly disseminated on Russian Telegram channels, some of which have thousands of subscribers. This video footage shows drone strikes along with the resulting deaths and destruction in the style of video games, often accompanied by background music. Meanwhile, menacing messages posted on Telegram call on Ukrainians to flee the region. “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die,” read one message quoted in the UN report.

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This is not the first time UN investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine. A March 2025 UN report reached a similar conclusion regarding the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. “The evidence gathered led the Commission to conclude that the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity,” the report stated.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a number of arrest warrants for senior Russian officials in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine including the targeted bombing of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure. The most high-profile ICC arrest warrant is for Vladimir Putin himself, who is wanted for his alleged involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

At least 20,000 Ukrainian children are believed to have been kidnapped since the start of the full-scale invasion and taken to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. The nature and scale of these mass abductions may qualify as an act of genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Russia’s deadly “human safari” drone campaign against the civilian population in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is part of the Kremlin’s strategy to make the area unlivable. The city of Kherson was occupied by the advancing Russian army during the first days of the full-scale invasion and was officially annexed by Russia in September 2022. However, Kherson and the surrounding area were liberated by the Ukrainian military soon after. The scenes of joy that accompanied the liberation of Kherson were deeply humiliating for Putin, who had personally proclaimed the city to be “forever” Russian just weeks earlier.

This setback forced Putin’s invading army to retreat across the Dnipro River, creating a major physical obstacle for the Russian invasion and limiting the occupied zone of Ukraine to the eastern half of the country. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to insist that Kherson and the surrounding region are now part of the Russian Federation and must be handed over within the framework of a future peace deal.

Ukraine has completely ruled out any such concessions. This is hardly surprising. While some temporary territorial compromises may prove possible during peace negotiations, Ukraine’s stance on Kherson is unlikely to change. After all, allowing the renewed Russian occupation of Kherson would be suicidal for Kyiv. It would present Russia with a priceless foothold across the Dnipro River that could be used as a gateway to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and complete the conquest of the country.

For now, Russia appears to have little chance of seizing Kherson militarily or of acquiring the city at the negotiating table. Instead, Moscow seems to be intent on terrorizing local residents and forcing them to flee. Putin claims that the population of the Kherson region are Russians, but he has no qualms about his soldiers using drones to hunt and kill them mercilessly. This tells you all you need to know about Putin’s cynical posturing as the protector of the Russian people in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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There are some drawbacks to this kind of drone. Key problems include limited range and a tendency to become entangled in obstacles such as trees and pylons. Nevertheless, there is mounting recognition on both sides of the front lines and among international military observers that fiber optic drones are now indispensable. In a recent report, the BBC called these drones “the terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine.” Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that Moscow’s focus on fiber optic drones represents “the first time Russia has surpassed Ukraine in front-line drone technology since the full-scale invasion in 2022.”

The combat effectiveness of fiber optic drones became increasingly apparent amid heavy fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the early months of 2025. Russia’s campaign to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region used large numbers of fiber optic drones to attack Ukraine’s flanks, cut supply lines, and cripple Ukrainian logistics. This eventually forced Ukrainian troops to retreat, ending an extended incursion into Russian territory that had been hugely embarrassing for Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian troops who fought in Kursk later reported that the only thing capable of stopping fiber optic drones was bad weather.

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The technology behind fiber optic drones is no secret and is available to Ukraine as well as Russia. However, as is so often the case, Moscow benefits from weight of numbers and is looking to exploit its strengths. While Ukraine has experimented with a wide variety of drones produced by hundreds of different startup-style defense companies, Russia has concentrated its vast resources on the mass production of a relatively small number of specific weapons categories including fiber optic drones and shahed kamikaze drones. Moscow’s strategy is to focus on volume with the goal of overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. Russia has also benefited from close ties with China, which is a key drone producer and ranks among the world’s leading suppliers of fiber optic cables.

Ukraine’s front line military commanders and the country’s tech sector developers recognize the growing importance of fiber optic drones and are now rapidly increasing production. However, they are currently lagging far behind Russia and have much work to do before they can catch up. It is a race Ukraine cannot afford to lose. One of the country’s largest drone manufacturers recently warned that if the current trajectory continues, Kyiv will soon be unable to defend against the sheer scale of Russia’s mass production.

Increased foreign investment in Ukraine’s defense industry could help close the gap. By financing the development and production of fiber optic drones, Ukraine’s international partners can put the country’s defenses on a firmer footing and enable the Ukrainian military to address the threat posed by Russia’s cable-connected drones. This trend has already been underway for some time, with more and more partner countries allocating funds for Ukrainian defense sector production. The challenge now is to channel this financing specifically toward fiber optic drones.

Time may not be on Ukraine’s side. The Russian army is currently in the early stages of a summer offensive that promises to be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war, with fighting already intensifying at various points along the front lines. If Putin’s commanders can implement the fiber optic drone tactics that proved so successful in the Kursk region, they may be able to finally overcome Ukraine’s dogged defenses and achieve a long-awaited breakthrough. In a war defined by attrition and innovation, Ukraine must now come up with urgent solutions to counter Russia’s fiber optic drone fleet.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

If these companies are forced to close, skilled professionals will seek employment abroad. This could lead to the leakage of knowledge and technologies. Meanwhile, with NATO countries likely to be focused on their own defense industries and strategic priorities, it is reasonable to assume that many Ukrainian defense sector companies will concentrate on exporting to more volatile regions. The potentially destabilizing impact of these trends is obvious. It is therefore vital to adopt effective measures to limit the spread of Ukrainian defense sector technologies, data, and finished products along with skilled developers, engineers, and operators to potential conflict zones around the world.

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Ukraine’s defense sector innovations fall into two categories. The first includes innovations that are easily replicated using readily available technologies. The second category features more complex systems requiring skilled professionals. It makes little sense to focus regulatory efforts on the first category. Instead, preventing proliferation is more effectively managed through intelligence operations and security measures. Preventative efforts should focus on those innovations that are more complex in both development and deployment.

Efforts to prevent Ukrainian defense technologies from fueling conflicts around the world will depend to a significant degree on enforcement. While Ukraine has made some progress in combating corruption over the past decade, this remains a major issue, particularly in the country’s dramatically expanded defense sector. A successful approach to limiting the spread of Ukrainian defense tech know-how should therefore incorporate a combination of positive and negative incentives.

Positive incentives can include opening up NATO markets to Ukrainian companies and supporting their efforts to comply with NATO standards. This would likely encourage a broader culture of compliance throughout the Ukrainian defense tech sector as companies sought to access the world’s most lucrative client base.

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Creating the conditions for the acquisition of Ukrainian companies by major international defense industry players could help to encourage a responsible corporate culture among Ukrainian companies while bolstering the country’s position globally. Likewise, enhanced access to funding and a simplified route to work visas and citizenship in the EU and US would help attract and retain talent. This would further strengthen Ukraine’s defense sector and encourage corporate compliance.

Professional organizations also have a potential role to play. Promoting the development of robust industry and professional associations for Ukrainians in the defense sector would encourage collaboration, knowledge sharing, and the establishment of industry standards, which could further propel innovation and growth within Ukraine’s defense industry, while creating a climate more conducive to regulation. Regulatory measures could include enhanced access to Western defense markets, with strict penalties for non-compliance.

Targeted export controls are another important measure. By establishing robust controls over critical components such as processors and specialized equipment, Ukraine can limit the availability of these technologies in regions with high conflict potential. Enhanced monitoring mechanisms should be implemented to track the transfer of technologies and the movement of skilled personnel. International cooperation is also crucial. Ukraine should look to work closely with global partners to synchronize regulatory standards and enforcement strategies, thereby reducing the challenges presented by regions with weak legal mechanisms.

Ukraine is now recognized internationally as a leading defense tech innovator in areas including AI solutions, cyber security, and drone warfare. There is huge global appetite for such technologies, but unregulated distribution could have disastrous consequences for international security. By combining enforceable regulatory measures with strategic incentives, it is possible to reduce the risks associated with the spread of Ukraine’s wartime innovations, while simultaneously maintaining an environment that supports ongoing innovation and growth in a controlled and secure manner.

Vitaliy Goncharuk is a US-based tech entrepreneur with Ukrainian roots who previously served as Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine from 2019 to 2022.

For the past one and a half years, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the International Partnership for Human Rights have documented and analyzed Russia’s aerial attacks in Ukraine. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, witness interviews, open-source intelligence, and forensic analysis.

After reviewing hundreds of Russian drone and missile strikes, researchers narrowed the focus down to twenty-two key attacks and identified two patterns that illuminate their impact: Attacks on energy infrastructure and on densely populated areas. The legal memorandum resulting from this work concludes that Russia’s bombing campaign amounts to the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.

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For three consecutive winters, Russia has bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in a bid to deprive the civilian population of access to heating and electricity at a time when the days are short and temperatures are typically well below freezing. These attacks have had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian power grid, with around half of Ukraine’s entire prewar energy-generating capacity destroyed by summer 2024.

As well as targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, Russia has also launched waves of drones and missiles at Ukrainian towns and cities throughout the invasion, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. There have been a number of particularly deadly attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed eighteen people including nine children. On Palm Sunday one week before Easter, Russia launched a targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving thirty-five dead.

In addition to killing and injuring civilians, Russian aerial attacks also create untenable living conditions for the wider civilian population. They leave people traumatized and fuel intense feelings of insecurity, while disrupting access to heating, power, water, healthcare, and other essential resources.

While estimating the true toll of these attacks is challenging, the number of displaced Ukrainians indicates the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to UN data from February 2025, Russian’s invasion has forced 10.6 million people to relocate, with 6.9 million recorded as refugees living outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, around 12.7 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance, including nearly two million children.

Russia systematically and deliberately deprives civilians of objects essential to their survival and inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction, which constitutes the crime against humanity of extermination. Statements by Russian officials, such as calls for Ukrainians to be left to “freeze and rot,” corroborate this conclusion.

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Russia’s aerial terror campaign, as well as the Kremlin’s actions in the occupied regions of Ukraine, have intentionally deprived Ukrainians of their fundamental rights to life, health, education, and culture, thus constituting the crime against humanity of persecution. The crime of persecution requires special discriminatory intent to target Ukrainians as a distinct group. This intent can be seen in Moscow’s branding of Ukrainians as “Nazis” who must be “destroyed.” such language underscores that Russia is attacking the very existence of Ukrainians. Targeted Russian attacks on educational and cultural facilities across Ukraine are further evidence of this intent.

Additionally, throughout the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities are reportedly enforcing russification policies that aim to extinguish any trace of Ukrainian national identity or statehood. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and subjected to anti-Ukrainian indoctrination. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in relation to the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

Holding Russia accountable for the ongoing air offensive against Ukraine is particularly important as this form of prohibited total war, where everything and anything including vital infrastructure and civilian populations are targeted to achieve victory, looks set to return. Technological advances are transforming the modern battlefield to essentially include entire countries and their civilian populations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s use of long-range drones and missiles to terrorize Ukrainian civilians is likely a taste of things to come.

To date, no international tribunal has held individual perpetrators responsible for international crimes resulting from unlawful aerial attacks. The International Criminal Court has taken an important initial step by issuing arrest warrants against four senior Russian officials for their roles in attacking Ukrainian civilians and energy infrastructure, but further measures are needed.

Failure to hold Russia accountable today will fuel tomorrow’s wars and embolden Putin’s fellow autocrats to embrace similar tactics against civilian populations. It is vital to make sure long-term security is not sacrificed in order to reach some kind of compromise with the Kremlin to end the bloodshed in Ukraine. By focusing on accountability for Russia’s aerial attacks, the international community can set a meaningful precedent that could help protect civilians around the world for years to come.

Anastasiya Donets leads the Ukraine Legal Team at the International Partnership for Human Rights, an independent non-governmental organization. She was previously an assistant professor in the International Law Department at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv. Susan H. Farbstein is a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, where she directs the International Human Rights Clinic.

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

David Kirichenko — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:10:46 +0000

Ever since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, military training has been a core element of Western support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As Moscow’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s partners has become much more of a two-way street. While Ukrainian troops continue to train with Western instructors, it is now increasingly apparent that NATO also has a lot to learn from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Claims of North Korean troops participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine first began to circulate in October 2024. However, the Kremlin initially denied the North Korean presence, with Russian officials remaining tight-lipped on the subject until late April.

Moscow and Pyongyang appear to have coordinated their recent statements, indicating that both partners felt the time was now right to confirm the involvement of North Korean forces in Russia’s war. Official confirmation came as Putin proclaimed the defeat of Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, where the bulk of North Korean soldiers are believed to have been deployed.

Moscow’s decision to confirm the presence of North Korean soldiers after months of denials could prove damaging to the Kremlin’s credibility at a time when questions are already being asked over Russia’s commitment to US-led peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. In recent days, US President Donald Trump has signaled his mounting frustration with Putin’s apparent stalling tactics, and has suggested that the Russian leader may be “tapping” him along.

The appearance of North Korean troops alongside their Russian counterparts on the front lines of the war against Ukraine represents the latest stage in a deepening military alliance between the two countries. North Korea has been supplying Russia with significant quantities of military aid since the early stages of the war in 2022. Deliveries have included millions of artillery shells as well as ballistic missiles, which have been used to devastating effect against Ukrainian cities.

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North Korea’s direct participation in the war against Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern European history. It is also widely seen an indication of the Russian army’s mounting recruitment issues.

While the Kremlin still has vast untapped reserves of available manpower to call upon, Putin is thought to be deeply reluctant to conduct a new mobilization due to fears of a possible domestic backlash inside Russia. This is making it increasingly challenging to replenish the depleted ranks of his invading army amid continued heavy losses.

For much of the war, Putin has relied on a combination of recruits drawn from Russia’s prison population and volunteer soldiers attracted by generous financial incentives that are typically many times higher than average Russian salaries. However, with the Russian army now reportedly averaging over a thousand casualties per day, it is becoming more difficult to find sufficient manpower to maintain the momentum of offensive operations in Ukraine.

So far, the North Korean contingent has seen action inside the Russian Federation itself amid fierce battles to push Ukrainian forces out of Russia’s Kursk region. However, with their participation now publicly confirmed by both Moscow and Pyongyang, officials in Kyiv are voicing concerns that North Korean troops could soon be redeployed to Ukrainian territory. This would represent a dangerous international escalation with unpredictable consequences for the wider region.

North Korea has now firmly established itself as one of the Kremlin’s most important allies in the invasion of Ukraine. Pyongyang’s involvement began with the supply of artillery shells and has expanded to include ballistic missiles and large numbers of combat troops. This comprehensive military support is enabling Russia to sustain the current war effort.

Ukraine’s allies are still searching for a suitable reaction to the expanding North Korean military presence on Europe’s eastern frontier. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for the strengthening of sanctions against Russia and North Korea, while also warning that the Koreans are gaining valuable experience of modern warfare in Ukraine that could have grave implications for international security. In the absence of an overwhelming Western response, it seems safe to assume that North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will continue to deepen.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

US officials do not believe the recently captured fighters have direct ties to the Chinese government, Reuters reports. However, there are mounting concerns in Washington and other Western capitals over reports that Beijing is sending army officers to observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a bid to learn tactical lessons from the war. This could provide the Chinese military with important insights into drone warfare and the rapidly changing nature of the modern battlefield.

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In a further indication of growing frustration in Kyiv over China’s alleged support for Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy recently accused Chinese citizens of working at a Russian manufacturing plant producing drones for the war in Ukraine. In the past month, the Ukrainian authorities have also imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies for alleged involvement in the production of Iskander ballistic missiles, which Russia often uses in the war against Ukraine.

The most serious Ukrainian allegations came in the middle of April, when Zelenskyy claimed that China was now supplying weapons and gunpowder to Russia. This was the first time the Ukrainian leader had openly accused Beijing of providing Moscow with direct military assistance. Although, last fall US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell had also suggested that China was providing Russia with technology that was “not dual-use capabilities,” contributing directly to Russia’s war production.

Claims of expanding Chinese involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine do not come as a complete surprise. After all, China has long been seen as one of the Kremlin’s key allies and has emerged over the past decade as Moscow’s most important economic partner.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. Over the past three years, the two countries have repeatedly underlined their shared geopolitical vision, which includes a commitment to ending the era of US dominance and ushering in a new multipolar world order. These strengthening ties have been further highlighted by a number of bilateral summit meetings between the Russian and Chinese leaders.

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Despite its close relations with Moscow, China has officially adopted a neutral stance toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has included refraining from any overt gestures of support and publicly backing calls for peace. Nevertheless, Beijing has faced accusations of enabling the Russian war effort in important ways through the provision of restricted items including sanctioned components and dual-use technologies used in the production of missiles, tanks, and aircraft. By providing the vast majority of these exports to Russia, US officials believe that China has helped Russia greatly boost its arsenal and ramp up military production.

US officials have also alleged that China is providing Russia with geospatial intelligence to aid the invasion of Ukraine.

Claims of growing Chinese involvement are fueling speculation that this could lead to a possible international escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. There is also alarm over what Russia may be providing in exchange for Chinese support. US officials have alleged that China is receiving unprecedented access to highly sophisticated Russian defense technologies. The US Congress has also suggested that the Kremlin could be providing China with critical knowledge about the vulnerabilities of Western weapons systems based on combat experience acquired in Ukraine.

While Beijing has denied providing any material support for Moscow’s war, there is no question that the geopolitical partnership between China and Russia has reached new levels against the backdrop of the conflict.

With the United States now looking to reduce its involvement in European security, opportunities may soon emerge for China to play a greater role in peace efforts to end the war. However, Beijing would first need to align its actions with its words to convince Kyiv that it is a plausible peacemaker rather than a Russian ally.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on April 30, 2025, to clarify that reports of Chinese support for Russia’s war effort have been persistent before Kyiv’s recent accusations.

Ukraine’s innovative army can help Europe defend itself against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 21:39:48 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he cited Ukraine’s “demilitarization” as one of his two key war aims. He has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal, to put it mildly. Rather than disarming Ukraine, Putin’s invasion has actually transformed the country into one of Europe’s most formidable military powers.

The emergence of the Ukrainian army as a serious international fighting force can be traced back to the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2014. At the time, decades of neglect and corruption had left Ukraine virtually defenseless. With the country’s existence under threat, a program of military modernization was rapidly adopted. During the following years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces expanded dramatically and implemented a series of far-reaching reforms in line with NATO standards.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, the transformation of the Ukrainian military entered a new phase. The number of men and women in uniform swelled to around one million, making the Ukrainian army by far the largest in Europe. They have been backed by a domestic defense industry that has grown by orders of magnitude over the past three years and now accounts for around 40 percent of Ukraine’s military needs.

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For today’s Ukraine, a strong domestic defense sector is now a matter of national survival. During the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relied heavily on military aid from the country’s partners. This support helped enable Ukraine’s early victories but was also often subject to prolonged delays that left Kyiv vulnerable to changing political priorities in various Western capitals.

The need for greater military self-sufficiency has been underlined in recent months by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House. The new US leader has made clear that he does not intend to maintain United States military support for Ukraine, and plans instead to downgrade the overall American commitment to European security. This shift in US policy has confirmed the wisdom of Ukraine’s earlier decision to prioritize the expansion of the country’s domestic defense industry.

Ukraine’s growing military capabilities owe much to a defense tech revolution that has been underway in the country since 2022. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing innovative new technologies for the military ranging from software to combat drones. By focusing on relatively simple and affordable defense tech solutions, Ukraine has been able to close the gap on Russia despite Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and resources.

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More than three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is now clear that wartime necessity has transformed Ukraine into perhaps the most agile and experimental military ecosystem in the world. Whereas Western arms procurement cycles typically span several years, Ukraine can translate ideas into operational weapons within the space of just a few months. This has helped establish Ukraine as a global leader in drone warfare. The country’s use of inexpensive FPV drones is increasingly defining the modern battlefield and now accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Russian casualties.

Ukraine’s domestic drone production capacity is growing at a remarkable rate. According to the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk, Ukrainian forces are currently receiving approximately 200,000 drones per month, a tenfold increase on the figure from just one year ago. Kyiv is also making rapid progress in the development of numerous other cutting edge military technologies including robotic systems, marine drones, and cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s dramatically expanded armed forces and groundbreaking defense tech sector make the country an indispensable partner for Europe. After decades of reliance on US security support, European leaders currently find themselves confronted with the new political realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia. In this uncertain environment, it makes good sense for Europe to upgrade its support for the Ukrainian army while deepening collaboration with Ukrainian defense tech companies.

European investment in the Ukrainian defense industry is already on the rise, both in terms of government donor funds and private sector investment. This trend looks set to intensify in the coming months as Ukrainians and their European partners increasingly acknowledge that their collective future security depends on closer cooperation. Russia’s invasion has forced Ukraine to become a major military power and a leading defense tech innovator. This status looks set to guarantee the country a position at the heart of Europe’s security architecture for many years to come.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Ukrainian commanders are well aware that the recent lull in Russian battlefield gains may only be a temporary phenomenon as Putin’s army regroups following months of intense fighting. Officials and analysts in Kyiv are now warning that preparations are likely well underway for a major new Russian offensive that is expected to begin in the coming weeks and last until late in 2025.

Putin hopes this new campaign can help strengthen his position as negotiations intensify over a possible compromise settlement to end the war. Speaking last week in Paris, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused the Kremlin dictator of “dragging out talks and trying to get the United States stuck in endless and pointless discussions about fake conditions just to buy time and then try to grab more land.”

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Russia’s modest battlefield gains since the start of the current year provide important perspective at a time when international media coverage and Western commentaries often create the misleading impression that Ukraine’s position is hopeless. In reality, the Ukrainian army has stood up to the full might of the Russian military for more than three years and represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s plans for the complete subjugation of the country.

Today’s Ukrainian army is by far the largest and most experienced force in Europe, and is backed by a rapidly expanding domestic defense industry that already accounts for around forty percent of Ukraine’s military needs. Since early 2022, Ukrainian troops have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory occupied by Russia, and have won a string of famous victories in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions.

Over the past three years, Ukraine has also emerged as a technologically advanced drone warfare superpower. Ukrainian drone manufacturers now produce millions of drones each year and continue to innovate on a daily basis. This is having a huge impact on the battlefield, where drones now account for well over half of all Russian casualties.

At sea, marine drones have enabled Ukraine to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. This has transformed the Battle of the Black Sea and forced the remainder of Russia’s warships to retreat from Crimea. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commanders are using the country’s expanding arsenal of long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles to bring Putin’s invasion home by striking military and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia.

The remarkable evolution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022 should give pause to all those who insist that Ukraine “has no cards” to play in future negotiations. While Kyiv cannot realistically hope to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, funding, and industrial capacity, Ukraine is now a major military power in its own right and will not agree to any peace deal that leaves the continued existence of the country in doubt.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Crucially, Ukraine’s army is backed by a highly innovative and rapidly expanding domestic military-industrial complex that is harnessing the excellence of Ukraine’s prewar tech sector and reviving long neglected Soviet era capabilities. Any discussion on the likely future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must therefore take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right.

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For the past year, international media coverage of Russia’s invasion has tended to create the impression that Putin’s army is slowly but surely grinding forward toward a costly but inevitable victory. The reality is less straightforward.

Russian troops reclaimed the battlefield initiative in early 2024 and have been advancing fairly steadily ever since, but they have only achieved relatively modest territorial gains while suffering record casualties. Analysts estimate that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost a century to complete the conquest of Ukraine.

Viewed from a broader perspective encompassing the entire full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s military performance becomes even more impressive. Since spring 2022, The Ukrainian Armed Forces have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory seized by the Russian army, and have won a series of key battles in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions. Russia has been unable to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital, and is still struggling to force Ukrainian troops out of Russia itself following Kyiv’s bold August 2024 cross-border incursion into the Kursk region.

Far beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also overachieved. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian marine drones have revolutionized naval warfare and forced Putin to withdraw his fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. Deep inside Russia, long-range Ukrainian drones strike at military assets, logistical hubs, and energy infrastructure with growing frequency.

Ukraine’s resilience owes much to the international military assistance the country has received. However, this support has often been subject to delays and has frequently fallen victim to political considerations that have cost Ukraine dearly. In order to minimize these vulnerabilities, the Ukrainian authorities have prioritized the development of the country’s domestic defense industry.

The results have been striking. In 2025, the overall capacity of Ukraine’s defense industry is expected to reach a new high of $35 billion, up from just $1 billion at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While this capacity is not yet being fully utilized due to defense budget limitations, Ukraine now produces around one-third of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the country’s armed forces. In critical areas such as drone production, the figure is now close to one hundred percent.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is encouraging international partners to invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies and finance weapons production in Ukraine. A number of countries have already responded by committing large sums and promoting joint projects within the Ukrainian defense industry. This trend is expected to gain pace during 2025 as the US pivot away from Europe fuels increased defense spending across the continent.

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Ukraine’s biggest defense industry success has been the development of the domestic drone manufacturing sector. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, the country boasted only a handful of drone producers. The sector has now mushroomed to include over 200 businesses producing millions of drones annually, with output expected to treble during the current year. In order to harness this rapidly growing strike potential and maximize battlefield impact, Ukraine last year established a special branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare.

Ukraine’s emergence as a drone warfare superpower owes much to the country’s strong tech traditions and entrepreneurial spirit. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers have proved highly innovative and are now recognized internationally as world leaders in military drone technologies. “Foreign models are like Toyotas now, while Ukrainian drones are Mercedes. Ours are just leagues ahead,” one Ukrainian commander told Ukrainska Pravda recently.

Ukraine now has a formidable arsenal of drones for use on the battlefield, at sea, and for long-range attacks against targets across Russia. The country also has a growing collection of hybrid missile-drones and missiles. President Zelenskyy recently confirmed that Ukraine had carried out an attack with the domestically produced Long Neptune cruise missile for the first time, underlining the country’s growing potential to strike back at Russia. Further innovations are in the pipeline, with domestic missile production expected to increase in the coming months if Kyiv is able to secure the necessary additional funding.

The Ukrainian military still faces a range of major challenges. The biggest issue remains manpower shortages. So far, Kyiv has sought to address mobilization problems by updating training and offering recruits the opportunity to choose the unit they will serve in, but shortfalls persist. A new initiative aimed at potential recruits between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five was launched in February 2025, featuring attractive enlistment packages and one-year service contracts.

There is also no escaping the fact that Ukraine remains dependent on Western support in order to maintain the country’s war effort. While officials in Kyiv have spoken of increasing the share of domestically produced war materials to fifty percent, Ukraine cannot realistically expect to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower, firepower, industrial capacity, and financing without continued assistance from the West.

Despite these limitations, Ukraine’s growing military strength must be taken into consideration during coming negotiations over a potential compromise peace deal with Russia. While nobody in Kyiv would relish the grim prospect of fighting on without Western assistance, the country is far from defenseless and will not accept a bad peace that places Ukrainian statehood in jeopardy.

Russia made the mistake of underestimating Ukraine in 2022, and has since paid a terrible price. Three years on, there can be little doubt that the Ukrainian army is now the most powerful fighting force in Europe. This military reality will help shape the contours of any future peace deal. It should also guarantee Ukraine’s place at the heart of Europe’s changing security system as the continent adjusts to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Trump’s energy sector ceasefire could be good news for Putin’s war machine

David Kirichenko — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 17:49:46 +0000

US President Donald Trump’s hotly anticipated March 18 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to achieve any major breakthroughs, but it did result in preliminary agreement on a partial ceasefire covering attacks on energy infrastructure. The news was hailed by the White House as a significant step toward a future peace agreement. However, critics have noted that any pause in energy sector attacks may actually benefit Putin while limiting Ukraine’s ability to hinder the Russian war effort.

Putin has so far refused to join Ukraine in accepting a US proposal for a full ceasefire. Instead, during Tuesday’s telephone conversation he agreed to halt attacks on energy infrastructure for a thirty-day period. This appears to be a very calculated concession. It gives Trump something tangible to show for his peacemaker efforts, but at the same time allows Putin to draw out the negotiating process further while continuing efforts to weaken Ukraine militarily and diplomatically.

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Crucially, Russia may have much more to gain than Ukraine from a temporary energy sector ceasefire. While both countries have sought to target energy infrastructure, the timing of the proposed pause in attacks would appear to favor the Kremlin.

Since the first winter of the war, Russia has conducted a series of air offensives targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a bid to break the country’s will to resist by leaving millions of Ukrainians without access to electricity and heating. These attacks have succeeded in destroying around half of Ukraine’s prewar power-generating capacity, and have resulted in periods of rolling blackouts across the country.

Faced with the unprecedented challenges presented by Russia’s ongoing bombardment, Ukraine has managed to adapt. The country has dramatically enhanced its air defenses since 2022, while the Ukrainian power grid has proved remarkably resilient. Kyiv has also received extensive financial and technical support from international partners, which has proved instrumental in the struggle to keep the lights on.

Seasonal changes are an additional factor shaping Russia’s bombing campaign. Despite multiple large-scale missile and drone attacks in recent months, Ukraine avoided a much feared energy collapse during the winter season. The arrival of spring is now expected to further undermine the effectiveness of Moscow’s energy sector offensive, with higher temperatures in Ukraine reducing demand for electricity, and longer days minimizing the psychological impact of blackouts.

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As the Kremlin struggles to destroy the Ukrainian power grid, Ukraine’s own campaign of airstrikes against Russia’s oil and gas industry has steadily accelerated. Ukrainian officials say these attacks are designed to weaken Russia’s wartime economy while also creating logistical headaches for Putin’s army in Ukraine.

The first attacks on Russian refineries took place during the early months of the war. However, Ukraine initially lacked the long-range firepower to mount a sustained air offensive, and was further hamstrung when the country’s international partners imposed restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities responded to these limitations by prioritizing the development and domestic production of long-range drones and missiles. As Ukraine’s air arsenal has expanded, so have attacks on Russia’s vast energy industry. Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries first began making headlines in spring 2024. There has been a further escalation in attacks during the first three months of the current year, reflecting Ukraine’s increased long-range capabilities and growing drone production.

Assessing the scale of the damage caused by these Ukrainian strikes is challenging. Amid tightening wartime censorship, Russia no longer publishes refining figures or other key industry data. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials remain tight-lipped and typically claim that any blazes captured on video are the result of falling debris from intercepted drones. However, according to Reuters data published in early February, Ukrainian drone attacks since the start of 2025 had succeeded in knocking out around ten percent of Russia’s total refining capacity.

The recent uptick in attacks may only be the beginning. Ukraine has ambitious plans for dramatically increased drone production, and is also developing a number of long-range weapons including missile-drone hybrids capable of striking targets deep inside Russia.

On March 15, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the latest breakthrough for the country’s missile program with the successful deployment of a domestically produced cruise missile. Called the Long Neptune, this Ukrainian cruise missile is adapted from the earlier Neptune model, which was designed for use against warships and was famously responsible for the sinking of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, in April 2022. With a reported range of around one thousand kilometers, the Long Neptune has the potential to wreak havoc throughout Russia’s energy sector.

This is bad news for Putin, who is heavily dependent on the Russian oil and gas sector to fund and supply his war machine. With Russia’s air defenses already stretched thin in order to cover the front lines of the invasion in Ukraine, Putin now finds himself unable to adequately protect his energy industry from aerial assault. It is therefore hardly surprising that he has now agreed to a mutual pause in attacks that will keep his refineries, pipelines, and export hubs safe for at least a month. Any progress toward peace is certainly welcome, but Putin’s support for Trump’s partial ceasefire should be seen as a pragmatic move rather than an indication of his readiness to end the invasion of Ukraine.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Thom Shanker

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Ukraine’s innovative defense tech sector is the country’s trump card

David Kirichenko — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 21:50:27 +0000

As tempers flared last month during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disastrous Oval Office confrontation with US President Donald Trump and Vice-President JD Vance, Trump offered a blunt assessment of Ukraine’s limited leverage in any future negotiations with Russia. “You don’t have the cards,” he told Zelenskyy. It is a message the US leader has repeated on multiple occasions as he seeks to broker a peace deal and end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Trump’s logic is easy enough to understand. After all, Ukraine is currently locked into a brutal war of attrition against a far larger and wealthier enemy. For over a year, the Russian army has been slowly but steadily advancing as Ukraine struggles to address mounting troop shortages and encounters regular issues with the flow of military assistance from the country’s Western allies. If this continues, most observers believe Moscow’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and funding make eventual Russian victory virtually inevitable.

The Ukrainians are acutely aware that the odds are stacked against them. However, they also understand that Russia’s invasion represents an existential threat to their nation. This helps to explain the remarkable resilience displayed by Ukraine’s army and Ukrainian society as a whole. Faced with a fight for survival against a military superpower, Ukrainians recognize that they cannot realistically expect to match Russia in terms of conventional military strength. Instead, their country’s trump card in this uneven struggle is the innovative and rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense tech sector.

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Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion just over three years ago, an improvised industry of defense tech startups has mushroomed in garages, workshops, and warehouses across Ukraine. This trend has benefited from the country’s vibrant prewar IT industry, with many existing IT businesses and tech entrepreneurs switching their focus in 2022 to support the Ukrainian army.

This has led to dramatic increases in the domestic production of key items such as surveillance and attack drones, with Ukrainian developers engaged in a relentless daily race to stay ahead of their Russian adversaries. Hundreds of Ukrainian companies are now engaged in drone manufacturing, compared to a mere handful in 2021. The Ukrainian government recently unveiled plans to purchase around 4.5 million first person view drones in 2025, more than doubling last year’s number. This is enhancing Ukraine’s reputation as a global defense tech hub and boosting the country’s efforts to reduce its reliance on military aid from the West.

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Ukrainian drones are playing a key role in transforming the modern battlefield and are now responsible for around two-thirds of Russian losses, according to a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute. Ukraine’s progress has been so groundbreaking that leading Western defense companies are increasingly looking to learn from the country. For example, Silicon Valley companies are tapping into the know-how of Ukrainian drone makers, the Wall Street Journal reports.

The impact of Ukraine’s defense tech prowess is perhaps most evident in the Black Sea. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s navy was virtually nonexistent, while the dominance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was taken for granted. Three years on, Ukraine has successfully leveraged low-cost, high-impact naval drones to offset Russia’s initial advantages and break the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports.

Ukraine’s maritime drones have repeatedly proved their effectiveness, sinking or damaging numerous Russian warships and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet from Crimea to the safety of Russia itself. Despite the distances involved, Ukrainian naval drones are able to pose a threat to Russian shipping far from Crimea. In summer 2023, Ukraine launched a long-range drone attack that reportedly damaged a warship close the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, around six hundred kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian naval bases in the Odesa region.

Ukraine’s naval drone fleet continues to evolve at a rapid pace. In recent months, a new model equipped with missiles reportedly shot down a Russian helicopter over the Black Sea. Marine drones have also been developed as launch craft for aerial drones. Ukrainian officials claim these “miniature aircraft carriers” have already been used to hit Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine. Looking ahead, the use of naval drones as platforms for aerial attacks could create opportunities for Ukraine to bypass Russian front line defenses and launch strikes from unexpected angles.

As Ukraine enters a fourth year of full-scale war against one of the world’s leading military powers, the need for continuous innovation on the battlefield and at sea remains critical. Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle for the Black Sea is an indication of what can be achieved when the Ukrainian military makes the most of the country’s innovative defense tech industry. Kyiv’s partners should take note of the key role being played by Ukrainian defense tech innovators and maximize their support for this strategically crucial sector.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Beyond its financial contribution, the Ukrainian IT industry also plays a crucial role in employment. By 2024, Ukraine’s IT workforce had grown to more than 300,000 specialists, solidifying its position as a major employer and a pillar of Ukrainian economic stability in today’s wartime environment.

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The United States is already an important partner for Ukraine’s IT industry. In 2023, the US was the largest importer of Ukrainian IT services, accounting for $2.39 billion or 37.2 percent of the industry’s total exports. This presents opportunities for intensified bilateral collaboration in both the private and public sectors that have the potential to transcend the kind of aid-based relations found elsewhere in the region.

Ukrainian IT companies are not seeking handouts but are actively investing in the US market. Rather than displacing American jobs, they are creating new opportunities and fostering technological advancements. Importantly, these companies are not appropriating US technologies but are in many cases sharing their own advanced developments. This cooperative approach could strengthen both economies, reinforcing a business-driven relationship that aligns with the Trump administration’s strategic vision.

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The knowledge-based economy benefits immensely from such international partnerships. Unlike resource-dependent models, this framework ensures a two-way exchange of expertise. Ukraine’s IT professionals are already playing a significant role in cybersecurity, actively defending against digital threats and ensuring the integrity of critical infrastructure. From the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, they have consistently delivered in even the most difficult of circumstances and have enhanced Ukraine’s global reputation as a leading tech nation.

Moreover, the war has propelled Ukrainian engineers to the forefront of innovation in autonomous systems including aerial, maritime, and other drone technologies. Many of Ukraine’s most recent innovations in the drone sphere leverage AI. The depth of experience gained in developing and deploying these systems under real combat conditions is unparalleled worldwide. For the US defense industry, collaboration with Ukraine in this domain could be invaluable, offering access to battle-tested innovations that have the potential to redefine modern warfare.

The obvious synergies between the US and Ukrainian tech industries extends beyond the private sector. Cooperation in areas such as dual-use technologies should be prioritized by both governments to enhance security and drive innovation. Strengthening this partnership could contribute to a safer and more prosperous future for both nations.

By leveraging Ukraine’s IT expertise, the United States can improve its own technological capabilities while supporting a partner nation at a critical time. This partnership can bring further economic and strategic benefits to both parties. As the Trump administration moves toward a business-driven approach to US foreign policy, strengthening ties with Ukraine’s IT sector could boost innovation and security while also offering a range of business opportunities.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region. Hanna Myshko is regional director for Ukraine, Moldova, and the Gulf at StrategEast.

Given the benefits the Houthis continue to enjoy from shooting down these drones, the United States needs to adjust its drone deployment strategy to ensure that MQ-9 Reapers are less vulnerable to the militant group’s attacks.

The offensive

The surge of attacks on US UAVs and the anti-shipping campaign are major pieces of the Houthi’s latest offensive. Since mid-November 2023, the Houthis have held Red Sea freedom of navigation and seaborne commerce hostage, launching hundreds of attacks on merchant vessels. Framing its anti-shipping campaign as an act of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, the Houthis have delivered a severe blow to maritime traffic in the commercial artery connecting the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Quickly after the Houthis’ campaign against Red Sea shipping began, the Yemeni armed group significantly broadened its targets to any ship owned or operated by international shipping lines whose vessels service Israel’s ports. Yet, the group’s limited identification and tracking capabilities led to attacks on ships with no official links to Israel, including occasional strikes on Chinese– and Russian-linked vessels (which have since been largely spared from Houthi attacks following Iran-facilitated deals to ensure their safe transit).

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As the Red Sea basin’s maritime security deteriorated in 2023, the United States and the European Union sought to deter the Houthis by setting up multinational naval coalitions: Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides. Though successful in countering dozens of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, Western maritime security missions only partially restored the safety of shipping lanes. In 2024, the United States and the United Kingdom launched Operation Poseidon Archer to conduct precise air strikes on military targets in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled territories. The Houthi naval offensive’s operational tempo appears to have reduced in recent months, with the most recent attack on merchant ships occurring in mid-November 2024.

Since 2002, the United States has regularly fielded UAVs such as the MQ-9 Reaper for surveillance and strike missions in Yemen, especially for gathering intelligence on and eliminating operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Despite their protracted deployment, the number of US drones lost to hostile fire was minimal, with only three MQ-9 Reapers shot down by the Houthis between 2017 and 2019.

During the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign, there has been a marked escalation in the group’s tactical proficiency against US drones. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones, in a series of attacks that have targeted US assets primarily in Marib and Sa’ada governorates. The intensifying operational tempo and increasing success rate of Houthi attacks on US drones are unprecedented, showcasing the militia’s improved marksmanship and expanding offensive capabilities.

While it isn’t clear what exactly is in the Houthi missile force, and thus is bolstering this offensive capability, a rough sense can be gleaned from Houthi military parades and from seizures of military-grade materials from dhows smuggling Iran’s lethal aid. The Houthi arsenal of surface-to-air missiles includes Russian-made missiles originating from prewar Yemeni army stocks, such as the SA-6/Faster (Innovator) surface-to-air missile and the Thaqib (Piercer) missile family. In addition, the Houthis claim to produce indigenous missile designs. However, those designs are either variants of Iranian weapon systems or based on Iran’s technology, such as the Sayyad-2C (Hunter) missile, the Saqr series (Iran’s 358 missile), and the Barq missile family (Iran’s Taer series).

Inside the Houthis’ strategy

Tactically, the Houthi shootdowns of MQ-9 drones primarily aim to blind the US intelligence and targeting systems. Operation Poseidon Archer significantly relies on data gathered by UAVs to plan US-UK joint air strikes on hostile ground targets in Houthi-controlled territories. Although designed to be a top-notch “hunter-kill” drone, the MQ-9 Reaper also plays an important role in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and recognition thanks to its twenty-four-hour endurance and maximum operational altitude of fifty-thousand feet. The intensification of Poseidon Archer’s precision strikes on Houthi radar, storage, and launch sites compelled the group to rely more on underground facilities and hideouts in Yemen’s rugged interior. The Houthis’ efforts to conceal strategic sites have heightened the Western coalition’s dependence on UAVs to collect actionable intelligence on military installations.

For the Houthis, the shootdowns of US drones also hold symbolic value. Direct armed confrontation with the United States and Israel is part and parcel of its ideological foundation. Wanting to be seen as capable of standing up to the United States, the Houthis have heavily propagandized the downing of MQ-9 Reapers. For instance, as noted by Mohammed Al-Basha (founder of the consultancy Basha Report), the Houthis have turned the US UAV into the main character of a satirical song titled baw-wart (“useless” in local slang) that mocks the drone’s poor combat capabilities.

The Houthis have also sought to strengthen domestic political legitimacy and gain regional recognition by attacking US aerial assets. The shootdowns of US drones boost morale for Houthi supporters at a time of great hardship under Western and Israeli air strikes. From a regional standpoint, claiming the destruction of MQ-9s has allowed the Houthis to portray themselves as the most lethal member of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance and to win the sympathy of anti-US and pro-Palestinian voices in the Arab world.

However, the Houthis’ claims warrant skepticism. The insurgent group is well known for its propaganda operations, including wielding unverifiable declarations to inflate the perception of its military performance. Since the anti-shipping campaign’s onset, the Houthis have often vaunted successful strikes on US naval assets deployed in the Red Sea, although US Central Command has been swift to say such claims are false. Similarly, the downing of MQ-9 Reapers represents a powerful attention-grabber to trumpet the Houthis’ offensive air warfare capabilities. Factual or not, these claims serve to inflate the Houthis’ perceived combat strength and burnish their image as a militia capable of confronting US forces head-on.

The Houthis’ dangerous partners

Although the MQ-9 Reapers have been shot down over Yemen, the negative ramifications of these Houthi attacks on US military assets could spill over beyond the country’s borders. After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, there has been a marked acceleration in military cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and symbolic support between the Houthis and Iran (the group’s most crucial lifeline), Russia, China, and other regional armed groups in the Tehran-led Axis of Resistance.

Russia has significantly deepened political engagements with the Houthis, showcasing diplomatic solidarity with the group’s military actions and offering a counterweight to Washington’s hardline position against it at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In addition, US intelligence revealed that Iran mediated talksbetween Russia and the Houthis that led to Moscow supplying Russian-made advanced anti-ship cruise missiles to the group. It also reported the forward basing of Russian military advisors in Yemen, which allegedly provided the Houthis with ship tracking data and targeting guidance to increase the precision of attacks on commercial shipping.

Similarly to Moscow, Beijing seems to have intensified engagement with the Houthis since mid-November 2023. Beijing reportedly struck a deal with the militia to ensure safe passage for Chinese-flagged commercial ships. The Houthis have allegedly benefitted from China’s neutral stance at the UNSC and the procurement of Chinese-made military and dual-use components to support its domestic military-industrial base.

While motivated by different strategic goals, each of these actors share similar deep-rooted anti-West sentiments, a common denominator that the Houthis have sought to leverage to their advantage. In this regard, the militant group could offer Yemen and the Red Sea as battlegrounds from which Washington’s adversaries can get their hands on US military hardware. Anti-Western forces could have their eye on accessing US-made technology components for multiple purposes: They could attempt to reverse engineer the components, design tailored countermeasures, and obtaining potentially sensitive information stored in the MQ-9 Reapers. For Iran, getting access to US military equipment has long been a coveted prize. For instance, in mid-2019, Iran rushed to retrieve a US Navy MQ-4C Triton that the IRGC shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. But getting access to US-made technology could prove useful for others as well, including China, which faces heightening competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Bolstering the MQ-9 Reaper’s defenses

The MQ-9 Reaper is the backbone of the United States’s UAV fleet, providing US military planners with tactical depth into Yemen’s rugged interior. However, despite its technical edge over the Houthis’ missile force, it has proved vulnerable to basic anti-air weapon systems. Undoubtedly, the deployment of drones remains a preferable alternative to manned aircraft when operating in a high-risk environment such as Yemen. Yet, the rate of MQ-9 drones lost in combat since mid-November 2023 warrants attention from US military strategists. MQ-9 Reapers are worth around thirty million dollars apiece, and losing them at this pace—nearly one a month over the fifteen-month anti-shipping campaign, according to Houthi claims—is not sustainable.

Although the Houthi missile arsenal remains a low-tier threat to US aerial assets, the group has proved capable of partially blunting the United States’ combat edge, denting US air superiority, and exposing significant vulnerabilities in the MQ-9 Reaper’s defense layers. Washington’s adversaries could seek to capitalize on these gaps to further their strategic interests. After the Israel-Hamas cease-fire was brokered in January, the Houthis vowed to scale down their naval offensive, but freedom of safe navigation is far from being restored in the Red Sea. Washington should take advantage of the current lull in Houthi attacks to adjust its drone deployment strategy and accelerate the integration of self-protection kits into the MQ-9 Reaper that bolster its survivability against hostile fire. For example, such kits could include active and passive countermeasure systems against cyber and radio frequency or infrared threats.

Since November 2023, the Houthis have successfully turned the shootdowns of MQ-9 drones into a propaganda boon to tout their military performance domestically and abroad. Should the group conclude that keeping up attacks on US aircraft pays dividends, the Houthis are likely to intensify strikes on US assets. The group’s strong determination to heighten military confrontation with Washington can be seen in attempted strikes on February 19, in which Houthi rebels reportedly fired surface-to-air missiles at a US F-16 fighter jet and MQ-9 Reaper drone (but the missiles did not strike their targets).

The United States needs to keep its guard up. As the security conditions remain volatile in the Red Sea, MQ-9 Reaper drones are poised to keep playing a paramount role in strengthening the United States’ threat awareness over the Houthi menace.

Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a researcher who focuses on the security affairs of the Gulf region. He is also an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. Follow him on X: @mazz_Leonardo.

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Warrick quoted in Salon on the lack of answers fueling drone paranoia in the US

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:26 +0000

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Ukrainian drones reportedly knock out 10 percent of Russian refining capacity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 22:17:50 +0000

Ukraine’s recent campaign of drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure has succeeded in knocking out around one-tenth of Russia’s refining capacity, according to analysis by news agency Reuters.

Since the beginning of 2025, Ukraine has launched a wave of long-range drone attacks against military and industrial targets inside Russia. The Kremlin remains tight-lipped over the impact of these air strikes, but open source data and media reports point to significant damage to at least eight Russian refineries along with a number of oil depots and key logistical points such as pumping stations and ports used for oil and gas exports. The range of targets suggests a well-planned Ukrainian campaign to methodically dismantle Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Ukraine’s bombing offensive is proving effective. Calculations by Reuters analysts based on oil industry trading figures covering the period from January to early February 2025 indicate that Ukrainian drone attacks have disabled approximately 10 percent of Russia’s refining capacity. Coupled with the impact of recently imposed United States sanctions against the Kremlin’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, this is expected to leave Moscow with no choice but to slow oil production in the coming months.

Reports of significant disruption to Russia’s energy industry will be welcomed in Kyiv. Ukrainian officials have made no secret of their intention to target the Russian oil and gas sector, which serves as the economic engine of Vladimir Putin’s war machine. The first Ukrainian attacks took place during the initial months of the war, with a marked increase in frequency during 2024. Ukraine’s air offensive against Russia’s energy industry now appears to be entering a new phase of heightened intensity.

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Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia have been hampered by restrictions imposed on the use of Western-supplied weapons amid a reluctance among Kyiv’s partners to risk escalating the conflict. The Kremlin has skillfully exploited these fears, with Putin warning explicitly in September 2024 that any attempt to lift restrictions on long-range strikes would mean NATO and Russia were “at war.”

In order to bypass Western restrictions, Ukraine has prioritized the domestic production of long-range drones and missiles capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. Thanks to Ukraine’s innovative defense tech sector and the country’s strong aerospace legacy from the Soviet era, progress has been rapid. In late 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy showcased a number of new domestically produced drones and missiles with expanded ranges and payloads.

Ukrainian officials have stated that they intend to manufacture 30,000 long-range drones and 3000 missiles during the current year. Some of Kyiv’s Western partners also appear to recognize the strategic importance of Ukraine’s growing long-range arsenal, and are providing financing for production along with technical support. However, it will still be some time before Ukraine has sufficient long-range firepower to seriously threaten Russia’s ability to wage war.

At present, Ukraine’s air offensive is achieving the more limited goals of disrupting Russia’s energy industry, stretching the Kremlin’s limited air defenses, and undermining Moscow’s efforts to insulate ordinary Russians from the war. Since the onset of the full-scale invasion three years ago, Putin has been careful to cultivate a business-as-usual climate within Russia itself. Ukraine’s eye-catching daily strikes on oil refineries and storage depots are now sending a powerful message to the Russian public that the war unleashed by the Kremlin in February 2022 will not be fought exclusively on foreign soil.

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Ukraine’s expanding arsenal of domestically produced long-range weapons is particularly important at a time of growing uncertainty over the future of US military aid for the country. Throughout the war, the Ukrainian military has been heavily reliant on the United States and other Western partners for vital weapons supplies. However, there are now mounting concerns in Kyiv that US President Donald Trump’s efforts to reach a compromise peace deal with Putin could leave Ukraine isolated and vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

In the absence of credible NATO-style security guarantees, Ukrainian leaders believe one of the few reliable deterrents would be the proven ability to strike back powerfully at targets inside Russia. Zelenskyy’s “victory plan,” which he presented to Western partners in the final months of 2024, included a call for the supply of long-range missiles as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package” designed to prevent a fresh Russian invasion. In his traditional New Year address, Zelenskyy spoke at length about Ukraine’s numerous new missile models, calling them “arguments for a just peace.”

There is currently very little to suggest that Putin is interested in any kind of peace with Ukraine, of course. On the contrary, he looks to be more confident of victory than ever, and appears unwilling to compromise on his original war aim of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. However, if Ukraine can continue escalating its current wave of attacks on Russia’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, the Russian dictator may be forced to reassess the prospects of his invasion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s ability to adapt has been further demonstrated through the innovative use of civilian infrastructure and technologies. Ukrainian SOF units have effectively incorporated commercial drones, civilian communications networks, and other non-military technologies, showing remarkable creativity in overcoming resource constraints.

One of the most significant lessons from the conflict has been the effective integration of SOF units with conventional military forces engaged in large-scale combat operations. Ukrainian SOF units also played a vital role in preparing the battlefield before and during the initial phases of the invasion. They established networks of resistance, gathered intelligence, and identified key targets that would later prove crucial for conventional forces.

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Ukraine’s achievements since 2022 have owed much to years of solid preparations. Following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces underwent significant transformation with assistance from NATO countries, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. Between 2015 and 2021, Ukraine also implemented major structural reforms to align with NATO standards, including the establishment of dedicated SOF training centers.

These steps helped lay the foundations for a sophisticated network of resistance capabilities across potential invasion routes by early 2022. Ukrainian SOF units mapped key infrastructure, identified potential targets, and established relationships with local civilian networks, while developing protocols for rapid information sharing between SOF units, conventional forces, and civilian resistance elements. These preparations proved vital, enabling Ukrainian forces to target Russian supply lines, command nodes, and communications systems using real-time intelligence.

Throughout the invasion, coordination between Ukrainian SOF units and conventional forces has enabled effective combined arms operations. SOF units frequently act as forward observers, providing targeting data to artillery units and conducting battle damage assessments. The ability to rapidly share intelligence has been particularly important in urban environments, where the complexity of the battlefield requires close cooperation between different military elements.

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Russia’s invasion has reinforced the importance of unconventional warfare in modern conflicts. Ukrainian SOF units have successfully employed various unconventional warfare techniques that have had strategic impacts far beyond their tactical execution.

Ukraine’s implementation of guerrilla tactics and sabotage alongside partisans has been highly effective, with numerous successful operations conducted behind enemy lines. This has included the disruption of Russian supply lines, targeting of key military infrastructure and command centers, and the execution of precision strikes on high-value targets.

The psychological aspect of warfare has proven equally important, with Ukrainian SOF units making significant contributions to information warfare campaigns that have influenced both domestic and international audiences. They have conducted deception operations that have complicated Russian planning and operations, while also executing morale operations targeting both enemy forces and occupied populations.

The successful integration of modern technology has been a key characteristic of Ukrainian SOF operations. Despite facing a far wealthier and numerically superior adversary, Ukrainian SOF units have leveraged various technological capabilities to maintain operational effectiveness. They have utilized commercial technologies for reconnaissance and surveillance, integrated drone operations into tactical planning and execution, and leveraged artificial intelligence and big data analytics for targeting and planning.

Ukraine’s SOF operations provide several critical lessons for the country’s Western partners. In terms of doctrine development, it is clear that military organizations must emphasize flexibility and adaptability in force structure and training, while integrating SOF capabilities more deeply in support of conventional forces.

The importance of technological integration and adaptation cannot be overstated. Future military forces must be prepared to operate in environments where commercial technology plays an increasingly important role, and where the ability to utilize these technologies can provide crucial advantages. In terms of equipment, Western planners should focus on communications jamming and interception, improved surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and integrating AI tools to aid in intelligence collection and analysis.

The role of Ukrainian SOF operations in the current war provides valuable insights for military forces worldwide. Their impact demonstrates the critical importance of adaptability and the effective use of technology in modern warfare. These lessons are particularly relevant as military organizations prepare for future high-intensity conflicts in increasingly complex operational environments.

Doug Livermore is national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America and deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently used his daily video address to emphasize the importance of his country’s air offensive. “I would like to thank all developers and producers of our long-range drones and missiles,” he said on January 26. “Everyone can see their effectiveness. Our weapons are bringing the war back to Russia and reducing Russia’s military potential.”

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Ukraine’s early 2025 bombing campaign owes much to advances made in the development of the country’s drone fleet. Speaking in January, Ukrainian officials claimed the military now has drone models capable of reaching targets located up to 2000 kilometers inside Russia. “Our main goal is to conduct strikes to hit logistics hubs in the rear, ammunition warehouses, and decrease our enemy’s pressure on the front,” commented a battalion commander of Ukraine’s 14th Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment, which is focused specifically on long-range strikes.

In addition to drones, Ukraine’s air offensive is also utilizing the country’s growing missile arsenal. Since 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have revived the domestic missile industry following decades of stagnation as part of efforts to boost firepower and reduce reliance on Western arms supplies. This has resulted in the development of numerous new models including the Palianytsia, Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles. However, scaling production remains a major challenge requiring significant investment, foreign partnerships, and secure manufacturing locations to evade Russian attacks.

A number of Western allies such as Britain and Denmark are already stepping up support for Kyiv’s missile program, which is seen as a cost-effective way of supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Deploying domestically produced Ukrainian missiles also reduces the risk of potential escalations from the use of Western-supplied weapons against targets inside Russia, a key concern among Kyiv’s partners. While this offers obvious advantages, progress is unlikely to be rapid. On the contrary, some experts believe Ukraine will need at least another year before it can increase missile production to levels that could pose a serious threat to Russia.

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Ukraine’s bombing campaign has a number of strategic goals. Most immediately, it disrupts the logistics of Russia’s invasion and increases the cumulative strain on supply chains while reducing the output of Putin’s defense industry. Attacks on energy infrastructure such as ports and refineries are designed to weaken a central pillar of Russia’s war economy, limiting the Kremlin’s ability to generate vital energy export revenues.

Airstrikes deep inside Russia also play a significant role in shaping perceptions of the war. For the Ukrainian public and international audiences, these attacks are convincing evidence of Ukraine’s mounting ability to strike back against Russia despite the Kremlin’s overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. The lack of an emphatic response from Moscow is also further eroding notions of Russian red lines and encouraging Ukraine’s Western allies to overcome their fear of escalation.

Meanwhile, increasing Ukrainian drone and missile strikes are sparking public alarm in Russia and directly undermining the Kremlin’s painstaking efforts to shield ordinary Russians from the consequences of the invasion. Much like Ukraine’s ongoing incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the attacks confirm that the war cannot be contained within the borders of Ukraine and will increasingly spread to Russia itself.

From a longer term perspective, officials in Kyiv hope Ukraine’s proven ability to strike targets deep inside Russia can strengthen the country’s position in possible negotiations and serve as a powerful deterrent against future Russian aggression. With this in mind, Zelenskyy has stated that Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone and missile programs are “our arguments for a just peace.” In order for that argument to be truly persuasive, Ukraine will need to continue increasing the frequency of long-range drone strikes, while also significantly expanding the country’s domestic missile industry.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

North Korea is using Russia’s Ukraine invasion to upgrade its army

Alina Hrytsenko — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:09:38 +0000

The first North Korean soldiers were taken prisoner by Ukraine in early January, providing final confirmation of the Hermit Kingdom’s involvement in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine following initial reports in late 2024. The participation of North Korean troops represents a dangerous escalation in what is already the largest European war since World War II, with potentially alarming implications for global security.

Pyongyang’s support for the Russian war effort began in late 2022 with the delivery of artillery shells. The list of armaments was subsequently expanded to include ballistic missiles. These supplies have helped Russia maintain the momentum of its invasion despite the country’s significantly depleted stores of munitions. With Moscow now also facing manpower shortages and reluctant to order a fresh round of mobilization, the arrival of North Korean troops helps relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians for the war.

While no official data is available, Ukrainian, US, and South Korean sources have estimated that North Korea has sent at least 11,000 soldiers to join Russia’s invasion. Some are believed to be drawn from highly trained elite units. Materials found on dead North Korean troops and battlefield accounts from Ukrainian forces indicate that the heavily indoctrinated North Koreans have been ordered to kill themselves if necessary to avoid being captured alive and taken prisoner.

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Pyongyang has a very specific interest in sending troops to fight against Ukraine. While the deployment is unlikely to dramatically alter the battlefield situation in the Kremlin’s favor, it allows the North Koreans to acquire priceless combat experience, test weapons systems, gain access to Russian military technologies, and secure Moscow’s further assistance in countering UN sanctions.

North Korea currently boasts one of the world’s largest armies with around 1.3 million active soldiers. However, unlike Russia, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has not been directly involved in any major wars for many years. This lack of battlefield experience is a source of considerable concern for North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who is anxious to counter South Korea’s more technologically advanced military.

Sending thousands of troops to fight in the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the KPA with valuable insights into what is widely recognized as the most technologically advanced battlefield environment in the history of warfare. North Korean soldiers are now learning the realities of modern drone warfare first-hand. As a result, North Korea will be “more capable of waging war against its neighbors,” senior US officials have warned.

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Ukrainians have been impressed by the skill and tenacity of the North Koreans they have encountered, including their ability to shoot down drones. “They are young, motivated, physically fit, brave, and good at using small arms. They are also disciplined. They have everything you need for a good infantryman,” Ukrainian army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi told POLITICO.

North Korea is believed to receive significant financial and technological incentives for supplying Putin with soldiers. South Korean intelligence officials estimate that Moscow is paying Pyongyang $2000 per solder each month. While this money is no doubt welcome, the real prize is access to advanced Russian military tech. In exchange for troops, North Korea is believed to be receiving support from Moscow that will help upgrade its military, including the country’s anti-aircraft, submarine, and missile capabilities.

The Ukrainian front also serves as a valuable testing ground for North Korea, allowing the country to assess the effectiveness of the weapons it supplies to Russia. This will make it possible for Pyongyang to improve the quality of its own domestic arms industry and adapt future output to the realities of the modern battlefield. Meanwhile, the troops who survive their time on the Ukrainian front lines are expected to return home and become instructors, sharing their knowledge of modern warfare with colleagues.

At this point, North Korea’s participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine looks to be less about supporting Putin’s imperial ambitions and more about upgrading Kim Jong Un’s war machine. In the short term, the presence of North Korean soldiers is allowing Russia to overcome mounting manpower shortages. But with Russia believed to be losing tens of thousands of troops each month, there is little chance that Pyongyang will be able to fully satisfy Moscow’s insatiable demand for additional manpower.

Looking ahead, the historically unprecedented appearance of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe could alter the security equation on the Korean peninsula and beyond. “For the first time in decades, the North Korean army is gaining real military experience,” commented Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andrii Yusov. “This is a global challenge. Not just for Ukraine and Europe, but for the entire world.”

Alina Hrytsenko is an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies.

A better way to ensure public safety and security from drones

E. Aaron Brady — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 15:51:07 +0000

Last month, many Americans on the East Coast were watching the skies, and not just for Santa and his flying reindeer. In December, the news was full of reports of unidentified drones spotted over New Jersey and New York. Many of these flights were perfectly legal, yet some flouted existing regulations, including airspace violations over airports and military facilities. At the time, then President-elect Donald Trump, Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and several other prominent US politicians called for the drones to be shot down. Some leaders, such as Governor Kathy Hochul of New York, demanded policy changes to address the uncertainty and concern the drone reports caused. A month has passed since these reports, and the issue seems to have faded into the background. But it would be a mistake not to draw important lessons from this episode. As private and commercial small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) continue to proliferate, similar situations are likely to occur in the future, and they could be more disruptive than the brief dustup in December.

The core issue underlying the New Jersey drone concerns is one of public perception. Citizens felt unsafe and political leaders searched for solutions. Potential solutions generally fell into two groups: intervention and policy change. However, existing policy is not lacking; rather, the main impediment is that local and state authorities need the capability to respond meaningfully to sUAS incidents. To ensure public safety and security, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should work with local and state authorities to implement law enforcement networks based on the principles seen in military integrated air defense networks, although at a smaller (and less expensive) scale.

Current policies

Since its inception in the 1950s, the FAA has been responsible for almost all aviation matters, including airspace management and enforcement. In 2012, Congress mandated that the FAA plan for sUAS usage by both private and commercial operators. In 2016, the agency published Part 107 to fulfill the mandate. Among other rules, sUAS operators were required to remain below four hundred feet above the ground, and night flights required anti-collision lights visible from at least three miles away. Notably, since 2021, sUAS have been required to broadcast an identification signal referred to as Remote ID. This signal is effectively a digital license plate, both identifying the drone and providing the operator’s location.

The regulatory policies failed in December because authorities could not identify the sUAS or their operators. However, it remains unclear if the policies failed because the sUAS were not in compliance or simply because authorities did not possess the ability to receive the Remote ID information. A June 2024 Government Accountability Office report suggested that in earlier instances of drone encounters, the latter cause was more likely than the former. Additionally, since many of the drones in December were spotted because they were following anti-collision light regulations, it stands to reason that many of the drone operators may also have been complying with Remote ID requirements. The question stands: Did enforcement agencies simply lack the capacity to receive the broadcasted information?

The issue of enforcement

Considering the issues with Remote ID described above, it is unlikely that the regulations themselves were the failure point. It’s more likely that authorities instead lacked both the ability to address public concerns by being able to identify the drones and the capability to intervene in those sUAS flights that were violating the law.

This is partly because the FAA, while focused on safety, is the agency responsible for aviation enforcement. But the FAA lacks the ability to rapidly respond to sUAS incidents and instead relies heavily on local and state authorities to deal with such incidents. The enforcement question, therefore, is what do local and state law enforcement agencies need to effectively police the low-altitude skies?

Police regularly patrol to detect potential legal violations and intervene quickly when necessary. The same logic should hold true for the very low-altitude area in which sUAS operate. While the FAA should retain overall authority for this region, local and state authorities should actively police this domain to ensure compliance with federal statutes and FAA regulations. The National Guard and state militias may be able to assist with some of these operational problems, and military concepts related to air defense illustrate how law enforcement agencies might best resolve this issue.

Integrated air defense systems

Militaries develop aggregated networks known as integrated air defense systems (IADS) to defend airspace. IADS are not unitary systems; they can range from basic to incredibly complicated systems of systems. Broadly speaking, IADS are comprised of three components: air surveillance, weapons control, and battle management.

Air surveillance makes up the systems and processes which detect, identify, and track air objects. Air surveillance is synonymous with the detection function in UAS security discussions. Weapons control is target engagement. Within weapons control there may be several processes occurring to acquire, track, and engage the target. Depending on the engagement system, this can be as simple as pulling a trigger or it can be a complicated sequence of actions to operate an advanced device.

The gap within UAS security discussions is battle management. One description of IADS states that battle management includes: threat evaluation, engagement decision, weapon selection, and engagement authority. This is the critical missing piece to the domestic counter-UAS discussion. Someone must assess what is happening in the air and decide what to do. Clearly, UAS flying in the United States does not constitute a “battle.” Nevertheless, the concept of a centralized command-and-control node holds true, and such a system would likely have prevented much of the public furor in December.

Completing the “enforcement chain”

How might the incident in December have been different with these capabilities? Imagine a management center receiving surveillance information to quickly resolve calls from concerned citizens to identify the drones. State police could have responded to illegal activity and handled the situation, including the ability to safely neutralize the drone if necessary.

A state-wide management center might have received surveillance information of the low-altitude air domain to both identify potential enforcement issues and to serve as a primary conduit to other agencies, especially the FAA’s Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP), if questions arose or authorities perceived a need for intervention. Given the FAA’s area of responsibility, any direct intervention against sUAS should only be conducted with FAA approval, unless local law enforcement must act to protect people or property. Yet, since there is a paucity of LEAP agents in the country, such a management center could dramatically improve coordination between local, state, and federal agencies.

Assessing the costs

These capabilities are costly but not cost prohibitive. Much like the FAA’s NextGen air traffic control system will rely on GPS-based position broadcasts from aircraft as opposed to traditional radars, a detection network can rely on Remote ID sensors rather than more expensive active sensors. If one assumes that many of the sUAS observed in December were complying with FAA regulations, then many could have been identified by an appropriate detector.

For example, Morris County, New Jersey, where the drone sightings began, is about 482 square miles in size and appropriated $77.8 million for public safety in 2024. Many commercially available Remote ID detectors can range between two and five miles, and some can sense much farther. These detectors range in cost between $1,500 and $3,000 for mid-grade to advanced models. Assuming a three-mile detection range and not accounting for terrain, a detector network covering all of Morris County (an excessively large network) would require fewer than twenty detectors costing about $60,000, or less than 0.01 percent of Morris County’s annual public safety expenditures.

Networking the detectors and linking them to a management center would be more costly, of course, but certainly should be affordable, especially if spread over several years. In 2024, the state of New Jersey appropriated $880 million for public safety. A small fraction of this could be used over several years to develop the necessary infrastructure, which should be primarily software, and train a small crew to staff the center. Additionally, given the FAA’s overall authority, Congress could appropriate money to enable the FAA to create standards for these law enforcement centers and help design and field appropriate software applications.

In short, creating this system will not be free, but it need not be excessively expensive. One way that states can keep expenses low is to choose where to establish these capabilities. For example, it may not be necessary for a state like North Dakota to establish a surveillance network anywhere except over urban areas. Indeed, the North Dakotan government may not need to create a management center at all, relying instead on county or city governments to monitor and manage their areas. Each state and municipality will have its own priorities and physical characteristics influencing the design of the system. States are not trying to build military-grade IADS, but they should be trying to create an adequate law enforcement network for the low-altitude domain.

Securing the skies

Ensuring public safety in low-altitude domestic airspace requires governments to solve three problems. First, detection capabilities need to spread and should integrate to form a cohesive “picture” of the low-altitude air domain. Second, states need to establish basic management functions for very low altitude air law enforcement. Finally, authorities should procure and train personnel to use UAS mitigation systems. Some specific recommendations are:

Detection:

The FAA should accelerate the development of methods for local and state law enforcement to rapidly access Remote ID information.
States, in coordination with the FAA, should decide whether to build a state-wide detection network or focus on municipalities. A sparsely populated state should lean toward municipal networks while a very developed state should hew toward a state-wide network. Regardless, states and the FAA should ensure that data is networked together to form a coherent picture of airspace below 1,000 feet above the surface.

Management:

States or counties, in coordination with the FAA, should introduce a basic management center which can assess the information gathered by the detection network; act as a communications hub with other agencies, especially the FAA’s LEAP agents; and dispatch mobile mitigation teams.
The FAA should establish standards and help create baseline applications for centralized center usage.

Mitigation:

States or counties, in coordination with the FAA, should train and equip mitigation teams available to respond throughout an area to UAS incidents. Once on-scene, these teams should be able to identify specific UAS, neutralize or capture the UAS, and/or locate the operator based on Remote ID information for follow-on enforcement action.

Within each area, policymakers and leaders should recognize the overall authority of the federal government and the FAA over aviation. At the same time, Congress and the FAA should embrace the reality that local and state authorities will enforce UAS policy. Put simply, they are the ones who are there. This means that the federal government and the FAA should actively support state authorities in developing UAS security capabilities so that the next drone issue is mitigated before it becomes another drama like the one in December.

E. Aaron Brady is a US Air Force officer and A-10 instructor pilot with more than 2,500 flight hours currently serving as a national defense fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Air University, or any other US government agency.

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Ukraine’s escalating air attacks bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia

Maria Avdeeva — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 21:01:13 +0000

Ukraine launched what officials termed as the country’s “most massive” air attack of the war this week as Kyiv seeks to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. In the early hours of January 14, Ukrainian drones and missiles struck a series of strategic targets in multiple Russian regions including Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, and Tatarstan. The strikes at distances of up to 1000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border underscored Ukraine’s growing capacity to conduct long-range bombardments against high-value Russian targets.

This week’s attack was notable both for its scale and sophistication, with drones and missiles deployed in coordinated airstrikes that exploited the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Representatives of Ukraine’s 14th Separate Regiment of Unmanned Aerial Systems confirmed that decoy drones were used to distract and overwhelm Russian air defenses, creating openings for missiles to hit primary targets. Once defenses were compromised, some targets were then struck by additional waves of long-range drones.

While Russian officials remain tight-lipped over the scale of the damage inflicted, media reports and open source data indicate that a range of military and industrial objects were hit. Targets included oil refineries and storage facilities, an airbase used for attacks against Ukraine, and various industrial plants involved in the production of materials critical for the Russian war effort.

These simultaneous strikes against multiple high-priority targets deep inside Russia highlight Ukraine’s ability to conduct increasingly complex long-range air operations. The attacks of January 14 required close coordination between Ukrainian drone and missile crews along with military intelligence and special operations units.

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Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone industry is at the heart of the escalating air war inside Russia. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukrainian drone production has increased dramatically, with hundreds of new companies from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector emerging to develop and manufacture a wide array of different drone models.

The Ukrainian authorities have sought to make the most of this potential, establishing the Brave1 platform in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the Ukrainian military, state organs, private sector developers, and investors. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a new branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare. The creation of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces underlined the country’s emphasis on innovation as Kyiv seeks to compensate for Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and other vital military resources.

In addition to an expanding arsenal of long-range strike drones, Ukraine is also working hard to develop domestic missile production. In recent months, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has showcased a number of new missiles as Kyiv looks to reduce its dependence on Western partners for the supply of missiles capable of hitting targets inside Russia.

This emphasis on domestic drone and missile production is part of a broader shift away from reliance on foreign military aid. It also reflects longstanding frustration in Ukraine over the reluctance of the country’s partners to authorize attacks inside Russia due to fears of possible retaliation from the Kremlin. While US President Joe Biden partially lifted restrictions on strikes against Russian targets in late 2024, President-elect Donald Trump has since been critical of the decision. This has added weight to arguments that Ukraine must rely on its own drones and missiles to strike back against Russia.

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The impact of Ukrainian airstrikes inside Russia goes far beyond disruption to military logistics, damage to oil refineries, and reductions in Russia’s military output. Together with the ongoing Ukrainian occupation of hundreds of square kilometers in Russia’s Kursk region, Ukraine’s air war is undermining the illusion of Putin’s invulnerability and eroding Russian confidence in the Kremlin’s ability to defend the country.

Since February 2022, the Putin regime has gone to great lengths to shield the Russian public from the consequences of the war in Ukraine while maintaining an air of normality. However, frequent footage on social media of burning Russian infrastructure and powerful Ukrainian airstrikes is now directly challenging Moscow’s tightly controlled narrative. This is causing a visible change in mood, with even leading regime propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov now voicing their displeasure over the failure of Russia’s air defenses.

Growing signs of demoralization within Russia reflect the sobering realization that the country’s existing air defenses are unable to cope with Ukraine’s growing deep strike capabilities. For Kyiv, this represents an important window of opportunity. In all likelihood, Russia will eventually address the vulnerabilities of its vast military and industrial infrastructure to drone and missile attacks. However, if Ukraine can continue expanding the current air offensive in the coming months, it could succeed in striking a significant blow to the Russian war effort.

For now, Ukraine’s air attacks are sending a clear message to Moscow and to Kyiv’s own partners that the Ukrainian military is capable of escalating on its own terms and does not share Western concerns over so-called Russian red lines. Maintaining this momentum and securing the means to continue offensive strikes inside Russia will be paramount to determining not just the direction of the war, but also its eventual outcome.

Maria Avdeeva is a Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Emadeddin Badi and Abdullah al-Jabassini — Mon, 13 Jan 2025 16:55:22 +0000

The Mediterranean has always been a theater of rivalries, shifting alliances, and calculated gambles, and Turkey has once again thrown its dice. Ankara’s announcement of a potential Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement with Syria’s new government mirrors Turkey’s 2019 maritime pact with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA). That earlier agreement allowed Turkey to claim a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, reshaping regional dynamics to its advantage. Today, Ankara is pursuing a similar strategy in Syria, seeking to create facts on water as it did on land, using the promise of economic and political support to position itself as a dominant player in the country. These parallel maneuvers underscore Ankara’s broader vision of Libya and Syria as interconnected pillars of its geopolitical strategy in the Mediterranean, where actions in one arena bolster influence in the other.

Central to this strategy is Turkey’s proclivity to leverage military interventions, political agreements, and economic tools to advance its objectives. In Libya, Turkey’s 2019 intervention secured it a critical foothold through the deployment of drones, Syrian mercenaries, and direct military support. This allowed Ankara to negotiate an EEZ agreement that, from its vantage point, redefined maritime boundaries and challenged the claims of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The agreement was not merely an economic gambit; it was a strategic move to confront Mediterranean rivals over territorial waters and energy resources. Five years later, Ankara is seeking to establish an EEZ agreement with Syria’s new government that would extend its maritime claims further into the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey frames these actions as legitimate assertions of its rights, regional powers are likely to view them as provocations that deepen tensions in an already volatile environment.

Balancing Russia in Libya

Libya occupies a central role in Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy, serving as a gateway for Ankara’s regional ambitions and a platform for projecting influence. The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which established a long-contested maritime boundary, has been criticized for raising unresolved sovereignty issues and its questionable legality under international law. Beyond these legal challenges, Turkey’s position in Libya is further complicated by Russia’s entrenched involvement. Through the Wagner Group—recently rebranded as the Africa Corps—Moscow has bolstered Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar’s forces, securing itself its own foothold in Haftar’s areas of control. Reports of Russian arms transfers over Turkish-controlled airspace from Syria’s Hmeimim airbase to eastern Libya after the fall of Damascus exemplify the paradoxical nature of the Turkey-Russia rivalry. On the surface, such developments may appear transactional, but they reflect Ankara’s broader strategy: maintaining escalation dominance by setting boundaries on Russian operations while leveraging its role as a regional balancer to extract strategic advantages.

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This balancing act underscores Turkey’s calculated pragmatism in Libya, where collaboration with Russia acts as both a counterweight to regional adversaries and a measured gamble. By permitting Moscow’s logistical transfers, Ankara has transformed a potential liability into a tool of strategic leverage, subtly positioning itself to influence Russian ambitions in Africa while reaffirming its indispensability to NATO and fortifying its regional clout. However, this strategy is not without vulnerabilities. The delicate balancing required to manage Moscow’s activities leaves Ankara exposed to the risks of miscalculation, overreach, and dependency. Disruptions in its arrangement with Russia—or fractures in its relationships with NATO allies, regional powers, or Libyan factions—could unravel Ankara’s hard-won gains, imperiling its broader Mediterranean ambitions and leaving its geopolitical foothold exposed.

Flexing muscle in Syria

In Syria, Turkey’s intervention was initially driven by the need to address immediate security threats, primarily removing the self-proclaimed Islamic State and containing Kurdish forces seeking to expand territorial control in northern Syria. However, with the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, Ankara recalibrated its approach, merging economic and geopolitical ambitions with its security objectives. The prospect of an EEZ agreement with Syria mirrors the dynamics of the 2019 Libya pact. While such a pact could offer maritime gains and deepen Turkey’s influence in the region, it is fraught with risks. Greece, Cyprus, and other European powers are likely to view such an agreement as an illegal and destabilizing move, further polarizing regional dynamics and intensifying disputes over energy and sovereignty.

Turkey’s approach in Syria also reflects its broader ambitions to integrate its strategies across theaters, enhancing its influence through interconnected policies. The country’s pursuit of maritime gains in Syria builds on the successes of its Libya agreement while highlighting the risks inherent in replicating this strategy in a different geopolitical context. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as Ankara navigates volatile rivalries and shifting alliances. The integration of its strategies underscores Turkey’s vision of the Mediterranean as a unified arena for projecting power.

However, significant challenges loom in Syria, the most salient of which stem from Israel. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli airstrikes have escalated, targeting countless military installations and destroying aircraft, radar systems, and missile sites. Simultaneously, Israeli forces have conducted incursions and expanded their presence beyond the occupied Golan Heights, particularly in the Quneitra province of southern Syria. These actions reflect dissatisfaction with Syria’s current trajectory. There is a widespread perception within Israel that Syria risks becoming a Turkish protectorate, a scenario that would severely constrain Israel’s military latitude in the region. This concern is compounded by the belief that Iran will continue to maneuver for influence, viewing Syria’s strategic assets as too valuable to relinquish. In this context, a Syria rebuilt under the leadership of Arab states is seen as a far more desirable outcome, curbing the influence of both Turkey and Iran while pre-emptively neutralizing their resurgence.

Should this vision prove unattainable, Israel may resort to curbing Turkish influence by undermining Syria’s unity, channeling support to ethnic and religious minorities to fragment the country and weaken Ankara’s position. This could set the stage for a potential collision course between the two. The interplay of this rivalry highlights the fragile nature of Ankara’s ambitions, with Israel emerging as perhaps its most formidable challenge. Tel Aviv’s ability to operate beyond traditional international norms, as starkly demonstrated in Gaza, and to secure the unwavering support of Ankara’s traditional Western allies—regardless of its methods—exposes the looming asymmetry Turkey faces in this geopolitical contest.

Strengthening influence in the Mediterranean

Anticipating the challenges to its broader Mediterranean aspirations, Turkey is building synergies between its strategies in Libya and Syria to maximize its leverage, reflecting its broader ambition to reshape the Mediterranean’s geopolitical map and strengthen its negotiating position. In Libya, Ankara has adapted to the shifting political landscape, engaging with Eastern Libyan factions and the Haftar family to expand its influence. This outreach signals a pragmatic shift from confrontation to cautious diplomacy, as Turkey seeks to transform former adversaries into cooperative stakeholders while navigating the crowded Libyan geopolitical arena. In Syria, Turkey’s political influence has positioned it as a linchpin for regional engagement with the Syrian government, mediating between Damascus and key external actors, including Arab states, European Union countries, and potentially Russia. Ankara’s subtle gatekeeper role sharpens its leverage, turning regional rivalries into stepping stones for its own ascent.

By aligning its strategies in Libya and Syria, Turkey seeks to consolidate influence and amplify its leverage across both theaters. This calculated approach underscores Ankara’s effort to position itself as an indispensable actor in the Mediterranean, translating tactical maneuvers into broader geopolitical gains while pre-empting challenges that threaten its ambitions. Yet, this high-stakes strategy leaves Turkey exposed. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as advances in one arena could rapidly unravel in another.

The return of US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House this month looms as perhaps the most significant determinant shaping the region’s dynamics. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer Ankara opportunities to assert itself more aggressively, particularly as it leverages its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, this same approach raises the specter of greater US disengagement from regional conflicts, leaving Turkey to face escalating challenges from Moscow, Israel, and other regional powers without the backing of its traditional Western allies. The uncertainty of this geopolitical environment underscores the precariousness of Turkey’s gains, where advances in one theater could rapidly unravel in another, placing its broader Mediterranean strategy on a knife’s edge.

Ultimately, Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy reflects both ambition and vulnerability, a delicate dance on shifting sands where every advance risks triggering a cascade of challenges. Much like Ankara views Libya and Syria as interconnected theaters, Western actors should embrace this moment of change to recalibrate their bilateral relations with Turkey, recognizing shared interests in maritime stability and regional development.

In Libya, this means supporting a political process that moderates a Turko-Russian oligopolistic arrangement while promoting stability and inclusivity to align with shared Turko-Western priorities. In Syria, targeted sanctions relief and reconstruction efforts tied to an inclusive political framework can support stabilization efforts and address immediate needs. By anchoring their engagement with Turkey in mutual interests and shared goals, Western actors can transform competition into cooperation. This recalibration will be pivotal in shaping whether Turkey’s Mediterranean gambit becomes a cornerstone of regional stability or a foundation of enduring fragility.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Abdullah al-Jabassini is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

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Ukraine hopes robot army can counter Russia’s battlefield advantages

David Kirichenko — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 16:38:26 +0000

In December 2024, Ukrainian forces operating north of Kharkiv reportedly conducted their first ever attack on Russian positions using exclusively unmanned technologies. This landmark military operation, which featured a combination of machine gun-equipped ground drones and kamikaze aerial drones, underscored Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated use of robotic systems, while also highlighting the evolving role being played by these technologies on the modern battlefield.

As Ukrainian commanders prepare for a fourth year of combat in Europe’s largest war since World War II, they are now hoping that their country’s growing arsenal of robotic systems can help counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. “Ukrainian officials have repeatedly highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to utilize technological innovations and asymmetric strike capabilities to offset Ukraine’s manpower limitations in contrast with Russia’s willingness to accept unsustainable casualty rates for marginal territorial gains,” noted the Institute for the Study of War in late 2024.

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Ukraine’s emphasis on unmanned robotic systems certainly makes good sense. While overall Ukrainian casualties during the first three years of the full-scale invasion are thought to be significantly lower than Russian losses, Russia’s far larger population means Ukraine has little prospect of success in a grinding war of attrition. Over the past year, reports of Ukrainian mobilization challenges and personnel shortages have become more and more frequent, with desertion rates also reaching record highs.

With the Ukrainian military outnumbered and outgunned, defense tech innovations have played an important part in Kyiv’s war effort since 2022. Many of Ukraine’s key advances have come via the country’s vibrant startup sector, much of which pivoted to military projects in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In July 2024, the Associated Press reported that Ukraine had developed an ecosystem of laboratories to create a robot army, with around 250 defense startups active in secret locations “that typically look like rural car repair shops.”

The Ukrainian government has sought to support these grassroots efforts with the creation of initiatives like the BRAVE1 defense tech cluster, which was established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the private sector, the state, and the Ukrainian military. In a move hailed by officials in Kyiv as a unique development, Ukraine launched a dedicated drone warfare branch of the country’s military in summer 2024. The establishment of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces demonstrated that Kyiv was preparing for “the war of the future, not the war of the past,” commented USF commander Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi.

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Robotic systems alone cannot solve the Ukrainian military’s manpower shortages. At present, the focus is on developing technologies capable of performing a range of specific combat and logistical tasks. For example, Ukraine plans to deploy tens of thousands of robotic ground vehicles along the one thousand kilometer front line of the war during 2024. These systems will handle functions including mine-laying and de-mining, the delivery of ammunition and other supplies to troops in trenches, and the evacuation of wounded soldiers to rear positions where they can receive medical treatment.

Unmanned ground vehicles are seen by Ukrainian military planners as a particularly effective response to the ubiquity of reconnaissance and attack drones above the battlefield. With the entire front line area now under more or less constant surveillance, it can be extremely difficult for soldiers to move about above ground, and virtually impossible to travel in vehicles without electronic jamming devices. Robotic systems capable of operating in dangerous environments can go some way to addressing this problem, and can help make sure front line units are resupplied in a timely fashion.

The Ukrainian army’s use of robotic systems is already attracting consideration international attention. With new models typically undergoing testing in combat conditions, the cycle from development to deployment is often exceptionally dynamic, creating unprecedented opportunities for defense tech companies. Maintaining Ukraine’s current rapid pace of innovation is recognized as vital in order to remain one step ahead of Russia, which is also investing heavily in robotic systems and drones.

With Ukrainian efforts to implement AI technologies expected to advance in 2025, there are concerns that the fledgling robot armies currently taking shape on the battlefields of Ukraine could reduce the barriers to killing and dramatically escalate the potential for future conflicts. However, with their country fighting for survival, Ukrainian defense tech developers are primarily concerned with saving the lives of their compatriots and defeating Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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One particularly important category is interceptor drones. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as the world’s first large-scale drone war. Since February 2022, drone technologies have evolved at a remarkable rate. As attack and reconnaissance drones have become more and more ubiquitous above the battlefield, the need for effective interceptor drones has become increasingly apparent.

In April 2024, Ukraine launched a competition to identify the most effective interceptor drone solutions, with dozens of Ukrainian drone manufacturers participating. One of these models is already credited with around twenty confirmed hits on enemy spy drones and is now being used by Ukrainian drone units on the Kursk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia fronts.

Ukrainian drone producers have also managed to develop effective domestic alternatives to widely used Chinese drone models. This is a significant step forward. While Chinese drones have proved important workhorses of the drone war, their prominence has left Ukraine dangerously dependent on imports and vulnerable to possible disruption in supply chains. Domestically produced alternatives allow the Ukrainian military to reduce this reliance on China.

Ukraine’s efforts to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) technologies advanced in 2024, with the development of drones capable of locking onto targets identified by operators during the final phase of flight prior to impact. This helped neutralize Russian electronic warfare jamming technologies, which typically seek to disrupt the connection between drones and operators. Ukrainian developers are now working on the next stage in the evolution of AI-driven drones. The goal is to produce a new generation of drones that utilize artificial intelligence not only at the final targeting stage, but throughout their flight.

2024 was also the year when Ukraine brought Putin’s invasion home to Russia and made the enemy realize that their domestic front was no longer safe from attack. This was made possible thanks to a growing arsenal of long-range strike drones developed by Ukrainian manufacturers with ranges in excess of one thousand kilometers. Further long-range drone innovations are expected in 2025.

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The defense tech advances of the past year have had a significant impact on the Ukrainian war effort. However, it is important to underline that in modern warfare, the innovation contest is a constant struggle that requires a high degree of creativity, consistency, and coordination. With new technologies appearing on the battlefield on an almost daily basis, any delays in the chain from development to deployment can prove deadly.

Nobody can predict exactly what defense tech challenges may emerge during the coming months. Nevertheless, it is already possible to identify a number of strategic priorities for the Ukrainian military in 2025.

Ukraine’s domestic missile program gained pace in 2024 and is poised to play a far greater role in the war during the coming year. Producing missiles domestically allows Ukraine to attack targets inside Russia at a time when some of the country’s Western partners remain reluctant to authorize strikes for fear of escalation. Many of the breakthroughs achieved in this direction have already been made public. In 2025, Russia may be surprised to learn exactly how far Ukraine’s domestic missile production has advanced.

As the nature of drone warfare becomes ever more sophisticated, the tactics employed by drone forces are also evolving. Ukraine’s drone units are already beginning to move beyond the initial concept of “one drone, one operator,” and will be looking to transition toward more widespread use of drone swarm technologies in 2025. From a military perspective, it is critical for Ukraine to outpace the enemy in the deployment of this next generation technology.

Anti-drone defenses will also be a 2025 priority. Almost every single day, Ukraine is attacked by large numbers of Russian Shahed drones that frequently damage civilian targets including residential buildings and energy infrastructure. Russian drone production is rapidly increasing, with regular upgrades to drone design making these weapons difficult to counter. This will likely remain a major challenge for Ukrainian air defense teams and for the country’s defense tech industry throughout the coming year.

Nataliia Kushnerska is Head of Ukraine’s Brave1 defense tech cluster.

Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 19 Dec 2024 22:31:29 +0000

The war unleashed by Russia almost three years ago in Ukraine is rightly recognized as one of the great crimes of the twenty-first century. Understandably, little attention has been paid so far to the impact the conflict is having on Ukraine’s international image. And yet amid the trauma and horror of Russia’s invasion, there are growing signs that the unprecedented media spotlight on Ukraine since 2022 is gradually helping to transform global perceptions of the country. As a result, Ukraine is now finally emerging from a prolonged period of international obscurity that has hindered the country’s progress for centuries.

International ignorance of Ukraine has been a feature since long before the country regained independence in 1991. Following the Soviet collapse, little was done to address this lack of outside awareness or strengthen Ukraine’s national brand in the global arena. This low profile helped set the stage for Russia’s disinformation efforts, with foreign audiences often prepared to believe all manner of outlandish lies about a country that was otherwise unknown to them. Thanks to the recent media focus on Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists are now finding that their distortions are not so readily accepted. This is an ongoing process, but it is already possible to identify a number of important facts about Ukraine that have taken root in the international consciousness since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

1. Ukraine is not Russia

The fact that Ukraine is not Russia may seem insultingly obvious when viewed from a Ukrainian perspective, but in reality this was the fundamental image problem facing the country in 2022. Indeed, it is no coincidence that on the eve of the full-scale invasion, Vladimir Putin published an entire essay denying the legitimacy of a separate Ukrainian state on the grounds that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”).

Putin did not invent this narrative of Ukraine denial himself. His predecessors have been insisting that Ukraine is an inalienable part of Russia since at least the eighteenth century, and have ruthlessly manipulated the historical record to support their arguments. Throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras, anyone attempting to counter this Great Russian narrative or highlight Ukraine’s long statehood struggle was treated as a dangerous heretic subject to the harshest of punishments.

For generations, Russia was able to impose its imperial propaganda on international audiences, with Ukrainians silenced and Ukraine misleadingly portrayed as an intrinsic part of Russia’s own historical heartlands. It was therefore understandable that when an independent Ukraine appeared on the map in 1991, many had trouble distinguishing it from Russia. This created much confusion and went some way to legitimizing subsequent Russian attempts to reassert its authority over Ukraine.

The full-scale invasion has changed all that. Since February 2022, international perceptions of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine have undergone a radical transformation as global audiences have witnessed the ferocity of the Russian attack and the determination of Ukraine’s national defense. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin has killed hundreds of thousands and shattered millions of lives; it has also finally buried the Kremlin myth of Russians and Ukrainians as “one people.” As the invasion approaches the three-year mark, it is now safe to say that anyone who continues to insist on the indivisibility of Russia and Ukraine is either acting in bad faith, or is so stunningly ignorant that their opinion can be disregarded.

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2. Ukraine is huge

Prewar Ukraine’s low international profile encouraged many to imagine the country as an obscure and irrelevant statelet whose fate mattered little to the wider world. Meanwhile, very few people seemed to appreciate that Ukraine was in fact the largest country wholly in Europe. That is no longer the case. Throughout the past three years, the map of Ukraine has featured relentlessly in the international press. Even casual observers have grown familiar with the outline of the country, and cannot have failed to notice how large it looms over its European neighbors.

Media coverage of battlefield developments has also helped to emphasize the sheer size of Ukraine. Despite regular war reports of major offensives and record advances, the overall picture of the front lines has changed little since the first year of the war, underlining the comparative vastness of Ukraine. While Ukraine may still appear small when compared to Russia, it is a huge country by European standards. Growing awareness of this fact is helping to shape perceptions of Ukraine’s geopolitical significance.

3. Ukraine is an agricultural superpower

Prior to 2022, Ukraine was probably best known to many around the world as the site of the Chornobyl disaster. Associations with the world’s worst nuclear accident were particularly unfortunate as Ukraine is anything but a radioactive wasteland. In reality, the country’s real claim to fame is as the breadbasket of Europe. Ukraine’s fabled black soil is among the most fertile land in the entire world, making much of the country a giant garden of agrarian abundance.

Since 2022, Russia’s invasion has helped educate international audiences about Ukraine’s crucial role in global food security. Extensive media coverage of Russia’s Black Sea naval blockade has highlighted the importance of Ukrainian agricultural exports, with disruption caused by Moscow’s interference leading to famine fears in Africa and price hikes on basic foodstuffs throughout the West. Growing awareness of Ukraine’s status as an agricultural superpower has undermined Kremlin efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a strictly local affair, and has mobilized international opposition to the war.

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4. Ukraine is an innovation hub

For decades, international perceptions of Ukraine were plagued by lazy cliches depicting the country as a terminally corrupt backwater on the vodka-soaked fringes of Eastern Europe. These deeply unflattering caricatures of Ukrainian stagnation were always misleading. They are now also hopelessly outdated. Since 2022, Ukraine has demonstrated that it is a sophisticated high tech nation capable of more than holding its own in the most technologically advanced war the world has ever seen. Ukraine’s ability to develop, deploy, and update its own domestically-produced weapons systems on an almost daily basis has done much to debunk the negative stereotypes of old and establish the country’s reputation as a leading innovation hub.

Ukrainian defense tech companies have been responsible for a string of particularly innovative battlefield solutions that have caught the eye of global defense industry giants and helped Ukraine even up the odds against the country’s far larger and wealthier enemy. For example, ground-breaking Ukrainian marine drones have turned the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea and forced Russia’s entire fleet to retreat from Crimea, while Ukrainian long-range drones routinely strike targets deep inside Russia. As a result, “Made in Ukraine” is now recognized as a stamp of quality throughout the international security sector. This image transformation is already attracting international investors and will shape Ukraine’s economic development for decades to come, with the country’s defense industry and broader tech sector set to be in high demand.

5. Ukraine is united

The full-scale invasion has seriously undermined longstanding Russian efforts to portray Ukraine as a country irrevocably split along geographical and ideological lines. The narrative of a divided Ukraine has been a mainstay of Kremlin propaganda since the Soviet era, and has been central to the disinformation that has accompanied the escalating Russian aggression of the past two decades. For many years, this crude oversimplification of Ukraine’s regional complexities proved superficially persuasive among international audiences, but it has been decisively debunked by Ukraine’s united response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Ukrainians across the country have overwhelmingly rallied in opposition to the invading Russians, with residents in supposedly “pro-Russian” cities such as Odesa and Kharkiv proving no less determined to defend themselves and their homes. This is not to say that regional diversity is no longer a feature in today’s Ukraine, of course. On the contrary, Ukraine remains just as subject to regional differences as any other large European nation. However, the Russian invasion has shattered the myth of a terminally divided Ukraine and proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the vast majority of Ukrainians bitterly oppose the idea of a Russian reunion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Meanwhile, a long-range version of Ukraine’s domestically produced Neptune cruise missile is expected to become operational in the near future. The Neptune is currently best known as the weapon used to sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, during the initial months of the Russian invasion in spring 2022.

In addition to these developments, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry recently announced plans to deliver more than 30,000 long-range attack drones in 2025, with production partially financed by international partners. Since the beginning of 2024, Ukraine has conducted an extensive air offensive against Russia’s energy industry and military infrastructure using long-range drones. With domestic output now reaching record levels, the coming year is likely to witness a sharp escalation in Ukrainian attacks.

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Ukraine’s efforts to expand the domestic production of long-range weapons reflect widespread frustration in Kyiv over restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners on attacks inside Russia. For almost the entire war, Western leaders have prevented Ukraine from striking back against Russian targets due to concerns over possible retaliatory measures from the Kremlin. This has allowed Russia to launch attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure with impunity, while forcing Ukraine to effectively defend itself with one arm tied behind its back.

The United States and other partners recently relaxed these restrictions and authorized some categories of Ukrainian strikes inside Russia using Western weapons. However, a number of constraints are believed to remain in place. The missiles provided to Ukraine by the country’s Western allies also have a relatively modest maximum range of up to 300 kilometers, making them of limited use against a country as vast as Russia.

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Many in Kyiv believe an expanded long-range arsenal is essential in order to secure a viable peace with Russia. Advocates of increased long-range strikes argue that unless Ukraine is able to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia, the Kremlin dictator will have little reason to seek a settlement. They believe that missile attacks can weaken Russia’s military potential while also starving Putin’s war machine of funding by targeting oil refineries and other elements of the country’s economically crucial but highly vulnerable energy industry.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly stressed the importance of being able to strike targets deep inside Russia, and has frequently pressed Ukraine’s allies to supply more long-range weapons. His recently presented victory plan reportedly contained one confidential segment proposing the delivery of US-made Tomahawk missiles with a range of almost 2,500 kilometers as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package.” While this request was widely dismissed as unrealistic, it underlined the importance attached to long-range strike capabilities among officials in Kyiv as Ukrainian policymakers search for the tools to secure a lasting peace.

Recent increases in the production of long-range drones and missiles come as Ukraine seeks to revive the country’s long-neglected defense industry and reduce reliance on military aid. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukraine has managed to dramatically increase domestic output in areas ranging from armored vehicles and artillery shells to electronic warfare equipment and naval drones. Much of this is being financed by Ukraine’s partners, who are being encouraged to place orders with Ukrainian producers.

As talk turns to the possibility of a peace deal once Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukrainians are taking nothing for granted and are preparing for a fourth year of Europe’s largest war since World War II. They hope that by enhancing their ability to strike back inside Russia, they will be able to increase the pressure on Vladimir Putin and strengthen their own position ahead of any negotiations.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

How NATO learns and adapts to modern warfare

General Chris Badia — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have had strategic consequences far beyond the region, showcasing the complexities of modern conflicts, where conventional battles are intertwined with cyber warfare, information operations, and hybrid tactics.

No doubt, Russia’s actions have reshaped the global geopolitical landscape. Yet NATO’s capability to adapt has been central and the basis for its sustained relevance and success as an alliance since its founding in 1949. And now, seventy-five years later, NATO continues to lead in learning and evolving to address emerging challenges in the future operating environment.

As with past conflicts and Russia’s evolving war against Ukraine, NATO’s mechanisms for lessons learned and transformation serve as a critical means to adapt and prepare the Alliance to counter every aggression in the future.

But how does NATO, with thirty-two member nations, learn lessons? While NATO’s internal learning process is informed by its members and their own experiences, the situation in Ukraine now demands the ability to learn lessons from others’ experiences. In short, this external learning process is achieved by Alliance-wide lessons sharing and collecting through a dedicated NATO lessons-learned portal. These national observations and experiences are collected, evaluated, consolidated, and then transformed into actions to be applied in NATO’s activities to transform, adapt, and prepare for the future.

The organization’s military learning and adaptation process is strategically led by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the United States in Norfolk, Virginia, with a dedicated subordinate command as the Alliance’s center for enabling and supporting the NATO lessons-learned policy and capability: the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portugal. By systematically collecting reports from open sources, partners, and allies, and sharing them in the NATO lessons-learned portal, all member nations can benefit. A dedicated analysis team gleans insights from the vast amount of data to enhance NATO’s understanding of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and thus, where applicable, inform and influence the development of new strategies, doctrines, and training programs. Recently, JALLC is also benefiting from inputs delivered by a Ukrainian nongovernmental organization focused on analysis and training.

NATO’s decision to establish the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis Training and Evaluation Centre (JATEC) will soon play another crucial role in ensuring that NATO remains informed, agile, adaptable, and effective in addressing contemporary and future security challenges. JATEC thus represents a significant commitment by allies not only to improve the interoperability and effectiveness of Ukrainian forces but also to enhance the Alliance’s capability by learning and applying lessons.

The lessons-learned process is also supported by various national NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COE). These COEs, under the coordinating authority of ACT, specialize in various military areas of expertise, such as cyber defense, command and control, air power, medical support, etc.

Altogether, ACT with the JALLC in its overarching role, the contributions by the nations, and the NATO-accredited COEs with their specializations, create a comprehensive system for ensuring lessons are captured and disseminated to operational forces, fostering a culture of continuous improvement within NATO.

The basis of a successful alliance is a common understanding and principles, which are laid out in doctrines. Therefore, doctrine development is a critical component of NATO’s adaptation and transformation process. By continuously updating doctrine based on real-world experiences and lessons learned, NATO ensures that its operational principles remain robust and effective in the face of evolving threats. With regard to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics, which combine conventional military force with irregular tactics, and cyber and information operations, has prompted improvements in NATO doctrine governing how NATO shares intelligence and counters disinformation campaigns to strengthen NATO’s response toward hybrid warfare tactics.

Furthermore, lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine underscore the importance of agile, integrated command and control systems capable of coordinating operations across multiple domains: land, sea, air, cyber, and space. NATO needs command and control structures that are flexible, resilient, and capable of rapid decision-making. Advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning are being leveraged to enhance shared situational awareness and streamline decision-making processes to maintain an advantage.

Lessons learned will be injected into NATO exercises and training to generate high-fidelity training scenarios allowing NATO forces to “train as they fight.” Besides improving interoperability, certifying NATO forces, and demonstrating NATO’s fighting credibility, NATO exercises also challenge training audiences to face operational dilemmas that reflect the complexities of modern warfare. JALLC reports summarizing lessons from the war in Ukraine are being used by the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) and Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) to update and improve NATO exercises. The increased use of drones, private-sector support for military operations, the battle for both cognitive and information superiority, sustainment, and civilian resilience are key features, which have already informed changes in NATO exercises to ensure that NATO forces are better prepared to operate in complex and dynamic environments.

ACT, as the strategic warfare development headquarters, also looks into the future. Studies focus on widely debated topics including, for example, the future operating environment and the future force structure. Other topics include the future of tanks and attack helicopters, small-drone warfare, vulnerabilities of fleets and ports to maritime drones, and the protection of critical infrastructures against long-range strikes.

NATO’s commitment and ability to continuously develop and improve ensures the Alliance’s enduring strength and cohesion. NATO is rapidly incorporating battlefield lessons into the transformation, adaptation, and preparation activities of the Alliance’s forces. ACT is key to this process, ensuring lessons reach operational forces at the speed of relevance.

General Chris Badia is NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

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Putin is creating the conditions for Russian victory in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 29 Oct 2024 18:50:01 +0000

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is often depicted in the Western media as a bloody stalemate with neither side able to achieve a decisive military breakthrough. While this has been the case for much of the war, there are growing indications that Russia may now be creating the conditions for victory in Ukraine.

For more than a year, Russia has held the battlefield initiative in southern and eastern Ukraine. While Moscow’s territorial gains have been relatively minor, the advances achieved by Putin’s army since late 2023 stand in stark contrast to the virtually static front lines of the previous year. Indeed, according to Germany’s Die Welt, Russian territorial gains during October 2024 were the largest since March 2022.

Russia’s offensive operations have focused on the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, with Putin’s troops capturing a number of towns so far this year such as Avdiivka and Vuhledar as they advance toward Pokrovsk. If this trend continues during the coming months, Russia could be poised to complete the conquest of the Donbas during the 2025 campaigning season.

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The success of Russia’s Donbas campaign owes much to Moscow’s traditional advantages in munitions and manpower, along with an apparent disregard for losses. Russia’s offensive has also benefitted from a number of tactical adaptations including the extremely effective use of glide bombs against Ukrainian defensive positions.

Over the past year, Russian commanders have been able to exploit a growing number of Ukrainian battlefield vulnerabilities. These Ukrainian weaknesses have included ineffective front-line fortifications, persistent troop shortages due to the mismanagement of Ukraine’s mobilization efforts, and extended delays in the delivery of military aid from the United States and Kyiv’s other Western partners.

Ukraine’s military setbacks have forced them to return to the tactics favored during much of the initial fighting in early 2022, which involved trading space for maximum enemy losses. This approach allows the Ukrainian military to impose heavy costs on the advancing Russians, but it also means abandoning any attempts to liberate occupied Ukrainian territories, for the time being at least.

While Russia’s recent offensive operations have not yet produced any decisive breakthroughs, the psychological impact of the advances achieved in recent months cannot be measured in kilometers alone. Crucially, Moscow’s localized successes in the Donbas are gradually undermining morale among the Ukrainian public. Regular reports of fresh Russian gains are also weakening the resolve of Kyiv’s Western partners and bolstering arguments against continued military support for Ukraine.

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The Russian invasion is not going entirely according to plan, of course. US, UK, and European officials have reported that September 2024 was the deadliest month of the entire war for Putin’s troops, with Russia suffering more than one thousand soldiers killed or injured every single day.

Russia has sought to address these catastrophic losses by enticing a steady stream of new recruits with ever larger bounty payments and inflated monthly salaries. The Kremlin is also scouring other branches of the Russian armed forces such as the navy and strategic rocket forces for troops who can be converted into infantry and sent to Ukraine. Most recently, Moscow has persuaded North Korea to provide thousands of additional troops.

The one thing Putin definitely does not want to do is announce another politically risky mobilization. So far, he looks to have found solutions that will allow Russia to maintain its offensive operations in Ukraine without mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Russian civilians.

As the Russian military gradually gains the upper hand in Ukraine, the Kremlin is also strengthening its position on the international stage by playing on the West’s fears of escalation. In recent months, Putin has openly intimidated Western leaders by threatening to revise Russia’s nuclear doctrine and significantly lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. This latest example of nuclear blackmail has succeeded in derailing Ukrainian efforts to end Western restrictions on deep strikes inside Russia.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is now at a critical juncture. Unless steps are taken in the coming few months to reverse today’s negative dynamics, Russia’s advantages will continue to grow until the military situation reaches the point of no return. Ukraine’s needs are well known, and include a significant increase in military aid along with the lifting of restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Above all, it is vital to maintain Ukraine’s fighting capability and impose increasing costs on the Kremlin while convincing Putin that Western support for Kyiv will not waver.

Much will depend on the outcome of the United States presidential election on November 5. Whoever wins the race for the White House, they will inherit a war in Ukraine that requires their urgent attention to prevent a Russian victory that would signal the decline of the West and transform the geopolitical landscape for decades to come.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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There is unlikely to be any shortage of potential international buyers for Ukrainian drones, which have demonstrated their effectiveness throughout the war with Russia. Meanwhile, many NATO countries are cautious about the acquisition of drones manufactured in China, while other major drone producers have a range of restrictions in place that limit foreign sales. This could create additional opportunities for Ukrainian companies.

Crucially, exporting drones to international markets might actually make it easier for Ukraine’s drone producers to deliver more drones to the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian drone production has increased so much over the past two-and-a-half years that it has now far outstripped the Ukrainian government’s procurement potential. In other words, Ukrainian drone manufacturers are capable of producing significantly more drones than the state can currently purchase.

Opening up export markets could help solve this problem. Enabling exports would allow Ukrainian drone companies to operate closer to capacity, making it possible to scale up production and reduce the cost of individual drones for all customers, including the Ukrainian state. This is a key reason why many Ukrainian producers see exports as the most sensible solution to the current challenges facing the industry.

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While the arguments in favor of lifting export restrictions appear strong, any steps to allow the sale of drones to foreign clients during wartime would be seen by many as controversial. If the Ukrainian authorities do opt to allow exports, they will need to determine which categories can be sold abroad and in what quantities. The needs of the Ukrainian military will naturally remain the number one priority. With this in mind, it may make sense to create some kind of centralized mechanism to regulate international sales in order to streamline the process and enhance transparency.

Ukraine would also have to take steps to monitor where the country’s drones end up. Any potential misuse of Ukrainian drones would likely be very high profile and could raise serious concerns among the country’s partners. Exporting drones internationally would also increase the risk of Russia acquiring and examining Ukrainian technologies.

Permitting the export of Ukrainian drones would be a complex process with a number of potential pitfalls. At the same time, Ukrainian officials and the country’s drone manufacturers currently appear to have few other options as they look to boost domestic production while faced with limited state funding.

Exports could help Ukraine’s drone industry continue to grow at a time when the country’s future hinges on staying one step ahead of Russia in the defense tech arms race. If Ukraine decides to allow drone exports, the process must be thoroughly thought out and carefully implemented in order to safeguard all-important drone deliveries to the Ukrainian military.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

According to US military experts, the window between the first deployment of an improved drone design and the appearance of countermeasures is usually just over a month. Responses can range from electronic interference to copying drone designs and combat tactics. It is a lethal game of whack-a-drone that has led to the testing of, among other technologies, autonomous target acquisition and increasingly autonomous drone operations.

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International observers including opponents of the West are carefully studying how the defense tech innovations that are emerging in Ukraine will shape the future of warfare. Unsurprisingly, military cooperation among autocracies is already expanding as the Kremlin and its allies look to share knowledge and experience. For example, Iran has reportedly been providing training to Russian drone operators.

Western military planners are in turn learning from their Ukrainian partners about adapting commercially available platforms to military applications in an extremely challenging environment. Ukraine’s inventiveness and ability to establish mutually beneficial cooperation between tech startups and the state have amazed Western military experts, who are more accustomed to slow and highly bureaucratic processes.

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When it comes to learning the defense tech lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War, there is no substitute for being close to the battlefield. Observing Ukrainian drone operators at work, interacting closely with electronic warfare specialists, and participating in the deconstruction and analysis of recovered Russian drones are all vital to understanding how these technologies are evolving.

Many Western journalists and volunteers are already embedding themselves with Ukrainian units as they seek to learn more about the realities of modern warfare and the increasingly central role being played by defense tech innovations. This close proximity could be highly beneficial for military commanders and defense industry developers. However, that would require a far more comprehensive approach.

At present, Western efforts to learn from the war in Ukraine are being impeded by an extreme aversion to putting any personnel at risk. Fears over the possible consequences of injury or death to non-Ukrainian personnel in the war with Russia appear to be inhibiting Western governments and weapons manufacturers. These concerns are limiting their ability to study the remarkable developments currently taking place in Ukraine.

This is not necessarily the case elsewhere. For instance, US military personnel are currently deployed in a number of active conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. In contrast, the movements of Western military personnel in Ukraine remain heavily restricted, even in a purely observational role.

While there is a strong case for allowing military personnel to get closer to the front lines in Ukraine, it is arguably even more important to provide weapons developers with direct access. Indeed, some smaller Western military equipment manufacturers have already sent experts to Ukraine. Mainstream manufacturers now need to overcome their reluctance and allow key staff greater access to the Ukrainian front lines.

Today’s self-imposed constraints are limiting the West’s opportunities to get a closer look at what the battlefield of the not-too-distant future will look like. This is making it harder to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to win the current war, while also preventing the development of new defense tech capabilities that can help keep Western societies safe in the coming decades.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

Faced with these setbacks, Russia has reportedly moved some of its limited air defense systems away from northwestern Crimea and concentrated them close to the Crimean Bridge, which connects the occupied peninsula to Russia across the Kerch Strait. This is leaving other parts of Crimea increasingly vulnerable to attack.

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Another key aspect of Ukraine’s campaign against the Russian occupation of Crimea is the targeting of key logistics routes. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than a decade ago, Moscow has sought to militarize Crimea. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the peninsula has served as a key logistical hub for Russian forces fighting in southern Ukraine.

Despite the development of additional overland rail routes connecting Russia to occupied regions of mainland Ukraine, Crimea continues to play an important logistical role in the war. In a bid to weaken the Russian army’s supply chains and isolate Crimea, Ukraine has targeted the ferries used to transport military supplies across the Kerch Strait from Russia to Crimea.

In spring and summer 2024, Ukraine carried out a series of strikes on ferries in Crimea itself and in Russia’s neighboring Krasnodar region. These attacks succeeded in cutting key supply routes for the Russian military, forcing Moscow to explore improvised alternatives such as the use of barges.

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Ukraine’s efforts to isolate Crimea have benefited from the use of Western weapons including US-supplied ATACMS missiles and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s British and French partners. Crimea is internationally recognized as part of Ukraine, so restrictions that prevent the use of Western weapons inside Russia do not apply. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated in July 2024 that some limitations remain on Ukraine’s ability to use Western-supplied arms in Crimea. “I will tell you honestly, we cannot use everything and everywhere in Crimea,” he commented.

Ukrainian attacks on Crimea are a huge source of embarrassment for Russia. The 2014 occupation of the Ukrainian peninsula is routinely portrayed in Kremlin propaganda as the greatest achievement of Vladimir Putin’s entire reign and a symbol of Russia’s return to great power status. Putin’s current inability to defend Crimea is therefore widely perceived as a personal humiliation.

For the time being, Moscow remains in denial over the deteriorating security situation in Crimea and continues to promote the peninsula as a safe holiday destination. However, if the current Ukrainian campaign continues to gain momentum, the Kremlin will be forced to abandon this business-as-usual approach and acknowledge that the Russian occupation of Crimea is under threat.

Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea. Many analysts believe the war can only be brought to an end by liberating the peninsula from Russian control. It is still far too early to speak about the impending end of the Russian occupation. Nevertheless, with the Black Sea Fleet in retreat, logistical connections disrupted, and air defenses depleted, the Kremlin’s grip on Crimea already appears to be significantly weaker than it was when the full-scale invasion began two and half years ago.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Officials in Kyiv regard the current restrictions on attacks inside Russia as politically unjustified and militarily absurd. They argue that by preventing Ukraine from striking back, Western leaders are effectively protecting Putin’s war machine while forcing the Ukrainian military to fight with one hand tied behind its back.

With little indication that Ukraine’s major allies are ready to change tack and allow the use of Western-supplied missiles inside Russia, it may be time to explore other options. The most obvious solution would be to enhance Ukraine’s ability to launch attacks inside Russia using its own domestically-produced long-range weapons.

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Ukraine’s rapidly advancing domestic drone program already has considerable long-range capabilities, but requires extensive investment and technological cooperation in order to reach its full potential. Ukraine has also recently confirmed the successful testing of its first domestically-produced ballistic missile. With sufficient Western support, this expanding Ukrainian arsenal of long-range weapons could have a major impact on the future course of the war.

Since the beginning of 2024, Ukraine has been conducting an increasingly ambitious campaign of drone strikes against military targets and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia. Many of these attacks have taken place at distances more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border and have involved large numbers of drones that have succeeded in overwhelming Russia’s air defenses.

The potential of Ukraine’s long-range drones was underlined in September when a large-scale attack on a military storage facility in Russia’s Tver region produced an explosion that was large enough to be picked up by earthquake monitoring stations. According to Ukrainian sources, the blast destroyed vast quantities of Russian missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition. Satellite imagery appeared to confirm that the targeted facility had been partially destroyed.

Some of Ukraine’s partners were initially reluctant to back this air offensive, with multiple US officials publicly questioning the wisdom of Kyiv’s strategy. However, these concerns appear to have eased in recent months. Western officials are now more publicly supportive of Ukraine’s right to strike back inside Russia, provided this is done using Ukrainian weapons.

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Over the past two and a half years, drones have emerged as a vital asset in Ukraine’s asymmetric warfare strategy as it fights to defend itself against a far larger and more powerful adversary. Outgunned and outnumbered by Russia, Ukraine has focused its resources on building up the country’s domestic drone industry. In the air, on land, and at sea, domestically-made drones have been instrumental in many of Ukraine’s most important military successes.

Ukrainian drone output has dramatically increased since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with more than two hundred companies now producing millions of drones annually. The expansion of the sector has been so rapid that Ukraine is currently making more drones than the Ukrainian authorities can afford to purchase, leading to excess capacity. Unless this can be addressed, there is a danger that many Ukrainian drone companies could be forced out of business or obliged to move abroad.

Ukraine’s partners can bridge the gap between rising drone manufacturing capacity and the country’s limited state procurement budgets by placing orders directly with Ukrainian drone manufacturers themselves. Some countries including Denmark have already committed to do so. More comprehensive efforts in this direction could place Ukraine’s dynamically developing drone industry on a firmer footing and bolster the country’s ability to hit targets deep inside Russia.

In early October, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed that increased production of long-range drones and missiles will be a key goal in 2025. Ukraine’s partners should follow suit and prioritize their support for the country’s long-range air strike capabilities. By expanding investment and technical cooperation in this area, they can help Ukraine regain the initiative and force Putin to rethink his invasion, while at the same time adhering to their own cautious doctrine of escalation management. Western policymakers may still believe in Putin’s red lines, but Ukrainians do not.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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One of the basic requirements for any investor is a transparent marketplace with clear and simple rules. Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has adopted around twenty significant laws and resolutions aimed at accelerating the development of the domestic defense tech market.

Measures have included tax and customs duty reductions, the relaxation of permit and licensing requirements, and the minimizing of bureaucratic waiting periods. These steps have already had a significant impact on the domestic UAV industry, helping to fuel a hundred-fold increase in annual drone production in 2023. A similar approach is now being adopted toward other segments of the defense sector including electronic warfare, robotics, and ammunition production.

The Ukrainian authorities understand that international investors are primarily driven by a desire to make money. In order to attract investment, Ukrainian defense tech companies must therefore be able to demonstate a credible business plan and a pathway to profitability. To help establish the necessary conditions, we are taking steps to conclude more government procurement contracts with Ukrainian producers. For example, the Ukrainian state has signed agreements to procure more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024, compared to around three hundred thousand drones during the previous year.

Meanwhile, the number of Ukrainian companies able to compete for state contracts is steadily increasing. In 2022, only seven Ukrainian drone producers were eligible for government contracts. Today, the figure has risen to more than eighty companies. To maintain this upward trend, the Ukrainian authorities provide additional support to help domestic companies meet NATO standards.

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Placing more orders with Ukrainian producers is not enough, of course. It is also important to remain agile and concentrate Ukraine’s limited resources on the acquisition of technologies that offer the biggest practical advantages in today’s rapidly evolving military environment. For example, in September 2024, the Ukrainian government launched its first tender for the purchase of ten thousand first person view (FPV) drones equipped with machine vision guidance.

Another key challenge is connecting investors with developers. Ukraine’s defense tech sector offers potentially exciting opportunities for investors, but it is also an inherently difficult environment to navigate without local knowledge. The Ukrainian authorities have sought to address this by establishing the Brave1 cluster, which aims to streamline cooperation between investors, private sector companies, state agencies, and the Ukrainian military. At present, Brave1 is working with more than one hundred and fifty investors from over thirty countries.

Current initiatives include Investor Demo Days, where Ukrainian developers can showcase their products and attempt to attract funding. On October 3-4, Kyiv will host the largest international investment summit of the war so far dedicated to the Ukrainian defense tech industry. This event should provide an indication of the progress since 2022 toward making the country’s defense tech sector attractive to investors.

In order to win the war, Ukraine needs game-changing technologies that can help overcome Russia’s conventional military advantages and shift the battlefield situation in our favor. This cannot realistically be achieved by relying on an improvised ecosystem of defense tech startups operating out of garages and apartments. Instead, Ukraine needs the kind of powerful and well-resourced defense tech industry that is only possible through significant investment and cooperation with international partners. If this goal can be achieved, the Ukrainian military will be able to receive the tools they need to finish the job of defeating Russia.

Mykhailo Fedorov is Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for Innovations and Development of Education, Science, and Technologies, and Minister of Digital Transformation.

Robert Soofer

Former Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Ukraine’s expanding drone fleet is flying straight through Putin’s red lines

Giorgi Revishvili — Sat, 21 Sep 2024 14:34:39 +0000

Ukraine conducted one of the largest and most effective drone attacks of the entire war in the early hours of September 18, causing a blast at a weapons depot deep inside Russia that was large enough to be picked up by earthquake monitoring stations. According to Ukrainian sources, the attack involved more than one hundred domestically produced long-range Ukrainian drones and targeted a major Russian arms storage facility in Toropets, a town in Russia’s Tver region northwest of Moscow.

The Toropets raid was the latest Ukrainian success in an ambitious campaign of long-range drone strikes that has been steadily gaining momentum throughout the current year. Ukraine launched its air offensive in January 2024, and has since hit dozens of high-value targets in Russia including oil refineries, air bases, armament production facilities, and military sites.

The increasing frequency and effectiveness of these drone attacks would appear to vindicate Ukraine’s earlier decision to focus its limited resources on boosting the domestic development and production of long-range drones. Ukrainian attacks are now visibly expanding in scale as more drones are produced, and are also routinely reaching targets deep inside Russia over one thousand kilometers beyond the Ukrainian border.

In a sign of the rapidly advancing drone technologies that are now becoming available to the Ukrainian military, the country recently unveiled its first missile drone. Dubbed “Palyanytsia” in honor of a traditional Ukrainian bread that invading Russian troops find notoriously difficult to pronounce, this missile drone was welcomed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in August 2024 as “our new method of retaliation against the aggressor.”

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Ukraine’s long-range drone strike campaign has a number of goals. The most immediate objective is to undermine the Russian war machine by targeting military infrastructure and the country’s economically vital energy industry.

Strikes on Russian air fields have been credited with damaging a number of military planes used in the Kremlin’s bombing campaign of Ukraine’s cities and civilian infrastructure. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials believe the recent attack in Tver region destroyed significant quantities of Russian munitions including artillery shells and missiles.

At this stage, Ukraine’s bombing raids on Russian oil refineries remain on an insufficient scale to plunge the Kremlin’s vast energy industry into crisis. However, Ukrainian drone attacks are frequently followed by media reports of decreased Russian refining capacity.

Russian officials have remained characteristically tight-lipped over the impact of Ukraine’s air offensive, but there are some indications that the Kremlin is concerned. In March 2024, Moscow imposed a six-month ban on gasoline exports that has since been extended to the end of 2024 in an apparent bid to prevent domestic shortages and price spikes. Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service has also reportedly stopped publishing oil production data.

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Kyiv’s drone strike strategy also has important political objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s partners have imposed restrictions on the use of Western-supplied weapons inside Russia. This includes a ban on long-range missile strikes that is seen as particularly damaging by officials in Kyiv, who argue that it prevents them from targeting the air bases and military sites used by Russia to attack Ukraine.

The caution on display in Western capitals reflects widespread concerns among Ukraine’s partners over a possible escalation in the current war. Moscow has skillfully exploited these fears, using a combination of nuclear threats and talk of Russian red lines to scare Western leaders and ensure that current restrictions remain in place. Indeed, Putin recently warned that allowing long-range strikes against Russian targets would mean that NATO was “at war” with Russia.

By hitting targets deep inside Russia, Ukraine hopes to convince its allies that their fears of escalation are greatly exaggerated and expose Putin’s red lines as a bluff designed to intimidate the West. This argument is supported by numerous other examples of Russian red lines being crossed without consequence, such as the partial destruction of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine’s recent invasion of Russia’s Kursk region.

While there has yet to be any breakthrough in Kyiv’s diplomatic push for an end to restrictions on long-range missile attacks, recent reports suggest that it may now be only a matter of time before Ukraine receives the green light for a least some categories of long-range strikes inside Russia. If permission is finally granted, this would dramatically increase the potential impact of Ukraine’s air offensive and create significant logistical headaches for the Russian military.

Russian commanders are currently struggling to provide sufficient air defense coverage to counter the existing threat posed by Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. With the bulk of Russia’s available air defense systems currently deployed in Ukraine, the Kremlin lacks the additional resources to protect the country’s vast airspace. If Ukraine continues to expand drone production and also secures permission for strikes inside Russia with Western weapons, these air defense shortages will likely become even more apparent.

Ukraine’s drone campaign is already bringing the war home to the Russian public and undermining the Putin regime’s efforts to shield domestic audiences from the negative consequences of the invasion. While the Kremlin maintains tight control over the Russian information space and can easily suppress negative news coming from Ukraine, it is much more challenging to disguise regular air raid alarms and exploding military depots in towns and cities across western Russia.

Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign has been one of the key developments of the war in 2024. It has provided Kyiv with a partial solution to its own lack of domestically-produced missiles, and has helped Ukrainian commanders address the challenges created by the risk-averse West’s fear of escalation. Ukrainians are now hoping that by flying their long-range drones straight through Vladimir Putin’s red lines, they can convince Western leaders to abandon the failed doctrine of escalation management and lift restrictions that protect Russia while preventing Ukraine from defending itself.

Giorgi Revishvili is a political analyst and a former senior advisor to the Georgian National Security Council.

Ukraine has made particularly striking progress in the field of drone warfare. Over the past two and a half years, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing drones, with state-led and private initiatives helping to streamline cooperation between individual companies, government agencies, and the military. This has paved the way for the development of battlefield strike drones, maritime drones, and long-range drones capable of hitting targets deep inside Russia.

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Ukraine’s ability to stay one step ahead of Russia in the race for battlefield innovation offers valuable lessons for the country’s Western partners. It is therefore no surprise that defense companies and military planners throughout the West are already looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience as they prepare for the wars of the future.

Ukraine is also striving to establish itself as a leading defense industry player in its own right, drawing on its recently acquired know-how along the country’s past experience as a major contributor to the Soviet military-industrial complex. Ukrainian efforts are currently focused on a combination of public and private sector partnerships, together with integration into global supply chains and the defense programs of partner companies.

Recently, officials in Kyiv have begun encouraging allies to finance defense production in Ukraine. Supporters of this approach note that it saves time and is cost-effective, while also strengthening Ukraine economically and boosting the country’s long-term ability to defend itself. Ultimately, the goal is for the defense sector to become a major component of Ukraine’s postwar economy.

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Despite this broadly encouraging picture, many issues must be urgently addressed in order to make the most of Ukraine’s potential as a key defense tech partner for the West. These include imperfect intellectual property laws governing joint enterprises in Ukraine and in potential partner countries; excessive regulation of state-owned enterprises in Ukraine; and restrictions on defense companies in countries including the United States that create barriers to international cooperation.

In order to nurture the next generation of innovators and develop dual-use military technologies, Ukraine must ensure the right legal frameworks and operational mechanisms are in place. This is essential if the country hopes to attract manufacturers, engineers, and investors for joint research and development initiatives. Kyiv also needs to reform its export control systems and deepen cooperation with international partner agencies to counter industrial espionage.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Western allies should be looking to relax or remove a range of existing barriers to joint research and development projects. In order to respect specific political and security sensitivities, this process could initially be limited to certain categories or separately approved projects.

Supporting the development of Ukraine’s defense sector brings a range of potential benefits. Most immediately, it enables Ukraine to more effectively resist Russia’s ongoing invasion. Looking ahead, it can also serve as an engine for Ukraine’s economic recovery, thereby reducing the need for external funding from Western partners. By harnessing Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience and strong record of defense tech innovation, the West can gain crucial advantages amid the growing security threat posed by Russia and other authoritarian powers.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Ukraine is building the arsenal of the free world. A number of individual Ukrainian defense companies have already demonstrated that they have much to offer and can compete internationally. In order to capitalize on this potential, Ukraine still needs to be fully embraced as an ally. This will require an imaginative understanding of the contribution the Ukrainian defense sector can make toward guaranteeing the security of the free world.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is the managing partner of COSA and co-chair of the Defense, Aerospace, and Security Working Group at the US-Ukraine Business Council. He is also a consortium member of the Ukraine Defense R&D Initiative, a contributor to the International Working Group on Russia Sanctions, and a member of the Public Council at the National Agency for Corruption Prevention of Ukraine.

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India is currently seeking to plot a geopolitical course that protects the country’s trade and energy interests, while reducing its reliance on Russia in the defense sector and increasing engagement with Ukraine and other countries in the region including Poland, which Modi visited on the eve of his arrival in Kyiv. Underscoring the importance of his Ukraine trip, the Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by a high-level delegation including Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.

Although the landmark visit did not yield any major breakthroughs, Modi and Zelenskyy did reach a number of agreements that should allow the two countries to expand cooperation in the agrarian, healthcare, cultural, and humanitarian sectors. The terms of the humanitarian agreement signed in Kyiv could help pave the way for an Indian role in Ukraine’s reconstruction. The joint statement issued by both leaders following their summit also mentioned significant potential for deepening partnership in the defense sector, with India believed to be interested in Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone technologies.

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India’s openness to greater engagement is an indication that attitudes toward Ukraine are evolving, with Delhi keen to counter perceptions that the country views Ukrainian affairs predominantly through a Russian lens. Today’s diplomatic language is certainly more nuanced than the position adopted at the onset of Russia’s attack on Ukraine a decade ago. In 2014, Indian officials initially responded to the seizure of Crimea by stating that Russia had “legitimate interests” in Ukraine. Such messaging is no longer seen as helpful in Delhi. As an aspiring economic superpower, India now seeks to project the image of a leading global player and cannot afford to be seen as too close to the Kremlin.

Another factor driving the strengthening of bilateral ties is people to people contacts. Zelenskyy stressed this point when he met with Indian journalists during Modi’s visit, expressing his own interest in getting to know more about India. Ukraine’s large community of Indian students and the country’s Indian diaspora are already playing an active role here, sharing personal stories of life in Ukraine that often run directly counter to Russian propaganda. The positive experiences of Indians in Ukraine contrast sharply with the fate of numerous Indian citizens who have been lured to Russia since 2022 to fight in Ukraine. Zelenskyy noted that Modi had specifically raised this issue during their talks in Kyiv.

Much homework still needs to be done by India and Ukraine in order to take bilateral cooperation to the next level. Delhi must also address the elephant in the room, namely how it can continue benefiting from cheap Russian energy supplies without enabling Putin’s war economy. At the same time, it is worth stressing that the visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Ukraine is a significant diplomatic event for both countries that few would have anticipated as recently as one year ago. As India seeks to consolidate its position on the world stage, the dynamic of relations with Ukraine is now on a positive trajectory and is beginning to look promising.

Dr. Mridula Ghosh is an associate professor of international relations at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Board Chair of the East European Development Institute.

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Ukraine’s political leaders have been unusually tight-lipped about the entire offensive, providing no hint in advance and saying very little during the first week of the campaign. This is in stark contrast to the approach adopted last year, when the country’s coming summer offensive was widely referenced by officials and previewed in the media. Ukraine’s efforts to enforce operational silence appear to have also extended to the military. According to The New York Times, even senior Ukrainian commanders only learned of the plan to invade Russia at the last moment.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appears to have been a major surprise for Ukraine’s Western partners. The Financial Times has reported that neither the US nor Germany were informed in advance of the planned Ukrainian operation. Given the West’s record of seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke Putin, it is certainly not difficult to understand why Kyiv might have chosen not to signal its intentions.

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It is also likely that Ukraine benefited from Russia’s own complacency and overconfidence. Despite suffering a series of defeats in Ukraine since 2022, the Kremlin remains almost pathologically dismissive of Ukrainian capabilities and does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility of a large-scale Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Federation. The modest defenses established throughout the border zone confirm that Moscow anticipated minor border raids but had no plans to repel a major Ukrainian incursion.

Russia’s sense of confidence doubtless owed much to Western restrictions imposed on Ukraine since the start of the war that have prohibited the use of Western weapons inside Russia. These restrictions were partially relaxed in May 2024 following Russia’s own cross-border offensive into Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast, but the Kremlin clearly did not believe Kyiv would be bold enough to use this as the basis for offensive operations inside Russia. Vladimir Putin is now paying a steep price for underestimating his opponent.

It remains far too early to assess the impact of Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive. One of the most interesting questions will be whether Ukraine can force the Kremlin to divert military units from the fighting in eastern Ukraine in order to defend Russia itself. Much will depend on the amount of Russian land Ukraine is able to seize and hold. Putin must also decide whether his military should focus on merely stopping Ukraine’s advance or liberating occupied Russian territory.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible on the modern battlefield. This is a significant achievement that underlines the skill and competence of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian invasion has also confirmed once again that Putin’s talk of Russian red lines and his frequent threats of nuclear escalation are a bluff designed to intimidate the West. Taken together, these factors should be enough to convince Kyiv’s partners that now is the time to increase military support and provide Ukraine with the tools for victory.

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Long-range attack drones are a good fit for Ukraine’s limited offensive capabilities. Kyiv needs to be able to strike military targets inside Russia, but is prevented from doing do with Western-supplied missiles due to restrictions imposed by the country’s partners. While Ukraine has some capacity to produce its own missiles domestically, this is insufficient for a sustained bombing campaign.

Drones are enabling Ukraine to overcome these obstacles. Ukrainian drone production has expanded dramatically over the past two-and-a-half years. The low cost of manufacturing a long-range drone relative to the damage it can cause to Russian military and industrial facilities makes it in many ways the ideal weapon for a cash-strapped but innovative nation like Ukraine.

Ukraine’s drone industry is a diverse ecosystem featuring hundreds of participating companies producing different models. The Ukrainian military has used a variety of drones with different characteristics for attacks inside Russia, making the campaign even more challenging for Russia’s air defenses.

The decentralized nature of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing sector also makes it difficult for Russia to target. Even if the Kremlin is able to identify and hit individual production sites located across Ukraine, this is unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s overall output.

Since 2022, Ukraine has taken a number of steps to reduce bureaucracy and streamline cooperation between drone makers and the military. The result is a sector capable of adapting to changing battlefield conditions and able to implement innovations quickly and effectively. This includes efforts to create AI-enabled drones capable of functioning without an operator, making it far more difficult for Russia to jam.

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As it expands, Ukraine’s drone bombing campaign is exposing the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Defending a territory as vast as Russia against air strikes would be problematic even in peacetime. With much of Russia’s existing air defense systems currently deployed along the front lines in Ukraine, there are now far fewer systems available to protect industrial and military targets inside Russia.

During the initial stages of the war, this shortage of air defense coverage was not a major issue. However, Ukraine’s broadening bombing offensive is now forcing Russia to make tough decisions regarding the distribution of its limited air defenses.

In addition to strategically important sites such as airbases, the Kremlin must also defend prestige targets from possible attack. In July, CNN reported that air defenses had been significantly strengthened around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summer residence. Protecting Putin’s palace from attack is necessary to avoid embarrassment, but it means leaving other potential targets exposed.

Ukraine’s drone program is the biggest success story to emerge from the country’s vibrant defense tech sector, and is helping Ukraine to even out the odds against its far larger and wealthier adversary. The country’s partners clearly recognize the importance of drones for the Ukrainian military, and have formed a drone coalition to increase the supply of drones from abroad. This combination of international support and Ukrainian ingenuity spells trouble for Russia. It will likely lead to increasingly powerful and plentiful long-range strikes in the months ahead.

US President Joe Biden finally gave the green light to supply Ukraine with F-16s in summer 2023. However, it would take another year before the the Ukrainian Air Force received the first batch of jets. Sadly, Pilschikov did not live to see this historic day. The pilot who did so much to secure F-16s for his country was killed in a mid-air collision during a training exercise in August 2023.

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Despite achieving a breakthrough in summer 2023, the process of preparing for the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine proved frustratingly slow. Ukrainian pilots spent many months training, with only a limited number of slots made available. As a result, Ukraine still has very few pilots able to fly F-16s. Identifying and upgrading Ukrainian airfields capable of accommodating F-16s also created challenges.

The planes that Ukraine has received from the country’s European partners are from the older generation, which is being phased out elsewhere as air forces transition to more modern models. This imposes some limitations on the functions Ukraine’s F-16 fleet can perform. Limited radar reach means that deployment of F-16s on the front lines of the war is seen as too risky, as they could be shot down by both Russian aircraft and Russian air defenses.

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With a combat role unlikely at this stage, Ukrainian F-16s will primarily be used to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The planes Kyiv has received are ideally suited to the task of shooting down the Russian missiles and drones that are regularly fired at Ukrainian cities and vital infrastructure.

Their effectiveness in this role will depend on the kinds of missiles they are armed with. F-16s can carry a range of armaments that are more advanced that the types of weapons used by the majority of planes in service with the Russian Air Force. Initial indications are encouraging, with the first F-16s arriving in Ukraine complete with weapons ideally suited to air defense. It is now vital for Ukrainian officials and members of civil society to focus their advocacy efforts on securing sufficient numbers of missiles from partner countries.

Ukraine should also prioritize the supply of long-range radar detection aircraft, such as the planes recently promised by Sweden. In May 2024, the Swedes announced plans to deliver two surveillance aircraft as part of the Scandinavian nation’s largest support package to date. These “eyes in the sky” can monitor airspace for hundreds of kilometers. Together with Ukraine’s growing F-16 fleet, they will significantly enhance the country’s air defenses.

As Ukraine acquires more F-16s in the coming months, and as the country’s limited pool of pilots grows in size and experience, we will likely see these jets used in more adventurous ways. This may include targeting Russian planes and helicopters operating close to the front lines with long-range strikes. For now, though, the main task of Ukraine’s F-16s will be to improve the country’s air defenses and protect the civilian population from Russian bombardment.

Olena Tregub is Executive Director of the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), a member of the Anti-Corruption Council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Russia’s Black Sea defeats get flushed down Vladimir Putin’s memory hole

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 13:51:05 +0000

There was much pomp and pageantry on display recently in former Russian imperial capital Saint Petersburg as Vladimir Putin presided over the country’s annual Navy Day festivities. In truth, however, Putin and his assembled admirals had very little to celebrate. Over the past year, Russia’s once-vaunted Black Sea Fleet has been decimated by Ukrainian drones and missiles in what must rank as the most remarkable series of naval defeats in modern military history.

Despite barely having a navy of its own, Ukraine has managed to sink or severely damage approximately one-third of Putin’s fleet, forcing the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from occupied Crimea. The war at sea has gone so badly for Russia that by spring 2024, Britain’s Ministry of Defense was already declaring the Black Sea Fleet “functionally inactive.”

The details of this year’s Russian Navy Day program provided some hints of the inglorious reality behind Moscow’s efforts to project naval strength. Tellingly, the traditional parade of Russian warships along the Neva River to the Kronstadt naval base, which usually serves as the centerpiece of the entire holiday, was canceled due to security concerns. In its place, a reduced flotilla took part in a significantly scaled down event that featured around half as many vessels as in previous years.

Despite being by far the smallest Russian Navy Day since the holiday was reinstated in 2017, this year’s event nevertheless represented an excellent opportunity for Putin to honor Russia’s fallen sailors and vow retribution for the country’s unprecedented losses in the Black Sea. In fact, he did nothing of the sort. Throughout his official address, Putin barely mentioned the casualties suffered or the sacrifices made by the Russian Navy during the invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin dictator preferred to flush Russia’s Black Sea defeats down the memory hole. He was aided by the loyal Russian media, which carefully avoided any awkward references to the disaster that has befallen the country’s Black Sea Fleet.

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All this brings to mind an old Soviet joke that begins with Napoleon, Julius Caesar, and Alexander the Great looking down from heaven at a Red Army parade on Red Square. Caesar indicates the endless rows of Soviet troops and says, “with so many men, I could have held Germania.” Alexander points to the tanks and missiles and declares, “with such weapons of war, I could have conquered all India.” Napoleon, meanwhile, completely ignores the parade and is instead engrossed in a copy of Pravda. “If I had such a newspaper,” he proclaims, “nobody would have heard of Waterloo.”

Many Soviet jokes have not aged well, but this particular punchline remains as relevant as ever in modern Russia, where Putin has succeeded in creating a propaganda machine every bit as potent as its Soviet predecessor. Today’s Kremlin-controlled multimedia ecosystem is far more sophisticated than its Communist forerunner, but it serves the same basic function of bending reality to suit the whims of Russia’s ruling elite.

For the past decade, Putin has used this unrivaled information weapon to fuel the biggest European invasion since World War II. Kremlin propagandists have managed to convince millions of ordinary Russians that democratic Ukraine is actually a “Nazi state” whose very existence poses an intolerable threat to Russia. Ukrainians have been demonized and dehumanized to such an extent that genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is now a routine feature on prime time Russian TV.

The success of these efforts is all too apparent, with a wide range of opinion polls, research, and anecdotal evidence pointing to consistently high levels of Russian public support for the invasion. Meanwhile, there is no meaningful anti-war movement in the country, despite widespread knowledge of the horrors taking place in neighboring Ukraine. This is not surprising. After all, as Voltaire once warned, those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.

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Putin’s ability to distort Russian reality is genuinely terrifying, but the sheer scale of his propaganda operation could also inadvertently offer hope for the future. Many commentators have argued that failure in Ukraine would lead to the fall of the Putin regime and quite possibly the breakup of Russia itself, but these concerns may be exaggerated. While a third Russian collapse in a little over a century cannot be ruled out, the experience of the past two-and-a-half years gives good cause to believe that Moscow’s disinformation industry is more than capable of rebranding any future retreat from Ukraine in a favorable light, or of burying it completely. In other words, if the Russian media can manufacture a major war, it can also fabricate a suitably plausible peace.

Anyone who still doubts the Kremlin’s capacity to whitewash military defeat in Ukraine hasn’t been paying attention. We have recently witnessed Putin hosting the biggest naval event of the year while studiously ignoring the historic humbling of his southern fleet. It was the same story in 2022, when he ceremoniously announced that Kherson had joined Russia “forever,” only to order his beaten troops to abandon the city just weeks later. Likewise, when Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv during the initial phase of the invasion, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge defeat and absurdly insisted that the retreat from northern Ukraine was a mere “goodwill gesture.” If Putin is eventually forced to end his invasion, it seems safe to assume he will downplay this humiliation in similar fashion.

Since February 2022, Western leaders have found numerous reasons to limit their support for Ukraine. Some are restricted by modest defense budgets and competing domestic priorities. Most are afraid of possible escalation and have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s talk of Russian red lines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says many of his country’s Western partners are also reluctant to arm Ukraine because they fear the unpredictable geopolitical consequences of a Russian defeat. This Western alarm over a possible Russian collapse is exaggerated and fails to account for the power of Putin’s propaganda.

If Russia suffers a decisive defeat in Ukraine, past experience indicates that the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to move the goalposts, change the narrative, or devise some other way of rewriting history and claiming victory. Any embarrassing evidence of failure would simply be flushed down the memory hole, along with all the sunken Russian warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The trends shaping defense technology across the world, from Japan to Mexico and beyond

Forward Defense — Sat, 03 Aug 2024 12:39:33 +0000

Below is an abridged version of the Forward Defense initiative’s Defense Technology Monitor, a bimonthly series tracking select developments in global defense technology and analyzing technology trends and their implications for defense, international security, and geopolitics.

Recent events in countries around the world have highlighted the trends shaping defense technology—and their significant ramifications for global security.

For example, in Japan, the government released a policy on the military use of artificial intelligence (AI). Evolutions in the use of drone technology in Russia, Mexico, and Sudan have brought further attention to the conversation around the use of lethal drones. Meanwhile, the United States revealed more information about a hyper-enabled operator concept it is working on, which would connect troops with technologies they need to make faster decisions and improve situational awareness.

Below is a brief look at these and other changes in how defense technologies are used and deployed globally.

AI and data

As Japan continues to face a low birth rate, which is complicating the military’s recruitment efforts, the Japanese Defense Ministry released its first policy on the use of artificial intelligence. The defense minister argued that as Japan faces demographic pressures, it is increasingly important that each member of the force is as efficient and productive as possible. The new policy is another data point in the trend of using AI in a way that is human-centered.

Autonomous systems

While the use of lethal drones has become a topic of conversation in regard to Russia’s war in Ukraine and other major conflicts around the world, the diffusion of this cheap and effective technology has begun to appear in other contexts as well. Notably, there has been a diffusion of drones to non-state actors. Cartels in Mexico have started operating bomb-dropping drones, resulting in the deaths of Mexican soldiers. Attacks like these began in 2020 but have become alarmingly more frequent over the past year. In addition, a spokesperson from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) said that Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—leader of the SAF—had survived an assassination attempt in the form of a drone attack, which the spokesperson blamed on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). However, a legal adviser to the RSF said the group was not responsible. Some analysts have said that the RSF has been using drones with more frequency, with attacks directed at army-controlled areas.

Platforms and weapons systems

A new in-depth analysis from National Defense University Press shines a light on the ways drone operators can combat the diverse set of counter-drone measures and tactics being developed and deployed around the world. The analysis inspects technologies including kinetic weapons, directed-energy weapons, and autonomy manipulation, as well as offensive anti-air operations and targets. This analysis is timely, given the value that drones have demonstrated in Ukraine and elsewhere, as well as the growing emphasis on the development and acquisition of more effective counter-drone capabilities.

Human performance enhancement and protection

The US military has shed more light on its development of a hyper-enabled operator concept, which would equip special operations forces with technologies that enhance their situational awareness and accelerate decision making. The concept is the successor to an earlier effort to build an exoskeleton of armor, called the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS), that would improve survivability in combat by offering the operator resistance to small-arms fire.

Manufacturing and industry

This summer, digital engineering company Istari Digital was awarded a contract to develop “Model One.” This new digital platform program is designed to integrate fifty models and simulations from across the Air Force into a unified system, in an effort to adapt to “the ever-evolving landscape of digital warfare,” as Istari CEO Will Roper and backer Eric Schmidt put it in a Wall Street Journal op-ed. The US Army is also pursuing a new platform to speed up the pace, lower the cost, and reduce the risk in weapons systems development. It has also released a new policy aimed at boosting its digital engineering capacity.

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Europe can do more to help Ukraine counter Russia’s energy attacks

Aura Sabadus — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 20:54:59 +0000

Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure has forced millions of Ukrainians to spend the summer months adjusting to rolling power blackouts, with record high temperatures adding to the practical challenges of living without electricity. The Ukrainian response to this latest episode of wartime adversity has been marked by typical grit, resourcefulness, and good humor. Nevertheless, there is now widespread awareness that the country is facing what may be the toughest winter in modern Ukrainian history.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has destroyed, damaged, or occupied approximately eighty percent of Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. The situation has deteriorated sharply since March 2024 following a wave of Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants that have devastated the country’s thermal capacity.

Ukrainian energy sector officials believe that during the coming winter season, peak demand could be above eighteen gigawatts, with average consumption likely to hover around fifteen gigawatts. However, remaining capacity is just over ten gigawatts. Unless significant new sources can be secured, Ukrainians will have to deal with extended blackouts amid subzero temperatures. This could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and create new waves of refugees fleeing to the EU.

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Looking ahead, there is no substitute for much needed air defenses to protect Ukraine’s remaining energy production capacity. However, additional steps from the Ukrainian authorities and Kyiv’s partners could help prepare the country for the coming winter season.

A July 2024 report funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Education and Research has identified a number of short-term measures that could be adopted swiftly to at least partially plug current shortfalls. Fast repairs of thermal and hydro plants together with the deployment of small-scale gas-fired turbines and solar panels could bring approximately 3.4GW of additional capacity online before temperatures start to drop. Donations of spare equipment are also absolutely vital, while Ukraine should intensify work with partners to establish stockpiles of components to rebuild generation capacity.

One of the most promising initiatives would involve increasing cross-border capacity with neighboring EU countries operating under the umbrella of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Ukraine synchronized with the ENTSO-E grid in March 2022. Since then, Kyiv has increased cross-border capacity significantly, but there is still scope for a further expansion of interconnection capacity by approximately 0.3GW ahead of the coming winter season. This may be easier said than done, however.

Hungary and Slovakia are key exporters of electricity to Ukraine but are currently threatening to cut flows after Kyiv introduced a partial ban on the transit of Russian oil to refineries in the two EU countries. Budapest and Bratislava have long benefitted from cheap Russian energy imports and have faced accusations of acting in the Kremlin’s interests by blocking EU financial and military support to Ukraine. Both countries could now undermine efforts to boost energy exports to Ukraine.

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While there has not yet been any disruption to electricity flows from the EU into Ukraine, it is clearly in Kyiv’s interests to avoid disagreements where possible and to seek enhanced energy partnership with the country’s European neighbors. Closer cooperation with Slovakia and Romania in particular could pay major dividends. Indeed, recent research has found that transmission capacity could be more than doubled to five gigawatts. This could provide greater energy security, create jobs, and attract significant investments.

If completed, one existing power line project linking Slovakia and Ukraine could bring additional capacity of one gigawatt, enough to supply a million consumers. Work on this line began in 2013 and is seventy percent complete on the Ukrainian side, but nothing has yet been done on the Slovak side. Similarly, a proposed electricity power line linking Ukraine’s Pivdennoukrainska nuclear power plant to Romania would not only bring an additional one gigawatt of transfer capacity, but could also potentially end nearby Moldova’s dependence on electricity generated in the Kremlin-controlled Transnistria enclave.

Despite the numerous benefits offered by these projects, the Romanian and Slovakian governments remain unwilling to commit. This lack of political cooperation may contribute to a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine during the coming winter months that could spill over into neighboring countries. With the countdown to the cold season now already underway, there is no time to lose. Helping Ukraine to keep the lights on should be a priority for the whole of Europe.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

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Speaking in summer 2023, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov outlined the country’s drone strategy of bringing together drone manufacturers and military officials to address problems, approve designs, secure funding, and streamline collaboration. Thanks to this approach, he predicted a one hundred fold increase in output by the end of the year.

The Ukrainian drone production industry began as a volunteer project in the early days of the Russian invasion, and quickly became a nationwide movement. The initial goal was to provide the Ukrainian military with 10,000 FPV (first person view) drones along with ammunition. This was soon replaced by far more ambitious objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more the one billion US dollars has been collected by Ukrainians via fundraising efforts for the purchase of drones. According to online polls, Ukrainians are more inclined to donate money for drones than any other cause.

Today, Ukrainian drone production has evolved from volunteer effort to national strategic priority. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the country will produce more than one million drones in 2024. This includes various types of drone models, not just small FPV drones for targeting personnel and armored vehicles on the battlefield. By early 2024, Ukraine had reportedly caught up with Russia in the production of kamikaze drones similar in characteristics to the large Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This progress owes much to cooperation between state bodies and private manufacturers.

Marine drones are a separate Ukrainian success story. Since February 2022, Ukraine has used domestically developed marine drones to damage or sink around one third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, forcing Putin to withdraw most of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk in Russia. New Russian defensive measures are consistently met with upgraded Ukrainian marine drones.

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In May 2024, Ukraine became the first country in the world to create an entire branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare. The commander of this new drone branch, Vadym Sukharevsky, has since identified the diversity of country’s drone production as a major asset. As end users, the Ukrainian military is interested in as wide a selection of manufacturers and products as possible. To date, contracts have been signed with more than 125 manufacturers.

The lessons learned from the successful development of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem should now be applied to the country’s cybersecurity strategy. “Ukraine has the talent to develop cutting-edge cyber products, but lacks investment. Government support is crucial, as can be seen in the drone industry. Allocating budgets to buy local cybersecurity products will create a thriving market and attract investors. Importing technologies strengthens capabilities but this approach doesn’t build a robust national industry,” commented Oleh Derevianko, co-founder and chairman of Information Systems Security Partners.

The development of Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities has been so striking because local manufacturers are able to test and refine their products in authentic combat conditions. This allows them to respond on a daily basis to new defensive measures employed by the Russians. The same principle is necessary in cybersecurity. Ukraine regularly faces fresh challenges from Russian cyber forces and hacker groups; the most effective approach would involve developing solutions on-site. Among other things, this would make it possible to conduct immediate tests in genuine wartime conditions, as is done with drones.

At present, Ukraine’s primary cybersecurity funding comes from the Ukrainian defense budget and international donors. These investments would be more effective if one of the conditions was the procurement of some solutions from local Ukrainian companies. Today, only a handful of Ukrainian IT companies supply the Ukrainian authorities with cybersecurity solutions. Increasing this number to at least dozens of companies would create a local industry capable of producing world-class products. As we have seen with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian drone industry, this strategy would likely strengthen Ukraine’s own cyber defenses while also boosting the cybersecurity of the wider Western world.

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Russia’s retreat from Crimea makes a mockery of the West’s escalation fears

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 20:52:12 +0000

This week marked another milestone in the Battle of the Black Sea as the Russian Navy reportedly withdrew its last remaining patrol ship from occupied Crimea. The news was announced by Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk, who signaled the historic nature of the Russian retreat with the words: “Remember this day.”

The withdrawal of Russian warships from Crimea is the latest indication that against all odds, Ukraine is actually winning the war at sea. When Russia first began the blockade of Ukraine’s ports on the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, few believed the ramshackle Ukrainian Navy could seriously challenge the dominance of the mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet. Once hostilities were underway, however, it soon became apparent that Ukraine had no intention of conceding control of the Black Sea to Putin without a fight.

Beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically produced drones and missiles together with Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike a series of devastating blows against Putin’s fleet. Cruise missiles delivered by Kyiv’s British and French partners have played an important role in this campaign, but the most potent weapons of all have been Ukraine’s own rapidly evolving fleet of innovative marine drones.

The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had seventy four warships, most of which were based at ports in Russian-occupied Crimea. In a little over two years, Ukraine managed to sink or damage around one third of these ships. In the second half of 2023, reports were already emerging of Russian warships being hurriedly moved across the Black Sea from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia. By March 2024, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive,” according to the British Ministry of Defense.

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Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea has had significant practical implications for the wider war. It has disrupted Russian logistics and hindered the resupply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine, while limiting Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian targets from warships armed with cruise missiles. Crucially, it has also enabled Ukraine to break the blockade the country’s Black Sea ports and resume commercial shipping via a new maritime corridor. As a result, Ukrainian agricultural exports are now close to prewar levels, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

The Russian reaction to mounting setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea has also been extremely revealing, and offers valuable lessons for the future conduct of the war. It has often been suggested that a cornered and beaten Vladimir Putin could potentially resort to the most extreme measures, including the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, he has responded to the humiliating defeat of the Black Sea Fleet by quietly ordering his remaining warships to retreat.

This underwhelming response is all the more telling given the symbolic significance of Crimea to the Putin regime. The Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, which occupies an almost mystical position in Russian national folklore as the home of the country’s Black Sea Fleet. Throughout the past decade, the occupied Ukrainian peninsula has featured heavily in Kremlin propaganda trumpeting Russia’s return to Great Power status, and has come to symbolize Putin’s personal claim to a place in Russian history.

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Crimea’s elevated status was initially enough to make some of Ukraine’s international partners wary of sanctioning strikes on the occupied peninsula. However, the Ukrainians themselves had no such concerns. Instead, they simply disregarded the Kremlin’s talk of dire consequences and began attacking Russian military targets across Crimea and throughout the Black Sea. More than two years later, these attacks have now become a routine feature of the war and are taken for granted by all sides. Indeed, the Kremlin media plays down attacks on Crimea and largely ignores the frequent sinking of Russian warships, no doubt to save Putin’s blushes.

The Russian Navy’s readiness to retreat from its supposedly sacred home ports in Crimea has made a mockery of Moscow’s so-called red lines and exposed the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear threats. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s international allies remain reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions. Instead, Western support for Ukraine continues to be defined by self-defeating fears of escalation.

For almost two and a half years, Ukraine’s partners have allowed themselves to be intimidated into denying Ukraine certain categories of weapons and restricting attacks inside Russia. This is usually done while piously citing the need to prevent the current conflict from spreading any further. Western policymakers apparently prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence from the Battle of the Black Sea, which confirms that when confronted by resolute opposition, Putin is far more likely to back down than escalate.

The West’s fear of escalation is Putin’s most effective weapon. It allows him to limit the military aid reaching Kyiv, while also preventing Ukraine from striking back against Russia. This is slowly but surely setting the stage for inevitable Russian victory in a long war of attrition. Western leaders claim to be motivated by a desire to avoid provoking a wider war, but that is exactly what will happen if they continue to pursue misguided policies of escalation management and fail to stop Putin in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

Rudder featured in Intelligence Online on Taiwan’s military advancements

ylee — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 20:24:08 +0000

Original source

On July 5, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Steven Rudder was featured in Intelligence Online discussing Taiwan’s military advancements. The article highlighted his crucial role in facilitating Taiwan’s acquisition of American drones.

Fellow

Steven R. Rudder

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

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Bombing Europe’s breadbasket: Russia targets Ukrainian farmers

Hanna Hopko — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 19:07:28 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has identified Ukraine’s vast and strategically vital agriculture industry as a priority target. This offensive against Ukrainian farmers has included everything from the blockade of the country’s seaports to the systematic destruction of agricultural produce and infrastructure.

On the eve of the invasion in February 2022, the Russian Navy began blocking Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, cutting off long-established trade routes taking Ukrainian grain and other agricultural goods to international markets. This represented a devastating blow to the Ukrainian economy, while also increasing the threat of famine in countries throughout the Global South dependent on Ukrainian food supplies.

For more than two years, this attack on the Ukrainian agricultural sector has continued to accelerate. From Odesa to the Danube Delta, the southern Ukrainian port facilities that are so crucial to the export of agricultural produce have been subjected to relentless bombardment. According to Odesa Military Administration head Oleh Kiper, this has made it impossible to accumulate large quantities of grain in warehouse facilities, and is forcing the country’s agricultural exporters to operate under constant threat of attack.

Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure is also being systematically targeted across the country, with regular Russian attacks on equipment, storage facilities, and transport hubs. According to recent research, the total value of destroyed agricultural assets amounts to more than ten billion US dollars. Meanwhile, approximately two billion dollars worth of Ukrainian agricultural products have been destroyed or stolen and shipped to Kremlin allies such as Syria and Iran.

The scale of the damage done to Ukraine’s farmlands is staggering. More than one-third of the Ukrainian agricultural land dedicated to cereal production has been directly affected by the war, with about four million hectares currently unusable due to mining, munitions, or ongoing hostilities. A further eight million hectares of Ukrainian farmland is currently under Russian occupation. Beyond the front lines, Russia is also accused of deliberately setting fire to Ukrainian grain fields.

The Kremlin’s goal is clear: Russia aims to inflict irreparable damage on Ukraine’s agricultural industry, leading to economic collapse and depopulation. Ukraine has historically been known as Europe’s breadbasket, with the country’s agricultural sector serving as a key engine of the national economy. By blocking agricultural exports, destroying agricultural infrastructure, and preventing farmers from growing crops, Moscow hopes to undermine the economic foundations of Ukrainian statehood and pave the way for the country’s subjugation.

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Russia’s campaign against the Ukrainian agricultural industry also has a broader international dimension. The Kremlin is using food as a weapon to expand its influence throughout the Global South while employing a combination of blackmail and bribery. Moscow seeks to prevent Ukraine from exporting foodstuffs to countries in Africa and Asia, while at the same time looking to “replace Ukrainian grain” with Russian supplies.

In summer 2022, there were hopes of some relieve for the Ukrainian agricultural sector when Russia signed up to a UN-brokered grain deal. This apparent breakthrough sparked initial optimism, but ultimately highlighted the Kremlin’s readiness to exploit global food security concerns. The UN-backed grain agreement allowed for limited exports of grain from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, but it soon became apparent that Moscow saw the deal primarily as an opportunity to secure further concessions. The Kremlin consistently sabotaged implementation of the grain agreement, before unilaterally withdrawing one year later when its escalating demands were not met.

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Ukraine has achieved some notable successes in defense of the country’s farming industry. Beginning in August 2023, Ukraine has managed to partially unblock the country’s Black Sea ports and resume grain deliveries through the creation of a new corridor for merchant shipping. Maritime agricultural export volumes are now close to prewar levels, underlining the remarkable resilience of wartime Ukraine.

The resumption of agricultural exports via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports represents one of the country’s most significant victories since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This was made possible by the innovative use of Ukrainian drone technologies and the effective deployment of missiles provided by the country’s international partners, allowing Ukraine to significantly reduce the Russian Navy’s effectiveness in the Black Sea.

Despite this progress, much more still needs to be done in order to safeguard shipping lanes and allow for the free passage of agricultural produce across the Black Sea to global markets. As the trade routes that Russia is targeting lie in international waters, this is not an issue for Ukraine alone. Instead, there are implications for the wider international community, especially for other Black Sea region countries. It is important to hold Russia accountable for jeopardizing the security of vital maritime trade routes and for engaging in conduct that could be classified as piracy.

Ukraine has proven that it can fight back effectively against Russia with even limited resources. The Ukrainian military has damaged or destroyed around one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and has forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to Russia itself. Ukraine now urgently needs to receive fighter jets, long-range missiles, and air defenses from the country’s international partners. With the right tools, Ukraine will be able to protect its ports and agricultural infrastructure, enforce international law in the Black Sea, and safeguard the breadbasket of Europe from further Russian attack.

Hanna Hopko is co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory and head of the ANTS Network. She was a member of the Ukrainian Parliament from 2014 to 2019 and served as head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Ukraine’s innovative drone industry helps counter Putin’s war machine

David Kirichenko — Wed, 26 Jun 2024 13:02:03 +0000

Since the outbreak of hostilities in February 2022, Ukraine’s domestic drone industry has emerged as an increasingly crucial element in the struggle to resist and outmaneuver the formidable Russian war machine. Ukraine’s innovative use of drones has allowed the country to counter Russia’s far greater resources and strike back at targets everywhere from the Black Sea to oil refineries deep inside Russia itself.

For more than two years, Ukrainian commanders have been adapting to rapidly evolving battlefield conditions shaped by the use of drones. In the initial weeks of the war, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were instrumental in allowing Ukraine to strike over-stretched Russian lines as Putin’s invading army attempted to take Kyiv. A range of countermeasures, including increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, have since created an environment where Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly competing to gain an innovative edge over their adversaries. Many view this military tech contest as the decisive front of the war.

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As the front line stabilized during the first winter of Russia’s invasion, trench warfare became the defining feature of the conflict, with drones filling the skies and searching for targets. This has created unprecedented visibility on both sides of the front lines and made offensive operations increasingly challenging. A large proportion of the drones buzzing above the Ukrainian battlefield in winter 2022 were Chinese in origin, which placed Russia at a significant advantage due to Moscow’s close ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, many of the Western drone models used in Ukraine have proved costly and ineffective, according to the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, delays in military aid have underlined the risks for Ukraine of relying too heavily on the country’s Western partners. These factors have helped convince policymakers in Kyiv to concentrate on the development of their own domestic drone industry. They have been able to call upon Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector to support these efforts.

With Ukraine typically losing thousands of drones per month, keeping production costs as low as possible is vital. Flexibility in drone operations is also essential, as drone units frequently use 3D printing to modify and adapt parts to meet specific needs. With this in mind, Ukraine has adopted a decentralized approach to drone development that allows for rapid testing and deployment.

Ukraine’s emphasis on agility contrasts with the more centralized military structure favored by the Kremlin. While Russia can produce vast quantities of military equipment, comparatively slower decision-making processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies often hinder the Kremlin’s ability to respond swiftly to new battlefield realities. Many analysts believe this was a factor behind the recent appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new defense minister.

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The growth of Ukraine’s domestic drone industry over the past two years has been striking, with more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies created. The Ukrainian authorities have allocated $2 billion for the production of drones in 2024, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy setting an annual production target of one million FPV drones.

Ukraine’s leaders hope more drones will mean less reliance on traditional munitions and fewer casualties. “We don’t have as many human resources as Russia. They fight, they die, they send more people, they don’t care, but that’s not how we see war,” commented Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation.

A key element in Ukraine’s drone strategy is the BRAVE1 initiative, a government-led defense tech cluster established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the public and private sectors. This cluster has helped numerous companies cut through red tape, speeding up the implementation of new technologies to support Ukraine’s defense.

The race to innovate is relentless, with Ukraine’s steadily improving drone capabilities mirrored by Russia’s own rapidly expanding electronic warfare arsenal. Ukrainian engineers are now attempting to overcome the Kremlin’s increasingly sophisticated jamming efforts by embedding artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into drones. This innovation has already played a part in Kyiv’s long-range drone strike campaign against Russia’s energy industry, with CNN reporting that Ukraine has employed AI-enabled drones to hit targets as far away as Russia’s Tatarstan region, well over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine’s partners certainly seem to recognize the importance of drones and have set up an international drone coalition to aid deliveries. In a further example of institutional innovation, Ukraine has this year become the first nation to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy will continue to focus on flexibility, innovation, and the daily challenge of maintaining a technological advantage over Russia. Ukraine’s leaders know they cannot hope to defeat Russia in a traditional war of attrition, and must instead make the most of the agility and technological ingenuity that the country has demonstrated since February 2022. As Ukraine’s understanding of drone warfare continues to evolve, the outside world will be watching and learning.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

A global strategy to secure UAS supply chains

Matthew Kroenig, Imran Bayoumi — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 21:09:37 +0000

Foreword: A US strategy for UAVs

The United States has long been one of the world’s leading innovators, allowing it to rapidly adopt emerging technology to strengthen US national defense. This has been especially true in the field of aviation. From the first powered flight at Kitty Hawk to twenty-first-century strategic competition, the United States has made the maintenance of air superiority a major priority.

Today, however, the People’s Republic of China has built a near-insurmountable lead in the development and use of small, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Benefiting from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) unfair trading practices, Chinese companies have come to dominate the global UAV market, which was valued at $31 billion in 2023.

Chinese dominance of the global UAV industry poses a number of national security challenges for the United States. On the battlefield, drones play a crucial role in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and in conducting strikes. Chinese leadership in UAVs provides the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with potential battlefield advantages.

At home, these devices provide critical support to law-enforcement agencies and a variety of government departments, in everything from undertaking infrastructure inspections to fulfilling vital roles in scientific research. Chinese commercial drones operating in the United States and allied countries, therefore, provide the PLA with a potential source of intelligence about personal data and critical infrastructure that can be used to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in US and allied homelands.

Finally, Chinese UAVs raise human rights concerns, as Chinese drone companies surveil Chinese citizens and assist the CCP in its mistreatment of its Muslim Uyghur minority.

Washington has begun to wake up to the challenges presented by China’s dominance of the global UAV market. Federal agencies and some states have banned the use of Chinese drones. The federal government has enacted tariffs. Recognizing UAVs’ potential benefit to defense and deterrence, the Department of Defense created the Replicator initiative, a flagship effort to promote the development and fielding of autonomous systems. Congress has also introduced legislation with new measures to protect the US market from Chinese drones and to promote the production of US-made drones.

These are good initial steps, but, to date, they have been piecemeal in nature and lack an overarching strategic framework.

This issue brief proposes a comprehensive three-part “protect-promote-align” strategy for the United States and its allies to secure their national security interests in the global UAV market. It argues that the United States and its allies should introduce new restrictions on the use of Chinese drones in their markets. They should promote the development of alternative drone manufacturers in the United States and trusted allies. Finally, they should align their policies to advance a whole-of-free-world approach to the global drone competition.

If adopted, the strategy proposed here will go a long way toward ensuring that the United States and its allies can remain secure at home, deter their adversaries, and benefit from an emerging technology that is likely to play a critical role in twenty-first-century defense.

Deborah Lee James
Atlantic Council Board Director
Former Secretary of the Air Force

Executive summary

The United States has been the world’s innovation leader since the time of Thomas Edison, and this innovation edge has provided the United States and its allies with enormous economic, military, and geopolitical benefits. China, however, aims to usurp the US position as the world’s leader in the most important technologies of the twenty-first century, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), commonly known as drones. Using a variety of unfair trade practices, including massive intellectual-property theft, China has closed the gap, and even maintains the lead, in some of these critical technologies, including UAS.

While the United States has preserved its edge in large military drones, China dominates the market for smaller and commercially available drones with dual-use civilian and military applications. China controls 90 percent of the drone market in the United States and 80 percent globally.

China’s supremacy in the commercial UAS market creates a number of national security threats for the United States and its allies. First, Chinese drones operating in the United States and its democratic allies create an intelligence vulnerability, as these drones scoop up sensitive data that can be transferred back to Beijing for a variety of national security purposes, including aiding the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in targeting critical infrastructure for cyber and kinetic military attacks.

Second, China’s drone-manufacturing prowess provides a military edge. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that inexpensive commercial drones will be critical to intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike in twenty-first-century warfare.

Third, and related, the free world has a supply-chain vulnerability problem, as it is dependent on an autocratic adversary for access to UAS for both civilian and military purposes, creating dangerous dependencies that China could exploit in crisis or peacetime. States increasingly utilize “drone diplomacy” to gain influence abroad. The act of selling a drone can be used to “extract concessions, exert influence, counter rivals, and strengthen military ties.” China’s artificially low prices for UAS, achieved through state subsidies, crowd out the development of a homegrown domestic drone industry in the United States and among US allies.

Fourth, Chinese-built drones threaten democratic values and human rights, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other autocracies employ Chinese drones for surveilling their populations, including in the CCP’s genocide of the Uyghur minority.

To address these challenges, the United States and its allies need a new strategy to protect against the threats posed by Chinese drones, strengthen their position in the international UAS market, and assert global leadership in this key twenty-first-century technology. To help the United States and its allies win the new tech race, the Scowcroft Center previously published a three-part “promote, protect, and coordinate” strategy. This paper updates that framework, and applies it to the issue of dual-use drones.

First, the United States and its allies should protect their countries from the national security threat posed by Chinese-made drones by prohibiting their use in sensitive areas, such as by the government and in critical infrastructure.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act and the Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant (DIIG) Act.
The US Congress should pass legislation to make US state-level bans effective and actionable by offering federal-government support for their implementation, including through targeted grant programs accelerating the transition to secure and capable systems.
The US State Department should, in light of increasing global restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC)-made drones, launch an initiative to educate allies and partners on the risks associated with those systems, and support secure and capable alternatives.
The US State Department should encourage allies and partners to enact tariffs and sanctions on PRC-made UAS to counter China’s unfair trade practices.

Second, the United States and its allies should promote domestic drone manufacturing to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US federal government should provide targeted grants to accelerate the transition to secure drones in the government and critical-infrastructure sectors, and should consider funding to expand domestic drone manufacturing.
The US State Department should encourage allied governments to do the same, providing reasonable funding measures to accelerate the transition to secure US and allied solutions.
The US Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) should ensure that the Replicator initiative has the proper funding and support to achieve the ambitious goals laid out in the program.
The US Departments of State and Defense should encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator initiative to ensure the free world has UAS in mass necessary to deter and defeat aggression.
The US Congress should pass legislation, using a public-private partnership framework, to stimulate investment in research and development of autonomous drones, and scale existing UAS-manufacturing capabilities in the United States.

Third, and finally, the United States should align with its allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

Specific recommendations include the following.

The US State Department should elevate drones in technology and commercial diplomacy, starting by designating an individual to lead allied cooperation on drone policies, manufacturing, and supply-chain security.
The United States and its allies should work with existing multilateral frameworks including the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), Quad, Department of Commerce, and World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of drones and autonomous systems.
The United States should leverage NATO and AUKUS Pillar II to improve defense coordination related to UAS.

Pursuing this strategy now will help the United States and its allies maintain their innovation edge and prevail in a new era of strategic competition against revisionist autocracies.

The threat posed by China’s dominance of the global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry

In 2023, the global UAS market was worth more than $30 billion, a number projected to increase to more than $55 billion by 2030. The market is dominated by firms based in China, with DJI controlling 80 percent of the commercial market within the United States and as much as 70 percent of the global market, and Autel, another PRC manufacturer, controlling 7 percent globally. As of 2021, estimates put Autel’s US market share at 15 percent. In comparison, Skydio, perhaps the most prominent US-based company, had only a 3 percent share of the global market, the same as Parrot, a French-based entity.

DroneAnalyst’s 2021 Drone Market Sector Report includes data from a survey of drone industry stakeholders in over 100 countries on the percentage of all new commercial drone purchases. The graph examines the percentage each company has of the global market share and sorts by the headquarter location of each company. DroneAnalyst

In 2020, 90 percent of UAS operated by US public-safety agencies were manufactured by DJI, though this number has since fallen due to a series of state and local bans. In Florida, before a recent ban was enacted, more than 1,800 of 3,000 UAS registered by the government and police departments were manufactured by DJI and Autel. However, in some states, DJI and Autel still hold a disproportionate market share among public-sector entities. In New Jersey, more than 500 of the 550 UAS registered by the state and local police departments were made by DJI or Autel.

US allies continue to rely heavily on PRC-made drones. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, 230 out of the 337 drones operated by police forces across the country are DJI products. In Australia, a report revealed that federal agencies owned several thousand DJI drones, although the Australian military had grounded its systems and other agencies had begun to move away from them as well.

The global-market dominance of DJI and Autel has been supported by two national CCP policies, Made in China 2025 and Military-Civil Fusion, which are supported in part by industrial and corporate theft of foreign technology. The PRC has never been a market economy. Instead, it relies on a noncompetitive system of trade, bolstered by subsidies and other unfair practices.

Made in China 2025 was announced in 2015 and seeks to boost China’s manufacturing competitiveness across a variety of industries. The plan focuses on ten different sectors, including the development of UAS. Across each sector, the PRC aims to increase China’s domestic manufacturing capacity to have 70 percent of the core components and materials produced in China by 2025. To achieve this goal, the PRC uses a variety of tactics, such as creating financial and tax incentives to convince foreign-based firms to shift manufacturing and research and development (R&D) operations to China, intellectual-property theft, predatory procurement policies, and financing state-owned enterprises in their acquisitions of overseas companies.

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is central to Xi Jinping’s plan to allow China to modernize its military by 2035 and ensure that the PLA becomes “world-class” by 2049. At its core, MCF is a strategy that aims to break down barriers between commercial R&D and military products, allowing the PLA to rapidly identify, adopt, scale up, and leverage commercial technologies that also have a military application, such as UAS. The MCF system also encourages linkages between the state and dozens of private companies that can contribute to military projects and help meet procurement needs, including companies that develop unmanned systems. To achieve the goals of MCF, the PRC uses both licit and illicit means, including exploiting global academic exchanges, investment in foreign companies, forced military transfer, and, in some cases, blatant theft.

As a result of these strategies, DJI and Autel can sell their UAS at below-market cost to the United States and allied countries, a process known as dumping. A 2017 investigation by the US Department of Homeland Security found that, in 2015, DJI slashed its prices by 70 percent, leading to a problem highlighted in 2019 by then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord, who said, “We don’t have much of a UAS industrial base because DJI dumped so many low-price quadcopters on the market, and we then became dependent on them.” DJI has even clearer linkages to the CCP than just state support for illegal trade practices. A 2022 Washington Post investigation found four different CCP-owned or operated investment vehicles invested in DJI.

The US government recognizes the threat posed by PRC-made drones. In 2021, the Department of Defense released a statement indicating that DJI systems pose potential threats to national security. In 2022, the department identified DJI as a Chinese military company operating in the United States. Similarly, the Treasury Department added DJI to the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex (CMIC) companies list, which prevents US citizens from investing in or trading their stock, should DJI attempt to build a public company.

PRC-made UAS pose four direct national security concerns. The first concern relates to Chinese intelligence collection in the United States. In early 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released an alert that stated, “The use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.” These concerns represented by the joint CISA-FBI alert are compounded by China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which mandates that private companies work with the PRC’s intelligence services. Article 14 of the law states, “State intelligence work organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs, organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation.” In practice, this may include Chinese drone companies sharing sensitive flight data, the personal information of users, geolocation data, images, and video collected in the United States with the CCP. The transfer of such information to the CCP would allow Beijing to identify and exploit US vulnerabilities and facilitate the sabotage, disruption, or destruction of US critical infrastructure in times of crisis or conflict. Indeed, in 2017, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement determined that DJI was likely providing information about critical US infrastructure sites to the PRC, which the PRC then used to target specific assets. At the strategic level, FBI Director Christopher Wray warns that the Chinese security services present a “broad and unrelenting threat” to US critical infrastructure and are prepared to “wreak havoc.” PRC-made UAS have also been located in restricted airspace, including over Washington, DC. This is despite DJI claiming to have geofencing restrictions, which, in theory, limit where its UAS can operate.

The second concern relates to military effectiveness. The war in Ukraine is a testbed for new military technologies, and small commercial UAS have been a game changer in the conflict. They allow troops on the ground to conduct more accurate, real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of adversary positions and troop movements, and to facilitate more effective fires. They have also proven to be an effective and economical strike option, as UAS can destroy much more expensive platforms by crashing into them or dropping inexpensive bombs. Indeed, Chinese drones are making Vladimir Putin’s war machine more lethal. As of March 2023, the PRC had sold more than $12 million in UAS and parts to Russia. The consistent supply of UAS has allowed Russia access to a cheap and plentiful way to carry out ISR and targeted attacks. DJI and Autel are the number one and two brands, respectively, that China exports to Russia. To maintain deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its allies will need the ability to develop trusted drones, at scale, for military purposes and to counter adversaries’ drones. Recent news from China makes that reality more important. Last year, China enacted export controls on small commercial drones for the first time. Those controls threaten to choke Ukraine’s primary source of drones without affecting supplies to Russia. That development highlights the criticality of the United States and its allies developing alternative sources of supply.

An Autel Robotics Dragonfish Pro drone, with an 18-mile range, is displayed during CES 2022 at the Las Vegas Convention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S. January 5, 2022. REUTERS/Steve Marcus

A third concern relates to secure supply chains. In recent years, the United States and its allies have recognized they are economically vulnerable due to dependence on autocratic rivals—China and Russia—for critical supplies, including semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and much else. As demonstrated by the recent Chinese efforts to strangle Ukraine’s source of supply, the PRC has the ability to restrict US and allied access to UAS, potentially limiting their access in wartime. Similarly, drone customers not subject to federal or state prohibitions on Chinese drones, such as commercial entities, remain vulnerable to the PRC’s ability to restrict their access to UAS for civil purposes in peacetime.

The fourth and final concern relates to human rights. China commits gross human rights violations, including genocide against its Uyghur minority population. Under the Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2020, Washington committed to sanctioning companies that participate in atrocities against the Uyghurs. The US Treasury Department stated, “SZ DJI has provided drones to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, which are used to surveil Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang Public Security Bureau was previously designated in July 2020, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for connection to human rights abuses in Xinjiang.” DJI has already been added to the Commerce Department’s entity list, which restricts the ability of US companies to sell technology and component parts to DJI. DJI’s complicity in the human rights violations against the Uyghurs is indicative of the CCP’s support of authoritarianism globally. China and its authoritarian partners increasingly use UAS to suppress democracy and human rights globally. Countering DJI and other PRC UAS companies is critical to limiting the reach of autocrats and supporting democracy globally.

Ongoing efforts to counter PRC-made drones

The United States and its allies have already undertaken some efforts to challenge the dominance of Chinese UAS. At the federal level, the Donald Trump administration banned the sale of US technology to DJI without a license. The Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of the Interior stopped using Chinese drones in 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. Congress codified the Pentagon’s ban in 2019. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded those restrictions to prohibit DOD from buying UAS or components from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This law was further expanded to ban defense contractors from using UAS and components manufactured in the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in execution of their DOD contracts starting in 2023. The American Security Drone Act, passed in the 2024 NDAA, bans federal government entities from buying and operating UAS from designated adversarial nations, including China, and prohibits the use of federal funds to purchase or operate these drones starting in December 2025.

At the state level, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Tennessee, and Utah have restricted the use of PRC-made UAS by state agencies, local agencies, or both. Those restrictions generally mirror federal laws, protecting government agencies from insecure products connected to adversarial nations. This first phase of state action focused on government end-user restrictions, but a second phase—focused on providing grants to accelerate the transition away from insecure drones—is under way. In 2023 Florida enacted a $25-million grant program to help local agencies reduce their dependency on insecure drones. In 2024, legislators in several states proposed similar grant programs.

There are additional efforts under way in the US Congress. Representatives Elise Stefanik and Mike Gallagher introduced the Countering CCP Drones Act to amend the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Their bill would add DJI to the list of equipment banned from operating on US telecommunications infrastructure, potentially impacting DJI’s ability to place new products on the market. The bill would not affect existing DJI drones.

In an effort to better equip the United States with UAS for military purposes, the DOD recently announced the Replicator initiative, which aims to directly counter PRC dominance in the domain of attritable autonomous systems. Replicator was motivated, in part, by the recognition that the PRC has a scale advantage, which allows Beijing to rapidly manufacture and field weapons systems, including attritable autonomous systems. With Replicator, DOD aims to deploy thousands of autonomous systems. Open questions remain as to what systems will be selected for Replicator, how the initiative will be funded, and how many systems will be procured. To be decisive in a near-peer conflict, Replicator will likely need to purchase tens of thousands of various systems to be used across all domains. For example, the UK-based Royal United Services Institute estimates that Ukraine is losing ten thousand drones per month in its fight against Russia, providing insight into the scale of the total number of UAS. To complement Replicator and make all-domain attritable autonomous systems decisive in near-peer conflict, the DOD should consider stockpiling drones. The stockpiling of these systems would be a hedge against supply-chain interruptions in times of conflict, and would allow for the quick delivery of drones to theaters of conflict as these systems are rapidly expended on the battlefield.

US allies have also started to act. In 2022, Lithuania banned the purchase of technology from countries deemed “untrustworthy” for applications in defense and security, including PRC-made UAS. India has gone further, banning both Chinese-made drones and their component parts. Australia’s military services and border force have grounded DJI drones, and other agencies appear to be transitioning to secure systems. In Japan, the coast guard stopped using DJI drones in 2020 due to cybersecurity concerns.

While the above actions are a good start, the United States and its allies need a whole-of-free-world strategic framework to mitigate the threat posed by PRC-made drones.

A free-world strategy for securing UAV supply chains

The United States and its allies should adopt a comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by Chinese-made drones. The goal should be to reduce or eliminate the national security threats that come from an overreliance on PRC-made drones, and to develop an alternative drone market in trusted countries. To achieve these goals, the United States and its allies should pursue a three-part “protect, promote, and align” strategy.

1. Protect the United States and its allies from the national security threat posed by PRC-made drones.

The first element of a strategy for securing UAV supply chains is to protect US and allied markets from PRC-made drones that threaten national security or that violate international trade laws and norms. This begins by pursuing a hard decoupling from Chinese-made drones in areas of sensitive national security concern. The regulation of UAS can be modeled after the “small yard, high fence” approach that the United States is taking to the regulation of other critical technologies, such as semiconductors.

In the United States, the American Security Drone Act is a good first step, but it is insufficient to fully address the problem. In addition, Congress should pass the Countering CCP Drones Act to prohibit Chinese drones from operating on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) infrastructure, just as the United States did for Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE. As identified by CISA and the FBI, the continued operation of Chinese UAS on US infrastructure raises the risk that the PRC will gain access to sensitive information and could use that information to conduct espionage on vulnerabilities in US critical infrastructure and public-safety response footprint, and to stage potential cyberattacks. Volt Typhoon, a recently disclosed Chinese threat activity discovered penetrating US critical infrastructure to prepare for future attacks, illustrates the stark nature of the threat. Currently, the American Security Drone Act would only ban DJI, but this should be amended to include all PRC-made drones, including those made by Autel.

Reasonable restrictions on PRC-made drones should be extended to state and local governments. Currently, the diverse range of legislation at the state and local levels has created a piecemeal approach that is confusing and leaves loopholes. Furthermore, the ban on Chinese drones operating in the United States should include the US private sector operating in sensitive national security areas, such as inspecting critical-infrastructure sites.

Next, the State Department should work with US allies and partners and encourage them to pass similar legislation restricting Chinese drones in sensitive sectors and to cooperate on common drone policies going forward. US global defense readiness and ability to project power in key regions could be compromised if China is able to gather sensitive intelligence and targeting information through drones operating in key allied countries. The United States and its allies already discuss critical and emerging technology cooperation through various forums, such as the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. The State Department should elevate drone cooperation as a key agenda item for discussion and cooperation in these forums. Additionally, the State Department should designate an individual who has the mandate to lead diplomatic efforts on drone cooperation.

In addition, the United States and its allies should seek coordinated tariffs and other countervailing measures to offset China’s unfair trade practices and level the playing field. The United States should maintain, if not increase, its 25-percent tariff on Chinese-made drones. There will, of course, be a cost to these measures, but they can be partially offset by the recommendations in the following “promote” element of the strategy. Should the United States increase tariffs on Chinese-made drones, the corresponding increased tariff revenue could be used to fund various grant programs to help existing Chinese drone customers—such as law-enforcement agencies—transition to US or allied drones.

When considering tariffs, it is critical to counter tariff evasion. In March 2024, bipartisan members of Congress wrote to the Joe Biden administration raising serious concerns that Chinese drone makers are evading the 25-percent tariffs by transshipping drones through Malaysia. The letter said, “[A]fter exporting virtually zero drones to the United States and being home to no major domestic drone manufacturers prior to 2022, Malaysia’s drone exports to the United States jumped inexplicably to 242,000 units that year.” In “the first eleven months of 2023 the United States imported more than 565,000 drones from Malaysia.” It is critically important to tackle transshipment, and to apply equivalent tariffs to—or categorical bans on—companies and products found to be complicit.

As part of this strategy to secure drone supply chains, the United States must be wary of efforts by DJI and other Chinese drone companies to avoid US sanctions. The New York Times reported earlier this year, for example, about a Texas-based company that licenses its drone designs from DJI and sources much of its parts from China. Legislative initiatives by Congress and other efforts by federal regulators to curb dependence on Chinese drones need to eliminate loopholes that would enable Chinese companies to evade punitive measures by distributing their products through US-based companies.

In preparation for a possible crisis or conflict with China, Washington and its allies should also be prepared to enact wide-reaching sanctions against Chinese companies critical for China’s military and intelligence activities, including DJI and Autel.¹ Washington must also be prepared to sanction companies involved in the overall procurement process for UAS, something that the Treasury Department has done in targeting companies that support Iran’s UAV industry. A response to the PRC in a time of crisis would also include enacting retaliatory export restrictions of US technology to China. To best prepare for these potential impacts, the Sanctions Economic Analysis Unit, established within the Department of the Treasury, should undertake research to understand the possible “collateral damage of sanctions before they’re imposed, and after they’ve been put in place to see if they should be adjusted.” A quick and easy win in this space would be adding Autel to the Department of Defense’s 1260H list, the Commerce Department’s entity list, and the Treasury Department’s Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, joining DJI. Additionally, the United States must work to develop robust and durable secure supply chains for all components of UAS, including through the development of a domestic industrial base.

To guide engagement with its allies, the United States should leverage the recently established Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (S/TECH). The S/TECH should make secure supply chains for drones a priority, along with other measures such as coordinating restrictions and safeguards against Chinese drones. Additionally, the DOD should elevate UAS as a priority agenda item for all bilateral and multilateral technology engagements carried out by US diplomats with allies and partners.

Taken together, these steps will offer significant protection for the United States and its allies from the threat of Chinese-made UAS.

U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Mary Beth Leonard, walks past a Zipline drone while touring an Innovation Exhibition at Innov8 Hub in Abuja, Nigeria November 19, 2021. Andrew Harnik/Pool via REUTERS

2. Promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure alternative to PRC-made drones.

The second major element of the strategy is to promote the development of a robust drone-manufacturing capability in the United States and allied countries. As outlined above, drones are critical for many purposes, and Chinese-made systems dominate all drone markets. As the United States and allied countries successfully de-risk from Chinese-made drones, they will need to replace this supply with drones produced by trusted sources.

Some of the steps identified in the “protect” element of the strategy will also stimulate domestic US and allied production. A selective ban on Chinese drones will naturally increase demand for drones produced elsewhere. Stiffer tariffs on Chinese-made drones will help to level the playing field and make non-PRC-made drones more competitive in the market.

To ensure these bans can be effectively enacted while being minimally disruptive, the federal government should provide funding incentives to facilitate the transition away from PRC-made UAS. As noted earlier, Florida’s ban on PRC-made UAS left local bodies, including fire departments and law-enforcement agencies, scrambling to find funding for alternatives. The provision of federal funds can help overcome the financial burden of buying alternatives to PRC UAS. The DIIG Act, for example, promises to provide funding for state and local agencies to purchase UAS for infrastructure inspections. Federal funding should be conditional, and only available to states that fully ban PRC-made UAS. For example, states that only ban DJI and not Autel, or that fail to ban the use of PRC-made UAS by contractors, would not be eligible for this funding.

The State Department should share these efforts, such as the DIIG Act, with allied countries and encourage the adoption of similar measures by allied governments. Its network of allies is the cornerstone of US national security. Therefore, the United States must encourage its allies to adopt similar policies that promote their own security as well.

In addition, the Pentagon’s Replicator initiative should be harnessed to stimulate a major leap forward in the development and deployment of US autonomous systems. In the short timeframe of 18–24 months, Replicator can help modernize the DOD’s warfighting capabilities and produce thousands of new drones. The US Congress and the DOD should prioritize significant, enduring funding for the Replicator initiative.

The efforts initially achieved through Replicator can be boosted by utilizing the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). Established in 2022, OSC identifies critical technologies for the DOD and partners with private capital and other agencies to create investment vehicles. Given Replicator’s priority status for the department, the development of the autonomous UAS industry should be a prioritized area for OSC. However, OSC funding is designed to target small companies that would not be able to produce systems at scale in order to contribute to Replicator. Instead, OSC should consider boosting small, innovative companies that are in the UAS supply chain and help enable the critical domestic industrial base of advanced components for current and future UAS systems. By designating UAS as a priority area for OSC, the Department of Defense can help create a strong domestic manufacturing base for this technology.

There is potential for OSC funding to play an important role in strengthening the domestic UAS industry, with the White House requesting $144 million for the office in 2025. In addition to fully meeting the White House’s request for OSC funding, Congress should continue funding other accelerators and offices that strengthen the development of companies across the DOD’s fourteen critical technology areas.

In order to meet any potential funding gaps, the DOD should be prepared to provide additional funding for investment in small UAV systems outside of OSC, including by increasing related funding to the relevant task forces working inside of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Furthermore, Congress should authorize additional funding for the Defense Production Act that will allow the Department of Defense to further invest in the defense industrial base, including the development of asymmetric capabilities such as the small drones that have played a critical role in Ukraine’s battlefield success.

The US Departments of State and Defense can encourage key allies to adopt their own versions of the Replicator program to ensure the free world has UAS in mass that will be necessary to deter and defeat aggression in the twenty-first century. Additionally, the Department of Defense should consider the potential to invite other allies and partners into the Replicator program, or establish a multinational, allied Replicator initiative. In doing so, the department would scale the allied drone industry, create interoperability among combined allied forces, and strengthen allied deterrence against great-power adversaries.

DOD is already working to integrate UAS and autonomous systems more broadly into its operations. The US Navy’s Task Force 59 aims to better integrate emerging technologies into warfighting, and is currently focused on robotics and autonomous systems. Task Force 59 operates a variety of uncrewed vehicles, including submersible and surface-level ships, alongside UAS.

The Air Force operates Task Force 99.² Based in Qatar, it has developed a 3D-printed UAV, dubbed the “kestrel,” which can be produced for $2,500 and can carry a payload of up to three kilograms.

The efforts of Task Forces 59 and 99 are a solid start, but they have been challenged by institutional hurdles and a lack of funding. Similar concerns have been raised about the ability of the private sector to meet the government’s demand for Replicator. Any successful long-term strategy in this area will require close coordination between the private and public sectors. Replicator offers a good starting point, allowing the DOD to establish trust with the defense-technology industry, break free from the antiquated Cold War procurement process, and establish the new defense industrial base required for twenty-first-century security.

Beyond Replicator, Congress should pass legislation modeled on the CHIPS and Science Act to produce autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles. Recognizing a similar challenge related to domestic semiconductor manufacturing, Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022. The act provides billions of dollars in incentives for the research, development, and manufacturing of semiconductors. It has already stimulated the construction of new semiconductor-fabrication facilities in the United States. Similarly, the United States should provide a variety of incentives, including tax credits and investments, for the research, development, and manufacturing of autonomous vehicles. Stimulating US manufacture of autonomous vehicles will make drones available for DOD procurement, while also allowing US-made UAS to be sold globally for commercial applications.

Creating an equivalent piece of legislation for the manufacturing of UAS would have one major difference compared to the CHIPS Act—the price would be significantly lower. A manufacturing facility for the production of semiconductor chips costs a minimum of $10 billion while taking at least five years to build. Compare that to the US drone manufacturer Skydio, which raised $230 million in additional funding in 2023, part of which paid for the construction of a new UAV-manufacturing facility within the United States that expanded its production capacity ten times. For a fraction of the $54-billion CHIPS Act, the United States can successfully develop and support a variety of domestic UAV-manufacturing operations.

US allies and partners have taken note of the CHIPS Act and passed their own legislation to advance in this space. For example, the European Union enacted the European Chips Act into law in September 2023. As the US encouraged allies to invest in CHIPS, it can encourage key allies to stimulate domestic drone manufacturing in their countries.

Coordinating these actions will require a whole-of-free-world approach, among the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and US allies and partners. To achieve these ambitious goals, the president should consider designating an individual within the State Department’s S/TECH office. This individual would be responsible for coordinating this slate of policy proposals, similar to how the White House coordinator for CHIPS implementation operates. The special envoy should set a date for achieving the above benchmarks to ensure accountability.

Taken together, these actions can help create an industrial base in the United States and allied countries to provide a secure supply for UAS.

3. Align with allies and partners to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS.

The third major element of the strategy is to forge a coherent free-world approach to the setting of policies, regulations, and norms regarding commercial UAS. Among the United States’ greatest strengths in its competition with China is its network of allies and partners. Combined, the United States and its allies possess nearly 60 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and, when they work together, they retain a preponderance of power to shape global outcomes.

The G7, the G20, and the Quad are all multilateral groupings in which the United States has galvanized allies and partners alike to develop a series of secure supply chains for semiconductors. It should do the same with UAS.

The Scowcroft Center has previously argued that the United States and its allies should establish a new Democratic Technology Alliance to coordinate the free world’s approach on emerging technology, including UAS. Short of this, the United States and its allies should work through existing bilateral and multilateral channels.

The United States should continue to work with its allies to develop regulations and norms for the responsible use of new technology, including UAS, through bodies such as the US-EU TTC, NATO, G7, G20, and WTO. The United States would be well served to develop polices in coordination with its allies and partners through these forums. Doing so will help ensure a coordinated approach going forward. The United States should also raise concerns in these bodies about China’s unfair and illegal behavior. Though the WTO lacks teeth when coming after China, raising concerns about its behavior and trade disputes at the WTO can help build evidence of a pattern of unfair actions. The development of clear norms would help to demonstrate that the free world is not taking punitive measures against China or seeking to hold China down. Rather, it is taking prudent actions to protect itself from China’s unfair and threatening practices. If China were to reform its practices and its economic system, it could be welcomed back into US and allied markets.

Concurrently, the Department of Commerce and its International Trade Administration should play a central role in developing a trusted ecosystem—both in the United States and with its allies and partners—to secure critical components to strengthen domestic UAS manufacturing while promoting US-made drones around the world.

In addition, the United States should leverage the new trilateral defense pact, AUKUS. AUKUS Pillar II brings together Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to improve defense coordination across critical-technology areas, including artificial intelligence and autonomy, innovation, and information sharing. The Pentagon should work with AUKUS partners to prioritize the development of advanced UAS.

Moreover, Washington should work with allies and partners to develop a secure supply chain for UAV components and manufacturing. DOD has already cleared two drones produced by Parrot, a French UAV manufacturer, as secure and reliable through its Blue UAS program. This will allow for the manufacturing of component parts through final assembly to take place in trusted countries.

NATO offers other opportunities for Washington to coordinate with allies on emerging technologies. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is a venue for Alliance members to coordinate on the development of emerging technologies, bringing together researchers, industry, and government. In 2023, DIANA announced the first three areas in which it aims to encourage the development of dual-use technologies. One of these domains, sensing and surveillance, is a logical avenue for the allied development of UAS. Indeed, DIANA has already accepted a Czech UAV manufacturer into the program. Here, the United States should utilize DIANA as a means to further cooperation on UAS and enable reciprocal development and manufacturing relationships across Europe, creating the basis of a dual-use drone industry.

In addition, the United States should work with its allies to secure the key UAS component supply chain, including batteries and battery cells. Part of the solution concerns mineral access. Amid a global transition to low-carbon energy sources, China’s strong position in the global lithium market and Russia’s robust nickel-mining capacity present challenges to US efforts to secure access to minerals needed for batteries. As several colleagues in the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center have argued, one option to address these challenges is supporting research, development, and capacity building for alternative battery chemistries. This includes leveraging public capital from US and allied governments and using tax incentives to encourage diversification of battery inputs. In 2021, the Department of Energy announced that innovations related to advanced batteries, which were developed via taxpayer dollars through Department of Energy (DOE) funding, would need to be “substantially” manufactured in the United States. In 2023, as a result of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, DOE announced $3.5 billion “to boost domestic production of advanced batteries and battery materials nationwide.” At the same time, the federal government, as well state and local governments, will need to muster the political will to allow domestic mining and refining of these minerals to ensure truly secure access to batteries. Once regulatory red tape is reduced, private capital necessary for the development of this domestic capability will enter the battery market. This sort of public-private engagement is an important part of shoring up the US battery supply chain and mitigating vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China.

Taken together, these steps will help to ensure a successful and coordinated free-world approach to UAS.

Conclusion

This paper recommended a protect-promote-align strategy to help the United States and its allies secure a trusted UAS industry to compete against China. China’s dominance of the dual-use UAS sector presents an unacceptable national security risk to the United States and its allies. Following this strategy will allow the United States and its allies to counter the unfair CCP practices that have led to China’s ill-begotten dominance of the global UAS market. A dedicated strategy, one that limits the use of PRC-made UAS, creates incentives for domestic UAS production, aligns the United States and its likeminded allies, and will allow the free world to retain its innovation edge over the CCP and better position itself for victory in a new era of strategic competition.

About the authors

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In these roles, he manages the Scowcroft Center’s nonpartisan team of more than thirty resident staff and oversees the Council’s extensive network of nonresident fellows. His own research focuses on US national security strategy, strategic competition with China and Russia, and strategic deterrence and weapons nonproliferation.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He supports the Center’s work on foresight and strategy development, focusing on emerging technologies, conflict, and climate security. In addition, Bayoumi contributes to the development of the Center’s annual “Global Foresight” publication.

Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

Defense Journal’s Rich Outzen spoke with T. X. Hammes, a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University, on January 26, 2024. The conversation is lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Dr. Hammes, you’ve been tracking and predicting developments in drones, unmanned systems, and the changing nature of combined arms warfare for over a decade now. Looking back, what has surprised you and what has confirmed your early surmises in recent years?

T. X. Hammes: From the beginning I expected that “small, smart, and many” could overcome “few and exquisite” by sheer numbers. The general trend has held, but what has surprised me—especially in Ukraine—has been how quickly users have adapted. For instance, Ukraine has employed carpenters to build drones made out of wood powered by outboard motors. It was undeterred by its lack of manufacturing facilities for advanced synthetic materials. These drones launch from a simple wheeled carriage but can achieve a range of 750 kilometers, and carry a fairly substantial payload. These very cheap systems are being used to attack oil facilities deep in Russia.

I suggested in 2016 that, in many cases, an unmanned aerial system (UAS) doesn’t necessarily have to deliver the explosive; it is enough to bring the detonator. Modern societies provide their own explosives and combustibles. Very small drones can do great damage by impacting with enough of a detonating charge to induce fuel, ammunition, or energy sources to explode. Large warheads are not required.

In 2016, the idea had little traction with senior [officers], but younger, field grade officers got it. Unfortunately, developing a concept and bending the procurement system are two very different things. We have the “iron triangle” of vested interests in procurement—defense contractors, the Pentagon, and Congress. Each is vested in keeping current systems and approaches for as long as possible. This is very difficult to change. Congressional reversal of the US Navy’s attempt to not refuel an aircraft carrier (the Harry S. Truman) in favor of devoting more resources to advanced strike capabilities is an example of this. There are thousands of jobs in congressional districts engaged in military production: the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) involves production in forty-five of the fifty states. Couple these economic incentives with the fact that military officers are inherently conservative as a group, and you see resistance to real or rapid change.

As always, warfare will include the adaption, counteradaption and counter-counteradaption cycle. The Turkish Bayraktar drones were a shock early in the war in Ukraine, but the Russians gradually got an air defense system together and effectively neutralized the Bayraktar. Today, the Turks are developing jet stealth systems like the US Valkyrie XQ58A. I don’t know what the Turkish model will cost, but the Valkyrie is roughly $4 million apiece. The F-35 costs nearly $140 million each. With an expected operational lifespan of 8,000 hours, at $30,000 per flight hour, the lifetime operations and maintenance (O&M) cost can exceed $360 million per F-35. This gets to be real money over time. Further, with the current fleet-wide mission capable rate of just over 50 percent, you effectively need two aircraft (for $720 million) to ensure one mission-capable aircraft. Current full-mission capable rates on the F-35 are 28 percent, so we’re close to needing four to ensure one fully mission-capable aircraft. In essence you are spending $1.4 billion for each full mission-capable F-35. You can have hundreds of XQ58As at that price. And the world will know where the F-35s are (few in number, operating in a world with pervasive surveillance). Keep in mind, these figures cover only O&M costs for F-35s. They do not cover the cost of pilot or maintenance personnel and training pipelines. Nor do they cover the cost of large fixed air bases and air defense for the facilities required to operate F-35s. The Turks will likely develop an export version of their aircraft, and so we can see a world in which small, high-speed, deep-penetrating drones with a variety of onboard armaments and sensors will be available to almost anyone. Drones like these can operate up to 1,500 miles beyond launch points. And they do about the same as some of the advanced munitions fired by F-35s, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, or JASSM, at $3 million a missile.

DJ: Some observers think that Russia is winning the drone war against Ukraine, including Eric Schmidt, whose recent Foreign Affairs article, “Ukraine Is Losing the Drone War,” cited the effective pairing of drones for observation and strike (Orlans and Lancets). Do you agree?

Hammes: Schmidt is right about Russia outproducing Ukraine in drones. But this does not translate directly to winning the conflict. I find it bizarre that some commentators essentially take the Russian side without critical comparison. This goes for commentators and in some cases political leaders. If you look at both Russian and Ukrainian sources, Ukraine continues to inflict three or four times as many casualties on attacking Russian forces: this is typically the case, an advantage to the defender.

With regards to UAS, both sides are training a lot of drone pilots. But as the war drags on, both Ukrainians and Russians are finding difficulty in recruiting for traditional combat arms. For instance, recent warehouse fires in Saint Petersburg and elsewhere in Russia reportedly stem from resistance to the forced roundup of conscripts for the war.

In the case of the Foreign Affairs article, title notwithstanding, the piece was not really about the drone competition—it was about industrial competition and the race to mass produce. The article was right: it’s an industrial competition. Ukraine can win and compete if the United States leans into it. But the Biden administration has been too reticent in providing advanced and long-range strike systems. The Kerch Strait Bridge should be down. And why are we demilitarizing MLRS [multiple launch rocket system] ammunition rather than allowing the Ukrainians to fire it in defense of their country? Domestic politics on both sides of the aisle has been working against us fully leaning into the defense industrial competition. The Russian production goal is two million UAS per year; they are not there yet. The Ukrainian goal is 100,000 per month. They are producing enough to pose a substantial long-range strike capability deep into Russia. Russia has already had to pull air defense systems back from Ukraine into its own territory to defend key sites. In the Ukraine war, we are seeing early forms of largely autonomous UAS and swarm usage. After launch, some of these systems can be fully autonomous. If you launch tens of thousands per month, the requirement for autonomous guidance grows. It is far more complex than UAS usage in counterinsurgency or small wars.

DJ: Turning to the US military, have we adapted doctrine, organization, and employment to shift from drones as a counterterror platform to drones as an integral part of maneuver warfare?

Hammes: The services are trying. The US Navy fielded Task Force 59 in the Persian Gulf as a way to deploy experimental unmanned technologies and designs. The US Fourth Fleet stood up an experimental task force. The Navy also deployed a four-ship squadron of unmanned systems in the Pacific—primarily as a sensor package. Following the Marine Corps FD2030 lead [Force Design 2030], the US Army has a Strategic Mid-range Fires program that includes small-signature trucks launching Tomahawks and other missiles up to and beyond 1,500 miles. In a major war against a near-peer competitor—say China—airfields and fixed installations will be heavily targeted, so distributed fires of this sort will be important. We can conceivably go to country X and buy native-style trucks, which will be very survivable due to blending in, and put these systems on them. The US Air Force is investing in unmanned combat vehicles as wingmen for F-35s or advanced bombers. But again, everyone will know where the advanced bombers live and stay. Containerized missiles based on commercial ships can saturate bomber airfields and kill low-density, high-cost assets on the ground. In sum, we are seeing adaptation beginning across the forces, but procurement and advanced planning remain the big problems. Instead of $360 million for one aircraft we should consider buying 360 $1 million missiles in containers. These systems need a high level of autonomy and small crews. In the current environment, we need to focus resources on the weapons, not the delivery platforms. Low cost and expendable, primarily unmanned weapons will overwhelm the large, exquisite but few platforms of our current forces.

DJ: Defense Journal examines issues of common interest to the United States, Turkey, and NATO. Can I get your views on the Turkish experience with UAS, and how they’ve become a major player in production, export, and operational use of UAS?

Hammes: Unmanned systems allow a country at very low cost to influence a conflict. With automated systems you can intervene regionally with lower human cost, and little risk of blowback. Turkey has done this successfully. What will be interesting is when the other side starts countering with their own UASs. As these systems proliferate, what is to keep cheap launch trucks and boats from approaching striking range of Turkey? When everyone has long-range precision strike capability, and every modern society has highly combustible, energy-dense targets embedded in their society, security concepts have to adapt. Not just medium powers, but insurgent groups have the ability increasingly to conduct this type of operation. The Houthis proved this with the attack on Saudi oil facilities. There are massive geopolitical implications when everyone can strike at long range.

DJ: In most military technological fields there is a sort of dialectic or cat-and-mouse game between developers of offensive and defensive systems. Why the great lag in counter-UAS systems vis-à-vis the platforms themselves?

Hammes: There is a lag. UASs present a very tough challenge. Many are very small and made of polymers, plastics, and wood, so they are very difficult to track and engage. That said, the electronic warfare (EW) systems of Russia and Ukraine have been very effective. But the counter-countermeasure has been more autonomy for the attack systems. We are seeing autonomous drones that carry EW jammers, and rely more on visual/optical IR [i.e., infrared] sensors. In the war in Karabagh, 70 percent of vehicle kills were achieved by drones or drone-fired munitions—and the Armenian side was not prepared. If you look at Reddit and other social media feeds covering the fighting in Ukraine, you can see absolutely terrifying videos of how UASs dominate the battlespace. UASs are hunting individual vehicles and soldiers. They can fly into buildings and turn corners in pursuit.

The game of competitive adaption has been a mixed bag. At one level, UAS have greatly strengthened tactical defense. Yet with increased methods of long-range strike, at the operational level, offensive capabilities are strengthened. Perhaps also strategically, as we see Ukraine going hard against the Russian oil industry.

We are starting to see the advent of counterdrone drones: drones that fly into other drones. It will be interesting to see how this further develops; we are likely to see a cheap version of the identify friend or foe (IFF) sensors carried on manned aircraft to protect drones operating over friendly forces, so you don’t have your own killing your own. The innovation cycle in Ukraine is very short, with each side adapting rapidly, sometimes in a few days, to innovations by the other side. In fact, Ukrainian innovation with naval drones has pushed the Russian Black Sea fleet back significantly. In less than a year, starting from scratch, Ukraine developed unmanned surface vessels that hit several Russia ships and restored export shipping lanes for Ukrainian products.

There is a need now for better command and control nodes to consolidate information from pervasive drone sensors and get it to commanders. We have entered the era of pervasive intelligence for targeting; everyone will be visible and targetable, so everyone will have to keep moving.

My key advice for the United States and its friends is to get away from focusing on platforms and focus on weapons.

T. X. Hammes is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Hammes is also a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute of National Security Studies of the US National Defense University.

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US-Turkey relations in an era of geopolitical conflict

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

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Foreword

The first half of 2024 has brought new energy and dynamics to US-Turkish bilateral strategic ties, much—though not all—positive. The successful sequential approval of Swedish accession into NATO and Turkish acquisition of upgraded F16V air warfare deterrent restored a level of trust, albeit rooted in transactionalism, after nearly a decade of unarrested divergence and increasing mistrust. New hope in defense industrial cooperation has been embodied by new investments in the field including a significant new munitions collaboration in Texas. Turkish diplomatic reconciliations with a number of US regional allies—Egypt, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—have removed an additional source of friction while the war in Gaza has led to new tensions, and very divergent policies. This issue of Defense Journal provides a snapshot of several current dynamics in the strategic relationship at a critical time, approaching the NATO Summit in Washington. Enjoy!

Dr. Rich Outzen & Dr. Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

Sweden’s NATO accession: A twenty-month square dance

By Rich Outzen

Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

By Can Kasapoglu

Türkiye and the Russian military threat to NATO

By Gen. (ret.) Yavuz Türkgenci

The F-16 deal is as good for NATO as it is for Turkey

By Andrew Bernard

Small, smart, many and cheaper: Competitive adaptation in modern warfare

Interview with Thomas X. Hammes

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council in Turkey interview with Gregory Bloom

Interview with Gregory Bloom

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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Drones and more: Turkish defense cooperation trends in the air

Can Kasapoglu — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000

The Turkish defense technological and industrial base has reached a critical mass across certain segments. The successful trajectory of the unfolding projects manifests a new reality in the realm of air power. While the Bayraktar TB-2, aka the “flying Kalashnikov” by Baykar, has made most of the headlines, the Turkish drone program is not merely about that. Turkey has built a reputable edge in designing wide range of high-value assets.

In the drone warfare segment, Baykar’s unmanned combat aircraft Kizilelma and the company’s high-altitude drone equipped with high-end weapons, Akinci, as well as Turkish Aerospace Industries’ flying wing, stealthy unmanned combat aircraft Anka-3 loom large as some examples. Even more importantly, the Anka-3 and Kizilelma are designed to fly within the loyal wingman concept alongside manned aircraft, which is technically a sixth-generation tactical military aviation feature, presaging the future horizons of Turkish defense planning.

In the manned fighter jet segment, Kaan, formerly known as the Milli Muharip Uçak, presents interesting takeaways to grasp the Turkish defense industry’s international dynamics. In February 2024, Turkey’s indigenous, stealth combat aircraft, Kaan, conducted its maiden flight. Besides painting a shiny picture of the future of Turkish air power, Kaan also sheds light on some of the ongoing capability limitations of the nation’s defense technological and industrial base (DTIB). The first problem pertains to the jet’s power configuration. The initial batches, and the prototype of the aircraft, fly with the F-110 engines that power the F-16 fighter jet, illustrating a clear dependency.

With the rising trajectory and still-in-place limitations of the Turkish DTIB’s air power generation capacity, one has to answer two political-military questions pertaining to the nature of defense business: First, what kind of an arms exporter is Turkey to become considering its aerial assets? Will it follow a more reserved model, such as Germany? Or a more business-friendly one like France? Or, will it pursue more of a market disrupter role like China? Second, how will the nation’s foreign collaboration network take shape?

Turkey’s defense cooperation outlook

From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey’s success in unmanned aerial technologies has positioned it as a burgeoning drone-exporting nation within the transatlantic Alliance.

Indeed, Turkey’s drone warfare success, at least in the headlines, started with the Bayraktar TB-2’s combat record in Syria and Libya. Still, to grasp the Turkish drone warfare’s defense diplomacy dimension, one has to know more about other operators of the drone.

Both in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 has helped the operating countries, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, in the hard turning points of their respective quests. Having proven its combat performance, the TB-2 paved the way for a fruitful strategic collaboration with these nations. A series of cooperative production deals between the Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar, and Ukraine and Azerbaijan, respectively, stand out as important examples of such defense industry collaborations. More importantly, having capitalized on the TB-2’s combat performance, Baykar established defense companies in Kyiv and Baku. But these are not one-way journeys. The engine collaboration for the Kizilelma drone with Kyiv, for example, has opened a new chapter in Ukrainian-Turkish military ties. At present, Ukraine also eyes engine deals for Turkey’s manned combat aircraft segment.

In the manned aircraft segment, a careful assessment of Kaan’s export portfolio would explain Turkey’s defense diplomacy outlook for its advanced solutions. To keep the unit costs at manageable levels, Turkey needs to find lucrative deals to market the aircraft. Yet Kaan will enter an international market characterized by fierce competition. Therefore, transforming the Kaan into an attractive platform for clients seeking either enhanced fourth- or the more advanced fifth-generation fighter jets will be a critical priority, especially at a time when the F-35 dominates the Euro-Atlantic market and when other alternatives, such as the Rafale by Dassault Aviation of France and soon the South Korean KF-21 Boramae by Korea Aerospace Industries, are seeking to capture the remainder of the pie globally. SAAB’s Gripen, on the other hand, is losing its market share. All in all, Paris and Seoul are aiming to increase their market share in critical arms industries, indicating that Turkey will also face heavy competition. The Kaan could function as a geopolitical ledger that opens the path for new international partnerships. The combat aircraft will likely offer an effective solution to countries that cannot procure F-35s such as Pakistan or the Gulf Arab nations, due to a series of sensitive political impediments; though the latter may impinge on Seoul’s interest in selling its new Boramae. Another natural target for Turkey’s multirole combat solution would be militaries that want to replace their Soviet era-remnant arsenals with a defense ecosystem that is in line with NATO standards, such as the non-NATO former Soviet space, which has traditionally been Russia’s markets. In this regard, Azerbaijan and Ukraine loom large as two particularly interesting potential operator nations as Kaan’s export market slowly takes shape in the coming years.

The geopolitical showdown ahead

From a defense economics standpoint, Turkey’s serious air power projects, such as high-end drones and advanced manned aircraft, will also help the West to counterbalance its great power competitors in the international arms market. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Moscow and Beijing constituted around 16 percent and 5.2 percent of the global arms exports between 2018 and 2022, respectively, although the former’s share decreased following its stumbling invasion in Ukraine. Yet China continues to pose a real risk to the NATO members’ overall weapons market presence in several regions.

China has already snatched up the Middle Eastern drone market amid a long absence of American solutions due to restrictions. Turkey’s drone sales to the Gulf, and recently Egypt, offered a critical comeback to tackle the Chinese share in the unmanned aerial systems segment. In the coming years, China’s potential presence in the Middle Eastern manned aircraft market will be among the highest priorities to track. The Kaan can offer some help in this respect.

Therefore, it is important to note that, unlike popular speculations in the Turkish press, the Kaan will not compete with the F-35 head-on. Instead, it will introduce an alternative, NATO-grade solution in the manned aircraft segment that can be delivered to the nations that cannot purchase the F-35. While it will directly compete with the combat aircraft of Russia and China, both Korea and France will join the contest. The million-dollar question, for now, is about who will dominate the Gulf manned aircraft market in the absence of F-35.

Extending technology transfers in the drone warfare realm

Along with market opportunities, Turkey’s limits in arms transfers and coproduction deals remain key to understanding how the nation’s defense business will play out in the near term.

The Akinci is an interesting example, as it illustrates how the Turkish DTIB is evolving around high-end platforms. Akinci’s weapon systems configuration, featuring Turkey’s first aeroballistic missile, TRG-230-İHA, and a stand-off missile (SOM) baseline of cruise missiles, transforms the platform into a deep strike asset. The high-altitude long endurance (HALE) drone can also fly up to 40,000 feet (out of the engagement envelope of short-to-medium air defense systems). Looming large as one of the most capable platforms in the Turkish export portfolio, Akinci has started to leave a footprint in the international weapons market. In the summer of 2023, Baykar signed a historic export and coproduction deal with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries for local production and technology transfer. Roketsan and Aselsan, the primary manufacturers of the platform’s critical weapon systems configuration and sensors, were also included in the deals.

Baykar’s deal with the United Arab Emirates’ Edge Group to arm the Bayraktar TB-2 with Emirati payloads in early 2024 is another notable example. The procurement package marked the first instance of a Turkish drone maker certifying foreign munitions to be integrated into its platforms.

Last, having monitored the Ukrainian military’s successful TB-2 employment at the outset of the conflict, the TB-2 is also expanding its footprint in NATO markets. Following Poland, Romania has purchased the drone in a lucrative deal.

Next up

During the Cold War, Turkey—a NATO nation standing up to more than twenty Soviet Red Army divisions—remained a decades-long net arms importer. Thus, perhaps the country’s transformation into a key arms exporter, especially in advanced technologies such as drone warfare assets, has marked one of the most important developments in the Euro-Atlantic security affairs in the twenty-first century.

The Turkish model comes with successes and limitations. Turkey’s shipyards are now capable of designing principal surface combatants, frigates, and corvettes. In the submarine segment, however, especially in air-independent propulsion systems, Turkey’s needs foreign collaboration. Likewise, the Turkish defense industry can produce most of the land warfare solutions, albeit, the national tank program, Altay, still awaits its entry into the army’s arsenal. The aerial systems segment in not a different one compared to the naval and land warfare segments. In the air, the Turkish aerial drone design and production prowess is one of the best in the international weapons market. The manned aircraft segment, nonetheless, is lagging behind. As to high-end systems, manned or unmanned, engine configuration will continue to be troublesome for years to come. Turkey’s calculus goes well beyond merely becoming an off-the-shelf arms supplier. Ankara aims to establish deep-rooted ties in the market nations while paving the way to bring those nations’ capabilities to Turkey’s DTIB when possible, as is the case with the Ukrainian industries. Drones are still pioneering the Turkish defense outreach in the air. The path of Kaan, as well as the unmanned combat aircraft/loyal wingman projects, Kizilelma and Anka-3, will determine the final trajectory of the nation’s defense business outlook in the air.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on Twitter @ckasapoglu1.

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FPV drones in Ukraine are changing modern warfare

Tomas Milasauskas, Liudvikas Jaškūnas — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 20:27:42 +0000

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is often referred to as the world’s first large-scale drone war. But what exactly does “drone war” mean in practical terms, and how is this war being waged?

Media coverage of the drone war often focuses on particular models such as the Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, or the Bayraktar drones that played an eye-catching role in Ukraine’s fight back during the initial stages of the invasion. However, behind these brands lies a much more complex and rapidly expanding drone ecosystem.

By far the most prevalent type of drone on the Ukrainian battlefield is the First Person View (FPV) drone—a type that our company sells in Ukraine and elsewhere. Despite their relatively low cost compared to other aerial platforms, FPV drones possess a number of capabilities that have resulted in a dramatic shift in our understanding of modern warfare. Given their navigation capabilities, these drones have become the preferred platform for mounting explosives and executing targeted strikes.

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Originally emerging from the realm of civilian hobby drone racing, FPV drones have robust motors and frames that are built to withstand the rigors of high-speed races and multiple crashes.

Relative to their fixed-wing cousins, copter-type drones have greater maneuvering capabilities, which, in the hands of skilled pilots, convert into precision targeting unique to FPV drones. It is not uncommon for pilots to fly their drones through the window of a building or into the open hatch of an armored vehicle, unleashing an explosion on exposed personnel inside. FPV drones are also well-suited for targeting specific equipment like optics, radars, and antennas mounted on the exteriors of armored vehicles.

FPV pilots in Ukraine do not normally operate from front-line trenches. Instead, they typically serve in specialized teams located around two to five kilometers away from the front line. This distance provides them with relative security from small arms and larger systems mounted on armored vehicles as well as from the indirect fire of mortars.

The nature of drone piloting equipment offers an additional layer of protection. Since everything is controlled remotely, only the antenna transmitting between the drone and operator needs to be exposed. The remaining equipment and the team can conduct their operations from the safety of a bunker or basement.

While hubs of drone operators are now recognized as high-value targets, in practice most attention is focused on blocking or destroying the drones themselves. This shift of lethal danger from personnel in forward positions to drones has accelerated the proliferation of FPV drone usage. It appeals to soldiers, who naturally seek to minimize the dangers of combat, and also appeals to Ukrainian and Russian commanders as they wage a war of attrition amid growing manpower shortages.

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The main feature that has made FPV drones such a key weapon in the Russian war on Ukraine is their relatively low cost, with prices for a single unit sometimes lower than five hundred US dollars. This affordability, coupled with performance and tactical versatility, helps to explain the ubiquity of FPV drones on the front lines of the war. For Ukraine, which has not always had access to predictable weapons supplies from its Western partners, the affordability of FPV drones has helped its military stay in the fight, despite being outgunned by Russia.

In technological terms, FPV drones are currently in the early stages of their development. Most components are still sourced from the civilian market, while many models offer only a relatively limited range of frequencies. This is significant, as jamming is considered the Achilles’ heel of FPV drones. Many skeptics argue that it won’t be long until jammers are employed everywhere, rendering radio controls useless. However, jammers have their own hardware limitations that can be difficult to overcome.

Creating signal interference relies on sending a stronger signal than the one it is aiming to jam. In other words, effective jamming capabilities require considerable electrical power and bulky hardware. This is why most infantry units can only operate with small jamming devices that create a limited protection bubble for short periods of time. Stronger jamming systems can be employed on armored vehicles, but the prevalence of tank “cope cages” and the recent appearance of “turtle tanks” hints that physical armor is still the go-to protection against FPV drone attacks.

Despite efforts to counter them with jamming technology, FPV drones have proven resilient and have managed to adapt effectively to electronic warfare measures. Ongoing innovations in areas such as customized frequencies, frequency-hopping, and automated flight patterns promise to further enhance their effectiveness.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought FPV drones to prominence as a component of modern militaries and it appears that they are here to stay. This can be seen in the way the Ukrainian and Russian armies are both incorporating this technology into existing military structures. Indeed, in early 2024, Ukraine launched a new branch of the country’s armed forces dedicated exclusively to drones.

There are few reasons to believe the role of FPV drones will diminish in the coming years. On the contrary, as technologies advance and military tactics evolve, FPV drones are likely to become even more prominent in the wars of the future. This new reality is already being digested by military planners and commanders around the world. As they look to assess how best to incorporate FPV drones into their own defense doctrines, they will be studying the significant shifts currently taking place on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Tomas Milasauskas is CEO of RSI Europe, a Lithuania-based remotely controlled systems manufacturer for the defense sector. Liudvikas Jaškūnas is head of marketing and communications at RSI Europe.

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

Olivia Yanchik — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 23:17:53 +0000

A combination of Ukrainian ingenuity and Western-supplied long-range missiles is making the Russian occupation of Crimea increasingly untenable. The continued weakening of Russia’s position on the Crimean peninsula is a major blow to Kremlin prestige that also has potentially serious practical implications for the future of the war.

In recent weeks, long-awaited supplies of US missiles have allowed Ukraine to step up a campaign of air strikes against Russian air defense assets and other military targets throughout the occupied peninsula. This follows on from an earlier series of drone and missile attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which forced the bulk of Putin’s warships to retreat from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia (and the Caribbean).

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Reports of fresh Ukrainian air strikes on Russian military assets in Crimea are now an almost daily occurrence. On June 10, for example, Ukraine claimed to have struck three advanced Russian air defense systems. Additional high value targets have included Russian airfields, radars, command posts, and communications centers. The majority of recent attacks have been possible thanks to the delivery of ATACMS missiles from the US as part of the military aid bill that was finally passed by Congress in April following months of delays.

In addition to steadily depleting Russia’s defensive capacities, Ukraine also appears intent on isolating Crimea by targeting the Kremlin’s logistical connections to the occupied peninsula. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian air strikes in late May damaged two rail ferries on the Crimean side of the Kerch Strait, putting them temporarily out of service. This represented a significant blow as Moscow has grown reliant on these ferry services to resupply its army in Crimea following a series of Ukrainian attacks on the Crimean Bridge connecting the peninsula to Russia.

Ukraine’s recent ferry service attack has reportedly forced Russia to resume the transportation of military supplies and fuel over the vulnerable Crimean Bridge. Moscow has sought to protect the bridge from possible attack by deploying a series of barges in addition to extensive existing defenses. However, the apparent ease with which Ukraine has been able to hit Russian air defenses and logistical hubs throughout Crimea has led some to suggest that the destruction of the Crimean Bridge may now only be a matter of time.

The Kremlin appears to be well aware of this vulnerability. For the past year, Russian engineers have been constructing a series of railway lines running from Russia itself through occupied regions of mainland Ukraine along the coast of the Sea of Azov to Crimea. This should help Moscow maintain connection with the peninsula and supply Russian forces in southern Ukraine, but the new railway routes will also serve as key targets for Ukrainian missiles and saboteurs.

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It is now evident that Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are placing Russian occupation forces in Crimea in a precarious position. By utilizing Western-provided cruise missiles and domestically produced naval drones, Ukraine has already succeeded in forcing most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw from its home port of Sevastopol in Crimea. This has also restricted the ability of Russian warships to operate in the western Black Sea.

The next stage of this effort is now underway, with Ukraine methodically depleting Russian air defenses and exposing the entire peninsula to further attack. Ukraine is expected to receive the first F-16 fighter jets in the coming months, setting the stage for what is likely to be a broader air campaign against Russia’s extensive surviving military infrastructure throughout Crimea. With its air defenses decimated and supply lines under threat, the Russian army in Crimea may soon face the realization that its position is no longer sustainable.

Russia’s declining fortunes in Crimea represent a very personal humiliation for Vladimir Putin. The 2014 seizure of the peninsula marked the start of Russia’s Ukraine invasion and is still widely regarded as the greatest single achievement of Putin’s entire reign. With this in mind, he is likely to resist calls to reduce the Russian military presence in Crimea unless absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, it is already clear that Crimea is no longer the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” it once was. Instead, it is becoming a weak link in Russia’s invasion that Ukraine will continue to exploit.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:22:53 +0000

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Panikoff quoted in The Independent on Russia using Iranian drones to bomb Ukranian civilians

Atlantic Council — Fri, 31 May 2024 01:20:23 +0000

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‘The time has come’: Calls grow to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 28 May 2024 21:04:23 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, most of Ukraine’s international allies have insisted that any weapons they provide be used exclusively within Ukrainian territory. These restrictions were initially imposed to prevent a broadening of the conflict, but a growing chorus of critics now say this approach is preventing Ukraine from defending itself and risks enabling Russian victory.

The debate over the use of Western weapons to attack targets inside Russia has rumbled on throughout the war, and has recently been thrust to the top of the agenda by the Russian army’s latest offensive. In early May, Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s northern border and began advancing toward the country’s second city, Kharkiv. This attack was no surprise; on the contrary, Ukrainian military officials had been monitoring preparations on the other side of the border for weeks, but were powerless to act.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive has highlighted the military absurdity of current restrictions on the use of the Western weapons supplied to Ukraine. Russian commanders are well aware of Ukraine’s inability to strike back, and are actively exploiting the border zone as a safe haven to concentrate forces and launch bombardments. Understandably, this is fueling calls among Ukraine’s allies for a major rethink.

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The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is the latest international organization to voice its support for an end to restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. Lawmakers from all 32 NATO states adopted a declaration on May 27 urging alliance members to allow strikes on military targets inside Russia. “Ukraine can only defend itself if it can attack Russia’s supply lines and Russian bases of operation. It is time to recognize this reality and let Ukraine do what it must,” stated NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Michal Szczerba.

This declaration echoed NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenburg’s May 24 interview with Britain’s The Economist calling on NATO allies to end their prohibition on the use of Western weapons against Russian targets. “The time has come for allies to consider whether they should lift some of the restrictions they have put on the use of weapons they have donated to Ukraine,” commented Stoltenberg. “Especially now when a lot of the fighting is going on in Kharkiv, close to the border, to deny Ukraine the possibility of using these weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory makes it very hard for them to defend themselves.”

A number of senior Western officials have also recently backed an end to restrictions. During an early May visit to Kyiv, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron announced that Ukraine had the “right” to use British-supplied weapons for attacks inside Russia. Speaking in Germany on May 27, French President Emmanuel Macron noted that Ukraine was being attacked from Russia. “We must allow them to take out the military sites the missiles are fired from,” he commented. The following day, Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren said the present ban was forcing Ukraine to fight “with one hand tied behind its back” and argued that lifting restrictions “should not be subject to debate.”

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Not everyone is convinced. For now, the Biden administration remains unwilling to revise its position limiting the use of US weapons. Meanwhile, a number of European countries including Germany and Italy have also called for caution. This reluctance to escalate the existing confrontation with Russia was on display in Brussels on Tuesday, when Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced plans to provide Ukraine with thirty F-16 fighter jets, but informed visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the planes were not to be used inside Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded to mounting talk of an end to Western restrictions on attacks inside Russia by warning of “serious consequences” and hinting at a possible nuclear response. “If these serious consequences occur in Europe, how will the United States behave, bearing in mind our parity in the field of strategic weapons,” he commented in Tashkent this week. “Do they want a global conflict?”

Putin’s nuclear threats are nothing new, of course. Since the start of the Ukraine invasion, he has made numerous thinly-veiled references to nuclear escalation as part of efforts to intimidate the West and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. These nuclear blackmail tactics have proved highly effective, encouraging Western leaders to embrace policies of escalation management that have significantly undermined the international response to Russia’s invasion.

The Kremlin dictator is now clearly hoping the same approach can deter the US and other key allies from giving Ukraine the green light to strike Russia using Western weapons. If he succeeds in this latest act of nuclear intimidation, it will bring Russian victory in Ukraine closer and set a dangerous precedent for the future of international security.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Russia’s new offensive did not come as a complete surprise, of course. On the contrary, the build-up of Russian troops across the border had been common knowledge for weeks. Kharkiv Regional Council member and political sciences professor Halyna Kuts says she has been preparing for some time, and has a bag of emergency items packed and ready.

Kuts is one of many people in Kharkiv to express anger at restrictions preventing Ukraine from using Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Due to fears of possible Russian retaliation, most of Kyiv’s partners insist the military aid they supply only be used within Ukraine’s borders. These restrictions prevented Ukraine from attacking concentrations of Russian troops as they prepared for the current offensive. “We could have destroyed them, but we were not allowed to,” says Kuts.

With Russian troops now gradually moving toward the city, Kuts believes the only option is to “dig in” and prepare to defend Kharkiv. “This is no longer a center of culture and science; this is a military fortress. Everyone should be carrying a gas mask, bandages, and water with them at all times,” she says.

In recent days, it has become much rarer to encounter children on the streets of the city. Some families have now left Kharkiv due to the deteriorating security situation, heading west for the relative safety of Poltava, Kyiv, or beyond. Youngsters who remain are obliged to attend classes underground or online.

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Olha Kashyrina, the co-founder of a Kharkiv publishing house specializing in children’s books, has spent recent evenings watching the glow of artillery fire on the horizon as fighting edges closer and closer to her home in Kharkiv’s Saltivka residential district. She estimates that there is now less than twenty kilometers separating her from the Russian army. For the time being, Kashyrina continues working in her publishing business and volunteering to help evacuees find temporary accommodation. However, if Russian troops advance further and the city comes within artillery range, she plans to leave.

Others insist they will not leave Kharkiv under any circumstances. Kashyrina’s publishing house colleague Svitlana Feldman has spent recent days stockpiling power banks, generators, and headlights for employees. “Adaptability is the key skill now,” she explains. One of the most dangerous aspects of daily life in Kharkiv is commuting to the office, so the company now encourages working from home.

Some Kharkiv residents have already fled from the Russian invasion once and do not intend to do so again. Liudmila, who came to Kharkiv from Donetsk when it was first occupied by Russia ten years ago, says she will not evacuate and is instead placing her faith in the Ukrainian army to defend the city, much as it did in 2022. This is a common refrain in today’s Kharkiv. While almost everyone is watching anxiously for signs of an escalation in the current offensive, there is also a mood of defiance and plenty of confidence in the city’s ability to defend itself.

Defiance can be expressed in different ways. For Halyna Kuts, this means proceeding with Kharkiv’s annual Vyshyvanka Day parade on May 16 in one of the city’s underground metro stations. This colorful annual event, which features people sporting Ukraine’s traditional embroidered shirts, is widely seen as a celebration of Ukrainian patriotism and national identity. With Russian troops advancing toward the city, Kuts says it is now more important than ever to host this year’s parade as planned.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

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Many in the Ukrainian media and beyond have been quick to publicize the numerous improvised and ingenious measures adopted by Ukraine to counter Russia’s drone attacks. These steps have included the establishment of mobile teams using older anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks to shoot down drones at a fraction of the cost of more sophisticated air defense systems. In spring 2024, US General James Hecker, head of US Air Forces in Europe, described how Ukrainians had set up a detection network using cheap cell phones on poles to warn of incoming drones. German-supplied Gepard systems have also proved extremely cost-effective drone destroyers, as have newer systems such as the US-made VAMPIRE.

While Ukraine’s high interception rates are impressive, the threat posed by this form of aerial warfare remains grave and continues to evolve. Even when the majority of drones are shot down, those that do reach their targets often cause significant damage and loss of life. Indeed, when it comes to air defenses, even a 99 percent success rate is not good enough. While it is better to shoot down drones than allow them to hit their targets, interceptions can also be costly, with debris from falling drones frequently causing death and destruction in a terrifyingly random manner.

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Russia’s fleet of kamikaze drones is growing. During the first year of the invasion, the Kremlin organized regular deliveries of Shahed kamikadze drones from Iran. Moscow has since set up domestic production facilities and is now far less dependent on Tehran. This is allowing Russia to scale up its own output, making it possible to increase the frequency of attacks. As production continues to expand, more and more drones will be launched against targets across Ukraine. These increasing quantities of drones will deplete Ukraine’s anti-drone ammunition and could potentially overwhelm the country’s limited defenses.

In addition to producing a domestic version of Iran’s Shahed drone, Russia is also experimenting with a range of modifications. These efforts have included spraying drones to reduce detection and adding cameras to stream video footage of drone flights back to Russian operators. Meanwhile, Russia reportedly continues to receive new drone models from the country’s Iranian partners.

While these upgraded models and modifications have so far failed to make a big difference to Russia’s air offensive, they do serve as a reminder that this is a war of innovation and underline the need for Ukraine to maintain the highest degree of vigilance. Throughout the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military has demonstrated its ability to learn from earlier mistakes and incorporate new technologies. Ukrainians cannot afford to assume that today’s defenses will necessarily be sufficient to stop tomorrow’s drones.

An additional drone-related headache for Ukrainian military planners is the need to spread air defenses across as wide an area as possible. While mobile anti-drone teams have proved relatively effective, they are only one part of a much wider network of air defenses centered around Ukraine’s major cities and key infrastructure sites. Given that air defenses are desperately needed to support military operations on the battlefield, guarding against frequent kamikaze drone attacks far away from the front lines weakens the Ukrainian war effort.

As long as Russia continues to build and deploy kamikaze drones, they will remain a significant problem for Ukraine. The country’s partners can help address this problem in two ways. They can supply more air defense systems, especially models that are designed to intercept slow-moving but plentiful drones rather than far faster missiles. They can also support Ukraine’s efforts to strike targets such as air bases, production facilities, and drone storage sites inside Russia. Destroying Russian drones before they are launched is the most effective way to protect Ukraine from further bombardment.

Putin appoints economist as defense minister as Russia plans for long war

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 14 May 2024 14:54:02 +0000

Vladimir Putin has appointed technocrat economist Andrei Belousov as Russia’s new defense minister in a shake-up that underlines his determination to wage a long war of attrition against Ukraine.

The relatively unknown Belousov replaces long-serving Sergei Shoigu, who will now take up a new post as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council. Shoigu had led the Defense Ministry since 2012. Known as both a Putin loyalist and a personal friend of the Russian dictator who accompanied him on hunting holidays, he is the most senior figure to be dismissed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

While Shoigu’s tenure in office coincided with Russian military success stories such as the 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and the 2015 Russian intervention in Syria, his reputation had been severely tarnished in recent years by the poor performance of the Russian army in Ukraine. The many battlefield setbacks suffered in Ukraine have been particularly embarrassing for Putin, who has long pointed to the revival of Russia’s military strength as one his greatest achievements.

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Shoigu’s removal took many by surprise but was not entirely unexpected. The announcement came just weeks after his deputy defense minister, Timur Ivanov, was arrested on corruption charges. At the time of Ivanov’s removal in late April, many speculated that Shoigu’s days as defense minister may also be numbered.

Shoigu’s replacement, Andrei Belousov, is a former deputy prime minister and minister of economic development who also served for a number of years as an economic advisor to Putin. The appointment of a civilian technocrat suggests that Putin aims to control military spending and improve efficiency at the ministry of defense as he looks to outproduce Ukraine and the country’s Western partners in a protracted confrontation.

Unlike his predecessor, Belousov has played no significant role in the invasion of Ukraine and is not tainted by the military defeats of the past two years. His long record of government service and relative anonymity make him in many ways a typical pick for Putin, who is notoriously reluctant to raise ambitious new faces to senior positions within the Kremlin leadership.

Speculation over Shoigu’s future has been mounting ever since the failure of Russia’s blitzkrieg offensive in the spring of 2022 during the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has frequently been singled out for criticism by Russia’s military blogger community, and was repeatedly accused of corruption by former Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in a series of explosive video addresses on the eve of the short-lived June 2023 Wagner mutiny.

Unsurprisingly, Shoigu’s departure was widely cheered within Russia’s so-called “Z-patriot” pro-war community. Media tycoon and prominent Russian nationalist Konstantin Malofeyev toasted the news, while suggesting Belousov’s appointment would now make defense “the absolute priority” of Russian state policy. “We’ll have both guns and butter,” he commented.

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Putin’s decision to finally remove Shoigu and replace him with a veteran economist comes as he begins a fifth presidential term while bogged down in the largest European invasion since World War II. His new defense minister is now expected to focus on boosting domestic Russian arms production while channeling resources toward the development of the country’s defense tech sector. “Today on the battlefield, the winner is the one who is more open to innovation,” commented Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on the recent ministerial changes in Moscow.

Belousov appears well qualified to meet the twin challenges of improving armament output and aiding Russia’s efforts to regain the technological advantage in the war against Ukraine. His long career in government gives him detailed knowledge of the Russian economy and the intricacies of state budgets, while he has a record of supporting the development of Russia’s drone capabilities. Belousov will now join a number of other senior government officials with similarly strong defense tech credentials including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko, and Minister of Digital Development Maksut Shadayev.

Despite being removed from his defense post, Shoigu has not been kicked to the curb. His appointment as Secretary of Russia’s National Security Council, replacing longtime Putin confidant Nikolai Patrushev, should allow him to retain significant influence within the Kremlin. At the same time, it is not clear whether Shoigu will be able to exercise the same kind of power as his predecessor, who now takes on a new role as an aide to Putin. While this has the appearance of a slight demotion for Patrushev, the parallel promotion of his son Dmitry to the position of deputy prime minister would suggest that he will remain an influential figure.

The recent changes in the leadership of Russia’s Defense Ministry do not signal any fundamental shift in Putin’s war aims. On the contrary, this week’s appointment confirms Putin’s continued commitment to the invasion of Ukraine and his readiness to prioritize the war effort over all other considerations. Putin clearly intends to place Russia on an indefinite wartime footing, and hopes Belousov is capable of managing the process with maximum efficiency.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin expands invasion as outgunned Ukraine waits for Western weapons

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 14 May 2024 13:08:20 +0000

Russia launched a cross-border offensive into northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region on May 10, opening a new front in its ongoing invasion. The attack had been widely anticipated, but the apparent ease with which Russian forces were able to penetrate the Ukrainian border sparked considerable alarm and allegations of security blunders.

The debate over Ukraine’s apparent failure to secure the border overlooks the fact that fortifications are typically located some 15 to 20 kilometers behind forward positions. Nevertheless, the renewed presence of Russian troops in northern Ukraine marks a significant escalation in the war.

During the first five days of the offensive, Russia has been able to establish two separate bridgeheads on Ukrainian territory and advance between five and seven kilometers into the country. These modest gains reflect the relatively small numbers of Russian troops involved in the initial incursion. However, that may change in the coming days as the Kremlin has concentrated approximately 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers across the border and continues to reinforce the ongoing offensive.

Ukrainian officials had earlier predicted the start of Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv region toward the end of May or in early June. The recent US decision to grant Ukraine a major new aid package may have convinced the Kremlin to attack earlier than planned in order to exploit the remaining window of opportunity before fresh deliveries of US weapons reach the front lines.

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At this point, Russia’s immediate military goals look to be rather limited, as can be seen from the numbers of troops involved. The initial objective may be the establishment of a buffer zone along the Ukrainian border in the Kharkiv region. This is something Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin leaders have spoken about repeatedly in recent months. If Russian forces do manage to advance further and establish a foothold around 15 kilometers inside northern Ukraine, this would place Kharkiv itself within range of Russian artillery.

Ukraine’s former capital and second-largest city with a prewar population of more than one and a half million, Kharkiv has been subjected to intensive Russian bombing since the beginning of 2024. The city’s power plants were destroyed in March, while residential districts are frequently subjected to missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks. There are now fears that Russian artillery could take this campaign of destruction to the next level. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov has repeatedly warned that his city risks becoming a “second Aleppo,” a reference to the Syrian city reduced to rubble almost a decade ago following relentless bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces.

Russia’s end goal appears to be the depopulation of Kharkiv. Moscow aims to make the city unlivable and force the vast majority of its over one million residents to flee. By emptying Kharkiv of its civilian population, the Kremlin hopes to create the conditions for the city’s capture. However, this would require far more troops than Russia currently has available in the region.

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While many observers assume Kharkiv remains Russia’s primary objective, the new offensive may actually be an attempt to destabilize Ukraine’s broader defenses. By opening up a new front in the north of the country, Russia creates dilemmas for Ukrainian commanders and forces them to divert key units that are currently holding the front line in the east of the country.

The present military situation is rapidly evolving and extremely challenging for Ukraine, but it is not yet critical. Indeed, given the clear battlefield advantages enjoyed by defensive forces since the start of the war more than two years ago, the Ukrainian military theoretically has every chance of preventing any major breakthroughs and should also be able to inflict significant losses on advancing Russian forces. However, Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself are currently being severely hampered by an inability to strike Russian targets across the border.

Throughout the war, most of Ukraine’s international partners have insisted that the weapons they provide only be used on Ukrainian territory. These restrictions contradict all military logic and have created uniquely favorable conditions for Russia, which is able to concentrate troops close to the Ukrainian border and prepare to attack without fear of being targeted. Unless Ukraine is granted the right to hit military targets inside Russia, it will be extremely difficult to defeat the current offensive or prevent more cross-border attacks similar the recently opened front in the Kharkiv region.

Russia’s new Kharkiv offensive is an attempt by the Kremlin to capitalize on considerable advantages in both manpower and firepower. Despite suffering staggering losses over the past two years, Putin has succeeded in creating a force far larger than the army that first invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been seriously weakened by more than half a year without major arms deliveries, and is unable to strike back effectively due to restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners. None of this means Russia is guaranteed to succeed, but it does make it far more difficult for Ukraine to prevail.

Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 09 May 2024 20:35:44 +0000

For the second year running, Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 featured just one solitary tank. Throughout his twenty-four year reign, Russian ruler Vladimir Putin has used the annual Victory Day holiday to showcase his country’s resurgence as a military superpower. However, the underwhelming spectacle of a single World War II-era T-34 tank pootling across Red Square has now become a embarrassing tradition and a painful reminder of the catastrophic losses suffered by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Victory Day parades had typically featured dozens of tanks as the Kremlin sought to demonstrate its vast arsenal and trumpet Russia’s leading role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The difference this year did not go unnoticed, with many commentators poking fun at Putin. “This T-34, the legendary Soviet tank from World War II, was the only Russian tank on display at the Victory Day parade in Red Square today. The others must all be busy somewhere!” quipped Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Max Seddon.

Putin’s parade came just one day after analysts at open source conflict monitoring site Oryx announced that visually confirmed Russian tank losses in Ukraine had passed the 3000 mark. Oryx researchers document military losses based on video or photographic evidence, while recognizing that overall figures are likely to be “significantly higher” than those verified by publicly available open source materials. Meanwhile, the latest figures from the Ukrainian military indicate Russia has lost as many as 7429 tanks since February 2022. While Ukraine’s claims regarding Russian battlefield losses are generally treated with a degree of skepticism, even the visually confirmed baseline figure of 3000 tanks underlines the devastating toll of Putin’s invasion on the Russian military.

In addition to exposing the Kremlin’s dwindling supply of tanks, this year’s strikingly modest Victory Day festivities have also drawn attention to other negative consequences of Russia’s ongoing Ukraine invasion. During the buildup to the holiday, a number of major Russian cities including Pskov, Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod announced they would not be staging traditional Victory Day parades this year. These cancellations were justified on security grounds, highlighting the growing threat posed by Ukraine to targets inside Russia.

Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has brought the war home to Russia with a highly successful long-range drone campaign against the country’s oil and gas industry, including air strikes against refineries located more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border. While Kyiv has largely refrained from attacks on civilian targets, Ukraine’s proven ability to strike deep inside Russia is a major blow to the Kremlin, which has vowed to shield the Russian public from the war and prevent any disruption to everyday life.

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The downgrading of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations is a personal blow for Putin, who has sought to place the holiday at the heart of efforts to revive Russian nationalism following the loss of status and perceived humiliations of the early post-Soviet period. This approach marked a departure from the Soviet years, when Victory Day was overshadowed by a number of more ideologically driven holidays such as May Day and the annual anniversary of the October Revolution. Indeed, during the 46-year period between the end of World War II and the fall of the USSR, the Soviet authorities held just three Victory Day military parades in Moscow.

It was Putin who masterminded the rise of Victory Day to its current position as Russia’s most important public holiday. Since the early 2000s, he has transformed Victory Day into the propaganda centerpiece of a pseudo-religious cult, complete with its own sacred symbols, feast days, saints, and dogmas. Anyone who dares question the Kremlin’s heavily distorted and highly sanitized version of the Soviet role in World War II is treated with the kind of ruthless severity once reserved for medieval heretics. Meanwhile, in a further nod to the continued potency of the World War II narrative in Putin’s Russia, opponents of the Kremlin are routinely branded as “fascists” and “Nazis.”

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The mythology surrounding Putin’s Victory Day cult is not just a matter of repairing battered Russian national pride. It has also helped strengthen perceptions of the Russian army as unbeatable. Both inside Russia and among international audiences, the pomp and propaganda surrounding the holiday have encouraged people to view the Russian army as simply too big and powerful to be defeated. This is complete nonsense. The past few centuries of Russian history are littered with resounding military defeats including the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the failed Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Russia even managed to lose World War I, despite starting the war on the winning side.

The historically unjustified but widespread belief that Russian victory is somehow inevitable has helped shape the West’s weak response to the invasion of Ukraine. When the war began, most Western observers were convinced Ukraine would fall in a matter of days. Even after the Ukrainian military shocked the world by winning battle after battle and liberating half the land occupied by Russia, many have clung to the assumption that eventual Russian victory remains assured. This defeatist thinking has been an important factor hampering efforts to arm Ukraine adequately. It may yet become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The sight of a lone tank on Red Square this week is a timely reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, Putin’s Russia is far from invincible. For years, the Kremlin has sought to intimidate the outside world with carefully choreographed displays of military muscle-flexing. However, the invasion of Ukraine has revealed a very different reality. Since February 2022, Putin’s once vaunted army has seen its reputation plummet and has suffered a series of stinging battlefield defeats while failing to achieve a decisive breakthrough against its much smaller neighbor. The Russian military remains a formidable force and should not be underestimated, but the events of the past two years have demonstrated that it is also very much beatable. If Ukraine is finally given the necessary tools by the country’s partners, it will finish the job.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Bombings are now a daily occurrence. Russia employs a mix of weapons including everything from ballistic missiles and drones to vast quantities of long-range glide bombs that are steadily destroying the city from a safe distance. These attacks target residential neighborhoods and critical civilian infrastructure in what appears to be a calculated campaign to make the entire city unlivable.

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Amid the constant threat of bombing, Kharkiv residents continue to display the kind of remarkable resilience that is now synonymous with Ukraine. The city’s Makers coffee chain is a good example of this dogged determination. The chain has actually expanded since the start of the war, doubling its presence in Kharkiv from two outlets to four, while also opening a new branch in the front line city of Kupyansk. Dmytro Kabanets, the twenty nine year old owner of the chain, believes it is vital for local residents to have a sense of community. “The feeling of not being alone is invaluable. People need to know there are others ready to lend a hand, both emotionally and practically,” he says.

Despite this upbeat attitude, he admits staying in business in today’s Kharkiv is becoming more and more difficult. The windows of the chain’s flagship coffee shop are boarded up as a precaution against further bomb damage. Due to Russian attacks on the city’s energy infrastructure, electricity supplies are a major challenge for all local businesses. After both of Kharkiv’s biggest power plants were destroyed in March, the city has experienced rolling blackouts. The rumble of generators has become a background feature of everyday life, with restaurants offering “generator-friendly’ menu items that require minimal power to prepare.

Many analysts believe Russia’s objective is to depopulate Kharkiv ahead of a summer offensive that will aim to seize the city and deliver a decisive blow to Ukrainian resistance. Rumors of looming encirclement and evacuations swirl around on social media, often fueled by Russian disinformation. For now, there is no indication of a mass exodus from Kharkiv, but the strain and trauma of recent months are forcing residents to make hard decisions.

Yevhen Streltsov, who runs the city’s Radio Nakypilo, says everyone approaches the issue of whether to stay or go in a highly personal manner. Some residents are bracing themselves for a repeat of the artillery barrages that rocked Kharkiv in the first months of the war. Others say they will only leave if the city is under direct threat of Russian occupation. “The situation is tense, but there is no panic,” he says, noting that he and his team are determined to continue their mission of broadcasting to the local population.

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For some Kharkiv residents, the stress has already become too much. Exhausted and emotionally drained by months of Russian bombardment, they are heading westward to Kyiv or beyond. Many are leaving their homes for the second time, having returned to Kharkiv after initially fleeing the city in the first days of the invasion.

Inevitably, the outflow of people is having an impact on the local economy. Revenues at the Makers coffee chain have dropped by up to 40 percent in recent weeks. Across Kharkiv, companies are reluctantly shutting down as people move their families to safety, with some businesses being put up for sale. Many of the city’s public spaces now feel eerily empty, especially once evening arrives.

It is still far too early to write Kharkiv off. While more and more residents are understandably seeking to escape the horrors of daily bombing, many remain determined to stay put. The population is clearly declining, but it remains nowhere near the lows witnessed during the early months of the invasion, when only around 300,000 people remained in the city.

If Russia does launch a serious campaign to capture or encircle Kharkiv in the coming months, this would represent by far the Kremlin’s most ambitious undertaking since losing the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022. The Ukrainian army will fight hard to defend the country’s second city, and they will be supported by a still sizable local population. Given the considerable difficulties Russia has encountered in seizing much smaller towns such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, it is far from certain that Putin’s invading army currently has the offensive capabilities to take Kharkiv.

As the summer campaigning season approaches, the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in eastern Ukraine is rising and requires urgent international attention. Kharkiv is now the focal point of Russia’s entire invasion and is in desperate need of increased air defenses. This is the only way to prevent it from becoming the largest in a long line of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by the Russian military.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

UK gives Ukraine green light to use British weapons inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 03 May 2024 21:23:35 +0000

Ukraine can use British-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russia, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated during a May 2 visit to Kyiv. “Ukraine has that right,” Cameron told Reuters. “Just as Russia is striking inside Ukraine, you can quite understand why Ukraine feels the need to make sure it’s defending itself.”

The British Foreign Secretary’s comments represent a departure from the cautious position adopted by most of Ukraine’s Western partners over the past two years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the majority of countries backing Ukraine have insisted that Western weapons can only be used within Ukraine’s international borders and must not be deployed against targets inside the Russian Federation.

These restrictions reflect widespread concerns in Western capitals over a possible escalation of the current war into a far broader European conflict. Moscow has skillfully exploited the West’s fear of escalation, with Kremlin officials regularly warning of Russian red lines and Vladimir Putin making frequent thinly-veiled nuclear threats.

So far, Russia’s intimidation tactics have proved highly effective. By threatening to escalate the war, Moscow has been able to slow down the flow of military aid to Ukraine, while also deterring the delivery of certain weapons categories and limiting Kyiv’s ability to strike back against otherwise legitimate targets inside Russia.

This has placed Ukraine at a significant military disadvantage. Already massively outgunned and outnumbered by its much larger and wealthier Russian adversary, Ukraine has had to defend itself without the ability to deploy Western weapons against Russia’s military infrastructure. Critics of this approach claim the West is effectively making Ukraine fight against a far larger opponent with one hand tied behind its back.

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With the existence of their country under threat, Ukrainians have bristled at Western restrictions and are using their own limited range of weapons to strike back. These attacks include a recent campaign of long-range drone strikes on Russian refineries that have hurt the Russian energy sector and divided opinion among Ukraine’s partners. While US officials have voiced their disapproval and urged Kyiv to focus on military targets, France has indicated its support.

The situation regarding the use of Western weapons on Russian territory has been further complicated by the Kremlin’s territorial claims inside Ukraine. In September 2022, Moscow declared the “annexation” of four Ukrainian regions and officially incorporated them into the Russian Constitution. Fighting has continued in all four of these partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, with the Ukrainian military free to deploy Western weapons despite the Kremlin’s insistence that these regions are now part of Russia.

In contrast to the caution displayed by Western leaders, Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff and exposed the emptiness of Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Weeks after the Kremlin dictator ceremoniously announced the entry of Kherson into the Russian Federation, Ukrainian troops liberated the city. Rather than retaliating by deploying the might of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Putin simply accepted this humiliating defeat and withdrew his beleaguered army across the Dnipro River.

The Kremlin’s reaction to mounting Ukrainian attacks on the Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula has been similarly underwhelming. Since first occupying Crimea in 2014, Putin has portrayed the peninsula in almost mystical terms as a symbol of Russia’s return to Great Power status. However, when Ukraine used a combination of locally developed naval drones and Western-supplied cruise missiles to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Putin quietly ordered the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from Crimea and head for Russian ports. Despite the crucial role played by Western weapons in this Ukrainian success, there has been no sign of any escalation from Russia.

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With the Russian invasion now in its third year, there are indications that Western leaders may now finally be overcoming their self-defeating fear of escalation. In addition to David Cameron’s landmark comments regarding the use of British weapons inside Russia, the US has recently begun providing Ukraine with large quantities of long-range ATACMS missile systems capable of striking targets throughout occupied Ukrainian territory. Moscow had consistently warned against such deliveries, but has yet to provide any meaningful response to this highly conspicuous crossing of yet another Russian red line.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron is actively attempting to reclaim the escalation initiative from Moscow by refusing to rule out the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine. This development has clearly riled the Kremlin. Putin has reacted to Macron’s newfound boldness by engaging in more nuclear blackmail, while the nuclear saber-rattling continued last weekend on Russia’s flagship current affairs TV show. None of this seems to have put Macron off. On the contrary, he remains adamant that direct Western military involvement in the defense of Ukraine must remain on the table.

This apparent strengthening of Western resolve comes at a pivotal moment in the war. With Ukrainian forces suffering from shortages in both ammunition and manpower, Russia has recently been able to regain the battlefield initiative and make significant advances for the first time in two years. Preparations are now underway for a major Russian summer offensive that could potentially break through Ukraine’s weakened front lines and deliver a knockout blow to the war weary country.

Removing restrictions on attacks inside Russia would enable Ukraine to disrupt preparations for the coming offensive. It would also limit Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian cities and destroy the country’s civilian infrastructure with impunity. This will not be enough to transform the course of the war, but it will go some way to evening out the odds.

By giving Kyiv the green light to use Western weapons in Russia, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron has established an important new precedent. This is in many ways fitting. After all, Britain has consistently set the tone for international aid since the eve of the Russian invasion, providing Ukrainians with anti-tank weapons, tanks, and cruise missiles in advance of other allies. Ukrainians will now be hoping the country’s other partners follow suit soon.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Officials in Kyiv hope this new wave of weapons deliveries will arrive in time to help stabilize the front lines of the war and prevent further Russian advances. In recent months, Russia has taken advantage of the Ukrainian military’s mounting supply problems to edge forward at various points along the one thousand kilometer front line, often overwhelming Ukrainian defenses with sheer numbers and relentless bombardments.

During Stoltenberg’s Kyiv visit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to send additional military aid as quickly as possible. The Ukrainian leader said the battlefield situation “directly depended” on the timely delivery of ammunition supplies to Ukraine. “Today, I don’t see any positive developments on this point yet. Some supplies have begun to arrive, but this process needs to speed up.”

The sense of urgency in Kyiv reflects widespread expectations that Vladimir Putin will launch a major summer offensive in late May or early June. Having already succeeded in regaining the battlefield initiative, Russian commanders now hope to smash through Ukraine’s weakened defensive lines and achieve major territorial gains for the first time since the initial stages of the invasion in spring 2022. Ukraine’s international partners currently find themselves in a race against the clock to strengthen the country’s defensive capabilities before Russia’s anticipated offensive can get fully underway.

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Ukraine’s recent supply issues and battlefield setbacks have highlighted the need for a more reliable long-term approach to arming the country against Russia. At present, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself depends heavily on the changing political winds in a number of Western capitals. This makes it difficult for Ukraine’s military and political leaders to plan future campaigns, while also encouraging the Kremlin to believe it can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to address this problem, Stoltenberg has proposed the creation of a $100 billion, five-year fund backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 32 members. While in the Ukrainian capital, he reiterated his support for this initiative. “I believe we need a major, multi-year financial commitment to sustain our support. To demonstrate that our support to Ukraine is not short term and ad hoc, but long-term and predictable.”

Crucially, Stoltenberg believes a five-year fund would help convince the Kremlin that Ukraine’s NATO partners have the requisite resolve to maintain their support until Russia’s invasion is defeated. “Moscow must understand: They cannot win. And they cannot wait us out,” the NATO chief commented in Kyiv.

Stoltenberg’s message has never been more relevant. With the Russian invasion now in its third year, Putin is widely believed to be counting on a decline in Western support for Ukraine. Following the failure of his initial blitzkrieg attack in 2022, the Russian dictator has changed tactics and is now attempting to break Ukraine’s resistance in a long war of attrition. Given Russia’s vastly superior human and material resources, this approach has a good chance of succeeding, unless Ukraine’s Western partners remain committed to arming the country.

The issue of a long term military fund for Ukraine will likely be high on the agenda at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC in July. With little hope of any meaningful progress on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, a commitment to provide reliable long-term support may be the most realistic summit outcome for Kyiv. This would not solve the existential challenges posed by resurgent Russian imperialism, but it would bolster the Ukrainian war effort and dent morale in Moscow while sending a message to Putin that time is not on his side.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Kharkiv has been on the front lines of the war ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Situated approximately half an hour by car from the Russian border, the city was one of the initial targets of the invading Russian army and witnessed heavy fighting in spring 2022. Following Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive, which liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian troops further away from the city itself, the Kharkiv population rose from a wartime low of around 300,000 to well over a million.

With delays in US military aid creating growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses, Russia has intensified the bombardment of Kharkiv since early 2024. A series of strikes in March destroyed the city’s main power plants, creating an energy crisis that has led to widespread blackouts. In mid April, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned that the city was now at risk of becoming a “second Aleppo,” a grim reference to the Syrian city partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

The extensive use of highly destructive glide bombs has further exacerbated the situation and added to the psychological strain on the Kharkiv population, with many attacks on residential districts taking place in broad daylight. One of the most recent blows was the destruction of Kharkiv’s iconic television tower, a city landmark and also an important element of local communications infrastructure.

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Russia’s escalating bombing campaign has been accompanied by a major information offensive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is one of numerous senior Kremlin officials to encourage a mood of mounting insecurity among Kharkiv residents by publicly speaking of a coming campaign to seize the city. In April, Lavrov noted Kharkiv’s “important role” in Vladimir Putin’s plans to create a demilitarized “sanitary zone” inside Ukraine.

This message has been reinforced throughout Russia’s tightly-controlled mainstream media space. During a revealing recent lecture to Russian students, prominent Kremlin propagandist Olga Skabeyeva argued that patriotic journalists should portray the bombing of Kharkiv region not as evidence of Russian aggression, but as part of efforts to establish a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian border with Russia.

Statements from Russian establishment figures on the need to destroy and depopulate Kharkiv have been accompanied by a steady stream of similar chatter on social media. Since January 2024, there have been growing signs of a coordinated campaign to flood the online information space with intimidating and alarmist posts pushing the idea that Kharkiv will soon become an uninhabitable grey zone.

The role of social media in Russia’s information offensive against Kharkiv cannot be overstated. Platforms like Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become battlegrounds for competing narratives and serve as platforms for carefully choreographed Russian propaganda. Groups of pro-Kremlin accounts frequently engage in the intensive promotion of key propaganda messages. These include the alleged hopelessness of Ukraine’s military position, the inability of the Ukrainian state to protect its citizens, and the likelihood of Kharkiv suffering the same fate as Mariupol, a Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million that was largely destroyed by the invading Russian army during the first months of the war.

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Russia’s information offensive features a strong disinformation component. This includes the distribution of fake statements supposedly released by the Ukrainian authorities. On one occasion, Kremlin accounts spread disinformation that the Ukrainian government was calling on residents to leave Kharkiv urgently in order to avoid imminent Russian encirclement. In a separate incident, Russian sources pushed fake Ukrainian government reports stating that Kharkiv was on the brink of a humanitarian collapse.

These elaborate fakes are typically presented in a convincing manner and closely resemble official Ukrainian government communications. They have even been accompanied by detailed information about “safe evacuation routes.” Inevitably, many Kharkiv residents are fooled by this disinformation and become unwitting accomplices in the dissemination of weaponized Russian fakes.

Russian accounts have also taken genuine news reports and distorted them in ways designed to mislead the public and maximize panic. For example, a series of planned evacuations from specific front line settlements was repackaged by Kremlin trolls as a complete evacuation of entire Kharkiv region districts.

In addition to fake government announcements and deliberate distortions, Kremlin-linked social media accounts are also actively spreading misleading video footage. One widely shared recent video purported to show long lines of cars evacuating Kharkiv while proclaiming that an “exodus” of the “ruined” city was underway. However, this video was later debunked as archive footage shot during the early days of the invasion in spring 2022.

Russia’s disinformation campaign seeks to sow fear and confusion among the Kharkiv population, says local resident Nataliya Zubar, who heads the Maidan Monitoring Information Service. “Disinformation clouds people’s judgment, leading to emotional reactions and stress,” she notes. “This fuels instability and places additional strains on the limited resources that are needed for the city’s defense and to address the growing humanitarian crisis Russia is creating.”

Kharkiv officials and civil society organizations are well aware of Russia’s ongoing information offensive. Work is currently underway to debunk false information and reduce the city’s vulnerability to information attack. These efforts include methodically exposing false claims, while also informing city residents of Russian information warfare tactics and educating them on ways to detect and counter disinformation. The stresses and strains of the emotionally charged wartime environment in today’s Kharkiv make this is a particularly complex task.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities are developing a draft law to target the spread of deliberate disinformation via social media. This initiative mirrors similar undertakings in a number of other countries, but skeptics question whether legislative measures will prove effective against sophisticated state-backed information operations conducted across multiple media platforms.

Russia failed to take Kharkiv in the early weeks of the invasion more than two years ago. As the city braces for the possibility of a new Russian offensive in the coming summer months, local residents are equally determined to defy the Kremlin once again. In order to do so, they must withstand unprecedented aerial bombardment, while also guarding against the demoralizing impact of relentless Russian disinformation.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

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Since late 2023, the negative impact of delaying military aid to Ukraine has been all too apparent. With Ukrainian troops often at a ten-to-one disadvantage in terms of artillery firepower, Russia has been able to advance at various points along the approximately 1000 kilometer front line of the war, capturing the town of Avdiivka in February and pushing further forward in recent weeks. Russian commanders have also taken advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses to launch a new bombing campaign targeting the country’s cities and civilian energy infrastructure. This has led to the destruction of multiple power plants, sparking fears of a looming humanitarian catastrophe.

As soon as it begins to arrive in the coming days, US aid will go some way to addressing the most immediate challenges facing Ukraine. The package approved this week in Washington DC includes air defense systems and interceptor ammunition that will help protect residential areas and vital infrastructure from further Russian bombardment. Likewise, the delivery of artillery shells and long-range missiles should make it far more difficult for the Russian army to advance and occupy additional Ukrainian territory. Russian dominance of the skies above the battlefields of eastern and southern Ukraine will also soon become increasingly contested.

At the same time, this new US military aid package will not provide Ukraine with anything like the quantities it needs to defeat Russia. This has been a problem ever since the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022. While the West has provided significant amounts of military aid, weapons have consistently been delivered to Ukraine after extended delays and in insufficient quantities. The first meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which brings together more than 50 countries in support of Ukraine, did not take place until more than two months after the onset of Russia’s invasion. It would be almost a year before NATO member countries agreed to supply Ukraine with a modest number of modern tanks. With the invasion now in its third year, Ukraine is still waiting for the arrival of the first F-16 fighter jets.

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The underwhelming international response to Russia’s invasion has led to accusations that Ukraine’s partners seek to provide Kyiv with sufficient weapons to avoid defeat but not enough to actually win. This cautious approach is primarily due to the West’s well-documented fear of escalation. It also reflects widespread concerns over the potentially destabilizing geopolitical consequences of a Ukrainian victory.

Many in the West seem to sincerely believe that if confronted by the prospect of imminent battlefield defeat, a desperate Vladimir Putin may be prepared to use nuclear weapons. Putin himself has skillfully exploited these fears, intimidating Western leaders into self-deterrence with his frequent and thinly-veiled nuclear threats. Meanwhile, if Russia does lose the war, there is considerable anxiety that this could lead to the collapse of the Putin regime and the breakup of the Russian Federation into a series of smaller successor states. Faced with these nightmare scenarios, Kyiv’s Western backers have repeatedly shied away from bold decisions that could have turned the tide of the war decisively in Ukraine’s favor.

Russia’s war effort suffers from no such uncertainty or indecision. On the contrary, Putin has succeeded in mobilizing the entire country in support of his invasion. He has moved the Russian economy onto a war footing, and is now comfortably outproducing the far wealthier West in key categories such as artillery shells. The Kremlin-controlled Russian media and the Russian Orthodox Church have led efforts to consolidate popular backing for the invasion of Ukraine, which has been presented to the Russian public as a “holy war” and an existential struggle against the West. With no sign of domestic opposition and ample supplies of both men and equipment, Russia is clearly preparing for a long war.

There are growing indications that Europe now recognizes the scale of the threat posed by Russia. This week, Britain confirmed its largest Ukrainian military aid package to date. In recent months, French President Emmanuel Macron has acknowledged that Ukrainian victory is vital for European security, and has refused to rule out sending French troops. Across Europe, initiatives to boost armament manufacturing are gradually gaining momentum and will lead to far greater production volumes by the end of the current year. This is encouraging but it is not enough.

The recent scare over US aid has underlined the fragility of the current Western approach to arming Ukraine. With the future of US support for Ukraine still uncertain, European leaders must accept a far greater share of the burden. This means taking the necessary steps to move toward a wartime economy capable of supplying the Ukrainian military for years to come. Such a shift is likely to prove politically unpopular with domestic European audiences, but the alternative is even more unpalatable. Unless Putin is stopped in Ukraine, he will go further. Europe can either support Ukraine today or face a resurgent Russia tomorrow, with all the additional costs this would involve.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Konaev cited in Taipei Times about drone warfare, deterring China, and global conflict

gmatchett — Sat, 20 Apr 2024 15:08:38 +0000

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

On April 20, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in the Taipei Times about drone warfare as a deterrent against China and its implications on increasing global conflict.

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Margarita Konaev

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Hammes referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review article about autonomous military systems

gmatchett — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:01:32 +0000

On April 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review piece titled “From Sling and Stone to Autonomous Drone? Key Questions for Determining Whether Autonomy Favors Davids or Goliaths,” about autonomous military systems (AMS) favoring conventionally “weaker” or poorer actors.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Western fear of escalation will hand Putin an historic victory in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 16 Apr 2024 18:07:03 +0000

Millions of Ukrainians watched with mixed emotions over the weekend as a coalition of countries came together to protect Israeli airspace from Iranian bombardment. Ukraine’s reaction was hardly surprising. After all, this impressive display of international air defense efficiency was exactly what the Ukrainians themselves have been pleading for ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of their country began in February 2022.

In the aftermath of the operation to defend Israel, Western officials moved quickly to reject any direct comparisons with Ukraine. “Different conflicts, different airspace, different threat picture,” commented US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby. UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron was even more explicit, stating that the use of British jets to shoot down Russian drones in Ukraine would lead to a “dangerous escalation” in the war.

For Ukrainian audiences, Cameron’s anti-escalation argument was all too familiar. For the past two years, Ukraine’s Western partners have sought to strike a delicate balance between aiding the country’s self-defense and avoiding anything that could lead to a wider European war. This overriding fear of escalation has shaped the Western response to Russia’s invasion, and has been masterfully exploited by Putin to restrict military support for Ukraine.

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On the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion, fear of escalation was already deterring Western leaders from delivering weapons to Ukraine. Once the attack had begun, it took precious months for the Biden administration to send artillery and HIMARS missile systems. Almost an entire year had passed before Western partners finally agreed on plans to deliver a relatively small number of modern tanks.

This pattern of delays and half-measures shows no signs of changing. With the Russian invasion now well into its third year, Ukraine is still waiting to receive the first batch of F16 fighter jets. Meanwhile, officials in Kyiv are desperately calling on partners to provide them with long-range missiles and air defense systems.

The West’s preoccupation with avoiding escalation at all costs goes against basic military doctrine and has been instrumental in preventing greater Ukrainian battlefield success. When Putin’s invasion force was at its weakest in 2022, Ukraine was denied the support it needed to break through Russia’s vulnerable defensive lines in the south. By the time Kyiv’s partners had agreed to create the necessary offensive force, it was too late; Moscow had mobilized an additional 300,000 troops and fortified the front lines of the war.

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Throughout the invasion, Russia has consistently fed Western fears of escalation through a mixture of bellicose statements, back channel signalling, and clever influence operations. The Kremlin’s most effective intimidation tactic has been nuclear blackmail. In late 2022, for example, US intercepts began picking up vague but alarming “chatter” about Russian preparations for the use of nuclear weapons.

Many believe this was a deliberate ploy to boost the credibility of Putin’s public nuclear saber-rattling. It appears to have worked. The intel led to heated debate in the White House and nuclear wargaming in the Pentagon, with Biden administration officials engaging in renewed diplomatic outreach to Moscow. Crucially, concerns over a possible Russian nuclear response dampened Western enthusiasm to press home Ukraine’s advantage at a time when Putin’s army was retreating in disarray.

In addition to blunting Ukraine’s offensive capabilities, the West’s desire to avoid escalation is undermining Kyiv’s ability to defend itself. For the past two years, Ukraine has been blocked from using Western weapons against targets inside Russia. In recent weeks, US officials have even objected to Ukraine using its own weapons to attack Russian refineries.

These artificial restrictions have created an unprecedented situation that aggravates the existing imbalance of forces between Russia and Ukraine. While Russia is able to bomb Ukrainian infrastructure at will, Ukrainian commanders are severely limited in their ability to target the air bases, production facilities, and logistical hubs inside Russia that are being used to attack Ukraine.

The West’s emphasis on escalation management has prolonged the war in Ukraine, allowing Russia to overcome initial setbacks and regain the initiative. It has prevented the Ukrainian military from building on the momentum of late 2022, and has turned a dynamic war of movement into an attritional fight that heavily favors Russia. By allowing themselves to be intimidated by the threat of Russian escalation, Western leaders have granted Putin an effective veto over various categories of military aid for Ukraine. This lack of Western resolve has inevitably emboldened the Russian dictator.

Policymakers in Europe and the US must now decide whether they wish to continue with this losing strategy or finally commit to a Ukrainian victory. It is still not too late to adopt a more sensible military strategy, but the clock is ticking. Unless Ukraine is given the tools to defeat Russia on the battlefield, Putin will secure an historic victory that will transform the international security climate. If that happens, today’s emphasis on avoiding escalation will come to be seen as the biggest geopolitical blunder since the appeasement policies of the 1930s.

Konaev cited in the Washington Post about drone swarms escalating global conflict

gmatchett — Fri, 12 Apr 2024 13:43:50 +0000

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

On April 12, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Margarita Konaev was quoted in a Washington Post article titled “US-China competition to field military drone swarms could fuel global arms race,” about the risks of increasing the deployment of drone swarms.

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Margarita Konaev

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Technologies

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Ukraine pleads for Patriot air defense systems as Russia destroys power grid

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 20:10:50 +0000

Ukraine’s top diplomat is becoming increasingly undiplomatic in his quest to bolster the fraying air defenses of his beleaguered country. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba says he is no longer holding back as he desperately tries to secure additional Patriot air defense systems to protect Ukraine’s cities and civilian infrastructure from Russian bombardment. “Give us the damn Patriots,” he told Politico in late March.

Speaking to the Washington Post this week, Kuleba explained that his tough new tone reflects the growing sense of exasperation felt by many in Kyiv at the apparent lack of urgency among Ukraine’s partners amid growing shortages of vital military aid. “We’ve tried everything, and nothing seems to work,” he commented. “The feeling that extraordinary decisions are needed on a regular basis to end this war with a victory for Ukraine is gone.”

Kuleba says his team has identified more the one hundred available Patriot systems that could potentially be handed over to Ukraine. Officials in Kyiv say they need 26 systems in order to provide comprehensive cover for the entire country. The immediate objective is to acquire seven Patriot systems to guard key targets against Russian airstrikes. EU partners including Germany have vowed to assist in the search for Patriot systems, but there have yet to be any breakthroughs.

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Ukraine’s hunt for Patriot air defense systems is taking place against the backdrop of an escalating Russian air offensive that is capitalizing on months declining Western military support and prolonged deadlock in the US Congress over a major Ukrainian aid package. With gaps now growing in Ukraine’s air defense network and individual air defense units increasingly obliged to ration their dwindling resources, Russia has launched a series of overnight attacks in recent weeks that have decimated much of Ukraine’s power grid.

Ukraine’s second-largest city and former capital, Kharkiv, has been particularly hard hit. Located just a few dozen miles from the border with Russia in eastern Ukraine, the city has been subjected to an intensive bombing campaign since mid-March that has caused extensive damage to residential districts and civilian infrastructure. In recent weeks, hundreds of thousands have been left without power for extended periods.

The destruction in Kharkiv has been so severe that some analysts now believe Russia’s objective is to empty the city of its more than one million residents ahead of an anticipated summer offensive. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported Britain’s The Economist in early April.

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The latest wave of Russian missiles and drones struck targets across Ukraine early on April 11. In an indication of Ukraine’s increasingly ineffective air defenses and mounting vulnerability to Russian bombardment, all of the Kremlin’s hard-to-intercept hypersonic and ballistic missiles reportedly reached their objectives, according to the Kyiv Post.

A major power plant close to Kyiv was among those destroyed in the overnight attack, dealing a further significant blow to Ukraine’s energy resilience. The Trypilska Thermal Power Plant, the largest supplier of electricity to central Ukraine’s Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions, suffered a series of direct hits and was left in ruins.

“The scale of destruction is terrifying,” commented Andriy Hota, the chairman of Ukrainian energy company Centrenergo. Speaking to the BBC, Hota said the Kyiv region plant can be rebuilt with the help of spare parts from elsewhere in Europe, but warned that the facility will remain vulnerable to Russian attack unless Ukraine’s partners provide powerful air defenses. “We can repair. We can do the impossible. But we need protection.”

With each new Russian bombardment destroying more of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, there is a growing sense that time is now running out to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. Unless Ukraine urgently receives additional air defense systems and ammunition, entire regions could soon face rapidly deteriorating conditions without access to electricity and other basic services. This could fuel a new refugee crisis, with millions of Ukrainians entering the EU.

The collapse of the country’s power grid would also cause economic mayhem and dramatically undermine the Ukrainian war effort. This would set the stage for a Russian military victory that would have disastrous consequences for Ukraine itself and for the future of international security. Russia has so far been unable to break Ukraine on the battlefield, but there is now a very real chance that a lack of air defenses will allow the Kremlin to achieve its goals by targeting Ukraine’s increasingly undefended civilian infrastructure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Western weakness in Ukraine could provoke a far bigger war with Russia

Oleksiy Goncharenko — Mon, 08 Apr 2024 01:15:19 +0000

Does the West actually want Ukraine to defeat Russia? That is the question many in Kyiv are now asking amid continued signs of Western indecision as the biggest European invasion since World War II approaches its third summer with no end in sight.

The mounting sense of frustration among Ukrainians is easy to understand. Encouraged by delays in military aid for Ukraine, Russia has intensified the bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure over the past month, plunging entire cities into darkness and leaving millions without access to electricity, heating, water, or internet. Despite the looming prospect of a humanitarian catastrophe, the Western response has been notably lacking in urgency.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has begun striking back with drone attacks on Russian refineries, and has succeeded in disrupting more than ten percent of Russian refining capacity. Rather than supporting this seemingly effective campaign to weaken Putin’s war machine, The US has reportedly called on Kyiv to end its drone strikes due to concerns over global oil prices and possible retaliation. Viewed from Ukraine, these do not look like the actions of partners who are fully committed to Ukrainian victory.

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Over the past two years, Ukrainians have grown accustomed to excessive Western caution and insufficient Western support. While the democratic world deserves considerable credit for delivering the weapons that have allowed Ukraine to survive, the military aid provided since February 2022 has been subject to frequent delays, and has consistently fallen far short of the quantities required to defeat a military superpower like Russia.

The West’s inadequate response to Russia’s invasion is primarily due to a crippling fear of escalation. Putin sees this indecisiveness and acts accordingly. He easily intimidates Western leaders with nuclear blackmail, while escalating his own attacks on Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

In March 2024 alone, Russia attacked Ukraine with 264 missiles and 515 drones, according to Ukrainian Air Force data. Some were intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses, but ammunition is rapidly running out. With no clear idea of when the next batches of interceptor missiles may arrive, Ukrainian troops must ration supplies, leaving millions vulnerable to the horrors of Russian bombardment.

The situation on the front lines of the war is equally critical. With half of promised weapons deliveries arriving late and vital US military aid held up in Congress for the past eight months, Ukrainian troops are running short of crucial ammunition and are currently in danger of being overwhelmed by Russian firepower. In late March, President Zelenskyy admitted that if US aid is not forthcoming, Ukraine will be forced to retreat. If that happens, he warned, Russia could break through Ukraine’s defensive lines and attempt to seize the country’s biggest cities.

Despite this deteriorating picture, there is currently a surreal sense of business as usual in much of the West. The political classes are increasingly preoccupied with upcoming elections and appear largely unaware of the geopolitical disaster unfolding on Europe’s eastern frontier. Many seem to think Ukrainian courage alone will be enough to hold Russia back until the invasion runs out of steam. This is wishful thinking. In reality, if Ukraine does not urgently receive increased support, there is a very real chance that Putin will win. And if Putin wins in Ukraine, he will go further.

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At present, the West appears content to wage of a slow war of attrition while drip-feeding Ukraine minimal supplies. This is a recipe for defeat. Russia enjoys huge advantages in terms of manpower and weapons, while the Kremlin has successfully shifted the entire Russian economy onto a war footing. Putin clearly believes he can outlast the West in Ukraine, and is confident time is on his side.

This does not mean a Ukrainian victory is unachievable, but Ukraine’s partners need to demonstrate far more resolve if they genuinely hope to secure Putin’s defeat. Ukraine’s long-range drone attacks on Russian refineries have exposed the vulnerability of Russia’s economically crucial energy industry, but the Western response has so far been predictably cautious. This needs to change. Ukraine cannot win a war against such a powerful enemy with one hand tied behind its back.

Likewise, Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea debunks notions of Russian red lines and offers a road map toward victory over the Kremlin. Despite not having a conventional navy of its own, Ukraine has used drones and missile strikes to sink around a quarter of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. This has forced Putin to quietly withdraw the bulk of his remaining warships from Crimea.

Similar success is possible on land if Ukraine’s Western partners give the country the tools it needs. Ukraine’s requirements are already well known; the Ukrainian military needs vast quantities of artillery shells and drones along with increased deliveries of armored vehicles, combat aircraft, air defense systems, electronic warfare technologies, and long-range missiles.

Without this military aid, Ukraine’s prospects look grim. Nor would the consequences of a Russian victory be confined to Ukraine alone. On the contrary, the shock waves would be felt around the world as Putin and his fellow autocrats sought to capitalize on Western weakness.

A triumphant Putin would almost certainly look to build on the considerable geopolitical momentum created by success in Ukraine. In practical terms, this would mean expanding his quest to reverse the verdict of 1991 and reclaim “historically Russian lands.” Putin’s revisionist agenda would place more than a dozen independent states that formerly belonged to the Russian Empire at risk of suffering the same fate as Ukraine. The most probable initial targets would include Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, but his ambitions would likely expand further.

The fall of Ukraine would leave NATO demoralized and discredited, creating a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the Russian dictator to achieve his ultimate goal and instigate the break-up of the alliance. NATO leaders have already demonstrated that they are afraid of escalation and inclined to back down when confronted by the Kremlin. In a post-Ukraine environment, Putin may look to exploit this lack of resolve by testing NATO’s own red lines while stopping short of full-scale hostilities. If the alliance failed to rise to this challenge, it would risk losing all credibility overnight. While NATO could technically survive such a crisis, the alliance would struggle to maintain any legitimacy without its cast-iron commitment to collective security.

Fellow authoritarian powers like China and Iran are also watching the West’s weakness in Ukraine and are drawing the obvious conclusions. This is already helping to fuel insecurity in the Middle East and increasing the threat to Taiwan. The global security architecture established over the past eighty years is clearly crumbling, and Ukraine is the front line in the fight to shape the future of international relations.

The West’s fear of escalation is Vladimir Putin’s secret weapon. It has deterred Western leaders from arming Ukraine, and has prolonged the war by preventing the Ukrainian army from building on its early battlefield successes. Unless the West can overcome this self-defeating fear, it may ultimately lead to Russian victory.

Russian success in Ukraine would almost certainly set the stage for a far bigger military confrontation between the Kremlin and the democratic world. Since February 2022, Putin has placed his entire country on a war footing and has positioned Russia as the leader of an anti-Western coalition of authoritarian states aiming to transform the world order. As the invasion of Ukraine has escalated, he has become increasingly open about his own imperial ambitions. It is dangerously delusional to suggest Putin will simply stop if he wins in Ukraine. Instead, Western leaders must decide whether they would rather arm Ukraine for victory today, or find themselves confronted with a resurgent and emboldened Russia tomorrow.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

The French position was welcomed by Ukrainians, who view the war with Russia as existential for their country and believe they should have the freedom to fight without artificial constraints. This means leveraging Russian vulnerabilities and capitalizing on emerging opportunities, both within occupied Ukrainian territory and inside Russia itself.

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Ukraine has bombed more than a dozen Russian oil refineries since the air offensive began in early January 2024, including some of the biggest plants in the country. Many of the attacks have taken place far from the Ukrainian border, highlighting the increasingly long-range capabilities of Ukraine’s drone fleet.

Since Ukraine is restricted from employing Western-provided weapons against targets inside Russia, the production of long-range drones has become a top priority for Kyiv. This has led to a surge in investment and a spike in output. Drones are significantly cheaper to produce in large quantities than long-range missiles and require less infrastructure.

Ukraine’s partners have also backed Kyiv’s focus on drone warfare. In January 2024, the United Kingdom pledged to spend at least $250 million to rapidly procure, produce, and deliver 1000 one-way attack drones to Ukraine. Although precise details regarding Ukraine’s drone stockpile remain undisclosed, the rhetoric of Ukrainian senior officials and the ongoing strikes suggest the current bombing campaign inside Russia is likely to continue gaining momentum.

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Ukraine has defended its attacks on Russian refineries by noting that oil revenues are at the heart of the Russian war economy, making oil facilities legitimate targets. Ukrainian military planners expect their expanding drone offensive to have military, economic, and political repercussions for the Kremlin.

In the military sphere, the past three months of attacks have confirmed that Russia’s oil facilities are inadequately defended. Russian demand for air defense systems already appears to be growing in response, with indications including delays in delivering promised systems to India. Further Ukrainian drone attacks might compel Moscow to redeploy existing air defense systems to safeguard refineries. This could potentially create opportunities for Ukraine to strike other high-value targets inside Russia and in occupied Ukrainian regions.

Ukrainian commanders hope drone strikes can undermine Putin’s ability to wage war. The Russian military relies heavily on refined oil products such as gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. Reducing Russian oil refining capacity might have implications for military fuel supplies in the long run, creating logistical challenges for the Russian army in Ukraine and hampering preparations for a major new offensive in summer 2024.

Ukraine’s strategy is also economic and aims to reduce Russian oil revenues. Drone strikes have already disrupted at least 10% of Russian oil refinery capacity, according to Britain’s Ministry of Defense. The process of repairing damage from drone strikes is further complicated by the fact that Russian refineries are heavily reliant of Western technologies. With sanctions limiting Russian access to critical parts and equipment, resuming operations at targeted refineries is likely to be a costly and time-consuming process.

There are already some signs Ukraine’s drone strikes are impacting Russia’s energy industry. On March 1, the Kremlin imposed a six-month ban on gasoline exports in an effort to avoid shortages and prevent price spikes on the domestic market. Nevertheless, gasoline prices have gone up in Russia.

Rising fuel prices could lead to mounting discontent within Russian society. Since the onset of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has maintained an unspoken agreement with the Russian public to keep any war-related disruption to an absolute minimum. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons why the invasion was officially termed a “Special Military Operation” rather than a war. The impact of higher fuel prices would be felt throughout Russia, particularly in regions with struggling economies, potentially creating instability.

The economic consequences of Ukraine’s drone strikes are also evident beyond Russia, with Brent crude up nearly 13% this year. With the US currently in election mode, this appears to have alarmed many in Washington DC. For now, Ukraine’s leaders are unmoved by such concerns. On the contrary, they are unwilling to rule out anything that might help secure national survival and believe attacks on Russia’s oil and gas industry are fully justified.

Giorgi Revishvili is a Fulbright Scholar at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service and a former senior advisor to the Georgian National Security Council.

The mood in wartime Ukraine: Weariness, resolve, and exasperation

Steven Pifer, John Herbst — Mon, 25 Mar 2024 21:17:11 +0000

We had the opportunity to visit Kyiv last week and met many Ukrainians, both inside and outside of government. We found them understandably war-weary but resolved to continue the fight, believing they can prevail and drive out the Russian aggressors. We also heard growing exasperation with their most important partner, the United States.

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, transforming the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War into Europe’s largest and bloodiest since World War II. It should surprise no one that Ukrainians are tiring of sending their husbands, sons, wives, and daughters to spend months at a time on the front lines of the war.

Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone attacks bring the war to civilians in cities across the country. The March 20-21 overnight attack on Kyiv was the heaviest in months. We spent much of that night in a bomb shelter, getting a taste of an experience that is all-too-common for millions of Ukrainians.

At the same time, nothing suggested resolve is flagging. Ukrainians want to win and believe they can. Indeed, they see no alternative in a fight that they regard as existential; if they lose, Ukraine as they know it is gone. Most want full victory, meaning the complete recovery of their territory up to the border agreed when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. That includes the return of Crimea.

We asked about proposals suggested by some in the West who say the United States should press for a negotiation to “save” Ukraine by ceding parts of the country to Russia in exchange for peace. Few Ukrainians expressed interest. They pointed to the war crimes Ukrainians have suffered under Russian occupation and asked how they could abandon anyone to such a fate. Most also felt it would only lead to a short respite, after which a rejuvenated Russian military would resume hostilities.

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Ukrainian military officers understand they face a difficult year in 2024. They described Russian pressure along much of the front line, with a particular focus on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. In September 2022, Putin claimed to annex these regions, even though the Russian military does not control all their territory.

The slowing of assistance, particularly from the United States, has hurt Ukrainian military operations. Ukrainian officers described situations in which their units can only fire one artillery shell for every ten the Russians fire. They lack the means to defend against devastating glide bomb attacks launched by Russian fighter aircraft, and worry that continuing Russian missile and drone attacks will exhaust their air defense capabilities.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officials are tracking Russian plans for new combat formations and monitoring a likely mobilization of manpower now that Putin has secured a further term in office. They believe the Kremlin retains broader ambitions in Ukraine including taking Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv.

Despite this, Ukrainian officials are showing no signs of despair. They are fortifying their defensive positions and rushing to put innovative technologies such as advanced drones into action in the field. They question whether the Russians currently have the capacity to make a major breakthrough on the ground. Given enough weapons and ammunition, many Ukrainians remain confident they can reverse Russia’s gains of the past two years.

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While expressing gratitude for US assistance, Ukrainian officials and others in Kyiv made clear their exasperation on three points.

First, with NATO scheduled to hold a summit in Washington in July 2024, Ukrainians want a definite message on their acceptance into the Alliance, and ideally an invitation. They are looking in particular to the United States, which has the most important voice within NATO. To be sure, Ukrainians are fighting for their country’s survival, but they see that fight as also defending NATO and Europe against a Russian threat that extends beyond Ukraine.

Second, Congress’s failure to pass a supplemental assistance bill for Ukraine has caused a gap in the flow of American assistance that has had an impact on the battlefield. This is reflected, among other things, in higher Ukrainian casualties. Ukrainians have become knowledgeable about how the House works, including the role of the speaker and discharge petitions, but their frustration is palpable.

Third, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Kyiv last week and left Ukrainians clearly unhappy with his request that Ukraine stop targeting oil refineries in Russia. Ukrainians accept, with some annoyance, restrictions limiting the use of US-provided weapons to targets within Ukraine. However, Ukraine uses domestically produced drones to attack Russian refineries, which are legitimate military targets. Thus far, they have struck facilities that produce seven to eight percent of Russia’s refined oil products, and many more are within range of Ukrainian drones.

There are questions about the rationale for the request to stop refinery attacks, which reportedly had to do with the price of oil. Russia mainly exports crude oil, not refined oil products; it is therefore unclear how reducing Russia’s refinery capacity would affect crude exports. As one senior Ukrainian official put it, “stop telling us not to hit targets in Russia.”

We left Kyiv inspired by Ukrainian resilience, courage, and their continued conviction that they can defeat one of the largest military powers on the planet. The United States has a vital national interest in Ukraine’s success. Were Putin and the Kremlin to become emboldened by a win in Ukraine, they would pose a far greater threat to the rest of Europe. The Biden administration and Congress should act without delay to help the Ukrainians prevail.

Steven Pifer and John Herbst served as the third and fifth US ambassadors to Ukraine.

With no warships of its own, Ukraine initially appeared to have little hope of challenging Russia’s naval dominance. However, it soon became clear that the outgunned Ukrainian military had no intention of conceding control of the Black Sea to the Kremlin. Instead, Ukraine has used a combination of innovative drone technologies and foreign firepower to even out the odds and inflict a string of defeats on Putin’s fleet.

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Ukraine scored its first major success at sea in April 2022, sinking the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, with a brace of domestically produced Neptune missiles. This forced Russian warships to pull back from the Ukrainian coastline, relieving the immediate threat of an amphibious landing close to Odesa.

Ukraine maintained this momentum into summer 2022, forcing Russian troops to retreat from the strategically important Snake Island and launching the first drone strikes against Russian naval targets in occupied Crimea.

The Battle of the Black Sea escalated significantly in 2023 when Britain and France began supplying Ukraine with cruise missiles. This enhanced strike capability enabled Ukraine to deliver a series of punishing blows to Russia’s fleet that severely damaged or destroyed multiple warships and a submarine. In one particularly symbolic strike, Ukraine bombed the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.

The remarkable sequence of Ukrainian victories at sea has continued into 2024, with the reported sinking of a further three Russian warships since the start of the year. These most recent attacks have been carried out by Ukraine’s rapidly evolving fleet of domestically produced marine drones. By early March, Ukraine was claiming to have sunk or disabled around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet.

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Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea will not prove militarily decisive in a land war, but it has provided a significant boost to the country’s war effort. The sinking of so many Russian warships has forced Putin to move the bulk of his fleet away from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports, making it more difficult for the Russian Navy to play a logistical role in the invasion or engage in missile attacks on Ukrainian targets.

Crucially, Ukraine’s progress at sea has made it possible to break the blockade of the country’s southern seaports and resume maritime commerce. By early 2024, export volumes were once again approaching prewar levels, providing Ukraine with a vital economic lifeline.

The steady stream of positive news coming from the Black Sea front has also helped boost morale among war-weary Ukrainians. This trend began on the very first day of the invasion, when a Russian warship approached the tiny Ukrainian garrison on Snake Island with an ultimatum to surrender, only to be told: “Russian warship, go f*ck yourself.”

This instantly iconic reply was soon embraced by Ukrainians as a symbol of national defiance and an unofficial slogan for the country’s entire war effort. Within days, it was appearing on billboards and bumper stickers, and even inspired an award-winning postage stamp.

Throughout the past two years, sunken Russian warships have remained a popular theme for Ukrainian meme-makers, with each new success sparking a flurry of online creativity. The Ukrainian military has joined in, publishing video footage of fresh drone attacks on Russian warships together with dramatic musical accompaniment.

For the Ukrainian public, the humbling of Putin’s navy is a source of hope in their country’s David-and-Goliath struggle against the might of the Russian military. This optimism is currently on display outside Kyiv City Hall in the heart of the Ukrainian capital, where a large poster board recently appeared bearing a mocked up image of Russian warships languishing at the bottom of the Black Sea. Amid the carnage and terror of Russia’s ongoing invasion, the sinking of Russian warships has given Ukrainians something meaningful to cheer.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The air strike campaign against Odesa first began to intensify last summer following Russia’s withdrawal from a UN-brokered agreement that had allowed shipments of Ukrainian grain to sail from the city’s port to global markets. Since July 2023, Russia has attacked Odesa region with over 880 drones and more than 170 missiles, according to Ukrainian Navy officials. The mood in Odesa has darkened significantly in recent weeks as Russian attacks have become more frequent and deadlier. At least 17 people, including five children, have died so far in March.

This is fueling renewed discussion among local residents and international officials over whether to stay or go. The question is no longer rhetorical: French President Emmanuel Macron recently told opposition party leaders he had sketched out a possible Russian military advance toward Odesa or Kyiv that “could lead to an intervention.” In response to the recent surge in air attacks, at least one foreign mission is pro-actively thinning its presence in Odesa for the time being.

In one of the most brazen attacks on Odesa since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin sent a missile on March 6 to within a few hundred meters of where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was meeting Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis. “It is a very intense experience. It’s really different to read about the war in newspapers, and to hear it with your own ears, see it with your own eyes,” Mitsotakis commented after the attack.

Russian air strikes on Odesa are not only acts of aggression against Ukraine. The Kremlin’s bombing campaign also poses a direct threat to global food security. In this context, recent developments have been encouraging. Since Ukraine broke the Russian naval blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports last summer, cargo volumes of agricultural products have reached about two-thirds of their prewar levels, leading to a stabilization of grain prices on world markets.

This begs the question: Why has the international community not responded to the Russian maritime threat with the same robustness seen when protecting commercial shipping in the Red Sea? Do deliveries of consumer goods really matter more than grain shipments to world markets, especially to countries on the brink of starvation such as Sudan, to which Ukraine recently donated 7,000 tons of wheat?

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Increasingly, friends in Ukraine ask how long I think the war will last and whether the country can expect to be abandoned by weak-kneed Western allies afraid of provoking Putin. Military cemeteries such as the one at Lychakiv in Lviv are now full as war dead are carried to their final resting place, underlining the sense that not one Ukrainian family has been untouched by this war.

If anyone doubts Russia’s resolve to seize more Ukrainian land, they should carefully study former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent remarks to a forum in Sochi. Medvedev, who now serves as deputy head of Russia’s influential Security Council, outlined his vision for the near complete destruction of the Ukrainian state, with Ukraine reduced to a landlocked rump around Kyiv and most of the country incorporated into the Russian Federation. “One of Ukraine’s former leaders once said that Ukraine is not Russia. That concept needs to disappear forever,” he commented. “Ukraine is definitely Russia.”

The darkening mood in today’s Ukraine is not limited to Odesa. As the full-scale invasion passed the two-year mark recently, increasing doubts about Western pledges to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes” could be heard from politicians and civil society members. Several panelists at a high-profile forum in Kyiv on February 24 called out Western partners for failing to deliver on promises ranging from ammunition and longer-range missiles to tougher sanctions. Since then, worries have increased even further as US legislators kick the ball further down the road on the $60 billion supplemental bill for Ukraine that has yet to pass the US Congress.

There is now a growing feeling in Odesa and across Ukraine that time is running out. Unless new US aid is confirmed and the West arms Ukraine to the teeth, there may soon be nothing to prevent Russia from advancing all the way to Odesa and on to the border with Moldova. If that happens, the verdict of history, which can be extremely unkind to cowards, will be harsh for all those who failed to provide Ukraine with the support it so desperately needs.

Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The Ukraine-Turkey defense partnership with the potential to transform Black Sea and Euro-Atlantic security

Pınar Dost — Tue, 05 Mar 2024 18:49:21 +0000

The burgeoning defense partnership between Ukraine and Turkey has helped Kyiv in its fight to fend off Russia and shored up Ankara’s security while bolstering the two partners’ economies. But now, there’s an opportunity to expand that partnership—and in so doing, secure the Black Sea and Europe at large.

The benefits of that partnership have been made clearer over the past two years, with Bayraktar TB2 drones—manufactured by Turkish defense company Baykar—grabbing headlines for helping Ukraine by bolstering Kyiv’s air-strike capabilities in the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Just weeks before Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—during a visit to Kyiv—struck a deal with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to allow Ukrainian factories to produce Turkish drones. That deal is now bearing fruit, with Baykar breaking ground on a drone factory near Kyiv in February. The factory, which will take twelve months to build, is expected to create five hundred jobs and produce 120 units a year. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed to the project, calling it an example of how NATO allies are supporting Ukraine not only “with direct deliveries of weapons and ammunition but also by investing in and ramping up their capacity to produce their own weapons.”

Turkey and Ukraine’s strategic partnership stretches further. For example, Baykar’s Akıncı combat drone (introduced in 2021) and its Kızılelma combat drone (expected to be introduced this year) use Ukrainian-made Ivchenko-Progress engines. The Kızılelma has even been called a “Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.” Kyiv and Ankara also cooperate in the maritime domain; since 2021, Turkey has been building two Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes for Ukraine’s naval forces, expected to be completed and delivered this year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces received Cobra II tactical vehicles—developed by Turkish company Otokar—and were seen deploying them last year. Also in 2023: Ukraine sent two engines to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the company’s T929 ATAK-II attack helicopter; Ukraine has committed to send twelve more by 2025.

While the flow of Turkish defense equipment northward to Ukraine has been strong, it has experienced headwinds. For example, European countries have been unable to come to a consensus on topping up the European Peace Facility, the mechanism with which the European Union (EU) funds weapons supplies for Ukraine. France, Greece, and Cyprus have blocked additional financing out of a desire to ensure that funds are spent on weapons, technologies, and ammunition from the EU. Greece said that it did not want the money to go to Turkish defense companies. The countries should let up on this demand—France recently has, for the procurement of artillery. Supplying Ukraine is not just about Kyiv’s security; it is also about Black Sea security and Euro-Atlantic security.

Nevertheless, the Ukraine-Turkey bilateral defense partnership has room to expand. On February 21, TAI announced that its KAAN fighter jet conducted its first flight. The jet was conceptualized and developed initially to replace the Turkish Air Force’s aging F-16 fleet and to bolster Turkey’s self-sufficiency—before the United States decided to sell Turkey forty new F-16s and equipment to upgrade dozens more. While the KAAN jet prototype is currently powered by General Electric F-110 engines (the engine that powers F-16s), Turkey is aiming to start using domestically produced engines produced by TAI Engine Industries by 2028. However, there may be a role for Ukraine in the project, as Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bodnar recently stated that not only is Ukraine looking to buy and use the KAAN jet, but “Ukrainian teams continue to work on the engine” and are “competing” to be a partner on the project.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on joint engine production for the KAAN jet would contribute to Ukraine’s economy and also provide Turkey a trustworthy and steady partner in bolstering its self-defense—political divides between Ankara and the West could potentially erupt into measures such as export license bans as was the case in 2019 with some European Union governments’ limiting arms exports following Turkey’s operation in northeast Syria and in 2020 with the United States imposing sanctions on Turkey following Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system.

NATO countries have acknowledged the important role that fighter jets play in the region’s security. Ukraine has been offered sixty second-hand F-16 fighter jets by the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Last year, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom began training Ukrainian pilots. In November last year, Romania received three of the thirty-two F-16s it bought from Norway. By 2025, Romania is expected to own forty-nine F-16s. Bulgaria is also gearing up to receive the sixteen F-16 Block 70 fighter jets it bought from the United States; the first eight are expected to arrive by 2025.

Turkey plans to export some KAAN jets, which could offer countries an alternative to fighter aircraft manufactured and sold by Russia and China. And, once Turkey has more KAAN jets off the ground and more F-16 upgraded in its fleet, it could support Ukraine with second-hand F-16s or by serving as a repair and upgrade hub for the F-16s that Ukraine and other Black Sea countries own.

Benefits that ripple across the sea

An expanded Ukraine-Turkey security partnership would compound upon the beneficial effects of previous efforts to secure the region undertaken by NATO countries.

In both its 2022 Strategic Concept and its 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué, NATO called Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In both documents, the Alliance also reiterated the “strategic importance” of the Black Sea. The United States—the NATO member with the largest military—echoed this in its 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, where it emphasized the need to bolster defenses in the region and increase cooperation on Black Sea security, not only bilaterally with regional partners—specifically Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Georgia—but also with NATO and the EU to minimize the risk of duplicating efforts and to improve interoperability.

Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region is even more important as the US presidential election looms. Former US President Donald Trump, a candidate again this year, has repeatedly argued that the United States is unfairly carrying the burden of financing NATO. Recently, he added that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wants to any NATO country that doesn’t meet the Alliance’s defense spending guidelines. This kind of announcement unfortunately encourages an imperialist president such as Putin.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began and threats to the Black Sea region increased, NATO and its members have worked to bolster the region’s defense and deterrence capabilities. NATO increased its forward presence in the region by establishing four new battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The United States has developed close security cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, providing them with important defense technology and weapons as well as Foreign Military Financing to support their military modernization efforts and regional defense capabilities. The United States is also leading a Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness project, in which Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia are participants.

Ukraine has disabled one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. With Turkey being the guardian of the straits under the Montreux Convention, Russia will not easily be able to replace these losses. NATO allies should take advantage of the opportunity they now have to get the upper hand in the maritime domain against Russia. Montreux limits the passage of non-Black Sea countries’ naval forces through the straits and the amount of time these forces can spend in the Black Sea; but the United States and non-littoral European countries, seeking to bolster Black Sea allies’ defense capabilities, can lean more on Turkey. The erosion of Russia’s capabilities has shifted the balance of power in the Black Sea to Turkey’s advantage. Turkey could lead naval operations in the international waters in the Black Sea, further out from its coastline, with its TCG Anadolu assault ship without a NATO mandate. While there is no specific mention of Turkey in the US Black Sea strategy, the outline for which is reflected in the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the existing structure of the law is enough for the US to support—alone or in cooperation with other NATO allies—the Black Sea countries with additional capabilities and efforts to improve interoperability.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on the KAAN jet would add to these efforts and bolster security in the region.

What’s at stake

Gridlock in the US Congress over approving additional financial support to Ukraine and debate over whether the war is at a stalemate—in addition to Ukraine’s losses on the battleground and its ammunition shortage—have alarmed many European capitals.

After weeks of resistance from Hungary, the EU agreed to $54 billion in long-term aid to Ukraine. European countries, for their part, are also pitching in to shore up Ukraine’s and the Euro-Atlantic community’s security. Germany, which ranks second in military assistance committed to Ukraine, is—among other initiatives—building a new ammunition factory in response to Germany’s and Europe’s needs. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also called on Europe to “move… towards large-scale production of defense equipment.” Good news also came out of Denmark, as the prime minister announced that she would pledge all of the country’s artillery arsenal to Ukraine. France has also recently concluded a security pact with Ukraine, pledging up to three billion euros in military aid—including cooperation on artillery—and the Netherlands has committed to providing 2.2 billion euros in military aid this year.

Turkey has also looked to boost Euro-Atlantic security. Turkey and the United States are already cooperating to replenish the United States’ munitions stockpiles, critical considering Washington’s role in supplying ammunition to Ukraine. According to the US ambassador to Turkey, by next year, 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds made in the United States will be manufactured by factories that are part of a partnership between the US Department of Defense and a Turkish defense company. Turkey, as well as Greece, recently joined the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which offers participating countries a platform through which they can jointly procure air defense capabilities, an important contribution to European security. All these efforts and initiatives are important, as the United States, NATO, and EU will need to prepare over the next eleven months for a potential Trump presidency.

Leaders in the West are putting into words how important it is for Ukraine to win. As French President Emmanuel Macron said, Russian defeat in Ukraine is vital for security in Europe; Scholz stressed that what happens in Ukraine will decide “if our [peaceful] order, our rules-based world has a future.” Ukraine’s defense-industrial know-how and Turkey’s experience in manufacturing combine into a win-win security partnership that can pay dividends for Black Sea security, Euro-Atlantic security, and—ultimately—the international rules-based order.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Follow her on LinkedIn.

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Ukraine needs enhanced air defenses as Russia expands missile arsenal

Olivia Yanchik — Sat, 02 Mar 2024 19:13:02 +0000

With efforts to pass new US military aid to Ukraine still stuck in Congress, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently singled out reinforcing the country’s air defenses as one of Kyiv’s most pressing priorities. “The most important thing is to unblock the sky,” Zelenskyy commented during a press event in Kyiv to mark the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 25.

Recent reports indicate that unless Congress is able to break the current deadlock, Ukraine will face potentially catastrophic shortages of ammunition and air defenses within weeks. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly bolstering its own growing stockpiles with deliveries of ballistic missiles from Iran.

Ukraine’s Western partners have provided significant air defense capabilities over the past two years since the onset of Russia’s invasion. This proved particularly crucial during the first winter of the war, when Russia launched a sustained air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in an apparent bid to freeze the country into submission and force Kyiv to surrender.

Despite improvements in Ukraine’s air defenses, the country remains highly vulnerable to Russian missile and drone attacks. While Kyiv now has relatively strong air defense coverage, other major cities such as Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia are far less protected and regularly experience deadly bombardments.

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The most prized assets within Ukraine’s patchwork air defenses are the Patriot systems the country has received from international partners. The US military’s most advanced air defense system, Patriot batteries are capable of shooting down nearly all of the missile types currently being used by Russia to strike targets across Ukraine. The Ukrainian military has also reportedly deployed Patriots in an innovative offensive capacity to shoot down Russian war planes close to the front lines of the conflict.

So far, Ukraine has only received a handful of Patriot systems. Given their effectiveness, Kyiv is understandably eager for more. Speaking in late February, Zelenskyy said the delivery of ten Patriot systems would be enough to have a significant impact on the course of the war. He argued that this would allow Ukraine to shield big cities and vital infrastructure while also defending the skies above the battlefield and potentially enabling Ukrainian troops to break through fortified Russian defensive lines.

At the same time, there is recognition in Kyiv and among the country’s partners that Ukraine’s air defense challenges cannot be solved by more Patriot systems alone. With individual missiles costing millions of dollars, the Patriot system is not a cost-effective option, especially when targets include waves of relatively cheap kamikaze drones that Russia is receiving from Iran and also producing domestically in increasingly large quantities.

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In order to counter Russia’s growing aerial threat, Ukraine’s partners must continue helping the Ukrainian military establish a multi-layered air defense network covering the entire country. This network should be designed with economic factors and supply sustainability in mind. It should also reflect the expanding variety of drones and missiles being deployed by the Russians.

Russia’s most dangerous missiles, such as the Kinzhal, are often deployed within larger bombardments that include a range of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside drones. These complex attacks are particularly challenging for Ukrainian air defense units. “The most difficult is an attack by various types of aerial targets,” confirmed one Kyiv air defense commander in summer 2023.

Ukraine’s international partners need to provide a range of additional air defense tools such as laser-guided weapons that can help counter Russia’s use of drones. US-made Hawk systems, which predate the Patriot system, have also proven a valuable addition to Ukraine’s air defense arsenal, as have gun trucks. A more diverse array of systems will enable Ukrainian air defense units to target large numbers of incoming drones without depleting their own limited supplies of expensive interceptor missiles.

Providing Ukraine with enhanced air defenses is essential for the country’s war effort. This will allow Ukraine to defend its civilian population and vital infrastructure from Russian attack, while also strengthening the country’s resilience and making it possible for business and everyday life to continue. This is critical if Ukraine is to withstand the Kremlin’s attrition tactics. With Russia now reportedly receiving missiles from both Iran and North Korea, it is time for Ukraine’s partners to step up their own deliveries of air defense systems and ammunition.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Ukrainian long-range drones target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

Victoria Vdovychenko, Alexander Khara — Thu, 22 Feb 2024 21:29:53 +0000

For the past two years, international support for Ukraine has been hampered by widespread fear of escalation among the country’s Western partners. This has prevented Ukraine from receiving the kind of long-range weapons that would have allowed the Ukrainian military to strike back against strategic targets inside Russia. Ukraine has responded to the West’s escalation paralysis by developing its own fleet of domestically produced deep strike drones, and is now deploying these long-range weapons against Russian targets with growing frequency.

In the first two months of 2024, Ukraine has launched a new campaign of air strikes inside Russia. Key targets have included the Ust-Luga fuel export terminal on the Baltic Sea close to St. Petersburg, and major oil refineries in Yaroslavl and Volgograd. These attacks against Russia’s energy industry infrastructure mark a new stage in the conflict, with Ukraine aiming to bring the war home to Russia and weaken Putin’s war machine from within.

As the full-scale invasion enters a third year, Russia has largely managed to circumvent sanctions imposed on the country’s oil and gas industry. Despite the loss of European markets and the imposition of price caps, Russia has been able to identify new customers while also finding creative ways of bypassing restrictions.

With Western sanctions failing to have the desired impact, Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes represent a far more direct approach that Kyiv hopes will create greater challenges for the Kremlin. If drone attacks succeed in causing significant disruption to Russia’s economically vital energy sector, this could negatively impact military operations in Ukraine and domestic stability in Russia.

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The Ukrainian air strike campaign targeting high-value energy assets inside Russia is likely to expand in the coming months. In addition to undermining the economic foundations of the Putin regime, Ukraine’s attacks aim to damage or destroy the Western equipment that is widely used throughout the Russian oil and gas industry. Much of this equipment is already subject to sanctions, making it problematic for Russia to import replacements.

Ukraine’s drone raids are creating dilemmas for Russian military planners and forcing them to make tough choices regarding the deployment of scarce air defense, anti-drone, and electronic warfare capabilities. Much of this is currently concentrated along the front lines in Ukraine, but attacks inside Russia are now fueling calls to transfer units to the deep rear. Given Russia’s vast size and extensive energy infrastructure, it will be extremely difficult to provide comprehensive coverage.

Ukraine’s drone strikes also have an informational aspect as they are difficult to conceal. As a result, they are making the Russian public more aware of the ongoing war in Ukraine and forcing them to acknowledge that it has now reached the home front. This is potentially important as the Kremlin has worked hard for the past two years to insulate Russian society from the invasion of Ukraine, and has sought to keep any negative impact from the war to an absolute minimum.

Another focus of long-range Ukrainian attacks is Russia’s military industrial complex. Over the past year, Ukrainian drones have targeted at least four missile and air defense production facilities in Smolensk, Bryansk, Tula, and Kolomna. There are some indications that these attacks are hampering Russia’s ability to supply its invading army. For example, Ukrainian military officials noted a substantial reduction in the number of lancet drones deployed on the front lines following an attack on a Russian production facility.

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Determining the overall impact of Ukraine’s deep strike campaign on the Russian economy is difficult due to the Kremlin’s efforts to conceal evidence of any resulting damage. Nevertheless, international news reports indicate that the initial wave of drone attacks in early 2024 did manage to disrupt energy sector operations and force temporary stoppages at targeted facilities. This achievement underlines the potential of Ukraine’s strategy.

Future long-range operations inside Russia will be shaped by Ukraine’s recently formed Unmanned Systems Force, a new branch of the Ukrainian military dedicated to drone warfare established by President Zelenskyy in early February. While attacks are expected to continue, it will likely take some time for Ukraine to produce enough long-range drones to pose a more serious threat to Russia’s energy sector and military production facilities. Ukrainian officials are committed to producing one million drones in 2024, but this total includes large quantities needed for the front lines as well as additional marine drones to build on Ukraine’s success in the Black Sea.

While there are no wonder weapons or silver bullets in this war, correctly deployed drones in sufficient numbers are capable of making a meaningful difference, both on the battlefield and far beyond the front lines inside Russia. Ukraine’s strategy of targeting high-value energy assets using low-cost drones looks to be both effective and sustainable. It is also a sensible response to mounting concerns over the future of US military aid.

Ukraine’s new generation of long-range drones are comparatively easy to produce. They have also proven surprisingly difficult to intercept. Looking ahead, the key issue is likely to be quantity. If Ukraine can manufacture enough long-range drones, it may be possible to seriously degrade Russia’s essential military capabilities and impact the course of the war.

Victoria Vdovychenko is Program Director of the Security Studies Program at the Centre for Defence Strategies. Alexander Khara is a fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

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Over the past two years, the Ukrainian military has managed to incorporate drones with considerable success. This has often been done on a somewhat improvised basis, with separate UAV teams independently established as part of different units. Ukraine’s expanding drone capabilities have owed much to public fundraising efforts and contributions from diverse grassroots groups including volunteer networks. Meanwhile, a startup-style drone manufacturing and modification industry has emerged from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech industry.

The results have been impressive. During a single week in early 2024, Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov reported that the country’s drone units had destroyed 73 Russian tanks along with air defense systems, fuel storage depots, and multiple other high-value targets. Longer range drones are now being used to strike strategic targets deep inside Russia including military production sites and energy industry infrastructure. At sea, marine drones have helped break the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and have forced the bulk of Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea.

Much of this has been possible thanks to expanding domestic production. According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, by early 2024 there were approximately 200 companies producing drones in Ukraine, with domestic output around one hundred times higher in 2023 than during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion. As manufacturing potential continues to expand, Ukrainian officials have set a target of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.

Ukraine’s international partners are also focusing their efforts on helping the country stay one step ahead of Russia in the drone war. A coalition of around ten countries recently vowed to deliver one million drones to Ukraine by February 2025, while France is reportedly preparing to provide the Ukrainian military with the latest strike drone models in the coming weeks.

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Ukraine’s newly established Unmanned Systems Force must now manage this highly dynamic drone supply situation while making sure the country’s expanding UAV fleets are deployed effectively in what is a rapidly changing battlefield environment.

The creation of a separate branch of the armed forces dedicated to drones should allow Ukraine to assess developments in a systematic manner and gain an accurate overview of the most effective tactics, making it possible to create something approaching a drone warfare doctrine. This would represent a considerable improvement on today’s somewhat chaotic approach to sharing experience, which often relies on direct communication between individual drone pilots and unit commanders.

The Unmanned Systems Force could take the lead in developing a more coordinated approach to training. At present, many of Ukraine’s UAV training programs are private initiatives that typically offer valuable insights but lack any centrally established standards. Additionally, the new branch can contribute to more effective cooperation with the military industrial complex to make sure Ukrainian manufacturers are focused on producing the kinds of drones the military needs.

Zelenskyy’s decision to establish a specific drone branch of the army also creates a number of potential challenges. Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution over the past two years has often been organic in nature. On many occasions, creative solutions have been implemented with a high degree of operational flexibility by people on the front lines of the conflict. Ukrainian commanders must now make sure efforts to coordinate the country’s drone operations do not blunt this creativity or slow down reaction times by introducing new layers of bureaucracy.

There is also a danger that efforts to fill leadership and training positions within the Unmanned Systems Force could lead to the withdrawal of experienced pilots from the combat zone. One solution might be to prioritize the recruitment of wounded drone operators who are not currently able to serve in front line conditions but have valuable knowledge to share.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has turned the country into a giant war lab and confirmed the status of drones as the weapons of the future. With Ukraine no longer assured of further military aid from the US and increasingly obliged to ration ammunition, drones are a cost-effective solution that plays to the country’s tech sector strengths. President Zelenskyy and his military leaders clearly recognize this, and will be hoping the new Unmanned Systems Force can help Ukraine maximize its drone potential without becoming a bureaucratic burden.

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The Battle of the Black Sea began on the eve of the full-scale invasion, with Vladimir Putin ordering his navy to impose a blockade on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports more than a week before Russian tanks rolled across the border on February 24, 2022. On paper, at least, the war at sea appeared to be a foregone conclusion, with the Ukrainian Navy’s handful of small vessels hopelessly outmatched by the might of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. However, it would not be long before Ukraine was challenging such assumptions.

Ukraine’s first naval triumph was the April 2022 sinking of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, which was struck by a brace of Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles. Two months later, Ukraine succeeded in liberating Snake Island, a small by strategically important Black Sea island which had been occupied by Russia on the first day of the invasion. By late summer 2022, Ukraine had begun drone strikes on the Russian fleet and related naval facilities in Russian-occupied Crimea.

These attacks gained significant momentum in 2023, thanks to developments in Ukraine’s marine drone fleet along with the appearance of British and French-supplied cruise missiles in the Ukrainian arsenal. Landmark achievements included a successful long-range marine drone attack on a warship close to the Russian port of Novorossiysk in the eastern Black Sea, and the destruction of a Russian submarine and warship undergoing maintenance in Crimea’s Sevastopol, the traditional home port of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

This week’s attack on the Caesar Kunikov is the second successful naval operation in February 2024 alone, and comes following the reported destruction of Russian warship the Ivanovets at the start of the month. As is now customary, news of this latest sinking inspired a flood of memes on social media as Ukrainians toasted the further weakening of the Russian navy. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called it a “great victory for Ukrainians,” and noted that the country has been able to “inflict heavy losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet.”

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The sinking of Russian warships will not prove decisive in a land war, of course. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s success in the Battle of the Black Sea is no mere morale boost and is already shaping the course of the wider war. Ukrainian attacks have made it difficult for the Russian navy to maintain a presence in the northwestern Black Sea and have forced Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet from Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. This is hampering Russia’s ability to bomb Ukraine using the Black Sea Fleet’s missile-carrying warships, while also disrupting the logistics of the Russian army in Crimea and southern Ukraine.

Crucially, sinking so many Russian warships has enabled Ukraine to break the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports and resume maritime exports to global markets. The reopening of merchant shipping lanes for the country’s vast agricultural industry represents a financial lifeline for Ukraine, which is struggling to keep its battered economy afloat and fund the war effort. Many were skeptical that Ukraine could defy the Russian blockade, but the results speak for themselves. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, exports in January 2024 reached 12 million metric tons, the highest monthly total since the start of the invasion and just two million tons below prewar levels.

In addition to restricting the role of the Russian navy and boosting the domestic economy, Ukraine’s victories at sea are also providing important lessons for the future conduct of the war. The effective use of British and French cruise missiles has underlined Ukraine’s ability to deploy sophisticated Western weapons systems, while also highlighting Russia’s vulnerability. The success achieved over the past year in Crimea and the Black Sea with relatively limited supplies of cruise missiles offers a glimpse of what could be possible if Ukraine’s partners finally agree to deliver long-range missiles in anything like the quantities Kyiv is asking for.

Perhaps the single most important lesson to take from the Battle of the Black Sea is the need for the West to overcome its crippling fear of escalation. For the past two years, risk-averse Western leaders have consistently demonstrated excessive caution in their response to the Russian invasion, while warning against anything that might potentially provoke Putin. The Russian dictator has skillfully exploited these concerns, hinting at dire consequences if Western support for Ukraine passes certain thresholds. President Zelenskyy has long complained that this preoccupation with avoiding escalation plays directly into Russia’s hands while leaving Ukraine at a massive disadvantage.

Ukraine’s Black Sea success has now made a mockery of the West’s self-deterrence and exposed the emptiness of Russian threats. During the first year of the invasion, Putin and other senior Russian officials repeatedly indicated that attacks on Crimea represented a red line for the Kremlin. However, when Ukraine ignored these threats and proceeded with its campaign against the Russian navy, Putin’s promised retribution failed to materialize. Confronted with unfavorable new military realities, the Kremlin strongman simply ordered his fleet to retreat.

If Putin is prepared to quietly withdraw the bulk of his navy from Crimea, which is the jewel in the crown of his new Russian Empire, there is every reason to believe he will be similarly pragmatic when faced with the prospect of military disaster in mainland Ukraine. In other words, Putin can be defeated if Ukraine’s partners conquer their fear of escalation and refuse to be intimidated by the Kremlin.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Thomas X. Hammes

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

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Ukraine opens new front with drone strikes on Russia’s energy sector

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 06 Feb 2024 21:43:21 +0000

Amid worsening ammunition shortages and mounting concerns over the future of Western military aid, the Ukrainian army has largely switched to active defense in recent months. Nevertheless, as the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the two-year mark, talk of a stalemate remains premature.

While heavy fighting continues at various hot spots along the front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian commanders have begun 2024 by attempting to bring the war home to Russia with a new air strike campaign against the Russian oil and gas industry. By targeting Putin’s economically important energy sector, Ukraine hopes to weaken Russia’s war machine and create a range of dilemmas for the Kremlin.

The recent long-range Ukrainian drone strikes against energy sector targets deep inside Russia are not entirely unprecedented. Indeed, during 2023, Ukraine managed to carry out a number of successful strikes against Russian military targets.

But unlike these earlier attacks, the major feature of Ukraine’s latest drone strike campaign is the emphasis on Russia’s oil and gas processing, storage, and export facilities. Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has bombed a series of facilities located hundreds of kilometers from the border, with targets ranging from Volgograd in the south to Saint Petersburg and the Baltic Sea in the north.

These Ukrainian attacks strike at the heart of the economic engine that fuels Putin’s war machine. Oil and gas exports remain a major source of Russian GDP and have so far proved surprisingly resistant to Western sanctions, with new clients emerging to compensate for the loss of European customers. As many commentators have quipped in Kyiv, Ukraine has now decided to impose its own informal and far more direct sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.

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Ukrainian commanders believe their new long-range drone strike campaign can eventually create major disruption to the Russian economy that will translate into leverage over the Kremlin. For now, however, the scale of the drone strikes remains limited.

One key obstacle is the size of Ukraine’s delivery systems. While Ukraine is constantly upgrading its drone fleet, the country’s existing long-range UAVs are unable to carry warheads weighing more than around 50 kilograms. This means most of the damage done at Russian energy facilities is relatively easy to localize and neutralize. Ukraine also faces significant challenges navigating past Russia’s traditional air defenses and electronic warfare systems.

Despite these limitations, there are already signs that Ukraine’s long-range air strike campaign is having an impact. A February 5 report by Bloomberg indicated Russia’s weekly oil-processing rates had dropped to the lowest level in almost two months after two major refineries were forced to halt operations following Ukrainian drone strikes.

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Ukraine’s military planners are now hoping long-range drone strikes can force their Russian counterparts to make some difficult decisions. At present, the vast majority of Russia’s air defense assets are concentrated along the front lines of the war. These systems play a crucial role providing protection against the Ukrainian Air Force and Ukraine’s increasingly deadly drone forces. As Ukraine intensifies attacks on Russia’s energy sector, Kremlin chiefs will have to choose whether to keep their country’s limited air defense systems close to the battlefield in Ukraine or redistribute them to protect oil and gas facilities inside Russia itself.

Both scenarios could potentially lead to major risks. If Russia fails to protect critical oil and gas infrastructure, there is always a danger that the sheer quantity of Ukrainian attacks may cause serious harm to the Russian economy and compromise the Kremlin’s ability to wage war. At the same time, attempts to reinforce the defense of Russian energy facilities would leave Putin’s army in Ukraine exposed and vulnerable.

Moscow faces additional dilemmas due to Russia’s vast size, which makes it extremely challenging to provide comprehensive air defense coverage. Russian officials have recently indicated that the country lacks sufficient air defense systems to fully protect major cities like Saint Petersburg against Ukraine’s expanding long-range drone threat.

The situation is further complicated by the Russian energy industry’s reliance on Western technologies. While Ukraine is currently unable to inflict major harm due to the country’s relatively modest air strike capabilities, sanctions restrictions will likely make it difficult for Russia to replace any Western equipment damaged or destroyed by Ukrainian drones.

At present, Ukraine’s new long-range drone strike campaign is too limited in scope to derail the Russian war effort of seriously disrupt the Russian economy. However, these attacks are clearly capable of inflicting economic pain, while also increasing the pressure on Russian commanders to reduce air defense protection for their army in Ukraine. This is the same dilemma Ukrainian army chiefs have faced for much of the past two years in response to Russia’s own air strikes far beyond the front lines against civilian targets including essential infrastructure.

By attacking Russia’s energy sector, Ukrainian commanders are seeking to open a new front in the war and reshape the battlefield in Ukraine itself. The recent flurry of air strikes on Putin’s oil and gas industry underlines Ukraine’s commitment to bring the war home to Russia, even while adopting a strategy of active defense along the front lines of eastern and southern Ukraine.

Dean interviewed by Sky News on Australian killer drones

kyusko — Wed, 31 Jan 2024 18:25:38 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On January 30, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean spoke on Sky News, where he suggested that Australia should take a “calibrated approach” to acquiring killer drones.

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Peter J. Dean

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

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Putin’s Achilles Heel: Ukraine targets Russia’s vital but vulnerable energy industry

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 25 Jan 2024 21:55:54 +0000

Ukrainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southern Russia early on January 25, sparking a blaze that highlighted an emerging new front in the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin almost two years ago. The incident was the latest in a series of recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure as Ukraine seeks to bring the war home to Russia by targeting the country’s vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry.

Since the start of 2024, Ukraine has launched a number of drone strikes on energy facilities across Russia. These have included the first successful attacks on targets close to St. Petersburg, almost one thousand kilometers away from the Ukrainian border. Officials at Russian energy company Novatek confirmed on January 20 that they had been forced to temporarily suspend some operations at the huge Ust-Luga fuel export terminal on the Gulf of Finland due to a fire started by Ukrainian drones.

This unfolding drone campaign aims to hamper the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, while also dealing a painful economic blow to the Putin regime. By using long-range drones to strike energy facilities across Russia, Ukraine seeks to disrupt the logistical networks supplying Putin’s invasion force and reduce the mobility of the Russian army in Ukraine.

Many in Kyiv believe the potential to cause economic mayhem is even greater. The Russian economy is heavily reliant on the energy sector, making it an obvious and attractive target for Ukrainian military planners. Russia’s oil and gas industry has so far proven remarkably resistant to Western sanctions, with clients from the Global South stepping in to replace exiting European customers. Ukrainians hope their far more direct approach will now succeed where sanctions have failed and impose crippling costs on the Kremlin.

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Kyiv’s recent attempts to expand attacks on energy targets inside Russia are in part a reflection of unfavorable battlefield realities. The failure of the much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive in the second half of 2023 forced the country’s commanders to acknowledge that the war had reached a stalemate. Meanwhile, the future of international military aid to Ukraine is now in doubt amid mounting political obstacles, leaving front line troops increasingly outgunned and forced to ration limited ammunition. With little choice but to adopt a strategy of active defense, long-range drone strikes against strategic targets inside Russia offer Ukraine an opportunity to break the deadlock and undermine Putin’s war machine.

This kind of asymmetrical warfare plays to Ukraine’s strengths while exploiting Russia’s weaknesses. The long-neglected Ukrainian arms industry has been unable to keep pace with the unprecedented demands of Russia’s full-scale invasion, but the country has managed to develop impressive domestic drone production capabilities. Government initiatives like the BRAVE1 hub are helping to support private sector efforts and harnessing the huge potential of Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector.

This emphasis on defense tech is enabling Ukraine to keep pace with its far wealthier adversary in what is widely seen as the world’s first drone war. Innovations are a daily feature of the contest between Russian and Ukrainian drone warriors, with both sides struggling to counter the latest enemy developments while implementing their own upgrades. For Ukraine, range has been a key factor. Recent drone attacks demonstrate that Kyiv now has the ability to hit targets throughout European Russia, where the vast majority of the country’s energy assets are located.

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Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure are creating serious headaches for the Kremlin. Russia’s vastness and the sheer size of the country’s energy industry make it virtually impossible to provide all possible targets with adequate air defenses. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the bulk of Russia’s air defense systems have already been deployed to occupied Crimea and the front lines in Ukraine. If Ukraine’s current bombing campaign continues to gather momentum, Russian military chiefs will have to decide whether to reduce protection for the army in Ukraine or leave critical infrastructure on the home front exposed to potential attack.

The Kremlin is also likely to encounter significant challenges repairing any damage done to the country’s oil and gas facilities. The Russian energy sector is highly reliant on equipment imported from the West. While sanctions measures imposed since February 2022 have so far failed to seriously impede the Russian economy, import restrictions should make it difficult for Russian energy companies to replace sophisticated equipment following Ukrainian drone attacks.

Crucially, the use of domestically produced drones enables Ukraine to minimize any potential protests from the country’s international partners, who have consistently sought to prevent Kyiv from using Western weapons inside Russia due to escalation fears. While Ukrainian leaders remain sensitive to these concerns, they have long expressed frustration over what many regard as excessive caution among Ukraine’s Western allies. Speaking at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, President Zelenskyy complained that the West’s emphasis on avoiding escalation at all costs had resulted in countless missed opportunities while emboldening the Kremlin. “Every ‘don’t escalate’ addressed to us, sounded like ‘you will prevail’ to Putin,” he commented.

Ukraine’s decision to target Russia’s energy infrastructure is one of the boldest moves of the entire war. For almost two years, hostilities have been largely confined to Ukraine itself. That now appears to be changing. So far, Ukraine’s drone strikes are too small in scale to seriously damage the Russian war effort. Nevertheless, the recent flurry of attacks inside Russia crosses a major red line and marks a new phase in the conflict. The oil and gas industry has long fueled Russia’s resurgence on the international stage; Ukrainians are now hoping it will become Putin’s Achilles Heel.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s Black Sea success exposes folly of West’s “don’t escalate” mantra

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 22 Jan 2024 21:43:06 +0000

There is no disguising the disquiet in today’s Ukraine as the country braces itself for what promises to be an exceptionally difficult year. The optimism of early 2023 has been replaced by a far gloomier outlook that reflects the failure of Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive and mounting alarm over delays in vital military aid from the country’s international partners.

This is fueling fresh calls for a negotiated settlement, with advocates arguing that the war with Russia has now reached a stalemate. However, talk of an impasse may be premature. Although the 1000 kilometer front line of the conflict has barely moved for the past twelve months, events elsewhere indicate a military breakthrough could still be a realistic possibility.

While the international media has spent much of the past year firmly focused on the bloody but largely static battlefields of eastern and southern Ukraine, the most dynamic developments of the war in 2023 actually took place at sea. Despite having no warships of its own, Ukraine managed to force Putin’s fleet to retreat from Crimea and succeeded in breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. This remarkable Ukrainian progress may now offer a blueprint for a more general victory over Russia.

Ukraine has been able to transform the balance of power in the Black Sea thanks to the skill, boldness, and ingenuity of the country’s military, together with ample supplies of Western weapons and the ability to use them without being hampered by restrictions based on misguided fears of a possible escalation. If applied to the wider Ukrainian war effort, this winning combination could pave the way for Russia’s eventual defeat.

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On the eve of the full-scale invasion two years ago, Russian mastery of the Black Sea seemed all but assured. Ukraine was even more hopelessly outgunned at sea than on land, and appeared no match for the might of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Putin was so confident that he began the blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports under the guise of naval exercises almost two weeks before the start of the land invasion.

The first significant naval engagement came in the initial hours of the invasion when the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s powerful flagship, the Moskva, approached Ukraine’s Snake Island and ordered the tiny garrison to surrender, only to be told: “Russian warship, go f*ck yourself.” This instantly iconic reply was rapidly embraced by Ukrainians as a symbol of national defiance and an unofficial slogan for the country’s entire war effort. It was soon appearing on billboards and bumper stickers, and even inspired an award-winning postage stamp.

During the early weeks of the invasion, residents of southern Ukraine’s Odesa Oblast were on high alert over possible amphibious landings, with Russian warships cruising menacingly along the horizon. However, these landings would never take place. Instead, in April 2022, Ukraine scored its first major success in the Battle of the Black Sea by sinking Russia’s flagship with domestically produced cruise missiles.

Two months later, Ukraine used a mix of artillery, air power, and drones to force a Russian withdrawal from the small but strategically important Snake Island. This was followed by the first Ukrainian drone attacks on port facilities and naval infrastructure in Russian-occupied Crimea.

As 2022 drew to a close, it was clear that the tide was beginning to turn at sea, with Russian naval dominance no longer a foregone conclusion. Even so, the scale of Ukraine’s subsequent achievements on the Black Sea front would surpass all expectations.

Britain’s May 2023 decision to supply Ukraine with Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles set the stage for the spectacular progress that was to follow. In July, France followed suit with deliveries of its own SCALP cruise missiles. This dramatically enhanced Ukraine’s ability to strike targets in Crimea.

During the second half of the year, Ukraine bombed an array of Russian warships, logistics hubs, air defense systems, and command centers throughout the occupied peninsula. Highlights included a series of attacks in September that seriously damaged a Russian warship and submarine along with the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet itself.

At sea, Ukraine deployed domestically produced naval drones to great effect, striking Russian shipping in Crimea and across the northern Black Sea. In August 2023, Ukraine signaled the range of its naval drone fleet with successful attacks on a Russian warship and oil tanker close to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which serves as a major hub for Russian energy exports.

This campaign of missile and drone attacks eventually forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet commanders to acknowledge that their position was no longer tenable. By early October, Russia had reportedly withdrawn the bulk of its remaining warships and submarines from Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports.

Russia’s naval retreat allowed Ukraine to end the blockade of the country’s seaports and resume merchant shipping. An earlier grain agreement brokered by the UN in July 2022 had made it possible for Ukraine to export some agricultural produce, but these shipments were on unfavorable terms and subject to Russian interference. When Putin announced Russia’s withdrawal from the initiative in summer 2023 and threatened to target any ships sailing for Ukrainian ports, Ukraine felt confident enough to defy the Kremlin and declare a new “humanitarian corridor” for cargo vessels.

This new corridor has thrived, with food exports in December 2023 already surpassing the maximum monthly volume achieved during the UN-backed grain deal. The renewal of maritime trade has provided Ukraine with a vital economic lifeline and contributed to last year’s impressive GDP growth of approximately five percent.

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Ukraine’s remarkable gains in the Black Sea arena highlight what can be achieved when the country’s partners overcome their escalation phobia and provide Ukrainian commanders with sufficient weapons without imposing artificial restrictions on their use.

Ever since the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion, Western leaders have withheld key categories of weapons while limiting Ukraine’s ability to strike back at Russia due to concerns over Moscow’s possible response. This self-defeating approach was also initially applied to Crimea, even though the Russian-occupied peninsula is internationally recognized as part of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently highlighted the damage done by the West’s obvious fear of escalation. Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, Zelenskyy recounted how Ukrainian officials constantly heard the same “don’t escalate” mantra from the country’s allies. “Every “don’t escalate” to us, sounded like “you will prevail” to Putin,” he noted. “Nothing has harmed our coalition more than this concept.”

There is no question that Putin has sought to exploit the West’s evident timidity. Throughout the invasion, he has employed threats and bluster to decrease the flow of weapons to Ukraine and determine where Ukraine can and cannot attack. Putin’s most powerful tool in this regard has been nuclear blackmail. On numerous occasions, he has hinted at a nuclear response if territory he regards as Russian is targeted. “I’m not bluffing,” he warned in September 2022.

While Western leaders have proven highly susceptible to Russian saber-rattling, Ukrainians have had no such qualms about calling Putin’s bluff and have done so repeatedly. On each occasion, it has soon become clear that the Russian dictator’s threats are about as credible as his promises.

Despite increasingly bold Ukrainian attacks on Crimean targets, Putin has failed to escalate in any meaningful way. Instead, when confronted by unfavorable new military realities in the Black Sea, the Russian fleet quietly withdrew. This makes a complete mockery of the crippling hesitancy displayed by much of the democratic world.

Ukraine’s strategic success in the Black Sea offers a number of important lessons for the future conduct of the war. It underlines the Ukrainian military’s ability to seamlessly integrate the latest Western weapons systems into their own offensive operations, while also confirming Russia’s inability to defend itself against this enhanced Ukrainian firepower.

By combining a limited number of cruise missiles provided by Britain and France with its own expanding drone capabilities, Ukraine has been able to destroy around 20 percent of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and force the remaining warships to retreat. Additional weapons supplies could have a similarly profound impact on the battlefields of mainland Ukraine.

Perhaps most of all, Ukraine’s progress at sea confirms the emptiness of Russian threats and the utter folly of the West’s emphasis on avoiding escalation at all costs. Kremlin officials employ threatening language because they believe the West lacks resolve. So far, they have been proved correct.

For almost two years, Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Russia. They have denied Ukraine the weapons needed to win the war for fear of provoking Putin. This disastrous approach has merely served to prolong hostilities and embolden the Kremlin. It should now be painfully clear that nothing is more likely to provoke Russian aggression than continued Western weakness.

In 2024, Ukraine’s partners must draw the logical conclusions from developments in the Black Sea and apply them to create a war-winning strategy. This means abandoning their own self-imposed red lines and finally providing Ukraine with the tools to finish the job. Western fear of Russian escalation is Putin’s secret weapon. It is high time he was disarmed.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Co-chairs: The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD,
& The Hon. Deborah Lee James

Commission staff: Kathryn Levantovscaia, Mark J. Massa, Delharty M. Manson II, and Jacob Mezey

Commissioners

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 27th Secretary of Defense; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
The Hon. Deborah Lee James, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 23rd Secretary of the Air Force; Co-Chair, Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption
Ambassador Barbara Barrett, Board Director, Atlantic Council; 25th Secretary of the Air Force
General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), Board Director, Atlantic Council; 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Frank A. Finelli, Managing Director, The Carlyle Group
The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Co-founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense
Scott Frederick, Managing Partner, Sands Capital
The Hon. James “Hondo” Geurts, Distinguished Fellow, Business Executives for National Security; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense
Peter Levine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, US Department of Defense
The Hon. Ellen M. Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), CEO, The Punaro Group; Member, Advisory Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Nick Sinai, Senior Advisor, Insight Partners; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Josh Wolfe, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
The Hon. Robert O. Work, Senior Counselor for Defense and Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security, Center for a New American Security; 32nd US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Industry commissioners

Steven Escaravage, Executive Vice President and AI Lead, Booz Allen Hamilton
Wendy R. Anderson, Senior Vice President, Palantir Technologies
Prashant Bhuyan, Founder and CEO, Accrete AI
Mark Brunner, President, Primer Federal, Primer AI
Adam Hammer, Counselor, Schmidt Futures
Chris Lynch, CEO, Rebellion Defense
Michael Niggel, CEO, ACT1 Federal
Doug Philippone, Co-founder, Snowpoint Ventures

Former Industry commissioners

Caitlin Dohrman, Former President, US Defense and National Security, Improbable
Jim Gill, Former Chief Operating Officer, Accrete AI
Sean Gourley, Founder and Former Chief Executive Officer, Primer AI
Ahmed Humayun, Former Head of Federal Growth, Applied Intuition
Mara Motherway, Former Senior Vice President, Peraton; former chief growth officer, Epirus

Introduction

Foreword

Overview

Recommendations:

Introduce a new capability portfolio model
Consolidate program elements
Reset reprogramming authorities
Modernize DoD to align with the 21st century industrial base
Strengthen alignment of capital markets to defense outcomes
Incentivize tech companies to do business with DoD
Modernize budget documents
Establish bridge fund for successfully demonstrated technologies
Scale the Space Development Agency model
Modernize DoD’s requirements system

Vignettes:

Leveraging operational innovation and experimentation to demonstrate the value of commercial capabilities to meet operational needs
Purposeful experimentation and scaling SBIRs for more rapid and well aligned tech adoption
Tying experimentation to acquisition outcomes and leveraging DIU commercial landscape monitoring
Pivoting to modern IT capability portfolio management
Modernizing capability requirements
Communicating demand signal to leverage commercial sector innovation and adopt private sector best practices
Leveraging warfighting insights and commercial product vision to develop new innovative products
Incorporating robust user feedback with government and private seed funding to deliver unique commercial capability

* Eric Lofgren served as a project author until February 2023, when he transitioned to a position in government service. All of his contributions were made before his transition to that role.

Introduction

As the United States addresses the rise of competing powers on the global stage, it must confront the acute threat posed by Russia and the longer-term one presented by China. With its military modernization progress, advanced offensive cyber capabilities, hybrid-warfare strategies, and aggressive territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe, Russia poses a considerable threat to democratic institutions and Western norms. Meanwhile, China has built the world’s largest military and grown into an economic powerhouse, igniting tension in disputed regional territories and expanding its geopolitical influence far beyond the Indo-Pacific. For the first time in history, the United States is faced with two revisionist powers armed with nuclear capabilities and detrimental territorial ambitions. This new age has amplified the need for enhanced deterrence and defensive measures, particularly in the case of Taiwan. Unfortunately, the United States’ defense acquisition process is plagued with lengthy timelines and inefficiencies, underscoring the urgent need for a fundamental shift in how the Department of Defense (DoD) approaches the adoption and integration of new technology.

Historically, US advancements in defense technology have been spurred by international conflict or heavy government research and development (R&D). Outpacing adversaries was not as much an ambition as it was critical for the nation’s security. The Cold War served as a catalyst for one of the most innovative periods in US history, a time when US defense capabilities were driven by the military, federally funded research organizations, and traditional defense and aerospace industries. Today, much of that innovation is found in commercial dual-use technology and advancements made by smaller nontraditional companies in the private sector. Often, these advancements include software-driven solutions that are smaller in scale, yet highly attritable. Nontraditional companies have become key players in the defense market due to their ability to adapt quickly to evolving technological and threat landscapes. While US companies continue to demonstrate technological prowess, this rate of innovation serves little use in deterring conflict unless the DoD is able to procure and get new technology into the hands of warfighters at a faster pace.

The current US defense acquisition system was not designed to keep pace with today’s rapid rate of innovation. Despite the DoD’s recognition of these emergent dual-use technologies, lengthy budget timelines, inflexible procurement options, and outdated internal procedures create unnecessary barriers between the DoD and nontraditional companies seeking collaboration. Such limitations disincentivize smaller firms from engaging with military projects due to survival concerns in commercial markets; the resulting frustration often compels those that engage to drop out.

In an attempt to reconcile the disconnect between evolving operational needs and limitations posed by dated acquisition processes, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program established its Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption. Launched in 2022, the primary objective behind this commission was to take the DoD’s acquisition process, and Congress’ role in that system, out of the Cold War era. The commission sought actionable recommendations that would advance DoD’s adoption of innovative technologies and ability to rapidly field dual-use capabilities.

The commissioners and authors highlighted a number of challenges that the DoD faces. They identified an outdated R&D model that struggles to adopt and apply leading commercial innovations to weapon systems as one of these challenges. They also brought the long timeline and inflexible execution into focus, emphasizing their impact on the DoD’s ability to respond to dynamic threats and harness the latest technology. Addressing the critical role of gatekeeping state-of-the-art technology from the warfighter, the commission tackled issues such as a shrinking US defense industrial base, a limited number of prototypes advancing from research to production contracts, and a bureaucracy seemingly designed to stifle speed and innovation. Additionally, the commission assessed the impact of an insufficient understanding of emerging technology by those generating requirements, in addition to program-centric acquisition and cumbersome reporting processes.

The commission interviewed more than sixty key stakeholders across the DoD, industry, and Congress to support extensive research and deliberations. This effort produced ten recommendations to overcome key challenges, which are summarized below.

(1) Empower and resource five program executive offices (PEOs) through a new capability portfolio model, authorized by Congress and implemented by the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment USD (A&S). This approach would break down barriers between the DoD and nontraditional companies seeking collaboration, allowing for faster procurement and integration of innovative technologies into military operations.

(2) Consolidate program elements and budget line items to simplify budget submissions and allow for greater flexibility in responding to changing warfighter needs, which would encourage smaller firms to engage with DoD without jeopardizing their commercial viability.

(3) Congressional appropriations committees should modify reprogramming authorities in their fiscal year (FY) 2024 joint explanatory statements to reflect historical norms, which entails maintaining the existing reprogramming thresholds, but shift from the requirement of prior approval to congressional notification with a thirty-day timeframe for briefing or rejection.

(4) Congress should elevate the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to report directly to the deputy secretary of defense and provide it with adequate resources within six months of enactment. This recommendation offers myriad suggested actions and authorities the DIU should be empowered to take, including engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players to align capability requirements with the twenty-first-century industrial base, and modernize guidance and training for commercial acquisition.

(5) Strengthen existing capital market programs and create new pathways for mission-critical technologies by broadening programs for capital market-backed companies, leveraging capital market funding for defense innovation, and enhancing the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants program to increase competition and widen the aperture of firms competing for SBIR grants.

(6) Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and service acquisition executives (SAEs) should increase incentives and reduce barriers for leading technology companies to do business with the DoD by September 2024 by rebalancing defense budgets, modernizing access to capital markets, raising cost-accounting standards thresholds, improving online contract opportunities platforms, streamlining security-clearances processes, assigning visible leaders for various programs to champion adoption and simplify processes, mapping and improving acquisition processes for successful research and prototypes, and establishing a working group with primes to incentivize leveraging technology start-up companies.

(7) The under secretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer of the DoD (USD (C)/CFO) should propose a streamlined budget-justification format for the president’s FY 2026 budget request, focusing on concise program overviews.

(8) Allocate $250 million of the DoD’s FY 2024 budget to programs that address challenges in scaling and accelerating successful demonstrations of operationally relevant technologies. Shortening the lag time for successful vendors to receive funding would incentivize new companies to work with the DoD, ultimately increasing the number of technologies transitioned at scale to the warfighter.

(9) Existing organizations should adopt the Space Development Agency (SDA) model, which provides a framework for preemptive disruption within the Space Force, focusing on rapidly fielding and scaling modern technologies.

(10) The vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and services should establish a team by September 2024 to modernize the DoD’s requirements processes, which includes designing a new framework, enabling dynamic requirements systems, streamlining documents, integrating threat and technology assessments, collaborating with industry experts, improving training for requirements managers, and publishing new policies online.

If implemented in their entirety, these recommendations would go a long way toward allowing the United States to swiftly deploy cutting-edge technology at scale and have the potential to resolve near-term deterrence threats. Embracing the private sector’s rapid innovation, modernizing acquisition and budgeting processes, and fostering greater collaboration with nontraditional companies would allow the United States to swiftly adopt and deploy cutting-edge technology. As a result, the United States would amplify its leadership in defense innovation, thereby addressing immediate deterrence gaps and ensuring a robust posture against evolving threats in today’s era of strategic competition. As of November 2023, six of the commission’s ten recommendations have been implemented fully or in part by the DoD or Congress.

Foreword

The US Department of Defense (DoD) needs to accelerate the adoption of cutting-edge technology from the leading edge of the commercial and defense sectors. Doing so will enable the Pentagon to deliver high-impact operational solutions to the Warfighter in a much timelier manner. That is why we are co-chairing the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, which has released this interim report.

In our time serving in the Defense Department, we have found that the United States does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. That is to say, our Nation leads in many emerging technologies relevant to defense and security—from artificial intelligence and directed energy to quantum information technology and beyond. But the DoD struggles to identify, adopt, integrate, and field these technologies into military applications.

The persistence of this challenge is not for lack of trying. The Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office has cut through bureaucratic constraints to accelerate even the most complicated major acquisitions. The Defense Innovation Unit stands out for expanding the range of firms involved in innovation for national security purposes. Army Futures Command has accelerated modernization in ground forces through its cross-functional team model. The new Office of Strategic Capital has a promising new approach to engaging capital markets in support of national security goals.

But the growing national security challenges facing our country and the threat they pose to the rules-based international order require actionable reform across the DoD. We and a group of distinguished Commissioners, with decades of service between us in government, the private sector, and capital markets, believe that time is running out to do so. The United States faces simultaneous competition with two nuclear-armed, autocratic great-power rivals. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and China’s revanchism not only spur urgent geopolitical considerations, but also cast into sharp relief the US industrial base’s ability to produce and field innovative technologies at scale.

To address the DoD’s innovation adoption challenge in light of the urgency of the geopolitical environment we face, this interim report advances ten policy recommendations for Congress and the Pentagon, focusing on the three key areas of reforming acquisition; overcoming barriers to innovation; and revising specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution structures.

To that end, the DoD should adapt the way it conducts its acquisition programs to provide additional flexibility in the year of execution, and Congress can authorize that flexibility. We recommend that five DoD program executive offices be empowered to operate in a portfolio model so that they can more easily shift funding among possible products that meet their mission needs. Congress should appropriate money to DoD with fewer but larger discrete budget line items and reset reprogramming authorities so that acquisition professionals have greater flexibility.

To better leverage innovation in the commercial sector, Congress should restore at least the traditional ratio of procurement funding to other defense spending, and the DoD should more intentionally engage a much broader innovation base. Allocating a higher percentage of the DoD’s budget to procurement will clearly signal a larger market to nontraditional defense firms.

Additionally, the deputy secretary of defense, with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) as a direct report, should take a leadership role in aligning and harnessing stakeholders within the Pentagon and the existing defense industrial base for the twenty-first century. The DIU should be resourced and empowered to broaden the defense ecosystem by robustly engaging start-ups, nontraditional vendors, and capital market players.

The DoD must develop approaches to more rapidly validate its needs for commercial capabilities, rather than waiting years after identifying a key capability to write a requirement and submit a budget request. The DoD should both reform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to operate more swiftly and develop a military need validation system outside of JCIDS for mature commercial capabilities. Congress and the DoD should expand both eligibility for, and the award size of, Small Business Innovation Research grants. To provide additional mechanisms for rapidly matching key capabilities with funding, they should also provide funds to procure capabilities successfully demonstrated in exercises.

As the 2022 National Security Strategy states, we are living through a “decisive decade,” a sentiment shared by the previous administration as well. Congress and the DoD must seize this opportunity to enact near-term changes that will help get our service members the capabilities they need to defend our country and its interests.

The Hon. Mark T. Esper, PhD

27th US Secretary of Defense

The Hon. Deborah Lee James

23rd US Secretary of the Air Force

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.