On May 29, Jamie Metzl, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, appeared on CNN’s NewsNight with Abby Phillip to discuss US visa policy. He emphasized the importance of thoroughly vetting individuals entering the country while also highlighting the need to retain top global talent. Metzl noted that doing so is critical to maintaining US competitiveness, particularly in the context of growing strategic competition with China, which he described as a new “cold war.”

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Jamie Metzl

Nonresident Senior Fellow for Technology and National Security

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Technologies

The post Metzl discusses US student visa policy on CNN’s NewsNight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The election of a pope thrusts a previously little-known figure onto the world stage and places significant geopolitical influence in his hands. As head of state of the Holy See, the pope oversees a vast diplomatic network and holds a moral authority that resonates across both the spiritual and political spheres. Each new pontiff brings a unique imprint to the role. Pope Francis, for instance, drew deeply from his experience working with marginalized communities in Argentina—a perspective that shaped the priorities and tone of his papacy from the beginning. In his first speech to the world as the new pontiff, Pope Leo XIV addressed the crowds in Spanish and greeted “his beloved Diocese of Chiclayo in Peru,” perhaps an early sign that his US–Peruvian identity will leave an imprint on his papacy.

This unique combination of identities could represent more than just mere symbolism. It may also help Pope Leo XIV reframe the US–Latin American relationship in more humane and values-driven terms. To do so, he will need to pick up where Pope Francis’s social justice work left off, but better communicate the shared humanity of people across the hemisphere to a US audience, who increasingly disapproved of Pope Francis and his views during his papacy.

Two decades in Peru

As a missionary and priest in towns and cities across Peru, Pope Leo XIV worked with marginalized communities during some of the country’s most turbulent decades. The 1980s and 1990s in Peru were marked by hyperinflation, an internal armed conflict between Maoist guerrillas and the Peruvian military that left an estimated seventy thousand people dead, and a dramatic erosion of the rule of law. During this period, he became a vocal advocate for vulnerable populations and sought to hold those in power accountable for the lives lost amid the violence and political breakdown.

In 2015, Pope Francis appointed him apostolic administrator of the Diocese of Chiclayo, a coastal city in Peru, a role he held until 2023. In this position, he became known for his closeness to rural communities and his support for social programs, including efforts to combat child malnutrition. As more than 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants escaped to Peru seeking asylum during his eight years in the Diocese of Chiclayo, Prevost showed care and defended their right to migrate. In 2023, he also publicly condemned the violent crackdown by Peruvian security forces against protesters, reinforcing his long-standing commitment to human dignity and justice. To this day, many Peruvians remember him as a priest who never hesitated to walk alongside the country’s poorest and most forgotten.

The unlikely blend of US and Latin America

One of the most distinctive aspects of Pope Leo XIV’s leadership may be his ability to bridge two regions across the same hemisphere. Within the Vatican, he was informally known as the “Latin American Yankee,” a nickname that captures both his dual identity and his capacity to bridge a hemisphere that increasingly finds itself at odds. While the Catholic Church is rarely seen as a central force in US–Latin American relations—with the notable exception of Archbishop Óscar Romero’s outspoken role in El Salvador’s civil war between the US-backed right-wing government and leftist guerrillas in the 1970s—it retains profound cultural and political influence in both places. The church shapes civic life, public debate, and electoral outcomes.

A pope who understands both the hopes of a campesino (small-scale farmer) in northern Peru and the concerns of a middle-class worker in the US Midwest is uniquely positioned to act as a moral and diplomatic bridge. To do so, he will need to carefully weigh his rhetoric on US politics, particularly on immigration, and forge a message of peace that cuts across political divides in the United States—no small feat at a time of increasing political polarization. As a result, Pope Leo XIV could help inspire a shift toward a US–Latin American relationship grounded not just in transactional interests, but in dignity, shared values, and common humanity.

Martin Cassinelli, a native of Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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On May 3, Muhammad Tahir, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former RFE/RL Central and South Asia liaison in Washington, DC, was published in MSNBC on the revocation of temporary protected status for Afghans who aided the United States during its war in Afghanistan.

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Muhammad Tahir

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Eurasia Center

Central Asia Media

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In my work researching how African diaspora communities in the United States maintain their connections to their homelands, I have found that long-standing experiences involving racism, combined with growing anti-immigrant sentiments, have led many members of the African diaspora to strengthen their ties to the continent.

Such diasporans, especially second-generation diasporans (that is, the children of immigrants), have connected with their African identities by turning to the digital space, which has enabled them to follow Africa-related news and cultural trends, connect with diaspora organizations, and keep in touch with family and friends. Digital platforms reduce the distance between home and abroad, accelerating the movement of people, capital, and ideas. 

Second-generation diasporans have also turned to digital platforms to engage in cultural commerce. This digitized and culturally rooted economic engagement—which includes business development, trade, and investment—is what I call the digital identity economy. And this type of diaspora engagement offers new opportunities for reshaping US relations with the African continent.

Diaspora engagement is nothing new; African diaspora communities have long maintained economic, cultural, and social connections to their countries of origin. African immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s maintained homeland ties by opening cultural shops for food products, sending remittances, forming associations and religious institutions, and visiting home.

But the digital identity economy has created space for second-generation diasporans to channel their shared desire to connect with their homelands, offering products and services that meet their cultural needs while addressing the distinct challenges they face in reconnecting with home, challenges that first-generation immigrants may not experience in the same way. For example, one app called Nkenne, created by a second-generation Nigerian-American, helps diasporans learn African languages and addresses declining heritage-language fluency, a common issue for second-generation diasporans. The app provides cultural education about customs in African countries that younger diasporans may not be familiar with, helping them feel more connected to their culture and their identity from afar. 

Digital platforms such as Spotify and YouTube enable young diasporans to engage with African music, stream artists’ work, and share their content. The popularity of Afrobeats music has given rise to businesses and events centered around the genre, including parties and popular music festivals—such as Afrofuture and Afronation—which take place not only in African countries but also in diaspora communities. While some may view these events solely as entertainment, they reflect deep cultural connections that create economic activity.

The digital identity economy has created economic opportunities in tourism for second-generation diasporans. For example, acclaimed second-generation Ghanaian-American chef Eric Adjepong offers a Ghanaian culinary tour, using digital platforms for promotion and booking. And the digital identity economy has enabled second-generation diasporans to use fashion to express their cultural pride and identity. The brand Ashanti Beads, which creates apparel featuring the Akan Adinkra symbol Gye Nyame, is an example of this. Its tagline, “Bridging the gap in the African diaspora through fashion,” speaks to the growing demand for culturally rooted apparel. Ashanti Beads uses digital platforms to engage its audience, market its brand, and sell its products. 

These culturally rooted economic activities reflect the financial engagement patterns of second-generation African diaspora members. In speaking with second-generation Ghanaians in the United States and United Kingdom, I found that they are not sending traditional remittances at the same rate as the first generation and are also less likely to send remittances in the future. Reasons for this included not wanting to be taken advantage of financially, not having anyone to send money to, and fears around creating a cycle of dependency. They preferred practices that would promote widespread economic improvement, such as business development, investing, and collective remittances. 

Some view the lack of interest in sending remittances among young African diasporans to be a challenge, especially with cuts to foreign aid, tariffs threatening the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the end of Prosper Africa. While some have argued that remittances could fill that funding gap (in 2023, the African continent received over ninety billion dollars in remittances, significantly surpassing foreign aid and foreign direct investment), this is not realistic. Remittances are primarily used for consumption, immigrants face increasing financial difficulty in part due to restrictive immigration policies, and younger diasporans are less likely to send such funds.  

These shifts are seen by some as a threat to Africa’s development, but they really present an opportunity to reimagine US-Africa engagement. Washington can introduce new policies and initiatives that support diaspora investment, trade, and business development as an alternative to development aid. And it is in the United States’ interest to do so: Supporting the digital identity economy would yield growth for diaspora businesses and communities in the country.

One way to do that is by strengthening ties through American Chambers of Commerce. American Chambers of Commerce on the African continent can serve as connectors and champions for a new era of diaspora-driven trade. By supporting business matchmaking, policy reform, and transnational partnerships, they offer a ready-made infrastructure for unlocking the potential of the digital identity economy.

Another is by creating a post-AGOA US-Africa trade policy. A policy that centers on diaspora businesses and entrepreneurs—by offering concessions and incentives that reward investment in the continent’s creative, cultural, and digital sectors—would support the growth of African economies and diaspora businesses.

A third initiative could include redefining foreign direct investment (FDI) to include diaspora investment. US diaspora businesses investing in Africa should be recognized as a form of FDI. While diaspora direct investment may be harder to track than remittances or traditional FDI, it still offers a dual benefit by supporting Africa’s growth while strengthening diaspora businesses in the United States. Redefining FDI to include diaspora direct investment would provide a more accurate depiction of capital outflows and the actors driving them. It can also broaden how the United States views diaspora financial contributions, moving beyond a focus on remittances to acknowledge the businesses, services, and networks they provide.

By embracing the digital identity economy, fostering diaspora investment, and rethinking trade policies, the United States can adopt a collaborative approach that supports African economic empowerment while strengthening connections across the diaspora, encouraging mutual growth.

Kirstie Kwarteng is a postdoctoral research associate at SOAS University of London and founder of The Nana Project.

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As Turkey navigates a shifting global order, economic transformations, and regional conflicts, considering diverse perspectives from informed, visionary leaders—including women—will be crucial.

On March 6, the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs hosted a private roundtable to honor women’s leadership in Turkey in the days leading up to International Women’s Day. The event brought together women thought leaders, diplomats, and heads of businesses in Turkey to discuss global and regional developments, focusing on effective solutions to current challenges. These powerful women spoke under Chatham House Rule about their experiences navigating an increasingly complex world, and specifically about Turkey’s relations with the United States and European Union (EU), Turkey’s role in NATO and the Middle East, and the future of the Turkish economy.

US-Turkey relations amid a changing international order

Participants agreed that US President Donald Trump’s return to office has significantly altered the international order. Given its strategic geopolitical position, Turkey plays a key role in this shifting landscape, which presents Ankara with both challenges and opportunities, the participants said. Concerns were raised regarding the United States losing its status as a diplomatic reference point due to sudden foreign policy changes. Participants emphasized Turkey’s potential to become a full-fledged regional leader but warned against indecisiveness, drawing parallels to the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, when some felt Turkey missed an opportunity to strengthen ties with the EU through its response to the migrant crisis.

Turkey’s increasing significance in the Middle East

Speakers emphasized Ankara’s evolving role in the Middle East and beyond. For example, as some participants pointed out, Turkey has managed to strengthen ties with Gulf nations while looking beyond their historical disagreements. One participant noted that Turkey has shifted from direct competition with Gulf states to a more utilitarian strategy, improving diplomatic relations across the region. Turkey’s position on Israel and regional security was also debated, with participants mentioning concerns over rising tensions since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks on Israel. Additionally, Turkey’s influence in shaping the future of Syria was a critical point of discussion. Participants agreed on the difficulty of maintaining sway over the Damascus government without jeopardizing Syria’s legitimacy as an independent state.

EU-Turkey defense relations and implications for NATO

Participants welcomed signs of a more constructive EU-Turkey relationship in light of developments in Syria, cooperation in Ukraine, and the recent discussions of joint defense initiatives. However, skepticism remained regarding whether these bilateral ties can translate into broader EU-wide support for Turkey. The conversation highlighted Turkey’s strong relationships with key European nations such as Spain and Italy and also addressed the failure to leverage these relationships for more extensive regional backing. Some criticized the EU’s reluctance to deepen ties with Turkey due to Turkey’s historical tensions with France and Greece, urging Europe to recognize Turkey as an indispensable ally due to its military, geographic, and economic significance.

One participant underscored the necessity of rethinking NATO’s framework to better integrate Turkey’s interests and security concerns while addressing broader tensions between global powers. The participant reminded the roundtable that Turkey has historically been a bridge between the East and the West, and this role has only become more significant as global tensions rise. She said that Turkey has actively engaged with both Western allies and Russia, seeking to maintain a delicate balance in its foreign policy.

Turkey’s role in the new Syria

In discussing the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey, which currently hosts 3.1 million Syrians under temporary protection, participants noted how many Syrian immigrants have had opportunities in Turkey to establish their own businesses. This echoed the stories presented to the roundtable in a screening of an excerpt from the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs’ documentary, Do Seagulls Migrate?, which explores the experiences of four Syrian women refugees in Turkey.

Some speakers noted the social tensions prevalent in refugee-dense regions such as Kilis and neighborhoods in Istanbul, where the large influx of refugees has contributed to rising rents, decreased job availability, and strains on infrastructure. The discussion acknowledged that while refugees have played a significant role in certain sectors of the economy, the rapid demographic changes have also led to challenges for local populations. The women leaders emphasized the need for holistic policies to address these challenges.

Beyond economic repercussions, participants expressed caution regarding the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, given its former ties to al-Qaeda, and acknowledged the apprehension many Syrian immigrants—especially women—feel about returning to an uncertain and potentially dangerous environment. The women leaders also raised concerns about long-term integration challenges; while many refugees have settled in Turkey and are unlikely to return to Syria, the refugees’ repatriation remains a key talking point for politicians. The discussion also highlighted the growing presence of a new generation of Syrian children raised in Turkey, underscoring the need to consider their future role and representation within Turkey’s democracy.

Trade, tariffs, and the economy

Several speakers noted that Turkey’s economic trajectory remains closely tied to Europe. One of the most critical concerns raised was the impact of US tariffs and sanctions, which can add to the pressure on Turkey’s economy. Additionally, the participants noted, new EU environmental regulations such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism could further strain Turkish exports. However, there was also a sense of cautious optimism, with some speakers pointing to the potential for increased trade volume between Turkey and the United States; in 2024, that trade volume was $32 billion. The participants argued that in the face of global economic shifts, Turkey’s ability to maintain a balanced foreign policy will be essential for safeguarding its economic stability and fostering long-term growth. Striking a careful equilibrium between the United States and Europe—and between these Western allies and regional partners—will be key in mitigating economic uncertainties and capitalizing on new trade opportunities, the participants added.

Investing in Turkey’s human capital

Speakers noted that Turkey has a strong private sector capable of cutting-edge innovation. However, they added that if Turkey wants to maintain and strengthen its relevance in an increasingly competitive global market dependent on new technologies, it should focus on developing a highly skilled workforce. Therefore, speakers at the roundtable extensively discussed the need for aligning educational initiatives with labor market demands, particularly in sectors such as digital innovation, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing. Speakers noted that university partnerships and investments in vocational training will be crucial in ensuring the continuous development of Turkish human capital. On the other hand, concerns were also raised about the impact of brain drain on Turkey’s innovation potential, with many young professionals seeking opportunities abroad. As one speaker put it, Turkey must focus on developing a highly skilled workforce to maintain its economic relevance in an increasingly competitive global market.

Zeynep Egeli is the project assistant of the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs.

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Since the start of the war in Ukraine, over 100,000 Russians have sought refuge in Serbia, drawn by historical ties, visa-free entry, and the complex geopolitical landscape. But who are these Russians, and what are their beliefs? What do they envision for their future in Serbia, a country at the crossroads of the East and West?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, delves into the growing Russian community in Serbia—a topic that has sparked significant discussion across the Western Balkans. Joining her are Srdjan Cvijić, President of the International Advisory Board of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Maxim Samorukov, Fellow at the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Center.

Their latest research offers a fresh perspective on the Russian community in Serbia, revealing their non-malign influence and shedding light on their social, political, and economic integration.

In this episode, we explore:

– The scope and size of Russia’s migration to Serbia—are we witnessing a cultural shift or a temporary wave?

– Who are the migrants arriving—political dissidents, tech workers, or others—and what are their motivations?

– Are these immigrants looking for safety, or do they see themselves as agents of change?

– How do they view Vladimir Putin and Serbian President Vučić?

– And what does their growing presence mean for Serbia’s future as it balances ties between the East and West?

Don’t miss this insightful conversation on the evolving role of Russian immigrants in Serbia’s political, social, and economic landscape.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post What is the future of Russian immigration to Serbia? | A Debrief with Srdjan Cvijić and Maxim Samorukov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Doing so will require facing the roots of the tension. There are deep-seated elements of discord between the two governments. These elements relate to Algeria’s colonial past, Algerian migration to France, and the divergence of their positions over Western Sahara. The shared history between Algeria and France is complex. That history is marked by more than a century of France’s colonization of Algeria, which ended with a bloody war of liberation. The two countries’ shared history has also witnessed successive waves of migration from Algeria to France. The relationship between the two governments has been rather rocky over the past decades with occasional periods of reconciliation.

For a while, the close relationship between the two heads of state, Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Emmanuel Macron, seemed to have brought about a hopeful rapprochement between the two countries. In 2021, Macron announced the creation of a “memory and truth commission,” involving both Algerian and French historians to mend wounds from the history of French colonial rule. Discussions were underway on the return of Algerian cultural artifacts and archives from the colonial period. That rapprochement came to a halt after Macron officially affirmed Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in October 2024.

A diplomatic route to resolve the discord is not only still possible but imperative. There is a lot more at stake than just the welfare of Algeria and France. Considering the shared history and the deep ties between their populations, the pair is at the center of a matrix of relationships between Europe and Africa and between the Global North and Global South more generally.

The tensions between Algeria and France are flaring up in the context of deepening rifts among Global North and Global South countries over trade, migration, energy, environmental and climate cooperation, and the rules-based international order. But these unfavorable geopolitical circumstances are all the more reason for the two neighbors on both sides of the Mediterranean sea to resolve their differences and provide a model for how other nations can reconcile North-South divides. For example, France and Algeria could cooperate to combat wildfires in the Mediterranean basin, which continue to kill hundreds people, destroy hundreds of thousands of hectares of land, and to devastate biodiversity and people’s livelihoods.

More and more, “sovereigntist” waves both in the North and South are pushing countries to close their economies. There is also a growing trend of politicians scapegoating the “other.” That said, if Algeria and France could resolve their differences, it would open new avenues to help partner further not only on combating wildfires, but also on security, energy projects, and finding new pathways to solve migration issues. The two countries must bear in mind their joint responsibility to ensure stability in the Mediterranean Sea and beyond, as well as to look forward to develop further economic and security cooperation.

The Mediterranean Sea has served as the crossroads between civilizations in the east and the west for millennia. Yet, it has become the backdrop for thousands of tragic journeys by refugees and migrants heading north toward Europe. A reinvigorated relationship between Algeria and France would serve to rekindle the potential for commerce and prosperity in the Mediterranean and beyond. Algeria is the doorstep to Africa, as France is for Europe. Yet, the economic ties between the two countries are well below what they could be. Total trade was just under twelve billion dollars between the two countries in 2023 and the stock of direct investment from France in Algeria that year was well below three billion dollars. Building common ground between these two countries could boost trade and investment, increasing both nations’ prosperity.

Just as France and Germany have become the engine of European integration after having fought bloody wars, France and Algeria could become an engine for partnership between Europe and Africa. For instance, as green technologies are becoming economical not just in solar but soon perhaps with hydrogen, the partnership between Algeria and France could help with the transfer of technology that will spur investment and trade in energy across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, in agriculture and agribusiness, there is an opportunity for increases in investment and trade that can mutually benefit of not just Algeria and France but the whole of Africa and Europe.

The galloping demography of the African continent far outweighs that of Europe, which should lead investment to flow massively from the North to the South. There are, of course, important frictions that prevent that. To be sure, deeper investments, including in infrastructure, require further progress on the investment climate in Algeria, as well as removing nontariff barriers to economic integration in Africa. But increasing investments between Africa and Europe also requires a new way for the two continents to view and treat each other.

Something else is required, too: Europe should move away from the paternalism of former colonizers, which has alienated many Africans. That may sound remote from economics and business, but that is likely a major reason why the relationship between Africa and Europe is stuck. Algeria and France’s relationship epitomizes this tension. Small but symbolic steps were taken to bridge the gap in perspectives between Algeria and France over their colonial past. These steps should continue to take place.  

The geographic proximity and societal ties between Algeria and France should allow the two countries to reinvent the relationship between Africa and Europe and, more broadly, between the Global North and Global South. A successful reinvention of France-Algeria relations could serve as a model for Europe-Africa relations based on mutual respect that face up to the wounds of the past while looking to the opportunities of the future.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region and a former chief of commodities at the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. Arezki is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development, and at the Harvard Kennedy School.

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Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has visited the United States twice after the US elections, including for a front-row seat at Trump’s inauguration. And as Modi becomes one of the first global leaders to meet with Trump in his second term, India is working to be a consistently visible presence in Washington, DC. India’s commitment to active diplomatic engagement, along with the prime minister’s strong base of support at home, will put the country in a strong position to prioritize strengthening relations with the United States. In this week’s meeting, Modi’s top priorities will be avoiding US tariffs against India, setting the stage for trade and defense deals with Washington, and making progress on bilateral immigration policy.

The search for big wins

Trade will no doubt be at the top of Trump’s agenda when he meets with Modi on Thursday. India has a trade surplus with the United States of $45.6 billion, and Trump has criticized India as a “tariff king” for its high import duties. Though Trump sought a trade deal with India in his first term, an agreement did not come together before he left office. The Biden administration did not pursue a trade deal with India, so it would be a significant development if Trump and Modi were to move forward on negotiations for one now. 

Modi is reportedly coming to Washington ready with his list of tariff concessions to push for discussions, and India has taken steps in its 2025 budget to avoid sending protectionist signals. He will try to avoid the pattern that is emerging in US trade relations, in which the Trump administration has announced tariffs first, then followed up with negotiations and concessions. Though India is investing significant diplomatic time and effort in avoiding a trade war with the United States, whether Trump responds to these proposals depends on how India plays its other cards.

A major card that India will be able to play in trade negotiations is its defense sector. Trump stated in his conversation with Modi last month that he wanted India to buy more US military hardware. Trump would also likely want India to invest more in military procurement to offset its trade surplus with the United States. Given the confluence of interests and Modi’s willingness to make concessions on these issues, expect both leaders to negotiate toward major agreements on trade and defense. 

Exceptions and immigration

In its relations with the United States, India has frequently made a case for exceptions. It is the only non-treaty ally of the United States with access to certain US missile technology, and has argued for exceptions to US sanctions on other countries. While the case for many of these exceptions may be valid, the variable is Trump’s tolerance and patience with the exceptions India enjoys. After all, these are potential pressure points that Trump could use as leverage in the future. If the exceptions, in his view, impede his larger strategic goals, then he may not negotiate on them. However, these exceptions also give India a bilateral opportunity to remove itself from sweeping measures. 

Take, for example, illegal immigration in the United States, an issue Trump highlighted in his phone call with Modi on January 27. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, too, raised this issue in his first bilateral discussion with Jaishankar. On February 5, India accepted more than one hundred Indian illegal immigrants from the United States, who arrived aboard a US military aircraft. The two countries have identified that around 18,000 Indian nationals are in the United States without a legal status. India could offer to send its own aircraft to get more of these individuals back, also giving it more control over their treatment and legal verification of Indian origin, or it could let the United States continue its own repatriation flights under Trump administration rules.

Yet, beyond illegal immigration, legal pathways to working, living, and gaining citizenship in the United States have also been in the crosshairs of many of Trump’s supporters and allies. These include H1-B work visas, many of which are obtained by Indian nationals. Though the president and his billionaire adviser Elon Musk have defended H1-B visas, the pathways to legal citizenship in the United States have become a bottleneck. The United States and India can only find a long-term understanding on immigration if the two leaders take it up at the highest level. For context, India and Germany’s Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership is a great example of bilateral consensus. Such an agreement between the United States and India would be a big win on both sides and potentially set the model for the legal immigration pathways Trump wants to promote.

While progress can be made on some of these issues on Thursday, the greater likelihood is that they will take more time to develop. That is why, perhaps most importantly, this week’s meeting is an opportunity for the two leaders to set an amicable tone for the next four years. The US president and Indian prime minister enjoyed a readily apparent camaraderie during Trump’s first term. Reviving and sustaining that spirit will be necessary for India to avoid US tariffs, open the door to trade negotiations, increase defense cooperation, and work with the Trump administration on immigration policy.

Srujan Palkar is the Global India fellow and an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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A clear warning

The tension became clear on January 26, when Colombian President Gustavo Petro revoked authorization for two deportation flights set to land in Bogotá. In a social media post announcing his decision, Petro accused the United States of treating the deportees like criminals, as they were deported on a US military plane in which they were handcuffed. Trump quickly retaliated by threatening harsh trade tariffs, sanctions, and visa restrictions against Colombian officials. Petro then countered on social media that he would impose tariffs on the United States as well. The diplomatic showdown ended after intense backchannel discussions between the two countries forced Petro to reverse his decision.

The Colombian president’s attempt to block the Trump administration’s mass deportation plan highlights the broader challenge Latin American leaders face in adapting to a dramatic turn in US immigration policy. During the Biden administration, US officials sought to foster partnerships with Latin American governments and nongovernmental organizations to create safe migration transits and open legal pathways for migrants seeking economic opportunities in the United States. This dynamic led at least five million people from the Western Hemisphere to enter the United States through the southern border, with and without authorization, between 2021 and 2023. Trump’s return marks the end of this approach. 

As Latin American leaders await further details of the Trump administration’s mass deportation plans, the US-Colombia standoff sends a clear warning that resisting the White House will come at a steep political cost. In Colombia, Petro’s failed attempt to block US repatriation flights led to the breakdown of his government coalition after the centrist Liberal Party withdrew two days later. His mismanagement of the crisis, which reportedly required intervention from former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, gave many Colombians the impression that Petro was unprepared to handle this high-stakes diplomatic issue. Similarly, Honduran President Xiomara Castro’s attempt to rally Latin American nations against Trump’s mass deportation plan under the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States fell flat after other countries declined to attend her late January emergency meeting, forcing her to cancel it.

A struggle to adapt

The primary concern for Latin American leaders is the scale and scope of the Trump administration’s mass deportation plans. Estimates on the number of individuals who could be deported often focus on the approximately eleven million undocumented immigrants living in the United States. However, this figure fails to capture the full scope of the Trump administration’s deportation plans. The administration has made it clear that all foreign nationals who entered the United States during the Biden administration on temporary legal status will be expected to leave when their program status expires. So far, the administration has terminated parole programs, such as the Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan initiatives, which facilitated the entry of more than 528,000 people into the United States since January 2023. The Trump administration has also rescinded the previous administration’s extension of the temporary protected status designation for approximately 350,000 Venezuelan nationals, who will now lose their work authorization and may be ordered removed starting in April of this year. 

A massive influx of deportations, particularly of individuals who have lived in the United States for years and have few ties with their countries of origin, will strain Latin American nations already struggling with sluggish economic growth and high unemployment rates. Many returning citizens may struggle to reintegrate after returning with greater employment skills and experience honed for the US economy but fewer economic opportunities or skills suited for where they are being sent. The sudden uprooting of people from the US labor force could also have a destabilizing impact on the deportees’ families and the local economies of their countries of origin, many of which rely on remittances for financial stability. 

Left-wing Latin American leaders will likely find managing the shift in US immigration policy especially difficult. Despite their ideological opposition to Trump’s plans, they will need to cooperate with the United States to avoid retaliation, which would undermine their countries’ economic stability and erode public trust. But while compliance with US policy will be necessary to avoid an international diplomatic crisis, mass deportation could create domestic pressures that may invariably lead to a decline in public opinion of their governments. A larger number of young working-age people unable to leave their countries to work due to stricter US border security, coupled with a greater number of Latin Americans forced to return to their countries of origin, may deepen public disillusionment in the ability of governments to adequately address organized crime, corruption, and weak job markets.

Latin American governments also face the challenge of managing returnees who have committed violent crimes. If the scale of these deportations increases significantly, then it could put a strain on some Latin American countries, which will have to determine who is truly dangerous and whose violations are minor enough that they could safely be released. It is doubtful that any Latin American country has the resources to process the disposition of hundreds of thousands of returnees deemed criminals by the Trump administration. However, officials will need to assure their publics that dangerous criminals are not being released into the streets. 

These factors could in turn push left-wing governments in the region to moderate their agendas—particularly their fiscal policies—to survive. Otherwise, they risk losing ground to centrist and conservative opposition parties. This dynamic may create a favorable situation for the Trump administration: Latin American governments will be forced to come into compliance with its top agenda of curbing migration to the United States. As a result, the political and economic pressures caused by the reduction of Latin American nationals in the US workforce could force the region’s governments to make long-overdue reforms aimed at reducing public spending and fostering greater economic growth.

Alicia Nieves is a legal expert in immigration and refugee law, specializing in humanitarian assistance and conflict rescue. She is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project and co-founder of the Gaza Family Project, an initiative of the Arab-American Civil Rights League (ACRL) dedicated to helping American families impacted by the Israel-Hamas war. 

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On February 1, Elliot Ackerman, a nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the New York Times that discussed the hundreds of remaining Afghan refugees, especially those who assisted US and allied forces, still struggling to find a new home abroad. In the opinion piece, Ackerman argued that accepting the “stranded” Afghans into the US would serve as not only a moral imperative to the US, but a strategic one as well.

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Elliot Ackerman

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Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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In a Wall Street Journal opinion piece published on January 30 titled “An Americas First Foreign Policy,” Rubio summed up the purpose of the trip: “El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic—the countries I will visit on this trip—all stand to benefit tremendously from greater cooperation with the U.S.” He went on to note that “Making America great again also means helping our neighbors achieve greatness.” One of this essay’s authors has just returned from Panama’s capital, where there was a palpable excitement among Panamanians that the US secretary of state is making their country his first foreign stop.

Rubio’s full trip includes all countries party to the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, with two notable exceptions. The secretary will skip Nicaragua, which is run by the dictator Daniel Ortega, and Honduras, which is governed by a president who is in her last year in office and has decided to cast her lot with Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro.  

In all the countries Rubio is visiting, the secretary will likely seek to reinforce the United States’ willingness to continue working with the region on migration, security, and economic cooperation. In all five countries, Rubio will find pragmatic leaders who recognize the importance of a prosperous and safe hemisphere for all. But each stop will also have unique aspects—both opportunities and sticking points—based on the specifics of each country.

Stop 1: Panama

Rubio and his Panamanian counterparts will have an ambitious agenda to deliver on US President Donald Trump’s inaugural address statement that the United States is “taking back the canal.” The operation of container ports by a China-based company at each end of the canal will be top item for discussion. So, too, will be the bridge being built over the canal and the tunnel underneath it for Panama City’s subway—both being constructed by China-based companies. Panama didn’t recognize China until 2017, when it switched relations from Taiwan, and since then ties have grown quickly, as have questions on the contracts agreed to with China-based companies. Another issue on the agenda will be the fees set by the Panama Canal Authority and items such as maintenance of the watershed to ensure correct water levels. Here, there’s an opportunity for the United States to partner with Panama on much-needed infrastructure upgrades in water management

With a strongly pro-US government led by President José Raúl Mulino, the visit should be a positive one as many areas of common interest align—even though Mulino reacted swiftly to Trump’s statements on the canal, saying he will not negotiate its sovereignty. Both countries also share a deep interest in stopping unauthorized migration coming through the Darién Gap and in clamping down on the criminal groups—now designated as foreign terrorist organizations by Trump—that profit off selling these illegal journeys to the United States. Expect further discussions on ways to further coordinate migration-related efforts.

Stop 2: El Salvador

Just a decade ago, San Salvador was one of the most dangerous cities in the world. As we both witnessed a couple weeks ago when walking in San Salvador’s historic downtown, El Salvador has seen a tremendous transformation in public safety. Since 2019, President Nayib Bukele has undertaken an unapologetic approach to dismantling organized crime. Rubio’s visit will reinforce the bilateral commitment to security cooperation. Bukele is personally close to the current US administration, but the affinities do not guarantee a tension-free relationship over the next four years.

Another important issue on the Rubio-Bukele agenda is migration. The Trump administration previously negotiated a “Safe Third Country” agreement with El Salvador, which allows the United States to send non-Salvadorans back to El Salvador. This visit from the secretary will surely include discussions on reviving and expanding that framework, which was ended by the Biden administration.

Stop 3: Costa Rica

Costa Rica has long been a stable, democratic partner of the United States, but the country has recently grappled with rising levels of citizen insecurity due to organized crime. The country also faces significant regional challenges, including the growing threat posed by Nicaragua’s Ortega regime—with lots of Russian and Chinese security and military presence—and increasing migration pressures from Nicaraguans in search of a better life. Costa Rica has been impacted by the destabilizing actions of the Ortega regime, which has driven waves of refugees into Costa Rican territory.

Rubio’s meeting with Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves could focus on strengthening security ties (including cybersecurity) and reinforcing Costa Rica’s role as an important partner in countering China’s economic influence in the region. Additionally, Rubio will have an opportunity to double down on existing opportunities for economic cooperation, particularly in advanced manufacturing, a sector in which Costa Rica has emerged as a regional leader through the CHIPS Act.

Stop 4: Guatemala

Since taking office in January 2024, Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo has shown a willingness to work closely with the United States on migration enforcement and economic development. Rubio will meet with Arévalo to discuss ways to deepen this cooperation and ensure that Guatemala remains a strong US partner in the region. Migration will be a top issue, with Guatemala’s continued role in receiving deportation flights. As with neighboring countries, the Trump administration has in the past prioritized agreements that allow for the expedited return of migrants. The agenda will also likely cover economic opportunities, with a particular focus on integrating Guatemala more closely into US supply chains through nearshoring efforts.

But most importantly, Guatemala is the largest of the seven countries in the Western Hemisphere (of twelve globally) that continue to diplomatically recognize Taiwan. The Guatemalan government also shares the administration’s support for Ukraine and Israel. The Taiwan question is perhaps the strongest point of alignment with the United States right now, with Arévalo focused on how to deepen economic ties with Taiwan to ensure the relationship continues beyond his mandate. Expect Rubio and Arévalo to discuss ways in which the United States can more fully support such efforts.

Stop 5: Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is much more than just pristine coastlines. President Luis Abinader and his government have transformed the country with a focus on rule of law, transparency, and strong democratic institutions. The Dominican Republic is focused on becoming a nearshoring destination and taking steps to attract US companies, with US foreign direct investment increasing by 40 percent since 2019 as the country has become an important player in the US supply of medical devices. As Rubio wrote in the Wall Street Journal: “Relocating our critical supply chains to the Western Hemisphere would clear a path for our neighbors’ economic growth and safeguard Americans’ own economic security.” Prioritizing nearshoring is in the United States’ economic security interest, and it is why the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center has a working group dedicated to moving this forward with a focus on all five countries in the Rubio itinerary.

The Dominican Republic also shares an island with Haiti. And as Special Envoy for Latin America Mauricio Claver-Carone noted in his press briefing to preview the trip, the Dominican Republic “has also been the country most affected by the challenges and, frankly, the vacuum created by the previous administration in Haiti which has led to, frankly, chaos in Haiti.”

In addition, the Dominican Republic will host the Summit of the Americas later this year—a gathering of regional heads of state to collectively tackle priorities that require collective action. Few threats are as severe and require as much constant cooperation as battling the scourge of violence and insecurity of transnational criminal organizations. Rubio’s visit should be an opportunity to discuss such shared priorities as part of the summit. Hopefully, it will also advance US participation in the summit at the highest diplomatic level.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is the director of impact and operations and lead for Central America at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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In his first days in office, Trump has made it clear that immigration is at the top of his agenda. Since taking office on Monday, Trump has already issued a series of executive actions restricting US immigration, including an executive order declaring a national emergency on the southern border. Furthermore, one of the first votes of the 119th Congress was on the passage of the Laken Riley Act, a key immigration enforcement bill backed widely by Republicans—and also supported by some Democrats after a bruising election cycle. The United States’ policy focus of early 2025 is clear—and this likely means that US-Africa relations will be no exception. If the Trump administration’s first days are any indication, African leaders shouldn’t be surprised if relations with the United States are guided by immigration issues rather than trade and investment in the immediate months to come.

Previously, African leaders and policymakers did not need to be too concerned about US domestic immigration enforcement when it came to their wider relations with Washington. While the past decades have seen rising numbers of Africans migrating to the United States and obtaining legal permanent resident status, most came via legal channels, and immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economies have achieved some of the highest median household incomes in the country. In the past several years, however, there has been a sharp increase in the number of African migrants arriving at the southern US border, having made it across the Atlantic one way or another, and then joining more traditional routes overland to the United States. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, articles abounded stating that African migrants had become the new face of the US border crisis.

Historically, the numbers of African migrants arriving at the US border have been so low that they were classified as “other”. But this is no longer the case. Recently, as Europe’s economic outlook falters and European Union member nations increasingly crack down on migrants and asylum seekers, African migration to the United States is surging. The New York Times reported that “the number of Africans apprehended at the southern border jumped to 58,462 in the fiscal year 2023 from 13,406 in 2022,” with Mauritania, Senegal, Angola, and Guinea the largest sources of migration from Africa to the United States. These, of course, are only the reported numbers, and illegal migration, by definition, is not fully accounted for. And while the number of African migrants entering the United States each year still pales in comparison to that of Latin American migrants, they are no longer insignificant numbers. As refugee, asylum, and immigration systems are being revised, and if 2025 brings the unprecedented level of attention and focus on deportations that the political climate is forecasting, then it’s almost inevitable that African migrants will be affected by whatever immigration policies the new administration implements.

Deportations to African countries are nothing new, as US Immigration and Customs Enforcement have routinely carried out removal flights to the continent. What would be different is the scale and the political landscape around them. There is a very good chance that significant numbers of African migrants will be returned to their countries of origin as part of a broader push against illegal immigration. In addition to migrants without status, should Temporary Protected Status (a humanitarian parole program) be rescinded, Africans in the United States under the program (which covers Cameroon, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan) would lose their work permits and protection from deportation. Any US mass deportation scheme is therefore bound to include African nationals.

As African governments await sit-downs with their new US counterparts in the departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce (as well as the US trade representative) to discuss AGOA and the G20, they may find that the US officials most eager to meet with them initially are from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security, and US Customs and Border Protection.

As for Trump, his past comments on African migrants and the prevailing belief that he will take a more transactional approach toward the continent could mean that African governments that express reluctance to accept back migrants will face hurdles in future initiatives with the United States. Indeed, the first Trump administration sanctioned Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone for refusing to accept migrants deported from the United States.

The G20 Summit and AGOA renewal are rightfully at the forefront of every Africa watcher’s attention for 2025. Both offer unique, timely, and much-needed opportunities to relaunch US-African relations and commercial ties. But for the United States, domestic politics is king, and notably, reauthorization of AGOA was not included in Congress’s continuing resolution last month, despite a concerted effort by African diplomats and industry allies. In today’s Washington, there is a lack of political will for such a key piece of legislation on trade and investment with Africa, but when it comes to immigration policy, political will is omnipresent.  

For better or worse, the focus of US policy in the early days of Trump’s second term will be on immigration, and this focus will almost certainly extend to how the United States approaches African nations. With rising numbers of African migrants in the United States, it is inevitable that the US immigration debate will have a significant impact on wider US-Africa relations.

The United States and Africa will get to trade and finance, but only after seeing what US immigration policy has in store for the relationship first.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Evolution of freedom

The Freedom Index ranks Canada among the freest countries of the world, fifteenth of 164. Canada has held a high ranking since the beginning of these data (1995), however the most recent ten to fifteen years reveal some slippage.

The political subindex trends down from 2016, primarily driven by falling scores for civil liberties and legislative constraints on the executive. The government drew criticism for overly heavy-handed COVID-19 restrictions, yet other high-income countries did much the same. Because the drops continue after pandemic restrictions ended, other explanations are needed. The current government has implemented an energetic social justice diversity-equity-inclusion (DEI) agenda; however, a recent poll by the nonpartisan Macdonald-Laurier Institute shows broad opposition to DEI policies, pronoun lists, and the like. Other civil liberties controversies include Quebec’s Bill 21, restricting overt religious symbols, and Bill 96, limiting the use of English.

The overarching constraint on executive power is that the government must retain the confidence of parliament to retain power. Canada’s Westminster democracy inherits a relatively powerful executive from nineteenth-century Britain. Party discipline is strict, so a majority or majority coalition can enact legislation and the appointed Senate has limited powers. The current minority Liberal government, now trailing badly in polls, has survived successive corruption scandals, discussed below, and no-confidence votes with adept procedural tactics and support from the socialist New Democratic Party (NDP) and, after that party withdrew its support, Quebec’s left-leaning nationalist Bloc Québécois.

Political rights varied little in Canada over the past decade. In contrast, the United States and many high-income European polities show declining scores for freedom of expression and association, reflecting threats from both left and right. Both threats exist to some extent in Canada, but are to date unrooted. Canada has no organized populist “blood and soil” nationalist party, though fringes of Quebec nationalism have this flavor.

The legal subindex drops some five points after 2017, mainly reflecting worsened judicial independence and control of corruption. In a move pertinent to both subindexes, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau removed Justice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould in 2018—allegedly for refusing to quash a corruption investigation into the Montreal construction firm SNC-Lavalin. Wilson-Raybould released a taped phone conversation proving the allegations, whereupon the prime minister expelled her from parliament for violating confidentiality.

A series of prominent scandals may explain the five-point deterioration in Canada’s Corruption Perception Index since 2018. One involved the government’s awarding management of a C$900 million Canada Student Service grant to the non-governmental organization WE, which had paid members of the Trudeau family substantial speaking fees. Another involved the C$836 million industrial policy tool, Sustainable Development Technology Canada, which the Auditor General Report concluded was used to channel funds to Liberal insiders.

Canadian judicial independence, historically seen as more secure than in the United States, is under stress. Democracy Watch has campaigned to expose political influence in the judicial appointments process and the issue has drawn mainstream media attention.

Two other components of the legal subindex require explanation. Internal security, or at least perceptions of it, show deterioration. Anti-COVID-19 lockdown demonstrations by commercial truckers in 2021 subsequently ceased, and so cannot explain the pattern.

Homeless encampments, a new phenomenon in Canada, have proliferated in major cities, contributing to the rising sentiment of insecurity. Rising housing and living costs, and lack of access to mental health and addiction services are contributing. The “decarceration” priority of the government—aiming at reducing the current rate of persons incarcerated relative to the population by 30 percent overall and by 50 percent for Black and Indigenous people—may have exacerbated the issue as ex-convicts are especially prone to homelessness. About one in five individuals released from prison in Ontario ends up homeless. Polls show falling public support for decarceration.

Despite showing little movement over the period, clarity of the law has been concerning. Subsequent interpretations of the Supreme Court’s sweeping 2004 ruling that Indigenous First Nations cannot veto major infrastructure projects but must be “adequately consulted” fail to provide meaningful clarity. It is unclear what “adequate” means, which First Nations need to be consulted, what marks the completion of consultations, and who represents each First Nation—the elected band council, traditional chiefs, or elders, and if the latter, who qualifies as an elder.

Countering this trend, in 2023 the Supreme Court found the Impact Assessment Act, which let the federal government block any large construction project it deemed not in the public interest, unconstitutionally broad. Parliament is rewriting the act to narrow its scope to environmental and Indigenous issues. Overall, the Supreme Court and federal government seem to appreciate a need to “do something” about environmental and First Nations problems, but want to preserve wide options for what that might be. The result is legal opacity that some argue makes large investment projects unviable in Canada when a rapidly growing population urgently needs upgrades and expansions to an aging public and private-sector capital stock.

Another issue is time limits for trials. The Supreme Court’s 2016 Jordan Rule requires provincial and superior court cases to conclude within eighteen and thirty months, respectively, of arrest. The fraction of adult defendants hitting the Jordan limit fell from 11.4 percent in 2015–16 to 5.3 percent in 2022–23, while that for juveniles rose from 11.0 percent to 18.8 percent. Critics cite prosecutor triage freeing dangerous offenders and rushed prosecutions convicting the innocent.

Finally, Canada retains high scores in all aspects of the economic subindex. The economy is open to trade and investment; and property rights protection remains strong. Investment freedom rose from 2007 to 2014, when successive Conservative governments reduced regulatory barriers.

Evolution of prosperity

Canada performs well in the composite Prosperity Index; however Canadian real income per capita, 15 percent below that of the United States in 2009, fell to 25 percent below the United States in 2023. Canada’s chronically low and, since 2015, declining productivity is widely thought responsible. Canada’s corporate research and development spending averaged 0.95 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) from 2003 to 2022, far below the 3.1 percent US figure and second lowest to Italy in the G7. Fewer Canadian firms now rise into global giants than previously. The Bank of Canada, Industry Canada economists, and corporate groups decry a productivity crisis. Figure 1 summarizes the problem.

Since 2015, federal and provincial governments have responded with increased business subsidies, officially totaling 1.84 percent of GDP in 2022. This omits loan guarantees and other channels, so the true total is likely higher. As Lerner shows, subsidy programs rarely stimulate productivity, often misallocate resources, and not infrequently worsen corruption. More abundant subsidies can channel resources to more able subsidy-seekers rather than more innovative firms.

Figure 1. Contributions of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth and capital per worker growth to growth in total output per worker, Canada vs. United States

Canada’s education subindex may reflect reforms in recent years to decolonize curriculums and teach social justice advocacy. However, fears of an impending shortfall in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) skills also command attention.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores provide comparable quantitative assessments of countries’ school systems in mathematics, science, and reading. Canadian students, traditionally well above the OECD average in all three categories, have slipped since the mid-2010s, with mathematics scores falling the most. Average scores for the OECD also drop, but US scores do not, so the margin by which Canadian students outperform US students has narrowed.

Because provincial governments govern public schools, PISA scores vary substantially across the country. Alberta and Quebec retain scores among the highest in the world; whereas the Atlantic provinces’ scores are most markedly down from 2018.

Canada’s public schools show early signs of stress, but fare relatively well compared to other public goods and services. While Canada continues to outperform other advanced economies on health, there is great concern regarding Canada’s public healthcare system, long deemed a major national asset, but now aging poorly. Figure 2 shows that Canada spends more on healthcare than any other country with socialized medicine.

Yet Canada languishes at or near the bottom in almost all measures of healthcare delivery. For example, among OECD countries, Canada ranks twenty-eighth in physicians per capita, twenty-third in somatic and psychiatric beds per capita, twenty-fifth in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners per capita, and at the bottom for specialist and elective surgery waiting lists.

Canada’s universal healthcare system, once a source of national pride, became the most expensive and among the least effective in the world for several reasons. One barrier to reform is an ingrained disincentive to experiment. The Canada Health Act (CHA) has the federal government collect taxes and allocate the funds to the provinces, each of which administers its own state-run monopoly health insurance bureaucracy, which must comply with the terms of the CHA. This arrangement let the federal government enter healthcare, which was constitutionally under provincial jurisdiction. Physicians, medical testing facilities, and even surgeries can be private-sector businesses, but all billing must be to the single-payer provincial insurance system. In the past, the threat of losing federal funding reined in provinces that experimented with paid services; though some are again cautiously permitting limited private clinics and surgical centers.

Another barrier is a narrative that reforms would emulate the United States and leave the poor and old without healthcare. Consequently, politicians have viewed healthcare reform as too dangerous to contemplate.

Advocates of the Canadian system especially value its “universality”—its provision of exactly the same free care to all, regardless of income or social position. Privately funded medical care is illegal except for procedures, such as laser eye surgery, not covered by the public system. Canada’s population has grown and grown older, but healthcare provision has not kept pace. Healthcare bureaucracies are expanding, while shortages of medical specialists leave operating theatres dark. Scarce MRI, computed tomography (CT) and positron emission tomography (PET) scanners create long waiting lists for diagnoses, which renders diagnoses more dire when finally made. Undersupplied long-term care facilities keep patients in expensive hospital beds, delaying urgent admissions and populating hallways with the most urgent cases. As the system grows increasingly strained, more Canadians go to the United States to access private care. This effectively creates a private alternative healthcare system for wealthy Canadians, undermining its “universality.”

A 2024 poll reveals an unprecedented shift in public opinion, with 90 percent agreeing that governments have neglected necessary improvements for too long, 73 percent agreeing the system needs major reform, and 80 percent agreeing that the public system should finance private sector surgeries to reduce waiting lists.

Unprecedented stress in the public healthcare system is only the most notable among signs of a general inability of Canadian governments to deliver basic public goods and services. First Nations reserves are all under the jurisdiction of the federal government, which has struggled to provide such basic services as safe tap water. While the incidence of unsafe tap water has declined, that the problem persists is remarkable. Canadians queue for hours to renew passports. Some 40 percent of trains run by VIA Rail, the federal government’s passenger railway state-owned enterprise, arrive late.

Figure 2. Healthcare spending as % of GDP in countries with socialized medicine

Income inequality rose from 1995 lows until about 2015, whereafter it recedes—almost back to 1995 levels. More detailed data show markedly lower top 0.05 percentile incomes and somewhat higher lowest quartile incomes. Highest tail incomes are primarily capital gains, which Canadian stock markets, lacking breakaway innovative superstar stocks, have been loath to deliver in recent years. The lowest quartile rise may reflect real minimum wage increases over the past fifteen years.

The current federal government’s greatest success is perhaps its prioritization of diversity, equity and inclusion. That success is evident in all manner of rankings. The World Population Survey ranks Canada second in the world for racial equality, edged out by New Zealand and ahead of the Netherlands. Human Rights Director (HRD) ranks Canada the second most inclusive country in the world, below Norway and above Sweden and third most gender-inclusive country in the world after Sweden and the Netherlands. Equaldex ranks Canada the ninth most LGBTQ+ inclusive country in the world, below Denmark and above the Netherlands. The University of California at Berkeley’s Othering and Belonging Institute gives Canada the fourteenth highest inclusiveness index in the world, below South Africa and above Denmark.

Amid this acclaim, the abrupt plunge in the minorities component of Canada’s Prosperity Index stands out. The current government has worked unprecedentedly to improve the status of Indigenous and Black Canadians.

The plunge corresponds to allegations of unmarked graves of Indigenous children at a residential school in British Columbia and elsewhere in 2021, which made headlines worldwide. The fact that no bodies have yet been found at any of these sites has drawn less attention, but the initial findings precipitated Bill C-413, an NDP private member’s bill before parliament at the time of writing, which would criminalize residential school holocaust denial. A second factor in the decline in minority rights is Quebec’s restrictions on the public display of religion and on the use of English, Bills 21 and 96, respectively. The former is widely regarded as directed at Muslim immigrants; the latter is widely perceived as a measure to prevent immigrants from using English.

The path forward

The discussion above highlights a major set of issues likely to dominate the next federal election, due before the fall of 2025.

As noted above, reform of the socialized healthcare system is emerging as a pivotal issue for many voters. Major healthcare reforms are likely to be expensive, and to limit governments’ scope to pursue other initiatives.

The general provision of public goods and services—issues ranging from First Nations water supplies to lengthy passport renewal delays—appears to be faltering. Pledges to make government more efficient in general may also arise in the upcoming campaign, especially if US President Trump’s initiatives along these lines show signs of early success.

Foreign interference in Canada is likely to become an increasingly salient issue as well. Ongoing parliamentary machinations around disclosing the names of members of parliament allegedly in the pay of foreign governments have created the impression that these allegations are true.

Canada’s openness to foreign investment is vulnerable to President Trump’s ongoing criticism of North American free trade. Renewal of the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) pact, scheduled for 2026, was expected to be routine until Trump’s victory in 2024. Canada may seek a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States as most of President Trump’s concerns relate to Mexico.

Canada’s current government is also rollback openness to foreign investment. Bill C-34, National Security Review of Investments Modernization Act, enacted in 2024, subjects foreign investment to increased official scrutiny where potential national security concerns arise. This legislation is widely expected to limit Chinese investment in Canada, and may help align the country with US trade reforms.

The separatist Parti Québécois leads the polls at 33 percent and may form the next Quebec government and contemplate another referendum on separation. However, Quebec is now far more ethnically diversified, and immigrants appear unenthusiastic about leaving Canada. Also, the 1995 referendum question—“Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”—employed tactical ambiguity to overcome polls consistently showing some 80 percent rejecting independence. An overwhelming majority continues to reject independence and the 2000 Clarity Act now limits scope for tactical ambiguity.

Integrating First Nations into the country’s broad prosperity while respecting their traditions and treaty rights remains a work in progress. The current government has prioritized social justice via energetic diversity, equity, and inclusion to remedy systemic racism in Canada. As mentioned above, opinion polls show rapidly diminishing support for such initiatives. No party advocates acceptance of the status quo regarding First Nations, but alternative approaches to solving the problems are likely to command increased attention.

The current government’s other major priority, alongside social justice advocacy, has been environmental leadership. Environment Minister Steven Guilbeault has energetically enacted policies to achieve carbon neutrality, downsize the fossil fuel sector, and promote alternative energy sources. The largest such initiatives include a C$52.5 billion subsidy program, for electric car battery and parts plants, exceeding by 14 percent the total of $46.1 billion in private sector capital spending being subsidized. Another C$1 billion initiative to subsidize green innovation, Sustainable Technology Development Canada, was shut down after a 2024 Auditor General exposed corruption problems.

Canada has long welcomed high levels of immigrants without a populist backlash of the sort now evident in the United States and some European countries. In large part, this is because Canada’s point-based immigration system vetted immigrants for professional qualifications, language skills, and employment histories to ensure that immigrants are not perceived as a burden on the economy.

The current government modified this system to accept more refugee, humanitarian, and asylum immigrants and to boost overall immigration numbers sharply. As these policies unfolded, expensive private “diploma mill” universities instructing predominantly foreign students sprang up across the country. From 2021 to 2022, immigrant admissions rose from 0.6 percent to 1.5 percent of the population. Escalating housing prices are blamed on immigrants, though increasingly restrictive local zoning laws and other regulatory barriers impeding the construction of apartment towers are perhaps more plausible explanations. For the first time in generations, immigration is becoming a political issue. Opposition parties have yet to lay out their alternatives to the current policy mix, but strengthening the traditional points-based system is one obvious path.

Randall Morck is the Stephen Jarislowsky distinguished chair in finance at the University of Alberta and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Morck earned a joint BSc and MA in applied mathematics and economics at Yale and a PhD in economics at Harvard, and (most recently) an honorary doctorate from HEC Montreal. He is the most cited economist in Canada, his research referenced more than 53,000 times. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

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On December 28, Thomas S. Warrick, director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, was quoted in The Washington Post on the discussion within the incoming Trump administration on H-1B visas, which allow highly-skilled immigrants to work for a period of time within the United States. He states, “The Trump White House has the danger of turning into a snake pit when different factions within Trump’s world compete for his attention.”

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Thomas S. Warrick

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National Security Terrorism

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2024 was a transformative year for Latin America and the Caribbean. Elections brought some surprises, but the region also bucked the global trend as continuity was the theme in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, where Claudia Sheinbaum made history as its first female president. Further south, Brazil played a pivotal role as the host of the Group of Twenty and Peru welcomed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, asserting Latin America’s leadership on the global stage.

Meanwhile, the region faced enduring challenges—from Nicolas Maduro’s ignoring electoral results in Venezuela to the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations. The region remains trapped in a low-growth economic environment with considerable strains on fiscal revenue, while a strong hurricane season reinforced the importance of building greater resilience across the Caribbean. China’s influence surged, with increased, notable new investments and Colombia’s decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

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Such claims are not new. The Kremlin has reportedly been using foreign fighters since the early stages of the invasion in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of mobilizing fresh troops at home. Moscow is accused of conducting recruitment in a number of low income countries throughout the Global South. Russia’s efforts in Cuba and India have been slammed by critics as human trafficking operations. Nepal has proved particularly vulnerable to Russian recruitment, with estimates ranging from a few thousand to 15,000 men signing up to fight in Ukraine.

The Putin regime has also allegedly targeted vulnerable populations within its own borders. This summer, the Russian authorities rounded up more than 30,000 migrants with Russian citizenship who had failed to register for military service. Many were subsequently sent to Ukraine.

Recruitment efforts have been conducted at Russian immigration detention centers holding migrant workers mainly from Central Asian countries. An October 2024 report by RFE/RL claimed that Russian officials have made prison conditions unbearably harsh and inhumane in an effort to pressure inmates into joining the military. “They keep you in a cold cell, you sleep on the floor with just a pillow underneath you holding plastic bottles filled with hot water to keep warm,” according to one Kyrgyz inmate.

While many foreign fighters have reported being pressured or misled by Russian recruiters, others are enticed by the promise of relatively high salaries and the prospect of a Russian passport. As of November 2024, Russia had granted citizenship to more than 3,000 foreigners in exchange for military service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The issue of foreign troops fighting for Russia has hit the headlines in recent weeks following news that North Korea has sent approximately ten thousand soldiers to join the invasion of Ukraine. Many see this as a watershed moment in the war, due to the number of troops involved and the official nature of the deployment. Given the vast size of the North Korean armed forces, there is clearly considerable scope for Pyongyang to send many more men.

Moscow’s enthusiasm for foreign fighters is easy to understand. As the war grinds on and approaches the three-year mark, Russia appears to be facing mounting manpower challenges. While the Kremlin does not release official information on the scale of its losses in Ukraine, most estimates indicate hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously wounded during the invasion. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, November 2024 was the deadliest month of the war so far, with Russia suffering more than 45,000 casualties.

The grim prospects for Russian troops in Ukraine are making it harder to attract volunteers. In response, the Russian authorities have recently begun offering greater financial incentives for new recruits as well as generous compensation for the families of those killed in action.

Despite these efforts, there are indications that the Russian military is now dangerously overextended. When Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast in summer 2024, Russia initially had to rely on an improvised defense made up largely of young conscripts, many of whom were taken prisoner. More recently, Russia’s inability to save its Syrian client Bashar Assad underlined Moscow’s lack of reserves.

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With his own army fully committed in Ukraine and experiencing heavy losses, Putin is running out of options as he seeks to shield Russians from the consequences of his invasion. For much of the war, the Kremlin has focused its domestic recruitment efforts on lower income and ethnic minority regions of Russia, while also enlisting large numbers of prisoners. Such tactics avoided touching more prosperous regions to prevent protests or rallies. However, these sources of manpower are not infinite.

Putin remains determined to avoid a repeat of his September 2022 mobilization order, which proved highly unpopular and led to an exodus from Russia as hundreds of thousands fled military service. With the supply of prisoners drying up and fewer Russians prepared to volunteer for a war that many see as a meat grinder, his best option may now be to seek increasing numbers of foreign troops.

The implications of foreign soldiers fighting in Russia’s invasion extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Growing collaboration between the Houthis and Russia has raised alarm bells in recent weeks, with the US Special Envoy for Yemen reporting that Moscow could begin weapons transfers to the rebel group to allow it to more effectively carry out attacks on Western shipping in the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the consequences of North Korea’s entry into the war are an even greater cause for concern. Fighting in Ukraine presents a rare opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain valuable experience of modern warfare, including innovations such as the use of drones. Pyongyang is also expected to receive significant military support from Russia that could enhance its missile, nuclear, and naval capabilities. Unsurprisingly, South Korea is monitoring the situation with growing unease.

Russia’s use of foreign troops is a dangerous trend that promises to prolong the war and has the potential to fuel international instability. It is also a sign that while Putin is not yet running out of Russian recruits, he would prefer to seek manpower elsewhere to sustain the costly human wave tactics employed by the Russian army in Ukraine.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Nov 26, 2024

Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s poisonous obsession with Ukraine first began to take root 20 years ago when millions of Ukrainians directly defied him during the Orange Revolution, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert Dec 10, 2024

Russian victory in Ukraine would spark a new era of global insecurity

By Victor Liakh

If Vladimir Putin’s Russia is allowed to claim even a limited victory in Ukraine, it will embolden other authoritarian regimes and plunge the world into a new era of insecurity, writes Victor Liakh.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

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In the end, it will come down to trust.

If the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in President Donald Trump’s second term can build and keep the trust of the overwhelming majority of Americans, then the country, the American people, and Trump will all be well served.

More than other cabinet departments, DHS needs to factor into its decisions how its actions affect the trust Americans have in it. DHS needs the support of the American people to succeed. DHS is the third-largest US government department, with more than 260,000 people. Its work is vital to the security and economic prosperity of the United States. DHS has more contact with the American people than any other federal department: everyone who uses computers, cell phones, and online networks; travels through airports; enters or leaves the country; is hit by a natural or man-made disaster; goes to a house of worship that uses a grant to pay for increased security; or visits a federal office building protected by DHS anywhere in the country—they all engage with what DHS does.

DHS requires cooperation from state and local governments on law enforcement and protecting the borders. It relies on voluntary cooperation and the sharing of information from state and local governments, and from the private sector, to protect computer networks and critical infrastructure. Security missions such as aviation and border security rely on Americans accepting what DHS does as necessary for their protection. People need to have confidence that the sensitive, personal information they provide to DHS is used appropriately. Public confidence in DHS cannot be commanded; it must be earned whenever DHS takes action.

While most of DHS has earned public trust since the department’s founding in 2003, the past two presidential terms have seen that trust fray significantly with different parts of the public. In the first Trump administration, an intentional policy of child separation at the border in 2018, misuse of DHS’s intelligence resources after the 2020 death of George Floyd, and the heavy-handed use of Customs and Border Protection’s elite Border Patrol Tactical Unit on the streets of Portland, Oregon, had the effect of energizing broad popular opposition to Trump administration homeland security policies.

In 2021, the Biden administration reversed many Trump immigration policies, but it failed to provide additional resources to quickly reject unfounded asylum claims. This led to more releases and more arrivals at the border. The surge of releases into the United States fueled the impeachment of Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas in February of this year (quickly acquitted in the Senate). A late 2023 bipartisan Senate compromise for additional resources and policy changes was blocked by Congress, at Trump’s request, in January 2024. The number of unauthorized migrants dropped in the summer of 2024, but by then it was too late.

According to polls, voters concluded that they did not trust Democrats with border security. Adding to this perception was the Secret Service’s failure in July to stop an attempted assassination of Trump, and controversies, many unjustified, over disaster aid to victims of hurricanes Helene and Milton. The administration’s performance on border security had become the second-most important issue in the presidential election that Trump won.

Mass deportations are coming

During his Republican Party convention speech in July, Trump promised that he would deliver “the largest deportation operation” in US history. Democrats may question the wisdom but for now they cannot question the mandate. Since his reelection, Trump has appointed Tom Homan, a former senior officer in the Border Patrol and one of Trump’s acting directors of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as border czar. Stephen Miller, Trump’s immigration adviser during his first term, has been named as deputy White House chief of staff, where he is expected to have substantial control of overall immigration and border policy. Trump also nominated South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem to be the next secretary of homeland security. In 2021, she sent South Dakota National Guard troops to the Texas-Mexico border.

By one estimate, Trump is trying to remove 11.7 million people from the United States. To give a sense of the effort required, the Trump administration deported 1.5 million people during his first term, a number the Biden administration will match by the end of its term. An additional 2.8 million people were expelled during the pandemic between March 2020 and May 2023. The previous recent high was five million deported or removed in President George W. Bush’s second term.

Trump has promised deportations will begin on “day one.” He is also certain to quickly revoke the parole that has allowed in tens of thousands from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Those awaiting a court date for their asylum claims are likely to see Trump administration efforts to shorten the legal process and deny most claims. Those without authorization to be in the United States face the choice between going home now or taking the risk of arrest and deportation if they stay.

Homan, one of the toughest and most highly skilled operators in the new Trump team, understands how he wants this to unfold. Initially, deportations will target migrants with criminal records, according to Vice President-elect JD Vance. The total number of such individuals is uncertain, but according to ICE, it is probably less than one million. This should have broad public support. They will also go after the 1.19 million people who have received “final orders of removal” from immigration judges, but it will take some effort to find many of them. Then they can target those whose parole was revoked or who have given DHS or the Department of Justice their current addresses.

Homan will need to quickly build up the resources and infrastructure to remove detained individuals as fast as they come in. Right now, there are not enough ICE agents, holding sites, contract jails, and aircraft or buses to remove people as fast as ICE can bring them into custody—especially if, as Trump and Miller have said, some state National Guard units also help detain people. Trump has already confirmed that he will declare a national emergency and use military assets to help with deportations. The infrastructure to do this at Trump’s scale does not exist and will need to be assembled, almost certainly with help from the Department of Defense. Until then, Homan can (1) limit the pace of arrests to the pace of deportations, which will frustrate Trump and Miller, or (2) get the money, people, and equipment to move more people out quickly. Republican control of both houses of Congress will make the latter possible, but Homan needs to have his reprogramming plan, and a supplemental funding request from Congress, ready in January.

Make no mistake, the price tag will be breathtaking. The January 2024 bipartisan Senate compromise asked for $20.3 billion. It is hard to see Homan’s plan as costing anything less than that, even in the first year. Trump has already made it clear that he will support this plan whatever it costs, and Republican control of both houses of Congress should allow him to get it.

What could go wrong?

There are three breaking points that could end public support for Trump’s deportation plans, and Homan has already shown he understands at least two of them. First, Homan knows that Americans will not accept mass detention camps, even though Miller described camps in Texas to podcaster Charlie Kirk in November 2023. Some in the Trump administration may want detention camps in the desert—in order to signal to migrants not to come to the United States. This could lead to a clash inside the Trump administration early in 2025.

The second potential breaking point, which Homan also seems to understand, is that the way to detain undocumented migrants is through targeted arrests, not roundups from people’s houses or children’s schools. Workplace enforcement actions would send a signal to businesses that use undocumented workers—and there are many fewer businesses that use undocumented workers than there are undocumented workers the Trump administration would want to arrest. Enforcing laws requiring hiring only those legally able to work in the United States could reduce the “pull” effect that draws potential workers from Central and South America to the US economy. But doing this in too heavy-handed a way will not be accepted by many Americans.

The third potential breaking point will occur after immigration advocates try to slow the deportation process through legal challenges and court injunctions. There are several existing legal settlements that give the courts the ability to slow or block certain procedural steps the Trump administration will likely try.

The Trump administration no doubt believes a Trump-friendly US Supreme Court will approve the measures they intend to take. But the White House needs to respect the rule of law and let the legal processes work out, even if it takes months, for a very important political reason. Many Americans are likely to accept the use of the law to deport people, but even more Americans may balk at the Trump administration breaking the law to do so.

Blowing through the rule of law would have severe consequences not just for immigration and border security but for other parts of the Trump agenda. The Trump administration should consider carefully the grave risks if it goes forward by ignoring the courts. With public trust in tatters, Trump’s opponents might then consider themselves justified in ignoring the law. That way lies anarchy.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

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Few expected Ukraine to reach this week’s grim milestone. Indeed, on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the consensus was that any organized Ukrainian resistance would likely crumble within a matter days. In retrospect, it is now clear that both Vladimir Putin and the vast majority of international observers were equally guilty of underestimating Ukraine.

While their country has surpassed all expectations, Ukrainians have little to celebrate as the war passes the 1000-day mark. The Russian invasion has inflicted unparalleled suffering on Ukraine, with hundreds of thousands killed and more than fourteen million people forced to flee their homes. Huge numbers of Ukrainian service personnel and civilians have suffered life-changing injuries. For the men and women defending the country on the front lines, the physical and psychological toll from almost three years of relentless fighting has been immense.

Beyond the battlefield itself, the Russian invasion has plunged the entire Ukrainian population into a mental health crisis that will last for decades. Almost everyone has experienced some kind of personal loss or wartime trauma. In towns and cities across Ukraine, people have grown used to the daily routine of air raid alarms, bomb shelters, and electricity blackouts, all accompanied by gut-churning news of the latest Russian atrocities.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Despite the many horrors and hardships, Ukrainians have remained broadly united by a shared sense of purpose. While most people are understandably desperate for peace, there is also widespread recognition that Ukraine is fighting for national survival and faces destruction if Russia’s invasion succeeds. This has been made abundantly clear by the actions of the Russian army in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, with thousands of potential dissenters abducted and children sent for indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Most Ukrainians acknowledge the need to fight on, but there are growing concerns over continued international support. During the initial months of the invasion, the watching world was awed by Ukrainian courage and tenacity as the country fought back against the might of the Russian military. This helped convince Western leaders that arming Ukraine was both morally right and worthwhile. However, as the war has dragged on, grumbles over the cost of supplying the Ukrainian military have grown louder, as has the chorus of voices calling for some form of compromise with the Kremlin.

Every time Western leaders delay the delivery of military aid, the cost can be measured in Ukrainian lives. These delays enable Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities and advance further along the front lines of the war. Shortfalls in military support are also making it significantly harder for Ukraine to mobilize new troops for the army, with many potential recruits left alarmed by the prospect of being sent into battle without adequate weapons or armor.

While Kyiv struggles to convince wavering Western leaders, Moscow is creating an axis of autocrats to bolster the Russian war effort. Since the start of the full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Putin has strengthened ties with China, Iran, and North Korea, receiving a range of support including sanctioned high-tech weapons components, attack drones, ballistic missiles, and vast quantities of artillery shells. This alliance is playing an increasingly direct role in the invasion of Ukraine, with North Korean soldiers recently appearing on the battlefield.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Donald Trump’s election victory is now fueling anticipation that the war is about to enter a new phase, with the incoming US administration expected to push for a negotiated settlement. Nobody wants to end the war more than Ukrainians, of course. At the same time, there are mounting concerns that Western efforts to pursue peace from a position of weakness may lead to Kremlin-friendly terms that would end up emboldening Putin and setting the stage for further Russian aggression.

Ukrainians have particularly painful memories of the failed peace process that followed Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. For eight years, Russia refused to even acknowledge its direct involvement in hostilities, insisting instead on noncombatant status. This farcical situation made it virtually impossible to achieve any meaningful progress toward peace. It is now clear that while Moscow was pretending to engage in diplomatic efforts to end the war, Russia was busy preparing for the full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022.

Ahead of any peace talks, Ukrainians will be hoping their international allies have not lost sight of the huge costs they will face if they fail to stop Russia in Ukraine. The invasion launched by Putin one thousand days ago has already transformed the geopolitical landscape and led to the emergence of a formidable authoritarian alliance that shares a common commitment to ending the era of Western ascendancy. Russian success in Ukraine would dramatically strengthen this alliance, with alarming ramifications for the security situation everywhere from Central Europe to East Asia.

As the world reflects on one thousand days of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the Ukrainian nation is exhausted but remains determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support. Putin was wrong to assume that Ukraine would collapse in the wake of his invasion. Western leaders must now convince him that he is equally wrong to believe he can outlast them in Ukraine.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 14, 2024

Freezing the front lines in Ukraine would condemn millions to Russian occupation

By Mercedes Sapuppo

Donald Trump’s election win is fueling speculation of a possible peace deal to end the war in Ukraine, but any attempt to freeze the front lines would condemn millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of Russian occupation, writes Mercedes Sapuppo.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Nov 5, 2024

Putin’s 2022 ‘peace proposal’ was a blueprint for the destruction of Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

New details of talks between Russia and Ukraine during spring 2022 confirm that Putin’s alleged peace proposal was in fact a call for unconditional surrender and a blueprint for the destruction of the Ukrainian state, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Russia’s economy is overheating but Putin cannot change course

By Alexander Mertens

Russia’s wartime economy is in danger of overheating due to a combination of record military spending, sanctions pressures, and runaway inflation, but Vladimir Putin dare not change course, writes Alexander Mertens.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post 1000 days of war: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine passes grim milestone appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Supporters of this approach typically claim that it is the only realistic option. This argument reflects the current battlefield dynamics of the war, with Russia steadily advancing and the overstretched Ukrainian military seemingly in no position to retake areas seized by Moscow since 2022. Crucially, however, advocates of a front line freeze tend to conveniently overlook the fact that any agreement involving territorial concessions would also mean condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since the very first weeks of the invasion, it has been clear that one of Russia’s key war aims is the destruction of Ukrainian national identity. For those currently living under Russian occupation, this means everything from large-scale abductions and mass deportations to ideological indoctrination and blanket Russification.

With occupied areas of Ukraine largely cut off from the outside world, accurate information regarding the scale of the human rights abuses currently taking place remains limited. However, the available evidence indicates that a systematic campaign is underway to silence any potential dissent and impose a reign of terror on the Ukrainian civilian population. “Kremlin-occupied Ukraine is now a totalitarian hell,” Britain’s The Economist reported in early November.

Large numbers of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country have been subjected to forced deportation or have simply disappeared. An Associated Press investigation in summer 2023 concluded that thousands of Ukrainian civilians are being detained in a network of formal and informal prisons across Russia and the territories it occupies, where they endure torture, psychological abuse, and are even forced to engage in slave labor. “Russia plans to build dozens more prisons,” the report claimed.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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In occupied regions, the Kremlin is working to erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and seeking to Russify every aspect of daily life. These efforts include renaming streets, turning the clocks back to Moscow time, and pressuring residents to accept Russian citizenship in order to access basic public services such as healthcare and state pensions. Ukrainian schools under Russian occupation now teach a Kremlin-friendly curriculum that demonizes Ukraine while forcing students to celebrate the soldiers invading their country. Parents who resist risk losing custody of their children.

Russian attempts to indoctrinate young Ukrainians are not restricted to the classroom. At least 20,000 Ukrainian children have been abducted from occupied regions since the start of the full-scale invasion, with many sent to a network of camps where they are subjected to indoctrination aimed at depriving them of their Ukrainian nationality and turning them into Russians.

Ukrainian civil society activist Mykola Kuleba, who is at the forefront of efforts to secure the return of young Ukrainians from Russia, has accused the Russian authorities of attempting to brainwash Ukrainian children and erase their identity. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his alleged role in these mass abductions.

For those detained in Russian-occupied Ukraine, the outlook is particularly grim. In September 2024, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine reported that the Russian authorities were employing “common patterns of torture” against Ukrainian prisoners in occupied regions of Ukraine as well as in Russia. “Torture has been used as a common and acceptable practice with a sense of impunity,” the report stated.

Western leaders need to recognize that trading land for peace in Ukraine would mean abandoning millions of Ukrainian civilians to the chilling realities of life under Russian occupation. The Kremlin has already provided ample evidence of its intentions in occupied Ukraine and its plans for the local population. The fate of these Ukrainians must not be forgotten as the international debate over a possible negotiated settlement evolves in the coming months.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Russia’s economy is overheating but Putin cannot change course

By Alexander Mertens

Russia’s wartime economy is in danger of overheating due to a combination of record military spending, sanctions pressures, and runaway inflation, but Vladimir Putin dare not change course, writes Alexander Mertens.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2024

Donald Trump’s election victory fuels hopes and fears in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Donald Trump’s election win has sparked alarm in Ukraine, where many fear he will end US support for the country. However, some war-weary Ukrainians hope he can help end the Russian invasion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Elections

UkraineAlert Nov 13, 2024

Russia’s economically vital energy sector is Vladimir Putin’s Achilles’ Heel

By Oleksiy Zagorodnyuk

By introducing additional sanctions on Russia’s energy industry and intensifying implementation cooperation, the West can undermine Putin’s ability to wage war and strengthen the global order against further acts of international aggression, writes Oleksiy Zagorodnyuk.

Conflict Economic Sanctions

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Freezing the front lines in Ukraine would condemn millions to Russian occupation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the world’s economic leaders convene at the upcoming International Monetary Fund-World Bank meetings next week, and as South Africa becomes the latest in a series of emerging markets to hold the Group of Twenty (G20) presidency starting this December, remittances should be at the forefront of discussions about the global financial system.

From large emerging market countries in the G20 to small island economies, remittances not only form a large portion of many nations’ gross domestic product (GDP), but have become the biggest source of their external financing over the last decade. In the years since the COVID-19 pandemic, even as remittance flows and household reliance on remittances have grown, the cost of sending and receiving them has remained significantly higher than World Bank and G20 targets. For some cross-border payment corridors, the cost of sending two hundred dollars is as high as one hundred dollars. And most of these costs are passed on to migrants and their households. 

There are macroeconomic factors in play when it comes to the post-pandemic volume and growth of remittances. The United States and advanced economies in Europe are the biggest sources of remittance flows into emerging markets. Sustained GDP growth and recovering labor markets in advanced economies have led to growth in the volume of remittance flows for emerging markets over the last decade.

In contrast, recessionary pressures in advanced economies, which lead to lower incomes and higher unemployment, as well as inflationary pressures, can impact the incomes of migrant workers, leading to lower remittances. Of the combined global value of $890 billion, the emerging market share of remittances is $669 billion. For these emerging market recipients, remittance flows can provide buffers for current account and fiscal deficits. This is especially crucial for economies whose remittance flows form a large portion of their GDP. 

There is an emerging bifurcation in low- and middle-income countries that receive remittance flows. Among emerging markets, India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt together account for almost half (45 percent) of the emerging market share of global remittances. For all of these economies, remittance flows on average form less than 9 percent of their GDP. In smaller economies with limited access to international capital markets, remittances play a critical role in supporting current account balances and addressing fiscal deficits. For example, in countries such as Tonga, Tajikistan, and Lebanon, remittance flows can make up over 30 percent of GDP.

However, migrants spend a large part of their income on transaction costs, which impacts households’ ability to spend and save. Both the World Bank, through its sustainable development goals, and the G20 have attempted to address the issue of high costs. The global average cost of sending remittances stands at 6.35 percent, more than twice the sustainable development goal of 3 percent, and above the G20 target of 5 percent. Costs are below 5 percent for only 37 percent of corridors globally, and there are major regional differences, especially within emerging markets. 

Therefore, an important question for policymakers is how to reduce the costs to migrants and their families and meet the benchmarks set by the World Bank and the G20. Remittance costs are made up of transfer fees and foreign exchange costs, with fees making up three-fifths to two-thirds of costs across digital and cash channels. The type of payment channel used by senders and receivers matters for reducing costs—digital payments are typically less expensive than non-digital counterparts, with banks being the costliest way to send money across borders, and mobile operators the cheapest.  

While digitalization of remittance channels can help reduce costs, the more significant global effort, to be undertaken by the G20 and the international financial institutions, must focus on the systemic components of the cross-border payments cost structure. A few global existing examples have created the proof of concept for lowering the costs of cross-border payments: 

• The introduction of Wise (formerly TransferWise) as an institutional nonbank partner into the United Kingdom’s Faster Payments System—which primarily included banks—improved costs and speed estimates. This demonstrates that new and nonbank participants must be included in the ecosystem of cross-border payments. This can include emerging fintech companies as well to provide more options to remittance senders and receivers. 
• Project Nexus is an experiment run by the Bank for International Settlements aimed at connecting domestic payments systems that run 24/7, all through one platform. This makes possible the interoperability necessary to connect distinct domestic payments systems through regulatory and technological harmonization. These scalable models can offer a way forward to interlink countries’ domestic models. Importantly, Nexus offers transparent schemes and governance models that countries can adopt to participate in the project. 
• Retail digital assets, especially combined with easy conversion and disbursement options—such as stablecoins or central bank digital currencies—can address high transfer fees associated with remittances. Many such multicurrency tokenization projects are currently underway. But so far, these projects have not focused primarily on improving remittance payments. It would be interesting to see how a high-volume corridor like the one between the United States and Mexico is impacted by the use of digital assets for remittances.

Introducing new participants, better rules, and innovative technologies can lower remittance costs for individuals and households. Too often, the issue is that remittances are an afterthought in the development of payments systems—their cross-border quality makes them secondary to domestic financial inclusion and payments concerns. Remittances now make up one-sixth of all cross-border payments—they remain significant drivers of countries’ GDPs and geopolitically relevant, especially in a time of increasing instability. It is time that international financial institutions and domestic markets reduce the pains associated with sending and receiving them.

Alisha Chhangani is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director, future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post Advancing a twenty-first century approach to remittances appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 27, 2024, Deputy Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center María Fernanda Bozmoski was interviewed on Bloomberg’s Balance of Power about Kamala Harris’s visit to the US-Mexico border.

More about our expert

Staff

María Fernanda Bozmoski

Director, Impact and Operations and Lead for Central America

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Northern Triangle

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But the same logic applies to the overall budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of which the Secret Service is a small but vital part.

The Secret Service is the quintessential nonpartisan security agency. Its agents are prepared to put their lives in the way of anyone trying to harm one of their protectees, regardless of party. They get to know the personal lives of presidents and ex-presidents and their families. Their discretion and valor are both legendary. They also understand that their failures make headlines. Successes, which are far more frequent, seldom get public attention.

It is unusual when the Service’s budget challenges become public controversies, but this has happened in recent years under administrations of both parties.

In 2019, the director of the Service went behind the backs of DHS leadership with Trump’s Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin in an attempt to move the Secret Service back into the Treasury Department, where it originated in 1865, when it focused on counterfeiting. While this cabinet intrigue was well reported at the time, this was less well-known: One reason the Service wanted to leave DHS, I’m told, was because of concerns its budget would be raided to build the wall Trump wanted on the US-Mexico border. Trump’s fiscal year 2018 budget called for the Service to lose fifty million dollars to help fund the border wall. After Biden was inaugurated, the effort to move Secret Service out of DHS was halted at the same time as work on Trump’s border wall.

Under the Biden administration, the Service has fared somewhat better. It has received moderate increases, but DHS as a whole has been treated as a domestic agency, grouped with agencies such as Health and Human Services for negotiating purposes in the 2023 budget deal between Biden and then House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, while the Department of Defense (DOD) got almost all that it requested for military operations. In March 2023, when Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin introduced DOD’s fiscal year 2024 budget, he called it the “most strategy-driven request we’ve ever produced from the Department of Defense.”

Basing the DOD budget on the threats facing the United States makes eminent strategic sense. The same thinking ought to apply to the budget for DHS, which, in effect, leads the defense of the nation against nonmilitary threats.

Even more than most agencies, the Secret Service’s budget needs to be based on threats against its most important protectees, which for decades have included the major party candidates for president and vice-president and their families. Any effort to place blame for the heightened threat is pointless, from the Service’s standpoint. It is vitally important for the sake of national security and the democratic process that the 2024 presidential election be decided fairly at the ballot box, not through violence.

But this should lead to a larger discussion: Are we spending the right amount on homeland security? There is ample evidence that the Secret Service is not the only DHS agency that needs substantially more funding to do what the public now demands on everything from migration to cybersecurity to school shootings.

Consider the interrelated issues of immigration and border security. Vice President Kamala Harris said days after becoming the presumptive Democratic nominee that she supported the January 2024 bipartisan Senate compromise on immigration and border security—a bill that would have made wide-ranging policy, operational, and resource improvements toward making the immigration system more just, fair and secure. She repeated this during her acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention and again during the September 10 presidential debate. We know the approximate price tag of the bipartisan Senate compromise: $20.3 billion. And we know the vice president, if elected, will ask Congress to appropriate the additional money.

Trump has pledged to finish the border wall, more strictly enforce border controls, and launch the largest deportation in US history using Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, state National Guard units, and local law enforcement. The Trump campaign has put forward no cost estimates for its proposals. If Trump is elected, there are good reasons to question whether much of this will actually work, but it will certainly be expensive—and likely impossible to squeeze out of other parts of DHS’s budget. The total cost will be likely be much more than $20 billion, perhaps by a multiple of five or ten times.

On cybersecurity, the Biden administration’s well-reasoned but ambitious cyber strategy calls for shifting the burden from consumers and end users to the organizations that are most capable and best able to reduce risk. Ransomware is still a dangerous threat, and foreign nation states continue to target US computer systems. This may not mean significant budget increases for DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, but it signifies that the national cybersecurity enterprise—which includes the private sector; federal, state, and local governments; and non-profits—all need to spend more on cybersecurity.

There’s a similar case to be made for increased spending for violence prevention programs to divert troubled individuals before they can shoot up schools or houses of worship. These programs have proven successful in proof-of-concept and pilot projects, but they need to be scaled up to try to prevent incidents like the Apalachee High School shooting in September. DHS’s Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention grant program awarded $18 million in grants this fiscal year, but a truly national violence prevention program would cost one thousand times this amount.

Other parts of DHS could benefit from a thorough, threat-based review to see if DHS’s funding and resource level meet the nation’s security needs.

The Secret Service has faced significant criticisms for what happened during the Trump assassination attempts. Additional resources are necessary but not sufficient, and the Secret Service and DHS understand the need for significant changes. But a fundamental re-think of the level of funding for homeland security should be high on the priorities of whoever is the next president. When the threats change, DHS’s resources should change to meet them.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

The post The Secret Service needs a budget increase—but so does the rest of the Department of Homeland Security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Strengthening democratic governance;
• Addressing disinformation and polarization; and
• Building a comprehensive approach to migration.

Check out the readout below for a deep dive into the main takeaways and policy recommendations from the inter-regional forum:

Report

Mar 5, 2024

The future of democracy in the Americas

By Breana Stanski and Diego Area

The Democracy and Governance commitment at the Ninth Summit of the Americas marked an imperative platform for strengthening the region’s democratic values and institutions.

International Organizations Latin America

Report

Feb 26, 2024

Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era

By Jason Marczak, María Fernanda Bozmoski, Matthew Kroenig

The strategic interest of the United States and the countries of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) lies in strengthening their western hemisphere partnership. However, the perception of waning US interest and the rise of external influences necessitate the rejuvenation of and renewed focus on this partnership.

Caribbean Economy & Business

Issue Brief

Dec 12, 2023

Galvanizing Spain’s presidency for the next chapter

By Ignacia Ulloa Peters, Diego Area, Felipe Félix Méndez

Spain’s presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2023 was a unique opportunity to deepen partnerships between the Euro-Americas. Through shared values, common interests, and complementary capabilities, the EU, US, and LAC have the potential to advance lasting solutions to the most pressing challenges facing these regions and the world.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

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Pokrovsk has long been an important Russian objective. Located on a crucial road connecting eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk province with neighboring Dnipro region, the city serves as a key logistical hub for the Ukrainian military. Russian troops have been steadily moving toward Pokrovsk for some months as Vladimir Putin seeks to consolidate his grip on the surrounding area. If the strategically important city falls, it will undermine Ukraine’s defenses while potentially serving as a gateway for further Russian gains.

Ukraine’s leaders are well aware of the stakes but have so far been unable to stop the Russian offensive. There has been considerable speculation that the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region was primarily intended to ease the pressure on Pokrovsk by forcing the Kremlin to redeploy forces. If this was the plan, it has not yet succeeded. Instead, the Russian army appears to be concentrating more troops for the push toward Pokrovsk, and is advancing with increasing speed.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

With the front lines of the war now less than ten kilometers from the city, Pokrovsk residents find themselves confronted by the same nightmare scenarios and impossible choices experienced by huge numbers of Ukrainians since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two and a half years ago. The mandatory evacuation of families with children has been ordered, while a twenty-hour daily curfew has been imposed. Leaving Pokrovsk means abandoning homes, possessions, family members, and all that is familiar. Staying may well prove deadly.

Prior to the war, Pokrovsk had a population of around sixty thousand. By the final week of August, this figure had dropped to approximately half the prewar total. Thousands continue to leave every day. The roads out of Pokrovsk are jammed with cars loaded up to the roof as families evacuate with whatever they can carry. Local institutions such as hospitals and banks are shutting down and preparing to close. Those who have yet to join the exodus are stockpiling water, groceries, and humanitarian aid, while bracing for the worst.

The process of leaving Pokrovsk can be fraught with danger. Evacuation teams try to keep civilian cars on established routes in a bid to maintain a degree of security, but reports of Russian drone and bombing attacks are growing. The thunder of artillery fire in the distance adds to the sense of urgency and uncertainty.

In the city itself, it is possible to encounter extremes of distress, despair, courage, and compassion at virtually every turn. On Samarska Street, half the houses now stand empty. When I visited, one elderly lady was in the process of locking up her home while a car packed with her worldly belongings waited outside. There were also signs of daily life as remaining residents bicycled past to get water from a nearby pipe or visit the local store. Some of those leaving remained defiant, insisting their departure was just a temporary measure. Others claimed they would stay and placed their hopes in Ukraine’s ability to defend the city.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Ukrainian and international volunteers are providing vital support for those seeking to evacuate, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly. These volunteers in many ways capture the indomitable spirit of wartime Ukraine and the sense of solidarity that has enabled the country to keep functioning despite the stunning violence and trauma of Russia’s invasion.

Pokrovsk railway station is one of the busiest places in the city, buzzing with activity and emotion as people wait to board evacuation trains. Railway workers wearing body armor guide passengers to different carriages based on their final destinations throughout Ukraine.

Some are preparing to go further and plan cross the border into the EU. One evacuee, who was traveling with her two children, told me she was heading to Germany and did not know what the future would hold. She was leaving Pokrovsk without her mother and grandmother, who insisted on remaining in their family home despite the rapidly approaching danger.

The harrowing and heroic scenes that are currently unfolding in Pokrovsk have already been replayed in countless Ukrainian towns and cities since February 2022. Every time the Russian army advances, ordinary Ukrainians find themselves forced to make life-changing decisions in incredibly stressful circumstances, often while having to rely on the kindness of strangers in order to survive.

This barely imaginable reality has now reached Pokrovsk. As the city prepares for the anticipated Russian onslaught, local residents are displaying the kind of remarkable resilience that has become a symbol of life in wartime Ukraine. Their desperate plight is a reminder that unless Russia is stopped, millions more will face a similar fate.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 20, 2024

Kursk offensive could help free Ukrainians in Russian captivity

By Olivia Yanchik

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk Oblast has resulted in the surrender of unprecedented numbers of Russian soldiers, raising hopes of a large-scale prisoner exchange, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 21, 2024

Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to downplay Ukraine’s invasion of Russia have severely dented his strongman image and make a mockery of the West’s escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 15, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia exposes the folly of the West’s escalation fears

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has shown that Putin’s talk of red lines and his nuclear threats are just a bluff to intimidate the West, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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Below, Atlantic Council experts answer the right questions about Germany’s political future.

1. What is the state of play? Who are the key people and parties in the race?

In both elections, the far-right AfD and the far-left BSW are set to achieve strong results. The only traditional party positioned to challenge the AfD in these elections is the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), as polling shows all other mainstream parties falling under 10 percent in both elections. Given the strength of the AfD and BSW, it might be impossible to form a government in either state without one of them. However, because the CDU refuses to work with the AfD, BSW would seemingly emerge as the only option—which is an unlikely coalition match.

In Thuringia, the AfD is poised to decisively defeat the CDU. Bjorn Höcke, the AfD’s highly controversial state party leader, is the dominant figure in the AfD’s campaign and its candidate for minister-president. Running against Höcke are the CDU’s Mario Voigt and Bodo Ramelow of the Left Party, who is the current minister-president of Thuringia. However, while the CDU is polling in second at 23 percent, Ramelow’s Left Party is polling in fourth place, well behind BSW’s 18 percent. 

In Saxony, polling shows the CDU barely leading the AfD, with each party at approximately 30 percent. The current minister-president of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer, is a member of the CDU, and he remains highly popular inside Saxony. BSW is polling in third at 13 percent. Although she is not running for an office in either election, Sahra Wagenknecht is the party’s dominant politician and has been the key figure in BSW’s electoral messaging. 

The parties of the current federal coalition—the Greens, the Social Democrats (SPD), and the Free Democrats (FDP)—will likely suffer significant losses. The FDP might fail to reach the 5 percent threshold in both elections, which would result in the party not entering the state legislatures. The same is true for the Greens in Saxony, while the SPD is polling below 7 percent in both states.

—Ian Cameron is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

2. What are the expectations for the far right and far left? What is driving their rise?

The German states of Saxony and Thuringia head to the polls this weekend, and the right-wing AfD hopes for an outcome that will secure its place as the strongest party in eastern Germany. The party wants to win, and it may do so by a large margin. In fact, a win in Thuringia or Saxony would be a first state election-level victory for the AfD. A win in both would be a political earthquake. If either outcome comes to pass, it shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone watching German politics. Over the past few months—indeed, over the past few years—the AfD has jumped in the polls, sitting at a comfortable 17 percent nationwide, and at around 30 percent in both Saxony and Thuringia. By comparison, the SPD is hovering at around 6 percent in both states.

In Germany’s east, a feeling of dejection and stagnation, combined with an economic hangover from German reunification, make it easy for antiestablishment candidates to take hold and spread a message similar to the one shared with rural voters in the United States: “The elites don’t care about you, but we do.” It’s a message built on an anti-immigration platform—exacerbated after a Syrian asylum seeker killed three people in a knife attack in Solingen on August 23. But it’s also driven by a deep mistrust of the European Union, opposition to Ukraine support, opposition to climate change policies, and a general sense that things are “bad” because the “elites” have botched the job.

But it’s not just the far right to look out for. The far-left candidate Wagenknecht, who broke off from the Left Party earlier this year to form the BSW, is also polling in the double digits in both states—20 percent in Thuringia and 10 percent in Saxony. Some even say she’s so far left, she’s right, a phenomenon where both parties meet in the middle of a bizarre and unlikely policy horseshoe. Her party is also pro-Russia, anti-NATO, and wants to focus on social justice through left-leaning economic policies like “job security, higher wages, generous benefits and a revamped tax system.” The kicker? All of these are combined, perhaps surprisingly coming from the far left, with a “restrictive migration policy.” Immigration is where the two parties meet.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

3. What would an AfD victory mean for the governments in Saxony and Thuringia?

In the event of a victory for the far right, the question becomes: Will it actually be able to govern? While it might eke out a win, it’s highly unlikely it will garner the over 50 percent necessary to form an outright majority. So it will likely need a coalition. 

Thus far, other parties, such as the CDU, have said they won’t enter a coalition with the AfD at either the state or national level. Think of it as a kind of cordon sanitaire—a political tactic whereby political parties refuse to cooperate with the party (or parties) they view as threats, therefore keeping them out of governance and keeping their dangerous policies at bay. The AfD certainly falls into this category. But this means other unlikely bedfellows, such as the CDU and the BSW, might find themselves with the once inconceivable choice of working together. The seeming impossibility of that scenario might mean we’ll see some interesting political posturing not just over the coming weeks, but over the coming months as Germany starts to look ahead to next year’s federal election. We’ll have to wait until after the votes are tallied in Saxony and Thuringia to see what happens at the state level, but one thing is for certain: The next year of German politics is about to heat up.

—Rachel Rizzo

4. What is German Chancellor Olaf Scholz most worried about on Sunday?

While state legislatures have a limited impact on Germany’s foreign policy writ large, Chancellor Olaf Scholz will be worried about the impact of September’s state elections on the federal government’s energy and green transition goals. The “traffic light” coalition was founded in large part on its dual promise to tackle climate change and economic stagnation, yet European Parliament elections in June accentuated the coalition’s fall from grace. In Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg, the AfD took center stage.

With a population of over four million, Saxony—where the CDU is polling ahead of the AfD—holds more sway in the Federal Council than the other two states, which could spell continuity in national policy debates and less headache for Scholz than the AfD. But Brandenburg leads Germany in renewable energy per capita, with more solar photovoltaic capacity and wind energy output per head produced than any other state in the country. As a party that questions the notion of human-induced climate change, an AfD victory in Brandenburg and elsewhere could play spoiler for Berlin’s decarbonization targets.

Although policy priorities such as these are certainly a concern for Scholz—from climate change to security, as the high-riding BSW and AfD both campaign on pro-Russian “peace party” rhetoric—perhaps what will worry Scholz the most in these elections is an ever more bruised reputation of the SPD going into the 2025 Bundestag election. On Sunday, voters in Thuringia and Saxony will show the rest of the country what is possible for government if the traffic light sees red.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

5. Could the outcome of the state elections impact Scholz’s ability to govern over the next year?

In the near term, it’s not likely that these election results will affect Scholz’s governing ability, if for no other reason than he and his unpopular three-way coalition have nothing left to lose. Germany does not have a culture of no-confidence votes or the calling of early elections in the face of an electoral loss for the ruling party the same way France does, for example. None of the three coalition partners has any reason to shake the electoral tree for the moment. The liberal FDP would not even enter the Bundestag if elections were held today. Scholz’s Social Democrats would suffer heavy losses. The Greens are the only party that could potentially survive the electoral defeat if they left the coalition, but there is little reason to risk it at this point. So a shaky coalition government will likely continue until it limps to the federal elections in September 2025.

These elections could be a much-needed wake-up call for the SPD and their coalition partners. Whatever Scholz and company are selling, voters in the east are not buying. Scholz will need to shift his messaging and his leadership style now if the SPD and its coalition partners are to have any chance of even a respectable showing come 2025.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center.

The post What Germany’s upcoming state elections reveal about the far right, Scholz’s future, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

More than 7.7 million Venezuelans—about a quarter of the population—have left the country since 2014, 6.5 million of whom are living in Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia alone hosts more than 2.8 million displaced Venezuelans, which has strained its ability to provide basic services amid its own ongoing fight against criminal groups. Available polling suggests migration flows are likely to rise in the coming months as Nicolás Maduro looks poised to maintain his stranglehold on power despite the cost. His regime has severed diplomatic relations with regional countries, arrested thousands of protesters, and blocked social media platforms in the country.

Earlier this month, opposition leader María Corina Machado said that if Maduro stays in power by force, the region will experience “a wave of migration like never before: three, four, five million Venezuelans in a very short span of time.”

Moreover, Venezuelans who have already left home are unlikely to return without political change. In a survey before the July 28 election of Venezuelans residing in the United States, 65 percent stated that they would return if an opposition candidate won the election, while less than 15 percent said they would return if Maduro remained in power, even if the economy significantly improved.

“We don’t have the regional resources to handle the migration from Venezuela,” Ronal Rodríguez, a researcher at the Colombian Migration Observatory in Bogotá, told the Associated Press this month. Young Venezuelans who already migrated have begun bringing over older relatives to see if conditions improve before the January presidential inauguration, but Rodríguez warns this could become a permanent flow.

As of May 2024, Colombia housed more than 2.8 million Venezuelans; Peru, more than 1.5 million; Brazil, more than 568,000; and the United States, more than 545,000. Chile and Ecuador host more than 532,000 and 444,000, respectively.

From January to June 2024, US Customs and Border Protection reported 114,695 encounters with Venezuelans. (This figure includes individuals who attempted multiple crossings, so one individual may be counted for multiple encounters.) In the same period last year, the United States reported 150,673 encounters. This does not include spikes later in the year: in September 2023 alone, the United States reported 72,325 encounters. The United States may see similar spikes in encounters in the next few months as more Venezuelans make their way north.

While it’s too early to tell how many will migrate, regional leaders should prepare for the worst. Backlash toward Venezuelans is rising in Chile, which has used armed forces and thermal cameras to limit illegal crossings, and in Peru and Ecuador, which have tightened visa restrictions and required arriving Venezuelans to present difficult-to-obtain passports.

Venezuela’s largest gang, Tren de Aragua, and other criminal organizations have taken advantage of migrant outflows to push into host countries, increasing violent crime. But trying to curb legal migration has only increased illegal migration. For desperate migrants, detainment, trafficking, and death might be a possibility, but for those who stay, they are often a certainty.

So, how should the United States and its regional partners prepare for this expected increase in migration from Venezuela?

Develop plans for transitioning from temporary to more permanent response strategies. Several major host countries, including the United States, Colombia, and Brazil, have developed distinct responses to the influx of migrants by granting various forms of temporary legal status to Venezuelans. Under Colombia’s temporary status program, for example, qualifying Venezuelans can obtain a ten-year permit, which includes work authorization, labor protections, and access to public education. Widespread rollout has seen more than 1.9 million Venezuelans approved for permits. Last September, the United States expanded Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to half a million Venezuelans, allowing them to live and work in the country legally and adding to the estimated 240,000 previously covered.

Neither program is perfect. Colombia’s program has been critiqued as offering only “liminal legality” because it does not offer a direct line to permanent residence. The United States’ TPS program likewise does not involve a path to permanent residency, though some politicians have cautioned that expanding TPS will incentivize additional migrants to journey to the United States and will allow people to stay indefinitely if their status is extended. However, the TPS extension has been praised in other US political circles because it grants work access, increases self-sufficiency, and relieves strains on local resources.

Brazil’s two-year renewable permits for Venezuelans grant similar rights and access as Colombia and the United States. After two years, however, Venezuelans can apply for long-term residence and, potentially, citizenship. Brazil also implemented a mass asylum grant in 2019 which has been extended to more than a hundred thousand people. Unlike many countries, Brazil grants work authorization to asylum seekers, leading more Venezuelans to seek the asylum route there.

While much attention has been directed toward temporary status programs, there is a clear discrepancy between the long-term nature of the Venezuelan crisis and the temporary nature of these programs. For migrants and refugees, temporary status often adds to their insecurity, rather than mitigating it. Most programs last only a few months or years and involve complicated renewal processes. Most also do not necessarily offer direct paths to permanent residency, making it harder for Venezuelans to invest in their futures.

For many countries with convoluted or heavily bureaucratic immigration systems, short-term programs, such as TPS, are useful for providing more responsive options for displaced persons. However, the majority of displaced Venezuelans have obtained legal status through more institutionalized programs, including mobility and residence agreements and asylum and visa programs. Improving the adaptability and applicability of existing immigration infrastructure involves clarifying qualifications and application steps, reducing processing time, and demystifying any renewal processes. Expanding and simplifying access to these programs can provide greater stability for Venezuelans, allowing them to integrate more rapidly and bolster the host country’s workforce.

Invest in improving working conditions in host countries. Most urgently, host countries should focus on improving conditions in sectors with high degrees of informality, temporality, and low pay. These sectors often have higher concentrations of Venezuelan migrant and refugee laborers.

In Colombia and Brazil, access to work permits has not necessarily led to formal employment, and Venezuelans often face poor working conditions and labor abuses. In Brazil, a 2017-2021 survey found that more than half of all displaced Venezuelans were earning less than the Brazilian minimum wage.

Host countries can start to improve working conditions by fostering public-private partnerships between civil society actors, trade unions, migrant associations, and government actors. These partnerships can work to improve wages, educate migrants on their rights, and prevent and challenge labor abuses. Expanding the network of institutions that invest in these efforts to create a more robust support system can create benefits not only for displaced Venezuelans but also for the economies of host nations.

Strengthen international coordination toward Venezuela aimed at mitigating its ongoing political and economic crisis. Without progress on a democratic transition in Venezuela, the United States and regional partners will need to take steps to either accommodate Venezuelans’ displacement on a more permanent basis or provide support to governments that are willing to do so. Greater humanitarian assistance and public-private partnerships can alleviate the worst of the widespread poverty and suffering facing Venezuelans both at home and abroad.

Mitigating the refugee crisis will also improve the economic and security situation of Colombia and other host countries, returning benefits for Venezuela’s neighbors. Regional leaders must continue to support negotiations and prioritize efforts to address Venezuela’s political and economic crisis to mitigate the impact of the projected mass exodus in the coming months.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Venezuela and Colombia.

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Since US President Joe Biden dropped out of the presidential race and endorsed Harris on Sunday, she has emerged as the likely Democratic nominee. So what might US foreign policy look like if she wins the presidency? For Harris, the daughter of Jamaican and Indian immigrants, there are ample clues in her work in the Americas over the past three-and-a-half years. Her approach: Listen to a broad array of stakeholders, act, follow up, and then adjust tactics as needed. This approach can take time to implement, but it also proves adaptive to unexpected challenges.

Although the United States’ southern border was not specifically part of the portfolio handed to her, Harris’s indirect involvement—through her role in seeking to reduce migratory push factors in northern Central America—has received considerable scrutiny, especially among those who criticize the Biden administration’s approach to migration. The data at this point indicate that the Biden administration has made progress in reducing the number of migrants arriving at the US border from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to levels last seen toward the end of the Trump administration, even as increased migration from other countries has contributed to a high level of overall encounters at the border.

At the same time, more work is clearly needed to ensure that migration levels from northern Central America do not jump back up. It is imperative that the efforts undertaken as part of the ongoing “root causes” strategy carry forward no matter who wins the US election in November. This means ensuring that local organizations have the technical and financial resources to improve opportunities for job creation and human-capital development and also to combat often-endemic corruption. These and other conditions are needed not just to dampen the drive to migrate but also to create longer-term economic security that ultimately benefits the national security of the United States and partner countries.

In one example of her “listen, act, then follow up” approach, Harris traveled to Guatemala and Mexico in June 2021. A month later, she rolled out a five-pillar strategy that revolved around working with in-country partners to address the root causes of Central American migration, noting that “migration to our border is also a symptom of much larger issues” and admitting from the start that “progress will not be instantaneous.” She subsequently visited Honduras in January 2022. In March 2024, she welcomed Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, to the White House for more discussions. This approach suggests that Harris could govern in a manner where decisions are carefully thought out and where a multitude of factors are taken into account before acting.

In its three years, the five-pillar strategy has produced more than $5.2 billion in commitments from companies and organizations to invest in the region while supporting local development in areas of high emigration. And there are signs that migration from the region is now slowing. The number of Guatemalans encountered at the southwestern border last month (11,485) was the second-lowest since November 2020. The number of Hondurans (8,896) was the lowest over the same period. Overall, the proportion of migrants encountered at the US border who are citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has dropped from 49 percent (March 2021) to 18 percent (June 2024).

Still, reflecting the shift in migrant patterns, including new or growing countries of origin, the overall number of migrant encounters by border authorities remains high (130,419 in June) as compared to the last full month of the previous administration (73,994 encounters in December 2020).

Though it has been less high-profile than her Central America work, Harris has also given substantial attention to addressing the many significant challenges facing the United States’ Caribbean neighbors. As she has explained it, doing so is a US national security priority that cannot be overlooked.

In June 2023, just over a year after virtually hosting leaders of fifteen Caribbean nations, Harris became the highest-ranking US official to visit The Bahamas, where she co-hosted the US-Caribbean Leaders Meeting. That meeting—and her overall engagement—has been focused on establishing a greater US presence in the Caribbean at a time in which it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Caribbean prosperity yields benefits for the United States too. The region’s geographic proximity also means that there is a national security imperative for the United States to be more fully engaged in a partnership with the Caribbean.

In keeping with her typical approach, Harris met with Caribbean leaders first to hear their priorities before crafting a strategy. Her priorities started with climate change and the energy transition, expanded to food security, and then extended to security and arms trafficking. At that June 2023 meeting, she announced $100 million of US assistance to address these issues, including Haiti’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. (In parallel with these efforts, the Atlantic Council organized the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit on the sidelines of her Bahamas trip.) Still, as with her Central America portfolio, substantial progress will not happen overnight.  

Over the coming days and weeks, Harris will set about defining what her foreign policy might look like. In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean, at least, she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions. And she has followed through on implementation, adjusting tactics along the way as the situation on the ground evolves. As she seeks to become commander-in-chief at a time of deep global instability, she will have no shortage of complicated challenges to confront.

Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What Kamala Harris’s record in Central America and the Caribbean reveals about her foreign policy approach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for both sending and receiving countries. In the Atlantic basin, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by various factors such as economic opportunities, political instability, social networks, and historical ties.

This joint report, in partnership with Policy Center for the New South and the Africa Center, aims to explore the trends in African migration within the Atlantic basin, focusing on case studies of Nigerian migration to the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa as well as Moroccan migration to the European Union. It seeks to provide valuable insights into ongoing discourse on African migration by exploring case studies from diverse regions within the Atlantic basin, it highlights the interconnectedness of migration flows and their impact on individuals, communities, and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The report examines factors such as economic disparities, political instability, educational opportunities, and family ties to explain motivations behind Nigerian and Moroccan migration. By analyzing the “push and pull factors” influencing Moroccan migration to France and Spain alongside Nigerian migration to the United States, the UK, and South Africa, it builds a nuanced understanding of migration dynamics within the Atlantic basin and what is at stake for the home countries experiencing brain drain.

Public Event Thu, June 27, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

New trends in African migration: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria

The Africa Center brings together experts to discuss current and future trends in African migration.

Africa Migration Morocco Nigeria

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Report

Aug 3, 2023

Irregular migration from North Africa: Shifting local and regional dynamics

By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

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The post Migration dynamics in the Atlantic basin: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Husain in The Spectator: Don’t Outlaw Islamophobia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This new peace initiative comes at a critical point in the Russia-Ukraine War. More than two years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there remains no end in sight to what is the largest European conflict since World War II. Instead, Vladimir Putin’s invading army is once again advancing, and has recently attempted to open a new front with a cross-border offensive close to Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv.

In parallel to these front line advances, the Russian military is also conducting in a nationwide bombing campaign that appears designed to terrorize Ukrainian civilians and force millions to flee their homes by making large parts of the country uninhabitable. Since the beginning of 2024, Russia has damaged or destroyed around half of Ukraine’s remaining energy generation capacity, leading to rolling blackouts. Meanwhile, recent air strikes against civilian targets such as shopping centers have left dozens dead. This air offensive illustrates how the escalating costs of the conflict are being felt far beyond the battlefield.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The most immediate consequences of Russia’s invasion have been carnage and destruction on an unprecedented scale for twenty-first century Europe. Military losses on both sides have not been officially disclosed and remain hotly disputed, but are widely believed to be in the hundreds of thousands. A similar number of soldiers have suffered life-changing injuries.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians have likely been killed during the invasion. Large numbers of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation to Russia, including thousands of children. Many more have been abducted and remain missing. A long list of Ukrainian towns, villages, and entire cities have been reduced to rubble.

Even for those who have escaped physical injury or the loss of property, Russia’s invasion has often had a devastating impact. Almost everybody in Ukraine has lost a friend, acquaintance, or family member in the war. Experts are already warning that Ukrainian society must prepare to deal with major mental health challenges for decades to come.

The demographic situation is equally alarming. Around a quarter of Ukraine’s prewar population have been forced to flee their homes, becoming either internally displaced or leaving the country for the neighboring EU. This has led to a dramatic decline in Ukraine’s overall population. The longer the war continues, the less likely it becomes that Ukrainian refugees will return home.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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In areas such as education, the costs of Russia’s invasion are severe and will likely be long-lasting. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine ranked among the world’s most educated populations. However, ongoing hostilities now threaten this status. A generation of young Ukrainians have had their schooling and university studies disrupted or derailed entirely by the war. Inevitably, many have chosen to continue their studies abroad. The same is true for Ukrainian academics. This wartime brain drain represents a massive blow to Ukraine’s future.

The Ukrainian economy has displayed remarkable resilience over the past two years of full-scale war, but even this cannot disguise the harm done by Russia’s invasion. With almost twenty percent of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation or close enough to the front lines to make normal business activities impossible, many companies have had to relocate or cease operations entirely. Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has created further logistical problems, while also reducing export revenues and depriving the Ukrainian authorities of taxes.

Finally, with Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies focused on war-related priorities and as employment options become more limited, crime is becoming a mounting challenge. According to recent research, most Ukrainian organized crime groups have severed longstanding ties with their Russian counterparts, but remain active and continue to seek opportunities created by wartime realities.

From mental health and population decline to the economy and education, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a profoundly negative impact on Ukrainian society that will be felt for generations to come. This should be at the forefront of people’s minds as they gather in Switzerland to discuss how to end the war and establish a sustainable peace for Ukrainians.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2024

Russia is winning the energy war and plunging Ukraine into darkness

By Elena Davlikanova

Electricity blackouts are the new normal in Ukraine as the country struggles to cope with the consequences of a devastating Russian air offensive that has destroyed around half of Ukraine’s wartime power-generating capacity since the start of 2024, writes Elena Davlikanova.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post The terrible cost of Russia’s war is being felt far beyond the battlefield appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s first attempt to destroy the Ukrainian power grid, which began in October 2022 and continued until March 2023, ultimately failed to achieve its objective. However, the current campaign has so far proved much more successful. Russia has clearly learned important lessons from its earlier air offensive, and has also benefited from growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses caused by delays in Western military aid.

In the past five months, Russia has managed to damage or destroy all of Ukraine’s thermal and hydroelectric power plants. The latest large-scale wave of missile and drone strikes on June 1 resulted in damage to power-generating facilities in five different regions across Ukraine, leading to warnings from officials that extended periods without electricity are now inevitable and will likely remain a feature for many months to come.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Kremlin’s bombing campaign has a number of goals. Russia seeks to undermine the Ukrainian economy by reducing industrial capacity, including in the rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense sector. By forcing Ukrainians to live without regular access to electricity, Russia also aims to demoralize the civilian population and weaken the country’s resilience. Moscow hopes this will fuel public calls for an end to the war and set the stage for a future peace agreement on Russian terms.

Thanks to sunny summer weather and long hours of daylight, the regular power outages currently being experienced across Ukraine are highly disruptive but not yet disastrous. Once temperatures begin to drop and winter draws closer, the implications of Russia’s bombing campaign are expected to become far more serious. Experts predict it will take years to repair Ukraine’s power grid, but urgent steps are required now in order to prevent a potential humanitarian catastrophe from unfolding during the coming winter season.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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The Ukrainian authorities have established a coordination center to address the mounting energy crisis in the country. Current measures to compensate for power shortages include the installation of gas-fired energy generation plants. Imports from neighboring EU countries represent another key source of additional electricity.

The loss of thermal and hydroelectric power generation means Ukraine is now increasingly reliant on the country’s nuclear power plants. The Ministry of Economy is investing in Energoatom to expand capacities, but constructing new plants is both extremely expensive and time consuming.

Renewable energy currently constitutes a significant portion of Ukraine’s remaining energy output, with much of this segment concentrated in the south of the country. While there is considerable room to expand renewable power generation, green energy options offer unstable power output, creating additional practical challenges for the Ukrainian energy grid.

One of the main focuses of the government’s strategy is the decentralization of the Ukrainian energy system. This is expected to involve smaller power plants that will be less vulnerable to Russian bombardment. To support this transition, efforts are underway to streamline procedures for the connection of small-scale power generation facilities to the national grid. A government program is also offering incentives for housing associations to install solar panels on residential buildings.

The biggest security challenge remains protecting the Ukrainian power grid from further Russian attack. In recent months, Ukrainian officials have consistently communicated that additional air defense systems are the country’s top priority. First and foremost, this means US-produced Patriot air defense systems.

So far, Ukraine’s pleas have largely gone unanswered. Although Ukrainian diplomats claim to have identified one hundred “available” Patriot systems worldwide, there has been no rush to supply Ukraine. Only Germany has committed to deliver one system, with talks continuing over possible delivery of Patriots from a number of other partner countries including Romania. Unless Ukraine’s air defense deficit is resolved, all other efforts to counter the Russian bombing campaign of the country’s energy sector may prove futile.

Dr. Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and an associate professor at Sumy State University in Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 4, 2024

Vladimir Putin just tacitly admitted Crimea is not really part of Russia

By Peter Dickinson

Russia claims to have annexed five Ukrainian provinces but refuses to extend security red lines to these regions. This highlights the pragmatic political realities behind Putin’s talk of historic conquests, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 30, 2024

If the West wants a sustainable peace it must commit to Ukrainian victory

By Hanna Hopko, Andrius Kubilius

Since 2022, Western policies of escalation management have failed to appease Putin and have only emboldened the Kremlin. If the West wants peace, it must help Ukraine win, write Hanna Hopko and Andrius Kubilius.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 28, 2024

Only enhanced air defenses can save Ukraine from winter energy collapse

By Aura Sabadus

Ukraine’s power grid has been decimated in recent months by a major Russian bombing campaign. In order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe this winter, the country urgently needs more air defenses, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Russia is winning the energy war and plunging Ukraine into darkness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A former mayor of Mexico City, Sheinbaum has a strong foundation in addressing urban challenges, governance, and social policies. Like her predecessor, outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum will likely coordinate her policies under a narrative of addressing social injustice and advocating for Mexico’s most vulnerable. But unlike her predecessor, Sheinbaum is an environmental engineer and climate scientist by training. She appears poised to place environmental issues, including climate-change mitigation and adaptation, high among her social justice concerns. This would likely include seeking to advance issues ranging from sustainable agriculture to renewable energy.

At first glance, this may sound odd. Mexico is a major oil producer—the second largest exporter in Latin America after Brazil—and Sheinbaum has all but guaranteed that she will continue funding the state-owned oil company PEMEX, which suffers from a range of inefficiencies and carries debt of more than one hundred billion dollars. However, her scientific background and previous initiatives indicate a potential for balancing economic development with environmental sustainability. For example, during her time as mayor of Mexico City, Sheinbaum spearheaded the installment of solar power panels on top of a major market. Furthermore, she campaigned for president on a promise to address, early on in her administration, the water issues affecting Mexico City. Already during her first speech since the election, and probably in an effort to differentiate herself from López Obrador, Sheinbaum spoke about an upcoming renewable energy program for Mexico. Calibrating this balance will be crucial, as will working with regional partners. After all, Mexico and its neighbor Guatemala, for instance, face similar challenges of environmental degradation and the impacts of climate change, from flooding to droughts and a lack of access to water.

Another way in which Sheinbaum could partner with her Central American neighbors is by working together to seize nearshoring opportunities. Specifically, she and her regional counterparts could promote a mechanism whereby Central American economies would be able to join the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Nearshoring, or bringing international supply chains and production closer to the US market, can provide significant economic benefits, creating jobs and fostering economic stability in Mexico and throughout Central America. Promoting economic integration through the USMCA could provide a structured framework for this cooperation. The idea has been floated for a couple of years now, first by Costa Rica in 2022. This move would enhance the competitive edge of Central American economies, which in many ways are too small to make a difference on their own but together could create economies of scale. Bringing other Central American countries into the USMCA would allow these nations to benefit from the same trade advantages enjoyed by Mexico. It could also reduce many of the economic pressures that drive migration, namely a lack of jobs and insufficient wages.

Furthermore, Sheinbaum’s administration could adopt a more humanitarian approach to migration, focusing on protecting migrant rights and providing humanitarian assistance. While López Obrador touted his tree-planting “Sembrando Vida” program, Sheinbaum could take the programs a step further. This approach aligns with her broader progressive values—she is a self-described humanist—and can enhance Mexico’s role as a regional leader in addressing the migration crisis. During the campaign, Sheinbaum repeatedly mentioned increased investments in social and youth programs in Central America, which, if designed holistically and sustainably, could effectively curb migration from Mexico’s neighbors. This is particularly important now, as US President Joe Biden prepares to roll out an executive order that would allow the United States to temporarily close its southern border if a threshold of encounters with migrants at the border is reached—reportedly, an average of five thousand crossings in a week or 2,500 in a day.

Regional security is another area in which Sheinbaum could make a big difference. Almost three dozen candidates were assassinated during the current electoral campaign, and record-breaking violence in the country is resulting in more than thirty thousand homicides each year. Improved and increased intelligence-sharing between Mexico and Central American countries can help combat organized crime and violence, which are significant push factors for migration. This is also an area in which the United States and Mexico may look to double down on their cooperation. Sheinbaum has pledged to address the rampant impunity in Mexico—less than five percent of criminal investigations are solved and many crimes go unreported. While Sheinbaum is unlikely to approach the security issue in the severe manner of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, she has recognized the urgency of this issue for the livelihood of millions of Mexicans.

Sheinbaum’s presidency could bring about significant positive change in Mexico and its relations with Central America. Her administration’s policies on energy and environmental sustainability, economic integration, and migration will have an important impact on the future of the region. The first female president of Mexico has the opportunity to redefine her country’s role in Central America, address the root causes of migration, and promote a more stable and prosperous region. In this new chapter for Mexico and the region, the Aztec nation could very well be a strong and stable partner for Central American nations.

María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director, operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

The post Three ways Mexico’s new president could transform Central America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Following the official three-month presidential campaign, polling indicates that one candidate has a firm lead. Assuming former Mexico City Head of Government Claudia Sheinbaum performs on par with expectations—the latest Reforma poll gives her a 20 percentage point lead over former Senator Xóchitl Gálvez—the candidate of the governing MORENA party will become Mexico’s first female president on October 1. The lack of movement in this poll since the campaign season began on March 1 is noteworthy. Sheinbaum has only dropped 3 percentage points (to 55 percent support) in the last three months. Other polls give Sheinbaum a lead of anywhere from 11 to 22 percentage points, with voter turnout one of the major factors to watch on Sunday.

More uncertain is what will happen in Mexico’s Congress. What has scuttled attempts by the current Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to fully carry out some elements of his government’s plan has been the checks provided by Congress. With a simple majority of seats—rather than the supermajority of two-thirds of the seats—the MORENA coalition rallied to pass some important pieces of legislation, but it has been impeded from making major constitutional changes, including controversial proposals for the popular election of Supreme Court judges and eliminating independent regulators.

Thus, this Sunday’s vote will determine whether López Obrador’s hand-picked successor, Sheinbaum, could advance the outgoing president’s stymied constitutional proposals. Polls—although less numerous and harder to calculate given the sheer number of candidates up for election (628 combined senators and deputies)—indicate continuity in Congress. Polls by the newspaper El Financiero, for example, predict that the MORENA coalition will secure 49 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies with opposition parties taking 40 percent. The check on power provided by Congress in this scenario, in which MORENA would lack a supermajority, would likely give assurance to international markets, since uncertainty around such reforms and their repercussions can generate anxiety for investors.

Counting the ways to count

How does Mexico’s unique vote-counting work? While the final congressional breakdown will take some time to determine, expect declarations on the presidential winner on Sunday night. Hours after polls close, results will begin to be shared from two different systems that count votes: the quick count and the preliminary electoral results program (PREP).

The quick count takes a predetermined, statistically representative sample of polling stations, and then it gives a minimum and maximum possible vote percentage for each candidate. Results are expected to be announced around 11:00 p.m. (CST), with all eyes on whether the margin of possible votes indicates a clear winner. The PREP, which is operational beginning at 8:00 p.m. (CST), reports results in real time from all polling stations as transmitted, which means that urban votes are likely to be accounted for earlier in the process. And to make things even more complicated, the official counting does not begin until June 5, thus the importance of the earlier vote-counting methods to give more timely results.

The other election

The next Mexican president will also have a keen interest in the vote-counting on November 5. The US election, and in particular how Mexico figures into the campaign leading up to election day, will set the stage for the coming years of bilateral ties. A newly inaugurated Mexican president may be forced to immediately respond to US campaign rhetoric.

Security and migration are top issues both north and south of the Rio Grande. While Sheinbaum has pledged to continue the current government’s focus on social and educational programs to reduce violence, Gálvez favors a strategy that puts greater emphasis on the security apparatus to combat crime. On migration policy, both candidates would continue to take a human-centered approach that recognizes and seeks to find solutions to the high demand for labor. A third important bilateral issue will be the review period of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, also known as USMCA, as the 2026 sunset clause approaches. This is all the more important now that Mexico is the United States’ number one trade partner. Here, a new Atlantic Council report suggests several ways that the next Mexican administration can unlock even greater border commercial efficiencies and new trade and investment.

Amid a fast-changing global order, a prosperous Mexico and strong US-Mexico ties will be increasingly important for the United States. US and Mexican security and economic concerns are deeply intertwined, as are their people. Sunday’s vote will set a crucial marker for how the relationship develops for the rest of the 2020s.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What to watch in Mexico’s elections: A supermajority and a superpower appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

The post How Cabo Verde is highlighting the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the Russian offensive began last Friday, harrowing footage of burning villages and fleeing civilians has flooded social media, adding to the sense of mounting danger. Evacuation efforts are still underway in the border region, with around eight thousand people so far brought from nearby communities to Kharkiv.

So far, Russian troops have made modest progress, advancing up to eight kilometers into Ukraine and capturing a number of Ukrainian villages. While the incursion is currently regarded as too small in scale to threaten Kharkiv itself, the reappearance of Russian soldiers in the region for the first time since 2022 has sparked considerable alarm and dismay.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s new offensive did not come as a complete surprise, of course. On the contrary, the build-up of Russian troops across the border had been common knowledge for weeks. Kharkiv Regional Council member and political sciences professor Halyna Kuts says she has been preparing for some time, and has a bag of emergency items packed and ready.

Kuts is one of many people in Kharkiv to express anger at restrictions preventing Ukraine from using Western weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Due to fears of possible Russian retaliation, most of Kyiv’s partners insist the military aid they supply only be used within Ukraine’s borders. These restrictions prevented Ukraine from attacking concentrations of Russian troops as they prepared for the current offensive. “We could have destroyed them, but we were not allowed to,” says Kuts.

With Russian troops now gradually moving toward the city, Kuts believes the only option is to “dig in” and prepare to defend Kharkiv. “This is no longer a center of culture and science; this is a military fortress. Everyone should be carrying a gas mask, bandages, and water with them at all times,” she says.

In recent days, it has become much rarer to encounter children on the streets of the city. Some families have now left Kharkiv due to the deteriorating security situation, heading west for the relative safety of Poltava, Kyiv, or beyond. Youngsters who remain are obliged to attend classes underground or online.

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Olha Kashyrina, the co-founder of a Kharkiv publishing house specializing in children’s books, has spent recent evenings watching the glow of artillery fire on the horizon as fighting edges closer and closer to her home in Kharkiv’s Saltivka residential district. She estimates that there is now less than twenty kilometers separating her from the Russian army. For the time being, Kashyrina continues working in her publishing business and volunteering to help evacuees find temporary accommodation. However, if Russian troops advance further and the city comes within artillery range, she plans to leave.

Others insist they will not leave Kharkiv under any circumstances. Kashyrina’s publishing house colleague Svitlana Feldman has spent recent days stockpiling power banks, generators, and headlights for employees. “Adaptability is the key skill now,” she explains. One of the most dangerous aspects of daily life in Kharkiv is commuting to the office, so the company now encourages working from home.

Some Kharkiv residents have already fled from the Russian invasion once and do not intend to do so again. Liudmila, who came to Kharkiv from Donetsk when it was first occupied by Russia ten years ago, says she will not evacuate and is instead placing her faith in the Ukrainian army to defend the city, much as it did in 2022. This is a common refrain in today’s Kharkiv. While almost everyone is watching anxiously for signs of an escalation in the current offensive, there is also a mood of defiance and plenty of confidence in the city’s ability to defend itself.

Defiance can be expressed in different ways. For Halyna Kuts, this means proceeding with Kharkiv’s annual Vyshyvanka Day parade on May 16 in one of the city’s underground metro stations. This colorful annual event, which features people sporting Ukraine’s traditional embroidered shirts, is widely seen as a celebration of Ukrainian patriotism and national identity. With Russian troops advancing toward the city, Kuts says it is now more important than ever to host this year’s parade as planned.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 7, 2024

Ukraine’s second city is struggling to survive amid relentless Russian bombing

By Maria Avdeeva

Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv, is struggling to survive amid a campaign of relentless Russian bombing that aims to make the city unlivable, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 9, 2024

Putin’s one tank victory parade is a timely reminder Russia can be beaten

By Peter Dickinson

Putin’s one tank victory parade reflects the catastrophic scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and is a reminder that behind the facade of overwhelming strength, the Russian army is far from invincible, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert May 14, 2024

Putin expands invasion as outgunned Ukraine waits for Western weapons

By Mykola Bielieskov

Russia has opened a new front in the invasion of Ukraine with a cross-border offensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region as Putin seeks to capitalize on a window of opportunity before fresh Western aid reaches Ukrainian front line troops, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The debate over Ukraine’s apparent failure to secure the border overlooks the fact that fortifications are typically located some 15 to 20 kilometers behind forward positions. Nevertheless, the renewed presence of Russian troops in northern Ukraine marks a significant escalation in the war.

During the first five days of the offensive, Russia has been able to establish two separate bridgeheads on Ukrainian territory and advance between five and seven kilometers into the country. These modest gains reflect the relatively small numbers of Russian troops involved in the initial incursion. However, that may change in the coming days as the Kremlin has concentrated approximately 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers across the border and continues to reinforce the ongoing offensive.

Ukrainian officials had earlier predicted the start of Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv region toward the end of May or in early June. The recent US decision to grant Ukraine a major new aid package may have convinced the Kremlin to attack earlier than planned in order to exploit the remaining window of opportunity before fresh deliveries of US weapons reach the front lines.

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At this point, Russia’s immediate military goals look to be rather limited, as can be seen from the numbers of troops involved. The initial objective may be the establishment of a buffer zone along the Ukrainian border in the Kharkiv region. This is something Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin leaders have spoken about repeatedly in recent months. If Russian forces do manage to advance further and establish a foothold around 15 kilometers inside northern Ukraine, this would place Kharkiv itself within range of Russian artillery.

Ukraine’s former capital and second-largest city with a prewar population of more than one and a half million, Kharkiv has been subjected to intensive Russian bombing since the beginning of 2024. The city’s power plants were destroyed in March, while residential districts are frequently subjected to missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks. There are now fears that Russian artillery could take this campaign of destruction to the next level. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov has repeatedly warned that his city risks becoming a “second Aleppo,” a reference to the Syrian city reduced to rubble almost a decade ago following relentless bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces.

Russia’s end goal appears to be the depopulation of Kharkiv. Moscow aims to make the city unlivable and force the vast majority of its over one million residents to flee. By emptying Kharkiv of its civilian population, the Kremlin hopes to create the conditions for the city’s capture. However, this would require far more troops than Russia currently has available in the region.

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While many observers assume Kharkiv remains Russia’s primary objective, the new offensive may actually be an attempt to destabilize Ukraine’s broader defenses. By opening up a new front in the north of the country, Russia creates dilemmas for Ukrainian commanders and forces them to divert key units that are currently holding the front line in the east of the country.

The present military situation is rapidly evolving and extremely challenging for Ukraine, but it is not yet critical. Indeed, given the clear battlefield advantages enjoyed by defensive forces since the start of the war more than two years ago, the Ukrainian military theoretically has every chance of preventing any major breakthroughs and should also be able to inflict significant losses on advancing Russian forces. However, Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself are currently being severely hampered by an inability to strike Russian targets across the border.

Throughout the war, most of Ukraine’s international partners have insisted that the weapons they provide only be used on Ukrainian territory. These restrictions contradict all military logic and have created uniquely favorable conditions for Russia, which is able to concentrate troops close to the Ukrainian border and prepare to attack without fear of being targeted. Unless Ukraine is granted the right to hit military targets inside Russia, it will be extremely difficult to defeat the current offensive or prevent more cross-border attacks similar the recently opened front in the Kharkiv region.

Russia’s new Kharkiv offensive is an attempt by the Kremlin to capitalize on considerable advantages in both manpower and firepower. Despite suffering staggering losses over the past two years, Putin has succeeded in creating a force far larger than the army that first invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been seriously weakened by more than half a year without major arms deliveries, and is unable to strike back effectively due to restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners. None of this means Russia is guaranteed to succeed, but it does make it far more difficult for Ukraine to prevail.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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There are still plenty of reminders that Kharkiv remains home to over a million people. Freshly planted flowerbeds bloom in bright spring colors. Downtown traffic is still sometimes congested, with delivery boys on bikes and scooters weaving their way through jams of taxi drivers, private cars, and public transport. Supermarkets and many small businesses remain defiantly open, while municipal workers emerge to diligently clear up the mess after each new explosion. But there is no mistaking the menace of sudden death and destruction that now hangs over the city.

Located just thirty kilometers from the Russian border, Kharkiv is Ukraine’s most vulnerable major city and has been on the front lines of the war for more than two years. Russia’s initial blitzkrieg attack on Kharkiv in early 2022 was repelled, with Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive then pushing Putin’s invading army further away from the city. However, since the beginning of 2024, Kharkiv has become the principle target in a new Russian offensive which aims to take advantage of Ukraine’s mounting ammunition shortages and lack of air defenses.

Bombings are now a daily occurrence. Russia employs a mix of weapons including everything from ballistic missiles and drones to vast quantities of long-range glide bombs that are steadily destroying the city from a safe distance. These attacks target residential neighborhoods and critical civilian infrastructure in what appears to be a calculated campaign to make the entire city unlivable.

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Amid the constant threat of bombing, Kharkiv residents continue to display the kind of remarkable resilience that is now synonymous with Ukraine. The city’s Makers coffee chain is a good example of this dogged determination. The chain has actually expanded since the start of the war, doubling its presence in Kharkiv from two outlets to four, while also opening a new branch in the front line city of Kupyansk. Dmytro Kabanets, the twenty nine year old owner of the chain, believes it is vital for local residents to have a sense of community. “The feeling of not being alone is invaluable. People need to know there are others ready to lend a hand, both emotionally and practically,” he says.

Despite this upbeat attitude, he admits staying in business in today’s Kharkiv is becoming more and more difficult. The windows of the chain’s flagship coffee shop are boarded up as a precaution against further bomb damage. Due to Russian attacks on the city’s energy infrastructure, electricity supplies are a major challenge for all local businesses. After both of Kharkiv’s biggest power plants were destroyed in March, the city has experienced rolling blackouts. The rumble of generators has become a background feature of everyday life, with restaurants offering “generator-friendly’ menu items that require minimal power to prepare.

Many analysts believe Russia’s objective is to depopulate Kharkiv ahead of a summer offensive that will aim to seize the city and deliver a decisive blow to Ukrainian resistance. Rumors of looming encirclement and evacuations swirl around on social media, often fueled by Russian disinformation. For now, there is no indication of a mass exodus from Kharkiv, but the strain and trauma of recent months are forcing residents to make hard decisions.

Yevhen Streltsov, who runs the city’s Radio Nakypilo, says everyone approaches the issue of whether to stay or go in a highly personal manner. Some residents are bracing themselves for a repeat of the artillery barrages that rocked Kharkiv in the first months of the war. Others say they will only leave if the city is under direct threat of Russian occupation. “The situation is tense, but there is no panic,” he says, noting that he and his team are determined to continue their mission of broadcasting to the local population.

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For some Kharkiv residents, the stress has already become too much. Exhausted and emotionally drained by months of Russian bombardment, they are heading westward to Kyiv or beyond. Many are leaving their homes for the second time, having returned to Kharkiv after initially fleeing the city in the first days of the invasion.

Inevitably, the outflow of people is having an impact on the local economy. Revenues at the Makers coffee chain have dropped by up to 40 percent in recent weeks. Across Kharkiv, companies are reluctantly shutting down as people move their families to safety, with some businesses being put up for sale. Many of the city’s public spaces now feel eerily empty, especially once evening arrives.

It is still far too early to write Kharkiv off. While more and more residents are understandably seeking to escape the horrors of daily bombing, many remain determined to stay put. The population is clearly declining, but it remains nowhere near the lows witnessed during the early months of the invasion, when only around 300,000 people remained in the city.

If Russia does launch a serious campaign to capture or encircle Kharkiv in the coming months, this would represent by far the Kremlin’s most ambitious undertaking since losing the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022. The Ukrainian army will fight hard to defend the country’s second city, and they will be supported by a still sizable local population. Given the considerable difficulties Russia has encountered in seizing much smaller towns such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka, it is far from certain that Putin’s invading army currently has the offensive capabilities to take Kharkiv.

As the summer campaigning season approaches, the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in eastern Ukraine is rising and requires urgent international attention. Kharkiv is now the focal point of Russia’s entire invasion and is in desperate need of increased air defenses. This is the only way to prevent it from becoming the largest in a long line of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by the Russian military.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

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The Kremlin’s goal is to make Kharkiv “unlivable” and force a large percentage of its approximately 1.3 million residents to flee. Moscow hopes this will demoralize Ukraine and pave the way for the city’s capture by Russian forces during a widely anticipated summer offensive in the coming months.

Putin is not relying on missiles and drones alone to do the job of depopulating Kharkiv. In recent months, Russia has also unleashed an elaborate information offensive that aims to fuel panic and uncertainty among the city’s embattled population via a combination of aggressive propaganda and destabilizing disinformation.

Kharkiv has been on the front lines of the war ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Situated approximately half an hour by car from the Russian border, the city was one of the initial targets of the invading Russian army and witnessed heavy fighting in spring 2022. Following Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive, which liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian troops further away from the city itself, the Kharkiv population rose from a wartime low of around 300,000 to well over a million.

With delays in US military aid creating growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses, Russia has intensified the bombardment of Kharkiv since early 2024. A series of strikes in March destroyed the city’s main power plants, creating an energy crisis that has led to widespread blackouts. In mid April, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov warned that the city was now at risk of becoming a “second Aleppo,” a grim reference to the Syrian city partially destroyed almost a decade ago following heavy bombing by Russian and Syrian government forces.

The extensive use of highly destructive glide bombs has further exacerbated the situation and added to the psychological strain on the Kharkiv population, with many attacks on residential districts taking place in broad daylight. One of the most recent blows was the destruction of Kharkiv’s iconic television tower, a city landmark and also an important element of local communications infrastructure.

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Russia’s escalating bombing campaign has been accompanied by a major information offensive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is one of numerous senior Kremlin officials to encourage a mood of mounting insecurity among Kharkiv residents by publicly speaking of a coming campaign to seize the city. In April, Lavrov noted Kharkiv’s “important role” in Vladimir Putin’s plans to create a demilitarized “sanitary zone” inside Ukraine.

This message has been reinforced throughout Russia’s tightly-controlled mainstream media space. During a revealing recent lecture to Russian students, prominent Kremlin propagandist Olga Skabeyeva argued that patriotic journalists should portray the bombing of Kharkiv region not as evidence of Russian aggression, but as part of efforts to establish a “sanitary zone” along the Ukrainian border with Russia.

Statements from Russian establishment figures on the need to destroy and depopulate Kharkiv have been accompanied by a steady stream of similar chatter on social media. Since January 2024, there have been growing signs of a coordinated campaign to flood the online information space with intimidating and alarmist posts pushing the idea that Kharkiv will soon become an uninhabitable grey zone.

The role of social media in Russia’s information offensive against Kharkiv cannot be overstated. Platforms like Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter) have become battlegrounds for competing narratives and serve as platforms for carefully choreographed Russian propaganda. Groups of pro-Kremlin accounts frequently engage in the intensive promotion of key propaganda messages. These include the alleged hopelessness of Ukraine’s military position, the inability of the Ukrainian state to protect its citizens, and the likelihood of Kharkiv suffering the same fate as Mariupol, a Ukrainian port city with a prewar population of around half a million that was largely destroyed by the invading Russian army during the first months of the war.

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Russia’s information offensive features a strong disinformation component. This includes the distribution of fake statements supposedly released by the Ukrainian authorities. On one occasion, Kremlin accounts spread disinformation that the Ukrainian government was calling on residents to leave Kharkiv urgently in order to avoid imminent Russian encirclement. In a separate incident, Russian sources pushed fake Ukrainian government reports stating that Kharkiv was on the brink of a humanitarian collapse.

These elaborate fakes are typically presented in a convincing manner and closely resemble official Ukrainian government communications. They have even been accompanied by detailed information about “safe evacuation routes.” Inevitably, many Kharkiv residents are fooled by this disinformation and become unwitting accomplices in the dissemination of weaponized Russian fakes.

Russian accounts have also taken genuine news reports and distorted them in ways designed to mislead the public and maximize panic. For example, a series of planned evacuations from specific front line settlements was repackaged by Kremlin trolls as a complete evacuation of entire Kharkiv region districts.

In addition to fake government announcements and deliberate distortions, Kremlin-linked social media accounts are also actively spreading misleading video footage. One widely shared recent video purported to show long lines of cars evacuating Kharkiv while proclaiming that an “exodus” of the “ruined” city was underway. However, this video was later debunked as archive footage shot during the early days of the invasion in spring 2022.

Russia’s disinformation campaign seeks to sow fear and confusion among the Kharkiv population, says local resident Nataliya Zubar, who heads the Maidan Monitoring Information Service. “Disinformation clouds people’s judgment, leading to emotional reactions and stress,” she notes. “This fuels instability and places additional strains on the limited resources that are needed for the city’s defense and to address the growing humanitarian crisis Russia is creating.”

Kharkiv officials and civil society organizations are well aware of Russia’s ongoing information offensive. Work is currently underway to debunk false information and reduce the city’s vulnerability to information attack. These efforts include methodically exposing false claims, while also informing city residents of Russian information warfare tactics and educating them on ways to detect and counter disinformation. The stresses and strains of the emotionally charged wartime environment in today’s Kharkiv make this is a particularly complex task.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian authorities are developing a draft law to target the spread of deliberate disinformation via social media. This initiative mirrors similar undertakings in a number of other countries, but skeptics question whether legislative measures will prove effective against sophisticated state-backed information operations conducted across multiple media platforms.

Russia failed to take Kharkiv in the early weeks of the invasion more than two years ago. As the city braces for the possibility of a new Russian offensive in the coming summer months, local residents are equally determined to defy the Kremlin once again. In order to do so, they must withstand unprecedented aerial bombardment, while also guarding against the demoralizing impact of relentless Russian disinformation.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

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The post Bombs and disinformation: Russia’s campaign to depopulate Kharkiv appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, from late March Russia began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” Maxim Timchenko, CEO of Ukrainian energy producer DTEK, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

This is placing unprecedented pressure on Ukraine’s embattled power grid. Problems are arising not only due to a severe shortage of generation capacity, but also because the destroyed facilities played a vital role in ensuring the flexibility of the system. Fears are now growing that Ukraine will face rolling blackouts in the coming months, with potentially grave consequences for the wartime Ukrainian economy and the humanitarian situation in the country.

Ukrainian government officials and energy sector representatives anticipate that it could take years to repair the extensive damage done to power plants targeted in Russia’s recent attacks. Nor would this necessarily solve the problem. As numerous commentators have already pointed out, repaired facilities would remain vulnerable to future Russian airstrikes. Indeed, some of the plants struck since the beginning of 2024 had only recently been fixed following earlier bombardment.

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There are alternatives to simply repairing Ukraine’s old power grid and hoping for the best. Looking ahead, many industry experts and officials favor a more diverse and decentralized model for the Ukrainian energy sector. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, CEO of Ukrainian electricity transmission system operator Ukrenergo, recently argued that instead of relying on 15 to 20 large electricity generation facilities dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, Ukraine should be aiming to construct a nationwide network featuring hundreds of far smaller power plants.

This national energy upgrade should incorporate the latest technologies and take maximum advantage of Ukraine’s considerable renewable electricity generation capabilities. From a military perspective, it would be significantly more challenging for Russia to inflict critical damage on such a decentralized Ukrainian power grid. With a large number of potential targets spread out across the country, the cost of doing so would also likely be prohibitive.

The Ukrainian private sector can play a critical role in the transformation of the country’s energy industry. For the past two years, Ukrainian companies have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II. They have successfully adapted to incredibly challenging conditions and have overcome a wide range of obstacles, including in the energy sector. But in order to lead the way in building a new generation of power plants, the country’s energy entrepreneurs require access to the necessary financial tools.

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While Ukraine’s energy industry has received considerable financial support since 2022 from international donors and development institutions, most funding has gone to the public sector. This is understandable, given the need to keep state-run critical infrastructure functioning. However, in order to advance to the next stage, the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s international partners must look to make new projects economically viable for Ukraine’s private sector.

Without access to financing along with additional efforts to minimize the economic risks involved in new projects, the large-scale construction of decentralized energy facilities is unlikely to happen. Ukraine’s state-owned energy companies are already occupied with the restoration of their existing assets, and are not realistically in a position to embark on dozens of new projects in parallel. Providing access to financing could help spur competition within the Ukrainian private sector and pave the way for significant investment.

Much of the financial support for Ukrainian energy initiatives currently comes from international financial institutions. At present, many of Ukraine’s largest private sector players do not meet their criteria, while others are too small to appear on their radar. With little prospect of overcoming financial obstacles, some Ukrainian energy sector companies are already turning their attention to more economically viable projects outside Ukraine. Unless the situation changes, others may follow.

Financing the decentralization of Ukraine’s energy sector should be recognized as a strategic priority. Russia is clearly aiming to destroy the Ukrainian power grid and hopes this will break the country’s ability to resist. Withstanding the Russian attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is therefore vital for the wider war effort. The Ukrainian private sector is a logical partner in this undertaking, but needs access to the financial tools that only the country’s international partners can provide. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, “Give Ukrainian entrepreneurs the financial tools, and they will finish the job.”

Yuri Kubrushko is co-founder of the Green Recovery Fund.

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On April 23, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos wrote a book review for The Cipher Brief of Hala Gorani’s “But You Don’t Look Arab and Other Tales of Unbelonging.”

The review covers the story of Emmy Award-winning international journalist Hala Gorani, from her time as a globe-trotting correspondent and anchor with her own lifelong search for identity as the daughter of Syrian immigrants.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Terekhov is the latest in a series of high-profile voices to raise the alarm over the increasingly dire situation in and around Kharkiv. Located in eastern Ukraine close to the front and just thirty miles from the Russian border, the city has been the primary target of a new Russian air offensive that appears designed to depopulate large parts of Ukraine. “The Kremlin wants to make Ukraine’s second city unlivable,” reported The Economist in early April.

Russian attacks on Kharkiv’s civilian infrastructure and residential districts have increased dramatically over the past few months, killing dozens and leaving the city’s approximately 1.3 million residents with often sporadic access to electricity. A wave of Russian bombings on March 22 proved particularly damaging, destroying Kharkiv’s two main power plants and network of substations in a calculated move to plunge the city into darkness.

Hospitals, businesses, and homeowners are now scrambling to secure generators and other alternative power sources in anticipation of further blackouts, with children forced to study online or in makeshift underground classrooms. For now, most Kharkiv residents appear intent on staying put. However, if the situation does not improve in the coming months, there may be a mass exodus ahead of the winter season. Indeed, many fear that without enhanced air defenses, conditions inside the city could become intolerable much sooner.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The destruction of Kharkiv would certainly be a major war crime, but it would be far from unprecedented. On the contrary, the methodical depopulation of Ukraine’s second city would be very much in keeping with the destructive tactics employed by Russia ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began more than two years ago.

From Mariupol to Bakhmut, the Russian military has reduced a long list of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble as it has slowly steamrollered forward along the largely static front lines of the war. Although it is not possible to accurately determine casualty figures in areas currently under Russian occupation, tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians are believed to have been killed in Mariupol alone.

While the Kharkiv region has been the worst hit, the recent escalation in Russian bombardments has impacted the whole country, with attacks on the power grid in particular creating unprecedented challenges for the entire Ukrainian energy sector. This appears to be the result of extensive planning in Moscow, with Russian military officials learning important lessons from the failure of their winter 2022-23 energy infrastructure bombing offensive.

“Rather than continuing to focus their attacks on Ukraine’s transmission systems, Russia has began launching massive attacks on our energy generation infrastructure,” the CEO of Ukrainian energy provider DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, told CNN. “Unfortunately, the enemy has evolved his tactics and is using high-precision weapons. The result is a huge increase in its destructive effectiveness compared to 2023.”

The timing of the current bombing campaign also suggests Moscow is looking to take advantage of growing gaps in Ukraine’s air defenses. With a vital aid package held up in the US Congress for more than half a year, the Ukrainian military is currently suffering from a wide range of shortages, leaving front line commanders and air defense crews with no choice but to ration dwindling supplies of ammunition.

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Ukraine’s main port city and international maritime gateway, Odesa, has been heavily targeted in recent months. Attacks on residential areas in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions of northern Ukraine have also accelerated noticeably. In early April, a massive barrage of missiles succeeded in penetrating Ukraine’s depleted air defenses close to the country’s capital, destroying the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. “Why? Because we had zero missiles. We ran out of all missiles,” a clearly exasperated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told PBS NewsHour.

Ukrainian officials are now urgently appealing for extra air defenses to help counter Russia’s bombing campaign. So far, the response has been muted, with only Germany confirming plans to hand over a Patriot system. Others, such as the Netherlands, have offered to purchase Patriot systems on behalf of Ukraine. While these steps are welcome, much more needs to be done to protect Ukraine’s civilian population and the country’s infrastructure.

Many analysts believe improved air defenses are not enough and argue that in order to effectively counter Putin’s terror-bombing tactics, Ukraine must be given the necessary long-range weapons to target Russian launch sites. However, this would require Ukraine’s partners to overcome their well-documented fear of escalation and reverse a longstanding ban on the use of Western weapons for attacks inside Russia. At present, there is little sign of that happening.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has already issued arrest warrants for two high-ranking Russian military officers over the 2022-23 bombing of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, but this is of little comfort to the beleaguered Ukrainian population, who know it will be years before they see even symbolic justice served. Meanwhile, the current bombing campaign continues to gain momentum. This new air offensive is far more ambitious than Russia’s earlier efforts, with the apparent end goal of rendering entire Ukrainian regions uninhabitable.

Unless Ukraine’s air defenses are dramatically upgraded in the near future, the country will face a humanitarian catastrophe that could potentially define the future course of the war. Putin has been unable to defeat Ukraine decisively on the battlefield, but his bombing campaign may yet succeed in breaking Ukrainian resistance by forcing millions of civilians to flee their blacked out homes and ruined cities.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 31, 2024

Ukraine urgently needs air defenses as Russia decimates power grid

By Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti

A new Russian air offensive has destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a matter of days and threatens to spark a humanitarian catastrophe if Ukraine does not urgently receive enhanced air defenses, writes Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Apr 16, 2024

Western fear of escalation will hand Putin an historic victory in Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

The West’s self-defeating fear of escalation has allowed Russia to regain the initiative in Ukraine and is now threatening to hand Putin an historic victory, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Apr 15, 2024

Organizing for victory

By Ben Hodges

In the escalating struggle against Putin’s Russia, Iran, and China, The West needs a return to the clarity of Churchill and Roosevelt, who communicated clear strategic priorities to the public, industry, and the military, writes Ben Hodges.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s plan to depopulate Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the world stage, she has established strong relations with Biden, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Italy has forged strategic partnerships with India and Japan and recently hosted the Italy-Africa Summit, where Meloni launched her ambitious Mattei Plan to boost economic cooperation with African countries in addressing the root causes of migration. Meloni used Italy’s Group of Seven (G7) presidency to hold a virtual leaders’ meeting from Kyiv last week in solidarity with the Ukrainian cause of freedom. On February 24, to commemorate the second anniversary of Ukraine’s brave struggle against Russia’s full-scale invasion she spoke from the Hostomel Airport as the “symbol of Russia’s failure” and “Ukraine’s pride.” She further noted that “Ukrainians defended what they loved and, in so doing, they also defended us. They fought to give us the chance to be here today, to say that this land is a piece of our home, and that we will do our part to defend it.”

Under Meloni’s leadership, and against domestic opposition, Italy refused to renew its memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Free from the agreement with China, Meloni has prioritized leading Italian and European efforts in expanding connectivity and commerce with India and the Indo-Pacific through West Asia. She is equally committed to strengthening economic ties with the African economies. Italy, as a leading member of the EU’s “Aspides” mission, has been on the forefront of efforts to secure shipping lanes from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. 

Meloni’s active leadership coincides with the need for Italy to step up to protect its national and European interests, as Europe simultaneously contends with a land war on its eastern front with Russia, navigates strained and worsening economic relations with China, and devises a workable Africa strategy to stem the flow of migrants. To address all these challenges, Italy needs to be the economic and military mainstay of Southern Europe in the Mediterranean.

Linchpin of the Mediterranean

Italy should use its G7 presidency this year to both cement and chart forward a credible strategy toward its reemergence as the indispensable Mediterranean nation in addressing the global challenges posed by revisionist China and Russia.

Italy, in reestablishing its Mediterranean preeminence, needs to act simultaneously as a steady anchor, enthusiastic beachhead, and humane guard post. Italy can and should play an anchor’s role in the economic and military fortification of Europe and NATO’s eastern front. Italian industry is critical in meeting the greater demand for armaments in defense of Europe. Beyond its defense industry, Italy is well positioned to play a critical role in greater north-south infrastructure development linking the Baltic and Black seas with the Adriatic. Italian industry has much to benefit from both these developments.

The Chinese Communist Party’s arbitrary and autocratic handling of the Chinese economy—and its impact on the global economy—has put a premium on diversified and resilient global supply chains. China’s unpredictability necessitates greater commercial engagement between Europe and India and the Indo-Pacific. In short, it calls for closer links between the free and open economies and nations of the Indo-Pacific with that of the Med-Atlantic. Italy, given both its geography and its history, is best positioned to be the Mediterranean beachhead for the European Global Gateway initiative in response to the BRI. The increased flow of Indo-Pacific and Med-Atlantic trade and commerce holds two additional benefits. First, it represents the largest economic driver for fostering growth and development in African economies. Second, it will serve as a timely driver for the development of southern Italian communities. Italy’s recent Africa Summit complements and emphasizes the first point.

A transport and diplomatic connector

The time has come for both the Mediterranean and Italy to accept the mantle as the continental linchpin connecting the free and open economies and societies of the Indo-Pacific and Med-Atlantic. Growing strategic convergence between Rome and Washington may serve as a timely ballast for fortifying NATO, transatlantic solidarity, European resiliency, and Europe’s outreach to the Indo-Pacific. Under Meloni’s energetic leadership and with Italy hosting the G7 later this year, the stage is set for the reaffirmation of Italy as a geostrategic actor with the full support of the United States.

Kaush Arha is president of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific Forum and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue.

Paolo Messa is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and founder of Formiche.

The post It’s Italy’s time to cement itself as the indispensable Mediterranean nation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Most immigrant traffic to the United States goes through and comes from Latin America. A lack of economic opportunities, climate vulnerabilities, political instability, and the pervasive influence of organized crime are often cited as push factors for these migrants. However, recent migration patterns also reveal a diversification of nationalities at the US southern border, underscoring the global nature of the challenge. In addition to regional events such as the collapse of Venezuela, political instability in Haiti, violence in Ecuador, and the ongoing and unrelenting crackdown in Nicaragua, conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war in the Middle East are also fueling the migration crisis. Most migrants at the US southern border in recent years originated in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. However, despite the persistent conception of most migrants coming from Central America, in December, more than half of migrant encounters at the US-Mexico border involved citizens of other countries, such as Russia, India, Brazil, Afghanistan, Romania, Turkey, and others.

As such, Latin American countries and the United States should work together to develop and implement policies and strategies that address the driving causes of migration that are specific to the region and mitigate the region-wide risks of such a large migrant flow—much of which now comes from outside the region.

Specifically, the United States should work with the countries originating high numbers of migrants to improve conditions and thus prevent the need for people to leave their countries—whether from Latin America and the Caribbean or other parts of the world. That starts with a holistic security strategy to address the challenges of human, drug, and arms trafficking. Supporting local economic growth and human capital development, employing climate change mitigation and adaptation programs, and fostering coordinated, multifaceted responses to the drug supply chain would create a more secure hemisphere and decrease the number of people fleeing violence.

Additionally, the United States needs to recognize that its current policies aimed at deterring migration are ineffective and often harmful. The hardline policies that were put in place by the Trump administration and have largely been continued by the Biden administration have done little to nothing to curb migration flows. At the US-Mexico border, migration crossings have hit a record high, with more than three hundred thousand Border Patrol encounters with migrants in December. This context demands a reevaluation of current strategies aimed at deterring migration.

Instead of continuing its failed effort at deterrence, Congress should focus on developing humane, legal pathways to migration, recognizing pull factors in the United States, which will decrease the frequency of irregular migration. A straightforward recommendation is for clear, realistic timelines for US judges to expeditiously deliver decisions on asylum cases.

The United States should not take on all of the burden. There are opportunities to work in the region and support regional partners on integrating displaced migrants in third countries, from the region or from other parts of the world, to help alleviate the migration flow to the US border. A new report by the Atlantic Council also puts forward the idea of the United States supporting a regional task force “with the goal of jointly addressing the factors behind irregular migration and insecurity.” The idea builds on the existing work of countries such as Costa Rica and Panama, which are working hand in hand to establish more streamlined, efficient, and unified border crossings. Last week, these two countries, with the assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, inaugurated a one-of-a-kind border facility. Building on the Atlantic Council’s recommendation for a regional task force to address these challenges, the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala are already moving in this direction. The three nations have just “committed to establish an operationally focused trilateral working group aimed at enhancing security, law enforcement processes, and infrastructure along their international borders”—a concrete manifestation of a collaborative approach to solving regional challenges.”

Migration and security are inherently interlinked issues, and the urgency for a collaborative, multifaceted approach to both cannot be overstated. The United States must work with and support other countries in the hemisphere to holistically mitigate the root causes of migration and create safer conditions for citizens across the region.

María Eugenia Brizuela de Avila is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former minister of foreign affairs of El Salvador.

The post Irregular migration starts well before the US southern border. Focus on the driving causes of the problem. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The strategic interest of the United States and the countries of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) lies in strengthening their western hemisphere partnership. Shared borders, economic interests, and security alliances bind these nations, along with a common goal for prosperity.

However, the perception of waning US interest and the rise of external influences necessitate the rejuvenation of and renewed focus on this partnership. In May 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security established the US-LAC Future Strategy Working Group to redefine the US-LAC partnership.

This strategy promotes mutual and inclusive economic growth, renewed cooperation through enhanced commercial and investment ties, a renewed paradigm on bolstering security and reducing migration flows across the region, and a focus on preparedness in the face of natural disasters and the energy transition. Acting on this strategy could significantly benefit US economic and security interests. The United States should capitalize on immediate opportunities, like promoting nearshoring as a means to growth and prosperity across the Americas, while maintaining a medium-term strategy tailored to each country’s specific needs.

This strategy paper highlights the importance of adaptability and practicality, particularly as the global economic landscape evolves and power shifts foresee new leading economies by mid-century. In addition, the strategy advocates for the significance of the US-LAC relationship amid the recalibration of US worldwide interests.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

China pairs actions with messaging in Latin America. The United States should do the same.

By David O. Shullman

China has coordinated trade, financing, and investment with diplomatic engagement, public diplomacy, and information operations to deepen its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington should, in turn, pair diplomatic engagement and messaging with greater attention to regional countries’ needs.

China Economy & Business

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

Don’t let geopolitics undermine Latin America’s hard-won free markets

By Stephen B. Kaplan

The United States is concerned about China’s close economic ties to Latin America and the Caribbean; however, the US response should be careful not to undermine longstanding market norms and popular trade liberalization policies

Caribbean China

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2024

How the United States can counter malign Chinese and Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere 

By Atlantic Council

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center present a new series on US and allied strategy in the Western Hemisphere.

China Economy & Business

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

Learn more

The post Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Warrick mentioned in NBC on why House Republicans want to impeach secretary Mayorkas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How we got into this mess

To simplify this divisive debate, many Republicans want fewer migrants allowed into the United States. Republicans have particularly focused on what they call “catch and release,” a term Democrats consider pejorative (because it likens desperate people fleeing persecution or economic hardship to fish being caught for sport).

When migrants without visas enter the United States, often fleeing violence and extreme poverty in their home countries, many claim political asylum. Current law says that anyone who is physically present on US territory, no matter where they enter, with or without authorization, can ask for asylum. Border Patrol or other Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials can deport individuals entering without authorization using an administrative process called “expedited removal” without going to immigration court, but not if the individual asks for asylum. Those asking for asylum are interviewed under a low initial bar that allow them to pursue their asylum claim in the United States through immigration court if they have a “credible fear” of persecution in their home country. However, because there are too few immigration judges and courts, it takes up to five to seven years to adjudicate most asylum claims. The federal courts will not allow most migrants without visas to be kept in detention for such a long period, because they have not been found guilty of a crime and there are not enough detention beds for millions of asylum applicants. This is especially true of family groups with minor children, for which judicial decisions against long-term detention are even more strict. Hence, judicial decisions require asylum applicants to be released until their cases are heard by an immigration judge.

However, current law says applicants cannot legally work in the United States until six months after they file their asylum claim in immigration court or with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’) US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—a restriction in the law that is not subject to adjustment either way by the executive branch. Until migrants get a work authorization document from USCIS or a decision on their asylum claim, most depend on public aid, funds from relatives, friends, or charities, or work without legal authorization. Currently, more than half of all asylum applications are denied, but many migrants get to live and work in the United States for years until they receive that final decision and, even then, many will not be sent home. This is what entices more than a million migrants a year to pay rapacious human-smuggling cartels so they can make a dangerous, costly trek north through Central America and Mexico to arrive at the southwestern US border.

Democrats and migration advocates, for their part, see the United States as a safe haven for those fleeing persecution and desperate poverty, and say the United States can and should allow asylum claims at the US border. Most Democrats also want to see those who came to the United States without authorization as children receive legal status and a pathway to citizenship. A significant number would extend this offer to law-abiding, hard-working adults who are already here. Most Republicans oppose any kind of what they call “amnesty” for those who came to the United States without authorization. Some businesses, however, see a benefit to having more workers in the United States, especially for low-wage service jobs.

US public opinion, in broad terms, wants to see an immigration system that is both just and fair—allowing deserving applicants to get asylum, while denying entry to those without a valid legal claim.

President Joe Biden was elected in 2020 after campaigning on reversing the restrictive immigration policies of the Donald Trump administration—but the Biden administration did not request additional resources to process large numbers of additional migrants. Starting almost as soon as Biden signed new immigration executive orders on January 20, 2021, congressional Republicans demanded the administration stop the increasing numbers of migrants who began arriving without visas at the US southwest border. In April 2022, the Biden administration released a detailed plan to address the rising numbers, but did not request additional funding for it. As the COVID-19 pandemic eased in 2022, the Biden administration prepared to rescind the authority under federal public-health law used by the Trump administration to turn many migrants away without giving them a hearing on their asylum claims. (Legal challenges to those Trump policies were before the Supreme Court in January 2021, but were dropped after the Biden administration reversed some of the policies.) The Biden administration announced a number of post-pandemic new steps in January 2023, which took effect in May. As has happened in the immediate aftermath of every major immigration policy change in the Obama and Trump administrations, the numbers of migrants initially went down, but then began to increase.

Significantly—and unfortunately—the June 2023 budget deal between Biden and then-Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (the “Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023”) put fiscal restraints on the budgets of the departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Health and Human Services (HHS), and State—the departments that collectively fund the border and immigration system. For 2024 and 2025, the only way these departments can get additional funds to address growing needs is through emergency supplemental appropriations.

Understanding the Biden’s administration’s groundbreaking October border supplemental

On October 20, the Biden administration submitted a $105 billion supplemental spending request for Ukraine, Israel, and the Indo-Pacific, including $13.6 billion for border security and immigration. This package responded to Republican demands to condition more money for Ukraine’s defense on the Biden administration doing more about the southwestern border. Unlike regular budget submissions, in which each cabinet department lays out its separate request—making it difficult to see how cross-department programs support each other—this time the administration buried at the end of a detailed fact sheet an excellent laydown that showed with clarity how all the parts of the administration’s border supplemental request worked coherently. The administration wanted to do six things together:

• Address the delays in processing asylum and other cases by increasing the number of immigration judge teams by 375, around a 60-percent jump.
• Give CBP an additional $4.5 billion for expanded operations, including money for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants to local governments and nongovernmental organizations to provide shelter and services to migrants who were released after being given a notice to appear for their asylum hearing. This would help take the burden off states and cities that otherwise would need to provide aid for these migrants, because most applicants could not legally work. CBP would also get $849 million for inspection technology to detect smugglers trying to get migrants, drugs, and contraband into the United States.
• Provide additional government attorneys to process the increased number of asylum cases, and for additional investigators and other personnel, via $2.5 billion for the DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
• Add asylum officers and technology to more quickly handle the increased workload of processing claims, with $755 million for DHS’ USCIS.
• Increase funds for law-enforcement agencies—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency—for support functions, including testing DNA to ensure that adult migrants were not making false claims about being related to the children traveling with them.
• Increase migration and refugee-assistance programs at the Department of State by $1.3 billion.

The administration’s logic was to increase the capacity of the entire system that processes asylum and other immigration claims, thus shortening the time that applicants waited for a hearing and reducing the societal burden on supporting migrants until they got decisions in their individual cases. The additional funding for enforcement—and for people, technology, and programs to address smuggling of people and illegal drugs like fentanyl—was intended to respond to both Republican and Democratic concerns.

Administration officials testified before the House and Senate appropriations committees, conducted private briefings on Capitol Hill, and spoke to professional organizations, but did not embark on a major, nationwide public-outreach program to explain the logic of the border and immigration appropriations package to the US public.

Figure 1: Cases pending before immigration courts, fiscal years 1998-2022

If anything, the administration’s border and immigration supplemental could be criticized for not being large enough to erase the growing backlog in asylum cases that began to accelerate during the Trump administration. (See Figure 1.) The best available public study of immigration-court capacity said that to erase the backlog of cases that existed at the end of Fiscal Year 2022 would require increasing the number of immigration judge teams by two hundred each year for five years—implying that the administration’s request for 375 immigration judge teams needed to be thought of as a down payment, not an end state. The total number of pending asylum cases is now even greater, more than three million, likely requiring even more immigration judge teams to resolve the backlog over a five-year period.

Understanding the landmark bipartisan Senate compromise bill

After more than ten weeks of intense negotiations, the bipartisan Senate compromise bill that emerged was the first serious effort in more than a decade to do what Congress has almost never done on border security and immigration: combine major policy changes with the resources required to make those changes succeed. Congress traditionally separates authorizations and appropriations into separate committees that jealously guard their turf. As an Atlantic Council study in December 2020 explained, congressional responsibility for the homeland security enterprise is divided among eleven major committees in the House and nine in the Senate. The executive branch is little better, with four major cabinet departments having important roles (DHS, Justice, HHS, and State) and major policy decisions led by the National Security Council and the Domestic Policy Council, but funding decisions controlled by the Office of Management and Budget. As a previous Atlantic Council report highlighted, aligning policy and resources is a chronic problem in the homeland security enterprise. The bipartisan Senate supplemental, negotiated by key senators with Homeland Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and the White House, represented a landmark in uniting policy changes with increases in resources that are needed to make the policy changes work.

First, on the resource side, the bipartisan Senate compromise proposed to appropriate more money for border and immigration security ($20.3 billion) than the administration requested ($13.6 billion). The bipartisan bill also made major shifts in how that money was allocated.

Some of these shifts were fundamental, and reflected Republican skepticism about how migration cases should be processed faster and more efficiently if the compromise version had passed.

• The Department of Justice’s request was cut substantially, but preserved a significant increase of approximately a hundred immigration judge teams. This reduction in judicial capacity from the administration’s October request was offset by an increase in the number of USCIS asylum officers, who would have begun to process cases under the negotiated policy changes for newly arriving migrants who otherwise would have had to wait years for an available immigration judge to hear their legal claims.
• ICE would get more than three times the requested amount, with the additional funding going to increase the number of personnel, increase detention space to 46,500 beds, and increase the number of removal flights to return migrants whose claims are denied. To fully unlock the full appropriation, ICE would need to report to Congress that it has increased detention space and the number of removal flights.
• USCIS would get substantially more than initially requested to increase the number of asylum officers who, under the new rules made possible by the compromise, could make decisions in most asylum cases.
• The compromise version substantially cut funding for supporting migrants awaiting hearings, but still proposed to give FEMA $1.4 billion from CBP for the shelter and services program for migrants awaiting a decision—which, under the new policy changes, should take six months rather than five to seven years.
• The Department of State did not get as much as it requested for migration and refugees, and much of the funding it would have received was to increase the capacity of Latin American countries to receive returning migrants whose claims were denied.

The policy changes in the bipartisan Senate version were compromises intended to bring on both Republican and Democratic support:

• No longer would there have been a low bar that allows most asylum applicants to stay in the United States for years while waiting for an immigration judge to hear their case.
• Instead, thousands of USCIS asylum officers would have made faster decisions on most asylum cases, ideally within six months, without waiting years for the case to be reviewed by an immigration judge. All asylum applicants would have undergone thorough security vetting. Each applicant would need to prove to the asylum officer by “clear and convincing evidence” that they qualify for asylum. The expectation, based on experience, was that most applicants would not qualify for asylum, but those who are found eligible would get immediate work authorization so they can support themselves.
• Asylum applicants would get the right to counsel, but at their own expense. (Children and those deemed incompetent would be eligible for government-provided counsel.)
• There was a limited appeal option for applicants whose requests were denied, but most cases would not have to be heard by courts. Those found not eligible for asylum would have been removed from the United States. ICE would have had significantly greater resources to carry out removals of those who did not qualify for asylum protection under the Convention Against Torture or other US laws.
• If the number of inadmissible migrants exceeded 8,500 in a single day, or five thousand a day over a seven-day period, the bill would have required the Secretary of Homeland Security to “close” the border to asylum claims. Migrants could still claim protection under other US laws, such as the Convention Against Torture, but the standard of proof for such claims is higher and very few migrants qualify for it. Based on current levels of migrants arriving at the southwest border, the border would have been “closed” to asylum claims for most of the past four months, according to those involved in the negotiations.
• Afghan allies resettled in the United States after the August 2021 US withdrawal from Afghanistan would have been allowed to stay and become permanent residents after they passed security vetting.
• The bill would have required additional training for Border Patrol officers, improvements in ICE’s “alternatives to detention” program, and upgrades to technology at CBP and USCIS.
• USCIS and ICE would get streamlined hiring authorities to hire the thousands of new officers and agents required to implement the bill.

The bipartisan Senate bill went a long way toward addressing long-time Republican concerns. If the bill had been passed and implemented (and funded) in subsequent years, it would have significantly reduced the use of “catch and release” because those migrants who qualified for asylum would get a much faster determination and be eligible for work more quickly. Those not eligible would have been removed from the United States much more quickly than at present.

For Democrats, the compromise bill did not address important issues like adults who came to the United States as children without authorization—called Dreamers, from the proposed Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. Many Democrats also objected to the new asylum restrictions. However, for Democrats and migration advocates, the bipartisan Senate compromise promised faster determination of asylees’ eligibility and additional resources, including faster work authorization, to integrate those eligible into US society. This represented a significant improvement over the present situation, in which cities are being overwhelmed by needing to support those awaiting their court dates.

The bipartisan Senate compromise, while a definite improvement over the alternative of current funding levels and nothing else for a year, did have its flaws and limitations.

• The most serious concern was that the additional resources would not be sufficient to process all asylum applicants within six months of arrival. But even if more personnel and resources would ultimately have been required, the compromise bill was an important first step.
• The system set up by the bill would have taken at least two years to become fully operational—hiring and training the additional officers, agents, judges, and other personnel, buying the additional screening technology, and expanding needed facilities. In the meantime, the backlog of three million cases would not be reduced, and might increase further.
• The bill did not clarify the status of migrants already here, leaving millions of people in limbo for years, waiting for their claims to be heard. There is no bipartisan consensus on what to do about this.
• The bill tried to prioritize dealing with the current influx of new arriving migrants and did not have a clear plan or the resources to address the backlog of more than three million pending immigration cases. Even so, the compromise was a rational approach to the increasing numbers of migrants arriving every week. In an ideal world of bipartisanship, additional work would need to take place to develop an approach for eliminating the current backlog of cases.
• One of the most fundamental problems with the bipartisan Senate bill was that it did not end the incentives for people to pay smugglers to get them to the US southwest border. To be fair, a small group of senators trying to negotiate a complex legislative package has limits on what it could try to achieve in ten weeks. But the bipartisan Senate bill can be fairly described as treating the symptoms of the problem, not the underlying condition. Even so, as doctors say, the first priority is often to stabilize the patient before treating the underlying conditions. There are three approaches that could help with the underlying conditions.
  • Since July 2021, the Biden administration has had a “root causes” strategy, directed by Executive Order 14010, focused on reducing the “push” factors that drive migrants to leave home and make the dangerous and (to them) expensive journey north. Republicans, in particular, are leery of Democratic efforts to address the root causes of what is a global migration crisis. It is true that violence, extreme poverty, and the effects of climate change on agriculture are driving millions of people worldwide to believe they have no choice but to leave their homes in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia and come to the United States, Europe, or richer countries in Asia. Solving the root causes driving global migration will take a decade or more, at a global price tag that starts in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and there is no bipartisan consensus in Congress ready to take on even a significant part of this challenge.
  • Deciding who is eligible for asylum before migrants arrive at the southwest border would be a more practical, but still ambitious, approach. The Biden administration proposed this as a policy initiative and set up small “Safe Mobility Offices” in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Columbia that are under-resourced but starting to show promise. However, the administration has not put forward publicly a comprehensive plan (that is, policy plus personnel plus resources plus legislative language) comparable to the October border supplemental or the bipartisan Senate bill. Under this approach, people in Latin America could appear before a US official in their home country, or at least in a nearby safer country, and get a binding determination of their eligibility for asylum before they travel thousands of miles in the hands of dangerous smuggling cartels. Setting up asylum “overseas processing centers” in countries like Colombia, Panama, or Mexico would probably be more efficient and less costly overall than dealing with more than one million people per year coming into the United States who are hoping they can win their cases—when the reality is that very few will succeed. (The United States currently does almost all refugee interviews and processing overseas, so there is precedent for this model.) Overseas processing centers for asylum applicants would take several years to develop, and each center would effectively become a small “American” city of several thousand US or international citizens (including US asylum officers, support staff, and security) in the middle of Mexico or several Central American countries. This would require negotiations comparable in complexity to setting up a US military base in a foreign country—which the United States has done many times. Even if a civilian overseas processing center is less expensive than a military base, three or four would likely cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars each once salaries, housing, and facilities are included.
  • Tackling the criminal cartels responsible for most of the smuggling is another line of effort the Senate compromise did not emphasize. This would require increased efforts by US and Latin American law enforcement, military, intelligence, judges, and prisons. The limited success the United States has had against narcotics cartels shows that this will not be easy.

The shifting politics

The idea of joining a year’s worth of military assistance to Ukraine and Israel to more money for border security and migration arose in late 2023 after it became clear Ukraine would need more help against Russia’s invasion, Israel would need help after Hamas’s October 7 attack, and increasing numbers of migrants were continuing to arrive at the US southwest border after the end of the pandemic. Under the Biden-McCarthy budget deal, the only way to get additional funds was through an emergency supplemental appropriation.

In late November, Republicans said they would require immigration policy changes as a condition for passing additional military assistance to Ukraine. Over the next ten weeks, a group of Senate Republicans and Democrats, with participation from Mayorkas and White House officials, worked on what became the bipartisan compromise announced February 4. The secrecy of the talks had many stakeholders worried their core interests and values were at risk. In hindsight, it appears that the secrecy was what made compromises on several key points possible.

However, in mid-January, with the release of the bipartisan Senate compromise imminent and following a White House meeting with congressional leadership on the overall package, the table was overturned when former president and likely Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump said social media “I do not think we should do a Border Deal, at all, unless we get EVERYTHING needed to shut down the INVASION of Millions & Millions of people, many from parts unknown, into our once great, but soon to be great again, Country!”

This provoked a reaction from the former president’s supporters, leading Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to call the deal “dead on arrival” even before details had been released. Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, after initially supporting the bill when its text was rolled out on February 4, said on February 5 that Republicans should vote against a procedural vote scheduled for February 7. Biden addressed the nation on February 6, calling for public support for the bipartisan Senate compromise. A key procedural vote in the Senate to move the bill forward, which needed 60 votes, failed 49-50. On February 11, the Senate voted 67-27 to move forward with the Ukraine, Israel, Indo-Pacific, and humanitarian packages—everything except border security and immigration.

The debate on the Senate compromise was significantly affected by misinformation (and disinformation) about the bill’s provisions. Most notably, the bill’s number of five thousand inadmissible migrants who would trigger the border being “closed” to asylum seekers was twisted into the idea that five thousand inadmissible migrants would be allowed into the United States. (See above for the details of how this would really have worked.) The reality was that those five thousand migrants would be subjected to the full panoply of security checks and legal requirements for asylum, so that only the small number actually eligible for asylum would actually be allowed to stay in the United States. This provision started, ironically, from a Republican demand that the Biden administration “close the border” whenever there were large numbers of migrants trying to cross without authorization, and the five-thousand figure was a compromise that Democrats could accept in order to write the authority into law. (Democrats were no doubt aware that a future Republican administration would almost certainly use this authority.) Biden said on January 24 he would use this authority. Republicans claimed he did not need additional authority, but the Republican interpretation would be open to judicial challenges, whereas Section 244B(f) of the bipartisan compromise would have significantly narrowed the courts’ ability to overturn such a determination. This kind of attention to detail was largely lost in the claims by the compromise’s opponents.

Make no mistake: A year of not having additional resources to deal with the current numbers of arriving migrants will further severely strain the nation’s immigration system. Officials in cities like New York and Denver are saying they are at a breaking point. ICE is talking about having to release detainees to cover a $700 million shortfall. CBP will have to pull money away from increasing processing capacity for cargo and arriving lawful travelers—increasing delays and holding back the US economy. Taking away funds needed by FEMA for disaster relief will directly hurt the millions of US citizens who suffer from natural disasters and have nowhere else to turn. Strains on CBP and ICE personnel will likely increase turnover as many leave for other, less stressful law-enforcement positions. While Trump said he will run on his vision for border security, Biden said on February 6 that Democrats will ask voters to hold Trump and Republicans responsible for blocking the Senate compromise.

The prospects for either side getting a better deal after the November 2024 election are limited. If Biden is reelected, expectations are that he will still face a closely divided Congress, and the problems with the border and immigration system will likely have grown worse with congressional inaction during 2024.

If Trump is elected, his December 2023 vow to be a “dictator” on “day one” and close the US border should be taken seriously. Doing this through executive authority alone would lead to immediate court challenges, because the right to claim asylum is written into federal statutes. Even if Trump then demanded that DHS and Justice Department officials defy federal court orders and promised those officials pardons if they carried out his instructions, my assessment is that few federal officials outside of Trump’s immediate orbit would do it. They likely would not want to jeopardize their post-Trump careers by defying federal court injunctions to enforce existing laws that allow asylum applicants to remain in the United States until their claims are heard by an immigration judge. Courts and Democrats are likely to slow down some of Trump’s most ambitious plans. Democrats will point to the 2024 bipartisan Senate compromise as the best offer a Trump administration may get if it needs Democratic votes to pass a budget or statutory changes.

It is always possible that whoever wins in November 2024 will overreach in 2025 on immigration policy and a one-party approach in 2025 will go nowhere. It is also possible that the outcome of the failure of the bipartisan Senate proposal in 2024, plus a year of inaction, may convince a supermajority in the Congress that a bipartisan approach is essential, desirable, and unavoidable.

Thus, the details of the bipartisan Senate compromise could well become the starting point for talks in 2025.

Recommendations

1. Two core ideas of the bipartisan compromise should be maintained:
   1. Resource decisions and policy decisions on border security and immigration need to be linked—advancing one without the other will not work.
   2. In the absence of truly comprehensive immigration reform, increased funding for the back-office functions to process asylum and other immigration cases within weeks, not years, is essential. This will provide both Republicans and Democrats with important parts of what they want: an end to “catch and release” and an immigration system that is just, fair, and reflects US values.
2. The Biden administration should adjust its budget numbers for Fiscal Years (FY) 2025 and 2026 to include ramping up the hiring of additional officers, agents, judges, and support personnel needed to implement something like the bipartisan Senate compromise with the goal that something like the 2024 bipartisan compromise can be enacted sometime in late FY 2025. These additional personnel are needed to address the current backlog and numbers of arriving migrants, even if the policy changes could not be made. Hiring and training more people will take time to implement—and should be ramped up as soon as possible.
3. For future federal budget negotiations, the Biden administration should make funding for the Department of Homeland Security part of the “revised security category” that currently includes only military spending (budget account 050). This may sound technical, but it would have fundamental, far-reaching consequences to strengthen US security. Future negotiations between a Democratic White House and a Republican-led house of Congress (whether the House or Senate) are likely to involve tradeoffs between security spending and domestic spending. This was the essence of the negotiations during the past decade, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. However, the 2023 budget deal ended up pitting more funding for homeland security against other domestic spending priorities. Instead, both Democrats and Republicans would benefit politically from thinking of border security and immigration as integral to the security of the United States, so no one thinks of DHS as a “non-security” program during federal budget negotiations.
4. The Department of Homeland Security and the homeland security enterprise need to think of their mission as: “We lead the defense of the nation against non-military threats.” To the greatest extent possible, both DHS and the homeland security enterprise need to become more nonpartisan and “above politics.” This was a core recommendation of the Atlantic Council’s Future of DHS report in September 2020. It remains valid today.
5. As a long-term goal, DHS and the homeland security enterprise will be better off separating from the most partisan, toxic aspects of immigration policy. At one time, monetary policy was one of the most divisive issues in US politics. Most college students who take US history courses hear of William Jennings Bryan’s famous 1896 “cross of gold” speech, with few understanding the parallels between the divisiveness of monetary policy then and immigration policy today. It took the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 to take the bulk of monetary policy out of the hands of Congress and the White House. Congress set broad goals—currency stability and full employment—and then let the Federal Reserve Board decide how to balance both goals. Over the past century, admittedly with some dramatic ups and downs, the US economy has led the United States to a level of prosperity and security without precedent in human history. Something comparable for US immigration policy could help drive both security and prosperity for the next century.

About the author

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Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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If passed, the bill would allow Ukrainians to hold more than one citizenship. This would have significant implications for Ukraine itself and for the large international Ukrainian diaspora. According to the Ukrainian World Congress, the Ukrainian diaspora currently numbers around 20 million people. Most would potentially be eligible for Ukrainian citizenship. Restrictions on dual citizenship have previously deterred many members of the diaspora from applying for Ukrainian passports.

Zelenskyy’s proposal has been welcomed by many within the Ukrainian diaspora. If adopted, it could help strengthen ties between Ukraine itself and the global Ukrainian community, while granting diaspora members an opportunity to have a greater say in Ukraine’s development. It would make it far easier to visit Ukraine and open a business, purchase property, or otherwise invest in the country, while also providing diaspora Ukrainians with the chance to vote in elections or even run for office themselves.

For existing Ukrainian citizens, acquiring a second passport would potentially open multiple doors in terms of travel, work, and study. Ukrainians have enjoyed visa-free access to the European Union’s Schengen Zone for limited time periods since 2017, and have also benefited from a range of measures to ease border restrictions since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Nevertheless, the prospect of holding an EU, US, or other Western passport would certainly appeal to many.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While there is likely to be considerable public support for Zelenskyy’s dual citizenship proposal, any attempt at implementation in today’s wartime environment could prove highly problematic. Crucially, it remains far from clear what the initiative would mean for military service.

With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now approaching the two-year mark, most analysts believe the conflict has evolved into a war of attrition. With its far larger population, economy, and industrial base, this places Russia at a considerable advantage. The Russian military has also demonstrated a striking disregard for heavy losses in Ukraine, repeatedly employing so-called “human wave” or “meat assault” tactics to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses by sheer weight of numbers.

Ukraine cannot afford to accept such high casualty rates. The country has a far smaller pool of military-age men to draw from, and has already experienced a major decline in population as a direct result of Russia’s invasion. Current martial law restrictions mean most Ukrainian males eligible for military service are not permitted to exit the country. However, if changes to the Ukrainian Constitution made it possible to apply for a second citizenship, opportunities may arise for Ukrainian citizens to use newly acquired passports in order to leave Ukraine and avoid conscription.

Meanwhile, a relaxation in Ukraine’s dual citizenship restrictions could also potentially result in members of the Ukrainian diaspora who took Ukrainian passports becoming eligible for military service. Any uncertainty over the status of new passport holders with regard to conscription would be likely to deter many from applying.

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The issue of military service is currently high on the Ukrainian wartime agenda amid debate over how best to bolster the depleted ranks of the army. A recent proposal by Ukraine’s military chiefs to conscript up to 500,000 civilians has met with a mixed reaction in Kyiv, with Zelenskyy refusing to offer his public support and instead calling for further details before making a decision.

Differences of opinion over the correct approach toward mobilization are believed to have contributed to mounting tensions between Ukraine’s civilian and military leadership. This was widely cited as a contributing factor behind Zelenskyy’s February 8 decision to replace Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhny. Any constitutional changes to introduce dual citizenship would further complicate an already challenging and politically sensitive situation.

President Zelenskyy’s proposal to enshrine the right to dual citizenship in the Ukrainian Constitution reflects growing awareness of the important role played by the global Ukrainian diaspora. If implemented, it would probably prove a popular measure that would significantly increase the number of Ukrainian passport holders and provide millions more people with a stake in the country’s future. However, there are a number of practical reasons why progress on this issue remains unlikely in the current wartime conditions.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. 

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 17, 2023

2024 preview: The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

If Western leaders fail to provide Ukraine with the weapons to defeat Putin in 2024, this will significantly increase the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO, writes Richard D. Hooker Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jan 22, 2024

Ukraine’s Black Sea success exposes folly of West’s “don’t escalate” mantra

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s remarkable success during 2023 in the Battle of the Black Sea can serve as a blueprint for victory over Putin’s Russia, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Jan 4, 2024

To defeat Putin in a long war, Ukraine must switch to active defense in 2024

By Mykola Bielieskov

By embracing a strategy of active defense in 2024, Kyiv can achieve the twin goals of preventing any major Russian advances and creating conditions that strongly favor Ukraine in what is increasingly a war of attrition, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post President Zelenskyy’s dual citizenship proposal presents wartime dilemmas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the plan, Italy is boldly positioning itself as an energy hub for Europe and as a regional power capable of independently engaging in Mediterranean affairs, separate from other European Union (EU) countries. Moreover, through five main policy pillars (education and training, agriculture, health, water, and energy), the plan could help spur economic growth in Africa, and by default, reduce some of the economic causes driving mass migration from the continent.

Can the plan succeed? Early criticism of it centers on its perceived ambiguity, on concerns that it could jeopardize efforts to address climate change, and on its potential use as a pretext for Italy to tighten its stance on irregular migration. However, amidst these apprehensions, there are grounds for optimism. The plan presents an opportunity for Italy to emerge as a prominent player in Africa and to shift from its historically reactive approach to irregular migration toward proactive and constructive solutions.

A renewed Italian role in the Mediterranean

Since assuming office in October 2022, Meloni has made the Mediterranean a focal point of her foreign policy agenda. From addressing irregular migration to reducing reliance on Russian energy, the motivations behind this agenda are clear: the Mediterranean Sea, with its strategic location as a gateway to three continents and its abundant natural gas and oil resources, is crucial for Italy. This truth holds as much weight today as it did historically when the Roman Empire sought to assert its dominance by controlling the Mediterranean region.

In her first year as prime minister, Meloni visited Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. During her first diplomatic mission, she orchestrated a two-day visit to Algeria alongside Claudio Descalzi, the chief executive officer of Italian energy company Eni, signaling an effort to further her predecessor Mario Draghi’s strategy of reducing Italy’s dependence on Russian gas. Throughout the visit, she emphasized a “virtuous model of collaboration” between African and European partners. She also took part in numerous photo opportunities with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, to underscore her efforts to emphasize the warm relationship between Italy and Algeria. 

In early 2023, Meloni continued her engagements with North African leaders, traveling to Tripoli, Libya, where she met with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah to finalize substantial energy investment agreements, address migration challenges, and discuss security threats posed by Sahelian Islamist groups. During her visit, Eni and Libya’s National Oil Company signed an eight-billion-dollar gas investment deal aimed at facilitating exploration and production for both domestic and European markets. Additionally, Italy provided Libya with five ships for the Libyan coast guard to bolster patrols against irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

In July 2023, Meloni made two separate visits to Tunisia in under ten days, following a surge in migration from the North African country to Italy. Along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, Meloni negotiated the signing of a memorandum between the European Union and Tunisia worth 150 million euros, aimed at revitalizing Tunisia’s economy and strengthening its coast guard capacities to combat irregular migration.

Middle power or global player?

Italy has long grappled with formulating a cohesive foreign policy, oscillating between assertiveness and mediation. During the Cold War, Italy assumed the role of a mediator, often acting as an intermediary between the United States and the Eastern bloc in the Mediterranean. Hindered by its struggling economy and internal ideological divisions, Italy failed to attain the status of an assertive, leading power capable of guiding rather than following.

Italy’s engagement in the Mediterranean has followed a similar path, vacillating between prominent and passive stances. In the 1950s and 1960s, Eni founder Enrico Mattei positioned the company to challenge the dominance of Western oil companies in North Africa through strategic alliances with countries such as Egypt under Gamel Abdel Nasser. These efforts were in part aimed at strengthening Italy’s role in the region.

But since the early 2000s, and especially in the wake of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, Italy’s approach to the Mediterranean has been primarily reactive. Policies such as former Prime Minsiter Enrico Letta’s “Mare Nostrum,” aimed at tackling Mediterranean challenges through multilateralism and economic development, and former Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s “Minniti Plan,” emphasizing border control and law enforcement, were chiefly reactive strategies to the perceived migration crisis gripping Europe. These strategies often lacked a cohesive long-term vision and strategic foresight, relying instead on short-term fixes.

A path to renewal

The Mattei Plan for Africa seeks to establish an Italian agenda that prioritizes Africa’s needs and avoids predatory practices. Through investments in infrastructure and renewed energy, Italy aims to reclaim an assertive role in the region.

For this repositioning to succeed, however, the Meloni government must avoid repeating past mistakes. Instead, it should adopt forward-looking approaches aligned with global trends, such as addressing climate change and providing green energy solutions, while forging lasting relationships with African elites committed to impactful policies. While short-term gains may appeal to transient foreign policy agendas, it is the pursuit of long-term benefits that distinguishes leaders with enduring legacies.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

The post Italy’s Mediterranean pivot: What’s driving Meloni’s ambitious plan with Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

During Iran’s population surge—ten to over eighty-five million over the course of a century—its renewable water resources have gone from 130 BCM to 80-85 BCM. Projections indicate a potential halving of resources by 2041, raising concerns as Iran’s population is expected to surpass 100 million. Per capita water availability for Iranians may drop below 500 cubic meters, marking absolute scarcity. Once adept at groundwater management, Iran now faces consequences like land subsidence due to depleting groundwater, which affects food self-sufficiency. This has led to farmers abandoning lands, causing an influx of ten million people into the outskirts and shanty towns since 2013—ten times the number of Syrian villagers migrating during the 2006-2009 drought in the Hasakah governorate. Many researchers have linked the Syrian conflict to this drought.

Regardless of the numerous opportunities to enhance its water management policies, the government persistently adheres to the path of Iran’s “Water Mafia”—a non-official alliance that comprises the energy ministry, executives, academics, consulting engineers, influential contractors, and a cadre of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders overseeing the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. Disturbingly, if this group opts to construct a dam like Gotvand—where a multimillion-ton mass of salt became a part of the reservoir despite many warnings about this possibility due to nearby saline geological formations—there seems to be no governing authority capable of halting their actions.

The concept of top-down decision-making in Iran is not novel; Iranians have been acquainted with such a system for centuries. However, the adverse effects of water mismanagement have never wrought such devastation on the land and its water resources (the latter of which are steadily diminishing). Since the 1980s, when President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s post-war reconstruction plans garnered substantial attention, the landscape of Iran has been transformed by the construction of numerous dams along rivers, absorbing considerable financial resources over time.

In the late 1980s, the establishment of two key organizations—the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, equipped with significant machinery and war-acquired experience, and the Iran Water & Power Resources Development Company (IWPC)—resulted in an enduring business alliance. IWPC was founded by a group of engineers, mainly consisting of the students who occupied the US Embassy in Tehran. During Rafsanjani’s era and beyond, those entrusted with managing water and agriculture, despite warnings from experts, advertised that constructing dams and transferring water between watersheds would guarantee self-sufficiency. However, these decisions, made without consultation with independent and qualified experts, led to a decline in lakes, wetlands, rivers, and groundwater sources.

Social impact

In 2016, many believed that a successful nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions would allow the Islamic Republic to address its financial challenges, solve the water crisis, and rehabilitate its endangered lakes and rivers. The Center for Naval Analysis, an institute in Washington, later warned the US government of escalating and enduring water tensions that could lead to local protests, potentially sparking violence worldwide and undermining US national interests. The report also highlighted the possibility of global terrorism and civil war over shared resources. This warning gained attention in December 2017-January 2018 during an unexpected uprising in Iran that reverberated across the nation—the largest at the time since the 1979 revolution. Thousands protested, leading to swift intervention from security forces. Official reports acknowledged over twenty casualties, with unofficial sources suggesting the death toll exceeded fifty. The critical aspect was that protestors lost their lives in towns that were struggling with the harsh impacts of water scarcity.

In 2019, the nation witnessed another widespread uprising, with reports indicating that over 1,500 protestors lost their lives at the hands of security forces. In Mahshahr, a town in the Khuzestan province in southern Iran, and other towns, individuals affected by the regime’s detrimental water policies were fatally shot. The unrest persisted into 2020 and 2021, as people in Khuzestan clashed with security forces over water-related issues, resulting in further loss of lives. Despite being considered a water-rich province, with major rivers like Karun, Karkheh, and Jarrahi, and possessing vast oil and gas reserves, Khuzestan has tragically become a victim of poor water management. Many rivers and marshes in the region have dried up due to the water management schemes implemented by the government and the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.

Amidst the desiccation of wetland areas—exemplified by Hoor-al-Azim in Khuzestan—intricate sediment deposits have become susceptible to the elements. With even the faintest breeze, these minuscule particles ascend into the air, launching as dust storms that target the cities within the province. This matter has engendered a noteworthy deterioration in air quality across various sectors of Khuzestan, concurrently fostering the widespread illness of thousands of residents in the province.

Inequities in Iranians’ access to water

Iran’s uneven water rights approach disproportionately impacts citizens in marginalized provinces, causing severe water scarcity. Provinces like Sistan and Baluchistan, Kerman, Fars, Isfahan, Southern Khorasan, Hamedan, Yazd, Khorasan-e Razavi, and Semnan face widespread water poverty due to disappearing lakes, groundwater depletion, and contamination. Projects like the Karun-3 dam and the Khersan-3 dam, as well as water allocation, displace residents, resulting in enduring hardships. On top of this, climate change and vanishing glaciers intensify water losses in different river basins. Inter-basin water transfers fuel further tension, benefiting lobbyists and the Water Mafia while simultaneously exacerbating environmental injustice against marginalized populations. Despite government assurances, residents of Zayandeh Rud basin resort to illegal well pumping, causing groundwater depletion, land subsidence, and health issues, threatening Isfahan’s existence. In northern Iran, Lake Urmia has dried up due to dam construction and unsustainable farming, leaving behind a saline desert filled with residues and particles contaminated by industrial and human wastewater and chemical fertilizers. Strong winds disperse these toxic particles, harming millions in nearby areas.

Despite the evidence of human and environmental damage from expensive water management projects, it has been empirically proven that, in many regions of Iran, nature-based solutions—unlike dam constructions and inter-basin water transfers—are more efficient and cost-effective. But Iran’s Water Mafia consistently opposes projects prioritizing efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as these initiatives undermine their ability to extract commission money.

Nowadays, IRGC generals and water executives have fallen in love with seawater desalination, a technology practiced mainly by Israel and nations in the Persian Gulf region. As FAO’s Slim Zekri told me, the production cost of one cubic meter of freshwater in the Persian Gulf is approximately $1. However, an insider in Iran revealed to me that the actual cost of freshwater production in the country exceeds $1.5. This is influenced, in part, by sanctions and the absence of a direct business relationship with Israel, which is the proprietor of Reverse Osmosis (RO) technology and the primary manufacturer of RO filters. The expense of transporting this water through a pipeline to central Iran, nevertheless, significantly escalates the overall cost to almost $5 per cubic meter.

The harmful impact of desalination plants is not often disclosed to the Iranian public. The hot brine is disposed of in the shallow Persian Gulf, leading to an environmental massacre. Many fish species have migrated from the extremely saline waters and coral reefs are experiencing bleaching and dying. In some circles, it has been said that the price tag of establishing this infrastructure and its pipelines is over $8 billion, and that it would produce a minimal amount of freshwater—approximately 4 BCM per year in 2044.

Iranian experts have developed cost-effective methods to manage flash floods and recharge aquifers by storing water underground, potentially saving at least 30 BCM annually at a cost of less than $8 billion. With an anticipated cost of nearly $500 per hectare for implementation, the execution of this project over a 14-million-hectare area would result in an expenditure of approximately $7 billion. Additionally, the resulting annual water storage capacity would surpass 40 billion cubic meters, even in a dry year. This approach would inspire a reverse migration among farmers and the reclamation of ancestral lands. Surveys suggest it can be implemented on nearly 8 percent of Iran’s land, providing water savings and flood protection while positively impacting microclimates.

Empowering farmers to establish floodwater management co-ops safeguards resources, mitigates destructive floods, and ensures water storage. The positive environmental impact of artificial recharge and spate irrigation, which would provide an extra 50 percent to Iran’s annual renewable water resources, stands in contrast to desalination’s minimal water addition and environmental drawbacks. Despite viable alternatives, regime insiders choose to sacrifice natural resources for a slight commission increase from an $8 billion project.

How can the United States help?

Compelling data underscores the dire situation facing millions of rural Iranians, pushing them to abandon their ancestral lands due to a substantial decline in groundwater resources. Projecting forward, if current climate conditions persist and water management remains inadequate, a mass exodus appears imminent. This demographic shift could significantly impact the United States’ interests and security concerns in the Middle East and beyond. In recognizing Iranians as potential allies, the United States could prioritize their well-being in alignment with its national interests. Transforming Iran’s water situation necessitates a fundamental shift towards a democratic system that values knowledge and encourages active public participation, departing from the prevailing top-down decision-making model.

The United States can help Iranians through technical assistance and knowledge transfer, capacity building and training, and supporting civil society as well as promoting climate change adaptation.

For Iranians, learning from Israeli water experts and the authorities who established Israel’s national water company (Mekorot) in 1937—a centralized body predating the nation’s formation by eleven years—is imperative. Such an entity should possess the capability to address the challenges posed by a changing climate, fostering resilience in Iran while concurrently navigating diplomatic intricacies related to shared water resources with neighboring nations. This approach aims to alleviate tensions and initiate regional cooperation within the Middle East and North Africa region. The United States has the ability to financially support the establishment of an organization like Mekorot situated outside of Iran. This organization, once operational, could initiate the implementation of modified water management methods, effectively alleviating damages resulting from the mismanagement of the Islamic Republic. Strategic intervention of this nature can contribute to achieving a state of relative stability following the possible decline of the Islamic Republic.

The pursuit of sustainable improvements in Iran’s water management requires a concerted effort toward capacity building in civil society and water-dependent sectors. American institutions, drawing on successful initiatives predating 1979, are well-positioned to play a pivotal role in this regard. Despite historical criticisms of Truman’s Point 4 Program and Iran’s adoption of the American “Hydraulic Mission,” a tailored sustainable development approach is crucial. Oversight by Iranian-American academics, who are well-versed in Iran’s environmental challenges, can ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives. Renowned figures in the agricultural and water sectors within the Iranian community can serve as exemplars, showcasing successful practices applicable to diverse regions in Iran. Disseminating knowledge through online training courses, television programs, and instructional animations demonstrating sustainable solutions can help diminish reliance on the authoritarian governance of the Islamic Republic. Foreseeing potential uprisings in Iran, particularly arising from water and environmental crises, emphasizes the need to promote democratic practices in the agricultural and environmental sectors. In early 2024, severe air pollution led to school closures in major cities, prompting protests in Ardekan and Arak against regional pollution linked to local and national industrial policies. The substantial decline in rainfall and snowfall heightens the imminent risk of severe water shortages in the upcoming spring and summer, which suggest a likely escalation in protests and instability based on historical trends.

The prevailing patriarchal system in Iran has hindered genuine democratic experiences, impeding accountability for officials and elites. In contrast, the US environmental management evolution, driven by civil society activism, led to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and pivotal legislation like the Clean Water Act. This empowered communities to influence projects, challenging top-down decision-making. The evolving social landscape in Iran provides an opportunity to transmit the experiences of American groups effectively. This would enable Iranians to envision impactful changes through civil means in their protests, aligning with the democratic values witnessed in US environmental governance.

Sharing knowledge builds trust and fosters cooperation and partnership between Iranians and Americans in alignment with US national interests, especially in the Persian Gulf region. While US institutions have shared rainfall and groundwater data with Iranian scientists, expanding these efforts is crucial. Disseminating valuable information to farmers, stakeholders, and shareholders in Iran is vital for informed decision-making and sustainable practices in water and environmental management.  Addressing financial constraints for talented Iranian students is essential and would empower them to study under top Iranian-American academics, facilitating knowledge exchange on updated water management methods. This collaborative effort within academia has the potential to significantly impact water and environmental management in Iran, contributing to the preservation of natural resources.

In a warming climate with a deteriorating water situation, Iran confronts declining livelihoods due to the Islamic Republic’s poor management, prompting potential mass migration and instability. Despite Iranians’ inclination to engage with the United States, a human-made drought affects them. In the post-Islamic Republic era, Iranians require the United States to be a reliable partner to navigate challenges while respecting integrity and choices. This partnership, which is crucial for US national security, should begin sooner rather than later. Iranian experts are prepared to establish their Mekorot today and initiate planning for a new environmental system to address resource mismanagement.

Nik Kowsar is an Iranian-Canadian water issues analyst. He produces and hosts a weekly TV show addressing Iran’s water situation, broadcast on several satellite TV channels. Follow him on X: @nikahang.

The post A thirsty reality: Iran’s dire water situation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In December 2023, there had been a glimmer of hope. Ecuadorian Attorney General Diana Salazar carried out a large-scale investigation called Caso Metástasis. This operation exposed the extensive reach of criminal groups within the country’s state institutions, carrying out seventy-five raids and arresting more than two dozen individuals linked to organized crime across police forces, the military, the judiciary, and other state entities. The operation revealed the gravity of the problem and the extent of these groups’ reach and infiltration into Ecuadorian democracy. Days after the operation, Salazar declared that she had received multiple death threats from Pico. The leader of Los Lobos, who escaped from prison on January 8, is suspected of being one of the key players behind the assassination of former presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio.

Noboa’s declaration of “internal armed conflict” allows for the mobilization of military forces to neutralize twenty-two crime groups in Ecuador. This declaration reveals the scale and complexity of the issue: The violent events that have haunted Ecuador in recent years surpass the traditional government-versus-criminal group battle, encompassing a larger fight for hostages, territory, and resources among criminal groups, with citizens often getting caught in the crossfire. Ecuador is now one of the most dangerous countries in the world, with a homicide rate of forty homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

The state of emergency will allow the Noboa government to focus more military resources toward taking on these groups. However, inevitably, more attention to one group will mean less attention to others, causing a domino effect of violence that the country is likely to continue experiencing in the short term. Although the decision to declare a state of emergency and engage in armed conflict was the right one to address the security crisis, it is also one that will not be sustainable for long. The Noboa government faces financial constraints and a fiscal deficit, making it challenging to sustain a massive military operation against the profitable illicit economies managed by these criminal groups. An important next step for the government will be to determine exactly how to finance and budget for this new reality.

The Noboa government should keep prison control as an immediate priority. To stop crime in any country, authorities must be able to investigate crimes and count on their prison system to work. When prison systems fail, they can become recruitment and command-and-control centers for criminal groups, making it even harder to combat them. The prisons become liabilities for the government. While Noboa’s proposal to build new maximum-security prisons is a step in the right direction, it will take time to materialize. In the interim, prioritizing intelligence sharing and ensuring that the armed forces have necessary equipment are crucial. Surprisingly, Ecuador’s fragmented National Assembly has united and issued a statement, offering police and military officials amnesty from future prosecution for using excessive force in supporting the crackdown on organized crime, particularly in correctional facilities. This demonstrates a collective effort to address the crisis at the national level. 

Given the complexity of the issue and the absence of immediate actions to address its root cause, Ecuador will likely see a spike of violence in the short term as armed forces fight organized crime. In moments like this, the international community must move beyond speeches and mere statements of support. It must provide military equipment, intelligence sharing, capacity building, and enhanced protection of key figures such as Salazar and Noboa, recognizing that their well-being is integral to the preservation of Ecuador’s democracy. 

The impact of Ecuador’s crisis is not confined within its borders; it has repercussions for neighboring countries and, indirectly, the United States. South America plays a crucial role in global affairs, particularly with the significant increase in migration flows from the region, now surpassing migration from Central America’s Northern Triangle. Criminal organizations are taking advantage of these increased flows and profiting from human trafficking and exploitation. 

When societies and communities are infiltrated by fear, crime, and a lack of opportunity, citizens turn to familial economies and a dependence on profit from illicit work. Young adults who join criminal organizations often end up dead, maimed, or in jail, but they still choose to join because they consider that the cost of living their entire life in fear and poverty is much higher than as part of these groups. This change in perception and blurred morality is something the Noboa government needs to address with the help of international partners and organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. These organizations emphasize the importance of joint efforts that go beyond government-level cooperation to foster a comprehensive approach involving community leaders, civil society organizations, shelters, and schools.

For far too long, policymakers have focused on addressing illicit economies from the supply angle. It is imperative that they address the demand for illicit economies that fuel and finance these criminal enterprises, as well. By increasing costs at different parts of the supply chain and enhancing law enforcement and accountability that extends beyond the border, engaging in organized crime becomes riskier and less profitable. More importantly, the international actors who are significant drivers of demand for smuggling drugs, humans, and arms should collaborate to prosecute these organizations. Only then might governments be able to limit their survival in the long term.

The next couple weeks will be crucial in determining the democratic future of Ecuador. Each decision made by the government and its counterparts carries profound implications for the daily lives of citizens grappling with the consequences of organized crime’s deep infiltration in their country.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and is originally from Ecuador.

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Alissa Pavia, North Africa Initiative associate director, testified before the Alissa Pavia testifies to Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. Below are her prepared remarks on North Africa’s migration crisis.

Esteemed Senators,

By way of introduction, my name is Alissa Pavia and I am associate director at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program in Washington, DC.

It is an honor to convene with you today to deliberate upon the pressing issue of the major refugee and migration flow affecting the Middle East and North Africa region. I will pay particular attention to the Mediterranean, as this region is a world hotspot for migration and often overlooked.

Chers collègues, je vous remercie pour cette invitation et pour attirant l’attention sur cette région souvent oubliée sur la scène mondiale.

While the world’s attention understandably gravitates towards the conflict between Israel and Hamas and the resultant humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.7 million Gazans, we must not overlook the broader issue of significant refugee and migration movements elsewhere.

There exist numerous other vulnerable populations forced to migrate due to dire circumstances in their homelands—groups all too frequently overlooked by the international community. I speak of those migrants and refugees who cross the Mediterranean annually, seeking refuge and a better future elsewhere, enduring perilous sea voyages that endanger their lives and those of their loved ones. Since 2014, over 22,000 individuals have been reported dead or missing at sea, rendering the Mediterranean route the most treacherous for global migrants.

Esteemed senators, migration is an ancient facet of human history, with people perpetually seeking better conditions beyond their homeland’s borders. Yet, certain compelling factors—the so-called push factors—drive mass migration, such as war, famine, poverty, climate change, and political persecution. African and North African nations grapple with these challenges, fostering conditions driving vulnerable individuals to embark on the perilous Mediterranean journey. The last decade has witnessed recurring surges in migration from North Africa to Europe, each cycle presenting distinct challenges and varied causes behind these forced displacements. The year 2023, in particular, marked another of these cyclical uptakes: migration from North Africa to Europe has surged threefold since 2022, leaving southern European nations scrambling for effective solutions to the migration quandary.

Efforts to comprehend the sudden uptick reveal a new migration origin in North Africa: Tunisia. While Libya traditionally held this mantle, Tunisia, particularly the port city of Sfax, has assumed prominence as a significant transit hub for vulnerable individuals from Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the International Organization for Migration, this year, Tunisia witnessed a staggering 260 percent increase in departures compared with the previous year. Concurrently, the number of Tunisians seeking migration has similarly risen, signifying a renewed willingness among local Tunisians to leave their homeland.

While the reasons compelling migration deserve scrutiny, today, I seek not to dwell solely on these push factors. Instead, I implore your attention towards the dire conditions migrants face in North Africa, with a particular focus on Tunisia, given its current role as a migrant hotspot. Moreover, I aim to propose recommendations on how Canada can provide assistance.

Approximately 21,000 Sub-Saharan individuals—including migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees—are estimated to reside in Tunisia. However, since Tunisian President Kais Saied assumed office in 2019, the plight of these migrants has markedly worsened. A turning point for the worse occurred in February when President Saied made public remarks, echoing elements of Camus’ racist “great replacement theory,” accusing black African migrants of intending to alter the country’s demographic composition. Subsequently, migrants faced persecution, with many forcibly evicted from their residences and dismissed from their jobs.

Tensions between locals and migrants escalated further. Regrettably, the situation took a dire turn in July when Tunisian authorities rounded up 1,200 black African migrants from Sfax and forcibly expelled them, leaving them stranded for weeks in the deserts bordering Libya and Algeria. Having personally communicated with some of these affected individuals after my encounters with them during my visit to Tunisia earlier in the year, I received distressing videos, audio recordings, and voice notes pleading for aid, documenting an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. The stranded migrants endured scarcity of food and water, with only the Tunisian Red Crescent permitted access. While approximately 600 migrants have been readmitted to Tunisia since then, the whereabouts of the remainder remain uncertain, with an estimated two dozen fatalities.

During this crisis, European leaders convened with President Saied to discuss curbing the influx of migrants reaching Europe’s southern shores. Shockingly, no mention was made of the stranded migrants, and an agreement was struck to financially support Tunisia’s coast guard in intercepting migrants. Once again, the international system witnessed a failure as ‘Team Europe’ inadvertently empowered Tunisia’s authoritarian leader, signaling that racism and human rights violations would not impede financial aid.

Senators, I recognize the considerable challenges each nation confronts in managing surges of irregular migration. However, your influence lies in ensuring that global lives receive humanity and dignity, safeguarding migrants and vulnerable communities through mechanisms supported and financed by many among us: multilateral institutions like the United Nations, bilateral agreements, and diplomatic and trade relations.

Although Tunisia might appear distant from Canada, concerns about migrant treatment in Tunisia and the Mediterranean significantly impact the international community. Mass displacements wreak havoc across nations, disrupting stability, and fostering tensions among countries. A rise in far-right populism often correlates with these mass displacements, leading to growing xenophobia towards migrants and refugees in Western countries.

Europe, a close ally of Canada, has faced significant challenges due to mass displacement, weakening its unity in the face of global issues. It’s in Canada’s best interest to prevent Europe from encountering such challenges as it would inevitably strain Canada-Europe relations. Moreover, Canada has crucial ties with Tunisia, funding pivotal development and counterterrorism projects. It’s imperative that Canadian taxpayer money doesn’t support criminal acts by Tunisia’s national guard.

Firstly, Canada should ensure that institutions operating in Tunisia work diligently to locate and repatriate stranded migrants. Both the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees bear responsibility for their welfare and repatriation.

Secondly, during bilateral discussions with Tunisia’s interior ministry and defense ministry, Canada must stipulate that assistance won’t be provided if it contributes to human rights abuses, such as forced expulsions of migrants.

Lastly, the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights should conduct a comprehensive study on humanitarian aid to Tunisia, reassessing whether the current president, Kais Saied, meets the criteria for state assistance.

Thank you for your attention.

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Events in Dagestan unfolded against a backdrop of heightened international tension over the recent escalation of hostilities in Israel. Russia has adopted what many see as a pro-Palestinian position toward the crisis, further straining what was already a tense relationship with Israel. In recent years, Russia has rebuffed calls to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization and has deepened its alliance with anti-Israel Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.

On the eve of the recent unrest in Dagestan, Russia welcomed a Hamas delegation to Moscow in what was the group’s first high-profile foreign visit since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. Hamas officials reportedly vowed to give priority treatment to Russian citizens among the hostages seized in southern Israel, noting that Russia was “a closest friend.”

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Dagestan and the surrounding North Caucasus region have a long record of ethnic nationalism and religious extremism, especially following the import of Wahhabism in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conflicts between nationalist and religious extremist groups have plagued the region for years. This extremist influence was on full display during the storming of Makhachkala Airport.

The attempted pogrom also echoed the worst excesses of Russian nationalism, which has a history of antisemitism stretching back hundreds of years. The term “pogrom” itself can be traced to imperial Russia, which witnessed frequent outbreaks of deadly violence targeting Jewish communities. Meanwhile, the most notorious antisemitic forgery in history, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, originated in Russia at the turn of the twentieth century.

This legacy of antisemitic baggage is particularly important at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively promoting an aggressive brand of imperial nostalgia. Officially, modern Russia is a pluralistic state that celebrates its ethnic and religious diversity. Indeed, Putin has accused neighboring Ukraine of antisemitism and has framed the current invasion as a quest to “de-Nazify” the country. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, there is little evidence to support such assertions.

The groundless claim that Russia invaded Ukraine to combat Nazism is a transparent attempt to justify an old-fashioned war of imperial aggression. When confronted with the uncomfortable fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is himself Jewish, top Kremlin officials have retreated into the quagmire of antisemitic conspiracy theories. In May 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attempted to dismiss Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity by declaring that “Hitler also had Jewish blood.” More recently, Putin alleged that Zelenskyy had been deliberately chosen by the West as a Jewish puppet to cover up the “anti-human essence” of the Ukrainian state.

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There is antisemitism in Ukraine, of course, just as there is in all states. The real issue is whether extremist actors have inordinate political power, enjoy the support (or at least inaction) of the government, or the ability to coordinate large-scale violence. In Putin’s Russia, that may well be the case. Many see the recent attempted pogrom at Makhachkala Airport as a direct consequence of the antisemitic invective that has become increasingly normalized in the Russian public discourse following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In the nationalistic environment of wartime Russia, the country’s Jewish community has faced accusations from some quarters of being insufficiently supportive of the invasion. Senior Rabbi Berel Lazar has felt obliged to speak out against “vulgar antisemitism” that poses a “huge danger” to Russian Jews. In one particularly chilling incident, prominent Russian journalist Alexei Venediktov found a pig’s head with the word “Judensau” (German for “Jewish pig”) placed outside his apartment.

Russian Jews with close ties to the Kremlin have also become targets of antisemitic attacks. Russia’s most high-profile propagandist, Vladimir Solovyov, recently faced criticism that his media network employs too many Jewish staffers. When Solovyov’s colleague and fellow pundit Yevgeny Satanovsky, who is also Jewish, used strong language to accuse senior Russian Foreign Ministry officials of antisemitism and criticize the government’s policy on Israel, he was promptly dismissed.

These developments are fueling alarm among Russia’s remaining Jews and reawakening painful historical memories, while also sparking debate over the future security of the community. Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt was Chief Rabbi of Moscow for almost thirty years, but was forced to flee the country in March 2022 after refusing a request from state officials to publicly support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He has since called on Russian Jews to leave the country.

“When we look back over Russian history, whenever the political system was in danger you saw the government trying to redirect the anger and discontent of the masses toward the Jewish community,” Rabbi Goldschmidt told The Guardian in December 2022. “We’re seeing rising antisemitism while Russia is going back to a new kind of Soviet Union, and step by step the iron curtain is coming down again. This is why I believe the best option for Russian Jews is to leave.”

Joshua Stein holds a PhD from the University of Calgary and is a researcher on antisemitism and ethics.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 4, 2023

Putin’s fleet retreats: Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Putin was already struggling to account for his army’s evident inability to conquer a nation that he insists does not exist. He must now also explain how his once vaunted Black Sea Fleet is being defeated by a country without a navy, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 24, 2023

Battle of Avdiivka: Putin’s new offensive continues despite heavy Russian losses

By Olivia Yanchik

Russia has returned to the offensive in Ukraine in recent weeks with a major assault on the town of Avdiivka. The Russian offensive continues despite reports of catastrophic losses, underlining Putin’s determination to secure victory at any price in Ukraine, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Oct 19, 2023

Zelenskyy should say a Churchillian “no” to wartime elections in Ukraine

By Alan Riley

If Winston Churchill were still with us, he would surely be advising Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ignore mounting international pressure to call elections in wartime Ukraine, writes Alan Riley.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Attempted airport pogrom highlights rising antisemitism in Putin’s Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Concerns over mounting expenses are understandable but shortsighted. While Ukraine has so far received hundreds of billions of dollars in military aid, this figure pales into relative insignificance when compared to the far higher price the international community will have to pay in the event of a Russian victory.

A wide range of Western politicians and commentators have already made the case for the cost-effectiveness of funding the Ukrainian war effort, with many noting the dramatic reduction in Russia’s military potential as a result of crippling losses suffered in Ukraine. In May 2023, US Senator Lindsey Graham described American military aid to Ukraine as “the best money we’ve ever spent.”

US Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has recently echoed Senator Graham’s sentiments. “No Americans are getting killed in Ukraine. We’re rebuilding our industrial base. The Ukrainians are destroying the army of one of our biggest rivals. I have a hard time finding anything wrong with that,” he commented on October 20.

McConnell’s arguments are certainly persuasive. However, in order to fully appreciate the true value of continued support for Ukraine, it is necessary to contemplate what would happen if Western military aid came to an end and Vladimir Putin succeeded in subjugating the country.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The most immediate costs of a Russian victory would be felt by the Ukrainian population, of course. With much or all of Ukraine under Russian control, the war crimes already witnessed in occupied areas of the country would multiply. Tens of thousands would be executed or imprisoned, while millions would be subjected to forced deportation. These horrors would create major humanitarian challenges for the wider European community, with a massive new wave of Ukrainian refugees flooding across the border into the EU.

Vindicated and emboldened by victory in Ukraine, Putin would almost certainly seek to go further. The Russian dictator has already made clear that he sees the reconquest of Ukraine as part of a broader mission to correct the perceived injustice of the Soviet collapse and the fall of “historical Russia.” His next targets would most likely be Moldova, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia. If the West proves unwilling or unable to stop Russia in Ukraine, there will be little to deter further aggression against smaller and more vulnerable former Soviet republics.

With NATO discredited by the fall of Ukraine, Putin would then be tempted to test the resolve of the alliance in a more fundamental manner by threatening the Baltic states. Would a demoralized and divided NATO go to war with a resurgent Russia over an isolated incident on the Estonian or Latvian border? If not, Putin would exploit this weakness. Failure to defend the territorial integrity of a NATO member state would spark the rapid unraveling of the entire alliance, plunging the whole of Europe into chaos.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Even if the worst case scenario of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO could be avoided, a Russian victory in Ukraine would inevitably oblige Western leaders to boost defense spending to levels not witnessed since the end of the Cold War. This would require sums far in excess of the money currently being allocated to Ukraine. Outgoing US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Mark Milley recently warned that a Russian victory in Ukraine would lead to a potential “doubling” of defense budgets. Others have suggested the cost would be much higher, noting the need to establish and indefinitely maintain a dramatically increased military presence in Central and Eastern Europe.

While the direct financial and security costs of a Russian victory in Ukraine are already alarming, the geopolitical price would be even greater. The recent escalation in Israel is a direct consequence of the West’s indecisive response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. If Putin’s invasion is seen to succeed, other authoritarians will be encouraged and international instability will spread even further. The entire world will face decades of insecurity marked by mounting militarism, mutual suspicion, and multiplying acts of international aggression. The opportunity cost to the global economy will be measured in the tens of trillions.

None of this is inevitable. On the contrary, it can all be avoided by providing Ukraine with the tools to defeat Russia. The Ukrainians are ready and able to do the fighting themselves; all they ask is for their international partners to stop dithering and deliver the necessary weapons without delay.

Opponents of continued military aid to Ukraine often say it is too expensive. In reality, it is infinitely cheaper than the alternative. They also claim supporting Ukraine risks provoking World War III, but in truth, nothing is more likely to provoke Putin than Western weakness.

With his genocidal invasion of Ukraine, the Russian dictator has burned his last remaining bridges and is now completely committed to confrontation with the West. He will not stop until he is stopped. The longer Western leaders delay, the higher the price they will pay.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 24, 2023

Battle of Avdiivka: Putin’s new offensive continues despite heavy Russian losses

By Olivia Yanchik

Russia has returned to the offensive in Ukraine in recent weeks with a major assault on the town of Avdiivka. The Russian offensive continues despite reports of catastrophic losses, underlining Putin’s determination to secure victory at any price in Ukraine, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Oct 4, 2023

Putin’s fleet retreats: Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea

By Peter Dickinson

Putin was already struggling to account for his army’s evident inability to conquer a nation that he insists does not exist. He must now also explain how his once vaunted Black Sea Fleet is being defeated by a country without a navy, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Oct 19, 2023

Zelenskyy should say a Churchillian “no” to wartime elections in Ukraine

By Alan Riley

If Winston Churchill were still with us, he would surely be advising Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ignore mounting international pressure to call elections in wartime Ukraine, writes Alan Riley.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Arming Ukraine is cheap compared to the far higher price of Russian victory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Atlantic Council experts explain below, the visa decision is intertwined with several issues of importance in the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Thomas Warrick: A victory for citizens of both countries

Tuqa Nusairat: ‘Inclusion concerns’ remain for Palestinian and Arab Americans

Shalom Lipner: A consequential success spanning multiple Israeli leaders

A victory for citizens of both countries

The US government’s decision, announced September 27, to admit Israel to the VWP is the result of years of hard security work by US and Israeli officials. Israel will now join the program, which will allow most Israelis to travel to the United States without a visa and will allow US citizens, even those of Palestinian or Arab heritage, to travel through Israel’s main airports. While admission to the VWP is not the most important challenge facing either the United States or Israel today, this represents a victory for citizens of both countries.

The 2022 Atlantic Council issue brief by Ruth Marks Eglash and Scott Lasensky explained the challenges that had to be overcome in building ties between US and Israeli security agencies that matched those the United States has with other visa waiver countries. The Atlantic Council’s February 2023 event explained why the final steps involving reciprocity and information sharing were among the most difficult.

The credit goes to the enormous amount of hard work by government officials and civic organizations in both countries. Much of this work received very little publicity except among experts and those involved. On the US side, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas and Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers deserve enormous credit for continuing to push through more obstacles than most outsiders realize. Credit also goes to the US Embassy in Israel and to ambassadors and other US diplomats for helping their Israeli colleagues through a series of changes that Israel had to make to its laws and screening practices.

Admission to the VWP is not a one-and-done process. Israel will continue to have to meet US requirements of reciprocity and information sharing that other VWP countries are also required to meet. But Wednesday’s announcement is the culmination of a lot of hard, unglamorous security work. A day of celebration is in order.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

Issue Brief

Oct 12, 2022

Fulfilling the requirements: Israel’s entry into the US Visa Waiver Program

By Ruth Marks Eglash and Scott Lasensky

A little-discussed, yet far-reaching issue on the US-Israel bilateral agenda is Israel’s long-running quest to join the United States’ Visa Waiver Program (VWP). In his first year and a half in office, US President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has elevated the issue, and efforts to achieve Israel’s entry are gaining momentum after remaining stagnant during the Trump presidency.

Israel Middle East

Inclusion concerns remain for Palestinian and Arab Americans

The primary hurdle to Israel joining the VWP was its reciprocal treatment for Americans attempting to enter Israel, as a requirement of entry into the program is to admit Americans into Israel without discrimination. Americans of Palestinian and Arab descent have long faced consistent challenges when trying to enter Israel, especially when they were destined for the occupied Palestinian territories. At land and air borders, they face unreasonable questioning and intrusive searches of electronic devices. They have often been denied entry with no justification. 

Over the past couple months, I have heard stories from Palestinian and Arab Americans who have been able to take advantage of the trial period to visit relatives in the West Bank and holy sites in Jerusalem, which they were not able to do before as US citizens. Still, others faced the same challenges that existed before the trial period and will likely persist after Israel’s entry into the program. Some of those Americans who argue that Israel has yet to meet the necessary requirements have joined with the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in filing a federal lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State over “inclusion concerns” in the program. On Tuesday, the ADC posted on social media that “[c]redible reports and ADC’s own investigations have shown that Israel failed to meet all of the legal requirements for admission.”

Wednesday’s announcement is undoubtedly a win for Netanyahu’s extremist government, which has seen the largest domestic protests in Israel’s history and increasing international criticism over its judicial reforms, which critics argue are threatening the country’s democracy. The US government should instead be investing more political capital in putting pressure on Netanyahu’s government to address the multitude of policies that continue to discriminate against Palestinians, from the ongoing occupation and expansion of settlements into Palestinian territories to the unequal treatment Palestinian Americans face when attempting to enter the country.

—Tuqa Nusairat is the director for strategy, operations, and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

A consequential success spanning multiple Israeli leaders

This week’s admission of Israel into the VWP is being touted by Netanyahu as a second American feather in his cap, following on the heels of his recent (and much-awaited) meeting in New York with Biden. It does indeed deliver a consequential success—Israelis have long chafed at being refused entry into the exclusive VWP—but must also be viewed in a broader context. Efforts to promote Israel’s candidacy were shepherded by multiple officials, spanning Netanyahu’s tenure, but also those of former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. (Netanyahu, while serving as leader of the opposition, even obstructed progress on the issue, ostensibly to deny a signature achievement to his competitors.)

While Israel’s new status as VWP member stands to strengthen its relations with the United States, expectations that the doors may now be opened wider for compromise with the Palestinians—within the scope of a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia—should be tempered. The magnitude of the concessions being discussed between Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh comes into direct conflict with the objectives of Netanyahu’s hardline coalition partners to the extent that it could be impossible for him to consent and still maintain his hold in power.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post Israel is joining the US Visa Waiver Program. Here’s what that means. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the United Kingdom seeks new opportunities to diversify its trade relations post-Brexit, it has recognized Turkey as a market of interest and as an integral partner. Most recently, following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reelection in May, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak took to Twitter, writing that he “[looks] forward to continuing the strong collaboration” between the United Kingdom and Turkey, “from growing trade to tackling security threats as NATO allies.”

Both countries have set about making their partnership even stronger, including by starting talks to renegotiate the existing UK-Turkey free trade agreement. But this strengthening partnership can be seen in several areas other than trade such as investment, migration policy, and defense cooperation, which builds on the strategic partnership that the UK government outlined in 2010.

Trade

As part of its strategy to diversify its trade partnerships, particularly searching outside of the EU, the United Kingdom has courted Turkey, labeling it as a target market. Turkey provides the United Kingdom with access to its own market, and it also serves as an entry point to other dynamic markets in Eastern Europe and the Middle East where the United Kingdom has additional strategic interests.

Following Brexit, Turkey and the United Kingdom set up an initial free trade agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 2021. The agreement aimed to maintain preferential trade relations (replacing the EU-Turkey customs union) as well as to enhance future bilateral trade relations. Over time, UK-Turkey trade grew, with trade totaling 23.8 billion pounds between March 2022 and March 2023—up more than 20 percent from the previous year when adjusting for price changes.

The decision announced on July 18 to renegotiate the existing agreement came after a review found several areas for improvement, notably regarding services, data, and the digital sector. Should an updated agreement that reduces trade barriers and tariffs be agreed upon, it could further deepen economic ties—and cooperation more broadly—between the United Kingdom and Turkey.

However, this effort to strengthen the UK-Turkey partnership will take time—it could take years to negotiate a new free trade agreement, and implementation will be complex. It will also require a willingness on both sides to compromise and find common ground. So far, it would appear that both the United Kingdom and Turkey are ready to engage accordingly. It is also unlikely that the free trade negotiations or the overall trajectory of bilateral relations would be impacted should there be a change in government in the United Kingdom.

Migration, security, and stability

In addition to growing trade relations, the United Kingdom and Turkey have increased their geopolitical cooperation. Both countries have collaborated on various diplomatic fronts and engaged in dialogue on issues relating to regional stability—particularly in relation to Iraq and Syria—as well as counterterrorism efforts. 

The United Kingdom and Turkey have demonstrated strong bilateral cooperation on humanitarian and migration issues, most recently with rescue efforts following the earthquakes earlier this year. The refugee crisis resulting from the conflict in Syria has considerably affected both countries with higher migration numbers. Ankara and London have come together in an attempt to manage and address these issues and find ways to alleviate the risks associated with the crisis—such as domestic security concerns, strains on national resources, and social integration challenges.

Migration beyond the Syria context—specifically smuggling and illegal migration—has become a priority area for the United Kingdom since it exited the EU, prompting the passage of the 2023 Illegal Migration Act. Turkey, which hosts the largest refugee population in the world, has been a strategic partner in managing the United Kingdom’s migration-related concerns. The UK government recently struck a deal with Turkey to disrupt people-smuggling gangs and tackle illegal migration. The willingness of the countries to sign an agreement that tackles a problem both countries are committed to confronting is a sign of their strengthening relationship. According to the UK government, the partnership will involve a “centre of excellence” in Turkey that will, among other things, increase intelligence-sharing between enforcement agencies. This builds on an existing partnership, which last year saw the UK Home Office provide over three million pounds in funding to Turkish border forces to help block a common route for migrants to reach the United Kingdom.

Investment and defense

The United Kingdom, as it seeks to diversify its project and partner portfolios post-Brexit, is taking on new investment ventures. Earlier in July, the UK government announced it would back a 680-million-pound loan guarantee for a new high-speed electric railway in Turkey designed to connect a few major cities via a lower-carbon route. The plans connect Mersin, Adana, Osmaniye, and Gaziantep; the latter three cities were significantly impacted by the earthquakes earlier this year.

Defense cooperation has also contributed to the deepening of UK-Turkey bilateral ties. The two partners have engaged in training and capacity-building efforts, joint military operations, and defense-related trade and technology exchanges; and in recent years, the UK defense industry has secured various deals with Turkish counterparts. Turkey has imported UK arms for several years (aside from a brief halt in new export licenses for arms sales to Turkey in late 2019 due to Turkish military activity in Syria; licensing resumed in 2021). Last year, the UK defense secretary met his Turkish counterpart and asserted that both countries share a long-standing defense partnership that builds on their increased cooperation.

Yet tensions have emerged when the United Kingdom and Turkey’s strategic and foreign-policy priorities diverge, for example in the case of Syria. Furthermore, Turkey’s decision to purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system in 2019 raised concerns over trust in the partnership due to the potential security risks associated with compatibility issues with NATO defense systems. Competing security concerns, especially in relation to Turkey’s involvement across the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, have also contributed at times to complications for Ankara and London.   

Nevertheless, UK-Turkey ties are growing stronger—and it is not just due to trade. The countries are working together to tackle deep-rooted issues such as illegal migration and smuggling, especially in relation to tightened immigration policies post-Brexit—and as risks continue to evolve globally, so too does defense cooperation between both countries, whose strategic and security concerns are closely aligned. If the United Kingdom and Turkey continue the same trajectory, their relations will go from strength to strength. 

Ilayda Nijhar is a global risk analyst at ODI and a London Labour Councillor. Follow her on Twitter @ilaydanijhar.

The views expressed in this piece are solely those of the author.

The post What’s behind the strengthening UK-Turkey partnership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These changes are being interpreted as a fresh escalation in Lukashenka’s campaign against Belarusians who left the country following the mass pro-democracy protests of 2020. Thousands fled Belarus in late 2020 and sought refuge elsewhere in Europe after suffering arrest or facing criminal charges for their involvement in a nationwide protest movement that aimed to overturn a rigged presidential election and bring 26 years of increasingly dictatorial rule to an end. Many of the current exile community also experienced human rights abuses while in custody including torture.

The cancellation of consular services now places exiled Belarusians in a precarious position. Unless they return to Belarus to renew expired passports, they could find themselves without their primary identification document and unable to access a wide range of essential services in their current countries of residence. However, returning to Belarus could result in arrest and prosecution in connection with their earlier involvement in anti-regime protects.

The leader of Belarus’s democratic forces, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has urged exiled Belarusians not to return to Belarus if they face the risk of persecution. She has promised to raise the issue with officials in countries where Belarusians reside, while also seeking to secure international recognition for an alternative passport initiative launched recently by the country’s opposition movement in exile.

“Denying passports to Belarusians abroad is yet another ploy by Lukashenka,” tweeted Tsikhanouskaya. “It’s not just the regime’s revenge against those in exile but also an attempt to pressure the democratic nations hosting them. Encouraging Belarusians to return is an obvious trap. We won’t fall for it.”

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There is no precise data available for the number of people who left Belarus over the past three years. Estimates vary significantly, while official figures do not differentiate between those who left Belarus as political exiles and others who have moved abroad since 2020 for professional or personal reasons.

The latest Eurostat report on migration to the European Union stated that Belarusian nationals received approximately 309,000 EU residency permits in 2022, representing almost 9% of all permits issued. Research by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe indicates that as many as half a million Belarusians may have left the country since 2020. It is reasonable to assume that hundreds of thousands of Belarusians could now potentially face difficulties as their passports come up for renewal.

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The new restrictions on consular services are not the first example of Lukashenka targeting exiled Belarusians. In early 2023, he introduced new legislation making it possible to deprive Belarusians living abroad of their citizenship if found guilty of “extremism.” Meanwhile, a number of opposition leaders have been tried in absentia, with Tsikhanouskaya receiving a 15-year prison sentence.

Belarusians in exile have also been prevented from exercising their democratic rights as citizens. During a controversial February 2022 referendum on changes to the Belarusian Constitution, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to open polling stations at Belarusian embassies, citing Covid-related safety concerns and staffing shortages. Instead, Belarusians residing abroad were encouraging to return to Belarus in order to cast their votes.

Nobody within the exiled Belarusian democratic opposition movement is under any illusions regarding the dangers of returning to their homeland. Human rights watchdogs have already raised the alarm over mounting instances of returning Belarusians being detained. In some cases, detainees have been forced to record video confessions admitting their involvement in pro-democracy protests.

For the past three years, Lukashenka has consistently sought to downplay the significance of Belarus’s 2020 pro-democracy uprising while attempting to frame it as a foreign plot. He has publicly encouraged exiled citizens to return home and has even established a government commission to aid in the process. However, few appear ready to take him at his word. Instead, they view the recent ban on passport renewals as further confirmation that the Belarusian dictator still seeks to punish citizens who he earlier branded as “fugitives” and “traitors.”

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Belarus dictator weaponizes passports in new attack on exiled opposition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But for all the similarities between the current and previous surge in migratory pressures from North Africa, much has also changed. Going through these changes can help illuminate recent evolutions in regional migratory patterns, in the causes that push African migrants to attempt perilous journeys across the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, and in the effectiveness of policy responses from countries on both shores of the Mediterranean.

For one, today’s points of departure have become much more scattered along the North African coast. In 2014-2017, close to 90 percent of those who managed to reach Italy did so departing from Libya, and as time went on increasingly from its western shores—namely, from the sixty-mile strip that stretches in an east-west direction from Tripoli, Libya’s capital, to Zwara, a town near the border with Tunisia. However, since 2019, Tunisia and Libya have been competing for the top spot as point of departure, so much so that in the first five months of 2023, 52 percent of migrants disembarking in Italy had departed from Tunisia, while just 44 percent had done so from Libya. Even within Libya, UNHCR, the United Nations (UN) refugee agency, estimates that the majority of those who made it to Italy this year had embarked from Cyrenaica—the country’s eastern half, controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and Tobruk’s High Council of State—rather than from Tripolitania.

The second difference, tightly linked to the first, relates to the speed of the current surge. During the previous “migrant crisis,” the surge took just a few months between 2013 and 2014. This time around, the increase in migrant departures from northern African shores has been several years in the making, slowly and steadily building up from April 2020 to today. As to the economic causes of the current increase in arrivals, it is not surprising that the surge started just a few months after the pandemic wiped out any hope for tourism receipts in 2020. This was especially important for a country such as Tunisia, which draws around 10 percent of its gross domestic product from tourism and related activities, with around 12 percent of its active population employed in the sector.

Another difference can be found in the composition of nationalities making up the current surge. In 2014-2017, close to 80 percent of all irregular migrant arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route included citizens of sub-Saharan African countries, mainly from western Africa. In contrast, between 2020 and the first half of 2022, migration patterns had “regionalized,” including a large share of Tunisians and Egyptians. It was clear, then, that irregular migration was being driven first by the “twin crises” of the pandemic, and then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These forces acted as an economic double whammy for African economies, first (as seen) by hitting the tourism sector, and then through the Ukraine war by making energy and food prices skyrocket. The effects rippled across the continent like waves, and people living in closer proximity to points of departure in northern African countries were the first to arrive in Europe. As time passed, people living further away from the Mediterranean shores had time to reach them. This is why, from the second half of 2022 to today, the trend has reversed, so much so that in the first five months of 2023, more than half of the migrants that reached Italy having departed from Tunisia were citizens of the Ivory Coast (28 percent) or Guinea (another 23 percent), while Tunisians made up just 13 percent of the total.

In a way it seems like, in terms of nationalities, the last year is almost “back to square one.” But there is another difference compared with the period 2014-2017, and that is the existence of active entities that police the shores where most migrant crossings occur. During the previous migration crisis, when most migrants departed from Libya and the so-called Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) had not been set up yet or had insufficient vessels, resources, or political commitment to carry out rescues/interceptions at sea, the Central Mediterranean Sea was predominantly populated by European actors and ships—be they merchant vessels, coast guard ships, or components of the civil fleet like nongovernmental organization (NGO) vessels. Since 2017, however, the Italian and European Union (EU) authorities have funded, trained, and empowered the LCG while assisting Libyan authorities in declaring the existence of their own Libyan search and rescue region, as well as setting up a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in 2018. Accordingly, the proportion of migrants that has been stopped while trying to leave Libya and brought back to shore has risen from none in 2016, to 12 percent in 2017, and to 68 percent in 2019, reaching the highest level of thirty-two thousand irregular migrants brought back to Libya in 2021 (51 percent of total departures). At the same time, the Tunisian Coast Guard has continued to carry out rescue/interceptions itself, with a steady rise from thirty-five hundred interceptions in 2017 to twenty-three thousand in 2021 (more recently, the Tunisian Coast Guard reported over twenty-four thousand interceptions in just the first five months of 2023).

This trend, together with the sudden drop in irregular migrant departures from Libya in July 2017, lasting over three years before the start of the current surge, shows that enhanced cooperation among EU countries and official and unofficial actors in northern African countries that have a stake in the migrant smuggling business can significantly stem the irregular flow of persons. Of course, this is achieved at the cost of increasing the number of persons who are returned to unsafe countries (as the UN has defined Libya since at least 2016) or end up in brutal illegal detention centers (in Libya, estimates have grown from five thousand detained in January 2019 to close to ten thousand by the end of 2021), and exposing EU countries to a higher likelihood of being blackmailed.

Moreover, enforcement of border controls can ebb and flow. The Libya case shows this perfectly, as the LCG’s activities at sea have dropped consistently over the past year and a half relative to arrivals in Italy. In 2023 so far, the share of irregular migrants that has been rescued/intercepted by the LCG has dropped to 23 percent, less than half the 2018-2021 average. In Tunisia, a sudden drop in irregular departures in May and June compared with expectations (close to 70 percent lower arrivals than an ISPI short-term model for forecasting irregular arrivals had predicted) has been associated not just with worse-than-average weather conditions, but also with an increase in police raids in Sfax and other Tunisian towns along the coast that have been known to be heavily involved in smuggling activity. The fact that this drop in departures from Tunisia was observed just days after visits by EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi has generated renewed interest on political agreements among countries from the two shores of the Mediterranean. Since Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Tunis on June 6, departures have risen but have remained subdued compared with the previous trend.

Policy responses: Adequate or insufficient? 

What do recent trends teach us in terms of policy responses? First, they show the precarious nature of political-technical agreements to stem the flow of irregular departures from northern African shores. The sudden drop in departures from Libya in July 2017 held for years, allowing arrivals to Italy to drop from around 155,000 to 11,000 in twenty-four months. But the implicit agreement among Italy and a number of Libyan militias did not do much to reduce the “demand” for smuggling services among migrants who were already living in Libya or travelling to northern African countries. On the contrary, the drop in supply of migrant smuggling services in Libya opened up the possibility that Tunisian smugglers who were already providing a number of limited goods or services (such as sturdier iron boats) to smugglers in Libya could move up the “smuggling value chain” and start offering the full package as well.

It also teaches us about the flexibility of each smuggling route, as well as the need to understand each route’s specificities. For instance, it was only with the pandemic and its impact on tourism that Tunisian migrants started looking for smuggling services in much larger numbers. As soon as demand for smuggling rose, and the industry found its footing in Tunisia, it was only natural that it would start to provide the same services to sub-Saharan African nationals severely hit by the economic effects of the Ukraine crisis. This is exactly what happened in 2022: From the outside, the transition from Tunisian nationals to sub-Saharan Africans appeared to be seamless. Moreover, as the smuggling industry in Tunisia seems to be less led by specific households but rather a much more competitive business, it is less plausible to expect that irregular departures could be stopped by striking just a handful of deals with the right counterparts. Namely, both an increase in police raids and/or paying smugglers to stop providing their services are likely to bring only a respite from the issue, to eventually be replaced by other actors willing to offer the very same services.

Local contexts 

To adequately respond to irregular migration across the Mediterranean, it is crucial to comprehend the ongoing domestic crises that North African countries are facing. Among the five countries comprising the continent’s northern shore (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Libya and Tunisia stand out as the most precarious and unstable. Consequently, there seems to be a clear correlation between instability and heightened migration.

Libya is still rocked by civil strife, split between the east, under Khalifa Haftar’s control, and the west, under the UN-backed interim government led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. The ongoing conflict has made it impossible for economic conditions to improve. With unemployment continuously on the rise (now close to 20 percent) and economic growth low and volatile, locals and non-locals have found other means to make ends meet. Migration is a lucrative business for local militias both to Libya’s east and west, while non-locals (Libya hosts nearly seven hundred thousand international migrants) flock to the shores attempting to reach Europe in search of better economic and humanitarian conditions. The ongoing civil war is bad for locals, but particularly bad for migrants who face discrimination and a lack of employment as a result. 

Meanwhile, Tunisia’s perilous economic conditions and an uptake in anti-migrant sentiment have been important migratory push factors. Democratic backsliding has also been a key concern since President Kais Saïed froze parliament, sacked the prime minister (July 2021), and removed fifty-seven judges from office (June 2022), with more and more political opponents seeking refuge elsewhere and looking at Europe as a safe haven. 

Conclusions 

Europe is negotiating a deal worth almost one billion euros with Tunisia to curb the current migration flow. Yet, conditioning financial aid to a cessation in migration is a risky business that presents long-term challenges as well as ethical concerns. For one, it allows for the recipient country (in this case, Tunisia) to hold significant leverage on European countries and use migration flows as a bargaining chip for further demands. Instead, Europe could condition its aid to a more holistic package of requests, including a return to the rule of law and renewed efforts toward a democratic transition. 

Moreover, it is essential for European countries, particularly coastal states, to abandon the counterproductive approach of consistently blaming nongovernmental actors that seek to improve search and rescue efforts in the Central Mediterranean. In Italy, the current government’s practice of sending NGO ships that have carried out a rescue to faraway ports that take three to five days to reach, and another three to five days to return to the search and rescue zone off the Libyan coast, unnecessarily shortens their operational period and raises their costs. It is crucial to acknowledge that clear and repeated findings have debunked the notion that search and rescue operations serve as incentives for migrants to depart from North Africa’s shores.

Lastly, unless European countries establish safe and lawful avenues for low-skill migrants to reach their intended destinations, the problem of irregular migration will persist, or even worsen, in the coming decades. Even if new legal avenues do not directly decrease irregular crossings, they could legitimately be used to justify negotiations on increasing the return rates of irregular migrants. The current dearth of legal routes instead serves as justification for origin countries not to accept returnees, and serves to only raise political and diplomatic tensions.

Matteo Villa is Senior Research Fellow at ISPI and co-heads the ISPI Data Lab

Alissa Pavia is Associate Director at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program 

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What were the main outcomes from the recent European Council summit? Why are European Council summits important? How did EU leaders come together to address the latest European issues from Russia’s war in Ukraine, de-risking from China, and migration?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Ben Judah sits down with Dave Keating, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and France 24 Brussels correspondent, to discuss the developments from the summit and the main political debates. 

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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Yousef is not his real name. We’re not disclosing his identity nor additional details due to the precarious nature of his current circumstances. He has been in his profession for nearly ten years, operating an organization in Amman. Yousef’s career has been progressing remarkably. But none of that carries any weight in this instance.

“I’m sorry, there’s nothing I can do. No Syrians,” the official reaffirmed.

The clock is running out on Yousef’s temporary visa in Jordan, necessitating his exit. But where is he to go?

“I felt like walls were closing in on me. I couldn’t breathe,” He confides in me. “I’m out of options.”

He’s not the only one. Facebook private chat groups for Syrian in Jordan are filled with confusion and anxiety. Questions fly back and forth: “Does anyone know if there is a new procedure?” “Is there a way to prolong deportation?” “What happens if I’m stopped on the street?” 

Going back to Syria carries the risk of potential detention risk despite the regime’s continuous claims of amnesty for returnees. No one I have spoken to trusts the regime’s claim, and all know that detention in Syria most likely ends in death. 

But it’s not just Jordan where Syrians must fear deportation. Living in Turkey has become increasingly difficult as well. Even Syrians who own property in Turkey are getting their residencies rejected. Lebanon is a non-starter.

It’s a terrifying situation to be in. It’s a sort of fear that doesn’t dissipate, and a different one to the sort that drove Syrians out of their homes and into this wretched existence, where they’ve been branded as refugees—rejected and unwanted seemingly everywhere.

I get a message from a mother I know in Lebanon:

“Arwa, please, you have to do something. They are not going to renew our papers. You have to save us.” Umm Mohammed’s voice is cracking, breaking, desperate.

Umm Mohammed and her family fled Syria ten years ago. Her youngest children were born in Lebanon, and her eldest daughter is in university. While life in Lebanon has grown increasingly unbearable for them—the hatred they receive for being Syrian forces them to rarely venture out—at least they encountered no issues with their yearly permit That is, until now.

A relative who knows the family said he was informed through an official that their papers would be stamped “deport/leave”.

“We can’t go back. We just can’t. Our house was destroyed after we left. It was bombed. We have nothing.” Umm Mohammed is begging and begging. “My kids’ lives are here. They are all in school. I haven’t been able to tell my husband yet. He will have a stroke.”

Umm Mohammed and her family registered with the United Nations (UN) in 2013 as refugees. Umm Mohammed says that five years ago, they were called in twice for asylum interviews. Such hope they had! But then they got a phone call from someone who told them they were rejected while failing to provide a reason. Umm Mohammed says they’ve called the numbers on their papers to try to understand why, but no one even answers the phone. They personally visited the offices in their area and in Beirut. However, they could not even get through the front door. 

She doesn’t understand what is happening in her life; how everything is just so out of her control. Two of her siblings who interviewed at the same time as her family were resettled in other countries years ago. One is in Norway, and the other is in the United States.

“Please, please just do something to try and see if you can get an answer; if there is anything we can do to get our file moving again.” Umm Mohammed pleads to me. “Our lives are in your hands. My children’s lives are in your hands.”

I called the number on the paperwork she provided me numerous times but received no answer. I’ve reached out to people I know to see if they can point me in the right direction or to the right person. This is hardly the first time I’ve heard about Syrians struggling to get in touch with the UN in Lebanon or to get updates on their status.

The Arab League’s decision to “normalize” relations with the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has pushed a fast-forward button on making life harder for Syrian refugees in the region through deportations and rejections of residencies. But it’s hardly anything new. 

While Syria’s neighboring countries have long been struggling to host their Syrian refugee populations, with many, like Lebanon, being in a complete crisis of their own, the sheer lack of care provided to refugees is inhumane. This should not be regarded as a “Syria” problem. This is one of the core problems in the overall approach toward managing Syrian refugees. Neighboring countries need to be provided with the support—which has never fully materialized despite pledges—to host and treat their refugee populations with humanity. 

Ahmed al-Reems’ story is especially jarring. He arrived in Turkey in 2019, settling in a village around 40 km from the heart of the capital, Ankara. Late last year, Turkish security forces came for him, his wife, his two-year-old son, and his four-year-old daughter in the middle of the night. 

“We didn’t understand what was happening, it was 4 am, and they were banging on the door shouting police! police!” Ahmed tells me over the phone. “They said we just want to take you to the immigration department. I asked them to let me pack a bag, at least take diapers for my littlest one. He told me don’t worry about it; you will be back home in a bit.”

When his family boarded the bus, they realized that it was packed with other Syrian families from their same area. Eighteen families—around sixty people in all—had been rounded up at the same time. 

They were held for twenty-four hours in a detention facility. There were no blankets nor food, and the conditions were filthy. Ahmed says he and his family were then boarded on another bus and told that they were going to another area in Ankara. Instead, they were driven for hours to Gaziantep (which is close to the border with Syria), given papers, and ordered to sign them. 

“I said no at first, but they insisted. I didn’t want to create problems, so we did. I still thought I had a chance of going back home,” Yousef recalls, his voice utterly dejected. “At 6 am, they took us to the border crossing and just shoved us away.”

The presence of Syrian refugees was central to the recent elections in Turkey. The opposition party spouted hateful anti-refugee rhetoric and vowed to rid the country of them. While less vocal about their intentions, the government coalition of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who won the presidential vote, has been deporting Syrians for years. However, generally speaking, expulsion had been reserved for those who had not renewed their papers, traveled outside of their permit zone, or incurred other minor infractions.

“It might have been because of the elections,” Ahmed speculates, “but I still don’t understand. I had my residency; we were all legal. I didn’t do anything wrong. I’ve never had any problems.”

In Turkey, they had managed to build a home again. Not exactly the same as the one they had fled from when the bombs arrived in their town in Syria, but it was still a home, filled with their personal belongings and the children’s toys. It’s all gone again. They are back to living in a tent in Idlib. 

“I still feel like I’m going to wake up from this nightmare,” Ahmed says. “I feel like I am a dead man.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. She is also the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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On April 20, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the third Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). DHS calls the QHSR its “capstone strategy document,” setting out the short- and medium-term direction for the US government’s third-largest cabinet department. By law, the QHSR is a “review,” not a “strategy,” and so it devotes much of its ninety-two pages to a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments, more than a pure strategy would contain. With these caveats in mind, experts with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program read the 2023 QHSR and offered their assessment of its depth and importance for our latest scorecard.

Thomas Warrick

Senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; director, Future of DHS Project

Given DHS’s size and the breadth of its missions—counterterrorism; law enforcement; cybersecurity; aviation, border, and maritime security; immigration; and infrastructure protection—the QHSR should be considered one of the most important strategic documents put out by a major US cabinet department. The QHSR, while subordinate to the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy, should, in theory, be comparable to the Department of Defense (DOD) National Defense Strategy (NDS), which gets enormous attention in Washington and around the world.

The QHSR’s reality is rather different. No major news outlet covered the QHSR’s release on April 20. Only specialized news sites and a few others reported on it or on Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas’s speech the next day announcing the QHSR’s release along with DHS’s ninety-day “sprint” focusing on US nonmilitary vulnerabilities to China and establishing a DHS task force on uses and threats from artificial intelligence.

One reason for this lack of coverage may be that the QHSR, being a “review,” is more of a summary of DHS’s current activities and recent accomplishments. Lists of accomplish­ments seldom make news in today’s contentious Washington political scene. While the QHSR should educate the public about what DHS does, the people who need educating the most about DHS are probably the least likely to read ninety-two pages of government prose, even with pictures. Nevertheless, the QHSR is an important strategic road map to where the Biden administration and Mayorkas want to go.

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

This QHSR is distinctive in three ways. First, it exists—the Trump administration did not release a QHSR during its four years between January 2017 to January 2021. While the Trump administration never produced a QHSR, it had a coherent—and divisive—approach to immigration and domestic terrorism, much of which was led from the White House, not DHS. Second, the Biden administration promised during the campaign and afterwards a break with many of the Trump administration’s homeland security policies, especially on immigration and domestic terrorism, and the QHSR makes this very clear. Third, this QHSR intentionally returns to the tone and structure of the two Obama administration QHSRs, released in 2010 and 2014, with three changes from the Obama QHSRs: 

1. showing how the threat landscape has changed since 2014,
2. highlighting the importance of partnerships to the Biden administration’s and Mayorkas’s model of the homeland security enterprise, and
3. recognizing a new mission area for DHS: combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims.

DHS has long fought crimes of exploitation—this QHSR elevates the importance of this work and explicitly aligns DHS with the victims of such crimes. This will make it hard for future administrations to backslide from protecting exploited victims.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

Just as the National Defense Strategy is primarily, though not exclusively, focused on military threats to the United States, the QHSR should bring equal focus and vigor on the nonmilitary threats to the United States. The third QHSR provides a good summary of today’s dynamic terrorism threats (both international and homegrown), the challenges and strains on what it calls our “broken” immigration system (Mayorkas goes so far as to call it “completely broken;” his critics would no doubt agree), cyber threats from criminals and hostile nation-states, crimes of exploitation, the threat from fentanyl and transnational organized crime, natural and man-made risks to critical infrastructure, and other challenges to homeland security. Of particular importance is elevating fentanyl, transnational organized crime, and crimes of exploitation to the strategic level—no longer are they issues of only crime. The third QHSR wants the United States to see these as strategic threats, requiring a more strategic response.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

A sound strategy needs to define what “victory” looks like. In DOD’s mission space, victory is understandable: the goal is victory in war, coupled with deterrence and maintaining the peace at all other times. It’s a lot harder to define the end state in homeland security, and this QHSR, like many national security strategies of previous administrations of both parties, often uses phrases like “preventing and mitigating active threats” and “continue advancing national efforts” that give the direction but leave the ultimate goal fuzzy. There are few concrete end states against which this QHSR’s success or failure can be judged, but this is not unique to this QHSR or this administration.

For example, no responsible counterterrorism strategy would publicly set itself the goal of “no successful terrorist attacks.” The difficulty of detecting lone violent extremists and their ability to get semiautomatic assault rifles, coupled with political realities in the United States, mean that the QHSR needs—rightly—to point toward other approaches like community programs (see QHSR numbered page 8) needed to reduce active shooter events well below their levels in recent years, which would be a worthy goal. In cybersecurity, the QHSR describes the many innovative programs that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has undertaken in the past two years, but mentions only at the end of the cybersecurity section (QHSR numbered page 35) the truly transformational National Cybersecurity Strategy’s effort to shift fundamental risks from end users to the tech companies that are best situated to build security into their hardware and software. This will fundamentally change the future of cybersecurity and is a worthy goal.

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities? 

The third QHSR, like its predecessors, makes clear which DHS components are responsible for which missions and lines of effort. Unlike DOD’s military services, which encompass different domains but serve a (mostly) unified strategic mission, DHS’s eight components are organized functionally, and thus contribute differently to the QHSR’s six mission areas: 

• Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to aviation security (part of mission 1, counterterrorism and threat prevention).
• CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to land border security (mission 2, border security, but also part of mission 1) and immigration (mission 3).
• The US Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP to maritime security (part of missions 1 and 2).
• CISA, ICE, TSA (for pipelines), USCG (maritime cybersecurity) and the US Secret Service (USSS) to cybersecurity and fighting cybercrime (mission 4).
• The Federal Emergency Management Agency and CISA to infrastructure protection and resilience (mission 5); however both CBP and USCG have a part of mission 5.
• ICE, CBP, USSS, and USCIS to law enforcement (mission 6, combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims, but also part of other missions).

While this QHSR, like its predecessors (and like similar strategic summaries of DHS’s missions during the Trump administration), contains extensive descriptions of DHS activities, this QHSR proves the aphorism that—unlike DOD, where missions end when a war is over and the military pivots (for example) from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific—at DHS, missions never go away. In this respect, the “new” mission 6 of combating crimes of exploitation and protecting victims is not at all new—it is the recognition of a mission DHS has had almost since its inception in 2003.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR is not a budget, but any DHS report on its missions raises the question whether DHS has the resources to succeed in those missions. Alignment between policy and resources is one of DHS’s greatest challenges. 

After the October 2022 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in March 2023 that DOD’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget request was “the most strategy-driven request we’ve ever produced from the Department of Defense.” DOD is asking for $842 billion in FY 2024, $26 billion more than in FY 2023. A look at the China and Russia section of the NDS shows the link between DOD’s strategy and its budget request. 

DHS cannot say the same thing about the third QHSR and DHS’s FY 2024 budget, which calls for a 1.1 percent increase over FY 2023. DHS officials understand this. The QHSR calls for more efforts and resources on cybersecurity; border and immigration security; community-based programs to prevent future mass shootings as happened in recent years in Uvalde, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and elsewhere; and to head off threats to critical infrastructure from natural causes and nation-state adversaries.

The third QHSR does not have to quantify the resources required to achieve its goals, but it has rightly laid out this secretary’s road map for where DHS and the homeland security enterprise need to do more. One of the third QHSR’s most important benefits should be to focus a much-needed debate—inside the administration and with the Congress and the American people—over whether the United States is spending enough on homeland security.

Brigadier General Francis X. Taylor (ret.)

Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Overall, DHS’s QHSR sets forth a comprehensive review of the challenges facing the homeland security enterprise. The program initiatives outlined in the report, if successful, will improve the security posture of the homeland. There are some concerns about whether there is sufficient political and popular support for the initiatives outlined in the report. In addition, DHS should consider an annual review of outcomes that have resulted from its initiatives to give US citizens a sense of how effective the department has been in improving security of the homeland. This report is a good start but needs annual reiteration that reflects sustained improvement in the United States’ overall security posture. 

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The QHSR sets forth in clear detail the myriad of threats that face the homeland and the challenges for the homeland security enterprise to effectively address those threats. The world continues to evolve, as does the threat environment since the creation of DHS and this QHSR reflects the complexity of the threat environment and DHS’s initiatives to address that environment in new and innovative ways. 

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions?

The strategic context of the QHSR is sound and does not underplay the seriousness and challenges of the threat that faces the homeland security enterprise. The emphasis on partnerships to meet the challenges is an important underlying principle for DHS. Never has it been more important for DHS to strengthen and broaden its partnerships as the threat environment continues to change.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals?

The QHSR clearly defines the programs undertaken to address each mission area to address the threats that face the US homeland, but the mere implementation of programs does not ensure effective outcomes. 

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities? 

There are clear lines of effort that are identified in the QHSR. The core mission areas are addressed effectively, but it is not clear that the programs initiated are yet effective in achieving the goals of DHS. Time will tell what outcomes are achieved and how effective DHS has been in mitigating the threats to the homeland.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

The QHSR fundamentally outlines the challenges that DHS must address to keep the homeland safe. It is not clear that there are sufficient resources to execute this mission as outlined in the QHSR. Congressional support of these initiatives and funding will be critical to DHS’s success. 

Seth Stodder

Nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Like any strategy or planning document produced by a federal bureaucracy, the report on the 2023 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review inevitably provokes some trepidation from a potential reader, as such documents produced by Washington bureaucrats rarely last five seconds in an email inbox and never touch a printer.  

But in all seriousness, this year’s QHSR is somewhat of a page-turner. It is the first one since 2014—almost a decade. And what a decade it has been! ISIS and Al Qaeda, while still threats, have taken a back seat to AR15-wielding white nationalist extremists in the minds of counterterrorism professionals. The sense of operational control of the border that US officials felt they had in 2010 seems like a quaint bygone era, as compared to the massive challenges the United States faces today at the US-Mexico border. The cyber threats are much more varied, with the rise of catastrophic ransomware attacks and the drumbeat of cyber threats to our critical infrastructure and our electoral system. Meanwhile, emerging technology presents opportunities and threats like nothing before—from the rising concerns about social media invasions of privacy, disinformation campaigns, and deep fakes, to the threat of quantum computing and the potentially civilization-altering challenge presented by artificial intelligence. Nation-state threats to the homeland from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have become far more serious since 2010. On the other hand, the ultimate challenge to the US homeland may be environmental, as the force and impact of global climate change and the likelihood of more deadly pandemics have become ever more severe.

The 2023 QHSR—and the evolving mission of DHS—aptly reflect the tectonic shifts happening in the global security environment overall and its implications for US homeland security. To be sure, the original five homeland security missions from the first QHSR Report in 2010 are still there: (1) preventing terrorism and enhancing security; (2) securing and managing US borders; (3) enforcing and administering US immigration laws; (4) safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and (5) ensuring resilience to disasters. But so many of the characters in the play have changed, or assumed greater or lesser prominence.  

Suffice it to say, DHS has its hands full—with a sprawling and ever-more important set of missions, all of which requiring close partnerships with other federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies, the domestic and global private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and the millions of Americans and other nationals who interact with DHS every single day. And this new QHSR ably reflects this massive and growing responsibility. 

Distinctiveness

Is there a clear theme, concept, or label that distinguishes this strategy from previous strategies?

The key theme is the steadily evolving and, in some cases, radically changing and ever more complex threat picture, and the need for DHS and its components to evolve its missions and focus accordingly. This is expressed forcefully in the document. Unsurprisingly, most of the missions are the same—with one addition—as those stated in the previous QHSRs. But that does not necessarily warrant any effect on its score here as the missions of DHS and homeland security are what they are. Rather, it is the threat and broader strategic environment that has, in some cases, radically changed. And the 2023 QHSR articulates this extremely well.

Sound strategic context

Does the strategy accurately portray the current strategic context and security environment facing the United States? Is the strategy predicated on any specious assumptions? 

The 2023 QHSR is extremely clear on the security environment facing the United States and, specifically, the US homeland. The QHSR also effectively nestles DHS and its six core missions neatly within the Biden administration’s broader strategic framework for the United States, as expressed in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and other key documents. The analysis here is sound, and it does not rest on any specious or unfounded assumptions—either about the threat or the missions and capabilities of DHS.

Defined goals

Does the strategy define clear goals? 

The 2023 QHSR clearly sets forth various goals, backed up with various vignettes and descriptions of ongoing or past programs, initiatives, and other actions reflecting efforts in furtherance of goals. That said, the goals are for the most part relatively vague (e.g., “DHS must be a leader in the responsible use and adaptation of emerging technologies” or “DHS remains committed to facilitating and expanding naturalization pathways for new Americans”), without specifying any particular measurable outputs against which one might assess success or failure. However, one could argue the point of how does one know when the border is actually “secure” or under “operational control,” or when the asylum system is processing claims “fairly” or “efficiently?” And, from a fiscal standpoint, is there a way of knowing when increasing budgets hit a point of diminishing returns—where an additional dollar invested in, say, detection equipment or in efforts against drug smuggling might be better invested elsewhere, such as public health or education? It is hard to clearly find measurable goalposts for these from the QHSR. 

Clear lines of effort

Does the strategy outline several major lines of effort for achieving its objectives? Will following those lines of effort attain the defined goals? Does the strategy establish a clear set of priorities, or does it present a laundry list of activities? 

The QHSR—and previous DHS documents—have outlined the key missions and lines of effort, and the DHS operational components and management offices have (for the most part) worked out relatively delineated areas of focus meant to maximize unity of effort within DHS, while minimizing interagency conflict and rivalry. As is the nature of this kind of beast, the QHSR does have a bit of the whiff of a laundry list (or lists) of various component activities and success stories (albeit clean laundry, thankfully), but the lists are placed within an intelligently articulated framework of clear priorities. Again, as discussed above, it is difficult to discern measurable outputs or where the signposts are toward achieving mission goals and objectives—but the lines of effort are clearly stated.

Realistic implementation guidelines

Is it feasible to implement this strategy? Are there resources available to sustain it?

This is somewhere between an unfair question and an incomplete one—in the sense that the QHSR is not meant to be a budgetary document, and indeed there is no sense here as to whether resources are remotely adequate to achieving the goals. Moreover, as noted above, some of the goals are so vague or total (e.g., “preventing labor exploitation”), that it is hard to assess—judging solely from the QHSR—exactly how these goals might be achieved, how success or progress toward the goals could be measured, or at what point diminishing returns might be reached for additional spending. So, it’s hard to grade this one—but it surely isn’t a perfect score.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

This article is part of the Future of DHS Project by the Forward Defense program with financial support from Deloitte.

Further reading

Scorecard Jul 7, 2022

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: NATO’s Strategic Concept clear on threats, but will require sustained commitment from Alliance

By Atlantic Council

Several of the Scowcroft Center’s strategy experts analyzed the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept, assessing the strategy based on five criteria. The reviewers generally agreed that the document was clear-sighted about threats facing the Alliance. However, implementing the ambitious strategy will require sustained commitment and high investment from Alliance members. Here are the full assessments.

Europe & Eurasia International Organizations

Scorecard Oct 14, 2022

Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: What grade does Biden’s National Security Strategy get?

By Atlantic Council

Our strategy experts praised the document for being clear-eyed about the challenges posed by Russia and China, but downgraded it for a lack of focus as well as concerns about how to implement its ambitious aims.

National Security Politics & Diplomacy

Issue Brief Jan 31, 2022

Biometrics at the border: Balancing security, convenience, and civil liberties

By Seth Stodder, Thomas S. Warrick

Forward Defense nonresident senior fellows Seth Stodder and Tom Warrick consider how US Customs and Border Protection can employ biometrics for safer, more efficient border operations.

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

The post Scowcroft Strategy Scorecard: Does the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review make the grade? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The “they” is the outside world: the United Nations (UN), the United States, other Western nations, Turkey—countries that call themselves “friends of Syria” but have their own interests at the core of their Syria policies. It’s also Russia, Iran, and the Arab nations that are “normalizing” relations with Damascus.

I know this region well, having traveled there countless times as a senior correspondent for CNN. But this trip in March, after the earthquakes that decimated this region, was different. I was not there just to observe; I was on a humanitarian mission with my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance, or INARA. Greater insight into the aid world and how it functions has worsened my frustrations. I found myself muttering repeatedly, “It’s broken. This isn’t right.”

It has been well over a decade since the first of Syria’s displaced settled in these hills and fields in northwest Syria. They were the residents of Jisr al-Shougour, bombed in June of 2011. Each time I visit, I recall meeting those first arrivals stretching canvas between olive trees for shelter, and the young girl I met sleeping out of the back of her family’s van, telling me they had just come for a few days. Over time, the population swelled with those who fled Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus, and elsewhere. 

The population in Idlib province has more than tripled since people first took to the streets twelve years ago, from under one million to more than three. Hospitals and schools were bombed and not rebuilt. Factories ceased to function or are now in regime territory, meaning the job opportunities and products are inaccessible for those in the rebel-held northwest of the country. Some fields are planted, but many remain unsown. There is potential but no opportunity. 

Every year, as has been the case for more than a decade, there are pleas for more funding for food baskets, for winterization campaigns with images of little faces shivering in subzero temperatures. Every year, funding efforts fail to meet their targets and those pleas go unheeded. Fair or not, the prevailing sentiment in Idlib is that UN agencies responsible for shelter want to keep the population in tents.

INARA in partnership with Kids Paradise provided Ahlam al-Ahmad and her family with hygiene kits, childrens toys, clothing, and food after their tents flooded. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

A little boy plays in muddy and sewage-filled waters at a camp in Syria. There are growing concerns about the spread of diseases such as cholera. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

Ahlam al-Ahmed stands among what she and her family have been able to salvage from the floods. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

The author at a camp INARA set up in partnership with Syria Forum for those who lost their homes in the earthquake. Photograph courtesy of Arwa Damon.

I met Ahlam al-Ahmad as she slogged through knee-deep mud. Floods had just ravaged her small camp on the edge of agricultural fields in Idlib, the water so powerful it swept away everything in some of the tents, drowning clothes, kitchenware, mattresses, blankets, small stores of rice, potatoes, and jars of lovingly prepared Ramadan stuffed vegetables. 

Like hundreds of thousands here, she was displaced by war, running away with nothing but the clothes she had on. It has been all but impossible for her family to get back on their feet, to rebuild even the smallest fraction of what they lost. 

“Why do we live here?” she asks rhetorically. “It’s for work. We women work in the fields, it’s the only thing available.”

“I mean we had sorted ourselves out, sort of,” she continues, her voice cracking as she points to what they were able to salvage from the muck. It took her family years to achieve this meager progress—an existence in three tents, one of which acts as the kitchen. But even with four of them working the fields, they couldn’t afford a home with walls—not when their labor yields just three dollars a day. And there is such a yearning for walls.

Adults yearn to lean back against a wall, while many young children don’t even know what it is to live within a stable structure.

Moving beyond an emergency response

Spiraling inflation, coupled with rising global prices, has pushed this population even deeper into poverty. And yet last year the UN barely met half of its funding goal for Syria. The argument has long been that funding the sorts of projects that would allow greater autonomy for the northwest region—such as building proper shelters, factories, and schools—was too risky, what with the incessant and unpredictable Russian and Assad regime bombing campaigns. 

However, for more than three years now the battle lines have remained stable, and the skies no longer buzz with fighter jets raining death and destruction. Yet the humanitarian framework around Idlib is still viewed through the prism of emergency response. That needs to change.

Aside from the emergency response to the recent earthquake, the bulk of funding opportunities for projects in Syria are for small-scale development—efforts such as vocational training and microgrants—and civil engagement interventions. These activities provide little help to the population. Instead, they permit outside players to claim that they support development.

Civil engagement is important and can bring together inspiring minds, but it’s a fruitless exercise based on donor desires and not realities on the ground. “You can’t expect someone who is tunnel-focused on mere survival, on the next meal, to be able to have the mental capacity to focus on anything else. That is how they keep us weak,” explains Hasan al-Moussa, a Syrian friend of mine active in the humanitarian and development space. 

Vocational training and microgrants are important, but they need to be significantly scaled up to have a real impact.

At the same time, there is division among the UN Security Council members not just over cross-border access, but also over whether the focus should be on emergency, early recovery, or development. The emergency cycle that northwest Syria has been stuck in for more than a decade is creating dependency and perpetuating poverty, ignorance and disillusionment, and even that response is falling short of the needs. Early recovery and development projects, which would lay the framework to break the cycle, are too few, too small, too short term. The pattern of the current approach is paralyzing the population in a state of helplessness.

On the ground, the bleak situation can feel almost deliberate, an attempt to keep the population unemployed and uneducated. Just enough comes in for outside officials to point to certain projects and make themselves look good, but nowhere near enough to break the cycle of dependency. More money needs to be put into funding projects that create large-scale job opportunities and access to education for those who have none.

Helping the people of Syria will take moral courage that has long been lacking, and it will take—for once—those who hold the purse strings and power over northwest Syria to put their own politics and interests aside. People deserve the chance to regain agency over their own lives. That is the real humanitarian thing to do.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post It’s broken: The humanitarian response is keeping Syrians in a loop of helplessness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While Russia’s invasion has generated unprecedented international interest in Ukrainian studies, it has also had a profound and overwhelmingly negative impact on the academic community in Ukraine itself. This must be taken into account. After all, the international development of Ukrainian studies depends largely on the state of academia in Ukraine. As Andriy Zayarnyuk wrote last year, “the center of Ukrainian studies is now in Ukraine.”

A recent report evaluating the current state of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies identified more than 160 study centers located mainly in North America and Europe. Ukrainian studies centers are mostly placed within Slavic studies departments, with courses tending to focus on Ukrainian culture, language, and literature rather than politics and economics.

Europe has the most centers primarily concentrated in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland. Notably, Ukrainian studies remains virtually nonexistent in some neighborhood countries such as Romania and Turkey. This absence became particularly evident following Russia’s full-scale invasion, with a recent survey of Ukrainian studies professionals identifying increased demand for expert commentary.

Even in countries with Ukrainian studies programs, the focus is often limited. Universities typically employ individual lecturers who offer courses on Ukrainian topics which can change from semester to semester. Factors leading to the closure of Ukrainian studies centers include lack of funding, lack of student interest, weak institutionalization, and reliance on the activities of individual researchers.

A more comprehensive approach to Ukrainian studies is clearly needed. This should include the establishment of Ukrainian professorships to make studies an integral part of the academic environment and less exposed to changes in political preferences.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Growing international interest in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion has already boosted the field of Ukrainian studies. Universities have been able to bypass bureaucracy to host more people from Ukraine, with a diverse range of Ukrainian academics fleeing the war and arriving in the West over the past fifteen months. Among students, interest in Ukrainian studies has never been higher. The challenge is to ensure this does not become a mere passing fad.

To make Ukrainian studies more resilient in the long run, Ukrainian topics need to be integrated into existing classes on subjects such as Soviet or Russian imperial history, or even European studies, contemporary politics, and international relations. The goal should be to make Ukraine part of the conversation on different issues.

At the same time, much will depend on parallel progress in Ukraine. Key objectives include translating source materials, integrating Western academic practices, and improving English skills among the academic community.

Wartime realities in Ukraine have created new possibilities for Ukrainian academia but have also deepened many of the problems that existed before the invasion. Much of the country’s educational infrastructure has been destroyed, but the impact on human capital has been even more devastating. In short, Ukraine is currently losing many of its best people including significant numbers of irreplaceable academic professionals.

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Ukraine’s universities are currently in survival mode but reform is also on the agenda. Just one day before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Ukrainian government adopted a new two-year development strategy for the country’s higher education system. The Ministry of Education has since announced that it will use this strategy as a road map for the reconstruction and continuation of reforms in the post-war period. However, the strategy was designed before the war and does not target the specific problems caused by Russia’s invasion.

Last month, Oksen Lisovyi was appointed as Ukraine’s new Minister of Education. It is not yet clear whether he intends to implement radical reform with long-term goals or keep the existing higher education system largely in place. While support for change is widespread, many within the academic community and education industry also appear to favor a more conservative approach.

Ukraine may not have the luxury of time for an extended debate. Funding for education has been severely cut as a result of the Russian invasion, with academics struggling to survive on inadequate salaries. This is forcing many to consider a career change. Others have left their university positions to serve in the army. It is not clear how many will return to academia, or whether they will have jobs to return to.

Students also find themselves confronted by harsh realities. With no end in sight to the Russian invasion, today’s Ukrainian high school graduates face a choice between an uncertain fate in their homeland or exploring the wide range of study options currently available at European and North American universities.

Ukraine’s universities have responded to the challenges of the invasion with ingenuity, utilizing tools developed during the Covid pandemic to switch to distance learning. However, uncertainty over the future looms large.

Some Ukrainian universities still maintain cooperation with Western institutions, but these relationships typically depend on prewar ties and offer one-sided academic mobility enabling Ukrainian scholars and students to study abroad. It would be good to see European and North American universities launch more nonresident fellowships for Ukrainians who are unwilling or unable to leave the country.

It may also be time to consider establishing new platforms and institutions for collaboration between Ukrainian scholars and their international colleagues. Ukraine can offer opportunities for Western academics focused on the Soviet and Russian empires who are no longer able to access Russian archives. Ukraine’s State Archive Service has been digitizing materials for some time and has introduced a united search system of Ukrainian archives.

The past year of war has sparked unprecedented interest in Ukrainian studies while creating both huge challenges and exciting opportunities. Ukrainian studies is now widely recognized as an important field that requires far more international attention. Looking ahead, the discussion must address both institutional and practical issues. The most important task at this stage is to prevent the further erosion of Ukraine’s academic potential and create the conditions for sustainable post-war development.

Oleksandra Gaidai is a Department of History postdoctoral fellow at American University.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Apr 8, 2023

Human wave tactics are demoralizing the Russian army in Ukraine

By Olivia Yanchik

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has not gone according to plan but he still hopes to win a long war of attrition. However, Russia’s reliance on human wave tactics risks undermining morale within his invading army, writes Olivia Yanchik.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Apr 6, 2023

NATO poses a threat to Russian imperialism not Russian security

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s passive acceptance of neighboring Finland’s NATO membership raises serious questions over the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the invasion of Ukraine as a response to NATO expansion, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Mar 8, 2023

Ukrainians will never surrender. How long can they count on the West?

By Serhiy Prytula

Ukraine’s remarkable resistance during the first days of the Russian invasion convinced the democratic world to back the country but with Putin now preparing for a long war, continued Western resolve is vital writes Serhiy Prytula.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Russia’s invasion highlights the need to invest more in Ukrainian studies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The local economy of the earthquake-affected provinces accounts for 9.8 percent of Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP), 8.6 percent of exports, and 15 percent of agricultural products. With a lower GDP per capita and a higher unemployment rate than the national average even before the disaster, the region employs over 3.8 million people, primarily in the agriculture, trade, textile, and food sectors, almost 40 percent of whom are employed informally. The local private sector—made up of more than 538,000 enterprises—now needs wide-ranging support to recover from the earthquakes.

Recovery and rebuilding will require a multi-faceted approach prioritizing private-sector support for local development along with social impact. This approach will need to ensure that the region continues progressing toward United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and does not leave vulnerable communities behind, including the displaced. Of the 3.7 million Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey since the Syrian war began, half of them lived in this region, constituting over 11 percent of its overall population, and were affected by the earthquakes. Turkey is now home to over three million internally displaced people, who are looking for economic and social support after this disaster.

One of the essential tools at Turkey’s disposal to tackle these daunting challenges and to design a more sustainable, resilient recovery is impact investing. These are “investments made with the intention to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return,” according to the Global Impact Investing Network, targeting a spectrum of returns depending on the type of capital and instruments used. As Turkey’s Impact Investing Advisory Board stated in a report published shortly before the earthquakes, urban resilience—which will need to be a priority following this disaster—will benefit from “innovative, sustainable capital allocation and commercial value generation” with an impact focus. Thankfully, the local impact investing ecosystem has been taking root to enable this.

Impact investing can also aim to create self-reliance for refugees and internally displaced people through “refugee lens” investing, which is a framework to qualify and track investments developed by the Refugee Investment Network (RIN), where I work with enterprises and investors focused on impact.  

Forced displacement cuts across at least thirteen of the seventeen SDGs around the world, according to RIN. Actively investing in displaced populations leads to new and sustainable solutions. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, that could include supporting the thousands of refugee-owned small businesses in the earthquake region, providing microfinance to local farmers and artisans, or facilitating tech-based remote employment. The goal is to increase displaced people’s livelihoods, financial inclusion, and continued skills development (especially to respond to workforce losses due to the earthquake), thus leading to equitable economic and social revival. Funding the communities and employers around the country that welcome the displaced will also be important.

Having value chains focused on supplier diversity, economic inclusion, and job creation will also help this cause. The public and private sectors can strengthen community resilience by prioritizing local and displaced suppliers affected by the disaster, including social enterprises and cooperatives employing and supporting vulnerable communities through “social procurement.” For instance, Innovation for Development (i4D), a local economic development organization, aims to connect three hundred local producers from the earthquake-affected region with buyers to ensure business continuity and new contracts.

In international trade, proponents of a “Turkiye Compact” call for trade concessions from the European Union, United States, and Canada to incentivize the private sector to hire both Syrian refugees and locals in Turkey with the goal of boosting the local economy and improving social cohesion. According to a United Nations Development Programme feasibility study conducted prior to the earthquakes, such a policy could create 284,000 new jobs (including 57,000 jobs for refugees) and boost exports by 3 percent, primarily of labor-intensive agricultural, processed food, and textile products. Furthermore, local enterprises participating in the Turkiye Compact would become attractive investment opportunities given their tangible impact on displaced communities through employment and sourcing.

Finally, Turkey’s vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem is more crucial than ever. Accelerators, specialized funds, and growing communities of practice can nurture innovative, impact-driven ventures for earthquake-affected communities and create inclusive solutions. Examples so far have included a waste management start-up facilitating food aid, e-commerce solutions enabling microentrepreneurs, online mental health platforms offering therapy to survivors, and tech innovations in rescue and relief, among many others. Additionally, catalyzing entrepreneurship by underserved communities, especially those experiencing intersectional disadvantages, such as the refugee women entrepreneurs featured in an Atlantic Council documentary last year, will create new pathways to self-reliance.

Bringing all of these solutions together and amplifying their impact through the resources of the global impact investing community, local partnerships, and blended financing—with guarantees, concessional loans, or grants to attract private investments, for instance—will yield tremendous, complementary results.

With such a comprehensive toolbox, it will be possible to rebuild better after this terrible disaster and create more inclusive economies and resilient communities.

Selen Ucak is a social impact professional working at the intersection of private sector and international development. She currently leads a global community of refugee-led and refugee-supporting businesses and social enterprises at the Refugee Investment Network, as well as serving as a consultant on additional projects.

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