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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Turkmenistan’s deepening water crisis could have far-reaching regional consequences

Rasul Satymov — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 20:23:38 +0000

The vast, arid landscapes of Turkmenistan, stretching across Central Asia, are facing a profound and growing threat—a deepening water crisis that casts a shadow over its future stability, as well as over the security of the entire region. While often overshadowed by other domestic problems, the struggle for water in Turkmenistan is a critical issue demanding immediate attention. Exacerbated by a changing climate, almost a century of unsustainable practices, and new regional developments, this crisis is not just an environmental problem—it’s an unfolding human tragedy that could have significant economic and political ramifications well beyond its borders.

The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

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“Yes, really”: American private military companies (back) in Gaza

Alia Brahimi — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 19:22:18 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 11 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official Craig Mokhiber to discuss Israel’s militarization of aid in Gaza and how US private military companies (PMC) and individual contractors could be held legally liable for their association with violations occurring in the Gaza Strip.

Craig offers his assessment of why the Israeli-led Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was established, its rejection by the UN and the international aid community for weaponising hunger, as well as the international laws it is breaching. He describes the cruelties and dangers inhering in this new aid system and outlines how individuals, including PMC employees, may be held legally accountable for their participation in the GHF and their association with the IDF’s wider alleged war crimes.

“This is not an aid operation. It is an extension of the unlawful Israeli occupation and its plans for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza.”

Craig Mokhiber, international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official

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About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 20:50:06 +0000

US President Donald Trump has recently changed his tone toward Russian president Vladimir Putin, suggesting that he has “gone crazy” and is “playing with fire.” This highlights the ongoing difficulties of negotiating with the Kremlin. While the Trump administration broadly favors a realist approach to international relations, a more pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives could better equip the US to achieve its stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.

Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

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Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment?

Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, and Marie Forestier — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence.

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal.

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

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Mar 15, 2024

Syria Strategy Project

The Atlantic Council, Middle East Institute, and European Institute of Peace collaborate with subject matter experts and policymakers in the US, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to sustainably forge a pathway to resolving Syria’s crisis.

Sep 5, 2019

Syria Project

Our work on Syria sheds light on the ongoing struggle of Syrians to fulfill their desire for democratic self-governance as the United States and the international community grapple with the aftermath of a devastating civil war, millions of refugees across the Middle East and Europe, and ongoing security and political challenges spilling over Syria’s borders.

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Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 May 2025 21:46:50 +0000

Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, according to a new report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The report comes following an extensive investigation into a campaign of Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian civilians over a ten-month period beginning in July 2024, with the probe focusing on an area of southern Ukraine stretching more than 100 kilometers along the right bank of the Dnipro River around the city of Kherson.

Members of the UN Commission determined that Russia was engaged in the deliberate targeting of civilians and concluded that the drone attacks were “widespread, systematic, and conducted as part of a coordinated state policy.” The report detailed how civilians were targeted “in various circumstances, mainly when they were outdoors, both on foot or while using any type of vehicles,” and noted that on a number of occasions ambulances had been struck by drones in an apparent bid to prevent them from reaching victims and providing vital medical assistance.

During the ten-month period covered by the United Nations probe, Russian drones killed almost 150 Ukrainian civilians in and around Kherson, while leaving hundreds more injured. The constant threat of attack has created a pervasive climate of fear throughout the region, with people afraid to leave their homes. Terrified locals say they feel hunted and refer to the drone attacks as a “human safari.”

In addition to daily drone strikes, Russia has sought to maximize the psychological pressure on residents of the Kherson region via social media channels. UN investigators reported that video footage of drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians is regularly disseminated on Russian Telegram channels, some of which have thousands of subscribers. This video footage shows drone strikes along with the resulting deaths and destruction in the style of video games, often accompanied by background music. Meanwhile, menacing messages posted on Telegram call on Ukrainians to flee the region. “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die,” read one message quoted in the UN report.

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This is not the first time UN investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine. A March 2025 UN report reached a similar conclusion regarding the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. “The evidence gathered led the Commission to conclude that the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity,” the report stated.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a number of arrest warrants for senior Russian officials in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine including the targeted bombing of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure. The most high-profile ICC arrest warrant is for Vladimir Putin himself, who is wanted for his alleged involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

At least 20,000 Ukrainian children are believed to have been kidnapped since the start of the full-scale invasion and taken to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. The nature and scale of these mass abductions may qualify as an act of genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

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Russia’s deadly “human safari” drone campaign against the civilian population in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is part of the Kremlin’s strategy to make the area unlivable. The city of Kherson was occupied by the advancing Russian army during the first days of the full-scale invasion and was officially annexed by Russia in September 2022. However, Kherson and the surrounding area were liberated by the Ukrainian military soon after. The scenes of joy that accompanied the liberation of Kherson were deeply humiliating for Putin, who had personally proclaimed the city to be “forever” Russian just weeks earlier.

This setback forced Putin’s invading army to retreat across the Dnipro River, creating a major physical obstacle for the Russian invasion and limiting the occupied zone of Ukraine to the eastern half of the country. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to insist that Kherson and the surrounding region are now part of the Russian Federation and must be handed over within the framework of a future peace deal.

Ukraine has completely ruled out any such concessions. This is hardly surprising. While some temporary territorial compromises may prove possible during peace negotiations, Ukraine’s stance on Kherson is unlikely to change. After all, allowing the renewed Russian occupation of Kherson would be suicidal for Kyiv. It would present Russia with a priceless foothold across the Dnipro River that could be used as a gateway to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and complete the conquest of the country.

For now, Russia appears to have little chance of seizing Kherson militarily or of acquiring the city at the negotiating table. Instead, Moscow seems to be intent on terrorizing local residents and forcing them to flee. Putin claims that the population of the Kherson region are Russians, but he has no qualms about his soldiers using drones to hunt and kill them mercilessly. This tells you all you need to know about Putin’s cynical posturing as the protector of the Russian people in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukrainian detainees are being systematically subjected to torture and other human rights abuses, according to an international investigation led by the French group Forbidden Stories together with thirteen media outlets including Britain’s Guardian newspaper, the Washington Post, and Le Monde. While it is not possible to calculate exactly how many Ukrainian civilians have been abducted in the occupied regions, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity.

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Those who remain in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control face a regime of forced russification encompassing everything from language and the media to education and religion. Place names have been changed to reflect the new Russian realities, with the curriculum in local schools transformed in line with the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian imperial dogmas. Parents who attempt to shield their children from classroom indoctrination are being threatened with loss of custody.

Ukrainian residents in the occupied regions of the country have also come under increasing pressure from the Kremlin to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to take a Russian passport risks losing access to a range of essential services including healthcare. They also face restrictions on property rights along with the ability to run a business and use banking services.

This passport campaign has intensified significantly in recent months, with Russian President Vladimir Putin issuing a decree announcing that Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have until September 2025 to accept Russian citizenship or face possible deportation from their own homes. Understandably, Moscow’s ruthless tactics are proving difficult to resist. Kremlin officials claim that by March 2025, Russian passports had been issued to approximately 3.5 million people in occupied Ukraine.

Moscow is accused of engaging in religious persecution throughout the occupied regions, with all Christian denominations other that the Kremlin-linked Russian Orthodox Church facing various degrees of restrictive measures and oppression. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials stated in spring 2025 that the Russian occupation authorities have killed dozens of clergy members over the past three years while damaging or destroying hundreds of churches.

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Russia has been careful to prevent information about conditions in occupied Ukraine from reaching the outside world. All independent media sources have been shut down throughout the occupied regions, and have been replaced by new Kremlin-controlled outlets. Individual journalists have frequently been among those targeted for oppressive measures including physical abuse and imprisonment.

One of the few reporters to shed light on the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine was Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who visited areas under occupation on multiple occasions before being captured by the Russian authorities in summer 2023. Roshchyna died after a year in Russian captivity. When her body was returned to Ukraine in early 2025, it showed signs of torture.

From a military standpoint, it may not currently be feasible to liberate all of the Ukrainian regions held by Moscow. Nevertheless, the crimes being committed by the Kremlin in occupied Ukraine are unprecedented in modern European history and cannot be ignored.

It is vital that the human rights of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation feature prominently in any peace process. This includes the rights of those currently being held in Russian jails. Ukraine’s Western partners must maintain or increase sanctions pressure, while also expanding support for Ukrainian civil society and raising awareness about Russia’s actions among international audiences.

Looking ahead, longer term investments are also needed to help document war crimes and support Ukrainian victims of the Russian occupation. Ultimately, the most meaningful response to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian identity is to make sure Ukraine is in a position to not only survive but thrive as an independent European nation.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

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Based on current trends and previous displacement waves, at least two hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians living close to the current front lines of the war could be forced to leave their homes by fall 2025. This is not speculation; it is informed by experience gained during Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian organizations have been on the front lines of the humanitarian response. They have provided essential aid, temporary housing, psychological support, and ongoing reintegration counselling to help Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s invasion rebuild dignity and restart their lives.

Ukraine’s civil society has worked wonders over the past three years but cannot realistically hope to absorb another 200,000 diplaced people without international support. The situation is even more alarming due to the recent closure of USAID, which was a major player in the humanitarian response to Russia’s invasion. With Putin’s troops already advancing, Ukraine’s Western partners must not ignore the looming danger.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3.6 million people remained internally displaced within Ukraine as of early 2025. Most are women, children, and elderly individuals. Many have already been forced to flee multiple times. This population of displaced people may soon become considerably larger.

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Compounding the crisis, European governments are beginning to phase out temporary support programs for Ukrainians. While the EU recently agreed to extend temporary protection through 2026, enforcement is sometimes patchy. Meanwhile, there are indications across Europe that resettlement fatigue is growing.

In the UK and US, political rhetoric on the topic of Ukrainian refugees has shifted ominously. Most recently, reports emerged that the Trump administration is exploring options to repatriate Ukrainians who entered the United States following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

If these trends continue, millions of Ukrainians could find themselves trapped between advancing Russian forces and a closing window of international asylum. While Ukrainians in the east of the country flee Putin’s invading army, many Ukrainian refugees may be forced to return home with uncertain prospects.

If the overstretched Ukrainian military is unable to contain Russia’s summer offensive, the fallout will reverberate far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The displacement of at least 200,000 more civilians would severely strain humanitarian corridors, destabilize border regions, and sow chaos in Ukrainian cities already struggling to absorb previous waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s Western partners still have time to prevent this, but they must act with a sense of urgency. While the Trump administration has been clear that it does not plan to provide Ukraine with further military aid, it should continue sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians while confirming its readiness to sell arms to Kyiv. Europe must speed up the delivery of promised weapons and should expand supplies significantly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.

In parallel, European countries should take steps to provide reassurance and protect the legal status of Ukrainian refugees. Donor organizations can help by strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian civil society groups that have demonstrated agility, transparency, and high levels of local trust.

The next phase of Russia’s invasion is not just being fought on the front lines of the war. It is taking place across the country in bomb shelters, train stations, and temporary accommodations. Russia is trying to break Ukrainian resistance by making large parts of Ukraine unlivable and destabilizing the country. Ukraine’s partners can do much to counter these efforts, but they must act now before the military and humanitarian situation deteriorates further.

Viktor Liakh is president of the East Europe Foundation. Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine.

Charai in National Interest: The Washington Embassy Murders and the Rising Threat of Antisemitism

Atlantic Council — Fri, 23 May 2025 17:37:53 +0000

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Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 21 May 2025 20:51:25 +0000

US President Donald Trump came away from Monday’s phone call with Vladimir Putin expressing confidence that the Russian leader wants peace, but few others appear to share this optimism. Many senior Western figures were reportedly unimpressed by Putin’s vague references to a “memorandum on a possible peace agreement” and believe he is still engaging in stalling tactics. “Putin is clearly playing for time. Unfortunately we have to say Putin is not really interested in peace,” commented German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.

Trump’s latest call to Putin also prompted fresh questions over the US leader’s handling of the faltering peace process. Britain’s The Economist pondered Trump’s “strange reluctance to get tough with Putin,” while Washington Post columnist Max Boot led a chorus of voices accusing the Kremlin strongman of manipulating his American counterpart. “While Trump’s lack of success in peacemaking might not doom Ukraine, it certainly dispels the president’s pretensions to being a world-class deal maker,” argued Boot. “Putin is playing him for a fool, and Trump doesn’t even seem to realize it.”

The mood was very different in Moscow, with the Kremlin-controlled media trumpeting the call as a significant success for Russian diplomacy. In his daily press review, BBC correspondent Steve Rosenberg reported that many of Russia’s leading news outlets were “crowing” over the contents of the Trump-Putin conversation. “It looks like Russia has won the latest round of global poker,” commented one newspaper. “Donald Trump’s stance couldn’t be more advantageous to Moscow,” observed another.

It is no surprise to see mounting unease in Western capitals over the US push to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Since Trump first initiated peace talks in February, Ukraine has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire and signaled its readiness to make major territorial concessions. In contrast, Russia has consistently rejected calls for a ceasefire while proposing new conditions of its own and creating various obstacles to any meaningful progress. At one point, Putin even claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy lacked the legitimacy to sign off on a peace deal and suggested placing Ukraine under United Nations administration.

Recent diplomatic developments have further underlined Russia’s reluctance to end the war. When the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Poland delivered a ceasefire ultimatum to Putin in early May, the Russian ruler responded by calling for the first bilateral talks with Ukraine since spring 2022. However, Putin then chose not to attend the bilateral meeting in Istanbul that he himself had proposed, preferring instead to send a low-level delegation. This was widely interpreted as a “slap in the face” for Ukraine and the collective West.

Putin’s representatives during last week’s negotiations in Istanbul sought to emphasize Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise, calling on Kyiv to officially cede four entire provinces to Russia including a number of major Ukrainian cities that the Kremlin has so far been unable to seize militarily. If Ukraine refuses to do so, they warned, Russia will increase its demands to include six Ukrainian provinces. “We fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?” the head of the Russian delegation reportedly commented, in reference to the eighteenth century Great Northern War. “Maybe some of those sitting here at this table will lose more of their loved ones. Russia is prepared to fight forever.”

While Putin rarely makes such thinly veiled threats, he continues to insist that any settlement must focus on eliminating what he refers to as the “root causes” of the war. This is generally understood to mean Ukraine’s international neutrality and disarmament, along with the reestablishment of Russia’s former imperial dominance in every sphere of Ukrainian public life, from language and education to national memory and religion. Any Ukrainian leader who agreed to such terms would be signing their country’s death sentence.

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Trump’s efforts to talk up the prospects of a negotiated peace and his attempts to entice Putin with commercial incentives suggest a fundamentally flawed understanding of Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. The US leader seems to sincerely believe that Putin can be persuaded to end his invasion by the promise of limited territorial gains and future economic prosperity. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth.

Putin is not fighting for Ukrainian land; he is fighting for Ukraine itself. He views the current war in the broadest of possible historical terms and sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as a sacred mission that will define his entire reign and shape Russia’s future for decades to come. It is ludicrous to suggest that he could be swayed from this messianic vision by mundane talk of trade deals and sanctions relief.

Putin’s thirst for historical revenge can be traced back to his traumatic experience during the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Putin did not personally face the grinding poverty that millions of his compatriots endured in the 1990s, Russia’s national fall from grace nevertheless made a profound impression on him. Ever since, he has been haunted by fears of a further imperial collapse and driven by a determination to reverse the verdict of 1991. This has fueled his revanchist brand of Russian nationalism, and helps to explain his otherwise inexplicable obsession with Ukraine.

Throughout his reign, Putin has made no secret of his bitter resentment over the breakup of the USSR, which he has called “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” Crucially, he views Ukraine as a central and indivisible part of this fabled “historical Russia.” Indeed, the Ukrainian capital Kyiv occupies pride of place in his imperial mythology as “the mother of all Russian cities.”

To Putin, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a symbol of Russia’s post-Soviet humiliation and a potential catalyst for the next stage in his country’s retreat from empire. According to this twisted imperial logic, if a province as quintessentially Russian as Ukraine is allowed to break away and establish itself as a modern European democracy, the entire Russian Federation will be in danger of disintegrating. Likewise, Putin is convinced that if Ukraine can be returned to its rightful place within Greater Russia, the injustice of 1991 will be undone and Russia will resume its position among the world’s Great Powers.

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Putin has been attempting to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit ever since the 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by clumsily intervening in Ukraine’s presidential election. The violence of these efforts has escalated in direct proportion to the strengthening of modern Ukraine’s own national identity. At first, Putin pursued his imperial goals in Ukraine through control of the country’s political, business, cultural, and religious elites. When this failed, he ordered the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Once it became apparent that even this partial occupation of the country would not derail Ukraine’s national consolidation, Putin made the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The rising tide of Russian aggression against Ukraine has been accompanied by ever more extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. For years, Putin has publicly insisted that Ukrainians are Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the current invasion, he published an entire essay denying Ukraine’s right to exist. Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly labeled Ukraine as an artificial country built on stolen Russian land, a Nazi invention, and an intolerable “anti-Russia” created for the purpose of undermining Russia itself. Ukrainians who insist on their own national identity are typically portrayed as traitors undeserving of sympathy or mercy.

This dehumanizing propaganda has laid the ideological foundations for the crimes that are currently being committed by the occupying Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin is able to establish control, Ukrainian patriots and community leaders are routinely detained and incarcerated in a vast network of prisons and camps. While the number of victims remains unknown, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity. Those who remain are subjected to a reign of terror and forced to accept Russian citizenship while submitting their children to indoctrination. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, culture, and statehood are being ruthlessly erased. Many experts believe these actions qualify as genocide.

Putin is understandably happy to exploit the Trump administration’s enthusiasm for peace talks. This allows him to buy time, divide the West, and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. But it is already abundantly clear that he has no real interest in ending his invasion. Indeed, he dare not stop. Any peace deal that secures Ukraine’s survival as an independent state would be viewed in Moscow as a major defeat. Rather than taking his place alongside Stalin, Peter the Great, and Ivan the Terrible as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be remembered in Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine. He would rather fight on indefinitely than accept such a fate.

Trump deserves considerable credit for seizing the initiative and attempting to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, his current approach is obviously not working. The time has now come to stop seeking compromises with the Kremlin and start speaking to Putin in the language of strength. This means tightening sanctions on Russia and targeting the many countries that continue to fuel Putin’s war machine. Above all, it means significantly increasing military aid to Kyiv and boosting Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Putin has staked his entire reign on the destruction of Ukraine. He will not back down unless forced to do so. Peace will only come when Ukraine is too strong to be subjugated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

For the past one and a half years, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the International Partnership for Human Rights have documented and analyzed Russia’s aerial attacks in Ukraine. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, witness interviews, open-source intelligence, and forensic analysis.

After reviewing hundreds of Russian drone and missile strikes, researchers narrowed the focus down to twenty-two key attacks and identified two patterns that illuminate their impact: Attacks on energy infrastructure and on densely populated areas. The legal memorandum resulting from this work concludes that Russia’s bombing campaign amounts to the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.

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For three consecutive winters, Russia has bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in a bid to deprive the civilian population of access to heating and electricity at a time when the days are short and temperatures are typically well below freezing. These attacks have had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian power grid, with around half of Ukraine’s entire prewar energy-generating capacity destroyed by summer 2024.

As well as targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, Russia has also launched waves of drones and missiles at Ukrainian towns and cities throughout the invasion, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. There have been a number of particularly deadly attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed eighteen people including nine children. On Palm Sunday one week before Easter, Russia launched a targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving thirty-five dead.

In addition to killing and injuring civilians, Russian aerial attacks also create untenable living conditions for the wider civilian population. They leave people traumatized and fuel intense feelings of insecurity, while disrupting access to heating, power, water, healthcare, and other essential resources.

While estimating the true toll of these attacks is challenging, the number of displaced Ukrainians indicates the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to UN data from February 2025, Russian’s invasion has forced 10.6 million people to relocate, with 6.9 million recorded as refugees living outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, around 12.7 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance, including nearly two million children.

Russia systematically and deliberately deprives civilians of objects essential to their survival and inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction, which constitutes the crime against humanity of extermination. Statements by Russian officials, such as calls for Ukrainians to be left to “freeze and rot,” corroborate this conclusion.

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Russia’s aerial terror campaign, as well as the Kremlin’s actions in the occupied regions of Ukraine, have intentionally deprived Ukrainians of their fundamental rights to life, health, education, and culture, thus constituting the crime against humanity of persecution. The crime of persecution requires special discriminatory intent to target Ukrainians as a distinct group. This intent can be seen in Moscow’s branding of Ukrainians as “Nazis” who must be “destroyed.” such language underscores that Russia is attacking the very existence of Ukrainians. Targeted Russian attacks on educational and cultural facilities across Ukraine are further evidence of this intent.

Additionally, throughout the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities are reportedly enforcing russification policies that aim to extinguish any trace of Ukrainian national identity or statehood. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and subjected to anti-Ukrainian indoctrination. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in relation to the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

Holding Russia accountable for the ongoing air offensive against Ukraine is particularly important as this form of prohibited total war, where everything and anything including vital infrastructure and civilian populations are targeted to achieve victory, looks set to return. Technological advances are transforming the modern battlefield to essentially include entire countries and their civilian populations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s use of long-range drones and missiles to terrorize Ukrainian civilians is likely a taste of things to come.

To date, no international tribunal has held individual perpetrators responsible for international crimes resulting from unlawful aerial attacks. The International Criminal Court has taken an important initial step by issuing arrest warrants against four senior Russian officials for their roles in attacking Ukrainian civilians and energy infrastructure, but further measures are needed.

Failure to hold Russia accountable today will fuel tomorrow’s wars and embolden Putin’s fellow autocrats to embrace similar tactics against civilian populations. It is vital to make sure long-term security is not sacrificed in order to reach some kind of compromise with the Kremlin to end the bloodshed in Ukraine. By focusing on accountability for Russia’s aerial attacks, the international community can set a meaningful precedent that could help protect civilians around the world for years to come.

Anastasiya Donets leads the Ukraine Legal Team at the International Partnership for Human Rights, an independent non-governmental organization. She was previously an assistant professor in the International Law Department at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv. Susan H. Farbstein is a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, where she directs the International Human Rights Clinic.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

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Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Experts react: Trump just announced the removal of all US sanctions on Syria. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 13 May 2025 20:51:11 +0000

“We’re taking them all off.” US President Donald Trump announced on Tuesday that Washington will remove all US sanctions on the Syrian government. The announcement comes five months after the overthrow of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in a snap opposition offensive led by new President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s militant group.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable\

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses.

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence.

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations.

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace.

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions.

Going forward, there are three things to watch:

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation.

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future.

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December.

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists.

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity.

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions.

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land.

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors.

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.”

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention.

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state.

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development.

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country.

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise.

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran. The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria.

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate.

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.”

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.”

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center.

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians.

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria.

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal.

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood.

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory.

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria.

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life.

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough.

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians.

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed.

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses.

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community.

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in.

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries. 

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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The father of ‘soft power,’ a supreme intellect, and an eternal optimist: The Atlantic Council remembers Joseph Nye

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 May 2025 17:38:26 +0000

Joseph S. Nye Jr., the public servant and professor who coined the term “soft power” to describe US cultural influence around the globe, died on May 6. Nye served on the Atlantic Council’s board of directors from 2014 until his passing. He was an active contributor to the Atlantic Council’s work, including an essay for our New Atlanticist section in August drawing from his memoir, A Life in the American Century. He concluded the article by striking an optimistic note:

“Some historians have compared the flux of ideas and connections today to the turmoil of the Renaissance and Reformation five centuries ago, but on a much larger scale. And those eras were followed by the Thirty Years’ War, which killed a third of the population of Germany. Today, the world is richer and riskier than ever before.

I am sometimes asked whether I am optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the United States. I reply, ‘Guardedly optimistic.’ The United States has many problems—polarization, inequality, loss of trust, mass shootings, deaths of despair from drugs and suicide—just to name a few that make headlines. There is a case for pessimism. At the same time, we Americans have survived worse periods in the 1890s, 1930s, and 1960s. For all its flaws, the United States is an innovative and resilient society that, in the past, has been able to recreate and reinvent itself. Maybe Generation Z can do it again. I hope so.”

Below, members of the Atlantic Council community reflect on the impact Nye made on both our work and the wider world.

Click below to jump to an expert reflection:

Matthew Kroenig: “In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Chuck Hagel: “He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

Jan Lodal: He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Paula Dobriansky: “His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Daniel Fried: “He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

“In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Just recently, our CEO Fred Kempe applied the “Joe Nye rule” as a guide to the Atlantic Council’s geostrategy work. He advised that our regular, private Strategy Consortium convenings bring together the caliber of strategic thinkers who will entice people like Joe Nye to remain engaged.

We are deeply saddened to learn of Nye’s passing and that his participation in our convenings will no longer be possible. He was a longstanding Atlantic Council board director and a regular participant in our private Strategy Consortium meetings for many years, most recently in December 2024 on the topic of anticipating a future Trump administration national security strategy. He also contributed to our strategy work in other ways, authoring forwards for our Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series and articles for our website.

He was a towering intellect and a resolute and courteous commentator on global affairs. He brought penetrating insights to our meetings and did not shy away from expressing disagreement, but always in a generous way, intending only to elevate the discussion and improve the quality of the work.

In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist about American power, alliances, and global engagement. Even though he is no longer with us, Nye’s strategic clarity, civility, and optimism will continue to inspire the Atlantic Council.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

“He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

We have lost an exceptional human being. He brought clarity to so many complicated issues over the years. We all learned from him and benefitted from his wisdom and knowledge and unpretentious style. He’ll be missed by many.

—Chuck Hagel is a member of the Atlantic Council international advisory board, a former US secretary of defense, and a former US senator from Nebraska.

He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Joe’s contributions to his students, his family, and world peace and security were unparalleled. His impact will be felt indefinitely.

Joe was also a magnificent personal friend and colleague. We survived numerous hikes to the top of the mountains in Aspen after the exhilarating discussions he had organized for the Aspen Strategy Group. He asked me to take over the group when he had to step down, which I was honored to do. I then imposed on him to join my team as assistant secretary for international security affairs under Bill Perry in the Clinton administration. He was the best ever in that storied office.

Joe actually changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts—”soft power” being perhaps the most memorable. He was a devoted husband to his dear wife, Molly, and a great art dealer from whom we obtained twelve paintings that grace our walls and remind us daily of Joe. We will miss him greatly.

—Jan Lodal is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, a former principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, and a former senior staff member of the National Security Council.

“His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Joe Nye was an extraordinary scholar, intellect, professor, and public servant. He was a prolific writer whose books, articles, and op-eds advanced innovative ideas and provided cogent analyses of complex national security issues. Described as a “towering figure in international affairs,” he produced writings that have had a profound impact on policymakers both at home and abroad. He was widely known for having conceived the “soft power” approach in US foreign policy, which promotes American power through influence, persuasion, and diplomacy.

Joe’s service at the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and as chair of the National Intelligence Council was distinguished and results-driven. During his tenure at the State Department as deputy to the under secretary for security assistance, science, and technology, he chaired the consequential National Security Council interagency group on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

I have long admired Joe’s achievements in foreign policy and public service. On a more personal level, I was also proud to have been his colleague and friend. He touched my life in so many ways. While at Harvard for my master’s and Ph.D. degrees, Joe was not only my professor there, but a wonderful mentor. One of his many admirable qualities that I loved was his desire to have a good lively policy debate. He always brought opposing points of view into a discussion and relished a vibrant exchange of opinions. His calm demeanor in the midst of bureaucratic squabbles or crises was exemplary.

I will miss him terribly, but I am gratified that his policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure. He was indeed a giant in international affairs and leaves a remarkable legacy.

—Paula J. Dobriansky is the vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former US under secretary of state for global affairs.

“He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

Joe Nye was the rare combination of government foreign policy practitioner with political thinker and public scholar of the first order. He has been called a “neo-liberal.” But that term, like its twin “neo-conservative,” is more of an epithet than a useful guide. Roughly put, Nye believed that the rules-based international system that the United States created and led for three generations after World War II was a good thing—that it had more potential to generate prosperity, avoid world war, and advance American values and thus American interests than the competition. Because the competition in the twentieth century was fascism and communism, Nye’s judgment was a sure thing.

But Nye’s optimistic view now seems eclipsed by the dark neo-nationalism espoused by many in the United States and indeed across Europe. When some in the Trump administration, including US President Donald Trump, call for seizing Greenland, they seem to argue that only physical control of (and raw power over) territory can secure US interests, that there is no place for cooperation between nations to achieve goals that benefit both. That’s not a new view; it’s a mere repackaging of old European, great-power imperialism that brought disaster in its time and could bring disaster in ours. Such thinking would reduce the United States to a mere grasping, greedy superpower, a larger version of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, seeking to dominate through force and fear.

Nye’s views are now, more than ever, worth considering. He was no naif about the need for power in the international arena. But he acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right. When he spoke of such things, he meant it: artful, creative, committed, and realistic in the best sense. What a compelling and inspiring legacy he leaves behind.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

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Gazans fear famine amid Israel aid block: ‘I don’t want to be a number’

Arwa Damon — Mon, 12 May 2025 16:37:00 +0000

Humanitarian aid into Gaza is being blocked by a democratically elected nation state, Israel, and is fully supported by the world’s self-declared greatest democracy, the United States. Indeed, the imagery and stories coming from the Palestinian enclave leave one feeling like we exist in the realm of the inhumane absurd.

For more than two months now, nothing has entered Gaza. Not a single grain of rice or bag of flour. The only thing standing between Gaza’s 2.2 million starving people on the brink of famine and three thousand trucks packed with humanitarian aid is Israel.

“It’s a humanitarian catastrophe. Catastrophe on the true meaning of the world. We never could have ever imagined this.”

The voice note comes from one of the social workers assisting with the International Aid Network for Relief and Assistance, my non-profit organization that works in Gaza.

“We had been distributing rice, a serving of rice just to try to ease the hunger in the bellies of the children at the camps we work in,” she continues.

“But we had to stop now because there’s no rice left.”

I am not disclosing the names of those quoted, due to safety concerns in the aftermath of Israel’s targeting of humanitarian aid workers. Although even with the precaution of anonymity, one colleague remarked: “Israel knows who we all are anyway.”

It has been more than two months since Israel broke the ceasefire deal, resumed its bombing campaign of Gaza, and declared that no aid would enter the Strip. Well before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Israel controlled everything that entered or exited Gaza, even at the Rafah crossing at its border with Egypt.

The Israeli cabinet has started deliberations on resuming aid operations but under a framework that would “by-pass Hamas”, which would perhaps make sense if Hamas controlled the aid, only it doesn’t.

I have been to Gaza four times since the launch of the war in Gaza, on humanitarian missions with INARA, and would have gone on my fifth mission in February had Israel not denied me entry. I am hardly the only one, there has in fact been a troubling increase in denials of humanitarians and medics on missions to Gaza over the last three months.

I have been to warehouses, out in the field on distributions, and in sector meetings. Israel has long maintained that humanitarian aid entering Gaza is “controlled by Hamas.” The humanitarian community has categorically stated over and over that Hamas does not control the aid, despite allegations that the militant group has stolen some of it. But it is worth noting that if Hamas has been stealing or hoarding aid, it’s not from humanitarian organizations’ warehouses or distribution points.

This framework and its mechanisms would see private security contractors, or the military, establish “Israeli hubs” for distribution. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) issued a statement on behalf of all its partners slamming this plan.

“It is dangerous, driving civilians into militarized zones to collect rations, threatening lives, including those of humanitarian workers, while further entrenching forced displacement,” UNOCHA said in a statement.

“Humanitarian action responds to people’s needs, wherever they are.”

Most of us have set up distribution points close to the communities we serve, or, similar to our work at INARA, we deliver directly into the camps we work with. The population of Gaza is not mobile. Cars and buses don’t function; there is no fuel. People have to walk or take donkey carts to get anywhere. It’s not logical to expect someone to walk hours to get to a set distribution point in an active military zone and then haul an up to fifty-kilogram food parcel back to their tent.

Even assuming that someone was able to get the food box back to their tent, what are they supposed to cook with? Gaza has gone without cooking gas for months People try to gather wood, some are even burning books and trash to light a fire to cook on, but they are often unable to source enough. This is why functional community kitchens is so critical, but we have no idea how or if they will even be supplied.

But this is not a battle space that is ruled by logic. Equally ludicrous is Israel’s claim that “there is plenty of food in Gaza.”

There isn’t. The World Food Program does not state that its warehouses are empty, bakeries do not shut down, and children do not claw at scraps of food at the bottom of a pot when food is plentiful. What has been distributed to community kitchens will be depleted in the next few days.

It is no secret that Israel has weaponized humanitarian aid to ostensibly pressure Hamas, and the government itself has stated that it’s basically enforcing a “starve or surrender” policy.

Rule 53 of International Humanitarian Law specifically states, “The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited.”

Israel is countering this by citing Article 23, which states that consignments may be prevented if there are concerns they may not reach their intended target or benefit the enemy. This is again based on the false premise that Hamas controls the aid. If this were the case, aid organizations like ours would have been unable to deliver assistance when Israel was permitting entry. We especially would not have been able to deliver during the ceasefire, when Hamas re-emerged onto Gaza’s streets.

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There already is an International Criminal Court warrant, issued back in November of last year, for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which includes among the alleged crimes “the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.”

Last week, the International Court of Justice began its deliberations on Israel’s restrictions on aid and aid operations at the request of the UN General Assembly. The deliberations will likely take months. Israel boycotted the sessions and called the whole thing a “circus”.

Israel recently rejected a Hamas offer of a five-year deal that would see it cede political power, countering with a forty-five-day ceasefire proposal and the provision that Hamas agree to disarm, which Hamas in turn rejected.

While ceasefire talks sputter, Israel is doubling down. The government just approved a “conquest” plan to expand its operations in Gaza, calling up additional tens of thousands of reservists, and enraging the Israeli population, who are growing increasingly incensed with their government’s refusal to do what it takes to get back to a ceasefire that will see the remaining hostages released. Tens of thousands of Israelis have been demonstrating on a regular basis, demanding that their government not continue to endanger the hostages’ lives.

For Palestinians, time is running out— a warning that has been echoed at some of the highest ranks of international organizations, including the World Health Organization.

“We are breaking the bodies and minds of the children of Gaza. We are starving the children of Gaza. We are complicit,” Deputy Director General Michael Ryan told reporters at the WHO’s headquarters. “It’s an abomination .”

When I speak to Palestinians in Gaza, I hear the strain in their voices—the subtle tremors as they fight not to crack under mounting hunger after a year and a half of military bombardment.

“Arwa,” they say. “I don’t want to be a number.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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The new pope is American. He is also Peruvian. Why does it matter?

Martin Cassinelli — Fri, 09 May 2025 19:35:40 +0000

As global headlines celebrate the election of Pope Leo XIV—Robert Francis Prevost—as the first American pope, another nation three thousand miles south of the United States loudly claims him as one of its own. Though born in Chicago, Pope Leo XIV spent over two decades living and working in Peru and became a dual US and Peruvian citizen in 2015, forging a personal and spiritual bond with the Andean country that remains little known to the wider world. His identity as a dual citizen could be a defining characteristic of his papacy and, if channeled in his work, could shape US–Latin American relations.

The election of a pope thrusts a previously little-known figure onto the world stage and places significant geopolitical influence in his hands. As head of state of the Holy See, the pope oversees a vast diplomatic network and holds a moral authority that resonates across both the spiritual and political spheres. Each new pontiff brings a unique imprint to the role. Pope Francis, for instance, drew deeply from his experience working with marginalized communities in Argentina—a perspective that shaped the priorities and tone of his papacy from the beginning. In his first speech to the world as the new pontiff, Pope Leo XIV addressed the crowds in Spanish and greeted “his beloved Diocese of Chiclayo in Peru,” perhaps an early sign that his US–Peruvian identity will leave an imprint on his papacy.

This unique combination of identities could represent more than just mere symbolism. It may also help Pope Leo XIV reframe the US–Latin American relationship in more humane and values-driven terms. To do so, he will need to pick up where Pope Francis’s social justice work left off, but better communicate the shared humanity of people across the hemisphere to a US audience, who increasingly disapproved of Pope Francis and his views during his papacy.

Two decades in Peru

As a missionary and priest in towns and cities across Peru, Pope Leo XIV worked with marginalized communities during some of the country’s most turbulent decades. The 1980s and 1990s in Peru were marked by hyperinflation, an internal armed conflict between Maoist guerrillas and the Peruvian military that left an estimated seventy thousand people dead , and a dramatic erosion of the rule of law. During this period, he became a vocal advocate for vulnerable populations and sought to hold those in power accountable for the lives lost amid the violence and political breakdown.

In 2015, Pope Francis appointed him apostolic administrator of the Diocese of Chiclayo, a coastal city in Peru, a role he held until 2023. In this position, he became known for his closeness to rural communities and his support for social programs, including efforts to combat child malnutrition. As more than 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants escaped to Peru seeking asylum during his eight years in the Diocese of Chiclayo, Prevost showed care and defended their right to migrate. In 2023, he also publicly condemned the violent crackdown by Peruvian security forces against protesters, reinforcing his long-standing commitment to human dignity and justice. To this day, many Peruvians remember him as a priest who never hesitated to walk alongside the country’s poorest and most forgotten.

The unlikely blend of US and Latin America

One of the most distinctive aspects of Pope Leo XIV’s leadership may be his ability to bridge two regions across the same hemisphere. Within the Vatican, he was informally known as the “Latin American Yankee,” a nickname that captures both his dual identity and his capacity to bridge a hemisphere that increasingly finds itself at odds. While the Catholic Church is rarely seen as a central force in US–Latin American relations—with the notable exception of Archbishop Óscar Romero’s outspoken role in El Salvador’s civil war between the US-backed right-wing government and leftist guerrillas in the 1970s—it retains profound cultural and political influence in both places. The church shapes civic life, public debate, and electoral outcomes.

A pope who understands both the hopes of a campesino (small-scale farmer) in northern Peru and the concerns of a middle-class worker in the US Midwest is uniquely positioned to act as a moral and diplomatic bridge. To do so, he will need to carefully weigh his rhetoric on US politics, particularly on immigration, and forge a message of peace that cuts across political divides in the United States—no small feat at a time of increasing political polarization. As a result, Pope Leo XIV could help inspire a shift toward a US–Latin American relationship grounded not just in transactional interests, but in dignity, shared values, and common humanity.

Martin Cassinelli, a native of Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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The 2025 Distinguished Leadership Awards: Honoring leaders who demonstrate ‘the true meaning of bravery and service’

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 May 2025 03:12:51 +0000

“Tonight, we are gathered not only to celebrate global leadership, but to honor extraordinary courage,” said Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Distinguished Leadership Awards in Washington, DC, on Thursday. “The kind that changes the course of history and reminds us all of the true meaning of bravery and service.”

Before a crowd of high-level attendees from government, business, the military, civil society, and the media, the Atlantic Council honored six leaders who have shown such courage through their service, leadership, and activism.

Stephen Hadley, a former US national security advisor and an executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors, was honored for his decades of public service across three US administrations. 

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković was recognized for his efforts to advance Croatia’s economic development and his role in advancing the country’s accession to the European Union.

General (ret.) John W. “Jay” Raymond was honored for his pioneering role as the first chief of space operations for the US Space Force.

Victor Pinchuk, a Ukrainian businessman and philanthropist who founded EastOne, YES, and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, was awarded for his support for Ukrainian soldiers and civil society since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Judy Collins, a Grammy Award-winning and Academy Award-nominated singer and songwriter, was honored for her work promoting mental health awareness, civil rights, and environmental conservation. 

The final honorees of the evening were Ukrainian war heroes and veterans who have risked their lives to defend their country’s sovereignty and freedom from Russian aggression.

“Seldom has so much been at stake for the liberties and the collective interests of people and cultures and countries everywhere,” said Atlantic Council Chairman John F.W. Rogers. “Against this backdrop, the Atlantic Council continues its commitment to meet these challenges of the moment and to help chart a path forward.”

Below are more highlights from the ceremony. 

Judy Collins: “Music is, I think, the heart of most things in life”

Introducing Collins, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht said that in addition to her decades-spanning career as a singer and songwriter, “her artistry extends far beyond the stage and the recording studio,” citing her mental health awareness and environmental advocacy.

Arsht said that Collins was “an outstanding humanitarian” defined not only by her “unmistakable voice,” but also her “unwavering compassion.”

“In this room,” Collins said, “there is so much energy, and so much intelligence, and so much vision. And I’m sure we can solve these things that are going on in the world.”

“Music, is, I think the heart of most things in life,” said Collins. “We have work to do, we have celebrations to make, and music helps us to do it.”

After accepting the Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award, she performed the Stephen Sondheim song “Send in the Clowns,” which was a Billboard-charting hit for Collins in 1975.

Stephen J. Hadley: “Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity.”

“When the United States does not lead, either nothing happens or bad things happen,” said Hadley in a discussion with Rogers on the United States’ role in the world after accepting the Distinguished Service Award. “And I think this is a lesson that’s been lost on the American people.”

“If you want to really advance the peace, prosperity, safety, and security of the American people,” said Hadley, “you need a strategy. You need to define what you want, how you’re going to get there. Otherwise, you’re going to flounder.”

Noting that there are many US government agencies and departments that work on foreign policy, Hadley emphasized the importance of getting them to coordinate and cooperate toward the same objectives. “Good process does not dictate good policy,” he said, “but good policy is harder to achieve without good process.”

“You need to take the time to build a bipartisan support for foreign policy initiatives,” Hadley said, to ensure that they “last across administrations and so they can stay in place long enough to produce the results that they’re intended to produce.”

Hadley called the debate over whether the United States should pursue its values or its interests abroad “a false choice.” Advancing US values, he said “makes a world that is more congenial to American interests and is more congenial to the prosperity, security, and safety of the American people.”

Addressing policymakers who take a more transactional and less values-based view of US foreign policy interests, Hadley said: “Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity. There’s a lot still relevant here today.”

In a pre-recorded video message, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who served with Hadley during the George W. Bush administration, praised Hadley for serving with a “steady hand” and a “complete commitment” to the United States’ role abroad, as well as for carrying out US policies with “principle and with values at the center of them.”

Andrej Plenković: “We remain committed to preserving the transatlantic bond”

Plenković, receiving the Distinguished International Leadership Award, said his nine years in office have been “shaped by a growing number of global crises,” as “governing today is no longer a matter of routine decision-making—it is an ongoing exercise in resilience and crisis management.”

Plenković described his government’s “vision” as making Croatia stand among the “most advanced, stable, and prosperous nations,” but noted that the country’s path to this goal “has not been easy.”

Croatia began this journey “from the ashes of war and destruction” in the early 1990s, he said, but the country’s “determination was forged” in this difficult past.

“Croatia, as a committed transatlantic ally, will continue to stand with America,” Plenković said. He told of influential Croats who made their mark in the United States, including Medal of Honor recipient Peter Tomich, winemaker Mike Grgich, oil explorer Anthony Lucas, sculptor Ivan Meštrović, and inventor Nikola Tesla.

Together, he said, the United States and Croatia are “committed to preserving the transatlantic bond as the cornerstone of a free and democratic world.”

“Anything less,” said Plenković, would “weaken both Europe and the United States and only embolden those who challenge our shared values. This truth holds in Ukraine today, as it did in Croatia in the ‘90s, and wherever freedom is under threat.”

In his introductory remarks, former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango praised Plenković for bringing “continuity, stability, and a clear strategic vision” to Croatia, citing the country’s recent accession to the Schengen Area and strong economic growth.

John W. Raymond: “To effectively operate in the space domain we must have global partners”

In accepting the Distinguished Military Leadership Award, Raymond said that it was in recognition of “the nearly sixteen thousand civilian and military guardians” who volunteered to join the US Space Force after it was established in 2019, adding that because of their service “our nation and our allies are better postured to meet the incredibly complex strategic environment that we face.”

“To effectively operate in the space domain, we must have global partners,” said Raymond, noting that the Space Force expanded Combined Space Operations to include Five Eyes members as well as other allies and partners and has strengthened its ties with NATO.

The force has also partnered with the US commercial space industry, which Raymond said “provides us and our allies and partners great advantage.”

Noting that US war plans “are all sized assuming we have access to space,” Raymond warned that given the threats being developed by US adversaries, “this is a flawed assumption. We no longer have the luxury of taking space for granted.”

Amid these growing threats, Raymond said that space capabilities can enhance overall deterrence and that “if we can successfully deter conflict from beginning or extending into space, then we have a chance of deterring conflict from spilling over into other domains.” The space domain, he said, “represents our best hope.”

Raymond was introduced by former House Armed Services Committee Chairman William “Mac” Thornberry, a major advocate for the Space Force’s establishment. Thornberry said Raymond’s early precedent-setting moves for the Space Force “set the new service on a path that grows more crucial and also more contested every moment.”

Victor Pinchuk: “Security guarantees are vital”

Pinchuk said that on first learning he would be honored with the Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award, he thought to himself that “this is the wrong time for a Ukrainian businessman to get an award” given the continued suffering of the Ukrainian people during wartime.

However, he concluded that “if I go to Washington, I can be useful,” as this would allow him to speak to a US audience about “Ukrainian heroes” fighting against Russia, “express our deep gratitude to the United States” for military assistance, and emphasize the importance of a security guarantee for a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Pinchuk highlighted the bravery of two Ukrainian veterans in the audience. Dmytro Finashyn, he noted, lost his arm in combat but returned to service first as an intelligence officer and then as an adviser to the interior minister on veterans’ affairs. Liudmyla Meniuk, Pinchuk told the audience, joined the army at age fifty-two after her son was killed in the war, later becoming the first Ukrainian woman to lead an armored unit.

Pinchuk said he was grateful to the United States for its support for Kyiv and thanked US President Donald Trump for recently authorizing a weapons sale to Ukraine. He called the US-Ukraine minerals deal “momentous,” adding that he called it the “Minerals for Peace Accord.”

“Ukrainians understand, an end to the war now is possible only in a not perfect way,” he said, adding that no one would be completely satisfied with the peace settlement and that “some goals maybe will take many years to achieve.”

However, Pinchuk emphasized that when Russian leaders speak of addressing the “root cause” of the war in negotiations, what they mean is “the existence of Ukraine” as a free and democratic country with the rule of law. “It is the ‘mistake’ of the existence of Ukraine that our enemy wants to ‘address,’ which means—remove, delete, annihilate.”

“This is why security guarantees are vital,” said Pinchuk. “And nobody in the world can imagine such guarantees” without the participation of the United States, he said.

“Victor is truly Ukraine’s renaissance man,” said David M. Rubenstein, co-founder and co-chairman of the Carlyle Group, while introducing Pinchuk. Rubenstein commended him for his philanthropic work helping Ukraine, which since Russia’s full-scale invasion has included the creation of programs that operate rehabilitation centers for wounded Ukrainian veterans and provide mental health services to returning soldiers.

Ukrainian war heroes and veterans

Speaking on behalf of the delegation of nine Ukrainian soldiers and veterans being honored for their service, Daniel Salem thanked the United States for its “crucial support” for his country’s war effort.
“The cancer—the second name for war—spreads beyond the Russian-Ukraine war,” Salem said. “It spreads all over the world.”
“The people that you see in front of you are representative of a strong nation, like yours,” Salem told the audience. “An honorable nation, like yours. People with dreams, as you do have dreams. And we all know that in the way of achieving your dreams you must apply discipline, commitment, consistency. Because without commitment, you don’t know how to start, and without consistency we won’t know how to finish.”
Ukraine, Salem said, had already proven “that we are the home of the brave.” With US help, he added, Ukraine will be able to say it is “the land of the free.”

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Putin’s parade cynically exploits WWII to justify his own criminal invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 May 2025 02:13:09 +0000

Dozens of foreign leaders are expected in Moscow on May 9 for the largest international event in the Russian capital since Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than three years ago. Officially, they are gathering for a military parade to mark eighty years since the World War II victory over Nazi Germany, but it is already apparent that the shadow of Russia’s current war in Ukraine will loom large over the entire spectacle.

The guest list for Friday’s Victory Day parade on Red Square reflects the dramatic geopolitical realignments that have taken place since 2022, and underlines the widening rift between Putin’s Russia and the democratic world. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s showpiece annual parade had been attended by many Western leaders including US President George W. Bush. This year, however, the guest of honor will be Chinese President Xi Jinping. He will be joined by the Brazilian president along with a host of Central Asian and African leaders. The sole representative from the European Union will be Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Visiting dignitaries will be treated to a bold demonstration of modern Russia’s military might. The mood is expected to be far detached from the kind of somber tones more typically associated with World War II memorials elsewhere. Friday’s parade has been been carefully choreographed to emphasize Russian strength while projecting Putin’s supreme confidence in eventual victory over Ukraine.

The link to today’s war will be hammered home by the participation of numerous Russian military units accused of committing war crimes in Ukraine. Putin may also choose to surround himself with alleged war criminals from the ranks of his invading army, as he did last year. In his official address, it will be genuinely shocking if Putin does not attempt to draw direct parallels between the struggle against Nazi Germany and his own ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine.

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Even without the involvement of Russian troops fresh from the front lines of the current war, it would be virtually impossible to separate Putin’s parade from the Kremlin propaganda justifying the invasion of Ukraine. Ever since Russia first set out to subjugate Ukraine more than ten years ago, the Kremlin has portrayed its escalating invasion as a continuation of the World War II fight against Germany, with Ukrainians cast in the role of modern-day successors to the Nazis. Despite an almost complete lack of evidence to support these absurd and obscene claims, the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative continues to resonate among a Russia population that has been utterly saturated in an extreme form of World War II mythology that often borders on religious fanaticism.

From the very first years of his reign, Putin has sought to place the Soviet Union’s World War II experience at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. For the Kremlin, this emphasis on the immense suffering and ultimate triumph of the Soviet war effort has served as the ideal ideological antidote to the horrors of Stalinism and the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. It has proved a highly effective strategy, helping to rebuild Russia’s battered national pride and giving new meaning to the country’s twentieth century totalitarian trauma.

Putin’s war cult has centered around Victory Day, which has emerged over the past 25 years as by far the most important holiday on the Russian calendar. Many outside observers assume Victory Day always enjoyed similar prominence, but that is not the case. In fact, Stalin himself discouraged commemorations and made May 9 a working day in 1947. It remained so until the mid-1960s, when Victory Day was declared a public holiday. Nevertheless, there was none of the pomp and fanfare currently associated with the anniversary of the Nazi surrender. In the 46 years between the end of World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow hosted a grand total of just four Victory Day parades.

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Putin’s cynical exploitation of World War II has also shaped Russian rhetoric on the international stage. This has been most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine, which Kremlin propaganda has consistently portrayed as a Nazi state. Russia’s lurid claims have proved remarkably resistant to reality, with even the 2019 election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president of Ukraine failing to force a change in tactics. Instead, Putin and other leading Kremlin officials have resorted to ever more ridiculous mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi country could elect a Jewish leader. In one particularly notorious incident during the first months of the invasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots by declaring that Adolf Hitler also had “Jewish blood.”

When Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the fateful morning of February 24, 2022, it came as no surprise that he identified “denazification” as one his two key war aims. The true meaning of this chilling phrase has since become abundantly clear; “denazification” is actually Kremlin code for “de-Ukrainianization,” and reflects Putin’s end goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

In areas of Ukraine that have fallen under Kremlin control since the start of the invasion, the occupation authorities are systematically wiping out all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, and national identity. Thousands of children have been abducted and subjected to indoctrination in a bid to rob them of their Ukrainian nationality, while anyone seen as potentially loyal to Ukraine has been detained and dispatched to a vast network of prisons where torture is reportedly routine. Europe has not witnessed atrocities on this scale since World War II.

For decades, most European countries have marked the end of World War II with solemn memorial services while collectively vowing “never again.” Under Putin, Russians have come to embrace an altogether more menacing form of militant remembrance accompanied by the unofficial slogan “we can repeat it.”

Putin has already succeeded in weaponizing the memory of World War II to consolidate his grip on power, garner domestic support for his expansionist foreign policy, and dehumanize his enemies. He is now poised to use this week’s Victory Day parade in Moscow to legitimize the criminal invasion of Ukraine among his foreign guests and place it in the same context as the fight against Hitler. This is staggeringly disrespectful. It is also historically illiterate. If anyone today is guilty of echoing the crimes of the Nazis, it is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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US-led peace talks hampered by Trump’s reluctance to pressure Putin

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:20:14 +0000

During the 2024 election campaign, US President Donald Trump famously vowed to end the Russian war on Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Three months into his presidency, the US leader now appears to be rapidly losing patience with a faltering peace process that is showing few signs of progress. Trump stated on April 18 that he wanted a ceasefire agreement in place quickly and would “take a pass” if Moscow or Kyiv “make it very difficult” to reach a peace deal.

Trump’s latest comments reflect mounting US frustration. Speaking on the same day in Paris, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US may soon “move on” from efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if there is no progress in the coming days. “We are now reaching a point where we need to decide whether this is even possible or not,” Rubio told reporters.

It is not difficult to see why the Trump White House is feeling discouraged. While Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire on March 11, Russia has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has offered a long list of excuses and additional conditions. This has led to accusations that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no real interest in peace and is deliberately engaging in stalling tactics in a bid to drag out negotiations and continue the war until he has political control of Ukraine.

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Critics of Trump say he has been too reluctant to pressure Putin and has done little to convince the Kremlin dictator that the time has come to abandon his invasion. They claim Trump has consistently signaled his readiness to offer Russia concessions while adopting a noticeably tougher stance toward Ukraine. This has included multiple statements blaming Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

Since the very early stages of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has ruled out the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO. This was recently underlined by US envoy General Keith Kellogg, who confirmed that NATO membership for Ukraine was “off the table.” Kellogg’s comments were welcomed by the Kremlin. “Of course, this is something that causes us satisfaction and coincides with our position,” noted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

The US has also made clear that it expects Europe to play a leading role in any peace settlement, including the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent any future repeat of Russia’s current invasion. This is part of a broader foreign policy transition that looks set to see the United States reduce its historic commitment to European security in order to focus more on Asia.

After taking office in January, Trump threatened to target Putin’s energy sector and extended some existing sanctions, but he has so far chosen not to impose any additional economic measures against Moscow. When Trump unveiled landmark new tariffs in early April, Russia was one of the few major economies not on the list.

US officials said the decision not to impose tariffs was because bilateral trade had already effectively stopped due to sanctions imposed following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, trade with Russia is greater than trade with a number of countries subject to the new tariffs. Meanwhile, Trump and other US officials have frequently talked up the prospect for greater economic cooperation between Russia and the United States.

In the diplomatic arena, the Trump White House has sought to avoid direct criticism of Russia in favor of more neutral messaging that prioritizes the need for peace. This approach has seen the United States siding with Moscow at the United Nations and voting against UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. US officials also reportedly refused to back a statement by the G7 group of nations condemning Russia’s recent Palm Sunday attack on the Ukrainian city of Sumy, which killed dozens of civilians.

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The Kremlin has responded approvingly to the dramatic recent shift in the United States approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In early March, Russian officials noted that US foreign policy now “largely coincides with our vision.” However, while Putin has good reason to welcome the Trump administration’s stance on Ukraine, he has so far shown little interest in reciprocating by offering any concessions of his own. Far from it, in fact. Since the start of bilateral talks with the United States in February, the Russian military has significantly increased its bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. In recent weeks, Russian forces have launched a major new spring offensive in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s negotiating position in ongoing US-led talks is similarly hard line and reflects Russia’s continued commitment to ending Ukrainian independence. Moscow’s demands include official recognition of Russian control over four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, a complete end to all Western military support for Kyiv, and the drastic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force, apparently with the intention of leaving Ukraine defenseless against a future phase of Russia’s invasion.

Russia’s uncompromising current approach reflects Putin’s conviction that he can eventually outlast the West in Ukraine, and that by saying no, he will push Trump to offer more concessions. So far, Putin’s logic appears to be working. Trump’s efforts to win over the Kremlin seem to have convinced many in Moscow that they are now firmly on track to secure an historic victory and have no reason to offer any meaningful concessions. If Trump is serious about achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine, he must demonstrate that he is prepared to turn up the pressure on Putin and increase the costs of continuing the invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s domestic legal system has been overwhelmed by the scale and the gravity of the war crimes allegations against Russia. For example, since the onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022, more than 156,000 investigations into potential war crimes have been opened. As of March 2025, only around 150 verdicts had been reached, mostly in absentia.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has taken some bold steps to help secure justice for Ukraine, most notably charging Russian President Vladimir Putin for his involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While this is certainly welcome, the ICC can only be expected to handle a small number of cases involving the most senior Russian officials.

Meanwhile, recent US cuts to international assistance threaten to impact existing efforts to hold Russia responsible for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. This has underlined the need to explore alternative formats that can help Kyiv overcome existing gaps in capacity-building.

One possibility would be to broaden the mandate of a proposed special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leadership for the crime of aggression. Ukraine and its partners recently agreed to establish a tribunal in hybrid format with international and domestic components operating under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

While there is significant international support for efforts to put Russia’s military and political leaders on trial for the crime of aggression, the potentially political nature of this charge has raised some concerns. Expanding the mandate of a future tribunal to include other serious crimes could help garner more support and address any reservations regarding political legitimacy.

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Another possibility would be to expand international partnerships within Ukraine’s domestic legal system to enhance its ability to address alleged Russian war crimes. This hybrid approach would build on existing practice that has seen a number of countries providing investigators, prosecutors, forensic specialists, and other experts in recent years.

Foreign investigators and prosecutors could be formally inserted into specialized units at the investigative and prosecutorial level to work alongside their Ukrainian colleagues. This would significantly increase capacity, while also potentially improving the quality of investigative efforts. Further down the line, it may prove possible to introduce foreign judges in a similar manner.

This approach could draw on past experience and current international efforts, including those related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic (CAR). If tailored to meet the specific requirements of the Ukrainian justice system, this could serve as an improvement over the well-meaning but somewhat scattershot efforts of Ukraine’s partners to date.

Some skeptics have suggested that any new justice mechanisms for Ukraine would compete with the ICC in terms of jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Advocates counter that new mechanisms could in fact coexist with the ICC, complementing rather duplicating the work being done in The Hague.

ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has voiced support for the work of the CAR Special Criminal Court and recently endorsed the idea of a hybrid mechanism for the Democratic Republic of Congo. If applied effectively, this approach could make it possible for Ukraine to prosecute the kind of mid-level perpetrators who are beyond the mandate of the ICC.

Adopting new approaches to the issue of accountability for alleged war crimes committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine can bring hope for justice and lay the foundations for a sustainable peace. A strengthened Ukrainian justice system could also play an important role in the country’s postwar progress on the path toward EU membership and further Western integration.

Nadia Volkova is the founder and head of the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG). Eric Witte is an independent international justice consultant who has worked at the International Criminal Court and Special Court for Sierra Leone. Arie Mora is an advocacy manager at the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG).

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The war crimes accusations leveled against the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine extend far beyond the detentions highlighted by UN investigators. The most widely publicized charges relate to the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of vulnerable Ukrainian children. Russia is believed to have kidnapped tens of thousands of young Ukrainians and placed them in camps or foster homes, where they are often subjected to brainwashing programs designed to rob them of their Ukrainian identity and transform them into Russians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his role in these mass abductions.

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, the authorities are working methodically to remove all symbols of Ukrainian statehood and erase any traces of Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian language has been suppressed along with Ukrainian literature, history, and cultural heritage. Schools now teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that glorifies Russian imperialism while demonizing Ukraine. Any parents who attempt to resist the indoctrination of their children risk losing custody.

Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are being pressured into accepting Russian citizenship. Those who refuse to take Russian passports are denied access to basic services such as healthcare and pensions, and are unable to register their property with the occupation authorities. This so-called passportization campaign recently entered a new phase, with the Kremlin announcing that anyone who fails to acquire Russian citizenship within the next six months will be subject to potential deportation from their own homes.

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Fears over the future fate of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country were heightened recently by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s apparent endorsement of sham referendums staged by the Kremlin in 2022 to justify the seizure of Ukrainian lands. “There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule,” he told Tucker Carlson in an interview that set off alarm bells across Europe.

The furor over Witkoff’s comments was hardly surprising. Russia’s fig leaf referendums in occupied Ukraine had been roundly rejected at the time by the vast majority of the international community, including many of Russia’s traditional supporters. “The United States will never recognize these illegal attempts to seize territory that does not belong to Russia,” the US State Department declared.

The September 2022 ballots lacked even a basic semblance of legitimacy, with voting taking place at gunpoint. Indeed, in many instances, the captive population were visited in their homes by election officials accompanied by armed soldiers. Such Kafkaesque scenes are nothing new for the Kremlin, which has been staging similarly farcical “referendums” to justify acts of international aggression since the Stalin era. Prior to Witkoff, however, no senior Western official had attempted to offer their stamp of approval.

The new UN report detailing Russian crimes against humanity in occupied Ukraine is particularly timely. Peace talks initiated by US President Donald Trump in recent weeks have focused largely on the possible partition of Ukraine, with negotiating teams working to determine potential boundaries. But while Trump talks of “dividing up the lands,” millions of lives are also at stake. It is therefore crucial to highlight the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine and the crimes being committed by the Kremlin. While it may not be militarily feasible to liberate these regions at present, safeguarding the basic human rights of Ukrainian residents living under Russian occupation should be an important aspect of any negotiated settlement.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The enforced adoption of Russian citizenship is just one of the many tools being employed by the Kremlin to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to mass arrests designed to root out any potential dissenters. Those targeted typically include elected officials, military veterans, religious leaders, civil society activists, teachers, journalists, and patriots. Thousands have been abducted in this manner since 2022 and remain unaccounted for, with many thought to be languishing in a network of prisons in Russian-occupied Ukraine and Russia itself.

Those who remain are subjected to terror tactics in conditions that Britain’s The Economist has described as a “totalitarian hell.” All public symbols of Ukrainian statehood and cultural identity are being systematically dismantled. The Ukrainian language is suppressed, while any Christian denominations other than the Russian Orthodox Church face persecution or worse.

Moscow’s efforts to erase Ukrainian identity begin in the classroom. In schools throughout the occupied regions, Ukrainian children are being taught a new Kremlin-approved curriculum that praises Russian imperialism and glorifies the ongoing invasion of Ukraine while demonizing the entire concept of a separate and independent Ukrainian state. Any parents who dare to resist risk losing custody of their children.

The Kremlin is also accused of kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from occupied regions and deporting them to Russia, where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian roots and impose an imperial Russian identity. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin due his personal involvement in these mass abductions of Ukrainian children.

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The actions of the Russian occupation authorities are entirely in line with the vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric coming from Putin himself and other officials in Moscow. Putin has long insisted that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Six months prior to the full-scale invasion, he took the highly unusual step of publishing a lengthy history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood.

As Russian troops prepared to invade in February 2022, Putin sought to justify this act of international aggression by describing Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has declared occupied Ukrainian territory to be “Russian forever.”

The Russian establishment has enthusiastically followed Putin’s lead. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has stated that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” Meanwhile, poisonous anti-Ukrainian language has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.”

This week’s presidential decree threatening to deport Ukrainians from their own homes is the latest reminder that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no mere border dispute or attempt to address legitimate security concerns. It is a colonial war of the most brutal kind that aims to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. In the heart of Europe and before the watching world, Putin is openly pursuing policies that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide.

The grim reality of Russia’s invasion should weigh heavily on the US officials who are currently charged with drawing lines on maps and attempting to create a realistic framework for a possible ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. While diplomatic compromises and temporary territorial concessions are now clearly inevitable, any future peace deal must also take into account the fate of the millions of Ukrainians who are likely to be left under Russian occupation.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Silencing Voice of America will only strengthen autocrats around the world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 18:53:47 +0000

United States President Donald Trump has moved to shut down a series of prominent US-funded international media outlets including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as he continues efforts to cut government spending and reshape US foreign policy. In a March 15 statement, the White House said the decision “will ensure that taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”

Critics fear the move will strengthen the position of authoritarian regimes around the world while leaving millions of people in closed societies without access to independent information. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus called the step “a massive gift to America’s enemies.” He warned that the shutdown would make the United States weaker and would be celebrated by “the Iranian Ayatollahs, Chinese communist leaders, and autocrats in Moscow and Minsk.”

Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of numerous activists from the front lines of the fight against resurgent authoritarianism to voice their alarm over the closures. For many people living in authoritarian societies, outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have provided an objective and trustworthy alternative to what is often a heavily censored domestic information space. Kara-Murza suggested the demise of these outlets would be toasted in Moscow and beyond. “One more champagne bottle opened in the Kremlin,” he quipped.

As expected, the shutdown of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America was enthusiastically welcomed on prime time Russian state TV. Margarita Simonyan, who heads Russia’s flagship international media platform RT and state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, called the news an “awesome decision by Trump.” Meanwhile, fellow Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov took time out from fantasizing about a nuclear attack on Britain to mock the more than one thousand journalists now facing an uncertain future. “You are nasty, lying, deplorable traitors to the motherland. Go and die in a ditch,” he commented.

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For decades, authoritarian regimes ranging from Nazi Germany to Communist China have griped against the influence of US-funded independent media outlets, and have adopted various measures to try and block them. Voice of America was first set up in 1942 at the height of World War II, while Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was established in 1950 during the early years of the Cold War to provide uncensored information to people living behind the Iron Curtain.

Initially focused on radio broadcasts, these outlets and their numerous affiliates have evolved over time to become multimedia platforms reaching hundreds of millions of people every week. This has never been a purely altruistic endeavor; advocates maintain that providing access to objective information abroad strengthens the US position internationally.

Until their dramatic recent shutdown, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and many other regional pro-democracy platforms such as Radio Free Asia were all overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM). While often the subject of debate in the United States due to allegations of political bias and doubts over their continued effectiveness, recent studies have indicated that they remained widely recognized by international audiences as important sources of unfiltered information.

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Despite being funded by the US government, the network adhered to a code of journalistic integrity and objectivity similar to the charters governing the work of other state-funded media such as the BBC. This independence from governmental editorial oversight had on occasion led to issues with United States officials. Some within the Trump White House attempted to justify the decision to cut funding by claiming that these state-funded broadcasters had become overly politicized and were no longer representative of the values the new administration wished to project.

The international impact of the USAGM stable of media outlets is perhaps most immediately apparent in the number of journalists jailed or otherwise targeted by authoritarian regimes for their professional activities. At present, ten journalists and staff members from USAGM-affiliated outlets are being held in countries including Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Myanmar. Following news of the shutdowns, Ukrainian journalist Stanislav Aseyev posted that while imprisoned by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, he was subjected to electric shock torture specifically because he had previously worked for Radio Liberty.

The timing of Trump’s decision to shut down the United States international broadcasting network could hardly be worse. In today’s increasingly multipolar world, the information space is an critical front in the escalating global struggle between rival democratic and authoritarian camps. This has long been recognized by China and Russia, with both countries committing vast annual budgets to support sophisticated international media activities in a variety of guises. The US was previously seen as the world leader in this soft power contest, but that is suddenly no longer the case. Generations of autocratic regimes never did manage to silence Voice of America, but the Trump administration has now done so themselves.

Mercedes Sapuppo is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A light in the darkness: Why RFE/RL matters now more than ever

Muhammad Tahir — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:34:50 +0000

It was in the middle of a bitterly cold night in 2014 when my phone rang. At first, I ignored it. Then came a second call, and a third. The persistent buzzing was enough to jolt me awake. When I finally answered, a distressed female voice met me on the other end.

“They’re kicking me out of my home. I have two kids. Nowhere to go. I live in Mikrorayon,” she said, her voice breaking under desperation. She was referring to one of countless Cold War–era housing blocks built by successive regimes across the Soviet nations. Behind her, frantic voices clashed.

I knew that sound well. It was the sound of fear.

This was not unusual. As the director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen Service, locally known as Azatlyk, I often received such calls—cries for help in a country where independent journalism is considered a threat.

Turkmenistan, like many of the authoritarian regimes RFE/RL has covered, was built on the iron grip of a single ruler. Dissent was crushed, voices silenced, and truth distorted. RFE/RL was for many the only major source of news free from government manipulation.

The woman on the phone, whom I will call Maya, was a young widow with two children, the youngest just six months old. That night, city officials had come to demolish her home under the national leader’s so-called “beautification” campaign in the capital city Ashgabat.

When she saw the municipal workers approaching her home, she slammed the door shut, pressed her back against it, and, in that moment of desperation, reached for the only thing she believed could bring hope and protection: RFE/RL.

After gathering details, we did the only thing we could: We made a call to the local municipality. It was a simple act of journalism. We asked why a young widow with children was being thrown onto the streets in freezing temperatures.

That call was enough. The officials withdrew—not out of mercy, but out of fear. It was fear that the leader of the nation might catch wind of the story—that, as in many similar cases, he might view it as a stain on his image and make those responsible pay the price.

This is the power of RFE/RL. It is not just a news organization, but a shield for those whose own governments have abandoned them. In Turkmenistan, as in many of the places the organization serves, there are no fair and impartial courts to turn to, no free press to expose wrongdoing, no way for many citizens to hold power accountable. Without RFE/RL, Maya’s story would never have been heard. And she would have been just another forgotten casualty of authoritarian rule.

In recent days, however, the Trump administration has raised the specter of a world without RFE/RL. On March 15, the US Agency for Global Media terminated the funding grant for RFE/RL, endangering the organization’s ability to provide journalism for millions of people who would struggle otherwise to get access to news that is not controlled by an authoritarian government.

What’s the price of truth?

The recent decision to cut funding for RFE/RL along with its sister networks—Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting—is not just a financial cutback. It is a major blow to the millions who rely on it.

For decades, these networks have signaled that the United States has not turned its back on those living under the rule of autocrats and radical extremists. They have served as a voice for the silenced, a bridge connecting the oppressed to the world beyond their borders.

RFE/RL’s annual budget was $142 million in fiscal year 2024. That is slightly less than the cost of three Apache helicopters, the same type of aircraft that was lost in large numbers over two decades of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with little lasting progress to show for it.

With that single investment, RFE/RL reaches nearly 47 million people each week, broadcasting in twenty-seven local languages across regions spanning from Russia to the Balkans, from Iran to Central Asia, and all the countries in between.

In the tribal regions of Pakistan, where the Taliban’s grip remains strong, the alternative to RFE/RL’s Pashto-language Mashaal Radio is what locals call “Mullah Radio”—an extremist-run broadcast spewing radical propaganda.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service exposed war crimes while Russian state media flooded the airwaves with propaganda. Now, as Russia tightens its grip on Central Asia and China expands its influence in the region, RFE/RL remains an important line of defense against a rising tide of disinformation.

Hope, even in darkness

When I first joined RFE/RL in 2003, it had already been the lifeline for millions behind the Iron Curtain for over half a century. I remember when former Czech President Václav Havel visited RFE/RL headquarters. He spoke of growing up under communism, of listening to RFE/RL in secret, and of how those broadcasts carried the hope that one day freedom would come.

Havel wasn’t alone. Generations of dissidents, reformers, and ordinary citizens across Eastern Europe and Central Asia have similar stories. They drew strength from the words they heard in the media outlet’s broadcasts.. And when the Iron Curtain finally fell, they didn’t just see journalists at RFE/RL—they saw the voices that had never abandoned them.

Now, if the voice of RFE/RL and its sister networks is silenced, then what will fill the void? Chinese state media? Russian disinformation? The Taliban’s “Mullah Radio?” These forces have long pursued this outcome—weaponizing intimidation, censorship, harassment, and violence. Yet so far they have failed. The leaders of Iran, China, Russia, and Belarus are likely cheering the position in which these channels now find themselves. With no counterbalance, the propaganda of these regimes could go unchecked.

This outcome also would contradict the Trump administration’s own stated commitment to free speech, depriving millions of access to independent journalism. In many of its broadcast regions, RFE/RL remains one of the last sources, if not the only source, of truth.

History has shown that when free media disappears, oppression often takes its place.

For Maya, and for the millions like her, RFE/RL must endure.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former RFE/RL executive who dedicated eighteen years to advancing independent journalism and press freedom in some of the world’s most restrictive environments.

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Inside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s diplomatic offensive with Syria’s Christians and Ismailis

Gregory Waters — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:48:44 +0000

Shortly after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) drove Bashar al-Assad out of Syria last year, the group pledged to respect the rights of minorities. Yet, since HTS took control over much of the country, some across the international community have raised fears that Syria’s new leaders—with their jihadist backgrounds—might erode minority rights or exclude these communities from the political transition process. These fears have been newly flamed by the massive, targeted violence against Alawites on Syria’s coast during the second week of March. Nevertheless, there have been some signs for optimism about the inclusion of at least some minorities in post-Assad Syria.

This analysis draws on my conversations with members of these groups as well as HTS leadership over the past several years as a consultant with the International Crisis Group and an independent researcher. The people I spoke with were granted anonymity given the tenuous security situation in the country and their ongoing political work.

There are legitimate reasons for worry, specifically about the future of the Alawite community. In March, Alawite insurgents linked to the former regime launched a coordinated attack against security forces. Government forces, independent armed factions, and Sunni vigilantes mobilized in response, engaging in nearly four days of mass executions, killing more than six hundred Alawite civilians and detained insurgents. The insurgency by ex-regime elements is still ongoing.

This violence and the state’s inability to control both its own forces and the independent forces has reignited fears over minorities’ safety, but these devastating events should not be viewed as indicative of the fate of other minorities. The violence is rooted in the fact that, over Syria’s brutal civil war, Alawite men formed the core of the regime’s fighting forces and intelligence apparatus and that the Alawite sect has come to be linked to the regime via both Assad’s policies and Sunni extremist narratives. These political and social dynamics do not apply to other minority groups.

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For the other minority groups, there are positive indications that they will be included in post-Assad Syria. Even before entering Damascus, HTS had been reaching out to Syria’s minorities in Idlib for sensitive, but successful, diplomatic engagement for five years. Christian leaders in Idlib told me in a meeting in 2022 that HTS had consistently reached out to them, first through senior religious figures and then through dedicated political attachés. HTS appointed these individuals—and thus engaged with these communities—directly, rather than through the Syrian Salvation Government that HTS and other opposition groups had formed to administer Idlib. These political attachés came to serve as advocates for the local communities, representing their demands to the Salvation Government and HTS security forces.

Through this, Christians in rural Idlib gradually regained control over their homes and farms and restarted public prayers. Additionally, security forces halted attacks on Christian communities. The engagement process was long and arduous, and, as HTS leaders told me in 2022, early on they were fearful that they’d face backlash from hardliners and populists in Idlib. However, as the years passed and the Christian community grew ever more integrated into Idlib’s society and the local government, HTS’s fears gradually ebbed.

Growing from this experience, HTS engaged with Syrian community and diaspora leaders just days into its final military offensive in late 2024. This diplomatic offensive helped ensure that HTS could sweep through Syria without taking many minority regions by force. The discussions, which took place primarily during the first week of December last year, resulted in a particularly strong relationship between HTS and Syria’s Christian and Ismaili minorities and also ushered in a new era of relations with groups previously seen as close to the regime.

A diplomatic offensive, from Nubl and Zahraa . . .

For example, the collapse of the regime in Aleppo in November last year spread panic through the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa—once lynchpins of the regime’s defensive lines. Local Facebook pages claimed that two thousand Shia civilians had fled their homes, seeking shelter first in Aleppo and then in the town of Safira, where Hezbollah and Iran had built a strong militia network. By December 1, Safira came under at least partial opposition control, and regime forces abandoned the displaced people, resulting in widespread panic on Facebook over the fate of the civilians. On December 2, negotiations officially began between HTS and leaders from the displaced community to return them to their homes in Nubl and Zahraa, according to what an individual who facilitated the talks told me.

The negotiations began after members of the displaced community were able to reach one political activist living abroad, who told me that he helped establish a line to HTS’s political bureau and helped mediate. This initial experience quickly evolved into a small, multi-sect organization of activists representing a range of communities still under Assad’s rule—particularly the Ismaili-dominated cities of Masyaf and Salamiyah—all eager to assist in the peaceful handing over of their communities.

. . . to eastern Hama

This diplomatic approach expanded as HTS advanced on northern Hama. The city of Salamiyah, lying east of Hama, played a crucial role in the regime’s defense as it hosted the headquarters of several important regime militias operating in the countryside. But it also had a vibrant revolutionary movement dating back to the 1980s, particularly led by its Ismaili majority. “Ismailis have always opposed the regime,” one Ismaili activist told me, “but we work through political and civil means, not arms.” Salamiyah is also home to the Syrian National Ismaili Council, which supports and guides the Ismaili community across Syria. These factors opened the door to negotiations with HTS.

I spent several days in Salamiyah in early February, meeting with National Ismaili Council leader Rania Qasim and other security and civil society officials in discussions about the negotiations and resulting relations with HTS. According to Qasim, on December 2, HTS’s political bureau contacted her to initiate talks. The talks were led by Qasim and a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation, an international Ismaili humanitarian organization. The negotiations also included a coordination committee formed by the Ismaili Council’s Emergency Operations Center. Qasim told me that she and the other leaders of the negotiations saw themselves as participating in such talks on behalf of all communities across the Salamiyah region, not just Ismailis.

According to Qasim, the discussion focused on the fate of regime fighters in the region and on how HTS would enter the city of Salamiyah. The council, according to the people I spoke with, refused to provide cover for any criminals in the city, agreeing instead to HTS’s general taswiya (settlement) policy—employed nationally after the fall of Assad—that saw a grace period for all armed men to turn in their weapons and receive temporary civilian identification documents, but it did not provide them with blanket amnesty. In return, it was agreed that pro-regime fighters would lay down their weapons while HTS units simply drove through the main street on their way south to Homs. The coordination committee also agreed it would send a delegation to the outskirts of Salamiyah to meet the HTS convoy and escort them through the city.

These negotiations marked a significant first step in HTS’s relationship with the Ismaili community in Salamiyah. According to Qasim, the council spent the three-day negotiation repeatedly announcing to Salamiyah residents, “the council and the community will not fight; if you want to fight, it will be your own decision.” This message was carried even to some of the most infamous Alawite villages, such as Sabburah, where two pro-revolution Alawite ex-political detainees then worked within their village to ensure the local fighters agreed to lay down their weapons. Yet the Ismaili Council itself has never been affiliated with any armed faction and had no communication with regime military leaders; Qasim emphasized that at no point did they negotiate with or on behalf of any armed regime faction.

Instead, HTS leaders had to trust that the Ismaili Council had the influence needed to pacify the regime militias and ensure HTS’s safe entry into the city and surrounding villages. In fact, there was only one small skirmish—in the village of Tal Khaznah, on the road south to Homs—but otherwise, the handover of eastern Hama on December 4 was peaceful, local security officials and members of the Ismaili Council told me. According to Ismaili leaders in Salamiyah and Tartous, the Assad regime responded to these rapid negotiations by sending security officials to the Ismaili Council in Tartous and threatening them, telling them that their relatives in Salamiyah were “traitors.” However, the regime collapsed before these officials could follow through on any threats.

I was told that throughout this three-day negotiation period, other negotiations also took place on a more individual basis. Opposition fighters from both HTS and other factions who were from Salamiyah had begun reaching out to friends and families in their villages. One young commander remembered calling his family as his unit approached eastern Hama and asking them to connect him with the village’s mukhtar, telling me, “why would I want to risk fighting my father or brother?” He now leads a general security detachment in the countryside around his mixed-sect village, where he sees himself as bound to protect all locals no matter their sect.

The handover of the Salamiyah region was only the beginning of talks between HTS and the Ismaili Council, according to the Ismaili leaders I spoke with. The national council oversees seven regional branches, including ones in Tartous and Masyaf. With the regime still in control of western Syria, the Ismaili Council began negotiating on behalf of communities there. For its part, HTS ended its operations on the Masyaf front the same day it liberated Hama city, pausing its westward advance at the edge of the Ismaili- and Alawite-inhabited foothills. Ismaili leaders also told me that they began to share their positive experiences engaging with HTS with their contacts in the heavily pro-regime Christian towns of Muhradeh and Suqaylabiyah, which had ceased fighting but remained besieged by HTS. Those towns quickly concluded their own negotiations, which saw the peaceful entry of HTS units.

A foundation for a new Syria

The initial negotiations appear to have laid a strong foundation of trust that has extended beyond Salamiyah. According to the head of the Tartous Ismaili Council, HTS’s local military official met with the council the day after entering Tartous. The council was then invited to a general meeting between local representatives and HTS officials, was given a new line of communication with HTS’s political representative, and finally was welcomed to meetings with the new administrator of Tartous governorate. All of this evolved over just ten days. As one Ismaili official in Tartous described it to me, “It seems that the new government truly respects and has a special relationship with the Ismaili community. This came as a huge shock because we had never spoken with them before and had the same fears as the Alawites until December.”

HTS’s diplomatic offensive demonstrates the leadership’s political approach, which evolved over years of engaging with the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. HTS leaders had justified these new policies to me years ago as a political necessity for one day governing a country as diverse as Syria and for legitimizing the movement among minority communities who only knew of the organization from its days as an al-Qaeda affiliate, then called Nusra Front. This understanding that Syria cannot be ruled as an Islamist Sunni country (but instead must be led as a country of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds) has begun to shape the post-Assad era—at least at a local administration and security level.

The initial Salamiyah negotiations laid a strong foundation of cooperation that has continued to grow, ensuring the Ismailis across Syria “feel confident we will be fully represented in the constitutional process,” as a leader from the Tartous office told me. In Salamiyah, the Ismaili Council now plays a central role in the region’s administration, facilitating civil-political engagement, running a volunteer security force to assist local police, and hosting a security committee consisting of both civilian and military representatives to address security gaps and any violations committed by government forces.

Such relations have grown even stronger in the coastal city of Qadmus. According to two local Ismaili activists I spoke with, a small Ismaili volunteer force has been supporting the undermanned government police forces in Qadmus since December. Government forces have even provided these volunteers with small arms, while a new Ismaili-run local council has worked closely with the regime-era mukhtar—also an Ismaili—to coordinate services and administration with the HTS-appointed regional director. The council has also engaged in outreach with the Alawite villages around Qadmus, serving as a bridge between the new local administration and the Alawites.

Despite these efforts, their close relationship with the new government has made the Ismailis in Qadmus a prime target for pro-Assad Alawites, who killed two Ismaili security volunteers in late February and an Ismaili Council member and two government police officers on March 6. When the March uprising began, the Ismailis tried to protect the government forces in the town, eventually negotiating for their safe exit from the area after being besieged by insurgents. However, as a result, they faced widespread threats—by Alawites both in person and over WhatsApp—for “siding with the government,” local residents told me. Security forces eventually peacefully reentered Qadmus, and according to the locals I spoke with, the experience has only strengthened their ties with Damascus. Many Ismaili men have now volunteered to support government security forces, with at least some applying to become official security officers. Meanwhile, local security officials are discussing extending salaries to the entire volunteer force. Despite the events of the past week, the city’s local council continues to serve as an intermediary between local security forces and the Alawite villages, as the former works to negotiate the handover of weapons and wanted criminals.

Meanwhile, Christian civil society leaders in Syria’s tense coastal region also described a strong working relationship with local HTS-appointed administrators and security officials. Although they still have concerns centered on basic services, the economy, and the constitutional process, several activists and local Christian leaders told me in February that they did not fear direct attacks from the new government but rather worried about being caught in the growing violence between Alawites and government forces. Christian leaders across Syria were among the first men engaged by pro-opposition security forces in the days after Assad’s fall, with Facebook pages publishing pictures of meetings between military and political leaders and religious figures in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. As the violence on the coast escalated in March, the head of Aleppo’s Catholic community, Bishop Hanna Jallouf, reiterated the importance of a united Syria, affirmed the good treatment of Christians across the country, and called for a continuation of efforts to fully integrate all minorities into the political process.

These new interfaith and civil-centric networks and relationships will play a central role in shaping post-Assad Syria. However, the new government should do more to engage and empower groups such as the Ismaili and the Christian communities. It should do so both on a local and an international level, by working with groups such as the Aga Khan Foundation (to give Ismailis assurances) and even the Vatican (to do the same with Christians). Such efforts would help expand the local trust built with these groups into genuine representation in Damascus and would give real reason for optimism about the future of Syria’s minorities.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project.

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Nia joins Voice of America to discuss Iran’s human rights violations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:36 +0000

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Dijkstal quoted in Middle East Eye on the treatment of Ahmed al-Doush

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:42:38 +0000

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Pavia joins i24 News to discuss Tunisia’s crackdown on opposition figures and political opponents

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:43 +0000

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Asat quoted in ABC News on the deportation of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand to China

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:42 +0000

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Asat quoted in Breitbart on Thailand’s deportation of 40 Uyghurs

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:41 +0000

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Vladimir Putin does not want peace. He wants to subjugate Ukraine.

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 20:54:16 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has offered an evasive initial response to US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire proposal, backing the idea in principle while listing a series of additional demands that make any meaningful progress unlikely. Officials in Kyiv will be hoping Putin’s reluctance to embrace the US-led ceasefire initiative will help convince their American colleagues that the Kremlin dictator is not genuinely interested in ending the war.

Many in Ukraine have been dismayed by recent US suggestions that Russia is ready for serious peace talks, and have pointed to the Kremlin’s consistently hardline negotiating position as proof of Putin’s determination to fight on. They argue that the current debate over possible compromises and territorial concessions reflects a fundamentally flawed understanding of the maximalist motives behind Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainians feel they have a far more realistic view of Russia’s true intentions. They are convinced Putin will never be satisfied with limited territorial gains because he is not actually fighting for land in Ukraine. Instead, he is waging a war against the very existence of a separate Ukrainian state and nation. This chilling objective undermines the entire concept of a compromise peace. Put simply, there can be no meaningful middle ground between Russian genocide and Ukrainian national survival.

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The Trump White House is not the first to misjudge the extent of Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine. On multiple occasions, the preceding Biden administration declared Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “strategic failure” while pointing to the extremely high cost paid by the Kremlin in terms of military casualties and economic damage. This practical assessment of the invasion assumes that Putin is guided and constrained by the same logic as his Western contemporaries. In reality, however, he is not.

While democratic leaders must worry about approval ratings and economic indicators, Putin has removed virtually all possible sources of domestic opposition and is free to focus on securing his place in Russian history. Since the early years of his reign, he has made no secret of the fact that he views the collapse of the USSR as a tragedy, and regards the post-Cold War world order as an injustice. Crucially, Ukraine has come to embody both of these grievances. Putin firmly believes he cannot hope to achieve his historic mission of reversing the verdict of 1991 and reviving the Russian Empire without first extinguishing Ukrainian independence.

Putin’s obsession with Ukraine has become increasingly apparent over the past two decades as his campaign to subjugate the country has escalated from political interference to military intervention. In 2004, his efforts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a Kremlin-friendly candidate backfired disastrously and helped spark the Orange Revolution. Ten years later, he responded to another Ukrainian pro-democracy revolution by seizing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine.

In the years following the onset of Russia’s military aggression, it gradually became more and more obvious that the limited invasion of 2014 was not delivering the desired outcome of a pro-Russian Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia’s attack was only strengthening Ukraine’s commitment to turn westward and pursue a Euro-Atlantic future. Rather than acknowledging the counter-productive consequences of his military campaign, Putin chose to raise the stakes even further by launching the largest European invasion since World War II.

Over the past three years, Putin has become increasingly open about his intention to erase Ukraine altogether. He has declared occupied Ukrainian regions to be “Russian forever,” and has compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great. Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so normalized in the Russian state media that UN officials believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, throughout areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, Russia is systematically suppressing all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

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Despite the horror and trauma of the Russian invasion, Ukrainians have so far refused to back down. This defiance is a personal humiliation for Putin. It directly undermines his carefully crafted strongman persona, and makes a complete mockery of his insistence that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” Rather than securing his place among the most celebrated rulers in Russian history, Putin is now at risk of being remembered as the man who lost Ukraine.

Losing Ukraine is Putin’s worst nightmare. Ever since witnessing the collapse of Soviet power while serving as a young KGB officer in East Germany, he has been haunted by visions of people power movements overthrowing empires. This helps explain his increasingly violent opposition to the robust and often unruly democratic culture that has taken root in post-Soviet Ukraine. Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, he has viewed the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s retreat from empire.

Putin knows that the invasion of Ukraine will define his entire reign and decide the future fate of the Russian Federation. While he may be prepared to discuss a strategic pause in hostilities if ceasefire terms can be made to favor Moscow, he will never accept the existence of a separate and genuinely independent Ukrainian state on Russia’s border. This does not mean that current US-led peace efforts are entirely futile, but it is vital to recognize that freezing the conflict along the current front lines will not be enough to end the war.

For decades, Western leaders have made the mistake of viewing Putin through the prism of their own political pragmatism, while underestimating the importance of his revisionist imperial ideology. After three years of total war in the heart of Europe, there is no longer any excuse for such wishful thinking. Putin has bet everything on the destruction of Ukraine and is confident he will be judged favorably by the tribunal of history. Unless he is deterred by the overwhelming might of the collective West, he will continue to wage war against Ukraine until he achieves his chilling goal.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:50 +0000

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US peace initiative can help bring Ukraine’s abducted children home

Kristina Hook, Iuliia Hoban — Thu, 06 Mar 2025 21:50:14 +0000

Among the many crimes Russia is accused of committing in Ukraine, few are as shocking as the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Ukraine has identified around 20,000 children subjected to forced deportations since the full-scale invasion began three years ago, but officials believe the true number of victims may be far higher. These allegations are so grave that the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest in March 2023 on war crimes charges.

Securing the return of Ukraine’s kidnapped children must play a part in the peace efforts recently initiated by US President Donald Trump. Speaking in February, Trump acknowledged that he was aware of the situation and said he could potentially persuade Putin to release the children as part of a negotiated settlement to end the war. “I believe I could, yes,” he told Fox News Radio host Brian Kilmeade.

Efforts to rescue the thousands of Ukrainian children held in Russia would likely receive strong public backing in the United States, including from Trump’s support base. Reverend Jason Charron, who prayed over Trump moments before his near-assassination in Pennsylvania during the 2024 election campaign, recently wrote to the US leader calling on him “to be a shield for the Ukrainian people and for the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.”

The Kremlin’s illegal deportations have also sparked strong bipartisan condemnation in the US political arena. Less than a year ago, a resolution slamming Russia’s “illegal abductions” as a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention was passed in the US House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, with support coming from leading Republicans including Speaker Mike Johnson.

Meanwhile, research backed by the US Department of State has provided grim details of Russia’s deportation operations and linked them directly to Putin. According to a report by Yale’s School of Public Health released in December 2024, Russian presidential aircraft and funds were used in a program to take children from occupied Ukrainian territories, strip them of Ukrainian identity, and place them with Russian families.

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Russia stands accused of instigating a large-scale, coordinated, and systematic policy designed to remove thousands of Ukrainian children from their homes and rob them of their Ukrainian roots via a network of camps and foster homes, where they are subjected to indoctrination and in many cases assigned new Russian names. Kremlin officials have attempted to justify the deportations by claiming to be motivated by wartime safety concerns, yet their actions still constitute violations of international law. Nor has there been any attempt to explain why children are subsequently brainwashed and forced to adopt Russian identities.

The abductions are causing profound harm to the victims, their families, and wider communities. The relatively few children who have so far returned to Ukraine have provided harrowing testimonies of their experience in Russia. Many have recounted being physically and mentally abused for their Ukrainian identity, or told that their family and country had abandoned them.

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Presently, no international legal mechanism exists to facilitate the safe return of abducted Ukrainian children. However, the United States has many cards it can play in order to achieve this goal. US sanctions against Russia are not primarily linked to individual aspects of the invasion. Instead, they are focused on the illegal act of the invasion itself, which is in violation of the United Nations Charter. US negotiators can make it clear to their Kremlin counterparts that without the safe return of all abducted Ukrainian children, the Russian invasion cannot be considered over and sanctions cannot be lifted.

Sanctions could also be used to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to continue the abductions. The United States could follow the example of the British, who imposed targeted sanctions in late 2024 against individuals identified as “perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children.” UK officials described the abductions as “a systematic attempt to erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity.”

By focusing on the distressing plight of the abducted Ukrainian children, Trump could generate much-needed international confidence in his peacemaking efforts. Meanwhile, given his close personal association with the mass abductions, Putin has the ability to stop this policy and order the return of Ukrainian children. With few public signs that Russia is committed to long-term peace, initiatives aimed at identifying victims and ensuring their return to Ukraine could serve as a key US demand to test this willingness.

Before sanctions are even partially lifted, the United States should insist on concrete steps from the Russian side to end the abductions and enable Ukraine to bring all the victims home. It should be made clear that this must be verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. If progress proves possible, this could serve as a first step toward addressing other grave human rights concerns such as the widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in Russian captivity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Iuliia Hoban, Ph.D. is an expert on children and childhoods in peace and security studies and the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for vulnerable populations.

Since February 24, 2022, reserves of the Russian Central Bank have represented the largest frozen pool of Russian sovereign assets. Kyiv has consistently called for their full transfer to fund the Ukrainian war effort and compensate for war damage inflicted by Russia. G7 countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their stance that the frozen assets will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it has caused in Ukraine.

This position has effectively placed responsibility on Ukraine and Russia to negotiate a political settlement including war reparations. Over the past three years, significant work has been undertaken to elaborate legal grounds for the confiscation of the frozen Russian assets in Ukraine’s favor, but no decisive action has been taken to seize them outright.

Instead, as a temporary measure, Ukraine has received interest accrued on these funds, which were placed in deposit accounts in 2024. Additionally, G7 leaders agreed to provide a $50 billion loan to be repaid in the coming years using proceeds from the frozen reserves. This arrangement represents a substantial achievement. It has also fueled speculation that the Russian assets will remain untouched until the loan is fully repaid, which could take 10 to 15 years.

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The start of peace talks in Saudi Arabia, spearheaded by the United States, has shifted the political calculus surrounding the use of the frozen Russian funds. Potential proposals to channel them into Ukraine’s reconstruction, including reconstruction projects in Russian-occupied territories, would mark a striking departure from previous policy. While this would no doubt be framed as a pragmatic step toward resolving the conflict, many would see it as a major concession to Moscow.

At first glance, this approach may appear designed to set a balance between competing interests. In reality, it risks undermining the very principles on which the international response to Russia’s aggression has been built.

Since 2022, there has been broad consensus that Russia, as the aggressor state, bears full responsibility for the consequences of the war, including the obligation to compensate for all damages, irrespective of the circumstances under which they occurred. This has been reaffirmed in a UN General Assembly resolution, one of Ukraine’s key diplomatic achievements at the United Nations.

Any compromise that allows Russia access to its frozen reserves, even indirectly, would set a dangerous precedent for the division of responsibility over war-related damages. While some might argue that the money ultimately belongs to Russia and that partial access does not amount to a strategic loss for Ukraine, this perspective ignores a fundamental reality: These frozen assets were supposed to serve as leverage to compel Russia to accept its legal obligations, including reparations. Allowing Moscow to regain control over even a fraction of the frozen assets would weaken that leverage and allow the aggressor to benefit at the expense of its victims.

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The core issue remains clear. Any model for unlocking Russian sovereign assets must prioritize justice for Ukraine and the victims of Russian aggression. Allocating these funds to be used by the aggressor state without a formal reparations agreement would contradict the principles of accountability.

Since May 2022, Ukraine has consistently advocated for the creation of an international compensation mechanism based on the vision that victims of aggression must be the primary beneficiaries. The fate of the frozen Russian $300 billion has always been at the center of this process, as these funds were considered the main source for financing reparations. Under a framework led by the Council of Europe and supported by a coalition of international partners including the United States, a Compensation Fund could serve as the primary instrument for distributing these assets to those who have suffered direct harm from Russia’s aggression.

While the mechanism requires further refinement, supporters believe this format is the best path toward ensuring meaningful redress. The recently established Register of Damage for Ukraine, which is tasked with registering all eligible claims to be paid out through a Compensation Fund, is an initial step in this direction, demonstrating a tangible commitment to prioritizing victim compensation.

Transferring Russia’s frozen reserves to a future Compensation Fund appears the most logical and legally sound course of action. Moreover, the European Union, which administers $210 billion of the $300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank reserves, reportedly backs the move. Without this transfer of assets, the entire idea of a reparations mechanism for Ukraine would be undermined.

While the operational details of any future decisions can be refined through multilateral negotiations with the participation of Ukraine and the EU, the guiding principles appear clear. These should include the use of frozen Russian assets to serve the interests of Ukraine as the victim of aggression. The primary purpose of these funds should be direct compensation for war damages suffered by Ukrainian individuals, businesses, and institutions. Meanwhile, any decision on their use must be grounded in principles of justice, ensuring that responsibility for war-related damages is not shifted onto Ukraine, and that a victim-centered approach remains at the core of the process.

Ivan Horodyskyy is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and director of the Dnistryanskyi Center for Politics and Law.

Egyptian senator: The mass displacement of Gazans will only fuel Hamas’s extremist ideology

Mohamed Farid — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:51:46 +0000

As negotiations for the second phase of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas approach, significant challenges are emerging mere days before the first phase’s March 1 deadline.

Despite the significant weakening of Hamas’s military capabilities after fifteen months of conflict, the group’s political control over Gaza remains intact, complicating any roadmap for postwar recovery. This deadlock largely stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extended military campaign in Gaza and his government’s lack of any clear strategy for the strip’s day after. Netanyahu has failed to pursue a sustainable political path that could bring stability to Gaza and ensure Israel’s long-term security. Instead, recent rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government seems to have doubled down on the Trump administration’s proposal of displacing the entire Palestinian population of Gaza as a potential avenue to address the crisis. Any Israeli move in this direction would escalate the conflict, not resolve it.

Moving forward with the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza would only fuel support for Hamas’s extremist ideology and exacerbate tensions throughout the region. For a sustainable peace, the Israeli government must agree to a postwar governance framework for Gaza that provides an alternative to Hamas and allows Palestinians to govern themselves.

The absence of a postwar plan for Gaza

Since the war began, Israel’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. While Israel has successfully degraded Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated some of its top leaders, the group continues to wield control over Gaza, raising questions about the effectiveness of Israel’s approach.

The main Israeli failure lies in the absence of a credible governance alternative for Gaza. Netanyahu’s rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza has created a power vacuum that Hamas continues to exploit. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, the Israeli military effort alone cannot achieve long-term stability for the enclave or for Israel. US, Israeli, and regional leaders have all made clear that they view Hamas rule over Gaza in the war’s aftermath as unacceptable. This month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Hamas “pure evil” and said it must never govern Gaza again. Last year, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry described Hamas as “a faction outside the Palestinian consensus.” Yet despite this rhetoric, the failure to establish a viable alternative governing structure for Gaza risks prolonging Hamas’s control by default.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Instead of removing Palestinian civilians, remove Hamas

By Daniel B. Shapiro

Drawing inspiration from an approach that worked in 1982, US President Donald Trump should put forward a landmark plan to rid Gaza of the terrorist organization.

Conflict Israel

Netanyahu’s political calculations

With the fragile cease-fire hanging by a thread and mounting pressure from the families of Israeli hostages, Netanyahu appears to be prioritizing his own political survival over a sustainable peace settlement. Indeed, at various points during the current phase of the cease-fire, he has both threatened a renewed military offensive—despite the Israeli military’s claims in September that Hamas’s military wing had been defeated—and embraced Trump’s proposal for the mass displacement of Gaza’s population.

Further, Netanyahu appointed his close political ally, Ron Dermer, as the lead negotiator for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire, replacing Mossad head David Barnea. This decision centralized authority over the cease-fire talks within Netanyahu’s inner circle, giving him greater oversight and influence over the negotiation process and the flexibility to shape the narrative and outcomes of the cease-fire in a way that aligns with his political agenda.

Netanyahu’s direct involvement is particularly significant given his track record of altering cease-fire terms to serve his political interests, which has repeatedly led to the breakdown of prior rounds of negotiations. Prolonging the war in this manner has jeopardized the hostages, whose lives are further endangered every additional day they spend in Hamas captivity. This was made painfully evident by tragic incidents such as Hamas’s execution of six hostages, including American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in September, just days before Israeli forces arrived and discovered the victims’ remains.

Moving ahead with the plan for the mass displacement of Gazans would align with the hardline stance of prominent members of Israel’s far-right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, a member of the Knesset who resigned as national security minister in protest of the January cease-fire agreement. Both figures hold significant sway over the stability of Netanyahu’s fragile governing coalition.

However, forcing civilians out of Gaza would neither weaken Hamas nor bring security to Israel. On the contrary, it risks intensifying radicalization and reinforcing extremist narratives, potentially destabilizing the broader region. By intertwining his own political survival with a dubious military strategy, Netanyahu’s approach threatens to further escalate regional tensions, making a sustainable resolution even more elusive.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Reconstruction will fail unless these two challenges are addressed

By Ahmed F. Alkhatib

Gaza’s reconstruction will require creativity and an understanding that there is no simple US real-estate solution for the strip.

Israel Middle East

How mass displacement would fuel radicalization

The argument for mass displacement is fundamentally flawed because it blames Palestinian civilians for Hamas’s actions. In reality, Gazans have suffered under Hamas’s authoritarian rule, where dissent is crushed and civilians are used as human shields.

The idea that Palestinians are a homogeneous block that supports Hamas is simply not accurate. The only Palestinian legislative election in which Hamas participated, in 2006, showed a divided electorate, with Hamas winning 44.45 percent of the vote and Fatah garnering 41.43 percent. Since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza by brute force and coercion after taking over the enclave militarily in 2007. More recently, an Arab Barometer poll that was conducted just before the October 7 terrorist attacks indicated that 72 percent of Gazans believed Hamas was corrupt while 44 percent expressed no trust in the group. Considering how brutally Hamas suppresses dissent, one can only imagine how low support for the group in Gaza really is. Further, nearly half of Gaza’s population is under eighteen, meaning Hamas is the only government many Palestinians have ever known.

Therefore, blaming the whole population of Gaza for Hamas’s actions is not just a moral failure. It is also a strategic mistake. It shifts the focus away from the real issue: Hamas’s reign of terror. Treating civilians as perpetrators rather than victims feeds extremist narratives, fueling radicalization and hatred. If the goal is to eradicate extremism, foster stability, and achieve long-term security for Israel, then the focus should be on freeing Gazans from Hamas’s oppression, not displacing them.

Displacement would spread Hamas’s influence across the region, solidifying its image as a “resistance movement” rather than exposing it as a failed terrorist entity. This move would inflame tensions across the Middle East, destabilize neighboring countries, and fuel anti-Israel sentiment around the world.

History shows that forced displacement breeds extremism. The Nakba of 1948 created generations of refugees who would became the backbone of militant movements. This includes the late high-ranking Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom were born in refugee camps in Gaza after their families were displaced during the Nakba. A similar mass expulsion today would reinforce the idea that violence is the only way to reclaim lost land, further entrenching cycles of radicalization.

Breaking Hamas’s grip

Defeating Hamas militarily is not enough. To truly end its control over Gaza, Hamas must be defeated strategically by degrading its legitimacy and freeing Gazans from Islamist authoritarianism. This cannot be achieved by weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance” alone, but only by breaking Hamas’s grip on power.

Gaza’s reconstruction is impossible as long as Hamas controls the strip. The group has repeatedly manipulated international aid to build its military capabilities, fueling radicalization and extremism. Without a postwar governance framework liberating Gaza from Hamas’s influence, Gazans will continue to suffer under a humanitarian catastrophe.

This cannot be achieved through forced displacement or by obstructing efforts to establish a legitimate and credible alternative to Hamas. For long-term stability to be achieved, international actors must support the development of Palestinian institutions capable of effective governance. This requires fostering an Arab-led, Palestinian-owned transitional process with a nonpartisan, technocratic government that can implement the rule of law and carry out structural reforms in education, law enforcement, and media. Economic development initiatives must also be prioritized to reduce extremism by creating real employment opportunities.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be designed to empower civilians, not Hamas or its backers. The only way to defeat extremism is by offering Gazans hope, opportunity, and the means to govern themselves responsibly.

Netanyahu’s failure to agree on a clear day after plan for Gaza has prolonged Hamas’s rule and exacerbated the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. By embracing mass displacement, he is not solving the crisis but escalating it. This strategy threatens to radicalize a new generation of Palestinians, solidifying Hamas’s narrative of resistance and fueling long-term instability.

Achieving security and stability requires a strategic shift from military dominance and displacement to cooperation with Arab countries, empowering Gazans through governance reform and economic opportunity. A credible political alternative to Hamas is essential for lasting peace.

Ignoring this will only perpetuate cycles of violence, deepen regional instability, and ultimately undermine Israel’s security. The future of Gaza lies not in forced migration but in breaking Hamas’s grip on power and creating opportunities for Gazans to build a better future.

Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate.

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Putin uses NATO as an excuse for his war against Ukrainian statehood

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:15:19 +0000

As speculation swirls over the possible terms of a US-brokered peace deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Kremlin is insisting that above all else, the future Ukraine must be neutral and demilitarized. This is nothing new. Vladimir Putin has been citing Ukraine’s demilitarization as his key war aim since the very first morning of the invasion. Demilitarization also featured prominently in abortive peace talks held during the initial weeks of the war, with Russian representatives demanding an approximately 95 percent reduction in the size of Ukraine’s army, which was to become a skeleton force of just fifty thousand troops.

Calls for a demilitarized Ukraine have remained a central feature of Russian rhetoric throughout the past three years of the invasion, and have been accompanied by demands that Kyiv accept permanent neutrality and rule out the prospect of joining NATO or concluding military alliances with any Western powers. Russian officials have also consistently stated that postwar Ukraine must be banned from receiving weapons or training from the West. Most recently, the Kremlin has rejected the idea of deploying Western troops in Ukraine as peacekeepers to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement. In other words, Putin’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community.

Putin may currently find it advantageous to entertain talk of peace, but his insistence on Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament reveals what he really has in mind for the country. The Russian dictator is obviously preparing the ground for the eventual resumption of his current invasion, which he fully intends to continue as soon as he has rearmed and circumstances allow. Why else would the demilitarization of Ukraine be seen in Moscow as such a priority?

No serious military analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible security threat to Russia itself. Likewise, no Ukrainian politician or public figure has ever harbored any territorial ambitions against their country’s far larger and wealthier neighbor. On the contrary, the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to defend the country against Russian attack. The Kremlin’s emphasis on disarming Ukraine should therefore be seen as a massive red flag for the Trump White House and the wider international community that signals Putin’s determination to complete his conquest and extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

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There are worrying signs that this is not yet fully understood in Western capitals. Instead, US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration have recently begun shifting responsibility for the war away from Russia and echoing the Kremlin’s own longstanding efforts to blame the invasion on NATO expansion. Predictably, Russian officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have welcomed this dramatic change in the US position regarding the causes of the war. However, Russia’s whole NATO narrative suffers from a number of obvious flaws that should spark skepticism among even the most credulous consumers of Kremlin propaganda.

According to Putin, Ukraine’s deepening ties with NATO forced him to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022. In reality, Ukraine’s prospects of joining the alliance were virtually nonexistent at the time, and had not significantly improved since Kyiv was first fobbed off with platitudes at a landmark NATO summit way back in 2008. Even the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 failed to produce any change of heart among alliance members, with key NATO countries including the United States and Germany openly expressing their opposition to Ukrainian accession. Indeed, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assured Putin that Ukrainian NATO membership was out of the question for at least the next 30 years. This makes it difficult to accept Moscow’s claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations represented some kind of immediate danger to Russia.

There are also good reasons to question whether the Kremlin genuinely views NATO as a threat to Russian national security. Thanks to founding member Norway, the alliance has shared a border with Russia ever since its establishment in 1949. More recently, the accession of Poland and the Baltic states at the turn of the millennium dramatically expanded Russia’s shared border with NATO and placed the alliance a few hundred kilometers away from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This close proximity to Russia’s two biggest cities did not lead to any discernible rise in border tensions.

The most revealing evidence of Russia’s true attitude toward NATO came in 2022 when Finland and Sweden reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by ending decades of neutrality and announcing plans to join the alliance. Putin responded to this landmark decision by declaring that Russia had “no problem” with the accession of the two Nordic nations, despite the fact that Finnish membership would more than double Russia’s border with NATO, while Swedish membership would turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Putin has since underlined his indifference to this expanded NATO presence on his doorstep by withdrawing most Russian troops from the Finnish frontier and leaving this supposedly vulnerable border zone largely undefended.

So far, nobody has been able to adequately explain the glaring inconsistency in Putin’s logic. He appears to be unfazed by the presence of NATO troops along the Russian border in Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. And yet at the same time, he expects us to believe that the faint prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance at some point in the distant future is sufficiently alarming to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. Militarily, this makes no sense. The only reasonable conclusion is that Putin’s objections relate specifically to Ukraine and not to NATO in general. He knows perfectly well that the alliance poses no security threat to Russia itself, but does not want to risk a growing NATO presence that might prevent him from achieving his expansionist objective of subjugating Ukraine.

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While Putin moans to foreign leaders about the inequities of NATO expansion, when speaking to domestic audiences he is typically far more candid about the imperial ambitions that shaped his decision to invade Ukraine. For much of his reign, Putin has insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly accused modern Ukraine of being a invented nation occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay that many likened to a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. During the first summer of the war, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Putin’s frequent denials of Ukraine’s right to exist have set the tone throughout Russian society. Poisonous anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, senior Kremlin officials have sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin by echoing his vicious attacks on Ukraine. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has declared that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” These are not the words of rational politicians addressing legitimate national security concerns.

This genocidal rhetoric is being more than matched by the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin has been able to establish control, Russian troops have systematically detained local officials, military veterans, journalists, religious leaders, civic activists, Ukrainian patriots, and anyone else deemed to be a potential threat. Thousands have disappeared into a vast network of prisons amid a climate of fear that has been described by Britain’s The Economist as a “totalitarian hell.” Many more, including thousands of children, have been subjected to forced deportation and sent to Russia. Those who remain are being pressured to accept Russian citizenship, while all reminders of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and national identity are being methodically removed. Needless to say, anyone who dares speak the Ukrainian language risks severe punishment.

These horrors make a complete mockery of attempts to appease the Russians with limited territorial concessions. US negotiators need to recognize that Putin is not fighting for land. He views the current invasion in far broader terms as an historic mission to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe. In Putin’s chilling worldview, extinguishing Ukrainian statehood is a vital step toward the reversal of the Soviet collapse and the revival of the Russian Empire. He has pursued this messianic vision with increasing violence ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and is now closer than ever to realizing his goal.

This is why peace negotiations with Russia must focus primarily on establishing long-term security guarantees that are sufficiently credible to convince the Kremlin. Anything less will be viewed in Moscow as yet more proof of Western weakness and interpreted as a tacit invitation to go further. After all, that has been the pattern ever since the Russian invasion first began in 2014. Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine has been gradually unfolding in plain sight for over a decade and already ranks among the worst crimes of the twenty-first century. If Western leaders choose to ignore this and push ahead with a bad peace while leaving Ukraine without the support and security it needs to survive, they will be complicit in all that follows.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Damon quoted in Fars News on the process of medical evacuation of Palestinian children

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:33 +0000

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Alkhatib joins TRIGGERnometry to discuss his life story

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:22 +0000

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Alkhatib joins i24 News to discuss the humanitarian conditions in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:13 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in Jewish News on his Gaza views

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:12 +0000

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Alkhatib in the Good Men Project: Trump has kicked off a new wave of dehumanizing Palestinians. Let’s remember who the real enemies are

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:51 +0000

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Kather and Klamberg in OpinioJuris: Justice for the Yazidis in the Ishaq Case by the Stockholm District Court – Part I

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:47 +0000

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Kather and Klamberg in OpinioJuris: Justice for the Yazidis in the Ishaq Case by the Stockholm District Court – Part II

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:46 +0000

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Will a new Russia reset prove more successful than earlier attempts?

Leah Nodvin — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 16:32:49 +0000

The Trump administration is seeking to reset relations with Russia as part of a comprehensive shift in US foreign policy. While advocates say this reflects changing geopolitical realities, past experience suggests a successful reset may be easier said than done.

Since the end of the Cold War, successive United States governments have sought Russia resets. Perhaps the most famous example came in 2009, when US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton initiated a highly-publicized effort to develop a new Russia strategy. Their administration envisaged renewed cooperation with Russia on a range of issues such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and the illicit trafficking of goods and people.

The challenges of communicating with the Kremlin were evident from the very outset. In a moment of poetic irony, Secretary Clinton and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov staged a photo-op pressing a big red button that was meant to say “reset” in Russian. However, the label had been mistranslated and actually read “overload.” This was to prove prophetic, with bilateral relations soon trending toward confrontation rather than cooperation.

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In addition to often conflicting foreign policy agendas, the leaders of the United States and Russia also operate in very different political realities. When US presidents are elected to office and their party controls Congress, they only have two surefire years to forge new policy, positively impact American lives, and set the course for their re-election. During that short time frame, US policymakers often face difficult decisions under extreme pressure from their constituents. Unfortunately, success through innovation requires a willingness to fail.

In comparison, Russian politicians do not compete against the clock in the same manner. They seldom face hard deadlines or constraints from public opinion when implementing their policies. Just as most Soviet leaders ruled until death, today’s Russian leaders like Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have remained in their roles for decades. Russia’s security apparatus, the true source of political power in the country, has been loyal to Putin since the very beginning of his reign.

Developing a holistic strategy toward Putin’s Russia has been more complicated than dealing with other regions because traditional playbooks do not apply. The United States has not been willing to pursue a Cold War-style policy of containment, as Russia is now a global power with an internationally integrated economy. Washington has also been reluctant to pursue strategic security cooperation as it did in the 1990s because Russia has proven to be an unreliable partner, has violated the international rules-based order, and has placed American lives directly at risk.

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Despite the need to address the security challenges posed by Russia, a coordinated United States strategy to deal with the Kremlin remains elusive. Successive attempts to reset relations have failed and bilateral ties have deteriorated. It is true that the US has had a policy on Ukraine and a policy on Russia as it relates to Ukraine. However, a strategic plan to counter Russian actions globally through traditional soft and hard power tools has become politically toxic for successive US administrations.

This applies throughout US politics. While Congress maintains country-specific caucuses like the Ukraine Caucus or the Friends of Democratic Belarus Caucus, it has long been considered politically impossible to create a Friends of Democratic Russia Caucus. Until recently, no member of Congress has wanted to appear as though they were extending even a metaphorical hand toward Russia. However, that may now be changing.

Why is there such an apparent sense of urgency? Like US presidents before him, Trump is working against time. He ran for the presidency on a campaign of ending foreign wars. He also has an ambitious domestic agenda to both cut the federal workforce and drastically increase its output. Crucially, Congress must pass a budget by March 14 or the federal government will shut down, a scenario that would create explosive pressure on the Trump administration.

Trump needs a deal with Russia more than he fears the political fallout that a Russia reset could bring to his presidency. In an era where having a Russia policy has long been politically elusive, now may be the time for a dramatic shift in US-Russia relations. As the Trump administration reviews the US approach to international aid and diplomacy, all eyes will be on how they navigate relations with America’s long-time geopolitical rival and the potential consequences for the future of Ukraine.

Leah Nodvin is a national security specialist with extensive experience covering issues related to foreign affairs, defense, trade, and geopolitical risk.

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Many Iranians rejoiced hearing the news, since the two judges were infamous for handing down death, imprisonment, and lashing sentences to dissidents, journalists, and activists. Over decades, activists and former political prisoners have brought attention to the judges’ involvement in human rights violations and have named the judges as playing a role in the mass executions of the 1980s when thousands of dissidents were summarily executed and their bodies were dumped in mass graves.

The Persian hashtag “hero janitor” went viral, and former political prisoners told of their encounters with the two judges. For example, stories about Moghiseh, who was sanctioned by the United States in 2019 for rights violations, showed his tendency for cruelty and prejudice and how he threatened people with torture. One journalist recounted how Moghiseh, while judging his case, had told him, “We should fill your mouth with gunpowder and explode your head.” Another journalist noted how Moghiseh had said to people arrested during protests, “We should set you all on fire in city squares.” Despite this background, Iran’s so-called “reformist” President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a condolence message about the deaths and vowed the continuation of the judges’ “glorious path”—a path drenched in blood.

From the narratives emerging out of Tehran about the killing of the two judges, one thing is clear: The ayatollah is losing his grip on power. Khamenei’s lieutenants are falling like leaves in autumn. And despite the state having absolute control over broadcast media and stringently censoring print and online spaces, the regime is no longer capable of controlling narratives about anything. The public’s recurring jubilation over the death of senior regime officials signals irreconcilable rage directed at the clerical establishment.

The state’s attempt to steer the narrative

In the first hours after the incident, authorities (including ones representing the Foreign Ministry) labeled the killings “acts of terror,” with the Judiciary’s own news agency, Mizan, reporting that an “armed infiltrator assassinated the two judges in a premeditated manner.”

The first statement from the Judiciary broadly blamed the usual suspects, saying that the killings might have been in retaliation for “extensive measures taken by the judiciary against elements affiliated with the cursed Zionist regime, American agents and spies, and terrorist groups.”

The head of the Judiciary Protection and Intelligence Center, which is responsible for protecting Judiciary personnel, echoed the same allegations. Former Judge Hojatoleslam Ali Abdallahi called the assailant a “terrorist” and blamed the “enemy” for the incident without elaborating.

The commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Major General Hossein Salami, called the incident the “glorious martyrdom of two honorable judges” in a “terrorist crime” that is a “sign of the hatred and anger of the counterrevolutionaries and the sworn enemies of the Islamic homeland.”

Less than twenty-four hours after the attack, the state started blaming the exiled, cult-like opposition group Mujahadin-e-Khalq (MeK). Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a veteran security and judicial figure, appeared on state TV to talk about the killings, saying that the “MeK certainly had a hand in the terrorist killings.” He alleged that the two judges were killed in a “targeted assassination.” As for proof, he claimed that the assailant had been “questioning around who deals with security cases and cases of MeK members.” Pourmohammadi also said that the assailant planned to kill a third person, an Islamic Revolutionary Court judge, who was not on the premises on the day of the incident. He also alleged that during the shooting, the assailant had “said something about the MeK to a judge he failed to kill,” adding that “It’s not clear if he chanted slogans or what. All these indicate that he was acting in a targeted manner and carrying out an operation. It is not clear if from outside, [MeK] had given him a clear assignment or had told him to assassinate judges with the Islamic Revolutionary Court that deal with [security] cases.”

News outlets reporting on Iran’s accusations regarding these killings have noted that the 1980s mass executions, in which Moghiseh and Razini were allegedly involved, targeted the MeK among other opposition groups.

Judiciary spokesperson Asghar Jahangir has doubled down on this narrative. He said last month that “multiple people have been identified and arrested in relation to this case . . . among them at least three were agents of opposition groups . . . It appears that the [assailant] was in contact with opposition groups and the MeK.”

Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i days later took the rhetoric up a notch. He described the killings as “part of the extensive plans of the enemy for disrupting security. They implement hundreds of similar plans, but they are quashed.” In the jargon of Islamic Republic officials, “enemy” is often used to refer to the United States and its allies—and the regime claims opposition groups are controlled and directed by the “enemy.”

Senior intel officer has a different story

On January 25, 2025, an Iranian intelligence agent and senior MeK case officer, Naser Razavi, significantly diverged from the state narrative. In the past, Razavi’s book on the MeK was promoted by the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, with the agency introducing him as a former senior intelligence officer with the Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC who “has dedicated 30 years of his service to working on the MeK file.”

In his recent interview, Razavi told the reformist Ensaf News that the Iranian intelligence agencies have “concluded that this incident and the assailant had nothing to do with the Monafeghin Organization,” a derogatory term used by Islamic Republic officials to refer to the MeK. However, he said that in “such cases,” the intelligence community faces “a lot of pressure to assign responsibility to the MeK since that would be seen as an achievement for the victims.”

A core ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic is celebrating “martyrdom,” when one is killed while defending the state, which regime leaders see as the embodiment of Allah itself. Case in point, as is customary in official communications in Iran, the supreme leader issued a message to the judges’ families, extending both his “congratulations and condolences” for the judges’ “martyrdom.”

Razavi said that the assailant was “depressed since he had been demoted” and “his salary had been cut. His anger was caused by this.” He argued that “The killing was not politically motivated. However, it is not clear if he had a personal grudge against Moghiseh and Razini or his anger was directed against the entirety of the [Supreme Court] and targeted senior members of the [state] entity.”

He also noted that this was not the first time that Razini was targeted. In 1999, Razini survived an attempt on his life that an Iranian general blamed on the Mahdaviat Group, an Islamist cult that professes to be preparing the world for the arrival of Shia Islam’s twelfth imam, Mahdi. At the time, Razavi was in charge of the investigation. When he informed Razini that the intelligence community had concluded that the MeK was not behind the attack, “he got outraged and told me I was talking nonsense,” Razavi said.

According to Razavi, over the years, Iranian senior officials have pressured the security agencies to unfoundedly blame incidents on the MeK, to either cover up personal grudges and murders or to promote their own public profile.

Reacting to the state blaming the MeK for the killing of the two judges, Razavi said, “What else can they say? When they blame the incident on the ‘enemy,’ they are left with no choice but to name the ‘enemy’ as well, and they name the MeK.”

A few hours after the interview was published, the Iranian Judiciary released a statement saying that comments made by Razavi were “his personal views, are far from reality, and have nothing to do with the judicial investigation into the case.” The Judiciary also announced that since Razavi’s comments had included “multiple false claims,” a legal case has been opened against him. Reacting to the statement, Razavi stood by his comments and again rejected reports linking the assailant to the MeK.

The bigger picture

Incidents such as the recent killing and the conflicting narratives coming out of Iran are another tear in the veil, and they reveal that the Islamic Republic is in shambles.

Consider the fact that, while terror leaders had found Iran to be one of their very few safe havens over the past decade, Haniyeh’s targeted killing and this recent incident indicate that the ayatollah can’t even protect his pawns in safe houses and judiciary buildings in Tehran.

The ayatollah himself appears to not be immune to the rising fear felt by his men. During Haniyeh’s funeral in Tehran, he kept eyeing the sky, and speculation spread that he was looking upward fearing a drone strike. Burying the two judges, he appeared bulkier than usual, sparking speculation that he was wearing a bulletproof vest underneath his clothes.

Another sign of Khamenei losing his grip on power is that his frustration about being strategically cornered has seeped into his public speeches. Speaking about the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the frustrated ayatollah bemoaned that he was “prepared to send aid but land and air was blocked.”

The Islamic Republic—an authoritarian state that has kept its grip on power by maintaining perpetual war—now finds itself unpopular at home, fending off imagined and real foreign adversaries, and paranoid about infiltration. Power is slipping through the hands of the clerical establishment like sand. And Tehran’s ayatollah doesn’t need to look farther than Syria to see how fast he can end up deposed.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is a researcher with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 23:43:38 +0000

As the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion draws close, the chorus of voices calling for new elections in Ukraine is growing louder and louder. Curiously, however, these calls are not coming from the Ukrainians themselves, but from the Kremlin and the Trump White House.

Since his inauguration one month ago, US President Donald Trump has begun echoing Russian demands for fresh Ukrainian elections. This week, he sparked outrage by branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator without elections.” These attacks have proved popular in Moscow but have fallen flat in Kyiv, with most Ukrainians rejecting the US leader’s claims and rallying behind Zelenskyy.

The debate over Ukrainian elections reflects the challenging wartime realities in the partially occupied country. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary votes in 2024 but was forced to postpone both ballots as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow national elections during martial law, which was introduced in 2022 and remains in place. Zelenskyy has vowed to hold elections as soon as the security situation allows, but argues that it would be impossible to stage free and fair votes in the current circumstances.

The majority of Ukrainians appear to agree. Two of Zelenskyy’s main political rivals, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as impractical and illegitimate. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced its opposition to the return of elections before a peace agreement has been signed. Meanwhile, a new opinion poll conducted in February 2025 found that 63 percent of Ukrainians are against holding any national votes until the war with Russia is over.

This lack of appetite for wartime elections is not the product of apathy or oppression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are fiercely proud of their country’s democratic credentials, which were hard-won during two separate pro-democracy revolutions in 2004 and 2014. On both occasions, millions of Ukrainians took part in massive protest movements opposing Russian-backed attempts to subvert the country’s emerging democracy and place Ukraine on a trajectory toward Kremlin-style authoritarianism. This grassroots embrace of democratic values has become central to modern Ukraine’s sense of national identity.

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For more than two decades, Ukraine’s burgeoning democratic culture has been one of the key triggers behind Moscow’s escalating campaign of aggression against the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine can be traced back to the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was in part provoked by his botched intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election. This was to prove a watershed moment in relations between the two post-Soviet countries. Over the subsequent two decades, Ukraine has pursued a European democratic future, while Putin’s Russia has turned back toward the imperial past.

Putin’s fear of Ukrainian democracy is easy enough to understand. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, his formative political experience was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire as a wave of democratic uprisings swept across Eastern Europe. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Putin has been haunted by the idea that an increasingly democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat and spark the breakup of the Russian Federation itself.

Mounting concern in Moscow over the possible impact of Ukraine’s democratic progress was a major contributing factor behind Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2014. When the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region failed to prevent the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy or derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin felt compelled to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

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Ukrainians would be the first to admit that their country’s democracy is still very much a work in progress that suffers from a wide range of imperfections including deeply entrenched institutional corruption and excessive oligarch influence. Temporary wartime security measures targeting Kremlin-linked political parties and institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church have also raised concerns. At the same time, Ukrainians are acutely aware that their country’s recent history of internationally recognized elections and strengthening democratic culture set them apart from their Russian neighbors.

The fight for democracy has in many ways defined Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support the idea of holding elections in the current wartime conditions. This skepticism is understandable. More than ten million Ukrainians, representing around a quarter of the population, have been internally displaced by Russia’s invasion or forced to flee abroad as refugees. Millions more are currently living under Russian occupation. Without their participation, any vote would lack legitimacy. Likewise, around one million Ukrainian men and women are now serving in the armed forces. Attempting to provide safe voting conditions for them would be a logistical and security nightmare.

It would be similarly impossible to organize a credible election campaign. With the entire country subject to virtually daily Russian bombardment, large-scale campaign events and election rallies would be out of the question. It would be even more reckless to open thousands of polling stations on election day and invite attacks from Russian drones and missiles. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has repeatedly bombed Ukrainian civilians at train stations, funerals, and other public gatherings. There is little reason to believe election day crowds would not also be targeted. Even if a ceasefire was introduced well before the vote, the threat of renewed Russian air strikes would loom large over the entire campaign and deter public participation.

In addition to these practical impediments, attempting to stage an election campaign prior to the signing of a peace treaty would risk sowing division within Ukrainian society at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Many believe this is the true reason for the Kremlin’s sudden and otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Ukrainian democracy. After all, Russia is the world leader in election interference. While Putin’s army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, he may feel that he can still achieve his goal of dividing and subjugating the country via the ballot box. At the very least, if current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to win reelection, this would remove a very high-profile obstacle to a peace agreement in Russia’s favor.

Democracy is at the very heart of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival and is destined to remain one of the core values in postwar Ukraine. For now, though, most Ukrainians acknowledge that any attempt to stage elections would be impractical and irresponsible in the extreme. For this reason, there is currently no clamor whatsoever for elections within Ukrainian society. The current generation of Ukrainians have fought long and hard for their democratic rights, but they also recognize that the country must be at peace before credible elections can take place. It would be absurd to ignore their wishes and impose premature elections on Ukraine as part of a Kremlin-friendly peace process.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Sobhi is utterly emotionally lost and has been for years. He shows us the notification he received with his son’s alleged death date.

“I saw him after this date,” he says. “What is the meaning of this, what is the goal of this psychological torture?”

He begged and pleaded with the authorities for answers.

“They all just played games with us,” he remembers. “I told them if he’s dead, let me know. Once one told me to stop nagging him. ‘I can’t tell you more, he’s alive, but I don’t know where.’”

Sobhi’s voice trembles with quiet anger as he lists the names of the officers. He wants more than just answers: He wants to see the officers behind bars, and he wants to be able to confront those who took his son, who caused him so much pain.

I went to Syria at the end of December, a country I covered extensively in my former job as a senior international correspondent for CNN. I was back this time in my capacity as the founder of my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA). One of the first neighborhoods my team and I visited was Darayya, a Damascus suburb that for years was bombed, besieged, and starved. In Darayya alone, local officials estimate that some fifteen thousand men were disappeared by the Assad regime. Mothers who used to tell their children “daddy is with the regime” are now at a loss, unsure how to answer the question “but mommy, the regime is gone, why isn’t daddy back?”

The pain felt by those searching for clues in the dark void of the former regime’s detention system is palpable.

Justice, accountability, and reparations are not just “catch words,” Joumana Seif, a prominent lawyer and Atlantic Council fellow, argues. Also a human- and women’s-rights activist, Joumana has been pushing for the creation of a Syria Victims Fund for years, so that the states that have been collecting hundreds of millions of dollars linked to violations of sanctions and other Syria-related crimes are no longer lining their own coffers but are giving that money back to the Syrian people.

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“It’s important for this damage, pain to be recognized and compensated, morally and also with some services and financial support,” Joumana explains. “Without this I think people will start to think about revenge, and this will be chaos. How to prevent revenge is to establish a clear transparent process of transitional justice.”

Time is not on Syria’s side, not when so much damage has been done, when the fabric of society is so frayed, when the country still is a patchwork of territories with de facto borders, and when there has been so much death and destruction. There have already been revenge attacks on Syria’s Alawite community—the sect with which the Assad family is affiliated.

Joumana knows the system well. Her father, Riad Seif, was a parliamentarian back in the 1990s and is a well-known voice of political dissent. He was twice jailed under the Assad regime.

“We need a process to go forward so that at least people see that there will be justice, and they can wait for that,” Joumana says.

As the rebel-forces-turned-rulers of Syria flung open the gates of the Assad regime’s prisons, a flood of hope and dread swept over the families of the missing.

“When the 8th of December happened, I was so scared because I thought that’s the end of the journey and now I will either know that my father is alive or no, that he’s not alive,” says Wafa Mustafa with The Syria Campaign. She is one of the most prominent and outspoken voices for the families of Syria’s missing.

“He’s here, I don’t know how, I don’t know in what form. I feel he’s here, but at the same time, I cannot see him. I’m this close, but I cannot find him.”

Wafa’s father disappeared from their Damascus home in 2013, forcing Wafa and the rest of her family into exile. He was always a dominant force in her life, as a father, a hero, a source of comfort, and a guiding light. The two were especially close, and both were highly politically active, first closely following as the Arab Spring erupted in other countries and then actively partaking in demonstrations in Damascus.

Since fleeing, first to Turkey and then onwards to Germany, Wafa has been relentless in her demand for answers, standing outside for hours in the freezing cold or sweltering summer heat, holding solitary vigils or joining others in holding photographs of missing loved ones. She has held and participated in countless press conferences, panels, meetings, and media appearances.

Now back in Damascus for the first time, memories reemerge, of not just her father but also the ghostly faces of friends and fellow protestors who are dead or missing.

The need for the truth—for Wafa, the truth of what happened to her father—is a gnawing and raw wound, one that rips through the psyche of countless Syrians. There are an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Syrians missing, according to the International Commission on Missing Persons.

“If you don’t bring to justice those who were responsible, how do you think people will feel about justice? How do you think that people will seek justice? Many will go for revenge, and revenge literally means no peace,” Wafa warns.

Prison papers, identification documents, and other files were not preserved in the chaos following the shockingly fast fall of the regime of dictator Bashar al-Assad.

“We have no clarity on any level. We don’t know what they are doing with the detainees, the files, the mass graves,” Wafa explains.

It took two months for representatives of the families of the missing, including Wafa, to finally get an audience with Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and its foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani.

“I think it was good as a first step,” Wafa says. “This is just the beginning, and I hope that this meeting will be a step towards an actual plan and the real and serious work.”

A number of regime officials, including Assad, managed to flee the country. Much criticism has been leveled at Syria’s new rulers for not publicly asking that the deposed dictator be handed back over to Syria. While that may not be realistic at this stage, the people at least need reassurance that their new leaders recognize the importance of justice and accountability.

Joumana says there need to be steps toward establishing a hybrid court and that the trial needs to happen in Syria with international judges to guarantee that international standards are followed.

“The people themselves need to decide if there should be amnesty or a forgiveness process for lower-ranking regime members,” she explains. “There also needs to be justice and recognition for the crimes of forced displacement, sexual and gender-based violence.”

“We need to create our own model. It’s different from one context, one people, one area to another,” she says. “We can find a solution, we can tailor our process, our transitional justice, and we will create a very good example of this.”

Syrians cannot focus on their future if they are still drowning in their past.

“For years the Assad regime made us feel unseen. We, our detained loved ones, our wounds and our demands, we were unseen,” Wafa says. “I will feel seen when we see actual steps.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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Ahmed Charai in National Interest: How Trump 2.0 Challenges the Global Order

Atlantic Council — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 22:14:32 +0000

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The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

The Global Foresight 2025 survey

Full results

This survey was conducted from November 15, 2024 through December 2, 2024.

Demographic data

Survey questions

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

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Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Welcome to 2035

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

By Mary Kate Aylward, Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Explore findings on…

2. Conflict with China and Russia

3. The China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis

4. Nuclear proliferation and use

5. The future of US power

6. The endgame in Ukraine

7. Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace

8. The outlook for multilateral institutions

9. The chances of democratic depression

10. Gender and the global future

Another devastating world war, potentially bringing China and the United States into direct conflict. The spread and even the use of nuclear weapons. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza failing to ultimately produce favorable outcomes for Kyiv and Israeli-Palestinian peace. A more multipolar world without robust multilateral institutions. A democratic recession further devolving into a democratic depression.

These are just some of the future scenarios that global strategists and foresight practitioners pointed to when the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed them, in late November and early December 2024 following the US elections, for its third-annual survey on how they expect the world to change over the next ten years.

Not all the projections were pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of those who participated in our Global Foresight 2025 survey, for example, felt that artificial intelligence would, on balance, have a positive impact on global affairs over the next ten years—an increase of 7 percentage points from our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Roughly half of respondents foresaw an expansion of global cooperation on climate change.

But the grimmer forecasts were in keeping with a dark global outlook overall, with 62 percent of respondents expecting the world a decade from now to be worse off than it is today, and only 38 percent predicting that it will be better off.

The 357 survey respondents were mostly citizens of the United States (just under 55 percent of those polled), with the others spread across sixty countries and every continent but Antarctica. Respondents skewed male and older, and were dispersed across a range of fields including the private sector, nonprofits, academic or educational organizations, and government and multilateral institutions.

So what do these forecasters of the global future anticipate over the coming decade? Below are the survey’s ten biggest findings.

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Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

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1. Forty percent of respondents expect a world war in the next decade—one that could go nuclear and extend to space

For the first time in our annual survey, we asked respondents whether they expected there to be another world war by 2035. We defined such a war as involving a multifront conflict among great powers. And the results were alarming, with 40 percent saying yes.

While this was a new question, our Global Foresight 2024 survey surfaced a similar concern, with nearly a quarter of respondents pointing to war between major powers as the greatest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

The finding tracks with worries expressed by other experts amid major wars in Europe and the Middle East, growing tensions between the United States and China, and increasing cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Surveying this treacherous global landscape this past summer, for example, the historian and former US diplomat Philip Zelikow assigned a 20 to 30 percent probability to the prospect of “worldwide warfare” and warned of a “period of maximum danger” within the next one to three years.

Judging by our respondents’ answers, another world war might feature nuclear weapons. Forty-eight percent of respondents overall (and 63 percent of those predicting World War III) expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade by at least one actor.

Such a conflict also may play out in outer space. Forty-five percent of respondents overall (and 60 percent of those predicting World War III) expected the next decade to include a direct military conflict fought, at least in part, in space.

And it could be devastating to the global economy. Twenty-eight percent of respondents identified war among major powers as the single biggest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

2. Tensions with China and Russia are potential vectors for major conflict

By definition, a world war would involve more than two belligerent nations. But across multiple questions in the survey, respondents forecast a future in which today’s strategic competition and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in particular could sharpen into something more dangerous.

Survey respondents, for instance, were significantly more inclined than a year earlier to foresee a military conflict over Taiwan, which could draw in the United States in support of the island and against China. Sixty-five percent of all respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that China will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, and only 24 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, that split was 50 percent to 30 percent. Among those predicting the breakout of another world war, the proportion was even higher: Seventy-nine percent believed China will attempt to forcibly retake Taiwan over the next ten years.

Expand to read expert insight by Markus Garlauskas

Though this year’s survey findings may seem worrisome at first because respondents see increasing risks of war, I find them reassuring. The change from last year shows a greater awareness of the nature of the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the risk of confronting simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries and nuclear attacks.

That a clear majority of respondents now expect Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force in the coming decade is actually a hopeful signal to me. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been clearly building up military forces suited for offensive operations and has repeatedly stated that he will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under control. Meanwhile, polls suggest that the vast majority of the people of Taiwan are disinclined to be ruled by Beijing, favoring either the status quo or outright independence.

This would seem to set Beijing and Taipei on an inevitable collision course. Yet there is also good reason to believe that China overwhelming Taiwan is not inevitable, in part because invasion would be a far more difficult operation than is commonly recognized. It will take the increasing sense of threat of force identified by the survey to prompt Taiwan and the United States to make the investments necessary to increase their preparedness for deterring and defeating such use of force.

This growing awakening on the part of the United States and its allies can become the basis for a call to action for the populations, governments, and militaries of these countries. The United States has typically waited until war was thrust upon it before preparing comprehensively. Now is the time to act, to prepare, ideally to deter such aggression, and to be ready to hold firm if deterrence fails and we face either a short, sharp war or a protracted one.

—Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

A US-China confrontation is not the only potential pathway to a multifront conflict among great powers. Forty-five percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that Russia and NATO will engage in a direct military conflict within the next ten years—a significant increase from the 29 percent who felt this way in our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Among respondents expecting another world war within the next decade, 69 percent anticipated a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

3. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to be formal allies within a decade, potentially in a world featuring China- and US-aligned blocs

Other geopolitical dynamics forecast by survey respondents could serve as the kindling for whatever spark ignites a wider war or, alternatively, emerge as byproducts of such a conflict.

Forty-seven percent of respondents predicted that, by 2035, the world will largely be divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs; among that group, nearly 60 percent expected the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies, presumably with China leading the alliance.

Overall, just under half of our survey respondents (46 percent) agreed that the emerging axis of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea will be formal allies in 2035. While this was the first time we asked this question regarding all four countries, in our Global Foresight 2024 survey 33 percent of respondents thought Russia and China would be formal allies in ten years’ time.

Many respondents appeared to associate these potential developments with the prospect of a world war. Among respondents who foresaw both the world being divided into China- and US-aligned blocs and China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea becoming formal allies, 62 percent also anticipated another world war over the next decade; among other survey respondents, that figure was far lower at 33 percent.

Expand to read expert insight by Melanie Hart

Economically, there is movement underway toward a US-and-allies versus China-aligned bloc structure, but this movement is still nascent. How far it goes will largely depend on whether the United States can overcome its domestic political reticence to actively shaping the global economic order and once again begin negotiating market-access trade deals.

Beijing seeks a global system in which other nations must abide by its wishes and there are no constraints—legal, normative, or otherwise—limiting Beijing’s own actions. Beijing is using global commerce to enforce this approach. For nations that depend on trade or investment with China, Beijing is increasingly willing to shut off the flow of goods and capital to enforce its demands in other issue areas. Beijing is also using those partners as consumption dumping grounds, exporting excess capacity across a wide array of goods (such as steel and electric vehicles) at rock-bottom prices, which addresses over-supply in the China market but drives local producers out of business. This is leading many nations to reduce their exposure and vulnerabilities to Beijing’s market interference. Many of those nations increasingly view Western, US-centric supply chains as a more attractive option.

As this shift unfolds, it could lead to new economic blocs—for example, a new multilateral trading structure in which the United States and its allies are at the center of a global trading bloc that China is not allowed to join. However, that will depend on Washington shaking off its trade malaise and figuring out how to negotiate new trade deals that create new, formal structures centered on US and allied rules of the road. China is busy creating its own options—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia—but the United States is hanging back. Without more assertive US-led action on the trade front, the biggest risk is that China will form a new, massive global economic bloc and write the rules to benefit itself at our expense, while the United States and its allies watch from the sidelines.

As for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these four nations are partners with a clear shared interest—namely, their desire to undermine the United States and the liberal international order—but they are not true allies. China’s need for integration with the global economy is likely to limit the degree to which today’s partnership evolves in the future into a more formal alliance similar to the alliance the United States enjoys with its NATO partners.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its regime legitimacy—its pitch for the Chinese people’s continued support—largely on its ability to deliver economically. Unfortunately, the party has also decided that the reforms required to deliver next-level economic growth are too risky, as they would require the party to cede more internal political control over the nation’s economy, legal system, and society. As long as Chinese leaders are unwilling to do that, they will lag behind the West in technology innovation, and they will depend on access to Western companies, universities, and markets to help fill that gap. That dependence limits China’s willingness to sign up for a comprehensive alliance with Russia, Iran, or North Korea, because Beijing does not want to join those nations in an economic wilderness that cuts Chinese companies off from the world’s leading technology powers.

—Melanie Hart, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub

4. The proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is a growing risk, with nearly half of respondents expecting a nuclear weapon to be used by 2035

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age and particularly since the latter part of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation efforts have sought to prevent additional countries from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapons, with varying success. And after the United States did so in 1945, no country has used nuclear weapons in war. But according to our survey respondents, the coming decade could bring very concerning developments on both these fronts.

Iran is the most likely—but not the only potential—new nuclear-weapons power on the horizon

In our latest survey, 88 percent of respondents expected at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, a slight uptick from 84 percent in the Global Foresight 2024 edition. As in our previous survey, just under three quarters of respondents predicted that Iran will go beyond its current threshold status and join the nuclear-weapons club within the next ten years, making it the survey’s most-cited candidate to become a nuclear-weapons state in the future.

The coming years could bring a range of policy responses to this anticipated development, from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to a new round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps in recognition of these scenarios, more than a third of respondents expected Israel to have engaged in a direct war with Iran by 2035.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

Is Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon inevitable or at least highly likely in the next decade? Far from it. Whether Iran acquires a nuclear weapon will depend on policy choices made by Iran, Israel, and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.

Currently, Iran still officially disavows an intent to produce a nuclear weapon, but there has been much more talk among Iranian officials during the past year of the need for one as pressure on Iran has increased due to Israeli military actions against Tehran’s “resistance axis” and Iran itself.

Iran’s military and economic weaknesses have intensified an ongoing debate between moderates and hardliners in Iran over the direction of the country’s foreign and nuclear policy. Moderates want to negotiate a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and an opening of trade and investment with the West and Arab Gulf states. Hardliners argue Iran must double down on its expansionist regional policies, its threshold status as a military nuclear power, its growing ties to Russia and China, and its hardline stance toward the United States and the West to rebuild deterrence and resilience.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will have to make the call on which policy to pursue, and uppermost in his mind will be which approach—or mixture of the two—best ensures the survival of the Islamic Republic, his overarching priority.

Israeli officials continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear program closely and have reiterated warnings that Israel will resort to military force if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emboldened by its military successes over the past year, including the destruction of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Iran’s air defenses, as well as the weakening of Iran’s missile-production capabilities. Senior Israeli officials probably believe conditions are ripe to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program without major threat of retaliation, given the Islamic Republic’s current vulnerability, but also seem to recognize that Israel would need US military support to do lasting damage.

The Trump administration is committed to restoring its previous maximum-pressure campaign of sanctions against Iran to compel it to agree to a new nuclear deal and curbs on its malign regional behavior. Trump’s transition team reportedly discussed the possibility of a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities given that Iran now has enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs and that sanctions could take a long time to work. They may have leaked this option to frighten Iran into agreeing to negotiations, but clearly the Trump administration is signaling a willingness to go beyond sanctions and diplomacy to achieve its objectives.

With Iran’s axis of resistance shredded, and Iran itself weakened militarily and economically, the United States has an extraordinary opportunity—working with Israel, Arab allies, and European countries—to use economic and diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force to secure an agreement that walks Iran back from the nuclear brink and curbs its destabilizing regional policies.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East

What is new is the jump in the percentage of respondents expecting other countries to get these weapons. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, for example, a quarter of respondents thought South Korea would acquire nuclear weapons. In our most recent survey, that figure was 40 percent. The percentage of respondents expecting Japan—the only country ever subject to a nuclear-weapons attack, where the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are a prominent national presence—to acquire nuclear weapons also increased ten percentage points over 2024, from 19 percent to 29 percent. (Notably, while the percentage of respondents anticipating a nuclear Iran in ten years’ time remained steady year over year, so did the roughly 40 percent of respondents expecting nearby rival Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons as well.)

North Korea and Russia are considered the most likely to launch a nuclear-weapons attack

Forty-eight percent of respondents expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, up from 37 percent in our previous survey.

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

This finding demonstrates that nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics. For years after the end of the Cold War, many assumed that nuclear weapons were obsolete relics from the past. The Obama administration made eliminating nuclear weapons a top priority. At the time, Washington assessed that there was virtually zero chance of a nuclear war among states and the greatest nuclear threats came from terrorism or accident.

Now, nearly half of our respondents assess that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade. This shows that nuclear weapons are not twentieth-century curiosities but the ultimate instrument of force and essential tools of great-power competition. China is engaging in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, Russia is issuing regular nuclear threats, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and Iran’s dash time to the bomb is now measured in weeks.

This means that the United States will need to once again strengthen its strategic forces to deter adversaries and assure allies. By doing so, I hope the United States can prove our respondents wrong and ensure that the world’s most powerful weapons are never used again.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Roughly one-quarter of respondents predicted that Russia will use a nuclear weapon by 2035, with around the same percentage saying the same regarding North Korea, amid reports of near-Russian nuclear use early in its war against Ukraine and concerns about crumbling deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Both cases represent significant increases relative to our previous survey, when only 14 percent expected Russia to employ a nuke and 15 percent believed North Korea would do so.

5. The United States is still likely to be dominant militarily in 2035—but with relatively less economic, diplomatic, and soft power as it navigates a multipolar world

Three-quarters of respondents in our latest survey agreed that the world in 2035 will be multipolar, with multiple centers of power, in line with the findings in our previous survey.

A slightly smaller percentage of respondents—71 percent—expected the United States to remain the world’s dominant military power by that time. A majority (58 percent) envisioned the United States being the world’s dominant technology innovator a decade from now.

On other measures of power—economic, cultural, and diplomatic—respondents predicting US dominance in 2035 were in the minority, if only ever so slightly in the case of economic power, in which 49 percent of respondents expected the United States to be dominant.

Between our latest survey and the previous year’s, confidence in US dominance over the next decade dropped across several measures of power, particularly diplomatic and military clout. Those forecasting US dominance in ten years’ time declined from 81 percent to 71 percent for military power, 63 percent to 58 percent for technological innovation, 52 percent to 49 percent for economic power, and 32 percent to 24 percent for diplomatic power. (The Global Foresight 2024 survey did not ask about future US dominance in cultural or soft power, which 35 percent of respondents expected in our most recent survey.) Slightly more respondents (12 percent) relative to our prior survey (7 percent) forecast that the United States will be dominant in none of these areas by 2035.

A bright but more uncertain future for US alliances

While a majority of respondents (61 percent) expected the United States to maintain its security alliances and partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in 2035, this figure was markedly down from our previous survey (79 percent), with much of the shift seeming to stem from those answering that they “don’t know” (26 percent in the Global Foresight 2025 edition relative to 12 percent in the 2024 edition).

Responses on the future of US military dominance and alliances appear correlated. Among those who expected the United States to retain such dominance by 2035, 67 percent believed that it would maintain its network of alliances. Among those who did not think the United States would be the world’s dominant military power in a decade, only 46 percent believed that the country would preserve its alliance network.

In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, just under a third of respondents expected Europe to have achieved “strategic autonomy” within the next decade by taking more responsibility for its own security and thus relying less on the United States. In our latest survey, however, almost half of respondents (48 percent) expected Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy” over the next ten years—a notable increase as President Donald Trump presses European countries to substantially increase their defense spending.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of alliances and partnerships in 2035:

The dangers of a diminished United States

Those who anticipate a diminished United States over the next decade may link such a scenario to worse outcomes for the world. Among respondents who said that by 2035 the United States will be the dominant power in none of the domains listed in the survey, for instance, only 24 percent believed that the world will be better off in a decade’s time. Among other respondents, 40 percent expected the world to be better off ten years from now. Similarly, among those who didn’t expect US dominance in any domain of power in a decade, 62 percent envisioned a world war occurring over that timeframe. For the rest of the survey pool, 38 percent anticipated another world war.

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

In the United States, declinism is a national pastime with a poor track record. In the 1970s, many thought the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the world’s leading superpower. In the 1980s, economists projected that Japan would unseat the United States as the world’s leading economy. In the 2010s, many thought it was inevitable that China would become the world’s largest economic power.

All of those predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The United States is now a rising power, claiming 26 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), its largest share in two decades. Meanwhile, China is declining; Xi Jinping’s desire to assert Chinese Communist Party control over all aspects of Chinese society is stifling Chinese growth, and his aggressive foreign policy is undercutting the global economic engagement strategy that fueled China’s rise. Europe’s share of global GDP has fallen from a quarter in the 1980s to roughly 15 percent today. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Spain’s. To whom then is the United States supposedly ceding all of this power?

Is the United States in decline? I wouldn’t bet on it.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

6. Many respondents are pessimistic about the war in Ukraine ending on terms favorable to Ukraine

Amid a push by the incoming Trump administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an end three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, and as Ukraine and Russia each seek to secure the best possible terms in any future negotiated peace deal, respondents were split on the likely outcome of the conflict. Forty-seven percent predicted that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end on terms largely favorable to Russia and 43 percent forecast that it will result in a “frozen conflict.” Only 4 percent expected the war to end on terms largely favorable to Ukraine.

Our previous survey a year earlier, which asked a different and more detailed question about Ukraine in ten years’ time, reflected more optimism, with 48 percent of respondents predicting that Ukraine would emerge from the war as an independent, sovereign state in control of the territory it held before Russia’s escalated assault on the country in 2022.

Expand to read expert insight by John Herbst

Expectations about the future change in the wake of historic developments and perceptions of those developments. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is US policy.

Simply put, a strong US policy providing Ukraine the weapons to drive Russian forces largely out of Ukraine and rallying the political West to supply Ukraine’s economic needs would lead to a clear defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin that would return much of occupied Ukraine to Kyiv’s control, and with a US-led effort would vouchsafe Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity via NATO membership. Alternatively, a US decision to cut off aid to Ukraine would likely lead to a disaster that would ensure Kremlin political control of the country, produce a direct threat to NATO, and encourage aggression by US adversaries in the Far and Middle East.

US President Joe Biden gave substantial support to Ukraine, but he stopped well short of giving Ukraine the arms and permission to take back most of the country. Trump has stated that he wants Ukraine to survive and would not abandon the country, but he is seeking a durable peace that requires compromise from Ukraine as well as Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness to compromise; Putin has not. Recognizing this, Trump and his team have identified Putin as the recalcitrant party and have spoken of major economic measures—tougher sanctions, transferring the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine—to persuade Russia to negotiate. Respondents to the survey pay attention to the major factors affecting this war, including the Trump angle. But respondents to surveys are not seers, and survey questions are not written to explore the insights that seers might provide.

What therefore might we expect to happen with the war this coming year? First, Trump will roll out a peace initiative that likely includes four elements already public. Two are hard for Zelenskyy: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and no NATO membership for Ukraine for twenty years minimum. And two are hard for Putin: the demilitarized zone enforced by European troops and arming Ukraine to the hilt to prevent future Russian aggression. We can expect Putin to try hard to get Trump to drop those last two points before and then during the talks. But if Putin is persuaded that Trump will arm Ukraine with far more advanced weapons if Russia is unyielding, he might agree to terms that he intends to violate. Trump’s hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize depend on him insisting that Russia compromise to the point of ensuring a viable and stable future for Ukraine, and being ready to confront the ever-treacherous Russian dictator if Putin violates an agreement whose terms would yield that outcome.

—John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

7. Respondents are much more optimistic about a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations than in Israeli-Palestinian peace

Ever since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza set off transformative changes in the broader Middle East, US officials have linked reviving work on normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia with renewing the push for a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, with the Saudis insisting on the latter as a condition for the former.

But our survey respondents—who, notably, shared their views before Israel and Hamas reached their January cease-fire and hostage deal—were much more bullish about the prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization in the coming decade than about the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. Fifty-six percent envisioned Israel having normalized diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia by 2035—roughly similar to the percentage who said the same in our post-October 7, 2023, Global Foresight 2024 survey—relative to 17 percent who expected Israel to be coexisting next to a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within that timeframe. More than 60 percent of respondents predicted that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today’s status quo, with occupied Palestinian territories, will persist.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

In 2035, will Israel have the status quo that exists today, with occupied Palestinian territories?

Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 has taught us the dangers of thinking a status quo will continue indefinitely. Israeli leaders’ belief that Hamas had reconciled itself to the status quo in Gaza—in which Gazans received economic benefits in return for Hamas not attacking Israel—left them unprepared for the most devastating attack on the Jewish state since its war of independence in 1948.

And the war in Gaza that resulted from Hamas’s attack has brought further surprises: Israel’s almost complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization; the killing of most of Hezbollah’s military leaders and elimination of a majority of its vaunted rocket and missile arsenal; direct Iranian and Israeli attacks on each other’s territory, with Israel wiping out all of Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems; and the almost overnight collapse of the Syrian military and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the face of a renewed rebel offensive.

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed, and Iran’s image as a regional hegemon and defender of the Palestinians badly tarnished. Israeli leaders have been emboldened by Israel’s military successes and seem to believe that maintaining military dominance alone will deter the country’s enemies.

But some observers, looking ahead, ask whether the cycle of violence since October 7 is likely to repeat itself at some point if Israel doesn’t address the issue of Palestinian aspirations for independence. The Biden administration and others have called for a return to the idea of a two-state solution as necessary to forestall future cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Admittedly, the current environment is not propitious for discussion of a Palestinian state. A large majority of Israelis, still traumatized by Hamas’s horrific attack on October 7, reject the idea as posing a grave risk to Israel’s security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly refused calls from the United States to incorporate the concept of an eventual Palestinian state into Israel’s post-war strategy, and right-wingers in the current Israeli government want to annex a large part of the West Bank, keep long-term control of the Gaza Strip, and return Israeli settlements to Gaza.

But the Palestinian issue is not likely to go away. Anti-Israel militancy and violence by Palestinians is growing in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and Israel hasn’t totally suppressed attacks by Hamas in Gaza after more than a year of fighting. Arab publics are seething with anger over the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced by Israeli military operations in Gaza. And world opinion has increasingly turned against Israel as Palestinian casualties have mounted.

The Palestinian issue remains a roadblock to Israel becoming fully integrated into the region, a key goal of Netanyahu’s that he hopes will put a capstone on his legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Responding to popular sentiment, Saudi leaders have indicated that Riyadh won’t normalize relations with Israel—an essential step to create a political and security bulwark against renewed threats from Iran—unless Jerusalem endorses a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood.

New elections will probably need to take place in Israel, bringing new leadership open to the idea of a political horizon for the Palestinians, if the current status quo is to change. The United States has an important role to play here by encouraging Israeli leaders to think about how to translate their military success into a regional strategy that includes a vision for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The odds of such a development seem long right now, but October 7 is a reminder that clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East

8. As global organizations become less capable of solving the world’s problems, regional groupings and the BRICS may rise in importance

Respondents foresaw many global institutions growing less effective over the coming decade. Seventy-five percent expected the United Nations (UN) to be less capable of solving challenges core to its mission by 2035 relative to today, compared with 9 percent who anticipated it becoming more capable of doing so. The figures for the United Nations Security Council are only slightly better, with 67 percent of respondents predicting less capability and 9 percent more capability. Sixty percent of respondents envisioned the World Trade Organization being less capable in a decade than it is today.

Respondents also may be skeptical about the UN’s capacity to tackle global-governance challenges such as climate change. Just under 40 percent of respondents predicted that greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2035, despite signs that this tipping point is already near. Only about half of respondents believed that renewable energy technologies will be the dominant form of electricity production globally by then, despite significant growth in demand for renewable energy.

The forecast was less dire for the World Bank, with 46 percent predicting less capability and 19 percent more capability, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 41 percent predicting less capability and 20 percent more capability. A similar if slightly more sanguine picture emerged regarding organizations consisting of the world’s leading powers. Forty-nine percent of respondents predicted less capability and 21 percent more capability for the Group of Seven (G7), while 38 percent expected less capability and 29 percent more capability for the Group of Twenty (G20).

But respondents seemed to hold out even more hope for regional blocs and the BRICS, which is now expanding its membership beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Forty percent of respondents predicted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be more capable of fulfilling its mission by 2035, while 20 percent said the opposite. For the European Union, those figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. (Respondents from EU countries were even more optimistic, with 50 percent expecting greater capability and 22 percent less capability.) For the BRICS, the numbers were 43 percent and 31 percent.

Expand to read expert insight by Josh Lipsky

The findings show in hard data what many analysts believe—that the international financial institutions, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, remain the most functional parts of the multilateral system. That’s because they deliver real money every day to countries around the world.

But the responses also show a growing recognition that these institutions are not self-perpetuating. The tenuous consensus that allows them to go about day-to-day business is predicated on an understanding that functioning IMF and World Bank institutions serve every country (including the United States) better than dysfunctional ones. With Donald Trump’s return to office, there are questions about whether that consensus will hold. For what it’s worth: The first time Trump was in office, it did, and Trump and his team saw the value in both institutions, even if they disagreed with some policy decisions.

The one area of the findings that seems off-target is on the BRICS. The likelihood of the BRICS succeeding in fulfilling their main goals seems vastly overstated in these findings (likely a product of media reporting on BRICS expansion during 2023 and 2024). Here’s the question that is much tougher to answer: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve? What they oppose—the Western-led system—is clear. But what is their proactive agenda? Until they answer that question, the ability of BRICS to succeed as an institution will be limited at best.  

—Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center

9. Today’s democratic recession may deepen into a democratic depression

Overall, respondents appeared gloomy about the prospects for democracy around the world by 2035. Just under half envisioned the current “democratic recession” worsening and becoming a “democratic depression,” while only 17 percent anticipated a “democratic renaissance” instead. The remaining 37 percent expected the global state of democracy to remain much as it is today, with some encouraging progress but also considerable headwinds and backsliding.

Sixty-five percent of respondents also forecast that global press freedoms will decrease by 2035, with another quarter expecting them to stay about the same as they are today and very few anticipating those freedoms increasing over the coming decade.

Our question on the state of global democracy in our previous survey was not identical and therefore not directly comparable. Nevertheless, its results—24 percent expected more democracies a decade hence, 38 percent forecast fewer democracies, and another 37 percent foresaw stasis—presaged the dim outlook expressed in our latest survey.

10. Women are more pessimistic about the global future than men are

Women notably expressed a bleaker outlook across many questions in the survey related to conflict, their own rights, and US clout over the next decade.

For instance, 61 percent of female respondents predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade, compared with 44 percent of male respondents who said the same. Women (54 percent) were also more likely than men (44 percent) to expect a democratic depression. Thirty-two percent of women pointed to women as the most likely group to have their rights curtailed in the coming decade—twice the proportion of men who gave the same answer. Women, moreover, were less likely than men to envision the United States as the world’s dominant military power (58 percent relative to 76 percent) and technological innovator (47 percent relative to 61 percent) in a decade’s time.

Expand to read expert insight by Nicole Goldin

The pessimism from women likely reflects persistent inequities in military, economic, and political representation and participation, as well as the disproportionate impacts of crises and shocks—whether those are economic (like inflation), security-related (from wars such as those in Ukraine or Gaza), the result of political turmoil or transition, or the product of natural disasters and climate events.

Compounding these situations are the challenges of child or family care and pay gaps, which limit the work and earnings of many women, and worsening domestic and gender-based violence, which devastates women’s lives in all dimensions. In the United States, the rollback of Roe v. Wade has left many women believing their rights and protection more broadly are at risk.

—Nicole Goldin, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and head of equitable development at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research

About the authors

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Uri Friedman, Senior Editorial Director, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

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Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come.

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know.

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

Choose your global future

The reluctant international order

China ascendant

Climate of fear

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.”

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world.

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests.

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner.

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage.

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest.

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems.

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms.

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat.

China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China.

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli.

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.

Allies hedging

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States.

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.

Institutional shifts

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter.

Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate.

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament.

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains.

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments.

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought.

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction.

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric.

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason.

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.

About the authors

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

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Can Russia be held accountable for the crime of aggression in Ukraine?

Kristina Hook — Tue, 11 Feb 2025 22:13:26 +0000

In early February, a coalition of 37 countries made an important step forward on promises to hold Russian leaders accountable for the invasion of Ukraine. This coalition, which includes every member state of the European Union, announced “significant progress” toward the establishment of a special tribunal for the international crime of aggression against Ukraine.

In a statement, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the historical significance of the moment. “When Russia chose to roll its tanks over Ukraine’s borders, breaking the UN Charter, it committed one of the gravest violations: The Crime of Aggression. Now, justice is coming,” she commented.

Russia stands accused of committing a vast array of crimes in Ukraine. Russians have allegedly engaged in the systematic targeting of Ukrainian civilians with the bombardment of civilian homes, infrastructure, churches, and schools. Alleged Russian crimes also include rape, torture, mass trafficking of adults and children, forcible disappearances, and the execution of surrendering Ukrainian soldiers.

The perpetrators who committed and abetted each of these individual crimes must face legal accountability. However, this month’s progress in the quest to establish an international tribunal is aimed at filling another glaring gap in legal accountability. Presently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague is authorized to prosecute Russian nationals for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, but it is unable to hold Russia’s leaders accountable for the decision to launch the invasion.

This inability to prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression is a significant problem. After all, the attempt by Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders to subjugate Ukraine is a test case with profound consequences for the future of international security. The outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will reveal whether citizens of all countries can expect to live securely within their recognized borders without threat of invasion, occupation, and annexation.

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Enshrined in the United Nations Charter as “territorial integrity” and “state sovereignty,” the principles challenged by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have stood the test of time since World War II. In the past, even when allegations were levied that a country was violating these principles, there was never any serious question that such rules protecting a country’s borders existed.

These basic rules serve as the cornerstone of today’s international security architecture. They quietly uphold every existing diplomatic, economic, and military arrangement in the world, shaping the environment around us in ways that few notice and almost everybody takes for granted. If Russia is allowed to claim victory or even succeed in holding any of Ukraine’s recognized territory, the entire world will face a shift toward a dark new period in international relations governed by the principle of “might makes right.” A global arms race will likely follow.

Russia’s invasion and attempted illegal annexation of five Ukrainian provinces in a war of conquest is widely recognized by the international community as a crime of aggression. In March 2022, for example, a United Nations General Assembly resolution supported by an overwhelming 141-5 majority condemned Russia’s “aggression against Ukraine in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Critically, the crime of aggression is a leadership crime. Those prosecuted must be military or political leaders. This has fueled speculation that figures like Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs could potentially be charged. It remains unlikely that any high-ranking Russians could be forced to stand trial in person, but even prosecutions in absentia could have serious repercussions for Russia itself and for the future framework of international security.

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Significant questions remain about the legal format of a possible tribunal, as different options including a fully international tribunal or a so-called hybrid tribunal established under Ukrainian law would face different limitations. The United States has not yet prioritized support for an international tribunal. Instead, Europe is currently playing a leading role in the push for justice. The proposed legal framework will now be scrutinized closely to see if it precludes the prosecution of key leaders while they remain in office, including Russia’s head of state and other senior Kremlin officials.

Additional issues include the financing of any future tribunal and its location. Presently, The Hague appears to be the most likely option as it hosts the ICC, the International Court of Justice, and the International Center for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression, which was established by Eurojust (the European Union’s judicial cooperation agency) in 2023.

This month’s agreement on the framework for a potential tribunal was welcomed in Kyiv. The Ukrainian authorities have proven adept at leveraging international legal mechanisms to pursue justice and accountability for Russian crimes ever since Moscow first invaded Ukraine in 2014. Legal scholars have extolled Ukrainian legal efforts as exemplars of post-colonial nations securing their due rights through such institutions and “countering imperialism through international law.”

Beyond the real legal importance of this progress toward a tribunal for Russian crimes against Ukraine, an accompanying narrative corrective is no less significant. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a faraway “border issue,” but rather a direct assault on the US-led system of international rules. It is therefore a direct referendum of US credibility on the world stage. Senior officials in the Trump administration have recently framed Russia’s invasion as an issue in which “both sides” must make concessions. Recognizing the one-sided nature of Russian criminal aggression reminds of the many sacrifices Ukraine and Ukrainians have already made in the fight to uphold the core principles underpinning international relations.

Recent announcements regarding a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression should serve as a reminder to US leaders that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the world’s most documented war. Too much evidence exists in the public record to deny the reality of Russian crimes. Legal battles to hold Russia accountable will result in multiple highly detailed timelines of crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine. Failure to bring Russia to justice for these crimes could pose serious challenges to the future of international security and to US President Donald Trump’s own historical legacy.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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While the exact structure of Ukraine’s resistance movement is necessarily shrouded in secrecy, it is possible to divide the country’s resistance efforts into three broad categories: civil resistance, partisan activities, and covert military operations.

The “Yellow Ribbon” movement and the “Zla Mavka” resistance group are two prominent examples of Ukrainian civil resistance in action. The “Yellow Ribbon” movement first emerged during the initial months of the full-scale invasion in spring 2022. As the name suggests, it allows activists to display their opposition to the Russian occupation by leaving yellow ribbons in public spaces or painting other symbols associated with the movement. Activists have also engaged in a wide range of information operations designed to intimidate Russian troops or lift the spirits of fellow Ukrainians living under Russian occupation.

The all-female “Zla Mavka” group takes its name from a traditional woodland spirit in Ukrainian folklore who is famed for luring unsuspecting men to their deaths. Members of this loosely knit group are known for using satire and engaging in creative mockery as they seek to boost Ukrainian morale and undermine the legitimacy of the Russian occupation forces.

A number of partisan groups are currently engaged in more direct acts of resistance including intelligence gathering, sabotage operations, and armed attacks on Russian forces in occupied Ukraine. One prominent example is “Atesh,” a partisan group that was founded in September 2022 in Russian-occupied Crimea but claims to have carried out attacks throughout the occupied regions of Ukraine.

The name “Atesh” comes from the Crimean Tatar word for “fire,” reflecting the group’s strong links with the Crimean Tatar community. In a July 2023 interview, Crimean Tatar community leader Mustafa Dzemilev said “Atesh” was able to operate “very deep underground” to avoid detection, but claimed that it could form the basis of a far larger partisan force in Crimea if Ukrainian troops were able to advance toward the peninsula.

Numerous other partisan groups are active across Russian-occupied Ukraine, often focusing on a particular city or region. These include the “Popular Resistance of Ukraine,” an umbrella organisation that claims to have conducted dozens of operations in occupied eastern Ukraine. Another example is the “Berdyansk Partisan Army,” which is active in and around the port city of Berdyansk in southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region.

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Unsurprisingly, the main source of resistance activities in Russian-occupied Ukraine is the Ukrainian military. Ukraine first created a covert resistance force back in 2014 during the early stages of Russia’s invasion. In 2021, this was formally established as a unit within Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces. Known as the “Rukh Oporu” (“Resistance Movement”), it is currently engaged in a wide range of support functions that include training, supplying, and funding activists and partisan groups, while also conducting its own extensive operations against the Russian occupation forces. These activities are thought to include the assassination of Russian officials and collaborators.

In addition to “Rukh Oporu,” Ukraine’s SBU (State Security Service) and HUR (Military Intelligence Directorate) are also thought to be heavily involved in military activities behind enemy lines. This includes operations in Russian-occupied territory inside Ukraine and across the border in Russia itself.

It is difficult to assess the overall impact that resistance activities are having on morale within the ranks of the occupying Russian forces or among local collaborators. At the same time, numerous specific attacks on officials, soldiers, equipment, and infrastructure have been confirmed via multiple sources. Resistance groups also support the Ukrainian military with critical intelligence on everything from Russian troop movements to the deployment of air defense batteries. This has enabled a large number of precision strikes on high value targets, while also proving important for the conduct of major operations such as Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region.

Ukraine’s efforts to resist the Russian occupation have become markedly more sophisticated over the past three years and are unlikely to end any time soon. If talks progress in the coming months and a compromise peace agreement begins to take shape that would allow Russia to retain control over currently occupied regions of Ukraine, the issue of further Ukrainian resistance operations will likely become the subject of heated discussions as Moscow seeks assurances that Kyiv will be reluctant to provide.

Omar Ashour is a professor of security and military studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in Qatar. He is an honorary professor at the Security and Strategy Institute at the University of Exeter in the UK, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine.

The first official reaction came from Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, which published a statement soon after Trump first proposed his idea in January expressing its rejection of the forced displacement of Palestinians—whether temporarily or in the long term.

The statement affirmed Egypt’s “continued support for the steadfastness of the Palestinian people on their land” and rejected “any infringement on those inalienable rights whether by settlement or annexation of land or by the depopulation of (Palestinian) land of its people.”

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The Egyptian Parliament also voiced its disapproval of Trump’s idea, describing it as “a grave threat” to regional security and stability.

Trump’s proposal has also been met with disdain from many Egyptians on social media despite his efforts to promote the idea as serving Gazans’ best interests.

On January 27, two days after his first proposal, Trump described Gaza as a “demolition site,” adding, “you can get people living in areas that are a lot safer—and a lot more comfortable.” He continued by saying that the proposal would help Gazans “live without disruption . . . and violence.” Trump also reportedly said, referring to Sisi, “I’ve helped him a lot and I hope he’ll help us.”

But that doesn’t seem likely; it took Sisi several days before he finally broke his silence on January 29, expressing his outright rejection of Trump’s offer at a press conference with visiting Kenyan President William Ruto. Sisi called the forced displacement of Gazans “an injustice,” adding that Egypt could never be part of such a move. He continued, “regarding what is being said about the displacement of Palestinians, it can never be tolerated or allowed because of its impact on Egyptian national security.”

Sisi’s words were an affirmation of his earlier stance vis-à-vis the relocation of Palestinians to Egypt. Sisi has warned that transferring Gaza refugees to Sinai is “a red line” that would threaten Egypt’s national security. Sisi has also cautioned that displacing Palestinians could ignite war with Israel, alluding to concerns cited by some Egyptian officials that if a large number of Palestinians were relocated to Sinai, they might turn it into a staging area for attacks on Israel, prompting Israeli reprisals. His comments were in response to calls by Israel’s far-right for the expulsion of Palestinians to Sinai.

Hisham Kassem, a publisher and activist, told me that Trump’s proposal to transfer Palestinians to Egypt is “unrealistic,” and the US president’s wish may be difficult to fulfill as Sisi would likely face stiff resistance at home should he side with Trump.

“It could’ve worked if Trump had discussed the matter secretly with Sisi, but now that the information has been made public, there is too much at stake for Sisi,” Kassem argued. Public discontent is growing in Egypt due to a dire economic crisis and double-digit inflation, and Kassem noted that it would be “a grave mistake” to give the public another reason to be angry.

“But there would also be opposition from other Arab states in the region that have already rejected the plan, such as Saudi Arabia,” Kassem noted, adding that the Egyptian leadership is right to focus instead on the two-state solution to resolve the conflict once and for all. He believes the war that lasted for more than fifteen months has provided “a window of opportunity” to restart peace talks, as both sides to the conflict are licking their wounds after suffering heavy losses.

Meanwhile, a Trump executive order temporarily halting foreign development assistance and calling for a review of aid programs’ efficiencies and consistency with US foreign policy stirred controversy worldwide. Following the executive order, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told officials and US embassies abroad that the State Department would temporarily pause existing foreign assistance—except emergency food aid and military funding for Israel and Egypt—in order to conduct the review.

Egypt receives about $1.3 billion in foreign military assistance from the United States annually. It also receives significant economic and development assistance from Washington, which would be subject to the aid freeze and the review.

“Egypt takes immense pride in the fact that it is the second largest recipient of US military aid in the region after Israel,” Kassem noted. He added, “This gives Egypt political clout in its dealings with other countries.” At a time when the country is facing a severe economic crisis, it is also in desperate need of economic assistance to avert unrest.

The military aid exemption was seen by analysts as linked to Cairo’s role in maintaining security in the region; some also believed the exemption was meant to ensure that Egypt upholds its peace treaty with Israel.

Samir Ragheb, a retired army general and political commentator, told me he believes the US decision is linked to the strong security cooperation between the United States and Egypt, particularly in the area of counterterrorism. In a January 23 phone call with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, Rubio stressed the importance of “close cooperation to advance post-conflict planning for the governance and security of Gaza,” according to a State Department readout of the call.

During a press conference with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, Trump stirred further controversy in Egypt when he announced that the US would “take over the Gaza Strip;” he did not rule out the possibility of sending US troops to fill the security vacuum in the enclave. While much about the proposal is unclear—and senior officials have tried to walk parts of it back—analysts expect Trump to discuss details of the controversial idea with Sisi, including during a reported scheduled visit to Washington later in February. Such analysts say Trump will use US leverage to persuade Sisi to take in at least some of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents so that the US administration can carry out its plan of, as Trump put it, transforming Gaza into “the Riviera of the Middle East.” Whether or not Sisi will bow under US pressure is uncertain, but politician and former Member of Parliament Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat believes Sisi will ultimately cave in to US demands.

“Unlike Saudi Arabia, which has pledged $600 billion in investments in the US, Egypt does not have the means to cash out billions of dollars,” Sadat argued. He added, “Taking in Palestinian refugees is the one thing Egypt can do to avert a fallout with the United States.”

Indeed, it is in Cairo’s interests to cement ties with Washington: For one, Egypt wants to continue to receive US military aid and development assistance; it also wants to be able to import weapons from the United States should the need arise. (During the first Trump administration, Egypt was among the top ten overall weapons importers in the Middle East, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, with the majority of arms imports supplied by the United States.)

Egypt is also hoping that Trump’s “strongman” policies will bring an end to the Gaza war, ushering in stability in the Middle East. Ending the war could also mean a halt to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which have caused Suez Canal revenues to diminish significantly. Cairo is eager for the return of the canal’s revenues to their pre-war record-high levels as Egypt badly needs the foreign currency to import wheat and avert default on its crippling foreign debt.

Cairo would also like to hold on to its regional leadership role, especially as its latest mediation efforts—alongside those of Qatar and the United States—have succeeded in brokering a long-awaited Gaza cease-fire and hostage release deal. The cease-fire went into effect on January 19, boosting Egypt’s standing in the region and giving Gazans some respite from more than fifteen months of a deadly war that has killed more than forty-six thousand Palestinians, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. The truce agreed to by Israel and Hamas will also secure the release of dozens of hostages captured by Hamas during its attack on October 7, 2023, thirteen of whom have already been released since the cease-fire went into effect (while five Thai nationals have been freed under a separate agreement).

Although the relationship between the Sisi government and the United States tends to be trouble-free or at least less tense with a Republican in the White House—largely because Democrat leaders have previously conditioned US aid on progress being made in Egypt’s dire human rights record while Trump turns a blind eye—it looks like the road ahead under the Trump administration may be bumpy still. While Trump, during his first administration, had reportedly called Sisi his favorite dictator and, more recently, had allegedly told reporters that Sisi was his friend, the Egyptian leader’s refusal to go along with Trump’s proposal for Gazan refugees may cause tensions between the two.

Moreover, US policymakers will need to scrutinize Egypt’s violations of its 1979 peace agreement with Israel by deploying an increased number of Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula. The topic is highly sensitive for Egypt, which got a nod of approval from Israel after the 2011 uprising to deploy additional troops in northern Sinai to rein in Islamist militants. Egypt has since beefed up those military forces several times with Israel’s consent despite the move being in a breach of the Camp David agreement (which limits the number of troops and types of armament Egypt can station in the border area.)

During the war in Gaza, the Israeli military took over the Philadelphi Corridor and a military official said it located at least twenty underground tunnels built by Hamas, stretching from Gaza to Egypt. The tunnels had likely been used as supply lines by Hamas including for military purposes; Israel also suspects the tunnels may have allowed Hamas fighters to travel in and out of the enclave. The revelation has cast a pall over Egypt-Israel relations, which had been warming in the months and years prior to Israel’s war on Gaza.

It seems likely that the issue of the tunnels may also impact Egypt’s relations with the new Trump administration, as it has raised questions among some analysts about Egypt’s adherence to the peace treaty (the prime reason why the United States sent billions of dollars in military aid and development assistance over the last four decades.) Any talk about the withdrawal of the additional forces from North Sinai or about a permanent Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor would certainly provoke the wrath of Cairo and get relations with the new US administration off on a wrong footing, an Egyptian security source (who spoke to me on condition of anonymity) warned.

The alternative to such talks would be to agree with the Sisi government on installing some sort of underground surveillance system that could prevent the exploitation of the border by Hamas and other militant groups. As the Trump administration gets settled in the White House, it is unclear how the US-Egypt relationship will evolve. But how US policymakers react to Egypt’s violations of the peace treaty—and how Sisi reacts react to Trump’s plan to seize control of Gaza—will likely determine which direction US-Egypt relations will take under Trump.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

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Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

Jonathan Panikoff — Wed, 05 Feb 2025 22:35:31 +0000

Many Americans and allies in Europe and the Middle East woke up this morning confused and shocked to learn of US President Donald Trump’s declaration that the United States will “take over” the Gaza Strip, and its approximately two million inhabitants should be moved elsewhere. They shouldn’t be.

Trump’s plans and goals to end many of the traditional domestic and global norms we’ve experienced in the post-World War II period were never a secret. And Tuesday night’s policy declaration is not part of a strategic master plan to get Hamas to agree to a deal with better terms for Israel and the United States. Nor is it a strategy to cajole Egypt or Jordan to be more accommodating to US preferences in the region, as some commentators have assessed.

The plan the president announced is about remaking the world and US interests in it in a fundamental way. Does the president truly believe his plan can ultimately be executed? Maybe, maybe not. If it cannot, then it could indeed serve as a starting point for negotiations over Gaza with Arab states, making the result the same regardless of whether he intended the plan to be a serious proposal or not.

But even if his plan is a nonstarter, which it almost certainly is, it’s not because that was the intent all along. Rather, it is because he doesn’t fully understand, or perhaps care, about the history of the region, the complexities of intra-Palestinian relationships, the potential implications for US allies, or, most importantly, the emotional connection most people have to their home.

Without those drivers influencing his views, the president’s proposal makes strategic sense and is not actually contradictory to his fundamental goal to end extensive US involvement in the Middle East. From his perspective, the only way to reduce long-term US financial obligations in the Middle East, which are largely tied up in security support, is to gut Gaza and start over from the ground up. If the United States doesn’t take the lead in doing that, then the long-term costs associated with having to protect Israel, for example, will continue indefinitely. A single Iron Dome interceptor missile, for instance, costs upwards of fifty thousand dollars, for which the United States provides most of the financing. And the United States gives over $1.4 billion annually in mostly security aid to both Jordan and Egypt.

For the president, a US “take over” of Gaza must appear to be the best way to incubate a region of peace, eventually allowing security costs to be significantly reduced. And while he proposed on Tuesday to do so with US efforts on the ground, the White House press secretary said today that Trump’s statement “does not mean American taxpayers will be funding this effort.” The president probably expects what he called “neighboring countries of great wealth”—almost certainly a reference to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and potentially Kuwait—to pay for some or all of it. Either way, if the United States puts in the time to rebuild Gaza, the president expects it to reap much of the economic benefit once its capacity to be, as he said, “the Riviera of the Middle East” is achieved.

The president might genuinely view his proposal in humanitarian terms, as National Security Advisor Michael Waltz highlighted, seeking for Gazans to be moved to third countries as a means to ultimately help them. The result, however, is a distinction without a difference, both legally and politically: forced displacement is a violation of international law—and Trump does not seem to care about international laws or norms.

A disturbing deal for regional leaders

When Trump announced his plan, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may not have been aware it was coming. But ever the consummate politician, he paid credence to Trump without endorsing it during the press conference, saying that Trump “has a different idea, and I think it’s worth paying attention to this.” The reality is that implementing the plan would be a disaster for Netanyahu and Israel, given the likely destabilizing impact it would have on the region.

Nor would it be any better for other US regional partners and allies. Jordanian and Egyptian leaders’ opposition to relocating any Gazans to their countries is not just a matter of international law but of domestic stability. For both Amman and Cairo, the implications of doing so are likely to be viewed in existential terms. Such a move could be construed as endorsing the desire of those in Israel who oppose a Palestinian state. That is a grave concern for the leaders, especially in Jordan, where more than half of the population is of Palestinian descent.

And both Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah II would be equally concerned that some of those displaced are members of Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist organizations. These people would then become the responsibility of Egypt and Jordan to control, creating a near certainty that the terrorist groups would then seek to attack Cairo and Amman, as well. A destabilized Jordan and Egypt, Netanyahu certainly understands, would increase instability in the Levant, and with it threats to Israel.

But even worse for Israel, this project would set back Israeli and US relations with Gulf states. Tuesday night, the president said, “And I really believe that many countries will soon be joining this amazing peace and economic development transaction.” But for Riyadh, which immediately responded by highlighting that it will not normalize ties with Israel without a two-state solution, the displacement of the Palestinian population from Gaza at the behest of the United States would probably be a bridge too far. This is also true for Abu Dhabi, which has been heralded by Trump for signing the Abraham Accords. Since the attacks on October 7, 2023, both Saudi and Emirati populations have been relatively less vocal than some of their Arab brethren about the conflict. That could change. Even monarchies must be responsive at times to their people. Instead of advancing peace, the expulsion of Gazans would likely undermine the accords and jeopardize Riyadh’s willingness to consider joining them before a Palestinian state is formed.

It’s almost impossible to imagine Trump’s plan for Gaza coming to fruition. But it would be a mistake to think that he was anything but serious with the proposal he laid out Tuesday night. Doing so risks underestimating how committed he will be for the next forty-seven-and-a-half months to changing the US role not just in the Middle East, but in the world.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

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Experts react: Is the US really going to ‘take over’ the Gaza Strip?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 05 Feb 2025 19:34:58 +0000

“The US will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it too.” During a press conference on Tuesday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump proposed that the United States take control of the Palestinian territory and rebuild it. While the real-estate mogul-turned-president said that he envisions Gaza becoming “the Riviera of the Middle East,” Arab states and other countries quickly rejected the idea of direct US intervention, arguing that it would in effect force out Palestinians from the land and abandon the long-standing US commitment to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on how to decode Trump’s comments and how the remarks are already impacting the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

Thomas Warrick: Trump has pushed the US further ahead on Gaza in a month than Biden ever did

Jennifer Gavito: It’s a concept without a plan—made all the more difficult by dismantling USAID

Arwa Damon: The way to avoid “history repeating itself” is not to repeat the core cause

Alex Plitsas: The reality of “owning” Gaza would carry large costs and risks—including an armed insurgency

If Trump is trying to pressure Hamas, it’s unlikely to work

Though many were extremely taken aback by Trump’s remarks alongside Netanyahu, a few rushed to view them through the prism of Trump’s hardball negotiation style. By setting the goalpost in such an extreme territory, Trump might then gradually negotiate down and obtain favorable conditions for whatever policy he hopes to implement between Israel and Gaza.

However, what remains puzzling in this equation is who the president might be trying to influence with such outlandish and extreme declarations that violate decades of established US policy toward the Middle East, international humanitarian law, and diplomatic norms.

It is well understood that Jordan and Egypt are in no position to help facilitate the forced or even voluntary removal of more than two million Gazans out of the coastal enclave and into their respective territories. Even if those countries wanted to acquiesce to the president’s blackmail, the US foreign aid that they receive is insufficient to justify the geopolitical, economic, security, and social risks and implications such a move would entail. Clearly, the president is not trying to pressure Israel or its leadership, represented by Netanyahu, who received a hero’s welcome in Washington as the first foreign leader to visit the White House in Trump’s second term. That leaves the Palestinians, and Hamas in particular, as the likely party that Trump was trying to pressure with his unprecedented declarations on Tuesday.

Contextually, Netanyahu’s visit comes on the heels of the impending negotiations to begin the second phase of the cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. Netanyahu is involving his close confidant, Ron Dermer, instead of Mossad’s head, David Barnea, as the negotiations are expected to be political and less technical. The expected goal is to tie the implementation of the second phase with a political horizon that displaces Hamas as the sole authority in Gaza and prevents the terror group from remaining in power after the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the decimated Palestinian strip.

It is unclear how these threats can credibly force Hamas to moderate and shift its position vis-à-vis the negotiations. It’s also unclear whether the group is susceptible to threats of US military action against the territory as a way to induce behavioral change. Hamas has unleashed the most destructive chapter in Palestinian contemporary history upon the people of Gaza, and it is still ruthlessly acting as if it will enjoy the spoils of war, including the full reconstruction of the territory. Although the entire world, including Arab and Muslim nations, has made it clear that there will be no reconstruction of Gaza while Hamas remains in complete control (and for good reason), Hamas has yet to signal that it is willing to give up anything in order to facilitate Gaza’s recovery.

Trump’s comments are extraordinarily harmful to the prospects of regional stability, to moderate Arab Sunni states, and to the prospects of Israeli-Saudi normalization, with the kingdom releasing a statement on Wednesday saying that it will not join the Abraham Accords if there isn’t a Palestinian state. The comments also reek of an incoherent foreign policy that is defined by threats, not compelling US leadership. Indeed, these remarks are fuel for the United States’ enemies, especially the likes of China, Iran, and Russia, the last of which will now likely point to US actions to justify its illegal and ruthless invasion of Ukraine.

The rules-based world order that the United States has led for decades must not be sacrificed for neo-imperialism that breeds chaos and instability while eroding trust in US leadership among its allies and emboldening its foes.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and an analyst who grew up in Gaza City.

Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

Read more from Jonathan Panikoff, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council:

New Atlanticist

Feb 5, 2025

Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

By Jonathan Panikoff

It’s almost impossible to imagine Trump’s plan for Gaza coming to fruition. But it would be a mistake to think that he was anything but serious with the proposal he laid out Tuesday night.

Human Rights International Norms

Trump has pushed the US further ahead on Gaza in a month than Biden ever did

Since his election win on November 5, I have told colleagues that Trump would eventually realize that only the United States can organize a lasting solution to the problem of who will govern postwar Gaza. I thought this would happen in June, given the start of the new US presidential administration and the seasonal rhythms of Middle East diplomacy. I never would have guessed that the realization would hit Trump during a press conference on February 4.

Those criticizing Trump for calling for the displacement of more than two million Gazans are fundamentally misunderstanding how Trump sees Gaza: Trump is a longtime billionaire property developer who has recently come to understand the extent of Gaza’s devastation. He is right that it will likely take more than a decade to rebuild Gaza—and that the only way Gaza will be rebuilt even in that amount of time is if Hamas plays no role in Gaza’s governance going forward. Trump is also right on this point: No Arab government is going to donate billions of dollars to rebuild Gaza if Hamas is able to attack Israel in three or four years, turning all that reconstruction back into rubble.

Trump, as a developer used to buying and selling properties, does not understand the depth of Gazans’ attachment to the land and their absolute unwillingness to be further dispossessed after what happened to so many of them in 1948. The obvious precedent is their next-door neighbors, who were steadfast after almost 1,900 years of dispossession. The people of Gaza are never going to leave.

Trump also underestimates Egyptian and Jordanian unwillingness to accept Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank under any circumstances, even if it were to mean the cutoff of US assistance to those countries. There is quite literally no tool in the US toolbox that could persuade the leaders of Egypt or Jordan to change their minds on this point. Trump’s advisors know this, but they would likely rather have Trump hear this directly from Jordanian King Abdullah on February 11, and from Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, who reportedly will visit the following week, rather than from them. Fair enough. Abdullah and Sisi need to tell Trump plainly, directly, and undiplomatically that they will not do this, so that discussions will move in a more productive direction.

What Palestinians and Arab leaders need to praise is the idea that the United States will directly involve itself, in a limited way, in organizing international efforts for Gaza’s transition. Trump is not serious about wanting to “own” Gaza. What the United States can usefully do needs to be negotiated with Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab governments, along with other major donors, such as European states and Japan. But the United States contributing to disarming unexploded bombs and rubble-clearing efforts, as Trump said the United States would do, is something that the Biden administration steadfastly refused to even consider. The Biden administration refused even when pressed by former US officials (I was one) who urged it to recognize that the only way this could turn out well for the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians would be for the United States to take a leadership role in organizing the efforts of others.

Much of what Trump suggested in the past twenty-four hours will need to be dialed back to what is workable. But no one predicted that Trump would push the United States to engage more on what postwar Gaza should look like in one month than the Biden team did in fifteen months.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

It’s a concept without a plan—made all the more difficult by dismantling USAID

Tuesday’s comments by Trump sent shock waves not only through the Middle East, but also through his circles of supporters. The president campaigned on a platform of international disentanglement, not taking on new nation-building responsibilities like the one he is proposing in Gaza.

Not since the Marshall Plan, which saw massive investments in postwar Europe that continue to pay dividends today, has the United States successfully undertaken such a project. Indeed, most of its attempts have ended in abject failure (think Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Why? Because the American people ultimately weren’t prepared for the massive, all-in, long-term investment in both dollars and troops that is needed to transform a warzone into a flourishing economy. And the United States now lacks the institutional infrastructure to conceive of such a project, thanks to the ongoing dismantling of the only US government organization with nation-building expertise: the United States Agency for International Development.

Ultimately, though, this is a concept without a plan, as it is predicated on the willingness of Israel’s neighbors—especially Egypt and Jordan—to take in massive numbers of Gazans at the expense of their already shaky political and economic stability. Other Arab foreign ministers joined them earlier this week in roundly rejecting any effort to displace Palestinians, setting the stage for a difficult conversation when Jordan’s King Abdullah becomes the first Arab leader to visit Trump in the White House next week.

—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a former US acting principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

The way to avoid “history repeating itself” is not to repeat the core cause

We just heard the US president endorse the idea of committing ethnic cleansing and forcibly resettling a population. We just heard a US president lay out the potential intent to draw the United States into a war crime. That is stunning in itself. However, it’s highly likely that Trump will be given a “pass” given how accustomed the world has grown to his history of irresponsible rhetoric. Many analysts are already predicting that his sweeping commentary will need to be dialed down into an actual executable plan.

The speed of the Saudi response, reaffirming Riyadh’s commitment to a Palestinian state as a precondition to establishing diplomatic ties, is an indication of how unpalatable Trump’s plan is. It could also give Egypt and Jordan the courage they need to stand firm against the United States’ not-so-subtle threats of consequences if they refuse to take in more than two million Gazans.

“It’s terrifying. But what we fear is not the rhetoric of one man,” a Palestinian friend of mine in Gaza messaged me. “We fear forced displacement and losing the right to return like our grandparents and great-grandparents did. What we fear is losing our home, our right to our home, to see our families, to have roots.”

Gaza is a demolition zone. Trump is 100 percent correct on that, even if he did neglect the fact that US bombs dropped by Israel are the culprit. Gaza does need a massive effort to clear it of explosives and rubble and then to start reconstruction. But the clarity of his comments end there. The rest of this haphazardly laid out “plan”—if it can be called that—is little more than psychological torture for a population that is already on the edge of a mental abyss.

To somehow think that the solution, as Trump stated, to avoid “history repeating itself” is to repeat the core cause—stealing of land, illegal occupation, the forced displacement of Palestinians, denying the right of return—is rather ludicrous.

The sad irony is that it would be among the best outcomes for Palestinians to have Gaza rebuilt and transformed into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” But there is nothing in Trump’s comments or in Netanyahu’s apparent glee at them that suggest that this will be a Riviera for those whose land it is: the Palestinians.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs; the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA); and a former international correspondent for CNN.

The reality of “owning” Gaza would carry large costs and risks—including an armed insurgency

Trump’s suggestion that the United States could clear and rebuild Gaza presupposes a significant level of US military and economic involvement. In his comments, Trump was ambiguous about the deployment of US troops to secure Gaza and oversee its reconstruction, saying “We’ll do what needs to be done.” This would require a long-term commitment, with estimates of up to fifteen years for full reconstruction. The question of who would pay for such an enormous endeavor remains unanswered. Given the immense cost and the political sensitivity of the region, it is unclear if the United States would foot the bill entirely or if there would be international partners involved.

Trump’s recent statements that he can get Egypt and Jordan to host Gazans, combined with his statement about “owning Gaza,” suggest a bargain: The United States could take on Gaza’s reconstruction but, in exchange, Jordan and Egypt would host displaced Palestinians. Neither country wants to administer or secure Gaza. But they also do not want to be seen as complicit in Israel’s actions and have historically been reluctant to host more Palestinians, fearing that it would lead to the permanent displacement of the Palestinian people and thus the end of Palestinian statehood.

While this could be seen as a diplomatic move, it raises several significant concerns, not least of which is the formation of an armed insurgency. US troops or contractors in Gaza could come under fire from militant groups, particularly Hamas, which has not been fully dismantled despite efforts by Israel and others. Recent reports of Hamas recruiting more than ten thousand new members, along with the public presence of large groups of Hamas fighters at recent hostage handover events, show that the group remains an operational force. The president could have been thinking that if Egypt and Jordan take responsibility for the Gazan people, then there wouldn’t be an insurgency as there would be no one to fight. However, that would mean Gazans would have to leave Gaza altogether, which is a tall order given their desire for statehood and fears that a temporary displacement for reconstruction would actually lead to a permanent displacement and not being able to return.

Additionally, Trump’s proposal seems to overlook the deep animosity many Gazan Palestinians have toward the United States regarding US military support for Israel. The United States is often viewed as a partial actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could fuel armed resistance to any perceived US-led efforts in Gaza. There is also the issue of who would take responsibility for the security of Gaza during the rebuilding process. Arab states have shown no interest in stepping into this role, fearing the political ramifications of being seen as complicit in the displacement of Palestinians or Israel’s actions.

The logistics of this plan remain unclear. Would Palestinians be willing to leave Gaza voluntarily or would they be forcibly relocated? This question is crucial, as any attempt to remove or displace a population would likely face resistance and could lead to further violence. Trump’s idea might therefore be seen as a negotiating tactic, similar to his approach with trade deals, but its success would hinge on navigating complex regional dynamics and the realities of a volatile and heavily armed Gaza.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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Ukrainian Holocaust survivor: Russia is waging ‘war of extermination’

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 22:33:03 +0000

Ukrainian Holocaust survivor Roman Schwarzman has implored Germany to increase support for Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s “war of extermination.” Addressing the Bundestag this week as part of events to mark 80 years since the liberation of Auschwitz, Schwarzman accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of attempting to “destroy” Ukraine as a nation. “Back then, Hitler wanted to kill me because I am Jewish. Now Putin wants to kill me because I am Ukrainian.”

Schwarzman, 88, is president of Ukraine’s association for concentration camp and ghetto survivors. Born in Ukraine’s Vinnytsia region in the 1930s when it was part of the Soviet Union, he told German lawmakers of the “humiliation, pain, lice, and constant hunger” he had experienced as a child while confined to the ghetto in the town of Bershad during the Nazi occupation of World War II. “I have already been able to escape extermination once,” he commented. “Now I am an old man and must once again live with the fear that my children and grandchildren could fall victim to a war of extermination.”

Germany ranks second behind the United States in terms of military aid for Ukraine, but Schwarzman called on the country to do more. Responding to German Chancellor Olaf Sholz’s reluctance to deliver long-range Taurus missiles, he argued that Ukraine needs the missiles “in order to disable Russian airfields and rocket depots which are used to attack us every day.” Failure to do so would have dire consequences for Ukraine and for European security, he warned. “Those who believe Putin will be happy with just Ukraine are wrong.”

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Schwarzman’s comments serve as a timely reminder of Russia’s extreme objectives in Ukraine. In recent months, there has been mounting international speculation over the potential territorial concessions Ukraine may be obliged to make in order to end the invasion of their country. In reality, however, the war unleashed by Putin in February 2022 was never about limited territorial gains. From the very beginning, it has been a war to extinguish Ukrainian independence entirely.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession has dominated his reign and can be traced all the way back to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. He has always viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an historical injustice and a bitterly resented symbol of the Soviet collapse, which he has described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” The Kremlin dictator’s desire to reverse this breakup of “historical Russia” has long focused on Ukraine, and has been given additional impetus by his fears that Ukraine’s fledgling democracy could serve as a catalyst for similar change within his own authoritarian state and spark a new phase in Russia’s retreat from empire.

Putin made his intentions obvious during the buildup to the invasion when he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay arguing against Ukraine’s right to exist and insisting that Ukrainians were in fact Russians (“one people”). As Russian troops massed along the Ukrainian border in February 2022, he described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great, and has declared occupied regions of Ukraine to be “Russian forever.”

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Putin’s contempt for Ukrainian statehood has set the tone throughout wartime Russian society. Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become a daily feature of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media space, with Ukrainians routinely demonized and dehumanized. This has led United Nations investigators to note that some content “may constitute incitement to genocide.”

Following Putin’s lead, numerous senior Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia’s ultimate goal is the complete disappearance of the Ukrainian state. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in particular has become notorious for his unhinged rants. “The existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” he declared on one occasion in early 2024. More recently, close Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev has predicted that Ukraine “may cease to exist” in 2025.

This genocidal language has been matched by the actions of the invading Russian army. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Russia has systematically targeted anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime. Thousands have been detained and imprisoned, with victims including elected local officials, journalists, civil society activists, army veterans, cultural figures, and anyone regarded as a potential Ukrainian patriot. Those who remain are subjected to ruthless russification including the forced adoption of Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, statehood, and culture are being methodically erased.

Russia’s determination to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation is unprecedented in modern European history and makes a complete mockery of calls for a compromise peace. In words and deeds, Putin has made it abundantly clear that he will not tolerate the continued existence of an independent Ukraine, and regards the country’s destruction as an historic mission that will define his reign. Any efforts to broker a sustainable settlement must take this chilling vision into account.

Nobody wants the current war to end more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they are also painfully aware that the survival of their nation is at stake. Unless measures are put in place to prevent the resumption of Russian aggression once Putin has had an opportunity to rearm and regroup, a bad peace deal will merely set the stage for genocide in the heart of Europe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Blamm is an activist, well known in the country for his fierce criticism of the government. Meanwhile, and as reflected by the charges brought against Blamm, authorities accuse him of being linked to a foreign terrorist network, in whose favor he allegedly spreads false information.

Earlier, on November 16, Algerian authorities arrested French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, who is known for being critical of Algeria’s political leadership and has been accused by local authorities of threatening Algerian national security. He was arrested shortly after arriving in Algeria, and he is being prosecuted under an article of the penal code on terrorist or subversive acts against the constitutional order and state security. Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune himself has spoken on the subject, calling Sansal an impostor sent by France to destabilize the country’s public order. According to some reports, Algerian authorities may have been offended by Sansal’s comments to a French news outlet about Western Sahara being part of Morocco.

But even beyond this recent escalation of tension, however, the bilateral relationship has been progressively deteriorating in other areas.

The two countries’ positions on both the bilateral relationship and regional politics have increasingly diverged. Last July, France signalled for the first time that it would recognize an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara region, albeit under Moroccan sovereignty, leading to outrage and strong condemnation from Algeria, with a formal statement from the government calling the decision “unexpected, ill-judged, and counterproductive.”

Several members of the Algerian political system believe that the relationship has also deteriorated due to the increasing political assertion of the far right in France, whose anti-immigration policies heavily impact Algerian citizens. At the same time, however, some French officials and politicians—including members of Macron’s government—have criticized Algeria and its increasingly anti-French drift.

Yet, the deterioration of the relationship extends even beyond recent tensions and issues related to Western Sahara and Morocco. The nature of the crisis between Algeria and France seems to have much deeper roots, which lie in the failure to define a real postcolonial reconciliation process and in France’s persistent refusal to engage in a critical reinterpretation of its role in the country. For example, recent studies suggest that the French school system still refers to the colonial period as having positive effects in addition to negative consequences, angering Algerians.

With France and Algeria apparently unable to engage in constructive dialogue on the substance of their bilateral relations, it seems quite unlikely that they will be able to manage a positive turnaround of the current state of crisis in the short term. Algeria’s fear of growing international isolation, coupled with growing internal tensions in French domestic politics, risk aggravating misunderstandings between the two countries. If left unchecked, these disputes could push France and Algeria toward an irrevocable rupture in their relations reminiscent of Paris’s diplomatic breaks with its former allies in the Sahel region.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Nicola Pedde is the director of the Rome and Brussels-based Institute for Global Studies.

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Strategic Litigation Quarterly Newsletter: A look back at 2024

Strategic Litigation Project — Tue, 28 Jan 2025 16:58:17 +0000

The Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) works at the intersection of law and policy to expand the reach of international justice mechanisms and make universal legal tools truly universal. In partnership with affected communities and regional experts, it takes on projects aiming to strengthen, enhance, and repurpose existing justice pathways for atrocity crimes and serious human rights violations.

This past year, the SLP team has been advancing efforts led by Afghan and Iranian jurists and women’s rights defenders to recognize and codify the crime of gender apartheid in a global treaty focusing on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity. SLP experts have helped build a legal and political movement in support of codification, engaging with governments, UN experts, and other key stakeholders in advancing the relevant legal arguments and justifications. In an exciting development, on November 22, 2024, the United Nations Sixth Committee voted to move the treaty forward to formal negotiations.

This decision is a key step forward for the codification effort, as well as for victim and survivor communities around the world in search of justice and the nonrepetition of these crimes. The continued development of the treaty also presents an opportunity to further urge states to take a progressive, gender-competent approach to the formal negotiations. Looking forward, our team will continue to heavily advocate with states to ensure a strong final text that includes the codification of gender apartheid and other emergent gender crimes.

Below is more information about the SLP’s progress on the gender apartheid campaign and other projects throughout 2024. As we plan for even greater impact in 2025, we hope that you will consider including the SLP in your end-of-year giving. On behalf of the SLP team, I thank you for your continued support of our work and mission.

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Gender Apartheid

Leading up to the recent vote by the United Nations (UN) Sixth Committee, the SLP—in partnership with Afghan and Iranian civil society—ramped up its advocacy efforts around the draft crimes against humanity treaty in 2024. In addition to dozens of meetings held at states’ permanent missions to the UN, the team convened bilateral and multilateral briefings, traveled to country capitals, and launched a social media campaign to further advance the effort.

Discussions at Greentree

In April, the SLP team hosted a two-day diplomatic retreat at the Greentree Estate called “Centering humanity: Gender apartheid and the slave trade in the draft crimes against humanity convention.” The convening facilitated informal discussions between representatives of member states and experts on the urgent need to enumerate the crimes of gender apartheid and the slave trade in the proposed treaty. Taking place just ahead of the Sixth Committee’s second resumed session to debate the draft convention, the SLP emphasized the need to ensure a victim- and survivor-centered approach to the treaty’s development.

To date, a cross-regional group of eleven member states have voiced openness to exploring the codification of the crime of gender apartheid in the potential treaty.

In June, the SLP helped organize the launch of a social media campaign to increase the visibility of the effort to recognize and codify the crime of gender apartheid under international law. The social media campaign featured high-profile supporters, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, Afghan paralympian Zakia Khudadadi, Baroness Helena Kennedy, actors Golshifteh Farahani and Nazanin Boniadi, former President and Prime Minister of Mongolia Elbegdorj Tsakhia, Ambassador Melanne Verveer, and more. Each participant posted a customized graphic declaring their support for the effort and urging states to make gender apartheid a crime against humanity.

Following the initial posts by signatories to the joint letter and legal brief issued by the SLP and the Global Justice Center, the team produced a template and suggested caption for the campaign graphic. If you wish to join the campaign, add your photo to the template and be sure to tag @endgenderapartheid.today on Instagram and @EGACampaign on X (formerly known as Twitter) when you post.

JOIN THE CAMPAIGN

Engagement in South Africa

In August, the SLP Gender and Policy Advisor Metra Metran, Strategic Legal Advisor for Gender Justice Akila Radhakrishnan, and Legal Advisor Azadah Raz Mohammad traveled to South Africa for a week to meet with jurists, experts, academics, anti-apartheid activists, and civil society leaders, as well as the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. Meetings included a dinner (hosted by a sitting constitutional court judge) with fifteen lawyers, judges, and experts, and also gatherings with key South African civil society organizations and other prominent experts. These meetings made clear that there is a promising opportunity to continue developing solidarity and support between the people of South Africa and the women and girls of Afghanistan.

Seeing impact in Geneva

In June, the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, presented his report on “the phenomenon of an institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity and exclusion of women and girls,” at the UN Human Rights Council’s fifty-sixth session. Metran and Radhakrishnan traveled to Geneva to attend the report presentation and interactive dialogue.

The report concluded that “the Taliban’s discriminatory and misogynist policies and harsh enforcement methods” in Afghanistan constitute “an institutionalized framework of gender apartheid.” Notably, Bennett’s report further calls on member states to codify gender apartheid as a crime against humanity.

Syria Victims Fund

Consultations in Syrian civil society

The SLP team has been working with Syrian civil society to explore and advocate for the establishment of an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund. The suggested framework for the fund would rely on significant monetary judgments that states are collecting linked to violations in Syria—including fines, penalties, and forfeitures for sanctions violations and international crimes committed in Syria.

Following a series of individual consultations held between March and July 2023, the SLP team, in 2024, convened a series of virtual working group sessions with its Syrian partners to continue discussing key questions around the establishment of the proposed fund. In October, the team hosted eighteen partners for an in-person workshop in Warsaw, Poland, to develop firm recommendations for the fund’s design and operation. Using these recommendations, the SLP is now working to develop a policy paper, which will be the basis for future advocacy.

Advocacy around the Lafarge forfeiture

In May, the SLP supported a coalition of fifty-three organizations and individuals—representing Syrian, Yezidi, US, and international civil society—in issuing an open letter, accompanied by a press release, urging US Attorney General Merrick Garland to earmark funds the Department of Justice (DOJ) received in its case against Lafarge to benefit victims and survivors of underlying atrocity crimes linked to Syria.

READ THE LETTER

Lafarge forfeited $687 million—the largest identified monetary judgment linked to violations in Syria—to the US government after admitting to making payments to ISIS and al-Nusra Front to continue operating a cement plant in northern Syria. The letter expresses grave concern that the forfeiture will be retained for general US government use rather than to enable the recovery of affected communities in Syria that lack access to remedy and support.

Two years after the forfeiture, the DOJ has still not indicated how it intends to use the Lafarge funds. The SLP team has continued to urge the DOJ to repurpose the Lafarge forfeiture to benefit victims, following the precedent it set with Ukraine. With all eyes on Syria once more, the United States must direct the Lafarge funds to Syrian victims—and it must act now.

In its final days, the Biden administration should take this step to support Syrian victims

By Mohamad Katoub, Alana Mitias

The outgoing administration could direct up to $600 million in forfeited funds to support victims in Syria—but time is running out.

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Iran Digital Archive Coalition

In March 2024, the SLP and Mnemonic led a coalition of international organizations to launch the Iranian Archive, an archive that has preserved more than two million pieces of digital evidence documenting human rights abuses committed during the Islamic Republic of Iran’s crackdown on the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.

At a meeting of the Eurojust Genocide Network in April, SLP Deputy Director Nushin Sarkarati, alongside coalition partners at Mnemonic, gave a presentation on the archive and its potential utility for pursuing accountability against perpetrators of international crimes in Iran. Specifically, Sarkarati emphasized the need for third states to open structural investigations—investigations for serious violations of international law that aren’t linked to any one individual perpetrator or event—using evidence collected by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI).

On September 17, the Investigations Lab at UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, another coalition partner, published its report on the blinding of protestors and bystanders in Iran. The report is the first to be largely based on open-source information that has been preserved as part of the archive.

READ THE REPORT

On September 20, the SLP and the Iran Digital Archive Coalition hosted an event at The Promise Institute for Human Rights at UCLA to launch the work of the coalition and commemorate the two-year anniversary of the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini and emergence of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. The event featured Afsoon Najafi, sister of Hadis Najafi (an Iranian activist who was shot and killed by Iranian security forces); Elahe Tavakolian, an Iranian protestor blinded by Islamic Republic security forces; and representatives of the Iran Digital Archive Coalition who presented on the findings of the coalition’s open source investigations.

The event concluded with a conversation with Sara Hossain, chair of the FFMI, and actor and activist Nazanin Boniadi. Speaking on pathways towards international accountability for the crimes committed during the 2022 protests, Hossain concluded that “what we need is justice and accountability for these violations, reparations for the victims, and, most importantly, telling the truth about what’s happened, in terms of the violations and international crimes that have occurred.”

Iranians sacrificed their lives to share videos of regime violence. Now there’s an online archive for the world to see.

By Cameran Ashraf

The Iranian Archive holds more than one million videos to ensure that the Women, Life, Freedom uprising led by women would not be erased.

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Advocating for the Uyghur Community

The SLP expanded its advocacy work regarding human rights abuses against the Uyghur population in China and welcomed Rayhan Asat, Uyghur human rights lawyer and SLP nonresident senior fellow, as the SLP’s new senior legal and policy advisor and China lead.

On September 30, the SLP co-hosted an event on the sidelines of the fifty-seventh session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, entitled “Xinjiang: Supporting victims and advancing the implementation of UN recommendations.” Asat was joined by Priya Gopalan, vice-chair on follow-up at the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and John Fisher, deputy director for global advocacy at Human Rights Watch. The panel was moderated by Raphaël Viana David, program manager for China & Latin America at the International Service for Human Rights.

At the panel, Asat spoke on China’s continued policy of repression towards the country’s Uyghur population: “We’re going to face the rise of authoritarian international law, where China is expanding its counterterrorism framework by including the legitimate cultural and religious practice and the right to self-determination as a form of terrorism.”

In August, Asat published a report in the Yale MacMillan Center’s genocide studies program. The report, entitled “Uyghur race as the enemy: China’s legalized authoritarian oppression & mass imprisonment,” unveils the extent of China’s systematic, large-scale imprisonment of the Uyghur community, and includes recommendations for international bodies to pursue accountability mechanisms.

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European Parliament and United States condemn ‘sham’ Belarus vote

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 18:24:04 +0000

The European Parliament has condemned this weekend’s presidential election in Belarus as a “sham” designed to keep the country’s long-serving dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka in power. In a resolution adopted ahead of the January 26 vote, MEPs noted the absence of any credible opposition candidates and called for the strengthening of sanctions against Belarus.

Days earlier, the United States said the vote could not be free or fair due to the “repressive environment” in the country. “The United States joins many of our European allies in assessing that elections cannot be credible in an environment where censorship is ubiquitous and independent media outlets no longer exist,” commented US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

This international condemnation comes as no surprise. Since the early 1990s, seventy year old Lukashenka has been steadily concentrating power in his own hands. For more than three decades, he has fostered an authoritarian political culture in Belarus that closely echoes the Soviet past.

The political climate became particularly oppressive following Belarus’s last presidential election in 2020, which saw opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya emerge from obscurity to mobilize a grassroots movement demanding change. When the authorities then rigged the vote in favor of Lukashenka, weeks of nationwide protests erupted that threatened to topple the regime.

Lukashenka was ultimately able to cling onto power in 2020 thanks to support from the Kremlin. In the wake of the protests, he launched a ruthless crackdown on all opposition, leading to thousands of arrests and reports of grave human rights abuses. Targets included civil society and the country’s last remaining independent media outlets. Hundreds of thousands fled Belarus to avoid possible persecution.

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The Belarusian dictator is clearly in no mood to repeat the mistakes of 2020, when his decision to allow a wildcard outsider onto the ballot backfired so disastrously. Ahead of Sunday’s vote, only the tamest of regime-approved opponents have been permitted to participate.

Lukashenka was so fearful of the upcoming election that he “completely cleansed the political field, leaving no room for alternative candidates,” commented Hanna Liubakova, a journalist from Belarus who has been forced to remain in exile since the 2020 protests. “The trauma of 2020 and deep distrust remain high,” she noted.

Tsikhanouskaya, the rival candidate in 2020 who now leads the Belarusian democratic opposition from exile, was similarly critical of the forthcoming vote. “The Belarus dictator’s so-called ‘election’ is nothing more than a sham,” she commented. “We won’t be fooled. All political prisoners must be freed and repressions must end.”

With Lukashenka guaranteed to win Sunday’s vote, the only remaining question is the margin of victory he chooses on this occasion. In 2020, he was officially credited with 81 percent, despite widespread claims that Tsikhanouskaya had actually garnered more votes. “The last intriguing moment in this sham election is how many votes Lukashenka will claim for himself,” commented Liubakova.

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Lukashenka’s deepening dictatorship is not only a threat to domestic human rights and democratic values in Belarus itself. The country is also a key ally of the Kremlin and a junior partner in the emerging axis of autocratic regimes that includes Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Minsk and Moscow have enjoyed close relations for decades and are bound together in a broad but vague Union State agreement dating back to the 1990s. Despite this apparent intimacy, Lukashenka has spent much of his reign attempting to maintain a degree of independence by balancing between Russia and the West. However, this strategy collapsed in the wake of the 2020 uprising, which left the Belarus dictator shunned by Western leaders and heavily reliant on Putin for his continued political survival.

Since 2020, Lukashenka has permitted the dramatic expansion of Russian influence over Belarus in a process some have likened to a creeping annexation of the country. He allowed tens of thousands of Russian troops to use Belarus as a base for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and has since begun hosting limited quantities of Russian nuclear weapons. Lukashenka has also been linked to alleged Russian war crimes including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

Meanwhile, Belarus is facing accusations of attempting to undermine the European Union through weaponized migration on the country’s western border. According to a recent POLITICO report, Belarus is helping large numbers of migrants enter the EU illegally as part of Lukashenka’s “revenge” for the imposition of sanctions. In response, Poland is beefing up security at the Belarusian border and calling for the EU to take tougher action.

Sunday’s sham election is a timely reminder of the ongoing struggle for basic freedoms against a brutal dictatorship in the geographical heart of Europe. Western governments can play a meaningful role in this struggle by supporting independent Belarusian media, backing human rights defenders, imposing further sanctions, and highlighting the plight of the country’s many political prisoners. While international attention is rightly focused on Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Western leaders must not forget that neighboring Belarus also remains a critical front in the fight against resurgent authoritarianism.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Appeasement will only fuel Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine

Anastasiia Marushevska — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 01:20:01 +0000

When US President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House next week, his foreign policy priority will be ending the war in Ukraine. As he seeks to engage with the Kremlin, however, Trump is likely to discover that Moscow’s war aims extend far beyond limited territorial gains and leave little room for any meaningful compromise.

If Trump’s peace initiative fails to make progress, it should come as no surprise. After all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a simple land grab that can be resolved with some kind of compromise deal. Instead, it is an old-fashioned war of colonial conquest that forms the latest chapter in an historic campaign of Russian imperial aggression against Ukraine stretching back hundreds of years.

Russian rulers have been attempting to suppress Ukraine’s statehood aspirations and subjugate the country ever since the seventeenth century and the days of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate. Throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras, successive generations of Russian rulers sought to dominate Ukraine and extinguish the very idea of a separate Ukrainian nation. This led to a vast array of crimes and atrocities including as the Holodomor, an artificial famine engineered by the Stalin regime in the 1930s that killed millions of Ukrainians in their own homes.

From the very beginning of his reign, Putin has enthusiastically embraced this Russian imperial tradition. When his initial efforts to reestablish control over Ukraine via political subversion were thwarted by the country’s 2004 and 2014 Maidan revolutions, Putin opted to use force and ordered the Russian military to seize Crimea. This watershed moment in modern European history set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022. Putin himself has since underlined his imperial ambitions, comparing his own ongoing invasion to the eighteenth century conquests of Russian Emperor Peter the Great.

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International audiences often struggle to understand the true nature of Russian imperialism because they have been encouraged to view Russia as a nation rather than an empire. While academics and historians have always made clear distinctions between Great Britain or France and their colonial possessions, for example, this has not usually been the case when dealing with Russia. Instead, occupied countries within the Tsarist and Soviet empires such as Ukraine and Georgia have often been treated as ethnic minorities rather than captive nations.

As a result, modern Russia’s expansionist policies typically escape the ire of those who identify as opponents of imperialism. This also helps to explain why everyday cultural practices such as the use of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine are still sometimes perceived by outside audiences as evidence of dangerous nationalism.

The ultimate objective of Russian imperialism in Ukraine could hardly be more extreme. Putin and his predecessors have consistently aimed to erase any sense of Ukrainian national identity and replace it with a Russian imperial identity. In other words, Russia’s historic goal has always been a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

For generations, Ukrainian community leaders were systematically silenced and all evidence of Ukrainian national memory eradicated. Meanwhile, many of Ukraine’s most prominent intellectuals and cultural figures were appropriated by the empire and rebranded as Russians.

Over the centuries, Russia’s long war on Ukrainian identity has been most immediately apparent in the many legislative initiatives introduced to restrict or ban the use the Ukrainian language. This often extended to outright denials. “A separate Ukrainian language never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist,” stated one particularly notorious Russian imperial decree in the mid-nineteenth century.

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Efforts to remove all traces of Ukrainian identity continue in regions of the country currently under Russian occupation. In areas of Ukraine where the Kremlin has been able to establish control since 2022, anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian is at risk of arrest. Thousands have reportedly disappeared into a vast network of prison camps.

Those who remain are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Dissenters face being stripped of their property rights, denied access to basic services such as healthcare, and deported. They must also subject their children to indoctrination via Kremlin-approved school curriculums that glorify the Russian invasion and demonize the idea of a Ukrainian state. Needless to say, the Ukrainian language is no longer taught or tolerated.

The grim realities of life for the millions of people living in Russian-occupied Ukraine make a complete mockery of suggestions that the war can be stopped simply by handing over more land to Russia. In reality, the current occupation regime is not peace; it is a continuation of Russia’s long war against the Ukrainian nation.

Any attempt to end the war in Ukraine must take Russia’s imperial agenda into account. The future existence of Ukraine is at stake, including everything it represents from language and culture to national memory and ancient traditions. For Ukrainians, this is a fight for national survival against an enemy that makes no secret of its ambition to wipe the country off the map. For Europe as a whole, this is a turning point that will shape the continent’s security climate for many years to come.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not a war for land or resources. It is therefore wishful thinking to suggest that Putin can be appeased with the promise of relatively minor territorial concessions. Like so many Russian rulers who came before him, Putin is determined to destroy Ukraine. The war will continue until he is forced to abandon his imperial ambitions entirely.

Anastasiia Marushevska is a co-founder of Ukrainian NGO PR Army, editor in chief at Ukraїner International, and host of the Decolonisation podcast.

Holly Dagres — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 23:48:00 +0000

Elahe Tavakolian is an Iranian activist who gained international recognition for her courageous protests against the Islamic Republic—a stand that cost her an eye when security forces systemically shot her during the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. As a PhD student, Tavakolian joined the nationwide anti-regime protests sparked by outrage over the murder of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the so-called morality police.

Denied medical treatment in Iran due to her activism on social media in support of the protestors, Tavakolian left the country to seek treatment in Italy. There she was fitted with a prosthetic eye and has undergone numerous surgeries. In exile, she has become a recognized voice for the Women, Life, Freedom movement, advocating for justice for victims of the Islamic Republic. In 2023, her efforts were honored with the Fondazione Minerva’s Women in the World for Human Rights award.

Former Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Holly Dagres had the pleasure of sitting down with Tavakolian to share her story and discuss the situation in Iran and what the West needs to do.

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IRAN SOURCE: Can you retell what happened the night you were shot by security forces in September 2022?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: I was in Mashhad when Mahsa Amini was killed. All of Iran was angry and upset. I was one of those Iranians. It was a bad scene, and the news was painful. Because of the mandatory hijab, a girl would be murdered. And she was a guest in the city of Tehran; our girl was Kurdish—our Mahsa Jina.

When I found out, I was very upset and felt as if she was my sister. I felt with all my existence how mercilessly they killed her. For two nights, I was in the streets of the city of Mashhad. We would chant and I was with my kids and my friends. My family was in Esfarayen [at the time].

Well, it was the end of summer, and my kids would need to go to school and needed supplies. I went to visit my family in Esfarayen. I went there and went into the street. That day, there was a nationwide call for a nationwide protest.

If you look up the city of Esfarayen in North Khorasan, it is very small. It has a total population of twenty to thirty thousand, and 90 percent of the people in that town are religious and traditional. It also has the largest number of martyrs and veterans—my own father is a veteran. It was really interesting. I saw with my own eyes that 70 percent of the people of Esfarayen were in the streets chanting. When a unity ring and crowd was formed with the chanters, I was in the main square. Suddenly, I saw the young people standing next to each other chanting, and I joined the crowd too.

I was with my kids and my younger sister, chanting. We were chanting “Women, Life, Freedom,” “Man, Homeland, Prosperity,” “Death to the dictator,” and “Death to the IRGC.” We didn’t set anything ablaze. We didn’t destroy property. We just chanted.

After I decided to join the crowds, my daughter asked me, “Why should we make chants?” She was a little scared, but my son said, “No, let’s go.” I said, “Because you should defend your rights. So that you learn that your lives should not be trampled by the regime, unlike my generation.”

When I was nine years old, my hair was very long and beautiful. I really loved it. Because of my age, I had to wear a chador and take part in school celebrations and they would take us to the mosque. Because my hair was long, I didn’t like to wear hijab. They forcibly cut my hair, so I made my first sacrifice at that age.

When I was older, I was forced to get married—I had an unsuccessful marriage. At that moment when I went to chant, it was my combined rage over the pain I had suffered and the rage I was experiencing over Mahsa’s killing. I put myself in the place of Mahsa. I could fully feel it. I felt so upset that, because of hijab rules, our girls are being imprisoned, raped, and killed. This was incomprehensible. We couldn’t forgive what happened.

That’s why I decided to chant at that moment. I didn’t want my daughter to be sacrificed like me. I didn’t want my daughter to stay silent for all her years. At that age, you need to yell for your rights and not let the regime force you to say what they want.

IRAN SOURCE: It’s now the second anniversary of the Women, Life, Freedom uprising. How do you feel?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Nowadays, other injured protesters and myself all have the same feeling. But I always say that every Iranian who was forced to leave Iran has suffered and was injured. Yes, we were physically injured—we lost our eyes, lost our hands, or even our feet. But every Iranian who was forced to leave has suffered enough.

Those of us who were shot, saw blood spilled on the ground. Our eyes came out and we saw the blood. It was a bad feeling. Every year when September approaches, it’s traumatic—it triggers panic. That moment comes to my memory and my eyes. [In the lead-up to the anniversary], I was feeling terrible. I was at home for a week. It was as if my eye could remember what had happened to me two years ago. Up until two years ago, both my eyes were healthy.

I still can’t look at my old photos because I get upset. I had two eyes and they were beautiful. I still say they are beautiful, but sometimes I miss them. It’s like you have lost someone dear to you. In these two years, I lived in pain and suffered a lot. In these two years, I’m bothered a lot. I’ve had a hard time.

When it’s the Mahsa Amini anniversary, it’s as if I can hear all the screams of the boys and girls in the street. Their yelling, “Women, Life, Freedom” rings in my ears. When they yelled in response, “Man, Homeland, Prosperity,” rings in my ears. “Death to the dictator” rings in my ears.

The moment I was shot during the crackdown, my children were screaming, “They killed our mother,” and nobody was helping. I could hear the screams of “Don’t be afraid, we’re all together” and I would just shout and yell, “I’m burning! I’m burning!”

Those moments replay over and over in my head. This is the trauma that I get every time the anniversary is near. It’s as if I’m back in that exact moment—I’d like to be back in Iran. I’d like to be back in that moment to yell—it’s as if I must take my rights back as if something is left back there. I still need to fight for it. I still haven’t finished my work. I feel like my job is incomplete. Whenever Mahsa’s anniversary arrives, I feel so much is left to do in the country.

IRAN SOURCE: Do you think the Iranian people will take back their rights and this regime will be gone?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Well, if we think that we are trying but aren’t getting an outcome, obviously we won’t get a good response. We need to spend a lot of time together, to build unity.

We shouldn’t stop. We must continue ahead on the path we’ve taken. There are difficulties in the way, including the cyber army that attacks us with their smear campaigns to create false divisions. These stop us from reaching our main goal. I might not have been a very political activist or speaker. Life and accidents have put me on this path. I was a protester and have now become a political and freedom-seeking protester and advocate, and a lawyer.

All Iranians are protesters, advocates, and political activists now because we don’t want the regime of the Islamic Republic. When [Iranians] rejected the regime, they have become political advocates. And I believe they must want it for union, for solidarity, to forge unity—and if they fight for what they want, why not? We will certainly see a positive result.

IRAN SOURCE: For those not familiar, can you explain why security forces systemically blinded protesters during the uprising?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: According to a report, which was published by the Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), nearly 560 people reportedly lost an eye, or both of their eyes. This report included those who were able to publicize their cases and were verified. But many people in Iran are not able to talk or communicate about this issue because of the security conditions; they don’t have the financial resources and their families are still trapped there. If I want to ask about the main statistics, the rate would be more than a thousand people. But they have the right [to remain silent].

Security forces wanted to scare people. When I was in Iran, when I lost my eye, I quickly went to Mashhad because I had been living there for a few years. And there were security forces’ motorcycles everywhere. Every one hundred meters, there were twenty motorcyclists with batons, tear gas, and pellet guns, and I don’t know what else. They would rev their motorcycles and everyone would get scared and run away. Targeting our eyes had one goal, to sow fear. For people in the streets to see us and say, “What happened to you?” And for us to reply, “They shot and took our eyes out.” So that when the next protests happen, a mother, father, sister, or brother would not allow protesters in their home to join the demonstrations: “Don’t go out. See how they shot others? They will take your eye out.” For this reason, it made a lot of people scared. Fortunately, the current generation is utterly brave, fully aware, and not afraid; 50,000–60,000 have left Iran since and are still speaking up.

They did this so that the protesters would be silent and afraid to talk. But as you can see, the injured are trying to be a voice against the Islamic Republic and its crimes. The injured, wherever they are in the world, are talking about it and are living evidence of the Islamic Republic’s crimes. As long as they live, they would be questioned, “What happened to your eye?” “It was taken by the Islamic Republic.” “But why did they do it?” “Because we were protesting.” “Protesting for what?” “Because we wanted our rights and wanted freedom only.”

The regime didn’t think it would get a reaction like this. As you know, there are a lot of folks who are talking or spreading the news.

Second-anniversary rally commemorating Mahsa Jina Amini, held in front of the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C., on September 15, 2024, organized by NSGIran (National Solidarity Group of Iran).

IRAN SOURCE: If you were right now sitting in front of the president of the United States, what would you like to say to him?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Well, when we were in Iran, everyone was watching television and social media. We expected instead of saying we condemn the actions, [that the United States would say] we stand on the side of the [Iranian] people.

Because we have only heard for forty-five years that “we condemn.” But we want [the United States] to be on the side of the people, not the Islamic Republic. They should know that the Islamic Republic is different from its people. They should know that the Islamic Republic is not representative of the people of Iran. If I am with the president, I will tell them, “You should not have relations with the Islamic Republic behind the curtain.”

Maybe my words are too harsh, but this is what comes out of the hearts of the people of Iran. We always say, that until the United States, the United Kingdom, and other world powers want it to, this regime will not fall. This is the truth and can’t be denied. All the hope of the people of Iran is inside Iran, but also in the Western governments because they are powerful.

They need to see, if I come and talk, that I took the risk. My family is in Iran. They may be under pressure; [the regime] may even create a plan against me. They may even force my family into giving false testimonies against me. But I risked it and came and talked, and I am ready to have face-to-face meetings and show and testify and demand that they stand by the people of Iran once and for all and turn their backs on the Islamic Republic.

IRAN SOURCE: What does the West not understand about the Islamic Republic?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: If I want to talk about it frankly, I came from the heart of the people. I was apolitical. And they would say, “America just condemns but doesn’t do anything. On the sidelines it’s talking with the Islamic Republic, appeasing them and they are having relations with them, but giving the appearance of otherwise.” They [the West] say one day they want to sanction, the other day they don’t want to. My discussion isn’t about whether to sanction or not. The people of Iran have lost hope in the West.

This has been happening since 2009 when all these people were killed. In the following years, the same thing happened in 2017 and 2019. We lost so many lives. How long does this have to go on until the United States sees the true nature of the Islamic Republic?

For forty-five years, the United States has been pretending to be asleep. You can’t wake up someone who is pretending to be asleep. This is something that the Iranian people have understood. And they say, “Well, now our hope is inside Iran.” But they can’t. The Iranian people are empty-handed. The Iranian people give one chant and they end up in prison or they are executed or raped. A lot have been extrajudicially killed in silence. I was only able to come out because of medical issues and was able to talk. But a lot are there and unable to talk. Our athletes abroad are successful, they have given their lives for Iran, but they aren’t backed and they can’t. The people of Iran are really tired. Their backs are bent over.

I don’t understand what the United States and Western countries want to see that they haven’t seen already. All this killing, all this living evidence of the crimes of the regime. In Europe, in the United States, they can talk to every one of these Iranians. They can see that all of these folks were protesters. I was not political; I was with my children and family chanting. The United States doesn’t want to see it because it doesn’t serve its benefit. I feel it is not beneficial for the [Joe Biden] administration. So many have been killed, so many imprisoned. You see the official announcement of the executions from all around the world. Iran is more genocidal than anywhere else.

IRAN SOURCE: In one of our previous conversations, you said that the Iranians living abroad had brought a lot of hope to protesters. Can you talk more about that?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: When we were in Iran in the streets, one foot was in the streets and the other foot was watching the media. We would come home quickly when we were no longer able to be on the streets. We turned on the cell phone and satellite, and we checked the channels one by one. Every night, I would tune into the channels and news to see what they were doing [in the West] to cover what happened over here.

When I saw that there were about 10,000–50,000 people in front of the consulates, embassies, in the streets, I would be with my friends and we’d all say, “This year it’s over, folks. Look, the Iranians over there have created a hailstorm of protest. This year [the regime is] over. Oh yes, our Iran will revive.” We were all thinking of freedom and thinking of much more. We were hopeful. When we became united, we became very hopeful. It was as if there was a spark of hope in the heart of each Iranian. Anytime we turned on the channels and saw our pictures—the injured, the killed—in the hands of Iranians abroad who hadn’t even met us, it would bring me joy. I would say, “This is the Iranian spirit. This is an army of thousands of people outside of Iran.”

I don’t know if it was because of the end of the unity or the coalition, or the division between unity, but the Islamic Republic cyber army infiltrated all the groups. If you’re with them you’re not with us. If you’re with us you’re not with them. You can’t be with them.

As a result, everyone became scattered. Now that I came here [to the West], I lost hope. I saw that apart from the fact that there is an Islamic Republic in Iran, there is also an Islamic Republic here. Unfortunately, this prevented us from reaching the goal. They have to focus on unity and protests because in Iran we only looked at what people were doing. Who are the voices of Iran? Who is active in Iran? We didn’t have hope because we couldn’t go under the bullets. We risked our lives but they didn’t let us. They oppressed protests, they killed, they arrested, they didn’t let us go. But after that, our hope was really for the diaspora.

We were always looking at it. Well, we were more hopeful when we saw diaspora protests. We said, “Look, guys, when the pressure of all these Iranians is on the Western governments, we will get a response.” This trend, instead of increasing, has become less and less and less. It’s really disturbing. But we shouldn’t lose hope because it takes time.

It is a long road, but it is not a goal we cannot reach. We will reach 100 percent if our goal is the collapse of the Islamic Republic. We must remove hurdles from our way. We must give hope to each other. We must participate in gatherings. You can participate in the gatherings with any political beliefs you may have. With any Iran flag you like. We have the lion and sun flag and that is all. And let’s stand by each other. Now, if someone says, “I have this belief or that.” That will be determined during democracy, during free elections, and a free ballot box. Each of us will have a single vote in a free election. But stand together. You cannot reach free and democratic elections by smearing me.

IRAN SOURCE: You mentioned the new generation of Iranians. What is the difference between them and the old generation?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: The new generation is very aware. Now, it is the age of social media and cyberspace. The old generation came with newspapers and pamphlets at that time. They didn’t understand—they would say, “We saw [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini on the moon” and it’s laughable. I don’t know why they would believe such things.

And everyone came and said that they have a single leader. They were free, but they were not aware. But the current generation is very different. The current generation is aware, but they are not free. And now they want to be both aware and free to reach prosperity. This is the difference between the two generations.

Civil disobedience is still going on in Iran. Women go out without hijab, boys go with shorts, and many of our actors stand by the people. Our singers have sung songs for the [protesters], for the people of Iran, so many have stood by the people of Iran. Because they have come to a point where if you do not have the support of the people, you are not loved anymore. The Islamic Republic itself understands this. It understands that the people are aware. It understands that people don’t want it anymore. The reason it brought [President] Masoud Pezeshkian was because the system was crumbling. It needs a fake shock. Pezeshkian was brought to supposedly reform the new government and to work on it. However, he was a deception, and the cabinet ministers were chosen by the dictator, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

IRAN SOURCE: You were once in Iran watching what Iranians abroad were doing. Now that you’re abroad, how can you help the people in Iran?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Well, when I left, I did a lot of interviews and met with a lot of people who were victims of state violence like me. I went to the United Nations, for the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for Narges Mohammadi. I went and spoke at a lot of places. They are hearing the real story of Iran—not just from my lips, but from others who have left. However, the expectation that I and others like me had was not fulfilled because divisions were sowed. They say, “If you’re going to talk, you shouldn’t belong to this or that group.” But no one should be seen as a member of this or that group. We’re all for Iran. When we were in Iran, we participated in the protests just for freedom, for the people.

I didn’t realize that the person next to me was Turkish, Lor, or Kurdish, or something else. Or which party I’m with. We would just shout with one voice. But when I came out [of Iran], I realized that what’s inside Iran is very different from what’s outside. The people of Iran are here. Some groups are helping each other. They are trying hard to meet with policymakers, talk to the governments, and expose the Islamic Republic’s atrocities. But our hopes and expectations are much more than this.

We lost our eyes on this path. Let’s not lose sight of our goal over marginal issues. That would only make the Islamic Republic happy.

(Translated from Persian by Holly Dagres and Khosro Kalbasi)

Holly Dagres is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute. Follow her on X @hdagres

The post Blinded Iranian activist Elaheh Tavakolian: ‘We lost our eyes on this path. Let us not lose sight of our goal’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Netzarim Corridor: Tragedy, death, and an obstacle to a lasting ceasefire

Ahmed F. Alkhatib — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 22:27:23 +0000

Disturbing and deeply troubling accounts have emerged from a Haaretz investigation published in December that details the brutal and seemingly indiscriminate application of Israeli firepower in the Netzarim Corridor. The investigation included interviews with current and former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, officers, and commanders serving or who have served in the Gaza Strip. The Netzarim Corridor, a part of Gaza that has been under IDF control since November 2023, split Gaza in two, separating the coastal enclave’s north from the rest of the strip. The report describes what has been alleged time and again throughout the war: an imaginary line has been drawn up by IDF field commanders beyond which anyone passing through is to be shot and killed immediately.

The Israeli military has designated the two access points to the Netzarim Corridor as no-go zones to provide force protection for troops inside the zone, threatening to shoot those “trespassing” the area around the Salah al-Din Road in central Gaza and the Al-Rashid coastal highway, where most of the civilian population has been moving out of the north and heading south.

The corridor has become significant because those seeking to leave northern Gaza have been forced to pass through it on their journey south. Meanwhile, those facing cramped and unbearable humanitarian conditions in the crowded central and southern Gaza seeking to take their chances on returning to what’s left of Gaza’s north attempt to traverse the deadly corridor. As ceasefire negotiations appear to be making progress, the incoming Trump administration must ensure that any deal, regardless of its phased implementation, includes mechanisms for protecting Palestinian civilians traversing the corridor to return to their homes and monitoring the IDF’s compliance with the terms of the agreement.

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A sobering investigation

A combination of satellite images shows farmland, buildings and roads in central Gaza before Israel’s invasion of the Palestinian enclave and before the Israeli military cleared an area known as the Netzarim Corridor dividing north and south Gaza, October 6, 2023 (TOP) and the same area cleared by the Israeli military after invading the Palestinian enclave August 20, 2024. Planet Labs Inc./Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT.

The Haaretz investigation describes in harrowing detail how civilians were repeatedly targeted by careless, reckless, and, in a few instances, even joyous soldiers who applied overwhelming firepower against civilian targets who were clearly visible through drones and cameras as nonthreatening people, only to be mercilessly and ruthlessly gunned down without any apparent military necessity.

Time and again, the officers, soldiers, and commanders interviewed describe how arbitrarily designated kill zones were regularly littered with dead Palestinian bodies who were counted as “terrorists” without any confirmation of their identities, affiliations, crimes, or wrongdoing. Israeli officials regularly assert that IDF attacks and operations only strike military targets based on intelligence, battlefield assessments, and reactions to incidents and threats. Though this claim has been repeatedly challenged by evidence, footage, and even the IDF’s own admission at times, the Israeli government maintains that it vigorously investigates incidents and takes appropriate action against soldiers who violate established codes of conduct and rules of engagement.

However, the report details how the excessive use of helicopters, drones, tanks, and hundreds of bullets was regularly deployed against targets that did not pose an imminent threat and likely could have been spared with simple warning shots instead of being obliterated. Even when those killed were confirmed not to be militants based on IDF intelligence databases, murdered civilians were added to a daily count of eliminated combatants, left to be eaten by packs of stray dogs, as some officers congratulated their soldiers on a supposed job well done.

Despite the details being difficult and depressing to read, perhaps the silver lining throughout was that there are still IDF soldiers with consciousness, awareness, and recognition of the horrors that they are technically part of who are speaking out. They wanted to defend their people after the October 7 massacre but feel that the Israeli public deserves to know the full picture of the brutality that some of their soldiers and commanders are committing. They questioned their orders and the necessity of what they were doing, knowing that they would have to live with the consequences of what they were witnessing for the rest of their lives.

If Israel doesn’t trust any external mechanism for legal accountability for its conduct in Gaza, then the only way that its internal checks and balances can work is for brave soldiers to speak out against war crimes and for courageous journalists to expose these stories so that there can at least be a record of what took place.

What’s next for the corridor?

There are intensive rounds of negotiations to reach a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, though it remains unclear whether this could occur in the final days of the Biden administration or in the early days of the incoming Trump administration. Regardless of when such an agreement may be struck, serious questions will have to be answered about the Netzarim Corridor and Palestinian civilians’ ability to return to northern Gaza. Some reports suggest that as part of pending negotiations, Palestinian civilians would be able to return north without conditions, but vehicles would be inspected in accordance with a new mechanism. This would necessitate a partial or complete withdrawal of IDF troops from the corridor, something that is difficult to envision after the Israeli military expanded the corridor last month to vast areas and built more than a dozen bases throughout the space, which encompasses over twenty-one square miles of the coastal enclave’s territory.

The incoming Trump administration will have to wrestle with tactical-level details—especially what happens with the Netzarim Corridor and civilians’ return to the north—if it wants to play a role in mediating a ceasefire and ending the war. The carnage associated with the forced deportation of Palestinian civilians from the north and the prevention of their return has been an exceptionally bloody chapter in this war; the road to Gaza’s recovery and the prospects for lasting peace will require addressing this issue.

President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming secretary of state, working with special envoys and the National Security Council, should ensure the inclusion of specific guidelines for how the corridor—and indeed, all territories held by Israel during a ceasefire—would be administered and secured. This would entail pushing for stricter rules of engagement that involve higher-ups in the chain of command, higher thresholds for engaging suspects, mechanisms for issuing warnings before opening fire, and a clear strategy for how to discriminate targets based on a tangible threat matrix, not hunches or an overzealous field officer and commander.

Additionally, if the IDF maintains a presence in the corridor or other parts of Gaza that would be traversed by civilians seeking to return to their neighborhoods, there should be a mechanism for an independent observer, including regional players with US support, who could assess the behavior and compliance of Israeli soldiers with the ceasefire agreement, much like what the United States is doing in southern Lebanon.

The incoming Trump administration can play a positive role in dialing back some of the battlefield excesses that have caused immense, unnecessary loss of life to Palestinian civilians. The testimonies of IDF soldiers should give serious pause to policymakers, who must register the irreparable geopolitical damage that these stories inflict on regional stability and the hope for lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Dispatch from Damascus: The challenges of rebuilding are becoming clearer in Syria

Diana Rayes — Fri, 03 Jan 2025 19:03:29 +0000

View of Damascus (photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

DAMASCUS—Over a half-century of Assad regime rule, including fourteen years of a brutal civil war, had turned Syria into a state of mass oppression as well as a geopolitical black hole. In December, a startling advance by an umbrella of armed opposition groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led to an unprecedented takeover and a rapid transition in governance. Just a month ago, I (and the millions of Syrians both inside and outside of the country) would not have imagined this day would come. Now that it has, the challenges and opportunities of rebuilding Syria—a free, secure, inclusive, and prosperous Syria—are becoming clearer.

I am in Syria for the first time in nearly fifteen years. While visiting Damascus, Homs, and Hama days after the collapse of the Assad regime and the initial period of joy and uncertainty that followed, I saw Syrians slowly returning to business as usual. In Damascus (considered the world’s oldest inhabited capital city) policemen in orange vests whistled and directed the congested traffic, vendors reopened their shops, and students boarded school buses ahead of the holiday. Young children wove between cars selling revolutionary flags—the new Syrian flag, which features a green band along the top. License plates from Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa suggested that many of these cars belonged to displaced individuals who were either returning to their homes or coming back to Damascus for the first time in years.

There were notable differences between this visit and my last. For one, across the city, posters depicting former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s face had been torn by jubilant civilians. Another was that the tarnished statue of Bashar’s father and predecessor Hafez al-Assad, which once stood dauntingly outside of the al-Assad Library, had been toppled and was lying in front of the Damascene Sword monument across the street. Syrians stomped on it, celebrating their freedom from fifty-four years of tyranny. These symbols of state repression aside, the indication of Syrians’ newfound liberties that stood out the most was their speaking and assembling freely without the fear of being thrown into one of the regime’s prisons or being bombed by a Russian jet.

Protesters step on top of a toppled a statue of Hafez al-Assad (photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

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The Syrian civil war was the deadliest and most devastating conflict of the 2010s, with profound consequences for human security, regional security, and global politics. The toll on civilian lives, infrastructure, and the economy was staggering, and its ripple effects were felt across the globe. Over half of the country’s population—fourteen million people—had been displaced at least once, and over five million Syrian refugees fled to neighboring countries. During the global migrant crisis of the 2010s, over a quarter of the world’s refugees were Syrians. Migration proved a lightning-rod issue warping politics from Ankara to Berlin to London to Washington. The ramifications of a free and stable Syria are huge for vulnerable populations as well as the countries that host them. Discussions about repatriation are already underway, for example in European countries. However, these conversations are concerningly premature: Syria is not yet prepared to receive and integrate returnees, as significant humanitarian, economic, and political-military challenges must be addressed.

Since the start of the conflict in 2011, Syria’s economy has contracted by a staggering 85 percent. The estimated cost of rebuilding the country ranges between $250 billion and $400 billion—figures that, given the extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, appear increasingly accurate. For those returning, one of the most striking changes is the visible level of poverty that greets them within minutes of entering the city center. The toll on society is undeniable: Buildings, both public and residential, are unusable, dirty, and neglected, and streets and storefronts are damaged and in disarray. The road between Homs and Hama, normally a leisurely thirty-minute drive, took longer to navigate as it was littered with debris and had been subject to destruction by bombardment from the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran-backed militias. But the visible destruction hardly captures the societal scars left behind.

(Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

“We are waking up from a long nightmare,” someone in Damascus told me. Others described it as “living in a dream” and said that many are in “denial” of this new reality. It became clear that the trauma of authoritarianism, for societies held in an iron fist like in Syria, is intergenerational. And it will likely take generations to heal.

This was apparent in the days following the collapse of the Syrian regime, which led to the freeing of thousands of prisoners—men, women, and children— from Assad’s prisons. Their release shed new light on the decades of crimes committed by both Assads—Hafez and Bashar—and a harsh reminder for regional and international parties who sought to normalize with the regime. Syrians were confronted with a painful reality that they had long known but had been forced into staying silent about for generations. Families today are still searching the Syrian regime’s notorious prisons and mass graveyards for loved ones forcibly detained or disappeared.

(Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

In Damascus’s Martyr’s Square, I met with families hanging photographs of their missing loved ones, many of whom had been taken as prisoners as early as 2012. I spoke to two mothers: one who had identified her son in an online video released after the liberation and was still trying to find him. Another mother had heard her son, missing since 2014, had been spotted near their old home by a neighbor. “I will wait for him at the Umayyad Mosque, maybe he will turn up there,” she said, with a glimmer of hope in her eyes.

Families hold photographs of their missing loved ones. (Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

I also met with civil society groups, who highlighted that the greatest challenge continues to be providing support to the 70 percent of Syrians living in poverty and the one in four Syrians experiencing extreme poverty. Earlier this year, the United Nations reported that over 16.7 million Syrians—around 79 percent of the population—are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

Syrians know they will not get what they need to rebuild as a society, stabilize their economy, and set up government services and a social safety net with one hand tied behind their backs. Nearly every conversation I had with civil society groups touched upon the need for global sanctions relief, with people expressing hope that sanctions would soon be eased to facilitate the flow of money from abroad, enable the delivery of remittances from the diaspora, and streamline licensing processes to allow nongovernmental organizations to operate more effectively and provide much-needed humanitarian aid. In the West, policymakers and humanitarian organizations have begun to reexamine such sanctions, seeing as they could stunt Syria’s recovery.

The Syrian interim authorities’ success is contingent on buy-in from the Syrian people, as international security expert Sana Sekkarie wrote for the Atlantic Council in her recent analysis. Addressing the current economic crisis and guaranteeing that basic needs are met, including access to food, water, electricity, and healthcare, will be critical to political stability. Without fundamental needs and services being met, public trust and stability will remain elusive, further complicating efforts to foster sustainable peace and democratic governance.

A multifaceted crisis such as the one in Syria demands innovative and swiftly implemented solutions. Among many priorities, it is crucial for the new governing party or leadership to focus on rebuilding trust and legitimacy. And while Syrians are ready to take ownership of their country, this society—plagued by half a century of tyranny—will need to unlearn its fear of the state. Syrians will also need to deliberately work together, for the first time, across minority groups and sects. These are the first of many steps toward building a free, stable, and prosperous Syria that can serve as an inspiration for other countries impacted by conflict across the world.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is the chairwoman of the Syria Public Health Network.

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How Jimmy Carter’s support for human rights helped win the Cold War

Daniel Fried — Sun, 29 Dec 2024 22:17:06 +0000

During his presidency and for many years thereafter, many viewed Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy as a mix of disasters—the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis, the failure of détente with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan among them—and major achievements, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the Israeli-Egyptian peace forged at Camp David. Despite these successes, Carter’s legacy has often and wrongly been dismissed as an inconsequential prelude to President Ronald Reagan’s return to US leadership of the free world and to a forward-leaning, ultimately successful strategy of pressure on the Soviet Union.

One of Carter’s most consequential initiatives—the general elevation of human rights in US foreign policy—has usually been overlooked. Moreover, the specific application of human rights criteria to US relations with then-Soviet-controlled Central and Eastern Europe has been underappreciated. As the tributes roll in following Carter’s death on December 29 at the age of one hundred, this aspect of his legacy deserves its due.

Introducing human rights into US bilateral relations meant that the default Cold War policy that a reliably anticommunist government could be embraced and its authoritarian nature tolerated was no longer automatic. A junior foreign service officer at the time, I recall a furious debate within the State Department between the newly established Human Rights Bureau, headed by human rights activist Patricia Derian, and the more traditional State bureaus over whether the United States should use economic leverage against the Argentinian government, a repressive military regime that had a habit of “disappearing” its opponents. Derian’s people said yes, but most of State was appalled by the thought (and corridor talk was openly sexist in dismissing human rights as a policy criterion in general and Derian in particular). Derian and her people took grief for their views, but the impact of the policy grew over time; it was not dispositive, but it meant fewer free rides for dictatorships.

Carter put the United States on offense in the Cold War and on the side of the people of the region.

The impact in Europe was more profound. An implicit axiom of President Richard Nixon’s détente was that the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, marked by the imposition of the Iron Curtain, was a sad but by then immutable fact. Official Washington and most of US academia regarded the Soviet Bloc—communist-dominated Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea east of West Germany—as permanent and, though this was seldom made explicit, stabilizing. Talk of “liberating” those countries was regarded as illusion, delusion, or cant. Maintaining US-Soviet stability, under this view of Cold War realism, required accepting Europe’s realities, as these were then seen. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Final Act of Helsinki, a sort of codification of détente concluded under President Gerald Ford, did include general human rights language, and this turned out to be important. However, few at the time expected the Helsinki Accords to have any more operational impact than the vague language about democracy included in the Declaration of Liberated Europe issued at the Yalta Summit in 1945, which had no impact at all.

Carter’s shift toward human rights challenged this uber-realist consensus. It came just as democratic dissidents and workers’ movements inspired by them began to gather strength in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Carter, and his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, put the United States in a better position to reach out to these movements and to work with them when communist rule began to falter as Soviet Bloc communist regimes started running past their ability to borrow money on easy “détente terms,” making them vulnerable. More broadly, by elevating human rights in the mix of US-Soviet and US-Soviet Bloc relations, Carter put the United States on offense in the Cold War and on the side of the people of the region.

In 1978, a Polish cardinal, Karol Wojtyła, was elected pope John Paul II. In 1980, workers’ strikes at a shipyard in Gdańsk exploded into a national movement—Solidarity—that about ten million Poles joined within a year. Later that year, the Soviet Union, alarmed by Solidarity’s rise, started threatening to invade Poland, as it had Czechoslovakia in August 1968. At that time, the Lyndon Johnson administration, consumed with Vietnam, barely reacted. This time, the Carter administration warned the Soviets not to invade Poland. The United States under Carter was no longer ceding Central and Eastern Europe to the Soviets’ undisturbed control, as “their” sphere of influence.

Reagan’s support for Solidarity, the sanctions he imposed on communist Poland and the Soviet Union after Poland instituted martial law in December 1981, and his support for democracy around the world embodied in the new National Endowment for Democracy (of which, full disclosure, I am a board member) that he inspired have rightly been lauded since. However, these successes were built on a foundation that Carter laid down. Carter from the center-left and Reagan from the right brought together a consensus that US interests could be advanced through support for US values abroad. This was not the first time US presidents made the link between values and interests, but Carter reconnected that link after the cynical and defeated Vietnam era. He did so just in time to catch the wave of freedom that swelled and crested with the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself in 1991.

That’s some legacy.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

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Putin faces antisemitism accusations following attack on ‘ethnic Jews’

Joshua Stein — Tue, 24 Dec 2024 16:35:21 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has been accused of antisemitism after claiming that “ethnic Jews” are seeking to “tear apart” the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian leader’s controversial statements, which came during his annual end-of-year press conference in Moscow on December 19, were the latest in a series of similar outbursts since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that have either directly or indirectly targeted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is Jewish.

“These are people without any beliefs, godless people. They’re ethnic Jews, but has anyone seen them in a synagogue? I don’t think so,” Putin stated during the flagship event, which is broadcast live on Russian state television and traditionally runs for hours. “These are people without kin or memory, with no roots. They don’t cherish what we cherish and what the majority of the Ukrainian people cherish as well.”

Putin’s comments came as the Ukrainian authorities seek to limit the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which is seen as closely tied to the Kremlin. Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has emerged since 2022 as an outspoken supporter of the invasion, which he has sought to defend on spiritual grounds. His backing for the war has shocked many and sparked international criticism, with Pope Francis warning him not to become “Putin’s altar boy.”

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Many commentators have noted the similarity between Putin’s recent attack on people “with no roots” and Stalin’s earlier Soviet era persecution of Jews as “rootless cosmopolitans.” The Kremlin leader’s comments also offered alarming echoes of Russia’s most notorious antisemitic fake, the early twentieth century Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which alleged a Jewish plot to take over the world by infiltrating and destroying Western institutions.

Putin and his Kremlin colleagues have faced multiple accusations of antisemitism since 2022 as they have sought to defend Moscow’s claims to be “denazifying” Ukraine despite the country’s popularly-elected Jewish president and its role as a prominent destination for Jewish pilgrimages. This toxic trend has included frequent attacks on Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage. “I have a lot of Jewish friends,” Putin stated in June 2023. “They say that Zelenskyy is not Jewish, that he is a disgrace to the Jewish people. I’m not joking.”

Following these comments, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum accused the Russian leader of repeatedly employing “antisemitic lies” to justify the invasion of Ukraine. US officials have been similarly critical. “President Zelenskyy’s Jewishness has nothing to do with the situation in Ukraine and Putin’s continued focus on this topic and “denazification” narrative is clearly intended to distract from Russia’s war of aggression against the Ukrainian people,” commented US Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah Lipstadt in 2023.

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Similar slurs feature regularly in the Kremlin-controlled Russian state media, with leading propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov known for questioning the authenticity of Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity. Meanwhile, during the initial months of the invasion in spring 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to a question about the absurdity of “denazifying” a country with a Jewish leader by claiming that Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.” Lavrov’s remarks sparked outrage and were branded “unforgivable” by Israeli officials.

Many within the Jewish community see Putin’s most recent inflammatory comments as part of a broader trend that is legitimizing antisemitic tropes and raising serious safety concerns. “This is just one example of his regime’s explicit and virulent antisemitism, which has intensified following his 2022 invasion of Ukraine,” commented Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, the president of the Conference of European Rabbis and former Chief Rabbi of Moscow, who fled Russia following the attack on Ukraine after coming under pressure to publicly endorse the invasion. In December 2022, Goldschmidt warned of rising antisemitism in Putin’s Russia and advised Jews to leave the country.

Goldschmidt is now appealing to the international community to address the antisemitic rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin. “As a representative of Jewish communities across Europe, and someone who was forced to flee my home and community in Moscow, I call on Europe and the free world to unequivocally condemn President Putin’s dangerous propaganda before it spreads further,” he stated.

Joshua Stein is a researcher with a PhD from the University of Calgary.

In the next few months, there will be a power struggle among the anti-Assad groups in Damascus and western Syria. Adding to this combustible mix, former regime supporters and outside players like Iran will seek a comeback. The cynical reality is that whichever groups have the most guns and control the most money will become the leading voices in Syrian politics. It would be naïve to think that Syrians will get to decide this peacefully on their own without outside interference. Instead, external support and internal ruthlessness will be decisive.

This is a warning, but if handled in a clear-eyed fashion, it can also be a blueprint for managing the politics of postwar Syria in ways that lead to better outcomes for the Syrian people, the region, and countries like the United States that want a sustainable peace in the Middle East.

Well-meaning international mediators, such as those the United Nations (UN) was supposed to provide under Security Council Resolution 2254, will talk about power-sharing and a constitution, but the real power around the negotiating table will be the groups that have the most guns and the most money. The nascent civil society that Syria truly needs will have only minor influence, and most of that will come, if at all, at the insistence of outside players. In late 2025 or early 2026, the UN will be brought in to oversee elections. I can already predict that everyone will say, in hindsight, that these elections were held too soon. The UN elections experts will insist on a proportional representation system, ostensibly to give all Syrian political factions a voice.

What this will do is cement in power those groups that control the guns and the money. Money is the mother’s milk of politics. Syria is no exception. The proportional representation system gives party bosses who control party funds the power to rank-order the candidates, with those at the top of the lists of the bigger parties assured of election victory. Loyalty to the party boss becomes all-important for these candidates, not representing the people who elect them.

Neither al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) nor the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army needs lessons about controlling guns and money. For years, HTS has ruthlessly and efficiently taken control of “customs duties” and monopolies over trucks and people crossing the Turkey-Syria border. These groups, unless blocked by their international supporters, will try to seize Syrian government ministries as a lucrative source of funds and jobs for supporters before elections take place. Iraqi political parties did this in 2003.

There is good reason to be concerned about HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani). In his interviews, he talks about “institutional governance.” To be fair, he understands the need to project moderation because many Syrians do not want to replace the Assad dictatorship with a Salafi jihadist one. Syrians want peace, not a march on Jerusalem. Remember that Fidel Castro tried to moderate his image after he seized power in Cuba in 1959, only to reveal his true intentions a few months later. The Taliban in 2021 tried to project an image of moderation, only to revert to gender apartheid. Overcoming skepticism toward HTS’s claims of moderation will depend on the new Syrian government taking actions that gain the support of both Syrians and countries, such as the United States, whose support is going to be essential for Syria to move in a positive direction.

Iran and Hezbollah will almost certainly try to regain power through politics. In 2003, Iran recovered quickly from the US takeover of Iraq by generously funding political parties (which the United States would not do) and militias to intimidate nationalist Iraqis. The Iranian Quds Force—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ overseas paramilitary and covert action group—has deep connections to Syrian politics and the country’s security services. Plus, Iran still has ground lines of communication through Iraq into eastern Syria using Iranian-backed militias.

Seven steps to help the transition

The United States and the world have a lot to lose if Syria’s new leaders revert to terrorism, if ISIS is allowed to recover, or if Iran and Hezbollah regain power in Syria. Here are seven ways to improve the odds:

Turkey, Jordan, and other Arab governments will be supporting groups inside Syria, whether the United States wants them to or not. For the moment, Turkey is in the driver’s seat. The United States should work closely with its allies, with the goal of getting everyone to support only groups that work toward tolerance and coexistence internally and peace with all of Syria’s neighbors externally, including not just Israel and Lebanon but also, importantly, with Turkey. Groups that are not willing to meet these criteria need to be cut off from outside support, no matter what previous support they received.
The United States should make it a top priority to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from being spoilers in the new Syria. And Washington should expose Russian attempts to bribe its way back into influence.
The United States and its allies should prioritize keeping aid distribution out of the control of hard-line groups. Look at Gaza, where Israelis complain that Hamas controls distribution and criminal gangs intercept aid shipments.
HTS should be given a chance to show it has changed, and actions matter more than words. But Syrian officials should not be made to guess about what actions matter the most to the United States. The United States will need a channel to convey to the new Syrian leadership which actions would jeopardize prospects of further US support, including the all-important sanctions relief that new Syrian officials, including Sharaa, are aware they need.
Outside governments should work to keep Syrian ministries in technocratic hands, out of the control of individual militias or parties, to avoid a repeat of the disastrous muhasasa system in Iraq.
Since the 1980s, the United States has been allergic to funding foreign political parties directly, although Trump often shows little regard for historical restraints on US action. But how internal politics is funded in a country emerging from tyranny is hugely consequential. Then-President George W. Bush ordered the US invasion of Iraq in part to help make Iraq a democracy, but the United States failed to fund Iraqi political parties, leading some to take money from Iran and others to engage in massive corruption, in part to fund party activities. First-time free elections in countries like Syria do not result in stability and progress by chance. The United States has a poor record of picking winners in foreign countries (Iraq and Afghanistan being obvious cases in point), but the United States does well at promoting leadership development more broadly. Funding a robust system of opinion polling could also be one of the most important investments in a stable Syria that the United States and its European allies could make. Given that US allies and adversaries are unlikely to feel restrained from picking their preferred winners, the United States should stay clear-eyed about the importance, at least, of thwarting the ambitions of its enemies.
It’s too early to predict which electoral system will have the best chance to produce a peaceful, stable Syria, but this will be a hugely consequential decision that should not be left only to UN elections experts when the time comes. This requires careful analysis, not just by neutral elections officials but by those most knowledgeable about Syrian internal politics. The United States needs to be prepared to weigh in with its allies and with the UN to make sure that the election system gives the Syrian people the best chance for a stable, peaceful future.

Countries such as Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon may have bigger stakes in Syria than the United States does, but what happens in postwar Syria is still vitally important to US interests. No one suggests that Syria needs more US troops, but the next few years will see a historic opportunity to avoid a future Middle East war that could draw in the United States. Expanding the Abraham Accords depends in part on better relations between Israel and Syria. The next few weeks will be crucial, but Trump could have a truly historic win if he listens to the right advisers on his team.

It will be up to the Trump administration whether Syria falls into the hands of terrorists, Iran, or chaos—or whether the Syrian people will genuinely have a chance to determine their own path to peace, reconstruction, and prosperity.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

The post Postwar Syria could go wrong in many ways. Here’s how the US can help it go right. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What will minority and women’s rights look like in the new Syria?

Sinan Hatahet — Fri, 20 Dec 2024 14:33:22 +0000

The fall of the Assad regime marked a seismic shift in Syria’s governance dynamics. The new administration, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is navigating a delicate balance between its ideological origins and the practical necessity of governance. One of the immediate challenges it faces is addressing the rights and concerns of Syria’s minorities and women. I witnessed this balancing act play out firsthand while in Damascus in the frenetic days following dictator Bashar al-Assad’s ouster. How the new transitional government responds to these challenges will be crucial for consolidating its internal legitimacy, managing societal cohesion, and engaging with the broader international community.

For minorities, between reassurance and skepticism

From the outset, the new authorities demonstrated a conscious effort to signal a departure from the divisive practices of their predecessors. In Aleppo, HTS contacted prominent Christian leaders and clergy across various denominations to repair strained relations and foster a sense of security. These meetings were not superficial; they included discussions on tangible grievances, such as the injustices faced by Christians in Jisr al-Shughur a year prior. Some of these grievances have since been addressed mainly through accountability and restoring properties to their rightful owners, an unprecedented move that underscores the leadership’s understanding of the need for inclusivity, albeit carefully managed.

Similar gestures were made towards the Druze community in Idlib Governate’s Jabal al-Summaq area, where HTS leadership engaged with representatives to rebuild trust and ensure that their communities were not targeted. Additionally, on December 17, leaders held dialogues with prominent figures from the Druze community in Suwayda and Jabal al-Arab, sending assurances of safety and future inclusion. For the Ismailis of Salamiyah, the transition of power was remarkably smooth, as the town surrendered without violence. This cooperative handover reflects longstanding tensions between the Ismaili community and the Assad regime, which had marginalized them over the years.

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However, the situation remains more nuanced with the Alawite community. The new government refrained from delivering targeted reassurances to the Alawites, instead embedding its messages of justice and reconciliation within broader declarations. The new authorities emphasized that no one would face retribution without due process and clear evidence of wrongdoing. The deployment of rebel forces in Latakia and its surrounding mountains occurred without notable violence, with explicit orders to safeguard public property and prevent retaliatory attacks. Such actions suggest an effort to mitigate fears of collective punishment among Alawites—a community burdened with its historical association with the Assad regime.

Still, there are lingering anxieties within minority communities. The Alawites, in particular, remain wary of the new leaders’ promises, balancing a cautious optimism with deep-seated concerns about potential reprisals. In response, some within the community have distanced themselves publicly from Assad, framing the current transition as an opportunity for a fresh start and a shared national future. Whether the new authorities can translate these gestures into meaningful inclusion will depend on their willingness to integrate minority representatives into future governance structures and decision-making processes.

For women, between pragmatism and policy gaps

The evolving role of women in Syria is shaped by societal necessity and practical realities. Syria’s protracted conflict has led to significant demographic shifts: countless men have been killed, displaced, or forced into exile due to military conscription, economic hardship, or combat involvement. As a result, women now bear much responsibility for sustaining households, working in various sectors, and managing day-to-day economic activities.

In urban centers and rural areas alike, women have maintained an active presence in the public sphere. Notably, no widespread attempts have been made to impose restrictive dress codes or curtail women’s mobility, in stark contrast to the fears many harbored when HTS first rose to prominence. Women freely participated in public celebrations across towns and villages, underscoring the relative ease with which they navigated public spaces under the new leadership.

However, women need to achieve meaningful political inclusion. While women are visible in mid-level administrative roles in the transitional government, there has yet to be any effort to appoint them to senior leadership positions or ministries. This mirrors a broader trend in conservative governance structures where women’s participation is often limited to symbolic roles. The new government’s failure to include women in decision-making risks alienating a critical population segment and undermining its claims of inclusivity.

Moving forward, the new leadership must recognize that empowering women is not merely a concession to international pressure but a practical necessity for rebuilding Syria. Women’s inclusion in governance, education, and economic development will be critical for addressing Syria’s demographic and financial challenges. The government can indicate its commitment to inclusivity with concrete steps, such as appointing women to leadership roles, supporting women-led initiatives, and ensuring equal access to education and employment.

Drafting a constitution

Despite the positive gestures made toward minorities and women, Syria’s new government under HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara faces structural and institutional challenges that threaten to undermine these early gains. Effective governance is not simply a matter of security or symbolic inclusivity; it requires building functioning institutions that deliver services, mediate disputes, and foster participation from all segments of society.

The need to integrate the experiences and expertise of Syria’s technocratic and bureaucratic workforce is at the heart of this challenge. The structure of Syria’s public administration going back decades included representation from various sects and backgrounds and significant contributions from women. Often overlooked in political narratives, this workforce remains vital to the country’s reconstruction and future success. The new government’s ability to retain and mobilize these experienced individuals within its evolving institutions will determine the effectiveness of its governance.

However, there are signs of tension between ideological considerations and practical governance. While Shara has shown a degree of pragmatism, particularly in dealing with local communities, the transitional government’s structures remain centralized and hierarchical, with power concentrated in a small leadership circle. This limits opportunities for inclusive decision-making and reinforces perceptions of exclusion among minorities and women.

To foster genuine participation, the new government must decentralize aspects of its governance, empower local councils, and integrate representatives from underrepresented groups. Decentralization has been a demand in many post-conflict contexts, allowing communities to manage their affairs while preserving national cohesion. In Syria, where local dynamics vary significantly across regions, such an approach would not only address the concerns of minorities and women but also strengthen the new authorities’ legitimacy.

The drafting of a new constitution presents both an opportunity and a challenge. On one hand, it offers a chance to codify the principles of inclusivity, justice, and representation essential for Syria’s long-term stability. On the other hand, the process is fraught with risks, particularly in a polarized environment where trust remains fragile. Minority communities and women must sit at the table during this process, ensuring their voices are heard and their rights are protected.

A constitution that explicitly guarantees the rights of minorities and women will strengthen the new government’s domestic legitimacy and address longstanding grievances that have fueled instability. It will provide a legal foundation for Syria’s governance, creating a framework that transcends political factions and ensures continuity in protecting vulnerable communities.

The test ahead

Syria is at a crossroads. The departure of the Assad regime has created a unique opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and its people. The actions taken by Shara thus far—reaching out to minorities, refraining from imposing restrictive norms on women, and prioritizing internal legitimacy—reflect a pragmatic shift in HTS’s governance approach. However, these actions remain tentative and incomplete.

The true test lies in the new authorities’ ability to institutionalize these early gestures through concrete policies and legal frameworks. A new constitution that guarantees the rights of minorities and women will serve as a foundation for Syria’s future, ensuring that these rights are not contingent on political or ideological changes. Similarly, meaningful political inclusion—by appointing women and minority representatives to leadership roles—will signal a genuine commitment to shared governance.

For the Syrian people, the stakes are clear. After years of conflict and division, there is an opportunity to build a more inclusive and just future that reflects the resilience, diversity, and aspirations of all Syrians. The leaders of the new government face a critical choice: they can either embrace this opportunity and chart a path toward stability and legitimacy or retreat into exclusionary practices that risk perpetuating the very divisions they seek to overcome.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

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Ukraine seeks further progress toward EU membership in 2025

Kateryna Odarchenko — Thu, 19 Dec 2024 21:43:28 +0000

Ukraine has long identified membership of NATO and the European Union as its twin geopolitical objectives as it looks to achieve an historic turn to the West. With seemingly little prospect of an invitation to join NATO while the war with Russia continues, the Ukrainian government will be hoping to advance further on the road toward EU integration in 2025. Progress in the country’s EU bid is realistic, but Kyiv will likely face a series of obstacles during the coming year, both domestically and on the international stage.

Ukraine’s EU aspirations first began to take shape in the aftermath of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution. However, the European Union initially showed little sign of sharing this Ukrainian enthusiasm for closer ties. Instead, it took nine years for Brussels and Kyiv to agree on the terms of an Association Agreement that aimed to take the relationship forward to the next level.

When the Association Agreement was finally ready to sign in late 2013, Russia intervened and pressured Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out. This led to protests in Kyiv, which then spiraled into a popular uprising following heavy-handed efforts to disperse students rallying in support of EU integration. The Revolution of Dignity, as it came to be known, reached a bloody climax in February 2014 with the murder of dozens of protesters in central Kyiv. In the aftermath of the killings, Yanukovych fled to Russia.

Yanukovych’s successor, Petro Poroshenko, signed the EU Association Agreement months later. By then, Putin had already decided to intervene militarily, seizing control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. This was the start of an undeclared Russian war against Ukraine that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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As Russian troops approached Kyiv during the opening days of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for EU membership. This gesture underlined the historical significance of the country’s European choice at a time when Moscow was openly attempting to force Ukraine permanently back into the Kremlin orbit.

Amid the horrors of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II, EU officials and individual member states also recognized the importance of Ukraine’s European integration. In June 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status. This was followed in late 2023 by a decision to start membership accession negotiations, with talks beginning in June 2024.

The dramatic progress made since 2022 has led to growing confidence in Ukraine that EU membership is a realistic goal for the country. It is certainly a popular option. The number of Ukrainians who back joining the EU has been rising steadily since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, with recent polls consistently indicating that more than three-quarters of Ukrainians would like to see the country as part of the EU.

This overwhelming public support means there is unlikely to be any shortage of political will in Kyiv to adopt the policies that will bring Ukraine closer to achieving EU membership. Nevertheless, the pathway forward is complex and demanding. Effective governance reforms, particularly in the fight against corruption, are essential for Ukraine’s EU aspirations. Aligning with EU legal standards across 35 policy areas including taxation, energy, and judicial reform will also require a monumental effort.

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Ukraine will be hoping for an accelerated period of EU integration progress when Poland takes on the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council in January 2025. This follows on from a Hungarian presidency that brought few benefits for Ukraine, and should create favorable conditions for constructive engagement on key reform issues.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s EU bid is likely to encounter additional obstacles and headwinds as the prospect of membership draws nearer. Ukraine’s agricultural prowess in particular is set to present both opportunities and challenges. Ukraine is already a major exporter of agricultural products to the EU. If the country is able to join the single market and eliminate existing barriers including tariffs and quotas, this would potentially overwhelm European markets.

Increased Ukrainian grain exports to the EU since 2022 have already become a controversial issue in many EU member states, sparking protests and border blockades. This opposition will only grow in the coming few years, with EU farmers pressing their governments to act in their interests and prevent Ukraine from achieving unrestricted access.

Labor flows of Ukrainian workers may also create some concerns among existing EU members. While millions of Ukrainians are already living and working in the EU including many with refugee status, membership could lead to an influx similar to the large number of Poles who moved to other EU member states following Poland’s 2004 EU accession. To address these concerns, transition periods may be necessary.

How soon could Ukraine achieve EU membership? EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová has expressed confidence that Ukraine could join by the end of the decade. This was echoed by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi, who stated in October that Ukraine could potentially secure membership by 2029 if it completes the necessary reforms.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has underscored the nation’s determination to achieve fast-track integration. While there is strong support for Ukraine’s membership bid in most EU capitals, the accession process is rigorous and requires unanimous approval. Further progress is likely in 2025, but the road to full membership remains long and challenging.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

The China-Latin America and the Caribbean Business Summit, held in Managua in November, marks the culmination of China and Nicaragua’s growing economic ties over the past year. With Nicaragua having joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in January 2022, relations between the two countries have developed considerably. In January, China and Nicaragua signed a free trade agreement, which was followed by the inauguration of their first direct maritime trade route from Tianjin, China, to Corinto, Nicaragua, in August. Furthermore, the ship that inaugurated the trade route was carrying materials for the Chinese-sponsored construction of Punta Huete International Airport.

Even more recently, Nicaragua sent a delegation of thirty-one business leaders, led by Laureano Ortega Murillo, son of the two co-presidents, to the China International Import Expo. During the event, he stated, “Our government is fully open to Chinese investment. We are under the guidance of our president to facilitate everything we can do for Chinese businesses.” Chinese foreign investment oftentimes undermines US geopolitical interests, which has made curbing such investment a key foreign policy priority of the incoming Trump administration. For example, Nicaragua severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan right before joining the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s willingness to engage with authoritarian actors like Nicaragua greatly impacts US hemispheric goals for democracy.

On the national security front, military cooperation between Nicaragua and Russia has intensified. Over the past decade, nearly 3,500 Russian military personnel have entered the country, and Moscow has been providing the regime with military equipment and training since 2016. In March, the legislature, which is dominated by Ortega’s ruling party, permitted the construction of a police training center run by the Russian Interior Ministry. This deal builds upon previous espionage concerns associated with Mokorón Base, claimed as a hub for Russian espionage, and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System. At the beginning of December, the Russian government approved a draft proposal establishing a joint military working group and extending military cooperation. In reference to Russia’s military presence, Laureano Ortega Murillo stated, “Nicaragua is Russia’s strategic ally in Central America. We position ourselves as its regional platform in all fields and we are committed to enhancing Moscow’s influence and action in the region.”

Furthermore, the Nicaraguan government traffics migrants to systematically increase migration pressure and fuel remittance payments, which comprise 30 percent of Nicaragua’s gross domestic product. In an effort to protest existing sanctions, the regime loosened visa restrictions for countries across the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa and sold ninety-six-hour visas to migrants looking to bypass the treacherous journey through the Darién Gap. The Nicaraguan government organizes charter flights for migrants through third-party airline companies while creating a million-dollar enterprise charging migrants predatory visa fees. Between May 2023 and May 2024, an estimated 200,000 migrants arrived in Augusto Sandino International Airport on “pseudo-commercial flights.” Approximately 10 percent of all migrants arriving at the United States’ southern border start the trek in Nicaragua.

Countering Chinese influence, curtailing immigration, and bolstering national security are issues that President-elect Donald Trump campaigned on. Since Nicaragua poses a threat to all three of these goals, the question becomes: What tools are at the disposal of the Trump administration?

Go for the gold

One option for the incoming administration is to enact wider sectoral sanctions, but there are pros and cons to this approach.

Following the 2018 antigovernment protests in Nicaragua, the first Trump administration issued Executive Order 13851 sanctioning key officials, including Ortega and Murillo. These individual sanctions did not have a significant impact on the regime. Therefore, the Trump administration should consider imposing wider sectoral sanctions on key economic sectors, such as gold and precious metals. The Biden administration slowly began to target the gold sector, designating multiple private companies and a government-run mining organization. All the while, the Biden administration still negotiated through diplomatic channels to release 135 political prisoners.

However, the sanctioned companies comprise only 1 percent of Nicaraguan mining concessions. Broader sectoral sanctioning on the gold industry would send a strong message by targeting one of the country’s top exports, serving as a bargaining chip to release remaining political prisoners and to promote democratic reform. Gold exports already outnumber Nicaraguan production rates, hinting at illegal gold mining and smuggling, which gold sector sanctions would likely exacerbate. As such, the administration must prepare a holistic framework to tackle illicit gold trade from artisanal and small-scale mining operations through commodities tracking, custody ledgers, or even chemical trace analysis measures. Lastly, the Trump administration should harmonize sanctions programs with allies such as the United Kingdom and the European Union to increase their efficacy. Considering that the United States imports the majority of Nicaraguan gold, targeting this sector would eliminate a large cash flow for the regime.

Push where the regime feels pressure: Trade

In recent years, some policymakers have proposed expelling Nicaragua from the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) to increase pressure on the Ortega government. For example, the first Trump administration considered it in 2019, seeing the agreement as providing an economic lifeline to an authoritarian regime. The Biden administration also considered expelling Nicaragua in 2022. But without an expulsion clause, there is no feasible avenue to expel Nicaragua without dismantling the entire agreement.

As Trump discusses the renegotiation of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), sights could turn to CAFTA-DR. Any potential renegotiation of CAFTA-DR could include tougher restrictions on member countries’ interactions with Chinese investors while excluding Nicaragua from an updated CAFTA-DR to help prevent Chinese transshipment of goods into the United States. However, a review pathway for Nicaragua would need to be made available pending significant democratic reform.

Alternatively, the Trump administration could keep the CAFTA-DR in place while presenting the opportunity for accession of other qualifying members to the USMCA agreement. In this scenario, Nicaragua would not qualify, considering its rebuke of democratic principles, centralization of power, and strong ties to China. If Nicaragua’s neighbors choose to join the USMCA, Nicaragua would become susceptible to Trump’s proposed blanket tariffs, losing favored access to US markets. However, prior to the official disruption of CAFTA-DR, Trump should continue the US Trade Representative’s Section 301 investigation into Nicaragua’s adherence to labor rights, human rights, and the rule of law, which is a pathway to increased sanctions. The United States could also consider mobilizing the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs in conjunction with the CAFTA-DR oversight commission to review labor and environmental requirement adherence.

Trade plays a significant role in Nicaragua’s economy, which makes these approaches a likely effective way to increase pressure on the government.

Keep the end in mind

Avenues exist to increase pressure on the Nicaraguan government, but it should be pressure with a point. Any new measures from Washington should be tied to specific calls for the regime to carry out democratic reforms, ensure human rights, and/or take steps to address security concerns emanating from its dealings with Russia and China.

In addition, the Trump administration should be aware that new punitive economic measures would likely result in an increase of Nicaraguan emigration. More than a fifth of Nicaragua’s population has already left the country and this will likely increase if the economic situation gets worse. To confront the regime’s exploitation of migrants, existing programs such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Operation Sentinel should be bolstered to investigate migrant trafficking operations and further explore their connections to the Ortega-Murillo regime.

Finally, the Trump administration will need to decide whether to continue the Biden administration’s policies toward Nicaragua, including the reallocated quota on imports of Nicaragua’s sugar, as well as existing export controls pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations.

The incoming Trump administration has consequential choices ahead of it, but the sooner it acts the better. The Nicaraguan regime’s increasing collaboration with China and Russia is providing the economic backing to crack down at home and make Nicaragua increasingly dangerous to the region. If Trump wants to meet his foreign policy campaign goals while reaffirming hemispheric human rights, Nicaragua is a good place to start.

Brennan Rhodes is a former young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Dispatch from Damascus: Celebrations and concerns as a new Syria takes shape

Ömer Özkizilcik — Tue, 17 Dec 2024 11:00:00 +0000

DAMASCUS—After more than a decade of conflict, Syrian rebels, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), have successfully overthrown the Assad regime. The rapid and unanticipated advance of the rebels raises numerous questions about the future of Syria. Many people around the world, especially Syrians, are speculating about what lies ahead for their country and how the international community—particularly the United States—will respond. While in Damascus, I witnessed firsthand the early atmosphere in Syria’s capital.

Upon arriving in Damascus on December 10, two days after the collapse of the Assad regime, I immediately went to the famous Umayyad Square, where I witnessed the joy and celebrations among many Syrians. The atmosphere was vibrant, marked by fireworks, sporadic gunfire, and massive crowds. Interestingly, I soon found myself speaking with around twenty young Syrians in Turkish. They had all lived in Turkey but had returned to Syria some time ago, rushing from the Turkey-protected areas in northern Syria to the capital. Among them were both civilians and individuals in military uniforms.

Several hours later, the city calmed down. The curfew and the darkness of the night transformed the city from a joyous festival into a silent ambiguity—a mood that indicates Syria’s hopeful but uncertain future.

The next day, the streets of Damascus were busy and crowded. People rushed through the streets as their daily lives continued. The Umayyad Mosque was filled with visiting Syrians. However, the Syrian rebels captured the most attention from the visitors. The rebels were busy taking pictures and praying alongside the civilians. This excitement wasn’t limited to the mosque; throughout the city, civilians cheered for the rebels.

Syrians attending prayers at Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Syria. Photo by Ömer Özkizilcik.

But the relative optimism in the city is accompanied by suspicion. Just as the world is closely monitoring the situation in Syria, Syrians are also pondering whether the positive and relatively inclusive messages from the Syrian rebels, particularly those of HTS’s leader, Ahmad al-Shara (formerly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), will be borne out in the way they govern the country.

Syrian minority groups, including Christians, Shiites, and Alawites in Damascus, are hopeful that the rebels have learned from their past mistakes and are sincere in their approach. However, many remain concerned about potential acts of revenge against members of minority groups who are perceived as having been loyal to the Assad regime. Efforts are underway to reassure them, but one thing is clear: the military and security personnel in Damascus are insufficient. Due to the focus on securing the Assad regime’s former strongholds in Tartus and Latakia, as well as a lack of manpower, many streets and neighborhoods remain unguarded. This reality gives minority groups ample reason to be fearful.

Given the new political reality in Syria and the uncertainty surrounding it, many individuals, including known personalities who have collaborated with the Assad regime, express disdain for it publicly in an effort to demonstrate their loyalty to the new authorities in Damascus. For example, many members of the hotel staff, where I am writing this article, loudly criticize Assad whenever they encounter rebel personnel or commanders. Although the hotel owner, rumored to be a close associate of the regime, has fled to Lebanon, most of the staff members continue to work here.

As the less organized reconciled rebels from southern Syria and sporadic uprisings reached Damascus, many state institutions and properties belonging to the Assad family were devastated. I was informed that order was restored with the arrival of HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA), a rebel militia backed by Turkey.

Many in Damascus view the establishment of the transitional government as the first test that will determine the city’s future direction. Some believe that the transitional government will only handle managerial tasks and will be temporary until March 2025, arguing that the period following this date will be more crucial.

The power struggle ahead

The key question is how much power HTS will share with other Syrian rebel groups and the broader Syrian population. Observing the situation in Idlib, some critics worry that HTS may ultimately seek to establish its dominance. They point out that since Shara has gained the status akin to that of a national hero, he may be less inclined to agree to power-sharing arrangements.

Others argue that Shara must share power, even if he is resistant to the idea. They contend that without the SNA and the reconciled rebels from the south, HTS lacks the manpower necessary to control Syria and ensure security. Additionally, they claim that the designation of HTS as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the United States, Turkey, and others creates an opportunity to promote a more inclusive transitional government, incorporating regime technocrats and representatives from both the civilian and armed Syrian opposition.

A recent meeting between the military leaders of HTS, the SNA, and reconciled rebels could signal exactly this. There are strong rumors that HTS, SNA, and the reconciled rebels are in discussions about the possibility of disbanding their individual factions to form a united military structure.

Skeptics and optimists alike agree that foreign states could play a crucial role in facilitating a smooth and inclusive transition in Syria. Many point to Turkey’s involvement, while a few highlight Qatar’s contributions as well. In contrast, Washington is viewed as pursuing a narrow interest without a clear agenda. The US partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an entity dominated by the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) to establish an autonomous region in Syria, is perceived in Damascus as a limited agenda that lacks sustainability. The United States has partnered with the SDF to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Contacts I have spoken to suggest that the days of the SDF may be numbered due to the overwhelming demographic strength of Arabs in SDF-held areas who are likely to oppose governance by Kurdish forces; the withdrawal of Russian troops, which had been protecting the SDF against Turkish forces; and offensives that the SNA, backed by Turkish drone strikes, has launched against SDF positions since Assad’s fall. Also, HTS officials I have spoken to clearly state that they won’t accept the status quo in northeastern Syria.

A roadmap for Washington

Looking from Damascus and with a good understanding of Ankara, I recommend that the United States broaden its focus in Syria beyond just the campaign against ISIS. Given the new realities in Syria and in anticipation of the incoming Trump administration, the United States should promote a more inclusive transitional period and collaborate with its NATO ally. A dispute between Ankara and Washington over the SDF is likely to be unproductive.

Washington should collaborate with Turkey and encourage non-YPG elements of the SDF to switch sides to the new authority in Damascus. In exchange, the United States could secure the interests of Kurds in the Kurdish areas by introducing the Kurdish National Council (KNC). The KNC is part of the Syrian opposition, is closely aligned with Iraqi Kurdistan, has good relations with Turkey, and represents the majority of Syrian Kurds. This cooperation can facilitate a safe US withdrawal from Syria in exchange for security guarantees regarding ISIS prisons in northeastern Syria, which are currently guarded by the SDF. An organized handover to prevent a mass escape will be the first step. Still, more importantly, with a new government established in Damascus, ISIS prisoners and their families could be properly prosecuted, something that the SDF couldn’t manage due to legislative obstacles.

Additionally, Washington should coordinate its approach to Syria with Ankara. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Ankara was a step in the right direction. However, judging by how bland the statements were from both sides after the meetings, it looks unlikely that there was agreement. To reach a solid deal, the United States must abandon the limited SDF project for a wider perspective toward all of Syria. While Turkey has become the most influential foreign actor in Syria, the United States still maintains significant leverage over the international legitimacy of the new Syrian government and funding for the country’s reconstruction. Combined Turkish and US influence can help guide Shara toward a realistic path that aligns with the best interests of the Syrian people.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Russian victory in Ukraine would spark a new era of global insecurity

Victor Liakh — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 21:49:34 +0000

The election of Donald Trump has set the stage for what many expect to be a push for some kind of peace deal between Russia and Ukraine in the coming months. The outcome of these efforts is likely to redefine the entire global security framework and determine whether the rules-based order established since World War II is replaced by a new era of international instability.

In the eighty years since the defeat of Nazi Germany, the United States has emerged as the key architect of global stability. The decades of unprecedented economic growth and relative peace that followed the Cold War allowed nations to enjoy a period of relative security and prosperity under the umbrella of international law. However, it is now clear that this tranquility lulled some democracies into neglecting their defense commitments, which helped convince autocracies like Putin’s Russia that the time was right to contest the existing order.

Ukraine now finds itself on the front lines of a clash between the democratic and authoritarian worlds. Since the collapse of the USSR, the former captive nations of the Soviet Union have struggled to emerge from centuries of Russian imperial rule. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have succeeded in integrating into Western economic and security alliances. Others such as Belarus have returned to the Kremlin orbit. Ukraine’s journey has been the most challenging of all.

Since 1991, Ukraine has slowly but steadily moved away from the totalitarian past and set out on a pathway toward a democratic European future. However, these efforts have been hampered by Russia’s determination to reassert its control over the country. Since the early years of the post-Soviet era, it has become apparent that Moscow views the emergence of a genuinely independent and democratic Ukraine as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next chapter in Russia’s retreat from empire.

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Ukraine’s resilience in the face of Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the full-scale attack of 2022 demonstrates the success of the country’s nation-building efforts and the strength of Ukrainian civil society. Despite the immense pressures of war, today’s Ukraine remains committed to democratic values and Euro-Atlantic integration. This helps to explain why Putin regards continued Ukrainian independence as so dangerous.

Moscow’s ambitions are no secret. The Kremlin views its war against Ukraine as both a crucial step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire and as a tool in the broader struggle to transform the geopolitical landscape. Putin is determined to erase Ukrainian statehood while simultaneously eroding the very foundations of international law and global security.

In Putin’s worldview, today’s rules-based order is merely a construct that serves US interests rather than a framework for mutually beneficial global cooperation. He is now building a coalition of like-minded autocrats who share his ambition of establishing a new world order defined by spheres of interest and power projection, where the world’s largest nations are free to dominate their smaller neighbors.

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The first cracks in the current rules-based order began to emerge in 2014 with the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This provoked an underwhelming response from the international community, which was interpreted by Moscow as an invitation to go further. More recently, the chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan was seen as further proof that the United States was a declining power. This helped convince Putin to proceed with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Continued Western weakness in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion has made Putin even more ambitious and has encouraged his authoritarian allies. Moscow has expanded its presence in Africa and the Middle East, while strengthening cooperation with the likes of China, Iran, and North Korea. This axis of autocrats is playing an increasingly important role in Russia’s war effort. In recent weeks, the first contingent of approximately ten thousand North Korean soldiers joined the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They are unlikely to be the last.

It should now be abundantly clear that a Russian victory in Ukraine, no matter how limited, would embolden autocracies worldwide. This would ignite a chain reaction and accelerate the unraveling of global security. Moreover, abandoning Ukraine would send a chilling message to all US allies. This would pave the way for a far more dangerous world where aggression is met with silence and order gives way to chaos.

It is not too late to prevent this descent into geopolitical lawlessness. A resolute Western stance on ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine can still secure “peace through strength” and send a powerful message that international aggression will not be tolerated. However, failure to do so will undermine global security and prosperity for years to come.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of the East Europe Foundation. From 2005 to 2008, he was executive director of the Child Well-Being Fund Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Ukrainian State Center for Social Services for Youth (1996–2001) and for UNICEF (2000–2001).

Putin’s representatives during the Istanbul talks called for the Ukrainian army to be drastically reduced to a minimal force of just 50,000 troops, with strict limits also placed on the amount of armor and types of missiles Ukraine could possess. Meanwhile, Russia would face no such restrictions. Crucially, the Kremlin demanded complete Ukrainian neutrality and insisted on retaining a veto over any international military aid to Kyiv in the event of renewed hostilities. These punishing terms leave little room for doubt that Putin’s intention was to place Ukraine completely at his mercy and in no position to resist the next stage of Russian aggression.

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The implications of “denazification” are even more ominous. Putin has long accused Ukraine of being a “Nazi state,” despite the fact that the country has a popularly elected Jewish president and no far-right politicians in government. In reality, “denazification” is Kremlin code for the complete eradication of a separate Ukrainian national identity. In other words, Putin pretends to be fighting fascism order to legitimize his criminal goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

The grim consequences of Putin’s “denazification” policies are already evident throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. In regions of the country currently under Kremlin control, all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity are being ruthlessly purged. Ukrainian children are forced to study a Kremlin curriculum that demonizes Ukraine while glorifying the invasion of their country. Adults must accept Russian citizenship if they wish to access basic services such as pensions and healthcare.

Anyone regarded as a potential threat to the Russian occupation authorities is at risk of deportation, abduction, torture, or execution. While it is impossible to determine exact figures, it is estimated that thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been detained since February 2022. In most cases, relatives of detainees have no way of knowing if they are still alive. Britain’s The Economist recently described conditions in Russian-occupied Ukraine as a “totalitarian hell.” It is a very specific vision of hell that has been designed to remove all traces of Ukraine and impose an imperial Russian identity.

The most obvious indication of Russia’s genocidal intent in Ukraine has been the mass deportation of Ukrainian children, with thousands abducted and transferred to a system of camps where they are subjected to indoctrination in order to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and turn them into loyal Kremlin subjects. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in relation to these abductions. The UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention recognizes “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as an act of genocide.

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Russia’s own actions since February 2022 have made a mockery of the arguments used by the Kremlin to justify the war. At the start of the full-scale invasion, Putin claimed to be defending the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east of the country. However, the Russian army has since killed tens of thousands of predominantly Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine, while reducing dozens of towns and cities across the region to rubble.

Likewise, Russia’s attempts to justify the attack on Ukraine by painting it as a response to NATO enlargement have been largely debunked by Putin himself. When neighboring Finland and Sweden responded to Russia’s invasion by announcing plans in spring 2022 to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO, Putin was quick to declare that Russia had “no problem” with the move. This indifference was particularly striking as Finnish accession more than doubled Russia’s NATO border, while Swedish membership transformed the strategically vital Baltic Sea into a NATO lake.

Putin has since gone even further, withdrawing the bulk of Russian troops from the Finnish border and leaving it largely undefended. Based on Putin’s remarkably relaxed response to NATO’s recent Nordic enlargement, it seems safe to conclude that he does not in fact view the NATO alliance as a security threat to Russia itself, and has merely exploited the issue as a smokescreen for his own imperial ambitions in Ukraine.

As Donald Trump attempts to implement his campaign promise and end the war in Ukraine, he is likely to discover that his famed deal-making skills are no match for Putin’s single-minded obsession with the destruction of Ukraine. In words and deeds, Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to wiping Ukraine off the map. In such circumstances, any talk of a compromise settlement is dangerously delusional. Until Putin is forced to recognize Ukraine’s right to exist, any peace deals will be temporary and the threat of further Russian aggression will remain.

Yuliya Kazdobina is a senior fellow at the “Ukrainian Prism” Foreign Policy Council. This text is adapted from the “Pragmatic Dialogue with the West: Why it is Worth Supporting Ukraine” project undertaken with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Lafarge settlement marked a watershed moment for victims and survivors of international crimes in Syria—including those affected by ISIS’s and ANF’s crimes and those forced to live under the groups’ control. Lafarge lined the pockets of ISIS and ANF while these groups were victimizing the company’s own Syrian employees and otherwise perpetrating horrific atrocities across northern Syria—including the war crimes and crimes against humanity of enslavement, torture, rape, sexual slavery, displacement, and enforced disappearance. ISIS’s crimes in Syria include the killing of more than 5,043 individuals, thirty-two of whom died as a result of torture. Additionally, at least forty-seven individuals, among them sixteen children and ten women, lost their lives due to lack of food and medicine during sieges imposed by ISIS. To this day, the fate of 8,684 individuals forcibly disappeared by ISIS remains unknown. These atrocities represent just a fraction of the immense suffering that ISIS’s war crimes inflicted in Syria.

The victims of Lafarge’s activities have no avenues for legal remedy inside Syria and routinely face logistical, procedural, and jurisdictional hurdles to accessing justice abroad. Ongoing conflict and displacement, among other circumstances, further impede victims’ recovery. Since 2011, more than 113,000 people have been forcibly disappeared by various parties to the conflict, mostly by the Syrian regime, and more than 300,000 have been killed. Over the past thirteen years, the lives of Syrians have been devastated: The country has become the site of the largest displacement crisis in modern history, with more than thirteen million people—over 50 percent of the population—displaced. More than sixteen million Syrians are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. Among them are survivors and families of victims who require urgent medical, psychosocial, and financial support. Moreover, with a significant number of Syrian victims and their families now displaced to other countries, the challenges of securing legal status and access to essential documentation add an additional layer of hardship.

As aid to address the Syrian crisis continues to shrink, support for victims and their families to recover from violations has diminished, as has sustained support for the pursuit of justice and efforts to preserve the truth.

The Lafarge forfeiture offers a pathway to recovery

When the Lafarge forfeiture was announced, it presented a glimmer of hope that the DOJ would work to realize a “primary goal” of its Asset Forfeiture Program: returning forfeited assets to victims, as authorized under federal law. Two years later, however, the funds continue to sit within the US government’s Assets Forfeiture Fund. Syrian victims, including the victims of ISIS and ANF violations in Syria, have seen little, if any, benefit from Lafarge’s prosecution in the United States.

US Attorney General Merrick Garland enjoys broad discretion over the fate of the Lafarge forfeiture and could direct the funds to benefit victims of underlying violations in Syria, following DOJ precedent. Earlier this year, for example, the DOJ announced that the United States had transferred $500,000 in forfeited Russian funds to Estonia for the benefit of Ukraine. The funds were forfeited by Estonia-based company By Trade OU, which pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export a high-precision grinding machine system to Russia, where it could have been used by the Russian defense and nuclear industries. In sending the funds to Estonia, the DOJ exercised its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 981(i), which allows the attorney general to transfer forfeited funds to any foreign country which “participated directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture.” Pursuant to an international sharing agreement with the United States, Estonia would use the transferred funds to benefit Ukraine.

The DOJ’s pursuit of “creative solutions to ensure the Ukrainian people can respond and rebuild” is commendable, and—given the exceptional circumstances—should also be applied to Syrian victims. The US government has itself condemned ISIS’s and ANF’s grave violations in Syria, which United Nations bodies have determined amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It has also recognized ISIS’s genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing targeting Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims. Further, the US government has promoted justice and accountability for victims in Syria, acknowledged the lack of access within the country, and emphasized the need to pursue legal avenues elsewhere. As is the case for Ukraine, creative solutions are necessary to ensure that Syrian victims may recover and heal.

Three ways to act now

In neglecting to apply a victim-centered approach to use of the Lafarge forfeiture, the United States risks playing into the growing perception of a double standard in its treatment of the war in Ukraine in contrast to other conflicts and groups of victims. As the Biden administration’s term ends, there is still an opportunity to apply the precedent set for Ukraine and allocate the Lafarge forfeiture for the benefit of Syrian victims. But it must act at once.

At least three potential avenues exist by which the attorney general—working quickly and within existing DOJ guidelines—could direct the funds to benefit affected communities.

First, the United States could send a portion of the Lafarge forfeiture to France, earmarked for disbursement into an eventual Syria Victims Fund. This would follow the pathway used in the transfer of Russian funds to Estonia for the benefit of Ukraine and support a recommendation from the European Parliament to establish a Syria Victims Fund through the European Union.

Second, the United States and France could establish a bilateral fund to support victims of crimes in Syria, modeled after the US- and Swiss-established BOTA Foundation, which returned forfeited Kazakh assets to populations in need.

Third, the DOJ could disburse the funds to the US Department of State to support accountability efforts and programming benefiting affected communities. The State Department and many other Western governments are already funding several programs to support victim groups and accountability programs in Syria and thus have extensive experience implementing and monitoring such projects.

The DOJ took laudable action in holding Lafarge accountable for its crimes. Now is the time to finish the job. The Biden administration has a fleeting opportunity to take meaningful action in determining the fate of the Lafarge forfeiture. In diverting the $687 million or even a portion of it to the underlying victims, the administration could heed the calls of Syrian, Yezidi, and international civil society and leave a positive mark on its legacy in the Middle East. Failure to do so risks raising further questions about the existence of a double standard in the US government’s treatment of different groups of victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity throughout the world.

Every moment of suffering for Syrian victims matters, and every day without support for recovery prolongs unnecessary pain.

Mohamad Katoub is a Syria community liaison consultant at the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Alana Mitias is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 26 Nov 2024 22:36:41 +0000

This month marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. When protests over a rigged presidential election first erupted in downtown Kyiv on November 22, 2004, few observers could have imagined that they were witnessing the opening act in a geopolitical drama that would eventually lead to the largest European conflict since World War II. And yet there can be little doubt that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to crush Ukraine first began to take shape two decades ago as he watched the Ukrainian people defy their own authoritarian rulers and demand a democratic future.

For the past twenty years, there has been a tendency to view the Orange Revolution primarily as a political failure. This assessment is easy enough to understand. After all, while the revolution overturned a fraudulent presidential vote and brought reformist candidate Viktor Yushchenko to power, it did not lead to the kind of political transformation that the millions of Ukrainians who participated in the protest movement hoped for. Instead, Yushchenko spent much of his presidency squabbling with colleagues and compromising with opponents, before eventually losing the 2010 election to Orange Revolution villain Viktor Yanukovych.

While the revolution clearly fell short of its lofty political goals, focusing exclusively on domestic Ukrainian politics is short-sighted. In order to appreciate the true historic significance of the Orange Revolution, it must viewed in a far broader context.

Prior to the revolution, post-Soviet Russia had substantial influence in Ukraine, with Vladimir Putin topping polls as the most popular politician among Ukrainians. At the same time, the two countries were already quite distinct. The centralized power vertical in Russia created the conditions for hard authoritarianism. In contrast, the need to balance competing centers of influence and power in Ukraine gave rise to a softer authoritarianism.

Putin’s heavy-handed promotion of Viktor Yanukovych ahead of the 2004 presidential election, and his subsequent push for a crackdown on protesters during the Orange Revolution, highlighted the growing differences between the two nations. This hastened Ukraine’s trajectory away from Russia, a pattern that continues to this day.

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Putin played a very prominent personal role in the Orange Revolution. Russian television, which was at the time widely watched in Ukraine, relentlessly pushed the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych during the buildup to Ukraine’s presidential election. On the eve of the vote, Putin made the fateful decision to intervene directly. He traveled to Kyiv in late October 2004, where he was greeted with an impromptu military parade before appearing on national TV to lecture the Ukrainian public at length on the importance of backing his preferred presidential pick.

It soon became clear that Putin had miscalculated disastrously. His open and unapologetic attempt to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs was widely interpreted as a grave insult and an indication of his contempt for Ukrainian statehood. This electrified public opinion and helped mobilize millions of previously apolitical Ukrainians.

Weeks later, after a deeply flawed second round of voting, Ukrainians would respond to the attempted theft of their election by flooding into central Kyiv in huge numbers. It is no exaggeration to say that Putin’s act of supreme imperial hubris was one of the key causes of the Orange Revolution.

This pattern has repeated itself throughout the past twenty years, with Putin’s efforts to impose his will on Ukraine consistently backfiring and pushing the two countries further apart. In 2013, he pressured his Ukrainian ally Yanukovych to abandon European integration and return the country to the Kremlin orbit, only for this to provoke a second revolution and the fall of the Yanukoych regime.

Putin then opted for a military solution. He began the invasion of Ukraine in February 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, before sending forces into eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region weeks later. When it became obvious that this limited military intervention had merely succeeded in strengthening Ukraine’s resolve to exit the Russian sphere of influence entirely, Putin began plotting what would become the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

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Since the Orange Revolution, Putin’s quest to reconquer Ukraine has come to define his entire reign. In his single-minded pursuit of this goal, he has demonstrated a willingness to incur huge costs. In addition to the lives of the countless Russian soldiers killed or maimed while fighting in Ukraine, Putin has also sacrificed Russia’s economic prosperity, the country’s international standing, and its ties to the developed world.

The historic shift in Putin’s worldview was already evident soon after the Orange Revolution. Within a few months of Ukraine’s people power uprising, he ordered work to begin on the development of what would become the Kremlin’s flagship RT English-language media platform. This was the first step in a process that has established the Putin regime as the undisputed global leader in the dissemination of anti-Western disinformation.

In spring 2005, the Kremlin also backed a nationwide campaign encouraging Russians to display orange-and-black St. George’s ribbons in honor of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. With images of rebellious Ukrainians sporting orange ribbons still fresh in everyone’s minds, the loyalist symbolism of this counter-gesture was hard to miss. St. George’s ribbons have gone on to establish themselves at the heart of a fanatical victory cult as the Putin regime has sought to justify its own authoritarianism via ever more extravagant forms of WWII reverence. What began life as a reaction to the orange ribbons of Ukraine’s revolution has become the ultimate symbol of the entire Putin era.

Why is Putin so obsessed with Ukraine, and what was it about the country’s Orange Revolution that triggered him so irreversibly? The answers to these questions lie in Putin’s imperialistic understanding of Russian identity and his formative political experiences as a KGB officer in Eastern Europe during the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin was in East Germany in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell. He watched helplessly as the entire Soviet presence throughout the region crumbled amid a surge in pro-democracy protests. In his own account of this traumatic time, Putin claims that his stunned superiors informed him, “Moscow is silent.” This experience has haunted Putin and left him convinced that Moscow must never be “silent” again, especially when confronted by mass protest movements or attempts to shake off Kremlin control.

Putin is particularly sensitive to modern Ukraine’s national awakening and its embrace of European democracy because he views the country as part of Russia’s imperial heartlands. If a democratic political culture can take root in a place as central to Russia’s national identity as Ukraine, this could prove contagious and serve as a catalyst for similar demands within Russia itself.

Tellingly, Putin first began to indicate his opposition to Ukrainian independence soon after the Orange Revolution. In April 2005, he had recent events in Ukraine very much in mind when he branded the fall of the USSR “the greatest political catastrophe of the twentieth century.” This is apparent from some of the lesser quoted segments of his speech, which also referenced an “epidemic of disintegration” and bemoaned the fate of the “tens of millions of countrymen” who found themselves beyond the borders of Russia in 1991. At the time, Ukraine was home to by far the largest population of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union.

Little has changed during the intervening twenty years. Today’s ongoing Russian invasion is a direct result of Putin’s firm conviction that the loss of Ukraine would pose an existential threat to Russia itself. It is therefore delusional to suggest that some kind of limited territorial settlement could end the current war and lead to a sustainable peace. Any attempt to offer concessions will only result in a temporary pause in hostilities before Putin resumes his campaign to extinguish Ukrainian statehood.

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to reassert Russian control over Ukraine date back to the 2004 Orange Revolution and have now escalated from political interference to the bloodiest European war for generations. He sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as his historic mission and believes the fate of Russia hinges on his success. In such circumstances, talk of compromising with the Kremlin is futile. Instead, peace will only be possible if Putin can be convinced that Ukrainian independence is irreversible.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

China’s atrocity crimes in Xinjiang are entering an even darker phase. The UN must act.

Rayhan Asat — Tue, 26 Nov 2024 17:51:11 +0000

While the world’s attention has turned to the devastating conflict in the Middle East, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, and other global crises, the suffering of the Uyghur people in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is accelerating. In late October, a Chinese state-run news outlet released what it called a documentary but was in fact an atrocious propaganda video. In this video, two Uyghurs, Gulmira Imin and Zulpiqar Rozi, were forced to confess to a crime they almost certainly did not commit. Forced confessions are a routine tactic employed by the Chinese government against Uyghur political prisoners. Imin and Rozi had been detained in the aftermath of the July 5, 2009, Uyghur uprising, and for almost fifteen years it was not known what had happened to these political prisoners. As a more well-known political prisoner, Gulmira is listed as a prisoner of conscience by the US Congress’s Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission. Then suddenly, they appeared on camera, ostensibly blaming outside forces for the Chinese government-manufactured human rights violations that resulted in the student-led uprising. The years of torture they had endured since they were detained were visible on their faces, hair, and teeth due to the horrific conditions in the camps.

This video is just the latest example of the Chinese government’s brutal treatment of Uyghurs. My colleague Alyssa Johnson and I have prepared a forthcoming report to the United Nations (UN) documenting an array of horrors, including deaths, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and the newly imposed illegal financial penalties on prisoners’ families as a form of extortion. Our report also details forced labor, transnational repression, continuous violations of reproductive rights, and assaults against human rights defenders, among other offenses. Our work bears witness to the dark history unfolding in our time.

When atrocities persist, they risk becoming tragedies that the world feels powerless to change.

In the face of genocide and grave human rights violations, the Uyghur people have demonstrated extraordinary courage, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to peace. From the brave survivors to families of those who fell victim to the camps, the Uyghur community stands as a testament to grace and unity in the most trying of times. Yet, despite their strength, the global community and the UN system have failed to protect them.

For nearly a decade, Uyghur advocates, myself included, have pushed the UN and governments across the world to address China’s crimes against humanity and genocide against the Uyghur people. After two years of engaging with China on its terms, on August 27 of this year, Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, issued an update on the ongoing human rights crisis in Xinjiang. The update merely confirmed what was already known—that despite requests from the UN, the Chinese government has refused to allow authorities any meaningful access to the region. This statement builds on the 2022 landmark report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which alleged that Chinese government policies targeting the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang may amount to crimes against humanity. The recommendations made in this report urged China to engage with and facilitate further visits by the OHCHR. However, in subsequent engagements with the UN and member states, the Chinese government has presented a deceitful image of its policies in Xinjiang, deliberately concealing the atrocity-torn region where Uyghurs and other ethnic groups remain in mass incarceration.

Today, after nearly nine years since China initiated its policy of mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Beijing’s atrocities against the Uyghur people have entered an even darker phase. China is further escalating the use of its authoritarian penal system to imprison people, with at least half a million Uyghurs imprisoned as of 2022, according to the Chinese government’s own data (with 2022, 2023, and 2024 data missing due to public scrutiny indicating that the real numbers are much higher). In an August report that I co-authored with Min Kim for the Yale Genocide Studies Program, we conducted a statistical analysis of Uyghur imprisonment rates based on the Chinese government’s own data. Despite Uyghurs comprising less than 1 percent of China’s population, they account for 34 percent of the country’s incarcerations, marking the world’s highest rate of ethnic imprisonment. Our analysis estimates that, if left unchecked, China’s atrocities will strip 4.4 million years of life from my proud community.

An investigation by researcher Nyrola Elimä and journalist Ben Mauk, published in the New York Times in November, uncovered the alarming extent of China’s international reach, as it targets Uyghurs who have fled its oppressive regime. In cooperation with Thai authorities, the Chinese government has forcibly repatriated—in overt violation of international law—hundreds of Uyghurs who sought asylum in Thailand. The UN Refugee Commission failed them after their brave escape. Dozens died. Today, more than sixty Uyghurs remain detained in Thailand under dire conditions, awaiting an uncertain fate.

This situation calls for urgent international attention and action, as reports coming out of camps in Xinjiang are increasingly alarming. One such example is the Netherlands-based Uyghur activist Abdurehim Gheni, whose brothers, niece, and dozens of other relatives are in the camps. The Chinese government temporarily released Abdurehim’s father, Abdugheni Hudaberdi, to pressure him into refraining from testifying at an international tribunal hearing examining China’s human rights violations. When Abdurehim refused to comply with their request, his father was taken back to the camp, where he tragically passed away two months later in government custody. There is a saying in Uyghur that when someone passes away before they can see someone who they longed for, the person leaves this world with their eyes wide open. Abdurehim’s father left this world with his eyes open.

Abdurehim Gheni holds a poster of his father, Abdugheni Hudaberdi, on July 29, 2024, in Amsterdam during a protest against the Chinese government’s brutal policies in the Uyghur homeland. (Photo courtesy of Abdurehim Gheni.)

When thinking about such cases, my brother, Ekpar Asat—an award-winning entrepreneur and alumnus of the US State Department’s exchange program—comes to mind. He has been unjustly imprisoned for eight years and eight months. I can hardly fathom what he endures each second in that prison. But Ekpar is not alone; there are countless others like him languishing in those cells. This reality leaves me, and others who care about the Uyghurs, no room to dwell in pain—we must channel it into action.

When atrocities persist, they risk becoming tragedies that the world feels powerless to change. But the Chinese government’s crimes against the Uyghurs are not just tragic facts—they are deliberate acts of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The world cannot remain passive. Above all, the UN has a responsibility to act on the recommendations it has put forward and to demand accountability.

The United States, too, will have a major role to play in ensuring accountability for China’s crimes against the Uyghur people. As the incoming US administration assembles its team of experts on China, I hope that the plight of Uyghurs will be placed at the center of US diplomacy with Beijing. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Lima, Peru, last week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping outlined four red lines for the United States, one of which was democracy and human rights—a pointed message to the incoming Trump administration not to press Beijing on these issues. The United States must respond decisively: These red lines for Xi are the foundations of the United States’ core values that define its global leadership. Along with more decisive action from the UN, US leadership and initiative on China’s human rights violations against the Uyghur people will be essential to hold Beijing accountable for its crimes.

Rayhan Asat is a senior legal and policy adviser and China Project lead at the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

This article is dedicated to the legacy of the late Felice Gaer, a distinguished former UN expert and steadfast champion of the Uyghur people’s rights.

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Charai in Times of Israel: The ICC challenges Israel’s Judicial independence

Atlantic Council — Mon, 25 Nov 2024 14:21:25 +0000

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A protester’s story from inside a Taliban prison

Narges Sadat — Mon, 25 Nov 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Kabul, Narges Sadat took to the streets in protest along with other women. She faced violence and imprisonment, a story she recounts below.

I was born in Karaj, Tehran, and after many years in Iran, I returned to Afghanistan to work. At that time, Afghan women were beginning to engage with democracy and reclaim their place in public life, but the Taliban attacked this progress with a relentless assault on civilian life. The group destroyed infrastructure; attacked schools, universities, and hospitals; and ultimately seized control of the country before imprisoning women in their homes.

Days before the Taliban entered Kabul, Kandahar had fallen. My mother and siblings fled to my home in Kabul, leaving everything behind as our father’s house in Kandahar was surrounded by Taliban forces, who arrested the men in our family.

On August 15, 2021, I saw Taliban fighters in the streets as I attempted to reach my office. They were on motorcycles and in military vehicles, brandishing white Taliban flags, their faces weary yet triumphant. People were fleeing in terror. Unable to reach my destination, I turned back, a journey that stretched for hours due to the chaos. In the sixth district, Taliban soldiers angrily lowered Afghanistan’s tricolor flag, replacing it with their own.

The sight of people’s panic and the violent, angry faces of the Taliban terrified me. I began to fear that they would notice my uncovered face. At one point, a Taliban soldier slammed the car I was in and demanded to know, “Who is this, and where are you taking her?” The driver, thinking quickly, responded, “She is my daughter, and I’m taking her home.” Later, near the American University, the sounds of gunfire filled the air, and I broke down in tears.

My husband and I were on an evacuation list, but when we attempted to reach the airport with a single bag of clothes, we turned back in fear after witnessing a deadly explosion there. On the way home, I saw the Taliban whipping a woman over her clothing. Her husband pleaded for leniency, but they insulted him too, accusing him of dishonor for allowing his “bad wife” to go out in public. This is how gender apartheid operates under the Taliban—not only imposing strict regulations on women but also systematically turning men in the family into enforcers of the Taliban’s control over women.

The following day, I learned that women were banned from working. I was permitted only to collect my belongings from the office. Drivers, however, had been instructed not to pick up women who were alone or not fully covered in hijab. Waiting hours for a ride, I faced jeers from Taliban fighters, who hurled insults at women to cover their faces.

Humiliated and isolated, I decided to later join other women at the Fawara Aab, the water fountain square, to protest. My mother had taught me to resist, not to stay silent. And with no job or income, resistance through protest was our only choice. Abandoned by the international community, Afghan women were left alone to face the Taliban’s repression and apartheid regime.

When we protested, men on the streets accused us of seeking an excuse to leave Afghanistan, questioning our motives. But our revolution was all we had left. On August 13, 2022, a year after the Taliban takeover, we gathered to protest again. We met at Kabul’s Golbahar Center, but soon, Taliban forces surrounded us, firing shots into the air. They pursued us, firing directly at us as we reached Jamhuriat Hospital. Injured and separated, ten of us took shelter in an underground space. The owner, who initially reassured us, ultimately betrayed us and called the Taliban. When they arrived, the Taliban soldiers beat us with Kalashnikov rifles, accusing us of dishonoring our families. After confiscating our phones, they detained us for three hours before releasing us, though they kept us under surveillance.

On February 9, 2023, the Taliban arrested me again, dragging me from a taxi at a checkpoint and dispersing the crowd by firing shots to prevent there from being any witnesses. They took me to a security facility, where thirty armed men awaited. One of them threw a cup of hot tea at me when I told them I was from Kandahar, and I feared I had gone blind. They forced me to unlock my phone by prying my fingers, then beat me when I asked to see my family.

Around 11:30 pm, they took me to the intelligence office, twisting my arms when I resisted. Two women were brought to escort me, placing a black hood over my head. We reached Dehmazang, where they photographed me like a criminal and led me to a damp, dark cell. I was bleeding heavily, and after I fainted, they took me to the hospital under strict orders to hide my face. There, I whispered to the doctors, “I am Narges Sadat, the girl who protested and was arrested by the Taliban. They can’t silence me.” Some of the doctors even cried but could do little beyond applying ointment to my wounds.

Back in prison, they beat me and denied me sanitary items. I scratched words onto the cell walls with my nails, recounting what had happened. I saw traces left by other protesting girls who had been held there before me.

Each time they whipped me, they declared the reason: “Because you messaged other protesting women, because of your protests, because you posted photos of Ahmad Shah Massoud and General [Abdul] Raziq,” military leaders who resisted the Taliban. Their accusations piled up. When Eid approached, I hoped for release, as others had been pardoned. A prison official called my name, but instead of freedom, he accused me of causing trouble in the prison, calling me a mercenary and servant of foreigners. My nine-year-old son visited me, terrified, asking them to free me. They told me they would release me if I pledged to stop protesting. Desperate to be with my son, I agreed. After taking a heavy “guarantee” from me, they finally let me go.

In total, I was in Taliban custody for eighty days (though their official record falsely stated sixty), including thirty-five in solitary confinement. They tortured me with electric shocks and left cold water beneath my feet at night. I was denied family visits, and each trip to the bathroom involved being hooded and led several floors up in excruciating pain.

When transferred to the general cell, the pain only intensified. There were other women imprisoned with their children in deplorable conditions. Some had severe mental health issues, worsened by confinement. Girls as young as ten and fifteen were jailed because their male relatives had served under Raziq, a commander in the Afghan army who was assassinated by the Taliban in 2018. Other young women faced the threat of stoning, accused of fleeing their homes.

I even witnessed women in the prison who were affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) enjoying better conditions than ours. They were granted cell phones, water filters, and a variety of food. They often bullied other inmates, and once, they physically assaulted me.

Reflecting on my traumatic ordeal, I realize that perhaps my time in prison was part of my purpose. I endured to speak out for the women still silenced within those walls. The Taliban prison is a place where calls to prayer mix with women’s screams. We took to the streets not just for ourselves but to demand equality and resist the Taliban’s apartheid regime.

Our resistance is rooted in a long history. We are the daughters of women whose lives were stolen by the Taliban, who taught us to resist through their own stories of suffering. Today, the world’s fleeting support reminds us of Afghan women’s bravery, but we are now abandoned to a terrorist authoritarian regime that decides our fate as the world watches. Yet we will continue to rise, defying the Taliban’s will with renewed strength each day.

Today, we call on countries that claim to champion human rights to recognize gender apartheid as a crime. Our testimonies provide undeniable proof of this regime’s repressive nature. The sexual assaults on women protesters in Taliban prisons, the Taliban’s public announcements of stonings, and decrees from their Supreme Court and Amir al-Momineen establish a foundation for defining gender apartheid in Afghanistan.

To achieve a safer and more just world, gender apartheid must be recognized as a crime, and the Taliban must face accountability in international courts.

Narges Sadat is an advocate and women’s rights activist from Afghanistan. She garnered international attention for her protests against the Taliban’s gender apartheid. She graduated in the fields of literature, administration, and diplomacy.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. This article is based on an interview with Sadat by Nayera Kohistani and was translated and edited by Mursal Sayas.

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Grossman quoted in Religion News on women leaders from the Abrahamic faiths convening in the UAE

Atlantic Council — Wed, 20 Nov 2024 20:00:17 +0000

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Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 19 Nov 2024 02:12:55 +0000

With Donald Trump’s election win fueling fresh speculation over the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russian President Vladimir Putin has once again underlined his insistence on Ukrainian neutrality. “If there is no neutrality, it is difficult to imagine any good-neighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine,” he commented on November 7 in Sochi.

This is nothing new. Since the eve of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has been consistent in its calls for permanent Ukrainian neutrality. Neutral status was a key condition set out by the Kremlin during the abortive peace talks that took place in the first weeks of the war. It once again featured prominently when Putin laid out an updated peace proposal in June 2024.

Many in the international community regard Putin’s push for a neutral Ukraine as by far his most reasonable demand. Indeed, some have even accused NATO of provoking the current war by expanding into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence since 1991 and deepening cooperation with Ukraine. They argue that if Ukraine can be kept in geopolitical no-man’s-land, Russia will be placated.

Such thinking is likely to feature prominently as the debate continues to unfold in the coming months over the terms of a future peace deal. While Trump has yet to outline his plans for a possible settlement, unconfirmed reports suggest that a twenty-year freeze on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations is under consideration. This would be a costly blunder. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion.

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Ukrainians have already learned the hard way that neutrality does not protect them against Russian aggression. The country officially embraced non-aligned status during the 2010-2014 presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, but this didn’t prevent Moscow from seeking to reassert full control over Ukraine. Initially, Russia’s efforts focused on orchestrating Ukraine’s economic reintegration through membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. When this sparked a popular backlash that led to the fall of the Yanukovych regime, Putin opted to use force and began the military invasion of Ukraine.

Ever since the start of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in spring 2014, Putin has sought to justify Russian aggression by pointing to the looming danger of Ukrainian NATO membership. In reality, however, Ukraine has never looked like progressing toward the distant goal of joining the alliance. For the past decade, NATO leaders have refused to provide Kyiv with an invitation and have instead limited themselves to vague talk of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward future membership. Putin is well aware of this, but has chosen to wildly exaggerate Ukraine’s NATO prospects in order to strengthen his own bogus justifications.

Putin’s complaints regarding NATO enlargement are equally dubious. Indeed, his own actions since early 2022 indicate that Putin himself does not actually believe that the alliance poses a genuine security threat to Russia. Instead, he merely exploits the NATO issue as a convenient smokescreen for Russia’s expansionist foreign policy.

Tellingly, when Finland and Sweden responded to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine by announcing plans to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO, Putin was quick to declare that Russia had “no problem” with the move. This evident indifference was particularly striking, given that Finnish NATO membership has more than doubled Russia’s NATO border while Sweden’s accession has transformed the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Over the past two-and-a-half years, Putin has continued to demonstrate his almost complete lack of concern over NATO’s Nordic enlargement by withdrawing the vast majority of Russian troops from the Finnish border and leaving the area largely undefended.

Putin obviously understands perfectly well that NATO is not a threat to Russia itself, and sees no need to guard against a NATO invasion that he knows will never come. While Putin’s resentment over the expanding NATO presence on his borders is real enough, he only really objects when the alliance prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, Putin’s opposition to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. Instead, it confirms that his ultimate goal is the destruction of Ukrainian statehood.

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For years, Putin has made no secret of his belief that the emergence of an independent Ukraine is an historical mistake and a symbol of modern Russia’s retreat from empire. He has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is not a “real country,” and is fond of declaring that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). In July 2021, Putin even published an entire essay arguing against the legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian state.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, it has become increasingly apparent that Putin’s ultimate goal is not Ukraine’s neutrality but Ukraine’s destruction. The Kremlin propaganda machine has portrayed Ukraine as an intolerable “anti-Russia,” and has promoted the idea that Ukraine’s continued existence is incompatible with Russian security. Meanwhile, Putin has compared his invasion to eighteenth century Russian ruler Peter the Great’s imperial conquests, and has repeatedly claimed to be “returning” historically Russian lands.

Putin’s imperialistic outbursts must be taken seriously. Throughout occupied Ukraine, his soldiers and administrators are already imposing a reign of terror that directly echoes the criminal logic of his imperial fantasies. Millions have been displaced, with thousands more simply vanishing into a vast network of camps and prisons. Those who remain face policies of relentless Russification and the suppression of all things Ukrainian. Adults must accept Russian citizenship in order to access basic services, while children are forced to undergo indoctrination in schools teaching a new Kremlin curriculum.

The crimes currently taking place in Russian-occupied Ukraine are a clear indication of what awaits the rest of the country if Putin succeeds. Despite suffering multiple military setbacks, he remains fully committed to his maximalist goals of ending Ukrainian independence and erasing Ukrainian identity.

Furthermore, since 2022 Putin has demonstrated that he is prepared to wait as long as it takes in order to overcome Ukrainian resistance, and is ready to pay almost any price to achieve his imperial ambitions. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine in such circumstances would be akin to condemning the country to a slow but certain death.

Any peace process that fails to provide Ukraine with credible long-term security guarantees is doomed to fail. Acquiescing to Putin’s demands for a neutral Ukraine may provide some short-term relief from the menace of an expansionist Russia, but this would ultimately lead to more war and the likely collapse of the current global security order. There is simply no plausible argument for insisting on Ukrainian neutrality other than a desire to leave the country defenseless and at Russia’s mercy.

Peace will only come once Putin has finally been forced to accept Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent country and as a member of the democratic world. Naturally, this includes the right to choose security alliances. It is absurd to prioritize Russia’s insincere security concerns over Ukraine’s very real fears of national annihilation. Instead, if serious negotiations do begin in the coming months, Ukrainian security must be the number one priority. Until Ukraine is secure, Europe will remain insecure and the threat of Russian imperialism will continue to loom over the continent.

Beyond the battlefield itself, the Russian invasion has plunged the entire Ukrainian population into a mental health crisis that will last for decades. Almost everyone has experienced some kind of personal loss or wartime trauma. In towns and cities across Ukraine, people have grown used to the daily routine of air raid alarms, bomb shelters, and electricity blackouts, all accompanied by gut-churning news of the latest Russian atrocities.

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Despite the many horrors and hardships, Ukrainians have remained broadly united by a shared sense of purpose. While most people are understandably desperate for peace, there is also widespread recognition that Ukraine is fighting for national survival and faces destruction if Russia’s invasion succeeds. This has been made abundantly clear by the actions of the Russian army in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, with thousands of potential dissenters abducted and children sent for indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Most Ukrainians acknowledge the need to fight on, but there are growing concerns over continued international support. During the initial months of the invasion, the watching world was awed by Ukrainian courage and tenacity as the country fought back against the might of the Russian military. This helped convince Western leaders that arming Ukraine was both morally right and worthwhile. However, as the war has dragged on, grumbles over the cost of supplying the Ukrainian military have grown louder, as has the chorus of voices calling for some form of compromise with the Kremlin.

Every time Western leaders delay the delivery of military aid, the cost can be measured in Ukrainian lives. These delays enable Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities and advance further along the front lines of the war. Shortfalls in military support are also making it significantly harder for Ukraine to mobilize new troops for the army, with many potential recruits left alarmed by the prospect of being sent into battle without adequate weapons or armor.

While Kyiv struggles to convince wavering Western leaders, Moscow is creating an axis of autocrats to bolster the Russian war effort. Since the start of the full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Putin has strengthened ties with China, Iran, and North Korea, receiving a range of support including sanctioned high-tech weapons components, attack drones, ballistic missiles, and vast quantities of artillery shells. This alliance is playing an increasingly direct role in the invasion of Ukraine, with North Korean soldiers recently appearing on the battlefield.

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Donald Trump’s election victory is now fueling anticipation that the war is about to enter a new phase, with the incoming US administration expected to push for a negotiated settlement. Nobody wants to end the war more than Ukrainians, of course. At the same time, there are mounting concerns that Western efforts to pursue peace from a position of weakness may lead to Kremlin-friendly terms that would end up emboldening Putin and setting the stage for further Russian aggression.

Ukrainians have particularly painful memories of the failed peace process that followed Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. For eight years, Russia refused to even acknowledge its direct involvement in hostilities, insisting instead on noncombatant status. This farcical situation made it virtually impossible to achieve any meaningful progress toward peace. It is now clear that while Moscow was pretending to engage in diplomatic efforts to end the war, Russia was busy preparing for the full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022.

Ahead of any peace talks, Ukrainians will be hoping their international allies have not lost sight of the huge costs they will face if they fail to stop Russia in Ukraine. The invasion launched by Putin one thousand days ago has already transformed the geopolitical landscape and led to the emergence of a formidable authoritarian alliance that shares a common commitment to ending the era of Western ascendancy. Russian success in Ukraine would dramatically strengthen this alliance, with alarming ramifications for the security situation everywhere from Central Europe to East Asia.

As the world reflects on one thousand days of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the Ukrainian nation is exhausted but remains determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support. Putin was wrong to assume that Ukraine would collapse in the wake of his invasion. Western leaders must now convince him that he is equally wrong to believe he can outlast them in Ukraine.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Freezing the front lines in Ukraine would condemn millions to Russian occupation

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 14 Nov 2024 19:52:47 +0000

As the world prepares for Donald Trump’s return to the White House, many are now expecting to see a new push for negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. While Trump has yet to clarify his vision for a potential settlement in Ukraine, allies including vice president-elect JD Vance have suggested that any agreement would involve freezing the war along the current front lines and allowing Russia to maintain control over approximately 20 percent of Ukraine.

Supporters of this approach typically claim that it is the only realistic option. This argument reflects the current battlefield dynamics of the war, with Russia steadily advancing and the overstretched Ukrainian military seemingly in no position to retake areas seized by Moscow since 2022. Crucially, however, advocates of a front line freeze tend to conveniently overlook the fact that any agreement involving territorial concessions would also mean condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of permanent Russian occupation.

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Since the very first weeks of the invasion, it has been clear that one of Russia’s key war aims is the destruction of Ukrainian national identity. For those currently living under Russian occupation, this means everything from large-scale abductions and mass deportations to ideological indoctrination and blanket Russification.

With occupied areas of Ukraine largely cut off from the outside world, accurate information regarding the scale of the human rights abuses currently taking place remains limited. However, the available evidence indicates that a systematic campaign is underway to silence any potential dissent and impose a reign of terror on the Ukrainian civilian population. “Kremlin-occupied Ukraine is now a totalitarian hell,” Britain’s The Economist reported in early November.

Large numbers of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country have been subjected to forced deportation or have simply disappeared. An Associated Press investigation in summer 2023 concluded that thousands of Ukrainian civilians are being detained in a network of formal and informal prisons across Russia and the territories it occupies, where they endure torture, psychological abuse, and are even forced to engage in slave labor. “Russia plans to build dozens more prisons,” the report claimed.

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In occupied regions, the Kremlin is working to erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and seeking to Russify every aspect of daily life. These efforts include renaming streets, turning the clocks back to Moscow time, and pressuring residents to accept Russian citizenship in order to access basic public services such as healthcare and state pensions. Ukrainian schools under Russian occupation now teach a Kremlin-friendly curriculum that demonizes Ukraine while forcing students to celebrate the soldiers invading their country. Parents who resist risk losing custody of their children.

Russian attempts to indoctrinate young Ukrainians are not restricted to the classroom. At least 20,000 Ukrainian children have been abducted from occupied regions since the start of the full-scale invasion, with many sent to a network of camps where they are subjected to indoctrination aimed at depriving them of their Ukrainian nationality and turning them into Russians.

Ukrainian civil society activist Mykola Kuleba, who is at the forefront of efforts to secure the return of young Ukrainians from Russia, has accused the Russian authorities of attempting to brainwash Ukrainian children and erase their identity. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his alleged role in these mass abductions.

For those detained in Russian-occupied Ukraine, the outlook is particularly grim. In September 2024, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine reported that the Russian authorities were employing “common patterns of torture” against Ukrainian prisoners in occupied regions of Ukraine as well as in Russia. “Torture has been used as a common and acceptable practice with a sense of impunity,” the report stated.

Western leaders need to recognize that trading land for peace in Ukraine would mean abandoning millions of Ukrainian civilians to the chilling realities of life under Russian occupation. The Kremlin has already provided ample evidence of its intentions in occupied Ukraine and its plans for the local population. The fate of these Ukrainians must not be forgotten as the international debate over a possible negotiated settlement evolves in the coming months.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The election was widely seen as a referendum on Georgia’s future geopolitical direction. The country’s Russia-friendly authorities hoped to secure a mandate for a pro-Kremlin manifesto, while opponents sought to return Georgia to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. This westward trajectory is certainly popular, with polls consistently indicating that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s bid for EU membership. At the same time, many have been alarmed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and are fearful of facing the same fate if they attempt to turn away from Moscow.

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and is officially committed to supporting European integration. However, party officials in Tbilisi have become increasingly critical of the West in recent years, and have faced mounting accusations of trying to steer the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Criticism has intensified following the adoption earlier this year of draconian laws similar to the authoritarian policies of Putin’s Russia. Critics say these legislative changes are aimed at silencing Georgia’s political opposition and muzzling the country’s civil society.

In the wake of the disputed election, Georgia’s pro-Western political forces have vowed to fight back against what they see as an attempt to undermine their country’s fledgling democracy. A number of large protest rallies have taken place in downtown Tbilisi since the late October ballot. Meanwhile, opposition parties are demanding fresh elections, refusing to serve in the new parliament, and calling on Georgia’s Western partners to conduct an international investigation into allegations of electoral misconduct.

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Russia has refrained from officially celebrating the election victory of its Georgian Dream allies. Instead, Moscow has accused the West of trying to “destabilize” Georgia with calls for an investigation into alleged violations. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the vote represents a significant geopolitical triumph for the Kremlin and a major setback for the West.

Critics of Georgia’s governing party fear the country may now follow the geopolitical trajectory of Belarus, which in recent years has become increasingly subject to creeping Russian control in every sphere of national life from the economy to defense. This would represent a significant turnaround for Russia, which had looked to be in danger of losing its traditional influence in the southern Caucasus region.

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of the country. Bilateral relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have remained tense ever since this brief war sixteen years ago. However, while the Georgian public has overwhelmingly backed closer ties with the West, many have also spoken of the need to avoid a resumption of hostilities with Russia. Georgian Dream officials have sought to exploit these concerns over the possibility of a new Russian invasion. During the recent election campaign, the party ran a series of controversial adverts featuring images of wartime destruction in Ukraine along with appeals to “choose peace.”

Some observers believe Russia’s approach to Georgia may offer hints of the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions in Ukraine. After first invading and occupying a large portion of Georgian territory, Russia then helped engineer the election of a sympathetic government that has paid lip service to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations while working toward mending fences with Moscow. This proved possible despite frequent evidence of intense anti-Russian sentiment throughout Georgian society. While such an outcome is extremely hard to imagine in today’s wartime Ukraine, the remarkable revival of Russian influence in Georgia could certainly serve as inspiration for Kremlin policymakers.

Protests look set to continue in Tbilisi. However, it is not clear whether anything can now be done to prove the allegations of election fraud or annul the results of the October vote. Georgia’s Western partners have voiced their concerns over the election but remain reluctant to withhold official recognition. Georgia will be on the agenda when EU foreign ministers meet next week in Brussels, but the European Union is not expected to take a stance on the legitimacy of the election. Instead, the most meaningful sanction will likely be the continued freezing of EU membership talks, which have been on pause since June 2024.

With Western leaders unwilling to confront the Kremlin in the Caucasus, Russia is the real winner of Georgia’s recent elections. The vote has demonstrated Moscow’s ability to overcome popular opposition by forging powerful alliances with local elites and ignoring international concerns over election interference. Russia will doubtless seek to apply the lessons learned in Georgia as it turns its attention to future election campaigns in front line countries like Moldova, and may also seek to adopt a similar approach to postwar Ukraine.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a research fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

Debates about boundaries

In the context of the ongoing conflict, the debate is deeply personal for many Ukrainians.

“If fate decrees that a rocket or something else hostile kills me, then I give permission in advance, with full awareness, for my photos—before and after my death—to be shared anywhere and as much as required,” Ukrainian communications expert Yaryna Klyuchkovska wrote on Facebook in early September.

“If I end up in a coma in the hospital, and all my relatives die—please forget about me and don’t touch me. Don’t post my pictures. . . . I am a psychologically weak person and will not care about your effectiveness in the international media,” responded Ukrainian writer and journalist Bogdan Logvynenko.

On September 4, Lviv was struck by Russian shelling, resulting in the deaths of nine people, including the Bazylevych family. The mother and her three daughters were among the dead, leaving only Yaroslav Bazylevych, their husband and father, alive. Photographs of a grief-stricken and wounded Yaroslav at the site of the shelling quickly spread across Ukrainian media. These images circulated widely, including among international media.

Almost immediately, a public debate broke out: How permissible is it for media outlets to publish photos of people who have just become victims of such barbaric crimes, at the very site where the crime occurred, and in their initial moments of shock? Does such publication adhere to media ethics, standards of the right to privacy, and respect for victims?

Proponents of publishing the photos argue that these images serve as documentation of Russian war crimes, both for the historical record and for the purposes of ensuring accountability for the perpetrators. The images are also intended not just for a domestic audience, but primarily for an international one. Proponents argue that such stories and visuals serve as reminders of the war in Ukraine and help gain international support for Kyiv.

On the other hand, critics argue that such publications could inflict additional suffering on the victims and contribute to their re-traumatization. Publishing photos of individuals in a state of shock, they argue, is a severe invasion of their privacy, even in the extreme context of war.

The situation in Lviv—where the photos of the victim were taken at the direct scene of the war crime—was not the first to occur during the armed conflict. Photos and videos of victims of Russian shelling, the shooting of Ukrainian prisoners of war, and other war crimes have repeatedly caused shockwaves in the Ukrainian media space.

However, the widespread focus on Bazylevych sparked especially intense debates about the ethics of such practices. At the funeral of the mother and children a few days later, media attention focused on Yaroslav’s personal tragedy, with photos and videos of him again circulating in the media and on social networks.

The media coverage of conflict in the digital age can help prevent crimes and bring perpetrators to justice. But coverage of the victims and survivors of war crimes can also cause victims further suffering and contribute to their re-traumatization. In this context, journalists carry an increased level of professional responsibility.

“We need to learn to maneuver between carefully preserving events and names and picking at the open wounds of relatives with red-hot iron. Between documenting crimes and savoring someone else’s grief. Because, of course, the world must know. Of course, we must know. But definitely not at the expense of those who have already given us and the world the most precious thing they had,” wrote Lesya Lytvynova, a veteran of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a week and a half later, commenting on the Bazylevych family tragedy and similar cases.

In his later comment to the Washington Post, Bazylevych recognized both the difficulty and importance of such broad media coverage: “It’s very difficult to see all of the attention and news on our family out there, but it’s also important”.

One of the problems is that no universal legal or ethical rules exist for journalists in these wartime situations; international standards mainly prioritize journalists’ safety and professional protections over guidance on how and when to depict victims of armed conflict.

Setting standards for reporting on the victims of war

Some guidelines for how to report on the victims of war do exist, including the Code for the Coverage of the Colombian Armed Conflict, which was developed by Colombian journalists in 2003. The document states that “We will respect the privacy of citizens involved in or affected by the armed conflict, provided that this silence will not compromise the public interest. In all instances we will respect the grief of the victims.” In addition, there are recognized standards for how journalists should cover victims of crimes or people who cannot give informed consent to the press. These include standards for covering cases of violence against women and girls, interviewing trafficked women, and reporting on children.

For instance, in Europe, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights provided guidance in Dupate v. Latvia on the limits of distributing visuals of individuals in a state of reduced self-control, even when the circumstances are of public interest.

The balance between public interest and victims’ right to privacy can serve as the key criterion for determining the permissibility of sharing media featuring individuals in a state of shock after a war crime.

The Commission on Journalistic Ethics, a Ukrainian organization, reached similar conclusions in its recommendations based on its review of this situation in September 2024:

“Media intrusions, including close-ups of a man who survived the shooting, are legally excessive. Even if individuals in a fragile psychological state give consent for filming and publication, they may not always be fully aware of their actions. In such cases, the portrayal of their suffering mainly serves one purpose—to satisfy the emotional curiosity of the information consumer.”

Ukraine’s tragic experience offers an important opportunity to reassess the media’s approach to reporting on conflict victims from both legal and ethical perspectives. Currently, Ukrainian media outlets are trying to align with the standards of major international outlets like the BBC and Reuters. However, this experience also provides a foundation for developing standards on covering war crimes that balance freedom of speech with respect for victims’ privacy.

Building on the earlier recommendations, here are three important questions that journalists and editors should answer before publishing material on war crime victims:

Does the public interest necessitate the publication of an entire series of photos and videos? Would it be sufficient to share a single image or present the information in a more restrained manner (e.g. blurring faces, using initials, not specifying sensitive details, etc.)?
Is it necessary to publish such materials in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy? Would waiting a few days, when victims can provide informed consent, diminish its impact?
Is the publication in the public interest, rather than solely for increasing media coverage and visibility, and is the material presented in a way that minimizes the risk of secondary trauma and re-traumatization?

Of course, each case is unique, and the decision to publish may vary depending on the specific context. But without seriously considering these questions, media coverage of Ukraine risks shifting the focus of the publication from the fact of the crime and its consequences to how the victims experience these events, highlighting their emotions and behavior at different moments. And in the absence of the victims’ consent to publish these stories and photos, such publications risk exposing victims to “public curiosity”—a practice broadly prohibited by international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, for the protection of victims of war.

Obviously, there is no universal set of criteria for deciding whether and when to publicize the stories and images of victims of conflict. However, at a time when information can be spread instantly, a responsible, victim-centered approach will require journalists to make a good faith effort to obtain informed consent from victims before publishing their photos and stories. Respect for the choice of victims is fundamental. Victims of the war in Ukraine have already been deprived of their choices by Russia’s aggression. They have the right to choose whether they want their stories to be publicized.

Ivan Horodyskyy is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and cofounder of the Dnistryanskyi Center for Politics and Law.

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Putin’s war on Ukrainian heritage: Russia bombs first Soviet skyscraper

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 29 Oct 2024 23:51:12 +0000

Russia bombed and partially destroyed one of Ukraine’s most recognizable national landmarks on Monday evening in the heart of the country’s second city. The targeted bombing of the iconic Derzhprom building in central Kharkiv was the latest in a series of attacks on Ukrainian heritage sites that many regard as evidence of a deliberate Kremlin campaign to erase Ukraine’s national identity.

The Derzhprom building stands at one end of Kharkiv’s vast central square and serves as a prominent symbol of the city. Built in the 1920s at a time when Kharkiv served as the capital of Soviet Ukraine, the Derzhprom building was the first modern skyscraper in the USSR. When it was unveiled in 1928, the building was promoted as a flagship project showcasing the innovation of the Soviet Union. It remains an internationally important example of the Constructivist architectural school.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Monday’s bombing had “severely damaged” the Derzhprom building and called for international solidarity. “Appeasement never brings peace; it simply feeds the aggressor’s appetite,” he commented. “Instead, we must isolate the aggressor and increase the pressure on him until he ceases terror. Adhering to shared principles saves human lives and cultural heritage. Compromising them brings death and ruin.”

Others noted that while the Derzhprom building had managed to emerge relatively unscathed from the carnage of World War II when Kharkiv repeatedly witnessed intense battles between Nazi and Soviet forces, it had now joined the long list of Ukrainian landmarks and sites of cultural significance to be damaged or destroyed by Russia’s invasion. “If we look back at World War II, even Hitler couldn’t do what the Russians have done,” commented Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov.

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has included hundreds of targeted attacks on Ukrainian heritage sites across the country. By the middle of October 2024, UNESCO officials had verified damage to 457 sites including churches, museums, monuments, and libraries. This figure may only represent a fraction of the real total, however. Crucially, it does not include the systematic destruction of Ukrainian heritage sites throughout regions of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation.

Attacks on Ukraine’s heritage sites are one element of the Kremlin’s broader efforts to erase Ukrainian national identity. Russian President Vladimir Putin has set the tone with his regular denials of Ukraine’s right to exist and insistence that Ukrainians are in fact Russians (“one people”). Since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2014, areas that have fallen under Kremlin control have been declared “historically Russian” and subjected to ruthless policies of russification. This has included the exclusion of the Ukrainian language, the suppression of Ukrainian history, and the methodical removal of all symbols of Ukrainian statehood.

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Russia’s war on Ukrainian identity has included the abduction and indoctrination of large numbers of Ukrainian children. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and sent to camps where they are subjected to Soviet-style “re-education” to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian imperial identity. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges related to these mass abductions.

Over the past two-and-a-half years, the international community has become increasingly aware of Russia’s intention to eradicate Ukrainian identity. The goals of Russia’s invasion go far beyond capturing Ukrainian territory and extend to the “gradual destruction of a whole cultural life,” United Nations special rapporteur for cultural rights Alexandra Xanthaki told the New York Times in December 2022. “One of the justifications of the war is that Ukrainians don’t have a distinct cultural identity,” she noted.

By targeting Ukrainian heritage sites, Moscow is underlining its determination to not only reestablish political control over Ukraine, but to erase the very markers of a separate Ukrainian identity that challenge the Kremlin’s imperialistic vision of the country as a core part of Russia itself. Throughout his reign, Putin has championed the “historical unity” of Russia and Ukraine, and has described today’s Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” Continued attacks on prominent Ukrainian landmarks are a reminder that the Kremlin dictator remains committed to realizing his chilling goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Brian Whitmore: This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

Maia Nikoladze: The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Laura Linderman: The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

Andrew D’Anieri: In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

The US and EU need a plan for Georgian government repression

Georgia’s authoritarian-minded ruling party Georgian Dream, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has dubiously claimed victory in the country’s October 26 parliamentary elections, while the pro-democracy opposition has asserted fraud and the election-monitoring mission of the respected Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has cited extensive efforts to intimidate voters and manipulate the results. Tensions in the country are high, as are the chances of government repression to retain power.

Credible exit polls published on October 26 (from Mtavari and Formula TV) gave Georgian Dream 41 percent and 42 percent percent of the vote, respectively. The official Georgian Central Election Commission announced on October 26 that Georgian Dream had won with about 54 percent, at odds with this credible exit polling.

The elections occurred against a background of mounting authoritarian threats and actions by the Georgian government, including threats to outlaw opposition parties and a law putting pressure on civil-society groups that receive foreign funding.

Georgians have consistently and over many years expressed their desire to integrate with Europe and NATO. Russia has for years sought to undermine this option, using economic pressure, disinformation, and, in 2008, war. Russian propagandists have boasted that the October 26 elections marked a defeat for Western efforts to engineer “regime change” in Georgia.

Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili, who has publicly supported the democratic opposition, condemned the elections on October 27, characterizing the official results as illegitimate and the product of Russian efforts to subordinate the country. She announced a public demonstration for the evening of October 28.

The Georgian government is likely to press ahead with its claims of victory. The opposition demonstration on Monday is likely to be huge. Violence, instigated by the authorities directly or through surrogates, could ensue.

The United States and Europe (not counting Hungary’s pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who congratulated Georgian Dream even before the government announced the results and may visit Tbilisi on Monday) face a crucial set of decisions. The West must decide how to characterize these patently bad elections, how to respond to the ruling party’s repression (including the potential for a Belarus- or Venezuela-style scenario of retaining power through force), and how to support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term.

The United States has reportedly prepared sanctions against Georgian leaders, including Ivanishvili, which it will probably employ in the event of government-instigated violence or the government remaining committed to election fraud. The key variable will be whether Georgian society has the determination to resist, on a sustained basis, the imposition of authoritarian rule.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

I traveled to Georgia to serve as one of the International Republican Institute’s short-term observers for the country’s parliamentary elections. As I witnessed first-hand, fears that the ruling party, Georgian Dream, would use aggressive and illegal tactics to secure a victory were realized.

Leading up to the election, there was a systemic and pervasive intimidation campaign. One of the most common stories I heard was employers forcing employees to turn over their IDs to either prevent them from voting or so those IDs could be used to commit voter fraud.

On Election Day, rules limiting campaign materials and campaigning near polling stations were unabashedly ignored. The most glaring violation I saw was in the town of Tkibuli, where a large screen displayed a video of the Tbilisi mayor, a Georgian Dream member, giving a speech, his voice ringing out over the city’s loudspeaker system. In addition, at most of the polling stations I visited, groups of people hovered outside watching voters come and go, creating an air of surveillance. They were often large, intimidating-looking men, in groups of three or four, not talking but simply watching.

A video plays of the Tbilisi mayor, a prominent Georgian Dream politician, outside a polling place in Tkibuli, with sound playing over city speakers. Photo by Leslie Shedd.

We also witnessed the activities of what appeared to be fake observer organizations deployed to “monitor” the elections. In the small town of Satsire, I met a woman working for one roughly translated as the “Georgia Lawyers Barristers International Organization.” For an hour and a half, we observed her approaching voters and walking them to the side of an adjacent building where she couldn’t be seen. When we asked her what she was doing, she hurriedly walked away while a different man who had also been “monitoring” the station demanded we leave. Worse, inside every single station I visited I witnessed a small video camera pointed at the voting booths or at the ballot boxes. I was told they were set up by Georgian Dream or election officials, purportedly for security and to prevent ballot stuffing.

This all sent a very clear message: We are watching.

—Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the president of Rising Communications.

This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

The battle for Georgian democracy is now headed for the streets, which is exactly where most observers have long expected it to end up. After an election marred by what international observers called vote buying, double voting, and voter intimidation, the ruling Georgia Dream party’s claim to have won a parliamentary majority lacks any legitimacy. In fact, it is absurd. Moreover, Zourabichvili’s refusal to recognize the result, and her call for street protests, fully and firmly aligns the largely ceremonial presidency, the only institution of the Georgian state that has not been captured by Russia, with Georgia’s pro-Western opposition.

The battle lines are drawn. So what happens next? If Zourabichvili’s allegation that Georgia is the victim of a Russian special operation is correct—and few serious observers of the region doubt that this is the case—it stands to reason that the Kremlin and its Georgian proxies have a plan for the day after, as well.

Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its “Maidan” phase. There are three possible outcomes: This could lead to a redux of Georgia’s 2003 peaceful Rose Revolution in which street protests ousted a corrupt and authoritarian government. It could lead to a violent crackdown and suppression of the democratic opposition, with covert Russian assistance, as was the case in Belarus in 2020. Or it could provide the pretext for direct Russian intervention, as in Ukraine in 2014. More than two decades after Georgian civil society came of age in the Rose Revolution, the country is headed for another decisive round. This weekend’s deeply flawed election was just the opening bell.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and a founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), a government agency, reported that the ruling Georgian Dream has received about 54 percent of the votes so far. Opposition leaders have expressed concerns that CEC could be under pressure from the ruling party during these pivotal elections. Now CEC is under scrutiny from the public because of the widespread violations that took place in voting districts outside of big cities in Georgia, which have cast doubt on the legitimacy of these elections.

It is indeed suspicious that in a country where 79 percent of the population supports EU membership, 54 percent would vote for a party that has been driving a wedge between Georgia and its Western partners, most recently by adopting the controversial foreign-agent law and offshore law.

Before accepting the highly contested election results, the international community should question the legitimacy of the elections.

Violations such as ballot stuffing and voter intimidation appear to have had what one watchdog group called “a significant impact on the election results.” Both Transparency International and the International Society for Fair Elections and Monitoring have reported that 10 percent or more of the votes were impacted by “systemic fraud” and “widespread rigging.”

As the Georgian public and international observers navigate the challenging process to ensure that the Georgian people’s votes are accurately counted, Western policymakers should keep two things in mind:

1. The Georgian people are doing all they can to keep the country on a Western course, including by voting and volunteering to observe the elections, but they are not on a level playing field.

2. Pushing Georgia away from the West will only benefit the Russia-China-Iran axis, which could turn Georgia into an economic black hole if the Georgian government supports the evasion of sanctions and export controls.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

The official CEC results of the Georgian parliamentary elections have raised significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process.

As Georgian domestic observation organizations and international observers have noted, the elections were marred by manipulation of the results through the strategic use of intimidation, surveillance, and targeted interventions in vulnerable areas of the voting system. It strains credulity to believe that the Georgian Dream party would receive its highest numbers since the 2012 election after massive protests this spring over its foreign-agent law and amid high voter turnout.

Eoghan Murphy, head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) ODIHR election-observation mission, concluded that the parliamentary elections were not “in line with international democratic principles.” Considering the typically restrained standards of the OSCE’s commentary on elections, the ODIHR statement was remarkably critical for a diplomatic organization and outlined evidence that supports many of the claims made by national organizations and international observers.

I echo Zourabichvili’s assertion that the elections were a “Russian special operation,” and she is right not to recognize the results. The people of Georgia deserve free and fair elections that are not marked by the kinds of irregularities that both national and international observers observed on Saturday.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow and program manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council.

In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

This weekend’s parliamentary elections in Georgia went largely according to the grim forecasts of many experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party appears to have cheated, mainly through widespread voter intimidation, particularly in small cities and rural areas. The Georgian Dream-friendly electoral commission declared the ruling party the victor, opposition voters and parties credibly alleged electoral fraud, and Tbilisi looks set for mass street protests Monday evening. Things could get ugly if the government deploys the new crowd-control materiel it has bragged about or if it deploys thugs to beat up protesters as it did in May.

At stake in the aftermath of this disputed election is nothing less than Georgians’ civil liberties. Egged on by Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream has already passed laws to harass civil-society organizations and to largely criminalize homosexuality, both of which the party could use to stifle dissent and jail political opponents if it remains in power. Georgian Dream’s “foreign-agent law” and “LGBTQI+ propaganda law” are lifted directly from the Russian playbook. But the ruling party won’t stop there. Its leaders have pledged to pass legislation to ban opposition political parties and codify a Belarus-style one-party autocracy. Georgian Dream has so far made good on its goals of limiting the freedoms of its citizens. We should believe party leaders when they say this is just the beginning.

The United States should continue to support Georgians’ right to self-determination and free and fair elections. More importantly, the Biden administration should have a significant policy response ready should Georgian authorities resort to further violence against protesters or political opponents.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The post Experts React: Georgia just concluded a contested election, with the country’s future at stake. Now what? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: Can children of Iranian officials be designated?

Holly Dagres, Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 14:12:42 +0000

به زبان فارسی بخوانید

مجموعۀ تحریم‌های حقوق بشری هدفمند ایران: آیا فرزندان مقامات ایرانی می‌توانند مشمول تحریم شوند؟

نویسندگان: سلست کامیوتیک و لساندرا نووُ

به طور خلاصه، تحریم‏ها‏ی هدفمند حقوق بشری ابزاری هستند که دولت‏ها‏ برای مسدود کردن دارایی‏ها‏ و عدم صدور ویزا برای افرادی که در موارد نقض حقوق بشر مشارکت نموده‏اند، به کار می‏گیرند. اگر چه به طور کلی مقصد از اِعمال این تحریم‏ها‏، وادار کردن متخلفان به تغییر رفتارشان است، اما اقدامات مزبور دارای تأثیرات دیگری نیز هستند. برای مثال، منع مجرمین از به دست آوردن ابزارهای مورد نیاز برای ادامۀ بدرفتاری و آزار، و نیز ابراز حمایت از قربانیان این آزارها. اما پروژۀ اقدام قضایی استراتژیک شورای آتلانتیک (SLP) از منابع متعددی شنیده است که بسیاری از افرادی که در اینگونه جوامعِ آسیب دیده به سر می‏برند، از جمله جامعۀ ایرانی، در مورد اقدامات مزبور و مفهوم آنها به خصوص به زبان محلی خود اطلاعات کافی در دست ندارند.

در نتیجه، بر اساس بازخورد فوق، تهیۀ این مجموعه وبلاگ‏ها‏ آغاز شد تا اطلاعات مهمی در بارۀ تحریم‏ها‏ی هدفمند حقوق بشری که به جمهوری اسلامی ایران مربوط می شود را مطرح نماید. این وبلاگ‏ها‏ همچنین مهمترین اخبار روز در مورد مجرمین ایرانی که به دلیل نقض حقوق بشر تحریم شده‏‏اند‏ و علت آن، و نیز هر گونه اطلاعات دیگری که ممکن است مربوط به جوامعی باشد که حقوق شان نقض شده را در اختیار خوانندگان قرار می‏دهد. در مورد پرسش‏ها‏ و همچنین موضوعاتی که باید مطرح گردد، مشتاقیم نظرات ارسالی خوانندگان، به ویژه اعضای جامعۀ مدنی ایران را دریافت کنیم.

«مهمانی کنار استخر جاستین بیبر»، این جمله‌ای است که نعیما طاهری در استوری اینستاگرام خود از تور هلیکوپتری‌اش بر فراز هالیوود هیلز منتشر کرده است. این پست معمولاً توجه زیادی را جلب نمی‌کند. با این حال، طاهری نتیجهٔ آیت‌الله روح‌الله خمینی، بنیان‌گذار جمهوری اسلامی، است و به‌عنوان «آقازاده» شناخته می‌شود—اصطلاحی که مشابه مفهوم «فرزند نپوتیسم» در غرب است.

طاهری یکی از نمونه‌های متعدد فرزندان مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران (IRI) است که از طریق ارتباطات خانوادگی در نردبان قدرت نظام روحانیون بالا می‌روند و از طریق خویشاوندسالاری، فساد، و اقتصادی مبتنی بر بازار سیاه که به آنها دسترسی به کالاهایی می‌دهد که در غیر این صورت از شهروندان ایرانی دریغ می‌شود، منافع مالی کسب می‌کنند. فرزندان نخبگان ثروتمند ایرانی به مستندسازی علنی ثروت خود و «به رخ کشیدن دارایی‌هایشان» در رسانه‌های اجتماعی شناخته شده‌اند. آنها با انتشار تصاویری از رانندگی خودروهای لوکس، سفر با جت‌های خصوصی، استفاده از لباس‌ها و زینت‏آلات طراحان مشهور یا گذراندن تعطیلات مجلل بین‌المللی، خود را به‌عنوان تأثیرگذاران احتمالی مطرح می‌کنند. این رفتارها ایرانیانی که برای گذران زندگی به سختی تلاش می‌کنند، در حالی که طبقه متوسط به تدریج در حالِ از بین رفتن است را خشمگین کرده است.

در نوامبر ۲۰۲۳، بانک جهانی گزارش داد که 28.1 درصد از ایرانیان در فقر زندگی می‌کنند. با این حال، یک کارشناس اقتصادی در ایران این رقم را نزدیک به ۵۰ درصد برآورد کرده است. این شرایط به‌طور نامتناسبی بر زنان تأثیر گذاشته و نزدیک به یک میلیون کودک ایرانی را مجبور به ترک تحصیل کرده است.

پس از مرگ مهسا ژینا امینی به دست آنچه «پلیس اخلاق» نامیده می‌شود و اعتراضات ضد رژیم که به قیام «زن، زندگی، آزادی» در سال‌های ۲۰۲۲-۲۰۲۳ معروف شد، فرزندان مقامات بار دیگر به دلیل استفاده از ثروت والدینشان برای زندگی در همان کشورهای غربی که علیه مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران تحریم اعمال کرده‌اند، مورد انتقاد قرار گرفتند. تعداد این فرزندان به هزاران نفر تخمین زده می‌شود، اگرچه آمار دقیقی در دسترس نیست. برخی گزارش‌ها حاکی از آن است که فرزندان مقامات بلندپایه‌ای مانند معصومه ابتکار، معاون سابق رئیس‌جمهور، و علی لاریجانی، رئیس پیشین مجلس، در کشورهای غربی زندگی می‌کنند. جای تعجب نیست که برخی بحث‌ها به اعمال محدودیت‌های ویزا و/یا سایر تدابیر تحریمی هدفمند علیه فرزندان این مقامات نیز معطوف شده است، افرادی که اغلب در غرب زندگی و/یا تحصیل می‌کنند که گاهی اوقات در دانشگاه‏های طراز اول هم می‏باشند.

تحریم‌های هدفمند معمولاً با هدف ایجاد تغییر رفتار در مجرمان اعمال می‌شوند و بنابراین عمدتاً برای تحریم افرادی به کار می‌روند که شخصاً مسئول یا همدست در موارد نقض حقوق مربوطه هستند. در برخی موارد، برای مثال، فرزندان مستقلی که به‌طور عمومی یا خصوصی رفتار والدین خود را محکوم کرده‌اند، اعمال تحریم بر این فرزندان نه‌تنها بی‌فایده است، بلکه می‌تواند با لغو ویزای آنها، امنیتشان را به خطر بیندازد. با این حال، در موارد دیگر، مانند زمانی که مقامات هزینه تحصیل و زندگی فرزندانشان در خارج از کشور را شخصاً تأمین می‌کنند، چنین تحریم‌هایی می‌تواند در صورتی که به طور استراتژیک به اجرا درآید، به‌عنوان یک اهرم فشار اضافی عمل کند.

تعیین تحریم‌های هدفمند برای اعضای درجه یکِ خانواده

برخی از رژیم‌های تحریمی، اما نه همه، اجازه تحریم اعضای «درجه یک» خانواده یا اعضای خانواده به‌طور کلی را می‌دهند. در ایالات متحده، طبق بند (c) 7031 از قانون تخصیص بودجه سالانه وزارت امور خارجه «(c)7031»)، مقامات دولت‌های خارجی و اعضای درجه یک خانواده آنها—که تعریف دقیق‌تری برای آن ارائه نشده است—می‌توانند به دلیل «فساد قابل توجه» یا «نقض فاحش حقوق بشر» مشمول تحریم شوند. با این حال، برخلاف اکثر رژیم‌های تحریمی هدفمند، این مورد تنها منجر به ممنوعیت ویزا می‌شود و شامل مسدودسازی دارایی‌ها نمی‌گردد. به‌طور مشابه، طبق «ممنوعیت خاشقجی» (روزنامه‏نگار صعودی، جمال) در ایالات متحده، «افرادی که به نمایندگی از یک دولت خارجی، تصور می‌شود به‌طور مستقیم در فعالیت‌های جدی سرکوب مخالفان در خارج از مرزها مشارکت داشته‌اند» و اعضای خانواده این افراد می‌توانند مشمول تحریم شوند، اما این نیز تنها به ممنوعیت ویزا محدود می‌شود.

برای سایر رژیم‌ها، مانند تحریم‌های جهانی مگنیتسکی تحت فرمان اجرایی ۱۳۸۱۸ یا تحریم‌های مربوط به نقض حقوق بشر در ایران تحت فرمان اجرایی ۱۳۵۵۳، تعیین تحریم تنها بر اساس عضویت شخص در خانواده مرتکب امکان‌پذیر نیست. با این حال، اگر آن عضو خانواده به مرتکب کمک یا حمایت مادی ارائه داده باشد یا به‌طور مستقیم یا غیرمستقیم از طرف او عمل کرده باشد، می‌توان او را نیز مشمول تحریم کرد.

مقررات تحریم‌های خودمختار استرالیا مصوب ۲۰۱۱ نیز اجازه تعیین اعضای درجه یک خانوادۀ افرادی را می‌دهد که «مشمول» یک تحریم یا اعلامیه جلوگیری از سفر به‌ دلیل نقض‌های جدی یا سوءاستفاده‌های جدی از حقوق بشر هستند.

مقررات اقدامات اقتصادی ویژه کانادا (ایران) اجازه می‌دهد اعضای خانواده افرادی که در «نقض‌های فاحش و سیستماتیک حقوق بشر در ایران» مشارکت دارند، مقامات ارشد فعلی یا سابق سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی، همکاران چنین افرادی، و مقامات ارشد نهادهای متعلق به این افراد مشمول تحریم شوند. «عضو خانواده» در این مقررات تعریف نشده است و به نظر می‌رسد که فراتر از اعضای درجه یک خانواده را نیز شامل می‌شود. کانادا در سال ۲۰۲۳ سیزده مقررات تحریمی خاص کشورها، از جمله مقررات مربوط به ایران، را اصلاح کرد تا امکان تعیین تحریم علیه اتباع سابق کشورهای مربوطه را نیز فراهم کند.

بریتانیا (UK) و اتحادیه اروپا (EU) گسترده‌ترین تحریم‌های مبتنی بر نسیت خانوادگی را تحت رژیم‌های تحریمی خاص ایران و حقوق بشر ارائه می‌دهند و شامل افرادی می‌شوند که «مرتبط با» اشخاصی هستند که اَعمالِ مربوطه را مرتکب شده‌اند. بریتانیا همچنین در مقررات جهانی تحریم‌های حقوق بشر ۲۰۲۰ خود، افرادی را که از فعالیت‌های تحریمی به‌طور مالی سود می‌برند یا به هر شکل دیگری بهره‌مند می‌شوند، به‌عنوان «اشخاص دخیل در این وقایع» در نظر می‌گیرد که می‌توانند مشمول تحریم شوند. در مقررات سال 2023 بریتانیا در مورد تحریم های ایران، عبارتِ «مرتبط با» به معنای دریافت منافع مالی یا مادی یا عضویت درجه یک در خانواده فردی است که در فعالیت‌های مربوطه (مانند نقض حقوق بشر) دخیل است. بر اساس چارچوب تحریم‌های بریتانیا، «خانواده درجه یک» به معنای همسر یا شریک مدنی، والدین یا ناپدری و نامادری، فرزندان یا فرزندان ناتنی، خواهر و برادر یا خواهر و برادر ناتنی، عمه، عمو، خاله، دایی، پدربزرگ و مادربزرگ، و نوه‌ها است. هم بریتانیا و هم اتحادیه اروپا فرزندان یا فرزندان ناتنی مرتکبانی را که در زمینه روسیه تحریم شده‌اند، بر اساس رابطه خانوادگی و بهره‌مندی مالی از والدین تحریم کرده‌اند. احکام دادگاه عدالت اتحادیه اروپا در مورد آنچه که در روابط خانوادگی، به‌عنوان «مرتبط با» محسوب می‌شود یا نمی‌شود، راهنمای بیشتری ارائه می‌دهد.

برای نظام‌های تحریمی موضوعی، مانند مگنیتسکی جهانی یا سیستم‌های حقوق بشری، امکان تحریم اعضای خانواده برای همه کشورها و زمینه‌ها یکسان است. برای نظام‌های تحریم اختصاصی کشورها، با وجود تفاوت‌ها، رژیم‌های تحریم مختص روسیه و ایران معمولاً مشابه یکدیگر هستند. برای مثال، زبان مورد استفاده در مورد اعضای خانواده و افرادی که با مجرمان«مرتبط» هستند در مقررات اقدامات اقتصادی ویژه کانادا (روسیه)، مقررات روسیه (تحریم‌ها) (خروج از اتحادیه اروپا) ۲۰۱۹ بریتانیا، و مقررات شورای اتحادیه اروپا شماره 2014/269 در مورد اقدامات محدودکننده مربوط به اقداماتی که تمامیت ارضی، حاکمیت و استقلال اوکراین را تضعیف یا تهدید می‌کنند، مشابه مقررات مربوط به ایران است. به همین ترتیب، برخی از نظام‌های ایالات متحده مرتبط با روسیه، مانند سیستمی که بر طبق فرمان اجرایی ۱۳۶۶۱ در مورد مشارکت در «وضعیت اوکراین» است، مستلزم کمک مادی یا حمایت از مرتکب یا عمل به نمایندگی از او هستند. با این حال، سیستم‌های دیگری مانند رژیم مطابقِ فرمان اجرایی ۱۴۰۲۴ اجازه تحریم همسران و فرزندان بزرگسال مرتکبان را می‌دهند.

مسدودسازی دارایی‌ها و محدودیت‌های مالی

حتی اگر فرزندان افراد تحریم‌شده شخصاً مشمول تحریم نشوند، مسدودسازی دارایی‌ها می‌تواند مانع از دسترسی آنها به ثروت والدینشان در خارج از کشور شود. تحریم‌های هدفمند به طور کلی ویزای افراد یا نهادهای تحریم‌شده را رد می‌کنند، دارایی‌های آنها را مسدود می‌کنند و معاملات مالی با آنها را ممنوع می‌سازند. علاوه بر این، ایالات متحده محدودیت‌های مالی اعمال‌شده به‌عنوان پیامد تعیین تحریم را شامل ممنوعیت هرگونه معامله با دلار آمریکا تفسیر می‌کند—که به دلیل «مرکزیت دلار در نظام پرداخت‌های جهانی» بخش بزرگی از تجارت بین‌المللی را شامل می‌شود و تا ۱۱ مارس ۲۰۲۳، ۸۸ درصد از معاملات ارزی خارجی را در بر می‌گیرد. بنابراین، هرگونه معامله بین‌المللی با شخصی که توسط ایالات متحده تحریم ‌شده است، به‌ویژه خطر نقض مقررات تحریم را به همراه دارد.

با این حال، چندین رژیم تحریمی موارد استثنا را مجاز می‌دانند: استثناهایی از محدودیت‌های تحریمی برای دلایل خاص. برای مثال، اتحادیه اروپا استثناهایی را برای تأمین نیازهای اساسی اعضای خانواده تحت تکفل، مانند «غذا، اجاره یا وام مسکن، داروها و درمان پزشکی، مالیات‌ها، حق بیمه‌ها و هزینه‌های خدمات عمومی» را مجاز می‌داند. به همین ترتیب، بریتانیا نیز مجوزهایی را برای نیازهای اساسی افراد تحریم‌شده و اعضای خانواده تحت تکفل آنها، از جمله نیازهای پزشکی، غذا، پرداخت حق بیمه یا مالیات، اجاره یا وام مسکن، و پرداخت هزینه‌های خدمات عمومی صادر می‌کند. کانادا، استرالیا و ایالات متحده نیز صدور مجوز یا درخواست مجوز را مجاز می‌دانند.

این در عمل به چه معناست؟ در حالی که اعضای خانواده فرد تحریم شده ممکن است برای سفر به کشور اعمال تحریم آزاد باشند، آنها نمی‌توانند به دارایی‌هایی که به نام فرد تحریم شده در آنجا نگهداری می‌شود، دسترسی پیدا کنند، مگر اینکه واجد شرایطِ استثنا باشند. برای مثال، اگر یک مقام جمهوری اسلامی ایران دارای حساب بانکی و آپارتمانی در لندن باشد و توسط بریتانیا تحریم شده باشد، بستگان او می‌توانند به لندن سفر کنند اما نمی‌توانند به حساب بانکی یا آپارتمان دسترسی داشته باشند. علاوه بر این، آن مقام تحریم شده نمی‌تواند شخصاً با هیچ بانک یا کسب‌وکار بریتانیایی معامله مالی انجام دهد تا برای این بستگان بودجه یا محل سکونت فراهم کند. همچنین، در حالی که بستگان در بریتانیا هستند، نمی‌توانند به هیچ وجه با دارایی‌های فرد تحریم‌شده «معامله کنند»، از جمله استفاده، تغییر یا انتقال آنها. اما اگر این بستگان، عضو «تحت تکفل» خانواده باشند، برای مثال، فرزندی که از نظر مالی مستقل نیست، ممکن است بتوانند به مقداری از دارایی‌ها دسترسی پیدا کنند که برای تأمین اجاره، غذا، دارو و سایر نیازهای اساسی مجاز کافی باشد. این موضوع در تمام کشورها و شرایط صادق است، هرچند که هر مورد به طور اختصاصی بررسی می‌شود.

علاوه بر این، تأثیر کامل مسدود کردن دارایی‌ها اغلب به دلیل دور زدن تحریم‌ها محدود می‌شود. برای مثال، این ممکن است شامل استفاده از شرکت‌های صوری، «بانکداری سایه‌ای» در حوزه‌های قضایی ثالث و استفاده از واسطه‌ها باشد. باز هم، اگر چه این موضوع در تمامی کشورها و بین همۀ مرتکبان صادق است، اما اراده سیاسی برای مقابله با آن ممکن است بسته به شرایط، متفاوت باشد.

مجازات‌های نقض تحریم‌ها

بسته به حوزه قضایی، اتباع یا ساکنان کشور صادرکننده تحریم‌ها عموماً موظف به رعایت قوانین تحریمی هستند. مجازات‌های نقض تحریم‌ها بسته به حوزه قضایی متفاوت است اما معمولاً شامل اتهامات کیفری، از جمله جریمه‌های احتمالی و حبس می‌شود. قابل توجه است که پس از تهاجم گسترده روسیه به اوکراین، پارلمان و شورای اتحادیه اروپا به توافق سیاسی موقت برای استانداردسازی «جرایم کیفری و مجازات‌ها برای نقض» تحریم‌های اتحادیه اروپا در میان کشورهای عضو اتحادیه رسیدند و ملزم کردند که برخی از نقض‌ها به عنوان جرایم کیفری در نظر گرفته شوند.

بنابراین، فرزندانی که در حوزه‌های قضایی مربوطه زندگی می‌کنند، ممکن است در صورت نقض آگاهانه مقررات تحریمی، مانند انجام معامله مالی با والدین تحریم‌شده در حالی که در کشور صادرکننده تحریم زندگی می‌کنند، مشمول پیگرد کیفری شوند. با این حال، رسیدگی به موارد دور زدن تحریم‌ها نیاز به اجرای قوانین دارد که می‌تواند منابع زیادی را مصرف کند—برای مثال، درگیر شدن در حسابرسی‌های قضایی.

توقیف دارایی‌ها

اگر فرزندان مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران سبک زندگی خود را در حوزه‌های قضایی غربی با استفاده از اموال نامشروع والدینشان تأمین مالی کنند، دارایی‌های آنها نیز ممکن است مشمول توقیف شود. برای مثال، قانون عواید ناشی از جرایم (POCA) در بریتانیا به نیروهای انتظامی اجازه می‌دهد اموالی را که از طریق اقدامات غیرقانونی به دست آمده‌اند، بازپس بگیرند.

بر اساس قانون عواید ناشی از جرایم (POCA)، «اقدامات غیرقانونی» شامل آن دسته از اقداماتی است که «مرتکب نقض یا سوءاستفاده فاحش از حقوق بشر بشود یا با آن مرتبط باشد». تعریف «نقض یا سوءاستفاده فاحش از حقوق بشر» در این قانون محدود است و اثبات ارتباط لازم بین اموال توقیف‌شده و اقدامات غیرقانونی می‌تواند دشوار باشد. با این حال، این قانون شامل اقداماتی است که در بریتانیا غیرقانونی هستند، و همچنین اقداماتی که در خارج از بریتانیا هم در جایی که اتفاق افتاده‏اند غیرقانونی بوده‌اند و در صورت وقوع در بریتانیا نیز غیرقانونی محسوب می‌شوند. برای مثال، آژانس ملی جرایم بریتانیا محتویات توقیف‌شده حساب بانکی خواهرزاده بشار اسد را به مبلغ 24.668 پوند (32.017دلار) بازپس گرفت و اشاره کرد که پنجاه‌وشش واریز به این حساب در طول سال‌های ۲۰۱۷ و ۲۰۱۸ انجام شده بود که مجموعاً به 150.000 پوند (194.686 دلار) می‌رسید، «با وجود این که منبع درآمد قابل شناسایی برای او وجود نداشت.» در نهایت، آنها تعیین کردند که این وجوه به حساب مذکور واریز شده بودند تا تحریم‌های اتحادیه اروپا دور زده شوند.

در همین راستا، قانون عواید ناشی از جرایم (POCA) به نیروهای انتظامی اجازه می‌دهد که «احکام ثروت غیرقابل توضیح» (UWOs) دریافت کنند. در صورت صدور این احکام، از شخصِ خوانده خواسته می‌شود جزئیاتی درباره یک دارایی مشخص ارائه کند، از جمله نحوه به دست آوردن آن. بسته به نتایج بررسی، این حکم می‌تواند منجر به توقیف دارایی شود.

احکام ثروت غیرقابل توضیح (UWOs) می‌توانند زمانی مورد استفاده قرار گیرند که «دلایل منطقی برای این باور» وجود داشته باشد که فردی دارای دارایی‌ای با ارزش بیش از 50.000 پوند (64.903دلار) است و «دلایل منطقی برای این گمان» وجود داشته باشد که منابع قانونی شناخته‌شده درآمد فرد «برای به دست آوردن [آن] دارایی کافی نبوده‌اند» یا این که دارایی از طریق اقدامات غیرقانونی به دست آمده است. علاوه بر این، فرد مورد نظر باید یک «شخص دارای موقعیت سیاسی برجسته» باشد، که شامل اعضای خانواده افرادی می‌شود که «عهده‌دار وظایف عمومی برجسته» در کشورهایی خارج از بریتانیا و منطقه اقتصادی اروپا هستند. در غیر این صورت، باید «دلایل منطقی برای این گمان» وجود داشته باشد که این شخص یا فرد مرتبط با او در «ارتکاب جرایم جدی» در بریتانیا یا در جای دیگری دخیل بوده یا هست.

استرالیا برای توقیف عواید ناشی از جرایم، قانونی مشابه دارد که امکان صدور «احکام ثروت غیرقابل توضیح» (UWO) را نیز فراهم می‌کند. تقریباً تمامی استان‌های کانادا نیز قوانینی را برای توقیف اموال مجرمانه تصویب کرده‌اند. در نوامبر ۲۰۲۳، بریتیش کلمبیا «نخستین درخواست برای صدور حکم ثروت غیرقابل توضیح در کانادا» را ارائه کرد.

یک بخشنامۀ اتحادیه اروپا در سال ۲۰۱۴ کشورهای عضو را ملزم کرده است که اقدامات لازم برای مصادره عواید ناشی از جرم را در صورت تعلق به فردی که به یک جرم کیفری محکوم شده است، اتخاذ کنند. این محکومیت باید یک محکومیت قطعی باشد، به این معنا که قابل تجدیدنظر نباشد و باید مربوط به یک جرم کیفری مشخص باشد که در این بخشنامه یا سایر اسناد حقوقی اتحادیه اروپا که به این بخشنامه ارجاع می‌دهند، درج شده است. این بدان معناست که این دستورالعمل در مورد همان نوع نقض‌های حقوق بشری که منجر به تعیین تحریم‌های هدفمند می‌شود، قابل اعمال نیست، زیرا این تحریم‌ها نیازی به محکومیت ندارند. اگر دور زدن تحریم‌ها به‌طور موفقیت‌آمیز به‌عنوان یک جرم کیفری در سراسر اتحادیه اروپا استاندارد شود، ممکن است مبنایی برای مصادره فراهم کند. در حال حاضر، این امر تنها در صورتی در مورد فرزندان مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران اعمال می‌شود که آنها به یکی از جرایم کیفری که بر طبق قوانین کیفری اروپا در فهرست کنونی‌ جرایم قرار گرفته‏اند، محکوم شوند.

اجرای ابزارهای موجود در عمل

فرزندان مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران ممکن است تحت تأثیر تحریم‌های هدفمند حقوق بشری قرار گیرند، اما این تنها از طریق اجرای جدی تحریم‌ها و تحقیقات امکانپذیر بوده و تنها در مواردی است که اراده سیاسی وجود داشته باشد. بستگانی که دارای استقلال مالی هستند و از روابط خانوادگی با مقامات تحریم شدۀ جمهوری اسلامی ایران بهره‌مند می‌شوند، در چندین حوزه قضایی، در صورت برآورده شدن الزامات، مشمول اقدامات قانونی خواهند بود. اما دلایل معتبری برای استثناهای پیش‌بینی‌شده در چارچوب‌های تحریمی وجود دارد تا سلامت و ایمنی اعضای خانواده تحت تکفل تضمین شود، و همچنین دلایل سیاست‌گذاری معتبری برای احتیاط در تعیین افرادی که به‌طور غیرمستقیم‌تری با نقض‌های حقوق بشری مرتبط هستند نیز وجود دارد. با این حال، این استثناها و تردیدها می‌توانند مورد سوءاستفاده قرار گیرند و مستحق نظارت بیشتری از سوی کشورهای اعمال‌کننده تحریم هستند.

این مسئله منحصر به وضعیت ایران نیست. این امر به ویژه شناخته شده است که فرزندان مقامات و الیگارش‌های روسیه نیز در خارج از روسیه، به‌ویژه در اروپا و ایالات متحده دارای زندگی مجللی هستند. با این حال، در صورتی که دولت‌ها پس از تهاجم گسترده روسیه به اوکراین به این وضعیت اذعان کردند و واکنش نشان دادند، به نظر نمی‌رسد که در مواجهه با نقض‌های مداوم حقوق بشر در ایران تلاش‌های مشابهی انجام دهند. بدون چنین نظارت و واکنشی، مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران می‌توانند علی‌رغم استفاده گسترده از تحریم‌های هدفمند، به حوزه‌های قضایی غربی دسترسی داشته باشند.

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هالی دگرس (Holly Dagres) عضو ارشد مهمان در برنامه‌های خاورمیانه شورای آتلانتیک و سردبیر وبلاگ ایران‌سورس این شورا است. او را در توییتر دنبال کنید: hdagres@

سلست کامیوتیک (Celeste Kmiotek) از حقوقدانان شاغل در پروژه اقدامات قضایی استراتژیک در شورای آتلانیک است.

لساندرا نووُ (Lisandra Novo) از حقوقدانان شاغل در پروژه اقدامات قضایی استراتژیک در شورای آتلانیک است.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

This page will be subsequently updated with a Persian translation of the post.

“Justin Bieber’s pool party time,” posted Naeima Taheri in her Instagram stories from her helicopter tour of the Hollywood Hills. The post would normally not be given much thought. However, Taheri is the great-granddaughter of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and considered an aghazadeh, or children of the elite—similar to the Western concept of “nepo baby.”

Taheri is one of many examples of children of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) officials who climb the ladder of the clerical establishment through family connections and financially benefit through cronyism, corruption, and a black market economy that gives them access to goods otherwise denied to Iranian citizens. Children of wealthy elite Iranians are known to also publicly document their affluence and “flaunt their wealth” on social media, flirting with the idea of being influencers by posting pictures of driving luxury cars, riding in private jets, donning designer accessories and clothes, or taking lavish international vacations, angering Iranians who struggle to make ends meet as the middle class fades into nonexistence.

In November 2023, the World Bank reported that 28.1 percent of Iranians were considered to be living in poverty, with an economic expert in Iran estimating the figure as closer to 50 percent. The circumstances leading to this have disproportionately impacted women and have forced almost one million Iranian children to drop out of school.

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Following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini at the hands of the so-called morality police and the resulting anti-regime protests known as the Women, Life, Freedom uprising in 2022-2023, the children of officials have again drawn criticism for using their parents’ wealth to live in the same Western countries levying sanctions on the IRI officials themselves. The number of these children is estimated to be in the thousands, though exact figures are unavailable, with some being reportedly the children of high-ranking officials, such as former Vice President Massoumeh Ebtekar and former Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani. Unsurprisingly, some discussion has turned to imposing visa restrictions and/or other targeted sanctions measures on these officials’ children as well, who often live and/or study in the West at sometimes elite universities.

Targeted sanctions are generally intended to promote behavioral changes in perpetrators and so are primarily used to designate those personally responsible for or complicit in relevant abuses. In some cases, for example, for financially independent children who have publicly or privately denounced their parents’ behavior, designating those children would not only be unproductive but could potentially endanger them by revoking their visas. However, in other instances, such as where officials personally fund their children’s education and overseas lives, such designations could serve as an additional pressure point when strategically implemented.

Targeted sanctions designations for immediate family members

Some but not all sanctions regimes allow designations of “immediate” family members or of family members more generally. In the United States, under § 7031(c) of the Annual Department of State Appropriations Act (“§ 7031(c)”), officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members—which is not further defined—can be designated for “significant corruption” or “gross violation[s] of human rights.” However, unlike most targeted sanctions regimes, this only results in a visa ban—not an asset freeze. Likewise, under the US’ (Saudi Journalist Jamal) Khashoggi Ban, “individuals who, acting on behalf of a foreign government, are believed to have been directly engaged in serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident activities,” and the family members of those individuals can be designated, but again this is limited to a visa ban.

For other regimes, such as Global Magnitsky sanctions under Executive Order 13818 or sanctions for human rights abuses in Iran under Executive Order 13553, designations cannot be made based solely on the status of being the family member of a perpetrator. However, if that family member provided assistance or material support to the perpetrator or acted directly or indirectly on their behalf, then they could be designated as well.

Australia’s Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 also allows for designations of immediate family members of those “covered by” a designation or declaration preventing travel for serious violations or serious abuses of human rights.

Canada’s Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations allow for the designation of family members of those engaged in “gross and systematic human rights violations in Iran,” former or current senior officials in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the associates of such individuals, and senior officials of entities owned by such individuals. “Family member” is not defined in the regulations and so would seemingly extend beyond immediate family. Canada further revised thirteen country-specific sanctions regulations in 2023, including those for Iran, to allow for designations against former nationals of the relevant state.

The United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) allow the broadest relationship-based designations under both Iran-specific and human rights sanctions regimes, covering those “associated with” individuals who have committed the relevant acts. The UK further considers, for its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, that those who profit financially or otherwise receive a benefit from sanctionable activities as “involved persons” who can be designated. For the UK’s Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023, “associated with” means obtaining financial or material benefit or being an immediate family member of a person involved in the relevant activities (e.g. human rights abuses). Under the UK sanctions framework, “immediate family” means a spouse or civil partner, parents or stepparents, children or stepchildren, siblings or stepsiblings, aunts, uncles, grandparents, and grandchildren. Both the UK and the EU have sanctioned the children or stepchildren of perpetrators designated in the Russian context on the basis of their relationship and for financially benefiting from the parent. Rulings from the Court of Justice of the EU provide further guidance on what does and does not constitute “associated with” for familial relationships.

For thematic sanctions regimes, such as Global Magnitsky or human rights regimes, whether family members can be designated is the same for all countries and contexts. For country-specific regimes, while there is variation, the Russia- and Iran-specific regimes generally mirror one another. For example, the language around family members and those “associated with” perpetrators in Canada’s Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, the UK’s Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, and the EU’s Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine reflect those of their Iran-specific counterparts. Likewise, some US regimes related to Russia, like that under Executive Order 13661 on contributing to “the situation in Ukraine,” require materially assisting or supporting, or acting on behalf of, a perpetrator. However, others, like that under Executive Order 14024, allow for the designation of spouses and adult children of perpetrators.

Asset freezes and financial restrictions

Even if they are not personally designated, asset freezes could prevent the children of designated individuals from accessing their parents’ wealth overseas. Targeted sanctions generally deny visas to, freeze the assets of, and prohibit financial transactions with the designated person or entity. Additionally, the US interprets financial restrictions imposed as a consequence of a sanctions designation to include a ban on any transaction involving the US dollar—which, due to the dollar’s “centrality to the system of global payments,” involves a large portion of international trade, and, as of March 11, 2023, 88 percent of foreign exchange transactions. Any international transaction with someone designated by the US, therefore, especially risks violating sanctions regulations.

However, several sanctions regimes do permit derogations: exceptions to the sanctions restrictions, for specific reasons. For example, the EU allows derogations to meet the basic needs of dependent family members, such as “food, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges.” Likewise, the UK allows licenses for the basic needs of designated persons and their dependent family members, including medical needs, food, payments of insurance premiums or taxes, rent or mortgage payments, and utility payments. Canada, Australia, and the United States also allow permits or license applications.

What does this mean in practice? While the family members of a designated person may be free to travel to the country of the designation, they will not be able to access any assets held there under the designated person’s name unless they qualify for an exception. For example, if an IRI official held a bank account and an apartment in London and was designated by the UK, their relative could travel to London but could not access either the bank account or the apartment. Additionally, that designated official could not personally conduct a financial transaction with any UK banks or businesses to provide this relative with funds and housing. While in the UK, the relative also cannot “deal with” the designated person’s funds in any way, including using, altering, or moving them. But, if this relative is a “dependent” family member, for example, a child who is not financially independent, then they may be able to access the funds to the extent necessary to cover rent, food, medicine, and other allowed basic needs. This is true across all countries and contexts, though each case would be handled uniquely.

Further, the full effect of asset freezes is often limited by sanctions evasion. For example, this may include the use of shell companies, “shadow banking” in third jurisdictions, and the use of intermediaries. Again, while true across all countries and perpetrators, the political will to address it may differ among contexts.

Sanctions violations penalties

Depending on the jurisdiction, the nationals or residents of a sanctions-issuing country are generally required to comply with sanctions rules. The penalties for violating sanctions depend on the jurisdiction but generally include criminal charges, including possible fines and jail time. Notably, in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Parliament and the Council of the European Union reached a provisional political agreement to standardize “criminal offences and penalties for the violation” of EU sanctions across EU member states, requiring certain violations to be treated as criminal offenses.

Children based in relevant jurisdictions could, therefore, be subject to criminal proceedings for knowingly violating sanctions regulations—such as engaging in a financial transaction with a designated parent while living in the country that made the designation. However, sanctions evasion cases require enforcement, which can be resource-intensive—for example, involving forensic accounting.

Asset seizures

If children of IRI officials fund their lifestyles in Western jurisdictions with their parents’ ill-gotten funds, their assets may also be subject to seizure. For example, the UK’s Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) allows law enforcement to recover property obtained through unlawful conduct.

Under POCA, “unlawful conduct” includes that which “constitutes, or is connected with, the commission of a gross human rights abuse or violation.” POCA’s definition of “gross human rights abuse or violation” is narrow, and the required link between the property seized and the unlawful conduct can be difficult to prove. However, it also includes conduct occurring in the UK that is unlawful and conduct outside the UK that is unlawful where it occurred and would be unlawful in the UK. For example, the UK’s National Crime Agency recovered the forfeited contents of the bank account of Bashar al-Assad’s niece (£24,668 or $32,017), noting that fifty-six deposits were paid into the account during 2017 and 2018, totaling £150,000 ($194,686), “despite her having no identifiable source of income.” They ultimately determined that the funds were put into the account to bypass EU sanctions.

In this vein, POCA also allows law enforcement to obtain Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs). If granted, these require the respondent to produce details about a specific identified property, including how they obtained it. Depending on the results, the UWO can lead to an asset forfeiture.

UWOs can be used when there is “reasonable cause to believe” that a person holds property valued greater than £50,000 ($64,903) and when there are “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the person’s known sources of lawful income “would have been insufficient … to obtain [that] property,” or that the property was obtained through unlawful conduct. Additionally, the specific person must be a “politically exposed person,” which includes family members of those “entrusted with prominent public functions” in states outside the UK and European Economic Area. Otherwise, there must be “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the person or someone connected to them is or has been “involved in serious crime,” either in the UK or elsewhere.

Australia has a similar law on seizing the proceeds of crime, which also allows for UWOs. Nearly all of Canada’s provinces have also enacted legislation allowing for the seizure of criminal property. In November 2023, British Columbia filed “the first ever application of an unexplained wealth order in Canada.”

A 2014 EU Directive requires member states to have necessary measures to confiscate proceeds of crime when belonging to someone convicted of a criminal offense. The conviction must be a final conviction, meaning it cannot be subject to further appeals and must be for a specific criminal offense as included in the directive or other EU legal instruments that refer back to the directive. This means it’s not applicable in relation to the same kinds of human rights abuses that result in targeted sanctions designations, as these do not require a conviction. If sanctions evasion is successfully standardized as a criminal offense throughout the EU, it is possible it may provide a basis for confiscation. For the moment, this would only apply to children of IRI officials if they are convicted of one of the currently listed criminal offenses under EU legislation.

Implementation of available tools in practice

Children of IRI officials might be impacted by targeted human rights designations, but only through strict sanctions enforcement and investigation and only where there is political will. Financially independent relatives who benefit from familial relationships with designated IRI officials are legally fair game in several jurisdictions, so long as the requirements are met. But there are valid reasons for the derogations built into sanctions frameworks to ensure the health and safety of dependent family members, and there are likewise valid policy reasons for using caution when designating individuals more tangentially linked to the human rights violations themselves. However, these derogations and hesitations can be exploited and merit increased scrutiny from sanctioning countries.

This issue is not unique to the Iranian context. Notably, the children of Russian officials and oligarchs are also known to live in luxury outside Russia, especially in Europe and the United States. However, while governments acknowledged the situation and responded in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, they do not appear to be making the same efforts in light of the ongoing human rights abuses in Iran. Without such scrutiny and response, IRI officials can continue to access Western jurisdictions despite the prolific use of targeted sanctions.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: Can children of Iranian officials be designated? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sledgehammer: The Wagner cult in Syria

Alia Brahimi — Wed, 23 Oct 2024 13:49:38 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 6 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi chats with defense researcher Jack Margolin about his new book on the Wagner Group. They focus on its operations in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the country’s central place within the Wagner subculture.

They also discuss the ever-present profit motive for the Wagner Group’s leaders and how grievances born in Syria festered and fostered resentment for many years, before exploding with the Wagner mutiny in June 2023. Margolin also delivers an update on the Group’s organization and leadership after the death of Prighozin, and on its current structure in Africa.

“[They] focused on this understanding of Slavic culture as being the inheritor of traditional values, but also attaching that to pre-Christian imagery, so you’d see a lot of runes, a lot of celebration of these Slavic pagan deities.”

Jack Margolin, independent expert on international crime and conflict

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Ukrainian journalist who exposed Russian occupation dies in Kremlin captivity

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 22 Oct 2024 22:17:20 +0000

A Ukrainian journalist who sought to document the Russian occupation of her country has died in Kremlin captivity. The family of award-winning journalist Victoria Roshchyna received notification of her death from the Russian authorities in early October. No cause of death was given, with reports indicating that she died in mid-September while being moved between Russian prisons. She was just twenty-seven years old.

Roshchyna, who worked as a staff reporter at Hromadske and as a freelance reporter for outlets including Ukrainska Pravda and Radio Free Europe, was renowned among colleagues for her integrity and personal courage. “She was a hardworking and brave reporter, sensitive to injustice,” commented former colleague Olga Tokariuk.

Roshchyna was best known for her reporting from behind the front lines in Russian-occupied Ukraine. She was first detained by Russian forces in March 2022 close to Mariupol. On that occasion, she was held for ten days before being released. Despite this experience, Roshchyna remained committed to raising awareness about conditions in Ukrainian regions under Kremlin control. She disappeared in summer 2023 while on a reporting trip to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine. Almost one year later, Kremlin officials confirmed that Roshchyna was in Russian custody.

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News of Roshchyna’s death sparked an outpouring of grief and anger in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called her death “a heavy blow.” Ukrainska Pravda chief editor Sevgil Musaieva led tributes from the journalistic community, decribing Roshchyna as “absolutely amazing” and recounting her commitment to reporting on the realities of life under Russian occupation.

Oksana Romaniuk, executive director of the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information, said the circumstances of Roshchyna’s death “makes you worry about other journalists who are in captivity.” Ukraine’s 2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk called on international media watchdogs to demand answers from Russia over Roshchyna’s death. “What could have been done to make a young girl die?” she asked in one of many posts on Ukrainian social media mourning Roshchyna.

Members of the international community stressed the need to determine Russia’s role in the young Ukrainian journalist’s death. “We must honor her legacy by holding her captors accountable,” commented Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus. National Press Club President Emily Wilkins called on the US to impose sanctions “against all Russian personnel involved.”

The European Union Delegation to Ukraine demanded a “thorough and independent investigation” into the circumstances of the journalist’s death in Russian detention. Meanwhile, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Senator Cardin said Roshchyna’s death was “heartbreaking” and served as a reminder of her bravery “reporting the truth about Russia’s war on Ukraine.”

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According to the Russian authorities, Roshchyna died while being transferred to Moscow from a detention facility in Taganrog that is particularly notorious among Ukrainian human rights groups for the widespread mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners. Ukrainian officials say they are now investigating her death as a war crime and an act of premeditated murder.

The death of Victoria Roshchyna in Russian custody highlights the dangers facing independent journalists attempting to cover the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Petro Yatsenko of the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Roshchyna was one of at least twenty-five Ukrainian journalists being held by Russia.

While the details regarding Roshchyna’s death have yet to be determined, she was known to be in good health prior to her detention. The journalist is one of many Ukrainian prisoners to have died in Russian custody since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 amid reports of widespread human rights abuses. The vast majority of Ukrainians released in prisoner exchanges have recounted being subjected to torture by their Russian captors.

The US Department of State’s 2023 Human Rights Report confirmed Russia’s use of “systematic torture and abuse against thousands of captured Ukrainian military POWs and detained civilians.” In a September 2024 report, United Nations human rights officials stated that “torture has been used as a common and acceptable practice by Russian authorities” against Ukrainian detainees.

Over the past two and a half years, thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been abducted from Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine and imprisoned. Ukraine’s Media Initiative organization has compiled a list of 1,886 names, but the actual number of detainees is believed to be far higher. In the vast majority of cases, family members and colleagues have no information regarding the status of those being held by Russia.

Victoria Roshchyna was an inspirational figure to her colleagues in the media and a widely respected journalist who sought to give a voice to Ukrainian victims of Russian occupation. Her death serves as a chilling reminder of the war crimes currently being committed against the civilian population throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ever since the onset of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014, Moscow’s ambitions have extended far beyond conventional territorial gains. Over the past decade, Ukrainian classrooms in regions under Kremlin control have become an important battleground, with Russia intent on reshaping not only international borders but also national identities.

Vladimir Putin recently highlighted the importance of Russia’s efforts to indoctrinate the current generation of Ukrainian schoolchildren. Speaking at an educational event in early October, he singled out teachers working in occupied Ukraine for special praise. “You are demonstrating exceptional commitment and true courage, ensuring children can continue their education under challenging conditions,” he commented.

Moscow’s strategy has involved importing Russian teachers to schools in occupied Ukraine, while also pressuring Ukrainian educators to accept the new Kremlin-friendly curriculum via a combination of bribes, threats, and violence. “Ukrainian teachers in Russian-occupied Ukraine are now faced with a stark choice: Leave everything behind and flee, or become part of a system that indoctrinates children to justify Russia’s war of aggression,” commented Amnesty International General Secretary Agnès Callamard in October 2024.

Human Rights Watch has documented cases of arbitrary detention, torture, and intimidation targeting Ukrainian teachers and school administrators who refuse to comply with the Russian occupation authorities. One school director from the Kherson region in southern Ukraine reported being detained for a total of forty days and beaten before eventually escaping to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

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Wherever the Kremlin has established control in Ukraine, the Ukrainian education system has been systematically dismantled. Instead, children in Russian-occupied regions of the country are now being taught a curriculum that glorifies the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine and justifies the current invasion.

New Russian school textbooks produced since the start of the full-scale invasion reframe the war in heroic terms and present Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a liberation mission rather than an act of international aggression. Meanwhile, children are encouraged to dismiss the entire notion of Ukrainian nationality and embrace a Russian imperial identity.

The Kremlin’s indoctrination campaign against the next generation of young Ukrainians goes far beyond historical distortions. The Russian occupation authorities are actively militarizing Ukrainian schoolchildren and encouraging teenagers to join the Russian army. Ukrainian children are also forced to attend special propaganda classes that seek to instill loyalty to Russia along with hostility toward Ukraine.

Ukrainian parents are being targeted by the Kremlin to make sure they agree to subject their children to Russian indoctrination. In occupied regions of Ukraine, parents have been threatened with a range of severe consequences for non-compliance including fines, loss of custody, or imprisonment. Despite the risks involved, tens of thousands of Ukrainian children in occupied regions continue to study online with Ukrainian teachers.

While international attention remains firmly focused on the military dimension of the war in Ukraine, it is crucial to recognize that Russia’s invasion is not merely an attempt to acquire new territory or redraw the map of Europe by force. The Kremlin also clearly aims to extinguish Ukrainian national identity, and sees the transformation of young Ukrainians into loyal Russians as a key element of this criminal endeavor.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies, and a research assistant at the Wilson Center. She is the co-founder and executive director of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting young Ukrainians affected by war and cultivating future Ukrainian leaders.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The pursuit of justice for Russian war crimes is not just a matter of upholding the law. It is a key component of Ukraine’s broader strategy to safeguard its sovereignty and rebuild its war-torn society. If Ukraine is unable to secure justice for the millions who have suffered as a direct result of Russia’s invasion, this could seriously weaken the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and lead to the long-term destabilization of the country.

Crucially, enforcing accountability for atrocities will also send a powerful signal to Russia and the wider international community that war crimes will not be tolerated. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked the largest European war since World War II, and has directly violated many of the core principles of international law. If the invasion ends in an ugly compromise that leaves Moscow unpunished, much of the progress made since 1945 will be undone.

Russia currently stands accused of war crimes in Ukraine including mass killings, deportations, torture, the systematic abduction of children, and the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. However, previous generations of Russians have faced very similar war crimes accusations without ever encountering legal consequences. This has helped foster a sense of impunity in modern Russian society that has paved the way for the atrocities currently taking place in Ukraine. Addressing Russian impunity must therefore be central to any meaningful peace process.

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Ukraine’s efforts to gather evidence of war crimes during the ongoing Russian invasion have been groundbreaking. Prosecutors, law enforcement officials, legal experts, and members of the country’s civil society have all made significant contributions. One particularly important development has been the use of DNA database technologies, with mobile DNA labs enabling forensic teams to operate in recently liberated areas of Ukraine. The physical evidence acquired during these investigations has made it possible to identify victims and could also be used in future prosecutions.

Ukraine’s efforts to hold Russia accountable have also been boosted by partnerships with a range of international legal experts and organizations. This cooperation could have consequences for international justice that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The experience of investigating war crimes that has been acquired in Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 can contribute to the broader objective of strengthening the international legal framework that underpins global security.

Continued international assistance in Ukraine’s quest for justice is an important element of the support Kyiv receives from its partners. By providing forensic expertise, legal guidance, and diplomatic backing, Western allies strengthen Ukraine’s efforts while emphasizing their own commitment to accountability for war crimes. This will help prevent the normalization of war crimes and other violations of international law. Failure to act decisively could embolden other actors globally, leading to the further erosion of the rules-based international order.

Looking ahead, the fight for justice must remain at the heart of efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is vital to pursue victory not only on the battlefield but also in the courtroom. This will require sustained international solidarity and political will at a time when there are growing signs of war-weariness and calls for a compromise that would allow Moscow to escape accountability. Anything less than justice for the victims of Russia’s invasion will invite further aggression from Russia itself and from other expansionist powers. This would be a costly blunder that would set the stage for a new era of international instability.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Lesia Zaburanna is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the Servant of the People Party and a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 04 Oct 2024 21:51:36 +0000

A year into the Gaza war, the conflict has left deep political, security, and societal scars across the Middle East and North Africa. The war was ignited by an unprecedented terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, 2023 in which militants killed some 1,200 people and took 251 hostages—97 of whom are still being held hostage one year later, with approximately one-third of that group already believed to be dead. The attack prompted Israel’s strongest response in decades, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launching airstrikes and a ground invasion aimed at dismantling Hamas and its capabilities that continue to this day.

The Gaza Strip, which has been ruled by Hamas since 2007 and under an Israeli blockade for nearly two decades, has suffered widespread destruction and heavy damage to its infrastructure. Since the war began, some 41,000 people have been killed, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The humanitarian situation in Gaza has reached catastrophic levels, with Gazans facing massive food shortages, the spread of disease, and the displacement of 1.9 million people from their homes.

International efforts at the United Nations to calm tensions have been ineffectual, and the decision by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to seek arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar has been met with fury in Israel and derision by Hamas. The United States, Qatar, and Egypt had early success in November 2023 in securing a ceasefire and freeing some hostages, but since then the conflict has continued unabated, leaving the region in a fragile state and possibly veering toward wider regional conflict.

The potential for a direct conflict between Israel and Iran has never been higher following Iran’s firing of almost two hundred ballistic missiles at the beginning of October, an event preceded by the Islamic Republic’s April barrage of over three hundred missiles and drones. Houthi rebels in Yemen have spent months intermittently launching missiles into Israel while consistently attacking Western shipping lines in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. And daily skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border have led to dozens of deaths in both countries over the last year. It may be a prelude to a broader war—the likelihood of which greatly increased following Israel’s September killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and its ground invasion of southern Lebanon.

One year on, the Gaza War remains unresolved and the potential for war across the region is becoming more likely. So what is the humanitarian situation on the ground? Will Saudi-Israeli diplomatic normalization materialize? What does the future of the Abraham Accords look like? Is there a regional war around the corner? Fourteen experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays below.

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Israel’s relations with the United States

By: Shalom Lipner

Israel has settled into a routine known colloquially as the “new normal,” where the fabric of daily life is interwoven with threads of ever-present crisis.

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The human toll of the October 7 attacks and hostage-taking

By: Liz Cathcart

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Humanitarian organizations face dire conditions in Gaza

By: Arwa Damon

Gazans are going to die in more painful ways and in higher numbers if we—humanitarian organizations—continue to be this deliberately impeded and unable to deliver what the population needs.

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Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

By: Alan Pino

Israel needs a long-term plan that can secure regional cooperation, rehabilitate its international image, maintain the support of the United States, and give the Israeli people hope of a future without endless war.

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Israel has lost its patience

By: Nicholas Blanford

A ceasefire agreement in Gaza remains elusive—and Israel’s patience with Hezbollah has run out.

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Don’t expect Arab states to join in a regional escalation with Iran

By: Richard Le Baron

Whether the current conflict will escalate further after a year of war—and whether others in the region could become involved—depends upon various calculations of risk and reward involving all these players and the United States.

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Israeli-Egyptian relations are on the rocks

By: Shahira Amin

The ongoing Israel-Hamas war has taken its toll on Egyptian-Israeli relations, reversing years of progress and leaving ties between the two neighbors in tatters.

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Eradicating Hamas means the possibility of an insurgency in Gaza

By: Alex Plitsas

60 percent of Hamas fighters have been killed or wounded during the war in Gaza. Although this figure may seem significant, it is indicative that Israel is not yet close to achieving its objectives for the war.

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Gaza is ‘the worst chapter in Palestinian living memory’

By: Ahmed AlKhatib

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Postwar Gaza is coming

By: Thomas Warrick

Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack and Israel’s subsequent military response should have started serious, detailed planning for postwar Gaza—by Israel, the United States, and other countries. That did not happen—but the need now is greater than ever.

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The future of the Abraham Accords depends on a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

By: Marcy Grossman

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The potential remains for ‘integration’ between Israel and Saudi Arabia

By: Kirsten Fontenrose

Quiet cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia has neither frozen nor slowed one year after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

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Israeli domestic politics have lurched to the right post-October 7

By: Carmiel Arbit

One year after the tragic events of October 7, 2023, Israel has lurched only further to the right.

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Can international justice make a difference in the conflict?

By: Gissou Nia

The Israeli state and Hamas and Hezbollah—non-state actors that may not even have legal advisors—are committing war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law.

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Israel’s relations with the United States

U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., July 25, 2024. REUTERS/Elizabeth Frantz

Israel has settled into a routine known colloquially as the “new normal,” where the fabric of daily life is interwoven with threads of ever-present crisis. One year since the brutal October 7, 2023, massacre wrought by Hamas, and amid the repercussions of that day’s devastating aftermath—including multiple “hot” battlefronts, constant dread over the fate of the captives in Gaza, and extended tours of reserve duty—Israelis are abiding a split-screen existence. They go about their regular business while simultaneously perceiving that the nation’s calendar will be stuck hopelessly on October 8, 2023.

A similar, schizophrenic rhythm pervades Israel’s relationship with its main benefactor, the United States, as matters of critical substance are intermingled tightly with considerations of domestic politics. On the one hand, the two countries remain aligned closely in their commitment to ensuring Israel’s security: The Joe Biden administration has come singularly to Israel’s aid with invaluable military, intelligence, and diplomatic assistance, thereby enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to persist in the effort to dismantle Hamas’s infrastructure and to defend against other threats, from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iran. On the other hand, and at the same time, that cooperation has come under heavy assault from various constituencies in the United States and Israel, who charge that Washington has been either excessively or insufficiently supportive of its embattled ally.

These conflicting realities complicate an already problematic environment where tensions have surfaced regularly over the precise manner in which the Benjamin Netanyahu government has pursued its objectives. US initiatives to promote a hostage release and ceasefire deal in Gaza, bring a halt to fighting across the Israel-Lebanon border, institutionalize an emerging US Central Command-led regional defense architecture, and possibly deepen Israel’s integration into the wider region have stalled as Israel gives precedence to continuing IDF maneuvers in neighboring theaters of operation and resists attempts to cede control to other foreign auspices. The volatility of the current political moment—with impending elections in the US and coalition instability in Israel—amplifies these fraught dynamics.

The predicament facing Israel is almost certain to grow more acute when the next US administration assumes power in January 2025. With more questions than answers about the path forward, both presidential candidates have resorted to issuing impatient calls for Israel to draw its Gaza campaign to a close. Under these circumstances, the prime minister would be wise to hasten and proceed toward an endgame that allows Israel to ground its relations with the United States’ next president—a vital component in Israel’s national security—on a more positive footing.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

The human toll of the October 7 attacks and hostage-taking

Eylon Keshet holds posters of captive family members as he views ‘Voices From The Tunnels’, an exhibition organised by 7/10 Human Chain Project which aims to highlight the continued plight of Israeli hostages in Gaza and the conditions in which they believe captives are being held, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in London, Britain, January 15, 2024. REUTERS/Toby Melville

On the anniversary of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack and subsequent war, the immense emotional and psychological toll of Hamas’s hostage-taking continues to affect not only those held in captivity but also their families. It is undeniable and heartbreaking that the attack and the hostage-taking, which has been a prolonged event, is a view into the broader context of the profound, collective suffering of innocent people and their families on all sides of the conflict.

For the families of those still being held hostage by Hamas, the ordeal is overwhelming and persistent. They are faced with the task of advocating for their loved ones’ safe return while managing the practical and emotional devastation of an uncertain future. Every single day brings about new fears as the families navigate the complex landscape of geopolitical tensions and international negotiations. The emotional burden is deep and intense. Families must focus their entire attention on the safe return of their loved ones during an ongoing war. Their relentless advocacy and the daily fear of loss weigh heavily on them.

The emotional trauma is severe for those who lose loved ones who were held hostage. The knowledge that their loved ones’ final moments were spent in captivity intensifies the grief of the family. This difficult, complex trauma complicates the grieving process. It is a trauma that leaves families feeling devastated and trying to grapple with the harsh reality of war.

For the hostages who have been released, reintegration into society is undeniably challenging. Families rejoice because of their loved ones’ return, yet the hostages themselves are often left with lasting emotional scars, and survivor’s guilt is a heavy burden for them to carry. Often, they struggle to reconcile their release with the continued captivity or death of others with whom they were taken. The path to psychological recovery is marked with hardships, and the prolonged challenge of getting back to life is a painful reminder that the impacts of being held hostage continue after release.

The suffering caused by the Hamas hostage-taking reflects the broader human impact of the attack on October 7. It is a snapshot of the broader human loss and the emotional and psychological toll of the war and underpins the profound collective suffering that touches all those caught in the war. As international negotiations continue, it is imperative to remember each person and family representing those still being held. World leaders must make every effort to resolve the situation swiftly.

—Liz Cathcart is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Program and the executive director of the nonprofit of Hostage US.

Humanitarian organizations face dire conditions in Gaza

Palestinians gather to receive food cooked by a charity kitchen near houses destroyed in the Israeli military offensive, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, May 30, 2024. REUTERS/Ramadan Abed TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Rubble cascades into the streets and waterfalls down the facades of half-standing buildings. Tents take over every inch of empty space, sewage runs through the streets, human and donkey cart traffic creep along. I’ve been to Gaza three times since October 7, 2023, on humanitarian missions with my charity, International Network for Aid, Relief and Assistance (INARA), each trip worse than the one before.

Ever since the Rafah border crossing closed with Israel’s invasion of the southernmost part of the Gaza strip, humanitarian aid—which was never at the levels needed to begin with—plummeted drastically.

At the al-Aqsa Hospital intensive care unit (ICU), I met a year-and-a-half-old toddler who needed a pediatric tracheostomy tube that was not available. If she makes it through, she will wake up and realize she is an orphan. Lying in the bed next to her was a thirteen-year-old boy with severe burns who should not have been in the ICU. But there were not enough bandages to dress his injuries regularly, which resulted in a blood infection and early sepsis.

Even more basic needs, like soap, are scarce. What is on the commercial market is grossly overpriced, and aid organizations have not been able to bring in hygiene kits in any meaningful quantity since June. The spread of communicable illnesses, from Hepatitis A to meningitis to the skin disease impetigo (a flesh-eating bacteria), is risking the lives of children whose bodies are too weak and malnourished to fight infection. This creates even more stress on hospitals that are limping along at best.

Humanitarian efforts in the war face outlandish challenges, from what Israel decides to “clear” and then, once pallets have been cleared, in being able to pick them up to deliver to the population safely. To sum it up, Gaza has been effectively split in two by Israeli forces. Crossing from the north to the south requires Israel’s permission, as do movements to any of the humanitarian aid pick-up points. However, these routes that are determined and given by Israel, especially in the south, have turned into looter and criminal gang havens. Aid organizations like INARA have repeatedly requested alternative secure routes to no avail. There was an attempt to use Gaza’s police force earlier this year to secure the roads, but Israel bombed them. More recently, another organization, ANERA, that was delivering fuel and food to the Emirati hospital, used a security escort that was bombed by Israel.

Israel doesn’t need to kill any more Gazans. Gazans are going to die in more painful ways and in higher numbers if we—humanitarian organizations—continue to be this deliberately impeded and unable to deliver what the population needs.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

This is an excerpt from a longer piece. Read the full article here.

Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

People look at apparent remains of a ballistic missile lying in the desert, following an attack by Iran on Israel, near the southern city of Arad, Israel October 2, 2024. REUTERS/Amir Cohen TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Instead of further escalating its attacks, Israel’s military gains provide the opportunity to support diplomatic efforts in achieving a political solution. US envoy Amos Hochstein and other diplomats have been trying for months to negotiate a halt to the fighting in which Hezbollah would withdraw its forces north of the Litani River, about fifteen miles from the border with Israel. For a settlement to hold, it would need to include a plan for a strengthened United Nations force to police the area south of the river and ensure compliance. Israel’s exclusive focus on “killing its way to victory over Hezbollah” in the face of calls from the United States and European and Middle Eastern countries for a ceasefire risks increasing frictions with the United States, further isolating Israel and involving the Israeli military in “an extended offensive with ill-defined objectives prone to mission creep.”

Israel’s devastating assault on Hezbollah strengthens the diplomats’ leverage by making it clear to the group and its Iranian patron the consequences of not acquiescing to an agreement. Even if a political solution does not emerge, Israel can use an interim period without fighting to prepare for the conflict that may come and to repair regional and international ties that it can draw on in any future conflict.

More broadly, dealing with the threat from Iran, including its advancing nuclear program and the ongoing threat from its Resistance Axis, is not something that Israel can do on its own. But ending the war in Gaza with a plan for reconstruction, moderate Palestinian leadership, and ultimately, statehood can help Israel elicit the regional and international support it needs to deal with these challenges. Such a plan would open the way for Arab state engagement with Israel that could counterbalance and isolate Iran and its militant allies. It can also begin to ease criticism of the Jewish state from the United States and rehabilitate its standing in the international community—which has suffered a sharp decline due to the high number of Palestinian civilian casualties and large-scale destruction caused by its military campaign against Hamas. Israel’s relations with the United States have suffered because of the perception by the Joe Biden administration that Israel has not taken sufficient care to avoid killing civilians and that Prime Minister Netanyahu may be prolonging the war to avoid fracturing his coalition and losing power. And both Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump have indicated that they want Israel to bring the war to a close.

Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy to keep Israel under pressure, to provoke Israeli aggression that will generate regional and international backlash, and to weaken the Israeli people’s will to fight. Israel has made progress in weakening Iran’s “ring of fire” and restoring deterrence because of its military successes. But the Jewish state needs a long-term plan that can secure regional cooperation, rehabilitate its international image, maintain the support of the United States, and give the Israeli people hope of a future without endless war.

—Alan Pino served as the Group Chief in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency and as the National Intelligence Council’s Officer for the Near East, retiring in 2020.

IranSource

Oct 2, 2024

Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

By Alan Pino

Conflict Iran

This is an excerpt from a longer piece. Read the full article here.

Israel has lost its patience

People inspect damage, in the aftermath of Israeli strikes on the Mreijeh neighbourhood in Beirut’s southern suburbs, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, in Beirut, Lebanon October 4, 2024. REUTERS/Ali Alloush TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Israel’s new offensive began on September 16 with an unprecedented attack against Hezbollah cadres using booby-trapped pagers, which exploded simultaneously. The next day, walkie-talkies exploded. The two attacks killed at least thirty-two people and wounded some 3,500. On September 20, Israel assassinated Ibrahim Aql, the head of Hezbollah military operations and commander of the Radwan Brigade, Hezbollah’s top combat unit. His death came a month and a half after Israel assassinated top Hezbollah military leader Fouad Shukr, one of several top combat commanders to have been targeted by Irael since the conflict began last October.

One important consideration that has helped keep the fighting below the threshold of all-out war is that Hezbollah has not yet begun using its more advanced weapons systems, namely its arsenal of precision-guided missiles. On September 25, it fired a single Qadir-1 liquid-fueled missile toward the headquarters of Israeli intelligence agency Mossad near Tel Aviv. The missile was intercepted by Israeli aerial defense systems, as Hezbollah no doubt expected. The launching of the missile served as a warning to Israel that Hezbollah has only used unguided legacy rockets to strike Israeli targets. It is believed to possess an arsenal numbering some 150,000 rockets and missiles of varying calibers and ranges, including precision-guided systems that carry five hundred kilogram warheads and can strike within fifty meters of their target. The reason why it has not yet resorted to more sophisticated systems is due to Iran. Tehran does not want Hezbollah, a key component of its deterrence architecture—the Resistance Axis—to become embroiled in a massive and debilitating war with Israel for the sake of Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah is far too important an asset for Iran to waste in such a manner. If Hezbollah were to begin launching its Fateh-110 missiles, for example, into Tel Aviv and other areas of Israel, it would undoubtedly trigger a full-scale war. Iran’s caution has led to some frustration among Hezbollah cadres who would prefer using the more advanced systems to inflict real damage and pain on Israel.

Despite the intensity of Israel’s aerial campaign and targeted assassinations of Hezbollah commanders, it is against the organization’s DNA to yield to the onslaught and plea for a ceasefire. Indeed, the level of damage that Hezbollah has sustained remains unclear at present. Israeli officials have claimed that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided rockets have been destroyed in the air strikes and that the organization is in disarray. There is little evidence so far to back such a claim. Hezbollah has escalated its rocket attacks into Israel at an increased daily rate and is hitting Israeli military targets deeper inside Israel than before. It has begun employing larger rocket systems not previously used in the one-year conflict. Its fighters are still attacking targets of opportunity—such as Israeli tanks and troop movements—along the Blue Line, the United Nations name for the Lebanon-Israel border, suggesting that the cadres remained entrenched in south Lebanon despite the aerial onslaught. On October 2, Hezbollah staged several ambushes against elite Israeli troops, killing eight soldiers and wounding several others in what was the first day of ground combat in south Lebanon.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a defense and security correspondent for Janes.

MENASource

Oct 4, 2024

Israel has lost its patience

By Nicholas Blanford

Since September 16, Israel has removed the gloves to stage a massive aerial bombing campaign targeting Hezbollah’s top political and military leadership and weapons sites to force the Iran-backed group to yield and redeploy its forces away from Lebanon’s southern border.

Conflict Israel

Don’t expect Arab states to join in a regional escalation with Iran

Mourners carry the coffins of Hezbollah members Fadel Abbas Bazzi and Ahmad Ali Hassan, after hand-held radios and pagers used by armed group Hezbollah detonated across Lebanon, during their funeral in Ghobeiry, Beirut southern suburbs, Lebanon September 19, 2024. REUTERS/Emilie Madi

When politicos and pundits talk about the prospects for a “regional war” in the Middle East resulting from escalation of the border conflicts between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah respectively, what they really are predicting or fearing is a war against Iran waged by Israel and the United States. This may be couched as a defensive reaction to Iranian retaliation for the assassinations of its military commanders and its clients’ leaders, as the United States’ defense of Israel, or as a preemptive war to preclude Iranian missile strikes on Israel, but it will involve a limited number of countries.

There is little sympathy for the Iranian regime in Gulf countries or in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but that does not translate into any interest in joining in a war against Iran. In fact, the Gulf states have been “normalizing’ their relations with Iran over the last few years just as normalization between Israel and MENA states has stalled. Any participation by Gulf states in a conflict with Iran will likely be limited to some intelligence sharing and overflight approvals. It is doubtful whether states such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will permit actions against Iran launched from US bases in their territory.

The main supporter of a major war with Iran will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long advocated the elimination of the Islamic Republic as the only genuine way to address the threats against Israel, both by Iran’s proxies and by a nuclear-weapons-seeking rabidly anti-Israel Iranian regime. Recently, Netanyahu addressed the “noble Persian people” directly, advising them that “when Iran is finally free—and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think—everything will be different.” These regime change hints are almost certainly not welcome in the Gulf states, which saw the results of US efforts in Iraq close up and would rather deal with the devil(s) they know in Iran than with chaos that would likely extend over years.

Meanwhile, in the coming year, the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon will continue at some level. Neither Hamas nor Hezbollah is likely to end its attacks. Continuing conflict, even at a low level, will prevent any significant rebuilding in Gaza and make it very difficult for people to return to their homes in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Israel will continue to be a divided country, and the remaining living hostages may very well languish in Hamas’s hands for some time to come. And in the United States, a new president will try to balance its support for Israel with keeping American troops out of a major war with Iran.

—Richard Le Baron, former US ambassador to Kuwait, is a career diplomat with over thirty years of experience abroad and in Washington and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Israeli-Egyptian relations are on the rocks

Palestinians shelter at the border with Egypt, amid fears of an exodus of Palestinians into Egypt, as the conflict between Israel and Hamas continues, in Rafah southern Gaza Strip February 16, 2024. REUTERS/Ibraheem Abu Mustafa

It’s been one year since the deadly October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas militants on southern Israel that unleashed a vengeful Israeli military campaign on the Gaza Strip that has killed more than 40,000 Palestinians. The ongoing Israel-Hamas war has also taken its toll on Egyptian-Israeli relations, reversing years of progress and leaving ties between the two neighbors in tatters.

Egyptian-Israeli ties had improved significantly in the years preceding the war, especially after Israel acquiesced to Cairo’s request for help to counter an insurgency by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated militants in North Sinai. In 2013, Cairo asked for a modification to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to allow for the deployment of additional troops and military equipment in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel gave its nod of approval, allowing approximately 66,000 troops to be stationed in the Sinai—three times the number permitted by the treaty. Israel also bolstered its security cooperation with Egypt, providing strategic assistance, including intelligence and air support, that ultimately helped Cairo contain the threat.

Egypt, in turn, maintained its tight blockade on the Gaza Strip, keeping the Rafah border crossing largely sealed and allowing only students and Palestinians seeking medical treatment to enter the country. Egypt’s destruction of hundreds of underground tunnels, used to smuggle goods and weapons to and from Gaza, along the shared border with the Gaza Strip further bolstered Egyptian-Israeli relations between 2011 and 2016.

The Israel-Hamas war, however, escalated tensions between Egypt and Israel, which, over the past year, have traded accusations and warnings over a number of contentious issues. In the early weeks of the war, controversial statements by some ultra-nationalist ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet calling on Egypt to take in displaced Palestinians and resettle them in the Sinai provoked a furious reaction from Cairo. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi insisted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be resolved at the expense of other parties and warned that such a move could jeopardize the peace treaty if rockets were to be fired into Israel from the Sinai Peninsula, provoking possible retaliatory attacks from Israel. Egypt and Israel have also traded blame over the closure of the Rafah border, which led to truckloads of humanitarian aid being blocked at Rafah.

Tensions reached their peak after Israel’s takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor in May, despite earlier warnings from Cairo that this was “a red line” and “a violation of the peace treaty.” The move put the Sisi regime on the spot, prompting some Egyptian activists to call for the severing of diplomatic ties with Israel. Israel’s announcement in May that it had discovered more than eighty tunnels leading from Rafah into Egypt added insult to injury. The Egyptian regime was again left red-faced in late May after Egyptian intelligence was found to have changed the terms of a ceasefire proposal that Israel had previously signed off on before submitting it to Hamas for review.

While the peace treaty will likely remain intact, it will take a great deal of diplomacy on Israel’s part to mend fences with Egypt and restore the broken trust. If Cairo succeeds in brokering a ceasefire and hostage-exchange truce between Israel and Hamas, this may just be the game-changer needed to restore ties to their pre-war status. The onus will be on the United States to manage the rapprochement to safeguard the longstanding peace treaty and avert the risk of further regional instability.

—Shahira Amin is an Egyptian journalist, the former Deputy Head of Egypt’s Channel Nile TV, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Eradicating Hamas means the possibility of an insurgency in Gaza

Southern Israel.- In the photos, Israeli forces are deployed in southern Israel on October 31, 2023. Israeli troops and tanks attacked the main city in northern Gaza from both sides, three days after they began a major offensive land. The Israeli military said it has struck more than 600 militant targets in recent days as it expands ground operations in the Gaza Strip.

Eleven months after the most deadly terrorist attack in Israeli history, which saw 1,200 people heinously tortured and slaughtered, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has announced that 60 percent of Hamas fighters have been killed or wounded during the war in Gaza. While this figure may seem significant, it is indicative that Israel is not yet close to achieving its objectives for the war.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the goal of the war is the “destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.” As someone who watched the forty-seven-minute video compilation of the October 7, 2023, attack that is not available to the public, the some 2,500 Hamas terrorists did not utilize technical or strategic weapons but AK-47s, pistols, grenades, and knives, demonstrating that it is the group’s ideology, not its weapons systems, that are a threat to Israel.

With 40 percent of its fighters remaining on the battlefield, Hamas still possesses the ability to conduct a large-scale terrorist attack in the future. As such, it is doubtful that Israel will agree to end the war until Hamas is further degraded. Israel is largely done with major combat operations, having cleared Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. That means that nearly half of Hamas’s fighters have either blended in with the civilian population or continue to hide amongst the buildings and the spiderweb of tunnels scattered throughout Gaza.

Israel is likely to have to engage in re-clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip for a sustained period of time. Even if a short-term hostage deal is reached for the remaining hostages, there is no way that Netanyahu can allow that amount of Hamas fighters to remain and be able to credibly say that the war has been won or that Israel is safe from another major terrorist attack. This likely means many more months of sustained urban combat throughout Gaza. Israel successfully killed Hamas’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, but he was quickly replaced by Yahyah Sinwar, the group’s military commander and architect of the October 7 attack.

At the same time, Israel will need to begin nation-state building in Gaza, as another stated objective is to replace Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza. Hamas has ruled Gaza by force since the last election in 2006 and presents significant risks for Israel. Recent media reports indicate that a multinational peacekeeping force of police officers is under consideration to provide security. This would be combined with a civilian administration to lead Gaza. If the local populace rejects the presence of the security force and the governing authority, it will likely lead to an insurgency.

Hamas has already stated that it will reject the presence of a multinational or foreign peacekeeping force of any kind. So whether Israel continues to pursue Hamas now or a peace agreement takes hold, Hamas will still, as an insurgent force, pose a threat to peace and stability.

In either case, Israel will have to continue to pursue Hamas in Gaza and degrade the organization further to prevent another major terrorist attack by Hamas fighters or an insurgency in postwar Gaza. There are very few scenarios in which Hamas can continue to exist in its current numbers and capacity and not pose a strategic threat to Israel.

At the moment, Hamas remains a strategic threat on the battlefield, as well as a terrorist organization with the ability to morph into a terrorist insurgency—given its current numbers and capabilities—if Israel begins to transition security and governance to another group or force.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, where he leads the initiative’s Counter-Terrorism Project.

Gaza is ‘the worst chapter in Palestinian living memory’

Palestinian children play amid the rubble at a park destroyed during Israel’s military offensive, during Eid al-Fitr, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Gaza City April 11, 2024. REUTERS/Mahmoud Issa

Few could have predicted that the massive war that followed the horrendous massacre Hamas launched on October 7, 2023, would persist without a resolution into its second year, making its first anniversary doubly grim and challenging. In addition to the unprecedented pain that Israelis and Palestinians have been experiencing, there are few prospects on the horizon for an end to the war, increasing the likelihood that this exceptionally bloody chapter will extend into 2025.

The escalation of violence in the West Bank that preceded October 7 has also significantly increased alongside large-scale Israeli military operations, the likes of which have not been seen in years. This, coupled with an unprecedented rise in violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinian towns and villages, has inflamed the entirety of the conflict, which has seen massive levels of public and international interest and engagement. The involvement of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directly in the war by attacking Israeli, US, and other targets in the region has transformed the war into a multilateral confrontation, some of which will end when the war is over, while the rest may persist well into the future.

Internally, the Palestinians continue to experience political paralysis and face an inability to end either the violence or the continued seizure and occupation of their territories by the Israeli military and the settlement enterprise. Worse for the beleaguered Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, the unprecedented global sympathy and solidarity with and attention toward the Palestinian cause has not materialized into a substantive change of realities on the ground. Beyond symbolic recognition of Palestine as a state by a handful of countries, some harsh statements against Israel, and large-scale grassroots actions in the Western world in support of Gaza, October 7 has not achieved the kind of shift that Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar may have hoped for in terms of Palestinians’ freedom or independence.

However, October 7 has succeeded in derailing Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel. The kingdom insists that bilateral peace can only occur through the creation of a Palestinian state—something that other moderate Arab nations have also adopted as a prerequisite to play a role in Gaza’s “day after” plans. Most crucially for Sinwar, October 7 forced Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran to play direct roles in the fight against Israel in ways none of these parties could have anticipated or even wanted.

The death and destruction in Gaza are the worst chapter in Palestinian living memory, something that will take significant time to heal from. Nevertheless, this war can, should, and must be Gaza’s last. With the right support and creative visions for the future, the coastal enclave can and will be the beating heart of a future Palestinian state.

—Ahmed AlKhatib is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Postwar Gaza is coming

People are checking the destruction caused by overnight Israeli bombardment in Deir Balah in the central Gaza Strip on February 23, 2024, as battles between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas continue. (Photo by Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto)NO USE FRANCE

Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack and Israel’s subsequent military response should have started serious, detailed planning for postwar Gaza—by Israel, the United States, and other countries that want both security for Israel and security and self-determination for the Palestinian people. That did not happen, but the need now is even greater.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out Israel’s goal for postwar Gaza in his July 25 speech to the US Congress: “Gaza should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel.” President Joe Biden on May 31 set the US goal of a “durable end to the war” that “brings all the hostages home, ensures Israel’s security, creates a better ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power, and sets the stage for a political settlement that provides a better future for Israelis and Palestinians alike.”

It should be obvious that military power alone will not achieve these goals. It will take an effective, sustained postwar effort—but it can be done, as experience in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrates. History teaches lessons that should be heeded by postwar planners, including Germany and Japan after World War II, but also Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Who governs Gaza, or the parts of it where the shooting has gone down, is vitally important. Outside experts, Israeli political leaders, and the United Arab Emirates have all called for Gaza to be governed during a transitional period by a multi-national authority overseen by an international contact group with a robust international policing force that can prevent Hamas’s return to power and relieve Israeli forces of day-to-day security and humanitarian aid distribution responsibilities. The exit strategy would be tied to the training and equipping of a local Gazan police and gendarmerie, which the Office of the US Security Coordinator in Jerusalem knows how to do, including how to work closely with both the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

Some thorny political issues must be resolved, and only the United States can broker a resolution. All of these plans recognize that achieving Biden’s goal will require more direct US involvement than the United States has been willing to undertake. But there is no alternative that would prevent Hamas’s return to power.

Remember the meme “Winter Is Coming” from the series Games of Thrones. It warns that even as we face difficult times, we need to plan to make it through even tougher times ahead. Postwar Gaza is coming.

—Thomas Warrick, the former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security and senior advisor to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Institute.

The future of the Abraham Accords depends on a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Handout photo shows Secretary Antony J. Blinken is greeted by MFA DIrector of Protocol Mohammed Al-Ghamdi at King Khalid Airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 5, 2024. Blinken met Saudi Arabia’s de-facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Monday at the start of a Middle East tour, a U.S. official said, as Washington sought to forge a Saudi normalization deal with Israel. In the Gaza Strip, Palestinians huddling under bombardment said they hoped Blinken’s visit to the region would finally deliver a truce, in time to head off a threatened new Israeli assault on the last refuge at the enclave’s edge. Official State Department photo by Chuck Kennedy via ABACAPRESS.COM

Despite the tragedy of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the ensuing conflicts, the continued trauma, and the heightened turbulence across the region, the Abraham Accords are still standing. The accords, signed in 2020, represent the normalization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—and stand as a testament to the power of diplomacy and the pursuit of shared interests, even in a region as complex and historically fraught as the Middle East.

However, the future of the accords cannot be fully realized without a sustainable and just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework that encourages renewed dialogue. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia could be a transformative development. While Riyadh has shown interest, any formal move would likely hinge on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s participation would not only bolster the accords but could also set the stage for broader regional acceptance of Israel, further reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and potentially opening new avenues for addressing Palestinian concerns comprehensively.

Looking ahead, the survival and success of the Abraham Accords will depend on a continued commitment from all parties to maintain open dialogue, strengthen economic ties, and foster people-to-people connections that transcend political tensions. It is essential for the signatory countries to reaffirm their dedication to these agreements, not only as a means of advancing their national interests but also as a broader contribution to regional stability. The accords may not have solved all the Middle East’s problems, but they have undeniably shifted the geopolitical landscape in a positive direction: the pursuit of lasting peace and cooperation in the Middle East.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

The potential remains for ‘integration’ between Israel and Saudi Arabia

The Abrahamic Family House that includes a mosque, a church and a synagogue, as well as a forum to learn and exchange about the three monotheist religions is seen in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on April 6, 2023, few weeks after its opening, the site, designed by Ghanaan-British architect Sir David Adjaye OM OBE RA is a unique place of its kind in the world. Photo by Balkis Press/ABACAPRESS.COM

Quiet cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia has neither frozen nor slowed one year after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

From the onset of discussions about “integration,” the kingdom’s preferred term for envisioned relations, Saudi Arabia insisted that public formalization of the relationship would only come with parallel formalization of a path for Palestinian statehood.

This “path” looked more like a “vague concept” just before October 7. The kingdom was ready to cross the threshold if the United States threw in an upgraded defense agreement, support for Riyadh’s civilian nuclear energy aspiration, and other deal sweeteners. It was Israel who declined. Even committing to the concept was more than the governing coalition could muster.

After October 7, reading the room in the Muslim world, the kingdom firmed up the path demand. Global debates about Israel’s counter terrorism operations in Gaza make it easier for Saudi Arabia to brush off requests from corners eager for a signing ceremony that the kingdom relax its insistence on a path to two states.

Arab countries are circling the wagons around the two-state vision in the Arab Peace Initiative. With regional heavyweight Saudi Arabia politely declining to make Israeli integration into the Arab world official until Tel Aviv commits to a future Palestinian state, countries like Qatar and Kuwait are having to defend their non-normalized status less and less frequently. Even the United Arab Emirates, gobsmacked by expectations that it will underwrite a lot of Gaza’s reconstruction, is tying any funding it eventually provides to this firm path toward two states.

Meanwhile, in an electric undercurrent, Saudi Arabia and Israel proceed discreetly at pace with mind-melds in areas both hope will surge their economies, deter their enemies (and prevent the resurgence or emergence of new ones), and reduce societal stressors.

In fact, one lesson both re-learned in the year since October 7 is that return on investments made locally in the region requires resilience against unpredictable disruption, and that resilience requires strong partnerships. Saudi Arabia and Israel share an assessment of the threats to their governance models despite differences in the models themselves. And they share an assessment of the great shaping force their collaboration in areas like technology, health, food, and water security can have on the region. Do not mistake their stealth for a lack of forward motion.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She is president of the advisory firm Red Six International and a former senior director for the Gulf on the US National Security Council, where she led the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Israeli domestic politics have lurched to the right post-October 7

An Israeli horse mounted police officer rides into a crowd of protesters during the demonstration. About 50 protesters gathered in support of Prime Minister Netanyahu as thousands of Israelis protested in Tel Aviv on Saturday, against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, calling on the government to reach a deal of swapping hostages held by Hamas and Israeli.

One year after the tragic events of October 7, 2023, Israel has lurched only further to the right. Any effort to build unity among Israeli politicians—including through Benny Gantz’s initial entry into the governing coalition—was short-lived. Of the 250 hostages Hamas abducted, more than a hundred remain in captivity, and roughly half are presumed dead. The militant, populist voices of Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism parties have prevented any progress on securing a hostage deal, and they will continue to fight tirelessly to ensure a continued state of war. They have successfully hobbled the Palestinian Authority and ushered in a period of settlement growth and violence in the West Bank not seen since the second intifada. The future of Israel’s relationship with Gaza remains no more certain than it did on October 8.

One year in, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has still failed to assume responsibility for the attacks of October 7—for the historic failure of the intelligence and security institutions that he built over his cumulative seventeen years as prime minister. He has proven as nimble as ever in holding his coalition together, and the hopes of so many Israelis for early elections have all but disappeared. Israel’s economy, which has already taken a hit during the controversial judicial reforms before October 7, has been battered by the war; a second front with Hezbollah will only harm it further. Yet despite all the turmoil, Netanyahu continues to pull himself out of the dregs and is regaining popularity: Recent polls show that while the prime minister could not necessarily reconstitute a coalition, he would still receive the largest number of votes of any party were elections held today. The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and any further successes on the Northern front will only bolster his numbers further.

Israel’s left, for its part, already severely hobbled, has been decimated. Public opinion polling shows that Israeli and Palestinian views have only hardened against their neighbors. A full 66 percent of Jewish Israelis and 61 percent of Palestinians believe the other side “wants to commit genocide against them.” Right-wing views have been increasingly entrenched and mainstreamed—particularly as the once-marginal voices of Jewish nationalists now find themselves in positions of comfort and extreme influence in the government. Israel has still not recovered from the horror and loss of October 7, and the future of its leadership offers no clear path forward for a resumption of peace or prosperity for Israel in the region.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Can international justice make a difference in the conflict?

File photo of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC who has announced on March 1, 2022 that he have decided to proceed with opening an investigation into the Ukraine situation over any war crime has been committed by Russia.

Questions on violations of international humanitarian law and the commission of war crimes have been at the center of many debates with deep divides in commentary following Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s retaliatory bombing of Gaza, which has since extended to the West Bank and Lebanon, and which threatens the possibility of a regional war.

What is certain: Hamas and Hezbollah—non-state actors that may not even have legal advisors—are committing war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. What is also certain: The Israeli state is committing war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. What is less certain: Who—if any—of these actors will actually be brought to justice in a court of law.

For its part, Israeli officials seem to have decided to settle their disputes through kinetic means, not the law. In May, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the filing of applications for arrest warrants against Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammad Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh, and Israeli leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. More than four months later, the pre-trial chamber at the ICC has yet to issue the warrants, but tellingly, the list of Hamas perpetrators is already formally down by one, with Israel killing Haniyeh in a planned operation in Tehran at the end of July and Israel claiming it killed Deif in a strike in Gaza in mid-July. In contrast, at the same time Israeli attacks continued to kill, maim, and displace civilians in Gaza in July, Netanyahu was feted by the US Congress.

Earlier in the year, much fanfare surrounded South Africa’s application against Israel for violations of the Genocide Convention at another storied institution in The Hague—the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A flurry of initial activity over provisional measures gave an initial boost to the application and invited intense media coverage, though any final ruling on the claims will be years away. The application, even in these initial stages, has had concrete impacts globally, including a Japanese defense firm ending its business in Israel following the ICJ’s January 26 order and an appeals court in The Netherlands ordering the government to block exports of fighter jet parts to Israel (which the Dutch government later challenged). But the ICJ’s rulings on provisional measures in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel and a separate advisory opinion concluding that the Israeli state’s decades-long occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory is in violation of international law has not actually stopped Israel’s continued military actions in Gaza.

The complete aversion of Hamas and Hezbollah to abiding by the laws of war, combined with Israel’s stated promise to not cooperate with the ICC and its lack of compliance with the ICJ order, leaves the question of what, if any, diplomatic or political compromise will bring an end to continued violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. The lives of thousands of civilians depend on it.

—Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post One year after Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks, here’s how the region has changed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Alkhatib in The Dispatch: Hamas is Monstrous. Most Gazans Agree

Ahmed F. Alkhatib — Thu, 03 Oct 2024 19:37:08 +0000

The post Alkhatib in The Dispatch: Hamas is Monstrous. Most Gazans Agree appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia’s political prisoners must not be forgotten

Leonid Gozman — Tue, 01 Oct 2024 20:45:46 +0000

In August 2024, the largest prisoner exchange between Moscow and the West since the end of the Cold War took place, drawing much-needed attention to the issue of political prisoners in Putin’s Russia. While the release of high-profile opposition figures in August was certainly welcome, it is vital that the international community does not forget the thousands of Russian political prisoners who remain incarcerated.

Since taking power a quarter of a century ago, Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia into an increasingly ruthless and aggressive dictatorship. The warning signs were there from the very beginning, such as his December 2000 decision to reinstate the Stalin-era Soviet national anthem. Putin also embraced the pomp and pageantry of the Russian Empire, reflecting his goal of underlining the continuity in Russian history from Ivan the Terrible to Joseph Stalin.

During the early years of Putin’s reign, some of his government’s initial acts of oppression focused on the Russian media. Independent TV channels were taken under state control and satirical programs shut down. Efforts to dismantle Russia’s fledgling democracy also began almost immediately. The level of fraud during the first parliamentary elections of the Putin era took many by surprise. At the time, we could not imagine how farcical the entire process of Russian elections would soon become.

As Putin sought to strengthen his grip on power, the Kremlin initially targeted those accused of economic crimes. However, this was soon expanded to include political opponents and anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime. Within a few years, political repression had become one of the defining features of Putin’s rule.

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Putin’s powerful propaganda machine has succeeded in convincing the majority of Russians to accept the return of authoritarianism. While public support for the regime is far less enthusiastic than the Kremlin likes to claim, most Russians have been persuaded to stay away from politics and ignore the increasingly oppressive climate in the country. At the same time, around 20 percent of the Russian population categorically disagree with the direction the country has taken since 2000. It is this group that Putin seeks to silence via policies targeting the most active elements.

The Kremlin is primarily concerned with two groups: Commentators and activists. Those who publicly criticize the regime pose a threat because the authorities have no response to their accusations other than oppression. Activists are viewed as even more dangerous as they remain ready to join protests and participate in elections. The courage, clarity, and selflessness they demonstrate has the power to resonate on a human level with far larger numbers of ordinary Russians, including millions who are otherwise disengaged from politics.

The Kremlin has developed a system for dealing with these troublesome elements. To begin with, they may receive a warning. They are then fined, deprived of civil rights, and declared foreign agents. If they still do not stop their activities or leave the country, they are likely to be jailed. In this manner, the Putin regime silences its opponents and prevents any opposition from gaining momentum.

The list of offenses that qualify as anti-regime activity also continues to expand. Any opinions on the invasion of Ukraine that differ from the official narrative are deemed worthy of jail time. There have also been instances of people being imprisoned for expressing generic anti-war sentiments such as “thou shalt not kill,” or for displaying the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian flag. In one recent case, a man was jailed for given the “wrong” answer to journalists surveying public opinion about the war in Ukraine.

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