The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

The post Turkmenistan’s deepening water crisis could have far-reaching regional consequences appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The frontier has become the front line.

Canada’s choice is binary: secure its portion of the Arctic or suffer the consequences of foreign powers acting with impunity in and around Canada’s Arctic. Ottawa’s central challenge, therefore, is to harden its Arctic presence with dual-use infrastructure and supply chain resilience while hostile powers increase their influence around the pole.

This task gets more difficult the longer Ottawa dithers because change manifests across many vectors concurrently. The infrastructure and supply chains critical to the region are underdeveloped and ill-suited for the future—and they do not improve with age. Climate change continues to alter the contours of the region, often to Canada’s strategic disadvantage. An ascendant generation of US strategists proclaim that the Canadian Arctic is the “new soft underbelly” of North America. And it is no longer fantasy to suggest that the Arctic is ground zero for the new ‘Great Game’ between the United States, Russia, and China.

The region has been one of strategic contest since 1921, when Joseph Stalin claimed the North Pole for the Soviet Union, a claim re-animated by Moscow in 2015. It may lack the trenches and dragon’s teeth in Europe, or the clashes between fishing vessels and coast guard ships in southeast Asia. But the Arctic is no longer a low-threat, low-force posture environment that can be defended by a couple Coast Guard icebreakers and some Canadian Rangers on snowmobiles.

It is a region of strategic consequence and likely to be more so in the coming decades, which begs the question—why does Canada lag allies and adversaries alike in both the defense and development of its Arctic territory?

The simplistic answer is that Ottawa is torn among competing interests and an inability, or an unwillingness, to marshal the domestic resources necessary to protect its Arctic from a growing cast of players keen to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in pursuit of their interests.

The Atlantic Council delved deeper into Canada’s challenge to bolster infrastructure and supply chain resilience in the region. Research included literature reviews, interviews, and off-the-record conversations with a broad range of government and private-sector stakeholders. Interviews yielded constructive, if passionate, views from respondents who expressed repeatedly how much they want Canada to secure its part of the Arctic and enable its full development.

Analysis revealed that Ottawa knows the region well; the Canadian government has few peers in understanding the Arctic and what is required to right supply chains there. Geological surveys and development plans are completed to a gold standard. Stakeholders know the problem and solution space—and have for decades. But domestic policy, not climate change or geopolitical calculus, is the primary factor influencing strategic decisions for Canada’s north.

Key players (and honorable mentions)

Climate change has made the Arctic accessible. Glacier melting has created new sea routes, extended shipping seasons, and unveiled vast natural resources. But it has also created an opening in the region for strategic contest. Three threat vectors shape the region’s security dynamics for Canada.

Russia

More than half of the Arctic Circle’s population and half its economy are Russian. Russia sits at the end of one of the Arctic’s most accessible regions. Russia is opening old bases and building new infrastructure throughout the region. It holds more than 50 percent of Arctic investment (made between 2017 and 2022), and its military doctrine treats the north as central to economic and national defense. Since 2014, the Kremlin has launched Cold War-style investments in Arctic airfields, radar systems, submarine networks, and year-round basing. Russian military planners are considering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) domes extending over the Northern Sea Route.

Moscow likely observes that Canadian defense planning remains rooted in an outdated peace dividend mindset—one that grossly underestimates the threat of state-on-state conflict in the Arctic. Canada’s lack of comprehensive undersea surveillance renders its Arctic maritime approaches effectively blind, and its military presence in the region—symbolized by a modest footprint of Canadian Rangers—leaves much to be desired in terms of deterrence or rapid response. Equipment remains outdated, modernization plans languish in bureaucratic limbo, and logistics chains are stretched perilously thin. These gaps create space for Russian forces to maneuver below the threshold of war, exploiting ambiguity and Canada’s limited detection capabilities to assert influence or project force unchallenged.

The Kremlin likes to see how Canada’s strategic dependence on the United States substitutes alliance commitments for genuine sovereign deterrence. Ottawa’s whole-of-government approach—while inclusive in theory—has fragmented decision-making in practice, rendering Canada slow and reactive at a time when speed and coherence are strategic advantages. Indigenous consultation, while legally and morally necessary, remains procedurally rigid and politicized, often becoming a brake on critical national security decisions rather than a channel for partnership and empowerment.

While Russia invests heavily in its Arctic capabilities, Canada’s Arctic capability is stuck in the twentieth century. Surveillance assets are aging, space-based platforms are insufficient, and investment in modern ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technology remains anemic. Communications remain unreliable across vast regions, exposing both civilian and military systems to disruption. Cyber defenses—especially around critical infrastructure—are poorly funded and unevenly deployed, inviting adversaries to strike via code rather than missile.

China

China considers itself a “near-Arctic power” and its Polar Silk Road links Arctic shipping to its global Belt and Road ambitions. China’s white papers frame the region as a commons to be commercially and scientifically accessed. Icebreaker construction in Chinese shipyards matches the tempo of a nation preparing for permanent presence.

Beijing understands that Canada’s economic infrastructure in the Arctic is brittle. Melting permafrost, seasonal reliance on ice roads, and a near-total absence of deepwater ports make northern logistics vulnerable to both climate and conflict. These choke points offer asymmetric opportunities to disrupt supply chains or sabotage dual-use facilities. China could exploit these vulnerabilities by embedding itself through ostensibly civilian investments in Arctic mining, telecommunications, or transportation infrastructure—investments that are strategic positioning by other means. In such a fragile environment, any hybrid attack or technological failure could sever vital arteries with catastrophic effects.

From China’s vantage point, Canada’s Arctic declarations are noble but hollow—bold in language but weak in execution. For Beijing, which has increased defense spending every year for three decades, Canada’s plan to reach two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending by 2030 is symbolic. Procurement remains tangled in inefficiency and overregulation, hampering modernization and undermining operational readiness. Economic pressures, shifting political winds, and lukewarm support for military spending are likely to derail Canada’s commitments before they mature. Moreover, China likely sees Canada’s overreliance on its NATO allies as a strategic liability. The Arctic can be probed or pressured just below NATO’s collective defense thresholds—ensuring ambiguity, diffusing Western resolve, and highlighting Canada’s limited unilateral options.

Manpower shortages, insufficient Arctic basing, and the long-delayed Nanisivik port all point to structural underinvestment in hard infrastructure. These gaps offer Beijing a rich menu of asymmetric opportunities to: subvert Arctic economies through proxy investments; cultivate cultural ties through scholarships, research partnerships, and diplomatic outreach; sabotage digital and physical infrastructure through cyberattacks or dependency entrapments; and sow political dissent by financing Indigenous, environmental, or anti-militarization movements within Canada’s own democratic fabric.

The United States (and others)

For Washington, Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect. The refusal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.

The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater footprints in the region.

While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.

This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.

Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence. Ottawa provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence, convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.

America cannot—and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.

Five “cold kills”

Our research unearthed five factors that contribute to Canada’s Arctic inertia. Each of these “cold kills” continues to impede progress on increasing supply chain and defense resilience.

1. Lacking multipartisan consensus on the region as “ground zero” for a new “Great Game.”

Canada cannot do much in the Arctic if it lacks enduring political will to support and fund dual-use infrastructure over decades. The growing importance of the Arctic for great-power competition underscores the need for politicians, defense planners, local communities, industry partners, and other relevant stakeholders to walk in the same general direction, if not in lockstep. Despite the urgency of this task, no sustained, cross-partisan strategy for Arctic defense exists. Without it, investments, infrastructure development, and operational planning will almost certainly come up short. In 2025, Natural Resources Canada is projected to invest $12.1 million toward climate adaptation projects in the North—which is necessary, but insufficient when compared to similar efforts by other Arctic powers.

Yet, allies offer a contrast. Norway’s Arktis 2030 fund and its defense pledge of 3 percent of GDP underscore a whole-of-society approach. Finland’s NATO entry boosted its participation in Arctic exercises. Sweden utilizes Arctic data to create a stronger and better informed national defense policy. Denmark leverages Greenland’s geostrategic importance in its Arctic defense. While Canada’s Arctic is inaccessible by comparison, it can look at what NATO allies do right in the region and their whole-of-society approaches.

2. Placing too much of the strategic burden on local communities.

The Canadian government continues to place disproportionate responsibility for Arctic security on local communities, revealing a dangerous strategic asymmetry between rhetoric and capability. The Canadian Rangers, though a symbol of national resolve and cultural integration, are not a substitute for a modern, standing military presence. They are lightly armed, part-time volunteers—valuable in their knowledge of the land but structurally unfit to deter or respond to the increasing threats posed by adversarial state actors operating just beyond the line of sight. This over-reliance has created a strategic mirage: Ottawa appears engaged in Arctic defence, but the burden is unfairly borne by those with the fewest resources and the highest exposure.

In effect, Canada’s Arctic is not treated as an equal part of Confederation, but as a frontier outpost whose primary function is surveillance and symbolic sovereignty. The political imagination to raise Arctic communities to the standard of living of rural southern Canada is absent. There is no serious nation-building project underway—no long-term vision to tie infrastructure, broadband, energy, healthcare, and education in the North to the national grid of opportunity.

The region is home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s richest reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security, given their importance in defense manufacturing and technology. Yet, the extraction and transportation of these resources are hampered by limited infrastructure that eludes further development due to lack of coordination and investment at all levels of government. While the Yukon Security Advisory Council can be a model for shared governance federal, territorial, and Indigenous jurisdictions overlap without coherent authority. The result is a bureaucratic bottleneck that limits response agility and accountability, especially in scenarios involving mass casualty events or foreign incursions below the threshold of war.

3. Misunderstanding the Arctic as a land- or maritime-centric domain, instead of a multidomain one.

Canada’s Arctic strategy remains anchored in a legacy mindset—fixated on land and maritime domains—while the battlespace has already expanded far beyond the ice and tundra. The Canadian Arctic is a multi-domain operating environment in the most rigorous sense: a crucible where air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains converge. Focusing primarily on ground mobility or maritime choke points is antiquated.

In an era defined by precision-guided conflict, gray zone incursions, and orbital competition, the North requires integrated deterrence across all domains. The space domain is already decisive; Russia and China have launched dual-use satellites optimized for polar reconnaissance, while Canada’s surveillance constellation remains limited and aging. Cyberspace, too, is an active front. Persistent foreign probing of Canada’s critical Arctic infrastructure—from power grids to fiber lines—underscores the need for zero-trust architectures and sovereign cyber capacity hardened against both disinformation and sabotage. The air domain, often overshadowed, remains underutilized despite offering cost-effective ISR opportunities via high-altitude, long-endurance drones and balloon-based sensors that can supplement space assets in degraded environments.

Canada must approach the Arctic as a multi-domain region. Infrastructure nodes at Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Inuvik must be conceived not as mere logistics hubs, but as permanent and staffed bases in a broader multi-domain lattice of deterrence. Airfields should be hardened, satellites shielded, networks encrypted, and data fused in real time. The resilience and infrastructure footprint must be multi-domain: ISR in orbit, radar on ice, seaborne logistics hubs, and hardened cyber networks. It might even be cheaper to establish and easier to maintain air-based sensors to augment space-based sensors, such as high-altitude, long-endurance drones and high-altitude balloons.

4. Missing the point that infrastructure spending enables both military and local resilience.

Canada’s policy frameworks fail to grasp a foundational truth: infrastructure is not ancillary to defence; it is defence. Roads, railways, hospitals, and power stations in the Arctic are bulwarks of resilience and lifelines to national unity. The harsh environment demands more than token outposts; it demands permanence that begins with infrastructure designed for both civilian and military pursuits.

Canada’s persistent underinvestment in Arctic infrastructure can be attributed largely to sticker shock. Building in the north is expensive at the outset, but those initial costs conceal long-term value. Roads, railways, and ports that facilitate the movement of Canadian forces and provide necessary infrastructure for local communities also enhance NATO mobility and resilience.

The Grays Bay Road and Port Project is unlikely to open before 2035. Until then, the Port of Churchill remains Canada’s only Arctic deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and even it is more than 800 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. The overland situation is equally stark. The long-considered Mackenzie Valley Highway remains unbuilt. Meant to replace unreliable winter roads and connect remote Arctic communities, the highway should be considered as a defense artery.

Moreover, the North needs cyber towers as much as radar domes; fibre optic cables as much as sonar arrays. Schools and post-secondary institutions—anchored by Arctic research centres—should be erected alongside hardened military installations to attract families, not just forces. In Alaska, the dual-use success of the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport provides a model: educational and aerospace ecosystems aligned with the broader security posture of the United States.

Still, there are signs of acceleration. The Department of National Defence has committed $230 million to extend the main runway at Inuvik Airport. The upgrades include modern lighting and arrestor systems—investments tailored for sustained military operations and a rare example of a concrete commitment in a domain often shaped by abstraction. Canada should build Arctic spaceports and drone launch facilities for persistent surveillance and communications dominance—assets that would likely qualify as defence expenditures under a broadened NATO definition. And that definition is evolving. With calls to raise the alliance-wide benchmark to five percent of GDP, the line between civil and military investment will blur. Forward-thinking allies are already redefining defence to include national resilience, critical infrastructure, and technological redundancy.

5. Failing to call out the need to achieve A2/AD capability.

Canada’s current Arctic strategy is more performative than purposeful. It remains anchored in rituals of presence rather than a doctrine of deterrence. The reasons are structural and cultural: A2/AD sounds too aggressive for a nation wedded to peacekeeping identity and constrained by intergovernmental jurisdictional frictions. But if Canada is to hold the Arctic, it must defend it—not merely inhabit it. That demands something Canada has never attempted: a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy adapted for the circumpolar battlespace.

A2/AD refers to the deployment of integrated capabilities that prevent an adversary from operating freely within a region. This includes long-range fires, persistent surveillance, advanced radar, cyber denial tools, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and air and maritime denial platforms. Canada does not mention A2/AD in its Arctic lexicon because it fears what it implies: that the North is no longer a sanctuary but a frontier. Building an Arctic A2/AD network would require political will, sustained investment, and a strategic mindset that accepts confrontation as a precondition for sovereignty. It would also provoke diplomatic risk—Russia would label such a move provocative, and China would test the perimeter with gray-zone maneuvers masked as scientific exploration or commercial navigation. Yet the absence of such a posture risks far greater cost: a hollow sovereignty, subject to erosion by increments.

Investments in some areas do not amount to A2/AD. True, Canada’s $38.6-billion commitment over twenty years to modernize NORAD is substantial. If fully implemented, this would be the largest reinvestment in continental defense since the early Cold War. Arctic over-the-horizon radar systems will track threats from the US-Canada border to the Arctic Circle. A more powerful polar variant will extend coverage into the Arctic archipelago and beyond. Crossbow—a classified network of advanced sensors—will supplement these systems with real-time precision. And the Defence Enhanced Surveillance for Space (DESSP) project will allow space-based tracking of adversary launch and maneuver capabilities. Canada has partnered with Australia on a next-generation Arctic early-warning detection system. But even these investments are insufficient; they do not achieve A2/AD in the Arctic. Canada has ISR blind spots, insufficient logistical depth, and infrastructure degraded by thawing permafrost. RADARSAT’s capabilities are aging; the Northwest Passage is functionally unmonitored. There is no cruise missile defense layer.

A Canadian A2/AD architecture would extend ISR reach from geostationary orbit to the ocean floor. At its core: Over-the-Horizon Radar (AOTHR), high-altitude drones, and advanced satellite constellations fused via a hardened C4ISR backbone. Any credible A2/AD structure must project deterrence not only northward but outward via NORAD, integrating seamlessly with allied efforts across the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the European High North.

Challenge and opportunity

We recommend the following six steps to shape decision-making vis-à-vis Canada’s Arctic. Addressing each of them is necessary for more resilient supply chains and robust infrastructure for defense of the Canadian Arctic.

1. Achieve enduring domestic political consensus.

Without sustained, bipartisan consensus on the strategic value of the Arctic, Canada’s northern policy will remain fragmented, underfunded, and vulnerable to reversal.

Canada should establish a nonpartisan Arctic Strategy Council, drawing on members from federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, as well as the private sector. This council could be modeled loosely on the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, with a standing mandate to oversee and report on Arctic development milestones.

To correct course, Parliament should adopt a minimum percentage of GDP for Arctic infrastructure and defense investments—similar to how NATO’s 2-percent defense spending benchmark frames national priorities. A 0.5-percent GDP floor specifically earmarked for Arctic readiness would send a powerful signal to allies, adversaries, and Canadians alike.

2. Build permanent bases and infrastructure.

Sovereignty requires presence. Canada cannot assert command over its northern territory while maintaining a transient, seasonal military posture.

Canada must develop at least two permanent Arctic bases by 2035 and reinforce the air infrastructures in Yellowknife. These installations should support multi-domain enablers: ground forces, drone squadrons, ISR satellites, and cyber defense detachments. One proposed location is Resolute Bay in Nunavut—a strategic logistics point halfway through the Northwest Passage. Another is Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, where the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway provides ground access to the Beaufort Sea.

Canada need not sacrifice environmental stewardship to bolster its dual-use infrastructure in the region. On the contrary, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a way to meet energy needs in a sustainable and flexible manner. These compact, deployable energy systems would enable off-grid installations to power radar stations, bases, and airstrips—allowing the Canadian Armed Forces to operate autonomously across a vast and power-starved frontier.

Canada can and should discover best practices in other nations and adopt to the fullest extent possible. The Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy is training a new generation in clean energy implementation, building the intellectual and technical foundation for sustainable Arctic energy systems. It is one example of innovation that can help make strides in the Arctic.

3. Reorient superclusters toward strategic innovation.

Canada’s innovation ecosystem is misaligned with its strategic realities.

To adapt, Canada must integrate Arctic operational challenges into supercluster mandates. The focus of these superclusters has strayed too far from core security imperatives, and redirecting their mandate toward the defense and security sector could allow Canada to reanimate its atrophied defense industrial base, stimulate Indigenous research and development, and provide a platform for strategic innovation drawn from academic and private-sector talent.

The Global Innovation Cluster for Advanced Manufacturing could sponsor development of modular Arctic housing for deployed forces. The Digital Technology Cluster could support remote communications networks hardened against magnetic interference. And the Protein Industries Cluster could help devise shelf-stable, high-calorie rations adapted to extreme environments.

Canada should establish a national challenge prize—modeled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge—to spur innovation in climate-resilient infrastructure, Arctic mobility, and remote power generation. Such efforts should be coordinated by a Defence Innovation Agency akin to the United Kingdom’s Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), ensuring alignment between technological output and operational need.

4. Integrate civil-military infrastructure.

Canada must adopt a whole-of-society approach to Arctic logistics—one that erases the line between civilian and military use.

Every kilometer of highway, every meter of runway, and every watt of power grid must serve dual purposes. Similarly, the Grays Bay Road and Port Project, which aims to connect the rich mineral fields of western Nunavut with the Northwest Passage, must be prioritized for its economic benefits and geopolitical value. Its completion would give Canada a second deepwater Arctic port—an essential node for resupply, power projection, and emergency response.

Meanwhile, the feasibility of Arctic spaceports must be considered thoughtfully. With global competition accelerating in polar orbit surveillance, Canada’s geography is a latent advantage. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are prime candidates for launching satellites into sun-synchronous and polar orbits, a domain critical for ISR.

5. Accelerate NORAD modernization and ISR integration.

Canada must modernize its Arctic surveillance and early-warning capabilities through the renewal of NORAD and deep integration of orbital, aerial, and terrestrial ISR platforms.

Canada must move decisively to modernize its contributions to NORAD and integrate a layered, multi-domain ISR architecture that meets the threats of the 21st century. The existing North Warning System (NWS)—a relic of the Cold War—is functionally obsolete. It is increasingly vulnerable to kinetic destruction, electronic warfare, and deception by adversaries leveraging hypersonic, low-flying, and space-enabled strike platforms. While Canada has acknowledged this through its stated commitment to over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and new space-based capabilities, progress has been halting, piecemeal, and under-resourced.

Canada should fast-track its involvement in key pillars of NORAD modernization alongside the United States by:

1. Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR): Advance procurement and installation of Arctic-facing OTHR systems based in Labrador and Nunavut to create a persistent early-warning envelope stretching across the polar approaches. These systems must be hardened against electromagnetic disruption and integrated into NORAD’s command-and-control nodes in real time.
2. Ballistic Missile Defence and the Golden Dome: Canada must shed outdated policy inhibitions and join the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture. A Canadian contribution to a “Golden Dome” over North America—built on Aegis Ashore components, ship-based interceptors, and ground-based midcourse defence systems—would reinforce deterrence and mitigate the strategic vacuum currently inviting adversary escalation. Participation in the US Missile Defense Review and integration into layered BMD command structures should begin immediately.
3. Space and High-Altitude ISR: The integration of RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) assets with Gray Jay microsatellites must be complemented by investment in high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, stratospheric balloons, and commercial space partnerships. Persistent polar orbit surveillance is not a luxury—it is the sinew of a sovereign Canadian deterrent.

A modern NORAD without a full Canadian partner is a NORAD weakened in scope, credibility, and political cohesion. In an age of hypersonics, space militarization, and AI-driven surveillance, Canada’s northern shield must be not just symbolic but steel-wrought—an active, intelligent barrier underpinned by the best minds and machines the alliance can field. The window to shape this future is closing fast. Canada must step forward now, not as a follower, but as a co-architect of North America’s defence.

6. Integrate the Arctic with broader national and allied defense postures.

Canada’s Arctic strategy must not be treated in isolation.

Canada must integrate its Arctic strategy into a broader, assertive national defence posture—one that acknowledges the indivisibility of Canadian sovereignty and its responsibilities as a G7 power. The Arctic is not a separate theatre, but the forward glacis of the North American fortress. What begins as radar coverage over Baffin Bay ends in deterrence posture from Vilnius to the Taiwan Strait. Canadian defence policy must therefore harmonize Arctic readiness with strategic power projection abroad, ensuring the nation can respond decisively to threats—whether they emerge from the Beaufort Sea, the Black Sea, or the South China Sea.

The Arctic remains critical—but it is not Canada’s only defence priority. A myopic focus on the North risks undermining broader global responsibilities. Canada must project credible force across multiple domains and theatres. That means integrating Arctic surveillance—through over-the-horizon radar, low Earth orbit satellite constellations, and AI-driven ISR—directly into NORAD’s early warning lattice. These capabilities must be interoperable with US Northern Command, NATO’s Arctic flank, and allied sensors in the Indo-Pacific. Surveillance is not enough; it must be paired with striking power and forward basing.

Strategic mobility and offensive reach are essential. Arctic airbases must be upgraded to sustain F-35 squadrons year-round, with rapid deployment capabilities for long-range precision fires and mobile expeditionary forces. Arctic-class naval platforms should anchor presence and power projection into contested waters, with the logistical depth to pivot between the Arctic archipelago and Pacific choke points. Canadian-built UAVs and high-altitude drones should patrol both the Northwest Passage and Western Pacific, forming a twin-hemisphere presence. Above all, Canada must act as a sovereign Arctic nation capable of defending its territory, while remaining a credible contributor to the rules-based international order. The Arctic is the crucible, but Canada’s responsibilities—and its enemies—do not stop at the pole.

Canada’s Arctic infrastructure and supply chain resilience are foundational components to its basic expression of sovereignty. But the future of the Arctic belongs to those who show up first and endure longest. The question is not whether Canada can afford Arctic sovereignty, but whether it can afford its absence.

Jeff Reynolds is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defense and Security (MINDS) program.

New Atlanticist Mar 10, 2025

Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship

By Atlantic Council experts

As the next prime minister of Canada prepares to take office, Atlantic Council experts look at what’s ahead for Ottawa and its relationship with Washington.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist May 1, 2025

Foreign policy was a hot topic in Canada’s election. Now it’s on Carney to make it last.

By Imran Bayoumi, Maite Gonzalez Latorre

The campaign is over. Now, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney faces several important choices, from how to increase defense spending to what a new relationship with the United States should look like.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is Haiti’s fourth year without a president, its ninth year without holding presidential elections, and its second year without a single democratically elected official in power. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the country has witnessed a litany of crises—security, humanitarian, and political—that have internally displaced over one million Haitians, more than half of whom are children. Weakened state institutions and an under-resourced national police force have left Haitians to confront these challenges with little to no support from their government. While resilience has long been a defining trait of the Haitian people, forged through more than two centuries of adversity, the past several months have tested that endurance to its limits. Gangs have made staggering advances into densely populated areas of the capital and previously sheltered rural regions, driving a surge in violence that has claimed over 1,500 lives since January 1.

Experts warn that the total collapse of Port-au-Prince is now closer than ever. What happens if the capital falls to the gangs? Beyond a seismic humanitarian crisis, the Transitional Presidential Council—a provisional governing body formed in April 2024 with the support of the Caribbean Community and the United States—would likely unravel, taking with it any remaining hope for constitutional reform, credible elections, and a functioning central government. And as gangs expand their control beyond urban strongholds and into the countryside, the entire nation would teeter on the edge of state collapse.

While there are no immediate solutions to the crisis in Haiti, there are several tangible steps the United States can take to ameliorate the suffering of the Haitian people and help facilitate the country’s recovery. Failing to do so risks allowing the crisis to not only worsen, but spill over into the United States and throughout the region.

Ripple effects

The paramount consequence of Haiti’s potential collapse into a failed state would be the devastating loss of life and the shattered futures of hundreds of thousands of Haitians. But this fallout would not be contained within the country’s borders—the United States and the broader Caribbean Basin will inevitably feel the ripple effects of the crisis as well.

A humanitarian disaster of this scale would trigger a dramatic surge in migration to countries across the region, including to the US southern border. This coincides with the Trump administration’s revocation of Temporary Protected Status for 200,000 Haitian refugees, forcing deportations at a moment of maximum instability. The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s closest neighbor and a key US ally, would also face intensified pressure—both from refugee flows and the risk of cross-border violence. In the total absence of a functioning state, Haiti could become a staging ground for terrorist activity, drug markets, and transnational criminal networks already active in the region, further destabilizing the Caribbean Basin. With this level of insecurity just miles from the United States’ shores, the situation represents a five-alarm fire for US national security.

US foreign policy in Haiti has long been marked by intervention, mismanagement, and short-term fixes. Many experts fear that the designation of Haiti’s gangs as foreign terrorist organizations falls into the same pattern—failing to address the root causes of gang violence or consider the impact on civilians who rely on aid. And as the failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support mission to restore security to Haiti has made clear, even efforts with significant US backing have proved inadequate to the challenges of the moment. Past US interventions and policies toward Haiti have fueled suspicion among many Haitians and hopelessness among many US policymakers. Yet while the US government bears significant responsibility for this skepticism, it also possesses the influence to effect positive—even if incremental—change for Haiti.

How the US can help right now

The US government can take several steps in the near term to bring back a modicum of stability and prepare the nation for “the day after.” Many of the necessary policies already exist—they simply require reauthorization or targeted revisions to be effective.

Although Haiti is widely recognized as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States remains the largest market for its most profitable sector: textiles. Thanks to bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in 2006 and 2010, known as the HOPE and HELP acts, which established preferential trade terms for the sector, Haiti’s apparel exports to the United States surged from $231 million in 2001 to $994 million in 2021. Although the crisis has severely undermined textile production, these exports provide a resilient economic lifeline for what remains of Haiti’s formal economy. However, unless reauthorized, these trade preferences are set to expire in September. Rather than imposing tariffs that further destabilize Haiti’s fragile manufacturing sector, Congress should move quickly to preserve the near-shoring of US manufacturing imports by passing HR 1625—the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2025, sponsored by Representative Gregory Murphy (R-NC).

The withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) raises many questions about the future of development organizations in Haiti, as hundreds of life-saving programs are put on indefinite hold. Several voices within the Haiti policy community note that the agency’s work, despite its best intentions, sometimes created an overreliance on foreign aid within Haitian institutions. Over a century of this dynamic led Haiti to become, in the words of Haiti expert Jake Johnston, an “aid state.”

In the wake of USAID’s departure, the United States has the opportunity to sculpt a more effective aid strategy that puts the onus of development work in the hands of an ever-resilient Haitian civil society, not just foreign contractors. This strategy proved successful in the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. And this approach serves as the foundation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), a law passed by Congress during US President Donald Trump’s first term that prioritizes localization and reorients US foreign policy strategy in fragile states toward preventing conflict rather than reacting to it. Haiti was designated one of the GFA’s ten priority countries and the Biden administration made meaningful strides toward developing a strategy that prioritizes engagement with a broad range of trusted local partners. Renewing the GFA could build on this groundwork by channeling substantial resources into empowering local partners, thus fostering greater self-reliance within Haitian institutions. Representatives Sarah Jacobs (D-CA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) have introduced a bill to reauthorize and strengthen the GFA. Yet despite the Trump administration’s support for aid localization, momentum for renewing this policy has faltered in both the legislative and executive branches, leaving its future in peril.  

A whole-of-government approach

As Georges Fauriol, an expert on the Caribbean, has described US policy toward Haiti, “the challenge is not so much the absence of a strategy as its disaggregated character.” Whether it be the State Department, the Office of the US Trade Representative, or the Department of Defense’s US Southern Command, the US government possesses no shortage of entities that conduct Haiti policy—not to mention the influence of external interest groups such as those in the US Haitian diaspora.

Although working toward the same mission, these initiatives tend to operate in silos and do not come together to form a cohesive strategy for the long-term stability of the country. This dynamic was evident during the US response to Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, as US Southern Command-led military relief operations and USAID disaster initiatives often struggled with unclear divisions of responsibility, resulting in operational inefficiencies. The GFA and policies such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative aim to establish a whole-of-government approach to address this issue. Rather than launching new initiatives for each emerging crisis, the Trump administration should also appoint a special envoy to coordinate and leverage existing Haiti policies within the various branches, helping to shape a more coherent foreign policy for the island and the broader region.

The severity of Haiti’s ongoing crisis makes envisioning “the day after” a challenge. Yet, for countless Haitians, whether living in Haiti or abroad, this vision is worth fighting for, just as it has been during past periods of turmoil. The United States has a strategic interest in advancing a Haiti policy focused on long-term stability rather than short-term fixes. No single policy or initiative will solve the security, humanitarian, and economic challenges that have engulfed Haiti for the past four years. But failing to act at all would further jeopardize the stability of Haiti, the United States, and the region as a whole.

Camilla Reitherman is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

The post There is no easy fix for Haiti’s crises. But here’s where the US can start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Özkizilcik in Dirilis Postasi: are the Druze Israel’s new excuse? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Securing the return of Ukraine’s kidnapped children must play a part in the peace efforts recently initiated by US President Donald Trump. Speaking in February, Trump acknowledged that he was aware of the situation and said he could potentially persuade Putin to release the children as part of a negotiated settlement to end the war. “I believe I could, yes,” he told Fox News Radio host Brian Kilmeade.

Efforts to rescue the thousands of Ukrainian children held in Russia would likely receive strong public backing in the United States, including from Trump’s support base. Reverend Jason Charron, who prayed over Trump moments before his near-assassination in Pennsylvania during the 2024 election campaign, recently wrote to the US leader calling on him “to be a shield for the Ukrainian people and for the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.”

The Kremlin’s illegal deportations have also sparked strong bipartisan condemnation in the US political arena. Less than a year ago, a resolution slamming Russia’s “illegal abductions” as a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention was passed in the US House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, with support coming from leading Republicans including Speaker Mike Johnson.

Meanwhile, research backed by the US Department of State has provided grim details of Russia’s deportation operations and linked them directly to Putin. According to a report by Yale’s School of Public Health released in December 2024, Russian presidential aircraft and funds were used in a program to take children from occupied Ukrainian territories, strip them of Ukrainian identity, and place them with Russian families.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia stands accused of instigating a large-scale, coordinated, and systematic policy designed to remove thousands of Ukrainian children from their homes and rob them of their Ukrainian roots via a network of camps and foster homes, where they are subjected to indoctrination and in many cases assigned new Russian names. Kremlin officials have attempted to justify the deportations by claiming to be motivated by wartime safety concerns, yet their actions still constitute violations of international law. Nor has there been any attempt to explain why children are subsequently brainwashed and forced to adopt Russian identities.

The abductions are causing profound harm to the victims, their families, and wider communities. The relatively few children who have so far returned to Ukraine have provided harrowing testimonies of their experience in Russia. Many have recounted being physically and mentally abused for their Ukrainian identity, or told that their family and country had abandoned them.

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Presently, no international legal mechanism exists to facilitate the safe return of abducted Ukrainian children. However, the United States has many cards it can play in order to achieve this goal. US sanctions against Russia are not primarily linked to individual aspects of the invasion. Instead, they are focused on the illegal act of the invasion itself, which is in violation of the United Nations Charter. US negotiators can make it clear to their Kremlin counterparts that without the safe return of all abducted Ukrainian children, the Russian invasion cannot be considered over and sanctions cannot be lifted.

Sanctions could also be used to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to continue the abductions. The United States could follow the example of the British, who imposed targeted sanctions in late 2024 against individuals identified as “perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children.” UK officials described the abductions as “a systematic attempt to erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity.”

By focusing on the distressing plight of the abducted Ukrainian children, Trump could generate much-needed international confidence in his peacemaking efforts. Meanwhile, given his close personal association with the mass abductions, Putin has the ability to stop this policy and order the return of Ukrainian children. With few public signs that Russia is committed to long-term peace, initiatives aimed at identifying victims and ensuring their return to Ukraine could serve as a key US demand to test this willingness.

Before sanctions are even partially lifted, the United States should insist on concrete steps from the Russian side to end the abductions and enable Ukraine to bring all the victims home. It should be made clear that this must be verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. If progress proves possible, this could serve as a first step toward addressing other grave human rights concerns such as the widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in Russian captivity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Iuliia Hoban, Ph.D. is an expert on children and childhoods in peace and security studies and the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for vulnerable populations.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Feb 25, 2025

US sides with Russia against Ukraine and Europe at the United Nations

By Shelby Magid

A diplomatic clash at the UN has illustrated the dramatic divide that has emerged between the United States and Europe since the inauguration of US President Donald Trump just over one month ago, writes Shelby Magid.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Feb 20, 2025

Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s fight for democracy has been at the heart of the country’s struggle against the past two decades of escalating Russian aggression, but Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject the idea of staging dangerous wartime elections before peace is secured, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 4, 2025

Europe has the resources to defend itself and back Ukraine against Russia

By Agnia Grigas

By leveraging its economic strength, demographic advantage, and military potential, Europe can confidently counter Putin’s imperial ambitions and provide Ukraine with the support it needs to resist Russia’s invasion, writes Agnia Grigas.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post US peace initiative can help bring Ukraine’s abducted children home appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 5, Shawn Creamer, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, was published in the Small Wars Journal on US under preparedness for large-scale conflict and the steps needed to strengthen defense and societal resilience. He argues that, as our adversaries are acting in a coordinated manner to build up capabilities, the US and its allies are failing to keep pace.

Fellow

Shawn Creamer

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Security & Defense East Asia

The post Creamer published in the Small Wars Journal on US and allied readiness in a “multi-theater general war” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Zaaimi quoted in World Politics Review on displaced Syrian women appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.¹ The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”² The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.³ This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Toward these ends and under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia:

• Has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region since the early 1990s.
• Invaded Georgia in 2008, has continued to occupy portions of that country, and recently increased its influence, if not control, over the nation’s governance.
• Invaded Ukraine in 2014 and significantly escalated this ongoing war in February 2022.
• Militarized the Arctic by increasing its military presence in the region, including through reopening Soviet-era bases and building new facilities to buttress Russian territorial claims over Arctic waters.
• Leveraged trade and energy embargoes and other forms of economic pressure to intimidate and coerce its European neighbors.
• Conducts an escalating campaign of active measures short of war against NATO allies and partners, including information warfare, election interference, sabotage, assassination, weaponized migration, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and other actions.
• Expanded its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, an effort that was part of President Putin’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
• Violated, suspended, and abrogated international arms control agreements, including New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Open Skies Agreement, and others.⁴

Enduring realities

A NATO strategy to counter Russia’s aggression is long overdue. Its absence cedes to Russia the initiative, leaving the Alliance too often in a reactive, if not indecisive and passive, posture in this relationship. An effective strategy requires recognition of nine enduring realities:

First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a failure of deterrence. The weakness of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s failure to respond forcefully to Russia’s months long mobilization of forces along Ukraine’s frontiers in 2021, and NATO’s acquiescence to Putin’s exercise of nuclear coercion emboldened and facilitated Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As a result, the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment to defend resolutely its interests and values has been damaged.

Second, Russia is at war, not just against Ukraine. It is also at war against NATO. The Alliance can no longer approach the relationship as one of competition or confrontation considering the military invasions, active measures, and other forms of violence and coercion Russia has undertaken against NATO allies and partners.⁵ As former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has written, “Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.”⁶ By failing to recognize this reality, NATO has ceded escalation dominance to Russia as evidenced by its limiting of support to Ukraine and its inaction against repeated Russian aggression and provocations. The Alliance must recognize and act upon the reality that Moscow has pushed the NATO-Russia relationship into the state of war.

Third, NATO faces long-term conflict with Russia. Putin cannot be expected to abandon his ambitions, even if defeated in Ukraine. Ever since Putin’s speech before the February 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he railed against the international order and NATO’s expanding membership, Russia’s campaign to subjugate its neighbors and to intimidate, divide, and weaken the Alliance has been unceasing and relentless. Nor can the Alliance assume that Putin’s successor will significantly diverge from the objectives and policies that drive Russia’s actions today. Peaceful coexistence with Russia is not attainable in the short to medium term and will be difficult to attain in the long term.

Fourth, Russia will continue efforts to increase the size and capability of its armed forces. While Russian land forces have suffered significant losses in its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has reconstituted that force faster than expected. Russia’s land forces were estimated to be 15 percent larger in April 2024 than when Russia attacked Kyiv in February 2022.⁷ Earlier this year, Russia announced new ambitious plans to restructure and expand its ground forces to 1.5 million active personnel.⁸ Moreover, the Russian air force and navy have not been significantly degraded by the war against Ukraine. Russia’s air force has only lost some 10 percent of its aircraft. While Russian naval ships have been destroyed in the Black Sea, Russian naval activity worldwide has increased.⁹ Similarly, Russian nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia retains the world’s largest arsenal of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons and continues to develop new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered subsurface drones, antisatellite weapons, and orbital space weapons.¹⁰ With some 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) being directed to its military, Moscow is investing to increase its defense-industrial and research and development capacities.¹¹ Russia’s industrial base produces more ammunition than that produced by all NATO members and is fielding new high-tech weapons systems, such as the nuclear-capable multiple warhead IRBM Oreshnik Russia, which was demonstrated in combat against Ukraine last November.¹² In April 2024, NATO SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli testified to the US Congress that:

• “Russia is on track to command the largest military on the continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating substantial amounts of ammunition and material in support of large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal and angrier with the West than when it invaded.”¹³

Fifth, Moscow’s aggressive actions short of war will continue and escalate. Putin has yet to face a response from the Alliance that will dissuade him from further exercising information warfare, cyber warfare, energy and trade embargoes, assassination, GPS jamming, sabotage, fomenting separatist movements, and other forms of hybrid warfare. These actions are intended to intimidate governments; weaken the credibility of the Alliance’s security guarantee; create and exacerbate internal divisions; and divide allies, among other objectives. Left unchecked, they threaten to undermine the Alliance’s ability to attain consensus necessary to take decisive action against Russia.

Sixth, Moscow’s exercise of nuclear coercion will continue as a key element of Russia’s strategy and should be expected to intensify. Threats of nuclear warfare are a key element of Putin’s strategy to preclude NATO and its members from providing Ukraine support that would enable it to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion. This repeated exercise of nuclear coercion includes verbal threats from President Putin and other senior Russian officials; the launching of nuclear capable ICBMs; the use of a nuclear capable IRBM against Ukraine, the first use of such a system in a conflict; nuclear weapons exercises; and the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, according to both Russia and Belarus.¹⁴ NATO allies have repeatedly rewarded this coercion by expressing fear of nuclear war; declaring that NATO forces will not enter Ukraine; restricting NATO’s role in assisting Ukraine; limiting the flow of weapons to Ukraine; and restricting their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. Rewarding nuclear coercion encourages its repeated exercise and escalation. It risks leading Russia to conclude it has attained escalation dominance. A key challenge for NATO going forward will be to demonstrate that Russia’s threats of nuclear strikes are counterproductive, and the Alliance cannot be deterred by nuclear coercion.

Seventh, Moscow is conducting a global campaign of aggression to weaken the democratic community of nations and the rules-based international order. Over the last two decades, Russia has exercised its military, informational, and economic assets to generate anti-Western sentiment across the globe, including in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. This has included military support to authoritarian, anti-Western regimes well beyond Europe, including Venezuela, Syria, and Mali. The most concerning element of Russia’s global campaign is the partnerships it has operationalized with China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia’s “no limits partnership” with China enables Putin to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions on his war economy. Both Iran and North Korea have provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russia’s fight against Ukraine. In return, Russia has supplied missile and nuclear technologies, oil and gas, and economic support to these nations that enables them to stoke violence across the Middle East, threaten the Korean Peninsula, and drive forward Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eighth, an effective Russia strategy will require a coordinated leveraging of all the instruments of power available through the Alliance, its member states, and its key partners, including the European Union. This includes the application of diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and other elements of power—none of which are the Alliance’s primary capacity, military power—that can be marshaled through its members states and multinational institutions, such as the European Union, where the Alliance and its member states have influence and authority.

Ninth, NATO significantly overmatches Russia in military and economic power.
NATO Headquarters estimates the combined GDP of Alliance member states to be $54 trillion, more than twenty-five times Russia’s estimated GDP of more than $2 trillion.¹⁵ The combined defense budget of NATO members amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion,¹⁶ more than ten times that of Russia’s publicly projected defense budget of $128 billion for 2025.¹⁷ This imbalance of power favoring the Alliance will be enduring and makes the execution of an effective Russia strategy not a matter of capacity, but one of strategic vision and political will.

Core objectives

To counter the direct and significant threat posed by Moscow, a NATO strategy for Russia should be structured around four core objectives:¹⁸

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine: NATO must defeat Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is its most urgent priority. Failure to do so—and failure includes the conflict’s perpetuation—increases the risk of a wider war in Europe and will encourage other adversaries around the world to pursue their revisionist and hegemonic ambitions. Russia’s decisive defeat in Ukraine is essential to return stability to Europe and to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent posture.

• Deter aggression by Russia: A key Alliance priority must be the effective deterrence of Russia aggression against the Alliance. A robust conventional and nuclear posture that deters Russian military aggression is far less costly than an active war. Deterrence must also be more effectively exercised against Russia’s actions short of war. Failure to deter aggression in this domain can undermine confidence in the Alliance and increase the risk of war.
• Contain Russia’s influence and control: The Alliance must actively contain Russia’s efforts to assert influence and control beyond its borders. The Alliance must assist Europe’s non-NATO neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia to strengthen their defenses and resilience to Russian pressure. NATO and NATO allies should also work to counter and roll back Russia’s influence and engagement around the globe.
• Degrade Russia’s capabilities and determination: A core objective for the Alliance should include weakening Russia’s capacity and will to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. Denying Russia access to international markets would further degrade its economy, including its defense-industrial capacity. Active engagement of the Russian public and other key stakeholders should aim to generate opposition to Putin and the Kremlin’s international aggression.

Achievement of these objectives would compel the Kremlin to conclude that its revanchist ambitions, including the diminishment or destruction of NATO, are unachievable and self-damaging. It would diminish Russia’s will and ability to continue aggression in Europe and weaken the impact of Russia’s partnerships, including with China, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, achieving these objectives would return a modicum of stability to Europe that in the long-term would enhance the prospects for NATO’s peaceful coexistence with Russia.

Recommended actions

A NATO strategy to defeat, deter, contain, and degrade Russian aggression and influence should effectuate the following actions by the Alliance, its member states, and partners:

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine and accelerate Ukraine’s accession into the NATO alliance Defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine requires its own strategy, which should feature five key elements: adopting Ukraine’s war objectives, including total territorial reconstitution (i.e., the Alliance must never recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories it illegally seized from Ukraine); maximizing the flow of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine, free of restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia; imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia; deploying aggressive information operations to generate opposition in Russia against Putin’s aggression; and presenting a clear, accelerated path for Ukraine to NATO membership. NATO membership, and the security guarantee it provides, would add real risk and complexity to Russian military planning. NATO membership for Ukraine is the only way to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine cannot be subject to Russian hegemony and would provide security conditions needed for Ukraine’s rapid reconstruction and economic integration into Europe.
• Fulfill and operationalize NATO’s regional defense plans. To establish a credible and effective deterrent against Russian military aggression, NATO allies must:
  • Build and deploy the requisite national forces. Military plans are no more than visions in the absence of required capabilities. NATO’s European and Canadian allies need to generate more forces, with requisite firepower, mobility, and enabling capacities. In short, given European allies’ obligations under NATO’s new regional defense plans, they must act with urgency.
  • Strengthen transatlantic defense industrial capacity. High intensity warfare, as seen in Ukraine, consumes massive amounts of weapons stocks, much of which have to be in a near constant state of modernization to match the technological adaptations of the adversary. Today, the Alliance has struggled (and often failed) to match the defense-industrial capacity of Russia and its partners. NATO’s defense industrial base must expand its production capacities and its ability to rapidly develop, update, and field weapons systems.
  • Increase allied defense spending to the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP. To facilitate the aforementioned requirements and to address emerging challenges beyond Europe that could simultaneously challenge the transatlantic community, NATO allies need to increase the agreed floor of defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent and fulfill that new commitment with immediacy. NATO members cannot allow themselves to be forced to choose between defending against Russia and another geopolitical challenge beyond Europe.

• Terminate the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Russia has repeatedly and blatantly violated the principles and commitments laid out in the Founding Act. Russia’s actions include having invaded Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022, using nuclear coercion and escalatory rhetoric to pressue the Alliance, and deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, as both Russia and Belarus have affirmed. Consequently, NATO should formally render the NRFA defunct, including the Alliance’s commitments to:
  • Adhere to the “three nuclear no’s” that NATO member states “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁹
  • Abstain from permanently stationing “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰

• Update NATO’s nuclear force posture. In response to Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, exercise of nuclear coercion, and adjustments to its nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons, the Alliance must update its own nuclear posture. The objectives should be to provide NATO with a broader and more credible spectrum of nuclear weapons options. An updated force posture would improve NATO’s ability to manage, if not dominate, the ladder of conflict escalation, complicate Russian military planning, and thereby weaken Moscow’s confidence in its own military posture and its strategy of nuclear “escalation to de escalate.” Toward these ends, the Alliance should:
  • Increase the spectrum of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This should include a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and a ground-launched variant. The breadth and number of NATO nuclear weapons exercises, such as the yearly Steadfast Noon, should be expanded and further integrated with exercises of conventional forces.
  • Expand the number of members participating in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing agreements. Doing so will expand the tactical options available to NATO and underscore more forcefully Alliance unity behind its nuclear posture.
  • Broaden the number and locations of infrastructure capable of hosting the Alliance’s nuclear posture. The Alliance’s nuclear posture still relies solely on Cold War legacy infrastructure in Western Europe. Given the threat posed by Russia, NATO should establish facilities capable of handling nuclear weapons and dual capable systems, including nuclear weapons storage sites, in NATO member states along its eastern frontier.

• Reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its growing provocations against NATO member states and partners underscore the need to further reinforce the Alliance’s eastern frontier. To date, NATO’s deployments along its eastern flank amount to more of a trip-wire force rather than one designed for a strategy of defense by denial. To give greater credibility to the Alliance’s pledge not to “cede one inch” when considering a potential attack by Russia, NATO should:
  • Establish a more robust permanent military presence along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. NATO is expanding its eight multinational battlegroups deployed to Central and Eastern Europe. But each of these deployments should be further upgraded to full brigades that are permanently stationed there. These elements should feature robust enabling capacities, particularly air and missile defenses and long-range fires. If the United States is expected to sustain a presence of 100,000 troops in Europe, the least Western Europe and Canada can do is to forward station some 32,000 troops combined in Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Conduct large-scale, concentrated exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. The Alliance has commendably reanimated its emphasis on large-scale joint military exercises. However, those exercises have yet to be concentrated on NATO’s eastern flank. Doing so would enhance readiness, reassure the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European member states, and demonstrate resolve and preparedness in the face of Russian aggression.
  • Upgrade the Alliance’s air defense and ballistic missile defense systems to more robustly address Russian threats. In its attacks on Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated with brutality its emphasis on missile and long-range drone strikes against military and civilian targets. As part of its efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense capacities, NATO should direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to address threats from Russia.²¹

• Expand the NATO SACEUR’s authority to order deployments and conduct operations along NATO’s eastern frontier. The Alliance’s regional defense plans are said to provide SACEUR with greater authority to activate and deploy NATO forces before crisis and conflict situations. Due to the aggressiveness of Russia’s ambitions, NATO should consider further expanding those authorities as they relate to the deployment and missions of forces along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The actions of a deterrent force can be even more important than the magnitude of their presence.
• Augment the Alliance’s posture in the Arctic. Russia has heavily militarized the Arctic, upgraded the status and capability of its Northern Fleet, and deepened its military cooperation with China in the region while the Kremlin continues to assert Arctic territorial claims that conflict with those of NATO allies. While NATO has been increasing the tempo of its Arctic operations and improving its Arctic capabilities, Russia continues to pose a significant threat in the region and possibly outmatches the Alliance in the High North. To further reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Alliance should:
  • Develop a comprehensive NATO strategy to defend its interests in the High North. Such a document would underscore the Alliance’s commitment to the region and help foster allied investments in infrastructure, capabilities, and training needed to defend and deter Russian threats in the High North.
  • Establish a NATO Arctic Command and Joint Force. The Arctic poses a unique set of geographic and climatic challenges requiring tailored operational capabilities. A command and air-ground-naval force focused specifically on the High North would provide the Alliance a dedicated and tailored deterrent to counter Russian aggression in the Arctic.²²

• Bolster deterrence against Russian actions short of war by strengthening resilience and through more assertive and punitive counteractions. NATO and NATO member states’ failure to respond robustly to Russia’s hybrid warfare—whether it is information warfare, cyberattacks, sabotage, assassinations, or other forms of aggression — has resulted in Russia’s intensification and escalation of these actions. The transatlantic community must strengthen its resilience against such attacks but also take stronger punitive measures against Russia if it is to persuade Russia to cease these attacks. While much of what needs to be done falls beyond the remit of NATO’s military capabilities, greater consideration should be given to how military assets can be leveraged to gather intelligence about Russian activity and provide a military dimension to the transatlantic community’s response to such provocations. For example, when a Russian ship fired a warning shot directed at a commercial Norwegian fishing boat within Norway’s exclusive economic zone or when Russia pulled out Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River,²³ an immediate show of force from NATO could have been an appropriate response.
• Strengthen the deterrence and resilience capacities of non-NATO nations in Europe and Russia’s periphery. Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania reflect the intensity of Russia’s determination to claw back control and influence over the space of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. A key priority of a Russia strategy should be to strengthen efforts by the Alliance, its member states, and key institutional partners, such as the European Union, to reinforce the resilience and defense capabilities of non-NATO nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO’s programs, such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, warrant even greater emphasis and resources, particularly in those regions.
• Intensify Russia’s economic and diplomatic isolation. The current set of measures taken against Moscow in these realms have failed to sufficiently degrade Russia’s war economy and its ability to sustain its invasion of Ukraine and provocations elsewhere in the world. A key priority for NATO and its member states should be to significantly escalate economic sanctions, including the exercise of secondary sanctions to eliminate Moscow’s ability to generate international revenue from energy exports and attain critical technologies needed by its defense industrial sector.
• Increase efforts to generate internal Russian opposition to the Kremlin’s revanchist objectives and greater support for democratic principles and governance. Russia has undertaken aggressive campaigns to influence the politics of NATO allies and partners. In the recent elections of Moldova and Romania, Russian intervention nearly effectuated regime change. For too long, the transatlantic community has remained on the defensive in this realm. NATO and its member states need to shift to the offensive and weaponize the power of truth to illuminate the brutal realities of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the corruption of Russian officials, and other realties of Russian governance. NATO allies must more actively support Russian stakeholders—particularly civil society—that are more aligned with transatlantic values. This is critical to degrading the political will of the Russian state to continue its aggressions.
• Modulate dialogue with Russia, limiting it to what is operationally necessary. The Alliance should formally disband the NATO-Russia Council—which last met in 2022—until Moscow has demonstrated genuine commitment to a constructive relationship. Nonetheless, the Alliance should establish and/or maintain lines of communication between the NATO secretary general and the Kremlin, as well as between Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian General Staff, to enable crisis management and provide transparency needed for military stability. This would not preclude NATO allies from dialogues with Russia deemed necessary, for example, to assist Ukraine or pursue arms control measures.

The bottom line

As noted, NATO possesses an overmatching capacity to defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. Today, there is no better time to achieve these objectives by fully marshaling the Alliance’s assets and potential. Moscow cannot undertake an all-out military attack on NATO without risking the viability of Russia’s armed forces and thus its regime. The accomplishment of these objectives would provide stability to Europe’s eastern frontier and establish the best foundation for an eventual relationship with Moscow that is minimally confrontational, if not cooperative and constructive. However, this will take political will and resources. Russia today is determined to prevail in Ukraine, expand its military capabilities, and further leverage its partners, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea, to defeat the community of democracies and, particularly, the Alliance. Russia already envisions itself as being at war with NATO.

Fellow

Ian Brzezinski

Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Defense Policy

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Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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New Atlanticist Feb 22, 2023

Russia policy after the war: A new strategy of containment

By Alexander Vershbow

To prevent further damage to the rules-based international order, the United States and its allies will need a strategy of containment to deter Russia militarily and decouple Russia from the international community, until Moscow has earned the right to be considered a partner once more.

Arms Control Defense Policy

Report Sep 19, 2024

NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power

By Andrew A. Michta, Joslyn Brodfuehrer

How will Russia reconstitute its land forces in response to the war in Ukraine and the changes in NATO’s force model? The NATO allies closest to Russia can provide valuable insight.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

Memo to… Oct 10, 2023

Memo to the president: A bold agenda for the Washington summit: How to advance vital US interests by helping Ukraine win and defining its path to NATO membership

The upcoming NATO summit marking the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary presents an opportunity for US leadership to meet this danger by taking steps to provide Ukraine the means to win the war and by setting a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Central Europe Conflict

The post Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eliminating FEMA would be a disaster, as it would surely lead to greater suffering and higher costs after disasters. In a cruel irony, moreover, abolishing FEMA would likely hurt the worst in states that supported Trump, especially Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and the Carolinas. These states went for Trump in the 2024 election and will be important politically in the 2026 midterms.

Most recent FEMA funds have gone to states that went for Trump in 2024

Size reflects total FEMA disaster grants Oct. 1, 2015 through Jan. 8, 2025; colors reflect the 2024 presidential election results.

Instead of abolishing FEMA, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security and includes other missions besides disaster recovery, Trump should seek to fix the agency’s problems, make it more efficient, and change its focus to include strategic resilience—that is, saving lives and reducing property damage before disasters strike. 

While FEMA does serve to get disaster relief money to the states, it does five important things that states need after a disaster and that virtually every state—but especially some red states—would have to budget for, at considerable ongoing expense, if FEMA no longer existed. Emergency management requires training and experience—it is no longer a game for amateurs.

First, FEMA has specialized experience in disaster response and recovery. It deploys hundreds of experts to states where disasters occur. If FEMA were abolished, states would have to hire and train their own experts at considerable cost to state budgets—or do without.

Second, FEMA maintains stockpiles of essential commodities needed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, which states would have to replicate or do without after a disaster.

Third, when the response to a disaster moves into the recovery phase, FEMA has special expertise in rebuilding infrastructure—expertise that states would have to replace.

Fourth, FEMA is better able than individual states to pull in expertise from other parts of the federal government to restore water treatment facilities, rebuild schools, and do the other necessary recovery work when a community gets devastated.

Fifth, at all phases of response and recovery, FEMA has the capacity to administer individual grants and account for them afterward—specialized expertise that states would have to replicate on their own if FEMA did not exist.

Additionally, and precisely because of its knowledge in response and recovery, FEMA also has more accumulated experience in how to prevent damage from disasters, and how to reduce the cost and time of recovery when disasters do occur. This expertise in resilience needs to be tapped to better save lives and reduce the cost of future disasters. This goes to the heart of what strategic resilience is all about.

Disasters can strike anywhere—but some places get hit worse

It is undeniable that disasters are getting more costly to communities. In the past six months alone, hurricanes Helene and Milton and wildfires in southern California have killed at least one hundred Americans and caused more than $100 billion in damage to homes and businesses. While hurricanes and wildfires vary in number and magnitude, they happen every year somewhere in the United States. Earthquakes and pandemics are less frequent, but whether tomorrow or years from now, they will happen. One lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of Trump’s first term is that better preparedness could have saved many more lives and helped keep the US economy going.

But the cost of disasters is not spread evenly across the country. As the map above shows, it is striking which states benefit from FEMA’s disaster grants. Of the $45.3 billion in FEMA disaster grants from October 1, 2015, through January 8, 2025 (this excludes grants to Puerto Rico and other territories), 82.8 percent went to states that Trump won in the 2024 election. The majority of FEMA disaster aid went to red states in the southeast, with the largest beneficiary being Trump’s home state of Florida, which received more than thirteen billion dollars.

Republicans who recently called for conditions on disaster assistance to California do so at their own political risk—and grave financial risk to the people they represent. In principle, disaster assistance is supposed to come fast and does not have policy conditions. In reality, it often depends on the US Congress passing a supplemental appropriation. Imposing conditions will likely have even worse consequences on Republican-led states such as Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and South Carolina, where Democrats in the future could seek payback by conditioning hurricane disaster relief on a range of policy changes from climate change to abortion policy. California may not have another wildfire season like the one this month for several years, but hurricane damage on the Gulf Coast or the southeast this or next year is a near-certainty. If Congress imposes conditions on disaster assistance, Republicans could have far more to lose in the future than Democrats.

Republicans are therefore right that there are a wealth of policy changes and investments needed in California. The same is true about Florida, Louisiana, Texas, the Carolinas, the Gulf Coast, and the Midwest. But conditioning disaster assistance on policy changes is bad for everyone. The need to approach these changes in a constructive, not confrontational, way should be one aspect of a Trump-commissioned study of what the United States needs from strategic resilience.

A bad deal for all states—red, blue, and purple

Trump’s suggestion to replace FEMA with a cash grant to states after a disaster misses the full extent of what FEMA does. The agency does give out grants to pay for rebuilding after widespread destruction from hurricanes, wildfires, floods, and tornadoes. While FEMA’s employees are not first responders—state and local governments are responsible for first response—the agency has thousands of people it can deploy who are experts in disaster response and recovery, rebuilding infrastructure, and grants management. FEMA also maintains stockpiles of emergency supplies and equipment, such as generators, and can marshal other parts of the federal government to do the essential but unglamorous work of rebuilding after a major disaster.

In contrast, when states were left to themselves during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the result was chaos. The governor of Maryland, for example, bought 500,000 test kits from South Korea and then used the Maryland National Guard to keep them away from the federal government. Under Trump’s approach, states would likely end up bidding for scarce expertise and emergency supplies. This, too, could end up hurting a high number of Trump’s supporters, since blue states on average have larger state budgets per capita than red states and have a higher gross domestic product per capita, too.

Democratic-leaning states could have an advantage in a potential bidding war for emergency supplies

As a result, red states may lose out in bidding wars to blue states under such an approach.

One important but unstated role FEMA plays is that it allows states (red and blue) to have smaller governments than those states would need if they had to prepare for emergencies on their own. Leaving disaster assistance up to the states would mean that each state would need to replace a lot of what FEMA does with its own personnel—or let its people suffer catastrophic losses after a disaster. Hiring a national cadre of emergency response professionals that can be deployed to states where disasters occur is far more cost-effective than every state having to hire and train its own people.

Three areas for reform

The professionals at FEMA and state-level emergency managers will be the first to tell you there are more efficient ways to save lives and reduce property damage. In March 2024, the Atlantic Council hosted one such event with these professionals, and it has been exploring this issue through the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative. Trump should invite in FEMA regional leaders and state emergency managers and listen to their ideas. Many of their ideas will likely center around three key themes:

1. Congress and state legislatures, not emergency managers, are the major reason there is so much bureaucracy and inefficiency in disaster response.

FEMA spent nearly half its disaster budget eight days into this fiscal year because of hurricanes Helene and Milton. This is in part because of how disaster response is funded. State legislatures, especially in red states, have habitually underfunded emergency response and recovery. Getting a check afterward from the federal government will not make up for a shortage of expertise in the hours, days, weeks, and months after a community is devastated by a hurricane, wildfire, or tornado.

2. There is a coming insurance crisis caused by ever-increasing damage from hurricanes, floods, and wildfires.

Already, insurance rates in Florida and other Gulf states have skyrocketed, and California’s already horrible insurance situation is about to become desperate. Homeowners must have insurance, or they cannot get a federally insured mortgage to buy a house. Businesses need to have insurance to be able to stay in business, and if they can’t stay in business and don’t have insurance, unemployment skyrockets. 

Two Category 5 hurricanes hitting Florida or a Gulf state in a single season or another catastrophic California wildfire season next winter could put the economies of those states, and perhaps the country, into recession. Americans living elsewhere should not be smug: they will get hit by the bills if Congress has to appropriate hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency aid. The resulting economic catastrophe would cause a terrible human toll by ruining the lives of millions of Americans—many of them in red states. 

3. There is a lot that can be done by focusing on strategic resilience to save lives and reduce property damage.

A 2018 study by the National Institute of Building Sciences found that every one dollar in disaster mitigation by FEMA and a program at the Department of Housing and Urban Development saved the US taxpayer six dollars in economic losses through such measures as rebuilding damaged houses on elevated foundations to reduce damage from future storm surges. In specific areas like river flooding, the payoff was even higher. While these estimates are now seven years old, and some initial investments were made during the Biden administration, federal and state emergency managers across the United States have some excellent ideas for cost-effective ways to reduce future losses. But this requires keeping FEMA, incorporating strategic resilience into its mission, and giving the agency the authority to work with states, local governments, and the private sector to do more to protect lives and reduce property damage.

As Trump’s administration looks more into this critical issue, Trump should invite federal, regional, and state emergency managers to Washington and figure out how to improve national disaster response. Trump should not make it worse by abolishing FEMA, which would cause disproportionate harm to many of the people who voted him into office.

Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

The post Abolishing FEMA would hurt all Americans—particularly Trump voters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the withdrawal is an important global signal and will make efforts to combat climate change more difficult, the new administration’s de-prioritization of climate action will have immediate and concrete consequences for Americans themselves. The country will bear a heavier burden of inaction as well as the losses of delayed national investment in adaptation and resilience if Trump succeeds in fully repealing the Biden administration’s climate investments.

This month provided a stark example of that opportunity cost. The Los Angeles wildfires killed twenty-seven people and burned through over 12,000 structures. The loss is visible and immediate. Notably, the true cost is still being calculated. Analysts are projecting economic losses of as much as $150 billion and anticipate more deaths as the ramifications of degraded air quality and smoke take full effect.

The deeper concern is that this withdrawal, coupled with Trump’s other executive orders to facilitate the fossil fuel industry and backtrack on climate investments, will have significant impacts on the American public, since increasing greenhouse gas emissions has a direct effect on increasing the frequency and intensity of natural disasters.

Hence, if in addition to these decisions, the Trump administration opts out of actively investing in disaster preparedness, its economic and financial losses will rise exponentially. In fact, it is estimated that each dollar spent on disaster preparedness and climate adaptation saves twelve dollars in recovery and response. Without climate-related action and resilience-building efforts, it will fall to the American taxpayer to cover that additional eleven dollars.

The United States is stepping back on climate at a critical moment for action. The public and private sectors need to be taking this moment to coordinate and align. But instead, the new administration is signaling, at least initially, a lack of political will that could set the country back both in terms of individual preparedness and long-term economic opportunity.

Other countries are seizing the economic opportunities of climate adaptation and resilience. Germany is set to invest at least €1.6 billion in artificial intelligence, including for climate efforts, by 2025; Japan has committed to doubling adaptation finance to $14.8 billion by 2025; and countries such as Uruguay, Denmark, and Lithuania are recognized for having scaled up the share of solar and wind energy in their electricity mix by at least 6 percentage points annually over a five-year span.

Trump’s recent executive orders mark not only a lack of commitment to climate action but also a backtracking on notable climate investments under the Biden administration. The private sector will likely no longer have the government’s support in fast-tracking adaptation initiatives. As other countries scale up incentives, this will make it more difficult for the United States to hold any competitive advantage in the long term.

In the short-term, however, it’s lives and livelihoods that are at risk. Without mitigation and adaptation, climate change is set to kill 3.4 million people each year by the end of the century. While the United States’ retreat from climate leadership has significant geopolitical implications, the more pressing concern is on the national impacts. Americans will face the consequences of inaction. They will have lower capacity to overcome climate shocks and stresses, putting their own health, finances, and well-being on the line. In fact, our Climate Resilience Center estimated that heat-related labor-productivity losses could cost half a trillion dollars annually by 2050 in the United States alone. Ignoring or denying the reality of climate change will not avoid its impacts.

Indeed, the world will feel the loss of US leadership under the Trump administration. Progress can—and must—continue, but the average American will feel the weight of these decisions on a personal, financial, and social level for years to come. Although Trump has made his climate stance clear in his first few hours back in the White House, there is time for his administration and the president himself to reassess and reinvest in a new way forward.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru during the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

The post The US retreat on climate comes with steep costs for the economy and the American people appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The mood of skepticism in Helsinki is understandable. While there are some superficial similarities between the position Ukraine currently finds itself in and Finland’s predicament during the Cold War, any attempt to emulate the Finlandization policies of an earlier era would be disastrous for Ukraine.

Despite spending much of the past twenty years since the 2004 Orange Revolution pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration, Ukraine is still often incorrectly portrayed as a country occupying a geopolitical buffer zone between East and West. This is familiar to Finns, whose own country was condemned to similar geopolitical limbo during the Cold War.

Finland successfully defended its sovereignty during World War II and was not forced to become a Soviet republic. However, this was followed by the 1948 Friendship Treaty between Finland and the USSR, which established the framework for what has since come to be known as Finlandization.

For more than four decades, Finlandization served as a survival strategy for Finnish independence. In practice, this meant voluntarily taking the interests of the neighboring Soviet Union into account, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy. This approach enabled the Finns to avoid the experience of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the costs were nevertheless considerable. Indeed, Finlandization went far beyond mere neutrality and negatively impacted Finland for almost half a century.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The postwar treaty that served as the basis for Finlandization stipulated that Finnish defense policy should focus exclusively on defending the country against possible attack from the west, despite the fact that a renewed Soviet invasion from the east was clearly far more likely. As a result, Finnish officials had to exercise extreme caution when addressing the security of the country’s eastern border.

Finland was also de facto obliged to seek Moscow’s consent before embarking on any efforts to increase political or economic cooperation with the West. This prevented Helsinki from participating in the initial stages of European integration. Instead, Finland was limited to membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This was viewed by the Kremlin as being sufficiently apolitical, as long as it did not disrupt the so-called “eastern trade” with the USSR as a result.

Domestically, Finlandization meant a series of restrictions and compromises on core democratic standards. Self-censorship was imposed throughout the Finnish media and information space in order to avoid any open criticism of the USSR. Finns also accepted more than two decades without any changes in the country’s leadership, as Finnish President Urho Kekkonen was regarded as an irreplaceable figure for continued good relations with Moscow. In light of these realities, it is easy to understand why the term “Finlandization” is regarded as derogatory by many Finns, who see it as a reminder of an era remembered with bitterness.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

There are also solid geographical reasons why Finlandization is not a good fit for the modern Ukrainian context. Finland’s status during the Cold War was intertwined with the broader security climate across the Nordic region. Neighboring Sweden remained neutral in part due to the “Finnish question,” with Stockholm concerned that joining NATO would leave their Finnish neighbors in jeopardy as the lone buffer state. This could potentially have created the conditions for the Soviet Union to make another attempt at occupying Finland.

Until the end of the Cold War era, Swedish policies of neutrality and Norway’s self-imposed restrictions on the presence of NATO troops or nuclear weapons on their territory were directly linked to the fate of Finland. This Nordic balancing act created an environment where the USSR was incentivized to maintain the status quo rather than risk an escalation in regional tensions if it increased pressure on Finland. This very specific set of circumstances does not apply to Ukraine. Instead, enforced neutrality would leave Ukraine highly vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

The Finlandization of Ukraine would not guarantee Ukraine’s survival as it once safeguarded Finnish independence. Today’s Ukraine cannot be expected to accept any restrictions on its ability to guard its borders, form alliances, or defend itself against Russian aggression. Likewise, any attempt to impose the kind of domestic political compromises that were part of the Finnish model during the Cold War could prove fatal for Ukraine’s democracy and European aspirations.

Anyone who is genuinely interested in finding the right formula for Ukraine should look beyond the Cold War period and focus instead on Finland’s experience since 1991. During the past three decades, Finnish integration into the Western world has demonstrated that geopolitical perceptions can change over time. Finland has proved conclusively that geography alone does not determine a country’s fate.

Finland has now joined both the European Union and NATO, and is firmly anchored within the core institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. This is the kind of Finnish model that could actually work for postwar Ukraine. As Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo commented in November, “Finland is a member of NATO and the EU. We support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s aggression. This is the model the Ukrainians are fighting for.”

Minna Ålander is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Nov 26, 2024

Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s poisonous obsession with Ukraine first began to take root 20 years ago when millions of Ukrainians directly defied him during the Orange Revolution, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 10, 2024

Russian victory in Ukraine would spark a new era of global insecurity

By Victor Liakh

If Vladimir Putin’s Russia is allowed to claim even a limited victory in Ukraine, it will embolden other authoritarian regimes and plunge the world into a new era of insecurity, writes Victor Liakh.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Why Finland thinks Finlandization is a bad idea for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Such claims are not new. The Kremlin has reportedly been using foreign fighters since the early stages of the invasion in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of mobilizing fresh troops at home. Moscow is accused of conducting recruitment in a number of low income countries throughout the Global South. Russia’s efforts in Cuba and India have been slammed by critics as human trafficking operations. Nepal has proved particularly vulnerable to Russian recruitment, with estimates ranging from a few thousand to 15,000 men signing up to fight in Ukraine.

The Putin regime has also allegedly targeted vulnerable populations within its own borders. This summer, the Russian authorities rounded up more than 30,000 migrants with Russian citizenship who had failed to register for military service. Many were subsequently sent to Ukraine.

Recruitment efforts have been conducted at Russian immigration detention centers holding migrant workers mainly from Central Asian countries. An October 2024 report by RFE/RL claimed that Russian officials have made prison conditions unbearably harsh and inhumane in an effort to pressure inmates into joining the military. “They keep you in a cold cell, you sleep on the floor with just a pillow underneath you holding plastic bottles filled with hot water to keep warm,” according to one Kyrgyz inmate.

While many foreign fighters have reported being pressured or misled by Russian recruiters, others are enticed by the promise of relatively high salaries and the prospect of a Russian passport. As of November 2024, Russia had granted citizenship to more than 3,000 foreigners in exchange for military service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The issue of foreign troops fighting for Russia has hit the headlines in recent weeks following news that North Korea has sent approximately ten thousand soldiers to join the invasion of Ukraine. Many see this as a watershed moment in the war, due to the number of troops involved and the official nature of the deployment. Given the vast size of the North Korean armed forces, there is clearly considerable scope for Pyongyang to send many more men.

Moscow’s enthusiasm for foreign fighters is easy to understand. As the war grinds on and approaches the three-year mark, Russia appears to be facing mounting manpower challenges. While the Kremlin does not release official information on the scale of its losses in Ukraine, most estimates indicate hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously wounded during the invasion. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, November 2024 was the deadliest month of the war so far, with Russia suffering more than 45,000 casualties.

The grim prospects for Russian troops in Ukraine are making it harder to attract volunteers. In response, the Russian authorities have recently begun offering greater financial incentives for new recruits as well as generous compensation for the families of those killed in action.

Despite these efforts, there are indications that the Russian military is now dangerously overextended. When Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast in summer 2024, Russia initially had to rely on an improvised defense made up largely of young conscripts, many of whom were taken prisoner. More recently, Russia’s inability to save its Syrian client Bashar Assad underlined Moscow’s lack of reserves.

Eurasia Center events

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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With his own army fully committed in Ukraine and experiencing heavy losses, Putin is running out of options as he seeks to shield Russians from the consequences of his invasion. For much of the war, the Kremlin has focused its domestic recruitment efforts on lower income and ethnic minority regions of Russia, while also enlisting large numbers of prisoners. Such tactics avoided touching more prosperous regions to prevent protests or rallies. However, these sources of manpower are not infinite.

Putin remains determined to avoid a repeat of his September 2022 mobilization order, which proved highly unpopular and led to an exodus from Russia as hundreds of thousands fled military service. With the supply of prisoners drying up and fewer Russians prepared to volunteer for a war that many see as a meat grinder, his best option may now be to seek increasing numbers of foreign troops.

The implications of foreign soldiers fighting in Russia’s invasion extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Growing collaboration between the Houthis and Russia has raised alarm bells in recent weeks, with the US Special Envoy for Yemen reporting that Moscow could begin weapons transfers to the rebel group to allow it to more effectively carry out attacks on Western shipping in the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the consequences of North Korea’s entry into the war are an even greater cause for concern. Fighting in Ukraine presents a rare opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain valuable experience of modern warfare, including innovations such as the use of drones. Pyongyang is also expected to receive significant military support from Russia that could enhance its missile, nuclear, and naval capabilities. Unsurprisingly, South Korea is monitoring the situation with growing unease.

Russia’s use of foreign troops is a dangerous trend that promises to prolong the war and has the potential to fuel international instability. It is also a sign that while Putin is not yet running out of Russian recruits, he would prefer to seek manpower elsewhere to sustain the costly human wave tactics employed by the Russian army in Ukraine.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Nov 26, 2024

Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s poisonous obsession with Ukraine first began to take root 20 years ago when millions of Ukrainians directly defied him during the Orange Revolution, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 10, 2024

Russian victory in Ukraine would spark a new era of global insecurity

By Victor Liakh

If Vladimir Putin’s Russia is allowed to claim even a limited victory in Ukraine, it will embolden other authoritarian regimes and plunge the world into a new era of insecurity, writes Victor Liakh.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Foreign troops help Putin avoid pitfalls of another Russian mobilization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The resourcefulness of Ukraine’s SME sector since February 2022 has been striking. By the end of 2023, more than three-quarters of SMEs that had suspended work at the start of the war had at least partially resumed their operations, reflecting the remarkable adaptability of the sector in crisis conditions. This ability to rebound is not just a testament to their determination; it also highlights the potential of Ukraine’s entrepreneurial class to drive the country’s economic transformation.

The Ukrainian authorities certainly seem to recognize the crucial role being played by SMEs. A national strategy for the development of the sector was approved in August 2024, while a range of individual programs have been unveiled to provide access to grants, affordable loans, and war risk insurance. Meanwhile, an SME Resilience Alliance was launched at the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, helping to further mobilize international support for Ukraine’s entrepreneurs. Private sector investments and individual international donor initiatives are also playing a pivotal role.

To fully realize the potential of Ukraine’s SME sector, partnerships with international private equity firms will be crucial. Such collaborations can help integrate Ukraine’s economy with Western markets, creating lasting economic ties and accelerating post-war recovery. By aligning with international private equity, Ukrainian SMEs can gain access to critical capital, global expertise, and expansive networks, enabling them to scale their operations and meet EU standards. These partnerships not only empower SMEs to grow but also deepen Ukraine’s economic connections with Western markets, fostering mutual benefits and laying the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic recovery.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s SMEs are now well positioned to act as engines for growth in several priority sectors of the economy that are essential for Ukraine’s recovery and successful EU integration. In the digital infrastructure domain, high-tech SMEs will play a critical role in building data centers, telecommunications networks, and energy-efficient systems.

Logistics and warehousing are key areas where expanding temperature-controlled facilities will enable Ukraine to meet EU trade standards. The construction materials and industrial production sectors hold immense potential, with SMEs poised to supply concrete, steel, glass, and eco-friendly materials necessary for rebuilding infrastructure. Given the scale of anticipated reconstruction work in Ukraine, the scope for growth and partnerships with experienced EU contractors in this segment of the SME sector is huge.

In the HR and education sectors of the Ukrainian economy, SMEs can help address the significant skills gap by training and recruiting over a million specialists needed across various industries. Similarly, healthcare modernization including clinics, hospices, and long-term care homes presents significant opportunities for Ukrainian entrepreneurs specializing in medical equipment, facility upgrades, and auxiliary services, ensuring the sector meets EU standards and serves the nation for decades to come.

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Even amid the trauma and destruction of Russia’s ongoing invasion, it is evident that the Ukrainian SME sector offers a remarkably wide range of opportunities. Looking ahead, it is possible to envision a time when Ukrainian SMEs are listed on global capital markets, providing new liquidity for business owners, creating pathways for Ukrainian citizens and state pension funds to invest in the country’s growth, and attracting the attention of emerging market investors.

Platforms such as the Warsaw Stock Exchange have already expressed interest in facilitating IPOs for Ukrainian SMEs. This development could potentially unlock billions of dollars in capital and help further integrate Ukrainian enterprises into the global economy.

The Ukrainian SME sector is poised to be at the forefront of efforts to create a modern, innovative, postwar economy. By continuing to adopt Western management practices, leveraging financial mechanisms such as private equity capital and public-private partnerships, and embracing international collaboration, SMEs can rebuild Ukraine’s economy and drive its transformation into a hub of technological advancement.

The importance of Ukraine’s entrepreneurs goes far beyond the valuable contributions they are already making to wartime economic resilience. With sufficient support from the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s partners, the SME sector can serve as the cornerstone of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and its emergence as a competitive force on the global stage.

Anton Waschuk is Director of Innovation, Education, and Entrepreneurship at the Ukraine-Moldova American Enterprise Fund.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Dec 3, 2024

Vladimir Putin does not want a peace deal. He wants to destroy Ukraine.

By Yuliya Kazdobina

Donald Trump has vowed to end the war in Ukraine, but there is no sign that Vladimir Putin has any interest in a peace deal that would prevent him from achieving his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, writes Yuliya Kazdobina.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 26, 2024

Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s poisonous obsession with Ukraine first began to take root 20 years ago when millions of Ukrainians directly defied him during the Orange Revolution, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s entrepreneurial class can drive the country’s economic recovery appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cyber insurance holds potential as a tool to encourage firms – especially those with sensitive data like cloud computing companies – to better manage and mitigate their cybersecurity risks. The upside of issuing cyber policies for insurers would be more predictable losses from cybersecurity harms, chief among them ransomware.¹ Limiting this potential, however, is a structural inefficiency in the insurance market: insufficient historical cyber incident and claims data impede insurers as they seek to predict and price cyber risks.² There are many other factors that affect pricing (including vague policy language and the potential for catastrophic loss events) but the lack of historical incident and claims data has been identified by the industry for years as the chief roadblock to effective cyber insurance.³

These pricing challenges also come amidst a dynamic cyber insurance market. A report by Howden, a global insurance broker, estimates that “the market could still be on course to achieve a premium base of close to USD 40 billion by the end of the decade,” nearly double its current level in 2024. “Cyber insurance entering a new phase of development as non-US territories set to capture 54% of growth up to 2030, according to new Howden report,”⁴ Despite these rising premiums, the demand for cyber insurance is also increasing. ⁵A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that corporate insurance clients opting for cyber coverage grew from 26 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2020.⁶According to Indian market research firm Fortune Business Insights, this number is projected to increase at a compound annual growth rate of 24.5 percent from 2024 to 2030.⁷

Cyber insurance itself can also drive improved cybersecurity practices in the private sector as providers have significant discretion to select customers for coverage based on their cybersecurity posture, which can effectively force firms to adhere to common standards.⁸This benefit of cyber insurance catalyzing good cyber practices is not new; in a submission to the Obama administration, the Internet Security Alliance noted that the standards of cybersecurity cyber-insurers employ could help to improve cybersecurity.⁹ The Royal United Services Institute has also evaluated the role of cyber insurance in incentivizing better cyber security practices in claimants, finding insurance allows for the consistent enforcement of minimum-security standards in industries and sectors where little to none may exist.¹⁰

The challenge with an emerging insurance market such as cyber insurance is that widespread adoption is an important prerequisite to providing benefits and collectivizing risk. Excessive premiums might drive customers away, but pricing too low or providing insufficient coverage risks unsustainable losses, pushing insurers out of the cyber market.¹¹ Cyber insurance premiums are based on predictive risk models that take historical cyber incident loss data as an input.¹² Insurers could simply use this improved data to fine-tune their predictive risk models and pad their margins, but more competitive pricing could benefit insurers relative to competitors as well as open up new segments of the cyber insurable market.

To address this data deficiency in the market, the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) should encourage the private sector to aggregate anonymized historical cyber incident data to a centralized public repository so that insurers can improve their risk models and price premiums more accurately. This could yield more accurate cyber insurance premiums and expand the number of policyholders over which insurers can enforce a set of cybersecurity standards.

Alphaeus Hanson is an assistant director with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the the Atlantic Council Tech Programs. Hanson studies the decision-making of technology companies around risk and geopolitics, including the interaction between insurance companies and capital markets. Prior to joining the Council, Hanson was an analyst at Krebs Stamos Group (KSG). 

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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The post The role of data in improving cyber insurance pricing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the campaign trail, Trump made his climate plans clear—and they are not currently aligned with global goals and targets. Instead, he has stated that he will again withdraw from the Paris Agreement and end many of the climate policies launched during the Biden administration. 

His “America first” approach doesn’t align with the scientific reality of climate change. While Trump has signaled that his administration will put boundaries on its international commitments, the consequences of climate change do not recognize national boundaries.

With the looming threat of reduced climate commitments from the world’s largest economy (in terms of nominal gross domestic product), the negotiations at COP29 will take on a new significance. In 2016, when Trump was last elected, US negotiators were unable to make strong commitments at COP22 in Marrakesh. While they participated in these negotiations, they were encouraged to avoid any legally binding commitments until the next administration came into office. As the United States begins another transition from one administration to another, the same expectations could be placed on US negotiators this year.

Notably, the outcomes on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance will bear the consequences of those expectations. The goal was mandated under the Paris Agreement and officially set at COP15, where developed countries agreed to mobilize $100 billion annually to enable climate action in developing countries. Now, the world is revisiting that $100 billion benchmark since the scope of the climate crisis has dramatically increased since 2009. 

With a noncommittal United States, there are two likely scenarios. The first scenario is that the decision on the NCQG is deferred to next year’s COP in Brazil. The second scenario is a new, nonbinding goal that is less ambitious and that will lack a mechanism to enforce it.

In short, the wording will matter. Instead of words like “commit,” the second scenario could result in a new finance goal with more ambiguous language. Nevertheless, it would serve as an important political signal. It could be a reference point that emphasizes the value of the process and the need to accelerate climate finance. It would keep the pressure on governments, ensuring that they recognize their responsibility to mobilize financial resources toward reducing emissions and protecting people from the impacts of climate change. In its ability to set a precedent, the agreement itself can inspire action not only in the public sector but also the private sector. COP negotiators should therefore seek to make the wording that sets this financing goal as strong as possible.

In recent years, the rising costs of global warming have become increasingly and painfully clear. It is in every country’s interest—including the United States’—to increase international financial commitments. After all, every one dollar invested in prevention saves sixteen dollars in disaster response.

As COP29 begins and the world looks ahead to COP30 where substantial commitments are expected, the value of US leadership cannot be overstated. This is not just a moral responsibility, but a survival mechanism. Climate change is a global issue. If the United States refuses to cut emissions further and ends the policies and investments launched under the Biden administration, the Trump administration would put even more Americans’ health, finances, and safety at risk as they face the rapidly intensifying consequences of climate inaction.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

The post What Trump’s return as president means for COP29 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Foreword
• Executive summary
• Explainer Videos
• Publication Signatories – US-Colombia Advisory Group
• Introduction
• Policy recommendations
• Conclusion
• Acknowledgments

Foreword

I am grateful to the US-Colombia Advisory Group for inviting me to share these words and for its valuable work in advancing the US-Colombian partnership.

Peace processes are constituent moments in any country, generating great expectations and hope. However, a peace accord alone—even the most innovative one—does not automatically produce the transformative changes necessary to create peace. Full implementation, in the social, political, and economic spheres, is required to consolidate peace for the decades to come.

Realism is of the essence. Peace agreements take time to implement. This is why the 2016 Peace Accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) sets a fifteen-year horizon to ensure its implementation. Eight years after it was signed, the significant and tangible progress that has taken place is a testament to the hard work and sacrifices of many. Few peace agreements indeed manage to truly consolidate as vectors of political change. It is worthy of celebration.

But the eighth anniversary of the accord is also an opportunity to acknowledge that more work needs be done to address challenges such as persistent violence in rural areas, the murder of social leaders and former combatants, the slow implementation of structural reforms, and the need to strengthen the territorial and cross-cutting approaches of the agreement.

One important lesson to emerge from Colombia is that sustainable peace is not achieved solely by the demobilization of armed groups. Despite FARC-EP’s disarmament and reintegration, dissidents and criminal groups emerged to occupy the spaces left by the former guerrillas. This underlines the need for a comprehensive approach to security, which not only creates peace, but also dismantles the illicit economies that fuel violence. Security is not achieved solely through disarmament, but also through the creation of viable economic alternatives for affected communities and the capacity of the state to consolidate its central role in the areas once occupied by armed groups.

Amid it all, prioritizing the rights and needs of victims is crucial to strengthening the legitimacy of the accord and allowing for reconciliation. Despite the difficulties and significant delays, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and reparation processes established by the accord remain one of Colombia’s greatest contributions to the practice of peacebuilding globally. The JEP’s ability to deliver justice rapidly and ensure legal security to those under its jurisdiction  will be essential to the legitimacy of the peace process and the durability of peace.

As it engages other armed groups into negotiating peace settlements, it is crucial the Colombian state doesn’t lose sight of the importance of safeguarding and prioritizing the comprehensive implementation of the 2016 accord. It presents a carefully designed road map of coherent political responses to comprehensively tackle some of the main challenges that Colombia faces today: violence, insecurity, inequality, drug trafficking, and exclusion of marginalized populations. Following this road to the end will open many more such opportunities for all. But that will first and foremost require a full and successful implementation of the accord.

Dag Nylander
Director, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF)

Executive summary

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,¹ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”² implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.³ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Through a series of consultations and roundtables with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s US-Colombia Advisory Group (UCAG), members identified that coordination challenges both at a national and territorial level between and among institutions with a role in the implementation of the accord have hindered its full implementation. Lack of coordination was also recognized throughout the three additional constraints identified:

• Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
• Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
• Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.

Policy recommendations

1. Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict. Addressing the severe delays in implementing these ethnic commitments requires an overhaul of state presence through strengthened policing, judicial systems, and economic support, all tailored to meet local needs and establish trust. Additionally the Petro government should improve coordination with local leaders and leverage the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE) to secure community-driven progress. International partners, particularly the US, should provide dedicated technical and financial support to ensure sustainable implementation of the accord, with a focus on addressing specific needs of ethnic territories and creating viable economic opportunities to reduce illegal group influence.
2. Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia. It is essential to incentivize development in conflict-affected areas, especially through the Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDETs) and Zones Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMACs) created under the 2016 peace accord. Despite their promise, these programs face funding shortages, weak institutional capacities, and ongoing security challenges that restrict effective implementation and delay critical infrastructure projects. Strengthening PDETs requires addressing resource allocation gaps, supporting local capacity-building, and prioritizing equitable development. Additionally, real-time data monitoring of conflict zones will enable targeted security and development interventions, with US support for local monitoring and evaluation actors enhancing resource distribution and operational effectiveness. By investing in community engagement and new support programs, the United States can bolster Colombia’s stability, curb the expansion of illegal armed groups, and address significant shared security concerns.
3. Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia. President Petro’s establishment of the “Alta Instancia para la Implementación” reflects a commitment to better coordinate efforts across 54 government entities, backed by a significant budget allocation. However, poor coordination, limited budget execution, and a deteriorating security environment due to increased illegal armed group presence continue to obstruct progress. Observers from academia and civil society should support Colombia’s efforts to streamline fund utilization, ensuring the accord’s constitutional mandate is prioritized over political agendas. Successful negotiations with armed groups require a balanced, transparent approach grounded in inclusivity and monitored incentives, backed by a clear legislative framework, with insights from international partners like the US and Norway.
4. Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia. Support for the JEP is key, yet many ex-combatants remain in legal limbo, and the JEP’s delay in resolving key “macro cases” has weakened its credibility. Additionally, the inclusion of high-profile paramilitary figures not intended for JEP jurisdiction has further eroded public trust. To enhance peace process success, U.S. agencies should support Colombia’s efforts to ensure victim and perpetrator participation in restorative justice. Improving JEP’s communication with ethnic communities, coordinating across cases, and delivering culturally sensitive reparations are also vital for effective implementation and justice for serious conflict-related crimes.

Explainer Videos

Signatories

US-Colombia Advisory Group Members

• Jaime Asprilla
• Cynthia Arnson
• Ambassador Carolina Barco
• Ambassador William Brownfield
• Minister Mauricio Cárdenas
• Enrique Carrizosa
• Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky
• Stephen Donehoo
• Steve Hege
• Muni Jensen
• Bruce Mac Master
• Paola Buendia
• Minister Maria Claudia Lacouture
• Ambassador P. Michael McKinley
• Ambassador Mariana Pacheco
• Kristie Pellecchia
• Arturo Valenzuela
• Kevin Whitaker

Introduction

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,⁴ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”⁵implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.⁶ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Factors that have hindered the accord’s implementation include inconsistent political will, governance and coordination challenges and institutional weakness in areas affected by the conflict, insufficient allocation of resources, and, most importantly, the persistence of the armed conflict. Violent conflict persists in Colombia on three fronts: between the state and preexisting armed actors; between the state and new emerging actors, including FARC dissidents, illegal armed groups and transnational criminal organizations; and between and among these groups. The lag in implementation as a result of these factors carries implications for the future of the US-Colombia partnership.

Given that Colombia is past the halfway mark in the set timeframe, the time is ripe for accelerating the implementation of the 2016 peace accord. A broad consensus on this fact exists among local governments, the business community, multilateral partners, civil society, and, most importantly, between Washington and Bogotá. In an era of deepening instability and insecurity in neighboring Andean countries and, more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States has a clear interest in ensuring that Colombia overcomes its own security challenges and builds state presence in the areas hardest hit by violence and conflict. Indeed, the commitments that Colombia made in its 2016 peace accord have ramifications that go far beyond the initial objective of reaching peace with the FARC. If fully implemented, the accord could lay the foundation to deepen Colombia’s democracy, bring new opportunities for investment in neglected but resource-rich areas of the country, and deal a crushing blow to organized crime. Although principally a Colombian achievement, a fully implemented accord would also be a capstone of over two decades of dedicated US commitment to Colombia. Achieving this, however, will require commitment and political will from the Colombian government to prioritize the implementation—as well as coordination and continued support from the United States.

Through a series of consultations and roundtables with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s US-Colombia Advisory Group (UCAG), members identified that coordination challenges both at a national and territorial level between and among institutions with a role in the implementation of the accord have hindered its full implementation. Lack of coordination was also recognized throughout the three additional constraints identified:

• Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
• Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
• Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.
• UCAG members propose that while addressing the lag in the accord’s implementation requires a holistic approach, it is imperative to address the current rise in crime and violence in both urban and rural areas in Colombia, an issue that ranks as the number one concern of Colombians today.

This publication builds on the UCAG’s first report, “Advancing US-Colombia Cooperation on Drug Policy and Law Enforcement,” by outlining four recommendations for steps the United States and Colombia can take to accelerate the accord’s implementation and simultaneously address the underlying issue of security in Colombia and the broader region. The three core challenges are discussed below.

The proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impact ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict

Colombia’s complex geography and richness in natural resources bring important opportunities for tourism and economic growth, but also require significant state capacity and resources to support the country’s most rural and isolated areas. State-neglected areas are where illegal armed groups thrive, enjoying full control and freedom of operation that pose extensive threats to local communities. The 2016 peace accord, while historic, only ended one armed conflict—between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, at least eight domestic armed conflicts were identified in 2024, based on their legal classification.⁷ Three of the conflicts are between the Colombian state and illegal armed groups which aim to replace or overthrow the democratic government, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), and the former FARC-EP (Disidencias, by its current name in Spanish). The other five conflicts exclude the state and are between new and existing illegal armed groups. (See table 1 below). All eight of the groups identified here engage in an array of illegal activities, principally narcotics production and trafficking, trade of people and illicit goods, illegal mining, and extortion. Included in these eight conflicts are groups that never demobilized when the accord was signed and those that took up arms again when they claimed the accord was violated. In its majority, these conflicts take place within marginalized and rural communities, and community leaders in these areas have suffered disproportionately. In Petro’s first two years, more than 350 social leaders and human rights defenders and at least 75 signatories of the 2016 peace accord have been murdered, and over 165 massacres have occurred.

In April 2024 700 civil society organizations presented a report to the United Nations claiming that violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups has expanded by 36 percent in the first trimester of 2024, affecting 189 municipalities (almost 20 percent of Colombian territory), with over 272 violent events being recorded during the same period. In practice, the impact of rising violence in Colombia has resulted in over 400 violations of human rights both by state and nonstate actors. Communities under threat face heightened rates of recruitment, homicides, displacement, confinement, sexual violence, and other effects. To put things in perspective, on a national level, more than 145,049 people were individually displaced in 2023, which meant an increase of 18 percent compared to 2022. Territorial disputes among armed actors also led to the confinement of 47,013 people (in 2023), representing an increase of 19 percent at the national level compared to 2022.

The forced displacement crisis in Riohacha has placed growing pressure on the resources of the Riohacha District, particularly in health, social welfare, security, and community cohesion. Displaced families face searious challenges in accessing a safe and stable environment, which heightens their need for assistance. Given the magnitude of the crisis, coordinated inter-institutional support and international cooperation are essential to alleviate the humanitarian impact. 

Genaro Redondo Choles, mayor of Riohacha

This 2024 report of the Analytical Service of Colombian National Police (CEPOL) outlines that on a national level, extortion, homicides, and personal injuries have seen a significant increase in the first trimester of 2024, while crimes such as theft and kidnapping have decreased. Many departments including Arauca, located on the border with Venezuela, have suffered a wave of killings as armed groups attack social leaders in areas controlled by rival groups and who are often accused of sympathizing with the “wrong” side. The reconfiguration of nonstate armed actors extends beyond its initial reliance on drug trafficking, as such groups have diversified their operations to other forms of profitable illicit businesses such as illegal mining, human smuggling, and money laundering, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences that affect the civilian population. Their complex operations, which are related to the historical institutional weakness in the most remote areas of Colombia, show the long road that remains to achieve peace in Colombia.

Since the 1990s, violence in Puerto Tejada has escalated, with an increase in homicides linked to its role as a drug trafficking corridor and the expansion of the Cali Cartel, as well as the arrival of paramilitaries who led “social cleansing” efforts and social control actions, primarily affecting young people. Today, violence continues with the proliferation of gangs, where youth engage in theft, extortion, and drug-related activities, while data shows alarming homicide rates and a pattern of intergenerational revenge. To address this situation, it is proposed to strengthen prevention programs for children and youth, resocialization for ex-convicts, and detox programs for substance users, while seeking alliances to improve security and coexistence in the municipality.

Luz Adiela Salazar, mayor of Puerto Tejada

Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups

Since taking office in August 2022, Gustavo Petro’s administration has rolled out its new strategy for peace, titled Paz Total, or Total Peace. This strategy aims to end the violence that has plagued Colombia for decades by brokering simultaneous ceasefires with various armed and criminal groups, offering judicial leniency and other benefits in exchange for permanent disarmament. However, 66 percent of Colombians say that progress on Petro’s Total Peace strategy is moving in the wrong direction and 85 percent think Colombia’s security situation is worsening, according to a June poll.

The lapsed ceasefires with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the AGC, the ELN, and other armed groups highlight the biggest challenge for Total Peace: The government has yet to describe an attractive incentive structure for armed and criminal groups—which reap significant profits and effectively control large portions of the country—to abandon their power and influence. The worsening violence has continued to erode public confidence in Petro’s ambitious approach. (Table 2) The government is now involved in ten sets of peace talks with more than a dozen armed groups, and Bogotá still hopes its talks with the ELN can be revived.

According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator report, 129 possible ceasefire violations were reported in 2023, including humanitarian impacts on the civilian population and offensive actions or armed incidents. The report considers not only the two official ceasefires—those of the ELN and the EMC—but also those declared unilaterally by other groups. Additionally, concerns have been raised about instances where advancing the Total Peace plan may come at the expense of certain commitments established in the 2016 peace accord. For example, the 2016 accord was intended to be the final opportunity for the FARC to surrender their weapons. However, some observers feel that by moving beyond this framework, Petro may be creating challenges for the sustainability of both the 2016 peace accord and future accords.

A key factor has been the intensification of violent competition among new and existing illegal armed groups: During Petro’s first year in office, intergroup confrontations rose by 85 percent. Given their power and influence, negotiations with some of these illegal armed groups are needed but are stalling as the government attempts to address the incentive structures of these groups. The ceasefires, when announced, have not yielded clear benefits. Meanwhile, clashes between groups and state forces have continued to disproportionately affect ethnic minorities and marginalized communities in areas most impacted by violence. In this context, the United States and other international partners must continue to pressure the Colombian government on the protections of the rights of local communities who are getting caught in the crossfire in the absence of a local strategy to tackle this.

The proliferation of armed groups in this region has trapped our communities in the crossfire. Though we are not participants in the conflict, we are suffering its
most critical impacts—our movement within our own territories is restricted due
to the presence of dominant armed groups, and we fear being mistaken as
affiliated with one side or another. Our communities must no longer be targets
of this conflict. Ceasefire violations have left us vulnerable, undermining our
access to healthcare, education, economic and social development, and even
political stability.

Ana Milena Hinojoso, mayor of Atrato

Amid widespread criticism for not delivering on the promise of Total Peace and the slow implementation of the 2016 peace accord, Petro has repeatedly highlighted the need for broader reforms (i.e., agrarian, education, health) as mechanisms to accelerate the implementation of the accord. Under the 2023–2026 National Development Plan, Colombia Potencia Mundial de la Vida, the Petro administration has highlighted the importance of fully implementing the peace accord as a key aspect of Colombia’s transformation, detailing more than 164 directives. Some of the key issues include the creation of the National System for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the strengthening of the multipurpose registry,⁸ financing for the peace accord’s Land Fund, strengthening citizen oversight, creating the National Reincorporation System and the Comprehensive Reincorporation Program, and reforming the National Drug Policy and the Victims’ Law.

However, while little progress has been witnessed overall, two notable achievements regarding Colombia’s “institutionality for peace” are worth highlighting. First, Law 2272/2022 establishes a policy called Para la Paz Total y la Seguridad Humana, which includes the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and strengthens the institutions responsible for its execution. Second, the Peace Accord Implementation Unit (UIAP) was created by decree and operates under the office of the High Commissioner for Peace, facilitating new approaches and dialogue processes with illegal armed groups. Yet, the UIAP has faced numerous challenges so far, as it is responsible for advising, coordinating, supporting, monitoring, and verifying the implementation of the accord, and has little capacity to do so.

Additionally, the newly created Ministry of Equality and Equity has had little impact on accord implementation efforts despite the fact that the government tasked it with addressing the accord’s gender and ethnic approaches. The Constitutional Court invalidated the law creating the Ministry of Equality—led by Vice President Francia Márquez—and deferred its decision for two years, allowing the ministry to operate until 2026. As of September 2024, only 13 percent of the ethnic chapter’s stipulations and 22 percent of the gender approach stipulations have been implemented. While these changes could potentially drive progress, the government’s failure to achieve tangible results in the Total Peace strategy and the 2016 accord remains an important concern.

A lack of progress in the crop substitution programs that were launched as part of the accord

The rollout of Petro’s ten-year National Drug Policy in November 2023 represents a shift from past administrations’ respective approaches to counternarcotics. The approach fully centers on efforts to generate greater pressure on financial structures of organized crime, as well as generating incentives for small coca-producing farmers in geographically isolated areas to replace their illicit crops with legal ones. The Petro administration has also eliminated all forms of “forced eradication,” except for coca plots classified as industrial plantations, reversing decades of Colombian counternarcotics policy that was coordinated with and extensively supported by the United States. In a practical matter, there are still no clear criteria on the identification and monitoring of industrial plantations, meaning that little eradication is taking place. According to the latest UNODC survey, cocaine production in Colombia surged by 53 percent in 2023. The increase was explained by the continued concentration of coca cultivation in areas with the highest productivity across all three stages of its production—cultivation, extraction, and processing—enabling a single hectare of coca to yield up to twice as much cocaine as it did 11 years ago. Additionally, the area dedicated to coca cultivation also expanded in 2023, increasing by 10% from 230,000 to 253,000 hectares. This growth, however, represents a slower rate compared to the previous year, which saw a 13% rise in coca plantations.

Coca prices have plummeted, and some analysts attribute the decline in prices to a variety of factors including persistent conflict in cultivation areas, which creates uncertainty and deters buyers; the saturation of drug smuggling routes out of Colombia, as evidenced by high seizures; and the oversupply and rapid growth of coca cultivation. Cartels also have altered their purchasing strategies, opting to buy counternarcotics closer to trafficking routes and from fewer locations. This shift has negatively impacted coca farmers in areas such as Putumayo. However, the UNODC notes that while Colombian cocaine prices have plummeted, global prices remain stable, and the drug is reaching new markets. A kilogram of cocaine can sell for up to $25,000 in the United States, $35,000 in Europe, $50,000 in Asia, and $100,000 in Australia, making it an extremely profitable and vibrant business, able to adapt to changes in supply, transport, and demand. Instead of attributing the decline in coca prices to oversupply, the UNODC points to a lack of consistent market controls as the main issue. This has led to a volatile market characterized by uncertainty.

Given stable cocaine prices in the global market, low coca leaf prices in Colombia lead drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Mexico, Europe, and other parts of the world to see the region and Colombia specifically as an area of opportunity, given the greater profit margins resulting from low coca prices and cultivation costs. While synthetic drug production, illegal mining, arms trafficking, and human trafficking contribute to the diversified operations of criminal businesses, and earned billions for transnational criminal organizations in 2023, cocaine remained the principal driver of criminal evolution and earnings, and must therefore remain a priority as enshrined in the 2016 peace accord.

A logical starting point should be Colombia’s Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos, or PNIS), which was born out of the 2016 peace accord with the goal of reducing the amount of coca crops in the country through substitution programs. The program has been lagging significantly, due to the lack of communication and follow-through from previous governments with communities in coca-growing areas, as well as insufficient budget allocation and operational capacities. The Colombian Congress has also shared concerns about the lack of progress in program implementation, amid media reports that only 5 percent of the budget allocated to the program was actually disbursed in 2023. The Petro administration has responded by appointing new directors of both the PNIS and the overall Paz Total programs this year, but concerns remain. Considering the lack of demonstrated progress on key aspects of the PNIS, the Kroc Institute cautions that the commitments at the minimum level of implementation risk not being completed by the deadline set in the final accord.

The current national government’s drug policy outlines its willingness to move forward with the PNIS, which consists of making payments of 36 million pesos—about $9,000—to persons who agree to eradicate their coca plantations. However, the government’s commitments to productive projects that define how this money will be used by families remains undefined. Only 10.8 percent of PNIS families with ethnic affiliation and 7.5 percent of the ethnic families with woman heads of household have benefited from the program. Despite these lags in implementation, the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART), through the Special Consultation Mechanism (MEC), has provided technical training to ethnic communities related to project formulation and management with private companies. Given the complex realities of coca-growing areas in Colombia, where criminal groups have strengthened their presence over the last year, it seems unlikely that even these subsidies will bring about lasting change unless there are secure conditions in the territories to do it, and unless the government defines a comprehensive and implementable set of programs to transition PNIS beneficiaries to the licit economy. Currently, there are 70,000 beneficiaries of the PNIS program, while the total number of coca growers in Colombia is estimated at 400,000. Thus, for the PNIS to continue effectively, its transition would need to encompass all coca growers across the country and be flexible enough to be consistently updated.

Policy recommendations

1. Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict.

Addressing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord’s ethnic chapter requires a fundamental overhaul of state presence and citizen security nationwide through strengthened police and justice systems in conflict-prone areas. Without such a transformation, Colombia risks slipping back into the turmoil experienced between the 1980s and the 2000s.

The ethnic chapter and approach of the 2016 peace accord is lagging behind significantly, compared to overall accord implementation. Significant obstacles such as the absence of ethnic approach mainstreaming in planning and programmatic work, the slow implementation of security guarantees for ethnic communities, and the lack of application of prior consultation for ethnic peoples have hindered its implementation. As of September 2024, 13 percent of the eighty ethnic approach stipulations had yet to reach the stage of implementation initiation, while 61 percent were at a minimal level, 14 percent were at an intermediate level, and only 13 percent were completed. Similarly, the commitments in the final accord’s ethnic chapter reflect this slow trend as well, with 15 percent of stipulations not initiated, 62 percent showing minimal progress, 15 percent at an intermediate level, and only 8 percent completed. This is concerning, particularly given that close to 20 percent of victims from the armed conflict belong to ethnic minority communities and regions, with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations facing heightened impacts from clashes between rival illegal armed groups. The enduring conflict in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities, particularly Afro-Colombians, is intrinsically linked to cross-sectional inequality within Colombian society. The unwillingness of successive governments to acknowledge and address these realities have thus generated a disconnect between the marginalized communities and the rest of Colombia—a critical factor that perpetuates conflict.

To address this issue, the Petro administration has tasked Márquez (who also serves as minister of equality and equity) with overseeing and coordinating the ethnic chapter and approach implementation. Last November, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, Raizal, Palenquero, and Rrom communities, alongside the national government and others, renewed their commitment through a pact aimed at advancing effective implementation of the ethnic chapter. Slight progress was seen in commitments linked to the ethnic approach within the PNIS, completion of prior consultation processes for land registry in ethnic territories, and the establishment of a budget tracker dedicated to ethnic minority community funding. However, important challenges persist, particularly in conducting consultations and reaching accords with these communities, due to the lengthy, complex nature of the consultative process, resource constraints, and the lack of confidence of vulnerable populations in government efforts. The presence of illegal armed groups in Afro-Colombian and other predominantly ethnic minority communities have impeded both government efforts and effective implementation of projects in affected areas.

Similarly, the international community, especially the United States, must continue to steadfastly support Colombia’s peace process. This entails providing sustained technical, political, and financial assistance to prevent fragmented implementation of the accord. Long-term financial and technical support should be prioritized for the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE), the primary consultative, representative, and liaison body of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI). The IEANPE has focused on improving the implementation of the ethnic approach and promoting the ethnic chapter’s pedagogy at the territorial level. It participated in the Pact for the Ethnic Chapter and led sessions to deepen understanding and gather inputs for reports on the implementation of the ethnic approach. Although Petro’s government allocated a portion of its implementation budget to the IEANPE in 2023 for the first time since the accord was signed, it is essential that this financial support is diversified, sustainable, and not solely reliant on government funding, which can change rapidly.

Economic development is also a key component needed for the progress of these communities and resource-rich territories. Local leaders and producers should receive the technical knowledge needed to connect their products to broader markets across Colombia and beyond: A best practice that can be applied here is cooperative farming to enhance export capacity by tapping into wholesale buyers. Ensuring financial support and tailored technical programs for local leaders, civil society groups, and grassroots initiatives in these regions will strengthen efforts to expedite the implementation of the ethnic chapter and, consequently, provide economic incentives for local communities to operate in legality at the face of the alternative, ideally creating safer conditions in neglected areas affected by persistent conflict, as well as access to quality public goods including education and health.

Community development is essential for the effective implementation of the ethnic chapter, as it bolsters the local economy and reinforces legal frameworks. By advancing initiatives such as cooperative agriculture and expanding access to broader markets, this approach fosters economic sustainability and progress in regions impacted by conflict, ensuring improved living conditions and essential services for these communities.

Gessica Vallejo, mayor of Candelaria

2. Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia.

To prevent and address the recurrence of armed conflict in Colombia, it is crucial to provide incentives for development and investment in conflict-affected areas across Colombian territory. During the negotiation of the 2016 peace accord, 170 municipalities were designated as Territorially Focused Development Programs, or PDETs. These programs aim to transform the Colombian countryside and rural environment by fostering a more equitable relationship between rural and urban areas through increased government presence and investment in conflict-ridden regions. PDETs encompass a variety of development projects, such as the construction of roads and schools, improved access to electricity and critical infrastructure, and enhanced health services. Incentives for investment are provided by the government through tax credits; PDET territories also are part of larger municipal clusters that have been most affected by the conflict, known as ZOMACs (Zones most affected by the armed conflict), which provide similar incentives. Both PDETs and ZOMACs are essential components of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord, designed to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable development in vulnerable regions. Despite their significance, their implementation faces numerous challenges.

Funding shortages prevent the adequate rollout of development and infrastructure projects, limiting the scope and impact of PDETs in vulnerable communities. These shortages—paired with institutional weaknesses such as limited capacity, poor coordination among government agencies, and difficulties in ensuring meaningful community participation in the execution and implementation of PDET programs—have led to delays and inefficiencies. The structural inefficiencies that have hindered the progress of PDETs are now compounded by growing security concerns, as ongoing conflicts in certain regions restrict access to communities and obstruct development efforts. Strengthening PDET implementation and closing gaps in prioritization by ensuring equitable distribution of resources and assistance for all initiatives will be essential. In addition, assessing the barriers limiting the activation of ethnic people’s own initiatives and strengthening the MEC’s technical capacities for formulating projects that are likely to be funded by international actors will help close this gap.

With conflict and violence expanding into new territories across Colombia (see table 2), it is essential to utilize real-time data to monitor and analyze the growth of conflict, the presence and expansion of illegal armed groups, and the resilience of institutions in these areas. This data-driven approach will be crucial for shaping comprehensive development strategies and informed security policies. US agencies, such as the US Southern Command, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and USAID, should play a complementary role by supporting local monitoring and evaluation actors such as the CSIVI and other independent academic institutions to allocate resources more effectively, tailor security operations to local conditions, and direct development initiatives toward regions experiencing increased conflict. Proactively engaging in these efforts can prevent further instability and enhance the overall response to emerging security challenges.

The United States should seize this opportunity to deepen existing support for Colombia in developing new programs and funding lines that strengthen institutional capacities in newly conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas. This could include investing in local governance training, improving resource allocation, and addressing budget disparities to ensure that these regions receive adequate support to confront the evolving threats of crime and insecurity. However, before deploying development funds, it is imperative to engage with and listen to local communities in these newly identified areas. Building trust and understanding local needs through community consultations and advisory boards will enhance the relevance and effectiveness of development programs. In doing so, the United States will not only help to curb the rapid expansion of illegal armed groups—which drive migration northward and erode state authority across Colombia—but also address a significant national security concern that affects its own interests. Supporting Colombia in this way will help foster stability, reinforce democratic governance, and reduce the broader regional security risks posed by transnational criminal organizations.

3. Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia.

One of the most commonly heard critiques of both the Duque administration and the current Petro administration is the failure to take consistent and concrete steps to implement the 2016 peace accord. When Petro took office, he promised to implement an “Alta Instancia para la Implementación,” a high-level governing body to help coordinate and articulate efforts aimed at fulfilling the implementation of the 2016 accord. This coordination is crucial due to the number of entities and sectors involved. In the National Development Plan, 50 billion pesos (close to $2.7 billion) were allocated for the implementation of the accord, a budget shared by fifty-four entities that must work together to uphold the comprehensive spirit of the accord.

The responsibility for accelerating the implementation of the accord falls under the Peace Accord Implementation Unit, spearheaded by Gloria Cuartas. Yet the unit has faced heavy criticism for its lack of action and results so far, attributed to inadequate budget execution, poor coordination among government agencies, and, most importantly, the rapid deterioration of security caused by the increased presence of illegal armed groups across the country, as well as declining confidence among demobilized individuals and communities on the ground. However, despite this criticism, the UIAP has a fundamental role. For the government’s security strategy to be effective, it is crucial to ensure that the UIAP is closely engaged in any new talks and that the funds allocated for implementing the peace accord are leveraged effectively as part of these violence prevention strategies.

To ensure the effective implementation of the 2016 peace accord in Colombia, it is crucial that observers, including academic institutions and civil society organizations, provide insights to support Colombian governmental efforts to optimize the utilization of funds that back the accord, ensuring efficient results within a strict timeline. Colombia entered the commitments associated with the 2016 accord already aware that there would be costs, both in terms of finances and government attention; it’s essential, even as the Petro administration works on its initiatives, that accord-related commitments be honored. The 2016 peace accord is a mandate in the Colombian constitution, making it a binding commitment that the current and successive administrations must continue to honor—and takes precedence over other aspirational commitments in political agendas. Therefore, entities overseeing the accord’s implementation must ensure that the government upholds this commitment, taking full responsibility for its effective execution.

The ongoing armed conflict in Colombia continues to hinder the implementation of the peace accord. While President Petro’s emphasis on negotiation is important, given the diverse range of conflicts across the country, his strategy has only yielded mixed results. To enhance the effectiveness of negotiations with illegal armed groups, the government should adopt a multifaceted approach that emphasizes inclusivity, local engagement, and transparency. It is crucial to closely monitor the incentives for armed groups and understand the power dynamics and reasons behind their reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue. The ability to inflict harm gives illegal armed groups a significant bargaining chip, making it also hard for the Colombian state to offer anything that these armed groups want enough to loosen their grip over territories that bring in ample profits.

Negotiations with criminal groups run the risk of undermining the rule of law; therefore, any incentives used must be approached with great caution and ideally supported by a legislative framework passed by democratically elected lawmakers. A well-defined, structured negotiation strategy, rather than an ad hoc approach, is essential. Countries with relevant expertise, such as the United States and Norway, should collaborate with the Colombian government to develop this framework.

4. Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is a backbone of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord. Its ability to deliver justice promptly and guarantee legal certainty to those under its jurisdiction is essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of the peace process. Particular attention should be paid to the resolution of the case to grant amnesty and guarantee legal security to demobilized FARC combatants, who were signatories of the accord for political or other relatively minor crimes, as stipulated in the final accord. Even after seven years, the overwhelming majority of these individuals still do not have their respective legal situations resolved, despite having administrative amnesties. This is a core commitment of the accord, and failure to follow through might lay ground for resentment and the resurgence of conflict in Colombia.

Equally critical is the work of the JEP in advancing all eleven “macro cases” that it has taken on. The failure to resolve even one of these macro cases, now eight years after the signing of the accord, has damaged the credibility of the JEP and shaped public opinion about it. This is compounded by the JEP’s decision to include—and thereby protect from normal judicial processing—high-profile individuals whose cases were not intended to be treated in this manner. Both of these issues—one an error of omission (failure to resolve macro cases) and the other an error of commission (including Salvatore Mancuso, a Colombian paramilitary leader who once was second in command of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and other paramilitary leaders)—have undermined public confidence in the JEP.

To ensure the success of the peace process, it is vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to support effective implementation and ensure the participation of both victims and perpetrators in restorative justice mechanisms. It is essential that the JEP, under its jurisdiction, make progress in holding accountable those responsible for the gravest crimes committed in the Colombian armed conflict, eight years after the accord was signed. It is also vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to ensure effective implementation and support for victims and perpetrators’ participation in restorative justice mechanisms. Strengthening the strategy for communication and participation of ethnic peoples in all cases, but especially Case 09, will help ensure the conditions necessary for their participation in judicial proceedings to have a reparation-oriented purpose. This includes providing for culturally specific measures, such as guaranteeing interpretation during hearings and translation of essential court documents, for communities still using their native languages. It is of the utmost importance to strengthen mechanisms for coordination across cases so that the most serious and representative acts perpetrated during the armed conflict are held accountable before the JEP and that sanctions are closely related to the harm caused. Reparation under the JEP is collective and symbolic. Importantly, it is not solely the JEP’s responsibility to deliver reparations; the Colombian state and its judicial institutions also play a crucial role.

Conclusion: A call to action

The implementation of the 2016 peace accord requires political will, broader coordination, and consistent technical assistance. The persisting conflict in Colombia requires attention and a coordinated strategy that places the 2016 peace accord at its core. Tides are changing in the region, as illegal armed groups and organized crime groups are thinking creatively about how to bypass state institutions to expand their illicit empires. Meanwhile, many governments in the region are approaching the problem differently, without a clear strategy in mind. Colombia, however, has a clear roadmap with the 2016 peace accord to help territories prevent the resurgence of conflict and deal with current illegal actors. Partner governments like the United States and European countries have committed to Colombia’s security by investing millions of dollars in the peace accord—but Colombia’s government needs the political will to prioritize the accord.

Addressing the lagging implementation of the accord will not only result in greater security for Colombia but will also address persistent drivers of violence such as poverty and inequality. The security situation across Colombia is resulting in loss of territories and greater clashes among groups, with citizens getting caught in the crossfire. The expansion of multinational criminal entities also poses a threat to US national security, meaning that more actors across governments, international organizations, business communities, and foundations are motivated to unlock new and innovative ways of support. Leveraging these opportunities will be critical.

But the bottom line is that Colombia needs to continue upholding its part by prioritizing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and showing tangible results to regain its legitimacy in the fight against organized crime.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of the US-Colombia Advisory Group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Daniel Tirosh, Lucas Da Pieve, Charles Orta, Guy Mentel, and Tom Melia for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, assistant director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC), was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the advisory group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, an AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise and important feedback, and Isabella Palacios, AALAC young global professional, for her excellent research, editorial support and logistical support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the advisory group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic, we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, Ambassador Carolina Barco, and Steve Hege. We would also like to thank AMUNAFRO (Asociación de Alcaldes de Municipios con Población Afrodescendiente) and the mayors who provided decisive input and perspectives during their trip to Washington DC and after reading this publication. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson and for the excellent design assistance, we thank Andrea Ratiu.

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The post A path forward for Colombia’s 2016 peace accord and lasting security  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since March 2024, Russia has decimated Ukraine’s thermal and hydro power plants. As a result, Ukraine is now reliant on the country’s nuclear industry to provide over 70 percent of its electricity needs. It is therefore vital for Ukraine to protect, sustain, and expand its nuclear power generation. Given the Soviet origin of Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, this will not be straightforward.

Obtaining parts to keep old reactors in operation while Kyiv transitions to Western nuclear technologies and expands energy production in other sectors, such as renewables, is essential. An opportunity to overcome the scarcity of parts now presents itself and must be seized to help Ukraine keep its infrastructure running and expand the country’s nuclear electricity generation as quickly as possible.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As part of efforts to fill gaps in energy generation created by Russia’s targeted attacks, Ukraine and Bulgaria are currently pursuing a deal to transfer excess nuclear equipment intended for Bulgaria’s Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to Ukraine’s Khmelnytsky NPP. This will make it possible to complete construction of reactors three and four at the Ukrainian plant.

Once Bulgaria had ruled out beginning the process of installing Russian-produced equipment at its Belene NPP, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company, Energoatom, quickly recognized an opportunity. They saw that Bulgaria was now the only country in the world with the type of excess Russian nuclear equipment needed to complete the unfinished units at Khmelnytsky NPP.

Given that Ukraine started building the two incomplete units some years ago using Russian technology, it faced two options: Abandon the units and their power generation entirely, or access the equipment possessed by Bulgaria to safely install those components in cooperation with Energoatom’s Western nuclear industry partners to increase electricity production in Ukraine. In the process, this could lead to new shared expertise that will help countries around the world reduce and ultimately end their dependence on Russia’s Rosatom.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria highlight Russia’s declining energy clout in the Balkans, but this does not mean that the initiative is without challenges. On the contrary, a number of major obstacles are holding up completion of this vital deal. One is Russia’s long-standing influence in Bulgaria. This includes the activities of Kremlin proxies in Bulgaria who are working to sabotage the transfer of Bulgaria’s nuclear equipment to Ukraine. The second barrier is the financing of the potential equipment transfer.

For decades, Russia has exercised considerable influence in the Bulgarian energy, media, and political spheres. Moscow is not relinquishing its position without a fight, and is doing everything possible to maintain its standing as a decisive player in Bulgarian affairs.

A key component of Moscow’s strategy in Bulgaria is the systematic organization of a campaign, closely resembling efforts elsewhere including in Moldova and Serbia, to quash the deal with Ukraine, thereby preventing additional power generation in Ukraine and further eroding Ukraine’s efforts to end its dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere. Earlier this year, when Ukrainian nuclear experts traveled to Bulgaria to inspect the equipment, supporters of Bulgaria’s pro-Russian Vazrazhdane (Revival) party clashed with the Ukrainian delegation and sought to prevent it from accessing the equipment.

The second key issue is financing, with talks already underway for almost two years. Bulgaria’s parliament is pressing the government to conclude the deal at a price of at least €600 million, the same price the Bulgarian National Electricity Company paid to Russia’s Atomstroyexport. Progress could be made if international partners provide Bulgaria with funding to invest in the expansion of its Kozloduy NPP, where Westinghouse will build reactors. The fact that Westinghouse is engaged in fuel production and reactor building in both Ukraine and Bulgaria is a potentially important point of intersection for the two countries and reflects why the United States in particular has an interest in the successful transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine.

Given that the purchase and transfer of the equipment would benefit Europe’s long-term energy security, there are European funds that could be used, including those available via the European Commission’s Ukraine Facility, which has a mandate to rebuild infrastructure and support the continuity of critical services such as energy transmission. The US could support the Europeans in this endeavor, including by allocating funding from its aid to Ukraine. However, Kyiv is likely to face significant transparency concerns and will need to instill stakeholder confidence.

The transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine would help address Kyiv’s electricity generation needs while also representing a major setback for Russia’s strategy in both Ukraine and the Balkans. Boosting Ukraine’s nuclear power capabilities would enhance the country’s economic outlook and position Ukraine to eventually replace Russia as a principal energy supplier to Europe in the postwar period. This makes Ukraine’s acquisition of Bulgarian nuclear power plant equipment a significant opportunity for the West that must not be missed.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Ukraine needs Western support to boost its nuclear energy potential appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this context, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducted a cooperative research project with the US Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) within the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) to better understand the extent of Russia’s nonproliferation-related IIA in three European countries: Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. This project focused on how to identify Russian IIA and coordinate a multistakeholder response to counter these tactics, which can ultimately strengthen nonproliferation norms and regimes.

Russian information influence activities against nonproliferation

Russia relies on a range of malign tactics to complement its conventional warfare capabilities, including information manipulation. Throughout Europe, Russia creates or amplifies false narratives that support the Kremlin’s ultimate geopolitical goals: undermining unity and security in Europe and abroad.¹ These narratives attempt to evoke emotional and psychological responses from the public with the broader aim of amplifying polarization, undermining democracy, and weakening support for international norms and institutions.

Russia’s information manipulation networks—which consist of official spokespeople, state-run media, proxy websites, social media, and other entities—aim to exploit fears and sensationalize threats through a range of information influence activities (IIA), a term we use to capture the multifaceted nature of information manipulation. IIA includes disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and propaganda (see definitions in Table 1 and a full list of key terms in Appendix I).

Russia has perfected its use of information influence activities to achieve its geopolitical goals. Through its information networks, Russia attempts to inject narratives favorable to the Kremlin.² Russia’s tactics include saturating the information space, continuously sharing false and misleading information, and amplifying preexisting narratives.³ These narratives try to damage the credibility of political institutions and instill feelings of distrust, confusion, and fear.⁴

Historically, Russia has targeted states around the world with information warfare. In Europe, topics such as inflation, migration, and energy shortages are regular targets of Russian disinformation.⁵ To amplify its IIA, Russia uses a broad network of fake pages, social media accounts, and private messaging groups. However, authentic accounts—including many within the countries that Russia is targeting—are often just as involved in these campaigns, whether they know it or not.⁶ Media outlets within targeted countries frequently pick up, repackage, and amplify Russian narratives, furthering the impact and resonance of the Kremlin’s influence.⁷

Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022 featured IIA as a prominent Kremlin tactic to augment Putin’s conventional war. Russia’s methods included frequent narratives designed to target nonproliferation norms and regimes, which continues a pattern the Soviets followed during the Cold War. These tactics mirror previous Soviet patterns of employing “active measures,” or covert propaganda and influence operations to project control surrounding CBRN weapons and erode trust in democratic institutions.⁸ As part of its active measures campaign, the Soviet Union made false allegations that the United States had developed and used biological weapons.⁹ After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia targeted the activities of the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program by alleging the US government employed the CTR program as a cover to develop CBRN weapons throughout Europe and Eurasia, even though the CTR program was developed to curb the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout the region after the Soviet Union’s collapse and included Russian participation until 2014.¹⁰

Russia continues to spread unfounded allegations that ongoing partnerships between the United States and other countries are fronts for biological weapons development programs.¹¹ Russia intensified its use of propaganda and false claims that argued Ukraine was engaged in developing biological weapons to be used against Russian civilians.¹² These efforts damage the credibility of the work conducted in legitimate research facilities, undermine public trust in these institutions, and potentially jeopardize the safety of laboratory staff.

After the re-invasion of Ukraine, Russia intensified its influence operations across Europe to sway public opinion in its favor. Many of Russia’s claims included that Moscow is seeking peace, Ukraine is inherently aggressive, the West instigated the war, and the European Union (EU) and NATO are to blame for increased tensions in the region.¹³ Russia complements its conventional war in Ukraine with information warfare to fracture Western support for Ukraine, and shore up global support from nonaligned countries within multilateral organizations.¹⁴

Impact of Russian information influence activities on nonproliferation norms

Russia’s manipulation of the information space to erode support for nonproliferation includes continued support for the Assad regime in Syria through disinformation and misinformation, despite Assad’s well-documented history of using chemical weapons against civilian populations in Syria’s civil war in the mid-2010s.¹⁵ Russia has also used the information domain to spread false and misleading information related to the Kremlin’s targeted assassination attempts with chemical weapons. This included Moscow’s attack on Russian dissidents in the United Kingdom (UK), against a former KGB agent and his daughter, as well as on its own territory against prominent dissident Alexei Navalny.¹⁶

Russia combines information influence activities with disruptive behavior in multilateral institutions, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to interrupt proceedings, derail procedures, and slow down investigations.¹⁷ Russian diplomats levy false accusations against nations Moscow deems hostile to stymie progress and undermine the authority of these organizations.¹⁸ These actions are not necessarily used to persuade others to accept Russia’s arguments, but instead to create doubt and confusion, undercut the unity and effectiveness of the organizations, and weaken protections of nonproliferation norms and regimes.¹⁹ Russia’s allegations include that Ukraine is concocting plans for a potential chemical attack (articulated at the OPCW in 2022),²⁰ preparing to deploy dirty bombs and nuclear weapons (UN, 2022),²¹ and using and developing biological weapons (BWC, 2022).²²

Russia’s false claims weaken accountability and verification measures established to monitor compliance with international treaties that ban CBRN weapons and regulate the legitimate use of technologies that have a dual-purpose capacity to create such weapons.²³ These claims also undermine efforts to strengthen and modernize nonproliferation norms and regimes, especially with respect to emerging technologies. Russia’s actions also distract from the Kremlin’s own harmful activities and noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations, especially Russia’s support for and use of chemical weapons, their sympathy for other regimes that have used CBRN weapons, and their escalatory rhetoric.

In several posts on state-run media and on social platforms, the Kremlin shared so-called evidence that Ukraine was developing a “dirty bomb,” an explosive device that contains radioactive material. However, the photo—depicted in Figure 1—was taken from other websites. In this instance, the photo provided as “evidence” was taken from the Russian stateowned nuclear energy company Rosatom. In Figure 2, Russia claimed the United States was providing toxic chemicals and other CBRN-related materiel to Ukraine, which indicated a “large scale provocation.” These kinds of narratives could serve as false flag scenarios for Russia’s own potential use of CBRN weapons, which would have severe consequences for nonproliferation norms in Ukraine and more broadly in Europe.

Overall, these tactics serve as tools in Russia’s toolbox to discredit and weaken the multilateral institutions and regimes that govern nonproliferation. Russia’s persistent IIA erode trust and credibility in nonproliferation, which safeguards the international community from the development and use of CBRN weapons. The effects of Russian IIA are widespread, as evidenced by the experience of three European countries: Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. The following sections provide an overview of each country’s recent experience with Russia’s false claims associated with nonproliferation and CBRN weapons.

Slovenia

Slovenia has been an active target of Russian disinformation and information influence activities. In 2016, Russia claimed NATO would harbor a secret arsenal of nuclear weapons throughout Eastern Europe,²⁴ including in Slovenia. Russian state media organizations invested millions of dollars in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovenia, to influence domestic politics and exacerbate political polarization through state-run media channels, government proxies, and other systems. Many of Slovenia’s top proliferators of disinformation and other falsehoods have significant inroads and connections to Russian state-media organizations.²⁵

Several websites that maintain strong linkages to Russia and the Kremlin—including RBTH Daily, NewsFront, and Katehon—operate or are available in Slovenia and consistently post dangerous rhetoric on the EU, NATO, and the United States. Russia launched RBTH Daily, a mobile app version of its Russia Beyond service operated by the Russian state news agency that regularly publishes content in Slovenian.²⁶

In early 2023, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on Twitter that Ukraine was secretly building a dirty bomb and included a series of photos as evidence.²⁷ One of the photos was taken directly from a 2010 public education campaign on the Slovenian Agency for Radioactive Waste’s website. In response, the Slovenian government quickly published a statement on its official website and on social media that denied Russia’s claims and stressed that nuclear waste was stored safely in the country (see Figure 3).²⁸ Slovenian government authorities responded to these Russian campaigns and attempts to undermine its credibility with facts, data, and truthful information.²⁹

Slovakia

Russia also has frequently targeted Slovakia with IIA. Within Slovakia, pro-Russia propagandists are actively working to discredit Slovakia’s allies,³⁰ including the United States, the EU, and other NATO allies to downplay Russian aggression in Ukraine, deflect blame from historical conflicts, and denigrate responses from across the Alliance. These campaigns also attempt to erode trust in and the credibility of nonproliferation norms and regimes.

For example, in May 2023, Russia spread disinformation in Slovakia regarding an alleged radiation leak as a result of an explosion of the ammunition warehouse in the Ukrainian city of Khmelnytskyi.³¹ Through its claims circulated on social media channels and with support from the Russian embassy in Slovakia, the Kremlin attempted to incite fear within targeted communities that there was a significant airborne risk of radiation spilling over into Slovakia from Ukraine.³²

In 2022, the Russian embassy in Bratislava issued several posts that claimed the United States and Ukraine were developing biological agents. The embassy—which was named by the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project as the most virulent in circulating disinformation across Moscow’s network of diplomatic missions—alleged that the United States and Ukraine were developing biological weapons that could target specific ethnic groups, including Slavs.³³

Similar to Slovenia’s experience, the Kremlin injects pro-Russian messaging within Slovakia to amplify its geopolitical goals. One recurring target of Russian information manipulation is the bilateral defense cooperation agreement (DCA) that Slovakia signed with the United States in 2022.³⁴ After it was signed, Russian operatives began to inject falsified information that the DCA would include the deployment of nuclear weapons in Slovakia.³⁵

Slovakia’s elections in September 2023 were preceded by an influx of false and misleading messages, including those from Russia. The London-based nonprofit organization Reset recorded more than 365,000 election-related disinformation messages on Slovak social networks in the first two weeks of September, with estimates that the number would grow.³⁶

Their research found messages that violated social network terms of use and featured disinformation generated more than five times as much exposure as the average message. More than 15 percent of such content was posted by pro-Kremlin accounts.

Serbia

Serbia is one of Russia’s top targets in Eastern Europe for IIA. Serbia is deeply affected by Russian information operations that attempt to undermine perceptions of the EU, NATO, and other multilateral institutions in the region. With respect to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation, Russia has established a number of fake profiles, proxy pages, and state-run media (including Belgrade-based offices of Russia Today and Sputnik) in Serbia to share and amplify favorable stories on these issues.³⁷ Both Russia Today and Sputnik publish a constant flow of articles that relate to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation. Russia has invested resources and funds into ensuring that narratives gain a broader audience, especially in the Western Balkans, given Serbia’s relationship with Russia.³⁸ Several Russian state-sponsored or state-connected media organizations publish Serbian-language content in support of the Kremlin,³⁹ including News Front, SouthFront, Geopolitica.ru, and Katehon. For example, SouthFront has circulated several false claims, including that the OPCW neglected to share key details in their investigation on Syria’s chemical weapons program or that US accusations of Russia’s involvement in chemical attacks in Syria were an act of “whitewashing.”⁴⁰

However, even as Russian state-run media organizations maintain presences in Serbia, their most frequent tactic involves flooding the information space to see what resonates the most within local communities. Through these tactics, local media outlets in Serbia frequently repost and amplify Moscow’s claims laid out in state-run media, which has much more impact in reaching the public because many individuals in Serbia have greater trust in local media outlets. For example, on Serbian platforms, false claims include the story of the United States and Ukraine developing bats as biological weapons to attack Russians.⁴¹ These platforms include local media organizations, television broadcasters, radio stations, and others in Serbia that amplify, give credibility to, or create their own narratives that mirror the Kremlin’s priorities.

These narratives circulate beyond Serbia throughout the Western Balkans. Given the reach of Serbian media and historical connections with other nations in the region, many of the narratives related to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation that are shared in Serbia are picked up by other media organizations—including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia—with great effect. Russia benefits significantly from destabilization in the Western Balkans, especially when Serbia and its neighbors do not condemn Russia’s actions within the international community. As part of its broader geopolitical strategy, Russia uses Serbian media organizations as proxies to create distrust in nonproliferation regimes while degrading broader support for global nonproliferation norms.⁴²

A strategic framework to counter Russian information influence activities

Given the scope and severity of Russian threats to nonproliferation norms in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia, the project team developed a strategic framework for countering Russian IIA with the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction. We convened private, small-group workshops with representatives from government, civil society, academia, media, think tanks, business groups, law enforcement, and other sectors in Ljubljana, Bratislava, and Belgrade in 2023.⁴³ The first series of workshops, conducted in all three cities, was designed to educate personnel who were familiar with the challenges of IIA but less knowledgeable about nonproliferation topics, especially as it relates to the risks IIA pose to the stability of nonproliferation norms and potential use of CBRN weapons. These workshops included a scenario-based exercise where attendees were asked to create a counter-messaging strategy to respond to a hypothetical disinformation campaign from an adversary that involved an anthrax leak at a secure government laboratory.⁴⁴

After these workshops were completed, the project team used the results of the discussions, our extensive research, and consultations with experts in the region to create a draft strategic framework for countering IIA. The framework is comprised of three critical elements, or pillars. As depicted in Figure 4, the three pillars are recognize, respond, and reinforce a community of practice. For the next series of workshops, the project team returned to Bratislava and Belgrade to present the draft strategic framework to similar groups of experts, both those who were present at the first workshops and new stakeholders. Participants shared their views related to the three pillars, as well as the threat of Russian IIA more generally in their countries. Their feedback was critical to finalize the strategic framework presented in this report.

These pillars reflect the central elements of establishing resilience against disinformation, misinformation, and other forms of IIA. As Figure 4 demonstrates, the pillars are mutually reinforcing. For example, members of a community of practice can help each other recognize possible Russian IIA and devise effective response strategies. Response options can be studied by the community of practice to understand strengths and identify areas for improvement. The next three chapters describe each pillar of the strategic framework in greater detail.

Recognizing information influence activities

Through its IIA, Russia attempts to distract from its own harmful actions and noncompliance with nonproliferation norms and regimes. These actions include Russia’s use of chemical agents as weapons, its support for other regimes who have deployed chemical weapons, and its threats of nuclear escalation in Ukraine. Russia’s long history of sowing doubt and confusion in public discourse by manipulating information goes beyond its borders. In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia, Russia has perpetuated narratives designed to undermine nonproliferation norms, including those about the development and use of CBRN weapons. The first pillar in our strategic framework is recognize, which covers strategies, methods, and tools to identify IIA. This pillar is critical to promoting public awareness of—and resilience against—Russian influence.

Key principles of recognizing information influence activities

Effective tools and methods to recognize IIA are critical to fostering greater resilience and promoting critical thinking. Many governments and organizations have prepared guidelines for how to recognize disinformation, misinformation, and other types of IIA.⁴⁵ Several of these guidelines discuss the importance of verifying, authenticating, and scrutinizing information. Some tools are tailored for academic settings or for government and multilateral institution representatives.⁴⁶ However, the wider public can use many of the same tools. Common elements include the following principles:

Check the sources of the content and authenticate legitimacy

Understanding the source of a social media post or article is a critical first step in determining whether the information is reliable. Media consumers should assess whether a source is a reputable and well-established individual, organization, media outlet, or other legitimate entity. This is especially important when considering responses to nonproliferation-related information manipulation.

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) produced a guide titled “Disinformation Stops with You,” which recommends several useful tactics to evaluate content, including investigating the issue with other reliable sources of information and thinking before sharing the content online.⁴⁷ CISA’s guide, built around the principles outlined in Figure 5, serves as an important tool for local communities to identify forms of foreign malign influence. Ensuring accuracy and conducting diligent fact-checking can help prevent the spread and impact of IIA.

Verify information within the article or publication

Cross-checking information through multiple reputable sources is instrumental in confirming the accuracy of content. Fact-checking websites and other digital literacy tools provide a methodical approach to validating the claims presented in an article. Fact-checking and verifying information also can serve as an important educational tool for individuals to learn how to critically assess information. Digital and media literacy exercises allow the public to make better-informed judgments on the credibility of content before sharing.

Apart from fact-checking websites, trusted networks can serve as another way to corroborate information before publishing or sharing content. During each workshop, participants frequently pointed to how often they rely on their own trusted relationships to screen information. Verifying content is an important step in mitigating the spread of falsehoods and minimizing the impact of Russian IIA.

Review the date of the publication before sharing

Prior to circulating any media online, audiences should inspect and identify the publication date of an article or post. A frequent Russian tactic includes circulating outdated information with eye-catching headlines that mislead audiences. First Draft News published a guide to corroborating false information online that recommends examining a webpage’s metadata to verify the date of the publication matches supporting sourcing elsewhere online and in print media.⁴⁸ Checking the publication date before sharing information can be a critical step in mitigating the spread of outdated, irrelevant, and sensationalized content.

Authenticate the authorship of content

Audiences should confirm the authorship of publications, especially as IIA can involve the impersonation of credible individuals or organizations.⁴⁹ Given that authors tend to publish within their area of responsibility and substantive focus, it is important to consider how the publication fits within the author’s broader expertise. Establishing the author’s identity by verifying their credentials contributes to the overall trustworthiness of the content.⁵⁰ Validating author identities is a necessary component to combat disinformation, while building trust and support for legitimate reporting.

Inspect multimedia and other content included within the post

With the development of new and emerging technologies, fabricated and doctored multimedia content appear more frequently on various publications, including social media posts and fringe website pages.⁵¹ To ensure manipulated content is properly verified, audiences should corroborate images and video to prevent manipulation through deepfakes, AI-generated photos and videos, deceptive editing, and other forms of online personalization.

Deepfake images in particular can mislead audiences to believe falsified content is real. For example, two seemingly authentic screenshots of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaking at a press conference appear in Figure 6.

Both images appear to be authentic, but upon closer examination, there are indications that the image on the right was doctored. In this instance, the image on the right is an authentic photograph, while the image on the left is an AI-generated deepfake. However, for a user who is scrolling quickly on Facebook or X (formerly known as Twitter), the difference may not be easy to discern, creating an even more challenging information environment.

Similarly, IIA rely on visually compelling or sensational images and video to evoke extreme reactions from audiences. This holds especially true for CBRN-related disinformation, which can grab attention and spread rapidly online, in print and broadcast media, and through word of mouth.⁵² As new methods for misleading audiences are developed, it is imperative for the public to ensure content has not been altered, taken out of context, or misconstrued to serve ulterior interests.

Tools to detect information influence activities

In many cases, it can be difficult to detect and identify IIA as they arise, especially as Russia deploys several kinds of narratives. As local media outlets frequently parrot Russian IIA and communities battle the constant influx of propaganda, people can unintentionally share misinformation. Several tools and methods exist to help identify and verify the accuracy of information shared online.

Fact-checking and debunking websites

Fact-checking sites and debunking organizations play an important role in assessing the accuracy of information shared online. Fact-checkers often investigate and corroborate claims made in news articles, social media posts, and official government documents.

In Europe, EUvsDisinfo,⁵³ Snopes,⁵⁴ and PolitiFact are good examples of fact-checking and debunking websites.⁵⁵ In Slovenia, Oštro⁵⁶ and its fact-checking arm, Razkrinkavanje,⁵⁷ play an important role in vetting truthful information within the public domain. In Slovakia, fact-checking and debunking webpages—including Demagog.sk⁵⁸ and Infosecurity.sk⁵⁹—frequently fact-checked the statements of candidates during the September 2023 parliamentary elections. Similar organizations also exist in Serbia, including the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA),⁶⁰ FakeNews Tragač,⁶¹ and the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK).⁶² Finally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty plays an important regional role throughout Central and Eastern Europe through its mission of sharing truthful information and independent analysis.⁶³

Reverse image search methods

Reverse image search tools are another important tactic in verifying online information. These platforms allow users to corroborate and verify the original uses and sources of images. Many reserve image search tools also provide tracing capabilities for audiences to track where the image has been circulated and whether the photos have previously been used in different contexts. In addition, reverse image search tools can determine whether questionable content has previously been used in other contexts. Similarly, in instances where images have been created and manipulated using deepfake technology, reverse image search tools are able to uncover the original sources of images and reveal inconsistencies, such as facial features, landscape backgrounds, and other details.

Several platforms including Google Images,⁶⁴ TinEye,⁶⁵ and ImageRaider⁶⁶ are examples of systems that can help individuals confirm the authenticity of visual content online. TinEye, as displayed in Figure 7, uses a database of over sixty-four billion images for users to cross-reference when photos have been used in other contexts. Given how technical CBRN-related topics can be for audiences, these tools are important to support efforts in debunking and combating the spread of Russian IIA related to nonproliferation.

Web browser extensions

As search engines become more sophisticated, browser extensions can be useful tools to help identify false and misleading information, especially on webpages that tend to share disinformation. Many extensions can analyze links and sources in real time, which provides important details on the trustworthiness of information online.

One example of a browser extension is NewsGuard, which provides ratings and detailed information about the news sites that users visit as they read through various webpages.⁶⁷ SurfSafe is another example that can help identify disinformation and other forms of IIA through highlighting tools on content posts.⁶⁸ TinEye, the aforementioned reverse image search tool, also offers a browser extension for verifying visual content in real time when visiting webpages.

Digital forensics tools

Digital forensics tools are more specialized software that can investigate and analyze sophisticated IIA. Many of these tools can comb through the metadata of websites, which can reveal important details of webpages and their creation, modification, and origins, especially in tracing links to other pages. Other tools, such as social media forensics technologies, can assist investigators in tracking the spread of disinformation, identifying key actors within information influence networks, and analyzing the extent of Russian IIA’s reach and impact.

One sample tool is InVID, a browser extension that can verify the authenticity of videos and information shared on social media.⁶⁹ The tool, as seen in Figure 8, can be used in a variety of different formats, including a browser extension and mobile phone application. Forensically is another suite of digital tools for digital forensics, including image analysis and other forms of authenticating content.⁷⁰ Both forensics analysis systems are useful in identifying manipulated content and deepfake technology.

Augmenting methods to recognize information influence activities

Our discussions with representatives in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia demonstrated that recognizing information influence activities is an important step to counter Russian influence efforts. However, these efforts need to be supported and complemented by effective responses to these campaigns. To counter Russian IIA, the recognize pillar of our strategic framework seeks to address some of the broader strategies that may be used in understanding the threat of disinformation and other forms of malign influence activity. In Chapter 3, we discuss our second pillar, responding to Russian information influence activities, which examines best practices and recent responses to Russian IIA.

Responding to information influence activities

Through our research, we identified several key principles to consider when crafting a response to Russian IIA. These principles are reinforced by examples from the United States, as well as the experiences of individuals in Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, and elsewhere. The second pillar in our strategic framework is respond, which covers strategies and narratives used to counter Russian IIA. Workshop participants demonstrated these principles when asked to create a response to the anthrax exposure posited in our hypothetical scenario-based exercise described in Appendix II. Several attendees also shared insights from their experiences creating responses to real-world Russian IIA, which we discuss in this chapter.

Key principles of responding to information influence activities

When crafting a response to Russian IIA, it is important to keep several key principles in mind: prioritize transparency and concise messaging, connect the ideas to the correct audience and platforms; and determine the best person to deliver the message.

Be transparent, clear, and concise

An effective response should be factual and clear, especially when addressing scientific and technical information that can be confusing to a non-specialist audience. By using clear and concise information, complex topics such as nonproliferation or chemical weapons can be distilled into digestible language that is easy to understand. Russia recognizes that CBRN-related issues and WMD threats are often not well understood among the general community, which makes them popular topics for false narratives.

Russia’s use of emotionally charged IIA has made the need for clear responses a priority. In Serbia, CRTA’s Istinomer project is at the forefront of debunking, fact-checking, and countering Russian IIA.⁷¹ Istinomer consistently monitors disinformation and misinformation on social media to determine which narratives are resonating the most within communities. Following their analysis, Istinomer staff publish short-form posts on their platform that debunk the various claims using facts. See Figure 9 for an example of how the Istinomer team debunked false and misleading claims that mischaracterized the work of US-supported research facilities in Ukraine. In each post, the Istinomer author refutes each false and misleading claim with citations, secondary sources, interviews, and further reading material, including US government reports.

It is important for counter-messaging strategies to include these characteristics to resonate with audiences and ensure effectiveness, especially when it relates to nonproliferation-related information manipulation tactics.

Match the message to the audience and platforms

Different audiences might require tailored messaging strategies, including via different platforms. Younger audiences that receive much of their information from social media platforms may view TikTok before watching a local news broadcast. Those who spend more time driving might listen to radio news than those who commute via other means. Therefore, it is important to consider whether a counternarrative should include more visuals than text based on the intended audience and platform. Messages designed for television will require compelling audio and visual components, but messages designed for print media should focus on attention-grabbing graphics and text that clearly convey the main messages. However, all messages should include the same basic facts to promote consistency and accuracy.

Counter-messaging strategies must consider both the medium for sharing responses as well as the social media platforms themselves. For example, TikTok prioritizes short-form videos, while Instagram focuses more on photographs and other forms of visually appealing content. The combination of message and medium is especially important when considering which kinds of counter-messaging campaigns will resonate with different audiences. Two organizations in Slovenia—Danes je nov dan (Today is a new day) and Pod črto (The Bottom Line)—developed innovative methods of using storytelling to debunk false information in Slovenia using trusted voices and captivating forms of visual media. These efforts deepen the impact and reach of their organizations.⁷² One initiative, which Danes je nov dan termed Mislimetar (Figure 10), serves as an educational and entertainment mobile application that promotes media literacy and critical thinking in younger audiences.

Regional differences also are important to consider. For example, in Slovakia, workshop participants said that Facebook and Telegram are more popular than Instagram or TikTok.⁷³ In Serbia, Telegram is the most frequently used social media platform, while Facebook remains a popular platform in Slovenia. Regardless of platform, it is essential to make sure credible information is available in regional dialects in addition to the main language spoken in a country to reach the broadest possible audience.

Consider who is best to deliver the message

The best person, organization, or outlet to deliver a counternarrative will depend on the country, city, or local area that the message is intended to reach as well as the specific target audience. When asked who the trusted messengers are within their communities, workshop participants in our three countries had varying answers. In Slovakia, the police and armed forces were cited as effective messengers, whereas in Slovenia, participants said a response led by the armed forces would not be well received.

The Slovak Police Force led a popular community-centered Facebook campaign titled “Hoaxy a Podvody” (“Hoaxes and Frauds”), which began in 2018. Through its platform, the Police Force led public engagement to debunk false narratives circulating online and develop an informed and resilient citizenry.⁷⁴ In 2023, the Police Force, part of the Department of Interior, kicked off a campaign called “Hoaxy Sa Na Mňa Nelepia” (“Hoaxes Don’t Stick to Me”). To move the campaign beyond the digital world, members of the community displayed buttons and stickers in public spaces in support of counter-disinformation efforts, as seen in Figure 11. The project’s community-centric focus could be a potential model to replicate in the future.⁷⁵

Beyond responding: Proactive measures to prevent Russian information influence activities

Our discussions with representatives in all three countries demonstrated that responding alone is not enough to stop Russian IIA. Countries need to get ahead of possible Russian IIA campaigns, an observation shared by US government officials. For example, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) established a dedicated information resilience office in 2022 to better understand the scope of information manipulation against its worldwide countering-WMD presence.⁷⁶ This includes prebunking,⁷⁷ a term that encompasses efforts to anticipate or identify IIA early and encourage resilience among citizens to inoculate them from IIA.⁷⁸ Additionally, the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) has issued numerous reports about Russia’s attempts to spread disinformation about US and Ukrainian biosafety and biosecurity initiatives.⁷⁹ The GEC was established in 2017, but has more recently begun to explore whether sharing limited details about sensitive missions in advance can limit the effect of Russian attempts to twist facts after a mission has occurred.⁸⁰

To effectively counter Russian IIA, the respond pillar of our strategic framework takes a broad approach that incorporates elements of prebunking and early identification to promote a holistic view of response. In this way, response can be proactive or reactive, which is essential to limiting the effects of false narratives Russia spreads worldwide. In the next chapter, we describe our third pillar, reinforcing a community of practice, which encapsulates elements of the first two pillars to augment their importance to a broader audience.

Reinforcing a community of practice

A community of practice committed to identifying and countering Russian IIA is a critical component to limiting the effectiveness of Russia’s efforts to spread false messages in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. For our project, this community is defined broadly to ensure that all stakeholders are represented. Members of the public and private sectors, including government, military, law enforcement, academia, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and the media all have a role to play in recognizing and responding to Russian IIA. This third pillar in our strategic framework is reinforcing a community of practice, which covers opportunities to expand the multistakeholder community dedicated to responding to Russian IIA. In this chapter, we describe the general roles that a community of practice should serve in addition to country-specific considerations discussed throughout our workshops.

Community of practice roles

Members of the community play an important role in promoting resilience among the populations most frequently targeted by Russia’s false messages. These roles include reinforcing consistent communication, expanding social resilience, prioritizing multistakeholder engagement, and identifying methods to expand the overall community dedicated to countering Russian information influence activities.

Resource and reinforce

A vital role for the community of practice is to ensure that efforts to counter Russian IIA reach the broadest possible audience, both within a country and among its regional neighbors, when appropriate. Community members from academia and think tanks can amplify messages from government and law enforcement sources to add legitimacy to their campaigns. This cooperation requires consistent communication among the community to understand Russia’s IIA, how it affects the broader public, and what stakeholders can do to counter false narratives.

In March 2022, the Russian Defense Ministry circulated claims about US-backed Ukrainian bioweapons production efforts to justify Russia’s then-recent invasion of Ukraine.⁸¹ Officials from the People’s Republic of China and incendiary US media figures amplified these claims on a popular social media platform, Weibo.⁸² In response, prominent US officials testified before Congress about the legitimacy of US-backed research facilities in Ukraine—including those established with CTR resources—and organizations like DTRA and the GEC issued fact sheets and statements that bolstered the legitimacy of CTR’s work. Former US officials and private-sector experts wrote editorials, social media posts, and made media appearances decrying Russia’s claims, providing important alternative perspectives that bolstered official government messages. The reinforcement of the key message that the United States and Ukraine were not producing biological weapons was critical to reaching as broad an audience as possible.

Reinforcing capacity-building efforts focused on countering Russian influence efforts is a priority among stakeholders in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. However, interest in these issues must be matched by resources to maintain and create new counternarratives. Many of the workshop participants shoulder numerous work responsibilities in addition to tracking Russian IIA. One benefit of an engaged community of practice is the ability to cooperate on messaging strategies and share the resource burden, including the time it takes to craft engaging, informative narratives and discern the best platform(s) on which to disseminate these narratives. When new approaches are needed to respond to new or evolving Russian falsehoods, an active community can also ensure that key messages from past campaigns are carried over to promote consistency. Furthermore, a coordinated approach among stakeholders to amplify key messages and reduce duplication in messaging is important to reduce confusion and promote clarity.

Enhance social resilience

The community of practice should also focus on enhancing social resilience through public messaging and public education campaigns. While it is more difficult to reach people who espouse aggressively favorable views of false claims, evidence-based messages can influence those who are more open-minded.⁸³ Though it might not be possible to stop Russia’s IIA, a resilient public might be less susceptible to believing or spreading false claims.

Enhancing social resilience emphasizes whole of society responses to counter Russian malign influence activities. This is a deliberately broad goal, but given the complexity of the media landscape, it is difficult to achieve.⁸⁴ A good starting point is by working through trusted messengers to understand whether false narratives have achieved support in specific parts of the community, and why those narratives were persuasive. Local journalists are especially critical because they are in closer contact with parts of the community that national outlets might not understand as well. In this way, local journalists can both contribute to an understanding of the pervasiveness of false messages and what could be effective in changing minds.

Media literacy is another critical component of enhancing resilience. Critical thinking skills that teach students to question everything they read can promote longer-term outcomes than identifying correct and incorrect statements.⁸⁵ Furthermore, engaging the public early and often can promote trust in the output of government data.⁸⁶ Such an approach has demonstrated benefits in countering public health-related disinformation and misinformation, and also applies to Russian IIA about biological and radiological weapons that prey on the health effects of exposure to toxic substances.

Employ multisectoral and multidisciplinary approaches

An important role of the community of practice is to promote effective methods to combat IIA through multisectoral and multidisciplinary approaches. For a complicated and technical subject such as biological weapons—a frequent target of Russia’s IIA efforts—it is critical to include scientists, public health experts, academics, and other experts in the development of responses. Communications experts should seek to translate scientific and technical information into digestible information suitable for a general audience. The Bioweapons Disinformation Monitor, a partnership between King’s College London and the Canadian government, publishes videos, fact sheets, and short reports that concisely explain false Russian narratives about biological weapons and the reasons why these claims are untrue.⁸⁷ In addition to producing concise, factual counternarratives, the website also promotes articles from other sources, such as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and foreign news sites to amplify the work of like-minded organizations in multiple sectors.⁸⁸

Identify opportunities for expansion

When considering other elements of society to incorporate into a community of practice, it is important to cast a wide net. In international relations theory, the concept of latent power refers to the broad range of resources available to a state that could contribute to greater military power.⁸⁹ Russia calls this the correlation of forces and means, which explains how Russia views its military expansion potential, but also incorporates elements of alliance relations, social cohesion, and economic stability that involve broader parts of society.⁹⁰ Although these theories have primarily military implications, the principle that all elements of a society can bolster one critical function applies directly to the fight against Russian IIA.

For example, Estonia has used a multisectoral approach to countering disinformation and misinformation since 2007, when it was subject to destructive cyberattacks that continue to present day.⁹¹ Media literacy is a core component of the curriculum in Estonian schools, and leaders from across Europe visit Estonia to learn more about their broad approach to establishing resilience to IIA.⁹² The need to go beyond traditional organizations tasked with identifying and stopping IIA also is understood in Slovakia. Participants at our second workshop in Bratislava suggested that engaging religious leaders and local labor officials to amplify counternarratives against false Russian claims could be effective because these leaders maintain the trust of their members.

Expansion also applies to promoting resilience across countries, not just in large population centers. In Slovakia and Serbia, political polarization and distrust of institutions hamper counter-messaging strategies and keep people with disparate views siloed from one another. Geographic differences exacerbate these silos. Participants in both countries noted that going beyond the capital allows one to reach disadvantaged communities that might be more affected by Russian information warfare preying on their existing views that the state does not look after their interests.

As the third pillar of our strategic framework, the community of practice plays an important role in reinforcing the efforts of the first two pillars to recognize and respond to Russian IIA. The linkages between the three pillars are important to ensure thoughtful, effective responses to false narratives that damage government credibility and trust in institutions. In the next chapter, we discuss considerations for implementing the strategic framework, as well as areas for investment to continue the fight against Russian IIA that target nonproliferation.

Considerations for implementation and the way ahead

Our research and discussions with stakeholders in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia illuminated several important considerations for implementing initiatives to counter Russian IIA as they relate to nonproliferation. In this chapter, we describe these considerations and include recommendations for investment, while discussing the way ahead for this project.

Implementation considerations

There are many opportunities for stakeholders within the region to design successful responses to Russian IIA. These include opportunities to strengthen transparency and access to information, expand cooperation within multistakeholder groups, and broaden existing networks to include international partners.

Maximize transparency and safeguard access to information

To improve trust in public institutions and political processes, government entities should strive to be as transparent as possible with information related to false Russian claims about CBRN weapons. Providing truthful and accurate information with proper citations and evidence can play an important role in prebunking Russian narratives. Maximizing transparency on social media platforms with respect to the activity of Russian information networks also can play an important role, especially as civil society and other organizations prioritize how to respond to Russian IIA.

Enhance cooperation with a multistakeholder community

Involving the private sector in government-led responses to Russian IIA can strengthen relationships and improve information sharing with partners outside of government. Members of the private sector can support a healthy information environment, including through their support for independent investigative journalism and objective reporting.

Another opportunity to strengthen responses to combat Russian IIA includes connecting civil society organizations and government entities with their counterparts in scientific and academic communities. Research-oriented professionals bring a wealth of expertise on technical topics, such as CBRN weapons and nonproliferation, which can augment countermessaging strategies with data-driven information.

Similarly, youth organizations can play an important role in mitigating disinformation. Dedicated engagement and educational initiatives with younger audiences can build broader resilience against Russian IIA. Youth organizations serve as an opportunity to reach unengaged youth who are not necessarily involved in countering Russian IIA more broadly. Increasing investment within younger generations also helps mitigate the brain drain phenomenon of young, highly educated people leaving Central and Eastern Europe.⁹³ This phenomenon leaves fewer in the next generation that are able to study disinformation and nonproliferation, resulting in a significant gap in substantive expertise on these issues. It will be critical to reinvest in the next generation of experts, which will allow for greater potential for locally driven development of policy solutions, especially around nonproliferation and information warfare.

Expand the community of practice to include international partners

Members of the community of practices within Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia should enforce stronger multistakeholder engagement with international partners, including neighboring countries, international organizations, and the United States. Maintaining consistent close cooperation with international partners provides opportunities to learn about other countries that might experience similar challenges with respect to Russian IIA and discuss best practices for response. These opportunities to learn from a broader range of stakeholders can build stronger alliances to coordinate responses against threats of information warfare on a larger scale.

Areas for investment

To expand societal resilience to counter Russian IIA, key stakeholders and organizations need to prioritize investing in programs to confront information manipulation in Europe. Several opportunities play an important role in building resilience and effectiveness in the long term, including: augmenting proactive measures, strengthening media literacy efforts and fact-checking programs, supporting independent media and community journalism, and prioritizing capacity building efforts.

Augment proactive measures

Attempts to more proactively counter malign influence campaigns are an important area for additional resourcing so counter-messaging strategies are not primarily reactive. The United States and NATO are exploring ways to be more proactive in sharing research and information, including exploration of prebunking initiatives, but continued cooperation will benefit NATO allies such as Slovenia and Slovakia.⁹⁴ For Serbia, cooperation with the EU, regional partners, or nongovernmental organizations could provide insights on how to incorporate proactive measures into their counter-messaging strategies.

Strengthen media literacy efforts and fact-checking programs

Greater cooperation between journalists and government representatives can improve public awareness about the threats of Russian IIA and enhance resilience. Instituting media literacy curriculum in education systems is also important to improve resilience among younger citizens, especially those who are more active on social media and exposed to a wider variety of messaging. Additionally, fact-checking programs to promote critical engagement with information from news, television broadcasts, and social media platforms can be expanded beyond education systems to workplaces, government offices, and other environments that would benefit from increased awareness.

Support independent media and community journalism initiatives

Independent media and community journalism can play important roles in combating IIA, especially through the prioritization of localized reporting, transparency, and accountability. Through strong connections to the communities around them, media and community journalism initiatives’ active engagement and collaboration with local organizations and trusted officials enhances the overall credibility of responses to Russian IIA. These organizations can highlight local solutions and positive stories that can play a role in bolstering broader support for institutions, minimizing polarization, and blunting the negative effects of disinformation.

Consider ways to measure success

Across the three countries considered for this project and in the United States, members of the communities of practice struggle with how to measure the success of responses to Russian IIA. It is impossible to isolate the effects of one message or campaign within the entire media landscape, given how much content is produced and how quickly it is distributed. It also is difficult to predict what could influence Russia to change its tactics. However, there are resources available to guide the development of attention-grabbing, impactful messages that can garner support, such as EUvsDisinfo and the Bioweapons Disinformation Monitor. Additionally, greater engagement with academia and journalism professionals can assist in developing messages backed by industry best practices and standards.

Review adequacy of cybersecurity infrastructure

In addition to concerns over false Russian narratives, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia should consider whether existing cybersecurity measures are adequate to prevent cyberattacks. In the event prevention measures fail, each country should also review whether current defenses are up to date. For Slovenia and Slovakia, NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence could be a good resource to support or inform these reviews.⁹⁵

Focus on capacity building efforts to increase effectiveness and viability across sectors

Leveraging programs to build capacity within organizations can sustain efforts, increase effectiveness, and build long-term resilience. For civil society organizations, think tanks, media entities, and others that are involved in countering Russian IIA, it is important to prioritize efforts that strengthen their overall ability to achieve success. To counter Russian IIA, educational programs—both within and outside of formal educational institutions—allow stakeholders to obtain important skills in digital literacy, cybersecurity, and critical thinking abilities. Professional development opportunities for analysts and journalists alike can strengthen the ability to use technologies and other tools to combat Russian IIA. For public diplomacy officials, training sessions that focus on strategic communications and crisis management provide important opportunities to implement standard operating procedures within their organizations. These kinds of programs play an important role in developing the necessary skills and experience to counter Russian IIA on nonproliferation.

Additionally, community engagement programs serve an important role in capacity building within the public. Organized workshops, outreach programs, and structured dialogues contribute to a broader sense of involvement among the community, which can increase buy-in and participation when combating Russian IIA. Community engagement programs can also empower local leaders and educators to play a role in disseminating truthful information and countering Russian IIA within the public.

Project next steps

For the next iteration of this project, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction will continue to examine the threat of Russian malign influence efforts that target nonproliferation norms in Eastern Europe and the responses to these threats. The Atlantic Council will monitor developments in Russia’s IIA for topics related to nonproliferation and CBRN weapons that might emerge in our focus countries to tailor the content of our private workshops accordingly. In addition, we will also support the organizations, experts, and entities on the frontlines of Russia’s information warfare to enable implementation and sustainment of the project’s overall goals.

In the next phase of our project, the Atlantic Council will continue to refine the three pillars of our strategic framework to ensure they capture the current challenges to recognizing and responding to IIA within Central and Eastern Europe, as well as any challenges to reinforcing a healthy community of practice committed to countering IIA in the region.

Finally, we will work closely with our partners at the Department of State to identify new countries that would benefit from engagement with our strategic framework.

The research team thanks the US Department of State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction for their strategic guidance and overall support throughout the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of stakeholders in Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia who contributed their invaluable insights to our workshops and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Amanda Moodie of the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction for their critical contributions to our workshops in Slovakia and Serbia. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and the Atlantic Council’s Eto Buziashvili from the Digital Forensic Research Laboratory also provided valuable peer reviews that improved our strategic framework. Within the Atlantic Council, we recognize the critical contributions of Leah Scheunemann, Zelma Sergejeva, and Kristen Taylor for their project management, research, and analytical support; Dr. Matthew Kroenig and Christopher Skaluba for their oversight of the project; and Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, Caroline Simpson, and Ursula Murdoch for their operational guidance and assistance.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Atlantic Council, the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, the US Department of State, or the US government.

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Natasha Lander Finch is a senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously worked as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she led and conducted research on a range of issues, including chemical, biological, and nuclear policy; counterterrorism; European security; and military and civilian workforce policy. She also held positions as an adviser within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and as the principal adviser for NATO’s Committee on Proliferation in the Defense Format.

Ryan Arick is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this capacity, he supports TSI’s work to strengthen the transatlantic alliance against emerging security threats from around the world. His research interests include NATO defense policy and transatlantic security; arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation; democratic resilience from foreign malign influence; and state fragility and conflict prevention.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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Report Feb 29, 2024

Undermining Ukraine: How Russia widened its global information war in 2023

By the Digital Forensic Research Lab

On the battlefield, Russia has made strategic gains. In the information sphere, it has the resources and will to outlast the West.

Disinformation Eastern Europe

Report Oct 26, 2023

Continued US and allied integration is essential to deter Russian CBRN use

By Natasha Lander Finch, Ryan Arick, Christopher Skaluba

This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence to Address Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of this project was to develop an approach for incorporating European allies and partners into the US model of integrated deterrence against Russian CBRN use.

Arms Control Defense Policy

Report Feb 22, 2023

Narrative warfare

By Nika Aleksejeva, Andy Carvin, Eto Buziashvili

In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Dive into a full accounting of the road to war.

Disinformation Russia

The post How the US and Europe can counter Russian information manipulation about nonproliferation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

My activism began in Jaghuri, Ghazni, where I was born. As a Hazara girl, I faced multifaceted discrimination and deprivation. Because there was no girls’ school in my village, I had to attend a boys’ high school. When my uncle tried to force me into marriage as an adolescent—a common tradition in my region—my mother, who herself had been a child bride, stopped it.

My mother’s resistance awakened my revolutionary spirit. The day that she prevented my forced marriage, I realized that if every woman took a stand, life would change for all women. When I was only a teenager, along with four girlfriends, I organized a group to speak to people in our village about forced marriage and its devastating consequences for women and children. 

I had a measure of privilege because my father supported me, which is not always the case for girls in Afghanistan. He would lament, “I am very sorry that you were born with this talent and genius in a country like Afghanistan, where it is drowned in misogyny.” After high school, I moved from Ghazni to attend Kabul University’s law department. 

As a Hazara, I have always been particularly aware of the oppression and discrimination we have continuously faced. In Kabul, my first civic action was to light candles in memory of the Hazaras who were executed or buried alive in Pul-e-Charkhi prison during the time of Nur Mohammad Taraki’s rule in 1978-79. In Dasht-e-Barchi, a Hazara neighborhood in Kabul that has been the site of many attacks and suicide bombings, my friends and I launched a campaign for girls’ education. Through these efforts, many families allowed their daughters to attend school.

Since then, I’ve participated in protests, from small university demonstrations to larger movements. In 2014, we protested the beheading of an eight-year-old Hazara girl by the Taliban in Zabul. We later organized protests against the beheading of eleven Hazara civilians by the Taliban on the Kabul highway in Bamyan. In 2015, I played a significant role in shaping the Enlightenment Movement, a youth movement formed to protest the inequities in development for Hazara communities. I later lost many friends in that movement after the suicide bombing of a peaceful protest in 2016 that killed at least eighty-five people and injured 413.  

When I was young, I believed men held more power that women simply because of their gender. After becoming financially independent, I realized that power comes from working and receiving an income. “Whoever provides the bread, commands” is a saying that I now deeply understand. And this is exactly why the Taliban stopped women from working—to strip them of power and maintain the apartheid regime.

After university, I established my own law firm, where I prosecuted and imprisoned several Taliban soldiers and the organizers of suicide bombings. One case I pursued was the murder of my father in 2019 by the Taliban for building schools and educating girls in Jaghuri. The defendants were sentenced to thirty years in prison, but I received many threats from the Taliban and other groups for prosecuting such cases.

When provinces began to fall in the summer of 2021 and the Taliban released prisoners from the jails, I sought a safe haven for myself and my family and, upon advice from a neighbor who was a former soldier, burned all my documents except my university diploma. By September 2021, however, I joined the ranks of women protesters in the Hazara region west of Kabul. During our peaceful demonstrations, the Taliban beat and pepper sprayed us. When they blocked the streets, we continued our protests from home and found various ways to raise our voices, such as wearing men’s clothing, organizing theater performances, engaging in social and cultural activities, and painting on walls.

But despite our best efforts, the protesters were eventually arrested one by one. The day of my arrest was dark. It resembled a Hollywood movie scene in which military forces raid a terrorist group, except in this case, the Taliban’s target was merely a group of protesting women whose only weapons are their voices. The road was packed with military vehicles and Taliban soldiers, who pounded on the gates and forced them open by threatening to shoot us. They searched us roughly, took our phones, and interrogated us before sorting us into different groups and taking us to the Ministry of Interior. I was terrified.

The next day before sunrise, three Taliban fighters entered the room in which we were being held, mercilessly stepping on the children sleeping in front of the door. One of the fighters called my name, holding up my phone and asking, “Is this your mobile phone?” I denied it, but began to cry after seeing my father’s photo on the screen. He forced me to unlock it and began to go through my videos. After watching a video of us protesting, the fighters asked me why I wasn’t wearing a hijab and why I was shouting in the street. Then they opened my private photos.

Another Taliban member, whom the other fighters called Moin Sahib (Deputy Sir), asked me in Pashto, “Did you go to the protest yourself, or did someone encourage you?” Fearfully, I answered, “Myself.” He slapped me so hard that every time I saw him afterward, I felt like my heart was going to stop, and I trembled with fear. He began swearing at me. A Pashto-speaking female protester stepped between us and explained to the Taliban member that I didn’t understand Pashto and began translating for me. The Taliban member then opened another video that showed this same Pashto-speaking woman in it and took her away with him.   

During my interrogation, the Taliban fighters told me that the death of Hazaras is permissible because they are “Rafizi,” a pejorative term they use for Shias, and all of us are absolute infidels. They said that killing us would open the doors of heaven for them. They also mentioned that if they weren’t under pressure from their higher-ups, they would have killed us right after we were arrested. In the days that followed, they would come late at night to take us to their interrogation rooms, where they would use violence to try to force us to reveal the whereabouts of the other protesting girls.

I soon began to contemplate suicide as a way out. But another one of the imprisoned protesting girls would try and press me to think of seeing my mother and my sister again, even if this prospect felt like a distant dream. 

After twenty days imprisoned in Taliban jails, I was only released after heavy guarantees and a written commitment to cease activism. My mother later told me that she had fallen ill soon after my imprisonment and had gone to beg the Taliban to release me. This breaking of my mother’s pride was the hardest part of my detention and torture.

After my release from prison, I secretly left Afghanistan. It has taken and continues to take a long time to deal with what happened to me. Today, however, the lawsuits and the growing awareness among Afghanistan’s women about the Taliban’s gender apartheid are beginning to heal the wounds they inflicted on our souls and bodies. I believe that international recognition of the Taliban’s gender apartheid will eventually end its rule and open up pathways to bring its members to trial.

Tamana Rezaei, an activist and law graduate, was a barrister in Afghanistan until the Taliban took over.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. This article was edited from an interview with Rezaei by Mursal Sayas.

The post ‘The death of Hazaras is permissible.’ What it’s like to protest the Taliban as a minority woman. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 5, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Sungmin Cho was quoted in The Economist discussing the resilience of liberalism in China. Cho noted that with growing nationalism and government suppression under Xi, support for democratic norms and values has increased over time, indicating a complex and evolving public opinion landscape. 

Fellow

Sungmin Cho

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Cho quoted in The Economist on resilience of liberalism in China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pokrovsk has long been an important Russian objective. Located on a crucial road connecting eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk province with neighboring Dnipro region, the city serves as a key logistical hub for the Ukrainian military. Russian troops have been steadily moving toward Pokrovsk for some months as Vladimir Putin seeks to consolidate his grip on the surrounding area. If the strategically important city falls, it will undermine Ukraine’s defenses while potentially serving as a gateway for further Russian gains.

Ukraine’s leaders are well aware of the stakes but have so far been unable to stop the Russian offensive. There has been considerable speculation that the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region was primarily intended to ease the pressure on Pokrovsk by forcing the Kremlin to redeploy forces. If this was the plan, it has not yet succeeded. Instead, the Russian army appears to be concentrating more troops for the push toward Pokrovsk, and is advancing with increasing speed.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

With the front lines of the war now less than ten kilometers from the city, Pokrovsk residents find themselves confronted by the same nightmare scenarios and impossible choices experienced by huge numbers of Ukrainians since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two and a half years ago. The mandatory evacuation of families with children has been ordered, while a twenty-hour daily curfew has been imposed. Leaving Pokrovsk means abandoning homes, possessions, family members, and all that is familiar. Staying may well prove deadly.

Prior to the war, Pokrovsk had a population of around sixty thousand. By the final week of August, this figure had dropped to approximately half the prewar total. Thousands continue to leave every day. The roads out of Pokrovsk are jammed with cars loaded up to the roof as families evacuate with whatever they can carry. Local institutions such as hospitals and banks are shutting down and preparing to close. Those who have yet to join the exodus are stockpiling water, groceries, and humanitarian aid, while bracing for the worst.

The process of leaving Pokrovsk can be fraught with danger. Evacuation teams try to keep civilian cars on established routes in a bid to maintain a degree of security, but reports of Russian drone and bombing attacks are growing. The thunder of artillery fire in the distance adds to the sense of urgency and uncertainty.

In the city itself, it is possible to encounter extremes of distress, despair, courage, and compassion at virtually every turn. On Samarska Street, half the houses now stand empty. When I visited, one elderly lady was in the process of locking up her home while a car packed with her worldly belongings waited outside. There were also signs of daily life as remaining residents bicycled past to get water from a nearby pipe or visit the local store. Some of those leaving remained defiant, insisting their departure was just a temporary measure. Others claimed they would stay and placed their hopes in Ukraine’s ability to defend the city.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Ukrainian and international volunteers are providing vital support for those seeking to evacuate, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly. These volunteers in many ways capture the indomitable spirit of wartime Ukraine and the sense of solidarity that has enabled the country to keep functioning despite the stunning violence and trauma of Russia’s invasion.

Pokrovsk railway station is one of the busiest places in the city, buzzing with activity and emotion as people wait to board evacuation trains. Railway workers wearing body armor guide passengers to different carriages based on their final destinations throughout Ukraine.

Some are preparing to go further and plan cross the border into the EU. One evacuee, who was traveling with her two children, told me she was heading to Germany and did not know what the future would hold. She was leaving Pokrovsk without her mother and grandmother, who insisted on remaining in their family home despite the rapidly approaching danger.

The harrowing and heroic scenes that are currently unfolding in Pokrovsk have already been replayed in countless Ukrainian towns and cities since February 2022. Every time the Russian army advances, ordinary Ukrainians find themselves forced to make life-changing decisions in incredibly stressful circumstances, often while having to rely on the kindness of strangers in order to survive.

This barely imaginable reality has now reached Pokrovsk. As the city prepares for the anticipated Russian onslaught, local residents are displaying the kind of remarkable resilience that has become a symbol of life in wartime Ukraine. Their desperate plight is a reminder that unless Russia is stopped, millions more will face a similar fate.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 20, 2024

Kursk offensive could help free Ukrainians in Russian captivity

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk Oblast has resulted in the surrender of unprecedented numbers of Russian soldiers, raising hopes of a large-scale prisoner exchange, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 21, 2024

Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to downplay Ukraine’s invasion of Russia have severely dented his strongman image and make a mockery of the West’s escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 15, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia exposes the folly of the West’s escalation fears

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has shown that Putin’s talk of red lines and his nuclear threats are just a bluff to intimidate the West, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Key Ukrainian front line city evacuates as Russian offensive gains pace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This lack of consequences is fueling a growing sense of impunity that can be seen in Russia’s actions. On the eve of the NATO Summit in July, Russia bombed Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital in broad daylight. Empowered by the absence of any discernible international response to the 2023 destruction of Kakhovka Dam, Russia targeted Kyiv’s hydroelectric dam in late August.

Since spring 2024, Russia has destroyed more than half of Ukraine’s energy generation capacity in a clear and calculated attempt to make the country unlivable. Throughout the sweltering summer months, Ukrainians have faced rolling blackouts, with electricity often only available for several hours per day. The Kremlin is hoping things will deteriorate further during the winter season, and intends to freeze Ukrainians into submission.

Despite Russia’s extensive list of crimes in Ukraine, many international voices continue to call for negotiations. These appeals are often accompanied by arguments claiming that the war is “unwinnable” for Ukraine, or suggestions that the West can promote peace simply by ending all military support to Kyiv. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists make no secret of their plans to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. In fact, they often say so explicitly. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev spelled out Moscow’s intentions in July when he stated that Russia would seek to occupy any “remaining Ukrainian lands,” even if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to a ceasefire deal.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

When Western commentators and politicians casually discuss ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia, they typically overlook the fact that the regions in question are home to millions of ordinary Ukrainians. Abandoning these people to indefinite Russian occupation means condemning them to the threat of kidnap, torture, disappearance, and death. Russians will continue erasing all aspects of Ukrainian identity wherever they can.

We have all seen the photos of the dead bodies in Bucha, the mass graves in the forests of Izyum, and the torture cells of Kupiansk. These are not isolated incidents or excesses. They are part of an horrific pattern that is being repeated throughout the areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control. It is grotesque to suggest that legitimizing this occupation will bring peace. And yet that is exactly what many international commentators advocate.

Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding Russia’s intentions. We have learned many hard lessons over the past decade, and have come to understand that modern Russia is fully committed to wiping Ukraine off the map.

In 2014, we lived through the occupation of Crimea and the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and saw how the international community failed to punish Russia in any meaningful way. We witnessed the cynicism of the Minsk Accords, and watched as Russia openly prepared the ground for full-scale genocide.

It appears obvious to Ukrainians that Russia is now seeking breathing space to consolidate its territorial gains and rearm before completing the conquest of Ukraine. Why else would the Kremlin be so insistent that any peace deal must include Ukraine’s international isolation and comprehensive disarmament?

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Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

It is vital to understand that the threat posed by Russia is evolving and extends far beyond Ukraine. Back in 2014, Russia was acting alone. Today, the Kremlin has managed to create a formidable coalition of authoritarian states that share Moscow’s goal of subverting the rules-based world order and replacing it with a lawless alternative governed by the schoolyard principle that “might is right.” The only way to prevent this axis of autocracies from becoming even more powerful is by defeating Russia in Ukraine.

Some say Russia cannot pose any real threat to Europe as the Russian army is fully engaged in the war against Ukraine. This gravely underestimates the scale of Russia’s ambitions. Putin genuinely believes he is on a sacred mission to correct the injustices of the Soviet collapse. He has repeatedly declared that he is reclaiming “historically Russian lands.” These territorial claims extend far beyond Ukraine.

Putin is now being emboldened by repeated signs of Western weakness and a lack of resolve among Ukraine’s partners. If Russia is handed victory in Ukraine, it is absurd to think they will simply stop.

Russia is already intensifying its hybrid war against the West. In recent months, details have emerged of a Russian plot to assassinate the CEO of a leading German defense manufacturer. There are also regular reports of sabotage campaigns, GPS jamming, attempted arson, cyber attacks, election meddling, and strategic corruption.

As Russia’s full-scale invasion passes the two-and-a-half year mark, it is time to acknowledge that supporting Ukraine is not an act of solidarity or charity. In reality, providing Ukraine with the military aid it requires to defeat Russia is the most effective way to prevent further escalation and avoid an even bigger war in the near future.

Kyiv’s wish list is well known. Ukraine needs more air defense systems, long-range missiles, and fighter jets. Crucially, Ukraine’s partners must lift all restructions on the use of Western weapons against military targets inside Russia and agree to shoot down Russian drones and missiles close to their airspace. Smart allies should be looking to boost Ukraine’s ability to defend itself by investing in the country’s rapidly expanding defense sector, while also bankrupting the Russian war machine by tightening sanctions on the country’s oil and gas industry.

Above all, we need to see a fundamental shift in international attitudes toward the war. The future of the world is being decided in Ukraine. It is not enough for countries to say they will stand with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Instead, Ukraine’s partners must define their position as “whatever it takes for victory,” and must act accordingly.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory. This article is an adapted version of an opinion piece that was first published by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 13, 2024

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war

By Mykola Bielieskov

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible despite the increased transparency of the modern battlefield, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 27, 2024

Putin hopes Belarus border bluff can disrupt Ukraine’s invasion of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

With his overstretched army struggling to repel Ukraine’s invasion of Russia, Vladimir Putin has pressed Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to mass troops on the Ukrainian border, but Belarus is unlikely to join the war, writes Peter Dickinson.

Belarus Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 15, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia exposes the folly of the West’s escalation fears

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has shown that Putin’s talk of red lines and his nuclear threats are just a bluff to intimidate the West, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post There can be no European peace without Ukrainian victory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since Ukraine’s invasion of Russia first began on August 6, it has dominated the international headlines and has been one of the top news stories around the world. Everywhere, that is, except Russia itself. While the global press has been reporting breathlessly on the first invasion of Russia since World War II, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media has been instructed to minimize the significance of Ukraine’s offensive and convince domestic audiences that the presence of Ukrainian troops inside Russia’s borders is the “new normal.”

This strategy has been all too evident on Russia’s federal TV channels throughout the past fortnight, with comparatively little coverage of Ukraine’s cross-border operation. Any mentions have typically been accompanied by euphemistic references to “the situation” or “events in Kursk region.” The Kremlin’s intense discomfort was perhaps most immediately obvious on last weekend’s episode of Russia’s flagship current affairs TV show, Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, with Russian MP and studio guest Andrey Gurulyov declaring, “the most important thing is for everyone to shut up.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s propagandists are taking their lead from Putin himself. The Kremlin dictator has remained remarkably tight-lipped over Ukraine’s invasion, and has limited himself to only a handful of public statements. Notably, there have been no attempts to rally the Russian people against the invader or engage in the kind of historical grandstanding that Putin normally favors. On the contrary, he has opted for a strikingly understated approach. Putin initially branded the invasion a “large-scale provocation,” and has since compared the advancing Ukrainian army to “terrorists.”

In recent days, Putin has sought to underline his apparent lack of concern over the invasion of Russia by embarking on a series of routine trips. First, he flew to Azerbaijan for a two-day visit that focused on strengthening bilateral trade ties. Next, he paid his first visit to Chechnya for thirteen years. Neither journey was urgent or in any way connected to Ukraine’s ongoing offensive.

Despite this very deliberate show of indifference, there have been numerous indications that Putin is in reality extremely rattled by the Ukrainian invasion. His evident disdain over the past fortnight while listening to Russian military commanders reporting fake battlefield victories has inspired multiple memes. In one particularly revealing exchange, Putin angrily interceded during a televised government meeting when the acting governor of Kursk region dared to disclose the scale of Ukraine’s territorial gains.

This behavior is nothing new. Indeed, Putin has long been notorious for going missing during times of national crisis, and has added to this unwanted reputation with numerous disappearing acts throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the unprecedented nature of Ukraine’s own counter-invasion makes his recent posture particularly revealing.

New Atlanticist Aug 15, 2024

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive marks Putin’s third major humiliation of the war

By Brian Whitmore

Ukrainian forces’ recent incursion into Kursk Oblast in Russia came as a shock and instantaneously transformed the narrative of the war.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

UkraineAlert Aug 20, 2024

Kursk offensive could help free Ukrainians in Russian captivity

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk Oblast has resulted in the surrender of unprecedented numbers of Russian soldiers, raising hopes of a large-scale prisoner exchange, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 11, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is erasing Vladimir Putin’s last red lines

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has erased the last of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and made a complete mockery of the West’s frequently voiced escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

The Russian ruler’s underwhelming response to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive can be at least partially explained by his genuine shock at what was a totally unexpected turn of events. Crucially, he may also have concluded that the present military situation leaves him with little choice.

Ukraine’s ongoing invasion has exposed the Russian military as dangerously overstretched. With his army fully committed and advancing at great cost in eastern Ukraine, Putin has no significant reserves to call upon and is deeply reluctant to withdraw his best units in order to protect Kursk Oblast. Instead, he is attempting to plug the gap with a ragtag collection of conscripts scraped together from across the Russian Federation. Faced with a choice between conquering Ukraine or defending Russia, it is becoming increasingly obvious that Putin cannot do both.

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In the current circumstances, the Russian ruler may feel his best option is to downgrade Ukraine’s invasion to the level of border skirmish and pretend it is nothing to worry about. With the help of his formidable propaganda machine, this approach may indeed prevent panic from spreading inside Russia. Even so, there is no escaping the fact that by occupying more than one thousand square kilometers of Russian territory, Ukraine has dealt a serious blow to Putin’s strongman image and made a mockery of Russia’s claims to military superpower status. If this situation persists, it will also fatally undermine his ability to intimidate the international community.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin has skillfully employed nuclear blackmail together with frequent warnings of Russian red lines to deter the West from supporting Ukraine. His bully boy approach has proved highly effective, with Western leaders consistently delaying decisions on new categories of military aid for Kyiv and imposing absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to use Western weapons inside Russia. However, this may be about to change. Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that it is possible to cross the reddest of all Russian red lines without sparking World War III. As a consequence, many are now concluding that Putin’s saber-rattling is mere bluster.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has seized on the Kremlin’s weak response to his counter-invasion. He is now arguing that the time has come to abandon the concept of escalation management entirely, and is calling on Kyiv’s allies to lift all restrictions on attacks inside Russia. “The whole naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has crumbled these days somewhere near Sudzha,” Zelenskyy commented on August 20, referencing the largest Russian town currently under Ukrainian occupation.

So far, the US and other key allies have yet to revise existing weapons restrictions or announce any upgrade in arms deliveries to Ukraine. But if Putin continues to downplay the invasion of Russia while failing to retaliate in a manner befitting his country’s superpower pretensions, it will be increasingly difficult to justify the excessive caution that has shaped the international response to Russia’s war. Putin succeeded in bluffing the world for almost two-and-a-half years, but Ukraine has now called his bluff in the most emphatic manner.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jul 30, 2024

Paris Olympics: Ukrainian dedicates medal to athletes killed by Russia

By Mark Temnycky

Ukrainian fencing star Olga Kharlan has won the country’s first medal at the 2024 Paris Olympics and dedicated her medal to the Ukrainian athletes “who couldn’t be here because they were killed by Russia,” writes Mark Temnycky .

Conflict France

UkraineAlert Aug 8, 2024

Ukraine continues to expand drone bombing campaign inside Russia

By Marcel Plichta

Ukraine’s long-range drone bombing campaign targeting military and industrial sites inside Russia has had a dramatic series of successes over the last few weeks, writes Marcel Plichta.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Aug 6, 2024

Russia’s Black Sea defeats get flushed down Vladimir Putin’s memory hole

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s readiness to flush Russia’s Black Sea naval defeats down the memory hole is a reminder that the Kremlin propaganda machine controls Russian reality and can easily rebrand any retreat from Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These steps are encouraging and indicate welcome Western awareness of the repression that continues to define the political climate in today’s Belarus. Nevertheless, there is still a sense that not nearly enough is being done by the international community to challenge the impunity enjoyed by Lukashenka and members of his regime.

These concerns were amplified recently when the largest prisoner swap between the Kremlin and the West since the Cold War went ahead without featuring any Belarusian political prisoners. Lukashenka himself was closely involved in the complex negotiations behind the exchange. The Belarusian dictator agreed to free German national Rico Krieger, who was being held in Minsk on terrorism charges, as part of efforts to convince the German government to release Russian secret service assassin Vadim Krasikov.

Many have questioned why prominent Belarusian pro-democracy leader Maria Kalesnikava, who had previously lived for many years in Germany, was not also freed as part of the trade. Kalesnikava was jailed amid nationwide protests following Lukashenka’s rigged 2020 election. One of the figureheads of the anti-Lukashenka protest movement, she has reportedly been suffering from deteriorating health for the past year and a half. Similar questions were also asked regarding fellow political prisoners Ales Bialiatski, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, and Ihar Losik, a prominent blogger and journalist for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Four years since the sham ballot that sparked the biggest protests of Lukashenka’s three-decade reign, he appears more comfortable than ever with the idea of holding large numbers of political prisoners as hostages. This must change. With no regime-linked Belarusians in Western custody who are anything like as valuable as Krasikov was to Putin, other approaches are clearly needed to increase the pressure on Lukashenka and convince him to release political prisoners.

Economic measures can be used to target the largely state-controlled Belarusian economy, but this is more likely to have an impact as part of a long-term strategy. One alternative approach would be to engage third parties such as China, which has considerable influence in Minsk. Earlier diplomatic efforts succeeded in securing the release of US citizen Vital Shkliarau, indicating that negotiations of this nature can yield results.

Finding the right formula to keep up the pressure on individual members of the Lukashenka regime is crucial. At present, comparatively few of those involved in repressive measures are subject to international sanctions. For example, I was recently sentenced in absentia by a Belarusian court to ten years in prison alongside nineteen other independent Belarusian analysts and journalists. The judge in our case has a history of handing down lengthy sentences to prominent opposition figures, but has yet to be sanctioned.

During the past four years, only 261 Belarusians have been placed on the EU sanctions list. While the work of sanctions teams is commendable, their capacity is limited. Past experience has also demonstrated how sanctions can be sabotaged, as was the case in 2020 when Cyprus was accused of blocking the introduction of new restrictions against Belarus. There is also room to improve cooperation between Western partners, with a view to developing a more unified approach to sanctions.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Strikingly, the quantity of Belarusians currently facing Western sanctions is far less the almost 1,400 political prisoners in the country’s prisons. According to human rights groups, tens of thousands of Belarusians in total have been detained in recent years for political reasons. Behind these arrests and prosecutions stands an army of enablers including government officials, security personnel, and judges. The vast majority of these people have yet to be held accountable by the international community for their role in the repressive policies of the Belarusian authorities.

There are some indications that Western policymakers are looking to broaden the scope of sanctions and increase individual accountability. However, while the recent round of sanctions included new measures targeting officials responsible for regime propaganda, other representatives of the Belarusian state media received international accreditation to cover the Olympics in Paris.

The West already has powerful tools at its disposal that can realistically make Belarusian officials consider the consequences of their actions. Standard personal sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes go far beyond mere symbolism and are capable of creating problems that can have far-reaching practical implications in everyday life. However, more leverage is required in order to maintain the pressure on the regime and on the individuals responsible for specific abuses.

Looking ahead, the West needs to make the issue of political prisoners far more uncomfortable for the entire Lukashenka regime. There is no single solution to this problem; instead, a range of options should be explored including broad economic restrictions, personal sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. Crucially, sanctions should be applied to thousands of officials rather than just a few hundred. The end goal must be to significantly raise the costs of the repressive policies pursued by Lukashenka and all those who enable his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 13, 2024

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war

By Mykola Bielieskov

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible despite the increased transparency of the modern battlefield, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 11, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is erasing Vladimir Putin’s last red lines

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has erased the last of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and made a complete mockery of the West’s frequently voiced escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 8, 2024

Ukraine continues to expand drone bombing campaign inside Russia

By Marcel Plichta

Ukraine’s long-range drone bombing campaign targeting military and industrial sites inside Russia has had a dramatic series of successes over the last few weeks, writes Marcel Plichta.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Belarus’s political prisoners must not be forgotten appeared first on Atlantic Council.

An initiative led by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State continues to focus on facilitating greater constructive exchange among multisectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the ninth Summit of the Americas. This readout was informed by a private, information-gathering roundtable and several one-on-one conversations with leading experts in the digital space.

Executive summary

At the ninth Summit of the Americas, regional leaders agreed on the adoption of a Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation that reaffirmed the need for a dynamic and resilient digital ecosystem that promotes digital inclusion for all peoples. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the digital divide globally, but these gaps were shown to be deeper in developing countries, disproportionately affecting women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable and/or marginalized individuals. Through this agenda, inclusive workforce development remains a key theme as an avenue to help bridge the digital divide and skills gap across the Americas.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s consultative process, thought leaders and practitioners evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation agreed on at the Summit of Americas, resulting in three concrete recommendations: (1) leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda; (2) strengthen public-private partnerships and multisectoral coordination to ensure adequate financing for tailored capacity-building programs, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and internet access; and (3) prioritize the involvement of local youth groups and civil society organizations, given their on-the-ground knowledge and role as critical indicators of implementation.

Recommendations for advancing digitalization and workforce development in the Americas:

Report

May 31, 2024

PACC 2030 objectives: The road to implementation

By Wazim Mowla, Charlene Aguilera

The Atlantic Council organized a PACC 2030 Working Group and worked closely with governments, the business community, and civil society organizations to support the implementation of PACC 2030’s objectives.

Caribbean Climate Change & Climate Action

Report

Apr 16, 2024

Advancing health and resilience policies in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Isabel Chiriboga, Martin Cassinelli, Diego Area

During an off-the-record private roundtable, thought leaders and practitioners from across the Americas discussed how to further enhance access to and finance for health services and products in the region.

Coronavirus Latin America

Summit of the Americas

An initiative led by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council in partnership with the US Department of State focused on facilitating greater, constructive exchange among multi-sectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement Summit commitments.

Staff

Isabel Chiriboga

Assistant Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Colombia Corruption

Staff

Maite Gonzalez Latorre

Program Assistant

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Education

Former staff

Diego Area

Former Director, Strategic Development Partnerships

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Crisis Management Democratic Transitions

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post The future of digital transformation and workforce development in Latin America and the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Svetlova in Haaretz: The tragedy in Majdal exposed the trap of the Druze, and obliges Israel to stand by their side appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the Call to Action, the secretary-general makes clear that governments and policymakers must protect and care for the lives and livelihoods of frontline communities, protect workers, advance the evidence base to drive innovative resilience solutions, and limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius. 

This clear recognition from the Office of the Secretary-General is an important moment for us all. Extreme heat is often underestimated and ignored, but its impacts are unavoidable. The planet is heating up faster than we thought. We are outside scientific model predictions and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and devastating. 

Rising heat affects our major critical systems—such as water, energy, food, transportation, and communications. It also feeds mega droughts, wildfires, and storms, creating cascading and compounding crises. It’s a global crisis. But we are not ready for any of it. We’re sleepwalking.

In my work as global chief heat officer and first chief heat officer for the city of Athens, I have worked directly with cities and have seen the impacts of heat firsthand. Cities are heating up at twice the rate of the global average. At 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming, sixty-seven cities will experience 150 or more days per year of temperatures exceeding 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit). At 2 degrees Celsius, the number jumps to ninety-four cities. At just under 3 degrees Celsius of global warming, it soars to 197 cities.  

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded. But the rising temperatures mark a global crisis with local impacts. That’s why the global focus of the UN’s Call to Action is so crucial. Increasingly, our world is facing challenges that go beyond the capacity and limited mandate of single nation states. We’re facing crises, like climate change, that need international cooperation to support and facilitate equitable, multilevel, science-based decision making and solutions. The UN is the only legitimate multilateral governance structure able to address issues that need global mobilization and localized solutions. As cities take on climate change, they need support at every level.  

In 2022, globally, humanity spent a little over one trillion dollars on adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. For comparison, the world spent $11.7 trillion on COVID-19 emergency fiscal measures in 2020 alone. As temperatures rise, this funding gap is a dangerous threat. And there is another issue that needs to be urgently addressed: In 2022, about one trillion dollars went to financing emissions mitigation, while only one hundred billion dollars went to adaptation and resilience-building initiatives. We urgently need both climate adaptation and resilience financing. 

The UN’s Call to Action is an important milestone for climate resilience, but it is also only the beginning. As the document explains, the world urgently needs a Global Action Strategy to “mobilize governments, policy makers, and all stakeholders to act, prevent, and reduce heat risk.” A dedicated trust fund for urban heat resilience initiatives is also needed, because cities are on the frontlines of extreme heat, and they are where more than half of the world’s population lives—a share that is expected to rise to seven-in-ten people by midcentury. Finally, more dedicated heat champions, like the community of chief heat officers established by the Arsht-Rock Resilience Center, with heat resilience departments that can articulate the challenges and co-create the best solutions are needed. These champions are critical to ensuring that the dangers of—and the solutions to—extreme heat are understood widely.

Each of these essential efforts, as well as others, requires building an international consensus around the scope of the problem and its solutions. Here, the UN’s Call to Action on Extreme Heat can help shape conversations in positive directions at upcoming conferences such as Climate Week NYC and this year’s UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29. Heat resilience must be at the top of the agenda at these and other international meetings, and work is needed at every level to ensure that cities have the support and finances they need to scale solutions.

As the Call to Action makes clear, everyone is at risk from extreme heat, and we must enable resilience at the local and international level, taking “bold decisions to change the way we live to avoid an even more scorched Earth in the future.” 

Eleni Myrivili is the world’s first global chief heat officer, a role jointly created and appointed by the Atlantic Council’s Arsht-Rock Resilience Center and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).

The post The world is sleepwalking into an era of extreme heat. The UN just issued a wake-up call.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2024

Ukraine is making the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s growing air strike capabilities are decimating Russian air defenses in Crimea and making the occupation of the peninsula increasingly untenable, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The 2003 US-led invasion, which led to the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein, presented an opportunity to rebuild Iraq’s educational system. While there were initial efforts to revitalize schools and universities, the ongoing violence and political instability hindered sustained progress. Corruption, sectarian strife, and the absence of coherent education policies exacerbated the challenges. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) severely disrupted the educational system in areas under its control. Despite these hurdles, there were pockets of progress, particularly in the autonomous Kurdistan region, which began to chart its course for educational reform.

Today, with 60 percent of Iraqis under the age of twenty-five, the nation’s education system is at a critical juncture. The young population represents both a tremendous opportunity and a daunting challenge. High unemployment rates and inadequate educational facilities threaten to undermine the potential of youth contributing to the country’s rebuilding efforts. The lack of investment in modern educational infrastructure and the disconnect between educational outcomes and labor-market needs are stark.

For instance, according to a 2021 IREX report, only 22 percent of university graduates find jobs in their field of study within three months of graduating. This highlights the critical need for a more responsive education system that meets the market’s needs. According to the World Bank, 2 million Iraqi children are deprived of education, presenting a significant challenge for their future prospects. In addition, literacy rates remain alarmingly low, especially among women.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has recognized the urgency of addressing these issues. The cabinet has developed Vision 2030, which prioritizes enhancing and adapting education to support economic diversification. This unprecedented framework aims to align Kurdistan’s educational system with international standards, while fostering a workforce capable of driving economic growth across sectors. A key element of this vision is establishing the Kurdistan Accrediting Association for Education (KAAE), a national accreditation body designed to bridge the educational gap and propel the region into the twenty-first century.

Because standardization can serve as leverage for reform, the KAAE seeks to establish standards to ensure that educational institutions in Kurdistan and Iraq meet rigorous quality-assurance requirements. By promoting best practices and fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement, the KAAE, as a twelve/fifteen-year project, aims to support the government in establishing sound policies for educational quality, making it more relevant to the needs of the economy and society. This initiative is crucial for modernizing Kurdistan’s education system and enabling it to catch up with global advancements, as it is for Iraq and the broader region when used as a model.

Strategic investment in education

Effective implementation of the KAAE’s quality-assurance standards necessitates leveraging the expertise and experience of the international community in building the capacity of academic institutions. The United States and Iraq have a framework agreement that identifies education as a cornerstone of bilateral relations as part of the broader cultural cooperation between the two countries. It is now time to translate this agreement into action. Strengthening this partnership can have far-reaching reverberations beyond education, fostering economic development, political stability, and social cohesion. While the United States has invested significantly in Iraq’s reconstruction, this has been disproportionately allocated to the security sector. According to the Military Times, the United States has spent nearly $2 trillion on military operations in Iraq. Even a fraction of this amount, 1 percent, would have a transformational impact if directed toward educational initiatives.

Investing in Iraq’s education system offers a unique opportunity for the United States to not only support a key ally but also address the root causes of instability in the region. The United States can help build the foundation for a stable and prosperous Iraq by directing resources toward educational reform. This investment would both strengthen US public diplomacy and promote the values of democracy and human rights, which are integral to long-term peace and security. Such support includes establishing partnerships between US schools and universities and their Iraqi counterparts to implement the quality-assurance standards the KAAE sets. These partnerships could focus on building capacity and mentorship, embedding student-centered learning in curricula, and creating continuous assessment and evaluation strategies. Because the Kurdistan region has already established the KAAE, this could serve as a pilot model for Iraq as a whole, with the goal of replicating the body in other parts of Iraq.

Countries like Singapore and South Korea provide valuable lessons in how education can drive national development. Both nations have transformed their economies through substantial investments in education, focusing on skills development and innovation. For example, South Korea’s emphasis on technology and vocational training has made it a global industry leader. Similarly, Singapore’s education system, known for its rigor and focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), has produced a highly skilled workforce that drives the country’s ongoing economic success.

By supporting similar models in Iraq, the United States can help foster an education system that not only equips young Iraqis with the skills and qualifications the local market and economy need, both today and in the long term, but also cultivates critical thinking and innovation. This approach aligns with the US strategy of promoting regional stability through economic development and education.

The role of education in peace and security

Enhancing education in Iraq is not just about economic growth; it is a crucial element of peacebuilding. Education fosters understanding, tolerance, and critical thinking, which are essential for mitigating conflict and promoting social cohesion. A well-educated populace is better equipped to participate in democratic processes and contribute to the nation’s development. By investing in education, Iraq can build a more inclusive society in which young people are empowered to contribute positively to their communities.

For Iraq, education is more than a policy priority; it is a pathway to peace and prosperity. The United States can play a critical role in achieving such prosperity. By leveraging initiatives like the KAAE and drawing on successful global models, Iraq can transform its education system, paving the way for a brighter future. This investment is not just about building schools; it is about building a nation with a capable and empowered citizenry.

The United States and the international community can seize this opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to a stable and prosperous Iraq, promoting a region where education empowers young people as agents of positive change.

Dr. Honar Issa is the secretary of the Board of Trustees at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK). He also serves as chair of the Middle East Peace and Security Forum.

The post Investing in Iraq’s education will contribute to its revival appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed new federal regulations to protect workers. When the heat index reaches or exceeds 80 degrees Fahrenheit, employers would be required to monitor workers and provide water and rest areas. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit, more protections kick in, including mandatory fifteen-minute rest breaks every two hours and monitoring employees for signs of heat-related illnesses.

Heat-related illnesses have been recognized as occupational hazards for a decade, with an estimated 2,300 workers in the United States dying from extreme heat exposure last year alone. However, this number is likely an undercount and does not capture the many more who suffered nonlethal or chronic heat-related illnesses, as well as workers who injured themselves on the job due to the heat. For instance, researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles found that workers in California are up to 9 percent more likely to suffer a workplace injury on days with temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than on days that are between 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This is a problem that will only get worse. The summer is only a few weeks underway in the Northern Hemisphere, and already more than one hundred million US residents have been exposed to extreme heat.

What comes next?

Despite the need for action, OSHA’s proposal will have significant opponents. Industry groups are gearing up for battle, arguing that the rule will be both administratively cumbersome and costly. This is a sentiment that some political leaders have already embraced. Earlier this year, both Florida and Texas enacted state-wide bans to prevent localities from instituting their own worker-protection ordinances. Both state governments are unlikely to accept OSHA’s proposal without protest. In fact, despite the persistent threat of extreme heat, only five states have extreme heat worker protections: California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.  

The argument that extreme heat worker protections will come at a cost often ignores the very real cost of maintaining the status quo under dangerously high temperatures. Aside from the price that workers pay with their health, extreme heat in the workplace has significant economic impacts, from lost labor productivity to healthcare costs. The high and growing price of extreme heat on US residents’ lives and livelihoods illustrates not only that this new rule is necessary, but also that, on its own, it is not enough.

Since 2021, the Biden administration has worked to reestablish the role of the United States as a leader in the fight against climate change, both domestically and abroad. This new rule could help cement the United States’ leadership role on climate—but only if it is properly enforced and expanded upon. For the rule to be effective, the administration should continue significantly utilizing OSHA’s National Emphasis Program for Outdoor and Indoor Heat-Related Hazards, which gives it latitude to direct resources toward both employer education on heat safety protocols and inspections that will better ensure compliance.

The Biden administration should also leverage existing funds to ensure that workers remain safe even when they head home for the day. As temperatures rise across the United States and the world, workplace regulations alone will not be enough to adequately protect workers. Federal agencies should incentivize states to direct Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) funding toward cooling assistance in vulnerable households, and lawmakers should ensure that LIHEAP is funded adequately to cover energy needs during both the summer and winter months. Currently, only approximately 5 percent of LIHEAP’s four billion dollars in funding goes to cooling assistance (heating receives ten times as much), despite the accelerating demand for relief from high nighttime temperatures that place a significant burden on the human body, and which can lead to heat exhaustion while on the job.  

Ultimately however, this issue cannot be solved at the federal level alone. It also requires efforts at the state and local level to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and individuals are being identified and solutions tailored to local contexts are being implemented. The appointment of a Chief Heat Officer (CHO), at the city, county, or state level, is one tool that can address the local challenges of extreme heat. Local governments such as Miami-Dade County, Phoenix, and Los Angeles have already taken this approach. Local climate leaders—like CHOs—are well positioned to work closely with their communities to tailor solutions to meet their specific needs and to create a unified response to build resilience to extreme heat both during the workday and off the clock.

Catherine Wallace is the associate director of strategic partnerships and advocacy for the extreme heat resilience pillar of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

Owen Gow is the deputy director for the extreme heat resilience pillar at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

The post Feeling the heat? Biden’s proposed protections for workers are a welcome start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Unfortunately, this is a familiar scene for the region, which routinely battles the effects of extreme weather events and climate change. Hurricane Beryl once again spotlights why focusing on the mitigation of climate change, through such methods as cutting carbon emissions, alone is insufficient. Caribbean countries must prioritize climate adaptation as the primary mechanism to withstand hurricanes and other baked-in effects of climate change.

Climate adaptation is the answer to these extreme weather events, but it requires significant investment that governments in the Caribbean cannot afford. International support, including private finance, is needed. In five months, the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29, will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. It has been dubbed the “finance COP,” and there governments and the private sector should come together and show the commercial utility of prioritizing climate adaptation. Doing so can unlock new financing and create project pipelines that are commercially attractive to global investors.

The Caribbean is often categorized as the world’s most vulnerable region to climate change. Seventy percent of the region’s population lives or works on the coast, meaning that storm surges from hurricanes affect businesses, lifestyles, and government operations. Hurricanes and strong storms also bring the tourism industry to a halt, disproportionately affecting the region’s tourism-dependent economies and severely slowing economic growth. Hurricane Maria in 2017 cost Dominica an estimated 225 percent of its gross domestic product, while Hurricane Irma in the same year cost Antigua and Barbuda more than $136 million in damages, of which the tourism industry represented 44 percent.

Strong storms damage critical infrastructure. Downed power lines cause widespread power outages, while flooded roads and bridges can prevent rescue operations. Already, Hurricane Beryl has caused power outages in Saint Lucia, and homes in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have lost their roofs. And stronger storms lead to longer recovery periods, which can increase governments’ public debt as they borrow at high interest rates from multilateral institutions to rebuild after the storm has passed. Six years after Hurricane Maria, for example, citizens in Dominica are still rebuilding.

Withstanding strong storms and other effects of climate change requires new climate adaptation projects. For hurricanes with high wind speeds (such as Beryl, which sustained wind speeds of 150 mph at its peak), it is necessary to retrofit infrastructure to be resilient. To achieve this, governments need to require building codes for new homes and infrastructure that ensure sufficient resilience across structures. To brace for storm surges, governments need to move water and energy infrastructure underground where possible to avoid damage. New sea walls and flood protection systems also need to be built.

In all, the region needs more than $100 billion dollars in investment to meet its climate adaptation goals, but it has only been approved for less than one billion dollars from various climate funds. Governments are often left to fend for themselves, taking high-interest loans (due to the classification of many Caribbean nations as middle- and high-income economies by the World Bank) since they often do not qualify for concessional financing. At the same time, governments have borne the brunt of the responsibility because these types of climate adaptation projects are not always attractive to the private sector. Retrofitting infrastructure and other climate adaptation projects, for example, have high upfront costs with little return on investment.

COP29 is an opportunity to bring the public and private sector together to unlock new financing and advance climate adaptation projects. The private sector—both in the region and around the world—has access to needed technologies and has the capacity to undertake climate adaptation projects, from providing drainage on roads and bridges to help ease flash flooding to building decentralized energy grid infrastructure to limit widespread blackouts. Climate adaptation is, after all, in the private sector’s interest. If the effects of hurricanes and climate change worsen and the region’s economies slow, then businesses’ profits will be affected.

What will it take to get the private sector more involved? Attracting private sector participation requires regulatory reforms and carve outs by governments to ensure that companies yield a return on projects. Governments can provide incentives, such as giving exclusive benefits to companies participating in projects and providing subsidies or tax exemptions on materials used. Equally important is access to low-cost finance and capital. Governments can work with institutions such as IDB Invest and global donors that provide grant finance to funnel capital to companies undertaking long-term developments while engaging with insurance agencies that can underwrite riskier projects. 

Caribbean leaders have begun to explore private sector participation in climate adaptation projects, notably through the Bridgetown Initiative and the Blue Green Investment Corporation, but there is still work to be done. COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community. Doing so requires flexibility from both sectors and a focus on projects that are investment-friendly and can attract global donors. 

In the lead-up to COP29, governments will need to begin laying the regulatory groundwork and soliciting the required technical assistance from development institutions to encourage private sector participation. Moreover, Caribbean governments should consider adding or increasing the size of the private sector groups to their delegations for COP29 to ensure they have a seat at the table and are bought into any signed agreements. Building these public-private relationships can go a long way toward showing global donors and companies the viability of investing in climate adaptation projects in the Caribbean and unlock needed capital that can save lives in the long run.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Hurricane Beryl spotlights the importance of climate adaptation in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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What a difference a year can make. Last summer, I was part of the annual Atlantic Council delegation and research trip to Taiwan that met with then President Tsai Ing-wen. Last week, I again visited Taipei with a delegation that included Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, during which we met with newly inaugurated President Lai Ching-te. I came away impressed by the progress of Taiwan’s defenses since our last visit. Taipei has continued military reforms and modernization, while shifting more attention and resources to “asymmetric warfare” approaches. And it is incorporating lessons learned from the war in Ukraine into its military planning, doctrine, and force structure. For example, after seeing the effectiveness of drones in Ukraine, Taiwan accelerated and expanded its efforts to field unmanned aerial systems. During our visit, the news broke that Washington had approved Taiwan purchasing over one thousand US-made armed drones.

I also saw momentum toward fully implementing the “all-out national defense” concept, emphasized under Tsai. Most notably, since our last visit, Taiwan followed through with executing plans to extend conscription from four months to one year. This year, a new word was also at the forefront—resilience—mentioned first by some key Taiwanese officials. Resilience was also raised by delegation members, in part because several of us had read a soon-to-be-published draft study on improving Taiwan’s resilience led by Atlantic Council Board Director and Distinguished Fellow Franklin Kramer, along with Philip Yu, Joseph Webster, and Elizabeth Sizeland. For Taiwan, resilience is a term whose exact meaning can be difficult to nail down—as we observed in our discussions—but I considered it to mean Taiwan’s will and ability to withstand Chinese coercion, as well as to adapt and sustain its defenses while under attack.

These opportunities for on-the-ground observations and interactions with officials, experts, and private sector leaders in Taiwan have been enlightening. This was only my second trip to Taiwan despite a longtime personal and professional interest in this embattled island on China’s doorstep. In my US government service as an intelligence officer and strategist, I had been stationed in South Korea for a dozen years, and I had also visited military bases, diplomatic posts, and other sites around the region—but never in Taiwan. The unique “unofficial” relationship between Washington and Taipei—along with decades of US deference to Beijing’s sensitivities—has resulted in, as in my case, many career US military officers and government officials never visiting Taiwan while on duty. Despite the best efforts of the de facto US “country team,” the American Institute in Taiwan, to ensure that US policymakers and analysts are well-informed, this anomaly of so little on-the-ground exposure among US national security professionals may cloud US analysis of Taiwan issues.

In contrast, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s intentions should be clear to Washington: Xi wants to bring Taiwan under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control, by force if necessary. When Xi and his top officials plan to accomplish this goal—and through what combination of subversion, coercion, strangulation, quarantine, blockade, bombardment, and invasion—is less clear and likely depends on unpredictable variables. (The Atlantic Council is exploring this further in its “Tiger Project” covering war and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.)

Some commentators, like our own Brian Kerg, point to the challenges of a cross-strait amphibious attack on Taiwan and emphasize the importance of countering other threats. Other US experts consider invasion to be a plausible “worst case” or “most dangerous” near-future scenario that should be the focus among these various threats. These experts recommend that Taiwan and the United States accelerate their preparations to quickly counter an invasion across the Taiwan Strait as the top priority. Evocative wording plays a part in this focus. Metaphorically turning the Taiwan Strait into a “boiling moat,” as depicted by Matt Pottinger and his colleagues, or into an “unmanned hellscape,” as described by US Indo-Pacific Command’s Admiral Samuel Paparo, often drives conversations on deterrence and defense against China to begin and end with stopping a cross-strait attack. So, too, does more technical terminology, such as Elbridge Colby’s “forward denial defense.” This focus could help deter Beijing from invasion by convincing it that landings are likely to be defeated before they can gain a foothold, but this is a risky bet.

Many Taiwanese officials instead appear to be emphasizing the broader importance of preparing for a sustained defense and ensuring resilience beyond just preparing to stop a cross-strait invasion. The idea that such resilience would contribute to deterrence resonated in some discussions, but one senior nongovernment expert scoffed at the idea that Taiwan’s resilience matters for deterring Xi. He argued that only credible threats to impose unacceptable costs or outright defeat of an invasion would be sufficient. But I question what sort of punishment, short of nuclear strikes, could inflict enough costs in mere weeks if Xi believed that Taiwan was not resilient enough to last very long.

More importantly, a focus on stopping an invasion force does little to deter and defeat other forms of attack aimed at subjugating Taiwan, such as persistent informational pressure and subversion to undermine Taiwan’s will from within, slow “strangulation” through internationally isolating Taiwan and wearing it down with military threats and coercion, and a bombardment or blockade designed to rapidly break Taiwan’s will to resist. The endgame of such scenarios would be either the arrival of a Chinese occupation force, rather than an invasion force, or a political settlement in which Taipei cedes control to Beijing.

When considering how long Taiwan could resist determined military pressure, perhaps the most worrisome point is its energy sector’s near-total reliance on imports by sea combined with insufficient stockpiles. As a result, the disruption or blockade of Taiwan’s sea lines of communication could quickly cripple its electrical power grid, economy, military logistics, and food distribution.

With this in mind, I looked out the window during our late-night flight home and snapped a few photos of the dazzling lights of the Port of Taipei. The view reminded me of the contrasting nighttime satellite photos of a well-lit South Korea next to a mostly pitch-black North Korea, and I pictured how the scene could quickly fall dark under a Chinese blockade. How would the people of Taiwan react? Taiwan can and should improve its energy resilience to be able to keep the lights on even during a lengthy blockade. But thriving maritime commerce will remain Taiwan’s economic lifeblood, so its people will still have to be willing to endure great sacrifices to preserve their freedom in the event China uses force.

To be fair, Taiwanese themselves—including scholars and business leaders we met—have wide-ranging views on the resilience and will to fight of the people of Taiwan. We were also struck by polling data that tells contrasting stories. First, poll after poll shows that a clear majority opposes accepting CCP rule of Taiwan. This is a strong foundation to work with. However, only just less than half of Taiwanese surveyed are “very willing” to fight to defend Taiwan. The good news is that this number can be increased. As one expert in public opinion shared with us, other polls show that Taiwanese are more likely to be willing to fight after receiving military training and if Taiwan can hold out after an initial attack.

Far more concerning, one independent poll we were briefed on suggested that Beijing and Moscow have a sympathetic ear among a large minority of Taiwanese. Given these polls and China’s unrelenting and insidious information warfare, our delegation came away concerned by the threat of subversion to Taiwan’s democracy. But in the next few years, such information warfare is unlikely to be decisive on its own. Instead, it could undermine Taiwan’s unity and will to resist if Beijing forced the issue. In short, if it came to blockade, bombardment, or invasion—accompanied by an information campaign and cyberattacks—would the Taiwanese people fold or fight? This is one question that Taiwanese institutions, such as the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, are exploring.  

In unstructured discussions among members of our delegation, several of us came to the informal conclusion that leadership could be decisive in answering that question—citing positive examples present and past, including Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Winston Churchill, Ulysses S. Grant, and George Washington. The personal resilience of Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership, along with its determination to ensure continued investments in resilience, could determine Taiwan’s resilience under Chinese attack. This gives me cause for optimism.

Not all of the Taiwanese public has awoken to the rising Chinese threat, and much work remains, but Taiwan grows more resilient by the day. Taiwan’s freedom may hinge on its people’s willingness to invest and make sacrifices to prepare to face unrelenting pressure, up to and including blockade, bombardment, and invasion. Deterrence by preparing military capabilities that could deny success to Chinese invaders or threaten severe punishment will continue to be important, but these capabilities may not matter if Taiwan folds or breaks as Chinese pressure and aggression ramps up. Improving deterrence through resilience—by visibly ensuring Taiwan’s ability to absorb, endure, adapt, and resist—could be the key to Taiwan’s survival.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, leading the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He is a former senior US government official with two decades of service as an intelligence officer and strategist, including twelve years stationed overseas in the region. He posts as @Mister_G_2 on X.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Taiwan was supported by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO). This analysis was informed by the research trip and by Atlantic Council activities sponsored by the US Department of Defense. It represents the author’s views and not those of the government of Taiwan or any US government entity.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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For more than two years, Ukrainian commanders have been adapting to rapidly evolving battlefield conditions shaped by the use of drones. In the initial weeks of the war, Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were instrumental in allowing Ukraine to strike over-stretched Russian lines as Putin’s invading army attempted to take Kyiv. A range of countermeasures, including increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, have since created an environment where Russian and Ukrainian forces are constantly competing to gain an innovative edge over their adversaries. Many view this military tech contest as the decisive front of the war. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As the front line stabilized during the first winter of Russia’s invasion, trench warfare became the defining feature of the conflict, with drones filling the skies and searching for targets. This has created unprecedented visibility on both sides of the front lines and made offensive operations increasingly challenging. A large proportion of the drones buzzing above the Ukrainian battlefield in winter 2022 were Chinese in origin, which placed Russia at a significant advantage due to Moscow’s close ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, many of the Western drone models used in Ukraine have proved costly and ineffective, according to the Wall Street Journal. Additionally, delays in military aid have underlined the risks for Ukraine of relying too heavily on the country’s Western partners. These factors have helped convince policymakers in Kyiv to concentrate on the development of their own domestic drone industry. They have been able to call upon Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector to support these efforts.

With Ukraine typically losing thousands of drones per month, keeping production costs as low as possible is vital. Flexibility in drone operations is also essential, as drone units frequently use 3D printing to modify and adapt parts to meet specific needs. With this in mind, Ukraine has adopted a decentralized approach to drone development that allows for rapid testing and deployment.

Ukraine’s emphasis on agility contrasts with the more centralized military structure favored by the Kremlin. While Russia can produce vast quantities of military equipment, comparatively slower decision-making processes and bureaucratic inefficiencies often hinder the Kremlin’s ability to respond swiftly to new battlefield realities. Many analysts believe this was a factor behind the recent appointment of a technocrat economist as Russia’s new defense minister.

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The growth of Ukraine’s domestic drone industry over the past two years has been striking, with more than 200 drone-manufacturing companies created. The Ukrainian authorities have allocated $2 billion for the production of drones in 2024, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy setting an annual production target of one million FPV drones.

Ukraine’s leaders hope more drones will mean less reliance on traditional munitions and fewer casualties. “We don’t have as many human resources as Russia. They fight, they die, they send more people, they don’t care, but that’s not how we see war,” commented Alex Bornyakov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Digital Transformation.

A key element in Ukraine’s drone strategy is the BRAVE1 initiative, a government-led defense tech cluster established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the public and private sectors. This cluster has helped numerous companies cut through red tape, speeding up the implementation of new technologies to support Ukraine’s defense.

The race to innovate is relentless, with Ukraine’s steadily improving drone capabilities mirrored by Russia’s own rapidly expanding electronic warfare arsenal. Ukrainian engineers are now attempting to overcome the Kremlin’s increasingly sophisticated jamming efforts by embedding artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into drones. This innovation has already played a part in Kyiv’s long-range drone strike campaign against Russia’s energy industry, with CNN reporting that Ukraine has employed AI-enabled drones to hit targets as far away as Russia’s Tatarstan region, well over one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border.

Ukraine’s partners certainly seem to recognize the importance of drones and have set up an international drone coalition to aid deliveries. In a further example of institutional innovation, Ukraine has this year become the first nation to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s drone warfare strategy will continue to focus on flexibility, innovation, and the daily challenge of maintaining a technological advantage over Russia. Ukraine’s leaders know they cannot hope to defeat Russia in a traditional war of attrition, and must instead make the most of the agility and technological ingenuity that the country has demonstrated since February 2022. As Ukraine’s understanding of drone warfare continues to evolve, the outside world will be watching and learning.   

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Just a week before his Cannes debut, the internationally acclaimed filmmaker fled Iran on foot after being handed an eight-year sentence and other judgments for clandestinely making his latest movie, The Seed of the Sacred Fig. That film, which defies mandatory hijab restrictions and uses the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising as a backdrop, went on to win the Special Jury Prize at the 2024 Cannes Film Festival.

In recent weeks, the Iranian government’s unprecedented punitive measures against Rasoulof and dissident rapper Toomaj, as he is known to his followers, have ignited widespread controversy, sparking condemnations from civil rights and human rights bodies alike.

These recent decisions have set new precedents in the history of a regime notorious for its draconian punishments.

Rasoulof’s sentencing was the harshest ever imposed on a filmmaker in the history of the Islamic Republic, topping the six years given to fellow director Jafar Panahi. Meanwhile, the death sentence issued by Iran’s judiciary for Toomaj marks an unprecedented decision against a singer.

Open criticism of the regime is what both artists have in common.

To observers, the Islamic Republic’s generic enmity toward artists is now an open secret. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and his coterie firmly believed from the start that to cement theocratic governance, cultural reform is indispensable. Soon after, artists faced bans and expulsions over the “un-Islamic” nature of their profession and any open disapproval of the new order.  

The censorship hit the music and film communities particularly hard. Before the revolution, these industries had flourished in Iran’s liberal climate during the 1960s and 1970s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

For more than four decades, artists in these fields have been under renewed pressure. At least two prominent directors died suspiciously: Kiyumars Pourahmad in April 2023 and Dariush Mehrjui and his spouse, Vahideh Mohammadifar, in October of the same year. There have also been reports of artists diagnosed with autoimmune diseases after prison release, such as actress Taraneh Alidoosti and filmmaker Mostafa al-Ahmad. Combined with the handing down of exceptionally long terms or capital punishment to artists in the past year, this translates into an anti-art revenge campaign in response to the Women, Life, Freedom uprising.

The sustained support from film-industry professionals and musicians during popular uprisings in Iran—notably during the disputed 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement and throughout the Women, Life, Freedom movement—has positioned artists and celebrities as a thorn in the side of the regime, something intelligence agents and authorities have shown they will not tolerate.

According to reformist newspaper Shargh, within just two months after the Women, Life, Freedom uprising kicked off in 2022, nearly one hundred artists were sentenced or banned from working and leaving the country because of comments in support of the protests and defiance of mandatory hijab rules.

In October 2023, the Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture imposed acting bans on at least twenty prominent actresses, including Alidoosti, the star of Asghar Farhadi’s Oscar-winning film The Salesman. The women had either posed without hijab on social media or openly supported the protests.

Exile and boycott

The Women, Life, Freedom uprising marked the culmination of a long-running regime face-off with artists, with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and intelligence authorities spearheading the confrontation.

The escalating repression has led to many artists choosing self-exile, with Rasoulof a recent example. Indeed, of the twenty-person ban list, nearly half now reside outside Iran. This trend is part of an ongoing exodus of artists fleeing widespread censorship since the 1979 revolution.

Many independent artists who remain in Iran have suspended their activities due to working bans or personal reluctance to engage in the current oppressive political climate, which has only gotten worse since the popular uprisings began in September 2022.

The artistic community’s concerted boycott of the state-sponsored Fajr Artistic Festivals—annually held by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to commemorate the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution—over the past two years highlights that these artists might never return to the scene as long as stifling cultural policies and hijab restrictions remain.

Oscar-winning filmmaker Farhadi’s refusal to make a movie in Iran under mandatory hijab in cinema indicates this decisive shift. He revealed the decision in an interview with French newspaper Le Monde in early 2024.

Despite this, artistic productions have not come to a standstill in Iran. Pro-regime artists and those who have never questioned authorities continue to work.

Such projects are often funded by two major media producers in Iran: the state broadcaster known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the Owj Arts and Media Organization, the arts and production body of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These state-owned entities currently monopolize hundreds of smaller media outlets and production firms, and also monitor the activities of independent media companies. IRIB and Owj productions are primarily used to spread regime propaganda.

The Owj Arts and Media Organization has strategically taken over Iran’s media-production landscape through an expanded and intricate network of connections with broadcaster IRIB and security and cultural authorities. With an estimated budget of $2 million in 2024, it funnels cultural money into various visual genres. High-profile and controversial Owj productions include the television spy series Gando, an Iranian version of the Israeli show Fauda, and musical theater Esfandiyar’s Seven Labors, based on the seminal Persian epic poem the Shahnameh.

Breaking free of long-standing taboos

Amid the boycotting of state-sponsored art by independent artists and the funneling of cultural budgets to state propaganda, a small yet burgeoning group of independent artists have pushed the boundaries of moviemaking from inside Iran.

Showing women without hijab and physical contact between men and women have been unbreakable taboos in post-revolution Iranian cinema. Yet, in the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, a batch of Iranian movies—made inside Iran without observing mandatory hijab and other restrictions and without obtaining a license from the authorities—were screened at the 2023 Cannes Film Festival, and received acclaim from Iranian and international audiences. Me, Maryam, the Children and 26 Others by Farshad Hashemi and Terrestrial Verses by Ali Agari and Alireza Khatami received overwhelmingly positive reviews.

Since then, other internationally acclaimed dramas, such as My Favorite Cake directed by Maryam Moghaddam and Behtash Sanaeeha, and Rasoulof’s The Seed of the Sacred Fig, have openly traversed the Islamic Republic’s long-standing red lines and strict dress codes.

The homegrown push could be seen as an evolution of underground art, a method of creation long used to depict prohibited subjects within Iran. However, it has never been as public and transgressive as it has now become.

It could be argued that the independent artists’ intentional disengagement from all forms of state-related art, powered by the emergence of a new generation of taboo breakers in Iranian cinema, exposes the failure of regime strategies to threaten and impede Iran-based dissident artists.

Unsurprisingly, the Islamic Republic’s restrictive measures have only spurred Iranian artists to resist pressure, open radical fronts, and fundamentally subvert the ideological restrictions on artistic independence and creation that have been enforced since the 1979 revolution.

Shekufe Bar is a journalist who writes about art, culture, and society.

The post The high price of dissident art in Iran: Silence or exile appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,” reads Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed seventy-five years ago in Washington, DC. Even though Article 3 precedes Article 5, many allies have not taken it particularly seriously—at least not since the end of the Cold War.

That’s because national resilience is harder to quantify than military defense. With the latter, the armed forces, policymakers, and even the public can assess how large and effective efforts are. Armed forces have a specific number of active-duty service members, a specific number of reservists, and specific weaponry. But the “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” involves a plethora of skills and items that are much harder to identify, let alone measure. There are no rules governing who should participate in resilience, nor is there an official level at which a country (or organization) is considered resilient.

At the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO leaders attempted to elevate resilience standards by adopting seven “baseline requirements.” These were: assured continuity of government and critical government services, resilient energy supplies, the ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people, resilient food and water resources, the ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient civil communications systems, and resilient civil transportation systems. Creating that list was a worthy step, though some allies have treated the baselines more like ambitions than requirements.

Some allies, though, go far beyond the baseline requirements. Indeed, they make national resilience a matter not just of infrastructure and governmental capabilities: instead, they involve the population. Two of the foremost practitioners of societal resilience, Sweden and Finland, have joined the Alliance at just the right time, because they have invaluable knowledge to share.

In the case of Sweden, its society-wide involvement in national security dates back to World War II, when the country had to meet Nazi leader Adolf Hitler’s total war by marshaling all the resources at its disposal: total defense. During the Cold War, Sweden turned these efforts into a system so well-managed that millions (in a country of some eight million at the end of the Cold War) were involved in various parts of national security: as soldiers, as reservists, as members of auxiliary defense organizations, as civilians in crucial professions (from daycare teachers to nuclear engineers), and as ordinary citizens knowing what to do in case of war, because the authorities had regularly kept them informed.

Finland, prevented by the Soviets from operating auxiliary defense organizations, focused instead on preparedness and what it called mental territorial defense: making the Finns steadfast in their support of the country. (Those interested can read more about it in The Defender’s Dilemma.) In recent years, Sweden has once again proven itself as an innovator when it comes to resilience, with initiatives such as the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, which the Civil Contingencies Agency published six years ago. Especially now that the two friends and neighbors have finally made it into NATO, other allies can pick from their collection of resilience practices and adopt and adapt the ones they like without having to spend the considerable time it takes to create such practices from scratch. Indeed, this kind of learning is already picking up speed. These days Latvia, for example, has a Sweden-like booklet called How to Deal with a Crisis.

But the much-lauded Swedes and Finns, and their Nordic and Baltic friends, are not NATO’s only resilience leaders. The Czech Republic has, through its ministry of defense, launched gray-zone exercises for the private sector. Until the Czech initiative, national-security training for companies had barely been addressed by NATO’s member states, mostly because doing so would require setting up a new format and designing the exercises. Now that the Czech Republic has done so, others can save time and effort by building on the Czechs’ initiatives.

Other allies are also taking important steps. Latvia, for its part, has introduced a defense curriculum that teaches all its high schoolers resilience skills. Germany’s Technisches Hilfswerk (THW), too, is a model worth learning from: 99 percent of those working for this federal agency, whose members help in public emergencies such as storms, are volunteers. The THW doesn’t have a national security mandate, but its model can easily be adapted to national resilience. NATO member states would also do well to learn from close friends outside the Alliance. In the Indo-Pacific, Singapore has an annual total defense day, and Australia is developing an ambitious resilience strategy.

Not every practice is applicable to every NATO country, but what matters is that solutions exist. Learning from friends willing to share best practices is the easiest and most efficient way of learning.

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the author of Goodbye, Globalization: The Return of a Divided World (Yale University Press: 2024).

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post National resilience is a crucial part of defense. Here are the countries doing it right. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

The post How Cabo Verde is highlighting the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The region has an urgent need to prepare for the scope of climate change. Many of the region’s countries rely on tourism to drive economic growth, with ten of the world’s twenty most tourism-dependent economies residing in the Caribbean. When hurricanes roll through the region, damaging infrastructure and halting flights, the tourism industry halts as well, diminishing economic prospects. Most Caribbean countries face the brunt of the Atlantic hurricane season, which is producing stronger and more frequent tropical storms. At the same time, most of the region’s populous cities are coastal, making sea level rise a threat to homes and the day-to-day functions of society. Further, changing precipitation patterns and higher average temperatures result in agricultural degradation and more acidic oceans, decreasing crop yields in rural areas and limiting fishery supplies.

While the entire region faces daunting consequences from climate change and related natural disasters, women and girls face disproportionate effects across four areas.

First, women and girls are “especially vulnerable to sexual violence and coercion” in the wake of a natural disaster, according to the United Nations Population Fund. This risk includes and extends beyond domestic violence, which is known to spike in crisis situations, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic in Trinidad and Tobago. Disproportionate risks mount, the World Bank notes, “in the face of uprooted housing and traditional support structures, disrupted access to services, and both structural and social obstacles to accessing food, relief, supplies, and latrines.” A lack of privacy and security in shelters is problematic, especially for young and teenage girls.

Second, women are responsible for a greater share of caregiving for families and households. After Hurricane María knocked out the power grid in Puerto Rico and made potable water scarce, it was women who bore a greater burden in doing the cooking, laundry, and cleaning to keep households going. Moreover, across multiple climate change events, when schools close, women with school-age children are often unable to return to work or attend school themselves.

Third, Caribbean women tend to work in the informal economy, including small-scale businesses and the hospitality sector, both of which are adversely affected by tropical storms. Storms can damage crops and roads, making it difficult to get produce to markets, while also leaving restaurants, shops, and hotels closed for days, affecting incomes.

Finally, women often have unequal access to finance, capital, and other assets, which can affect their resilience after a disaster. In addition, as governments finance the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure after natural disasters and fortify existing structures, there are fewer resources devoted to the education and health sectors—both of which are integral to providing care to and lifting family responsibility burdens from women.

Caribbean governments and regional partners must factor in the disproportionate challenges facing women and girls at the earliest stages of climate resilience and adaptation policymaking. Policy designs should incorporate government funding or subsidies dedicated to women-owned businesses adversely affected by climate change. Historically, Caribbean women face barriers to accessing finance and capital to start or invest in their businesses. Limited track records in operating a business relative to men and frequent climate events increase the risk profiles for women-owned firms. Here, governments can work with regional institutions like the Caribbean Development Bank to level the playing field for women-owned firms by providing grants to businesses in climate-affected sectors, like hospitality and agricultural work.

Further, resources can and should be dedicated to women-owned firms that are physically affected by climate events and to create shelters where at-risk women and girls can stay after natural disasters to limit spaces where gender-based violence can occur. This should include shelters that can care for children and allow working parents to return to their jobs to offset the disproportionate costs borne by women resulting from family responsibilities.

Involving women in policy designs also includes making them part of the decision-making process. Only women and girls can provide first-hand information to contextualize policies and streamline resources that address the unique challenges they face due to climate change. One way to do this is to incorporate perspectives from gender-focused civil society organizations.

Civil society organizations are uniquely intertwined with the realities of each country at national and subnational levels, allowing them to understand the day-to-day challenges facing women and girls across different communities. Governments can work with civil society organizations to ensure that policies are not blanket approaches but are bottom-up in nature, so that each community of women and girls receive the resources and attention they require. Regular consultation with these groups, particularly in the advent of hurricane season, during rainy seasons, and in the lead-up to drier months can provide real-time insights into the types of government resources that should be devoted to women and girls.

Given that the Caribbean is a heterogeneous region, with different climate events affecting different countries, it is essential for policy design and decision making to be country-specific as well as gender inclusive to best serve local populations. Climate change does not have to result in increasing gender inequity in the Caribbean—as long as the voices and interests of women and girls are incorporated in policy design and resource allocation in regional planning to combat climate change.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow for the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

This article is part of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s partnership with the UN Women Multi-Country Office–Caribbean.

The post Climate change doesn’t have to result in greater gender inequity in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Wed, April 24, 2024 • 3:00 pm ET

CEO Scott Nathan on DFC’s work on energy security and other strategic priorities

An #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Scott Nathan, chief executive officer of the US International Development Finance Corporation, discusses the agency’s role in US efforts to advance global energy security and other strategic US priorities.

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The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) isn’t “directly competing” with China, according to its chief executive officer Scott Nathan, but it is “offering an alternative.”

Nathan spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s Global Energy Center on Wednesday, explaining that the DFC is different from Chinese development banks or Chinese investment initiatives (such as the Global Development Initiative and Belt and Road Initiative) because it supports the private sector directly. The DFC doesn’t lend money to governments for “big and also sometimes bloated” projects that aren’t “appropriate for local laws and conditions,” he said, alluding to China’s investments that have pushed countries into deep debt.

The DFC head recalled how foreign government officials have told him that “they don’t want to be dependent on one country for their source of finance.”

“Good development is good foreign policy,” he explained. “That’s in our national interest.”

Here are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Amelia Lester, executive editor of Foreign Policy.

Standing out in the marketplace

• How exactly does the DFC differ from China’s investment engines? Nathan said it’s in part because “we maintain the highest standards possible” when it comes to “environmental, social, [and] labor” practices. It is “critical,” he added, not only to support economic development but also to “promote . . . values.”
• One important area is in internet connectivity—in which China is investing heavily, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The DFC, meanwhile, is supporting projects that push forward secure equipment and networks that protect privacy, Nathan said, highlighting specific DFC-supported projects in Australia and Africa that are offering an alternative to China’s services. “This is critical for growth,” he said, adding that infrastructure is “not just energy, airports, and railways. You need the infrastructure of the twenty-first century for economic development.”
• Nathan explained that the DFC was created by Congress in 2018 due to a “strong sense” among both Republicans and Democrats that the United States needed to improve its economic-diplomacy game. “We needed to show up in the developing world and offer an alternative to what was being offered by authoritarian governments and our strategic competitors,” he said.
• The DFC is due to be reauthorized by Congress in 2025. “There is a strong demand signal for us to do more to show up,” Nathan said. “That requires us being reauthorized; it requires continuous funding.”

Showing up for Ukraine

• Nathan explained that the DFC has provided nearly $500 million in financing to businesses in Ukraine and has offered political risk insurance—which includes coverage for war-related risks—that has catalyzed more investments in Ukraine’s private sector.
• The most critical tool to support Ukraine’s private sector, however, is “solid air defense,” Nathan said. It’s “hard to make decisions around investment and capital expenditure in an environment of such high insecurity.”
• Nathan explained that the United States has had a long history of providing political risk insurance. Since the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (DFC’s predecessor) started offering the insurance, he said, the United States has “done over $50 billion. . . of political risk insurance” and has had “just over a billion dollars of claims.” The institutions have covered 97 percent of those claims, he added. “So it’s not only been very important for economic activity. . . but it’s been very profitable.”
• Working in Ukraine, Nathan said, has shown him how important it is for the DFC to work closely with its peers, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, and European Investment Bank.

A diversified system

• Earlier this year, the DFC provided a $500 million loan to US company First Solar to build a new solar panel manufacturing facility in Tamil Nadu, India. Nathan said that the plant, which will use cadmium telluride sourced from India instead of China, “fits into the [DFC’s] supply chain diversification goals. . . We need to make sure that we’re not dependent on one country or one company for the inputs of the industries of the future.”
• “If we can do this kind of thing elsewhere in the world to make sure that supply chains are broadly diversified, that helps with resilience,” he argued, adding that the United States must not “replace dependency on oil” with dependency on “a couple of nations,” as that would bring “all sorts of strategic vulnerabilities.”
• “Having countries be able to be self-reliant, to have the energy they need for economic development, that promotes stability. . . that’s good for our security,” he said.
• On critical minerals, Nathan highlighted several projects underway in Africa, including one on graphite in Mozambique. And, he added, as the DFC invests in that project, it will also be working with the US Department of Energy, which has loaned a company in Louisiana funds to expand its capacity to produce graphite-based materials for batteries. “It’s critical to start with the sourcing of the minerals,” Nathan said. “But there’s a whole value chain” to support.

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the event

The post How the US is pitching a development finance ‘alternative’ to China’s initiatives, according to Scott Nathan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Responding to the news from Washington DC, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought to underline the broad historical significance of the vote. “I am grateful to the United States House of Representatives, both parties, and personally to Speaker Mike Johnson for a decision that keeps history on the right track,” he commented. “Democracy and freedom will never fail as long as America helps protect it. A just peace and security can only be attained through strength.”

In his daily address, Zelenskyy also noted the critical importance of fresh US military supplies for Ukraine’s war effort and for the entire country’s security amid an escalating Russian bombing campaign. The bill passed by the House of Representatives is “a very significant package that will be appreciated both by our soldiers on the front lines and by our towns and villages suffering from Russian terror,” the Ukrainian leader stated.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called the vote “a bad day for Putin” and “a bad day for anyone who dared to believe that America could waver when it comes to defending what and who it stands for.” Ukraine’s top diplomat also stressed the role of the bill in bolstering the US position on the international stage. “Everyone who made this decision a reality made the right choice. The United States has reaffirmed its global leadership.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Saturday’s vote in the United States was closely monitored by Ukrainian troops stationed thousands of miles away on the front lines of the war in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukrainian ambassador-at-large Olexander Scherba shared a message sent to him by one soldier serving in the Donbas, who recounted the enthusiastic reaction among his comrades. “The whole unit was watching. After the vote, you could hear shouts of “YESSS!” along the entire trench.”

For many Ukrainians, the House of Representatives vote has helped rebuild faith in the country’s international partners following months of mounting frustration and feelings of abandonment. Since late summer 2023, Ukrainians have watched in dismay as their country’s survival has become hostage to US domestic politics. Meanwhile, Russia has taken advantage of Ukraine’s dwindling ammunition and air defenses to regain the battlefield initiative in eastern Ukraine and launch a nationwide bombing campaign targeting the country’s increasingly unprotected residential districts and civilian infrastructure.

With major new US weapons shipments reportedly “ready to go” once final confirmation of the aid package is received from the Senate and the White House, there are now renewed hopes that Ukraine will receive the military support it needs in order to push Russian forces back and defend the country. This boost could not be more timely, with Ukrainian weapons shortages rapidly approaching critical levels and preparations well underway for what is expected to be a major Russian offensive in the coming months.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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In the wake of Saturday’s vote, Ukrainian army medic Yulia Paievska was one of numerous prominent figures from the country’s military community to praise Ukraine’s American partners and stress the importance of their continued support in the struggle against Russia. “They have lived up to their promises, which once again proves that justice and freedom are not empty words to the American people,” she commented. “Despite all the obstacles, we advance toward victory.”

These upbeat sentiments were echoed by a number of front line soldiers quoted by CNN. “We thought our partners had forgotten about us. This news gives us a sense of support and an understanding that we have not been forgotten,” one Ukrainian intelligence officer serving on the Zaporizhzhia front noted. “When we feel support from the outside, it motivates us. After all, the military knows it cannot win with sticks and bows and arrows,” stated another.

While the House of Representatives vote clearly boosted Ukrainian morale, many in Ukraine were also realistic about the scale of the challenges that remain. With the US presidential election set to take place later this year, further large-scale US military aid cannot be taken for granted. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s European partners are working to boost defense production but have so far struggled to fill the gap created by the recent pause in US security assistance.

If Western leaders are serious about preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine, they will have to look beyond the current $61 billion US aid package and develop the necessary resources to prevail in a long confrontation with the Kremlin. “Please don’t forget that Russia’s annual military budget is more than $100 billion,” noted Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko on Saturday evening. “We have won time today, but we have not won the war. We will still need to finish the job.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 18, 2024

Putin’s plan to depopulate Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s new plan for victory in Ukraine appears to rely on a strategic bombing campaign to render entire regions of the country uninhabitable, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Apr 16, 2024

Western fear of escalation will hand Putin an historic victory in Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

The West’s self-defeating fear of escalation has allowed Russia to regain the initiative in Ukraine and is now threatening to hand Putin an historic victory, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post ‘A bad day for Putin’: US aid vote gives Ukrainians renewed hope appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Terekhov is the latest in a series of high-profile voices to raise the alarm over the increasingly dire situation in and around Kharkiv. Located in eastern Ukraine close to the front and just thirty miles from the Russian border, the city has been the primary target of a new Russian air offensive that appears designed to depopulate large parts of Ukraine. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported The Economist in early April.

Russian attacks on Kharkiv’s civilian infrastructure and residential districts have increased dramatically over the past few months, killing dozens and leaving the city’s approximately 1.3 million residents with often sporadic access to electricity. A wave of Russian bombings on March 22 proved particularly damaging, destroying Kharkiv’s two main power plants and network of substations in a calculated move to plunge the city into darkness.

Hospitals, businesses, and homeowners are now scrambling to secure generators and other alternative power sources in anticipation of further blackouts, with children forced to study online or in makeshift underground classrooms. For now, most Kharkiv residents appear intent on staying put. However, if the situation does not improve in the coming months, there may be a mass exodus ahead of the winter season. Indeed, many fear that without enhanced air defenses, conditions inside the city could become intolerable much sooner.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The destruction of Kharkiv would certainly be a major war crime, but it would be far from unprecedented. On the contrary, the methodical depopulation of Ukraine’s second city would be very much in keeping with the destructive tactics employed by Russia ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began more than two years ago.

From Mariupol to Bakhmut, the Russian military has reduced a long list of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble as it has slowly steamrollered forward along the largely static front lines of the war. Although it is not possible to accurately determine casualty figures in areas currently under Russian occupation, tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone.

While the Kharkiv region has been the worst hit, the recent escalation in Russian bombardments has impacted the whole country, with attacks on the power grid in particular creating unprecedented challenges for the entire Ukrainian energy sector. This appears to be the result of extensive planning in Moscow, with Russian military officials learning important lessons from the failure of their winter 2022-23 energy infrastructure bombing offensive.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, Russia has began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” the CEO of Ukrainian energy provider DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

The timing of the current bombing campaign also suggests Moscow is looking to take advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses. With a vital aid package held up in the US Congress for more than half a year, the Ukrainian military is currently suffering from a wide range of shortages, leaving front line commanders and air defense crews with no choice but to ration dwindling supplies of ammunition.

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Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Ukraine’s main port city and international maritime gateway, Odesa, has been heavily targeted in recent months. Attacks on residential areas in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions of northern Ukraine have also accelerated noticeably. In early April, a massive barrage of missiles succeeded in penetrating Ukraine’s depleted air defenses close to the country’s capital, destroying the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. “Why? Because we had zero missiles. We ran out of all missiles,” a clearly exasperated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told PBS NewsHour.

Ukrainian officials are now urgently appealing for extra air defenses to help counter Russia’s bombing campaign. So far, the response has been muted, with only Germany confirming plans to hand over a Patriot system. Others, such as the Netherlands, have offered to purchase Patriot systems on behalf of Ukraine. While these steps are welcome, much more needs to be done to protect Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s infrastructure.

Many analysts believe improved air defenses are not enough and argue that in order to effectively counter Putin’s terror-bombing tactics, Ukraine must be given the necessary long-range weapons to target Russian launch sites. However, this would require Ukraine’s partners to overcome their well-documented fear of escalation and reverse a longstanding ban on the use of Western weapons for attacks inside Russia. At present, there is little sign of that happening.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has already issued arrest warrants for two high-ranking Russian military officers over the 2022-23 bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, but this is of little comfort to the beleaguered Ukrainian population, who know it will be years before they see even symbolic justice served. Meanwhile, the current bombing campaign continues to gain momentum. This new air offensive is far more ambitious than Russia’s earlier efforts, with the apparent end goal of rendering entire Ukrainian regions uninhabitable.

Unless Ukraine’s air defenses are dramatically upgraded in the near future, the country will face a humanitarian catastrophe that could potentially define the future course of the war. Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine decisively on the battlefield, but his bombing campaign may yet succeed in breaking Ukrainian resistance by forcing millions of civilians to flee their blacked out homes and ruined cities.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 16, 2024

Western fear of escalation will hand Putin an historic victory in Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

The West’s self-defeating fear of escalation has allowed Russia to regain the initiative in Ukraine and is now threatening to hand Putin an historic victory, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Apr 15, 2024

Organizing for victory

By Ben Hodges

In the escalating struggle against Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China, The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military, writes Ben Hodges.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s plan to depopulate Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kyiv Oblast and the US state of Washington recently took a major step in this direction. In March 2024, Washington State Governor Jay Inslee and his Kyiv Oblast counterpart Ruslan Kravchenko signed the first Sister State Agreement between a US state and a Ukrainian region.

Washington’s Sister State Agreement with Kyiv Oblast is emblematic of the benefits that robust subnational diplomacy can provide. In Ukraine’s case, subnational diplomacy creates opportunities to highlight the strengths of Ukraine’s many diverse regions. Strong local and regional partnerships can also be maintained regardless of the changing political winds that envelop national capitals.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The recently signed agreement with Kyiv Oblast was not the start of Washington State’s efforts to support Ukraine. Since the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Washington has provided a powerful example of the role regional governments can play in responding to global events.

In March 2022, Governor Inslee directed state agencies to begin reviewing and severing ties with Russian state institutions and companies. In the initial weeks of the invasion, local nonprofits worked together with the state’s Ukrainian diaspora community to organize the delivery of 32 tons of medical supplies to Ukraine. During 2022, Washington State officials allocated nearly $20 million to support the influx of Ukrainian refugees.

According to the Seattle Times, more Ukrainian refugees have arrived in Washington State over the past two years than any other US state. This warm welcome owes much to the state’s vibrant Ukrainian-American community, according Geoffrey Potter, director of international relations and protocol for Governor Jay Inslee. He says the new Sister State Agreement and Washington’s other efforts to support Ukraine are “an expression” of the way local residents with Ukrainian roots have become an integral part of the Washington community.

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Ukraine’s honorary consul in Seattle, Valeriy Goloborodko, believes the Sister State Agreement will pave the way for closer ties and can help “further relationships between academics, industries, and regional governments for the benefit of the people.” Meanwhile, Potter notes a number of common interests linking the Kyiv region and Washington including clean energy, forestry, and the aerospace industry.

As wartime Ukraine looks ahead toward the challenges of recovery and reconstruction, subnational diplomacy can open up a range of new business opportunities. Major Washington State-based business brands including Boeing and Microsoft are already active in Ukraine. The state’s many small businesses are also playing an important role in strengthening ties. In Tacoma, Washington-based SAFE Boats is currently outfitting eight patrol boats destined for Ukraine’s navy. BRINC Drones, based in Seattle, is supplying drones for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression.

At a time when the issue of vital military aid for Ukraine has become hostage to domestic US political tensions, grassroots relationships can help individual Ukrainian regions bypass the kind of obstacles that might otherwise hamper progress at the national level. With this in mind, Ukraine’s regional leaders and their counterparts across the globe should now be seeking to develop stronger subnational ties that can solidify relationships for the long term.

Washington State’s agreement with Kyiv Oblast offers an attractive model that others can follow, both in the US and beyond. In Goloborodko’s view, the recently signed Sister State Agreement “is a way to show leadership in supporting democracy.” The initiative is the first of its kind for a US state, but Potter is “pretty sure” it will not be the last. “We’re forging a model for what a meaningful, substantive collaboration looks like,” he says.

Benton Coblentz is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 11, 2024

Ukraine pleads for Patriot air defense systems as Russia destroys power grid

By Peter Dickinson

Officials in Kyiv are calling on partners to urgently supply Patriot systems as Russia capitalizes on Ukraine’s weakening air defenses to methodically destroy the country’s power grid, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 3, 2024

Ukraine’s allies divided over drone campaign targeting Russian refineries

By Giorgi Revishvili

Ukraine’s expanding campaign of drone strikes on Russian refineries has inflicted significant damage on Putin’s oil and gas industry while also revealing divisions among Ukraine’s allies, writes Giorgi Revishvili.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Grassroots diplomacy can help unlock international support for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Speaking to the Washington Post this week, Kuleba explained that his tough new tone reflects the growing sense of exasperation felt by many in Kyiv at the apparent lack of urgency among Ukraine’s partners amid growing shortages of vital military aid. “We’ve tried everything, and nothing seems to work,” he commented. “The feeling that extraordinary decisions are needed on a regular basis to end this war with a victory for Ukraine is gone.”

Kuleba says his team has identified more the one hundred available Patriot systems that could potentially be handed over to Ukraine. Officials in Kyiv say they need 26 systems in order to provide comprehensive cover for the entire country. The immediate objective is to acquire seven Patriot systems to guard key targets against Russian airstrikes. EU partners including Germany have vowed to assist in the search for Patriot systems, but there have yet to be any breakthroughs.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s hunt for Patriot air defense systems is taking place against the backdrop of an escalating Russian air offensive that is capitalizing on months declining Western military support and prolonged deadlock in the US Congress over a major Ukrainian aid package. With gaps now growing in Ukraine’s air defense network and individual air defense units increasingly obliged to ration their dwindling resources, Russia has launched a series of overnight attacks in recent weeks that have decimated much of Ukraine’s power grid.

Ukraine’s second-largest city and former capital, Kharkiv, has been particularly hard hit. Located just a few dozen miles from the border with Russia in eastern Ukraine, the city has been subjected to an intensive bombing campaign since mid-March that has caused extensive damage to residential districts and civilian infrastructure. In recent weeks, hundreds of thousands have been left without power for extended periods.

The destruction in Kharkiv has been so severe that some analysts now believe Russia’s objective is to empty the city of its more than one million residents ahead of an anticipated summer offensive. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported Britain’s The Economist in early April.

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The latest wave of Russian missiles and drones struck targets across Ukraine early on April 11. In an indication of Ukraine’s increasingly ineffective air defenses and mounting vulnerability to Russian bombardment, all of the Kremlin’s hard-to-intercept hypersonic and ballistic missiles reportedly reached their objectives, according to the Kyiv Post.

A major power plant close to Kyiv was among those destroyed in the overnight attack, dealing a further significant blow to Ukraine’s energy resilience. The Trypilska Thermal Power Plant, the largest supplier of electricity to central Ukraine’s Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions, suffered a series of direct hits and was left in ruins.

“The scale of destruction is terrifying,” commented Andriy Hota, the chairman of Ukrainian energy company Centrenergo. Speaking to the BBC, Hota said the Kyiv region plant can be rebuilt with the help of spare parts from elsewhere in Europe, but warned that the facility will remain vulnerable to Russian attack unless Ukraine’s partners provide powerful air defenses. “We can repair. We can do the impossible. But we need protection.”

With each new Russian bombardment destroying more of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, there is a growing sense that time is now running out to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. Unless Ukraine urgently receives additional air defense systems and ammunition, entire regions could soon face rapidly deteriorating conditions without access to electricity and other basic services. This could fuel a new refugee crisis, with millions of Ukrainians entering the EU.

The collapse of the country’s power grid would also cause economic mayhem and dramatically undermine the Ukrainian war effort. This would set the stage for a Russian military victory that would have disastrous consequences for Ukraine itself and for the future of international security. Russia has so far been unable to break Ukraine on the battlefield, but there is now a very real chance that a lack of air defenses will allow the Kremlin to achieve its goals by targeting Ukraine’s increasingly undefended civilian infrastructure.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 28, 2024

Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Apr 9, 2024

Russian Orthodox Church declares “Holy War” against Ukraine and West

By Brian Mefford

The Russian Orthodox Church has approved a remarkable new document that declares a holy war against Ukraine and the wider Western world, writes Brian Mefford.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine pleads for Patriot air defense systems as Russia destroys power grid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The proposed legislation would oblige civil society organizations receiving more than 20% of annual funding from sources outside Georgia to openly state that they are “pursuing the interests of a foreign power.” They would be required to register as foreign agents and subjected to extensive additional reporting requirements. Organizations that fail to do so could face large fines.

Critics say the bill is very similar to Russia’s draconian foreign agents legislation, which is widely seen as a tool for the Kremlin to target potential dissidents and silence civil society. The similarities between the law proposed by the Georgian authorities and restrictions already in place inside Russia helped fuel large-scale protests in Tbilisi last year, with many denouncing what they termed as the “Russian law.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Renewed efforts to pass last year’s foreign agents bill have sparked fresh debate over Georgia’s future. Opposition groups see the return of the draft law as a further indication of the ruling Georgian Dream party’s intention to steer the country away from Europe and toward Russia. The move comes just months after Georgia achieved a major breakthrough by securing official EU candidate nation status in December 2023.

EU officials voiced “regret” that Georgia’s foreign influence legislation was once again under consideration despite being “unconditionally” withdrawn last year. “Transparency should not be used as an instrument to limit civil society’s capacity to operate freely,” read an EU statement. “We encourage the political leaders in Georgia to adopt and implement reforms that are in line with the stated objective of joining the European Union, as supported by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens.”

The United States also voiced its concerns over the reappearance of the contentious foreign agents law. The largely unchanged draft legislation “undermines Georgia’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and risks pulling Georgia off its European path,” commented US Department of State spokesperson Matthew Miller.

When officials from the ruling Georgian Dream party first proposed new legislation to curb foreign influence in February 2023, the backlash was so strong that the draft law was ultimately withdrawn from consideration. Thousands rallied against the bill in Tbilisi, leading to clashes with police that generated global headlines.

Criticism also came from a range of international human rights watchdogs. “The foreign agent bill seeks to marginalize and discredit independent, foreign-funded groups and media that serve the wider public interest in Georgia,” commented Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia Director for Human Rights Watch.

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The reintroduction of the foreign agents law ahead of parliamentary elections in October casts a shadow over Georgia’s democratic progress. Critics say this renewed push to pass legislation virtually identical to last year’s abandoned bill is part of the Georgian Dream party’s efforts to silence opponents. They accuse the Georgian authorities of backsliding on the core values underpinning the country’s declared goal of securing a democratic, European future.

These concerns reflect fears over Russian influence. Despite widespread public opposition to Russia’s role in the country, the Georgian Dream party has long faced accusations of seeking to foster closer ties with the Kremlin. Russia continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of Georgia, and has recently announced plans to construct a major naval base on the Black Sea coast in Georgia’s occupied Abkhazia region.

Over the past two years, the Georgian authorities have responded ambiguously to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Georgia has refused to join international sanctions or restrict trade with Russia, while Georgian PM Irakli Garibashvili echoed the Kremlin in May 2023 by claiming NATO enlargement was one of the main reasons for the war in Ukraine. Georgia also recently relaunched direct flights to Russia.

In the coming weeks, Georgia’s revived foreign influence legislation is expected to be reviewed by a parliamentary committee. A new round of protests against the law has already begun in the capital, and could serve as a focal point for opponents of the current authorities. The further passage of the law will reveal much about the Georgian Dream party’s grip on power, while also providing an indication of the country’s future geopolitical trajectory.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Mar 28, 2024

Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Apr 3, 2024

Ukraine’s allies divided over drone campaign targeting Russian refineries

By Giorgi Revishvili

Ukraine’s expanding campaign of drone strikes on Russian refineries has inflicted significant damage on Putin’s oil and gas industry while also revealing divisions among Ukraine’s allies, writes Giorgi Revishvili.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Georgia launches new push to adopt Russian-style foreign agent law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The latest wave of Russian airstrikes has been notable for its breadth. Virtually every one of Ukraine’s thermal power plants has been hit along with a series of substations. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private power company, reports that two of its thermal power plants (TPP) are no longer operational, with repairs expected to take several years. A separate plant in Kharkiv has also been seriously damaged and will take years to repair, according to regional authorities.

The specific condition of additional Ukrainian power plants remains classified, but reports of recent blackouts in multiple major cities have underlined the extent of the threat to Ukraine’s power grid. In a move indicating the scale of the damage caused by recent Russian bombing, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ordered an early end to the country’s heating season.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russian targets in recent days have included the Dnipro Hydroelectric Dam, sparking fears of a possible ecological disaster. The dam itself has not collapsed, but the power plant was partially destroyed and pollutants are now reportedly leaking into the reservoir. Even more worryingly, the nearby Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant lost grid connectivity due to the attack, putting its cooling systems at risk of stopping. Energoatom called the situation “extremely dangerous.”

In a further escalation, Russia has also expanded its air offensive with attacks on Ukraine’s natural gas storage facilities. These facilities, which house large quantities of gas for European customers, had not previously been targeted in earlier Russian bombing campaigns. Although the storage facilities themselves are underground, the pumping stations that allow for the insertion and extraction of gas are not.

On March 24, Russia launched approximately 20 missiles and drones at the Bilche-Volitsko-Ugerskoye storage facility, which represents around half of Ukraine’s total storage capacity. Ukrainian state-owned gas company Naftogaz downplayed the extent of the damage but did acknowledge that repairs would be necessary. Naftogaz officials also sought to reassure European storage customers that all obligations would be met by Ukraine, regardless of the Russian airstrikes.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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The recent wave of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy system comes amid reports that the White House has been pressuring Kyiv to stop attacking Russian oil refineries due to concerns about the possible impact on oil prices ahead of the November 2024 US presidential election. Starting in January, Ukraine began a series of long-range drone strikes on refining facilities inside Russia. These attacks have succeeded in hurting Russia’s energy-dependent economy, with disruption reported to oil and oil product exports, gasoline and other fuel supplies in Russia, military fuel supplies, and Russian income from energy exports.

Global prices for crude oil and diesel, as well as other oil products, have risen in the wake of the Ukrainian attacks. This appears to be making US politicians nervous about the potential impact on their country’s forthcoming elections. Unsurprisingly, many in Kyiv have been outraged by the reported US efforts to effectively protect the Russian energy industry at a time when Moscow is bombing Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and plunging entire cities into darkness. Ukrainian officials have responded by insisting Russian refineries are legitimate targets.

So far, there have been no reports of European leaders seeking to deter Ukraine from attacking Russia’s oil and gas industry, but that could change as the continent faces a range of looming geopolitical and energy market problems. Russia’s gas transit contract with Ukraine is set to expire in December 2024, with the Ukrainian authorities stating they will not seek an extension. With the vulnerability of Ukraine’s gas storage facilities now an issue thanks to recent Russian airstrikes, and with instability in the Middle East making Arabian Gulf LNG both less assured and much more expensive, Europe may soon begin to pressure Ukraine, too.

Each wave of Russian airstrikes makes Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction more challenging while narrowing the options available to the country. Without crucial US military aid that remains held up in Congress, and faced with hypocritical but likely mounting pressure from Western capitals to play nice with Russia on energy infrastructure while Russia decimates Ukraine’s power grid, the path forward is unclear.

Instead of artificial restrictions on their own ability to strike back, Kyiv desperately needs adequate air defense systems so Ukraine can protect its power plants from Russian assaults. In the meantime, the many Ukrainians who are working tirelessly to maintain their country’s battered energy systems have a long road ahead of them.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 28, 2024

Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion

By Peter Dickinson

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2024

The mood in wartime Ukraine: Weariness, resolve, and exasperation

By Steven Pifer, John Herbst

Ukrainians are war-weary but remain resolved to continue the fight despite growing exasperation with the country’s most important partner, the United States, write Steven Pifer and John Herbst.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Mar 26, 2024

Is the US Congress finally poised to pass Ukraine aid?

By Doug Klain

After almost eight months of deadlock, the US Congress may finally be moving toward a political solution that can unlock desperately needed US aid for Ukraine, writes Doug Klain.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In February 2022, Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, transforming the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War into Europe’s largest and bloodiest since World War II. It should surprise no one that Ukrainians are tiring of sending their husbands, sons, wives, and daughters to spend months at a time on the front lines of the war.

Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone attacks bring the war to civilians in cities across the country. The March 20-21 overnight attack on Kyiv was the heaviest in months. We spent much of that night in a bomb shelter, getting a taste of an experience that is all-too-common for millions of Ukrainians.

At the same time, nothing suggested resolve is flagging. Ukrainians want to win and believe they can. Indeed, they see no alternative in a fight that they regard as existential; if they lose, Ukraine as they know it is gone. Most want full victory, meaning the complete recovery of their territory up to the border agreed when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. That includes the return of Crimea.

We asked about proposals suggested by some in the West who say the United States should press for a negotiation to “save” Ukraine by ceding parts of the country to Russia in exchange for peace. Few Ukrainians expressed interest. They pointed to the war crimes Ukrainians have suffered under Russian occupation and asked how they could abandon anyone to such a fate. Most also felt it would only lead to a short respite, after which a rejuvenated Russian military would resume hostilities.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukrainian military officers understand they face a difficult year in 2024. They described Russian pressure along much of the front line, with a particular focus on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. In September 2022, Putin claimed to annex these regions, even though the Russian military does not control all their territory.

The slowing of assistance, particularly from the United States, has hurt Ukrainian military operations. Ukrainian officers described situations in which their units can only fire one artillery shell for every ten the Russians fire. They lack the means to defend against devastating glide bomb attacks launched by Russian fighter aircraft, and worry that continuing Russian missile and drone attacks will exhaust their air defense capabilities.

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officials are tracking Russian plans for new combat formations and monitoring a likely mobilization of manpower now that Putin has secured a further term in office. They believe the Kremlin retains broader ambitions in Ukraine including taking Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv.

Despite this, Ukrainian officials are showing no signs of despair. They are fortifying their defensive positions and rushing to put innovative technologies such as advanced drones into action in the field. They question whether the Russians currently have the capacity to make a major breakthrough on the ground. Given enough weapons and ammunition, many Ukrainians remain confident they can reverse Russia’s gains of the past two years.

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While expressing gratitude for US assistance, Ukrainian officials and others in Kyiv made clear their exasperation on three points.

First, with NATO scheduled to hold a summit in Washington in July 2024, Ukrainians want a definite message on their acceptance into the Alliance, and ideally an invitation. They are looking in particular to the United States, which has the most important voice within NATO. To be sure, Ukrainians are fighting for their country’s survival, but they see that fight as also defending NATO and Europe against a Russian threat that extends beyond Ukraine.

Second, Congress’s failure to pass a supplemental assistance bill for Ukraine has caused a gap in the flow of American assistance that has had an impact on the battlefield. This is reflected, among other things, in higher Ukrainian casualties. Ukrainians have become knowledgeable about how the House works, including the role of the speaker and discharge petitions, but their frustration is palpable.

Third, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Kyiv last week and left Ukrainians clearly unhappy with his request that Ukraine stop targeting oil refineries in Russia. Ukrainians accept, with some annoyance, restrictions limiting the use of US-provided weapons to targets within Ukraine. However, Ukraine uses domestically produced drones to attack Russian refineries, which are legitimate military targets. Thus far, they have struck facilities that produce seven to eight percent of Russia’s refined oil products, and many more are within range of Ukrainian drones.

There are questions about the rationale for the request to stop refinery attacks, which reportedly had to do with the price of oil. Russia mainly exports crude oil, not refined oil products; it is therefore unclear how reducing Russia’s refinery capacity would affect crude exports. As one senior Ukrainian official put it, “stop telling us not to hit targets in Russia.”

We left Kyiv inspired by Ukrainian resilience, courage, and their continued conviction that they can defeat one of the largest military powers on the planet. The United States has a vital national interest in Ukraine’s success. Were Putin and the Kremlin to become emboldened by a win in Ukraine, they would pose a far greater threat to the rest of Europe. The Biden administration and Congress should act without delay to help the Ukrainians prevail.

Steven Pifer and John Herbst served as the third and fifth US ambassadors to Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 4, 2024

“Ukraine is Russia”: Medvedev reveals imperial ambitions fueling invasion

By Taras Kuzio

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has underlined the imperialism fueling the invasion of Ukraine by rejecting Ukrainian statehood and declaring “Ukraine is definitely Russia,” writes Taras Kuzio.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Mar 14, 2024

Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary: The West is still in denial over Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Western leaders have yet to grasp the true scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia and are in danger of suffering an history defeat, warns the Secretary of Ukraine’s Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 21, 2024

Russian victory in Ukraine would leave Europe at Putin’s mercy

By Mykola Bielieskov

A Russian victory in Ukraine would reinvigorate Putin’s war machine and leave much of Europe at the mercy of the Kremlin, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post The mood in wartime Ukraine: Weariness, resolve, and exasperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Danilov says the lack of faith he encountered among Ukraine’s allies during the first days of the invasion reflects the widespread disinformation that continues to cloud international perceptions of his country’s struggle against resurgent Russian imperialism. With the invasion now in its third year, Danilov warns that many in the West remain in denial over the scale of the threat posed by Putin’s Russia, and have yet to grasp the true international implications of the war in Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Danilov has led Ukraine’s influential National Security and Defense Council since October 2019, and has been at the heart of Ukrainian attempts to galvanize international opposition to Russia’s invasion. He readily admits that these efforts have been consistently hampered by Russia’s sophisticated and highly effective disinformation strategies. Looking back at the past two years, Danilov says this experience has underlined the growing importance of information warfare in shaping today’s multidimensional battlefield. “We all make decisions based on the information we have. While there is now an unprecedented amount of information available, it is also apparent that this information can be easily manipulated and distorted.”

Today’s increasingly chaotic and overloaded information landscape is helping Russia conceal its true intentions in Ukraine and disguise its geopolitical ambitions, says Danilov. He frames the ongoing invasion of Ukraine as the central stage in a far broader global confrontation between the democratic world and the resurgent forces of autocracy led by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, but cautions that such clarity is often lacking during his interactions with Ukraine’s Western partners.

The 61-year-old Ukrainian Security Council Secretary bemoans the absence of a modern-day Reagan or Churchill with the necessary vision to see the Russian threat in its true historical context. Unless today’s generation of Western leaders urgently acknowledge the scale of the challenge, he predicts they will soon be confronted by a very different and more hostile international environment. “Too many countries remain stuck in an information fog and do not realize that World War III is already underway. The whole world is engaged in the current war in one way or another, even though Ukraine is the only country doing the actual fighting against Russia.”

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With no end in sight to Russia’s invasion, the diplomatic debate in many Western capitals currently revolves around the question of Vladimir Putin’s ultimate war aims and how far he is prepared to go. To Danilov, the answer is disarmingly simple: Putin wants to completely transform the geopolitical climate and will keep going until he is stopped. If Ukraine should fall, Danilov is convinced Russia will expand its aggression further. He believes the countries most immediately at risk will be the former member states of the Warsaw Pact. “Putin made his intentions perfectly clear in his December 2021 ultimatum to the West, when he called for NATO to withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe. Just look at the map; it’s all there.”

Returning to the status quo of the early 1990s is unlikely to satisfy the Russian dictator, Danilov says. He argues that Putin’s foreign policy objectives ultimately stretch far beyond the old Iron Curtain and include the breakup of the European Union itself. This would allow Putin to divide and conquer Europe. “One of Putin’s key goals is the destruction of the EU. It is very difficult for the Kremlin to deal with a united Europe; this puts Russia at a significant disadvantage. Putin would much prefer to splinter the EU and negotiate with each European country separately.”

This does not mean Russia is preparing to imminently invade Belgium or occupy Brussels, of course. On the contrary, the Kremlin is far more likely to employ the kind of hybrid warfare tactics honed in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. Indeed, Danilov argues that Moscow has been engaged in an active campaign of hybrid hostilities inside the European Union for a number of years, and accuses European leaders of turning a blind eye to this unwelcome reality. “Russia’s hybrid war against the EU is already well underway, but some Western countries prefer not to acknowledge it. Putin constantly commits acts of hybrid aggression against Europe, but many Europeans are reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions as this would force them to recognize the threat and respond.”

Putin’s other great strategic priority is the dissolution of NATO. While skeptics argue that the Russian military is currently in no shape to take on NATO, Danilov believes Putin could potentially achieve his goal by discrediting the alliance rather than defeating it in a conventional war. With Western weakness increasingly evident in Ukraine, Putin may seek to test the shaky resolve of NATO leaders by staging some kind of border provocation. According to Danilov, if the alliance fails to produce an adequate response, there is a very real chance that member countries will quickly lose faith in collective security and seek alternative arrangements. NATO may be able to formally survive such a blow, but the damage to its credibility would be fatal. “When you have a maniac on the loose in your neighborhood, the task is to stop him as soon as possible and not engage in negotiations or other nonsense,” Danilov says.

Based on his own extensive interactions with NATO commanders over the past two years, Ukraine’s Security Council Secretary has full confidence in the alliance’s military leadership and believes they are under no illusions regarding both the nature of the Putin regime and urgency of the threat facing the West. However, he also stresses that the same cannot necessarily be said for Europe’s political leaders. This is a recipe for potential disaster, says Danilov. “Putin is the Hitler of our era. The current situation is strikingly similar to the 1930s, when military men warned of the mounting danger but were overruled by politicians who preferred to appease Hitler. If we make the same mistake again, it could mean the eclipse of the West.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Vladimir Putin turned his hotly anticipated interview with Tucker Carlson into a history lecture that laid bare the dangerous delusions and imperial ambitions driving the invasion of Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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This year, as part of International Women’s Day, three women from the Middle East, working toward a more equal world, have been recognized in Time magazine’s annual list of the most influential women. They include Nadia Murad, a Yazidi human rights activist, as well as two women who have formed a historic Israeli-Palestinian partnership: Yael Admi, a co-founder and leader of the Israeli movement Women Wage Peace; and Reem Hajajreh, founder and director of the Palestinian organization Women of the Sun. The one thing they have in common is that, despite their circumstances, they continue to push forward for equal rights.

Nadia Murad is a leading advocate for survivors of genocide and sexual violence. She was captured by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants in 2014 and has been outspoken about the horrific abuse she suffered at their hands. In her 2017 memoir, The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight Against the Islamic State, Murad recounts her brutal experience and the heroic reclaiming of her life. She earned a Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 alongside Congolese physician Dr. Denis Mukwege for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Murad is also the founder of Nadia’s Initiative, an organization dedicated to “helping women and children victimized by genocides, mass atrocities, and human trafficking to heal and rebuild their lives and communities.”

Despite heroes like Murad and Dr. Mukwege, and other international efforts to address these issues, the prevalence of violence against women in conflict remains a harsh reality. Women often bear the brunt of violence during times of conflict, becoming victims of war. That includes sexual violence, displacement, and targeted attacks. Their bodies become weaponized, and the expressions of their tormentors’ rage and dehumanization. The impact of war on women extends beyond direct physical harm, as displacement and breakdown of social structures further expose them to vulnerabilities. Disproportionate suffering is evident in the staggering number of female refugees and internally displaced persons, who often face increased risks of gender-based violence.

This tragic cycle repeated itself on October 7, 2023 with the “systematic, targeted sexual abuse of Israeli women during the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel” aimed at terrorizing and humiliating victims and their families. There is a growing body of evidence of acts of sexual torture—including rape and gang rape, as well as mutilations and gunshots to genital areas—the facts of which have been documented in the recent report of the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel, which was submitted to decision-makers at the United Nations (UN).

Subsequently, there has been a disproportionate impact of war on Palestinian women in Gaza. According to the World Health Organization, women and newborns are bearing the brunt of the conflict, representing 67 percent of all casualties. UN Women has also pointed to gender inequality and the burden on women fleeing the fighting with their children, accounting for 63 percent of all deaths in Gaza. Recently, the UN has also noted credible allegations of both human rights violations and sexual violence against Palestinian women and girls in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

With cruel and almost prescient timing, just three days before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, some 1,500 Israeli and Palestinian representatives of Women Wage Peace and Women of the Sun descended on Jerusalem and the shores of the Dead Sea, calling for their governments to find a diplomatic solution to the ongoing situation, elevate the role of peacemaking, and stop further violence. The two distinct, yet fully aligned grassroots peace organizations gathered to demand an end to the “cycle of bloodshed” consuming their communities and for their respective leaders to return to the negotiating table to secure a nonviolent resolution to their decades-long conflict.

It was a jubilant affair, but the joy was short-lived. Just three days later, Hamas militants unleashed their massacre, killing some 1,200 people in Israel, including three members of Women Wage Peace, one of whom was co-founder and Canadian-born Vivian Silver. Since then, at least twenty-seven Women of the Sun members in Gaza have been killed.

Despite this horrific backdrop, both organizations continue to forge ahead. They are focused on their respective communities, and they are also dedicated to continuing working together. One of their primary achievements has been the Mothers’ Call, a joint declaration by Palestinian and Israeli women united for a peaceful resolution and a future of peace, freedom, equality, rights, and security for their children and future generations.

As the Israel-Hamas war rages on, their cause is gaining momentum. The two organizations have been jointly nominated for the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, acknowledging not only that women are unjustly impacted by war, but that they are also part of the solution. According to data published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, the more women are engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, the more peace there is in the world. Negotiations go better, peace is more enduring, and more members of society reap the benefits. 

Women make up 50 percent of the global population, though they are seriously under-represented in areas that have the greatest impact on all members of society. Data show that the more women are included in the economy, education, politics, and the legal system, the more prosperous, peaceful, just, and safe the world will be for children and future generations.

On International Women’s Day this year, the world needs more voices echoing the resounding calls for peace and justice in the face of ongoing conflicts. The international community must acknowledge and support those women who are fighting every day to make a difference. The recognition of Nadia Murad and the collaborative efforts of Yael Admi and Reem Hajajreh underscore the indispensable role women play in shaping a more harmonious world. Their resilience has been tested, but their unwavering commitment persists. As these women stand at the forefront of change, they serve as powerful reminders that women are more than victims of war; they are crucial architects of lasting, peaceful solutions.

Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

The post While wars rage on, women wage peace in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 21st, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship, in collaboration with United States Embassy to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and ADGM, held a workshop exploring how women entrepreneurs in the UAE can integrate innovations in artificial intelligence (AI) to their small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  

The panel, which was moderated by Sarah Saddouk, Director of Innovation at Entrepreneur Middle East IMPACT, featured three successful executives with backgrounds in finance, healthcare, and tech; all have harnessed cutting-edge AI and digital advances to drive their companies forward. Speakers included Abir Habbal, Chief Data and AI Officer at Accenture Middle East; Amnah Ajmal, Executive Vice President for market development for EEMEA at Mastercard; and Salim Chemlal, Director of Product at AI71. Tanya Cole, Senior Commercial Officer at the United States Embassy to the UAE, provided the opening remarks. 

Tanya Cole opened the event with welcome remarks, noting that partnerships like the WIn Fellowship encourage innovation and sustainable growth and undergird the rich commercial exchange between the United States and UAE. She observed that one of AI’s principal benefits for SMEs is enhancing operational efficiency, allowing small teams to allocate time and resources to higher-level work like business strategy. Cole acknowledged initiatives by the United States government to promote greater global representation of women in tech but noted that stronger efforts were needed to promote gender equality in the AI sector. She concluded by encouraging the audience to continue breaking down barriers to women in STEM fields and ensuring that women continue to steer and benefit from the growth of AI. 

The panelists leveraged their experience working with AI to cover several areas of concern for entrepreneurs, such as risk, regulation, scalability, and equity. They identified key trends in its uses across the private sector and provided guidance for SMEs hoping to improve their workflow with AI. The speakers also emphasized the need for women to shape the future of the field. 

Main Takeaways

Amnah Ajmal pushed back on skepticism that recent advances in AI are overestimated, asserting that the increasing accessibility and efficiency of computing power make the technology commercially viable. She highlighted the relevant challenge posed by AI adoption in the private sector: the burden of unlearning and relearning technologies as they evolve and integrate into new fields. Ajmal spotlighted two trends in AI usage she observed among SMEs: risk management centered on combatting scams and fraud, and personalized marketing communications. She stated that the critical edge provided by AI is best understood in terms of scalability and speed, freeing up human capital for other tasks.  

Abir Habbal explained that by keeping abreast of AI advances and integration, actors can actively shape the future of policy and governance around the technology. She distinguished between “narrow AI” capable of single tasks versus “generative AI” capable of multiple tasks at once. The latter is expected to be heavily disruptive; research conducted by her firm indicated that most professions can expect 40 percent of their working hours to be affected by AI. Habbal added that financial services have particularly high potential for AI automation, but opportunities exist in every sector. 

Salim Chemlal mentioned that AI innovation should be propelled forward alongside regulation, rather than waiting for regulation before research continues, as experts have proposed. However, he also advocated for stronger international coordination to ensure AI safety, with a special emphasis on adaptability given the many variables in the field. Amnah Ajmal also offered her thoughts on regulation, proposing that businesses should gather industry stakeholders and experts, define the problem they wish to solve, and build the regulation themselves rather than waiting for a regulator to act. She added that regulators perform a service to society and governments will often embrace the suggested frameworks. Ajmal concluded by noting that traditional financial institutions have failed to uplift SMEs and women entrepreneurs, with all-women teams receiving a maximum of 2.7 percent of global VC funding. 

Abir Habbal turned to the risks of AI and how regulation can help mitigate them. She explained that risks in the field include both structural issues, such as systemic biases and inaccurate results, as well as intentional misuses. With fast-evolving technologies such as AI, regulation may stifle innovation, creating a need for “sandboxes” for advanced testing. The industry’s appetite for regulation stems from a desire to effectively govern AI to manage these risks— and fear of financial and reputational harm if they are not mitigated. Salim Chemlal added that different societies should have their own AI systems, arguing that AI deployed outside of the context it was trained in (such as Western products now used in the Middle East) lack context to adequately serve their current users.  

Amnah Ajmal emphasized that women must challenge the status quo in the AI field. She suggested that women are sometimes apprehensive about engaging deeply with new technologies, and she consequently urges other women in the field to be confident in their abilities. AI is trained on old data, which inherently introduces biases against women. Ajmal gave the example of office thermostats, which when adopted in the 1960s were calibrated for men; women, who radiate 35 percent less body heat, are now often left—literally—in the cold. Women should feel empowered to confidently steer the future of AI to prevent further inequity. Abir Habbal highlighted the coalescence of different skillsets in the AI field, which requires expertise in data science, engineering, business, and design. AI democratization is also on the rise, allowing users from outside the field to access and experiment with AI tools. Ajmal urged novices to utilize publicly available tools to experiment and learn more about AI.  

The Way Forward

There has never been a better time for entrepreneurs in the Emirates to integrate AI into their businesses, owing to the UAE’s growing role as a global hub for AI and the country’s booming SME sector. AI adoption will remain a powerful force in the national economy in the near future, with some forecasts expecting close to 14 percent of Emirati GDP to stem from AI by 2030. Meanwhile, government initiatives continue to promote the growth of small and medium enterprises, with a set target of 1 million SMEs in the country by 2030.  

AI has huge transformational power across sectors, particularly in facilitating speed and scalability. Technology may best serve entrepreneurs by freeing up human input otherwise spent on labor-intensive tasks, such as customer service or targeted marketing. However, adopters should ensure that they have defined a problem that AI can solve, as not all facets of business require automation. The risks inherent to AI, such as biases, malfunctions, and privacy concerns should also be evaluated when considering integration.  

Large scale adoption of AI could worsen global gaps in digital skills between men and women, creating an imperative for women to steer the future of the technology in their country and abroad. Currently only 25 percent of AI specialists and 14 percent of cloud computing specialists are women, demonstrating that much work remains to be done to create a more inclusive field. However, the democratization of AI and the UAE’s SME boom represent an opportunity for women entrepreneurs to both capitalize on the business potential of AI and gain expertise that could positively shape the field. Since AI reflects the input and biases of its maker, better systems will require both diverse architects and inclusive design principles. Women at the helm of successful AI-augmented enterprises will be well positioned to advocate for these changes, resulting in a more equitable future for all.  

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