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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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A tax on remittances could hurt US households—and national security

Ananya Kumar — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 12:10:45 +0000

Last month, the US House of Representatives narrowly passed a sweeping tax and spending bill that is the top legislative priority for President Donald Trump. Among its lesser-known provisions is a proposed 3.5 percent tax on remittances sent by anyone who is not a US citizen or national.

Currently, remittances are not taxed separately, as senders already pay income tax on the earnings they transfer to family and friends abroad. “The One, Big, Beautiful Bill” would upend that system—effectively taxing those transfers twice. But that’s not all. A tax on remittances—valued at $905 billion globally—would not only hit US households and low-income countries, where they can account for more than 30 percent of gross domestic product; it could also undermine key US national security and foreign policy priorities.

If the Senate passes the Republican budget bill, remittance senders and recipients—who already contend with high fees—will undoubtedly be hit the hardest. In 2024, the global average cost of sending two hundred dollars across borders was 6.4 percent. That’s more than double the United Nations’ sustainable development goal of 3 percent and exceeds the Group of Twenty (G20) target of 5 percent.

If overall remittance volumes were to fall, US remittance providers—the companies that enable the sending and receiving of these payments—would be adversely affected. The proposed legislation imposes new responsibilities for these remittance service companies—such as verifying the sender’s citizenship and enforcing new fee structures and reporting mechanisms—all of which impose new costs, compliance burdens, and risks for remittance providers. These additional requirements threaten to reduce operational efficiency and drive up consumer prices, especially as US companies currently dominate the remittance services sector, setting standards for transfer speed, cost, and security. A tax-driven shift in the market would hurt these companies’ profitability and competitiveness, undermining broader US economic interests.

The risk of driving transactions underground

When it comes to national security, the United States already has a robust framework to monitor and regulate money and payment flows, including laws and infrastructure designed to combat financial crime. Remittance service companies are a central component of this framework, enabling state and federal law enforcement to track and pursue suspicious transfers and bad actors.

Moreover, research shows that taxing remittances leads to increased use of underground or informal channels for sending money. That is, senders seek out alternatives—less regulated, less transparent, and less safe ways of transferring their money abroad. In fact, countries that have enacted punitive measures on cross-border payments and currency exchange have often undermined their own ability to combat financial crime, thereby weakening their economies and diminishing their foreign influence.

Argentina serves as a revealing case study. Under previous leadership, the Argentine government imposed foreign exchange and capital controls that drove transactions into underground banking networks, making it far harder to trace illicit activity. These restrictions also weakened the already vulnerable economy, contributing to stagnation and inflation. President Javier Milei is now actively reversing these policies in favor of open and transparent capital flows and foreign currency exchange—reforms that significantly benefit both law enforcement and economic stability.

In the United States, the revenue generated by a federal tax on remittances would likely be less than 0.1 percent of the national budget. At the same time, it would reduce remittance volumes or push them underground, contradicting broader US national security goals and making US companies less competitive by increasing their cost of doing business. Accordingly, policymakers should reconsider the trade-offs and recognize that transparent, reliable remittance services serve the national interest of the United States.

A foreign policy tool hiding in plain sight

With respect to foreign policy and the ability to influence global development, remittances play a vital role—especially in an era of shrinking public-sector aid. Private remittance flows often reach communities and individuals more directly and efficiently than government-to-government assistance. US senders are often family members and friends of recipients, as well as faith-based and other humanitarian organizations. These flows ultimately contribute to stabilizing fragile economies, reducing the financial distress that often drives illegal migration. Additionally, remittances often support democratic activity and institutions in recipient countries, while also helping undermine autocratic governments by empowering citizens with resources independent of state control.

Because they account for one-sixth of all cross-border payments, remittances also reinforce the global dominance of the US dollar. A large portion of remittances is sent in—or exchanged into—US dollars, bolstering the currency’s central position in the international financial system and providing visibility into foreign transactions. This visibility, in turn, allows for the effective enforcement of anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies, as well as sanctions enforcement in cases of illicit activity.

Given these strategic benefits, the United States should take concrete steps to better leverage remittances as a national security and foreign policy asset. This begins with adopting smart, forward-looking policies that strengthen remittance channels and maximize their impact.

First, US policymakers should not just protect, but also actively promote legal remittance channels to ensure that these funds can flow safely and efficiently. Rather than imposing restrictive measures such as new taxes, the United States should foster deeper collaboration between law enforcement and well-regulated remittance providers. Such cooperation would support the adoption of rapidly evolving compliance technologies that more effectively detect illicit financial flows.

Second, the United States should reduce the costs and friction associated with remittance transactions. This includes granting well-regulated US remittance providers direct access to national payments systems and modernizing AML and Bank Secrecy Act regulations to reflect the realities of digital transactions. Emerging technologies can improve financial crime detection—provided that regulators offer clear guidance and foster their adoption.

Third, the United States should leverage its presidency of the G20 in 2026 to establish a global working group that captures the complexity of remittances as a tool of foreign policy and national security. The G20 has traditionally provided targets for remittance payments. Additionally, a US-led working group could address the need for better global coordination to curb illicit flows, reduce frictions, and explore how remittances can complement official aid flows, especially in constrained fiscal environments.

By recognizing and elevating the role of remittances, US policymakers can incorporate a powerful, underused asset into their broader foreign policy strategy—one that supports both domestic prosperity and global stability.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The author thanks Daniel Gorfine for his contributions to this article.

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Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery

Oleksandr Vasiuk — Thu, 29 May 2025 19:22:49 +0000

Whenever the topic of Ukraine’s reconstruction arises, most people tend to think of physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, homes, and hospitals. But real national recovery does not start with bricks and concrete. It begins with trust. And there is no better test of trustworthiness than the rule of law.

Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

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Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

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Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

Nowhere is this more impactful than in Syria’s Alawite-majority coast—the minority group to which the Assad family belongs. These communities have, since December 8, relied on social media to both raise awareness of and look for sectarian crimes committed by civilians and security forces affiliated with the new government. But this ecosystem was immediately flooded with false and misleading claims of massacres and international intervention, bolstered by real events and confusing statements by the transitional authorities. All of this fueled panic and confusion even before the March 6 insurgent uprising and Alawite massacres that killed more than 1600 security forces and Sunni and Alawite civilians. Without access to a consistent stream of reliable news, Syrians of all sects have adopted divergent narratives of major security events and struggle to understand the diplomatic positions of foreign countries or assess their own security status in their regions. This uncertainty also extends to all details of the transitional, and now interim, government’s policies and security forces.

Utilizing two weeks of fieldwork across the coast and consistent monitoring and analysis of Syrian social media before and after the fall of the regime, this report provides anecdotal evidence of the issues and effects of the information ecosystem in Syria. This research followed a more loosely structured two weeks of fieldwork in the same areas in mid-February. Through this, three common themes of information sharing have emerged:

Social media dominates the information ecosystem, from rumor mills to international misinformation campaigns.
Locals and officials have utilized WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages to fill the communication void, but they have still failed to create clear lines of official communication.
The media void has fueled fear, hatred, and sparked instability over security uncertainty. Parallel narratives of the current security situation have created further sectarian divisions.

“The biggest problem is Facebook”

In the nearly two decades since Facebook’s creation, the social media platform has evolved into thousands of community, group, and celebrity pages that often compete for followers and daily traffic. Facebook’s algorithms often promote these high-traffic, generic ‘news’ pages over more accurate, smaller-traffic local news pages, flooding Syrians with unverified clickbait-style news.

Facebook has for years been Syria’s dominant social media and news platform, a crucial medium for sharing information about and calling attention to crimes occurring in their communities. Misinformation was widespread from the revolution’s earliest days in 2011, and similar trends were quickly apparent in the chaos of the regime’s collapse.

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For example, local Salamiyah community pages quoted a General Security official on May 8, saying, “We urge our fellow citizens to exercise caution and refrain from engaging with any fake accounts or pages and to rely only on the official channels issued by the Ministry of Interior to disseminate security news and information.”

When asked how locals along Syria’s Alawite-majority coast accessed news about their region, the response was a resounding accordance of: “social media.”

A Syrian Alawite family rides on a truck to return home, in Latakia, Syria, March 13, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Each governorate, village, and even neighborhood has experienced the fall of the regime and developments differently. Local news, perhaps even more so than national news, carries important implications for local safety, access to services, and impacts on daily life. For instance, information about the violence perpetrated by both the insurgents and the pro-government factions on March 6 became vital for survival, but fake claims muddied real events as everyone turned to social media for answers.

For many Alawites, all of these claims were taken together to prove the extent of a “genocide” against them in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. But as the fake claims were disproven, they became evidence for many Sunnis that the real deaths of Alawite civilians and crimes by pro-government forces must have also been faked. As a result, the two communities today have completely separate narratives of that week, and many attempts at interfaith dialogues since have devolved into debates over the basic facts.

One woman in Latakia put it simply: “The biggest problem is Facebook,” she told us.

The media environment in March was a microcosm of how fake news had been used since Assad’s downfall to push divergent realities between the pro and anti-new government communities. But this misinformation goes beyond local initiatives and rumors.

Recent investigations by the BBC, Arabi Post, Verify-Sy, and the German Marshall Fund have also underscored the role of foreign media campaigns backed by Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah to push sectarian narratives and fake news onlinee, including the rumors that Maher al-Assad was returning to the coast with the Russian army at his back, ready to reclaim Syria.

And as real violence against Alawites escalated in Homs in January and February, this disinformation ensured that Alawites in other areas like Latakia and Tartous, which had not seen any considerable violations, remained confused and terrified about their future safety. Promises from pro-Assad Alawite networks of an imminent international intervention by the United States, France, Israel, or the United Nations to either reassert Assad in Damascus or carve out an “Alawite Coastal State” were used to widen support for the growing anti-Damascus insurgent movement, culminating in widespread support or neutrality for the insurgent attacks in March.

A Christian businessman from Safita recalled the Maher rumor, pointing to the Alawite villages surrounding the city: “That night you could hear gunfire from every village here, they all believed he was returning and celebrated.” Other locals told the authors at the time how their Facebook feed had suddenly become full of Alawites threatening revenge on coastal Sunnis for opposing Assad. As a local from a village outside Tartous recalled, when the rumors began, gunshots were heard throughout the Khirbet al-Mazzah region, convincing the local General Security forces that they would soon come under attack. As the confusion threatened to escalate into armed conflict, Alawites in the village sheltered the security forces in their homes until the morning, ensuring the area remained calm.

Struggling official channels of communication

These social media rumors and foreign media campaigns spread fear and confusion across Syria’s minority regions by exploiting both the real sectarian violations and the government’s lack of official news channels. For its part, the new government has made some initial attempts to spread information about municipal news, but still struggles greatly at relaying clear security-related statements or establishing effective two-way communication channels so locals can clarify rumors.

The Tartous and Latakia Governorate Facebook pages, which were formed in mid-December 2024 and appear to be run by government employees, regularly post updates of meetings and activities conducted across the governorate. Yet these pages have relatively few followers, are overshadowed by much higher traffic privately-run pages, and do not resolve the fears of those who already distrust the government. The majority of people, when asked where they get official government news from, made no mention of such pages, instead relying on word of mouth and their own online networks.

It all leads to one question. As a Christian in Safita asked, “Who represents the government?”

Official communication for security issues is even more opaque.

While there is one official Ministry of Interior page, for example, there are dozens of Facebook pages that claim to represent the General Security Services, with no way to discern any of their affiliations.

Regardless, a single Ministry of Interior page does not address the vast majority of Syrians’ needs: detailed and up-to-date information on security issues. This is not just a problem of clear government communication, but also a lack of two-way communication, allowing locals to check rumors or events witnessed in their towns.

To address this, local officials in the cities of Latakia and Tartous created multiple WhatsApp groups to directly connect their communities to security and administrative officials on security developments.

A business owner in Latakia city who was among the first invited to the group claimed the system “was very useful in the early days of the new administration because of the rise in crime.” Residents will text in reports about robberies or suspicious activity, and security forces will respond in a timelier manner than when using phone lines, which he claimed were always busy. These groups have also become a central means for regional officials to disseminate news.

However, in Tartous, a female activist stated that the WhatsApp groups were almost entirely composed of men and were capped at four hundred people. As she wasn’t included in that limit, she would have to reach out to others to get information from or to the channel. The business owner from Latakia also voiced concerns about the size of the group, saying that some people were clogging the chat with non-security-related comments and would then have to be removed from the group by moderators.

While this approach improves some communication, many criticize this improvised system: “Why is an official decree distributed in a WhatsApp channel?” asks a Sunni activist in Tartous.

Confusion about official policies of the government, such as the settlement process for ex-regime soldiers, rules around civil society, curfews, and checkpoints, has forced many to lie low and wait anxiously for clarity. As a priest in Suqlabiyah stated, locals come to him with questions about what makes a war criminal: “There is confusion about who is going to be detained or killed.”

The rift between realities

In Latakia, some Sunnis who spoke with the authors were unsure what to think about the news of the massacres on the coast. They don’t know or perhaps don’t want to know if civilians were killed. Meanwhile, in Baniyas, many survivors argue that there were no insurgents in the city, but rather it began with a government-sanctioned slaughter. These conflicting realities continue to be fought online, but the Facebook quarrels have real-life consequences.

During the long years of Syria’s civil war, many regions became isolated and rooted in their local realities of struggle. As al-Sharaa’s forces seized the country, many were optimistic, though they knew little of his government in Idlib. However, as the new government settled in and in light of the violence on the coast and elsewhere, the initial hope has faded into distrust and confusion. Those interviewed had more questions than answers about the various security forces and their origins, the factions from the north, life in Idlib under al-Sharaa’s militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the ideology of the current government, and the conditions in nearby governorates.

Officials are deeply aware of this—one security officer in Qadmus told us that “combatting fear is a major issue.”

This uncertainty about the future has heightened sectarianism based on the regime’s careful weaponization of Syria’s demographic makeup. Fear of military checkpoints has further isolated many Alawites, while Facebook rumors about roving foreign fighters and factions committing daily crimes against Alawites have prevented most from engaging with local security officials. Distrust in the government, in hand with their resounding silence on the specifics of the events of March 6, has left Syrians to piece together their own narratives, further separating the country into distinct realities.

Reconstructing the Syrian information ecosystem

Breaking Syria from Facebook’s grasp will not be easy or quick. However, the Syrian authorities and international organizations can take several steps to help begin the process.

First, ensuring that the March 6 Investigation Committee releases an accurate and uncensored report on the events of that week will go a long way towards bridging a trust gap between the Sunni and Alawite narratives, as most Sunnis who denied the deaths of Alawite civilians also told the authors that they would accept whatever conclusion the committee came to.

Second, expanding civil communication networks will help foster more accurate and effective local news systems. This can include both word-of-mouth via civil councils that engage with local officials, as well as local journalists on Facebook. Expanding these systems requires funding support from the international community and clear authorization from Damascus to ensure local civil networks do not face any risk of legal troubles.

Third, expanding official government media channels to include local security announcements, such as curfews, deployments, and patrols, and, importantly, addressing any violations or crimes rumored to have been committed by security forces.

Lastly, international organizations should increase funding for local media outlets, especially those engaged in fact-checking and who demonstrate professional standards in what they share. Helping existing journalists organize into new institutions with websites outside of Facebook will further bolster their credibility and reach.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

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Russia’s summer offensive could spark a new humanitarian crisis in Ukraine

Viktor Liakh, Melinda Haring — Tue, 27 May 2025 19:34:22 +0000

As the Russian army gears up for a major summer offensive, Ukraine could soon be facing its most serious humanitarian crisis since the initial phase of the full-scale invasion more than three years ago. If the West does not act swiftly by sending military aid, tightening sanctions, and reaffirming its long-term commitment to Ukraine, the unfolding crisis could overwhelm Kyiv and undermine the Ukrainian war effort.

Current Russian troop movements and battlefield dynamics indicate that the coming summer offensive may be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war. If successful, this campaign could allow Russian troops to push the front line tens of kilometers forward into Ukrainian-held territory and overrun parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk provinces.

The cities of Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Kramatorsk are high on the list of likely targets. They have all experienced significant damage and large-scale displacement as a result of Russian bombardment. If these cities and others in the surrounding area fall to the Russians in the coming months, the wider region could become depopulated as large numbers of people flee the fighting.

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Based on current trends and previous displacement waves, at least two hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians living close to the current front lines of the war could be forced to leave their homes by fall 2025. This is not speculation; it is informed by experience gained during Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian organizations have been on the front lines of the humanitarian response. They have provided essential aid, temporary housing, psychological support, and ongoing reintegration counselling to help Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s invasion rebuild dignity and restart their lives.

Ukraine’s civil society has worked wonders over the past three years but cannot realistically hope to absorb another 200,000 diplaced people without international support. The situation is even more alarming due to the recent closure of USAID, which was a major player in the humanitarian response to Russia’s invasion. With Putin’s troops already advancing, Ukraine’s Western partners must not ignore the looming danger.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3.6 million people remained internally displaced within Ukraine as of early 2025. Most are women, children, and elderly individuals. Many have already been forced to flee multiple times. This population of displaced people may soon become considerably larger.

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Compounding the crisis, European governments are beginning to phase out temporary support programs for Ukrainians. While the EU recently agreed to extend temporary protection through 2026, enforcement is sometimes patchy. Meanwhile, there are indications across Europe that resettlement fatigue is growing.

In the UK and US, political rhetoric on the topic of Ukrainian refugees has shifted ominously. Most recently, reports emerged that the Trump administration is exploring options to repatriate Ukrainians who entered the United States following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

If these trends continue, millions of Ukrainians could find themselves trapped between advancing Russian forces and a closing window of international asylum. While Ukrainians in the east of the country flee Putin’s invading army, many Ukrainian refugees may be forced to return home with uncertain prospects.

If the overstretched Ukrainian military is unable to contain Russia’s summer offensive, the fallout will reverberate far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The displacement of at least 200,000 more civilians would severely strain humanitarian corridors, destabilize border regions, and sow chaos in Ukrainian cities already struggling to absorb previous waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s Western partners still have time to prevent this, but they must act with a sense of urgency. While the Trump administration has been clear that it does not plan to provide Ukraine with further military aid, it should continue sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians while confirming its readiness to sell arms to Kyiv. Europe must speed up the delivery of promised weapons and should expand supplies significantly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.

In parallel, European countries should take steps to provide reassurance and protect the legal status of Ukrainian refugees. Donor organizations can help by strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian civil society groups that have demonstrated agility, transparency, and high levels of local trust.

The next phase of Russia’s invasion is not just being fought on the front lines of the war. It is taking place across the country in bomb shelters, train stations, and temporary accommodations. Russia is trying to break Ukrainian resistance by making large parts of Ukraine unlivable and destabilizing the country. Ukraine’s partners can do much to counter these efforts, but they must act now before the military and humanitarian situation deteriorates further.

Viktor Liakh is president of the East Europe Foundation. Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine.

Ukraine’s vibrant civil society wants to be heard during peace talks

Ana Lejava — Thu, 15 May 2025 20:31:22 +0000

As US-led efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, debate continues over what a viable future settlement could look like. While officials in Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv discuss technicalities and potential concessions, members of Ukraine’s vibrant civil society are also attempting to define the contours of a lasting and meaningful peace.

Many Ukrainian civil society representatives stress that peace must be more than a mere pause in fighting. Temporary ceasefires may lead to periods of relative calm, but unless the root causes of the war are addressed and justice is delivered, the conflict will merely be frozen and not resolved. Similarly frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia offer cautionary tales of how such outcomes can serve Russian interests. These unresolved disputes have allowed Moscow to destabilize its neighbors for decades while maintaining strategic leverage and control.

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In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

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Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable\

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses.

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence.

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations.

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace.

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions.

Going forward, there are three things to watch:

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation.

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future.

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December.

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists.

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity.

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions.

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land.

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors.

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.”

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention.

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state.

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development.

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country.

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise.

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran. The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria.

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate.

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.”

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.”

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center.

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians.

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria.

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal.

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood.

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory.

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria.

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life.

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough.

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians.

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed.

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses.

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community.

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in.

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries. 

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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There is no easy fix for Haiti’s crises. But here’s where the US can start.

Camilla Reitherman — Tue, 13 May 2025 20:12:52 +0000

On May 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Haiti’s two most powerful gang coalitions, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, as foreign terrorist organizations. This move—along with Rubio’s two trips to the Caribbean earlier this year—signals the Trump administration’s recognition of the growing crisis just 750 miles from Key West, Florida. Still, the imminent collapse of Port-au-Prince may soon demand a broader and more coordinated US response.

This is Haiti’s fourth year without a president, its ninth year without holding presidential elections, and its second year without a single democratically elected official in power. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the country has witnessed a litany of crises—security, humanitarian, and political—that have internally displaced over one million Haitians, more than half of whom are children. Weakened state institutions and an under-resourced national police force have left Haitians to confront these challenges with little to no support from their government. While resilience has long been a defining trait of the Haitian people, forged through more than two centuries of adversity, the past several months have tested that endurance to its limits. Gangs have made staggering advances into densely populated areas of the capital and previously sheltered rural regions, driving a surge in violence that has claimed over 1,500 lives since January 1.

Experts warn that the total collapse of Port-au-Prince is now closer than ever. What happens if the capital falls to the gangs? Beyond a seismic humanitarian crisis, the Transitional Presidential Council—a provisional governing body formed in April 2024 with the support of the Caribbean Community and the United States—would likely unravel, taking with it any remaining hope for constitutional reform, credible elections, and a functioning central government. And as gangs expand their control beyond urban strongholds and into the countryside, the entire nation would teeter on the edge of state collapse.

While there are no immediate solutions to the crisis in Haiti, there are several tangible steps the United States can take to ameliorate the suffering of the Haitian people and help facilitate the country’s recovery. Failing to do so risks allowing the crisis to not only worsen, but spill over into the United States and throughout the region.

Ripple effects

The paramount consequence of Haiti’s potential collapse into a failed state would be the devastating loss of life and the shattered futures of hundreds of thousands of Haitians. But this fallout would not be contained within the country’s borders—the United States and the broader Caribbean Basin will inevitably feel the ripple effects of the crisis as well.

A humanitarian disaster of this scale would trigger a dramatic surge in migration to countries across the region, including to the US southern border. This coincides with the Trump administration’s revocation of Temporary Protected Status for 200,000 Haitian refugees, forcing deportations at a moment of maximum instability. The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s closest neighbor and a key US ally, would also face intensified pressure—both from refugee flows and the risk of cross-border violence. In the total absence of a functioning state, Haiti could become a staging ground for terrorist activity, drug markets, and transnational criminal networks already active in the region, further destabilizing the Caribbean Basin. With this level of insecurity just miles from the United States’ shores, the situation represents a five-alarm fire for US national security.

US foreign policy in Haiti has long been marked by intervention, mismanagement, and short-term fixes. Many experts fear that the designation of Haiti’s gangs as foreign terrorist organizations falls into the same pattern—failing to address the root causes of gang violence or consider the impact on civilians who rely on aid. And as the failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support mission to restore security to Haiti has made clear, even efforts with significant US backing have proved inadequate to the challenges of the moment. Past US interventions and policies toward Haiti have fueled suspicion among many Haitians and hopelessness among many US policymakers. Yet while the US government bears significant responsibility for this skepticism, it also possesses the influence to effect positive—even if incremental—change for Haiti.

How the US can help right now

The US government can take several steps in the near term to bring back a modicum of stability and prepare the nation for “the day after.” Many of the necessary policies already exist—they simply require reauthorization or targeted revisions to be effective.

Although Haiti is widely recognized as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States remains the largest market for its most profitable sector: textiles. Thanks to bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in 2006 and 2010, known as the HOPE and HELP acts, which established preferential trade terms for the sector, Haiti’s apparel exports to the United States surged from $231 million in 2001 to $994 million in 2021. Although the crisis has severely undermined textile production, these exports provide a resilient economic lifeline for what remains of Haiti’s formal economy. However, unless reauthorized, these trade preferences are set to expire in September. Rather than imposing tariffs that further destabilize Haiti’s fragile manufacturing sector, Congress should move quickly to preserve the near-shoring of US manufacturing imports by passing HR 1625—the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2025, sponsored by Representative Gregory Murphy (R-NC).

The withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) raises many questions about the future of development organizations in Haiti, as hundreds of life-saving programs are put on indefinite hold. Several voices within the Haiti policy community note that the agency’s work, despite its best intentions, sometimes created an overreliance on foreign aid within Haitian institutions. Over a century of this dynamic led Haiti to become, in the words of Haiti expert Jake Johnston, an “aid state.”

In the wake of USAID’s departure, the United States has the opportunity to sculpt a more effective aid strategy that puts the onus of development work in the hands of an ever-resilient Haitian civil society, not just foreign contractors. This strategy proved successful in the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. And this approach serves as the foundation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), a law passed by Congress during US President Donald Trump’s first term that prioritizes localization and reorients US foreign policy strategy in fragile states toward preventing conflict rather than reacting to it. Haiti was designated one of the GFA’s ten priority countries and the Biden administration made meaningful strides toward developing a strategy that prioritizes engagement with a broad range of trusted local partners. Renewing the GFA could build on this groundwork by channeling substantial resources into empowering local partners, thus fostering greater self-reliance within Haitian institutions. Representatives Sarah Jacobs (D-CA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) have introduced a bill to reauthorize and strengthen the GFA. Yet despite the Trump administration’s support for aid localization, momentum for renewing this policy has faltered in both the legislative and executive branches, leaving its future in peril.

A whole-of-government approach

As Georges Fauriol, an expert on the Caribbean, has described US policy toward Haiti, “the challenge is not so much the absence of a strategy as its disaggregated character.” Whether it be the State Department, the Office of the US Trade Representative, or the Department of Defense’s US Southern Command, the US government possesses no shortage of entities that conduct Haiti policy—not to mention the influence of external interest groups such as those in the US Haitian diaspora.

Although working toward the same mission, these initiatives tend to operate in silos and do not come together to form a cohesive strategy for the long-term stability of the country. This dynamic was evident during the US response to Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, as US Southern Command-led military relief operations and USAID disaster initiatives often struggled with unclear divisions of responsibility, resulting in operational inefficiencies. The GFA and policies such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative aim to establish a whole-of-government approach to address this issue. Rather than launching new initiatives for each emerging crisis, the Trump administration should also appoint a special envoy to coordinate and leverage existing Haiti policies within the various branches, helping to shape a more coherent foreign policy for the island and the broader region.

The severity of Haiti’s ongoing crisis makes envisioning “the day after” a challenge. Yet, for countless Haitians, whether living in Haiti or abroad, this vision is worth fighting for, just as it has been during past periods of turmoil. The United States has a strategic interest in advancing a Haiti policy focused on long-term stability rather than short-term fixes. No single policy or initiative will solve the security, humanitarian, and economic challenges that have engulfed Haiti for the past four years. But failing to act at all would further jeopardize the stability of Haiti, the United States, and the region as a whole.

Camilla Reitherman is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

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From rubble to rebirth: A model for Syria’s reconstruction

Mahmood Alhosain — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:53:47 +0000

Almost six months have passed since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria. The most notable event of this transitional phase was the establishment of a new Syrian government in late March 2025, consisting of twenty-three ministers from different backgrounds.

The new government has inherited the aftermath of more than five decades of authoritarian rule, compounded by the devastating consequences of nearly fourteen years of armed conflict. In addition, Syria continues to grapple with the impact of harsh international sanctions, which were imposed in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread human rights violations. These challenges have rendered Syria a fragile state, with its institutions on the verge of total collapse.

However, the fall of the dictatorial regime and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to begin rebuilding state institutions. Whether this new Damascus can seize this opportunity relies on four key pillars: achieving security and political stability, fostering inclusive political participation, establishing justice as a precondition for sustainable peace, and lifting sanctions to prevent the resurgence of violence.

The first pillar: Security and political stability

A deeply fragile security landscape, shaped by two major challenges, hinders Syria’s progress toward stability.

The first challenge is that the regions outside of the new Syrian government’s control, particularly the Jazira region of Eastern Syria—the provinces of Hasakah, Raqqa, and the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor—are currently under the authority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In March 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement outlining the integration of the SDF into the institutions of the newly formed Syrian state. However, the agreement remains vague in its provisions and lacks a concrete timeline for implementation.

Subsequently, it is imperative that the international coalition—led by the United States, which still maintains military presence in Syria—plays a proactive role in facilitating the agreement’s execution. This involves applying political pressure and actively sponsoring dialogue between the parties to foster mutual understanding and avoid any potential military confrontation.

Nevertheless, spoilers are working to derail any potential agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF. Among them is the hardline faction within the SDF, primarily composed of foreign cadres affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They oppose the agreement because its implementation would significantly diminish their influence, including restoring Damascus’s authority over oil and gas sites currently under SDF control. The shift would also undermine the influence of prominent SDF warlords, many of whom are PKK affiliates wielding unchecked authority.

Consequently, they have sought to escalate tensions and resist cooperating with the new administration, as seen with the SDF’s recent crackdown on civilians who displayed the new Syrian national flag. Moreover, according to human rights organizations, the SDF arrested 93 civilians in March 2025, including seven children.

The second challenge is Israel’s incessant military operations, which pose grave risks for Syria, the region, and Israel itself.

Fragmentation of the Syrian state could invite renewed foreign interference, particularly from Iran, which may view Syria’s weakened and divided state as a strategic opportunity to expand its influence.

But for Israel, the military campaign in Syria serves an objective of systematic destruction of Syrian military infrastructure to prevent the rebuilding of a functional defense apparatus. This also assists Israel in implementing a new regional security landscape, aimed at obstructing stabilization efforts through continued airstrikes and ground incursions.

Change in this calculus must come through pressure. The international community—particularly the European Union, Arab states, and the United States—must exert more meaningful and sustained diplomatic efforts to halt Israel’s military actions if they want to achieve sustainable peace in Syria.

The second pillar: Inclusive political participation

In Syria, decades of exclusion and sectarian domination under the al-Assad regime dismantled social cohesion and eroded political trust. It will be crucial to establish a political system that ensures genuine participation for all societal components—political, sectarian, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations. Such a system must provide for the equitable distribution of political and administrative influence through effective participatory mechanisms.

While the new Syrian administration has launched a national dialogue and appointed a qualified government, political participation must go beyond surface-level representation. Participatory governance must be the foundation for rebuilding state institutions. Any political exclusion or power monopolization risks driving certain groups toward disengagement or opposition, transforming them from constructive participants into potential nemeses of the political process.

Achieving this requires pursuing two complementary paths: both a top-down and a bottom-up approach.

The top-down model necessitates that the government lead by initiating structured and transparent programs that facilitate political inclusion. This includes continuing the national dialogue on foundational issues like transitional justice, constitutional reform, state structure, the political system, and foreign relations. These dialogues must be inclusive and truly representative of Syria’s diverse fabric.
Notably, Syrian public opinion demonstrates clear rejection of sectarian-based systems, favoring instead frameworks rooted in civil representation and citizenship. The new Syrian government must treat all Syrians as individual citizens, rather than as members of religious or ethnic groups, and anchoring national discourse in the concept of citizenship is fundamental.

Equally vital is the bottom-up role of civil society in advancing political transition and decision-making. Civil society should be granted the necessary space to operate freely, reflecting Syrian societal dynamics and avoiding inflaming social sensitivities. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of exiled Syrian civil actors, who—during the war—demonstrated a clear willingness to engage politically. According to the literature, these initiatives reveal strong potential for grassroots engagement. Building on these experiences is crucial for forming a cohesive, credible civil society capable of playing a constructive role in stabilization and institutional rebuilding.

The third pillar: Transitional justice

Transitional justice is pivotal for achieving sustainable peace in Syria. After more than a decade of violent conflict—fueled by an authoritarian regime responsible for killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions—there is growing consensus that any political settlement that neglects Syrians’ demands for accountability will neither end the violence, nor enable legitimate and stable state building.

Lack of transitional justice fosters a culture of impunity and fuels the risk of renewed violence, driven by cycles of personal and collective vengeance. As numerous studies have shown, accountability goes beyond a legal or ethical imperative—it is a structural requirement for achieving long-term stability and peace.

It also includes a social and moral process that must begin with public acknowledgment of the suffering endured by victims and their families throughout the 14-year war. Such acknowledgment lays the groundwork for reparations and paves the way for meaningful national reconciliation, helping to move beyond nearly half a century of repression and violence.

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The literature on conflict and transitional justice highlights the importance of context-specific approaches. In Syria, this means that transitional justice must be rooted in the aspirations of Syrians, particularly survivors of violence, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Empirical research on Syrian refugee communities abroad confirms that many see justice as essential to achieving sustainable peace.

Therefore, the new government needs to initiate a transparent and credible transitional justice process supported by the international community. This process must include well-defined implementation mechanisms aligned with international legal standards and grounded in justice and human rights principles. Moreover, it should avoid transplanting external justice models, as approaches that are not adapted to Syria’s social and political context may reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions rather than heal them.

This effort demands sincere political will, robust institutional frameworks, and the active participation of a broad range of actors, including human rights and legal organizations, civil society groups, and local communities. Furthermore, sustained support from international institutions, particularly the United Nations, is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the transitional justice process.

The fourth pillar: Lifting sanctions

In the wake of the regime’s collapse, lifting sanctions has become paramount to achieving two core objectives. First, enabling the reconstruction of state institutions. And second, alleviating the profound economic suffering endured by the Syrian civilian population.

The continuation of sanctions severely impedes stabilization and early recovery efforts. Without access to financial and material resources, the state remains incapable of delivering basic services, perpetuating Syria’s status as a fragile state. This vacuum risks fostering environments conducive to radicalization and renewed violence, which could destabilize Syria and the broader region.

Years of economic isolation have induced severe shortages in basic goods, rampant inflation, record unemployment, and a dramatic depreciation of the Syrian pound. These conditions have exacerbated poverty and social disintegration, undermining any prospect for national reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Economic sanctions against Syria are exceedingly complex. Following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread violence against civilians.

US sanctions have proven to be the most stringent, as they are open-ended with no built-in expiration, unlike EU sanctions, which are subject to annual renewal. Additionally, US sanctions on Syria predate the 2011 uprising, tracing back to 1979 when Washington designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The most expansive US sanctions to date were imposed after 2011, culminating in the Caesar Act, which significantly intensified financial and economic restrictions on the regime and its affiliates.

While reports have surfaced indicating that the United States has outlined certain conditions for sanction relief—such as addressing the issue of foreign fighters—it is imperative that the new Syrian administration prioritize meaningful internal reforms. These reforms should include guaranteeing fundamental rights, refraining from suppressing individual freedoms, enhancing transparency, and reinforcing the rule of law. Commitment to these principles will likely prove more effective in building international confidence than focusing solely on foreign policy overtures.

Rebuilding Syrian state institutions in the post-Assad era requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach integrating security and political stability, inclusive political participation, transitional justice, and sustained efforts to lift economic sanctions. Achieving this requires the support of both international actors and local stakeholders to ensure sustainable peace and stability.

Mahmood Alhosain is a PhD candidate in Conflict and Peace Studies in the political science department at Radboud University. His areas of interest focus on: Post-conflict studies, development, and deconstruction.

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US funding cuts create openings for Russian disinformation in Ukraine

Muhammad Tahir — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 21:14:02 +0000

Cut the cameras. Slash the salaries. Cancel the investigations. That’s the reality facing Ukraine’s independent media, which serves as a vital firewall against Kremlin disinformation, as the US freezes nearly all support.

Since January 2025, the United States has quietly suspended 90 percent of its development funding for Ukraine, including the grants that kept most of the country’s independent newsrooms alive. Whether channeled directly through USAID or via partners, that funding has disappeared. The move to cut financial support comes as Moscow is intensifying its disinformation efforts.

In Mykolaiv, a strategic port city in Ukraine’s south, NikVesti is on the brink. With 4.5 million visits in 2024, it has been a cornerstone of independent local wartime reporting. Now, after losing a fifth of its budget through the loss of US funding, the newsroom is running on fumes. “We’re burning through our final reserves,” co-founder Oleh Dereniuha commented. “If funding doesn’t return, it will be difficult to make it past April.”

Further south in Kherson, Vgoru, one of only three independent outlets still operating in the region, has lost 80% of its US funding. Freelancers are gone and investigative projects have been shelved. “No one else is reporting from here,” said editor Ilona Korotitsyna. “Without us, they’ll only hear Russia.”

In Sumy, a northeastern Ukrainian city facing relentless Russian bombardment from across the nearby border, independent outlet Cykr is barely hanging on. “Sixty percent of our budget came from USAID,” said editor Dmytro Tyschenko. The site has enough funding to last a month. “After that,” he warned, “we’re bracing for a flood of unchecked Russian propaganda to fill the vacuum.”

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Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022, the US has delivered more than $37 billion in development aid to Ukraine. With the domestic Ukrainian media market in a state of wartime collapse, the vast majority of outlets have survived almost entirely on international grants, most of them from the US.

Outlets like NikVesti, Vgoru, and Cykr are among the 90 percent of independent Ukrainian media that relied on this funding to report the facts under extraordinary conditions of bombardment, blackouts, and occupation. Beyond exposing Russian disinformation, journalists working for these outlets have investigated corruption, documented Russian strikes and their aftermath, and held the Ukrainian authorities to account, often at considerable personal risk.

There are now mounting concerns that Russia will seek to exploit emerging gaps in Ukraine’s information space created by US funding cuts. With far fewer credible sources able to report on local news stories across Ukraine, Kremlin disinformation will become much harder to counter.

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A recent disinformation operation in the Sumy region offered a glimpse of the kinds of tactics Moscow is likely to employ. In early April, Russian-linked Telegram channels began promoting fake messaging attributed to the Sumy City Council’s Health Department claiming that a mysterious disease had broken out among Ukrainian soldiers. They warned civilians to avoid contact with troops returning from the front.

This is a typical Russian disinformation operation, with fake news wrapped in official-looking packaging and seeded online in order to sow panic. The goal isn’t just to mislead, however. Russia also aims to undermine faith in the information space altogether. And with credible independent Ukrainian media outlets unable to operate, that task becomes significantly easier.

Allowing Ukraine’s independent media to fall silent in the middle of a war would have serious strategic consequences. Without independent journalism, Ukraine not only loses its first line of defense against Russian disinformation. It also loses the transparency and accountability that are vital for the future of the country’s democracy.

The Ukrainian outlets and journalists hit by recent US funding cuts are not just waiting for a bailout. They are launching membership programs, pitching donors, trimming operations, and testing new formats. Some are turning to diaspora networks. Others are banking on European funding. So far, these efforts are proving slow and insufficient.

“We’re doing everything we can. In a region where the local business market is nonexistent, we’re reaching out to European partners, applying for every grant we can find,” said Vgoru’s Korotitsyna. “But EU funding is slow, and the competition is fierce. We need support now, not six months down the line, or we won’t be around to receive it.”

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former journalist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He has reported extensively across the CIS, South Asia, and the Middle East.

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Putin is ruthlessly erasing Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 21:27:42 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered Ukrainians living under Russian occupation to “legalize” their status by September 10 or face deportation. In other words, those who have not yet done so must apply for Russian passports or risk being expelled from their homes as foreigners. This March 20 presidential decree is the latest step in a campaign to pressure Ukrainians into accepting Russian citizenship as the Kremlin seeks to strengthen its grip over areas of Ukraine currently under Russian control.

Kremlin officials say they have distributed around 3.5 million Russian passports in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine since the onset of the full-scale invasion just over three years ago. Residents are reportedly being forced to apply for Russian passports in order to access basic services such as healthcare and state pensions, while those without Russian documentation face the possibility of harassment and detention.

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The enforced adoption of Russian citizenship is just one of the many tools being employed by the Kremlin to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to mass arrests designed to root out any potential dissenters. Those targeted typically include elected officials, military veterans, religious leaders, civil society activists, teachers, journalists, and patriots. Thousands have been abducted in this manner since 2022 and remain unaccounted for, with many thought to be languishing in a network of prisons in Russian-occupied Ukraine and Russia itself.

Those who remain are subjected to terror tactics in conditions that Britain’s The Economist has described as a “totalitarian hell.” All public symbols of Ukrainian statehood and cultural identity are being systematically dismantled. The Ukrainian language is suppressed, while any Christian denominations other than the Russian Orthodox Church face persecution or worse.

Moscow’s efforts to erase Ukrainian identity begin in the classroom. In schools throughout the occupied regions, Ukrainian children are being taught a new Kremlin-approved curriculum that praises Russian imperialism and glorifies the ongoing invasion of Ukraine while demonizing the entire concept of a separate and independent Ukrainian state. Any parents who dare to resist risk losing custody of their children.

The Kremlin is also accused of kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from occupied regions and deporting them to Russia, where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian roots and impose an imperial Russian identity. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin due his personal involvement in these mass abductions of Ukrainian children.

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The actions of the Russian occupation authorities are entirely in line with the vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric coming from Putin himself and other officials in Moscow. Putin has long insisted that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Six months prior to the full-scale invasion, he took the highly unusual step of publishing a lengthy history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood.

As Russian troops prepared to invade in February 2022, Putin sought to justify this act of international aggression by describing Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has declared occupied Ukrainian territory to be “Russian forever.”

The Russian establishment has enthusiastically followed Putin’s lead. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has stated that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” Meanwhile, poisonous anti-Ukrainian language has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.”

This week’s presidential decree threatening to deport Ukrainians from their own homes is the latest reminder that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no mere border dispute or attempt to address legitimate security concerns. It is a colonial war of the most brutal kind that aims to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. In the heart of Europe and before the watching world, Putin is openly pursuing policies that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide.

The grim reality of Russia’s invasion should weigh heavily on the US officials who are currently charged with drawing lines on maps and attempting to create a realistic framework for a possible ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. While diplomatic compromises and temporary territorial concessions are now clearly inevitable, any future peace deal must also take into account the fate of the millions of Ukrainians who are likely to be left under Russian occupation.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Alkhatib quoted in The Jerusalem Post on the responsibility of Palestinian leaders to their people

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:38 +0000

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Warrick joins Al-Jazeera to discuss Hamas’ refusal to turn over Israeli hostages

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:52 +0000

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US peace initiative can help bring Ukraine’s abducted children home

Kristina Hook, Iuliia Hoban — Thu, 06 Mar 2025 21:50:14 +0000

Among the many crimes Russia is accused of committing in Ukraine, few are as shocking as the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Ukraine has identified around 20,000 children subjected to forced deportations since the full-scale invasion began three years ago, but officials believe the true number of victims may be far higher. These allegations are so grave that the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest in March 2023 on war crimes charges.

Securing the return of Ukraine’s kidnapped children must play a part in the peace efforts recently initiated by US President Donald Trump. Speaking in February, Trump acknowledged that he was aware of the situation and said he could potentially persuade Putin to release the children as part of a negotiated settlement to end the war. “I believe I could, yes,” he told Fox News Radio host Brian Kilmeade.

Efforts to rescue the thousands of Ukrainian children held in Russia would likely receive strong public backing in the United States, including from Trump’s support base. Reverend Jason Charron, who prayed over Trump moments before his near-assassination in Pennsylvania during the 2024 election campaign, recently wrote to the US leader calling on him “to be a shield for the Ukrainian people and for the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.”

The Kremlin’s illegal deportations have also sparked strong bipartisan condemnation in the US political arena. Less than a year ago, a resolution slamming Russia’s “illegal abductions” as a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention was passed in the US House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, with support coming from leading Republicans including Speaker Mike Johnson.

Meanwhile, research backed by the US Department of State has provided grim details of Russia’s deportation operations and linked them directly to Putin. According to a report by Yale’s School of Public Health released in December 2024, Russian presidential aircraft and funds were used in a program to take children from occupied Ukrainian territories, strip them of Ukrainian identity, and place them with Russian families.

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Russia stands accused of instigating a large-scale, coordinated, and systematic policy designed to remove thousands of Ukrainian children from their homes and rob them of their Ukrainian roots via a network of camps and foster homes, where they are subjected to indoctrination and in many cases assigned new Russian names. Kremlin officials have attempted to justify the deportations by claiming to be motivated by wartime safety concerns, yet their actions still constitute violations of international law. Nor has there been any attempt to explain why children are subsequently brainwashed and forced to adopt Russian identities.

The abductions are causing profound harm to the victims, their families, and wider communities. The relatively few children who have so far returned to Ukraine have provided harrowing testimonies of their experience in Russia. Many have recounted being physically and mentally abused for their Ukrainian identity, or told that their family and country had abandoned them.

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Presently, no international legal mechanism exists to facilitate the safe return of abducted Ukrainian children. However, the United States has many cards it can play in order to achieve this goal. US sanctions against Russia are not primarily linked to individual aspects of the invasion. Instead, they are focused on the illegal act of the invasion itself, which is in violation of the United Nations Charter. US negotiators can make it clear to their Kremlin counterparts that without the safe return of all abducted Ukrainian children, the Russian invasion cannot be considered over and sanctions cannot be lifted.

Sanctions could also be used to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to continue the abductions. The United States could follow the example of the British, who imposed targeted sanctions in late 2024 against individuals identified as “perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children.” UK officials described the abductions as “a systematic attempt to erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity.”

By focusing on the distressing plight of the abducted Ukrainian children, Trump could generate much-needed international confidence in his peacemaking efforts. Meanwhile, given his close personal association with the mass abductions, Putin has the ability to stop this policy and order the return of Ukrainian children. With few public signs that Russia is committed to long-term peace, initiatives aimed at identifying victims and ensuring their return to Ukraine could serve as a key US demand to test this willingness.

Before sanctions are even partially lifted, the United States should insist on concrete steps from the Russian side to end the abductions and enable Ukraine to bring all the victims home. It should be made clear that this must be verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. If progress proves possible, this could serve as a first step toward addressing other grave human rights concerns such as the widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in Russian captivity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Iuliia Hoban, Ph.D. is an expert on children and childhoods in peace and security studies and the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for vulnerable populations.

No serious military analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible security threat to Russia itself. Likewise, no Ukrainian politician or public figure has ever harbored any territorial ambitions against their country’s far larger and wealthier neighbor. On the contrary, the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to defend the country against Russian attack. The Kremlin’s emphasis on disarming Ukraine should therefore be seen as a massive red flag for the Trump White House and the wider international community that signals Putin’s determination to complete his conquest and extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

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There are worrying signs that this is not yet fully understood in Western capitals. Instead, US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration have recently begun shifting responsibility for the war away from Russia and echoing the Kremlin’s own longstanding efforts to blame the invasion on NATO expansion. Predictably, Russian officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have welcomed this dramatic change in the US position regarding the causes of the war. However, Russia’s whole NATO narrative suffers from a number of obvious flaws that should spark skepticism among even the most credulous consumers of Kremlin propaganda.

According to Putin, Ukraine’s deepening ties with NATO forced him to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022. In reality, Ukraine’s prospects of joining the alliance were virtually nonexistent at the time, and had not significantly improved since Kyiv was first fobbed off with platitudes at a landmark NATO summit way back in 2008. Even the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 failed to produce any change of heart among alliance members, with key NATO countries including the United States and Germany openly expressing their opposition to Ukrainian accession. Indeed, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assured Putin that Ukrainian NATO membership was out of the question for at least the next 30 years. This makes it difficult to accept Moscow’s claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations represented some kind of immediate danger to Russia.

There are also good reasons to question whether the Kremlin genuinely views NATO as a threat to Russian national security. Thanks to founding member Norway, the alliance has shared a border with Russia ever since its establishment in 1949. More recently, the accession of Poland and the Baltic states at the turn of the millennium dramatically expanded Russia’s shared border with NATO and placed the alliance a few hundred kilometers away from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This close proximity to Russia’s two biggest cities did not lead to any discernible rise in border tensions.

The most revealing evidence of Russia’s true attitude toward NATO came in 2022 when Finland and Sweden reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by ending decades of neutrality and announcing plans to join the alliance. Putin responded to this landmark decision by declaring that Russia had “no problem” with the accession of the two Nordic nations, despite the fact that Finnish membership would more than double Russia’s border with NATO, while Swedish membership would turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Putin has since underlined his indifference to this expanded NATO presence on his doorstep by withdrawing most Russian troops from the Finnish frontier and leaving this supposedly vulnerable border zone largely undefended.

So far, nobody has been able to adequately explain the glaring inconsistency in Putin’s logic. He appears to be unfazed by the presence of NATO troops along the Russian border in Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. And yet at the same time, he expects us to believe that the faint prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance at some point in the distant future is sufficiently alarming to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. Militarily, this makes no sense. The only reasonable conclusion is that Putin’s objections relate specifically to Ukraine and not to NATO in general. He knows perfectly well that the alliance poses no security threat to Russia itself, but does not want to risk a growing NATO presence that might prevent him from achieving his expansionist objective of subjugating Ukraine.

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While Putin moans to foreign leaders about the inequities of NATO expansion, when speaking to domestic audiences he is typically far more candid about the imperial ambitions that shaped his decision to invade Ukraine. For much of his reign, Putin has insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly accused modern Ukraine of being a invented nation occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay that many likened to a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. During the first summer of the war, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Putin’s frequent denials of Ukraine’s right to exist have set the tone throughout Russian society. Poisonous anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, senior Kremlin officials have sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin by echoing his vicious attacks on Ukraine. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has declared that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” These are not the words of rational politicians addressing legitimate national security concerns.

This genocidal rhetoric is being more than matched by the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin has been able to establish control, Russian troops have systematically detained local officials, military veterans, journalists, religious leaders, civic activists, Ukrainian patriots, and anyone else deemed to be a potential threat. Thousands have disappeared into a vast network of prisons amid a climate of fear that has been described by Britain’s The Economist as a “totalitarian hell.” Many more, including thousands of children, have been subjected to forced deportation and sent to Russia. Those who remain are being pressured to accept Russian citizenship, while all reminders of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and national identity are being methodically removed. Needless to say, anyone who dares speak the Ukrainian language risks severe punishment.

These horrors make a complete mockery of attempts to appease the Russians with limited territorial concessions. US negotiators need to recognize that Putin is not fighting for land. He views the current invasion in far broader terms as an historic mission to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe. In Putin’s chilling worldview, extinguishing Ukrainian statehood is a vital step toward the reversal of the Soviet collapse and the revival of the Russian Empire. He has pursued this messianic vision with increasing violence ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and is now closer than ever to realizing his goal.

This is why peace negotiations with Russia must focus primarily on establishing long-term security guarantees that are sufficiently credible to convince the Kremlin. Anything less will be viewed in Moscow as yet more proof of Western weakness and interpreted as a tacit invitation to go further. After all, that has been the pattern ever since the Russian invasion first began in 2014. Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine has been gradually unfolding in plain sight for over a decade and already ranks among the worst crimes of the twenty-first century. If Western leaders choose to ignore this and push ahead with a bad peace while leaving Ukraine without the support and security it needs to survive, they will be complicit in all that follows.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

AlKhatib in The Atlantic: There is no real-estate solution for Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:16:07 +0000

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AlKhatib in Foreign Policy: What Trump really wants in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:16:06 +0000

Original source

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Abercrombie-Winstanley joins Channel 4 News to discuss Trump’s response to the D.C. plane crash

itorre — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:28 +0000

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Ashraph in the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide: Advancing justice and accountability in Syria after the fall of Assad: key priorities

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:26 +0000

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Alkhatib joins TRIGGERnometry to discuss his life story

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:22 +0000

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Damon joins CSIS’ Babel Podcast to discuss the effects of war on children

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:21 +0000

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Alkhatib joins LBC to discuss the anniversary of a deadly IDF strike

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:06 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in the Eurasia Review on mutual recognition between Palestinians and Israelis

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:05 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in The Washington Examiner on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:30 +0000

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Damon joins CNBC to discuss Biden’s failures in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:25 +0000

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Alkhatib featured in Foreign Policy on his opinions on Gaza and Israel

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:14 +0000

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Alkhatib joins i24 News to discuss the humanitarian conditions in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:13 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in Jewish News on his Gaza views

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:12 +0000

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Alkhatib in the Good Men Project: Trump has kicked off a new wave of dehumanizing Palestinians. Let’s remember who the real enemies are

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:51 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in US News on collective healing for Arab Israels on the Lebanon border

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:42 +0000

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Kabawat quoted in ABC News on the Kurds’ role in Syria

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:36 +0000

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From Tunis to Baghdad: Can platform-based politics take root?

Carrie Schenkel and James Storen — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 19:30:13 +0000

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This paper is the fifth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

The organization of political parties has served multiple distinct roles in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In many cases, regimes use them to create a light veneer of democratic legitimacy for authoritarianism; in other cases, parties exist to represent one identity group or are centered around a singular individual. In rare cases, but with a few successful examples, parties exist to represent an ideology. Rarer still, but key to the future democratic success of the region, are true platform-based parties. Vacuums of political leadership have developed due to the limited role parties play in shaping governance, representation, and public policy. In a rapidly changing region, the opportunity for effective, issues-based parties has never been more evident. Iran’s proxies in the region have been significantly weakened and the “Axis of Resistance” dismantled, presenting openings for new political leadership to emerge.

Political parties are not yet poised to meet the moment. In much of the region, long histories of implicit and explicit bans and one-party dominance have left political parties weak, unpopular, and ineffective. Extended periods of suppression and restriction—such as Jordan’s thirty-year party ban, Iraq’s decades of one-party rule under Saddam Hussein, and Tunisia’s twenty-three years of party bans during the Ben Ali era—have resulted in political parties that lack both organizational capacity and broad public appeal. Rather, they are fragmented, ideologically vague, and centered around individuals rather than coherent platforms.

The proliferation of political parties—more than 220 are currently registered in Tunisia, for example—has further undermined any sense of clear policy platforms and the ability to differentiate one party from another. Rather than reforming or uniting under existing frameworks, disillusioned members frequently break away to form new parties, stymieing coalition-building and the development of rooted, comprehensive party ideologies.

Disillusionment with traditional parties has led citizens to favor actors perceived as more directly serving their interests, such as Hezbollah—which positions itself as a resistance force against Israel—or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties, which have gained trust through their provision of essential social services in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. In an era defined by youth-led movements, digital activism, and persistent calls for democratization, these parties stand at a crossroads. Whether they act as agents of change or instruments of entrenched power remains a central question, shaping not only the future of governance within individual nations but also the trajectory of regional stability and development.

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The killings of two Tehran judges show the Islamic Republic is disintegrating

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 16:26:46 +0000

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has earned a new name among Iranian social media users: “burial blogger.”

One by one, men close to the ayatollah are ending up in early graves, with Khamenei leading their burial prayers or at least holding state ceremonies for them (and posting photos or notices of the ceremonies on social media). His terror mastermind, Qasem Soleimani, was killed by a drone strike ordered by US President Donald Trump in 2020. Khamenei’s favorite “footman,” President Ebrahim Raisi, was killed in a helicopter crash last May. And last year, Israel took out Khamenei’s Axis of Resistance lieutenants, Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut.

The supreme leader buried two more on January 19. A day earlier, senior judges Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini were shot dead in broad daylight at the Palace of Justice in Tehran. The assailant is yet to be identified but has been described by Iranian officials as a “janitor” who had “infiltrated” the judiciary. He killed himself while attempting to escape.

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Many Iranians rejoiced hearing the news, since the two judges were infamous for handing down death, imprisonment, and lashing sentences to dissidents, journalists, and activists. Over decades, activists and former political prisoners have brought attention to the judges’ involvement in human rights violations and have named the judges as playing a role in the mass executions of the 1980s when thousands of dissidents were summarily executed and their bodies were dumped in mass graves.

The Persian hashtag “hero janitor” went viral, and former political prisoners told of their encounters with the two judges. For example, stories about Moghiseh, who was sanctioned by the United States in 2019 for rights violations, showed his tendency for cruelty and prejudice and how he threatened people with torture. One journalist recounted how Moghiseh, while judging his case, had told him, “We should fill your mouth with gunpowder and explode your head.” Another journalist noted how Moghiseh had said to people arrested during protests, “We should set you all on fire in city squares.” Despite this background, Iran’s so-called “reformist” President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a condolence message about the deaths and vowed the continuation of the judges’ “glorious path”—a path drenched in blood.

From the narratives emerging out of Tehran about the killing of the two judges, one thing is clear: The ayatollah is losing his grip on power. Khamenei’s lieutenants are falling like leaves in autumn. And despite the state having absolute control over broadcast media and stringently censoring print and online spaces, the regime is no longer capable of controlling narratives about anything. The public’s recurring jubilation over the death of senior regime officials signals irreconcilable rage directed at the clerical establishment.

The state’s attempt to steer the narrative

In the first hours after the incident, authorities (including ones representing the Foreign Ministry) labeled the killings “acts of terror,” with the Judiciary’s own news agency, Mizan, reporting that an “armed infiltrator assassinated the two judges in a premeditated manner.”

The first statement from the Judiciary broadly blamed the usual suspects, saying that the killings might have been in retaliation for “extensive measures taken by the judiciary against elements affiliated with the cursed Zionist regime, American agents and spies, and terrorist groups.”

The head of the Judiciary Protection and Intelligence Center, which is responsible for protecting Judiciary personnel, echoed the same allegations. Former Judge Hojatoleslam Ali Abdallahi called the assailant a “terrorist” and blamed the “enemy” for the incident without elaborating.

The commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Major General Hossein Salami, called the incident the “glorious martyrdom of two honorable judges” in a “terrorist crime” that is a “sign of the hatred and anger of the counterrevolutionaries and the sworn enemies of the Islamic homeland.”

Less than twenty-four hours after the attack, the state started blaming the exiled, cult-like opposition group Mujahadin-e-Khalq (MeK). Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a veteran security and judicial figure, appeared on state TV to talk about the killings, saying that the “MeK certainly had a hand in the terrorist killings.” He alleged that the two judges were killed in a “targeted assassination.” As for proof, he claimed that the assailant had been “questioning around who deals with security cases and cases of MeK members.” Pourmohammadi also said that the assailant planned to kill a third person, an Islamic Revolutionary Court judge, who was not on the premises on the day of the incident. He also alleged that during the shooting, the assailant had “said something about the MeK to a judge he failed to kill,” adding that “It’s not clear if he chanted slogans or what. All these indicate that he was acting in a targeted manner and carrying out an operation. It is not clear if from outside, [MeK] had given him a clear assignment or had told him to assassinate judges with the Islamic Revolutionary Court that deal with [security] cases.”

News outlets reporting on Iran’s accusations regarding these killings have noted that the 1980s mass executions, in which Moghiseh and Razini were allegedly involved, targeted the MeK among other opposition groups.

Judiciary spokesperson Asghar Jahangir has doubled down on this narrative. He said last month that “multiple people have been identified and arrested in relation to this case . . . among them at least three were agents of opposition groups . . . It appears that the [assailant] was in contact with opposition groups and the MeK.”

Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i days later took the rhetoric up a notch. He described the killings as “part of the extensive plans of the enemy for disrupting security. They implement hundreds of similar plans, but they are quashed.” In the jargon of Islamic Republic officials, “enemy” is often used to refer to the United States and its allies—and the regime claims opposition groups are controlled and directed by the “enemy.”

Senior intel officer has a different story

On January 25, 2025, an Iranian intelligence agent and senior MeK case officer, Naser Razavi, significantly diverged from the state narrative. In the past, Razavi’s book on the MeK was promoted by the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, with the agency introducing him as a former senior intelligence officer with the Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC who “has dedicated 30 years of his service to working on the MeK file.”

In his recent interview, Razavi told the reformist Ensaf News that the Iranian intelligence agencies have “concluded that this incident and the assailant had nothing to do with the Monafeghin Organization,” a derogatory term used by Islamic Republic officials to refer to the MeK. However, he said that in “such cases,” the intelligence community faces “a lot of pressure to assign responsibility to the MeK since that would be seen as an achievement for the victims.”

A core ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic is celebrating “martyrdom,” when one is killed while defending the state, which regime leaders see as the embodiment of Allah itself. Case in point, as is customary in official communications in Iran, the supreme leader issued a message to the judges’ families, extending both his “congratulations and condolences” for the judges’ “martyrdom.”

Razavi said that the assailant was “depressed since he had been demoted” and “his salary had been cut. His anger was caused by this.” He argued that “The killing was not politically motivated. However, it is not clear if he had a personal grudge against Moghiseh and Razini or his anger was directed against the entirety of the [Supreme Court] and targeted senior members of the [state] entity.”

He also noted that this was not the first time that Razini was targeted. In 1999, Razini survived an attempt on his life that an Iranian general blamed on the Mahdaviat Group, an Islamist cult that professes to be preparing the world for the arrival of Shia Islam’s twelfth imam, Mahdi. At the time, Razavi was in charge of the investigation. When he informed Razini that the intelligence community had concluded that the MeK was not behind the attack, “he got outraged and told me I was talking nonsense,” Razavi said.

According to Razavi, over the years, Iranian senior officials have pressured the security agencies to unfoundedly blame incidents on the MeK, to either cover up personal grudges and murders or to promote their own public profile.

Reacting to the state blaming the MeK for the killing of the two judges, Razavi said, “What else can they say? When they blame the incident on the ‘enemy,’ they are left with no choice but to name the ‘enemy’ as well, and they name the MeK.”

A few hours after the interview was published, the Iranian Judiciary released a statement saying that comments made by Razavi were “his personal views, are far from reality, and have nothing to do with the judicial investigation into the case.” The Judiciary also announced that since Razavi’s comments had included “multiple false claims,” a legal case has been opened against him. Reacting to the statement, Razavi stood by his comments and again rejected reports linking the assailant to the MeK.

The bigger picture

Incidents such as the recent killing and the conflicting narratives coming out of Iran are another tear in the veil, and they reveal that the Islamic Republic is in shambles.

Consider the fact that, while terror leaders had found Iran to be one of their very few safe havens over the past decade, Haniyeh’s targeted killing and this recent incident indicate that the ayatollah can’t even protect his pawns in safe houses and judiciary buildings in Tehran.

The ayatollah himself appears to not be immune to the rising fear felt by his men. During Haniyeh’s funeral in Tehran, he kept eyeing the sky, and speculation spread that he was looking upward fearing a drone strike. Burying the two judges, he appeared bulkier than usual, sparking speculation that he was wearing a bulletproof vest underneath his clothes.

Another sign of Khamenei losing his grip on power is that his frustration about being strategically cornered has seeped into his public speeches. Speaking about the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the frustrated ayatollah bemoaned that he was “prepared to send aid but land and air was blocked.”

The Islamic Republic—an authoritarian state that has kept its grip on power by maintaining perpetual war—now finds itself unpopular at home, fending off imagined and real foreign adversaries, and paranoid about infiltration. Power is slipping through the hands of the clerical establishment like sand. And Tehran’s ayatollah doesn’t need to look farther than Syria to see how fast he can end up deposed.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is a researcher with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 23:43:38 +0000

As the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion draws close, the chorus of voices calling for new elections in Ukraine is growing louder and louder. Curiously, however, these calls are not coming from the Ukrainians themselves, but from the Kremlin and the Trump White House.

Since his inauguration one month ago, US President Donald Trump has begun echoing Russian demands for fresh Ukrainian elections. This week, he sparked outrage by branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator without elections.” These attacks have proved popular in Moscow but have fallen flat in Kyiv, with most Ukrainians rejecting the US leader’s claims and rallying behind Zelenskyy.

The debate over Ukrainian elections reflects the challenging wartime realities in the partially occupied country. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary votes in 2024 but was forced to postpone both ballots as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow national elections during martial law, which was introduced in 2022 and remains in place. Zelenskyy has vowed to hold elections as soon as the security situation allows, but argues that it would be impossible to stage free and fair votes in the current circumstances.

The majority of Ukrainians appear to agree. Two of Zelenskyy’s main political rivals, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as impractical and illegitimate. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced its opposition to the return of elections before a peace agreement has been signed. Meanwhile, a new opinion poll conducted in February 2025 found that 63 percent of Ukrainians are against holding any national votes until the war with Russia is over.

This lack of appetite for wartime elections is not the product of apathy or oppression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are fiercely proud of their country’s democratic credentials, which were hard-won during two separate pro-democracy revolutions in 2004 and 2014. On both occasions, millions of Ukrainians took part in massive protest movements opposing Russian-backed attempts to subvert the country’s emerging democracy and place Ukraine on a trajectory toward Kremlin-style authoritarianism. This grassroots embrace of democratic values has become central to modern Ukraine’s sense of national identity.

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For more than two decades, Ukraine’s burgeoning democratic culture has been one of the key triggers behind Moscow’s escalating campaign of aggression against the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine can be traced back to the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was in part provoked by his botched intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election. This was to prove a watershed moment in relations between the two post-Soviet countries. Over the subsequent two decades, Ukraine has pursued a European democratic future, while Putin’s Russia has turned back toward the imperial past.

Putin’s fear of Ukrainian democracy is easy enough to understand. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, his formative political experience was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire as a wave of democratic uprisings swept across Eastern Europe. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Putin has been haunted by the idea that an increasingly democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat and spark the breakup of the Russian Federation itself.

Mounting concern in Moscow over the possible impact of Ukraine’s democratic progress was a major contributing factor behind Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2014. When the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region failed to prevent the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy or derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin felt compelled to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

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Ukrainians would be the first to admit that their country’s democracy is still very much a work in progress that suffers from a wide range of imperfections including deeply entrenched institutional corruption and excessive oligarch influence. Temporary wartime security measures targeting Kremlin-linked political parties and institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church have also raised concerns. At the same time, Ukrainians are acutely aware that their country’s recent history of internationally recognized elections and strengthening democratic culture set them apart from their Russian neighbors.

The fight for democracy has in many ways defined Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support the idea of holding elections in the current wartime conditions. This skepticism is understandable. More than ten million Ukrainians, representing around a quarter of the population, have been internally displaced by Russia’s invasion or forced to flee abroad as refugees. Millions more are currently living under Russian occupation. Without their participation, any vote would lack legitimacy. Likewise, around one million Ukrainian men and women are now serving in the armed forces. Attempting to provide safe voting conditions for them would be a logistical and security nightmare.

It would be similarly impossible to organize a credible election campaign. With the entire country subject to virtually daily Russian bombardment, large-scale campaign events and election rallies would be out of the question. It would be even more reckless to open thousands of polling stations on election day and invite attacks from Russian drones and missiles. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has repeatedly bombed Ukrainian civilians at train stations, funerals, and other public gatherings. There is little reason to believe election day crowds would not also be targeted. Even if a ceasefire was introduced well before the vote, the threat of renewed Russian air strikes would loom large over the entire campaign and deter public participation.

In addition to these practical impediments, attempting to stage an election campaign prior to the signing of a peace treaty would risk sowing division within Ukrainian society at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Many believe this is the true reason for the Kremlin’s sudden and otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Ukrainian democracy. After all, Russia is the world leader in election interference. While Putin’s army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, he may feel that he can still achieve his goal of dividing and subjugating the country via the ballot box. At the very least, if current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to win reelection, this would remove a very high-profile obstacle to a peace agreement in Russia’s favor.

Democracy is at the very heart of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival and is destined to remain one of the core values in postwar Ukraine. For now, though, most Ukrainians acknowledge that any attempt to stage elections would be impractical and irresponsible in the extreme. For this reason, there is currently no clamor whatsoever for elections within Ukrainian society. The current generation of Ukrainians have fought long and hard for their democratic rights, but they also recognize that the country must be at peace before credible elections can take place. It would be absurd to ignore their wishes and impose premature elections on Ukraine as part of a Kremlin-friendly peace process.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

With anti-government protests still taking place in cities across Georgia on an almost daily basis, the authorities have also recently introduced new laws limiting public gatherings and criminalizing minor protest actions such as placing stickers on public property. Since protests flared in late 2024, hundreds have been detained, with many reporting human rights abuses while in custody including beatings and torture.

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Critics say these latest steps serve as further confirmation of the Georgian government’s intention to establish a Kremlin-style authoritarian state. In early February, Transparency International Georgia executive director Eka Gigauri told the Associated Press that she believed the authorities were using the same tactics employed by the Putin regime against opponents. “There is nothing new in how they attack civic activists,” she said. “This was happening in Russia years ago.”

Similar sentiments have been expressed by international human rights watchdogs monitoring the current crisis. “The government is relentlessly taking the country into a repressive era that is uncharted for Georgia but all too familiar in authoritarian states,” commented Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Director Hugh Williamson in January 2025.

In recent months, Georgia’s Western partners have become more vocal in their criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian policies and apparent turn toward Moscow. This Western response has included imposing sanctions against a number of Georgian officials including billionaire Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is widely seen as the country’s de facto leader and architect of Georgia’s current pro-Kremlin policies. On February 13, the European Parliament adopted a resolution questioning the legitimacy of the current Georgian authorities and calling for fresh elections in the coming months monitored by international observers.

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Meanwhile, relations with Russia continue to improve. Georgia has won favor in Moscow in recent years by refusing to participate in Western sanctions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Georgia has welcomed Russian businesses and has been accused of helping the Kremlin bypass international restrictions put in place in response to the war.

Members of the Georgian Dream party have positioned themselves as the only political force capable of establishing pragmatic relations with Russia. With around twenty percent of Georgia currently under Russian occupation, the threat of renewed Russian military aggression is a highly sensitive issue for Georgian society. In the run-up to Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary election, Georgian Dream sparked controversy by using campaign posters contrasting peaceful Georgia with war-torn Ukraine as part of election messaging that sought to position the vote as a choice between war and peace.

With international attention now firmly fixed on developments in and around Ukraine, the political crisis in Georgia has slipped out of the headlines. However, this small nation in the southern Caucasus has a geopolitical significance that far outweighs its size. For the past two decades, Georgia has been widely seen in Western capitals as a post-Soviet success story, but the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations now hang in the balance. This represents a significant foreign policy challenge for the new Trump administration and for Europe.

Recent repressive measures indicate that the Georgian authorities are intent on escalating their clampdown against domestic opponents and strengthening ties with the Kremlin. If they succeed, it would represent a major victory for Vladimir Putin in the confrontation between the democratic world and an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Global Foresight 2025

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Global Foresight 2025

The authoritative forecast for the decade ahead

Welcome to the fourth edition of Global Foresight from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, home for the last decade to one of the world’s premier strategic foresight shops.

In this year’s installment, which is part of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series, our experts present exclusive findings from our survey of leading strategists and experts around the world on how human affairs could unfold over the next ten years across geopolitics, the global economy, climate change, technological disruption, and more. Our next-generation foresight team spots six “snow leopards”—under-the-radar phenomena that could have major unexpected impacts, for better or worse, in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three scenarios for how the world could transform over the next decade as a result of China’s ascendance, worsening climate change, and an evolving international order.

Welcome to 2035

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight gurus on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the likelihood of another world war to the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Six snow leopards to watch in 2025

The underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize global impact

Because it receives relatively little attention in the press, the “snow leopard” does not appear significant enough to warrant much scrutiny as a driver of change and shaper of the future. Yet just like the real cat in the wild, the figurative snow leopard is something that could sneak up and vividly remind us of its power.

Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how global affairs could be transformed over the next decade

The Atlantic Council’s foresight team brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of envisioning three potential future paths for humanity.

Full survey results

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Africa China

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Strategy Paper Editorial board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 17, 2024

Global Foresight 2024

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts identify the top risks and opportunities for 2024. Our foresight team spots “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2024 and beyond. And we share findings from our survey of global strategists and foresight practitioners on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Dec 21, 2022

Global Foresight 2023

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts identify the top risks and opportunities for 2023. Our foresight team spots “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2023 and beyond. And we share findings from our survey of global strategists and foresight practitioners on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Dec 21, 2021

Global Foresight 2022

The inaugural edition of a new annual report from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, home for the last decade to one of the world’s premier strategic foresight shops.

The post Global Foresight 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

The Global Foresight 2025 survey

Full results

This survey was conducted from November 15, 2024 through December 2, 2024.

Demographic data

Survey questions

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

Consider the snow leopard. Panthera uncia sports some of the most effective camouflage in the animal kingdom, its white coat with gray and black spots blending in perfectly with the rocky, snowy Himalayan landscape it inhabits. It’s known as “the ghost of the mountains,” seeming to appear out of thin air on the rare occasions it is seen in the wild.

There’s an equivalent phenomenon in global affairs: under-the-radar trends and events that elude even the most seasoned observer. When their effect on world affairs eventually becomes apparent, they may seem to have come out of nowhere. But these “snow leopards” were there all along. Trends slowly gathering momentum while the crisis du jour dominates headlines, technological developments whose real-world application is still theoretical, known but underrated risks—all of these phenomena have the power to reshape the future. Some already are.

Any forecast of the future needs to account for these snow leopards. As we brought together experts across the Atlantic Council for our annual look into the future, our next-generation staff took on the challenge of spotting the hard to spot. They surveyed the world around them for overlooked risks, trawled scientific journals and the websites of obscure government departments, and came up with a list of potentially world-changing trends and developments.

In the year to come and beyond, keep an eye on these six snow leopards.

The terrorist threat that could sever global connections

When you send a message on WhatsApp to a friend in Colombia or share a video call with family in India, the data—images, text, and video—gets broken down into packets and travels along undersea cables that connect continents in fractions of a second. Nearly 99 percent of international data passes through these cables, including terabytes of sensitive data sent by the US military to command posts overseas as well as an estimated ten trillion dollars transferred every day through the global financial system. In an increasingly interconnected world, nonstate actors pose a serious threat to this critical digital infrastructure, which often lies in shallow waters where it is vulnerable to everything from cyber threats to explosive devices to dragging anchors.

It doesn’t take advanced equipment like submarines to damage these undersea cables. In 2013, for instance, Egyptian authorities arrested three divers who had used underwater explosives to slice through the South East Asia-Middle East-West Europe 4 internet cable, which runs for 12,500 miles and connects three continents. This incident came five years after a similar attack on the same cables and three years after terrorists in the Philippines successfully cut cable lines near the Filipino city of Cagayan de Oro. While the possible involvement of China and Russia in recent cord-cutting incidents has drawn international scrutiny, these prior incidents indicate that nonstate actors also perceive these cables as an opportune target.

In late 2023, a Telegram channel affiliated with Yemen’s Houthi rebels threatened this vital underwater infrastructure by posting a map showing the subsea communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. An ominous message accompanied the map: “There are maps of international cables connecting all regions of the world through the sea. It seems that Yemen is in a strategic location, as internet lines that connect entire continents—not only countries—pass near it.” Of note, the Houthis possess an arsenal of underwater mines, and Houthi militants have reportedly undergone combat diver training in the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ bold assertion could inspire other nonstate actors to put undersea cables in their crosshairs, expanding the threat to this vital infrastructure beyond the region. The same day the Telegram post appeared, a Hezbollah-affiliated Telegram channel shared a similar message and questioned whether the Houthi statement was a “veiled message to the Western coalition.”

Since these cables facilitate financial transactions and are the only hardware capable of accommodating the huge volumes of military sensor data that inform ongoing operations, terrorist groups may see them as high-value targets that can be attacked at a relatively low cost. Furthermore, non-state actors with growing cyber capabilities could exploit vulnerabilities in these networks, potentially disrupting services or stealing sensitive data. This confluence of high-tech and low-tech threats should sound alarms about the future security of global communication networks.

Emily Milliken is an analyst focusing on Gulf security issues, and the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The low-carbon energy source that could power nearly half of US homes

In 2023, the United States produced more oil in a single year than any other country in history—largely due to fracking, which injects fluid under high pressure into rocks, cracking them open to access oil stored within them. The same technique can be used to draw cleaner sources of energy—such as the heat trapped in the earth’s crust—to the surface and send it out to homes across the United States. Geothermal energy harnesses that heat and constitutes a low-carbon energy source. With new technology on the horizon that could make it easier to utilize geothermal energy in more parts of the country, the United States is poised to unlock a major source of energy.

Geothermal-power extraction is currently confined to traditional hydrothermal regions, mostly in the western continental United States plus Hawaii and Alaska. In these regions, conventional geothermal systems tap into the naturally occurring hot water or steam from the earth to drive turbines that generate electricity.

Through enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), geothermal-energy production could be expanded far beyond traditional hydrothermal regions. According to the US Department of Energy, by replicating the physical dynamics present in these regions, EGS has the potential to power more than 65 million homes—a little under half of all American homes. EGS is similar to fracking in that it involves injecting fluid into the ground to create new fractures or reopen old ones, resulting in increased permeability. The hot fluid is then pumped to the surface, where it is used to generate electricity. This method works in areas where the ground is hot enough but there may not be enough naturally occurring fluid or permeability to make geothermal power viable without the addition of EGS.

Currently, the United States has utilized less than 0.7 percent of its geothermal-electricity resources, with the remaining potential expected to become available via EGS. The Department of Energy has started to recognize the potential of EGS, funding projects in Nevada, California, and Utah. The department’s Enhanced Geothermal Shot initiative seeks to reduce the cost of EGS by 90 percent by 2035 to $45 per megawatt hour. It’s an ambitious goal, but one that, if successful, would dramatically increase access to this low- or no-carbon energy source across the United States.

That could help address an urgent need. One analysis estimates that power demand in the United States will grow 4.7 percent over the next five years, outpacing the 0.5 percent growth in annual demand over the last decade. Though not a silver bullet, expanding access to geothermal power could help meet this demand in a clean, predictable, and relatively cheap way.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The yellow powder that cleans carbon dioxide out of the air

Given the political and technical difficulties of getting countries to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases they pump into the air, the quest for technologies that can remove these gases has grown ever more important. One such technology, direct air capture (DAC), involves pulling carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the air and permanently storing it somewhere else, usually deep underground in rock formations. Because current methods of direct air capture are costly and energy-intensive, they have made only a marginal contribution to meeting global climate goals.

Yet carbon capture might be poised for a transformation thanks to a yellow powder. DAC technologies are expensive to scale because they use substantial amounts of water and energy and are designed to capture concentrated sources of carbon such as the exhaust from a power plant. A new CO2-absorbing material called COF-999, created by a University of California at Berkeley-led team of scientists, could collect CO2 far more cheaply, using substantially less water and energy, than current DAC processes. Utilizing a covalent organic framework—involving the strongest chemical bonds in nature—the material promises to be dependable and sustainable. The powder is less likely to be damaged by humidity, reaches half its capacity in only eighteen minutes, is reusable (it can be used through one hundred cycles of the carbon-removal process, with minimal capacity loss), and might effectively pull CO2 out of the air around us, which has far lower concentrations of carbon than, for example, power-plant exhaust.

Current carbon-capture technology, according to some estimates, could account for 14 percent of the global-emissions reductions needed to meet climate targets by 2050. The market is already expected to rapidly expand, with a projected compound annual growth rate of 6.2 percent over the next five years and estimated value of four trillion dollars by 2050. The invention of COF-999 could supercharge these numbers. It could be easily implemented in existing carbon-capture systems, or scientists could experiment with ways to take advantage of its ability to clean ambient air. “We took a powder of this material, put it in a tube, and we passed Berkeley air—just outdoor air—into the material to see how it would perform … It cleaned the air entirely of CO2,” said Omar Yaghi, a Berkeley chemistry professor who worked on the study. As atmospheric CO2 levels hit record highs, and extreme heat waves, wildfires, floods, and hurricanes increase in frequency, the yellow-powder breakthrough is one example of the creative science needed to counter inaction on rising global emissions.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The return of wild land

If you have fifteen million dollars to spare, an unused ancestral estate, or even a small plot of land in need of transformation, you too can get in on the hot new trend of rewilding—or the process of rebuilding natural ecosystems on landscapes disrupted by humans. The concept represents a fundamental shift in the way governments, ecologists, and ordinary people view conservation. It focuses on restoring to health native environments—including their balance of plants and animals—rather than on trying to protect scarce undisturbed areas such as wilderness (only 3 percent of the Earth’s land surface is ecologically intact). The idea first took off in North America and has spread like kudzu, including to the estates of the ultra-wealthy. Although rewilding remains a niche solution to various conservation problems, it may be on the verge of an explosion, with major consequences for the global climate.

Some estimates already put the global total of land available for rewilding at a billion acres, which is roughly half the area of the Australian landmass—and even more is set to become available over the course of this century as a combination of factors reduce pressure for the intensive use of land. Some two-thirds of humanity is projected to live in cities by 2050, and the world’s total population (urban and rural) is expected to peak by the mid-2080s. At the same time, agricultural productivity is increasing, technology and innovation are decoupling food output from land input, and alternative proteins, which are far less land- and carbon-intensive than animal-based proteins, are becoming increasingly popular.

A 2024 study found that a quarter of land in Europe is suitable for rewilding, with Scandinavian countries, Scotland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal at the top of the list. A lot of land is viable for rewilding beyond Europe, too, including in Japan and North America. In the United States alone, around thirty million acres of cropland has been abandoned since the 1980s.

Rewilding may help the environment by absorbing carbon and reversing biodiversity loss. Recent declines in biodiversity around the world, including a 73 percent decrease in wildlife populations over the last fifty years and one million species on the verge of extinction, are linked to accelerated climate change and the spread of infectious diseases. There could be economic benefits as well. Nature tourism is responsible for $600 billion in revenue globally and twenty-two million jobs; revitalized natural spaces and the reintroduction of large animals into them can help raise those numbers. Restoration and rewilding can also increase farming yields, the availability of water, and global fish populations, while also reducing the degradation of agricultural land. Mangroves, coastal wetlands, and coral reefs can lessen flood risk. Putting large herbivores back into their native areas can lower wildfire risk.

Just as the potential benefits of rewilding are becoming clearer, so too are its possible costs. Some experts fear that rewilding efforts may, like some net-zero carbon pledges, allow governments and industry to sidestep decarbonization efforts in favor of carbon offsets, which are unregulated and can be reversed. The reintroduction of animals and plants, particularly large predators, can also induce a public backlash, which may harm rewilding and restoration. Restoration of ecosystems might increase the risks of tick- and other vector-borne diseases as well. As the world grows hotter, it could prove difficult to reintroduce some desired species.

Nevertheless, if the land resources and financial incentives for ecological restoration combine with messaging and public sentiment in favor of individual and community action, rewilding may become a movement capable of restoring wide swathes of land to their original states. In so doing, it might open a new route to address the effects of a changing climate.

John Cookson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist.

Sydney Sherry is an assistant director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The coming quantum leap in energy storage

In 2019, scientists Akira Yoshino, M. Stanley Whittingham, and John B. Goodenough won the Nobel Prize in chemistry for their development of the rechargeable, renewable lithium-ion battery. The committee commended the trio for having “laid the foundation of a wireless, fossil fuel-free society.” Since their debut in the 1990s, batteries have become ubiquitous in all kinds of electronics. But there’s something even better on the horizon, and not a moment too soon: quantum batteries.

These novel batteries store energy by drawing on quantum mechanics (the study of physics on a microscopic scale) and particularly quantum chemistry, which is crucial to battery research and allows scientists to understand the chemical structure and reaction of atoms at significantly quicker speeds than current models. It’s a promising emerging technology to watch amid a broader exploration of alternative battery chemistries that could offer the energy density and stability to perform better than lithium-ion batteries for certain functions.

One application is medical devices. About 26 percent of the US adult population has some type of disability that requires a medical device—such as cochlear implants or a pacemaker—and these devices rely on lithium-ion, lithium, or lithium-iodine batteries for energy. Supply of such batteries isn’t guaranteed; beginning in 2022, for instance, a lithium-ion battery shortage upended electric-vehicle and medical-device supply chains in the United States. These batteries also often require recharging or a replacement, which can necessitate additional surgeries if the medical device that uses them is implanted.

Since quantum batteries could have higher energy density, quantum devices could provide more efficient and long-lasting performance than lithium-based options, reducing the number of battery exchanges that put patients at risk. The energy stored in quantum batteries also could power medical facilities and electric vehicles, improving emergency services in vulnerable and remote areas—a crucial concern worldwide, as climate change brings stronger storms along with longer and more intense heat waves, which not only raise health risks but also strain power grids. During power outages, most hospitals today rely on fossil-fuel and battery-system generators, which often experience complications. In the future, quantum batteries could power these facilities instead. Additionally, since quantum batteries could accelerate charging times for electric vehicles from the current thirty minutes to seconds at high-speed stations (and from about ten hours to a few minutes at home), electrically powered ambulances and medical devices could be charged and ready to go in seconds—a unit of time that can make all the difference for first responders.

Tatevik Khachatryan is an assistant director for events at the Atlantic Council.

The very online generation’s susceptibility to misinformation

Picture someone falling for an online hoax. If an elderly internet user came to mind, think again. A recent study from Cambridge University revealed that the generation that grew up with the internet—and that reported in the study spending the most time online—had a hard time telling real headlines from fake ones.

Though they tend to be tech savvy and certainly are not the only generation vulnerable to inaccurate information, members of Generation Z (those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s) are more susceptible to mis- and disinformation than widely assumed. Often relying on social media as a primary news source, digital natives are vulnerable to manipulation. In the Cambridge study, as well as in research conducted by the Center for Countering Digital Hate, they demonstrated a propensity to believe in conspiracy theories. Gen Z might be conscious of the threat posed by biased feeds and manipulated media, but its members continue to scroll and share—and their amplification of mis- and disinformation will be a serious challenge in the future.

Social media is a central fact of life for the vast majority of Gen Zers in the developed world, and it has become an indispensable informational tool for those in developing countries as well. In 2024, a report surveying nearly 4,500 individuals across the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia found that 91 percent of Gen Z social media users are on Instagram and 86 percent are on TikTok. Gen Z is forming judgments based on the content appearing on their social media feeds—often curated by algorithms that privilege content with higher engagement levels regardless of whether it is true or false—and circulating it to their digital communities. Their decisions about who to follow on social media are not necessarily rooted in the authenticity or credibility of those figures. Instead their social media consumption is often parasocial: They tend to follow media streams and engage with the causes of individuals who they don’t know personally, be they influencers or politicians.

A generation growing up with seemingly unlimited access to information and extensive knowledge about what digital technologies like algorithms do, but with limited ability to verify that information, represents a significant sociological change. As members of Gen Z proceed in their careers and assume more powerful positions, there is a real risk that they have been left ill-prepared to navigate the overwhelming scale of online information ecosystems. The mis- and disinformation surrounding global challenges ranging from war to migration to climate change may also make Gen Zers more mistrustful of both institutions and other individuals, rendering them less capable of addressing these challenges. Collaborative efforts between Gen Z and older generations—engaging private companies, governments, and individuals—are needed to manage a transformed information landscape and prevent subsequent generations from growing up in an era of misinformation or falling for online hoaxes.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Srujan Palkar is a Global India fellow and assistant director with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Global Foresight 2025

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

Africa China

The post Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Welcome to 2035

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

By Mary Kate Aylward, Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Explore findings on…

2. Conflict with China and Russia

3. The China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis

4. Nuclear proliferation and use

5. The future of US power

6. The endgame in Ukraine

7. Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace

8. The outlook for multilateral institutions

9. The chances of democratic depression

10. Gender and the global future

Another devastating world war, potentially bringing China and the United States into direct conflict. The spread and even the use of nuclear weapons. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza failing to ultimately produce favorable outcomes for Kyiv and Israeli-Palestinian peace. A more multipolar world without robust multilateral institutions. A democratic recession further devolving into a democratic depression.

These are just some of the future scenarios that global strategists and foresight practitioners pointed to when the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed them, in late November and early December 2024 following the US elections, for its third-annual survey on how they expect the world to change over the next ten years.

Not all the projections were pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of those who participated in our Global Foresight 2025 survey, for example, felt that artificial intelligence would, on balance, have a positive impact on global affairs over the next ten years—an increase of 7 percentage points from our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Roughly half of respondents foresaw an expansion of global cooperation on climate change.

But the grimmer forecasts were in keeping with a dark global outlook overall, with 62 percent of respondents expecting the world a decade from now to be worse off than it is today, and only 38 percent predicting that it will be better off.

The 357 survey respondents were mostly citizens of the United States (just under 55 percent of those polled), with the others spread across sixty countries and every continent but Antarctica. Respondents skewed male and older, and were dispersed across a range of fields including the private sector, nonprofits, academic or educational organizations, and government and multilateral institutions.

So what do these forecasters of the global future anticipate over the coming decade? Below are the survey’s ten biggest findings.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

Africa China

1. Forty percent of respondents expect a world war in the next decade—one that could go nuclear and extend to space

For the first time in our annual survey, we asked respondents whether they expected there to be another world war by 2035. We defined such a war as involving a multifront conflict among great powers. And the results were alarming, with 40 percent saying yes.

While this was a new question, our Global Foresight 2024 survey surfaced a similar concern, with nearly a quarter of respondents pointing to war between major powers as the greatest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

The finding tracks with worries expressed by other experts amid major wars in Europe and the Middle East, growing tensions between the United States and China, and increasing cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Surveying this treacherous global landscape this past summer, for example, the historian and former US diplomat Philip Zelikow assigned a 20 to 30 percent probability to the prospect of “worldwide warfare” and warned of a “period of maximum danger” within the next one to three years.

Judging by our respondents’ answers, another world war might feature nuclear weapons. Forty-eight percent of respondents overall (and 63 percent of those predicting World War III) expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade by at least one actor.

Such a conflict also may play out in outer space. Forty-five percent of respondents overall (and 60 percent of those predicting World War III) expected the next decade to include a direct military conflict fought, at least in part, in space.

And it could be devastating to the global economy. Twenty-eight percent of respondents identified war among major powers as the single biggest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

2. Tensions with China and Russia are potential vectors for major conflict

By definition, a world war would involve more than two belligerent nations. But across multiple questions in the survey, respondents forecast a future in which today’s strategic competition and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in particular could sharpen into something more dangerous.

Survey respondents, for instance, were significantly more inclined than a year earlier to foresee a military conflict over Taiwan, which could draw in the United States in support of the island and against China. Sixty-five percent of all respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that China will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, and only 24 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, that split was 50 percent to 30 percent. Among those predicting the breakout of another world war, the proportion was even higher: Seventy-nine percent believed China will attempt to forcibly retake Taiwan over the next ten years.

Expand to read expert insight by Markus Garlauskas

Though this year’s survey findings may seem worrisome at first because respondents see increasing risks of war, I find them reassuring. The change from last year shows a greater awareness of the nature of the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the risk of confronting simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries and nuclear attacks.

That a clear majority of respondents now expect Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force in the coming decade is actually a hopeful signal to me. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been clearly building up military forces suited for offensive operations and has repeatedly stated that he will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under control. Meanwhile, polls suggest that the vast majority of the people of Taiwan are disinclined to be ruled by Beijing, favoring either the status quo or outright independence.

This would seem to set Beijing and Taipei on an inevitable collision course. Yet there is also good reason to believe that China overwhelming Taiwan is not inevitable, in part because invasion would be a far more difficult operation than is commonly recognized. It will take the increasing sense of threat of force identified by the survey to prompt Taiwan and the United States to make the investments necessary to increase their preparedness for deterring and defeating such use of force.

This growing awakening on the part of the United States and its allies can become the basis for a call to action for the populations, governments, and militaries of these countries. The United States has typically waited until war was thrust upon it before preparing comprehensively. Now is the time to act, to prepare, ideally to deter such aggression, and to be ready to hold firm if deterrence fails and we face either a short, sharp war or a protracted one.

—Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

A US-China confrontation is not the only potential pathway to a multifront conflict among great powers. Forty-five percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that Russia and NATO will engage in a direct military conflict within the next ten years—a significant increase from the 29 percent who felt this way in our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Among respondents expecting another world war within the next decade, 69 percent anticipated a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

3. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to be formal allies within a decade, potentially in a world featuring China- and US-aligned blocs

Other geopolitical dynamics forecast by survey respondents could serve as the kindling for whatever spark ignites a wider war or, alternatively, emerge as byproducts of such a conflict.

Forty-seven percent of respondents predicted that, by 2035, the world will largely be divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs; among that group, nearly 60 percent expected the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies, presumably with China leading the alliance.

Overall, just under half of our survey respondents (46 percent) agreed that the emerging axis of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea will be formal allies in 2035. While this was the first time we asked this question regarding all four countries, in our Global Foresight 2024 survey 33 percent of respondents thought Russia and China would be formal allies in ten years’ time.

Many respondents appeared to associate these potential developments with the prospect of a world war. Among respondents who foresaw both the world being divided into China- and US-aligned blocs and China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea becoming formal allies, 62 percent also anticipated another world war over the next decade; among other survey respondents, that figure was far lower at 33 percent.

Expand to read expert insight by Melanie Hart

Economically, there is movement underway toward a US-and-allies versus China-aligned bloc structure, but this movement is still nascent. How far it goes will largely depend on whether the United States can overcome its domestic political reticence to actively shaping the global economic order and once again begin negotiating market-access trade deals.

Beijing seeks a global system in which other nations must abide by its wishes and there are no constraints—legal, normative, or otherwise—limiting Beijing’s own actions. Beijing is using global commerce to enforce this approach. For nations that depend on trade or investment with China, Beijing is increasingly willing to shut off the flow of goods and capital to enforce its demands in other issue areas. Beijing is also using those partners as consumption dumping grounds, exporting excess capacity across a wide array of goods (such as steel and electric vehicles) at rock-bottom prices, which addresses over-supply in the China market but drives local producers out of business. This is leading many nations to reduce their exposure and vulnerabilities to Beijing’s market interference. Many of those nations increasingly view Western, US-centric supply chains as a more attractive option.

As this shift unfolds, it could lead to new economic blocs—for example, a new multilateral trading structure in which the United States and its allies are at the center of a global trading bloc that China is not allowed to join. However, that will depend on Washington shaking off its trade malaise and figuring out how to negotiate new trade deals that create new, formal structures centered on US and allied rules of the road. China is busy creating its own options—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia—but the United States is hanging back. Without more assertive US-led action on the trade front, the biggest risk is that China will form a new, massive global economic bloc and write the rules to benefit itself at our expense, while the United States and its allies watch from the sidelines.

As for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these four nations are partners with a clear shared interest—namely, their desire to undermine the United States and the liberal international order—but they are not true allies. China’s need for integration with the global economy is likely to limit the degree to which today’s partnership evolves in the future into a more formal alliance similar to the alliance the United States enjoys with its NATO partners.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its regime legitimacy—its pitch for the Chinese people’s continued support—largely on its ability to deliver economically. Unfortunately, the party has also decided that the reforms required to deliver next-level economic growth are too risky, as they would require the party to cede more internal political control over the nation’s economy, legal system, and society. As long as Chinese leaders are unwilling to do that, they will lag behind the West in technology innovation, and they will depend on access to Western companies, universities, and markets to help fill that gap. That dependence limits China’s willingness to sign up for a comprehensive alliance with Russia, Iran, or North Korea, because Beijing does not want to join those nations in an economic wilderness that cuts Chinese companies off from the world’s leading technology powers.

—Melanie Hart, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub

4. The proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is a growing risk, with nearly half of respondents expecting a nuclear weapon to be used by 2035

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age and particularly since the latter part of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation efforts have sought to prevent additional countries from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapons, with varying success. And after the United States did so in 1945, no country has used nuclear weapons in war. But according to our survey respondents, the coming decade could bring very concerning developments on both these fronts.

Iran is the most likely—but not the only potential—new nuclear-weapons power on the horizon

In our latest survey, 88 percent of respondents expected at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, a slight uptick from 84 percent in the Global Foresight 2024 edition. As in our previous survey, just under three quarters of respondents predicted that Iran will go beyond its current threshold status and join the nuclear-weapons club within the next ten years, making it the survey’s most-cited candidate to become a nuclear-weapons state in the future.

The coming years could bring a range of policy responses to this anticipated development, from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to a new round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps in recognition of these scenarios, more than a third of respondents expected Israel to have engaged in a direct war with Iran by 2035.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

Is Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon inevitable or at least highly likely in the next decade? Far from it. Whether Iran acquires a nuclear weapon will depend on policy choices made by Iran, Israel, and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.

Currently, Iran still officially disavows an intent to produce a nuclear weapon, but there has been much more talk among Iranian officials during the past year of the need for one as pressure on Iran has increased due to Israeli military actions against Tehran’s “resistance axis” and Iran itself.

Iran’s military and economic weaknesses have intensified an ongoing debate between moderates and hardliners in Iran over the direction of the country’s foreign and nuclear policy. Moderates want to negotiate a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and an opening of trade and investment with the West and Arab Gulf states. Hardliners argue Iran must double down on its expansionist regional policies, its threshold status as a military nuclear power, its growing ties to Russia and China, and its hardline stance toward the United States and the West to rebuild deterrence and resilience.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will have to make the call on which policy to pursue, and uppermost in his mind will be which approach—or mixture of the two—best ensures the survival of the Islamic Republic, his overarching priority.

Israeli officials continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear program closely and have reiterated warnings that Israel will resort to military force if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emboldened by its military successes over the past year, including the destruction of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Iran’s air defenses, as well as the weakening of Iran’s missile-production capabilities. Senior Israeli officials probably believe conditions are ripe to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program without major threat of retaliation, given the Islamic Republic’s current vulnerability, but also seem to recognize that Israel would need US military support to do lasting damage.

The Trump administration is committed to restoring its previous maximum-pressure campaign of sanctions against Iran to compel it to agree to a new nuclear deal and curbs on its malign regional behavior. Trump’s transition team reportedly discussed the possibility of a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities given that Iran now has enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs and that sanctions could take a long time to work. They may have leaked this option to frighten Iran into agreeing to negotiations, but clearly the Trump administration is signaling a willingness to go beyond sanctions and diplomacy to achieve its objectives.

With Iran’s axis of resistance shredded, and Iran itself weakened militarily and economically, the United States has an extraordinary opportunity—working with Israel, Arab allies, and European countries—to use economic and diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force to secure an agreement that walks Iran back from the nuclear brink and curbs its destabilizing regional policies.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East

What is new is the jump in the percentage of respondents expecting other countries to get these weapons. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, for example, a quarter of respondents thought South Korea would acquire nuclear weapons. In our most recent survey, that figure was 40 percent. The percentage of respondents expecting Japan—the only country ever subject to a nuclear-weapons attack, where the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are a prominent national presence—to acquire nuclear weapons also increased ten percentage points over 2024, from 19 percent to 29 percent. (Notably, while the percentage of respondents anticipating a nuclear Iran in ten years’ time remained steady year over year, so did the roughly 40 percent of respondents expecting nearby rival Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons as well.)

North Korea and Russia are considered the most likely to launch a nuclear-weapons attack

Forty-eight percent of respondents expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, up from 37 percent in our previous survey.

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

This finding demonstrates that nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics. For years after the end of the Cold War, many assumed that nuclear weapons were obsolete relics from the past. The Obama administration made eliminating nuclear weapons a top priority. At the time, Washington assessed that there was virtually zero chance of a nuclear war among states and the greatest nuclear threats came from terrorism or accident.

Now, nearly half of our respondents assess that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade. This shows that nuclear weapons are not twentieth-century curiosities but the ultimate instrument of force and essential tools of great-power competition. China is engaging in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, Russia is issuing regular nuclear threats, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and Iran’s dash time to the bomb is now measured in weeks.

This means that the United States will need to once again strengthen its strategic forces to deter adversaries and assure allies. By doing so, I hope the United States can prove our respondents wrong and ensure that the world’s most powerful weapons are never used again.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Roughly one-quarter of respondents predicted that Russia will use a nuclear weapon by 2035, with around the same percentage saying the same regarding North Korea, amid reports of near-Russian nuclear use early in its war against Ukraine and concerns about crumbling deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Both cases represent significant increases relative to our previous survey, when only 14 percent expected Russia to employ a nuke and 15 percent believed North Korea would do so.

5. The United States is still likely to be dominant militarily in 2035—but with relatively less economic, diplomatic, and soft power as it navigates a multipolar world

Three-quarters of respondents in our latest survey agreed that the world in 2035 will be multipolar, with multiple centers of power, in line with the findings in our previous survey.

A slightly smaller percentage of respondents—71 percent—expected the United States to remain the world’s dominant military power by that time. A majority (58 percent) envisioned the United States being the world’s dominant technology innovator a decade from now.

On other measures of power—economic, cultural, and diplomatic—respondents predicting US dominance in 2035 were in the minority, if only ever so slightly in the case of economic power, in which 49 percent of respondents expected the United States to be dominant.

Between our latest survey and the previous year’s, confidence in US dominance over the next decade dropped across several measures of power, particularly diplomatic and military clout. Those forecasting US dominance in ten years’ time declined from 81 percent to 71 percent for military power, 63 percent to 58 percent for technological innovation, 52 percent to 49 percent for economic power, and 32 percent to 24 percent for diplomatic power. (The Global Foresight 2024 survey did not ask about future US dominance in cultural or soft power, which 35 percent of respondents expected in our most recent survey.) Slightly more respondents (12 percent) relative to our prior survey (7 percent) forecast that the United States will be dominant in none of these areas by 2035.

A bright but more uncertain future for US alliances

While a majority of respondents (61 percent) expected the United States to maintain its security alliances and partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in 2035, this figure was markedly down from our previous survey (79 percent), with much of the shift seeming to stem from those answering that they “don’t know” (26 percent in the Global Foresight 2025 edition relative to 12 percent in the 2024 edition).

Responses on the future of US military dominance and alliances appear correlated. Among those who expected the United States to retain such dominance by 2035, 67 percent believed that it would maintain its network of alliances. Among those who did not think the United States would be the world’s dominant military power in a decade, only 46 percent believed that the country would preserve its alliance network.

In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, just under a third of respondents expected Europe to have achieved “strategic autonomy” within the next decade by taking more responsibility for its own security and thus relying less on the United States. In our latest survey, however, almost half of respondents (48 percent) expected Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy” over the next ten years—a notable increase as President Donald Trump presses European countries to substantially increase their defense spending.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of alliances and partnerships in 2035:

The dangers of a diminished United States

Those who anticipate a diminished United States over the next decade may link such a scenario to worse outcomes for the world. Among respondents who said that by 2035 the United States will be the dominant power in none of the domains listed in the survey, for instance, only 24 percent believed that the world will be better off in a decade’s time. Among other respondents, 40 percent expected the world to be better off ten years from now. Similarly, among those who didn’t expect US dominance in any domain of power in a decade, 62 percent envisioned a world war occurring over that timeframe. For the rest of the survey pool, 38 percent anticipated another world war.

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

In the United States, declinism is a national pastime with a poor track record. In the 1970s, many thought the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the world’s leading superpower. In the 1980s, economists projected that Japan would unseat the United States as the world’s leading economy. In the 2010s, many thought it was inevitable that China would become the world’s largest economic power.

All of those predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The United States is now a rising power, claiming 26 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), its largest share in two decades. Meanwhile, China is declining; Xi Jinping’s desire to assert Chinese Communist Party control over all aspects of Chinese society is stifling Chinese growth, and his aggressive foreign policy is undercutting the global economic engagement strategy that fueled China’s rise. Europe’s share of global GDP has fallen from a quarter in the 1980s to roughly 15 percent today. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Spain’s. To whom then is the United States supposedly ceding all of this power?

Is the United States in decline? I wouldn’t bet on it.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

6. Many respondents are pessimistic about the war in Ukraine ending on terms favorable to Ukraine

Amid a push by the incoming Trump administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an end three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, and as Ukraine and Russia each seek to secure the best possible terms in any future negotiated peace deal, respondents were split on the likely outcome of the conflict. Forty-seven percent predicted that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end on terms largely favorable to Russia and 43 percent forecast that it will result in a “frozen conflict.” Only 4 percent expected the war to end on terms largely favorable to Ukraine.

Our previous survey a year earlier, which asked a different and more detailed question about Ukraine in ten years’ time, reflected more optimism, with 48 percent of respondents predicting that Ukraine would emerge from the war as an independent, sovereign state in control of the territory it held before Russia’s escalated assault on the country in 2022.

Expand to read expert insight by John Herbst

Expectations about the future change in the wake of historic developments and perceptions of those developments. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is US policy.

Simply put, a strong US policy providing Ukraine the weapons to drive Russian forces largely out of Ukraine and rallying the political West to supply Ukraine’s economic needs would lead to a clear defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin that would return much of occupied Ukraine to Kyiv’s control, and with a US-led effort would vouchsafe Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity via NATO membership. Alternatively, a US decision to cut off aid to Ukraine would likely lead to a disaster that would ensure Kremlin political control of the country, produce a direct threat to NATO, and encourage aggression by US adversaries in the Far and Middle East.

US President Joe Biden gave substantial support to Ukraine, but he stopped well short of giving Ukraine the arms and permission to take back most of the country. Trump has stated that he wants Ukraine to survive and would not abandon the country, but he is seeking a durable peace that requires compromise from Ukraine as well as Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness to compromise; Putin has not. Recognizing this, Trump and his team have identified Putin as the recalcitrant party and have spoken of major economic measures—tougher sanctions, transferring the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine—to persuade Russia to negotiate. Respondents to the survey pay attention to the major factors affecting this war, including the Trump angle. But respondents to surveys are not seers, and survey questions are not written to explore the insights that seers might provide.

What therefore might we expect to happen with the war this coming year? First, Trump will roll out a peace initiative that likely includes four elements already public. Two are hard for Zelenskyy: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and no NATO membership for Ukraine for twenty years minimum. And two are hard for Putin: the demilitarized zone enforced by European troops and arming Ukraine to the hilt to prevent future Russian aggression. We can expect Putin to try hard to get Trump to drop those last two points before and then during the talks. But if Putin is persuaded that Trump will arm Ukraine with far more advanced weapons if Russia is unyielding, he might agree to terms that he intends to violate. Trump’s hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize depend on him insisting that Russia compromise to the point of ensuring a viable and stable future for Ukraine, and being ready to confront the ever-treacherous Russian dictator if Putin violates an agreement whose terms would yield that outcome.

—John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

7. Respondents are much more optimistic about a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations than in Israeli-Palestinian peace

Ever since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza set off transformative changes in the broader Middle East, US officials have linked reviving work on normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia with renewing the push for a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, with the Saudis insisting on the latter as a condition for the former.

But our survey respondents—who, notably, shared their views before Israel and Hamas reached their January cease-fire and hostage deal—were much more bullish about the prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization in the coming decade than about the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. Fifty-six percent envisioned Israel having normalized diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia by 2035—roughly similar to the percentage who said the same in our post-October 7, 2023, Global Foresight 2024 survey—relative to 17 percent who expected Israel to be coexisting next to a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within that timeframe. More than 60 percent of respondents predicted that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today’s status quo, with occupied Palestinian territories, will persist.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

In 2035, will Israel have the status quo that exists today, with occupied Palestinian territories?

Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 has taught us the dangers of thinking a status quo will continue indefinitely. Israeli leaders’ belief that Hamas had reconciled itself to the status quo in Gaza—in which Gazans received economic benefits in return for Hamas not attacking Israel—left them unprepared for the most devastating attack on the Jewish state since its war of independence in 1948.

And the war in Gaza that resulted from Hamas’s attack has brought further surprises: Israel’s almost complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization; the killing of most of Hezbollah’s military leaders and elimination of a majority of its vaunted rocket and missile arsenal; direct Iranian and Israeli attacks on each other’s territory, with Israel wiping out all of Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems; and the almost overnight collapse of the Syrian military and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the face of a renewed rebel offensive.

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed, and Iran’s image as a regional hegemon and defender of the Palestinians badly tarnished. Israeli leaders have been emboldened by Israel’s military successes and seem to believe that maintaining military dominance alone will deter the country’s enemies.

But some observers, looking ahead, ask whether the cycle of violence since October 7 is likely to repeat itself at some point if Israel doesn’t address the issue of Palestinian aspirations for independence. The Biden administration and others have called for a return to the idea of a two-state solution as necessary to forestall future cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Admittedly, the current environment is not propitious for discussion of a Palestinian state. A large majority of Israelis, still traumatized by Hamas’s horrific attack on October 7, reject the idea as posing a grave risk to Israel’s security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly refused calls from the United States to incorporate the concept of an eventual Palestinian state into Israel’s post-war strategy, and right-wingers in the current Israeli government want to annex a large part of the West Bank, keep long-term control of the Gaza Strip, and return Israeli settlements to Gaza.

But the Palestinian issue is not likely to go away. Anti-Israel militancy and violence by Palestinians is growing in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and Israel hasn’t totally suppressed attacks by Hamas in Gaza after more than a year of fighting. Arab publics are seething with anger over the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced by Israeli military operations in Gaza. And world opinion has increasingly turned against Israel as Palestinian casualties have mounted.

The Palestinian issue remains a roadblock to Israel becoming fully integrated into the region, a key goal of Netanyahu’s that he hopes will put a capstone on his legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Responding to popular sentiment, Saudi leaders have indicated that Riyadh won’t normalize relations with Israel—an essential step to create a political and security bulwark against renewed threats from Iran—unless Jerusalem endorses a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood.

New elections will probably need to take place in Israel, bringing new leadership open to the idea of a political horizon for the Palestinians, if the current status quo is to change. The United States has an important role to play here by encouraging Israeli leaders to think about how to translate their military success into a regional strategy that includes a vision for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The odds of such a development seem long right now, but October 7 is a reminder that clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East

8. As global organizations become less capable of solving the world’s problems, regional groupings and the BRICS may rise in importance

Respondents foresaw many global institutions growing less effective over the coming decade. Seventy-five percent expected the United Nations (UN) to be less capable of solving challenges core to its mission by 2035 relative to today, compared with 9 percent who anticipated it becoming more capable of doing so. The figures for the United Nations Security Council are only slightly better, with 67 percent of respondents predicting less capability and 9 percent more capability. Sixty percent of respondents envisioned the World Trade Organization being less capable in a decade than it is today.

Respondents also may be skeptical about the UN’s capacity to tackle global-governance challenges such as climate change. Just under 40 percent of respondents predicted that greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2035, despite signs that this tipping point is already near. Only about half of respondents believed that renewable energy technologies will be the dominant form of electricity production globally by then, despite significant growth in demand for renewable energy.

The forecast was less dire for the World Bank, with 46 percent predicting less capability and 19 percent more capability, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 41 percent predicting less capability and 20 percent more capability. A similar if slightly more sanguine picture emerged regarding organizations consisting of the world’s leading powers. Forty-nine percent of respondents predicted less capability and 21 percent more capability for the Group of Seven (G7), while 38 percent expected less capability and 29 percent more capability for the Group of Twenty (G20).

But respondents seemed to hold out even more hope for regional blocs and the BRICS, which is now expanding its membership beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Forty percent of respondents predicted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be more capable of fulfilling its mission by 2035, while 20 percent said the opposite. For the European Union, those figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. (Respondents from EU countries were even more optimistic, with 50 percent expecting greater capability and 22 percent less capability.) For the BRICS, the numbers were 43 percent and 31 percent.

Expand to read expert insight by Josh Lipsky

The findings show in hard data what many analysts believe—that the international financial institutions, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, remain the most functional parts of the multilateral system. That’s because they deliver real money every day to countries around the world.

But the responses also show a growing recognition that these institutions are not self-perpetuating. The tenuous consensus that allows them to go about day-to-day business is predicated on an understanding that functioning IMF and World Bank institutions serve every country (including the United States) better than dysfunctional ones. With Donald Trump’s return to office, there are questions about whether that consensus will hold. For what it’s worth: The first time Trump was in office, it did, and Trump and his team saw the value in both institutions, even if they disagreed with some policy decisions.

The one area of the findings that seems off-target is on the BRICS. The likelihood of the BRICS succeeding in fulfilling their main goals seems vastly overstated in these findings (likely a product of media reporting on BRICS expansion during 2023 and 2024). Here’s the question that is much tougher to answer: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve? What they oppose—the Western-led system—is clear. But what is their proactive agenda? Until they answer that question, the ability of BRICS to succeed as an institution will be limited at best.  

—Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center

9. Today’s democratic recession may deepen into a democratic depression

Overall, respondents appeared gloomy about the prospects for democracy around the world by 2035. Just under half envisioned the current “democratic recession” worsening and becoming a “democratic depression,” while only 17 percent anticipated a “democratic renaissance” instead. The remaining 37 percent expected the global state of democracy to remain much as it is today, with some encouraging progress but also considerable headwinds and backsliding.

Sixty-five percent of respondents also forecast that global press freedoms will decrease by 2035, with another quarter expecting them to stay about the same as they are today and very few anticipating those freedoms increasing over the coming decade.

Our question on the state of global democracy in our previous survey was not identical and therefore not directly comparable. Nevertheless, its results—24 percent expected more democracies a decade hence, 38 percent forecast fewer democracies, and another 37 percent foresaw stasis—presaged the dim outlook expressed in our latest survey.

10. Women are more pessimistic about the global future than men are

Women notably expressed a bleaker outlook across many questions in the survey related to conflict, their own rights, and US clout over the next decade.

For instance, 61 percent of female respondents predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade, compared with 44 percent of male respondents who said the same. Women (54 percent) were also more likely than men (44 percent) to expect a democratic depression. Thirty-two percent of women pointed to women as the most likely group to have their rights curtailed in the coming decade—twice the proportion of men who gave the same answer. Women, moreover, were less likely than men to envision the United States as the world’s dominant military power (58 percent relative to 76 percent) and technological innovator (47 percent relative to 61 percent) in a decade’s time.

Expand to read expert insight by Nicole Goldin

The pessimism from women likely reflects persistent inequities in military, economic, and political representation and participation, as well as the disproportionate impacts of crises and shocks—whether those are economic (like inflation), security-related (from wars such as those in Ukraine or Gaza), the result of political turmoil or transition, or the product of natural disasters and climate events.

Compounding these situations are the challenges of child or family care and pay gaps, which limit the work and earnings of many women, and worsening domestic and gender-based violence, which devastates women’s lives in all dimensions. In the United States, the rollback of Roe v. Wade has left many women believing their rights and protection more broadly are at risk.

—Nicole Goldin, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and head of equitable development at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research

About the authors

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Uri Friedman, Senior Editorial Director, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

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Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

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Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come.

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know.

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

Choose your global future

The reluctant international order

China ascendant

Climate of fear

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.”

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world.

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests.

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner.

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage.

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest.

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems.

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms.

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat.

China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China.

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli.

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.

Allies hedging

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States.

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.

Institutional shifts

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter.

Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate.

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament.

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains.

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments.

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought.

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction.

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric.

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason.

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.

About the authors

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

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How Ukraine’s shadow army fights back against the Russian occupation

Omar Ashour — Tue, 11 Feb 2025 21:19:57 +0000

As speculation mounts over a possible deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, most forecasts currently envisage Moscow retaining the Ukrainian territory that is now under Kremlin control. This would mean condemning millions of Ukrainian civilians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation. Crucially, it would also mark a new stage in the shadow war being waged by an extensive Ukrainian resistance movement throughout Russian-occupied regions of the country.

Ukraine’s resistance movement has evolved significantly in the eleven years since the onset of Russian military aggression against the country, with a dramatic escalation following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. An extensive network of civil resistance activists, partisans, and military special forces units currently operates throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, conducting everything from information campaigns to sabotage operations. The aims of the resistance movement include demoralizing the occupation authorities, undermining the logistics of the Russian invasion force, eliminating Russian troops and equipment, and providing vital intelligence to the Ukrainian military.

Geographically, the Ukrainian resistance movement is active throughout the occupied regions of the country, from Crimea in the south to Luhansk on Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia. Despite harsh Russian countermeasures and a Kremlin-enforced climate of fear throughout the occupied regions, Ukraine’s resistance network remains active and continues to expand, according to officials within the Ukrainian military who are charged with overseeing many of the operations taking place behind enemy lines.

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While the exact structure of Ukraine’s resistance movement is necessarily shrouded in secrecy, it is possible to divide the country’s resistance efforts into three broad categories: civil resistance, partisan activities, and covert military operations.

The “Yellow Ribbon” movement and the “Zla Mavka” resistance group are two prominent examples of Ukrainian civil resistance in action. The “Yellow Ribbon” movement first emerged during the initial months of the full-scale invasion in spring 2022. As the name suggests, it allows activists to display their opposition to the Russian occupation by leaving yellow ribbons in public spaces or painting other symbols associated with the movement. Activists have also engaged in a wide range of information operations designed to intimidate Russian troops or lift the spirits of fellow Ukrainians living under Russian occupation.

The all-female “Zla Mavka” group takes its name from a traditional woodland spirit in Ukrainian folklore who is famed for luring unsuspecting men to their deaths. Members of this loosely knit group are known for using satire and engaging in creative mockery as they seek to boost Ukrainian morale and undermine the legitimacy of the Russian occupation forces.

A number of partisan groups are currently engaged in more direct acts of resistance including intelligence gathering, sabotage operations, and armed attacks on Russian forces in occupied Ukraine. One prominent example is “Atesh,” a partisan group that was founded in September 2022 in Russian-occupied Crimea but claims to have carried out attacks throughout the occupied regions of Ukraine.

The name “Atesh” comes from the Crimean Tatar word for “fire,” reflecting the group’s strong links with the Crimean Tatar community. In a July 2023 interview, Crimean Tatar community leader Mustafa Dzemilev said “Atesh” was able to operate “very deep underground” to avoid detection, but claimed that it could form the basis of a far larger partisan force in Crimea if Ukrainian troops were able to advance toward the peninsula.

Numerous other partisan groups are active across Russian-occupied Ukraine, often focusing on a particular city or region. These include the “Popular Resistance of Ukraine,” an umbrella organisation that claims to have conducted dozens of operations in occupied eastern Ukraine. Another example is the “Berdyansk Partisan Army,” which is active in and around the port city of Berdyansk in southern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region.

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Unsurprisingly, the main source of resistance activities in Russian-occupied Ukraine is the Ukrainian military. Ukraine first created a covert resistance force back in 2014 during the early stages of Russia’s invasion. In 2021, this was formally established as a unit within Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces. Known as the “Rukh Oporu” (“Resistance Movement”), it is currently engaged in a wide range of support functions that include training, supplying, and funding activists and partisan groups, while also conducting its own extensive operations against the Russian occupation forces. These activities are thought to include the assassination of Russian officials and collaborators.

In addition to “Rukh Oporu,” Ukraine’s SBU (State Security Service) and HUR (Military Intelligence Directorate) are also thought to be heavily involved in military activities behind enemy lines. This includes operations in Russian-occupied territory inside Ukraine and across the border in Russia itself.

It is difficult to assess the overall impact that resistance activities are having on morale within the ranks of the occupying Russian forces or among local collaborators. At the same time, numerous specific attacks on officials, soldiers, equipment, and infrastructure have been confirmed via multiple sources. Resistance groups also support the Ukrainian military with critical intelligence on everything from Russian troop movements to the deployment of air defense batteries. This has enabled a large number of precision strikes on high value targets, while also proving important for the conduct of major operations such as Ukraine’s successful September 2022 counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region.

Ukraine’s efforts to resist the Russian occupation have become markedly more sophisticated over the past three years and are unlikely to end any time soon. If talks progress in the coming months and a compromise peace agreement begins to take shape that would allow Russia to retain control over currently occupied regions of Ukraine, the issue of further Ukrainian resistance operations will likely become the subject of heated discussions as Moscow seeks assurances that Kyiv will be reluctant to provide.

Omar Ashour is a professor of security and military studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in Qatar. He is an honorary professor at the Security and Strategy Institute at the University of Exeter in the UK, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine.

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Evolution of freedom

Poland, along with the three Baltic states, stands as one of history’s most remarkable examples of how embracing democratic institutions and a free-market economy can radically transform a nation and propel it onto a trajectory of rapid development. Following an unprecedented transition in 1989, Poland and other former communist bloc nations successfully established the three foundational pillars of a free society—rule of law, democracy, and market economy—guided by frameworks like the Freedom Index. Although the Index’s coverage begins only in 1995, when many key reforms were already implemented, Poland’s journey in the subsequent decades offers valuable insights. Notable milestones include its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 and, more recently, significant challenges to the rule of law starting in 2015, which is the primary focus of this piece.

The political shift following the 2015 parliamentary elections serves as an archetype of what might be called a “bad transition.” In such scenarios, authoritarian leaders or parties rise to power through legitimate electoral processes—a necessary but insufficient condition for true democracy—and proceed to systematically erode institutional independence, particularly within the justice system and civil service. The Law and Justice Party (PiS), under Jarosław Kaczyński’s leadership, secured a decisive victory in a fair election but quickly revealed its authoritarian tendencies. The sharp decline in political and legal subindexes from 2016 onward vividly illustrates this regression.

Among the political subindex components, the most severe deterioration occurred in political rights, driven largely by the PiS’s capture of public media, turning it into a propaganda tool. Fortunately, private media outlets managed to resist government pressure and served as a critical counterbalance.

However, the most dangerous attack came against the judiciary, as evidenced by the more than thirty-five-point drop in the judicial independence component within the legal subindex. Legislative changes in 2016 merged the roles of prosecutor-general and minister of justice, granting a political appointee sweeping powers over the judicial system, including appointments, promotions, and case allocations to specific prosecutors. This effectively undermined safeguards for prosecutorial independence, which allowed compliant prosecutors to be rewarded and dissenters punished. Judicial independence similarly eroded under politicized appointment processes.

Poland’s judicial system survived this assault primarily due to the vigorous defense mounted by civil society and advocacy groups. The rulings of the European Court of Justice in 2021 and 2023, alongside political pressure from the European Commission, played a crucial role, but these external interventions would likely have been insufficient without the active involvement of Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations.

PiS was unsuccessful in undermining the free elections, and those held in 2023 were democratic. The newly elected government has prioritized the restoration of judicial independence, a commitment that has led to the European Commission’s recent decision to terminate the Article 7(1) Treaty on European Union (TEU) procedure, citing that “there is no longer a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland.”

Turning to the economic subindex, several notable aspects deserve attention. From the early 1990s, the anticipation of eventual EU membership spurred a series of significant liberalizing reforms. Between Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 and 2016, the country benefited from increasing policy credibility and access to the common market for trade and capital, driving a robust convergence process with other EU member states.

However, during the years of PiS governance, economic freedom suffered, primarily due to increased nationalizations and expansion of the state sector in the economy. Higher fiscal spending and growing budget deficits during this period Evolution of Prosperity further weighed on economic freedom, representing a clear drag on progress in this area.

Despite these challenges, the economic subindex reflects an overarching positive trajectory, largely attributed to a notable increase in women’s economic opportunities. A rare positive legacy of the socialist era is the strong foundation of gender equality within Polish society, particularly in economic participation. The sharp rise in this indicator in 2010 aligns with the adoption of European regulations promoting equal treatment—standards that were already a widespread practice in Poland.

Evolution of prosperity

The Polish economy has undergone a remarkable convergence with the EU. In 1990, Poland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was less than 40 percent of the EU average. Over the past twenty-five years, this gap has significantly narrowed, reaching 83 percent of the EU average by 2023.

A notable aspect of Poland’s economic performance is its resilience during the 2008 financial crisis, which left no significant negative impact on the country’s economy. As illustrated in Figure 1, Poland’s GDP per capita growth remained consistently positive from 1992 until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, the financial crisis, followed by the debt crisis, had substantial repercussions in neighboring countries such as Estonia and Latvia, not to mention the severe impacts felt in Greece. Consequently, Poland today is wealthier than all these countries, despite having a lower GDP per capita than each of them in 2007.

Finally, it is worth noting a significant external factor that has boosted the Polish economy in recent years, namely, the absorption of around one million Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of the Russian aggression on Ukraine. In 2023, estimates suggested that Ukrainian refugees contributed between 0.7 and 1.1 percent to GDP in Poland.

Figure 1. Real GDP per capita in selected countries

Source: World Bank, GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), constant 2021 international dollars.

When analyzing the health component, it is evident that persistent challenges remain. Poland’s life expectancy continues to lag behind EU averages, particularly among men, who face a gap of over four years. Lifestyle factors such as high rates of tobacco and alcohol consumption account for much of this disparity. While smoking rates in Poland have declined in parallel with the EU, alcohol consumption has stagnated since 2007, posing an ongoing public health concern. Alcohol consumption is more than three times higher among men. Similarly, 28 percent of Polish men smoke tobacco, compared with only 20 percent of women.

Figure 2. Life expectancy by gender, EU vs Poland, 1990-2019

Source: World Bank.

The socialist economic system proved to be detrimental not only to consumers but also to the environment. The shift toward market-oriented policies in Poland significantly reduced the volume of emissions required to generate additional income per capita. However, the transition to an environmentally sustainable economy is not yet complete, as coal continues to play an important role in industry and energy generation. EU regulations in this area are expected to drive further change and the adoption of environmentally sustainable policies, though the pace of the reform will be a critical factor. While there is a risk that some of these regulations may be overly severe or implemented too quickly, the general direction of these measures is undeniably positive.

Turning to the minorities component, it seems clear that the marked decline in this component beginning in 2015 correlates with the rise to power of the PiS government. A detailed analysis of the underlying data confirm this connection. The sharp drop primarily reflects increased discrimination in access to public sector employment and business opportunities based on political The Path Forward affiliation. This decline illustrates the previously mentioned politicization of public institutions, including the prosecution office and public media, among other agencies that should have remained neutral and independent.

The path forward

Following the turbulent tenure of the previous government, support for democracy and the rule of law has strengthened in Poland. Consequently, there is little reason for concern, in my opinion, about the stability of these institutions in the near future. Instead, the more pressing issue lies in sustaining economic growth. Although Poland has significantly narrowed the income gap with the EU, including Germany, disparities remain, and the country faces several unresolved challenges requiring a new wave of reforms.

One persistent issue is the incomplete privatization process initiated in the 1990s. The public sector’s share in the economy remains high—one of the largest in Europe. To ensure sustained growth, Poland must pursue privatization and enhance competition in sectors like energy and oil processing. Unfortunately, no major political party has presented a comprehensive strategy for addressing this issue. Nonetheless, a carefully planned privatization initiative is essential for medium- and long-term economic growth.

Another major challenge is excessive fiscal spending, largely driven by social welfare programs. What is more, this spending is not effectively targeted, as it does not primarily benefit the poorest households. The tax and transfer system has a minimal impact on reducing income inequality. For instance, the “Family 500+” program, introduced by PiS and later expanded by the current government, provides universal child allowances irrespective of income and number of children in a given household. Such unselective transfers are more characteristic of populist policies than measures aimed at addressing inequality.

Finally, Poland shares demographic challenges with other developed nations, particularly the rapid aging of its population. Without substantial reforms, economic growth is likely to slow further, and fiscal pressures will intensify. Polish civil society has shown remarkable resilience in defending democratic institutions during recent crises. With these threats now neutralized, it is crucial for citizens to channel this energy to pressure the current government to implement essential reforms. These efforts will be vital to ensuring continued prosperity over the coming decade.

Leszek Balcerowicz is an economist and professor of economics at the Warsaw School of Economics. He served as deputy prime minister and minister of finance in the first non-communist government in Poland after 1989 (1989–91), and again between 1997 and 2000. He was president of the National Bank of Poland from 2001–07. A member of the Washington-based international advisory body Group of Thirty, he is founder and chairman of the Civil Development Forum, a Warsaw-based think tank.

The author is grateful to Bartłomiej Jabrzyk for assistance in the preparation of this paper.

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Ukrainian Holocaust survivor: Russia is waging ‘war of extermination’

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 22:33:03 +0000

Ukrainian Holocaust survivor Roman Schwarzman has implored Germany to increase support for Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s “war of extermination.” Addressing the Bundestag this week as part of events to mark 80 years since the liberation of Auschwitz, Schwarzman accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of attempting to “destroy” Ukraine as a nation. “Back then, Hitler wanted to kill me because I am Jewish. Now Putin wants to kill me because I am Ukrainian.”

Schwarzman, 88, is president of Ukraine’s association for concentration camp and ghetto survivors. Born in Ukraine’s Vinnytsia region in the 1930s when it was part of the Soviet Union, he told German lawmakers of the “humiliation, pain, lice, and constant hunger” he had experienced as a child while confined to the ghetto in the town of Bershad during the Nazi occupation of World War II. “I have already been able to escape extermination once,” he commented. “Now I am an old man and must once again live with the fear that my children and grandchildren could fall victim to a war of extermination.”

Germany ranks second behind the United States in terms of military aid for Ukraine, but Schwarzman called on the country to do more. Responding to German Chancellor Olaf Sholz’s reluctance to deliver long-range Taurus missiles, he argued that Ukraine needs the missiles “in order to disable Russian airfields and rocket depots which are used to attack us every day.” Failure to do so would have dire consequences for Ukraine and for European security, he warned. “Those who believe Putin will be happy with just Ukraine are wrong.”

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Schwarzman’s comments serve as a timely reminder of Russia’s extreme objectives in Ukraine. In recent months, there has been mounting international speculation over the potential territorial concessions Ukraine may be obliged to make in order to end the invasion of their country. In reality, however, the war unleashed by Putin in February 2022 was never about limited territorial gains. From the very beginning, it has been a war to extinguish Ukrainian independence entirely.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession has dominated his reign and can be traced all the way back to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. He has always viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an historical injustice and a bitterly resented symbol of the Soviet collapse, which he has described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” The Kremlin dictator’s desire to reverse this breakup of “historical Russia” has long focused on Ukraine, and has been given additional impetus by his fears that Ukraine’s fledgling democracy could serve as a catalyst for similar change within his own authoritarian state and spark a new phase in Russia’s retreat from empire.

Putin made his intentions obvious during the buildup to the invasion when he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay arguing against Ukraine’s right to exist and insisting that Ukrainians were in fact Russians (“one people”). As Russian troops massed along the Ukrainian border in February 2022, he described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great, and has declared occupied regions of Ukraine to be “Russian forever.”

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Putin’s contempt for Ukrainian statehood has set the tone throughout wartime Russian society. Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become a daily feature of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media space, with Ukrainians routinely demonized and dehumanized. This has led United Nations investigators to note that some content “may constitute incitement to genocide.”

Following Putin’s lead, numerous senior Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia’s ultimate goal is the complete disappearance of the Ukrainian state. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in particular has become notorious for his unhinged rants. “The existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” he declared on one occasion in early 2024. More recently, close Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev has predicted that Ukraine “may cease to exist” in 2025.

This genocidal language has been matched by the actions of the invading Russian army. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Russia has systematically targeted anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime. Thousands have been detained and imprisoned, with victims including elected local officials, journalists, civil society activists, army veterans, cultural figures, and anyone regarded as a potential Ukrainian patriot. Those who remain are subjected to ruthless russification including the forced adoption of Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, statehood, and culture are being methodically erased.

Russia’s determination to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation is unprecedented in modern European history and makes a complete mockery of calls for a compromise peace. In words and deeds, Putin has made it abundantly clear that he will not tolerate the continued existence of an independent Ukraine, and regards the country’s destruction as an historic mission that will define his reign. Any efforts to broker a sustainable settlement must take this chilling vision into account.

Nobody wants the current war to end more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they are also painfully aware that the survival of their nation is at stake. Unless measures are put in place to prevent the resumption of Russian aggression once Putin has had an opportunity to rearm and regroup, a bad peace deal will merely set the stage for genocide in the heart of Europe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

One of Syria’s two main economic arteries, the M4 highway runs across northeast Syria parallel to the Turkish border and extending toward Iraq. Northeast Syria can be divided into two regions: north and south of the M4.

The area south of the M4 is the heartland of Arab tribes in Syria, aside from a few Assyrian villages near Tal Tamr. The area north of the M4 is home to a mix of Arabs and Kurds, with minority populations of Assyrian Christians, Turkmen, and Circassians. For example, the city of Qamishli features a diverse demography. Out of its twenty-three neighborhoods, eight are predominantly Kurdish, six are predominantly Arab, two are primarily Christian, and seven are mixed. To the south of the city, the villages are almost entirely Arab.

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Another example can be found in the internationally renowned Kurdish town of Ayn al Arab (Kobane), which is not solely inhabited by Kurds. Kobane is home to various Arab tribes, including the Jubour tribe, Bani Said tribe, Omayrat clan, Adwan clan, and Henadi clan. Furthermore, people from the Turkmen tribes, such as the Arbaliyah, Turyaki, Qadirli, Qasimiliyah, Qazli, and the Qara Shaikhli clans, also reside in Kobane. Among the Kurdish population, several tribes are represented, including the Zirwar, Alaidan, Shadad Wawij, Zarki, Hefaydi, Bish Alti, Shaikhan, and Daydan clans.

According to Syria’s 2004 census—the most recent data available—the demographically mixed sub-districts north of the M4 highway had a population of 599,873. The ethnically diverse sub-districts reaching north and south of the M4 had a combined population of 378,151. Meanwhile, the almost homogeneous Arab sub-districts south of the M4 had a population of 1,721,132.

Region	Subdistrict	Ethnic Majority	Population	Total
North of the M4 highway	Ayn al Arab	Kurdish	81,424	599,873
	Shuyukh Tahtani	Kurdish	43,861
	Tel Abyad*	Arab	44,671
	Suluk*	Arab	44,131
	Rasulayn*	Arab	121,536
	Dirbasiyah	Kurdish	55,614
	Amuda	Kurdish	56,101
	Jawadiyah	Kurdish	40,535
	Malikiyah	Arab-Kurdish	112,000
Across the north and south of the M4 highway	Ayn Issa	Arab	40,912	378,151
	Qamishli	Arab-Kurdish	232,095
	Qahtaniyah	Arab-Kurdish	65,685
	Yarubiyah	Arab	39,459
South of the M4 highway	Dayr Hafir**	Arab	34,366	1,721,132
	Maskanah**	Arab	64,829
	Sarrin	Arab	69,931
	Raqqa	Arab	338,773
	Al-Karamah	Arab	74,429
	Al-Sabkhah**	Arab	48,106
	Al-Thawrah**	Arab	69,425
	Mansoura**	Arab	58,727
	Al-Jarniyah**	Arab	31,786
	Kasrah	Arab	63,226
	Deir Ezzour***	Arab	***
	Suwar	Arab	37,552
	Busayrah	Arab	40,236
	Khasham	Arab	28,718
	Diban	Arab	65,079
	Hajin	Arab	97,870
	Susah	Arab	45,986
	Tel Hamis	Arab	71,699
	Bir al-Helou al-Wardiyah	Arab	38,833
	Tel Tamr	Arab	50,982
	Hasakah	Arab	251,570
	Al Hawl	Arab	14,804
	Arishah	Arab	30,544
	Shadadi	Arab	58,916
	Markada	Arab	34,745

*The SDF does not hold these subdistricts. They are controlled by Turkish-backed forces and were taken during Operation Peace Spring in 2019. Therefore, 210,338 majority Arab persons in this pocket of northeast Syria will not be counted in the calculation below.

**The SDF currently controls these subdistricts located on the western side of the Euphrates River.

***The population count of the Arab Deir Ezzour subdistrict, which reaches across the Euphrates River and is mostly within non-SDF-held areas, has not been included as the official data does not reveal the population on the eastern side of the river.

The goal of using the 2004 census is not to make a definitive statement, but to have a reference point. The census recorded a population of 2,488,818 in areas currently held by the Kurdish-dominated SDF. Of this total, 277,535 individuals lived in Kurdish-majority towns and villages. If you count all of those people as Kurds and add half of the populations of Qamishli, Qahtaniyah, and Malikiyah, the total count amounts to 482,425 people—meaning that only about 19 percent of the total residents of SDF-held regions were Syrian Kurds, according to the 2004 census. Since Syrian Kurds historically have a lower birth rate compared to the Arab tribes in the region, the current percentage of Syrian Kurds has likely decreased even further than this rough reference point.

The Syrian Kurds

Like any ethnic group, Syria’s Kurds have a range of political, religious, and tribal orientations. The prominent historic Kurdish political movement in Syria is the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has close ties to Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The KNC’s military arm, the Rojava Peshmerga, is based in Iraqi Kurdistan and is trained by the Zarawani Peshmerga, who have received military training from the United States. In Iraq, both the Zarawani and Rojava Peshmerga fought against ISIS. The KNC has officially been part of the Syrian opposition.

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) was established as the Syrian branch of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey. The PYD is a relatively new political entity in Syria. Its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), was formed in 2012 by PKK veterans before the Assad regime transferred control of Kurdish areas in northern Syria to them. This exchange aimed to silence the Kurdish opposition and prevent a united front between Arabs and Kurds in the region. Several politicians from the KNC have been arrested, exiled, or killed by the YPG.

Many Syrian Kurds view the PYD and YPG as extensions of the PKK, with its main decision-making power coming from cadres based in the Qandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. This has led to perceptions that the PYD/YPG is ultimately a Turkish-Kurdish organization rather than Syrian. Notably, the general commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, is also a PKK veteran who was once stationed in the Qandil Mountains.

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom are currently facilitating talks between the SDF and the KNC to establish a joint Kurdish committee that will be sent to Damascus. At the same time, the KNC has sent a delegation to Damascus to engage with civil society and local leaders. Additionally, the SDF recently held its first meeting with the new government in Damascus. It’s important to note that a previous US-brokered intra-Kurdish mediation effort in 2020 failed due to the SDF’s resistance to any power-sharing arrangements, the burning of KNC offices, and the refusal to allow the Rojava Peshmerga to enter Syria.

The Arab tribes

After the United States formed a partnership with the YPG-dominated SDF, Kurdish forces made significant advances into areas that were previously held by ISIS. The Arab tribes in northeastern Syria—of which the primary groups are the Uqaydat, the Baqqara, the Jubour, the Shammar, the Tayy, and the Bushaban—have lived under the authority of the SDF. Until recently, several foreign actors, including Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the United States, have co-opted these tribes to further their own interests.

This had major ramifications for internal tribal relations and tribal identity. With some tribal chiefs aligning with outside powers, association at the tribe level decreased in favor of stronger bonds with the clan or even greater family level.

Some tribal chiefs were part of the Syrian revolution, working with the Syrian opposition and Turkey. However, these tribal chiefs were in exile until the collapse of the Assad regime and have now returned to areas on the western side of the Euphrates River. Another group of tribal chiefs feared the Assad regime and established a pragmatic relationship with the SDF as the lesser evil. Lastly, one group of tribal chiefs remained loyal to the Assad regime or recently aligned with the Assad regime and Iran in a bid to free their homelands from the YPG.

After the tribal uprising in August and September 2023 failed to secure US support for their control over Arab tribal areas, several tribal chiefs expressed frustration. Contrary to their expectations, the United States did not intervene to prevent the SDF from brutally suppressing the uprising. In their bitterness, many tribal leaders viewed cooperation with the Assad regime and Iran as their only viable option. Under Iranian supervision, many tribal chiefs, including uprising leader Ibrahim Al-Hafel of the Uqaydat tribe, were integrated into the tribal military units of the Assad regime. This situation mirrored the mistake made in Iraq when the United States abandoned the Sahawat Movement.

With the establishment of a new government in Damascus, the situation has shifted significantly. The first group of tribal chiefs has developed into effective mediators between Damascus and other tribal leaders. Those tribal chiefs who previously collaborated with the Assad regime and Iran to remove the SDF have now realigned themselves in support of Damascus. And the tribal chiefs who saw the SDF as the lesser of two evils no longer have the Assad regime to contend with. Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of the new government in Damascus, has held meetings with tribal chiefs, including a specific gathering with tribal leaders from northeastern Syria.

Except for the Shammar tribe, all Arab tribes in northeastern Syria have either directly or are rumored to have secretly aligned themselves with the winners in Damascus, seeking to be part of the future of Syria. The Shammar tribe, however, holds a unique position. It shares a strong historical bond with both Iraqi and Syrian Kurds. During the Arab-Kurdish wars in Iraq from 1961 to 1975, the Shammar tribe fought alongside the Kurds. In Syria, its members have maintained a relatively autonomous stance within the SDF under the Sanadid Forces, the tribal military units of the Shammar tribe, and have closely collaborated with the YPG. Nevertheless, their loyalty to the KDP and Syria may be stronger than their allegiance to the SDF leadership. It remains to be seen whether they will indicate a shift in their alignment.

The way forward

For the stake of stability and the future of Syrian Kurds, the SDF should withdraw from the south to the north of the M4 highway. These Arab regions are home to the oil facilities, agricultural lands, and strategic dams that the new government in Damascus will need as resources to establish security and stability in Syria. The current oppression of Arabs reportedly in the form of extensive curfews, mass arrest campaigns, and the killing of peaceful demonstrators by the SDF is counterproductive and risks an Arab-Kurdish escalation. Furthermore, the four recent suspected SDF car or motorcycle bomb attacks in the regions of Manbij and Tel Rifaat, areas recently lost by the YPG, are only terrorizing civilians and fueling hatred. Between June 2018 and July 2021, the YPG conducted, on average, one car bomb attack every six days. The public expression of joy and happiness when the SDF was driven out of the Arab region of Manbij on December 8 should have been a teaching moment for the SDF. The facade that the SDF puts on of being a multi-ethnic armed group was never real. The YPG always called the shots.

As it withdraws from Arab areas, the SDF should hand ISIS prisoners and families over to the new government in Damascus, preventing any potential risks. The new authorities in Damascus have demonstrated their capability in eliminating the ISIS threat in Idlib. The US partnership with the SDF against ISIS is an outdated concept.

Afterward, the SDF should hand its weapons to the new government in Damascus, integrate into the new security and administrative system, and become part of a new Syria. Both Ankara and Damascus have extended an olive branch to the SDF offering just such a deal, on the condition of disarmament, the departure of senior PKK cadres from Syria, and the YPG’s transformation into a political party. The Syrian Kurds are an essential part of Syria and should engage in politics and gain governmental positions along with all Syrians. The SDF should accept this new reality and prevent the Arab-Kurdish escalation that would come from trying to hold onto the Arab-majority areas in northeastern Syria.

After losing the protection of Russia and the Assad regime, the SDF relies on the United States. Therefore, Washington has huge leverage over the SDF. If the United States can convince the SDF to take this olive branch, it would set the framework for a new regional security arrangement in which Syria would be no threat to any regional state, including Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, a peaceful resolution to the SDF question will help for more constructive dialogue vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue in Turkey as well. In short, the United States should not bet on a horse that has already lost the race and work constructively with Damascus, not limiting itself with northeastern Syria.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Morocco’s government must foster greater economic competition

Rabah Arezki — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 18:31:21 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Evolution of freedom

Morocco has substantially improved in all institutional dimensions during the last three decades, as measured by the progress in the Freedom Index. The Kingdom navigated the Arab Spring, which rocked certain countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As a result, a diverging trend has emerged between the sustained improvement in Morocco and the deterioration in MENA’s regional average since 2013, resulting in a gap of more than eleven points in their respective Freedom Index scores. As this chapter will detail, there are many areas in which Morocco still needs to continue its reform effort toward fully free and open institutions, building on recent positive trends.

The economic subindex shows a very sharp discontinuity in the year 2004, where Morocco’s score jumps more than eight points, opening a very substantial gap with respect to the rest of the region. A closer look at the components included in the economic subindex evinces that it is primarily driven by an extensive improvement in women’s economic opportunities, produced by the implementation of a new Family Code, known as Moudawana, in 2004. This piece of legislation is seen as one of the most progressive of the region, expanding women’s rights and protections in relation to civil liberties like marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance; as well as labor and economic aspects such as workplace protection, equal pay, maternity leave, and access to credit.

Morocco has historically been fairly open to international trade and foreign investment. The European Union-Morocco Association Agreement that entered into force in the year 2000, creating a free trade area with the European Union, has certainly expanded exporting opportunities. Yet, the concentration of trade relations with Europe may have slowed down economic integration with neighboring countries in the Middle East and Africa. The signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in 2018, and its ratification in 2022, will likely favor the expansion of Morocco’s trade and investment flows with the rest of Africa in the coming decades.

The different components of the economic subindex are not wholly capturing domestic aspects of free and fair competition. Like in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco is subject to an important level of market concentration in many sectors, especially non-tradable sectors. That is despite progress made in the competition policy framework. Leveling the playing field will be paramount if Morocco wants to ignite productivity and job creation.

The political environment in Morocco is complex, as evidenced by the large differences in the scores of the four components of the political subindex. Following the Arab Spring, a new Constitution was adopted which aimed at fostering more democracy, reinforcing the independence of the judiciary, combating corruption, and better protecting women and minorities. As a result of the new Constitution, judicial independence and effectiveness scores increased by ten points. While the Constitution brought important strides, critics argue that the concentration of power has not changed. Political rights in Morocco are better protected than in most other countries in the region, but the overall level is still far from the most advanced countries of the world. Freedom of expression is fairly protected, but it is limited. As a result, the press cannot fully fulfill its role as a public watchdog, including on issues of corruption. Morocco performs poorly in the bureaucracy and corruption component of the legal subindex.

The positive trend in terms of reduction of informality reflects efforts by the authorities to formalize the economy. The enrollment of informal workers into the public health system is, however, proving difficult. The trend in informality is linked to progress toward poverty reduction in Morocco. Yet poverty remains pervasive, especially in rural areas. The informal sector serves as a shock absorber, Evolution of Prosperity and as such, adopting a more inclusive approach as opposed to coercion is desirable. Reduction in barriers to entry into the formal sector is the way to go to reduce informality.

Evolution of prosperity

The evolution of the Prosperity Index since 1995 illustrates the sustained improvement in standards of living in Morocco, which has reduced the gap with the average of the MENA region. It is important to note that the regional average includes several low-population, oil-rich countries, namely the Gulf monarchies, which partially explains the persistent gap.

An important factor that increased the cohesiveness of Moroccan society, and certainly improved the recognition and protection of minorities, is the acceptance of the Berber language as official in 2011. This historic step has produced positive spillovers in terms of cohesiveness but it remains to be seen whether this will translate into reduced regional inequality in the medium term.

Regional inequalities are significant in several components included in the Prosperity Index, The Path Forward such as income, education, and health. Increasing economic prosperity in the last decades has disproportionately benefited urban populations in cities, which have also been the destination of most investments and growth-enhancing public policies. As a result, there are still sizable pockets where poverty is severe.

The performance of the educational system reflects that duality. While access to primary education has become universal, the quality of education is uneven. Indeed, the quality of education is much lower in rural than urban areas, further exacerbating spatial inequalities. The situation of the healthcare system is not very different, and suffers from several issues already mentioned, like the large disparities along the urban-regional divide.

The path forward

Overall, Morocco has made notable progress toward economic transformation, but further efforts to balance its economic development are needed. Morocco’s experience with economic development is unbalanced. On the one hand, there are pockets of rapid development, and on the other, pervasive poverty remains, especially in rural areas. In 2021, Morocco has started to implement a “new development model” to improve human capital, boost productivity, and foster inclusion. Despite the progress, economic growth remains tepid and poverty is pervasive. What is more, Morocco is faced with a relatively high level of debt. The lack of fiscal space constrains government spending to reduce spatial disparities and support poorer households.

The danger for Morocco is that it could remain stuck in a so-called middle-income trap with low growth and high poverty, which could further ignite social tensions. To reignite growth and transform its economy, Morocco must level the playing field. To do so, issues of market structure and competition must become more central. That would help jumpstart productivity and create good jobs. Take the example of the telecom sector, where anti-competitive practices have long made the quality and cost of digital services expensive.

Barriers to the adoption of so-called general-purpose technology such as quality and affordable internet are an important factor keeping Morocco in the middle-income trap, and also could further the divide between urban and rural areas. The pervasive lack of contestability, and the slow pace of technology adoption, help explain why Morocco is stuck in low growth. Governments play a key role in the regulation of entry in key “upstream” sectors such as telecom. Meanwhile, the lack of availability of frontier technology may have forced firms into low-productivity activities and limited their trade and economic growth.

More generally, unfair competition that results from markets dominated by connected firms deters private investment, reducing the number of jobs and preventing countless talented youngsters Rabah Arezki from prospering. This lack of fair competition is the underlying reason that Morocco, like other Middle East and North African economies, is unresponsive. The lack of contestability leads to cronyism and what amounts to rent-seeking activity, including, but hardly limited to, exclusive licenses, which reward their holders and discourage both domestic and foreign competition.

Morocco has adopted a competition framework to champion open competition, but the limited independence of the competition authority reduces its ability to decisively shape the market structure of the economy. An integral part of the competition and contestability agenda is transparency and data availability. Morocco, like other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, trails behind other similar middle-income countries on government transparency and the disclosure of data in critical areas on the degree of competition in sectors. Greater transparency would help build a consensus over the need for more competition to stimulate growth and job creation.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region and a former chief of commodities at the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. Arezki is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development, and at Harvard Kennedy School.

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Blinded Iranian activist Elaheh Tavakolian: ‘We lost our eyes on this path. Let us not lose sight of our goal’

Holly Dagres — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 23:48:00 +0000

Elahe Tavakolian is an Iranian activist who gained international recognition for her courageous protests against the Islamic Republic—a stand that cost her an eye when security forces systemically shot her during the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. As a PhD student, Tavakolian joined the nationwide anti-regime protests sparked by outrage over the murder of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the so-called morality police.

Denied medical treatment in Iran due to her activism on social media in support of the protestors, Tavakolian left the country to seek treatment in Italy. There she was fitted with a prosthetic eye and has undergone numerous surgeries. In exile, she has become a recognized voice for the Women, Life, Freedom movement, advocating for justice for victims of the Islamic Republic. In 2023, her efforts were honored with the Fondazione Minerva’s Women in the World for Human Rights award.

Former Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Holly Dagres had the pleasure of sitting down with Tavakolian to share her story and discuss the situation in Iran and what the West needs to do.

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IRAN SOURCE: Can you retell what happened the night you were shot by security forces in September 2022?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: I was in Mashhad when Mahsa Amini was killed. All of Iran was angry and upset. I was one of those Iranians. It was a bad scene, and the news was painful. Because of the mandatory hijab, a girl would be murdered. And she was a guest in the city of Tehran; our girl was Kurdish—our Mahsa Jina.

When I found out, I was very upset and felt as if she was my sister. I felt with all my existence how mercilessly they killed her. For two nights, I was in the streets of the city of Mashhad. We would chant and I was with my kids and my friends. My family was in Esfarayen [at the time].

Well, it was the end of summer, and my kids would need to go to school and needed supplies. I went to visit my family in Esfarayen. I went there and went into the street. That day, there was a nationwide call for a nationwide protest.

If you look up the city of Esfarayen in North Khorasan, it is very small. It has a total population of twenty to thirty thousand, and 90 percent of the people in that town are religious and traditional. It also has the largest number of martyrs and veterans—my own father is a veteran. It was really interesting. I saw with my own eyes that 70 percent of the people of Esfarayen were in the streets chanting. When a unity ring and crowd was formed with the chanters, I was in the main square. Suddenly, I saw the young people standing next to each other chanting, and I joined the crowd too.

I was with my kids and my younger sister, chanting. We were chanting “Women, Life, Freedom,” “Man, Homeland, Prosperity,” “Death to the dictator,” and “Death to the IRGC.” We didn’t set anything ablaze. We didn’t destroy property. We just chanted.

After I decided to join the crowds, my daughter asked me, “Why should we make chants?” She was a little scared, but my son said, “No, let’s go.” I said, “Because you should defend your rights. So that you learn that your lives should not be trampled by the regime, unlike my generation.”

When I was nine years old, my hair was very long and beautiful. I really loved it. Because of my age, I had to wear a chador and take part in school celebrations and they would take us to the mosque. Because my hair was long, I didn’t like to wear hijab. They forcibly cut my hair, so I made my first sacrifice at that age.

When I was older, I was forced to get married—I had an unsuccessful marriage. At that moment when I went to chant, it was my combined rage over the pain I had suffered and the rage I was experiencing over Mahsa’s killing. I put myself in the place of Mahsa. I could fully feel it. I felt so upset that, because of hijab rules, our girls are being imprisoned, raped, and killed. This was incomprehensible. We couldn’t forgive what happened.

That’s why I decided to chant at that moment. I didn’t want my daughter to be sacrificed like me. I didn’t want my daughter to stay silent for all her years. At that age, you need to yell for your rights and not let the regime force you to say what they want.

IRAN SOURCE: It’s now the second anniversary of the Women, Life, Freedom uprising. How do you feel?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Nowadays, other injured protesters and myself all have the same feeling. But I always say that every Iranian who was forced to leave Iran has suffered and was injured. Yes, we were physically injured—we lost our eyes, lost our hands, or even our feet. But every Iranian who was forced to leave has suffered enough.

Those of us who were shot, saw blood spilled on the ground. Our eyes came out and we saw the blood. It was a bad feeling. Every year when September approaches, it’s traumatic—it triggers panic. That moment comes to my memory and my eyes. [In the lead-up to the anniversary], I was feeling terrible. I was at home for a week. It was as if my eye could remember what had happened to me two years ago. Up until two years ago, both my eyes were healthy.

I still can’t look at my old photos because I get upset. I had two eyes and they were beautiful. I still say they are beautiful, but sometimes I miss them. It’s like you have lost someone dear to you. In these two years, I lived in pain and suffered a lot. In these two years, I’m bothered a lot. I’ve had a hard time.

When it’s the Mahsa Amini anniversary, it’s as if I can hear all the screams of the boys and girls in the street. Their yelling, “Women, Life, Freedom” rings in my ears. When they yelled in response, “Man, Homeland, Prosperity,” rings in my ears. “Death to the dictator” rings in my ears.

The moment I was shot during the crackdown, my children were screaming, “They killed our mother,” and nobody was helping. I could hear the screams of “Don’t be afraid, we’re all together” and I would just shout and yell, “I’m burning! I’m burning!”

Those moments replay over and over in my head. This is the trauma that I get every time the anniversary is near. It’s as if I’m back in that exact moment—I’d like to be back in Iran. I’d like to be back in that moment to yell—it’s as if I must take my rights back as if something is left back there. I still need to fight for it. I still haven’t finished my work. I feel like my job is incomplete. Whenever Mahsa’s anniversary arrives, I feel so much is left to do in the country.

IRAN SOURCE: Do you think the Iranian people will take back their rights and this regime will be gone?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Well, if we think that we are trying but aren’t getting an outcome, obviously we won’t get a good response. We need to spend a lot of time together, to build unity.

We shouldn’t stop. We must continue ahead on the path we’ve taken. There are difficulties in the way, including the cyber army that attacks us with their smear campaigns to create false divisions. These stop us from reaching our main goal. I might not have been a very political activist or speaker. Life and accidents have put me on this path. I was a protester and have now become a political and freedom-seeking protester and advocate, and a lawyer.

All Iranians are protesters, advocates, and political activists now because we don’t want the regime of the Islamic Republic. When [Iranians] rejected the regime, they have become political advocates. And I believe they must want it for union, for solidarity, to forge unity—and if they fight for what they want, why not? We will certainly see a positive result.

IRAN SOURCE: For those not familiar, can you explain why security forces systemically blinded protesters during the uprising?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: According to a report, which was published by the Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), nearly 560 people reportedly lost an eye, or both of their eyes. This report included those who were able to publicize their cases and were verified. But many people in Iran are not able to talk or communicate about this issue because of the security conditions; they don’t have the financial resources and their families are still trapped there. If I want to ask about the main statistics, the rate would be more than a thousand people. But they have the right [to remain silent].

Security forces wanted to scare people. When I was in Iran, when I lost my eye, I quickly went to Mashhad because I had been living there for a few years. And there were security forces’ motorcycles everywhere. Every one hundred meters, there were twenty motorcyclists with batons, tear gas, and pellet guns, and I don’t know what else. They would rev their motorcycles and everyone would get scared and run away. Targeting our eyes had one goal, to sow fear. For people in the streets to see us and say, “What happened to you?” And for us to reply, “They shot and took our eyes out.” So that when the next protests happen, a mother, father, sister, or brother would not allow protesters in their home to join the demonstrations: “Don’t go out. See how they shot others? They will take your eye out.” For this reason, it made a lot of people scared. Fortunately, the current generation is utterly brave, fully aware, and not afraid; 50,000–60,000 have left Iran since and are still speaking up.

They did this so that the protesters would be silent and afraid to talk. But as you can see, the injured are trying to be a voice against the Islamic Republic and its crimes. The injured, wherever they are in the world, are talking about it and are living evidence of the Islamic Republic’s crimes. As long as they live, they would be questioned, “What happened to your eye?” “It was taken by the Islamic Republic.” “But why did they do it?” “Because we were protesting.” “Protesting for what?” “Because we wanted our rights and wanted freedom only.”

The regime didn’t think it would get a reaction like this. As you know, there are a lot of folks who are talking or spreading the news.

Second-anniversary rally commemorating Mahsa Jina Amini, held in front of the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C., on September 15, 2024, organized by NSGIran (National Solidarity Group of Iran).

IRAN SOURCE: If you were right now sitting in front of the president of the United States, what would you like to say to him?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Well, when we were in Iran, everyone was watching television and social media. We expected instead of saying we condemn the actions, [that the United States would say] we stand on the side of the [Iranian] people.

Because we have only heard for forty-five years that “we condemn.” But we want [the United States] to be on the side of the people, not the Islamic Republic. They should know that the Islamic Republic is different from its people. They should know that the Islamic Republic is not representative of the people of Iran. If I am with the president, I will tell them, “You should not have relations with the Islamic Republic behind the curtain.”

Maybe my words are too harsh, but this is what comes out of the hearts of the people of Iran. We always say, that until the United States, the United Kingdom, and other world powers want it to, this regime will not fall. This is the truth and can’t be denied. All the hope of the people of Iran is inside Iran, but also in the Western governments because they are powerful.

They need to see, if I come and talk, that I took the risk. My family is in Iran. They may be under pressure; [the regime] may even create a plan against me. They may even force my family into giving false testimonies against me. But I risked it and came and talked, and I am ready to have face-to-face meetings and show and testify and demand that they stand by the people of Iran once and for all and turn their backs on the Islamic Republic.

IRAN SOURCE: What does the West not understand about the Islamic Republic?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: If I want to talk about it frankly, I came from the heart of the people. I was apolitical. And they would say, “America just condemns but doesn’t do anything. On the sidelines it’s talking with the Islamic Republic, appeasing them and they are having relations with them, but giving the appearance of otherwise.” They [the West] say one day they want to sanction, the other day they don’t want to. My discussion isn’t about whether to sanction or not. The people of Iran have lost hope in the West.

This has been happening since 2009 when all these people were killed. In the following years, the same thing happened in 2017 and 2019. We lost so many lives. How long does this have to go on until the United States sees the true nature of the Islamic Republic?

For forty-five years, the United States has been pretending to be asleep. You can’t wake up someone who is pretending to be asleep. This is something that the Iranian people have understood. And they say, “Well, now our hope is inside Iran.” But they can’t. The Iranian people are empty-handed. The Iranian people give one chant and they end up in prison or they are executed or raped. A lot have been extrajudicially killed in silence. I was only able to come out because of medical issues and was able to talk. But a lot are there and unable to talk. Our athletes abroad are successful, they have given their lives for Iran, but they aren’t backed and they can’t. The people of Iran are really tired. Their backs are bent over.

I don’t understand what the United States and Western countries want to see that they haven’t seen already. All this killing, all this living evidence of the crimes of the regime. In Europe, in the United States, they can talk to every one of these Iranians. They can see that all of these folks were protesters. I was not political; I was with my children and family chanting. The United States doesn’t want to see it because it doesn’t serve its benefit. I feel it is not beneficial for the [Joe Biden] administration. So many have been killed, so many imprisoned. You see the official announcement of the executions from all around the world. Iran is more genocidal than anywhere else.

IRAN SOURCE: In one of our previous conversations, you said that the Iranians living abroad had brought a lot of hope to protesters. Can you talk more about that?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: When we were in Iran in the streets, one foot was in the streets and the other foot was watching the media. We would come home quickly when we were no longer able to be on the streets. We turned on the cell phone and satellite, and we checked the channels one by one. Every night, I would tune into the channels and news to see what they were doing [in the West] to cover what happened over here.

When I saw that there were about 10,000–50,000 people in front of the consulates, embassies, in the streets, I would be with my friends and we’d all say, “This year it’s over, folks. Look, the Iranians over there have created a hailstorm of protest. This year [the regime is] over. Oh yes, our Iran will revive.” We were all thinking of freedom and thinking of much more. We were hopeful. When we became united, we became very hopeful. It was as if there was a spark of hope in the heart of each Iranian. Anytime we turned on the channels and saw our pictures—the injured, the killed—in the hands of Iranians abroad who hadn’t even met us, it would bring me joy. I would say, “This is the Iranian spirit. This is an army of thousands of people outside of Iran.”

I don’t know if it was because of the end of the unity or the coalition, or the division between unity, but the Islamic Republic cyber army infiltrated all the groups. If you’re with them you’re not with us. If you’re with us you’re not with them. You can’t be with them.

As a result, everyone became scattered. Now that I came here [to the West], I lost hope. I saw that apart from the fact that there is an Islamic Republic in Iran, there is also an Islamic Republic here. Unfortunately, this prevented us from reaching the goal. They have to focus on unity and protests because in Iran we only looked at what people were doing. Who are the voices of Iran? Who is active in Iran? We didn’t have hope because we couldn’t go under the bullets. We risked our lives but they didn’t let us. They oppressed protests, they killed, they arrested, they didn’t let us go. But after that, our hope was really for the diaspora.

We were always looking at it. Well, we were more hopeful when we saw diaspora protests. We said, “Look, guys, when the pressure of all these Iranians is on the Western governments, we will get a response.” This trend, instead of increasing, has become less and less and less. It’s really disturbing. But we shouldn’t lose hope because it takes time.

It is a long road, but it is not a goal we cannot reach. We will reach 100 percent if our goal is the collapse of the Islamic Republic. We must remove hurdles from our way. We must give hope to each other. We must participate in gatherings. You can participate in the gatherings with any political beliefs you may have. With any Iran flag you like. We have the lion and sun flag and that is all. And let’s stand by each other. Now, if someone says, “I have this belief or that.” That will be determined during democracy, during free elections, and a free ballot box. Each of us will have a single vote in a free election. But stand together. You cannot reach free and democratic elections by smearing me.

IRAN SOURCE: You mentioned the new generation of Iranians. What is the difference between them and the old generation?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: The new generation is very aware. Now, it is the age of social media and cyberspace. The old generation came with newspapers and pamphlets at that time. They didn’t understand—they would say, “We saw [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini on the moon” and it’s laughable. I don’t know why they would believe such things.

And everyone came and said that they have a single leader. They were free, but they were not aware. But the current generation is very different. The current generation is aware, but they are not free. And now they want to be both aware and free to reach prosperity. This is the difference between the two generations.

Civil disobedience is still going on in Iran. Women go out without hijab, boys go with shorts, and many of our actors stand by the people. Our singers have sung songs for the [protesters], for the people of Iran, so many have stood by the people of Iran. Because they have come to a point where if you do not have the support of the people, you are not loved anymore. The Islamic Republic itself understands this. It understands that the people are aware. It understands that people don’t want it anymore. The reason it brought [President] Masoud Pezeshkian was because the system was crumbling. It needs a fake shock. Pezeshkian was brought to supposedly reform the new government and to work on it. However, he was a deception, and the cabinet ministers were chosen by the dictator, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

IRAN SOURCE: You were once in Iran watching what Iranians abroad were doing. Now that you’re abroad, how can you help the people in Iran?

ELAHE TAVAKOLIAN: Well, when I left, I did a lot of interviews and met with a lot of people who were victims of state violence like me. I went to the United Nations, for the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for Narges Mohammadi. I went and spoke at a lot of places. They are hearing the real story of Iran—not just from my lips, but from others who have left. However, the expectation that I and others like me had was not fulfilled because divisions were sowed. They say, “If you’re going to talk, you shouldn’t belong to this or that group.” But no one should be seen as a member of this or that group. We’re all for Iran. When we were in Iran, we participated in the protests just for freedom, for the people.

I didn’t realize that the person next to me was Turkish, Lor, or Kurdish, or something else. Or which party I’m with. We would just shout with one voice. But when I came out [of Iran], I realized that what’s inside Iran is very different from what’s outside. The people of Iran are here. Some groups are helping each other. They are trying hard to meet with policymakers, talk to the governments, and expose the Islamic Republic’s atrocities. But our hopes and expectations are much more than this.

We lost our eyes on this path. Let’s not lose sight of our goal over marginal issues. That would only make the Islamic Republic happy.

(Translated from Persian by Holly Dagres and Khosro Kalbasi)

Holly Dagres is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute. Follow her on X @hdagres

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Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Look to Middle Eastern Diasporas for Figures to Inspire Change

Atlantic Council — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 15:37:54 +0000

The post Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Look to Middle Eastern Diasporas for Figures to Inspire Change appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Damascus: The challenges of rebuilding are becoming clearer in Syria

Diana Rayes — Fri, 03 Jan 2025 19:03:29 +0000

View of Damascus (photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

DAMASCUS—Over a half-century of Assad regime rule, including fourteen years of a brutal civil war, had turned Syria into a state of mass oppression as well as a geopolitical black hole. In December, a startling advance by an umbrella of armed opposition groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led to an unprecedented takeover and a rapid transition in governance. Just a month ago, I (and the millions of Syrians both inside and outside of the country) would not have imagined this day would come. Now that it has, the challenges and opportunities of rebuilding Syria—a free, secure, inclusive, and prosperous Syria—are becoming clearer.

I am in Syria for the first time in nearly fifteen years. While visiting Damascus, Homs, and Hama days after the collapse of the Assad regime and the initial period of joy and uncertainty that followed, I saw Syrians slowly returning to business as usual. In Damascus (considered the world’s oldest inhabited capital city) policemen in orange vests whistled and directed the congested traffic, vendors reopened their shops, and students boarded school buses ahead of the holiday. Young children wove between cars selling revolutionary flags—the new Syrian flag, which features a green band along the top. License plates from Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa suggested that many of these cars belonged to displaced individuals who were either returning to their homes or coming back to Damascus for the first time in years.

There were notable differences between this visit and my last. For one, across the city, posters depicting former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s face had been torn by jubilant civilians. Another was that the tarnished statue of Bashar’s father and predecessor Hafez al-Assad, which once stood dauntingly outside of the al-Assad Library, had been toppled and was lying in front of the Damascene Sword monument across the street. Syrians stomped on it, celebrating their freedom from fifty-four years of tyranny. These symbols of state repression aside, the indication of Syrians’ newfound liberties that stood out the most was their speaking and assembling freely without the fear of being thrown into one of the regime’s prisons or being bombed by a Russian jet.

Protesters step on top of a toppled a statue of Hafez al-Assad (photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

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The Syrian civil war was the deadliest and most devastating conflict of the 2010s, with profound consequences for human security, regional security, and global politics. The toll on civilian lives, infrastructure, and the economy was staggering, and its ripple effects were felt across the globe. Over half of the country’s population—fourteen million people—had been displaced at least once, and over five million Syrian refugees fled to neighboring countries. During the global migrant crisis of the 2010s, over a quarter of the world’s refugees were Syrians. Migration proved a lightning-rod issue warping politics from Ankara to Berlin to London to Washington. The ramifications of a free and stable Syria are huge for vulnerable populations as well as the countries that host them. Discussions about repatriation are already underway, for example in European countries. However, these conversations are concerningly premature: Syria is not yet prepared to receive and integrate returnees, as significant humanitarian, economic, and political-military challenges must be addressed.

Since the start of the conflict in 2011, Syria’s economy has contracted by a staggering 85 percent. The estimated cost of rebuilding the country ranges between $250 billion and $400 billion—figures that, given the extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, appear increasingly accurate. For those returning, one of the most striking changes is the visible level of poverty that greets them within minutes of entering the city center. The toll on society is undeniable: Buildings, both public and residential, are unusable, dirty, and neglected, and streets and storefronts are damaged and in disarray. The road between Homs and Hama, normally a leisurely thirty-minute drive, took longer to navigate as it was littered with debris and had been subject to destruction by bombardment from the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran-backed militias. But the visible destruction hardly captures the societal scars left behind.

(Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

“We are waking up from a long nightmare,” someone in Damascus told me. Others described it as “living in a dream” and said that many are in “denial” of this new reality. It became clear that the trauma of authoritarianism, for societies held in an iron fist like in Syria, is intergenerational. And it will likely take generations to heal.

This was apparent in the days following the collapse of the Syrian regime, which led to the freeing of thousands of prisoners—men, women, and children— from Assad’s prisons. Their release shed new light on the decades of crimes committed by both Assads—Hafez and Bashar—and a harsh reminder for regional and international parties who sought to normalize with the regime. Syrians were confronted with a painful reality that they had long known but had been forced into staying silent about for generations. Families today are still searching the Syrian regime’s notorious prisons and mass graveyards for loved ones forcibly detained or disappeared.

(Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

In Damascus’s Martyr’s Square, I met with families hanging photographs of their missing loved ones, many of whom had been taken as prisoners as early as 2012. I spoke to two mothers: one who had identified her son in an online video released after the liberation and was still trying to find him. Another mother had heard her son, missing since 2014, had been spotted near their old home by a neighbor. “I will wait for him at the Umayyad Mosque, maybe he will turn up there,” she said, with a glimmer of hope in her eyes.

Families hold photographs of their missing loved ones. (Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

I also met with civil society groups, who highlighted that the greatest challenge continues to be providing support to the 70 percent of Syrians living in poverty and the one in four Syrians experiencing extreme poverty. Earlier this year, the United Nations reported that over 16.7 million Syrians—around 79 percent of the population—are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

Syrians know they will not get what they need to rebuild as a society, stabilize their economy, and set up government services and a social safety net with one hand tied behind their backs. Nearly every conversation I had with civil society groups touched upon the need for global sanctions relief, with people expressing hope that sanctions would soon be eased to facilitate the flow of money from abroad, enable the delivery of remittances from the diaspora, and streamline licensing processes to allow nongovernmental organizations to operate more effectively and provide much-needed humanitarian aid. In the West, policymakers and humanitarian organizations have begun to reexamine such sanctions, seeing as they could stunt Syria’s recovery.

The Syrian interim authorities’ success is contingent on buy-in from the Syrian people, as international security expert Sana Sekkarie wrote for the Atlantic Council in her recent analysis. Addressing the current economic crisis and guaranteeing that basic needs are met, including access to food, water, electricity, and healthcare, will be critical to political stability. Without fundamental needs and services being met, public trust and stability will remain elusive, further complicating efforts to foster sustainable peace and democratic governance.

A multifaceted crisis such as the one in Syria demands innovative and swiftly implemented solutions. Among many priorities, it is crucial for the new governing party or leadership to focus on rebuilding trust and legitimacy. And while Syrians are ready to take ownership of their country, this society—plagued by half a century of tyranny—will need to unlearn its fear of the state. Syrians will also need to deliberately work together, for the first time, across minority groups and sects. These are the first of many steps toward building a free, stable, and prosperous Syria that can serve as an inspiration for other countries impacted by conflict across the world.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is the chairwoman of the Syria Public Health Network.

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Putin faces antisemitism accusations following attack on ‘ethnic Jews’

Joshua Stein — Tue, 24 Dec 2024 16:35:21 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has been accused of antisemitism after claiming that “ethnic Jews” are seeking to “tear apart” the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian leader’s controversial statements, which came during his annual end-of-year press conference in Moscow on December 19, were the latest in a series of similar outbursts since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that have either directly or indirectly targeted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is Jewish.

“These are people without any beliefs, godless people. They’re ethnic Jews, but has anyone seen them in a synagogue? I don’t think so,” Putin stated during the flagship event, which is broadcast live on Russian state television and traditionally runs for hours. “These are people without kin or memory, with no roots. They don’t cherish what we cherish and what the majority of the Ukrainian people cherish as well.”

Putin’s comments came as the Ukrainian authorities seek to limit the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which is seen as closely tied to the Kremlin. Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill has emerged since 2022 as an outspoken supporter of the invasion, which he has sought to defend on spiritual grounds. His backing for the war has shocked many and sparked international criticism, with Pope Francis warning him not to become “Putin’s altar boy.”

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Many commentators have noted the similarity between Putin’s recent attack on people “with no roots” and Stalin’s earlier Soviet era persecution of Jews as “rootless cosmopolitans.” The Kremlin leader’s comments also offered alarming echoes of Russia’s most notorious antisemitic fake, the early twentieth century Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which alleged a Jewish plot to take over the world by infiltrating and destroying Western institutions.

Putin and his Kremlin colleagues have faced multiple accusations of antisemitism since 2022 as they have sought to defend Moscow’s claims to be “denazifying” Ukraine despite the country’s popularly-elected Jewish president and its role as a prominent destination for Jewish pilgrimages. This toxic trend has included frequent attacks on Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage. “I have a lot of Jewish friends,” Putin stated in June 2023. “They say that Zelenskyy is not Jewish, that he is a disgrace to the Jewish people. I’m not joking.”

Following these comments, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum accused the Russian leader of repeatedly employing “antisemitic lies” to justify the invasion of Ukraine. US officials have been similarly critical. “President Zelenskyy’s Jewishness has nothing to do with the situation in Ukraine and Putin’s continued focus on this topic and “denazification” narrative is clearly intended to distract from Russia’s war of aggression against the Ukrainian people,” commented US Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah Lipstadt in 2023.

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Similar slurs feature regularly in the Kremlin-controlled Russian state media, with leading propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov known for questioning the authenticity of Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity. Meanwhile, during the initial months of the invasion in spring 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded to a question about the absurdity of “denazifying” a country with a Jewish leader by claiming that Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.” Lavrov’s remarks sparked outrage and were branded “unforgivable” by Israeli officials.

Many within the Jewish community see Putin’s most recent inflammatory comments as part of a broader trend that is legitimizing antisemitic tropes and raising serious safety concerns. “This is just one example of his regime’s explicit and virulent antisemitism, which has intensified following his 2022 invasion of Ukraine,” commented Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, the president of the Conference of European Rabbis and former Chief Rabbi of Moscow, who fled Russia following the attack on Ukraine after coming under pressure to publicly endorse the invasion. In December 2022, Goldschmidt warned of rising antisemitism in Putin’s Russia and advised Jews to leave the country.

Goldschmidt is now appealing to the international community to address the antisemitic rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin. “As a representative of Jewish communities across Europe, and someone who was forced to flee my home and community in Moscow, I call on Europe and the free world to unequivocally condemn President Putin’s dangerous propaganda before it spreads further,” he stated.

Joshua Stein is a researcher with a PhD from the University of Calgary.

1. Provide diplomatic recognition to the new government

The political situation in Syria is fluid, and the future government will likely be a coalition of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and representatives from various ethnic and sectarian groups, including HTS. One of the most significant actions that Washington could take is to provide early diplomatic recognition to this emerging government—contingent on commitments to a peaceful transition, democratic reforms, and the protection of human rights. Recognition may be contingent upon specific steps, including:

Formation of a transitional government: This government should be representative of Syria’s diverse political and ethnic groups, and include women, youth, political structures currently in exile, and opposition military factions.
Commitment to a democratic process: The interim government should agree to hold free and fair elections with international oversight and establish a justice and accountability mechanism to address past atrocities.
Constitutional reform: A new, inclusive constitution should be developed with input from all Syrian stakeholders to lay the foundation for a democratic governance system.
International oversight: The United Nations should be allowed to oversee the transition, including monitoring justice and accountability processes and ensuring the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Encouragingly, HTS has indicated its readiness to cooperate with the international community to monitor Assad regime military sites.

2. Provide humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance

Syria faces an enormous humanitarian crisis. Millions of Syrians are displaced, and much of the country’s infrastructure is in ruins. The United States should work with international organizations to ensure that aid is distributed effectively. Given the opposition’s experience in governance, existing structures on the ground can be leveraged to channel aid, minimizing the risks that would come from trying to create entirely new systems from scratch. However, this aid should be conditional on:

Political inclusivity: The transitional government must equitably provide aid to all regions of Syria.
Anti-corruption measures: Donors must insist on transparency and accountability mechanisms to prevent misuse of funds.

3. Begin the process of removing sanctions on HTS and the new Syrian government

HTS is currently designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The group’s evolving stances, including its recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, suggests that HTS may be open to political accommodation. The United States should initiate a gradual, good-faith process for removing sanctions and designations on HTS and the new Syrian government. Additionally, the United States has designated the government of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since the 1970s and has since added additional sanctions beginning in 2011 in response to the Assad regime’s exercise of violence and repression. This process could include:

Phased sanctions relief on HTS: The United States should start by removing sanctions on individuals who demonstrate a willingness to engage in a political transition, particularly HTS leaders. Over time, as HTS shows concrete steps toward reconciliation, further sanctions can be lifted.
Quick sanctions relief on Syria: Removing broader sanctions on Syria can be done swiftly, as the new Syrian government will likely be hostile to US-designated terror groups like Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which were instrumental in bolstering the previous Syrian regime. As for the second batch of sanctions on Syria related to the regime’s exercise of violence on civilians, if HTS follows through on its promises to refrain from retributive violence against civilians, the United States should lift this second set of sanctions as well.
Diplomatic engagement: Engaging with HTS and other opposition groups is critical. Past US policy on similar groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), shows that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible if the organization demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace.

4. Cooperation on counter-terror measures

HTS has a law enforcement body that has since 2017 conducted dozens of operations against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cells operating in northwestern Syria, including arresting many members of its leadership. HTS has also arrested members of the al-Qaeda branch in Syria, Hurras al-Din, largely dismantling the organization. HTS will have an interest in preventing more extremist actors from trying to reform in Syria as the rest of the state rebuilds. The United States may thus find HTS willing to cooperate on counterterror measures.

Intelligence sharing: Intelligence sharing on counterterrorism measures can build good faith on both sides and prevent extremist groups from proliferating.

5. Encourage SDF participation in the political process

Syria’s Kurdish population, particularly those in the northeast, will play a crucial role in the country’s future. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been key allies in the fight against ISIS, but tensions with other opposition groups remain. The United States should encourage dialogue between the SDF and HTS, as well as other opposition factions. This dialogue could include:

Inclusion of Kurdish leaders in the political process: A future Syria should represent the interests of all Syrians, including Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities. The United States can mediate discussions between the SDF and HTS to ensure Kurdish representation in the future government.

Seizing the moment

Failure for the United States to engage with Syria’s new leadership can lead to several negative outcomes. HTS could radicalize further if it does not have international checks or relies on other actors for diplomacy, trade, and support. Russia and Iran could fill the vacuum and partner with the new Syrian government to sideline the United States in the region. A new Syrian government without international support could fall into chaos and sow instability, leading to further mass displacement throughout the rest of the region. The United States must seize this moment to help influence the future of Syria, rather than waiting to see what happens. No potential path forward for Syria or HTS is inevitable. The sooner the United States takes concrete action, the more likely it can positively impact Syria’s future.

HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, entered the political scene in Syria over ten years ago. He has long been mindful of the lessons learned from the failures of al-Qaeda to win the support of the Iraqi people. HTS was formed by military officials who wanted to work within the contexts of the societies they lived in. HTS has continuously moderated since its inception and break from Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s Syria branch—in 2017. Of course, part of its strategy may be for optics, but much of the group’s rhetoric about moderation has taken the form of concrete actions. HTS has a Directorate of Minority Affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. HTS has ordered its fighters not to disturb public institutions. And the larger and more diverse the population that comes under its governance, the more HTS will need to evolve and the less power it will have to determine what governance looks like on the ground.

It is important not to overstate the current moderation of HTS. The group is not a bastion of liberal democracy, and its political evolution is still ongoing. However, HTS is actively seeking diplomatic recognition and has expressed a willingness to engage with the international community. The United States should not expect perfection but should recognize that political entities are capable of evolving, especially when faced with the realities of governance and international expectations. Shara has already reached out to regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Russia, reassuring them that he intends to have good relations despite past support their past support for Assad. If HTS proves genuinely open to dialogue and reform, the United States should pursue engagement rather than exclusion.

As long as HTS is willing to evolve and accept constructive criticism, the United States should engage with the group. Ignoring Syria’s new leaders will not make them go away. US outreach to HTS is not just engagement for the sake of engagement. A post-Assad Syria, especially one with leaders willing to engage with Washington, presents an opportunity for the United States to promote stability and democracy in the Middle East, curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region, and provide a safe and secure home for Syrians both inside and outside Syria.

Sana Sekkarie is a digital threat analyst focusing on the Middle East. She was previously a researcher focused on Syrian opposition groups at the Institue for the Study of War and the University of Virginia.

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Ukraine seeks further progress toward EU membership in 2025

Kateryna Odarchenko — Thu, 19 Dec 2024 21:43:28 +0000

Ukraine has long identified membership of NATO and the European Union as its twin geopolitical objectives as it looks to achieve an historic turn to the West. With seemingly little prospect of an invitation to join NATO while the war with Russia continues, the Ukrainian government will be hoping to advance further on the road toward EU integration in 2025. Progress in the country’s EU bid is realistic, but Kyiv will likely face a series of obstacles during the coming year, both domestically and on the international stage.

Ukraine’s EU aspirations first began to take shape in the aftermath of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution. However, the European Union initially showed little sign of sharing this Ukrainian enthusiasm for closer ties. Instead, it took nine years for Brussels and Kyiv to agree on the terms of an Association Agreement that aimed to take the relationship forward to the next level.

When the Association Agreement was finally ready to sign in late 2013, Russia intervened and pressured Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out. This led to protests in Kyiv, which then spiraled into a popular uprising following heavy-handed efforts to disperse students rallying in support of EU integration. The Revolution of Dignity, as it came to be known, reached a bloody climax in February 2014 with the murder of dozens of protesters in central Kyiv. In the aftermath of the killings, Yanukovych fled to Russia.

Yanukovych’s successor, Petro Poroshenko, signed the EU Association Agreement months later. By then, Putin had already decided to intervene militarily, seizing control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. This was the start of an undeclared Russian war against Ukraine that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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As Russian troops approached Kyiv during the opening days of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for EU membership. This gesture underlined the historical significance of the country’s European choice at a time when Moscow was openly attempting to force Ukraine permanently back into the Kremlin orbit.

Amid the horrors of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II, EU officials and individual member states also recognized the importance of Ukraine’s European integration. In June 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status. This was followed in late 2023 by a decision to start membership accession negotiations, with talks beginning in June 2024.

The dramatic progress made since 2022 has led to growing confidence in Ukraine that EU membership is a realistic goal for the country. It is certainly a popular option. The number of Ukrainians who back joining the EU has been rising steadily since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, with recent polls consistently indicating that more than three-quarters of Ukrainians would like to see the country as part of the EU.

This overwhelming public support means there is unlikely to be any shortage of political will in Kyiv to adopt the policies that will bring Ukraine closer to achieving EU membership. Nevertheless, the pathway forward is complex and demanding. Effective governance reforms, particularly in the fight against corruption, are essential for Ukraine’s EU aspirations. Aligning with EU legal standards across 35 policy areas including taxation, energy, and judicial reform will also require a monumental effort.

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Ukraine will be hoping for an accelerated period of EU integration progress when Poland takes on the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council in January 2025. This follows on from a Hungarian presidency that brought few benefits for Ukraine, and should create favorable conditions for constructive engagement on key reform issues.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s EU bid is likely to encounter additional obstacles and headwinds as the prospect of membership draws nearer. Ukraine’s agricultural prowess in particular is set to present both opportunities and challenges. Ukraine is already a major exporter of agricultural products to the EU. If the country is able to join the single market and eliminate existing barriers including tariffs and quotas, this would potentially overwhelm European markets.

Increased Ukrainian grain exports to the EU since 2022 have already become a controversial issue in many EU member states, sparking protests and border blockades. This opposition will only grow in the coming few years, with EU farmers pressing their governments to act in their interests and prevent Ukraine from achieving unrestricted access.

Labor flows of Ukrainian workers may also create some concerns among existing EU members. While millions of Ukrainians are already living and working in the EU including many with refugee status, membership could lead to an influx similar to the large number of Poles who moved to other EU member states following Poland’s 2004 EU accession. To address these concerns, transition periods may be necessary.

How soon could Ukraine achieve EU membership? EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová has expressed confidence that Ukraine could join by the end of the decade. This was echoed by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi, who stated in October that Ukraine could potentially secure membership by 2029 if it completes the necessary reforms.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has underscored the nation’s determination to achieve fast-track integration. While there is strong support for Ukraine’s membership bid in most EU capitals, the accession process is rigorous and requires unanimous approval. Further progress is likely in 2025, but the road to full membership remains long and challenging.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

—Sungmin Cho is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Impeachment is a rare occurrence in the United States, with only three presidents having faced the process in nearly two-and-a-half centuries. Conversely, South Korea has seen three presidents face impeachment in just twenty years, with several others leaving office in less-than-ideal circumstances.

Nor is martial law unknown in South Korea. The country experienced it under the control of Park Chung-hee in the 1970s. Then, the South Korean people fought with blood, sweat, and tears to institute a true democracy. It’s under this context, with martial law in the living memory of many in the country, that South Korea was galvanized to call for impeachment for an already massively unpopular Yoon. South Koreans are very protective of their democracy, and Yoon’s attempt at martial law drew comparisons to the authoritarian Park Chung-hee government, especially since Yoon’s first move after the martial law declaration was seemingly to block the National Assembly from voting to end it. This move was undoubtedly one step too far for the South Korean public and the calls for impeachment were a statement from the population that they will not take a threat to the democratic process lightly.

—Lauren D. Gilbert is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

2. What is the potential removal process?

After the National Assembly impeached Yoon, his powers were immediately suspended, and the prime minister assumed the role of acting president. The impeachment case will now be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to decide if Yoon violated the Constitution or laws to a degree warranting removal. In former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment case that began in late 2016, the Constitutional Court took ninety-two days to reach a decision. Both Yoon and the National Assembly will present arguments, evidence, and witnesses in a trial-like process before the judges of the Constitutional Court. If upheld, Yoon will be formally removed from office, triggering a presidential election within sixty days; if rejected, he will be reinstated. Throughout this period, public opinion and political debates will intensify as the nation awaits the court’s final decision.

—Sungmin Cho

Now that Yoon is facing impeachment, the Constitutional Court has 180 days to decide, and the vote requires at least six of the full court’s nine judges to vote yes for impeachment. However, at present, the court only has six judges, with three seats on the court left vacant. This is leading to a debate over how and when the court should proceed. Some say that the vote should go through with the six current judges, while others say the vacant seats must be filled first.

There is also debate over whether the judges should be appointed by the National Assembly or whether Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who has taken over the presidency during the impeachment process, has the right to appoint the three judges. Further complicating matters, the court has several other impeachment cases still awaiting its decision, adding to the oversaturation of the Constitutional Court. While we await the decision on how they will proceed with the appointment (or not) of the three vacant seats, there is still the possibility that Yoon’s impeachment will be overturned. There is a precedent for this. Former president Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment was overturned in 2004, although unlike Yoon, Roh had the public’s support.

—Lauren D. Gilbert

3. What does this mean for South Korea’s relations with Japan?

In the immediate term, Japan and South Korea will broadly continue to communicate and coordinate along the lines forged over the past two-and-a-half years. However, South Korea and also to some extent Japan will have limited political capital to undertake any new measures to strengthen the relationship. Instead, Tokyo and Seoul are focusing on making both their bilateral relations and the trilateral security framework with Washington resilient and long-lasting to minimize the effects of political revisions in the future.

Japan is concerned about who will take the presidency in South Korea if the impeachment is upheld. The political momentum gained by progressives in Seoul is raising concerns about a reversal of the progress made in Japan-South Korea relations in recent years. On the plus side, however, Japan and South Korea have rebuilt ties and worked on the strategic and operational mechanisms and procedures of close coordination, setting a strong precedent for the future.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

4. What does this mean for relations with Washington and trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan?

In the near term, the acting president, Han, is already moving to ensure continued alliance coordination between Seoul and Washington. Key meetings and working-level coordination are likely to return to some semblance of normalcy, as the institutional memory and mechanisms of the alliance are strong. However, in practical terms, the timing of this political crisis will make it challenging to have high-level strategic coordination or make progress on key alliance issues in 2025. South Korea will have only an acting president when US President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. And depending on how long the Constitutional Court takes to decide the impeachment case, it could be as long as eight months from now before a new president is elected. We also cannot rule out a prolonged period of uncertainty followed by Yoon’s return to office, in a much-weakened and tenuous position, in the event the court does not uphold the impeachment.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and a former national intelligence officer for North Korea.

5. What can we expect from North Korea right now?

North Korea appears to have been laying the groundwork for a renewed military confrontation with South Korea for some time now, and it could initiate that confrontation at a particularly inopportune moment for the alliance. Pyongyang’s silence so far suggests that North Korea will wait for the outcome of the Constitutional Court’s decision and the election of a new president in South Korea before moving to take advantage of the situation, however. North Korea likely recognizes that pursuing a confrontation with Han, the interim president, could simply strengthen the position of South Korean conservatives inclined to take a harder line against North Korea. Meanwhile, before pushing too far, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is likely to want some time to probe Trump’s new position.

A major thaw in relations is unlikely, even if South Koreans elect a progressive president inclined to engage Pyongyang, given Kim’s moves this year to reinforce the permanence of the division between North and South. Despite optimism in some quarters about the possibility of renewed Trump-Kim summitry in 2025, not much is likely to result. A lot has changed in the four years since Trump left office, and Kim’s position has solidified in ways that make it much less likely that he would be willing to offer major, meaningful concessions to Washington or Seoul.

—Markus Garlauskas

On the surface, North Korea’s response to the political crisis has been limited to domestic media commentary and has refrained from openly confronting South Korea so, perhaps to prove wrong Yoon’s claims about North Korean infiltration. At the same time, the political turmoil in South Korea is a prime situation for North Korea to carry out covert cognitive warfare—particularly through social media and other communication methods. In particular, Pyongyang would be piggybacking and boosting the criticisms in South Korea toward Yoon and the conservatives.

For North Korea, such measures are essentially about investing in the return of the progressives to power, which North Korea could exploit to make South-North relations and circumstances on the peninsula more advantageous for Pyongyang. North Korea’s new official policy of recognizing South Korea as an “adversary” rather than a “partner for unification” was not only to bolster its militarily confrontational stance, but a means of hybrid warfare to apply further pressure on Seoul—particularly vis-à-vis the progressives. Hence for now, North Korea will likely see how the situation in South Korea plays out while also ensuring that it has the upper hand in dictating the direction of inter-Korean relations.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

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The reluctant consensus: War and Russia’s public opinion

Maria Snegovaya — Tue, 17 Dec 2024 15:00:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

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Introduction
The war and the Putin consensus
The demographics of war support
Information access
The new normal
Challenging the status quo
Can one trust the Russian polls?
The joke is on us
Acknowledgements
About the author

Russian president Vladimir Putin has been in power for a quarter of a century. During his tenure, Russia has actively participated in five wars. But not even Putin’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has been able to shake Russian society’s consolidation around the Kremlin, the so-called “Putin consensus” (i.e., Putin’s consistently high support among the majority of the Russian public). This report aims to dig into the origin of this phenomenon.

The war and the Putin consensus

Over the last two years, in surveys run through various modes and by several polling organizations, support for Russia’s war among the Russian public has remained fairly stable. Based on face-to-face surveys by the Levada Center and phone surveys by Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) and the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), war support fluctuated between 70–75 percent (with about 20 percent of respondents consistently opposing the war). Online polls by Russia Watchers show similar results. According to phone surveys by Russian Field and ExtremeScan, support has fluctuated between 60–70 percent (the differences in numbers might be due to the framing of the question). While a consistent level of approval continues, Russians disagree about specific war aims: none of the official reasons (such as Ukraine’s “denazification,” by which the Kremlin means regime change in Kyiv) typically reach majority support in surveys.

The demographics of war support

After February 2022, Putin’s approval rating increased by double digits. This notable spike, a “rally around the flag,” follows a pattern observed during previous Kremlin-led wars. The specific size of this effect has varied from one conflict to another. As one study estimated, the boost is usually smaller in magnitude for smaller conflicts, but major international crises were followed by increases in approval rating of more than 10 percentage points.

War often inflates the approval not only of the president, but of various political institutions such as the government, parliament, governors, the army, patriotism, and pride in Russia. Beyond political institutions, the rally-around-the-flag effect often boosts other indicators of perceived societal wellbeing and overall optimism about Russia’s direction. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine proved no exception to this pattern, even if the popular consolidation was somewhat weaker than it was in 2014. Right after the invasion, public optimism and pride soared. They have remained high, as evidenced by the finding that average Russians are now significantly more likely to believe their country is headed in the right direction. Furthermore, views of Russia’s economic, social, and political priorities shifted toward a siege mentality with a sense of grievance vis-à-vis the West.

What explains the rallying effect at the onset of the conflicts Russia initiates? Russian respondents are often categorized into several groups.

The separate but related “loyalist” (war supporters who express their beliefs with less intensity) and “uncertain” (those with average support for the war who are unsure whether Russia is moving in the right direction) groups—36–49 percent and 11–14 percent of the Open Minds Institute (OMI) sample, respectively—agree with the war in principle but in moderation. They are the groups most conformist with higher levels of authoritarian obedience. In Levada polls, a chunk of respondents (42 percent) broadly corresponding to this group has consistently supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine, albeit for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. For example, they tend to claim that Russia should “win anyways” and “finish what we started.” Such participants often describe the war as defensive, inevitable, or the result of the threat of NATO expansion. In polls, individuals in this group, while supporting the war, also typically want it to end soon.

Historically, these groups are foreign policy moderates. For years they have made up the core of Putin’s support, believing through the end of 2021 that Putin was not a hardliner vis-à-vis the West. These conformist groups are also more susceptible to propagandist narratives due to their lack of strong preformed opinions. While they do not necessarily trust the authorities on day-to-day matters and economic issues, they often delegate foreign policy decisions to the Kremlin. They also tend to believe it’s their duty to follow what the state considers morally correct, and even to sacralize the state allegedly waging a “defensive” and “liberation” war against an enemy “attacking their homeland.”

Accordingly, the Kremlin easily convinced these groups of the need for another foreign adventure. When asked whether the war against Ukraine should continue, they tend to shift back and forth on the topic, parroting what they believe to be the Kremlin’s intentions at the moment. The conformist groups display no distinct gender or age characteristics. They are usually less interested in politics, and they are more likely to switch back and forth between media channels depending on fluctuations in the news cycle.

The “hawks” (13–15 percent of the OMI sample, 18–22 percent of Levada’s samples, and 27 percent of the Russian Field data) are the most ideological group, firmly supporting the war against Ukraine and sharing a strong sense of national identification with Russia. They typically believe that a ceasefire in Ukraine is unacceptable until Russia “destroys and eradicates fascism and Nazism.” Pro-war groups are more likely to be male: 53 percent of men “completely” or “rather” support the war, while only 36 percent of women do. Age is another factor in respondents’ support for the war. In the OMI polls, 58 percent of those aged 45–60 expressed support, as opposed to only 29 percent of 18–30-year-old respondents. In their study, Maria Snegovaya, Peter Pomerantsev, and Graeme Robertson also singled out a significant share of respondents that identifies with Russia, supports militaristic action more strongly, and is more nostalgic for Soviet times than the rest of the sample.

Hawkish groups are also more likely to reside in rural areas or small towns, and to rely on TV as their main source of information. They are usually less educated, have higher income levels, and are mostly satisfied with their financial situation. Better-off respondents are more likely to support the war because of the idiosyncrasy of the Russian middle class, which includes many members of the security services and state and public-sector employees, all of whom are more likely to take pro-Kremlin stances.

War opponents made up 22–30 percent of the OMI sample and 34 percent of the Russian Field data. Since February 2022, war opposition in Russia has remained at roughly steady levels of about 19–20 percent, and about one-fifth of respondents have consistently supported peace negotiations in the last 2.5 years. In today’s Russia, these groups find themselves in an unenviable position, experiencing fear, shame, depression, horror, uncertainty, and despair. However, consistent pro-Western liberals constitute less than half of this group, and they are only about 7 percent of the total sample. War opponents are more likely to have lower levels of income and to be worried that the so-called special military operation will worsen their financial situation. They are younger, are more likely to reside in big cities, and primarily rely on information sources other than TV. In polls, the share of respondents who primarily rely on more independent media sources (YouTube, Telegram channels, or social networks) closely corresponds to the share of war opponents (about 18 percent). As sociologist Mikhail Sokolov put it: “If you are younger than 30, live in a big city, have a higher education and do not watch television, the probability that you will not support the actions of the Russian army exceeds 80%.”

For a while, scholars believed that the Russian youth would become one of the most opposition-minded groups in Russian society. However, as they mature, younger Russians tend to become more conformist, adapting to the political mainstream. Prior to the 2022 war, polls and focus group interviews revealed that Russians were extremely homogeneous on Ukraine-related issues. Both older and younger respondents, and internet and TV watchers, were unusually united in blaming “the West for the current escalation of the conflict.” In the post-2022 period, Kremlin-led indoctrination, which was particularly strong at the school and university levels, further reinforced this trend. Over time, according to polling data, the Russian youth has become more pro-Kremlin, more patriotic, and more pro-war. Hence, it is more accurate to speak of a generational continuum instead of a generational gap. Younger people still support the war in high numbers, though their support is lower than that of the older generation: 75–80 percent of people fifty-five and older support the Russian army’s actions in Ukraine, while 61 percent of young respondents in Levada polls share this sentiment.

Information access

A common misconception about Russian public opinion has to do with the alleged lack of information available to ordinary Russians. While there is a strong correlation between reliance on state TV channels and war support, Russians also have access to alternative information. In the last decade, they have become far less reliant on state-controlled TV channels, a sharp drop from about 90-percent reliance to slightly above 60 percent between 2013 and 2021, as Russians switched to social media and YouTube. More than 85 percent of Russians now have internet access. Popular social apps have nearly 60 million users in a country of 145 million people. Even after the Kremlin increased censorship, independent channels such as YouTube and Telegram still exist, as do virtual private networks (VPNs) and other ways to circumvent the limitations.

Yet, in the post-invasion period, state-controlled TV channels preserved their grip on the Russian public’s hearts and minds, effectively creating an alternative reality for many. Even on the internet, Russians tend to seek out information that is closer to their views. They often find such information in the so-called Z channels (run by pro-war bloggers), whose popularity skyrocketed since the start of the 2022 war, and other pro-Kremlin channels. For example, in the first few months since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, TikTok posts uploaded with the pro-war hashtags #zнаши (“Z-ours”) and #мненестыдно (“I’m not ashamed”) collected more than 2 billion views, and posts promoting the Wagner private military company (PMC) collected another billion. On the Russian-language internet, pro-Kremlin sources have surpassed exiled liberal voices in popularity by at least one order of magnitude.

While many Russians have access to true information about what happens in Ukraine, they often choose to avoid facts that challenge their propaganda-crafted preexisting beliefs. Even when such information was offered by their blood relatives, Russians commonly denied and refused to believe the facts, claiming that this evidence was fake. This is likely explained by Russians trying to avoid cognitive dissonance, the mental discomfort people experience when encountering facts challenging their preexisting beliefs. Conversely, many Russians are used to experiencing good feelings when Russia invades other countries. For most of the post-Soviet period, the Kremlin has waged wars of varying intensity, and periodic rallying around the flag has often triggered the sense of belonging to a great country. Indeed, the narratives the Kremlin promoted at the outset of its wars repeatedly boosted the perceptions of collective unity and allowed many Russians to derive their sense of worth from belonging to a large and strong state. For example, in the post-Crimea period, polls recorded that respondents’ own self-respect spiked from 27 percent in July 2012 to 45 percent in August 2014. Why learn the unpleasant truth when propaganda offers a much more satisfying, glorious, and convenient version of reality?

It appears that state-promoted narratives are more consequential for the conformist groups. The loyalists and the uncertain groups, which constitute the majority within the Russian population, are more likely to shift their support back and forth depending on the Kremlin’s view of the war at a given moment. In contrast, the more ideological hawks are less likely to support Putin during peaceful periods, believing he is too weak vis-à-vis the West. But during periods of escalation against the West, the hawks tend to join Putin’s coalition and unite with the more conformist core support groups. This might explain Putin’s popularity spike at the start of the war.

The new normal

While the previous wars Putin started were relatively painless for Russians, the 2022 war—with half a million casualties, immense economic costs, and the largest occupation of Russian territory in seventy-five years—would seem likely to break the aforementioned pattern. In the past, Russians appeared to be more perceptive about the costs of war; during the Second Chechen War, the public was more sensitive than it is now to casualties among its own soldiers and alarmed at the economic costs. And yet, while several events in the past 2.5 years have somewhat challenged the Putin consensus, after a short period of increased anxiety and support for peace talks, support for the war and Putin’s concurrent approval rating bounced back every time.

The introduction of sanctions was the earliest shock at the onset of the war. Under new conditions of uncertainty, many Russians postponed expensive purchases, as captured by the index of large-purchase expediency. However, the index subsequently recovered and kept growing until it reached its peak in June 2023. That is, adaptation to the economic shock happened within a few months, with few respondents experiencing any notable deterioration of their economic situations.

The announcement of partial mobilization in September 2022 led to a sudden and radical spike in anxiety levels, increased attention to the war, a decrease in Putin’s approval, and a decrease in war support, while support for peace talks temporarily increased to its highest number since the war started. The share of those who felt “tension, irritation, fear and melancholy” increased from 21 percent to 47 percent, the sharpest one-time change in public mood since the start of such observations in the early 1990s. A few protests by the wives and mothers of the mobilized took place outside major cities, primarily in republics that were more affected by mobilization. By the end of September, however, Russian society had generally come to terms with these changes. Protests subsided and the public mood returned to “pre-mobilization” levels by the end of 2022.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny attempt on June 23–24, 2023, also led to increased anxiety levels, with about one-third of respondents feeling anxious and depressed. However, public opinion soon returned to normal as, to many Russians, Putin appeared to have responded well by promptly condemning and cracking down on the rebels.

Most recently, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk, which started in early August 2024, has created a similar dynamic. Anxiety levels jumped from 33 percent to 49 percent between late July and early September, negative sentiment increased, and the share of respondents who thought things in Russia were headed in the right direction decreased. However, this time Putin’s approval declined only slightly—by 2 percentage points (no statistical significance)—and the percentage of peace supporters did not increase, instead dropping from 58 percent to 50 percent.

Altogether, negative war developments typically increase anxiety levels and support for peace talks, while dragging down the approval for the Russian army and the president, probably due to some respondents in the conformist groups temporarily distancing themselves from the Kremlin. However, the effects are usually short in duration and the ratings bounce back after several weeks.

Since 2022, about half of Russians have consistently supported peace negotiations. But even those respondents embracing peace talks support them only with the condition that Russia retains its recent territorial gains in Ukraine. They are unwilling to accept Russia’s strategic defeat. In recent months, some pollsters have noticed a slight increase of 7–8 percentage points more people in support of peace talks. Some believe this trend might indicate war fatigue spreading within Russian society. However, the pattern is not consistent across various studies.

To most Russians, things continue as usual, with many barely noticing any changes in their lives. They seem to be finding ways to accept the unprecedented developments even if they did not originally support or anticipate the war—as long as those developments do not concern them personally (a pattern that mobilization temporarily undermined). It is telling that many Kursk residents claimed in surveys that the war started only after Ukraine’s incursion in August 2024. The appearance of normalcy is partly due to the regime’s active propaganda efforts. Pro-Kremlin channels offer a reassuring picture that “everything is going according to plan, everything is as it should be, and we will win.” Thus, the propaganda has tried to portray the highly unpopular mobilization as a small nuisance and the chances of an average Russian being mobilized as slim. It also hides the true numbers of war casualties and avoids publicizing the unprecedented growth of military expenditures. As long as the war remains a cinematographic picture on TV screens, the Russian public tries to ignore it against all odds.

Challenging the status quo

Recent years have exposed fallacies in many analytical constructions about Russia, and expectations of Russia’s ability to easily shed its authoritarian legacies turned out to be somewhat naïve. How did so many get it so wrong?

One problem is that, for too long, optimists tended to overfocus on trends. While trends matter, the sheer size of the effect ultimately determines the political outcome. Many observers also tended to underestimate the legacy of formal and informal institutions inherited from Russia’s authoritarian past that continued to condition the public’s beliefs and behavior—such as attitudes toward the wars launched by the Kremlin—more than previously understood.

While noticing encouraging modernization trends among younger Russians, observers often missed the limited size of this age group. In the 2019 census, Russians aged 15–29 constituted only 16.5 percent of the population because relatively few children were born between 1989 and 2003. Despite their small number vis-à-vis the rest of the population and their tendency toward political apathy, the regime scaled up its indoctrination efforts toward young Russians in the last decade and appears to have successfully coopted many into its support base. Since 2022, a majority of younger Russians have consistently supported the war.

Similarly, observers have consistently ignored the size of Russia’s liberal pro-Western segment (less than 7 percent of polling samples). A recent German study has estimated the total audience of Russian-language independent media at around 6.7–9.6 million unique users, including 5.4–7.8 million inside Russia. A joint study by Levada and Spektr found that about 7 percent of Russian respondents have relied on independent media, such as Meduza, Novaya Gazeta, Deutsche Welle, etc. Another study asked respondents about YouTube channels they rely on for news about military operations. It discovered that among 1,600 respondents in Russia, the only liberal outlet receiving double-digit mentions was TV Rain, which was named only ten times. Altogether, Russian liberals appear to have failed to make a decisive imprint on Russian society, or even to resist the wave of repression unleashed by the Kremlin since mid-2020. The Kremlin’s brutal crackdown on Russia’s small liberal community, including its multiple attempts to murder opposition leader Alexey Navalny, encountered little pushback from Russian society short of several protests in Russia’s major cities. That was the abrupt end of a decades-long effort to nurture Russian civic groups.

Nor did the simple deterioration in the quality of life brought about by sanctions provoke a level of discontent strong enough to undermine the regime or the prosecution of the war. While research shows that economically worse-off respondents tend to decrease their war support, Russians also proved remarkably resilient to war casualties, which have now exceeded half a million. Invoking comparative cases like the Afghanistan war that helped bring down the Soviet Union, it appears now that only a perfect storm of military losses and economic collapse could cause major public-opinion reversal. As Levada Center sociologist Alexey Levinson points out, the first step in this process would be for the public to embrace the attitude of “screw it all!” But such mass despair appears unlikely in the near future. Instead, economic optimism has been on the rise. As long as Russian society views the war costs as acceptable, the pro-war status quo can be maintained.

People attend a concert in Moscow marking the declared annexation of the Russian-controlled territories of four Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. September 30, 2022. (REUTERS/REUTERS PHOTOGRAPHER)

Even in the event of an economic crisis in Russia, the decline in war support might not be as radical or pronounced as many hope. The Kremlin has proved remarkably successful at feeding Russians an alternative reality that is too pleasant and addictive for them to abandon. The goal of the analytical community should be to work on strategies designed to help Russians overcome their cognitive dissonance, force them out of denial, and make them challenge their own beliefs.

Can one trust the Russian polls?

After the war started, some observers criticized the reliability of Russian polls. However, most criticism of the polls comes from exiled Russian opposition figures who have their own agenda, or from journalists and experts who do not have experience working with the polling data in their research. The below section addresses most of the frequently raised concerns regarding the reliability of Russian polling data.

Types of polls

Critics claim that intensifying repressions in Russia and multiplying legal restrictions have made it hard to rely on polling evidence. As the argument goes, many Russians today have strong incentives to misrepresent their actual beliefs to avoid state persecution. Indeed, one should be careful interpreting polls in authoritarian contexts given the possible repercussions of disagreeing with official narratives.

However, as the above section demonstrated, most polls—regardless of pollster or mode (online, phone, face to face)—show comparable results. The majority of Russians support the war. One would expect more pronounced discrepancies between, say, online and face-to-face polling results if there was a systematic misrepresentation on behalf of a sizeable share of respondents.

Sample composition

If respondents are increasingly reluctant to talk to pollsters, this should be reflected in changing sample compositions (i.e., how well a sample represents various groups across society). But since the start of the 2022 war, no convincing evidence of this has emerged. Non-sensitive demographic indicators (from prevalence of wearing corrective eyewear to marital status) have generally remained in line with official statistics. Since the start of the war, polls have continued to quite accurately represent the socio-demographic structure of the Russian population. The only exception is a tiny decline in the share of young people willing to participate in surveys since the onset of mobilization. But such fluctuations in the sample structure are too marginal to significantly affect response distribution.

The emigration of many Russians with anti-war and pro-Western attitudes, which followed the start of the war, might have also affected survey composition. But the number of emigrants, estimated between 800,000 and 1 million, is small relative to the rest of the population. Accordingly, the emigration-related change is likely negligible from the sample-composition viewpoint.

Response rates

Poll critics often argue that response rates in Russia are too low to ensure that the samples reliably represent Russian society. In face-to-face surveys, for example, only about one-third or fewer of contacted respondents typically talk to pollsters. Can one trust Russian polls with such seemingly low response rates?

First, Russian response rates are not unusual. In fact, they are comparable to the response rate in surveys run by American National Elections Studies—the gold standard for survey research on US politics—and are often higher than in most US opinion surveys. Second, if Russian respondents hide their true preferences, they should be reluctant to talk to pollsters. Response rates in Russia have historically varied considerably depending on the specific pollster and method. But when those sources of variation are kept constant, most pollsters’ response rates have not changed much since the start of the war.

Interrupted interviews

Is it also possible that respondents agree to be interviewed but abruptly end a conversation when asked sensitive questions?

Once having agreed to an interview, most respondents tend to complete the survey. The number of interrupted interviews did not change much since the start of the war, and interviews are rarely interrupted specifically when sensitive Ukraine-related questions are asked. In addition, the respondents who typically cut interviews short or give “don’t know” answers are not regime opponents; rather, they are less interested in politics altogether. When pressed, they are more likely to parrot official narratives.

The average length of interviews also did not change much since 2022. For example, according to data from Morning Consult, the average interview length for its monthly tracker in Russia has remained relatively stable since November 2021 at around twenty-five minutes. Lastly, related indicators—such as the numbers of “don’t knows,” “no opinions,” and refusals to answer—have not varied much from various pollsters’ data.

Sensitivity bias

To look for evidence of preference falsification (i.e., respondents misrepresenting their beliefs), scholars have used list experiments that allow respondents to indirectly report their preferences and to avoid expressing their opinions directly.

Such approaches have discovered a small difference between direct and indirect responses in Russia. A study by Philipp Chapkovski and Max Schaub, using an online list experiment, discovered that direct questioning artificially inflated war support among Russians by about 10 percentage points (from 61 percent to 71 percent). Another study found similar evidence of preference falsification in war support, at less than 6 percentage points. Timothy Frye, Henry Hale, Ora John Reuter, and Bryn Rosenfeld found no evidence of artificial deflation from the design of their list experiment. However, they also found that the opposition to the war might be a few percentage points higher than opinion polls suggest. Altogether, to the extent that preference falsification exists, it is likely to be less than 10 percent of the overall sample, at 6–10 percentage points.

Historical trends

Lastly, do the post-invasion public-opinion polls tell something completely different from the evidence collected before the 2022 war started?

Juxtaposing the pre-full-scale invasion polls with those collected from 2022 onward, the results generally align. For example, a survey experiment conducted in February 2021 found that even a vaguely described security threat from a neighboring country significantly increased public support for military intervention from an estimated 8 percent to 40 percent (and to 48 percent if the survey attributed the statement to Putin). Polls conducted in late 2021 and in the early 2022 pre-invasion period discovered that three-quarters of respondents were willing to back the Kremlin if a military conflict with the West broke out. A mid-February 2022 poll conducted before the invasion found that 50 percent of respondents supported the use of force to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and 36 percent to supported it to “reunite” Russia and Ukraine. The polls conducted around the annexation of Crimea similarly demonstrated high levels of support, which became known as “the Crimea consensus.”

Altogether, even in the period when the Putin regime was much less repressive, more than half of respondents in Russia consistently favored military action against neighboring states. It is hardly surprising that state-led propaganda was able to raise these numbers to 70–80 percent after February 2022. Conversely, no alternative robust evidence (such as large-scale protests within Russia or cities hosting large concentrations of the Russian diaspora) has emerged to cast doubt on these conclusions.

The joke is on us

Altogether, various approaches suggest that one can generally trust Russian public opinion data, albeit with some reservations. Specific feelings that underlie the war support—such as resignation, acquiescence, or avoidance—might be up for debate. But the very fact that the war is embraced by a majority of Russians, and that it has become part of Russia’s “new normal,” is not.

The cognitive difficulty among Russia watchers and members of the exiled liberal community to accept that reality is more puzzling. After all, why should Russians not support the war, given the years of state-led indoctrination, the legacy of Soviet beliefs, the lack of alternative narratives in the public sphere, and more pragmatic considerations such as adaption and avoidance of cognitive dissonance?

Acknowledgements

This report has profited from comments by Dina Smeltz, Timothy Frye, Henry Hale, and Nicholas Fenton. I am deeply thankful for all these comments. Any remaining errors are my own.

About the author

Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and an adjunct professor in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. She studies Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, as well as democratic backsliding in post-communist Europe.

Her analysis has been published in multiple policy and peer-reviewed journals. Her research and commentary have appeared in a number of publications such as the New York Times, Bloomberg, The Economist, Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs. Her first book, When Left Moves Right: The Decline of the Left and the Rise of the Populist Right, was published with Oxford University Press in 2024. Her second manuscript, “Cadres Decide All: Russia’s Foreign Policy and Nomenklatura Continuity in Ruling Circles,” is under contract with Oxford University Press.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

Russian victory in Ukraine would spark a new era of global insecurity

Victor Liakh — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 21:49:34 +0000

The election of Donald Trump has set the stage for what many expect to be a push for some kind of peace deal between Russia and Ukraine in the coming months. The outcome of these efforts is likely to redefine the entire global security framework and determine whether the rules-based order established since World War II is replaced by a new era of international instability.

In the eighty years since the defeat of Nazi Germany, the United States has emerged as the key architect of global stability. The decades of unprecedented economic growth and relative peace that followed the Cold War allowed nations to enjoy a period of relative security and prosperity under the umbrella of international law. However, it is now clear that this tranquility lulled some democracies into neglecting their defense commitments, which helped convince autocracies like Putin’s Russia that the time was right to contest the existing order.

Ukraine now finds itself on the front lines of a clash between the democratic and authoritarian worlds. Since the collapse of the USSR, the former captive nations of the Soviet Union have struggled to emerge from centuries of Russian imperial rule. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have succeeded in integrating into Western economic and security alliances. Others such as Belarus have returned to the Kremlin orbit. Ukraine’s journey has been the most challenging of all.

Since 1991, Ukraine has slowly but steadily moved away from the totalitarian past and set out on a pathway toward a democratic European future. However, these efforts have been hampered by Russia’s determination to reassert its control over the country. Since the early years of the post-Soviet era, it has become apparent that Moscow views the emergence of a genuinely independent and democratic Ukraine as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next chapter in Russia’s retreat from empire.

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Ukraine’s resilience in the face of Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the full-scale attack of 2022 demonstrates the success of the country’s nation-building efforts and the strength of Ukrainian civil society. Despite the immense pressures of war, today’s Ukraine remains committed to democratic values and Euro-Atlantic integration. This helps to explain why Putin regards continued Ukrainian independence as so dangerous.

Moscow’s ambitions are no secret. The Kremlin views its war against Ukraine as both a crucial step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire and as a tool in the broader struggle to transform the geopolitical landscape. Putin is determined to erase Ukrainian statehood while simultaneously eroding the very foundations of international law and global security.

In Putin’s worldview, today’s rules-based order is merely a construct that serves US interests rather than a framework for mutually beneficial global cooperation. He is now building a coalition of like-minded autocrats who share his ambition of establishing a new world order defined by spheres of interest and power projection, where the world’s largest nations are free to dominate their smaller neighbors.

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The first cracks in the current rules-based order began to emerge in 2014 with the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This provoked an underwhelming response from the international community, which was interpreted by Moscow as an invitation to go further. More recently, the chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan was seen as further proof that the United States was a declining power. This helped convince Putin to proceed with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Continued Western weakness in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion has made Putin even more ambitious and has encouraged his authoritarian allies. Moscow has expanded its presence in Africa and the Middle East, while strengthening cooperation with the likes of China, Iran, and North Korea. This axis of autocrats is playing an increasingly important role in Russia’s war effort. In recent weeks, the first contingent of approximately ten thousand North Korean soldiers joined the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They are unlikely to be the last.

It should now be abundantly clear that a Russian victory in Ukraine, no matter how limited, would embolden autocracies worldwide. This would ignite a chain reaction and accelerate the unraveling of global security. Moreover, abandoning Ukraine would send a chilling message to all US allies. This would pave the way for a far more dangerous world where aggression is met with silence and order gives way to chaos.

It is not too late to prevent this descent into geopolitical lawlessness. A resolute Western stance on ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine can still secure “peace through strength” and send a powerful message that international aggression will not be tolerated. However, failure to do so will undermine global security and prosperity for years to come.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of the East Europe Foundation. From 2005 to 2008, he was executive director of the Child Well-Being Fund Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Ukrainian State Center for Social Services for Youth (1996–2001) and for UNICEF (2000–2001).

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

President Zourabichvili’s denunciation of the October parliamentary elections as illegitimate has shaken the nation. She has claimed that evidence of Russian interference and systematic election manipulation reveal a ruling party embracing increasingly authoritarian tactics.

Zourabichvili and other opposition figures accuse the governing Georgian Dream party of weaponizing anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives in order to gain political advantage during the election campaign. This included claims that the country’s opposition forces are part of a Western-led “Global War Party” that is allegedly seeking to open a “second front” against Russia.

Critics claim the events of October 26 in Georgia were less an election and more a performance designed to entrench the political status quo in the country. Independent exit polls revealed a decisive majority for Western-leaning opposition parties. Nevertheless, Georgian Dream declared victory.

Reports from international observers and Georgian civil society reveal a troubling reality including widespread evidence of glaring irregularities such as altered voter turnout figures and statistical anomalies. The vote itself featured numerous examples of violence and intimidation.

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Developments in Georgia are geopolitically significant for the surrounding region. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia serves as a critical energy transit hub and a potential model of democratic resilience in a region where autocracies and empires have long vied for dominance.

Since coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream party has increasingly aligned with authoritarian regimes. This has included favoring Chinese firms over American companies for projects like the Anaklia deep sea port, and facilitating Russian sanctions evasion.

Allowing Georgia to slip into authoritarian hands would send a dangerous message that democratic values are negotiable. For the US and EU, this is not just about Georgia. At stake is the West’s credibility in the wider region. Georgia aligns with Western foreign policy priorities such as countering the expansion of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the Black Sea region.

Georgia’s united democratic opposition and civil society have shown they are ready to lead a peaceful transition of power and position Georgia as a dependable Western ally. Achieving this vision, however, demands coordinated action from Washington, Brussels, and London.

First, new elections under international supervision are necessary. Only transparent elections monitored by independent actors can succeed in restoring democratic integrity and advance Georgia’s EU accession prospects.

Second, the West should impose targeted sanctions on Georgian Dream leaders and their enablers for undermining democracy and advancing Russian interests. These sanctions would send a clear message of support for Georgia’s democratic aspirations.

The US could expand current visa bans to include financial restrictions, with Brussels doing likewise. The prompt adoption of pending legislative bills in the US Congress to support the Georgian people would further demonstrate decisive commitment.

Third, Georgia’s civil society, and independent media need greater protection from repression. With a Russian-inspired “foreign agents” law now in place in Georgia, targeted funding and diplomatic support are crucial to ensuring these democratic pillars remain free and accountable.

Coordinated transatlantic pressure is crucial. Decisive action on Georgia can help strengthen a Western ally and stabilize a critical region, while also bolstering democracy at a pivotal moment. Georgia is far from a lost cause, but it will require bold Western leadership to prevent the country’s capture by the Kremlin.

Zviad Adzinbaia is a doctoral fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy specializing in Russian hybrid warfare, disinformation, and Euro-Atlantic security and politics.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani — Wed, 20 Nov 2024 14:33:58 +0000

The air ripples with the rhythm of hand drums as wrestlers dance and twirl around the battleground to songs of Persian poetry and religious incantation. They engage in flyting, a form of trash talk through poetry. Then they grapple each other and wait for an opening, trying to wear down the rival until a definitive blow slams one to the ground. This spectacle occurs at hundreds of modern and traditional wrestling clubs, or zorkhanehs, in Iran.

For the past four decades, many have viewed the Islamic Republic through the Cold War lens, struggling with the question of containing Tehran’s threat. As a result, historical analysis—from waiting for an Iranian Mikhail Gorbachev to prescribing political jujitsu—has been applied to the problem. But if one looks closely, the ancient Persian sport of wrestling might have answers to understanding how to contain Iran.

Waiting for Ayatollah Gorbachev

To many, the only perceivable model for change within authoritarian regimes has been to draw from the history books and take inspiration from dealing with the Soviet Union. As a result, since the mid-1990s Western analysts and commentators have been “waiting for Ayatollah Gorbachev” to shake up Tehran and deliver “liberalizing reforms.” In 1997, a Washington Post piece described newly elected President Mohammad Khatami as “Iran’s Gorbachev.” After Hassan Rouhani won the presidential race in 2013, a New York Times piece wondered whether he would be the “Iranian Gorbachev” and soon proclaimed that Iran was having a “Gorbachev moment,” with high hopes for nuclear talks and normalization. A commentator went even further in 2014 and predicted that benefiting from the supreme leader’s “tacit support,” Rouhani might even outperform Gorbachev and strike a “delicate balance [between] continuity and change” within the regime.

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Such comparisons resurfaced this year after the snap election to replace the “Butcher of Tehran,” President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash in May. Ahead of the election, pundits argued that the race had provided Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with a “golden opportunity to reverse course . . . and make a U-turn.” Later, “reformist” Masoud Pezeshkian, who won the race, was marketed as a “liberalizer” who could “forge a more moderate Islamist regime.” A reformist daily in Iran even published a front-page photo and article about Pezeshkian with the piece titled “Manifesto of the Iranian Gorbachev.” All these predictions, however, miss multiple key points.

First, all factions within the Islamic Republic abhor the Soviet model of evolution. From the kingmakers who helped Pezeshkian win to hardliners, all have reacted to such comparisons with outrage. The clerical establishments saw the Gorbachev model as a recipe for disaster because it neither delivered sustainable wealth nor prevented regime collapse.

More importantly, these analysts fail to see that, under the Islamic Republic, the office of the presidency—the source of the expected “Ayatollah Gorbachev”—amounts to nothing but being the supreme leader’s “footman,” in the words of two-term former President Khatami. True power resides in the hands of Khamenei, and he has repeatedly demonstrated that he is no Gorbachev. The supreme leader is well aware of the Soviet-inspired strategy and has warned dozens of times about the folly of being “fooled to trust the West and the US.” In a 2000 speech, he proclaimed, “Islam is not communism. The Islamic Republic is not the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Iran is not a motley of countries sown together.” He then took a jab at Gorbachev and said he was “fool[ish]” enough to “trust the West and the US,” leading to a slippery slope that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

How an ayatollah wrestles

Jujitsu, the Soviet-era security jargon, is evoked repeatedly in attempts to rein in the Islamic Republic, especially since Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack against Israel—its second direct attack on the Jewish state this year.

The concept of jujitsu in geopolitics revolves around a simplified and cartoonish understanding of the martial art. Instead of meeting the opponent with force, one manipulates their kinetic energy against them to send them flying across the dojo.

To entertain the idea of unarmed combat symbolizing the struggle to contain Tehran’s threat, a better option would be wrestling, as pictured in the national epic of the Iranian people, the Shahnameh or Book of Kings. To underscore wrestling’s importance, note that, once in a blue moon, a taste of the ancient sport can be experienced at Khamenei’s compound in Tehran. Khamenei believes the sport “encapsulates heroism . . . dates back thousands of years in our culture . . . and must be celebrated, persevered.” Wrestling in this manner has three major stages.

Rajaz (“boasting”): Walking around the battleground, cursing the adversary, listing your prowess and their weaknesses, boasting about your wins of the past and the glory yet to come.

Galaviz (“grappling”): Closing the gap and locking horns with the adversary. Contact is made here, not to land a blow or in an attempt to push the rival out of the ring. The point is to establish a tenuous and strenuous equilibrium to wear down the enemy while waiting for an opening.

Khak (“ground”): More specifically, slamming the adversary to the ground in a swift motion. There is a split second between the last two steps when, due to fatigue or distraction, a weakness of the adversary is exposed. That’s when the final blow lands.

Applying wrestling to today’s events

Khamenei has faced setbacks in the propaganda war (the rajaz stage), but his media machine has somewhat recovered from these blows. For instance, Tehran was once seen as a safe haven by terrorist leaders like Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh and al-Qaeda’s Saif al-Adel, who found Iran to be one of the few places for them to travel, reside, and operate. That image was shattered after the targeted July killing of Hamas top leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. However, the clerical establishment recovered some lost propaganda ground when Khamenei appeared in public days after Iran’s missile attack on Israel, leading Friday prayers for the first time in almost five years and projecting an image of power and confidence. The smoke-and-mirror tactics of the clerical establishment have not remained confined to Iran’s borders or the Middle East. Ignoring the Islamic Republic’s imperialist aspirations and its repression of its people, gullible Westerners have fallen for the old lie that the regime is the “defender of the downtrodden of the world” and wave the flags of the Islamic Republic and its proxies as if they are freedom fighters.

Regarding the second stage, galaviz, Tehran has had the upper hand and has won round after round. Grueling proxy wars and wearing down the enemy have been the cornerstones of Tehran’s campaigns in the Middle East. With no regard for human life since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic has unleashed wave after wave of terror upon the world and has shied away from no war crime to grasp control over Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. While Western governments face public censure for their “interventionism” and seek to end the “unending wars,” for the Islamic Republic jihad is eternal and shall only end with the “end of time.” Although the Islamic Republic faces economic collapse, its leaders believe it has the eternity to wear down the enemy.

The world has already seen Tehran’s third move in this deadly game. It has many times exported death and destruction in the region, from terror attacks sponsored and orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and carried out by its proxies to the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings by Hezbollah to the October 7, 2023, terror attack by Hamas. As promised, khak is swift and deadly.

Rajaz, galaviz, and khak are stages of a bloody cycle, but there is no need for one cycle to end before another is initiated elsewhere. Time is on the side of the Islamic Republic. Until the regime is dismantled in its entirety, the Islamic Republic will strike again “from where you do not expect” because, as he said himself, “if the road to battle is blocked, we will grow wings and fly to war.”

It is high time for the world to ditch the Cold War-era lens, comprehend the ayatollah’s wrestling tactics, and contain the Islamic Republic before more innocent lives are crushed amid his deadly dance.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

The post How to wrestle with an ayatollah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 19 Nov 2024 02:12:55 +0000

With Donald Trump’s election win fueling fresh speculation over the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russian President Vladimir Putin has once again underlined his insistence on Ukrainian neutrality. “If there is no neutrality, it is difficult to imagine any good-neighborly relations between Russia and Ukraine,” he commented on November 7 in Sochi.

This is nothing new. Since the eve of the full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has been consistent in its calls for permanent Ukrainian neutrality. Neutral status was a key condition set out by the Kremlin during the abortive peace talks that took place in the first weeks of the war. It once again featured prominently when Putin laid out an updated peace proposal in June 2024.

Many in the international community regard Putin’s push for a neutral Ukraine as by far his most reasonable demand. Indeed, some have even accused NATO of provoking the current war by expanding into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence since 1991 and deepening cooperation with Ukraine. They argue that if Ukraine can be kept in geopolitical no-man’s-land, Russia will be placated.

Such thinking is likely to feature prominently as the debate continues to unfold in the coming months over the terms of a future peace deal. While Trump has yet to outline his plans for a possible settlement, unconfirmed reports suggest that a twenty-year freeze on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations is under consideration. This would be a costly blunder. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion.

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Ukrainians have already learned the hard way that neutrality does not protect them against Russian aggression. The country officially embraced non-aligned status during the 2010-2014 presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, but this didn’t prevent Moscow from seeking to reassert full control over Ukraine. Initially, Russia’s efforts focused on orchestrating Ukraine’s economic reintegration through membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. When this sparked a popular backlash that led to the fall of the Yanukovych regime, Putin opted to use force and began the military invasion of Ukraine.

Ever since the start of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in spring 2014, Putin has sought to justify Russian aggression by pointing to the looming danger of Ukrainian NATO membership. In reality, however, Ukraine has never looked like progressing toward the distant goal of joining the alliance. For the past decade, NATO leaders have refused to provide Kyiv with an invitation and have instead limited themselves to vague talk of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward future membership. Putin is well aware of this, but has chosen to wildly exaggerate Ukraine’s NATO prospects in order to strengthen his own bogus justifications.

Putin’s complaints regarding NATO enlargement are equally dubious. Indeed, his own actions since early 2022 indicate that Putin himself does not actually believe that the alliance poses a genuine security threat to Russia. Instead, he merely exploits the NATO issue as a convenient smokescreen for Russia’s expansionist foreign policy.

Tellingly, when Finland and Sweden responded to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine by announcing plans to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO, Putin was quick to declare that Russia had “no problem” with the move. This evident indifference was particularly striking, given that Finnish NATO membership has more than doubled Russia’s NATO border while Sweden’s accession has transformed the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Over the past two-and-a-half years, Putin has continued to demonstrate his almost complete lack of concern over NATO’s Nordic enlargement by withdrawing the vast majority of Russian troops from the Finnish border and leaving the area largely undefended.

Putin obviously understands perfectly well that NATO is not a threat to Russia itself, and sees no need to guard against a NATO invasion that he knows will never come. While Putin’s resentment over the expanding NATO presence on his borders is real enough, he only really objects when the alliance prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, Putin’s opposition to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. Instead, it confirms that his ultimate goal is the destruction of Ukrainian statehood.

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For years, Putin has made no secret of his belief that the emergence of an independent Ukraine is an historical mistake and a symbol of modern Russia’s retreat from empire. He has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is not a “real country,” and is fond of declaring that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). In July 2021, Putin even published an entire essay arguing against the legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian state.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, it has become increasingly apparent that Putin’s ultimate goal is not Ukraine’s neutrality but Ukraine’s destruction. The Kremlin propaganda machine has portrayed Ukraine as an intolerable “anti-Russia,” and has promoted the idea that Ukraine’s continued existence is incompatible with Russian security. Meanwhile, Putin has compared his invasion to eighteenth century Russian ruler Peter the Great’s imperial conquests, and has repeatedly claimed to be “returning” historically Russian lands.

Putin’s imperialistic outbursts must be taken seriously. Throughout occupied Ukraine, his soldiers and administrators are already imposing a reign of terror that directly echoes the criminal logic of his imperial fantasies. Millions have been displaced, with thousands more simply vanishing into a vast network of camps and prisons. Those who remain face policies of relentless Russification and the suppression of all things Ukrainian. Adults must accept Russian citizenship in order to access basic services, while children are forced to undergo indoctrination in schools teaching a new Kremlin curriculum.

The crimes currently taking place in Russian-occupied Ukraine are a clear indication of what awaits the rest of the country if Putin succeeds. Despite suffering multiple military setbacks, he remains fully committed to his maximalist goals of ending Ukrainian independence and erasing Ukrainian identity.

Furthermore, since 2022 Putin has demonstrated that he is prepared to wait as long as it takes in order to overcome Ukrainian resistance, and is ready to pay almost any price to achieve his imperial ambitions. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine in such circumstances would be akin to condemning the country to a slow but certain death.

Any peace process that fails to provide Ukraine with credible long-term security guarantees is doomed to fail. Acquiescing to Putin’s demands for a neutral Ukraine may provide some short-term relief from the menace of an expansionist Russia, but this would ultimately lead to more war and the likely collapse of the current global security order. There is simply no plausible argument for insisting on Ukrainian neutrality other than a desire to leave the country defenseless and at Russia’s mercy.

Peace will only come once Putin has finally been forced to accept Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent country and as a member of the democratic world. Naturally, this includes the right to choose security alliances. It is absurd to prioritize Russia’s insincere security concerns over Ukraine’s very real fears of national annihilation. Instead, if serious negotiations do begin in the coming months, Ukrainian security must be the number one priority. Until Ukraine is secure, Europe will remain insecure and the threat of Russian imperialism will continue to loom over the continent.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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The election was widely seen as a referendum on Georgia’s future geopolitical direction. The country’s Russia-friendly authorities hoped to secure a mandate for a pro-Kremlin manifesto, while opponents sought to return Georgia to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. This westward trajectory is certainly popular, with polls consistently indicating that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s bid for EU membership. At the same time, many have been alarmed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and are fearful of facing the same fate if they attempt to turn away from Moscow.

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and is officially committed to supporting European integration. However, party officials in Tbilisi have become increasingly critical of the West in recent years, and have faced mounting accusations of trying to steer the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Criticism has intensified following the adoption earlier this year of draconian laws similar to the authoritarian policies of Putin’s Russia. Critics say these legislative changes are aimed at silencing Georgia’s political opposition and muzzling the country’s civil society.

In the wake of the disputed election, Georgia’s pro-Western political forces have vowed to fight back against what they see as an attempt to undermine their country’s fledgling democracy. A number of large protest rallies have taken place in downtown Tbilisi since the late October ballot. Meanwhile, opposition parties are demanding fresh elections, refusing to serve in the new parliament, and calling on Georgia’s Western partners to conduct an international investigation into allegations of electoral misconduct.

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Russia has refrained from officially celebrating the election victory of its Georgian Dream allies. Instead, Moscow has accused the West of trying to “destabilize” Georgia with calls for an investigation into alleged violations. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the vote represents a significant geopolitical triumph for the Kremlin and a major setback for the West.

Critics of Georgia’s governing party fear the country may now follow the geopolitical trajectory of Belarus, which in recent years has become increasingly subject to creeping Russian control in every sphere of national life from the economy to defense. This would represent a significant turnaround for Russia, which had looked to be in danger of losing its traditional influence in the southern Caucasus region.

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of the country. Bilateral relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have remained tense ever since this brief war sixteen years ago. However, while the Georgian public has overwhelmingly backed closer ties with the West, many have also spoken of the need to avoid a resumption of hostilities with Russia. Georgian Dream officials have sought to exploit these concerns over the possibility of a new Russian invasion. During the recent election campaign, the party ran a series of controversial adverts featuring images of wartime destruction in Ukraine along with appeals to “choose peace.”

Some observers believe Russia’s approach to Georgia may offer hints of the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions in Ukraine. After first invading and occupying a large portion of Georgian territory, Russia then helped engineer the election of a sympathetic government that has paid lip service to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations while working toward mending fences with Moscow. This proved possible despite frequent evidence of intense anti-Russian sentiment throughout Georgian society. While such an outcome is extremely hard to imagine in today’s wartime Ukraine, the remarkable revival of Russian influence in Georgia could certainly serve as inspiration for Kremlin policymakers.

Protests look set to continue in Tbilisi. However, it is not clear whether anything can now be done to prove the allegations of election fraud or annul the results of the October vote. Georgia’s Western partners have voiced their concerns over the election but remain reluctant to withhold official recognition. Georgia will be on the agenda when EU foreign ministers meet next week in Brussels, but the European Union is not expected to take a stance on the legitimacy of the election. Instead, the most meaningful sanction will likely be the continued freezing of EU membership talks, which have been on pause since June 2024.

With Western leaders unwilling to confront the Kremlin in the Caucasus, Russia is the real winner of Georgia’s recent elections. The vote has demonstrated Moscow’s ability to overcome popular opposition by forging powerful alliances with local elites and ignoring international concerns over election interference. Russia will doubtless seek to apply the lessons learned in Georgia as it turns its attention to future election campaigns in front line countries like Moldova, and may also seek to adopt a similar approach to postwar Ukraine.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a research fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

I am grateful to the US-Colombia Advisory Group for inviting me to share these words and for its valuable work in advancing the US-Colombian partnership.

Peace processes are constituent moments in any country, generating great expectations and hope. However, a peace accord alone—even the most innovative one—does not automatically produce the transformative changes necessary to create peace. Full implementation, in the social, political, and economic spheres, is required to consolidate peace for the decades to come.

Realism is of the essence. Peace agreements take time to implement. This is why the 2016 Peace Accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) sets a fifteen-year horizon to ensure its implementation. Eight years after it was signed, the significant and tangible progress that has taken place is a testament to the hard work and sacrifices of many. Few peace agreements indeed manage to truly consolidate as vectors of political change. It is worthy of celebration.

But the eighth anniversary of the accord is also an opportunity to acknowledge that more work needs be done to address challenges such as persistent violence in rural areas, the murder of social leaders and former combatants, the slow implementation of structural reforms, and the need to strengthen the territorial and cross-cutting approaches of the agreement.

One important lesson to emerge from Colombia is that sustainable peace is not achieved solely by the demobilization of armed groups. Despite FARC-EP’s disarmament and reintegration, dissidents and criminal groups emerged to occupy the spaces left by the former guerrillas. This underlines the need for a comprehensive approach to security, which not only creates peace, but also dismantles the illicit economies that fuel violence. Security is not achieved solely through disarmament, but also through the creation of viable economic alternatives for affected communities and the capacity of the state to consolidate its central role in the areas once occupied by armed groups.

Amid it all, prioritizing the rights and needs of victims is crucial to strengthening the legitimacy of the accord and allowing for reconciliation. Despite the difficulties and significant delays, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and reparation processes established by the accord remain one of Colombia’s greatest contributions to the practice of peacebuilding globally. The JEP’s ability to deliver justice rapidly and ensure legal security to those under its jurisdiction will be essential to the legitimacy of the peace process and the durability of peace.

As it engages other armed groups into negotiating peace settlements, it is crucial the Colombian state doesn’t lose sight of the importance of safeguarding and prioritizing the comprehensive implementation of the 2016 accord. It presents a carefully designed road map of coherent political responses to comprehensively tackle some of the main challenges that Colombia faces today: violence, insecurity, inequality, drug trafficking, and exclusion of marginalized populations. Following this road to the end will open many more such opportunities for all. But that will first and foremost require a full and successful implementation of the accord.

Dag Nylander
Director, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF)

Executive summary

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,¹ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”² implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.³ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Through a series of consultations and roundtables with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s US-Colombia Advisory Group (UCAG), members identified that coordination challenges both at a national and territorial level between and among institutions with a role in the implementation of the accord have hindered its full implementation. Lack of coordination was also recognized throughout the three additional constraints identified:

Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.

Policy recommendations

Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict. Addressing the severe delays in implementing these ethnic commitments requires an overhaul of state presence through strengthened policing, judicial systems, and economic support, all tailored to meet local needs and establish trust. Additionally the Petro government should improve coordination with local leaders and leverage the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE) to secure community-driven progress. International partners, particularly the US, should provide dedicated technical and financial support to ensure sustainable implementation of the accord, with a focus on addressing specific needs of ethnic territories and creating viable economic opportunities to reduce illegal group influence.
Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia. It is essential to incentivize development in conflict-affected areas, especially through the Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDETs) and Zones Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMACs) created under the 2016 peace accord. Despite their promise, these programs face funding shortages, weak institutional capacities, and ongoing security challenges that restrict effective implementation and delay critical infrastructure projects. Strengthening PDETs requires addressing resource allocation gaps, supporting local capacity-building, and prioritizing equitable development. Additionally, real-time data monitoring of conflict zones will enable targeted security and development interventions, with US support for local monitoring and evaluation actors enhancing resource distribution and operational effectiveness. By investing in community engagement and new support programs, the United States can bolster Colombia’s stability, curb the expansion of illegal armed groups, and address significant shared security concerns.
Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia. President Petro’s establishment of the “Alta Instancia para la Implementación” reflects a commitment to better coordinate efforts across 54 government entities, backed by a significant budget allocation. However, poor coordination, limited budget execution, and a deteriorating security environment due to increased illegal armed group presence continue to obstruct progress. Observers from academia and civil society should support Colombia’s efforts to streamline fund utilization, ensuring the accord’s constitutional mandate is prioritized over political agendas. Successful negotiations with armed groups require a balanced, transparent approach grounded in inclusivity and monitored incentives, backed by a clear legislative framework, with insights from international partners like the US and Norway.
Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia. Support for the JEP is key, yet many ex-combatants remain in legal limbo, and the JEP’s delay in resolving key “macro cases” has weakened its credibility. Additionally, the inclusion of high-profile paramilitary figures not intended for JEP jurisdiction has further eroded public trust. To enhance peace process success, U.S. agencies should support Colombia’s efforts to ensure victim and perpetrator participation in restorative justice. Improving JEP’s communication with ethnic communities, coordinating across cases, and delivering culturally sensitive reparations are also vital for effective implementation and justice for serious conflict-related crimes.

Explainer Videos

Signatories

US-Colombia Advisory Group Members

Jaime Asprilla
Cynthia Arnson
Ambassador Carolina Barco
Ambassador William Brownfield
Minister Mauricio Cárdenas
Enrique Carrizosa
Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky
Stephen Donehoo
Steve Hege
Muni Jensen
Bruce Mac Master
Paola Buendia
Minister Maria Claudia Lacouture
Ambassador P. Michael McKinley
Ambassador Mariana Pacheco
Kristie Pellecchia
Arturo Valenzuela
Kevin Whitaker

Introduction

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,⁴ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”⁵implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.⁶ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Factors that have hindered the accord’s implementation include inconsistent political will, governance and coordination challenges and institutional weakness in areas affected by the conflict, insufficient allocation of resources, and, most importantly, the persistence of the armed conflict. Violent conflict persists in Colombia on three fronts: between the state and preexisting armed actors; between the state and new emerging actors, including FARC dissidents, illegal armed groups and transnational criminal organizations; and between and among these groups. The lag in implementation as a result of these factors carries implications for the future of the US-Colombia partnership.

Given that Colombia is past the halfway mark in the set timeframe, the time is ripe for accelerating the implementation of the 2016 peace accord. A broad consensus on this fact exists among local governments, the business community, multilateral partners, civil society, and, most importantly, between Washington and Bogotá. In an era of deepening instability and insecurity in neighboring Andean countries and, more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States has a clear interest in ensuring that Colombia overcomes its own security challenges and builds state presence in the areas hardest hit by violence and conflict. Indeed, the commitments that Colombia made in its 2016 peace accord have ramifications that go far beyond the initial objective of reaching peace with the FARC. If fully implemented, the accord could lay the foundation to deepen Colombia’s democracy, bring new opportunities for investment in neglected but resource-rich areas of the country, and deal a crushing blow to organized crime. Although principally a Colombian achievement, a fully implemented accord would also be a capstone of over two decades of dedicated US commitment to Colombia. Achieving this, however, will require commitment and political will from the Colombian government to prioritize the implementation—as well as coordination and continued support from the United States.

Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.
UCAG members propose that while addressing the lag in the accord’s implementation requires a holistic approach, it is imperative to address the current rise in crime and violence in both urban and rural areas in Colombia, an issue that ranks as the number one concern of Colombians today.

This publication builds on the UCAG’s first report, “Advancing US-Colombia Cooperation on Drug Policy and Law Enforcement,” by outlining four recommendations for steps the United States and Colombia can take to accelerate the accord’s implementation and simultaneously address the underlying issue of security in Colombia and the broader region. The three core challenges are discussed below.

The proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impact ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict

General view of an area deforested by illegal mining in Puerto Guzman, Colombia February 8, 2022. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez

Colombia’s complex geography and richness in natural resources bring important opportunities for tourism and economic growth, but also require significant state capacity and resources to support the country’s most rural and isolated areas. State-neglected areas are where illegal armed groups thrive, enjoying full control and freedom of operation that pose extensive threats to local communities. The 2016 peace accord, while historic, only ended one armed conflict—between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, at least eight domestic armed conflicts were identified in 2024, based on their legal classification.⁷ Three of the conflicts are between the Colombian state and illegal armed groups which aim to replace or overthrow the democratic government, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), and the former FARC-EP (Disidencias, by its current name in Spanish). The other five conflicts exclude the state and are between new and existing illegal armed groups. (See table 1 below). All eight of the groups identified here engage in an array of illegal activities, principally narcotics production and trafficking, trade of people and illicit goods, illegal mining, and extortion. Included in these eight conflicts are groups that never demobilized when the accord was signed and those that took up arms again when they claimed the accord was violated. In its majority, these conflicts take place within marginalized and rural communities, and community leaders in these areas have suffered disproportionately. In Petro’s first two years, more than 350 social leaders and human rights defenders and at least 75 signatories of the 2016 peace accord have been murdered, and over 165 massacres have occurred.

In April 2024 700 civil society organizations presented a report to the United Nations claiming that violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups has expanded by 36 percent in the first trimester of 2024, affecting 189 municipalities (almost 20 percent of Colombian territory), with over 272 violent events being recorded during the same period. In practice, the impact of rising violence in Colombia has resulted in over 400 violations of human rights both by state and nonstate actors. Communities under threat face heightened rates of recruitment, homicides, displacement, confinement, sexual violence, and other effects. To put things in perspective, on a national level, more than 145,049 people were individually displaced in 2023, which meant an increase of 18 percent compared to 2022. Territorial disputes among armed actors also led to the confinement of 47,013 people (in 2023), representing an increase of 19 percent at the national level compared to 2022.

The forced displacement crisis in Riohacha has placed growing pressure on the resources of the Riohacha District, particularly in health, social welfare, security, and community cohesion. Displaced families face searious challenges in accessing a safe and stable environment, which heightens their need for assistance. Given the magnitude of the crisis, coordinated inter-institutional support and international cooperation are essential to alleviate the humanitarian impact.

Genaro Redondo Choles, mayor of Riohacha

This 2024 report of the Analytical Service of Colombian National Police (CEPOL) outlines that on a national level, extortion, homicides, and personal injuries have seen a significant increase in the first trimester of 2024, while crimes such as theft and kidnapping have decreased. Many departments including Arauca, located on the border with Venezuela, have suffered a wave of killings as armed groups attack social leaders in areas controlled by rival groups and who are often accused of sympathizing with the “wrong” side. The reconfiguration of nonstate armed actors extends beyond its initial reliance on drug trafficking, as such groups have diversified their operations to other forms of profitable illicit businesses such as illegal mining, human smuggling, and money laundering, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences that affect the civilian population. Their complex operations, which are related to the historical institutional weakness in the most remote areas of Colombia, show the long road that remains to achieve peace in Colombia.

Since the 1990s, violence in Puerto Tejada has escalated, with an increase in homicides linked to its role as a drug trafficking corridor and the expansion of the Cali Cartel, as well as the arrival of paramilitaries who led “social cleansing” efforts and social control actions, primarily affecting young people. Today, violence continues with the proliferation of gangs, where youth engage in theft, extortion, and drug-related activities, while data shows alarming homicide rates and a pattern of intergenerational revenge. To address this situation, it is proposed to strengthen prevention programs for children and youth, resocialization for ex-convicts, and detox programs for substance users, while seeking alliances to improve security and coexistence in the municipality.

Luz Adiela Salazar, mayor of Puerto Tejada

Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups

An indigenous man rests in a hammock inside the Casa Indigena, where he takes refuge after being displaced from his land due to clashes between illegal armed groups in his territories, in Riohacha, Colombia February 27, 2024. REUTERS/Antonio Cascio

Since taking office in August 2022, Gustavo Petro’s administration has rolled out its new strategy for peace, titled Paz Total, or Total Peace. This strategy aims to end the violence that has plagued Colombia for decades by brokering simultaneous ceasefires with various armed and criminal groups, offering judicial leniency and other benefits in exchange for permanent disarmament. However, 66 percent of Colombians say that progress on Petro’s Total Peace strategy is moving in the wrong direction and 85 percent think Colombia’s security situation is worsening, according to a June poll.

The lapsed ceasefires with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the AGC, the ELN, and other armed groups highlight the biggest challenge for Total Peace: The government has yet to describe an attractive incentive structure for armed and criminal groups—which reap significant profits and effectively control large portions of the country—to abandon their power and influence. The worsening violence has continued to erode public confidence in Petro’s ambitious approach. (Table 2) The government is now involved in ten sets of peace talks with more than a dozen armed groups, and Bogotá still hopes its talks with the ELN can be revived.

According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator report, 129 possible ceasefire violations were reported in 2023, including humanitarian impacts on the civilian population and offensive actions or armed incidents. The report considers not only the two official ceasefires—those of the ELN and the EMC—but also those declared unilaterally by other groups. Additionally, concerns have been raised about instances where advancing the Total Peace plan may come at the expense of certain commitments established in the 2016 peace accord. For example, the 2016 accord was intended to be the final opportunity for the FARC to surrender their weapons. However, some observers feel that by moving beyond this framework, Petro may be creating challenges for the sustainability of both the 2016 peace accord and future accords.

A key factor has been the intensification of violent competition among new and existing illegal armed groups: During Petro’s first year in office, intergroup confrontations rose by 85 percent. Given their power and influence, negotiations with some of these illegal armed groups are needed but are stalling as the government attempts to address the incentive structures of these groups. The ceasefires, when announced, have not yielded clear benefits. Meanwhile, clashes between groups and state forces have continued to disproportionately affect ethnic minorities and marginalized communities in areas most impacted by violence. In this context, the United States and other international partners must continue to pressure the Colombian government on the protections of the rights of local communities who are getting caught in the crossfire in the absence of a local strategy to tackle this.

The proliferation of armed groups in this region has trapped our communities in the crossfire. Though we are not participants in the conflict, we are suffering its
most critical impacts—our movement within our own territories is restricted due
to the presence of dominant armed groups, and we fear being mistaken as
affiliated with one side or another. Our communities must no longer be targets
of this conflict. Ceasefire violations have left us vulnerable, undermining our
access to healthcare, education, economic and social development, and even
political stability.

Ana Milena Hinojoso, mayor of Atrato

Amid widespread criticism for not delivering on the promise of Total Peace and the slow implementation of the 2016 peace accord, Petro has repeatedly highlighted the need for broader reforms (i.e., agrarian, education, health) as mechanisms to accelerate the implementation of the accord. Under the 2023–2026 National Development Plan, Colombia Potencia Mundial de la Vida, the Petro administration has highlighted the importance of fully implementing the peace accord as a key aspect of Colombia’s transformation, detailing more than 164 directives. Some of the key issues include the creation of the National System for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the strengthening of the multipurpose registry,⁸ financing for the peace accord’s Land Fund, strengthening citizen oversight, creating the National Reincorporation System and the Comprehensive Reincorporation Program, and reforming the National Drug Policy and the Victims’ Law.

However, while little progress has been witnessed overall, two notable achievements regarding Colombia’s “institutionality for peace” are worth highlighting. First, Law 2272/2022 establishes a policy called Para la Paz Total y la Seguridad Humana, which includes the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and strengthens the institutions responsible for its execution. Second, the Peace Accord Implementation Unit (UIAP) was created by decree and operates under the office of the High Commissioner for Peace, facilitating new approaches and dialogue processes with illegal armed groups. Yet, the UIAP has faced numerous challenges so far, as it is responsible for advising, coordinating, supporting, monitoring, and verifying the implementation of the accord, and has little capacity to do so.

Additionally, the newly created Ministry of Equality and Equity has had little impact on accord implementation efforts despite the fact that the government tasked it with addressing the accord’s gender and ethnic approaches. The Constitutional Court invalidated the law creating the Ministry of Equality—led by Vice President Francia Márquez—and deferred its decision for two years, allowing the ministry to operate until 2026. As of September 2024, only 13 percent of the ethnic chapter’s stipulations and 22 percent of the gender approach stipulations have been implemented. While these changes could potentially drive progress, the government’s failure to achieve tangible results in the Total Peace strategy and the 2016 accord remains an important concern.

A lack of progress in the crop substitution programs that were launched as part of the accord

A drone view shows a coca plantation at a village built by Colombian rebel group Segunda Marquetalia, in Colombia’s Pacific jungle, Colombia July 26, 2024. REUTERS/Daniel Becerril

The rollout of Petro’s ten-year National Drug Policy in November 2023 represents a shift from past administrations’ respective approaches to counternarcotics. The approach fully centers on efforts to generate greater pressure on financial structures of organized crime, as well as generating incentives for small coca-producing farmers in geographically isolated areas to replace their illicit crops with legal ones. The Petro administration has also eliminated all forms of “forced eradication,” except for coca plots classified as industrial plantations, reversing decades of Colombian counternarcotics policy that was coordinated with and extensively supported by the United States. In a practical matter, there are still no clear criteria on the identification and monitoring of industrial plantations, meaning that little eradication is taking place. According to the latest UNODC survey, cocaine production in Colombia surged by 53 percent in 2023. The increase was explained by the continued concentration of coca cultivation in areas with the highest productivity across all three stages of its production—cultivation, extraction, and processing—enabling a single hectare of coca to yield up to twice as much cocaine as it did 11 years ago. Additionally, the area dedicated to coca cultivation also expanded in 2023, increasing by 10% from 230,000 to 253,000 hectares. This growth, however, represents a slower rate compared to the previous year, which saw a 13% rise in coca plantations.

Coca prices have plummeted, and some analysts attribute the decline in prices to a variety of factors including persistent conflict in cultivation areas, which creates uncertainty and deters buyers; the saturation of drug smuggling routes out of Colombia, as evidenced by high seizures; and the oversupply and rapid growth of coca cultivation. Cartels also have altered their purchasing strategies, opting to buy counternarcotics closer to trafficking routes and from fewer locations. This shift has negatively impacted coca farmers in areas such as Putumayo. However, the UNODC notes that while Colombian cocaine prices have plummeted, global prices remain stable, and the drug is reaching new markets. A kilogram of cocaine can sell for up to $25,000 in the United States, $35,000 in Europe, $50,000 in Asia, and $100,000 in Australia, making it an extremely profitable and vibrant business, able to adapt to changes in supply, transport, and demand. Instead of attributing the decline in coca prices to oversupply, the UNODC points to a lack of consistent market controls as the main issue. This has led to a volatile market characterized by uncertainty.

Given stable cocaine prices in the global market, low coca leaf prices in Colombia lead drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Mexico, Europe, and other parts of the world to see the region and Colombia specifically as an area of opportunity, given the greater profit margins resulting from low coca prices and cultivation costs. While synthetic drug production, illegal mining, arms trafficking, and human trafficking contribute to the diversified operations of criminal businesses, and earned billions for transnational criminal organizations in 2023, cocaine remained the principal driver of criminal evolution and earnings, and must therefore remain a priority as enshrined in the 2016 peace accord.

A logical starting point should be Colombia’s Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos, or PNIS), which was born out of the 2016 peace accord with the goal of reducing the amount of coca crops in the country through substitution programs. The program has been lagging significantly, due to the lack of communication and follow-through from previous governments with communities in coca-growing areas, as well as insufficient budget allocation and operational capacities. The Colombian Congress has also shared concerns about the lack of progress in program implementation, amid media reports that only 5 percent of the budget allocated to the program was actually disbursed in 2023. The Petro administration has responded by appointing new directors of both the PNIS and the overall Paz Total programs this year, but concerns remain. Considering the lack of demonstrated progress on key aspects of the PNIS, the Kroc Institute cautions that the commitments at the minimum level of implementation risk not being completed by the deadline set in the final accord.

The current national government’s drug policy outlines its willingness to move forward with the PNIS, which consists of making payments of 36 million pesos—about $9,000—to persons who agree to eradicate their coca plantations. However, the government’s commitments to productive projects that define how this money will be used by families remains undefined. Only 10.8 percent of PNIS families with ethnic affiliation and 7.5 percent of the ethnic families with woman heads of household have benefited from the program. Despite these lags in implementation, the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART), through the Special Consultation Mechanism (MEC), has provided technical training to ethnic communities related to project formulation and management with private companies. Given the complex realities of coca-growing areas in Colombia, where criminal groups have strengthened their presence over the last year, it seems unlikely that even these subsidies will bring about lasting change unless there are secure conditions in the territories to do it, and unless the government defines a comprehensive and implementable set of programs to transition PNIS beneficiaries to the licit economy. Currently, there are 70,000 beneficiaries of the PNIS program, while the total number of coca growers in Colombia is estimated at 400,000. Thus, for the PNIS to continue effectively, its transition would need to encompass all coca growers across the country and be flexible enough to be consistently updated.

Policy recommendations

1. Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict.

Addressing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord’s ethnic chapter requires a fundamental overhaul of state presence and citizen security nationwide through strengthened police and justice systems in conflict-prone areas. Without such a transformation, Colombia risks slipping back into the turmoil experienced between the 1980s and the 2000s.

The ethnic chapter and approach of the 2016 peace accord is lagging behind significantly, compared to overall accord implementation. Significant obstacles such as the absence of ethnic approach mainstreaming in planning and programmatic work, the slow implementation of security guarantees for ethnic communities, and the lack of application of prior consultation for ethnic peoples have hindered its implementation. As of September 2024, 13 percent of the eighty ethnic approach stipulations had yet to reach the stage of implementation initiation, while 61 percent were at a minimal level, 14 percent were at an intermediate level, and only 13 percent were completed. Similarly, the commitments in the final accord’s ethnic chapter reflect this slow trend as well, with 15 percent of stipulations not initiated, 62 percent showing minimal progress, 15 percent at an intermediate level, and only 8 percent completed. This is concerning, particularly given that close to 20 percent of victims from the armed conflict belong to ethnic minority communities and regions, with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations facing heightened impacts from clashes between rival illegal armed groups. The enduring conflict in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities, particularly Afro-Colombians, is intrinsically linked to cross-sectional inequality within Colombian society. The unwillingness of successive governments to acknowledge and address these realities have thus generated a disconnect between the marginalized communities and the rest of Colombia—a critical factor that perpetuates conflict.

Police officers play with children from indigenous families who take refuge in La Casa Indigena, after being displaced from their lands due to clashes between illegal armed groups in their territories, in Riohacha, Colombia February 27, 2024. REUTERS/Antonio Cascio

To address this issue, the Petro administration has tasked Márquez (who also serves as minister of equality and equity) with overseeing and coordinating the ethnic chapter and approach implementation. Last November, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, Raizal, Palenquero, and Rrom communities, alongside the national government and others, renewed their commitment through a pact aimed at advancing effective implementation of the ethnic chapter. Slight progress was seen in commitments linked to the ethnic approach within the PNIS, completion of prior consultation processes for land registry in ethnic territories, and the establishment of a budget tracker dedicated to ethnic minority community funding. However, important challenges persist, particularly in conducting consultations and reaching accords with these communities, due to the lengthy, complex nature of the consultative process, resource constraints, and the lack of confidence of vulnerable populations in government efforts. The presence of illegal armed groups in Afro-Colombian and other predominantly ethnic minority communities have impeded both government efforts and effective implementation of projects in affected areas.

Similarly, the international community, especially the United States, must continue to steadfastly support Colombia’s peace process. This entails providing sustained technical, political, and financial assistance to prevent fragmented implementation of the accord. Long-term financial and technical support should be prioritized for the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE), the primary consultative, representative, and liaison body of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI). The IEANPE has focused on improving the implementation of the ethnic approach and promoting the ethnic chapter’s pedagogy at the territorial level. It participated in the Pact for the Ethnic Chapter and led sessions to deepen understanding and gather inputs for reports on the implementation of the ethnic approach. Although Petro’s government allocated a portion of its implementation budget to the IEANPE in 2023 for the first time since the accord was signed, it is essential that this financial support is diversified, sustainable, and not solely reliant on government funding, which can change rapidly.

Economic development is also a key component needed for the progress of these communities and resource-rich territories. Local leaders and producers should receive the technical knowledge needed to connect their products to broader markets across Colombia and beyond: A best practice that can be applied here is cooperative farming to enhance export capacity by tapping into wholesale buyers. Ensuring financial support and tailored technical programs for local leaders, civil society groups, and grassroots initiatives in these regions will strengthen efforts to expedite the implementation of the ethnic chapter and, consequently, provide economic incentives for local communities to operate in legality at the face of the alternative, ideally creating safer conditions in neglected areas affected by persistent conflict, as well as access to quality public goods including education and health.

Community development is essential for the effective implementation of the ethnic chapter, as it bolsters the local economy and reinforces legal frameworks. By advancing initiatives such as cooperative agriculture and expanding access to broader markets, this approach fosters economic sustainability and progress in regions impacted by conflict, ensuring improved living conditions and essential services for these communities.

Gessica Vallejo, mayor of Candelaria

2. Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia.

To prevent and address the recurrence of armed conflict in Colombia, it is crucial to provide incentives for development and investment in conflict-affected areas across Colombian territory. During the negotiation of the 2016 peace accord, 170 municipalities were designated as Territorially Focused Development Programs, or PDETs. These programs aim to transform the Colombian countryside and rural environment by fostering a more equitable relationship between rural and urban areas through increased government presence and investment in conflict-ridden regions. PDETs encompass a variety of development projects, such as the construction of roads and schools, improved access to electricity and critical infrastructure, and enhanced health services. Incentives for investment are provided by the government through tax credits; PDET territories also are part of larger municipal clusters that have been most affected by the conflict, known as ZOMACs (Zones most affected by the armed conflict), which provide similar incentives. Both PDETs and ZOMACs are essential components of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord, designed to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable development in vulnerable regions. Despite their significance, their implementation faces numerous challenges.

Funding shortages prevent the adequate rollout of development and infrastructure projects, limiting the scope and impact of PDETs in vulnerable communities. These shortages—paired with institutional weaknesses such as limited capacity, poor coordination among government agencies, and difficulties in ensuring meaningful community participation in the execution and implementation of PDET programs—have led to delays and inefficiencies. The structural inefficiencies that have hindered the progress of PDETs are now compounded by growing security concerns, as ongoing conflicts in certain regions restrict access to communities and obstruct development efforts. Strengthening PDET implementation and closing gaps in prioritization by ensuring equitable distribution of resources and assistance for all initiatives will be essential. In addition, assessing the barriers limiting the activation of ethnic people’s own initiatives and strengthening the MEC’s technical capacities for formulating projects that are likely to be funded by international actors will help close this gap.

With conflict and violence expanding into new territories across Colombia (see table 2), it is essential to utilize real-time data to monitor and analyze the growth of conflict, the presence and expansion of illegal armed groups, and the resilience of institutions in these areas. This data-driven approach will be crucial for shaping comprehensive development strategies and informed security policies. US agencies, such as the US Southern Command, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and USAID, should play a complementary role by supporting local monitoring and evaluation actors such as the CSIVI and other independent academic institutions to allocate resources more effectively, tailor security operations to local conditions, and direct development initiatives toward regions experiencing increased conflict. Proactively engaging in these efforts can prevent further instability and enhance the overall response to emerging security challenges.

The United States should seize this opportunity to deepen existing support for Colombia in developing new programs and funding lines that strengthen institutional capacities in newly conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas. This could include investing in local governance training, improving resource allocation, and addressing budget disparities to ensure that these regions receive adequate support to confront the evolving threats of crime and insecurity. However, before deploying development funds, it is imperative to engage with and listen to local communities in these newly identified areas. Building trust and understanding local needs through community consultations and advisory boards will enhance the relevance and effectiveness of development programs. In doing so, the United States will not only help to curb the rapid expansion of illegal armed groups—which drive migration northward and erode state authority across Colombia—but also address a significant national security concern that affects its own interests. Supporting Colombia in this way will help foster stability, reinforce democratic governance, and reduce the broader regional security risks posed by transnational criminal organizations.

3. Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia.

One of the most commonly heard critiques of both the Duque administration and the current Petro administration is the failure to take consistent and concrete steps to implement the 2016 peace accord. When Petro took office, he promised to implement an “Alta Instancia para la Implementación,” a high-level governing body to help coordinate and articulate efforts aimed at fulfilling the implementation of the 2016 accord. This coordination is crucial due to the number of entities and sectors involved. In the National Development Plan, 50 billion pesos (close to $2.7 billion) were allocated for the implementation of the accord, a budget shared by fifty-four entities that must work together to uphold the comprehensive spirit of the accord.

The responsibility for accelerating the implementation of the accord falls under the Peace Accord Implementation Unit, spearheaded by Gloria Cuartas. Yet the unit has faced heavy criticism for its lack of action and results so far, attributed to inadequate budget execution, poor coordination among government agencies, and, most importantly, the rapid deterioration of security caused by the increased presence of illegal armed groups across the country, as well as declining confidence among demobilized individuals and communities on the ground. However, despite this criticism, the UIAP has a fundamental role. For the government’s security strategy to be effective, it is crucial to ensure that the UIAP is closely engaged in any new talks and that the funds allocated for implementing the peace accord are leveraged effectively as part of these violence prevention strategies.

To ensure the effective implementation of the 2016 peace accord in Colombia, it is crucial that observers, including academic institutions and civil society organizations, provide insights to support Colombian governmental efforts to optimize the utilization of funds that back the accord, ensuring efficient results within a strict timeline. Colombia entered the commitments associated with the 2016 accord already aware that there would be costs, both in terms of finances and government attention; it’s essential, even as the Petro administration works on its initiatives, that accord-related commitments be honored. The 2016 peace accord is a mandate in the Colombian constitution, making it a binding commitment that the current and successive administrations must continue to honor—and takes precedence over other aspirational commitments in political agendas. Therefore, entities overseeing the accord’s implementation must ensure that the government upholds this commitment, taking full responsibility for its effective execution.

The ongoing armed conflict in Colombia continues to hinder the implementation of the peace accord. While President Petro’s emphasis on negotiation is important, given the diverse range of conflicts across the country, his strategy has only yielded mixed results. To enhance the effectiveness of negotiations with illegal armed groups, the government should adopt a multifaceted approach that emphasizes inclusivity, local engagement, and transparency. It is crucial to closely monitor the incentives for armed groups and understand the power dynamics and reasons behind their reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue. The ability to inflict harm gives illegal armed groups a significant bargaining chip, making it also hard for the Colombian state to offer anything that these armed groups want enough to loosen their grip over territories that bring in ample profits.

Negotiations with criminal groups run the risk of undermining the rule of law; therefore, any incentives used must be approached with great caution and ideally supported by a legislative framework passed by democratically elected lawmakers. A well-defined, structured negotiation strategy, rather than an ad hoc approach, is essential. Countries with relevant expertise, such as the United States and Norway, should collaborate with the Colombian government to develop this framework.

4. Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is a backbone of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord. Its ability to deliver justice promptly and guarantee legal certainty to those under its jurisdiction is essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of the peace process. Particular attention should be paid to the resolution of the case to grant amnesty and guarantee legal security to demobilized FARC combatants, who were signatories of the accord for political or other relatively minor crimes, as stipulated in the final accord. Even after seven years, the overwhelming majority of these individuals still do not have their respective legal situations resolved, despite having administrative amnesties. This is a core commitment of the accord, and failure to follow through might lay ground for resentment and the resurgence of conflict in Colombia.

A police officer stands guard while a backhoe removes earth as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Unit for the Search for Disappeared Persons (UBPD) resume the search for the remains of people authorities suspect were killed between 1999 and 2004 by guerrillas and paramilitaries who dumped their bodies amid tons of rubble, in Medellin, Colombia July 26, 2024. REUTERS/Juan David Duque

Equally critical is the work of the JEP in advancing all eleven “macro cases” that it has taken on. The failure to resolve even one of these macro cases, now eight years after the signing of the accord, has damaged the credibility of the JEP and shaped public opinion about it. This is compounded by the JEP’s decision to include—and thereby protect from normal judicial processing—high-profile individuals whose cases were not intended to be treated in this manner. Both of these issues—one an error of omission (failure to resolve macro cases) and the other an error of commission (including Salvatore Mancuso, a Colombian paramilitary leader who once was second in command of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and other paramilitary leaders)—have undermined public confidence in the JEP.

To ensure the success of the peace process, it is vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to support effective implementation and ensure the participation of both victims and perpetrators in restorative justice mechanisms. It is essential that the JEP, under its jurisdiction, make progress in holding accountable those responsible for the gravest crimes committed in the Colombian armed conflict, eight years after the accord was signed. It is also vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to ensure effective implementation and support for victims and perpetrators’ participation in restorative justice mechanisms. Strengthening the strategy for communication and participation of ethnic peoples in all cases, but especially Case 09, will help ensure the conditions necessary for their participation in judicial proceedings to have a reparation-oriented purpose. This includes providing for culturally specific measures, such as guaranteeing interpretation during hearings and translation of essential court documents, for communities still using their native languages. It is of the utmost importance to strengthen mechanisms for coordination across cases so that the most serious and representative acts perpetrated during the armed conflict are held accountable before the JEP and that sanctions are closely related to the harm caused. Reparation under the JEP is collective and symbolic. Importantly, it is not solely the JEP’s responsibility to deliver reparations; the Colombian state and its judicial institutions also play a crucial role.

Conclusion: A call to action

The implementation of the 2016 peace accord requires political will, broader coordination, and consistent technical assistance. The persisting conflict in Colombia requires attention and a coordinated strategy that places the 2016 peace accord at its core. Tides are changing in the region, as illegal armed groups and organized crime groups are thinking creatively about how to bypass state institutions to expand their illicit empires. Meanwhile, many governments in the region are approaching the problem differently, without a clear strategy in mind. Colombia, however, has a clear roadmap with the 2016 peace accord to help territories prevent the resurgence of conflict and deal with current illegal actors. Partner governments like the United States and European countries have committed to Colombia’s security by investing millions of dollars in the peace accord—but Colombia’s government needs the political will to prioritize the accord.

Addressing the lagging implementation of the accord will not only result in greater security for Colombia but will also address persistent drivers of violence such as poverty and inequality. The security situation across Colombia is resulting in loss of territories and greater clashes among groups, with citizens getting caught in the crossfire. The expansion of multinational criminal entities also poses a threat to US national security, meaning that more actors across governments, international organizations, business communities, and foundations are motivated to unlock new and innovative ways of support. Leveraging these opportunities will be critical.

But the bottom line is that Colombia needs to continue upholding its part by prioritizing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and showing tangible results to regain its legitimacy in the fight against organized crime.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of the US-Colombia Advisory Group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Daniel Tirosh, Lucas Da Pieve, Charles Orta, Guy Mentel, and Tom Melia for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, assistant director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC), was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the advisory group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, an AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise and important feedback, and Isabella Palacios, AALAC young global professional, for her excellent research, editorial support and logistical support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the advisory group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic, we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, Ambassador Carolina Barco, and Steve Hege. We would also like to thank AMUNAFRO (Asociación de Alcaldes de Municipios con Población Afrodescendiente) and the mayors who provided decisive input and perspectives during their trip to Washington DC and after reading this publication. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson and for the excellent design assistance, we thank Andrea Ratiu.

Program

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1 The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is responsible for monitoring and technically verifying the implementation of the 2016 Colombian peace accord. The Kroc Institute’s Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) Barometer Initiative in Colombia provides summary reports and briefs on the accord’s implementation status to government officials, United Nations representatives, and other agencies. The Kroc Institute’s methodology combines qualitative analysis with empirical data to assess the implementation of the accord’s 558 stipulations, 74 subthemes, and eighteen themes.

2 meaning that some progress has been made but that more is needed to meet the timeframe.

3 meaning that full implementation is possible at the current pace.

4 The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame is responsible for monitoring and technically verifying the implementation of the 2016 Colombian peace accord. The Kroc Institute’s Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) Barometer Initiative in Colombia provides summary reports and briefs on the accord’s implementation status to government officials, United Nations representatives, and other agencies. The Kroc Institute’s methodology combines qualitative analysis with empirical data to assess the implementation of the accord’s 558 stipulations, 74 subthemes, and eighteen themes.

5 meaning that some progress has been made but that more is needed to meet the timeframe.

6 meaning that full implementation is possible at the current pace.

7 The International Committee of the Red Cross is based on International Humanitarian Law, which establishes two criteria for a situation of violence to be classified as a noninternational armed conflict: that the armed groups have a sufficient level of organization and that the hostilities between the parties reach a minimum level of intensity. Both must come together. The ICRC technically and objectively analyzes whether these two criteria are met on the basis of information collected directly in the territories.

8 A register of property showing the extent, value, and ownership of land for taxation.

The post A path forward for Colombia’s 2016 peace accord and lasting security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: How can civil society contribute to the process?

Celeste Kmiotek, Lisandra Novo — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 19:10:04 +0000

به زبان فارسی بخوانید

مجموعۀ تحریم‌های هدفمند حقوق بشری ایران: جامعه مدنی چگونه می‌تواند به این فرایند کمک کند؟

نویسندگان: سلست کامیوتیک و لساندرا نووُ

به طور خلاصه، تحریم‏ها‏ی هدفمند حقوق بشری ابزاری هستند که دولت‏ها‏ برای مسدود کردن دارایی‏ها‏ و عدم صدور ویزا برای افرادی که در موارد نقض حقوق بشر مشارکت نموده‏اند، به کار می‏گیرند. اگر چه به طور کلی مقصد از اِعمال این تحریم‏ها‏، وادار کردن متخلفان به تغییر رفتارشان است، اما اقدامات مزبور دارای تأثیرات دیگری نیز هستند. برای مثال، منع مجرمین از به دست آوردن ابزارهای مورد نیاز برای ادامۀ بدرفتاری و آزار، و نیز ابراز حمایت از قربانیان این آزارها. اما پروژۀ اقدام قضایی استراتژیک شورای آتلانتیک (SLP) از منابع متعددی شنیده است که بسیاری از افرادی که در اینگونه جوامعِ آسیب دیده به سر می‏برند، از جمله جامعۀ ایرانی، در مورد اقدامات مزبور و مفهوم آنها به خصوص به زبان محلی خود اطلاعات کافی در دست ندارند.

در نتیجه، بر اساس بازخورد فوق، تهیۀ این مجموعه وبلاگ‏ها‏ آغاز شد تا اطلاعات مهمی در بارۀ تحریم‏ها‏ی هدفمند حقوق بشری که به جمهوری اسلامی ایران مربوط می شود را مطرح نماید. این وبلاگ‏ها‏ همچنین مهمترین اخبار روز در مورد مجرمین ایرانی که به دلیل نقض حقوق بشر تحریم شده‏‏اند‏ و علت آن، و نیز هر گونه اطلاعات دیگری که ممکن است مربوط به جوامعی باشد که حقوق شان نقض شده را در اختیار خوانندگان قرار می‏دهد. در مورد پرسش‏ها‏ و همچنین موضوعاتی که باید مطرح گردد، مشتاقیم نظرات ارسالی خوانندگان، به ویژه اعضای جامعۀ مدنی ایران را دریافت کنیم.

تحریم‌های هدفمند حقوق بشری ابزاری در سیاست خارجی هستند که هدف آنها تحمیل پیامدهایی بر افرادی است که اقدامات مضر خاصی را مرتکب می‌شوند. اهداف رسمی این تحریم‌ها در هر دولتی متفاوت است، اما به طور کلی شامل پاسخ‌گویی، تغییر رفتار و حفاظت از «ثبات نظام‌های سیاسی و اقتصادی بین‌المللی» می‌شود. با این حال، در نهایت، کسانی که از تحقق اهداف این تحریم‌ها بهره‌مند می‌شوند، قربانیان نقض حقوق بشری هستند که مجرمین به دلیل ارتکاب آن، تحریم شده‌اند. در مورد ایران، این قربانیان شامل تمامی افرادی هستند که تحت نقض مداوم حقوق بشر توسط جمهوری اسلامی ایران (IRI) قرار گرفته‌اند—از جمله، برای مثال، معترضان، مخالفان، گروگان‌ها، زنان و دختران، افراد دگرباش و اقلیت‏های جنسیتی، اقلیت‌های قومی و مذهبی، روزنامه‌نگاران، بازداشت‌شدگان و دیگران—هم در داخل و هم خارج از ایران.

جامعه مدنی به ‌عنوان افرادی که نهایتاً از این فرایند منتفع می‏شوند که اغلب آگاه‌ترین افراد درباره اشخاص یا نهادهای خاص مسئول این نقض‌ها نیز می‏باشند، در فرایند تحریم‌ها نقشی اساسی دارند. جامعه مدنی می‌تواند شامل افراد ساکن ایران و همچنین ایرانیان خارج از وطن باشد و تمامی کسانی را که به این موضوع اهمیت می‌دهند—از قربانیان و بازماندگان گرفته تا فعالان، پژوهشگران و همه افرادی که می‌خواهند از حقوق بشر حمایت کنند—را شامل گردد. با این حال، دولت‌ها در میزان اطلاعاتی که حاضرند با عموم به اشتراک بگذارند، میزان شفافیت در فرایندهای خود، و میزان فعال بودن در تعامل با جامعه مدنی متفاوت عمل می‌کنند. اگرچه بخشی از این عدم شفافیت به‌دلیل نگرانی‌های امنیتی و محرمانگی توجیه‌پذیر است، اما می‌تواند جوامعی را که این دولت‌ها در تلاش برای حفاظت از آنها هستند منزوی کند و آنها را از این فرایند دور سازد.

بسیاری از دولت‌ها تاکنون پیشرفت‌های قابل‌توجهی داشته‌اند، اما باید با تلاش هماهنگ‌تر برای تعامل با جامعه مدنی، از جمله از طریق شراکت‌های اختصاصی و گروه‌های کاری، برنامه‌های تحریمی خود را بهبود بخشند. در همین حال، جامعه مدنی همچنان می‌تواند از تخصص و اطلاعاتی که در اختیار دارد برای حمایت از اقدامات خاص دولت‌ها استفاده کند.

چرا مشارکت جامعه مدنی ضروری است

جامعه مدنی دانش منحصربه‌فرد و ضروری‌ای از زمینه کلی یک وضعیت، شبکه‌های عوامل و کنشگران و «ردپای دارایی» این مجرمان دارد. بنابراین، شواهد، شهادت‌ها و تخصص جامعه مدنی برای تمامی فرایندهای پاسخ‌گویی حیاتی است. مقامات سوئدی توانستند حمید نوری را، که در نهایت به دلیل مشارکت به‌عنوان معاون دادیار در اعدام‌های دسته‌جمعی زندانیان در سال ۱۳۶۷ در ایران به جنایات جنگی محکوم شد، بر اساس شواهد ارائه‌شده توسط کنشگران جامعه مدنی بازداشت کنند. شهادت شهود متخصص، قربانیان و خانواده‌های قربانیان نیز برای اثبات گناهکار بودنِ نوری بسیار حیاتی بود. در مورد سوریه، مستندسازی توسط سازمان‌های مختلف و مشارکت قربانیان به دادستان‌های آلمانی کمک کرد تا محکومیت تاریخی مقامات رژیم بشار اسد را تأمین کنند.

در مورد تحریم‌ها، دولت‌ها برای تحریم یک شخص یا نهاد به توصیه جامعه مدنی نیاز ندارند و مقامات دولتی مسئول تعیین تحریم‌ها می‌توانند هم به‌طور مستقل در بارۀ مرتکبان احتمالی تحقیق کنند و هم با شرکای خود در حوزه‌های قضایی دیگر مشورت کنند. با این حال، با توجه به رقابت میان اولویت‌ها در حوزه امنیت ملی، مقامات ظرفیت بررسی تمامی مرتکبان احتمالی و تمامی نقض‌های احتمالی را به‌تنهایی ندارند. علاوه بر این، نهادهای دولتی در اجرای تحریم‌هایی که صادر می‌کنند، با کمبود منابع بیشتری مواجه هستند.

در حوزه‌های قضایی که می‌توانند شواهد غیرعلنی را بپذیرند، جامعه مدنی می‌تواند شهادت‌ها و سایر اسناد محرمانه را برای بررسی ارائه دهد. حتی بدون در نظر گرفتن منابع و شواهد، سازمان‌های متخصص دریافته‌اند که مشورت و شفافیت کمک می‌کند تا «تعیین تحریم‌ها در نظر مردم ایران مشروع باقی بماند»، به نیازهای قربانیان پاسخ بهتری داده شود و اطمینان حاصل شود که این تحریم‏ها از سایر تلاش‌های پاسخ‌گویی نیز حمایت می‌کنند.

نقش جامعه مدنی

نخست، جامعه مدنی می‌تواند در شناسایی مرتکبان احتمالی کمک کند و اطلاعات موجود را برای مقامات مسئول تحریم ارائه دهد تا این مقامات سپس بر اساس آستانه‌های شواهد مربوطه و ملاحظات سیاستگذاری، تحقیقات و تحلیل‌های بیشتری انجام دهند. گزارشی در سال ۲۰۲۳ از سازمان‌های حقوق بشر در اولویت (Human Rights First (HRF))، ریدرس (REDRESS)، بنیادهای جامعه باز (OSF)، مرکز حقوق بشر رائول والنبرگ (RWCHR) و بنیاد توسعه پان‌آمریکن (PADF)، که ایران را به‌عنوان مطالعۀ موردی بررسی کرده بود، نشان داد که توصیه‌های جامعه مدنی به دولت‌ها کمک می‌کند تا «افرادی را که بیشترین آسیب‌پذیری را در برابر فشارهای مالی و اعتباری ناشی از تحریم‌ها دارند» بهتر هدف قرار دهند، مشروط بر اینکه دولت‌ها با جامعه مدنی «به‌صورت جامع تعامل کنند و موضوعات مورد علاقه را بر اساس اولویت‌های سیاسی به‌صورت گزینشی انتخاب نکنند.»

مقامات آمریکایی و وزارت‌های خارجه و خزانه‌داری اعلام کرده‌اند که «توصیه‌های جامعه مدنی به‌طور جدی مورد توجه قرار می‌گیرند و همچنان منبعی ارزشمند از اطلاعات هستند.» گزارشی در سال ۲۰۲۲ تخمین زد که حداقل ۳۴ درصد از تعیین تحریم‌های ایالات متحده که تحت رژیم تحریم‌های موضوعی مرتبط با حقوق بشر و فساد یا رژیم تحریم‌های مشابه قانون مگنیتسکی جهانی انجام شده‌اند، بر اساس توصیه‌های جامعه مدنی بوده‏اند. همان گزارش این رقم را برای اقدامات تحریمی بریتانیا تنها ۴ درصد و برای اقدامات تحریمی اتحادیه اروپا ۱۳ درصد در چارچوب رژیم‌های تحریمی مشابه مگنیتسکی تخمین زده است.

ثانیاً، جامعهٔ مدنی می‌تواند توجه دولت‌ها و سازمان ملل متحد را به موقعیت‌هایی که نیازمند تحریم‌های هدفمند هستند جلب کند، مثلاً با برجسته‌سازی روندهای نگران‌کنندهٔ جدید. به‌عنوان مثال، در بریتانیا، دولت قوانین تحریم مرتبط با ایران را اصلاح کرد تا امکان اعمال تحریم بر افرادی که در جمهوری اسلامی ایران در سرکوب فراملی نقش دارند—مانند هدف‌گیری مخالفان، فعالان و دیگر افرادی که در خارج از ایران هستند—فراهم شود. این اصلاحیه به‌طور مستقیم در پاسخ به افزایش تهدیدهای جمهوری اسلامی ایران که توسط ایرانیان مقیم بریتانیا گزارش شده بود، انجام شد. در ایالات متحده، یک کمپین پشتیبانی توسط بنیاد جیمز فولی و خانواده‌های گروگان‌ها منجر به تصویب قانون لوینسون و فرمان اجرایی شماره ۱۴۰۷۸ شد که امکان تعیین تحریم‌ها برای افرادی که در گروگان‌گیری مشارکت داشته یا با آن همدست بوده‌اند را فراهم کرد.

در نهایت، جامعه مدنی می‌تواند در صورت داشتن اطلاعاتی درباره دور زدن تحریم‌ها—از جمله موارد خاص، شبکه‌های کنشگران، تکنیک‌ها و فعالیت‌های شناسایی‌شده، یا سایر اطلاعات مربوطه—شواهدی مرتبط با اجرای [تحریم‏ها] ارائه دهد. با گسترش شفافیت در مورد مالکیت انتفاعی در کشورهای بیشتر، جامعه مدنی می‌تواند از این شفافیت برای تقویت اطلاعات و دانش خود استفاده کند که سپس می‌تواند «به‌عنوان یک منبع برای دولت‌های پرمشغله» ارائه شود.

منابع برای جامعه مدنی

اگرچه دولت‌ها قدردانی خود را از اطلاعات جامعه مدنی اعلام کرده‌اند، اما روند ارائه این اطلاعات به مراجع مربوطه همیشه شفاف نیست. یکی از جامع‌ترین منابع موجود، ائتلاف سازمان‌های HRF است که مجموعه‌هایی حاوی توصیه‌هایی برای تعیین تحریم‌ها ارائه می‌دهند. در جلسات فصلی، اعضا می‌توانند به گفتگو در بارۀ آخرین وقایع بپردازند، از مقامات دولتی که در واحدهای تحریم فعالیت می‌کنند بشنوند و از آنها سؤال بپرسند، و به طور کلی از یکدیگر حمایت کنند. سازمان دموکراسی برای جهان عرب اکنون (DAWN) نیز ائتلاف مشابهی برای گروه‌هایی که مجموعه‌هایی حاوی توصیه‌هایی برای تعیین تحریم‌ها تحت «ممنوعیت خاشقجی» ارائه می‌دهند، تشکیل داده است که به سرکوب فراملی مرتبط است.

علاوه بر این ائتلاف، HRF و شرکای آن منابعی برای افرادی که علاقه‌مند به ارائه اطلاعات به دولت‌های حامی تعدادی از تحریم‌های خاص، تهیه کرده‌اند:

منابع HRF عمدتاً بر ارائه اطلاعات به ایالات متحده متمرکز هستند. این منابع شامل یک الگوی ارائه اطلاعات، سند پرسش‌های متداول، توضیحاتی درباره برنامه‌های مختلف تحریم (از جمله تحریم‌های مرتبط با ایران)، توضیحاتی درباره تحریم‌های مگنیتسکی از منظر خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا، و ابزارهای پیگیری هستند.

منابع REDRESS عمدتاً بر ارائه اطلاعات به بریتانیا متمرکز هستند. این منابع شامل یک الگوی ارائه اطلاعات، یک یادداشت راهنما درباره جمع‌آوری شواهد، و یک برگه اطلاعات درباره استفاده بریتانیا از تحریم‌های هماهنگ مگنیتسکی است.

منابع RWCHR بر ارائه اطلاعات به کانادا متمرکز هستند. این منابع شامل یک الگوی ارائه اطلاعات، یک راهنمای ارسال، و یک فرم دریافت اطلاعات برای کسانی که مایل به بحث درباره ارسال‌های احتمالی هستند، می‌باشند. دانشکده حقوق پیتر ای. آلارد نیز منابعی را برای کسانی که به دنبال ارائه اطلاعات به کانادا هستند، تهیه کرده است.

برای اطلاعات مربوط به اجرای تحریم‌ها، بیشتر اطلاعات از طریق دولت‌های مربوطه قابل دسترسی است:

اطلاعات را می‌توان از طریق خط تلفن ویژه رعایت قوانین به دفتر کنترل دارایی‌های خارجی ایالات متحده (OFAC) ارسال کرد.

موارد دور زدن تحریم‌ها در بریتانیا را می‌توان به مرجع راهبرد امور مالی (Financial Conduct Authority) گزارش داد.

معاملات مشکوک در کانادا را می‌توان به مرکز تحلیل معاملات و گزارش‌های مالی (Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre) گزارش کرد.

کمیسیون اتحادیه اروپا دارای یک ابزار افشاگر تحریم‌ها می‏باشد.

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سلست کامیوتیک (Celeste Kmiotek) از حقوقدانان شاغل در پروژه اقدامات قضایی استراتژیک در شورای آتلانیک است.

لساندرا نووُ (Lisandra Novo) از حقوقدانان شاغل در پروژه اقدامات قضایی استراتژیک در شورای آتلانیک است.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those responsible for or complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

This page will be subsequently updated with a Persian translation of the post.

Targeted human rights sanctions are a foreign policy tool that seek to impose consequences on those who commit certain harmful acts. The official stated purposes vary by government, but broadly include accountability, behavioral change, and protecting “the stability of international political and economic systems.” In the end, however, those who stand to benefit when sanctions fulfill their purpose are the victims of the human rights abuses for which perpetrators are designated. For Iran, these include all those subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) ongoing abuses—including, inter alia, protesters, dissidents, hostages, women and girls, LGBTQI individuals, ethnic and religious minorities, journalists, detained individuals, and others—both inside and outside Iran.

As the ultimate beneficiaries, and often those most knowledgeable about specific individuals or entities responsible for abuses, civil society’s role is essential in the sanctions process. Civil society can include those in Iran as well as those in the diaspora, encompassing everyone invested in the issue—victims and survivors, activists, researchers, and all who want to support human rights. However, governments vary in how much information they’re willing to share publicly, how clear their processes are, and how proactive they are in engaging with civil society. While some of the opacity is warranted due to security and confidentiality concerns, it can also isolate the communities those governments are trying to protect and distance them from the process.

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Many governments have already made great strides, but they should continue to improve their sanctions programs by making a more concerted effort to engage with civil society, such as through dedicated partnerships and working groups. In the meantime, civil society can still use its expertise and the information it has available to advocate for specific government actions.

Why civil society participation is needed

Civil society has a unique and necessary knowledge of the overall context of a situation, the networks of actors, and perpetrators’ “asset footprint[s].” Civil society’s evidence, testimony, and expertise is therefore crucial for all accountability processes. Swedish officials were able to arrest Hamid Noury, who was ultimately convicted of war crimes for his participation as an assistant to the deputy prosecutor during the 1988 prison massacres in Iran, based on evidence submitted by civil society actors. Testimony from expert witnesses, victims, and victims’ families was likewise critical in establishing Noury’s guilt. In the Syria context, documentation from different organizations and victim participation helped German prosecutors secure the historic conviction of Bashar al-Assad regime officials.

When it comes to sanctions, governments don’t require a civil society recommendation to designate a person or entity, and government officials in charge of sanctions designations can both investigate potential perpetrators themselves and consult with their partners in other jurisdictions. However, given competing national security priorities, officials do not have the capacity to investigate every potential perpetrator and every potential violation on their own. Government agencies are also further under-resourced when it comes to enforcing those sanctions they do issue.

For those jurisdictions that can accept closed-source evidence, civil society can provide testimony and other confidential materials for their consideration. Even without the resource and evidence considerations, expert organizations have found that consultation and transparency helps “ensure that designations remain legitimate in the eyes of the people of Iran,” enhances responsiveness to victim needs, and ensures that designations support other accountability efforts.

What civil society can do

First, civil society can help identify potential perpetrators and submit information available for sanctioning authorities to then further investigate and analyze according to the relevant evidentiary threshold and policy considerations. A 2023 report from Human Rights First (HRF), REDRESS, Open Society Foundations (OSF), Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR), and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) looked at Iran as a case study and found that civil society’s recommendations help governments better “target those most susceptible to the financial and reputational pressures exerted by sanctions,” so long as governments engaged with civil society “holistically, and not selectively choos[ing] topics of interest based on political priorities.”

US officials and the State and Treasury Departments have stated that “civil society recommendations are seriously considered and remain an invaluable source of information.” A 2022 report estimated that at least 34 percent of US sanctions designations made under its thematic human rights and corruption-based or Global Magnitsky-style sanctions regime were based on civil society recommendations. That same report put that number at only 4 percent of UK sanctions actions and 13 percent of EU sanctions actions under their equivalent Magnitsky-style sanctions regimes.

Second, civil society can advocate for governments’—and the United Nations’—attention on situations that warrant targeted sanctions, such as by highlighting new concerning trends. For example, in the UK, the government amended its sanctions legislation related to Iran to allow designations for transnational repression—the IRI’s targeting of dissenters, activists, and others located outside Iran. This amendment directly responded to increased threats from the IRI reported by Iranians living in the UK. In the US, an advocacy campaign by the James Foley Foundation and the families of hostages led to the Levinson Act and Executive Order 14078, enabling designations for those engaged in or complicit in hostage-taking.

Finally, civil society can submit evidence relevant to enforcement if they have information on sanctions evasion—on specific instances, on networks of actors, on identified techniques and activities, or other relevant information. As more countries expand transparency on beneficial ownership, civil society can use this to strengthen their own information and knowledge, which can then be submitted “as a resource to overextended governments.”

Resources for civil society

While governments have noted their appreciation for civil society’s information, the process to submit that information to the correct authorities is not always clear. One of the most comprehensive resources available is HRF’s coalition of organizations that are submitting packages recommending designations. At quarterly meetings, members can discuss updates, hear from and pose questions to government officials working in sanctions units, and otherwise support one another. Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) also put together a similar coalition for groups submitting packages recommending designations under the (Saudi journalist Jamal) Khashoggi Ban, which relates to transnational repression.

Besides the coalition, HRF and its partners have put together resources for those interested in submitting information to governments advocating for certain designations:

HRF’s resources are mostly focused on submitting information to the United States. These include a template for submission, a Frequently Asked Questions document, explainers on different sanctions programs (including Iran-related sanctions), an explainer on Magnitsky sanctions through a Middle East and North Africa lens, and trackers.
REDRESS’ resources are mostly focused on submitting information to the United Kingdom. These include a template for submission, a guidance note on evidence collation, and a fact sheet on the UK’s use of coordinated Magnitsky sanctions.
RWCHR’s resources are focused on submitting information to Canada. They have a template and submission guide, and an intake form for those wishing to discuss potential submissions. The Peter A. Allard School of Law has also put together resources for those looking to submit information to Canada.

For sanctions enforcement information, most information is available through the relevant governments:

Information can be sent to the US Office of Foreign Asset Control through its compliance hotline.
Sanctions evasions in the UK can be reported to the Financial Conduct Authority.
Suspicious transactions in Canada can be reported to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre.
The European Union Commission has a sanctions whistleblower tool.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.
Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Moldovan and Georgian elections highlight Russia’s regional ambitions

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 21:31:52 +0000

Georgians go to the polls this weekend in a parliamentary election that is widely expected to determine whether the country will pursue integration with Moscow or the West. This closely mirrors the situation in Moldova, where voters face a similar choice on November 3 when the country holds the second round of its presidential election.

Allegations of undue Russian influence have overshadowed the ongoing election campaigns in Georgia and Moldova, highlighting the geopolitical significance of both votes. Critics have accused Moscow of engaging in everything from disinformation to voter bribery as part of Russian efforts to promote Kremlin-friendly candidates.

The first round of voting in Moldova took place last weekend and featured a separate referendum on enshrining the country’s European aspirations in their constitution, which voters backed by a razor-thin margin. Moldova’s pro-EU President Maia Sandu responded to this close win by suggesting that the Kremlin was engaged in a comprehensive campaign of election interference. “We have won the first battle in a difficult fight that will determine the future of our country,” she commented. “We fought fairly and won justly in an unjust struggle.”

Sandu’s claims of Russian meddling received prompt and strongly-worded backing from Brussels and Washington. Moldova’s presidential election and EU referendum campaigns had been marked by “really unprecedented intimidation and foreign interference by Russia and its proxies,” EU officials commented on Monday.

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The outlook ahead of this Saturday’s Georgian parliamentary vote is similar with one key difference: The country’s pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party has already been in power for the past twelve years and is now looking to secure a mandate for its increasingly open advocacy of closer ties with Russia.

Officially, at least, the Georgian Dream party remains committed to furthering Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. However, opponents claim that in practice, the party is becoming increasingly aligned with the Kremlin. They accuse the current authorities of passing authoritarian legislation such as a Russian-style “foreign agent law” that threatens to muzzle Georgia’s vibrant civil society.

The Georgian Dream political party was founded by the country’s richest man, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who reportedly has extensive business ties to Russia. In recent months, Ivanishvili has attempted to attract voters by warning that election victory for his pro-Western opponents could lead to renewed hostilities with Russia, which continues to occupy around twenty percent of Georgia. “We choose peace, not war,” he told a rally in Tbilisi on Wednesday.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has cast a long shadow over Georgia’s parliamentary elections. During the final weeks of the campaign, Georgian Dream officials sparked controversy by unveiling a series of adverts juxtaposing grim photos of war-torn Ukraine with bright images of a peaceful and prosperous Georgia. “I have never seen anything so shameful, so offensive to our culture, traditions, history, and beliefs,” commented Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili.

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The election interference tactics Russia is currently accused of employing in Moldova and Georgia echo earlier Kremlin efforts to manipulate Ukraine’s fledgling democracy and prevent the country from turning westward. Prior to the onset of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Moscow had attempted to use a wide range of tools including bribery, information warfare, and political violence to stop Kyiv exiting the Kremlin orbit. When all these measures failed to reverse Ukraine’s European choice, Putin escalated to direct military intervention with the seizure of Crimea. This set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later.

Voters in Moldova and Georgia are acutely aware of the Kremlin’s increasingly violent reaction to the potential loss of Ukraine, and are understandably eager to avoid suffering the same fate. At the same time, Moscow must contend with considerable public enthusiasm in both countries for European integration. While Moldova’s recent referendum on EU membership ended in a virtual tie, polls typically indicate majority backing for the European Union of sixty percent or higher. Pro-EU sentiment is thought to be even stronger in Georgia, with one recent poll finding seventy nine percent in favor of joining the EU.

Geopolitics is not the only topic shaping the current election cycles in Moldova and Georgia, of course. Domestic issues such as household budgets and the management of the economy will also be crucial in determining the outcome of the two votes. Nevertheless, the prominence of Russia in both election campaigns is a timely reminder that Moscow is in no mood to retreat and remains fully committed to retaining its regional influence.

Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine because he became convinced that the country was slipping irreversibly away from Russia and could no longer be kept in place by non-military means. This chilling reality looms large over the Moldovan and Georgian electorates as they prepare to vote in elections that will potentially define their futures for decades to come.

In a soft power contest of ideas, there is little doubt that the West would prove far more appealing to Moldovan and Georgian voters than anything the Kremlin has to offer. However, in the more pragmatic and immediate realm of hard power, it is Russia that currently holds the clear advantage. Coupled with Moscow’s proven record of successful election influence operations, this means there is every chance that pro-Kremlin forces could strong-arm their way to ballot box success in both Moldova and Georgia.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Nothing, actually. If China truly was the neutral, nonjudgmental partner that it claimed to be, Beijing could have chosen inaction, gotten out of the way, and allowed the will of the people to run its course. It also could have sided with the preponderance of evidence suggesting fraud—as dozens of other nations have. But by issuing these statements of support for Maduro, and speaking out so quickly, China decisively put its finger on the scale to help prop up a fellow autocracy, upending the will of a democratic movement.

Life support for Maduro

China’s longstanding support for the undemocratic regime in Venezuela is financial and material as well as diplomatic. In the 2000s, Beijing gave President Hugo Chávez tens of billions of dollars in investments and loans-for-oil deals. Maduro, Chávez’s hand-picked successor, took office after Chávez’s death in 2013, and since then, China has provided critical life support to his increasingly oppressive regime in the form of loans, cash, and investments.

Beijing’s support has at times included acting in accordance with Maduro’s interests during elections. In January 2019, when opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president, over fifty governments officially recognized his election. China stayed silent. That silence benefited Maduro, but Beijing cited noninterference as the reason for their inaction. In December 2020, Venezuela’s major opposition parties boycotted parliamentary elections, which they described as fraudulent and failing to meet the minimum requirements to qualify as free, fair, and transparent. Those elections were rejected by more than fifty-five countries, including the United States, members of the European Union (EU) and the EU-led International Contact Group, the Organization of American States, and the multilateral Lima Group. China, Russia, and Cuba were the only countries that recognized the 2020 parliamentary elections as legitimate. In January 2023, when the Maduro regime attempted to block a legitimate vote for National Assembly president, Beijing again remained silent.

Concrete proof of Maduro’s loss

The Venezuelan democratic movement pulled off a massive achievement in gathering clear evidence of electoral fraud in the presidential elections in July. In the weeks leading up to the election, roughly five thousand workshops were held for tens of thousands of volunteers, although some estimates place the size of the group closer to one million (out of Venezuela’s population of 28.3 million people). Volunteers were trained on electoral laws, including their right, as volunteer observers representing political parties, to obtain copies of their polling location’s voting tally. When election day came, volunteers faced significant hostility from soldiers, police, and Chavista loyalists guarding the polling stations. And yet, a mass democratic movement, operating in one of the world’s most oppressive regimes, succeeded. In an impressive logistical feat, volunteers gathered 83 percent of the voting tallies across the country, and, within forty-eight hours, digitized them and uploaded the results to a public website. The result was concrete proof that the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, had won 67 percent of the vote, compared to Maduro’s 30 percent.

The tallies have since been verified by five independent analyses: the Associated Press; the Washington Post; Colombian nongovernmental group Misión de Observación Electoral; Walter R. Mebane Jr., University of Michigan professor of election forensics; and the New York Times, whose analysis of partial voting tallies both broadly replicated the opposition’s estimates of the results within two percentage points and ruled out the possibility of a Maduro victory by any margin

Maduro nonetheless declared victory, backed by Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced that he had secured 51 percent of the votes, compared to 44 percent for González. As the opposition party revealed that it had evidence to prove that its candidate had won, most of the international community came to a similar conclusion about the fraudulence of the official tally. The Carter Center, which was invited to observe the election, issued a statement that the vote “did not meet international standards of electoral integrity,” and that the outcome “cannot be considered democratic.” In the following twenty-four hours, the United States, EU, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and the United Nations all cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election results.

Out of step with Latin America

China—Maduro’s longtime friend—stood apart from the crowd. One big question now is, to what degree will Beijing’s support for Maduro constitute a reputational hazard for China in Latin America and beyond?

China is now firmly out of step with most nations in a region where Xi hopes to deepen relations. All of Latin America, aside from Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Cuba, has either rejected Maduro’s reelection claim or expressed concern over the official election results. Mexico, which famously avoids entanglement in foreign controversies, has asked to see the National Electoral Council’s voting records. Even those who are not concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela will surely resent the resulting massive influx of migration putting a strain on the economies of Venezuela’s neighbors. On this matter, China is also at odds with several of its BRICS partners, both in the region (Brazil) and beyond (India and South Africa).

The extent to which this incident will factor into decision making in Latin American countries vis-à-vis China remains to be seen. As observers, we can only hope that citizens across the region are taking note of what seems to be a clear lesson from the China-Venezuela relationship: If you are looking for a partner who will allow you to shape the future of your own country, look elsewhere.

Caroline Costello is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

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Ukrainian journalist who exposed Russian occupation dies in Kremlin captivity

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 22 Oct 2024 22:17:20 +0000

A Ukrainian journalist who sought to document the Russian occupation of her country has died in Kremlin captivity. The family of award-winning journalist Victoria Roshchyna received notification of her death from the Russian authorities in early October. No cause of death was given, with reports indicating that she died in mid-September while being moved between Russian prisons. She was just twenty-seven years old.

Roshchyna, who worked as a staff reporter at Hromadske and as a freelance reporter for outlets including Ukrainska Pravda and Radio Free Europe, was renowned among colleagues for her integrity and personal courage. “She was a hardworking and brave reporter, sensitive to injustice,” commented former colleague Olga Tokariuk.

Roshchyna was best known for her reporting from behind the front lines in Russian-occupied Ukraine. She was first detained by Russian forces in March 2022 close to Mariupol. On that occasion, she was held for ten days before being released. Despite this experience, Roshchyna remained committed to raising awareness about conditions in Ukrainian regions under Kremlin control. She disappeared in summer 2023 while on a reporting trip to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine. Almost one year later, Kremlin officials confirmed that Roshchyna was in Russian custody.

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News of Roshchyna’s death sparked an outpouring of grief and anger in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called her death “a heavy blow.” Ukrainska Pravda chief editor Sevgil Musaieva led tributes from the journalistic community, decribing Roshchyna as “absolutely amazing” and recounting her commitment to reporting on the realities of life under Russian occupation.

Oksana Romaniuk, executive director of the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information, said the circumstances of Roshchyna’s death “makes you worry about other journalists who are in captivity.” Ukraine’s 2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk called on international media watchdogs to demand answers from Russia over Roshchyna’s death. “What could have been done to make a young girl die?” she asked in one of many posts on Ukrainian social media mourning Roshchyna.

Members of the international community stressed the need to determine Russia’s role in the young Ukrainian journalist’s death. “We must honor her legacy by holding her captors accountable,” commented Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus. National Press Club President Emily Wilkins called on the US to impose sanctions “against all Russian personnel involved.”

The European Union Delegation to Ukraine demanded a “thorough and independent investigation” into the circumstances of the journalist’s death in Russian detention. Meanwhile, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Senator Cardin said Roshchyna’s death was “heartbreaking” and served as a reminder of her bravery “reporting the truth about Russia’s war on Ukraine.”

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According to the Russian authorities, Roshchyna died while being transferred to Moscow from a detention facility in Taganrog that is particularly notorious among Ukrainian human rights groups for the widespread mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners. Ukrainian officials say they are now investigating her death as a war crime and an act of premeditated murder.

The death of Victoria Roshchyna in Russian custody highlights the dangers facing independent journalists attempting to cover the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Petro Yatsenko of the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Roshchyna was one of at least twenty-five Ukrainian journalists being held by Russia.

While the details regarding Roshchyna’s death have yet to be determined, she was known to be in good health prior to her detention. The journalist is one of many Ukrainian prisoners to have died in Russian custody since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 amid reports of widespread human rights abuses. The vast majority of Ukrainians released in prisoner exchanges have recounted being subjected to torture by their Russian captors.

The US Department of State’s 2023 Human Rights Report confirmed Russia’s use of “systematic torture and abuse against thousands of captured Ukrainian military POWs and detained civilians.” In a September 2024 report, United Nations human rights officials stated that “torture has been used as a common and acceptable practice by Russian authorities” against Ukrainian detainees.

Over the past two and a half years, thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been abducted from Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine and imprisoned. Ukraine’s Media Initiative organization has compiled a list of 1,886 names, but the actual number of detainees is believed to be far higher. In the vast majority of cases, family members and colleagues have no information regarding the status of those being held by Russia.

Victoria Roshchyna was an inspirational figure to her colleagues in the media and a widely respected journalist who sought to give a voice to Ukrainian victims of Russian occupation. Her death serves as a chilling reminder of the war crimes currently being committed against the civilian population throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

What are the biggest challenges for civil society in the Western Balkans today? How are governments responding to concerns about the rule of law, democracy, and civic spaces? And what can be done to hold them more accountable? Watch now for expert analysis on the future of the Berlin Process.

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Vision 2030 has done wonders for women. But there’s still room to enhance their economic roles in Saudi Arabia.

Beata Polok and Maha Akeel — Wed, 16 Oct 2024 19:16:16 +0000

Mobilized by the ambitious Vision 2030 plan launched by Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman in 2016, Saudi Arabia has undergone substantial socioeconomic reforms to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on oil revenue. Central to these reforms is women’s empowerment, a key driver of sustainable growth. Legal and labor reforms, such as lifting the driving ban in 2017 and introducing anti-harassment laws, have significantly increased Saudi women’s participation in the workforce and business. The government also amended the Civil Status Law, with amendments that grant women greater autonomy and allow them to make decisions without male guardianship, act as heads of households, decide on their residency, travel freely, and manage their own businesses. Female participation in the labor force surged from 23.2 percent in 2016 to 34.4 percent by 2022, surpassing Vision 2023’s initial target of 30 percent, while women now own 45 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, despite these significant advances, gaps persist between policy and practice.

According to the World Bank’s Women, Business, and the Law 2024 (WBL) report, Saudi Arabia’s legal frameworks score stands at 50 out of 100, with the global average scoring 64.2. This signals legislative progress, though more work is needed to align with global standards. Notably, Saudi Arabia is ahead of the Middle East and North Africa region, where the average score is 38.6. More importantly, the “supportive frameworks” score of 36.7—the global average is 39.5—reveals a lack of adequate mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation of these laws, reflecting that Saudi Arabia lacks sufficient childcare services, a streamlined parental leave system, and government-led support for women entrepreneurs.

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On a positive note, the report’s “expert opinion” score on gender equality practices—which is the third new score introduced in the 2024 expanded version of the World Bank report, along with the “legal framework” and “supportive framework” scores—shows Saudi Arabia’s score is significantly high at 85.6, compared to a global average of 65.7, indicating that professionals in the region perceive positive progress. These contrasting scores demonstrate a clear need for better policy instruments that transform legal victories into tangible outcomes for women across the kingdom.

Existing initiatives supporting women entrepreneurs

During the past few years, Saudi Arabia has also implemented several initiatives that support women entrepreneurs, aligning with some of the World Bank’s recommendations. Joint projects like the IGNITING Women’s Entrepreneurship and Innovation program and initiatives by the Small and Medium Enterprises General Authority (Monshaat), the Social Development Bank and the Talat Almara’a Initiative offer financial assistance, educational resources, and networking opportunities, aiding women-owned SMEs and micro-enterprises in Saudi Arabia and helping them overcome financial barriers to start or expand their businesses.

To address structural barriers, the Qurrah Program subsidizes up to 800 Saudi riyals per month ($213) per child for working mothers, helping them balance work and family commitments.Meanwhile, the Wusool Program provides transportation subsidies for women working in the private sector, covering 80 percent of transportation costs. While these initiatives are essential, the World Bank WBL report suggests that much more must be done to ensure women entrepreneurs can access the resources and support they need to thrive.

Bridging the gap between policy and practice

To fully capitalize on the reforms introduced under Vision 2030 and close the gap between policy and practice, Saudi Arabia can implement the following policy recommendations anchored in the WBL 2024 findings.

Strengthen legal protections for women’s safety and mobility
Introducing comprehensive legislation on domestic violence would help in addressing gender-based violence, an issue highlighted as a major global gap in the WBL 2024 report. These laws should be coupled with government-led monitoring bodies to ensure enforcement and an annual budget allocation for violence-prevention programs.
Enhance parental leave and childcare support
One of the areas in Saudi Arabia’s supportive frameworks that could benefit from improvement is related to parenthood. There is currently lack of a centralized system for applying for maternity benefits and a lack of incentives for fathers to take paternity leave. Establishing a single-application government portal for maternity benefits would streamline access for working mothers. Furthermore, introducing incentives for paternity leave would balance the childcare burden and encourage greater workforce participation by women.
Improve access to financial services
While existing programs address some barriers to finance, Saudi Arabia still lacks a comprehensive national strategy for women’s access to financial services. Developing a national financial-inclusion strategy that targets women across various sectors, including rural areas, and offering specialized financial products like microloans or gender-sensitive credit would enhance women’s economic participation.
Promote gender equality in leadership
Although Saudi women can engage in entrepreneurship, there are no gender quotas for corporate boards and women remain underrepresented in senior management roles. Introducing gender quotas for corporate boards or incentivizing companies to hire women in leadership positions could help address this imbalance. Public-private partnerships could be established to train and mentor women leaders, equipping them with the skills necessary to advance in their careers.
Publish sex-disaggregated data and monitor progress
A crucial gap identified by the WBL 2024 report is the need for more sex-disaggregated data in several key areas, including entrepreneurship, property ownership, and unpaid care work. Saudi Arabia should prioritize the regular collection and publication of sex-disaggregated data, which would provide critical insights for policymakers and help track progress in real time. Such data would also enable more tailored policy interventions that address the unique challenges faced by women in the workforce and business.

Saudi Arabia’s progress under Vision 2030 in advancing women’s rights and economic empowerment is impressive, but the journey is not yet over. By addressing the gaps highlighted in the World Bank’s WBL 2024 report and implementing targeted policies, Saudi Arabia can build on its achievements and create a more inclusive economy in which women play a central role. Empowering women not only supports Saudi Arabia’s economic growth but also aligns with its broader vision of modernization grounded in its cultural and religious values.

Beata Polok is a research fellow at the Haqaiq Centre for Legal Studies at Prince Sultan University in Riyadh and an academic visitor at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. She is also the Programme Director of the Law Department at Dar al-Hekma University.

Maha Akeel is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at Dar al-Hekma University and an expert on gender equality issues. She is a former director of communication at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

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Michelle Kholos Brooks interviewed by the Library of Congress on War Words

ayoung — Tue, 15 Oct 2024 18:00:00 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow

On October 15, Michelle Kholos Brooks, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, was interviewed alongside Sarah Norris by the Library of Congress about the creation of the play War Words. Kholos Brooks, a playwright, spoke about how she approached writing a play focused on veteran’s stories and what she learned about experiences in the military. She reflects on the importance of bridging the gap between national security, the military, and the public through art.

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Michelle Kholos Brooks

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Charai in the National Interest: The US and Israel’s Path to Supporting the Iranian People’s Aspirations

Atlantic Council — Sat, 12 Oct 2024 15:04:43 +0000

Original source

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Ending Russian impunity: Why Ukraine needs justice as well as security

Kateryna Odarchenko, Lesia Zaburanna — Tue, 08 Oct 2024 19:18:05 +0000

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some members of the international community are now advocating for a negotiated settlement that risks rewarding Moscow for its aggression. The idea of offering the Kremlin concessions is dangerously shortsighted and overlooks the central importance of justice in any future peace settlement. Failing to hold Russia accountable for crimes committed in Ukraine would set a disastrous precedent for the future of international security, and would create the conditions for more war.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities have been vocal about the need to document Russian war crimes and bring the perpetrators to justice. Many of Kyiv’s partners have provided extensive backing for these efforts. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has initiated investigative proceedings, and has issued a number of warrants for the arrest of senior Kremlin officials including Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges. This trend is welcome and must continue.

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The pursuit of justice for Russian war crimes is not just a matter of upholding the law. It is a key component of Ukraine’s broader strategy to safeguard its sovereignty and rebuild its war-torn society. If Ukraine is unable to secure justice for the millions who have suffered as a direct result of Russia’s invasion, this could seriously weaken the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and lead to the long-term destabilization of the country.

Crucially, enforcing accountability for atrocities will also send a powerful signal to Russia and the wider international community that war crimes will not be tolerated. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked the largest European war since World War II, and has directly violated many of the core principles of international law. If the invasion ends in an ugly compromise that leaves Moscow unpunished, much of the progress made since 1945 will be undone.

Russia currently stands accused of war crimes in Ukraine including mass killings, deportations, torture, the systematic abduction of children, and the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. However, previous generations of Russians have faced very similar war crimes accusations without ever encountering legal consequences. This has helped foster a sense of impunity in modern Russian society that has paved the way for the atrocities currently taking place in Ukraine. Addressing Russian impunity must therefore be central to any meaningful peace process.

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Ukraine’s efforts to gather evidence of war crimes during the ongoing Russian invasion have been groundbreaking. Prosecutors, law enforcement officials, legal experts, and members of the country’s civil society have all made significant contributions. One particularly important development has been the use of DNA database technologies, with mobile DNA labs enabling forensic teams to operate in recently liberated areas of Ukraine. The physical evidence acquired during these investigations has made it possible to identify victims and could also be used in future prosecutions.

Ukraine’s efforts to hold Russia accountable have also been boosted by partnerships with a range of international legal experts and organizations. This cooperation could have consequences for international justice that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The experience of investigating war crimes that has been acquired in Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 can contribute to the broader objective of strengthening the international legal framework that underpins global security.

Continued international assistance in Ukraine’s quest for justice is an important element of the support Kyiv receives from its partners. By providing forensic expertise, legal guidance, and diplomatic backing, Western allies strengthen Ukraine’s efforts while emphasizing their own commitment to accountability for war crimes. This will help prevent the normalization of war crimes and other violations of international law. Failure to act decisively could embolden other actors globally, leading to the further erosion of the rules-based international order.

Looking ahead, the fight for justice must remain at the heart of efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is vital to pursue victory not only on the battlefield but also in the courtroom. This will require sustained international solidarity and political will at a time when there are growing signs of war-weariness and calls for a compromise that would allow Moscow to escape accountability. Anything less than justice for the victims of Russia’s invasion will invite further aggression from Russia itself and from other expansionist powers. This would be a costly blunder that would set the stage for a new era of international instability.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Lesia Zaburanna is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the Servant of the People Party and a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

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It’s time Iran’s artists be considered as human rights defenders

Sanjay Sethi and Johanna Bankston — Wed, 02 Oct 2024 21:06:50 +0000

Two years after Mahsa Jina Amini’s tragic death in 2022 at the hands of the so-called morality police, Iran’s creative community has emerged as a formidable force in the ongoing struggle for human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the same time, Iranian artists’ influential work and high-profile activism have also made them vulnerable to political persecution at the hands of the clerical establishment ruling the country.

International recognition of the acute risk creatives face in Iran is necessary to ensure their vital role in advocating for human rights continues. Artists often struggle more than other human rights defenders (HRD)—such as activists, lawyers, and journalists—in receiving humanitarian protection, as art is not always recognized as a medium for dissent or political expression. If Iranian creatives receive due recognition as HRDs, they will be better situated to access support when their rights are threatened or violated, as they have been since the outbreak of the 2022 protests.

Tens of thousands of people joined the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising in response to Amini’s death, and from the earliest days of these protests, artists, musicians, authors, and creatives shaped the movement’s messaging. Their work transformed the raw emotions of the protestors into a powerful storm, clearly articulating the demands of those risking their lives on the streets of Iran’s cities and towns.

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The pivotal role of contemporary artists in Iran has been captured in a first-of-its-kind report by Artistic Freedom Initiative (AFI), “I Create, I Resist; Iranian Artists on the Frontline of Social Change.” The report documents how creative forces in Iran turned a nationwide protest into a cultural uprising that resonated across the globe and detailed the corresponding government’s effort to target fourteen of these artists with censorship, arbitrary arrests, and other forms of repression.

One of the most poignant examples of how art fueled the protests is Shervin Hajipour’s song “Baraye” (“For the sake of”). Composed of a series of Persian language posts on X (formerly Twitter) in which Iranians expressed their frustrations with the regime and their hopes for a different future, “Baraye” became the movement’s de facto anthem within a few days of its release. Its widespread popularity alarmed authorities, who promptly banned the song and sentenced Hajipour to three years in prison for “spreading propaganda against the regime,” though he has since been granted amnesty in a public “gesture of goodwill” by authorities. Though the regime took punitive action against the artist and censored his song, “Baraye” continued to have a strong effect, infiltrating the hearts of millions and giving a voice to the leaderless, decentralized demonstrations that captured global attention.

Visual artists, too, have played a crucial role in giving the movement a unique character. Graffiti, illustrations, paintings, and graphic designs, among others, have emerged as powerful tools of resistance, transforming public spaces into canvases of dissent. For example, a group of illustrators and designers known as the Iranian Women of Graphic Design created an open-access archive with hundreds of free posters for use in the Woman, Life, Freedom demonstrations. Their illustrations, particularly those depicting Amini or young Iranian women cutting their hair in defiance of the regime, have become iconic images associated with the protests. These artworks are not just acts of defiance but also symbols of the nationwide unwritten coalition of artists who, for the first time, have actively engaged in a protest movement with no singular leadership.

The situation for artists in Iran, however, has been perilous, as seen in the severe persecution of artists like musician Toomaj Salehi, artist Atena Farghadani, and director Mohammad Rasoulof. In 2022, Salehi, a rapper known for his politically charged lyrics, was arrested, tortured, and sentenced to death for his outspoken support of the protests, though his sentence was commuted in August. In 2023, Farghadani, a cartoonist, faced imprisonment for her satirical drawings that criticized the regime. Most recently, in June, Rasoulof was forced to flee Iran after the international release of his Cannes award-winning film, The Seed of the Sacred Fig, which uses actual footage of the 2022 protests and features several female characters without headscarves. While these are just three examples of higher profile artists who have suffered under the regime’s oppressive tactics, many lesser-known creatives continue to contend with a regime that is intent on controlling artistic production. Such artists include Daniel Moghadam and Vafa Ahmadpour, two dissident rappers arrested in May after releasing their music video “Amadeh Bash” (“Be Prepared”), highlighting the crises and challenges that Iranians are forced to confront under the country’s current leadership. The pair remain imprisoned as they await a final sentence.

Over the past several years, Iran’s law enforcement apparatus has increasingly been deployed to arbitrarily arrest and prosecute artists under the pretext of protecting national security and public morals. In 2022 alone, over a hundred artists were allegedly arrested and subjected to work bans for demonstrating their support of Woman, Life, Freedom. While it is difficult to ascertain the total number of artists targeted under these laws, at least twelve criminal cases have been brought against artists over the past two years as a direct result of their work or expressions of solidarity. Award-winning Iranian photojournalist Yalda Moaiery is among those. She was arrested and sentenced to six years on the charge of “spreading propaganda against the regime” in 2022 for photographing a Woman, Life, Freedom protest. Though Moaiery was later granted amnesty for this charge, she has been arbitrarily arrested several times throughout her career and still must serve a two year sentence for a previous case leveled against her. Today, Moaiery is one of fifty-three artists and activists represented by AFI who are in the process of relocating from Iran for fear of persecution in light of the escalating arrests of artists and dissidents in the country.

The Islamic Republic has also used bureaucratic offices to target artists. In particular, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has been instrumental in silencing artists through online and physical surveillance, the issuance of work bans against artists, and the forced closure of publishing houses, theaters, and arts organizations. In October 2023, the ministry published a list of twenty actresses banned from working in Iran for appearing in public or on camera without headscarves. Among them was Taraneh Alidoosti, star of the 2016 Oscar-award-winning film The Salesman. This state-led persecution highlights the extent to which the regime fears the power of art as a tool for social and political change.

In the context of such severe repression, the international community should recognize Iranian artists as human rights defenders. Their work is not merely artistic expression but a form of political activism that champions freedom of speech and justice. There exists an urgent need for international support, including immigration relief and resettlement assistance, to protect these artists from the severe repercussions of their work in Iran and ensure their voices are not silenced by the oppressive forces of the Iranian regime.

Reflecting on the role of artists in Iran’s struggle, it is clear that their courage and creativity are vital to the movement for freedom and justice. As Moaiery poignantly states, “Art is the last sanctuary of free thought.” This sentiment encapsulates the resilience of Iran’s artistic community, who continue to create and resist, even in the face of unimaginable adversity.

Read the AFI report: “I Create, I Resist; Iranian Artists on the Frontline of Social Change”

Sanjay Sethi is an international human rights lawyer and the co-founder and co-executive director of Artistic Freedom Initiative (AFI).

Johanna Bankston is AFI’s senior officer of advocacy.

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History is a key battleground in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Benton Coblentz — Thu, 26 Sep 2024 18:29:32 +0000

History is at the very heart of Russia’s war on Ukraine, with Russian President Vladimir Putin frequently using historical narratives to justify the invasion. Western academia can help combat the Kremlin’s weaponization of the past by paying significantly more attention to the field of Ukrainian history.

Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began ten years ago with the seizure of Crimea, history has been a key battleground. Putin set the tone himself by framing the spring 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula as an act of historical justice. He then famously published a lengthy essay in the run-up to the full-scale invasion using his version of history to argue against Ukrainian statehood. When the Kremlin dictator sat down with American journalist Tucker Carlson in early 2024 for his most high-profile international interview of the entire war, it came as no surprise that he chose to begin by launching into a rambling half-hour history lecture.

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It should now be clear that the Kremlin’s attempts to distort history represent a serious threat to international security. Academia can help global audiences become less vulnerable to Russian disinformation by improving awareness of Ukraine’s national story and decoupling the country from the imperial narratives that form the basis of Putin’s claims. A recent conference at Princeton University brought together a distinguished panel of Ukrainian history experts to address the current state of Ukrainian historical studies and look ahead.

As Princeton professor and conference co-organizer Iryna Vushko noted, victims have not traditionally been viewed as particularly interesting in academic studies of history. In order overcome the obstacles inherent in histories written by the victors, it is important for academics to ensure that narratives around contemporary events make more effort to center the targets of international aggression.

During the conference, Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history Serhii Plokhy acknowledged that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is “wrapped in bad historical mythology.” According to Plokhy, Putin is clearly motivated by his personal vision of Russian history as he seeks to reassert Russian dominance over Ukraine. The Harvard historian and prominent author observed that Putin’s attempts to root his invasion firmly in the past have had the unintended consequence of generating significant interest in Ukrainian history.

Despite this unprecedented attention, Russia’s invasion has in many ways highlighted how much work must still be done. Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies director Natalia Khanenko-Friesen noted that there is a need to “move forward on the decolonization of our field.” She pointed to projects such as the recently launched doctorate fellowship in indigenous Crimean Tatar studies at the University of Alberta as important contributions toward this goal.

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Decolonization will only be possible when Ukraine’s history is viewed beyond the context of established imperial narratives and on its own terms, of course. Yale University professor Marci Shore, whose work has focused on the intellectual history of Eastern Europe, reflected on how she feels the study of Ukraine should need no explanation. “This is a place I came to of my own free will because it was inherently fascinating,” she commented.

Shore noted that Ukraine has been at the forefront of key European intellectual and political developments for centuries. As they confront the current Russian invasion, Ukrainians are being forced to address some of the central questions of our time, including the meaning of national identity in twenty first century Europe and the balance between democratic values and national survival in a country waging an existential war.

There was broad agreement among conference panelists that the full-scale Russian invasion had thrust Ukraine into the international limelight. Martin Schulze Wessel of Munich’s Ludwig Maximilian University said Ukraine was “no longer the periphery” and had instead moved to the center of European events. He argued that Ukraine’s extensive historical experience of Russian imperialism can offer important lessons for today’s policymakers. According to Schulze Wessel, this could help demonstrate the “illusion” of believing a sustainable peace can be achieved without strengthening Ukraine to resist further Russian aggression.

Significant challenges remain. Plokhy noted that while numerous Western universities have begun creating new positions in fields such as Ukrainian language and literature, Ukrainian history studies has not yet witnessed the same kind of growth. He called for more investment in the emerging generation of young scholars and greater support for Ukrainian institutes that will be capable of continuing their important work even if public interest in the region wanes.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exposed serious shortcomings in the international community’s awareness of the region. Putin and other Russian officials have exploited this lack of knowledge to push an unashamedly imperialistic interpretation of Ukrainian history. They have used this weaponized historical narrative to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. This underlines the need for universities to prioritize the study of Ukrainian history and center Ukrainian perspectives in conversations about the country.

Benton Coblentz is an MPA candidate at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.

Russia’s assault on Ukrainian cultural identity has attracted considerable international concern, with numerous governments voicing their alarm and offering support to Ukraine. For example, the United States has recently unveiled plans to impose tough restrictions on the illicit trade in Ukraine’s cultural artifacts.

Since the full-scale invasion began, a large number of international initiatives have also emerged as part of efforts to document Russia’s war on Ukrainian cultural identity and preserve as much of Ukraine’s heritage as possible. These include monitoring work led by the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative, and a number of joint initiatives together with Ukraine’s museums.

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One of the most ambitious projects aimed at the preservation of Ukrainian heritage is the Ukraine is Here platform led by Google Arts and Culture. In early September, Google officials presented the latest updates to this project, with more than one thousand new images added along with ninety new stories and several virtual galleries.

Produced through partnerships with a number of civil society groups, cultural organizations, and state agencies, this Google initiative aims to serve as a digital database of Ukraine’s cultural heritage. It includes hundreds of 3D models of churches, theaters, castles, and other historically significant buildings, along with individual items ranging from kitchen utensils to ancient armor.

Efforts to preserve Ukraine’s cultural heritage are a crucial element of the broader international response to Russia’s invasion. While the front lines of the war have not witnessed any dramatic changes in almost two years, Russia continues to bombard towns and cities across Ukraine on a virtually daily basis, frequently causing irreparable damage to the country’s cultural sites.

Russia’s relentless air war makes it all the more important to keep a detailed digital record of Ukrainian national heritage assets. During a recent forum in Ukrainian Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Culture and Strategic Communications Anastasia Bondar said utilizing modern technologies such as digitization was a “key factor” in the struggle to safeguard Ukrainian culture for future generations.

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In addition to destroying the sites, monuments, and buildings that make up Ukraine’s cultural inheritance, the Russian invasion has also killed significant numbers of the country’s contemporary cultural community. As The Guardian’s chief culture writer Charlotte Higgins noted in a moving tribute to Ukrainian author and war crimes researcher Victoria Amelina following her death in a Russian air strike, “Stalin erased one generation of Ukraine’s artists. Now Putin is killing another.”

More than one hundred Ukrainian cultural figures have been killed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, according to data published by worldwide literary association PEN International. One of the youngest victims was eighteen year old Ukrainian artist Veronika Kozhushko, who was killed by a Russian glide bomb in Kharkiv in August 2024.

The destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage is entirely consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s longstanding efforts to deny Ukraine’s right to exist and his insistence that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Putin frequently claims that occupied Ukrainian regions are “historically Russian lands,” and has ordered the ruthless suppression of Ukrainian national identity in all areas currently under Kremlin control.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian identity even extends to the abduction and indoctrination of children on an industrial scale. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for the Kremlin dictator on war crimes charges related to Russia’s mass deportation of Ukrainian children. Many of these children have reportedly been indoctrinated in camps designed to rob them of their Ukrainian identity.

With no end in sight to Russia’s invasion, international efforts to help preserve Ukraine’s cultural heritage are more necessary than ever. While the Russian army is struggling to achieve its goals on the battlefield, the actions of the occupation authorities in areas under Moscow’s control provide clear evidence that the Kremlin remains committed to erasing Ukrainian identity and extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. Unless this is prevented, a terrible precedent will be set that will shape the global security climate for many years to come.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Siamak Aram — Tue, 10 Sep 2024 15:06:32 +0000

The enduring series of advocacy efforts and demonstrations that have unfolded across American cities since the onset of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran since 2022 highlights a remarkable shift in the political consciousness of the Iranian diaspora in the United States. These protests, initially ignited by the tragic killing in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini—a 22-year-old woman who was arrested for allegedly not wearing the mandatory hijab in accordance with the Islamic Republic’s laws—transcend mere expressions of outrage. Two years later, the Woman, Life, Freedom movement remains a blazing symbol of resistance, representing the most substantial wave of dissent against the Islamic Republic of Iran since its inception in 1979.

Historically, the actions of the Iranian diaspora have mirrored the ebbs and flows of their homeland’s political dynamics, but on a smaller scale and in a less coordinated fashion. However, since the post-1979 revolution period, this time, a significant cross-section of the diaspora has become politically active on an extraordinary level, reflecting the primary desires and needs of the people in Iran: regime change.

The Woman, Life, Freedom movement is central to this transformation, which extends far beyond its initial single-issue, gender-specific focus to a call for systemic change. It is rooted in Iranians’ deep desire for sweeping political and societal transformation, specifically removing the clerical establishment. Beneath the surface of these protests—inside and outside of Iran—lies the conviction that the Islamic Republic remains the primary impediment to achieving democracy and fundamental human rights in Iran. This conviction, combined with the principle of collective action, has united the diaspora to address common grievances—such as human rights violations, lack of freedom, economic hardships, discrimination, and gender inequality—and catalyze political change.

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This determination is evident in various ways, such as the demonstrations supporting the families of hostages held by Tehran; opposition to any deal—nuclear or otherwise—that would provide financial relief to the regime without stringent human rights conditions; efforts to limit the Islamic Republic’s influence on the international stage; advocacy at the level of Congress and the United Nations; and campaigns aimed at ending gender apartheid in Iran. These actions exemplify Iranian-American’s unwavering commitment to justice, human rights, and accountability.

Since 2022, unprecedented demonstrations have been held in various US cities—including Boston, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Nashville, Seattle, New York, and Washington—drawing thousands of participants to support events in Iran and to pressure the international community to take effective actions to address the human rights crisis in the country. In addition, many political and civil groups and organizations—including the Washington-based National Solidarity Group for Iran, which I lead—have emerged across the US to support the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, with many operating within coordinated networks to facilitate joint actions and amplify their impact.

For the first time, the diaspora effectively leveraged its political influence by holding meetings with congressional offices, calling lawmakers and sending them emails and letters, and distributing and signing petitions. This newfound engagement is evident in their unprecedented role in securing support for bipartisan legislation, such as the Mahsa Amini Human Rights and Security Accountability Act (MAHSA Act). Mobilized by ordinary diaspora citizens—often referred to as the Mahsa Act Army—the bill gained significant traction in Congress amidst ongoing protests and became law in April. These actions were not confined solely to Capitol Hill but extended to the State Department, White House, and relevant offices, marking a unique level of diaspora involvement and advocacy within US government institutions like never before.

This mobilization was driven by a powerful wave of online activism across various social media platforms inside and outside Iran, which played a substantial role in engaging the media, activists, and public figures to the cause of freedom for Iran. The unprecedented support from the entertainment industry and public figures further elevated awareness about the movement. A standout moment was the adoption of Iran-based artist Shervin Hajipour’s song “Baraye” (“For The Sake Of”) as the de facto anthem of the protests. This track, celebrated for its poignant lyrics derived from actual tweets by Iranians about their demands and aspirations, significantly amplified the movement’s impact and reach. Earning 83 percent of public votes submitted to the Recording Academy, Hajipour became the first recipient of the new Grammy Award category, “Best Song for Social Change,” presented by First Lady Jill Biden in 2023.

Across American universities, students and professors have also rallied together, participating in protests, publishing solidarity statements, organizing events, including panel discussions about the current situation in Iran and debates on its future, and expressing solidarity with the Iranian people. These collective efforts pressured many academic institutions to take a stance against the Islamic Republic’s brutality and oppression and to support the pro-democracy protesters. Such public mobilization efforts resonate deeply with theories of collective action, showcasing that people can transcend their interests to pursue shared objectives and drive political transformation.

The diaspora’s activism, which has amplified voices from within Iran, alongside campaigns like “No to Sham Elections,” as one of the key factors contributing to the significant boycott of the presidential elections on June 28 and July 5 following Ebrahim Raisi’s death. Several protests prompted the Islamic Republic’s Interests Section Office in Washington, DC—responsible for organizing absentee ballot stations in the US—to cancel polling station locations at the last minute on election day, causing disorder and confusion.

The Iranian diaspora’s persistent advocacy reflects the shifting political dynamics within its homeland and highlights its steadfast commitment to the struggle for a free and democratic Iran. For the first time in the Islamic Republic’s 45-year rule, there is remarkable alignment between efforts inside and outside Iran. However, internal divisions between the diaspora, as exemplified by the fallout of the Georgetown Eight Coalition—an opposition coalition made up of eight prominent figures in the diaspora—present serious challenges for future advocacy efforts. Such dynamics occasionally overshadow collective efforts, highlighting the complexities of diaspora engagement. While some view the coalition’s defeat as a setback, it offered valuable lessons for future coalition-building efforts. How the diaspora addresses these internal divisions will significantly shape its continued impact and effectiveness.

The Woman, Life, Freedom movement marked a pivotal moment for the diaspora, as it succeeded in reshaping and impacting the more than four-decade Western narrative about Iran by distinguishing the Islamic Republic from its people, which it does not represent in its entirety. More importantly, the movement has fundamentally reshaped the diaspora’s social, political, and cultural landscape, providing hope and a compelling rationale for sustained engagement. The Iranian diaspora should focus on unified messaging and goals, emphasizing shared principles like human rights and democracy to effectively support and express solidarity with the movement against the clerical establishment. Building alliances with human rights and civil society organizations and other diaspora communities can help garner more resources and support, increasing visibility and impact. Expanding the network of pro-democracy advocates and fostering solidarity within the diaspora should remain a primary ongoing goal.

As Iranians worldwide share a fervent aspiration for the end of the clerical establishment, the steadfast advocacy of the Iranian-American community in shaping US policy remains crucial to the challenging journey toward a brighter future for Iran, the Middle East, and, ultimately, the world. While the Islamic Republic grapples with persistent internal political struggles and legitimacy crises, the diaspora faces renewed challenges in upholding the demands of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement and amplifying the call for regime change from within Iran—particularly with a US presidential election in November. The Iranian-American community must confront these challenges head-on, focusing on the need for comprehensive and coordinated cross-factional unity to effectively advance the movement’s goals and prepare for future phases of mass protest.

Siamak Aram is president of the National Solidarity Group for Iran (NSGIran). He is also an associate professor of Data Analytics and Computer Science at Harrisburg University of Science and Technology.

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Linderman in Civil Georgia | Rising stakes in Tbilisi as elections approach

Atlantic Council — Sat, 07 Sep 2024 15:10:58 +0000

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Cho quoted in The Economist on resilience of liberalism in China

ylee — Fri, 06 Sep 2024 15:11:54 +0000

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On September 5, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Sungmin Cho was quoted in The Economist discussing the resilience of liberalism in China. Cho noted that with growing nationalism and government suppression under Xi, support for democratic norms and values has increased over time, indicating a complex and evolving public opinion landscape.

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Too many still view Ukraine through the prism of Russian imperialism

Olesya Khromeychuk — Thu, 05 Sep 2024 20:59:58 +0000

“There are only so many books on Ukraine we can review each month,” an editor from a major British newspaper tells me at one of the country’s largest literary festivals. He looks a bit uncomfortable, almost apologetic. He wants me to understand that if it were up to him, he’d review a book on Ukraine every day, but that’s just not how the industry works.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I’ve had a glimpse into how several industries work: Publishing, journalism, and the broader world of culture, including galleries and museums. Even before the big war, I knew more than I wanted to about how academia works (or rather doesn’t) when it comes to Ukraine. A common thread among all these fields is the limited attention they allocate to countries that do not occupy a place among the traditional big players of imperial politics.

Cultural imperialism lives on, even if its carriers often proclaim anti-colonial slogans. It thrives in gate-keeping, with editors and academics mistrusting voices that don’t sound like those higher up the ladder, while platforming those who have habitually been accepted as authoritative. “We’ve done Ukraine already” is a frequent response whenever you pitch an idea, text, or public event centering the country.

The editor who can’t keep publishing reviews of Ukraine-related books walks away, and I pick up a copy of one of the UK’s most prominent literary magazines to see their book recommendations. Out of a handful of reviews, three are on recent books about Russia. It seems like the space afforded to Russia remains unlimited. I close the publication to keep my blood pressure down.

Keeping my blood pressure down, however, is challenging. When my social media feeds aren’t advertising another production of Uncle Vanya, they’re urging me to splash out on opera tickets for Eugene Onegin. What happened to the dreaded “cancelling” of Russian culture? The Russia section in most bookshops I visit in the UK is growing daily with everything from yet another translation of Dostoevsky to accounts of opposition figures killed or imprisoned by the Kremlin.

The international media focus on the August 2024 release of Russian political prisoners was yet another example of how the more things change, the more they stay the same. While these released prisoners were provided with a global media platform to call for an end to “unfair” sanctions on “ordinary Russians,” there was no mention of the thousands of Ukrainian civilians who continue to languish in Russian jails.

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The ongoing international emphasis on all things Russian goes hand in hand with a reluctance to transform growing interest in Ukraine into meaningful structural changes in how the country is perceived, reported on, and understood. Although there has been some improvement in knowledge about Ukraine since 2022, the move is essentially from having no understanding to having a superficial grasp.

Each time I read a piece on Ukraine by someone not well-versed in the country’s history and politics, my heart sinks. The chances are it will recycle historical cliches, repeat Kremlin propaganda about Russophone Ukrainians, or generalize about regional differences. And to add insult to injury, such articles also often misspell at least one family or place name, using outdated Russian transliterations. A quick Google search or a message to an actual Ukrainian could prevent these errors and save the author from looking foolish. Yet aiding this kind of colonial complacency seems to bother neither the authors nor the editors involved.

I often wonder what would happen if I wrote a piece on British or US politics and misspelt the names of historical figures, towns, and cities. How likely would I be to get it published? And yet the same standards do not apply when it comes to writing about countries that have not been granted priority status in our mental hierarchies of the world. We can misspell them all we like; no one will notice anyway. Apart from the people from those countries, of course. And when an exasperated Ukrainian writes to complain, I can almost see the editors rolling their eyes and thinking, “What does this perpetually frustrated nation want now? We’ve done Ukraine. Why are they never satisfied?”

It is not enough to simply “do Ukraine” by reviewing one book on the war, especially if it’s by a Western journalist rather than a Ukraine-based author. It’s not enough to host one exhibition, particularly if it is by an artist or photographer who only spent a few weeks in the country. Quickly putting together a panel on Russia’s war in response to a major development at the front and adding a sole Ukrainian voice at the last minute doesn’t cut it either. This box-ticking approach is unhelpful and insulting.

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It is important to acknowledge that some Western media outlets have significantly enhanced their coverage of Ukraine over the past two and a half years. They have typically done so by dedicating time and resources to having in-house experts who have either reported from Ukraine for many years, or who are committed to deepening their knowledge enough to produce high-quality analysis. However, many of these outlets still seem compelled to provide platforms for individuals entirely unqualified to analyse the region. Surely this isn’t what balance means?

Since February 2022, more than 100 Ukrainian cultural figures have been killed in the war. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, by May 2024, over 2,000 cultural institutions had been damaged or destroyed. This includes 711 libraries, 116 museums and galleries, and 37 theatres, cinemas, and concert halls. In May 2024, Russia bombed Factor Druk, the country’s biggest printing house.

When I attended this year’s Kyiv Book Arsenal, Ukraine’s largest literary festival, each panel began with a minute of silence to honor the memory of colleagues killed in the war. All this is in addition to mounting military losses, many of whom are yesterday’s civilians, including journalists and creatives who have either volunteered or been drafted into the army. This is the current state of the Ukrainian creative industry.

To save time for Western editors, publishers, and curators, let me clarify what all of us perpetually frustrated Ukrainians want. We would appreciate it if they turned to actual Ukraine specialists when working on Ukraine-related themes. Not those who suddenly pivoted from specializing in Russia, or who feel entitled to speak authoritatively because they discovered a distant Ukrainian ancestor, or those who have only recently shown interest in Ukraine due to business opportunities in the country’s reconstruction. We would be grateful if they took the time to seek out experts who have been studying Ukraine long before it became fashionable, who understand the country in all its complexity, and who care enough to offer Ukrainians the basic dignity of having their names spelt correctly.

I like to fantasise about a time when editors of top Western periodicals will choose to review books on Ukraine not simply because the country is at war and they feel obliged to cover it now and again, but because these books offer vital insights into democracy, the fight for freedom, or the importance of maintaining unity and a sense of humor in times of crisis. I hope for a day when galleries will host exhibitions of Ukrainian art, not just because it was rescued from a war zone, but because the artists involved provide fresh perspectives on the world.

I also dream that we, the perpetually frustrated Ukraine specialists, will eventually be able to focus on our own scholarship and creativity rather than correcting the mistakes and misleading takes of others. This will happen when cultural institutions, publishing houses, universities, and newspapers acquire in-house experts whose knowledge of Ukraine and the wider region extends beyond Russia.

Dr Olesya Khromeychuk is a historian and writer. She is the author of The Death of a Soldier Told by His Sister (2022). Khromeychuk has written for The New York Times, The New York Review of Books, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, Prospect, and The New Statesman, and has delivered a TED talk on What the World Can Learn From Ukraine’s Fight for Democracy. She has taught the history of East-Central Europe at several British universities and is currently the Director of the Ukrainian Institute London.

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Iraq attempted to modify this law as early as the 1960s, with repeated attempts throughout the decades since. In 2014, following the electoral victory of the State of Law coalition—composed of conservative Islamist parties—the Iraqi parliament made another attempt to amend the PSL to a religious-based framework. This proposed change would have allowed religious sects to govern marriage, divorce, and inheritance according to their interpretations. The proposal faced significant controversy and opposition from civil society groups, women’s organizations, and international bodies at the time.

Another unsuccessful attempt was made in 2017, with one more bid now in August. This latest proposal appears to have broader political support than its predecessors and may have a higher chance of passing, despite a significant outcry from civil society groups.

What does the new amendment propose?

Iraq has one of the highest rates of underage marriage in the world, with 7 percent of girls married by fifteen years old. Rates of child marriage have been on the rise, with 28 percent of girls in Iraq married before the legal age of eighteen. Additionally, 22 percent of unregistered marriages in Iraq involve girls below the age of fourteen, with many exploiting loopholes in the legal system.

Unregistered marriages are not legally recorded in the court but are conducted through religious or tribal authorities. The state does not recognize these marriages, but they are a common practice due to the diverse religious communities in the country. These unregistered marriages prevent girls from accessing civil rights, such as inheritance and child custody, leaving them vulnerable and without legal protection. Without official documentation, women and children are at higher risk of exploitation, abuse, and neglect, with limited options for seeking justice. The lack of legal recognition also means women have little access to financial support or alimony in the event of divorce, further entrenching gender inequality and perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependency.

In rural areas, girls are often forced into marriages before reaching the legal age by bypassing official registration in the courts. In regions like the Nineveh governorate, this loophole is frequently exploited, especially in communities where child marriage is culturally normalized. Moreover, some religious and tribal authorities have been known to conduct marriages for even younger girls, sometimes those as young as twelve or thirteen, under religious or customary laws that do not align with the national legislation currently in place.

The new amendment to the PSL would allow families to choose whether to handle marriage according to the current 1959 law or according to sectarian interpretations. If a family opts for a sectarian interpretation, they will have to choose between the Sunni and Shia legal systems. This raises significant concerns, as different religious interpretations vary widely, and delegating such authority to religious law could have severe consequences.

Under the proposed changes, following Islamic legal systems could potentially legitimize child marriage below the current legal age of eighteen years old. If submitted, the amendment would still require a vote in parliament. Given that the parliament is dominated by conservative Islamist parties, the amendment is very likely to pass.

Another major concern is that this amendment could prompt non-Muslim Iraqis, such as Yezidis, Christians, and other minorities, to advocate for their own separate legal systems, further fragmenting the country’s legal framework. This could lead to increased sectarian divisions in a nation still striving to recover from the effects of past sectarian conflicts.

What happens if the law passes?

If the law passes, its implementation will be suspended for six months, allowing for the drafting and agreement of the Shia and Sunni legal codes. During this period, legal experts, religious authorities, and lawmakers will collaborate to establish frameworks for regulating marriages according to each sect’s interpretations.

If enacted, the new PSL could pave the way for further modifications that deepen sectarian divides and move the country further away from a unified legal system. The potential for additional sectarian-driven legal changes could exacerbate existing tensions and hinder efforts to achieve national cohesion and stability.

Passing this amendment would be an especially troubling step backward in protecting children’s rights and gender equality. Legalizing child marriage for girls as young as nine not only jeopardizes the well-being of countless girls and boys but also threatens to undermine Iraq’s progress toward a more just and equitable society.

Nibras Basitkey is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

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Palkar on the role of the Indian diaspora in India-US ties

Srujan Palkar — Wed, 04 Sep 2024 21:11:00 +0000

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Key Ukrainian front line city evacuates as Russian offensive gains pace

Maria Avdeeva — Sun, 01 Sep 2024 13:42:07 +0000

Evacuation efforts are currently accelerating in eastern Ukraine’s Pokrovsk as the Russian military draws closer. Residents are fleeing amid fears their hometown will soon become the latest in a growing list of Ukrainian cities reduced to rubble by Putin’s invading army.

Pokrovsk has long been an important Russian objective. Located on a crucial road connecting eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk province with neighboring Dnipro region, the city serves as a key logistical hub for the Ukrainian military. Russian troops have been steadily moving toward Pokrovsk for some months as Vladimir Putin seeks to consolidate his grip on the surrounding area. If the strategically important city falls, it will undermine Ukraine’s defenses while potentially serving as a gateway for further Russian gains.

Ukraine’s leaders are well aware of the stakes but have so far been unable to stop the Russian offensive. There has been considerable speculation that the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk region was primarily intended to ease the pressure on Pokrovsk by forcing the Kremlin to redeploy forces. If this was the plan, it has not yet succeeded. Instead, the Russian army appears to be concentrating more troops for the push toward Pokrovsk, and is advancing with increasing speed.

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With the front lines of the war now less than ten kilometers from the city, Pokrovsk residents find themselves confronted by the same nightmare scenarios and impossible choices experienced by huge numbers of Ukrainians since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion two and a half years ago. The mandatory evacuation of families with children has been ordered, while a twenty-hour daily curfew has been imposed. Leaving Pokrovsk means abandoning homes, possessions, family members, and all that is familiar. Staying may well prove deadly.

Prior to the war, Pokrovsk had a population of around sixty thousand. By the final week of August, this figure had dropped to approximately half the prewar total. Thousands continue to leave every day. The roads out of Pokrovsk are jammed with cars loaded up to the roof as families evacuate with whatever they can carry. Local institutions such as hospitals and banks are shutting down and preparing to close. Those who have yet to join the exodus are stockpiling water, groceries, and humanitarian aid, while bracing for the worst.

The process of leaving Pokrovsk can be fraught with danger. Evacuation teams try to keep civilian cars on established routes in a bid to maintain a degree of security, but reports of Russian drone and bombing attacks are growing. The thunder of artillery fire in the distance adds to the sense of urgency and uncertainty.

In the city itself, it is possible to encounter extremes of distress, despair, courage, and compassion at virtually every turn. On Samarska Street, half the houses now stand empty. When I visited, one elderly lady was in the process of locking up her home while a car packed with her worldly belongings waited outside. There were also signs of daily life as remaining residents bicycled past to get water from a nearby pipe or visit the local store. Some of those leaving remained defiant, insisting their departure was just a temporary measure. Others claimed they would stay and placed their hopes in Ukraine’s ability to defend the city.

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Ukrainian and international volunteers are providing vital support for those seeking to evacuate, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly. These volunteers in many ways capture the indomitable spirit of wartime Ukraine and the sense of solidarity that has enabled the country to keep functioning despite the stunning violence and trauma of Russia’s invasion.

Pokrovsk railway station is one of the busiest places in the city, buzzing with activity and emotion as people wait to board evacuation trains. Railway workers wearing body armor guide passengers to different carriages based on their final destinations throughout Ukraine.

Some are preparing to go further and plan cross the border into the EU. One evacuee, who was traveling with her two children, told me she was heading to Germany and did not know what the future would hold. She was leaving Pokrovsk without her mother and grandmother, who insisted on remaining in their family home despite the rapidly approaching danger.

The harrowing and heroic scenes that are currently unfolding in Pokrovsk have already been replayed in countless Ukrainian towns and cities since February 2022. Every time the Russian army advances, ordinary Ukrainians find themselves forced to make life-changing decisions in incredibly stressful circumstances, often while having to rely on the kindness of strangers in order to survive.

This barely imaginable reality has now reached Pokrovsk. As the city prepares for the anticipated Russian onslaught, local residents are displaying the kind of remarkable resilience that has become a symbol of life in wartime Ukraine. Their desperate plight is a reminder that unless Russia is stopped, millions more will face a similar fate.

Maria Avdeeva is a Kharkiv-based Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Algeria has never seen a smooth transfer of power. It won’t in this election, either.

Andrew G. Farrand — Fri, 30 Aug 2024 16:03:44 +0000

Algeria will hold a presidential election on September 7, in which incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune will face off against two weak challengers.

Tebboune was first elected in a controversial 2019 poll organized against the backdrop of the Hirak, a mass popular uprising demanding new leadership. The call for transition was a direct challenge to the country’s reigning political order—the shadowy cabal of military and political elites that Algerians refer to as “le pouvoir” (the power).

Five years later, those popular demands for new leadership have been addressed only superficially. Le pouvoir is still in place.

Nonetheless, next month, Tebboune is all but certain to win reelection to a second five-year term, disappointing the many Algerians who long for fresh faces and fresh thinking in the country’s leadership.

Broken handovers

In its sixty-two-year modern history, Algeria has never witnessed a smooth transfer of power from one president to another.

The country’s first post-independence president was deposed in a military coup after just three years in office. The coup leader, Houari Boumediene, ruled with an iron grip for more than a decade, entrenching a system of military rule with a thin civilian façade that has endured ever since. He would have reigned longer but for an obscure illness that claimed his life in 1978, sparking rumors of foul play.

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His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, elected in 1979, ruled until an oil price slump obliged the state to curtail social spending, provoking a crisis. His solution, a hasty political opening, nearly delivered the country to an extremist Islamist party. To prevent that outcome, the army seized power in 1992, triggering a civil war.

In search of a figurehead, the military tapped independence hero Mohamed Boudiaf—but soon regretted its choice when he launched ambitious anti-corruption and reform campaigns that threatened its interests. After just five months in office, Boudiaf was assassinated on live television by his own bodyguard—with signs pointing to the military’s involvement.

The army’s chosen replacement soon had his own falling out with the generals. So, too, did his successor, Liamine Zeroual, who resigned unexpectedly in 1998, complaining of undue influence from the military.

The following year, the army’s hand-picked candidate, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, won an election intended to turn the page on Algeria’s “dark decade.” He was reelected three times and, despite being incapacitated by poor health, remained le pouvoir’s default pick in 2019.

The imposition of an infirm and invisible president for a fifth term struck a chord of indignity for many Algerians. Just days after Bouteflika’s candidacy was announced, peaceful mass protests erupted nationwide.

Following five weeks of sustained demonstrations, the military signaled that it no longer backed the president. Two days later, on April 2, 2019, Bouteflika resigned. Arrests of many of his cronies soon followed.

The Hirak had coalesced around a blanket call for transition—the slogan “Yetnehaw gaa” (“Get them all out”). But here, it fractured. Some had sought new leaders rather than new institutions. The ouster of the sitting president and his corrupt entourage was enough for them. It also marked a symbolic passing of the torch from the long-ruling independence generation.

But other protesters sought a more fundamental reset of Algeria’s political system: an inclusive national transition process, a new constitution, and clearing of the political deck. Some even dared to demand an end to the long tradition of de facto military rule, which had seen every one of Algeria’s post-independence leaders drawn from the ranks of liberation heroes while the army lurked behind every president, steering decisions to maintain its authority.

After Bouteflika resigned, those military leaders rejected protesters’ calls for fundamental change and instead rushed to elections.

Tebboune, a former regional governor, housing minister, and failed prime minister—who holds the distinction of being Algeria’s shortest-serving premier, lasting less than three months in 2017—emerged as the army’s anointed pick in the controversial polls, which protesters boycotted. He was elected amid record-low turnout.

“The new Algeria”

During his five years as president, Tebboune has built a checkered legacy.

Just months after his inauguration, the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the country’s healthcare system. Meanwhile, Tebboune fled to Germany for treatment when he contracted the virus.

The Ukraine war saved his fortunes. As Europe scrambled to secure alternatives to Russian energy, demand for Algerian oil and gas soared. European leaders flocked to Algiers to sign new energy deals, bringing an influx of cash.

Tebboune used this windfall to buy support and compensate for his limited electoral legitimacy. He more than doubled the military’s budget (from $10 billion in 2022 to nearly $22 billion today), expanded social spending, and shelved planned subsidy cuts. But he struggled to rein in inflation and failed to meet his own export growth targets.

At the same time, he clamped down on public freedoms to smother the Hirak and prevent its return. He snuffed out the last protests, amended the penal code to make it easier to arrest dissidents on political charges, imprisoned journalists, shuttered unfavorable media outlets, and dissolved the country’s leading human rights organizations. He also passed a new constitution that further reinforced presidential powers.

These measures deepened a long-standing dichotomy. Today, those content to keep their heads down and mouths shut, and to accept some limited role in the state-dominated economy, stick around and do as they’re told. Meanwhile, more ambitious, free-thinking Algerians chafe at the restraints, with many ultimately fleeing abroad or landing behind bars.

On foreign policy, Tebboune failed to leverage Algeria’s newfound popularity to advance key foreign policy priorities—gaining admittance to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) coalition in 2023, protecting the Palestinians from Israeli aggression, defending Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, or maintaining Algeria’s sphere of influence in the Sahel.

The election

Tebboune’s record offers plenty of reasons why Algerians might want to vote him out of office. But this election offers little hope for a transition of power.

Every national institution of consequence has been coopted and pressed into service as an arm of Tebboune’s campaign, including the former ruling National Liberation Front and its allied parties; national organizations of women and veterans; and national councils of youth and civil society established by Tebboune.

Anyone who could threaten Tebboune’s reelection chances has already been sidelined. Former Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra was pushed into a United Nations envoy post abroad, General Ali Ghediri’s bogus prison sentence was extended, leftist firebrand Karim Tabbou is confined to his neighborhood and barred from politics, former candidate Rachid Nekkaz fled to the United States, and journalist Ihsane El Kadi languishes in prison. Others announced early retirements from politics to avoid similar fates. Algeria’s leading Islamist party, the Movement of a Society of Peace (MSP), blocked its outgoing president, Abderrezak Makri, from running in what appeared to be an orchestrated deal with le pouvoir.

Despite the risks, more than thirty candidates hoped to challenge Tebboune. Ultimately, authorities approved only two, while pursuing fraud charges against several others over their candidate paperwork.

The two approved contenders—Abdelaali Hassani Cherif, the Islamist who succeeded Makri as MSP president last year, and Youcef Aouchiche, the young leader of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS)—each have a solid campaign machine but will struggle to attract support beyond their limited electoral bases. Tebboune is an old bureaucrat in a young country, but handouts and the trappings of office have enabled him to rally a sizable core of supporters.

In sum, Tebboune is nearly certain to win an overwhelming majority on the first vote, eliminating the need for a second round.

Confident of victory, his campaign is concentrated on boosting participation beyond the 39.9 percent officially reported in 2019, having seen how that limited participation has sapped his legitimacy.

There is little reason to believe Tebboune will make dramatic gains on that score. The dissatisfaction with the ruling elite and their refusal to share power that pushed Algerians into the streets in 2019 remain largely unaddressed. A weak slate of alternative candidates and the near certainty of Tebboune’s victory will also do little to inspire participation. Algerians aren’t likely to see their first normal handover of power in 2024—le pouvoir won’t let them.

Andrew G. Farrand is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and author of The Algerian Dream.

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Zaaimi quoted in Deutsche Welle on Morocco’s strategy on the Western Sahara

Atlantic Council — Mon, 26 Aug 2024 13:37:40 +0000

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Azadah Raz Mohammad joins NPR to discuss Taliban codes on men and women’s dress

Atlantic Council — Sat, 24 Aug 2024 14:30:26 +0000

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Ukraine’s EU accession hinges on stronger defense and consolidated reforms

Zachary Popovich — Thu, 22 Aug 2024 15:27:36 +0000

Ukraine officially began accession talks with the European Union on June 25. While these negotiations offer hope for a nation that has long sought more comprehensive integration with European political and economic structures, they will also be qualified by contemporary security and political considerations. To achieve EU accession, Ukraine must strengthen its defense capabilities, execute administrative reforms within its judiciary, and implement a multi-sector approach to corruption.

Future administrative, judicial, and institutional reforms necessary for EU integration depend above all on Ukraine’s ability to secure its sovereignty and defend its territory. At the June 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, “United in defense, united in recovery, stronger together” was a rallying cry and call to action. Ukrainian and European stakeholders outlined Ukraine’s needs for air defense systems necessary to protect the country’s critical civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine must also build upon recent defense reforms to expand transparency and strengthen efficiency throughout its procurement and production system. In June 2023, Ukraine’s state-owned defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom was transformed into a joint-stock venture as Ukrainian Defense Industries (UDI). It introduced institutional reforms to create a new corporate structure reflecting European standards. Direct engagement with EU representatives has helped Ukraine adapt its administrative architecture while creating new production and procurement initiatives with Ukrainian agencies.

These new relationships have grown exponentially over the past year and feature plans to produce equipment and ammunition in Ukraine. In July, German defense firm Rheinmetall announced that it had received a request from the Ukrainian government to open an ammunition factory in Ukraine. In the same month, UDI signed an agreement with US defense company Northrop Grumman to jointly produce NATO-standard, medium-caliber munitions. Additional joint-venture initiatives with European states and individual companies can help Ukraine obtain the resources to halt Russian territorial advances and strengthen its long-term security capabilities.

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While these reforms will help overcome material deficits, Ukraine must also address corruption, which diminishes the country’s administrative capacities and erodes international appetite to support Ukraine. In 2023, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker justified his reserved attitude toward Ukraine’s EU integration by identifying Kyiv’s corruption challenges, stating, “Despite its efforts, it is not ready for accession; it needs massive internal reform processes.”

President Zelenskyy’s administration has increased efforts to remove corrupt defense officials and accomplices. In 2024, the Ukrainian Security Service opened investigations into five public officials who allegedly created fraudulent ammunition procurement contracts valued at $40 million. In 2023, Ukraine’s then Minister of Defense, Oleksii Reznikov, resigned after investigative journalists uncovered numerous mismanaged procurement contracts resulting in overpriced personnel equipment, food supplies, and clothing.

Ukraine’s battle with corruption transcends the defense sector and needs to be conducted with equal effectiveness throughout its public institutions. Looking ahead, the country’s ability to remove corrupt officials and the structures that conceal their relationships will be critical for its EU accession process.

Ukraine has taken concrete steps before and since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion to improve public accountability and transparency. As a result of Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Kyiv formed multiple agencies charged with enforcing anti-corruption laws and implementing preventative measures.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) is now Ukraine’s primary anti-corruption law enforcement agency investigating high-level cases. Since its inception in 2015, NABU has brought over 1,000 cases to court implicating high-profile public officials including a Ukrainian Supreme Court Justice, a member of parliament, and an oligarch. By empowering this and other anti-corruption agencies, Ukraine has made steady progress in removing corruption as an impediment to joining the EU.

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Political action reforming Ukraine’s judiciary is necessary to align Ukraine’s legal structures with European standards and safeguard progress in eradicating corruption. Specifically, legislation is needed to address issues relating to the selection and regulation of judges and public prosecutors.

So far, Ukraine has been responsive to domestic and international calls for greater action. In November 2022, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) released a report outlining recommendations for Ukraine to change the procedure for selecting judges for the Constitutional Court. By August 2023, Kyiv enacted legislation outlining merit-based procedures to select justice candidates for the court. This legislation also established an Advisory Group of Experts to serve as a pre-selection body of members appointed by Ukraine’s President, the Council of Judges, and international organizations. While this process will help reduce the political control of judicial leaders, similar legislation should be replicated to select public prosecutors.

Multiple semi-public agencies are responsible for appointing and regulating public prosecutors. The National Conference of Prosecutors holds considerable influence in appointing some of the members of other prosecution service governance bodies, including the Council of Prosecutors and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). Staff supporting the Council of Prosecutors are unpaid and serve part-time, while members of the QDCP comprise eleven appointed representatives selected by academic leaders and public interest groups.

Even though the Council of Prosecutors and the QDCP are financed by Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General, the existing system of selecting, administering, and regulating prosecutors diminishes Ukraine’s ability to service legal cases and potentially gives power to external interest groups. Instead, Ukraine can empower the Office of the Prosecutor General, granting them financial and administrative authority rather than relying on the discretion of lobbyists and private stakeholders.

During an October 2023 meeting of EU foreign ministers in Kyiv, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “The future of Ukraine lies in the European Union. In our community of freedom, which will stretch from Lisbon to Luhansk.” Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has committed to securing a democratic future alongside its European neighbors. This goal is now within reach. By strengthening its defense capabilities and taking a multi-sector approach to eradicating corruption, Ukraine can achieve the European future it has long sought and rightfully deserves.

Zachary Popovich is Young Professionals in Foreign Policy’s Rising Expert on Eastern Europe. He holds a master’s degree in public administration from James Madison University.

This intimate portrayal also serves as a crucial window for Western policymakers, providing insight into the lives of those in the region who bear the brunt of their policy decisions. Often treated as collateral damage or mere casualties in the pursuit of a greater good, the populace—be it in Iraq, Gaza, or Sudan—deserves to be better understood to shape policies with human rights in mind.

—Manal Fatima is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

‘Killing a King: The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the Remaking of Israel’ by Dan Ephron

In Killing a King, Dan Ephron recounts the two years between the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington and the murder of Yitzhak Rabin on a Tel Aviv street, juxtaposing the Israeli prime minister’s final acts with those of his murderer, Yigal Amir. Rabin’s murder came at a time of intense internal political debate in Israel over its future relationship with Palestine, feeding into existing divisions and making it a highly consequential moment in the country’s history. This retelling by Ephron helps explain the divisions in Israel that led to that fateful moment and how they linger today.

—David Maloney is the program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

‘Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books’ by Azar Nafisi

Reading Lolita in Tehran is an intimate and captivating look through Azar Nafisi’s lived experiences of revolutionary Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the formation of a clandestine book club, and eventual emigration. The memoir also delves into historical reversals, the loss of rights, and the plight of women across the country. Despite receiving its fair share of criticism since its 2003 publication, the book is arguably more relevant today, two years on from the beginning of the Women, Life, Freedom movement, offering readers an account of the early period of the Islamic Republic and the legacy of Iranian women’s struggles to regain the freedoms lost. And for those who love literature, the author—a professor of Western literature—delves deep into some of her favorite writers, including Vladimir Nabokov, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Jane Austen, and Henry James.

—Masoud Mostajabi is a deputy director of the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘Syrian Dust: Reporting from the Heart of the War’ by Francesca Borri

A raw and powerful account of the Syrian war by Italian correspondent Francesa Borri, Syrian Dust provides a compelling personal account of events in Aleppo and surrounding areas from the chemical attacks of August 2013 through the following months. Borri hides with dozens of terrified civilians, scavenges to survive, meets with officials, observes the development and fracturing of warring parties, and provides a human lens for an inhumane time. Syrian Dust provides a view from inside the conflict itself—focusing on the human realities for a conflict and region so often discussed from 30,000 feet.

—Emilia Pierce is the deputy director of operation and finance for the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

‘The Sheltering Sky’ by Paul Bowles

My favorite read this Summer (thus far) has been The Sheltering Sky by Paul Bowles. While written over seventy years ago, its themes, structure, and language seem surprisingly contemporary. The story follows a young American couple and their third-wheel friend who initially appear to be stereotypical wealthy “travelers, not tourists,” the kind of self-regarding intellectuals that pride themselves on their cultural openness but still disparage any local accommodations that don’t meet their standards. Over time, however, it becomes clear that exploring foreign lands is a convenient way for each to avoid their responsibilities, including to each other, much less confront their underlying alienation. As they travel through French-controlled North Africa—mainly Algeria—moving farther into the continent, their repeated efforts to escape their existence into environments that they don’t understand produces catastrophic results.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘No One Prayed Over Their Graves: A Novel’ by Khaled Khalifa

No One Prayed Over Their Graves was the last novel by Syrian writer and poet Khaled Khalifa before passing away in Damascus in 2023. The author is the Victor Hugo of the Arab World, known for his poignant realism, his vivid depiction of “Les Misérables” of subaltern Syria, and his criticism of the Baathist regime. The novel recounts the story of Christian and Muslim friends, Hanna and Zakariya, from a village near Aleppo in 1907 and how their lives were altered after a massive flood leveled their homes, businesses, and places of worship, and took the lives of their loved ones. The book that was long-listed for the 2023 National Book Award for Translated Literature is also a sweeping tale of religious diversity, coming of age, and class mobility in the hubbub of Aleppine society at the turn of the twentieth century. This novel was a particularly emotional read for me, as Khaled was a personal friend, and a living witness of the socio-political hardships and transformations in modern-day Syria that he immortalized in lush and elastic storytelling in novels like In Praise of Hatred, No Knives in the Kitchens of This City, or Death Is Hard Work.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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Dispatch from the Paris Olympics: The African sports movement is about to take off, if leaders help fuel it

Rama Yade — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:37:25 +0000

PARIS—As I watch the thirty-eighth Olympic Games unfold in Paris, I’m paying particular attention to the nearly one thousand African athletes participating in the competition, a group that is about 20 percent larger than it was at the Tokyo Olympics three years ago.

While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

A La Défense Arena, pleine comme un œuf, pour les épreuves de natation !!#Paris2024 #ThePlaceToBe pic.twitter.com/TmjTrpRViG
— Rama Yade (@ramayade) August 1, 2024

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027.

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

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Can citizens’ assemblies help counter a rising populist tide in the West?

Moritz Ludwig and Joely Virzi — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 13:28:02 +0000

Don’t be fooled by recent leftist and centrist electoral wins in France and the United Kingdom—the strength of right-wing populism is still a central through line for liberal democracies around the world. While each populist party carries its own national characteristics, a common driver of their recent increase in support has been the rejection of established political parties and criticism of much of the political, economic, and social order that has underpinned the West since the end of the Cold War. There has been much head-scratching and pontificating about what causes populism to take hold and how center-left and center-right politicians should respond.

Established political parties are now taking steps to win back support. Policymakers around the world should take note of these efforts, such as the use of citizens’ assemblies in Germany, as one way to counter this polarizing environment and rebuild trust in democratic systems.

Growing disillusionment and persistent divides

Germany is a compelling case study for the rise of populist ideology. Nearly thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East-West divide in the country persists. To this day, people in eastern Germany often face fewer economic opportunities, underrepresentation in elite professions, power imbalances, and an aging population. As recently as 2019, 60 percent of Germans in the east perceived themselves as second-class citizens. While on the rise throughout Germany, it is in large part for these reasons that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party resonates in the eastern part of the country, in states such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Elections in all three in September see the AfD polling in first place.

The AfD was formed in 2013 in reaction to eurozone bailouts for other countries, but the 2015 refugee crisis transformed its platform into the extreme one it has today. When nearly one million migrants entered Germany, a majority of citizens called for an immigration cap. The AfD, weaponizing both economic and social grievances, built itself on and instigated this cultural discontent. The party trademarked “Islam does not belong to Germany” in its 2016 manifesto, and has taken aim at costly climate action to spur discontent with the center and fuel its own base. This approach propelled the AfD to ninety-two opposition seats in the Bundestag in 2017, and in the years since it has established itself as a formidable populist alternative to Germany’s traditional parties closer to the political center.

The AfD’s 2024 manifesto paints a worrying picture of its vision for Germany. The AfD proposes to reduce the net number of annual immigrants to zero and oppose all major climate actions, arguing such government encroachments threaten to unravel the cultural fabric and stability of German society. These extreme stances threaten to endanger the unity of Germany and could hamper international cooperation. The party is largely Euroskeptic, anti-American, and pro-Russian, which drives its urge to scale back on Ukraine aid. Notably, the far-right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament kicked out the AfD in May of this year, following scandals surrounding its extreme statements and potential connections to China and Russia.

Nevertheless, the party remains relatively popular in Germany. It scored second among German parties in the European Parliament elections in June and could well secure more than a quarter of seats in state elections this fall. The AfD’s success has inspired other upstart parties on the left. The newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), for example, is expected to secure around 20 percent of seats across the three states, appealing to voters that are dissatisfied with the state of Germany’s economy and support for Ukraine.

The populist phenomenon is not exclusive to Germany. It is symptomatic of a general trend in the West. From gains in the European Parliament to momentum heading into the US presidential election, populism does not bode well for the liberal international order, especially at a time when intensifying global challenges demand collective solutions.

The long road to rebuilding trust

One strategy to counter illiberal tendencies and reengage citizens is the establishment of citizens’ assemblies: representative groups of randomly selected constituents that develop policy recommendations on a given issue based on expert briefings and discussions. The assemblies can be implemented at all political levels.

Citizens’ assemblies have been tried before. In various forms, they have been tested by several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. They all share the goals of bringing participatory democracy to the public and reconnecting with voters who have lost trust in democracy.

These citizens’ assemblies have led to big changes before. In Ireland, the successful 2018 referendum to remove the Eighth Amendment banning most abortions stemmed from a recommendation from a ninety-nine-person-strong citizens’ assembly and helped end years of deadlock over the issue. A similar Convention on the Constitution in the country helped lead the way to the 2015 referendum on marriage equality.

In Germany, ten nationwide citizens’ assemblies have been convened since 2019, covering topics such as “Germany’s role in the world,” “climate action,” and “countering disinformation.” While the practical policy proposals are not binding, they do provide policymakers with valuable insights on current positions, possible compromises, and existing sticking points. Within just five years, the German citizens’ assemblies have grown from being independently organized by a nonprofit to being implemented by the Bundestag—an indication of the growing hope and trust politicians are placing on these fora.

The German approach isn’t perfect. Commentators have identified several challenges facing Germany’s citizens’ assemblies, including the representative selection of participants, the neutrality of moderators and experts, the optimal format and institutionalization of the assemblies, and the effect on participants and nonparticipating citizens.

And in truth, so far, it is too soon to see the impact of these assemblies in Germany. Mostly experimental in design, few concrete recommendations were implemented by policymakers. Some people believe the concept’s success hinges on the assembly on nutrition, food labeling, and food waste, the first citizens’ assembly instituted directly by the German Bundestag, which met in January 2024. The outcomes of this assembly included recommendations on school lunches and new regulations on energy drinks.

The participatory idea behind citizens’ assemblies cannot replace the parliamentary process. To avoid conflicts of legitimacy between participatory and representative democracy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation recommends that parliaments initiate and mandate the process. It is crucial that the fora are not influenced externally and provide some flexibility regarding approach and outcome. They cannot be expected to arrive at predetermined conclusions and, depending on topic, composition, and mandate, every citizens’ assembly will be unique. To sustainably strengthen democracy and rebuild trust in political processes, it is important to complement the assembly with a broader public campaign. Linking the citizens’ assemblies with parliamentary institutions through the involvement of parliamentarians in the expert briefings could further improve the current system. Alternatively, an assembly could be followed by a referendum, giving citizens beyond those randomly chosen participatory power.

No easy fixes

Citizens’ assemblies alone are not sufficient to head off the rise of populists in Germany anytime soon: The AfD and BSW parties, for example, will very likely make gains in the eastern German elections this fall. Instead, the assemblies should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address the root causes of voter dissatisfaction.

It is imperative to see citizens’ assemblies for what they are. Policymakers should not expect a panacea for polarization. Instead, the fora are a piece of a bigger puzzle. Implementing citizens’ assemblies in tandem with regional structural policies can start the process of rebuilding trust in government. Until more citizens feel like they have a real voice in politics, the seeds of populism will likely continue to find fertile ground—in Germany, in the United States, and beyond.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Pavia in Haaretz: An Increasingly Dictatorial, Antisemitic President Threatens Tunisia’s Jews

Atlantic Council — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 15:57:54 +0000

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The Mattei Plan is an opportunity for North Africa

Karim Mezran — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 19:59:24 +0000

The Mattei Plan, announced in October 2022 by new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni as an innovative vision that the government of Italy would exercise in its relationship with Africa and African countries, has immediately taken center stage in the European political debate. The Mattei Plan is much more than an economic development plan, and it could become the main tool for defusing dangerous crises in Africa, particularly in North Africa. It has a strong economic component, consisting of collaboration with other Western partners in African countries if they agree to fully cooperate with the proposal. In essence, the Italian prime minister’s plan makes the donor country act as an equal partner in every step of any project undertaken in any African country.

The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

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The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship

Alesia Rudnik — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:48:25 +0000

At the beginning of July, I was one of twenty internationally-based Belarusian academics, analysts, and journalists to be sentenced in absentia by a court in Minsk on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and taking part in an extremist group.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Steven Moore — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:50:38 +0000

On June 29, more than eight hundred participants from fifteen countries representing a dozen different religious denominations gathered in the historic heart of Kyiv for Ukraine’s annual National Prayer Breakfast. The day before the breakfast, two Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, Father Ivan Levytsky and Father Bohdan Geleta, had been released from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange brokered by the Vatican Diplomatic Corps. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the priests back to Ukraine in a speech that drew tears.

I was honored to be seated close to the two freed holy men. Their features were tight and drawn from months of captivity and starvation, but this only served to accentuate the smiles on their faces from being able to once again worship without threat of Russian violence. Their strength and courage permeated the room like incense.

The Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast, organized by Ukrainian evangelical Christian leader Pavlo Unguryan, first emerged from the regional prayer breakfast movement in Ukraine almost twenty years ago. The late June event was Ukraine’s tenth national prayer breakfast and notably, the first held under the auspices of the Office of the President. This presidential backing reflects the importance attached to religious freedom in Ukraine’s fight for national survival.

A former member of the Ukrainian Parliament from Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast organizer Unguryan has been building bridges between the American and Ukrainian evangelical communities for more than a decade. His relationships with key members of the US Congress reportedly helped provide the spiritual and emotional connection that convinced many Republicans to vote for a major new Ukraine aid package in April 2024. US officials were among the participants at this year’s breakfast in Kyiv, with a series of video addresses from members of Congress including Speaker Mike Johnson along with senators Richard Blumenthal and James Lankford.

The event was held in Kyiv’s Mystetskyi Arsenal, a cavernous former munitions plant located across the street from the one thousand year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The list of attendees reflected the diversity of religious belief in today’s Ukraine. At one table close to mine, a Japanese Buddhist monk broke bread with Crimean Tatar Muslims during a service led by an evangelical Protestant, with prayers offered in Hebrew by Ukraine’s chief rabbi.

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Ukraine’s National Prayer Breakfast represents an important reality check to Russian propaganda, which seeks to accuse the Ukrainian authorities of engaging in religious persecution. In fact, it is the Russian Orthodox Church itself that has declared a “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, has offered spiritual justification for the current invasion, and has said that Russians who die while fighting in Ukraine will have all their sins washed away.

Kirill has allies in today’s Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is historically the local Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and remains the second largest Orthodox denomination in the country in terms of parishioners. Despite some effort to distance itself from the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC remains closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church and is staffed with clergy who have spent their entire careers reporting to Moscow. Around one hundred members of the UOC clergy are currently in prison or awaiting trial for a range of national security-related offenses including actively aiding the Russian military.

Recent research and polling data indicates that large numbers of former adherents are now leaving the UOC, while as many as eight-five percent of Ukrainians want their government to take action against the Russian-linked Church. However, while the Ukrainian authorities attempt to address this complex national security challenge, Kremlin-friendly public figures in the US such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, and Marjorie Taylor Greene have accused Ukraine of persecuting Christians. A team of lobbyists, allegedly funded by a prominent pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch, is currently canvassing Capitol Hill giving this message to members of Congress.

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Claims of religious persecution by the Ukrainian authorities are not only deliberately misleading; they also serve to obscure the very real crimes being committed against Ukraine’s Christian communities by Russian occupation forces. In areas of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, virtually all churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church have been forced out. Even more alarmingly, a significant number of Christian community leaders have been abducted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

The details of Russia’s alleged crimes are often shocking. Baptist children’s pastor Azat Azatyan says Russians attached electrical wires to his genitals. In many cases, Russian Orthodox Church clergy are directly implicated. Evangelical pastor Viktor Cherniiavskyi claims to have been tortured with a taser while a Russian Orthodox priest tried to cast demons out of him. His alleged crime? Being an evangelical Christian.

International awareness of Russia’s hard line campaign against religious freedom in occupied regions of Ukraine is now finally growing. This is shaping attitudes among Christians toward the Russian invasion. While waves of Russian propaganda succeeded in sowing doubt among some Republicans during 2023, recent research has found that seventy percent of Republicans who identity as evangelical Christians are more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learn of Russia’s oppressive policies against Christians in occupied Ukrainian regions.

The Kremlin is openly using religion to further the Russian war effort. The Russian Orthodox Church routinely portrays the invasion of Ukraine in religious terms, while members of the ROC clergy promote the war as a sacred mission. Throughout occupied Ukraine, all other Christian denominations are prevented from operating, with individual community leaders at risk of being detained or worse.

In stark contrast, the recent Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast in Kyiv highlighted the Ukrainian government’s commitment to values of religious tolerance and diversity. This is the pluralistic Ukraine that millions of Ukrainians are now struggling to defend. They deserve the support of everyone who values freedom of religion.

Steven Moore is the Founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project.

Investing in Iraq’s education will contribute to its revival

Honar Issa — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 17:16:08 +0000

Despite its rich tradition as a cradle of learning dating back to ancient Mesopotamia, and a leading educational system in the Middle East by the mid-twentieth century, Iraq’s educational landscape has faced significant challenges. The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf War, and subsequent international sanctions severely damaged educational infrastructure and funding, leading to a decline in quality and accessibility.

The 2003 US-led invasion, which led to the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein, presented an opportunity to rebuild Iraq’s educational system. While there were initial efforts to revitalize schools and universities, the ongoing violence and political instability hindered sustained progress. Corruption, sectarian strife, and the absence of coherent education policies exacerbated the challenges. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) severely disrupted the educational system in areas under its control. Despite these hurdles, there were pockets of progress, particularly in the autonomous Kurdistan region, which began to chart its course for educational reform.

Today, with 60 percent of Iraqis under the age of twenty-five, the nation’s education system is at a critical juncture. The young population represents both a tremendous opportunity and a daunting challenge. High unemployment rates and inadequate educational facilities threaten to undermine the potential of youth contributing to the country’s rebuilding efforts. The lack of investment in modern educational infrastructure and the disconnect between educational outcomes and labor-market needs are stark.

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For instance, according to a 2021 IREX report, only 22 percent of university graduates find jobs in their field of study within three months of graduating. This highlights the critical need for a more responsive education system that meets the market’s needs. According to the World Bank, 2 million Iraqi children are deprived of education, presenting a significant challenge for their future prospects. In addition, literacy rates remain alarmingly low, especially among women.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has recognized the urgency of addressing these issues. The cabinet has developed Vision 2030, which prioritizes enhancing and adapting education to support economic diversification. This unprecedented framework aims to align Kurdistan’s educational system with international standards, while fostering a workforce capable of driving economic growth across sectors. A key element of this vision is establishing the Kurdistan Accrediting Association for Education (KAAE), a national accreditation body designed to bridge the educational gap and propel the region into the twenty-first century.

Because standardization can serve as leverage for reform, the KAAE seeks to establish standards to ensure that educational institutions in Kurdistan and Iraq meet rigorous quality-assurance requirements. By promoting best practices and fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement, the KAAE, as a twelve/fifteen-year project, aims to support the government in establishing sound policies for educational quality, making it more relevant to the needs of the economy and society. This initiative is crucial for modernizing Kurdistan’s education system and enabling it to catch up with global advancements, as it is for Iraq and the broader region when used as a model.

Strategic investment in education

Effective implementation of the KAAE’s quality-assurance standards necessitates leveraging the expertise and experience of the international community in building the capacity of academic institutions. The United States and Iraq have a framework agreement that identifies education as a cornerstone of bilateral relations as part of the broader cultural cooperation between the two countries. It is now time to translate this agreement into action. Strengthening this partnership can have far-reaching reverberations beyond education, fostering economic development, political stability, and social cohesion. While the United States has invested significantly in Iraq’s reconstruction, this has been disproportionately allocated to the security sector. According to the Military Times, the United States has spent nearly $2 trillion on military operations in Iraq. Even a fraction of this amount, 1 percent, would have a transformational impact if directed toward educational initiatives.

Investing in Iraq’s education system offers a unique opportunity for the United States to not only support a key ally but also address the root causes of instability in the region. The United States can help build the foundation for a stable and prosperous Iraq by directing resources toward educational reform. This investment would both strengthen US public diplomacy and promote the values of democracy and human rights, which are integral to long-term peace and security. Such support includes establishing partnerships between US schools and universities and their Iraqi counterparts to implement the quality-assurance standards the KAAE sets. These partnerships could focus on building capacity and mentorship, embedding student-centered learning in curricula, and creating continuous assessment and evaluation strategies. Because the Kurdistan region has already established the KAAE, this could serve as a pilot model for Iraq as a whole, with the goal of replicating the body in other parts of Iraq.

Countries like Singapore and South Korea provide valuable lessons in how education can drive national development. Both nations have transformed their economies through substantial investments in education, focusing on skills development and innovation. For example, South Korea’s emphasis on technology and vocational training has made it a global industry leader. Similarly, Singapore’s education system, known for its rigor and focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), has produced a highly skilled workforce that drives the country’s ongoing economic success.

By supporting similar models in Iraq, the United States can help foster an education system that not only equips young Iraqis with the skills and qualifications the local market and economy need, both today and in the long term, but also cultivates critical thinking and innovation. This approach aligns with the US strategy of promoting regional stability through economic development and education.

The role of education in peace and security

Enhancing education in Iraq is not just about economic growth; it is a crucial element of peacebuilding. Education fosters understanding, tolerance, and critical thinking, which are essential for mitigating conflict and promoting social cohesion. A well-educated populace is better equipped to participate in democratic processes and contribute to the nation’s development. By investing in education, Iraq can build a more inclusive society in which young people are empowered to contribute positively to their communities.

For Iraq, education is more than a policy priority; it is a pathway to peace and prosperity. The United States can play a critical role in achieving such prosperity. By leveraging initiatives like the KAAE and drawing on successful global models, Iraq can transform its education system, paving the way for a brighter future. This investment is not just about building schools; it is about building a nation with a capable and empowered citizenry.

The United States and the international community can seize this opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to a stable and prosperous Iraq, promoting a region where education empowers young people as agents of positive change.

Dr. Honar Issa is the secretary of the Board of Trustees at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK). He also serves as chair of the Middle East Peace and Security Forum.

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Syria’s inflated electorate is caused by phantom voters

Vladimir Pran and Maroun Sfeir — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:37:14 +0000

President Bashar al-Assad set July 15 as election day for the 250 seats of the Syrian People’s Assembly held in the areas controlled by his government. As the electoral process unfolds, a series of articles will deconstruct the key elements of Syrian elections and their role in legitimizing Baath Party rule. This series will also conduct a deep dive into the challenges of moving ahead with electoral reform in the United Nations (UN)-facilitated political process. The first article of the series discussed the outline of the election process and its significance, while the second article examined the system of representation, which determines the voting method and how many candidates will be elected from each of the districts.

This article presents the structure of the Syrian electorate: who the voters are, how many voters are there, and why credible projections are so elusive. In theory, the constitution guarantees all Syrian citizens voting rights—with consequential caveats built into the electoral and nationality laws.

Syrian citizens obtain their status through their father, as defined by the Nationality Law of 1969, but cannot obtain it through their mothers. Syrian women also cannot pass citizenship to their husbands. Yet, there are shortcuts to Syrian citizenship—the Syrian interior minister has significant authority to grant citizenship through facilitated or exceptional naturalization processes.

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The Syrian opposition claims the government is altering demographics and voting preferences by granting citizenship to foreigners fighting in the conflict. There are no reliable reports about the number of foreigners granted citizenship since 2011, but the issue is politically significant and Syrians are keenly aware of the Lebanese case. This matter is especially relevant for ethnic Kurds, who have historically been denied their citizenship rights. On the opposite side, the right to vote in assembly elections has been extended to the military since 2016, but this has only fueled suspicions of vote manipulations.

The laws include a few other categories of potentially problematic restrictions, but it is unclear whether they significantly impact the electorate’s structure. For example, those convicted of a “felony or dishonorable misdemeanor or that which shakes public trust” and those “mentally ill in a manner that affects his eligibility” are excluded from the electorate. However, the Syrian diaspora is the largest group of Syrians excluded from the elections. While the diaspora has the right to vote in the presidential election, that right is not extended to the assembly elections. This is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254, which recommends diaspora participation in elections.

If given the right, how many Syrians in the diaspora could vote? For that matter, how many Syrians in total would have the right to vote? Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer that question credibly. The underlying reason for the speculative nature of the electorate’s size is that, despite being legally required to do so, the government does not register voters. Nor does it compile the voter lists. Evidence from previous elections clearly confirms that voter registration is nonexistent. In the 2020 and 2021 elections, there was no voter registration, polling committees did not have a voter list, instead they had blank forms to register voters as they approached the polls. Similarly, there was no evidence of voter-registration activities before this year’s elections.

So, where do the data about voters published by the government come from? According to statements by governmental officials, they come from the civil registry. However, in Syria this cannot be considered an accurate record of citizens. While the Assad regime used the administrative apparatus to control the population, it failed to create an orderly civil registry, even before the conflict. Since the conflict began in 2011, maintenance of the civil registry has been disrupted. Efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to preserve records might be crucial for those who will need to prove their civil status in the future, but these records are not reflected in the current version of the civil registry.

Official voter data are extremely scarce. Historically, the Supreme Judicial Election Commission only publishes overall voter numbers. These are virtually impossible to analyze, as no details are provided, and data are not even broken down by governorate. Governors or governorate-level commissions sometimes provide these randomly, but they are often rounded up by commissions without explanation.

Source: ElectionGuide and statements of the SJEC officials
*The lower number of registered voters in 2016 may be accounted for by the fact that elections did not take place in Raqqa and Idlib provinces, which were controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.

The significant increase in the number of reported registered voters in 2020 is likely due to the change in how the number is calculated. In the pre-2020 elections, the election committees received a preliminary voters list extracted from the civil registry. They would then audit the list by removing and adding voters. Since the 2020 election, that process has been abandoned, and the number of registered voters simply reflects all the civil registry adult records.

When it comes to diaspora voters, the numbers are difficult to crunch. The Syrian population is estimated to range between 24–27 million, with 16–20 million Syrians in the country and 5–6.7 million outside the country. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan alone are hosting more than 5 million Syrian refugees. Using a conservative estimate, the Syrian voting-age population is about 60 percent, which would imply 14–16 million voters in the country and 3–4 million outside the country. That would be within the range of the 18 million voters claimed by the government. However, it is unclear how many live in the government-controlled areas, as the estimate of 9.5 million might not be reliable.

In contrast to the previous election, the government has not issued a single statement about the size of the electorate, no matter how incredible the numbers may be. A comparison of reports from various sources regarding the eight rounds of assembly elections starting in 1990 shows that turnout varies between 50–60 percent. Extrapolating this and applying it to the number of voters who voted in the 2020 elections, in theory, suggests that the total number of voters should not be more than 10 million, which is much smaller than the previously announced 18 million.

Source: ElectionGuide and statements of the SJEC officials

Is it possible that, in the pre-2020 elections, almost half of the Syrian electorate was missing from the voter lists? Or are the post-2020 election figures enormously inflated? The confusion over the true size of the electorate will certainly not be resolved in these elections. The Assad government is not investing in even minimal efforts to sort out the voter registry. If there is ever a chance to hold elections according to the standards set by UNSC Resolution 2254, voter-registration reform will be one of the most technically and logistically challenging aspects. Such reform would need to protect the right of Syrians inside and outside the country to vote, while also infusing a basic transparency standard into the electoral process.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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#BalkansDebrief – Where next for Serbian foreign policy? | A Debrief with Igor Bandovic and Nikola Burazer

sjones — Wed, 03 Jul 2024 14:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

For decades, the United States and Serbia have engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance. Recently, Serbian think tank representatives visited Washington, DC, for critical talks with US policymakers.

Their agenda? Navigating the complexities of Serbia’s democratic health and evolving foreign policy, including unpacking its shifting alliances with Russia and China, and how these relationships impact Serbia’s aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU).

Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Bandovic, Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Nikola Burazer, Program Director at the Center for Contemporary Politics, to discuss their main concerns regarding Serbia’s state of democracy, nationalistic rhetoric, and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What are the top foreign policy and security challenges facing Serbia currently?

The All-Serb Assembly reignited nationalist sentiment across the region. How significant is this, and what potential consequences could it have for Serbia and regional stability?

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Kyiv Pride event highlights changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine

Aleksander Cwalina — Mon, 24 Jun 2024 21:38:28 +0000

On June 16, members of Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community and allies gathered in central Kyiv to celebrate the first Pride March in the Ukrainian capital since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The event highlighted changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine as the country stands defiant against Russia and embraces a European future.

Hundreds of kilometers from Kyiv on the front lines of the war with Russia, the Ukrainian LGBTQI+ community is also present within the ranks of the military among Ukrainians of all ethnic backgrounds and religions defending the country. While calculating the exact number of LGBTQI+ soldiers is challenging, a 2023 article in Britain’s Daily Telegraph estimated that between two and seven percent of serving personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces are members of the LGBTQI+ community.

Some serve openly, sporting symbols such as a unicorn patch below the blue and yellow national colors of Ukraine on their military uniform. In many cases, they do so to demonstrate that, contrary to assertions from Russian propagandists and other opponents, LGBTQI+ Ukrainians are just as willing to defend their country as other Ukrainians.

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The increasing openness in Ukraine toward issues of sexual orientation and identity stands in stark contrast to the deteriorating situation in regions of the country currently under Kremlin control. Throughout occupied Ukraine, the LGBTQI+ community faces the reality of draconian Russian legislation that often prevents them from defending their rights and sets the stage for serious human rights abuses.

According to Nash Svit, a Ukrainian LGBTQI+ organization, these abuses include public humiliation, torture, extortion, and sexual violence. The National LGBTQ Consortium in Ukraine has documented a similarly oppressive atmosphere of increased fear and violence in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and the Crimean peninsula following Russian occupation in 2014.

In Russia itself, LGBTQI+ individuals have long featured in the ever-growing category of scapegoated groups, where they are joined by representatives of the free media, civil society, and the country’s tiny anti-war opposition as proxy targets in the Kremlin’s campaign against the West. Scores of LGBTQI+ Russians have fled the country in recent years, citing a mounting climate of insecurity and oppression. Those who remain face routine discrimination along with threats to their livelihood and personal safety.

In line with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasingly radical anti-Western rhetoric, last year Russia’s Supreme Court declared the “international LGBTQ movement” a terrorist and extremist organization. The Russian authorities have since used this ruling to convict Russians of displaying the rainbow flag, raid LGBTQI+ clubs, and brand LGBTQI+ activists as foreign agents.

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The oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Putin’s Russia has sparked debate across the border and helped persuade many in traditionally conservative Ukraine to reject homophobia. A June 2023 poll found that more than 70% of Ukrainians believe members of the LGBTQI+ community should have the same rights as any other Ukrainian citizen, representing a significant increase from prewar levels of social acceptance.

Despite indications of progress, significant challenges remain. While LGBTQI+ individuals can now serve openly in the Ukrainian military, many say they face difficulties not experienced by non-LGBTQI+ soldiers. Efforts are ongoing to secure equal partner rights, including the right of same-sex partners to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner in case of injury, and to receive the same state benefits for military service.

Amid the unprecedented trauma and turbulence of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the issue of LGBTQI+ rights remains on Ukraine’s political agenda and continues to gain traction. In 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged growing demand for recognition of same-sex civil unions. A year later, Ukrainian MP Ivana Sovsun formally introduced a bill on civil unions.

Current trends look set to continue. As Ukraine takes additional steps toward membership of the European Union, the accession process will include a growing focus on Ukrainian human rights legislation. This will include measures to bring Ukrainian law into line with EU standards, meaning the likely introduction of greater legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community is in many ways at the forefront of the struggle against Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian brand of Russian imperialism. From the LGBTQI+ soldiers on the front lines of the war to the activists pushing for social change in Kyiv, the community plays a vital role in Ukraine’s ongoing European integration and defense against the Kremlin’s anti-Western crusade.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Husain in The Spectator: Don’t Outlaw Islamophobia

Atlantic Council — Sat, 22 Jun 2024 14:31:39 +0000