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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

The reality for women miners

In the ASM sector, where working conditions are unsafe, women face gender-based discrimination and physical harm. Women miners are ninety times more at risk of death than their male counterparts, according to the World Bank. Women miners also face sexual violence, which is especially prevalent in conflict areas: For example, amid the ongoing conflict between Congolese armed forces and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, women (both miners and not) reported 895 rapes in the last two weeks of February 2025, averaging sixty reports per day.

In the ASM sector and in large-scale mining (LSM), women have also been allocated fewer technical jobs in addition to unequal access to mining rights, tools, and financial resources, all diminishing their ability to achieve financial growth. Their restricted economic mobility often confines them to ancillary services such as preparing food and cleaning mineral ore. But regardless of the roles they take, women miners often receive lower wages than men for the same labor. Discrimination also results in women miners taking on a disproportionate burden of labor overall, as many are responsible for housework in addition to mining activities.

Legal infrastructures also reinforce discrimination against women miners: For example, the DRC’s Mining Code stipulates that pregnant women are not allowed to work in mining. Similarly, sections 55 and 56 of Nigeria’s 2004 Labor Act prohibit women from working in industrial undertakings, including mining, during nighttime hours and from doing any manual labor underground. These unequal legal measures can push more women to informal mining practices, making them more vulnerable to physical and gender-based harm.

Tapping the opportunity

African countries, for their development and economic growth, must address the challenges women in both ASM and LSM face, with policies that are tailored to the needs of local mining communities.

African countries must offer easily navigable pathways for ASM miners to formalize—and such pathways must be customized for local contexts. Formalization is particularly complex in regions with conflict and legal pluralism. There are frameworks available to guide African governments in this endeavor. For example, a nongovernmental organization called Pact has publicly put forth the model it uses to engage communities in formalization, tailoring the approach to the needs of local artisanal miners. Such a model includes stakeholder engagement and educational training for miners, in addition to support with securing licenses and land access and with addressing human rights and safety concerns.

African governments should also support local grassroots organizations in operationalizing these efforts to improve the well-being of women miners and their economic prospects. In the ASM sector in particular, these organizations are integral to reaching women miners, especially in spaces where governments lack reach. For example, Tanzania’s Women Miners Association economically empowers women miners through initiatives that organize savings and credit cooperative societies and support women as they work to acquire mining licenses and market access. An organization called IMPACT leads initiatives for women-led mining businesses to improve women miners’ safety and foster inclusion in global supply chains. IMPACT supported the building of at least fifty village savings and loans associations in the DRC and Burkina Faso, involving nearly three thousand women and men who saved more than $176,000.

In addressing women’s challenges in the mining sector—both ASM and LSM—more broadly, African governments must also deploy policies that are gender inclusive and women-centric in order to alleviate the gendered struggles of women in the mining sector. There are already positive examples of such policies on the African continent, some being South Africa’s programs to improve women’s participation in the LSM sector. In addition, the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum, and Gas Board implemented a gender strategy to improve awareness about the role of women in mining and to boost capacity building. Governments should also encourage women’s participation in mining governance.

Leveraging partnerships

Safeguarding and empowering women is essential for upholding human rights and fostering inclusive sustainable growth. While ensuring peace and stability, African countries need to leverage partnerships to advance their development goals.

As countries move forward on critical-minerals deals, they must do so ensuring that there will be mutual economic gains from such agreements. For example, the DRC must leverage its potential mineral deal—in which the United States would provide security against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel attacks in exchange for access to DRC’s critical minerals—for community development. While signing any deal, governments should foster multistakeholder partnerships with grassroots organizations that can help reach women miners and advance development goals in Africa’s booming mining sector, for an inclusive and equitable future for all.

Neeraja Kulkarni is a researcher, writer, and development practitioner with experience in decarbonization, community resilience, and international development. The views expressed in this article are her own.

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Modern Ukraine’s national journey can be traced on Kyiv’s central square

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 10 Jun 2025 21:18:16 +0000

Ancient Kyiv is drenched in more than a millennium of history and boasts a dizzying array of cathedrals, monasteries, and palaces dating back hundreds of years. However, the location most intricately associated with modern Ukraine’s national journey is far younger than any of these venerable landmarks and carried no particular spiritual significance until the very recent past.

Located in the geographical center of Kyiv, Independence Square is known to locals and foreign guests alike by its Ukrainian-language name, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or simply Maidan. Over the past three decades, Maidan has undergone a dramatic transformation that has seen it emerge from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity crisis via two popular uprisings to become the sacred ground zero of a nation forged in the crucible of revolution and war.

Today, Maidan is an obligatory point of pilgrimage on the itinerary of all visitors to the Ukrainian capital. People come to Maidan in order to honor those who have died in the fight against Russia’s invasion, or just to soak up the atmosphere of an iconic location that has witnessed some of the most consequential political events of the twenty-first century.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Turkmenistan’s deepening water crisis could have far-reaching regional consequences

Rasul Satymov — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 20:23:38 +0000

The vast, arid landscapes of Turkmenistan, stretching across Central Asia, are facing a profound and growing threat—a deepening water crisis that casts a shadow over its future stability, as well as over the security of the entire region. While often overshadowed by other domestic problems, the struggle for water in Turkmenistan is a critical issue demanding immediate attention. Exacerbated by a changing climate, almost a century of unsustainable practices, and new regional developments, this crisis is not just an environmental problem—it’s an unfolding human tragedy that could have significant economic and political ramifications well beyond its borders.

The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

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“Yes, really”: American private military companies (back) in Gaza

Alia Brahimi — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 19:22:18 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 11 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official Craig Mokhiber to discuss Israel’s militarization of aid in Gaza and how US private military companies (PMC) and individual contractors could be held legally liable for their association with violations occurring in the Gaza Strip.

Craig offers his assessment of why the Israeli-led Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was established, its rejection by the UN and the international aid community for weaponising hunger, as well as the international laws it is breaching. He describes the cruelties and dangers inhering in this new aid system and outlines how individuals, including PMC employees, may be held legally accountable for their participation in the GHF and their association with the IDF’s wider alleged war crimes.

“This is not an aid operation. It is an extension of the unlawful Israeli occupation and its plans for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza.”

Craig Mokhiber, international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official

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About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Russian hybrid warfare: Ukraine’s success offers lessons for Europe

Maksym Beznosiuk — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 21:39:11 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, the Kremlin is also rapidly escalating its hybrid war against Europe. Intelligence officials from a number of European countries are now raising the alarm and warning that Russian operations are growing in number and becoming bolder, with potential targets including transport hubs and critical infrastructure.

The Kremlin employs hybrid warfare tactics to remain below the threshold that would trigger a unified and potentially overwhelming European response. This has led to a surge in sabotage, cyberattacks, political interference, and disinformation campaigns across Europe, with a particular emphasis on countries closer to Russia.

Moscow’s hybrid war against Europe mirrors the tactics used by the Kremlin in Ukraine following the start of Russia’s invasion in 2014. Ukraine’s response to the often unprecedented challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare offers important lessons for Kyiv’s European partners.

The Ukrainian experience highlights the gravity of the hybrid threat and the importance of an integrated response. The overall message to Western policymakers is clear: Moscow views hybrid warfare as an important Russian foreign policy tool and will continue expanding its campaign. Europe cannot afford to wait for Russian hybrid attacks to escalate further before building the advanced capabilities required to counter this threat.

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There have been growing reports of Russian hybrid war-style attacks across the EU since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago. This trend gained significant additional momentum following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Typical incidents include cyberattacks targeting infrastructure, sabotage including arson attacks, and attempts to disrupt military aid destined for Ukraine. Moscow is also accused of investing billions of dollars in sophisticated social media campaigns to influence the outcome of elections across Europe. The Kremlin’s hybrid operations are concentrated in central and eastern Europe, with Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states among the primary targets.

None of this is new to Ukraine. For more than a decade, Ukrainians have been learning to cope with the full range of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox. Russia’s attack on Ukraine began in February 2014 when Russian soldiers without insignias took control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in a lightning operation that was accompanied by a massive wave of targeted disinformation.

Russia’s subsequent efforts to destabilize and subjugate the rest of Ukraine have involved a combination of conventional military aggression, sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and support for pro-Russian actors in Ukraine. Thanks to this prolonged exposure to Russian hybrid warfare, Ukraine has been able to develop countermeasures that have helped build resilience and reduce the impact of Russia’s hybrid operations.

Ukraine’s response has been a collaborative effort involving the Ukrainian government, civil society, and the private sector. In the cyber sphere, efforts to improve Ukraine’s digital security have played a key role, with the launch of the country’s popular Diia platform and the establishment of the Ministry of Digital Transformation helping to drive important digital governance reforms.

This has enhanced Ukraine’s ability to maintain public services amid acts of cyber aggression and has improved engagement with the population. Ukraine’s progress in the digital sphere has been recognized internationally, with the country climbing from the 102 spot to fifth position in the UN’s annual Online Services Index in the seven years between 2018 and 2025.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Ukraine’s coordination structures, such as the Center for Strategic Communications and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, enable swift and well-coordinated responses across government, media, and digital channels. This offers a number of advantages in a hybrid war setting. For example, it allows the Ukrainian government to synchronize positions with proactive narrative-setting when countering the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns.

Ukraine has also benefited from a decentralized approach involving digital volunteers, civil society, and public-private partnerships. A wide range of civic tech groups and open-source investigators are active in Ukraine detecting and countering Russian disinformation. These measures have made it possible to expose Russian narratives efficiently, coordinate messaging across government and civil society, and maintain coherence during military operations.

Since 2014, Ukraine has been able to reduce Russia’s overwhelming initial advantages on the information front of the hybrid war. While Russian disinformation tactics continue to evolve and remain a major aspect of the ongoing invasion, Ukraine has managed to increasingly leverage information to shape international opinion and influence diplomatic outcomes.

At present, the European response to Russia’s hybrid war lacks the institutional agility and coordination between public sector and civil society that is evident in Ukraine. Instead, the EU and NATO have developed a number of parallel structures such as NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division and the EU’s East StratCom Task Force. While these agencies continue to make meaningful contributions to the fight back against Russian hybrid warfare, they have yet to demonstrate the kind of real-time operational coordination that has served Ukraine so well.

Ukraine’s model for combating Russian hybrid warfare can’t be replicated in full, but it could serve as a practical reference point for building more adaptive and integrated responses across the West. Given Ukraine’s unique experience, it might make sense to establish a trilateral consultative framework together with the EU and NATO to enable rapid hybrid threat evaluations and coordinate responses.

Ukraine’s long record of countering Russian hybrid warfare has also highlighted the role of civil society. Kyiv’s European partners should consider increasing support for initiatives such as investigative journalism, fact-checking platforms, and technical watchdogs that can serve as support elements in a broader European defense ecosystem. In an environment where information is increasingly weaponized, Ukraine’s experience has also underlined the need to embed media literacy into the education system to ensure European citizens are able to consume information critically and are less vulnerable to Russian propaganda.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and international experts around key Ukrainian issues.

Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 20:50:06 +0000

US President Donald Trump has recently changed his tone toward Russian president Vladimir Putin, suggesting that he has “gone crazy” and is “playing with fire.” This highlights the ongoing difficulties of negotiating with the Kremlin. While the Trump administration broadly favors a realist approach to international relations, a more pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives could better equip the US to achieve its stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.

Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

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Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

How to improve Latin America’s agri-food security in a changing world

Peter Engelke, Ginger Matchett — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 16:02:38 +0000

Trade, innovation, and the exchange of people and ideas are fundamental components of today’s global food security system. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has observed that a fifth of all calories that are consumed in the world cross at least one border. The agriculturally rich Western Hemisphere plays a critical role in this global system. The United States, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina are among the world’s largest staple crop producers and exporters. Brazil and the United States, for example, rank first or second globally in exports by volume of corn, soybeans, and rice, while Canada is the world’s fourth largest wheat exporter. Other countries in the Americas are important producers of coffee, sugarcane, bananas, and other fruits and vegetables. Five of the world’s top ten banana exporters, for example, are in South and Central America, as are three of the world’s top five coffee exporters.

However, the uninterrupted flow of trade in the food and agriculture that feeds humanity is not guaranteed. The hemisphere’s leaders must think strategically and identify opportunities to strengthen the region’s agri-food architecture.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Food Security: Strategic Alignment in the Americas project, conducted in partnership with The Mosaic Company, assesses the Western Hemisphere’s food security in a changing strategic landscape. The project draws upon perspectives from across the Americas to understand the challenges and opportunities facing regional and global agri-food systems.

On April 10, the Scowcroft Center’s GeoStrategy Initiative hosted the project’s first private roundtable, bringing together dozens of leading experts from across the Americas from an array of research institutions, universities, the agri-food industry, government, and multilateral institutions. The discussion focused on food security in Latin America, highlighting the importance of trade, geopolitics, climate change, innovation, and investment trends.

A season of change

The Americas are navigating novel geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions, with uncertainties introduced by proposed new tariffs that the United States has placed (and might yet place) on its hemispheric neighbors. A significant concern involves the impact that such tariffs could have on established agri-food trade relationships across the hemisphere. Should the United States, Canada, or Mexico implement high tariffs on agri-food products, one potential consequence could be large reductions in the levels of agri-food trade around the globe and in the Americas. At the same time, some South and Central American countries might benefit from enhanced exports to one or more of those three countries.

There are just as many, if not more, opportunities throughout the region to enhance food security. Intraregional trade in agri-food products—including processed goods such as cereals, food residues, meats, fats and oils, food preparations, oilseeds, beverages, and dairy products—provides a significant opportunity for enhanced cooperation in the Americas. Studies by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank have projected that Latin America’s intraregional agricultural market has room to expand; they identified some sixty-seven agri-food products with potential for growth in the future, forecasting market growth of some $3 billion (from $21.6 billion to $24.7 billion). Latin America’s subregions have substantial capacity to expand agri-food exchange with one another, thereby improving competitiveness in global markets. For example, while 60 percent of South America’s food imports come from intraregional trade in Latin American and Caribbean markets, in Mexico and Central America, that figure is only 20 percent.

Policymakers in Latin America should facilitate intraregional trade through regional trade agreements that, among other things, dismantle the complex set of rules currently hindering integration. Greater investment in ports, rail, and roads can create more physical connectivity. And digital connectivity, which can ease exchanges of all types, such as trade logistics, should be enhanced as well. As food security will depend on the increase of crop productivity in the coming years, there are opportunities to deepen intraregional partnerships on agri-food sciences, which will support sustainable production growth in these countries.

A changing climate

Roundtable participants also stressed how the changing climate will impact agriculture in Latin America. The planet’s ongoing warming (above 1.5 degrees Celsius compared with pre-industrial levels) poses serious challenges to Latin American agriculture. Strategies to overcome climate impacts should include a focus on both adaptation and mitigation to ensure that the region’s agriculture remains viable. Policymakers should focus attention on how to make smallholder farmers more resilient given the disproportionately harsh climate impacts they face. One strategy is to provide low-interest loans and access to training and other services to smallholder farmers. Such actions can increase access to land, fertilizers, seeds, and tools while boosting incentives to implement innovative agriculture technology, ultimately increasing yields and market access.

Roundtable participants also observed that on- and off-farm innovation plays an important role in shaping Latin America’s agri-food sector, stressing the criticality of emerging technologies in a more sustainable and resilient food system. The central challenge, they asserted, involves crafting the strategies needed to finance and successfully scale new systems given their expense. Improvements in data collection and analysis enhance understanding of how climate change is contributing to pest outbreaks and crop diseases. Alternative chemical processes for creating fertilizers and seed certification programs might improve soil and plant resiliency. The adoption of low-carbon agriculture models, backed with government support within streamlined and science-based regulatory processes, could further align agricultural policy with climate adaptation and mitigation objectives.

These reforms are needed in part because Latin America continues to face problems related to food insecurity. While the region has seen declining hunger and food insecurity in recent years, in part due to investments in social protection systems, 41 million people across the region were still affected by hunger last year. Even in major food-producing countries such as Brazil and Argentina, which dominate South American production and exports of soybeans, wheat, corn, and rice, lower-income populations continue to struggle to gain access to sufficient amounts of healthy food.

To overcome food insecurity while ensuring that Latin America’s agri-food systems are resilient and interconnected, the region’s farmers, farming associations, agri-food firms and processors, supply distributors, and policymakers must cooperate with new, innovative strategies. Agri-food frameworks that are predictable, transparent, and based on rules and science will help cement the region as economically diversified, climate adaptive, and innovative. The Americas must take advantage of its strengths in the agri-food space for preeminence on the global stage.

Peter Engelke is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a senior fellow with its Global Energy Center.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Putin’s punitive peace terms are a call for Ukraine’s complete capitulation

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 21:42:17 +0000

Russian and Ukrainian delegations failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs when they met for peace talks in Istanbul on Monday. The event was not a complete waste of time, however. Aside from agreeing on another welcome round of prisoner swaps, the two sides also exchanged peace proposals that confirmed the complete lack of middle ground for any kind of meaningful compromise to end the fighting.

While Ukraine’s proposal laid out a fairly pragmatic vision based on battlefield realities and security concerns, Russia presented punitive peace terms that would reestablish Kremlin control over Kyiv and doom the postwar Ukrainian state to a slow but inevitable death. This uncompromising Russian position should serve as a wake-call for anyone who still believes Putin is negotiating in good faith. In reality, the Russian dictator is more determined than ever to destroy Ukraine, and is merely exploiting US-led peace talks in order to strengthen his hand and divide the West.

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The demands unveiled by the Russian delegation this week in Istanbul came as no surprise and closely mirrored the conditions outlined on numerous prior occasions by Putin and other Kremlin leaders. Nevertheless, at a time when US President Donald Trump is publicly pressing for progress toward peace, the Russian decision to deliver such a maximalist memorandum sent a clear message of defiance to Washington DC.

As expected, Moscow reiterated its call for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four Ukrainian provinces that Russia currently claims as its own but has been unable to fully occupy. This would oblige the Ukrainian authorities to hand over a number of major cities and condemn millions of their compatriots to indefinite Russian occupation. Kyiv would also be expected to officially cede these regions together with Crimea, paving the way for international recognition of Russia’s conquests.

This crushing territorial settlement is only one aspect of Russia’s vision for the comprehensive dismantling of Ukrainian statehood. In line with Putin’s peace terms, Ukraine would be forced to accept limitations on the size of its army and on the categories of weapons it is allowed to possess. The country would be also be barred from joining any military blocs or concluding alliances with foreign nations. It does not take much imagination to guess what Putin has in mind for Ukraine once it has been successfully disarmed and internationally isolated.

Nor is that all. The Kremlin’s conditions actually go much further and aim to transform Ukraine from within in ways that would erase Ukrainian identity along with the country’s political independence. Moscow’s memorandum called on Ukraine to grant Russian the status of official state language, reinstate the privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church, and adopt a Kremlin-friendly version of Ukrainian history. Meanwhile, all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties would be banned, paving the way for the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv.

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On the morning after this week’s bilateral meeting, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed the true objective of Russia’s participation in peace talks. “The Istanbul talks are not for striking a compromise peace on someone else’s delusional terms,” commented Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s powerful National Security Council. Instead, Medvedev stated that Russia’s goal was to secure victory and ensure “the complete destruction of the neo-Nazi regime,” which is widely recognized as Kremlin code for the Ukrainian state. “That’s what the Russian memorandum published yesterday is about,” he noted.

Medvedev’s frank appraisal of the Russian position won him sarcastic praise from US Senator Lindsey Graham. “Congratulations to Mr. Medvedev for a rare moment of honesty coming from the Russian propaganda machine,” commented Trump ally Graham. “I appreciate you making it clear to the world that Putin and Russia are not remotely interested in peace.”

It is hard to argue with Graham’s assessment. For the past few months, Putin has gone out of his way to demonstrate that he has absolutely no intention of ending the war. While Ukraine has accepted a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Putin has repeatedly refused to do so. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics that make a mockery of the entire peace process.

Away from the negotiating table, Putin has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians. On the battlefield, his armies are currently engaged in the early stages what is shaping up to be one of the biggest Russian offensives of the entire war. These are not the actions of a man who seeks peace.

After this week’s fresh confirmation of Moscow’s undiminished imperial ambitions in Ukraine, it is now surely time to abandon any lingering delusions and accept that the Russian dictator will not stop until he is stopped. Putin believes he is on a messianic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire. He currently thinks he is winning this historic struggle and will not be swayed by Trump’s comparatively trivial talk of tariffs and trade deals.

The only thing that can change Putin’s mind is Western strength. As long as Putin is confident of eventual victory, he will continue. But if the alternative to a peace deal is a potentially crushing defeat, he may reconsider. To achieve this change, Western leaders must demonstrate a degree of collective resolve that has often been absent over the past three years. They must sanction Russia to the max and arm Ukraine to the teeth. This will require considerable political will and good old-fashioned courage in Western capitals. Ukraine will do the rest.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

David Kirichenko — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 20:55:58 +0000

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet. While the full extent of the damage remains disputed, open source evidence has already confirmed that Russia lost at least ten strategic bombers and possibly many more.

The attack highlighted Ukraine’s innovative use of military technologies and confirmed the country’s status as a world leader in the rapidly evolving art of drone warfare. Crucially, it also underlined Kyiv’s ability to conduct complex offensive operations deep inside Russia. This will force the Kremlin to radically rethink its domestic security stance, which could lead to the diversion of resources away from the invasion of Ukraine.

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According to Ukrainian sources, preparations for Operation Spider’s Web had been underway since late 2023. Ukraine was able to move a series of modified cargo containers into Russia along with more than one hundred first-person view (FPV) drones. The containers were then loaded with the drones and mounted on lorries before being moved into position close to Russian airbases. On Sunday morning, the green light was given and the drones were remotely activated, emerging from their containers to strike nearby Russian bombers.

The bombers targeted in these drone attacks play a key role in Russia’s air war and are regularly used to launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities. While Ukraine’s June 1 success will not bring this bombing campaign to an end, it may help save Ukrainian lives by reducing the number of available planes and forcing Russia to disperse its remaining strategic bombers to locations further away from Ukraine.

While any reduction on Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian civilians is welcome, the impact of Ukraine’s airbase attacks on the future course of the war is likely to be far more profound. Sunday’s Ukrainian strikes at locations across Russia have transformed the situation on Putin’s home front. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, Russians have grown accustomed to viewing the war as something that is taking place far away. That sense of security has now been shattered.

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This was not the first time Ukraine has struck deep inside Russia. For much of the war, Ukraine has been using its growing fleet of long-range drones to target Russian military bases and the country’s oil and gas industry. Russian Air Force hubs such as the Engels airbase in Saratov Oblast have been hit multiple times.

Ukraine’s attacks have gained momentum as the country’s long-range drone fleet has evolved and as Kyiv has developed its own missile capabilities. This mounting proficiency has not gone unnoticed internationally. Indeed, China reportedly asked Ukraine to refrain from attacking Moscow during the recent Victory Day parade on May 9, as Beijing was apparently unsure whether the Russians themselves could provide sufficient protection for the visiting Chinese leader.

Sunday’s operation represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. By deploying large numbers of drones surreptitiously across the Russian Federation and activating them remotely, Ukraine demonstrated an ability to strike anywhere without warning. The consequences of this are potentially far-reaching. Russia must now increase security at every single military base, military-industrial site, command center, and transport hub throughout the country.

In addition to ramping up defensive measures around military infrastructure, Russia must also introduce further checks at the country’s borders and closely monitor all activity along endless highways stretching from Europe’s eastern frontier to the Pacific Ocean. This is a logistical nightmare. For example, thanks to Ukraine’s attack, all cargo containers must now be treated with suspicion. There are already reports of bottlenecks emerging at locations across Russia as alarmed officials inspect lorries in the hunt for more Ukrainian drones.

Given the colossal size of the Russian Federation, addressing the threat posed by Ukraine’s Trojan Horse tactics is a truly Herculean task. Russia’s vastness has traditionally been viewed as one of the country’s greatest strengths. The new form of warfare being pioneered by Ukraine could now turn this size into a major weakness. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that Ukraine does not “have any cards” in its war with Russia, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy may just have played the ace of drones.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment?

Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, and Marie Forestier — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence.

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal.

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

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A tax on remittances could hurt US households—and national security

Ananya Kumar — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 12:10:45 +0000

Last month, the US House of Representatives narrowly passed a sweeping tax and spending bill that is the top legislative priority for President Donald Trump. Among its lesser-known provisions is a proposed 3.5 percent tax on remittances sent by anyone who is not a US citizen or national.

Currently, remittances are not taxed separately, as senders already pay income tax on the earnings they transfer to family and friends abroad. “The One, Big, Beautiful Bill” would upend that system—effectively taxing those transfers twice. But that’s not all. A tax on remittances—valued at $905 billion globally—would not only hit US households and low-income countries, where they can account for more than 30 percent of gross domestic product; it could also undermine key US national security and foreign policy priorities.

If the Senate passes the Republican budget bill, remittance senders and recipients—who already contend with high fees—will undoubtedly be hit the hardest. In 2024, the global average cost of sending two hundred dollars across borders was 6.4 percent. That’s more than double the United Nations’ sustainable development goal of 3 percent and exceeds the Group of Twenty (G20) target of 5 percent.

If overall remittance volumes were to fall, US remittance providers—the companies that enable the sending and receiving of these payments—would be adversely affected. The proposed legislation imposes new responsibilities for these remittance service companies—such as verifying the sender’s citizenship and enforcing new fee structures and reporting mechanisms—all of which impose new costs, compliance burdens, and risks for remittance providers. These additional requirements threaten to reduce operational efficiency and drive up consumer prices, especially as US companies currently dominate the remittance services sector, setting standards for transfer speed, cost, and security. A tax-driven shift in the market would hurt these companies’ profitability and competitiveness, undermining broader US economic interests.

The risk of driving transactions underground

When it comes to national security, the United States already has a robust framework to monitor and regulate money and payment flows, including laws and infrastructure designed to combat financial crime. Remittance service companies are a central component of this framework, enabling state and federal law enforcement to track and pursue suspicious transfers and bad actors.

Moreover, research shows that taxing remittances leads to increased use of underground or informal channels for sending money. That is, senders seek out alternatives—less regulated, less transparent, and less safe ways of transferring their money abroad. In fact, countries that have enacted punitive measures on cross-border payments and currency exchange have often undermined their own ability to combat financial crime, thereby weakening their economies and diminishing their foreign influence.

Argentina serves as a revealing case study. Under previous leadership, the Argentine government imposed foreign exchange and capital controls that drove transactions into underground banking networks, making it far harder to trace illicit activity. These restrictions also weakened the already vulnerable economy, contributing to stagnation and inflation. President Javier Milei is now actively reversing these policies in favor of open and transparent capital flows and foreign currency exchange—reforms that significantly benefit both law enforcement and economic stability.

In the United States, the revenue generated by a federal tax on remittances would likely be less than 0.1 percent of the national budget. At the same time, it would reduce remittance volumes or push them underground, contradicting broader US national security goals and making US companies less competitive by increasing their cost of doing business. Accordingly, policymakers should reconsider the trade-offs and recognize that transparent, reliable remittance services serve the national interest of the United States.

A foreign policy tool hiding in plain sight

With respect to foreign policy and the ability to influence global development, remittances play a vital role—especially in an era of shrinking public-sector aid. Private remittance flows often reach communities and individuals more directly and efficiently than government-to-government assistance. US senders are often family members and friends of recipients, as well as faith-based and other humanitarian organizations. These flows ultimately contribute to stabilizing fragile economies, reducing the financial distress that often drives illegal migration. Additionally, remittances often support democratic activity and institutions in recipient countries, while also helping undermine autocratic governments by empowering citizens with resources independent of state control.

Because they account for one-sixth of all cross-border payments, remittances also reinforce the global dominance of the US dollar. A large portion of remittances is sent in—or exchanged into—US dollars, bolstering the currency’s central position in the international financial system and providing visibility into foreign transactions. This visibility, in turn, allows for the effective enforcement of anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies, as well as sanctions enforcement in cases of illicit activity.

Given these strategic benefits, the United States should take concrete steps to better leverage remittances as a national security and foreign policy asset. This begins with adopting smart, forward-looking policies that strengthen remittance channels and maximize their impact.

First, US policymakers should not just protect, but also actively promote legal remittance channels to ensure that these funds can flow safely and efficiently. Rather than imposing restrictive measures such as new taxes, the United States should foster deeper collaboration between law enforcement and well-regulated remittance providers. Such cooperation would support the adoption of rapidly evolving compliance technologies that more effectively detect illicit financial flows.

Second, the United States should reduce the costs and friction associated with remittance transactions. This includes granting well-regulated US remittance providers direct access to national payments systems and modernizing AML and Bank Secrecy Act regulations to reflect the realities of digital transactions. Emerging technologies can improve financial crime detection—provided that regulators offer clear guidance and foster their adoption.

Third, the United States should leverage its presidency of the G20 in 2026 to establish a global working group that captures the complexity of remittances as a tool of foreign policy and national security. The G20 has traditionally provided targets for remittance payments. Additionally, a US-led working group could address the need for better global coordination to curb illicit flows, reduce frictions, and explore how remittances can complement official aid flows, especially in constrained fiscal environments.

By recognizing and elevating the role of remittances, US policymakers can incorporate a powerful, underused asset into their broader foreign policy strategy—one that supports both domestic prosperity and global stability.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The author thanks Daniel Gorfine for his contributions to this article.

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The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic

Jeffrey Reynolds, Kristen Taylor — Fri, 30 May 2025 14:49:31 +0000

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s victory in the May 2025 elections provides a clearer picture of Canada’s political future and strategic priorities. During the election campaign, Carney emphasized bolstering defense spending and increasing Canada’s presence, awareness, and infrastructure footprint in the Arctic. As Carney seeks to achieve these stated ends, he will contend with a strategic environment that looks more dangerous for Ottawa than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And he will likely struggle to reconcile the strategic importance of the Arctic with the cost of developing the infrastructure required to secure it. But as the ice retreats, so too do the barriers that once insulated Canada’s Arctic.

The frontier has become the front line.

Canada’s choice is binary: secure its portion of the Arctic or suffer the consequences of foreign powers acting with impunity in and around Canada’s Arctic. Ottawa’s central challenge, therefore, is to harden its Arctic presence with dual-use infrastructure and supply chain resilience while hostile powers increase their influence around the pole.

This task gets more difficult the longer Ottawa dithers because change manifests across many vectors concurrently. The infrastructure and supply chains critical to the region are underdeveloped and ill-suited for the future—and they do not improve with age. Climate change continues to alter the contours of the region, often to Canada’s strategic disadvantage. An ascendant generation of US strategists proclaim that the Canadian Arctic is the “new soft underbelly” of North America. And it is no longer fantasy to suggest that the Arctic is ground zero for the new ‘Great Game’ between the United States, Russia, and China.

The region has been one of strategic contest since 1921, when Joseph Stalin claimed the North Pole for the Soviet Union, a claim re-animated by Moscow in 2015. It may lack the trenches and dragon’s teeth in Europe, or the clashes between fishing vessels and coast guard ships in southeast Asia. But the Arctic is no longer a low-threat, low-force posture environment that can be defended by a couple Coast Guard icebreakers and some Canadian Rangers on snowmobiles.

It is a region of strategic consequence and likely to be more so in the coming decades, which begs the question—why does Canada lag allies and adversaries alike in both the defense and development of its Arctic territory?

The simplistic answer is that Ottawa is torn among competing interests and an inability, or an unwillingness, to marshal the domestic resources necessary to protect its Arctic from a growing cast of players keen to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in pursuit of their interests.

The Atlantic Council delved deeper into Canada’s challenge to bolster infrastructure and supply chain resilience in the region. Research included literature reviews, interviews, and off-the-record conversations with a broad range of government and private-sector stakeholders. Interviews yielded constructive, if passionate, views from respondents who expressed repeatedly how much they want Canada to secure its part of the Arctic and enable its full development.

Analysis revealed that Ottawa knows the region well; the Canadian government has few peers in understanding the Arctic and what is required to right supply chains there. Geological surveys and development plans are completed to a gold standard. Stakeholders know the problem and solution space—and have for decades. But domestic policy, not climate change or geopolitical calculus, is the primary factor influencing strategic decisions for Canada’s north.

Key players (and honorable mentions)

Climate change has made the Arctic accessible. Glacier melting has created new sea routes, extended shipping seasons, and unveiled vast natural resources. But it has also created an opening in the region for strategic contest. Three threat vectors shape the region’s security dynamics for Canada.

Russia

More than half of the Arctic Circle’s population and half its economy are Russian. Russia sits at the end of one of the Arctic’s most accessible regions. Russia is opening old bases and building new infrastructure throughout the region. It holds more than 50 percent of Arctic investment (made between 2017 and 2022), and its military doctrine treats the north as central to economic and national defense. Since 2014, the Kremlin has launched Cold War-style investments in Arctic airfields, radar systems, submarine networks, and year-round basing. Russian military planners are considering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) domes extending over the Northern Sea Route.

Moscow likely observes that Canadian defense planning remains rooted in an outdated peace dividend mindset—one that grossly underestimates the threat of state-on-state conflict in the Arctic. Canada’s lack of comprehensive undersea surveillance renders its Arctic maritime approaches effectively blind, and its military presence in the region—symbolized by a modest footprint of Canadian Rangers—leaves much to be desired in terms of deterrence or rapid response. Equipment remains outdated, modernization plans languish in bureaucratic limbo, and logistics chains are stretched perilously thin. These gaps create space for Russian forces to maneuver below the threshold of war, exploiting ambiguity and Canada’s limited detection capabilities to assert influence or project force unchallenged.

The Kremlin likes to see how Canada’s strategic dependence on the United States substitutes alliance commitments for genuine sovereign deterrence. Ottawa’s whole-of-government approach—while inclusive in theory—has fragmented decision-making in practice, rendering Canada slow and reactive at a time when speed and coherence are strategic advantages. Indigenous consultation, while legally and morally necessary, remains procedurally rigid and politicized, often becoming a brake on critical national security decisions rather than a channel for partnership and empowerment.

While Russia invests heavily in its Arctic capabilities, Canada’s Arctic capability is stuck in the twentieth century. Surveillance assets are aging, space-based platforms are insufficient, and investment in modern ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technology remains anemic. Communications remain unreliable across vast regions, exposing both civilian and military systems to disruption. Cyber defenses—especially around critical infrastructure—are poorly funded and unevenly deployed, inviting adversaries to strike via code rather than missile.

China

China considers itself a “near-Arctic power” and its Polar Silk Road links Arctic shipping to its global Belt and Road ambitions. China’s white papers frame the region as a commons to be commercially and scientifically accessed. Icebreaker construction in Chinese shipyards matches the tempo of a nation preparing for permanent presence.

Beijing understands that Canada’s economic infrastructure in the Arctic is brittle. Melting permafrost, seasonal reliance on ice roads, and a near-total absence of deepwater ports make northern logistics vulnerable to both climate and conflict. These choke points offer asymmetric opportunities to disrupt supply chains or sabotage dual-use facilities. China could exploit these vulnerabilities by embedding itself through ostensibly civilian investments in Arctic mining, telecommunications, or transportation infrastructure—investments that are strategic positioning by other means. In such a fragile environment, any hybrid attack or technological failure could sever vital arteries with catastrophic effects.

From China’s vantage point, Canada’s Arctic declarations are noble but hollow—bold in language but weak in execution. For Beijing, which has increased defense spending every year for three decades, Canada’s plan to reach two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending by 2030 is symbolic. Procurement remains tangled in inefficiency and overregulation, hampering modernization and undermining operational readiness. Economic pressures, shifting political winds, and lukewarm support for military spending are likely to derail Canada’s commitments before they mature. Moreover, China likely sees Canada’s overreliance on its NATO allies as a strategic liability. The Arctic can be probed or pressured just below NATO’s collective defense thresholds—ensuring ambiguity, diffusing Western resolve, and highlighting Canada’s limited unilateral options.

Manpower shortages, insufficient Arctic basing, and the long-delayed Nanisivik port all point to structural underinvestment in hard infrastructure. These gaps offer Beijing a rich menu of asymmetric opportunities to: subvert Arctic economies through proxy investments; cultivate cultural ties through scholarships, research partnerships, and diplomatic outreach; sabotage digital and physical infrastructure through cyberattacks or dependency entrapments; and sow political dissent by financing Indigenous, environmental, or anti-militarization movements within Canada’s own democratic fabric.

The United States (and others)

For Washington, Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect. The refusal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.

The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater footprints in the region.

While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.

This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.

Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence. Ottawa provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence, convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.

America cannot—and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.

Five “cold kills”

Our research unearthed five factors that contribute to Canada’s Arctic inertia. Each of these “cold kills” continues to impede progress on increasing supply chain and defense resilience.

1. Lacking multipartisan consensus on the region as “ground zero” for a new “Great Game.”

Canada cannot do much in the Arctic if it lacks enduring political will to support and fund dual-use infrastructure over decades. The growing importance of the Arctic for great-power competition underscores the need for politicians, defense planners, local communities, industry partners, and other relevant stakeholders to walk in the same general direction, if not in lockstep. Despite the urgency of this task, no sustained, cross-partisan strategy for Arctic defense exists. Without it, investments, infrastructure development, and operational planning will almost certainly come up short. In 2025, Natural Resources Canada is projected to invest $12.1 million toward climate adaptation projects in the North—which is necessary, but insufficient when compared to similar efforts by other Arctic powers.

Yet, allies offer a contrast. Norway’s Arktis 2030 fund and its defense pledge of 3 percent of GDP underscore a whole-of-society approach. Finland’s NATO entry boosted its participation in Arctic exercises. Sweden utilizes Arctic data to create a stronger and better informed national defense policy. Denmark leverages Greenland’s geostrategic importance in its Arctic defense. While Canada’s Arctic is inaccessible by comparison, it can look at what NATO allies do right in the region and their whole-of-society approaches.

2. Placing too much of the strategic burden on local communities.

The Canadian government continues to place disproportionate responsibility for Arctic security on local communities, revealing a dangerous strategic asymmetry between rhetoric and capability. The Canadian Rangers, though a symbol of national resolve and cultural integration, are not a substitute for a modern, standing military presence. They are lightly armed, part-time volunteers—valuable in their knowledge of the land but structurally unfit to deter or respond to the increasing threats posed by adversarial state actors operating just beyond the line of sight. This over-reliance has created a strategic mirage: Ottawa appears engaged in Arctic defence, but the burden is unfairly borne by those with the fewest resources and the highest exposure.

In effect, Canada’s Arctic is not treated as an equal part of Confederation, but as a frontier outpost whose primary function is surveillance and symbolic sovereignty. The political imagination to raise Arctic communities to the standard of living of rural southern Canada is absent. There is no serious nation-building project underway—no long-term vision to tie infrastructure, broadband, energy, healthcare, and education in the North to the national grid of opportunity.

The region is home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s richest reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security, given their importance in defense manufacturing and technology. Yet, the extraction and transportation of these resources are hampered by limited infrastructure that eludes further development due to lack of coordination and investment at all levels of government. While the Yukon Security Advisory Council can be a model for shared governance federal, territorial, and Indigenous jurisdictions overlap without coherent authority. The result is a bureaucratic bottleneck that limits response agility and accountability, especially in scenarios involving mass casualty events or foreign incursions below the threshold of war.

3. Misunderstanding the Arctic as a land- or maritime-centric domain, instead of a multidomain one.

Canada’s Arctic strategy remains anchored in a legacy mindset—fixated on land and maritime domains—while the battlespace has already expanded far beyond the ice and tundra. The Canadian Arctic is a multi-domain operating environment in the most rigorous sense: a crucible where air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains converge. Focusing primarily on ground mobility or maritime choke points is antiquated.

In an era defined by precision-guided conflict, gray zone incursions, and orbital competition, the North requires integrated deterrence across all domains. The space domain is already decisive; Russia and China have launched dual-use satellites optimized for polar reconnaissance, while Canada’s surveillance constellation remains limited and aging. Cyberspace, too, is an active front. Persistent foreign probing of Canada’s critical Arctic infrastructure—from power grids to fiber lines—underscores the need for zero-trust architectures and sovereign cyber capacity hardened against both disinformation and sabotage. The air domain, often overshadowed, remains underutilized despite offering cost-effective ISR opportunities via high-altitude, long-endurance drones and balloon-based sensors that can supplement space assets in degraded environments.

Canada must approach the Arctic as a multi-domain region. Infrastructure nodes at Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Inuvik must be conceived not as mere logistics hubs, but as permanent and staffed bases in a broader multi-domain lattice of deterrence. Airfields should be hardened, satellites shielded, networks encrypted, and data fused in real time. The resilience and infrastructure footprint must be multi-domain: ISR in orbit, radar on ice, seaborne logistics hubs, and hardened cyber networks. It might even be cheaper to establish and easier to maintain air-based sensors to augment space-based sensors, such as high-altitude, long-endurance drones and high-altitude balloons.

4. Missing the point that infrastructure spending enables both military and local resilience.

Canada’s policy frameworks fail to grasp a foundational truth: infrastructure is not ancillary to defence; it is defence. Roads, railways, hospitals, and power stations in the Arctic are bulwarks of resilience and lifelines to national unity. The harsh environment demands more than token outposts; it demands permanence that begins with infrastructure designed for both civilian and military pursuits.

Canada’s persistent underinvestment in Arctic infrastructure can be attributed largely to sticker shock. Building in the north is expensive at the outset, but those initial costs conceal long-term value. Roads, railways, and ports that facilitate the movement of Canadian forces and provide necessary infrastructure for local communities also enhance NATO mobility and resilience.

The Grays Bay Road and Port Project is unlikely to open before 2035. Until then, the Port of Churchill remains Canada’s only Arctic deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and even it is more than 800 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. The overland situation is equally stark. The long-considered Mackenzie Valley Highway remains unbuilt. Meant to replace unreliable winter roads and connect remote Arctic communities, the highway should be considered as a defense artery.

Moreover, the North needs cyber towers as much as radar domes; fibre optic cables as much as sonar arrays. Schools and post-secondary institutions—anchored by Arctic research centres—should be erected alongside hardened military installations to attract families, not just forces. In Alaska, the dual-use success of the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport provides a model: educational and aerospace ecosystems aligned with the broader security posture of the United States.

Still, there are signs of acceleration. The Department of National Defence has committed $230 million to extend the main runway at Inuvik Airport. The upgrades include modern lighting and arrestor systems—investments tailored for sustained military operations and a rare example of a concrete commitment in a domain often shaped by abstraction. Canada should build Arctic spaceports and drone launch facilities for persistent surveillance and communications dominance—assets that would likely qualify as defence expenditures under a broadened NATO definition. And that definition is evolving. With calls to raise the alliance-wide benchmark to five percent of GDP, the line between civil and military investment will blur. Forward-thinking allies are already redefining defence to include national resilience, critical infrastructure, and technological redundancy.

5. Failing to call out the need to achieve A2/AD capability.

Canada’s current Arctic strategy is more performative than purposeful. It remains anchored in rituals of presence rather than a doctrine of deterrence. The reasons are structural and cultural: A2/AD sounds too aggressive for a nation wedded to peacekeeping identity and constrained by intergovernmental jurisdictional frictions. But if Canada is to hold the Arctic, it must defend it—not merely inhabit it. That demands something Canada has never attempted: a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy adapted for the circumpolar battlespace.

A2/AD refers to the deployment of integrated capabilities that prevent an adversary from operating freely within a region. This includes long-range fires, persistent surveillance, advanced radar, cyber denial tools, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and air and maritime denial platforms. Canada does not mention A2/AD in its Arctic lexicon because it fears what it implies: that the North is no longer a sanctuary but a frontier. Building an Arctic A2/AD network would require political will, sustained investment, and a strategic mindset that accepts confrontation as a precondition for sovereignty. It would also provoke diplomatic risk—Russia would label such a move provocative, and China would test the perimeter with gray-zone maneuvers masked as scientific exploration or commercial navigation. Yet the absence of such a posture risks far greater cost: a hollow sovereignty, subject to erosion by increments.

Investments in some areas do not amount to A2/AD. True, Canada’s $38.6-billion commitment over twenty years to modernize NORAD is substantial. If fully implemented, this would be the largest reinvestment in continental defense since the early Cold War. Arctic over-the-horizon radar systems will track threats from the US-Canada border to the Arctic Circle. A more powerful polar variant will extend coverage into the Arctic archipelago and beyond. Crossbow—a classified network of advanced sensors—will supplement these systems with real-time precision. And the Defence Enhanced Surveillance for Space (DESSP) project will allow space-based tracking of adversary launch and maneuver capabilities. Canada has partnered with Australia on a next-generation Arctic early-warning detection system. But even these investments are insufficient; they do not achieve A2/AD in the Arctic. Canada has ISR blind spots, insufficient logistical depth, and infrastructure degraded by thawing permafrost. RADARSAT’s capabilities are aging; the Northwest Passage is functionally unmonitored. There is no cruise missile defense layer.

A Canadian A2/AD architecture would extend ISR reach from geostationary orbit to the ocean floor. At its core: Over-the-Horizon Radar (AOTHR), high-altitude drones, and advanced satellite constellations fused via a hardened C4ISR backbone. Any credible A2/AD structure must project deterrence not only northward but outward via NORAD, integrating seamlessly with allied efforts across the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the European High North.

Challenge and opportunity

We recommend the following six steps to shape decision-making vis-à-vis Canada’s Arctic. Addressing each of them is necessary for more resilient supply chains and robust infrastructure for defense of the Canadian Arctic.

1. Achieve enduring domestic political consensus.

Without sustained, bipartisan consensus on the strategic value of the Arctic, Canada’s northern policy will remain fragmented, underfunded, and vulnerable to reversal.

Canada should establish a nonpartisan Arctic Strategy Council, drawing on members from federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, as well as the private sector. This council could be modeled loosely on the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, with a standing mandate to oversee and report on Arctic development milestones.

To correct course, Parliament should adopt a minimum percentage of GDP for Arctic infrastructure and defense investments—similar to how NATO’s 2-percent defense spending benchmark frames national priorities. A 0.5-percent GDP floor specifically earmarked for Arctic readiness would send a powerful signal to allies, adversaries, and Canadians alike.

2. Build permanent bases and infrastructure.

Sovereignty requires presence. Canada cannot assert command over its northern territory while maintaining a transient, seasonal military posture.

Canada must develop at least two permanent Arctic bases by 2035 and reinforce the air infrastructures in Yellowknife. These installations should support multi-domain enablers: ground forces, drone squadrons, ISR satellites, and cyber defense detachments. One proposed location is Resolute Bay in Nunavut—a strategic logistics point halfway through the Northwest Passage. Another is Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, where the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway provides ground access to the Beaufort Sea.

Canada need not sacrifice environmental stewardship to bolster its dual-use infrastructure in the region. On the contrary, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a way to meet energy needs in a sustainable and flexible manner. These compact, deployable energy systems would enable off-grid installations to power radar stations, bases, and airstrips—allowing the Canadian Armed Forces to operate autonomously across a vast and power-starved frontier.

Canada can and should discover best practices in other nations and adopt to the fullest extent possible. The Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy is training a new generation in clean energy implementation, building the intellectual and technical foundation for sustainable Arctic energy systems. It is one example of innovation that can help make strides in the Arctic.

3. Reorient superclusters toward strategic innovation.

Canada’s innovation ecosystem is misaligned with its strategic realities.

To adapt, Canada must integrate Arctic operational challenges into supercluster mandates. The focus of these superclusters has strayed too far from core security imperatives, and redirecting their mandate toward the defense and security sector could allow Canada to reanimate its atrophied defense industrial base, stimulate Indigenous research and development, and provide a platform for strategic innovation drawn from academic and private-sector talent.

The Global Innovation Cluster for Advanced Manufacturing could sponsor development of modular Arctic housing for deployed forces. The Digital Technology Cluster could support remote communications networks hardened against magnetic interference. And the Protein Industries Cluster could help devise shelf-stable, high-calorie rations adapted to extreme environments.

Canada should establish a national challenge prize—modeled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge—to spur innovation in climate-resilient infrastructure, Arctic mobility, and remote power generation. Such efforts should be coordinated by a Defence Innovation Agency akin to the United Kingdom’s Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), ensuring alignment between technological output and operational need.

4. Integrate civil-military infrastructure.

Canada must adopt a whole-of-society approach to Arctic logistics—one that erases the line between civilian and military use.

Every kilometer of highway, every meter of runway, and every watt of power grid must serve dual purposes. Similarly, the Grays Bay Road and Port Project, which aims to connect the rich mineral fields of western Nunavut with the Northwest Passage, must be prioritized for its economic benefits and geopolitical value. Its completion would give Canada a second deepwater Arctic port—an essential node for resupply, power projection, and emergency response.

Meanwhile, the feasibility of Arctic spaceports must be considered thoughtfully. With global competition accelerating in polar orbit surveillance, Canada’s geography is a latent advantage. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are prime candidates for launching satellites into sun-synchronous and polar orbits, a domain critical for ISR.

5. Accelerate NORAD modernization and ISR integration.

Canada must modernize its Arctic surveillance and early-warning capabilities through the renewal of NORAD and deep integration of orbital, aerial, and terrestrial ISR platforms.

Canada must move decisively to modernize its contributions to NORAD and integrate a layered, multi-domain ISR architecture that meets the threats of the 21st century. The existing North Warning System (NWS)—a relic of the Cold War—is functionally obsolete. It is increasingly vulnerable to kinetic destruction, electronic warfare, and deception by adversaries leveraging hypersonic, low-flying, and space-enabled strike platforms. While Canada has acknowledged this through its stated commitment to over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and new space-based capabilities, progress has been halting, piecemeal, and under-resourced.

Canada should fast-track its involvement in key pillars of NORAD modernization alongside the United States by:

Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR): Advance procurement and installation of Arctic-facing OTHR systems based in Labrador and Nunavut to create a persistent early-warning envelope stretching across the polar approaches. These systems must be hardened against electromagnetic disruption and integrated into NORAD’s command-and-control nodes in real time.
Ballistic Missile Defence and the Golden Dome: Canada must shed outdated policy inhibitions and join the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture. A Canadian contribution to a “Golden Dome” over North America—built on Aegis Ashore components, ship-based interceptors, and ground-based midcourse defence systems—would reinforce deterrence and mitigate the strategic vacuum currently inviting adversary escalation. Participation in the US Missile Defense Review and integration into layered BMD command structures should begin immediately.
Space and High-Altitude ISR: The integration of RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) assets with Gray Jay microsatellites must be complemented by investment in high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, stratospheric balloons, and commercial space partnerships. Persistent polar orbit surveillance is not a luxury—it is the sinew of a sovereign Canadian deterrent.

A modern NORAD without a full Canadian partner is a NORAD weakened in scope, credibility, and political cohesion. In an age of hypersonics, space militarization, and AI-driven surveillance, Canada’s northern shield must be not just symbolic but steel-wrought—an active, intelligent barrier underpinned by the best minds and machines the alliance can field. The window to shape this future is closing fast. Canada must step forward now, not as a follower, but as a co-architect of North America’s defence.

6. Integrate the Arctic with broader national and allied defense postures.

Canada’s Arctic strategy must not be treated in isolation.

Canada must integrate its Arctic strategy into a broader, assertive national defence posture—one that acknowledges the indivisibility of Canadian sovereignty and its responsibilities as a G7 power. The Arctic is not a separate theatre, but the forward glacis of the North American fortress. What begins as radar coverage over Baffin Bay ends in deterrence posture from Vilnius to the Taiwan Strait. Canadian defence policy must therefore harmonize Arctic readiness with strategic power projection abroad, ensuring the nation can respond decisively to threats—whether they emerge from the Beaufort Sea, the Black Sea, or the South China Sea.

The Arctic remains critical—but it is not Canada’s only defence priority. A myopic focus on the North risks undermining broader global responsibilities. Canada must project credible force across multiple domains and theatres. That means integrating Arctic surveillance—through over-the-horizon radar, low Earth orbit satellite constellations, and AI-driven ISR—directly into NORAD’s early warning lattice. These capabilities must be interoperable with US Northern Command, NATO’s Arctic flank, and allied sensors in the Indo-Pacific. Surveillance is not enough; it must be paired with striking power and forward basing.

Strategic mobility and offensive reach are essential. Arctic airbases must be upgraded to sustain F-35 squadrons year-round, with rapid deployment capabilities for long-range precision fires and mobile expeditionary forces. Arctic-class naval platforms should anchor presence and power projection into contested waters, with the logistical depth to pivot between the Arctic archipelago and Pacific choke points. Canadian-built UAVs and high-altitude drones should patrol both the Northwest Passage and Western Pacific, forming a twin-hemisphere presence. Above all, Canada must act as a sovereign Arctic nation capable of defending its territory, while remaining a credible contributor to the rules-based international order. The Arctic is the crucible, but Canada’s responsibilities—and its enemies—do not stop at the pole.

Canada’s Arctic infrastructure and supply chain resilience are foundational components to its basic expression of sovereignty. But the future of the Arctic belongs to those who show up first and endure longest. The question is not whether Canada can afford Arctic sovereignty, but whether it can afford its absence.

About the authors

Jeff Reynolds is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Acknowledgements

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defense and Security (MINDS) program.

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UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 May 2025 21:46:50 +0000

Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, according to a new report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The report comes following an extensive investigation into a campaign of Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian civilians over a ten-month period beginning in July 2024, with the probe focusing on an area of southern Ukraine stretching more than 100 kilometers along the right bank of the Dnipro River around the city of Kherson.

Members of the UN Commission determined that Russia was engaged in the deliberate targeting of civilians and concluded that the drone attacks were “widespread, systematic, and conducted as part of a coordinated state policy.” The report detailed how civilians were targeted “in various circumstances, mainly when they were outdoors, both on foot or while using any type of vehicles,” and noted that on a number of occasions ambulances had been struck by drones in an apparent bid to prevent them from reaching victims and providing vital medical assistance.

During the ten-month period covered by the United Nations probe, Russian drones killed almost 150 Ukrainian civilians in and around Kherson, while leaving hundreds more injured. The constant threat of attack has created a pervasive climate of fear throughout the region, with people afraid to leave their homes. Terrified locals say they feel hunted and refer to the drone attacks as a “human safari.”

In addition to daily drone strikes, Russia has sought to maximize the psychological pressure on residents of the Kherson region via social media channels. UN investigators reported that video footage of drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians is regularly disseminated on Russian Telegram channels, some of which have thousands of subscribers. This video footage shows drone strikes along with the resulting deaths and destruction in the style of video games, often accompanied by background music. Meanwhile, menacing messages posted on Telegram call on Ukrainians to flee the region. “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die,” read one message quoted in the UN report.

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This is not the first time UN investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine. A March 2025 UN report reached a similar conclusion regarding the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. “The evidence gathered led the Commission to conclude that the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity,” the report stated.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a number of arrest warrants for senior Russian officials in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine including the targeted bombing of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure. The most high-profile ICC arrest warrant is for Vladimir Putin himself, who is wanted for his alleged involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

At least 20,000 Ukrainian children are believed to have been kidnapped since the start of the full-scale invasion and taken to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. The nature and scale of these mass abductions may qualify as an act of genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

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Russia’s deadly “human safari” drone campaign against the civilian population in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is part of the Kremlin’s strategy to make the area unlivable. The city of Kherson was occupied by the advancing Russian army during the first days of the full-scale invasion and was officially annexed by Russia in September 2022. However, Kherson and the surrounding area were liberated by the Ukrainian military soon after. The scenes of joy that accompanied the liberation of Kherson were deeply humiliating for Putin, who had personally proclaimed the city to be “forever” Russian just weeks earlier.

This setback forced Putin’s invading army to retreat across the Dnipro River, creating a major physical obstacle for the Russian invasion and limiting the occupied zone of Ukraine to the eastern half of the country. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to insist that Kherson and the surrounding region are now part of the Russian Federation and must be handed over within the framework of a future peace deal.

Ukraine has completely ruled out any such concessions. This is hardly surprising. While some temporary territorial compromises may prove possible during peace negotiations, Ukraine’s stance on Kherson is unlikely to change. After all, allowing the renewed Russian occupation of Kherson would be suicidal for Kyiv. It would present Russia with a priceless foothold across the Dnipro River that could be used as a gateway to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and complete the conquest of the country.

For now, Russia appears to have little chance of seizing Kherson militarily or of acquiring the city at the negotiating table. Instead, Moscow seems to be intent on terrorizing local residents and forcing them to flee. Putin claims that the population of the Kherson region are Russians, but he has no qualms about his soldiers using drones to hunt and kill them mercilessly. This tells you all you need to know about Putin’s cynical posturing as the protector of the Russian people in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

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Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

To combat the Taliban’s institutionalization of gender apartheid in Afghanistan, international actors and civil society groups should document both the regime’s human rights abuses and the system of lawmaking and law enforcement that produces them. Documentation strategies should be geared toward supporting ongoing cases at international courts and catalyzing further accountability processes. An international investigative mechanism, modeled on the United Nations’ (UN) International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM), can help to hold the Taliban accountable for implementing gender apartheid and the specific rules and tools they use to maintain that system.

From constitutional order to rule by executive fiat

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the legitimacy and legality of the Afghan state were vested in the 2004 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which served as the supreme law of the country for seventeen years.

The Constitution was preceded by a Constitutional Loya Jirga or “grand council,” held in 2003, and was approved by consensus in January 2004. It provided an overarching legal framework for the relationship between the Afghan government and Afghan citizens and stipulated a set of constitutional principles and rights, such as separation of powers, due process of law, freedom from persecution, and freedom of expression.

In the new order created by the Taliban, by contrast, there is no constitution or equivalent supreme law. Laws and regulations are issued by the Taliban’s leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, by his leadership council, and by a host of public officials and religious authorities in an ad hoc manner. Sometimes they take the form of written decrees, such as the “Virtue and Vice” law, but often they are only issued verbally. For example, officials from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice set the law in declarations and conference speeches, while clerics do so in sermons—bypassing any formal process of lawmaking and ignoring basic requirements that laws must be general, prospective, clear, and stable.

Lawmaking and law enforcement as instruments of control and oppression

In the absence of a constitutional framework that anchors the legal order, regulates the exercise of state power, and protects the rights of citizens, Taliban law draws on a range of other sources. They include extremist religious ideology rooted in a rigid—and contested—interpretation of Sharia law, which has been influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, as well as patriarchal tribal norms and practices.

These sources inform and justify the system of control and oppression of women that has emerged and expanded under Taliban rule, which includes bans and restrictions on women’s education, employment, and a range of fundamental rights and freedoms. While the system is built on a multiplicity of verbal and written decrees and directives, the Taliban is aware that its effectiveness depends on more systematic codification and consolidation. This may explain the broad remit of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law, which, inter alia:

Bans women from travelling without a male guardian and denies them access to parks, gyms, and other public spaces.
Requires women to cover their faces and bodies in public; for example, Article 13(8) stipulates: “If an adult woman leaves her home for an essential need, she must cover her voice, face, and body.”
Declares that women’s voices are awrah (private), which means that women should not be heard in public.

The law’s sweeping, vague language gives the Taliban broad discretionary powers to interpret its provisions, creating ample space for abuses. Article 17, for example, requires media outlets to adhere to religious guidelines, prohibiting any content that may be deemed contrary to Sharia law, without clarifying what that means in practice. Taliban forces are tasked with ensuring compliance with the law—especially by women—and violations are punished with warnings, fines, flogging, and imprisonment. Article 17 gives them broad surveillance and enforcement powers: “Taliban forces are present in markets, streets, universities, offices, and public transportation to ensure that people, particularly women, comply with the imposed laws.”

Such provisions of the “Virtue and Vice” law have further strengthened the core characteristics of law enforcement under the Taliban. An array of authorities—Taliban officials and forces, imams, and other religious figures—are exercising broad discretionary powers to enforce a growing number of vaguely defined rules in arbitrary ways, free from due process constraints and safeguards such as judicial review. Any attempt to resist or circumvent the regime’s bans and restrictions is met with a brutal response, often involving punishment on the spot. Human rights groups have publicized several cases of female activists being detained, disappeared, or killed for protesting Taliban laws. They have documented cases of women getting arrested for secretly teaching young girls and have reported on women being flogged for minor infringements and entire families being ostracized or punished for resisting Taliban edicts. The “Virtue and Vice” law reinforced this brutal system of arbitrary law enforcement with new written edicts that Taliban authorities could use to justify human rights abuses.

Pushing back on gender apartheid: Documentation and accountability strategies

Afghan women are already living in a system of pervasive control and oppression that is best described as gender apartheid. Left unchecked, the Taliban will further institutionalize and entrench that system, making it even more difficult to challenge and reverse in the future. International actors—including international organizations, concerned states, human rights groups, and Afghans in the diaspora—must take appropriate steps to prevent that outcome.

Documentation and accountability strategies offer a path forward. Documenting human rights abuses is critical but given their widespread and systematic character, it must be complimented with documentation of Taliban lawmaking and law enforcement—the rules and practices that produce these abuses. And it must involve structural investigations to show how egregious abuses of power and human rights violations are not byproducts of the system of gender apartheid in Afghanistan but are rather its very means and ends, central to maintaining the system.

Building robust documentation can support ongoing accountability processes and initiatives, such as the case against the Taliban at the International Criminal Court for gender persecution as a crime against humanity. It can also strengthen an anticipated case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In January, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada announced that they intend to sue the Taliban at the ICJ for gross violations of women’s rights, invoking the interjurisdictional clause of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The experiences of other countries affected by widespread and systematic repression and human rights abuses suggest that documentation efforts can open other, potentially unforeseen pathways to accountability—when such efforts are scaled up and institutionalized. Afghanistan needs an international investigative mechanism modeled on the IIIM for Syria. The Syrian IIIM was established by the UN General Assembly—bypassing the Security Council—and has contributed to a spike in universal jurisdiction prosecutions of Syrian offenders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

An IIIM for Afghanistan can serve both as a catalyst and repository for gender apartheid documentation. It can also help build structural investigations and prepare criminal cases for prosecution when jurisdictions are able and willing to take up such cases in the future. This would create a vital resource and build momentum for the growing movement to criminalize gender apartheid in international law and ensure that its architects are held to account.

Wesna Saidy is a poet and researcher with a degree in law and political science, focusing on human rights and gender justice in Afghanistan. She is a fellow at the Civic Engagement Project focusing on documentation.

Iavor Rangelov, PhD, is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and has extensive experience with documentation, justice, and accountability strategies in the Balkans, Central Asia, East Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post How the Taliban is using law for gender apartheid, and how to push back appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Metzl featured on Fox News on antisemitism, student visa policy, and US competitiveness

bgalicia — Thu, 29 May 2025 12:17:55 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow for Technology and National Security

On May 29, Jamie Metzl, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, appeared on Fox News’ Brian Kilmeade Show to discuss antisemitism on college campuses and the Trump administration’s student visa policies. He argued that policymakers must address the rise of malign influence on US campuses while ensuring that universities remain engines of economic growth by supporting cutting-edge scientific and technological research. Metzl’s segment begins at 12:25.

Fellow

Jamie Metzl

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Technologies

The post Metzl featured on Fox News on antisemitism, student visa policy, and US competitiveness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Metzl discusses US student visa policy on CNN’s NewsNight

bgalicia — Thu, 29 May 2025 11:56:00 +0000

On May 29, Jamie Metzl, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, appeared on CNN’s NewsNight with Abby Phillip to discuss US visa policy. He emphasized the importance of thoroughly vetting individuals entering the country while also highlighting the need to retain top global talent. Metzl noted that doing so is critical to maintaining US competitiveness, particularly in the context of growing strategic competition with China, which he described as a new “cold war.”

Fellow

Jamie Metzl

Nonresident Senior Fellow for Technology and National Security

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Technologies

The post Metzl discusses US student visa policy on CNN’s NewsNight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sectarianism, social media, and Syria’s information blackhole

Gregory Waters and Kayla Koontz — Wed, 28 May 2025 19:07:06 +0000

The first state-sponsored television news channel to air in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime went live on May 5th, opening with a panel discussion between the governor of Suwayda and two prominent Druze leaders on the governorate’s ongoing security crisis. The launch of al-Ikhbariya is one small step in building back communication channels on security and governance across the country, but much more work must be done.

Since Assad’s December ousting, Syrians have struggled to sift the truth from fake claims about security incidents across the country and to find accurate information about local and central government decisions.

Under the Assad regime, all official media were state-run, overtly political, and heavily censored. Most Syrians instead relied on Facebook to obtain local news and avoid censorship. But since the regime’s collapse, many Syrians have struggled to keep up with current events, official decrees, and local news. Absent any clear official new channels, most Syrians turned to social media to fill the information void. This reliance on social media has predictably resulted in rampant misinformation and disinformation across the country. The flood of unverified news has been exploited by foreign actors as well, further exacerbating sectarian conflict and fears.

Nowhere is this more impactful than in Syria’s Alawite-majority coast—the minority group to which the Assad family belongs. These communities have, since December 8, relied on social media to both raise awareness of and look for sectarian crimes committed by civilians and security forces affiliated with the new government. But this ecosystem was immediately flooded with false and misleading claims of massacres and international intervention, bolstered by real events and confusing statements by the transitional authorities. All of this fueled panic and confusion even before the March 6 insurgent uprising and Alawite massacres that killed more than 1600 security forces and Sunni and Alawite civilians. Without access to a consistent stream of reliable news, Syrians of all sects have adopted divergent narratives of major security events and struggle to understand the diplomatic positions of foreign countries or assess their own security status in their regions. This uncertainty also extends to all details of the transitional, and now interim, government’s policies and security forces.

Utilizing two weeks of fieldwork across the coast and consistent monitoring and analysis of Syrian social media before and after the fall of the regime, this report provides anecdotal evidence of the issues and effects of the information ecosystem in Syria. This research followed a more loosely structured two weeks of fieldwork in the same areas in mid-February. Through this, three common themes of information sharing have emerged:

Social media dominates the information ecosystem, from rumor mills to international misinformation campaigns.
Locals and officials have utilized WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages to fill the communication void, but they have still failed to create clear lines of official communication.
The media void has fueled fear, hatred, and sparked instability over security uncertainty. Parallel narratives of the current security situation have created further sectarian divisions.

“The biggest problem is Facebook”

In the nearly two decades since Facebook’s creation, the social media platform has evolved into thousands of community, group, and celebrity pages that often compete for followers and daily traffic. Facebook’s algorithms often promote these high-traffic, generic ‘news’ pages over more accurate, smaller-traffic local news pages, flooding Syrians with unverified clickbait-style news.

Facebook has for years been Syria’s dominant social media and news platform, a crucial medium for sharing information about and calling attention to crimes occurring in their communities. Misinformation was widespread from the revolution’s earliest days in 2011, and similar trends were quickly apparent in the chaos of the regime’s collapse.

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For example, local Salamiyah community pages quoted a General Security official on May 8, saying, “We urge our fellow citizens to exercise caution and refrain from engaging with any fake accounts or pages and to rely only on the official channels issued by the Ministry of Interior to disseminate security news and information.”

When asked how locals along Syria’s Alawite-majority coast accessed news about their region, the response was a resounding accordance of: “social media.”

A Syrian Alawite family rides on a truck to return home, in Latakia, Syria, March 13, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Each governorate, village, and even neighborhood has experienced the fall of the regime and developments differently. Local news, perhaps even more so than national news, carries important implications for local safety, access to services, and impacts on daily life. For instance, information about the violence perpetrated by both the insurgents and the pro-government factions on March 6 became vital for survival, but fake claims muddied real events as everyone turned to social media for answers.

For many Alawites, all of these claims were taken together to prove the extent of a “genocide” against them in the aftermath of Assad’s fall. But as the fake claims were disproven, they became evidence for many Sunnis that the real deaths of Alawite civilians and crimes by pro-government forces must have also been faked. As a result, the two communities today have completely separate narratives of that week, and many attempts at interfaith dialogues since have devolved into debates over the basic facts.

One woman in Latakia put it simply: “The biggest problem is Facebook,” she told us.

The media environment in March was a microcosm of how fake news had been used since Assad’s downfall to push divergent realities between the pro and anti-new government communities. But this misinformation goes beyond local initiatives and rumors.

Recent investigations by the BBC, Arabi Post, Verify-Sy, and the German Marshall Fund have also underscored the role of foreign media campaigns backed by Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah to push sectarian narratives and fake news onlinee, including the rumors that Maher al-Assad was returning to the coast with the Russian army at his back, ready to reclaim Syria.

And as real violence against Alawites escalated in Homs in January and February, this disinformation ensured that Alawites in other areas like Latakia and Tartous, which had not seen any considerable violations, remained confused and terrified about their future safety. Promises from pro-Assad Alawite networks of an imminent international intervention by the United States, France, Israel, or the United Nations to either reassert Assad in Damascus or carve out an “Alawite Coastal State” were used to widen support for the growing anti-Damascus insurgent movement, culminating in widespread support or neutrality for the insurgent attacks in March.

A Christian businessman from Safita recalled the Maher rumor, pointing to the Alawite villages surrounding the city: “That night you could hear gunfire from every village here, they all believed he was returning and celebrated.” Other locals told the authors at the time how their Facebook feed had suddenly become full of Alawites threatening revenge on coastal Sunnis for opposing Assad. As a local from a village outside Tartous recalled, when the rumors began, gunshots were heard throughout the Khirbet al-Mazzah region, convincing the local General Security forces that they would soon come under attack. As the confusion threatened to escalate into armed conflict, Alawites in the village sheltered the security forces in their homes until the morning, ensuring the area remained calm.

Struggling official channels of communication

These social media rumors and foreign media campaigns spread fear and confusion across Syria’s minority regions by exploiting both the real sectarian violations and the government’s lack of official news channels. For its part, the new government has made some initial attempts to spread information about municipal news, but still struggles greatly at relaying clear security-related statements or establishing effective two-way communication channels so locals can clarify rumors.

The Tartous and Latakia Governorate Facebook pages, which were formed in mid-December 2024 and appear to be run by government employees, regularly post updates of meetings and activities conducted across the governorate. Yet these pages have relatively few followers, are overshadowed by much higher traffic privately-run pages, and do not resolve the fears of those who already distrust the government. The majority of people, when asked where they get official government news from, made no mention of such pages, instead relying on word of mouth and their own online networks.

It all leads to one question. As a Christian in Safita asked, “Who represents the government?”

Official communication for security issues is even more opaque.

While there is one official Ministry of Interior page, for example, there are dozens of Facebook pages that claim to represent the General Security Services, with no way to discern any of their affiliations.

Regardless, a single Ministry of Interior page does not address the vast majority of Syrians’ needs: detailed and up-to-date information on security issues. This is not just a problem of clear government communication, but also a lack of two-way communication, allowing locals to check rumors or events witnessed in their towns.

To address this, local officials in the cities of Latakia and Tartous created multiple WhatsApp groups to directly connect their communities to security and administrative officials on security developments.

A business owner in Latakia city who was among the first invited to the group claimed the system “was very useful in the early days of the new administration because of the rise in crime.” Residents will text in reports about robberies or suspicious activity, and security forces will respond in a timelier manner than when using phone lines, which he claimed were always busy. These groups have also become a central means for regional officials to disseminate news.

However, in Tartous, a female activist stated that the WhatsApp groups were almost entirely composed of men and were capped at four hundred people. As she wasn’t included in that limit, she would have to reach out to others to get information from or to the channel. The business owner from Latakia also voiced concerns about the size of the group, saying that some people were clogging the chat with non-security-related comments and would then have to be removed from the group by moderators.

While this approach improves some communication, many criticize this improvised system: “Why is an official decree distributed in a WhatsApp channel?” asks a Sunni activist in Tartous.

Confusion about official policies of the government, such as the settlement process for ex-regime soldiers, rules around civil society, curfews, and checkpoints, has forced many to lie low and wait anxiously for clarity. As a priest in Suqlabiyah stated, locals come to him with questions about what makes a war criminal: “There is confusion about who is going to be detained or killed.”

The rift between realities

In Latakia, some Sunnis who spoke with the authors were unsure what to think about the news of the massacres on the coast. They don’t know or perhaps don’t want to know if civilians were killed. Meanwhile, in Baniyas, many survivors argue that there were no insurgents in the city, but rather it began with a government-sanctioned slaughter. These conflicting realities continue to be fought online, but the Facebook quarrels have real-life consequences.

During the long years of Syria’s civil war, many regions became isolated and rooted in their local realities of struggle. As al-Sharaa’s forces seized the country, many were optimistic, though they knew little of his government in Idlib. However, as the new government settled in and in light of the violence on the coast and elsewhere, the initial hope has faded into distrust and confusion. Those interviewed had more questions than answers about the various security forces and their origins, the factions from the north, life in Idlib under al-Sharaa’s militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the ideology of the current government, and the conditions in nearby governorates.

Officials are deeply aware of this—one security officer in Qadmus told us that “combatting fear is a major issue.”

This uncertainty about the future has heightened sectarianism based on the regime’s careful weaponization of Syria’s demographic makeup. Fear of military checkpoints has further isolated many Alawites, while Facebook rumors about roving foreign fighters and factions committing daily crimes against Alawites have prevented most from engaging with local security officials. Distrust in the government, in hand with their resounding silence on the specifics of the events of March 6, has left Syrians to piece together their own narratives, further separating the country into distinct realities.

Reconstructing the Syrian information ecosystem

Breaking Syria from Facebook’s grasp will not be easy or quick. However, the Syrian authorities and international organizations can take several steps to help begin the process.

First, ensuring that the March 6 Investigation Committee releases an accurate and uncensored report on the events of that week will go a long way towards bridging a trust gap between the Sunni and Alawite narratives, as most Sunnis who denied the deaths of Alawite civilians also told the authors that they would accept whatever conclusion the committee came to.

Second, expanding civil communication networks will help foster more accurate and effective local news systems. This can include both word-of-mouth via civil councils that engage with local officials, as well as local journalists on Facebook. Expanding these systems requires funding support from the international community and clear authorization from Damascus to ensure local civil networks do not face any risk of legal troubles.

Third, expanding official government media channels to include local security announcements, such as curfews, deployments, and patrols, and, importantly, addressing any violations or crimes rumored to have been committed by security forces.

Lastly, international organizations should increase funding for local media outlets, especially those engaged in fact-checking and who demonstrate professional standards in what they share. Helping existing journalists organize into new institutions with websites outside of Facebook will further bolster their credibility and reach.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive and an independent analyst whose research focuses on the development and reform of security institutions, local governance initiatives, and sectarian relations.

Kayla Koontz is a PhD candidate at the Carter School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a researcher at the Syrian Archive.

The post Sectarianism, social media, and Syria’s information blackhole appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mickey goes to the Gulf: The UAE’s wish upon a soft power star

Amit Yarom — Wed, 28 May 2025 13:12:13 +0000

In a historic move that blends fantasy with foreign policy, the Walt Disney Company has announced its first theme park in the Middle East: Disneyland Abu Dhabi.

The park is set to be developed with Abu Dhabi-based Miral on Yas Island. It will be Disney’s seventh global resort, its first new resort in over fifteen years, and its most technologically advanced. Positioned within a four-hour flight of one-third of the world’s population, including markets in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the park represents more than a commercial expansion—this is no simple tale of castles, rides, and performances.

As Disney CEO Robert A. Iger noted, the park will be “authentically Disney and distinctly Emirati”.

Disneyland Abu Dhabi is best understood as a strategic milestone in the United Arab Emirates’ soft power playbook: a carefully choreographed effort to rebrand the country’s global image and elevate its influence through culture, education, and international partnerships, rather than through coercive means. The UAE seeks to downplay its reputation as “Little Sparta,” known for throwing its weight around in the region in places like Yemen, where the UAE’s military role is blamed for heightening divisions in that country and prolonging the civil war. It also signals deepening ties with the United States, projecting trust amid shifting regional alliances.

Soft power by design

The concept of “soft power”, coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, refers to a nation’s ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion. It’s about shaping preferences by “winning hearts and minds”. In the twenty-first century, culture, branding, and narrative have become as critical to international influence as military assets or economic might.

The UAE was one of the first Gulf countries to recognize this shift and institutionalize it. In 2017, it launched a national Soft Power Strategy aimed at enhancing the country’s reputation and extending its influence overseas. The strategy outlined a comprehensive approach, leveraging economic success, cultural heritage, humanitarian aid, and a commitment to tolerance to construct an appealing and recognizable national brand.

“Our goal is to engrain the UAE’s position in the world, and in people’s hearts”, explained H.H. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed at the strategy’s unveiling.

Few initiatives embody this strategy as vividly as Disneyland Abu Dhabi.

The UAE’s leadership sees cultural infrastructure not merely as a tourism booster but as a pillar of national soft power. Hosting a Disney park sends a clear message: The UAE is safe, modern, and family-friendly, trusted enough to house one of the world’s most iconic entertainment institutions.

This blending of Disney magic with local Emirati culture speaks to the UAE’s strategic intent to localize Western symbols of culture while showcasing its own heritage. The location is no accident either: Yas Island is already home to big-name theme parks: Warner Bros. World, Ferrari World, and SeaWorld Abu Dhabi.

Beyond oil: A new national brand

Behind the soft power lies a very concrete strategic imperative: economic diversification. Like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE faces a future in which oil revenues alone can no longer sustain national growth. However, it has moved earlier and more decisively in its effort to transition from a hydrocarbon economy to one based on knowledge and services.

Expanding the leisure and tourism sectors is central to that vision. These sectors attract foreign income, create jobs, and strengthen non-oil sectors. The UAE has identified tourism and the creative economy as key pillars for a sustainable future, and Disneyland ticks all those boxes.

An undated artist’s rendering shows a Disney theme park resort which the Walt Disney Company and Miral plan to construct in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

These projects also have a domestic dimension as instruments of legitimacy. For the Emirati leadership, ventures like Disneyland help reinforce a social contract at home: the ruling family delivers ever-greater prosperity, pride, and global recognition, and in return, the public acquiesces to their unelected governance.

In that sense, Disneyland is not just an economic asset, but a tool of statecraft.

Building a cultural hub: From Louvre to Disneyland

Over the past decade, the UAE has transformed a once-empty stretch of sand into a “branded entertainment Mecca”. Disneyland Abu Dhabi is the latest addition to a growing portfolio of landmarks that position the country as a global hub for arts, dialogue, and innovation.

The 2017 opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi, the first Louvre outside France, marked a milestone in cultural diplomacy, made possible by Emirati funding and a landmark agreement with Paris. Nearby, the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, set to be the largest of its kind, is under construction, further anchoring Saadiyat Island’s status as a beacon of global art tourism.

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The UAE has also positioned itself as a crossroads of religious and cultural dialogue. In 2019, during the country’s “Year of Tolerance”, Abu Dhabi hosted Pope Francis for a historic mass. In 2023, it inaugurated the Abrahamic Family House, a single complex housing a mosque, church, and synagogue. Dubai’s Expo 2020, which drew over twenty-four million visits and brought together 192 countries under the theme “Connecting Minds, Creating the Future”, further reinforced the UAE’s brand as a meeting point of civilizations and ideas.

These projects also carry implicit diplomatic weight. Hosting globally recognized institutions strengthens bilateral relationships and signals strategic alignment. The French government’s support for the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the US presence through NYU Abu Dhabi endorses the Emirati vision and its capacity to serve as a trusted cultural and knowledge partner.

US-Emirati relations: trust and verify

The arrival of Disneyland in Abu Dhabi carries symbolic weight for US-UAE relations. For decades, the UAE has been one of Washington’s closest regional partners, hosting US troops and welcoming major US investments.

Yet the relationship has faced moments of strain. In 2021, former US President Joe Biden’s administration paused a $23 billion arms deal, including F-35 fighter jets, citing concerns about the UAE’s role in Yemen and its growing ties with China, particularly through Huawei’s 5G technology. In response, Emirati officials questioned US reliability and reportedly explored Chinese defense alternatives.

Still, both countries have taken steps to reaffirm trust. In September 2024, Biden designated the UAE a “Major Defense Partner”, a title previously granted only to India. The move signaled renewed strategic alignment and paved the way for closer cooperation on advanced technology and security.

In this context, Disney’s expansion into the Emirates carries significance beyond business. A flagship American brand is staking its future on the UAE as a stable and profitable partner. This is a soft power gesture that strengthens cultural ties and introduces a new generation of visitors to an American-inflected vision of the Gulf. Ultimately, it underscores that enduring alliances are built not only on shared interests but also on shared experiences.

A contest of charisma

Abu Dhabi’s Disney deal doesn’t occur in a vacuum; it’s part of a wider regional race for soft power among the Gulf’s wealthiest monarchies: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

Just as Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project positions the Kingdom as a futuristic Disneyland, Abu Dhabi anchors the UAE’s claim to cultural openness and tourism supremacy.

Qatar has long leveraged its global media platforms, most notably Al Jazeera, alongside its major investments in sports diplomacy, including the landmark 2022 FIFA World Cup, to project a narrative of innovation to global audiences. Saudi Arabia, under the banner of “Vision 2030”, is undergoing a rapid soft power transformation of its own, emphasizing heritage tourism, mega-projects like NEOM and Qiddiya, and the hosting of international cultural and sporting events to reshape its image and diversify its economy.

What sets the UAE apart is the early institutionalization and coherence of its soft power strategy. Qatar’s media strategy often amplifies contentious political narratives and maintains affiliations with radical movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and Saudi Arabia’s reforms are very much ventures in progress. The UAE, on the other hand, has adopted a non-confrontational, globally inclusive narrative. Its soft power posturing is framed around these non-confrontational values: tolerance, intercultural dialogue, and sustainability, making its image more relatable and exportable to international audiences. Crucially, the UAE aims not only to attract attention but to project long-term reliability, a prized trait in an increasingly volatile region.

The results are telling: according to the 2025 Brand Finance index, the UAE ranks 10th globally in soft power, well ahead of Saudi Arabia and Qatar and even surpassing several global powers such as Russia and South Korea. More than mere rivalry, this signals a broader Gulf rebranding trend—one in which soft power is no longer a luxury but a strategic necessity for geopolitical resilience in the post-oil era.

Risks and realities

Of course, not everything is enchanted.

Theme parks in the Gulf have historically underperformed financially, and Disneyland’s presence won’t erase expected concerns over labor conditions in the UAE, particularly with regard to migrant workers, who make up 88 percent of the country’s population. Critics may accuse Disney of whitewashing this reality, echoing similar debates about its operations in China.

But soft power doesn’t require perfection; it requires attraction, and few countries have embraced this insight as effectively as the UAE.

Whether this strategy will yield enduring geopolitical “happily ever afters” remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: in a region often defined by hard power rivalries, Abu Dhabi has chosen to compete through visibility, credibility, and imagination.

And who better than Mickey Mouse to help carry that message?

Amit Yarom is an incoming graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a foreign policy expert and researcher, specializing in the Arabian Gulf.

The post Mickey goes to the Gulf: The UAE’s wish upon a soft power star appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia is extinguishing all traces of Ukrainian identity in occupied Ukraine

Kateryna Odarchenko — Tue, 27 May 2025 20:39:21 +0000

In recent months, US-led efforts to initiate a Russia-Ukraine peace process have focused primarily on the issue of potential Ukrainian territorial concessions. But as negotiating teams discuss technical details and draw lines on maps, almost no attention is being paid to the desperate plight of the millions of Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the Russian authorities are seeking to consolidate their control by eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity while imposing a reign of terror on the civilian population. If these Russian occupation policies are allowed to pass unchallenged in the international arena, it will set a disastrous precedent for the use of force against civilians and the weaponization of national identity in other contested regions globally.

From the very first days of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, it was clear that Russia intended to entrench itself firmly in occupied regions of Ukraine. Russian troops often arrived armed with lists of local community leaders including elected officials, journalists, activists, religious figures, and military veterans. Those who refused to cooperate were likely to be detained before disappearing into a vast network of Russian prisons and camps.

Ukrainian detainees are being systematically subjected to torture and other human rights abuses, according to an international investigation led by the French group Forbidden Stories together with thirteen media outlets including Britain’s Guardian newspaper, the Washington Post, and Le Monde. While it is not possible to calculate exactly how many Ukrainian civilians have been abducted in the occupied regions, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity.

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Those who remain in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control face a regime of forced russification encompassing everything from language and the media to education and religion. Place names have been changed to reflect the new Russian realities, with the curriculum in local schools transformed in line with the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian imperial dogmas. Parents who attempt to shield their children from classroom indoctrination are being threatened with loss of custody.

Ukrainian residents in the occupied regions of the country have also come under increasing pressure from the Kremlin to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to take a Russian passport risks losing access to a range of essential services including healthcare. They also face restrictions on property rights along with the ability to run a business and use banking services.

This passport campaign has intensified significantly in recent months, with Russian President Vladimir Putin issuing a decree announcing that Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have until September 2025 to accept Russian citizenship or face possible deportation from their own homes. Understandably, Moscow’s ruthless tactics are proving difficult to resist. Kremlin officials claim that by March 2025, Russian passports had been issued to approximately 3.5 million people in occupied Ukraine.

Moscow is accused of engaging in religious persecution throughout the occupied regions, with all Christian denominations other that the Kremlin-linked Russian Orthodox Church facing various degrees of restrictive measures and oppression. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials stated in spring 2025 that the Russian occupation authorities have killed dozens of clergy members over the past three years while damaging or destroying hundreds of churches.

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Russia has been careful to prevent information about conditions in occupied Ukraine from reaching the outside world. All independent media sources have been shut down throughout the occupied regions, and have been replaced by new Kremlin-controlled outlets. Individual journalists have frequently been among those targeted for oppressive measures including physical abuse and imprisonment.

One of the few reporters to shed light on the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine was Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who visited areas under occupation on multiple occasions before being captured by the Russian authorities in summer 2023. Roshchyna died after a year in Russian captivity. When her body was returned to Ukraine in early 2025, it showed signs of torture.

From a military standpoint, it may not currently be feasible to liberate all of the Ukrainian regions held by Moscow. Nevertheless, the crimes being committed by the Kremlin in occupied Ukraine are unprecedented in modern European history and cannot be ignored.

It is vital that the human rights of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation feature prominently in any peace process. This includes the rights of those currently being held in Russian jails. Ukraine’s Western partners must maintain or increase sanctions pressure, while also expanding support for Ukrainian civil society and raising awareness about Russia’s actions among international audiences.

Looking ahead, longer term investments are also needed to help document war crimes and support Ukrainian victims of the Russian occupation. Ultimately, the most meaningful response to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian identity is to make sure Ukraine is in a position to not only survive but thrive as an independent European nation.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Russia’s summer offensive could spark a new humanitarian crisis in Ukraine

Viktor Liakh, Melinda Haring — Tue, 27 May 2025 19:34:22 +0000

As the Russian army gears up for a major summer offensive, Ukraine could soon be facing its most serious humanitarian crisis since the initial phase of the full-scale invasion more than three years ago. If the West does not act swiftly by sending military aid, tightening sanctions, and reaffirming its long-term commitment to Ukraine, the unfolding crisis could overwhelm Kyiv and undermine the Ukrainian war effort.

Current Russian troop movements and battlefield dynamics indicate that the coming summer offensive may be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war. If successful, this campaign could allow Russian troops to push the front line tens of kilometers forward into Ukrainian-held territory and overrun parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk provinces.

The cities of Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Kramatorsk are high on the list of likely targets. They have all experienced significant damage and large-scale displacement as a result of Russian bombardment. If these cities and others in the surrounding area fall to the Russians in the coming months, the wider region could become depopulated as large numbers of people flee the fighting.

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Based on current trends and previous displacement waves, at least two hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians living close to the current front lines of the war could be forced to leave their homes by fall 2025. This is not speculation; it is informed by experience gained during Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian organizations have been on the front lines of the humanitarian response. They have provided essential aid, temporary housing, psychological support, and ongoing reintegration counselling to help Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s invasion rebuild dignity and restart their lives.

Ukraine’s civil society has worked wonders over the past three years but cannot realistically hope to absorb another 200,000 diplaced people without international support. The situation is even more alarming due to the recent closure of USAID, which was a major player in the humanitarian response to Russia’s invasion. With Putin’s troops already advancing, Ukraine’s Western partners must not ignore the looming danger.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3.6 million people remained internally displaced within Ukraine as of early 2025. Most are women, children, and elderly individuals. Many have already been forced to flee multiple times. This population of displaced people may soon become considerably larger.

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Compounding the crisis, European governments are beginning to phase out temporary support programs for Ukrainians. While the EU recently agreed to extend temporary protection through 2026, enforcement is sometimes patchy. Meanwhile, there are indications across Europe that resettlement fatigue is growing.

In the UK and US, political rhetoric on the topic of Ukrainian refugees has shifted ominously. Most recently, reports emerged that the Trump administration is exploring options to repatriate Ukrainians who entered the United States following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

If these trends continue, millions of Ukrainians could find themselves trapped between advancing Russian forces and a closing window of international asylum. While Ukrainians in the east of the country flee Putin’s invading army, many Ukrainian refugees may be forced to return home with uncertain prospects.

If the overstretched Ukrainian military is unable to contain Russia’s summer offensive, the fallout will reverberate far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The displacement of at least 200,000 more civilians would severely strain humanitarian corridors, destabilize border regions, and sow chaos in Ukrainian cities already struggling to absorb previous waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s Western partners still have time to prevent this, but they must act with a sense of urgency. While the Trump administration has been clear that it does not plan to provide Ukraine with further military aid, it should continue sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians while confirming its readiness to sell arms to Kyiv. Europe must speed up the delivery of promised weapons and should expand supplies significantly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.

In parallel, European countries should take steps to provide reassurance and protect the legal status of Ukrainian refugees. Donor organizations can help by strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian civil society groups that have demonstrated agility, transparency, and high levels of local trust.

The next phase of Russia’s invasion is not just being fought on the front lines of the war. It is taking place across the country in bomb shelters, train stations, and temporary accommodations. Russia is trying to break Ukrainian resistance by making large parts of Ukraine unlivable and destabilizing the country. Ukraine’s partners can do much to counter these efforts, but they must act now before the military and humanitarian situation deteriorates further.

Viktor Liakh is president of the East Europe Foundation. Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine.

Charai in National Interest: The Washington Embassy Murders and the Rising Threat of Antisemitism

Atlantic Council — Fri, 23 May 2025 17:37:53 +0000

The post Charai in National Interest: The Washington Embassy Murders and the Rising Threat of Antisemitism appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Beyond critical minerals: Capitalizing on the DRC’s vast opportunities

Fri, 23 May 2025 15:27:29 +0000

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As the race for access to critical minerals accelerates—with US President Donald Trump declaring the minerals that power new technologies essential to US national security, and China flexing its control of mineral supply chains with export bans—the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in the spotlight. But that light reveals a complicated picture: As major powers and neighboring states contend for access to the country’s tin, cobalt, and copper, the Rwandan-backed M23 paramilitary has seized control of large swaths of eastern Congo, and the specter of full-scale war looms. The DRC signed a minerals-for-infrastructure deal with China in 2007, and now a minerals-for-security or minerals-for-peace deal with the United States is in the offing.

The DRC has a chance to break the so-called “resource curse” and use its mineral wealth to build the roads, power grids, health infrastructure, and more that will sustain a democratic, economically growing country in the years ahead. Other countries and investors have a chance to live up to their commitments to responsible sourcing of natural resources, and in so doing support good governance and regional peace. The alternative is a continuation of the bad patterns of the past, with the real risk of a new outbreak of violence along the same fault lines that produced the deadliest conflict since World War II.

We asked six experts how the DRC—and its global partners—can take this transformative path. Read on for analyses of the country’s business environment, the industrial potential of its critical minerals and other promising sectors, and peace and security throughout the country.

The business case for peace and democracy in the DRC is strong

By Dave Peterson

Congo’s war and the critical minerals scramble are inextricably intertwined

By Mvemba Phezo Dizolele

Critical minerals won’t transform lives in the DRC—a radical shift in security and economic governance will

By Rabah Arezki

Partner perspective: The DRC’s vast potential extends beyond mining

By Thomas De Dreux-Brézé

US investors must lead on responsible sourcing in the DRC

By Nicole Namwezi Batumike

Better roads and stable power grids can unlock the DRC’s potential

By Calixte Ahokpossi

The business case for peace and democracy in the DRC is strong

Dave Peterson is the former senior director of the Africa Program of the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Rwandan-backed rebel militia M23 has seized control of most of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) while the national army (known by its French acronym, FARDC) and international peacekeepers retreat. At least seven thousand civilians have been killed and thousands more raped. Two million displaced persons and refugees are fleeing for safety, joining some five million already displaced. The US embassy in Kinshasa has been attacked by angry mobs—and both strategic interests and American values are at stake.

The DRC is rich. With 111 million inhabitants in a geographical area the size of Europe, the country is blessed (or cursed) by $24 trillion in mineral resources such as copper, cobalt, lithium, gold, and diamonds, much of it crucial to the world’s transition to electric power, half of it exported to China, and much of it now controlled by Chinese investors. Congo has the world’s largest tropical forests after the Amazon and a vast river network that could power half the African continent; it also has enormous agricultural potential, gas, and oil.

And the DRC is where the greatest slaughter of human beings since World War II occurred just thirty years ago, even as atrocities continue to be reported daily in the country’s east. In addition to M23, more than a hundred militia groups terrorize the population. Rampant corruption sucks billions of dollars from the economy every year, and poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and disease statistics place the DRC near the bottom of global rankings.

The Congolese people have begged for change. Democratic elections held on December 20, 2023, were won by the incumbent, Felix Tshisekedi. Although flawed in many respects, credible domestic observation groups, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and others, concluded they reflected the will of the people. The elections were reasonably competitive and peaceful, a notable achievement compared to Congo’s nine neighbors, many among the most autocratic countries in the world. The elections raised the level of political discourse and further cultivated Congo’s democratic practice. Congo’s press is relatively free, so citizens can debate, organize, and criticize their government. The nation’s civil society is extensive, active, and skilled—advocating, educating, and mobilizing citizens on a host of issues.

Yet after another year in power, the second Tshisekedi administration has failed to resolve the conflict in the east, address rampant corruption, or improve governance. The human rights record is not reassuring, as NED’s Congolese partners and others have documented. More than one hundred kuluna, purportedly youth gang members ensnared by DRC’s notoriously corrupt justice system, were recently executed after the government reinstated the death penalty. Freedom of expression is also under pressure as activists, journalists, and whistleblowers are attacked and fear for their personal safety. Meanwhile, the president seems intent on tampering with the constitution to allow him to extend his term in office.

The mining companies, banks, and tech industry—aware of but loath to abandon the bloody supply chain they rely on—profit handsomely from Congo’s precious minerals. Although the conflict in the country’s east is about more than the trade in minerals, and international funders have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the problem, the DRC’s best hope may be for foreign investors to mobilize pressure on the belligerents to make peace. The Belgian government has investigated Apple for tolerating human rights abuses in its supply chain originating in the DRC, and Apple has acknowledged the difficulty of identifying the sources of its suppliers. Because this is an issue for the entire industry, companies should find it advantageous, both in terms of public relations as well as in creating a conducive business environment, to be more accountable for the stability and prosperity of the communities from which they derive their wealth.

The Trump administration is paying attention. Tenuous negotiations between representatives of the Congolese and Rwandan governments led by the administration’s special envoy Massad Boulos may be making progress. To buttress this, Congolese civil society should be included in the process, including appropriate NGOs, community groups, the church, labor, and business, as proved successful in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue two decades ago. The DRC’s democratic aspirations should be the United States’ comparative advantage. The United States made mistakes in Congo, then called Zaire, during the Cold War, to the detriment of its own reputation, and it would be a shame to return to that era of zero-sum geopolitical competition. Security, strength, and prosperity are interests every nation pursues, but the United States can do better. Many Congolese, including civil society and political leaders, still see the United States as a force for good and a beacon of hope for ideals such as freedom, peace, democracy, justice, and human rights. It is what makes America strong: It is what makes the United States friends and allies, accords America respect and admiration—to be seen as a world leader rather than just another player, a model rather than a pariah.

The US private sector should take the lead. A golden age cannot be built on the blood of innocents, a course that can only lead to more hatred and suffering and will ultimately fail. The international business community must unite in committing to resource extraction practices that abide by international standards of human rights and transparency, incentivize the rival governments and factions in the subregion to lay down their arms, and make it easier and more profitable for companies to do their work. The private sector can rally international public opinion and pave the way for stability and prosperity. The long-suffering Congolese people deserve it.

Congo’s war and the critical minerals scramble are inextricably intertwined

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

For the past thirty years, the world has viewed the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo) through a binary lens of conflict and the exploitation of natural and mineral resources. The conflict optics magnify the insecurity that has characterized life in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. The protracted conflict between Congo and Rwanda spawned the proliferation of militias, including the two iterations of the Rwanda-backed M23, which captured the Congolese cities of Goma and Bukavu on January 25, 2025, and February 16, 2025, respectively. The death toll is estimated at more than seven thousand since January 2025, with unofficial reports from the region suggesting a much higher number of victims.

With 7.8 million internally displaced people, Congo ranks alongside Syria and Sudan among countries with the largest displaced populations, according to the United Nations. Of the more than two million people who have been displaced since the 2022 resurgence of M23, one million were displaced in 2024. Sexual violence, disappearances, and other human rights abuses have increased in M23-occupied areas. These abuses will continue as the rebels expand their territorial control.

Coverage of the conflict has also emphasized the role of natural and mineral resources as drivers of the war. Congo’s resource endowment is valued at a staggering $24 trillion. Analyses of the war have focused on the looting and smuggling of minerals, and have pointed to Rwanda and Uganda as primary beneficiaries. The two countries have emerged as major exporters of minerals, such as gold and coltan, of which they have limited reserves.

Recently, heightened interest in Congo’s mineral resources has been driven, among other reasons, by the West’s determination to circumvent China and secure critical resources like cobalt, copper, and lithium. For instance, on February 18, 2024, the European Union (EU) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains with Rwanda. Even though the EU signed similar memoranda with Congo, Zambia, and Namibia, Rwanda’s case raised questions given the country’s troubled history with Congo concerning mineral resources. This history includes invading Congo, arming violent rebel groups, and smuggling minerals out of rebel-controlled territory.

The second element driving high-profile interest in the country’s mineral wealth is the Trump administration’s classification of critical minerals as vital to US national security. The pursuit of a US-Congo minerals-for-security deal underscores Washington’s increased interest in Congo’s mineral endowment. As the world waits to learn about the contours and substance of the contract and what the United States will offer Kinshasa, it’s worth taking stock of the current foreign investment landscape in the country.

China tops the list of major investors with important financial and technical commitments to Congo’s mining sector. Besides China, the other major players who have established significant footprints in the country include the EU and the United States.

China leads in the mining and infrastructure sectors

China’s investments in DRC focus on the mining sector, with major stakes in the cobalt and copper industries. The engagement stems from the 2008 Sicomines joint venture between Chinese companies (Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering Corporation) and the Congolese government. The venture is the foundation of the Congo-China cooperation. Originally valued at $9 billion, the deal is a minerals-for-infrastructure barter. After pushback from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and Congolese civil society organizations, the deal was renegotiated to $6 billion in 2009. In exchange for mining rights, China has financed infrastructure projects, including roads and hospitals. In 2024, Chinese infrastructure investment commitments were valued at $7 billion. Today, China is the largest investor in the country.

United States seeks minerals for national security

Until the advent of the second Trump administration, the United States showed little interest in DRC minerals and focused on the humanitarian challenges of the country. Western companies that secured mining deals often sold their holdings to the Chinese. With every Western business divestment, the Chinese increased their stake in Congo’s mining sector. The new policy change has generated interest for greater US-Congo cooperation. This minerals-focused change is supported by a robust diplomatic engagement that seeks to broker peace between Congo and Rwanda. The administration’s stated objective is to stabilize Congo and create the right conditions for investments in mining and infrastructure.

The new US approach is yielding early results. On May 6, 2025, California-based KoBold Metals and Australia-based AVZ Minerals reached an agreement for the former to acquire AVZ Minerals’ interests in the Manono lithium deposit in Congo. Billionaires Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos back KoBold. The agreement will enable the company to invest over one billion dollars to develop the lithium project.

It is difficult to evaluate the level of current US investments in Congo. US pledges of multi-billion-dollar investments depend on the promises of peace accords between Rwanda and Congo and related bilateral mineral agreements.

European Union focuses on ethical approach to critical minerals

European countries’ approach in Congo focuses on ethical sourcing and sustainability, which also include traceability of minerals due to armed conflict. European development banks have funded projects that improve governance and reduce poverty. Some of these initiatives, however, have faced criticism. For instance, in light of the resurgence of M23, the February 18, 2024, memorandum the EU signed with Rwanda—“establishing close cooperation with Rwanda” on the sourcing of critical minerals—has raised questions about the EU’s commitment to ethical sourcing, given that Rwanda backs the violent M23 paramilitary group. Analysts of the Great Lakes region, diplomats, and members of the European Parliament have all questioned and challenged the intent and effect of the memorandum. Some see it as a driver of the re-emergence of the M23 and the current war between Congo and Rwanda.

Top European investors in Congo include France, the Netherlands, and Italy, who contributed a combined foreign direct investment stock of approximately $32.6 billion in 2022.

Comparative overview of investments

Country/Region	Key sectors	Notable investments
China	Mining, infrastructure	Sicomines Joint Venture, $7 billion in infrastructure
United States	Mining, diplomacy	KoBold Metals’ $1 billion in Manono project
European Union	Mining, development	€424 million grants to the partnership with the DRC (2021-24)

As the scramble for critical minerals enters a new phase with increased US interest in Congo, the country needs effective governance and transparent policies to ensure that foreign investments contribute to sustainable development and economic growth.

Critical minerals won’t transform lives in the DRC—a radical shift in security and economic governance will

Rabah Arezki is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He previously served as chief economist and vice president for economic governance and knowledge management at the African Development Bank, as well as chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank, and as chief of the commodities unit in the research department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s abundance of critical minerals has given rise to comparisons with Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth. But that abundance has not improved citizens’ lives in one of the poorest countries in the world. Yet there is a course that could make that possible: finding the right balance between openness to investments from multinational corporations and economic sovereignty—broadly defined as the ability of a country to control its own economic system.

The DRC is the repository of the world’s largest reserves of critical minerals such as cobalt, copper, and lithium. Indeed, the DRC holds around 70 percent and 60 percent of the world’s cobalt and lithium reserves, respectively, as well significant deposits of nickel and uranium, which are metal components for energy generation and batteries for electric vehicles. Yet the DRC encapsulates the seemingly insurmountable and intertwined challenges posed by critical minerals. These challenges are tied to geopolitics, conflicts, and the environment as well as economic and social dimensions.

First and foremost, the challenge facing the DRC is the new geopolitics around critical minerals. The demand for critical minerals is exploding. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for minerals is projected to increase by more than four times by 2040 amid the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Major powers—namely China, the United States, and the European Union—are engaged in a technological race spurring competition for access to these critical minerals. At the center of that global scramble is the DRC, which is being courted by these powers like never before. China is heavily invested in the mining sector of the DRC and controls the supply chains of critical minerals, including their processing.

Amid the technological race, China has recently imposed restrictions on exports of critical minerals to the United States. Washington and Brussels have tried to challenge Beijing’s monopoly of the supply chains of these minerals by attempting to secure mining contracts, including in the DRC. That competition should in principle help the DRC to not only get a fair share from the mining contracts but also the opportunity to move up the value chain. In practice, multinational corporations and foreign governments have much stronger capacity in negotiating mining contracts relative to the government of the DRC. Quid pro quos are also common involving the receipt of aid packages originating from self-interested donor countries in exchange for the awarding of mining contracts to multinational corporations—linked to donors.

Another major challenge for the DRC is conflict. The DRC is faced with external and internal conflicts. The DRC has a complex history: Once known as the Belgian Congo, it experienced a cruel form of colonization as the de facto personal property of Leopold II, Belgium’s king. The DRC’s post-independence era was plagued by direct interventions by foreign powers and autocratic rulers. That history helps explain the DRC’s deficient institutions, a persistent low level of trust among citizens, and distrust between the citizenry and the government.

The DRC has long faced massive violence and crimes in mineral-rich provinces such as Katanga and North Kivu—fueled by neighbors such as Rwanda and Uganda. The advances of Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Congo is alarming for the DRC and could fuel a “major continental conflict.” The Trump administration is actively pushing for a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda to end the violence. This peace deal appears to be contingent upon the two countries each signing a bilateral economic agreement with the United States involving mineral extraction and processing. The peace negotiations are at an early stage, but these efforts are welcome especially if they lead to an outcome perceived as just.

Minerals are routinely smuggled out of the DRC. Add to that illicit artisanal mining—mining done, generally on a small scale and with low-tech tools, by individuals not employed by a mining company—as a tug of war between the authorities and citizens directly grabbing minerals. As a vast territory, it is imperative for the DRC to expand and strengthen the governance of its security sector to secure its borders and confront armed groups operating on its territory. The DRC is nominally a centralized republic, and it needs to find the right balance for revenue sharing between the different provinces and the central government to reduce internal tensions.

Further, the extraction of critical minerals is leading to significant environmental and health hazards. Indeed, extraction is often associated with deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and the use of toxic chemicals (including mercury), which are polluting ground water sources. Add to that child labor in the extraction of critical minerals, with children and women facing health degradation and abuse. The weak enforcement of environmental and social standards in the DRC is very concerning. A global debate is raging over the boycott of critical minerals emanating from zones of conflicts and forced labor. These boycotts alone are unlikely to sway the DRC’s government to do right by its citizens, but multinational corporations and foreign governments may be more susceptible to pressure.

These multifaceted challenges may seem insurmountable, but that should not deter the government of the DRC. To confront these challenges, the DRC must find a balance between outward- and inward-facing institutions. On the outward-facing front, the government needs to get its fair share of revenues from the extraction of minerals and attract investment in processing domestically. To do so, the government needs to deploy utmost transparency in its dealing with multinational corporations and foster the right human capital to match the capacity on the other side.

On the inward-facing front, the DRC needs to also ensure it is redistributing the proceeds of the revenues from the extraction of critical minerals to its citizens to ensure economic justice. To do so, the government of DRC needs to improve the allocative and technical efficiency of its spending. The government of DRC should pursue further its local content policy (designed to ensure that extractive industrial activity benefits the region where the resources are found) by localizing the processing of critical minerals. A useful example is the case of Botswana, which acquired a 15 percent stake in the world’s biggest diamond miner, DeBeers, which helped lock in local diamond-cutting activities.

This would represent a radical system shift in the DRC’s economic governance apparatus—and such a shift is imperative, in security as well as economic governance. Without that radical shift, the benefits of critical minerals won’t reach the people of the DRC. The Trump administration peace proposal could provide a pathway to a just peace and security between DRC and its neighbors, most notably Rwanda.

Partner perspective: The DRC’s vast potential extends beyond mining

Thomas De Dreux-Brézé is director of strategy development at Rawbank, the DRC’s largest bank. He manages relations with international partners (fundraising, co-financing, syndication, etc.) and intrapreneurial projects. Rawbank supports the work of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The DRC is a land of untapped scale and promise. At the heart of Africa, where mining remains the backbone of the economy, the DRC is endowed with abundant natural wealth, a youthful and dynamic population, and a pivotal geographical position—holding many of the critical ingredients for large-scale economic transformation. While it faces undeniable structural challenges, political instability, infrastructure deficits, and regulatory complexity, these should not obscure the deeper truth: The DRC is a country in motion, with massive potential across multiple sectors.

As the global economic landscape shifts, marked by the rise of emerging markets, regional trade integration, and the acceleration of sustainable investments, the DRC stands out with compelling opportunities, particularly in energy, agriculture, climate finance, financial services, and intra-African trade. Realizing these prospects will require strategic vision, strong partnerships, and patient capital. But the potential returns—economic, social, and geopolitical—could be transformative, not only for the Congo but for the continent as a whole.

The energy sector as a pillar of transformation

No sustainable development is possible without access to affordable and reliable energy. And in this field, the DRC stands out as one of the world’s most promising frontiers.

The Congo River, the second largest in the world by discharge, holds a staggering 100 gigawatts (GW) of hydropower potential. Yet only a fraction of that is currently harnessed. Similarly, solar and wind energy remain vastly underexploited, even though recent studies suggest the country could generate up to 85 GW from renewable sources at competitive prices.

This untapped capacity offers a double dividend: powering domestic industries and households, while positioning the DRC as a regional supplier of green energy. Existing projects signal the way forward, including the rehabilitation of the Inga I and II dams, off-grid solar initiatives in eastern provinces, and hybrid minigrid pilots supported by international development banks.

But unlocking this sector will require not only investment in generation, but a massive expansion of transmission infrastructure, regional interconnections, and regulatory reform. If done right, the DRC could emerge not just as an energy consumer, but as a green energy champion for Africa.

Monetizing the Congo Basin’s ecological wealth

In the global climate equation, the Congo Basin is a critical wilderness area. As the second-largest rainforest on the planet, it captures an estimated 1.5 billion tons of CO₂ annually, roughly equivalent to the emissions of the entire European Union.

Because 70 percent of this vast rainforest is located within the DRC, the country has a unique role to play in planetary stabilization. But that role must be backed by economic value. A well-regulated carbon market—anchored in strong institutions, reliable measurement systems, and transparent benefit sharing—could become a vital source of revenue for the state and local communities.

The groundwork exists. The Blue Fund for the Congo Basin, the Presidential Climate Finance Task Force, and recent bilateral discussions with major carbon-credit buyers (Shell, Vitol, Engie, Microsoft, Amazon, the World Bank, Delta Air Lines, Netflix, Eni, etc.) demonstrate momentum. What’s needed now is acceleration: a national registry of credits, clear legal frameworks, and partnerships with credible certifiers.

Done properly, the DRC’s ecological stewardship can become a global public good, monetized fairly and reinvested in national development.

Agriculture as a national priority

Few countries possess agricultural potential on the scale of the DRC. With over eighty million hectares of arable land, most of it untouched, and a rapidly growing population projected to double by 2050, the DRC could become a major agricultural exporter and a driver of food security across the continent.

And yet, paradoxically, it remains a net food importer. The reasons are well known: fragmented value chains, poor logistics, lack of mechanization, and security concerns in the east.

But the opportunity is immense. Investments in agricultural technology, cold storage, rural roads, and access to inputs could lift yields dramatically. Initiatives like the revitalization of coffee cooperatives in South Kivu or the expansion of community irrigation systems in Kwilu show what is possible when technology, capital, and local know-how align.

In parallel, creating agricultural growth corridors and establishing specialized export zones would allow Congolese products (such as coffee, cocoa, rice, and cassava) to reach regional and global markets. Agriculture is not only about feeding people—it is about creating jobs, increasing exports, and building rural resilience.

Unlocking financial inclusion in a young, digital nation

The DRC’s demographic reality is its most powerful asset: a young, urbanizing population with rising aspirations and digital adoption. Yet financial inclusion remains stubbornly low. Less than 10 percent of the population has access to traditional banking and overall inclusion stands at around 38.5 percent.

This gap is a massive opportunity. The fintech revolution is already reshaping access to financial services. And in the DRC, local innovators are leading the charge.

The next frontier is to bridge fintech and formal banking: enabling savings, credit, insurance, and investment products through digital rails. Partnerships between fintech companies, microfinance institutions, and mobile operators will be key to scaling impact.

To catalyze the sector, regulators must continue building trust—ensuring data privacy, protecting consumers, and clarifying tax regimes. Financial services are not just about transactions, they are about empowering people, fueling enterprise, and driving shared prosperity.

The DRC as continental logistics hub

With nine borders and a landmass larger than Western Europe, the DRC is uniquely positioned to become a continental logistics hub. Its central location offers a direct line to West, East, and southern Africa—and with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) gaining traction, this position becomes even more valuable.

Realizing this potential requires hard and soft infrastructure alike. The development of the Lobito Corridor,* connecting the DRC and Zambia to Angola’s Atlantic coast, offers a cost-effective route to global markets. Investments in rail, roads, dry ports, and customs harmonization are already underway, supported by major global and regional institutions.

Beyond Lobito, projects such as the modernization of the Matadi-Kinshasa corridor and the establishment of special economic zones along border areas can spur regional supply chains, particularly in agriculture, textiles, and energy services.

Trade is not only about exporting but also about integrating into African value chains, reducing transaction costs, and creating cross-border prosperity. The DRC’s geography is its destiny—if paired with the right vision.

The case for confidence

To invest in the DRC today is not an act of charity or risk appetite. It is an act of strategic foresight.

Few countries offer such a rare blend of demographic dynamism, natural abundance, and regional leverage. The fundamentals are compelling, the reform trajectory is positive, and the appetite for change is growing in both the public and private sectors.

The international community (investors, development partners, entrepreneurs, etc.) has a role to play, not in prescribing solutions, but in cocreating a new development model with the Congolese people. One rooted in inclusivity, sustainability, and shared prosperity.

The DRC is not waiting to be discovered. It is asserting its place in the twenty-first century. Those who choose to walk alongside it today will not only unlock significant returns but also help write one of the most important economic success stories of our time.

US investors must lead on responsible sourcing in the DRC

Nicole Namwezi Batumike is a gender and responsible sourcing specialist at the Congolese nonprofit Panzi Foundation.

The ongoing conversations between the United States and the DRC over access to critical minerals present a rare and urgent opportunity to reset the terms of engagement with Congolese stakeholders and the broader mineral ecosystem. US officials have indicated that American and other Western companies are prepared to make multi-billion-dollar investments in the region once the bilateral mineral deals are finalized. The DRC holds vast reserves of cobalt, copper, and other strategic minerals essential to global technological and energy systems, yet for decades, the Congolese people have borne the costs of extraction without sharing in its benefits, treated as collateral in deals driven by geopolitical rivalries and elite bargains. On top of fueling instability and deepening marginalization, these transactional arrangements have also exposed investors to growing legal, financial, and reputational risks.

Experience shows that when mining fails to deliver value to local communities, companies lose their social license to operate, along with the legitimacy of the regimes they once depended on. In turn, those regimes have proven willing to shift allegiances in pursuit of regime security. The DRC, for example, has filed lawsuits against downstream tech giants and pushed for sanctions targeting neighboring countries laundering conflict minerals. It is increasingly clear that the Congolese regime is not bound to any single partner.

US engagement in Africa must reflect geopolitical realities. Recent peace deal discussions show the United States is willing to engage Rwanda’s refining sector—despite Kigali’s documented role in violating Congolese sovereignty and committing war crimes. If responsible sourcing is to truly guide stable engagements, policymakers must reckon with the risks of endorsing impunity and failing to deliver justice for the Congolese people.

The negotiation of a US-DRC mineral deal offers a crucial opportunity to break this cycle, provided Kinshasa resists the historical pattern of leveraging minerals solely for regime survival, and provided the United States supports a model of genuine security: one not rooted in a logic of extractivism but in mutual accountability and the rule of law. By aligning US investment strategy with Congolese legal frameworks and responsible sourcing standards, both countries can lower risks by forging a sustainable model.

Responsible sourcing is a legal and strategic imperative

Meeting international due diligence standards to ensure that a given business activity does not involve human-rights violations has shifted from being a reputational safeguard to a legal and strategic requirement. Standards include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Human rights due diligence is now codified through laws such as the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, France’s Duty of Vigilance Law, and Germany’s Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, making risk mitigation binding across global operations, especially in high-risk contexts like the DRC.

Yet despite these frameworks, the DRC remains at war, and the global minerals trade continues to serve short-term political and economic agendas. In 2024, the US Government Accountability Office reported that Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (America’s flagship due diligence law) had not reduced violence in eastern Congo and may have exacerbated conflict around artisanal gold-mining sites. The US government’s insistence on better outcomes demonstrates that due diligence is a means, not an end, and it cannot resolve the structural drivers of the conflict.

The DRC’s mining codes provide a responsible framework for US investors

It is in this context that the DRC’s 2018 mining code emerges not as an obstacle but as a strategic foundation. On top of aligning closely with international expectations for human rights due diligence, the code offers investors and companies a clear, locally grounded framework to manage risk and build sustainable partnerships. Born out of years marked by revenue leakage, extractive impunity, and donor-driven liberalization, the code reasserts the government’s dual roles as a regulator and shareholder while mandating local beneficiation (a part of mineral processing). It raises royalty rates on strategic minerals like cobalt, introduces a “super-profits” tax, and makes community development contributions legally binding. It also restricts the use of “stabilization clauses,” which limit countries’ ability to apply new regulations to investors with agreements signed before the regulations went into effect, and strengthens environmental and social accountability.

Pilot models offer early lessons in responsible sourcing. For example, at Mutoshi in the Lualaba province, the collaboration of multinational commodities group Trafigura with Chemaf, a Congolese company, and Pact, an international nonprofit organization, showed that formalizing artisanal mining not only met sourcing commitments but also helped contribute to de-risking efforts. Meanwhile, the Panzi Foundation’s Green Mining Community Model, an initiative led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Denis Mukwege, links inclusive training in responsible sourcing and value addition with investments in essential infrastructure like health and education. By seeking to address the root causes of conflict and the violent tactics it enables—such as the use of rape as a weapon of war—the Green Mining Community model promotes integration and community empowerment, positioning responsible sourcing as a pathway to long-term stability and shared value.

Opportunities and challenges in the US policy landscape

The United States is on the path to establishing promising policies and frameworks for responsible investment, as demonstrated by the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act, which emphasizes governance and transparency. Initiatives such as the US-backed expansion of the Lobito Corridor* linking the DRC to Angola’s Lobito port, alongside previous efforts like USAID’s Just Gold project, could provide a strong foundation. However, their long-term impact will depend on aligning with fair labor and environmental standards, sustainable development, and, importantly, the continuity of these efforts under the new administration.

At the same time, setbacks like the 180-day suspension of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement must be urgently addressed. Restoring accountability is essential for ethical investment.

As US Rep. Sara Jacobs highlighted in a March 2025 Africa Subcommittee hearing, investments will only succeed in the long term if they do not ignore the root causes of exploitation.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo stands at a pivotal juncture: either the cycle of extractive exploitation continues, or the government leverages its mineral wealth to foster long-term development. For US stakeholders, the way forward lies in transparent, law-abiding, and community-centered partnerships. This requires a commitment to the DRC’s 2018 Mining Code and collaboration with Congolese civil society. While short-term gains may be tempting, only those who embrace responsible sourcing and inclusive models will build sustainable, competitive advantages.

Better roads and stable power grids can unlock the DRC’s potential

Calixte Ahokpossi is mission chief, Democratic Republic of the Congo, for the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has vast economic potential, but infrastructure gaps remain a major constraint. The country is rich in natural resources and has a large and young population that could drive its development. However, chronic underinvestment in critical infrastructure—roads, rail networks, and power generation—continues to stifle economic progress. Additionally, governance challenges, corruption, macroeconomic instability, and recurring shocks—including armed conflicts in its eastern region—exacerbate fragility.

Addressing these challenges requires tackling their sociopolitical and economic roots, while leveraging the country’s vast natural resource wealth to rapidly bridge the infrastructure gap and foster diversified and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. The DRC needs an ambitious infrastructure agenda, prioritizing the development of transport corridors and stable power grids.

Weak, unevenly distributed infrastructure

The DRC’s road network is severely underdeveloped, limiting mobility and trade. With only 152,400 kilometers (km) of roads, connectivity remains a challenge. The roads serve the nation’s vast 2.45 million km² territory, a road-to-territory ratio that is just 40 percent of the sub-Saharan African average of 0.14 km/ km², which is already low compared to other regions. Fewer than 10 percent of these roads are passable year-round, and more than half of Congolese (54.5 percent) must travel over an hour to reach a paved or asphalted road. Urban-rural disparities are stark. In the southeast (Haut-Katanga and Lualaba), large-scale copper and cobalt mining has spurred some investment in roads and rail lines, but the transportation infrastructure remains vastly insufficient for a region that supplies most of the world’s cobalt and a significant share of global copper. Indeed, the DRC accounts for over 70 percent of global cobalt output and approximately half the world’s proven reserves. In contrast, the eastern provinces (North and South Kivu, Ituri)—rich in gold and the “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum, tungsten)—receive minimal investment, as small-scale artisanal mining dominates, offering limited economic spillovers.

The DRC remains one of the least electrified nations despite vast hydropower potential. Only 19.1 percent of the population has access to electricity, with rural coverage plummeting to a mere 2 percent. The country is heavily dependent on two aging hydropower plants: Inga 1 (with an installed capacity of 351 megawatts) and Inga 2 (installed capacity of 1,424 MW), both under rehabilitation and operating at roughly 80 percent capacity. These plants primarily serve the mining industry. Ambitious projects like Inga 3 (3,000 to 11,000 MW) and the even larger Grand Inga (which could surpass China’s Three Gorges Dam) underscore the Congo River’s vast potential. Yet delays, shifting international partnerships, and environmental concerns have repeatedly stalled construction.

A barrier to inclusive growth

Weak infrastructure inflates costs, constrains businesses, and fosters economic disparities. Poor infrastructure raises transportation and production costs, stifling economic activity in time-sensitive sectors (like perishable goods). This is evident in agriculture, which employs the majority of Congolese (over 60 percent of the labor force). Despite the DRC’s fertile land, poor transport links prevent farmers from bringing their surplus produce to markets. Goods perish on farms, and the country remains dependent on food imports, making it vulnerable to global food price shocks and exchange rate fluctuations. These disruptions fuel inflation, disproportionately affecting the poorest. The weak transportation network also restricts economic diversification and limits access to remote mineral deposits, leaving critical resources untapped—or controlled by armed groups.

Unreliable energy supply disrupts businesses and limits opportunities for local transformation and adding value. From irrigation systems to medical clinics, power shortages affect essential activities and reinforce a cycle of poverty and missed opportunities. They also hamper industrialization, making local mineral processing, manufacturing, and daily business operations difficult or virtually impossible. Mining companies report that frequent power shortages force them to rely on diesel generators, raising production costs substantially. This inefficiency hits small businesses even harder, eroding profit margins and reducing corporate income tax revenues. Under these conditions, the DRC’s ambition to increase local mineral processing and move up the value chain remains a major challenge.

Five steps to good roads, reliable power, and economic growth

Invest in transport and energy infrastructure to generate sustainable growth. The DRC’s vast mineral wealth and energy potential make it an attractive destination for large-scale private investment, but various bottlenecks such as infrastructure, business environment, and governance must be addressed. We focus here on infrastructure ones. Unlocking the hydropower potential (100,000 MW, which is 13 percent of the world’s total) could meet domestic needs and generate export revenue. Modernizing existing hydroelectric facilities and expanding transmission grids would provide clean, affordable electricity to both industry and households. For the mining sector, improved energy access could lower production costs while enhancing compliance with global environmental, social, and governance standards. Meanwhile, broader electrification would fuel local enterprise, boost economic diversification, and improve living standards.
Diversify financing for the substantial investments needed to bridge the infrastructure gap. The International Monetary Fund estimates that achieving universal electricity access would require annual spending of 5.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while ensuring that 75 percent of the population lives within two kilometers of an all-season road would necessitate 14.9 percent of GDP annually over ten years. Given these costs, leveraging diversified public, private, and international financing is key to accelerating infrastructure development.
Strengthen public investment management to maximize returns. Weak governance and public investment management have led to waste, corruption risks, and substandard project execution. Strengthening investment governance would maximize value for money, boosting private-sector confidence and investment. Equally key is creating fiscal space for critical infrastructure and social and human capital investments. This requires improving domestic tax and nontax revenue collection and prioritizing growth-enhancing spending. Yet low revenue collection, especially relative to peer countries and the DRC’s economic potential, remains a major constraint.
Pursue prudent, strategic government borrowing to secure favorable terms. Domestically, containing inflation would lower borrowing costs and encourage higher domestic savings, strengthening the local financial market. Externally, the focus should remain on concessional financing, prioritizing low-cost, long-term loans. Over time, as policy credibility strengthens and the country’s creditworthiness improves, access to international financial markets could be considered, particularly when global conditions are favorable.
Scale up infrastructure investments through regional partnerships. The DRC would benefit from harnessing regional frameworks such as the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community to mobilize resources for transport and energy infrastructure. Cross-border energy grids and trade corridors can reduce operational costs, attract larger financing and enhance the country’s global competitiveness. Regional collaboration offers a pragmatic solution to tackling infrastructure deficits while strengthening economic resilience. Also, the development of the Lobito Corridor,* linking the DRC to Angola’s Lobito port, can deepen regional integration and offer more cost-effective transportation routes for DRC’s exports—though it will be important to avoid undermining parallel port development projects in the western part of the DRC.

In sum, the future of the DRC will be promising if its development challenges can be addressed in an ambitious and realistic manner. Developing a reliable road network and extending electricity provision will be critical to reap the DRC’s vast potential—and will need to be supported by sound macroeconomic policies and reforms to strengthen the country’s resilience to overcome its fragility.

Launched in 2022, the Africa Center’s programming on the DRC seeks to advise on securing the country’s governance and to raise awareness of the economic opportunities in the DRC. In partnership with Rawbank, the Africa Center analyzes the DRC’s business environment, the industrial potential of its critical minerals, and peace and security throughout the country.

*Rawbank, which supports the Atlantic Council Africa Center’s work on the Democratic Republic of Congo, has an equity stake in the Africa Finance Corporation, which leads the development of the Lobito Corridor.

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The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 21 May 2025 20:51:25 +0000

US President Donald Trump came away from Monday’s phone call with Vladimir Putin expressing confidence that the Russian leader wants peace, but few others appear to share this optimism. Many senior Western figures were reportedly unimpressed by Putin’s vague references to a “memorandum on a possible peace agreement” and believe he is still engaging in stalling tactics. “Putin is clearly playing for time. Unfortunately we have to say Putin is not really interested in peace,” commented German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.

Trump’s latest call to Putin also prompted fresh questions over the US leader’s handling of the faltering peace process. Britain’s The Economist pondered Trump’s “strange reluctance to get tough with Putin,” while Washington Post columnist Max Boot led a chorus of voices accusing the Kremlin strongman of manipulating his American counterpart. “While Trump’s lack of success in peacemaking might not doom Ukraine, it certainly dispels the president’s pretensions to being a world-class deal maker,” argued Boot. “Putin is playing him for a fool, and Trump doesn’t even seem to realize it.”

The mood was very different in Moscow, with the Kremlin-controlled media trumpeting the call as a significant success for Russian diplomacy. In his daily press review, BBC correspondent Steve Rosenberg reported that many of Russia’s leading news outlets were “crowing” over the contents of the Trump-Putin conversation. “It looks like Russia has won the latest round of global poker,” commented one newspaper. “Donald Trump’s stance couldn’t be more advantageous to Moscow,” observed another.

It is no surprise to see mounting unease in Western capitals over the US push to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Since Trump first initiated peace talks in February, Ukraine has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire and signaled its readiness to make major territorial concessions. In contrast, Russia has consistently rejected calls for a ceasefire while proposing new conditions of its own and creating various obstacles to any meaningful progress. At one point, Putin even claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy lacked the legitimacy to sign off on a peace deal and suggested placing Ukraine under United Nations administration.

Recent diplomatic developments have further underlined Russia’s reluctance to end the war. When the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Poland delivered a ceasefire ultimatum to Putin in early May, the Russian ruler responded by calling for the first bilateral talks with Ukraine since spring 2022. However, Putin then chose not to attend the bilateral meeting in Istanbul that he himself had proposed, preferring instead to send a low-level delegation. This was widely interpreted as a “slap in the face” for Ukraine and the collective West.

Putin’s representatives during last week’s negotiations in Istanbul sought to emphasize Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise, calling on Kyiv to officially cede four entire provinces to Russia including a number of major Ukrainian cities that the Kremlin has so far been unable to seize militarily. If Ukraine refuses to do so, they warned, Russia will increase its demands to include six Ukrainian provinces. “We fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?” the head of the Russian delegation reportedly commented, in reference to the eighteenth century Great Northern War. “Maybe some of those sitting here at this table will lose more of their loved ones. Russia is prepared to fight forever.”

While Putin rarely makes such thinly veiled threats, he continues to insist that any settlement must focus on eliminating what he refers to as the “root causes” of the war. This is generally understood to mean Ukraine’s international neutrality and disarmament, along with the reestablishment of Russia’s former imperial dominance in every sphere of Ukrainian public life, from language and education to national memory and religion. Any Ukrainian leader who agreed to such terms would be signing their country’s death sentence.

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Trump’s efforts to talk up the prospects of a negotiated peace and his attempts to entice Putin with commercial incentives suggest a fundamentally flawed understanding of Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. The US leader seems to sincerely believe that Putin can be persuaded to end his invasion by the promise of limited territorial gains and future economic prosperity. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth.

Putin is not fighting for Ukrainian land; he is fighting for Ukraine itself. He views the current war in the broadest of possible historical terms and sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as a sacred mission that will define his entire reign and shape Russia’s future for decades to come. It is ludicrous to suggest that he could be swayed from this messianic vision by mundane talk of trade deals and sanctions relief.

Putin’s thirst for historical revenge can be traced back to his traumatic experience during the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Putin did not personally face the grinding poverty that millions of his compatriots endured in the 1990s, Russia’s national fall from grace nevertheless made a profound impression on him. Ever since, he has been haunted by fears of a further imperial collapse and driven by a determination to reverse the verdict of 1991. This has fueled his revanchist brand of Russian nationalism, and helps to explain his otherwise inexplicable obsession with Ukraine.

Throughout his reign, Putin has made no secret of his bitter resentment over the breakup of the USSR, which he has called “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” Crucially, he views Ukraine as a central and indivisible part of this fabled “historical Russia.” Indeed, the Ukrainian capital Kyiv occupies pride of place in his imperial mythology as “the mother of all Russian cities.”

To Putin, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a symbol of Russia’s post-Soviet humiliation and a potential catalyst for the next stage in his country’s retreat from empire. According to this twisted imperial logic, if a province as quintessentially Russian as Ukraine is allowed to break away and establish itself as a modern European democracy, the entire Russian Federation will be in danger of disintegrating. Likewise, Putin is convinced that if Ukraine can be returned to its rightful place within Greater Russia, the injustice of 1991 will be undone and Russia will resume its position among the world’s Great Powers.

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Putin has been attempting to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit ever since the 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by clumsily intervening in Ukraine’s presidential election. The violence of these efforts has escalated in direct proportion to the strengthening of modern Ukraine’s own national identity. At first, Putin pursued his imperial goals in Ukraine through control of the country’s political, business, cultural, and religious elites. When this failed, he ordered the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Once it became apparent that even this partial occupation of the country would not derail Ukraine’s national consolidation, Putin made the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The rising tide of Russian aggression against Ukraine has been accompanied by ever more extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. For years, Putin has publicly insisted that Ukrainians are Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the current invasion, he published an entire essay denying Ukraine’s right to exist. Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly labeled Ukraine as an artificial country built on stolen Russian land, a Nazi invention, and an intolerable “anti-Russia” created for the purpose of undermining Russia itself. Ukrainians who insist on their own national identity are typically portrayed as traitors undeserving of sympathy or mercy.

This dehumanizing propaganda has laid the ideological foundations for the crimes that are currently being committed by the occupying Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin is able to establish control, Ukrainian patriots and community leaders are routinely detained and incarcerated in a vast network of prisons and camps. While the number of victims remains unknown, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity. Those who remain are subjected to a reign of terror and forced to accept Russian citizenship while submitting their children to indoctrination. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, culture, and statehood are being ruthlessly erased. Many experts believe these actions qualify as genocide.

Putin is understandably happy to exploit the Trump administration’s enthusiasm for peace talks. This allows him to buy time, divide the West, and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. But it is already abundantly clear that he has no real interest in ending his invasion. Indeed, he dare not stop. Any peace deal that secures Ukraine’s survival as an independent state would be viewed in Moscow as a major defeat. Rather than taking his place alongside Stalin, Peter the Great, and Ivan the Terrible as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be remembered in Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine. He would rather fight on indefinitely than accept such a fate.

Trump deserves considerable credit for seizing the initiative and attempting to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, his current approach is obviously not working. The time has now come to stop seeking compromises with the Kremlin and start speaking to Putin in the language of strength. This means tightening sanctions on Russia and targeting the many countries that continue to fuel Putin’s war machine. Above all, it means significantly increasing military aid to Kyiv and boosting Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Putin has staked his entire reign on the destruction of Ukraine. He will not back down unless forced to do so. Peace will only come when Ukraine is too strong to be subjugated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

For the past one and a half years, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the International Partnership for Human Rights have documented and analyzed Russia’s aerial attacks in Ukraine. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, witness interviews, open-source intelligence, and forensic analysis.

After reviewing hundreds of Russian drone and missile strikes, researchers narrowed the focus down to twenty-two key attacks and identified two patterns that illuminate their impact: Attacks on energy infrastructure and on densely populated areas. The legal memorandum resulting from this work concludes that Russia’s bombing campaign amounts to the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.

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For three consecutive winters, Russia has bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in a bid to deprive the civilian population of access to heating and electricity at a time when the days are short and temperatures are typically well below freezing. These attacks have had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian power grid, with around half of Ukraine’s entire prewar energy-generating capacity destroyed by summer 2024.

As well as targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, Russia has also launched waves of drones and missiles at Ukrainian towns and cities throughout the invasion, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. There have been a number of particularly deadly attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed eighteen people including nine children. On Palm Sunday one week before Easter, Russia launched a targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving thirty-five dead.

In addition to killing and injuring civilians, Russian aerial attacks also create untenable living conditions for the wider civilian population. They leave people traumatized and fuel intense feelings of insecurity, while disrupting access to heating, power, water, healthcare, and other essential resources.

While estimating the true toll of these attacks is challenging, the number of displaced Ukrainians indicates the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to UN data from February 2025, Russian’s invasion has forced 10.6 million people to relocate, with 6.9 million recorded as refugees living outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, around 12.7 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance, including nearly two million children.

Russia systematically and deliberately deprives civilians of objects essential to their survival and inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction, which constitutes the crime against humanity of extermination. Statements by Russian officials, such as calls for Ukrainians to be left to “freeze and rot,” corroborate this conclusion.

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Russia’s aerial terror campaign, as well as the Kremlin’s actions in the occupied regions of Ukraine, have intentionally deprived Ukrainians of their fundamental rights to life, health, education, and culture, thus constituting the crime against humanity of persecution. The crime of persecution requires special discriminatory intent to target Ukrainians as a distinct group. This intent can be seen in Moscow’s branding of Ukrainians as “Nazis” who must be “destroyed.” such language underscores that Russia is attacking the very existence of Ukrainians. Targeted Russian attacks on educational and cultural facilities across Ukraine are further evidence of this intent.

Additionally, throughout the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities are reportedly enforcing russification policies that aim to extinguish any trace of Ukrainian national identity or statehood. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and subjected to anti-Ukrainian indoctrination. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in relation to the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

Holding Russia accountable for the ongoing air offensive against Ukraine is particularly important as this form of prohibited total war, where everything and anything including vital infrastructure and civilian populations are targeted to achieve victory, looks set to return. Technological advances are transforming the modern battlefield to essentially include entire countries and their civilian populations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s use of long-range drones and missiles to terrorize Ukrainian civilians is likely a taste of things to come.

To date, no international tribunal has held individual perpetrators responsible for international crimes resulting from unlawful aerial attacks. The International Criminal Court has taken an important initial step by issuing arrest warrants against four senior Russian officials for their roles in attacking Ukrainian civilians and energy infrastructure, but further measures are needed.

Failure to hold Russia accountable today will fuel tomorrow’s wars and embolden Putin’s fellow autocrats to embrace similar tactics against civilian populations. It is vital to make sure long-term security is not sacrificed in order to reach some kind of compromise with the Kremlin to end the bloodshed in Ukraine. By focusing on accountability for Russia’s aerial attacks, the international community can set a meaningful precedent that could help protect civilians around the world for years to come.

Anastasiya Donets leads the Ukraine Legal Team at the International Partnership for Human Rights, an independent non-governmental organization. She was previously an assistant professor in the International Law Department at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv. Susan H. Farbstein is a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, where she directs the International Human Rights Clinic.

Ukraine’s vibrant civil society wants to be heard during peace talks

Ana Lejava — Thu, 15 May 2025 20:31:22 +0000

As US-led efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, debate continues over what a viable future settlement could look like. While officials in Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv discuss technicalities and potential concessions, members of Ukraine’s vibrant civil society are also attempting to define the contours of a lasting and meaningful peace.

Many Ukrainian civil society representatives stress that peace must be more than a mere pause in fighting. Temporary ceasefires may lead to periods of relative calm, but unless the root causes of the war are addressed and justice is delivered, the conflict will merely be frozen and not resolved. Similarly frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia offer cautionary tales of how such outcomes can serve Russian interests. These unresolved disputes have allowed Moscow to destabilize its neighbors for decades while maintaining strategic leverage and control.

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In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

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Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Experts react: Trump just announced the removal of all US sanctions on Syria. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 13 May 2025 20:51:11 +0000

“We’re taking them all off.” US President Donald Trump announced on Tuesday that Washington will remove all US sanctions on the Syrian government. The announcement comes five months after the overthrow of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in a snap opposition offensive led by new President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s militant group.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable\

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses.

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence.

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations.

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace.

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions.

Going forward, there are three things to watch:

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation.

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future.

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December.

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists.

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity.

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions.

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land.

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors.

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.”

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention.

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state.

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development.

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country.

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise.

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran. The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria.

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate.

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.”

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.”

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center.

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians.

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria.

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal.

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood.

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory.

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria.

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life.

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough.

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians.

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed.

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses.

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community.

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in.

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries. 

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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There is no easy fix for Haiti’s crises. But here’s where the US can start.

Camilla Reitherman — Tue, 13 May 2025 20:12:52 +0000

On May 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Haiti’s two most powerful gang coalitions, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, as foreign terrorist organizations. This move—along with Rubio’s two trips to the Caribbean earlier this year—signals the Trump administration’s recognition of the growing crisis just 750 miles from Key West, Florida. Still, the imminent collapse of Port-au-Prince may soon demand a broader and more coordinated US response.

This is Haiti’s fourth year without a president, its ninth year without holding presidential elections, and its second year without a single democratically elected official in power. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, the country has witnessed a litany of crises—security, humanitarian, and political—that have internally displaced over one million Haitians, more than half of whom are children. Weakened state institutions and an under-resourced national police force have left Haitians to confront these challenges with little to no support from their government. While resilience has long been a defining trait of the Haitian people, forged through more than two centuries of adversity, the past several months have tested that endurance to its limits. Gangs have made staggering advances into densely populated areas of the capital and previously sheltered rural regions, driving a surge in violence that has claimed over 1,500 lives since January 1.

Experts warn that the total collapse of Port-au-Prince is now closer than ever. What happens if the capital falls to the gangs? Beyond a seismic humanitarian crisis, the Transitional Presidential Council—a provisional governing body formed in April 2024 with the support of the Caribbean Community and the United States—would likely unravel, taking with it any remaining hope for constitutional reform, credible elections, and a functioning central government. And as gangs expand their control beyond urban strongholds and into the countryside, the entire nation would teeter on the edge of state collapse.

While there are no immediate solutions to the crisis in Haiti, there are several tangible steps the United States can take to ameliorate the suffering of the Haitian people and help facilitate the country’s recovery. Failing to do so risks allowing the crisis to not only worsen, but spill over into the United States and throughout the region.

Ripple effects

The paramount consequence of Haiti’s potential collapse into a failed state would be the devastating loss of life and the shattered futures of hundreds of thousands of Haitians. But this fallout would not be contained within the country’s borders—the United States and the broader Caribbean Basin will inevitably feel the ripple effects of the crisis as well.

A humanitarian disaster of this scale would trigger a dramatic surge in migration to countries across the region, including to the US southern border. This coincides with the Trump administration’s revocation of Temporary Protected Status for 200,000 Haitian refugees, forcing deportations at a moment of maximum instability. The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s closest neighbor and a key US ally, would also face intensified pressure—both from refugee flows and the risk of cross-border violence. In the total absence of a functioning state, Haiti could become a staging ground for terrorist activity, drug markets, and transnational criminal networks already active in the region, further destabilizing the Caribbean Basin. With this level of insecurity just miles from the United States’ shores, the situation represents a five-alarm fire for US national security.

US foreign policy in Haiti has long been marked by intervention, mismanagement, and short-term fixes. Many experts fear that the designation of Haiti’s gangs as foreign terrorist organizations falls into the same pattern—failing to address the root causes of gang violence or consider the impact on civilians who rely on aid. And as the failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support mission to restore security to Haiti has made clear, even efforts with significant US backing have proved inadequate to the challenges of the moment. Past US interventions and policies toward Haiti have fueled suspicion among many Haitians and hopelessness among many US policymakers. Yet while the US government bears significant responsibility for this skepticism, it also possesses the influence to effect positive—even if incremental—change for Haiti.

How the US can help right now

The US government can take several steps in the near term to bring back a modicum of stability and prepare the nation for “the day after.” Many of the necessary policies already exist—they simply require reauthorization or targeted revisions to be effective.

Although Haiti is widely recognized as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States remains the largest market for its most profitable sector: textiles. Thanks to bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in 2006 and 2010, known as the HOPE and HELP acts, which established preferential trade terms for the sector, Haiti’s apparel exports to the United States surged from $231 million in 2001 to $994 million in 2021. Although the crisis has severely undermined textile production, these exports provide a resilient economic lifeline for what remains of Haiti’s formal economy. However, unless reauthorized, these trade preferences are set to expire in September. Rather than imposing tariffs that further destabilize Haiti’s fragile manufacturing sector, Congress should move quickly to preserve the near-shoring of US manufacturing imports by passing HR 1625—the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2025, sponsored by Representative Gregory Murphy (R-NC).

The withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) raises many questions about the future of development organizations in Haiti, as hundreds of life-saving programs are put on indefinite hold. Several voices within the Haiti policy community note that the agency’s work, despite its best intentions, sometimes created an overreliance on foreign aid within Haitian institutions. Over a century of this dynamic led Haiti to become, in the words of Haiti expert Jake Johnston, an “aid state.”

In the wake of USAID’s departure, the United States has the opportunity to sculpt a more effective aid strategy that puts the onus of development work in the hands of an ever-resilient Haitian civil society, not just foreign contractors. This strategy proved successful in the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. And this approach serves as the foundation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), a law passed by Congress during US President Donald Trump’s first term that prioritizes localization and reorients US foreign policy strategy in fragile states toward preventing conflict rather than reacting to it. Haiti was designated one of the GFA’s ten priority countries and the Biden administration made meaningful strides toward developing a strategy that prioritizes engagement with a broad range of trusted local partners. Renewing the GFA could build on this groundwork by channeling substantial resources into empowering local partners, thus fostering greater self-reliance within Haitian institutions. Representatives Sarah Jacobs (D-CA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) have introduced a bill to reauthorize and strengthen the GFA. Yet despite the Trump administration’s support for aid localization, momentum for renewing this policy has faltered in both the legislative and executive branches, leaving its future in peril.

A whole-of-government approach

As Georges Fauriol, an expert on the Caribbean, has described US policy toward Haiti, “the challenge is not so much the absence of a strategy as its disaggregated character.” Whether it be the State Department, the Office of the US Trade Representative, or the Department of Defense’s US Southern Command, the US government possesses no shortage of entities that conduct Haiti policy—not to mention the influence of external interest groups such as those in the US Haitian diaspora.

Although working toward the same mission, these initiatives tend to operate in silos and do not come together to form a cohesive strategy for the long-term stability of the country. This dynamic was evident during the US response to Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, as US Southern Command-led military relief operations and USAID disaster initiatives often struggled with unclear divisions of responsibility, resulting in operational inefficiencies. The GFA and policies such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative aim to establish a whole-of-government approach to address this issue. Rather than launching new initiatives for each emerging crisis, the Trump administration should also appoint a special envoy to coordinate and leverage existing Haiti policies within the various branches, helping to shape a more coherent foreign policy for the island and the broader region.

The severity of Haiti’s ongoing crisis makes envisioning “the day after” a challenge. Yet, for countless Haitians, whether living in Haiti or abroad, this vision is worth fighting for, just as it has been during past periods of turmoil. The United States has a strategic interest in advancing a Haiti policy focused on long-term stability rather than short-term fixes. No single policy or initiative will solve the security, humanitarian, and economic challenges that have engulfed Haiti for the past four years. But failing to act at all would further jeopardize the stability of Haiti, the United States, and the region as a whole.

Camilla Reitherman is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

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The father of ‘soft power,’ a supreme intellect, and an eternal optimist: The Atlantic Council remembers Joseph Nye

Atlantic Council — Tue, 13 May 2025 17:38:26 +0000

Joseph S. Nye Jr., the public servant and professor who coined the term “soft power” to describe US cultural influence around the globe, died on May 6. Nye served on the Atlantic Council’s board of directors from 2014 until his passing. He was an active contributor to the Atlantic Council’s work, including an essay for our New Atlanticist section in August drawing from his memoir, A Life in the American Century. He concluded the article by striking an optimistic note:

“Some historians have compared the flux of ideas and connections today to the turmoil of the Renaissance and Reformation five centuries ago, but on a much larger scale. And those eras were followed by the Thirty Years’ War, which killed a third of the population of Germany. Today, the world is richer and riskier than ever before.

I am sometimes asked whether I am optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the United States. I reply, ‘Guardedly optimistic.’ The United States has many problems—polarization, inequality, loss of trust, mass shootings, deaths of despair from drugs and suicide—just to name a few that make headlines. There is a case for pessimism. At the same time, we Americans have survived worse periods in the 1890s, 1930s, and 1960s. For all its flaws, the United States is an innovative and resilient society that, in the past, has been able to recreate and reinvent itself. Maybe Generation Z can do it again. I hope so.”

Below, members of the Atlantic Council community reflect on the impact Nye made on both our work and the wider world.

Click below to jump to an expert reflection:

Matthew Kroenig: “In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Chuck Hagel: “He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

Jan Lodal: He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Paula Dobriansky: “His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Daniel Fried: “He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

“In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Just recently, our CEO Fred Kempe applied the “Joe Nye rule” as a guide to the Atlantic Council’s geostrategy work. He advised that our regular, private Strategy Consortium convenings bring together the caliber of strategic thinkers who will entice people like Joe Nye to remain engaged.

We are deeply saddened to learn of Nye’s passing and that his participation in our convenings will no longer be possible. He was a longstanding Atlantic Council board director and a regular participant in our private Strategy Consortium meetings for many years, most recently in December 2024 on the topic of anticipating a future Trump administration national security strategy. He also contributed to our strategy work in other ways, authoring forwards for our Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series and articles for our website.

He was a towering intellect and a resolute and courteous commentator on global affairs. He brought penetrating insights to our meetings and did not shy away from expressing disagreement, but always in a generous way, intending only to elevate the discussion and improve the quality of the work.

In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist about American power, alliances, and global engagement. Even though he is no longer with us, Nye’s strategic clarity, civility, and optimism will continue to inspire the Atlantic Council.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

“He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

We have lost an exceptional human being. He brought clarity to so many complicated issues over the years. We all learned from him and benefitted from his wisdom and knowledge and unpretentious style. He’ll be missed by many.

—Chuck Hagel is a member of the Atlantic Council international advisory board, a former US secretary of defense, and a former US senator from Nebraska.

He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Joe’s contributions to his students, his family, and world peace and security were unparalleled. His impact will be felt indefinitely.

Joe was also a magnificent personal friend and colleague. We survived numerous hikes to the top of the mountains in Aspen after the exhilarating discussions he had organized for the Aspen Strategy Group. He asked me to take over the group when he had to step down, which I was honored to do. I then imposed on him to join my team as assistant secretary for international security affairs under Bill Perry in the Clinton administration. He was the best ever in that storied office.

Joe actually changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts—”soft power” being perhaps the most memorable. He was a devoted husband to his dear wife, Molly, and a great art dealer from whom we obtained twelve paintings that grace our walls and remind us daily of Joe. We will miss him greatly.

—Jan Lodal is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, a former principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, and a former senior staff member of the National Security Council.

“His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Joe Nye was an extraordinary scholar, intellect, professor, and public servant. He was a prolific writer whose books, articles, and op-eds advanced innovative ideas and provided cogent analyses of complex national security issues. Described as a “towering figure in international affairs,” he produced writings that have had a profound impact on policymakers both at home and abroad. He was widely known for having conceived the “soft power” approach in US foreign policy, which promotes American power through influence, persuasion, and diplomacy.

Joe’s service at the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and as chair of the National Intelligence Council was distinguished and results-driven. During his tenure at the State Department as deputy to the under secretary for security assistance, science, and technology, he chaired the consequential National Security Council interagency group on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

I have long admired Joe’s achievements in foreign policy and public service. On a more personal level, I was also proud to have been his colleague and friend. He touched my life in so many ways. While at Harvard for my master’s and Ph.D. degrees, Joe was not only my professor there, but a wonderful mentor. One of his many admirable qualities that I loved was his desire to have a good lively policy debate. He always brought opposing points of view into a discussion and relished a vibrant exchange of opinions. His calm demeanor in the midst of bureaucratic squabbles or crises was exemplary.

I will miss him terribly, but I am gratified that his policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure. He was indeed a giant in international affairs and leaves a remarkable legacy.

—Paula J. Dobriansky is the vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former US under secretary of state for global affairs.

“He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

Joe Nye was the rare combination of government foreign policy practitioner with political thinker and public scholar of the first order. He has been called a “neo-liberal.” But that term, like its twin “neo-conservative,” is more of an epithet than a useful guide. Roughly put, Nye believed that the rules-based international system that the United States created and led for three generations after World War II was a good thing—that it had more potential to generate prosperity, avoid world war, and advance American values and thus American interests than the competition. Because the competition in the twentieth century was fascism and communism, Nye’s judgment was a sure thing.

But Nye’s optimistic view now seems eclipsed by the dark neo-nationalism espoused by many in the United States and indeed across Europe. When some in the Trump administration, including US President Donald Trump, call for seizing Greenland, they seem to argue that only physical control of (and raw power over) territory can secure US interests, that there is no place for cooperation between nations to achieve goals that benefit both. That’s not a new view; it’s a mere repackaging of old European, great-power imperialism that brought disaster in its time and could bring disaster in ours. Such thinking would reduce the United States to a mere grasping, greedy superpower, a larger version of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, seeking to dominate through force and fear.

Nye’s views are now, more than ever, worth considering. He was no naif about the need for power in the international arena. But he acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right. When he spoke of such things, he meant it: artful, creative, committed, and realistic in the best sense. What a compelling and inspiring legacy he leaves behind.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

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Budginaite-Froehly in Wall Street Journal discussing Rail Baltica

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Tue, 13 May 2025 13:52:01 +0000

Transatlantic Security Initiative and Europe Center nonresident senior fellow, Justina Budginaite-Froehly, appeared in the Wall Street Journal to discuss how Europe’s strategic $27 billion railway project is addressing NATO concerns about Russian aggression in Europe.

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New Atlanticist Feb 20, 2025

What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next)

By Atlantic Council experts

European leaders are waking up to calls from the Trump administration to take the lead on security for Ukraine. Atlantic Council experts share what that might look like from Berlin to Vilnius.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Feb 13, 2025

Europe needs a seat at the table in Ukraine negotiations

By Jörn Fleck, James Batchik

European leaders must quickly make the case to the Trump administration for collaboration in negotiations—and show their willingness to step up.

Conflict European Union

New Atlanticist Feb 10, 2025

Now is Europe’s moment for decisive action on Ukraine

By Léonie Allard, Ian Brzezinski

Make Trump an offer he can’t refuse: European allies should propose deploying troops in Ukraine.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Flagship Event Thu, May 22, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

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Gazans fear famine amid Israel aid block: ‘I don’t want to be a number’

Arwa Damon — Mon, 12 May 2025 16:37:00 +0000

Humanitarian aid into Gaza is being blocked by a democratically elected nation state, Israel, and is fully supported by the world’s self-declared greatest democracy, the United States. Indeed, the imagery and stories coming from the Palestinian enclave leave one feeling like we exist in the realm of the inhumane absurd.

For more than two months now, nothing has entered Gaza. Not a single grain of rice or bag of flour. The only thing standing between Gaza’s 2.2 million starving people on the brink of famine and three thousand trucks packed with humanitarian aid is Israel.

“It’s a humanitarian catastrophe. Catastrophe on the true meaning of the world. We never could have ever imagined this.”

The voice note comes from one of the social workers assisting with the International Aid Network for Relief and Assistance, my non-profit organization that works in Gaza.

“We had been distributing rice, a serving of rice just to try to ease the hunger in the bellies of the children at the camps we work in,” she continues.

“But we had to stop now because there’s no rice left.”

I am not disclosing the names of those quoted, due to safety concerns in the aftermath of Israel’s targeting of humanitarian aid workers. Although even with the precaution of anonymity, one colleague remarked: “Israel knows who we all are anyway.”

It has been more than two months since Israel broke the ceasefire deal, resumed its bombing campaign of Gaza, and declared that no aid would enter the Strip. Well before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Israel controlled everything that entered or exited Gaza, even at the Rafah crossing at its border with Egypt.

The Israeli cabinet has started deliberations on resuming aid operations but under a framework that would “by-pass Hamas”, which would perhaps make sense if Hamas controlled the aid, only it doesn’t.

I have been to Gaza four times since the launch of the war in Gaza, on humanitarian missions with INARA, and would have gone on my fifth mission in February had Israel not denied me entry. I am hardly the only one, there has in fact been a troubling increase in denials of humanitarians and medics on missions to Gaza over the last three months.

I have been to warehouses, out in the field on distributions, and in sector meetings. Israel has long maintained that humanitarian aid entering Gaza is “controlled by Hamas.” The humanitarian community has categorically stated over and over that Hamas does not control the aid, despite allegations that the militant group has stolen some of it. But it is worth noting that if Hamas has been stealing or hoarding aid, it’s not from humanitarian organizations’ warehouses or distribution points.

This framework and its mechanisms would see private security contractors, or the military, establish “Israeli hubs” for distribution. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) issued a statement on behalf of all its partners slamming this plan.

“It is dangerous, driving civilians into militarized zones to collect rations, threatening lives, including those of humanitarian workers, while further entrenching forced displacement,” UNOCHA said in a statement.

“Humanitarian action responds to people’s needs, wherever they are.”

Most of us have set up distribution points close to the communities we serve, or, similar to our work at INARA, we deliver directly into the camps we work with. The population of Gaza is not mobile. Cars and buses don’t function; there is no fuel. People have to walk or take donkey carts to get anywhere. It’s not logical to expect someone to walk hours to get to a set distribution point in an active military zone and then haul an up to fifty-kilogram food parcel back to their tent.

Even assuming that someone was able to get the food box back to their tent, what are they supposed to cook with? Gaza has gone without cooking gas for months People try to gather wood, some are even burning books and trash to light a fire to cook on, but they are often unable to source enough. This is why functional community kitchens is so critical, but we have no idea how or if they will even be supplied.

But this is not a battle space that is ruled by logic. Equally ludicrous is Israel’s claim that “there is plenty of food in Gaza.”

There isn’t. The World Food Program does not state that its warehouses are empty, bakeries do not shut down, and children do not claw at scraps of food at the bottom of a pot when food is plentiful. What has been distributed to community kitchens will be depleted in the next few days.

It is no secret that Israel has weaponized humanitarian aid to ostensibly pressure Hamas, and the government itself has stated that it’s basically enforcing a “starve or surrender” policy.

Rule 53 of International Humanitarian Law specifically states, “The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited.”

Israel is countering this by citing Article 23, which states that consignments may be prevented if there are concerns they may not reach their intended target or benefit the enemy. This is again based on the false premise that Hamas controls the aid. If this were the case, aid organizations like ours would have been unable to deliver assistance when Israel was permitting entry. We especially would not have been able to deliver during the ceasefire, when Hamas re-emerged onto Gaza’s streets.

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There already is an International Criminal Court warrant, issued back in November of last year, for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which includes among the alleged crimes “the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.”

Last week, the International Court of Justice began its deliberations on Israel’s restrictions on aid and aid operations at the request of the UN General Assembly. The deliberations will likely take months. Israel boycotted the sessions and called the whole thing a “circus”.

Israel recently rejected a Hamas offer of a five-year deal that would see it cede political power, countering with a forty-five-day ceasefire proposal and the provision that Hamas agree to disarm, which Hamas in turn rejected.

While ceasefire talks sputter, Israel is doubling down. The government just approved a “conquest” plan to expand its operations in Gaza, calling up additional tens of thousands of reservists, and enraging the Israeli population, who are growing increasingly incensed with their government’s refusal to do what it takes to get back to a ceasefire that will see the remaining hostages released. Tens of thousands of Israelis have been demonstrating on a regular basis, demanding that their government not continue to endanger the hostages’ lives.

For Palestinians, time is running out— a warning that has been echoed at some of the highest ranks of international organizations, including the World Health Organization.

“We are breaking the bodies and minds of the children of Gaza. We are starving the children of Gaza. We are complicit,” Deputy Director General Michael Ryan told reporters at the WHO’s headquarters. “It’s an abomination .”

When I speak to Palestinians in Gaza, I hear the strain in their voices—the subtle tremors as they fight not to crack under mounting hunger after a year and a half of military bombardment.

“Arwa,” they say. “I don’t want to be a number.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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The new pope is American. He is also Peruvian. Why does it matter?

Martin Cassinelli — Fri, 09 May 2025 19:35:40 +0000

As global headlines celebrate the election of Pope Leo XIV—Robert Francis Prevost—as the first American pope, another nation three thousand miles south of the United States loudly claims him as one of its own. Though born in Chicago, Pope Leo XIV spent over two decades living and working in Peru and became a dual US and Peruvian citizen in 2015, forging a personal and spiritual bond with the Andean country that remains little known to the wider world. His identity as a dual citizen could be a defining characteristic of his papacy and, if channeled in his work, could shape US–Latin American relations.

The election of a pope thrusts a previously little-known figure onto the world stage and places significant geopolitical influence in his hands. As head of state of the Holy See, the pope oversees a vast diplomatic network and holds a moral authority that resonates across both the spiritual and political spheres. Each new pontiff brings a unique imprint to the role. Pope Francis, for instance, drew deeply from his experience working with marginalized communities in Argentina—a perspective that shaped the priorities and tone of his papacy from the beginning. In his first speech to the world as the new pontiff, Pope Leo XIV addressed the crowds in Spanish and greeted “his beloved Diocese of Chiclayo in Peru,” perhaps an early sign that his US–Peruvian identity will leave an imprint on his papacy.

This unique combination of identities could represent more than just mere symbolism. It may also help Pope Leo XIV reframe the US–Latin American relationship in more humane and values-driven terms. To do so, he will need to pick up where Pope Francis’s social justice work left off, but better communicate the shared humanity of people across the hemisphere to a US audience, who increasingly disapproved of Pope Francis and his views during his papacy.

Two decades in Peru

As a missionary and priest in towns and cities across Peru, Pope Leo XIV worked with marginalized communities during some of the country’s most turbulent decades. The 1980s and 1990s in Peru were marked by hyperinflation, an internal armed conflict between Maoist guerrillas and the Peruvian military that left an estimated seventy thousand people dead , and a dramatic erosion of the rule of law. During this period, he became a vocal advocate for vulnerable populations and sought to hold those in power accountable for the lives lost amid the violence and political breakdown.

In 2015, Pope Francis appointed him apostolic administrator of the Diocese of Chiclayo, a coastal city in Peru, a role he held until 2023. In this position, he became known for his closeness to rural communities and his support for social programs, including efforts to combat child malnutrition. As more than 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants escaped to Peru seeking asylum during his eight years in the Diocese of Chiclayo, Prevost showed care and defended their right to migrate. In 2023, he also publicly condemned the violent crackdown by Peruvian security forces against protesters, reinforcing his long-standing commitment to human dignity and justice. To this day, many Peruvians remember him as a priest who never hesitated to walk alongside the country’s poorest and most forgotten.

The unlikely blend of US and Latin America

One of the most distinctive aspects of Pope Leo XIV’s leadership may be his ability to bridge two regions across the same hemisphere. Within the Vatican, he was informally known as the “Latin American Yankee,” a nickname that captures both his dual identity and his capacity to bridge a hemisphere that increasingly finds itself at odds. While the Catholic Church is rarely seen as a central force in US–Latin American relations—with the notable exception of Archbishop Óscar Romero’s outspoken role in El Salvador’s civil war between the US-backed right-wing government and leftist guerrillas in the 1970s—it retains profound cultural and political influence in both places. The church shapes civic life, public debate, and electoral outcomes.

A pope who understands both the hopes of a campesino (small-scale farmer) in northern Peru and the concerns of a middle-class worker in the US Midwest is uniquely positioned to act as a moral and diplomatic bridge. To do so, he will need to carefully weigh his rhetoric on US politics, particularly on immigration, and forge a message of peace that cuts across political divides in the United States—no small feat at a time of increasing political polarization. As a result, Pope Leo XIV could help inspire a shift toward a US–Latin American relationship grounded not just in transactional interests, but in dignity, shared values, and common humanity.

Martin Cassinelli, a native of Peru, is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Full transcript: The 2025 Distinguished Leadership Awards recognize leaders reshaping the global landscape

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 May 2025 03:16:16 +0000

Don’t miss the broadcast of the event

2025 Distinguished Leadership Awards

This year’s awards recognize visionary policymakers, trailblazing corporate leaders, decorated military brass, and humanitarian champions who are reshaping the global landscape.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Good evening, and welcome to the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards. It’s a pleasure to see all of you here in this ballroom tonight. And we gather in our nation’s capital to honor some of the world’s most impressive and influential leaders, and to underscore our commitment to promoting constructive global leadership and ensuring that freedom and opportunity and prosperity can be more widely realized across nations. In navigating the increasingly intertwined social and economic and political challenges of our time, it’s imperative that individuals of intellect, experience, and resolve guide our collective march towards a safer and a more secure world order. And we are fortunate to have such individuals with us here tonight to celebrate.

Now, we celebrate and we assemble at a pivotal time for the Atlantic Council and, frankly, for the world over. In an era of uncommon geopolitical uncertainty and unrest, and seldom has so much been at stake for the liberties and the collective interest of people, and cultures, and countries everywhere—now and for generations to come. And against this backdrop, the Atlantic Council continues its commitment to meet these challenges of the moment and to help chart a path forward. And in an environment of exceptional charged—polarized politics, it’s worth restating that we continue to operate and conduct ourselves solely as policy advocates for America and its allies.

The Atlantic Council has never been shy about advocating for US values, principles, and ideals. Our fundamental goal has always been to equip policymakers, business decision makers, civil society leaders, and the broad public with the insights and the analysis necessary to make the most informed decisions possible in an increasingly complex environment. Which is to say, we are not neutral. We believe in a strong national defense. We believe in strong alliances. We believe in respect for individual rights, free and fair market economies, and the rule of law. And our work reflects the sometimes nuanced but certainly multifaceted nature of the issues we analyze and provide. And that’s where we put most of our work, to those viewpoints.

And in short, our experts are sometimes critical of the policies and the policy frameworks of a particular administration, but always striving to bring about the best possible outcome. What is arguably the most volatile geopolitical moment since World War II, President Trump’s second term has begun at an even—far more perilous time than his first. He confronts a protracted war in Europe, continued conflict in the Middle East, strikes between India and Pakistan, and increasing tensions with China. He faces an escalating contest over technological change and a coalition of China and Russia, North Korea, and Iran, who have made clear that they are working in common cause against Western ideals.

And in the face of such complex and worldwide challenges, including the economic, societal, and political disorder, the Atlantic Council’s work has rarely, if ever, been so crucial. And while our mission and principles are unchanged, we have remained nimble, dynamic, and robust, enabling us to react and respond when the context changes around us. And now more than ever, we are dedicated to an alliance of democracies, galvanizing US leadership alongside our partners to shape solutions to these challenges and advance the broader cause of democracy across the global stage.

And that mission is greatly enriched by the distinguished leaders we celebrate tonight. Four exemplary and influential honorees, who represent the very best in our transatlantic partnership, whose character and contributions have been a wellspring of inspiration and left an indelible and enduring impact on the world.

Tonight we pay tribute to a businessman and a philanthropist, Victor Pinchuk, for his support of soldiers and civilians suffering from a war in Ukraine, and his contributions to health, education, and diplomacy.

The prime minister of Croatia—to Prime Minister Plenković, for his visionary leadership of Croatia and a steadfast commitment to European unity as well as to his dedication to strengthening our transatlantic alliance. His vast experience speaks well of his leadership and his judgment.

General Jay Raymond for his ingenuity and his guidance at the helm of the US Space Force, serving as its first chief of space operations, the first chief of this, America’s newest military branch.

And Grammy-winning singer and songwriter Judy Collins, whose contributions to music—to her cultural advocacy, and charitable initiatives she shaped Americans’ music so dramatically and she inspired generations.

And finally, ladies and gentlemen, there is among us a person synonymous with the art of statecraft, demonstrating an extraordinary ability to wield influence through dialogue and strategy and vision. His work transcends traditional politics, embodying the idea that governance is not merely a mechanism of power but an art form that requires intuition and empathy, and a deep understanding of human nature and society. And tonight, for the sixth time in the history of our Council, we bestow the Distinguished Service Award upon Stephen Hadley for his invaluable contribution.

And let me conclude by expressing our appreciation for this evening’s co-chairs and the entire Atlantic board of directors and our international advisory board, which also is here with us tonight, and all of our friends and partners for their importance and their unwavering support. In solidarity, we stand proven and ready to shape the global future together and a better world for all.

Thank you very much.

ADRIENNE ARSHT: Thank you all for being here this evening. Probably the hardest part of that was getting through the traffic.

We have an extraordinary group of honorees tonight, and as you just saw our first honoree, Judy Collins, is no exception. For more than six decades, Judy’s voice has carried the hopes, dreams, and stories of generation.

With a career that began at the height of the 1960s folk revival, she has remained an enduring musical force, bringing tradition and innovation with a signature blend of sincerity, poetry, and fearless activism. She has recorded more than fifty albums, earned multiple Grammy awards, and received an Academy Award nomination.

But her artistry extends far beyond the stage and the recording studio. Through her songwriting and storytelling, she has never shied away from advocating for collective change. A passionate supporter of mental health awareness and suicide prevention, she has used her own journey to inspire openness, healing, and something I’m very passionate about—resilience. She has stood as a proud voice for civil rights, environmental conservation, and the transformative power of the arts.

Judy, to pay tribute to you tonight, we wanted to give you a gift of music. The artist who will perform tonight hails from Sweden and now captivates audiences around the world. She is a singer, composer, and instrumentalist whose emotionally rich and genre-blending artistry calls to mind your spirit. With a sound that fuses Nordic folk, pop, and jazz influences, her music, like Judy Collins, transcends boundaries and speaks straight to the heart.

So please welcome a rising star in her own right, Helena Hallberg.

ADRIENNE ARSHT: Shh. Thank you, Helena, for that incredible tribute. Now, Judy, of course, is a cultural icon. But we consider you an outstanding humanitarian whose legacy is defined not only by your unmistakable voice, but also by your unwavering compassion. I consider Judy a friend, and so I’m thrilled to ask her to join me on stage to receive the Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award. And when she takes the award and does a few other things, be very quiet. Please welcome to the stage, Judy Collins.

JUDY COLLINS: How are you? Oh, hi, hi, hi. Are you there? I think that we’ve got—where is my pianist? There you are, Daniel. Please welcome Daniel Mintseris. Hi, hi, hi. You know, after the pandemic I was trying to think, I hadn’t been on a vacation for about forty years. And so I was very interested in what was going to happen. And a friend of mine—you know, we were going to—we were locked down in New York, as you were here. I think everybody was locked down. And we decided, you know, what are we going to do? We can’t go and see our relatives, so we’ll take walks in the park and appreciate that.

But anyway, I got a call from my friend Jim. Jim Hart. He’s a wonderful guy. But he’s a little out of touch with things. And he said to me, you know, I have a problem. I said, you have a problem? Everybody has a problem. All of us have a problem. What’s yours? He said, I can’t quit smoking. And I said, do you want to? He said, no. Why would I try, my God! And I said, well, you know, if you’re serious about this you should call my doctor. He’s a very good fellow. And he has a lot of ideas about things, particularly addictions. And so we went to see Dr. Brumen, and Brumen said, well, Judy said that you are going to—you want to—you could possibly quit smoking? He said, no, no, no, no. That’s not my thought. She must have misunderstood me.

And I said, well, you have to go see my doctor. He went to see my doctor. My doctor said, do you want to quit smoking? He said, no, never. He said, well, if you’re serious about this, you have to think about this in a way that is creative. And he said, you know, if you take—if you take a substance into your body, a cigarette, God takes an hour of your life and gives it to Keith Richards.

Hi, Daniel. You’ve heard that a number of times, haven’t you?

I always like to say that you’re looking to the “American Idol” of 1956.

By the way, first of all I want to say, I am so honored to be a part of this organization’s presentation of an award tonight. I don’t know how this really happened. I didn’t think anybody really knew what was going on in my life.

And I do have to say, I’m not going to—I’m not going to talk on and on and on and on and on. I thought perhaps we would start with a moment of memory.

I saw—by the way, this young lady was so wonderful, wasn’t she, singing, “Turn, turn, turn.” Amazing.

And I was thinking, in this room, there is so much energy and so much intelligence and so much vision, and I’m sure we can solve these things that are going on in the world. Isn’t that true? Let me hear this from you.

Where have all the flowers gone? Long time passing. Where have all the flowers—would you like to sing?

Long time ago. Where have all the flowers gone? Young girls have picked them, every one. When will they ever learn? When will they ever learn?

Pete Seeger at his very best. Thank you.

Music is I think the heart of most things in life, the music that you carry around from childhood. I think when I was in the womb, I heard my father singing—Oh, Danny boy, the pipes, the pipes are calling—so I sort of knew that from the time I was a child. It’s probably why I changed my direction from being a concert pianist to being a folk singer.

And so here I am, and here you are, and we have work to do and we have celebrations to make, and music helps us to do it, I think. I know it does for me. And I know it does for you.

So I’ll sing you a song that I understand is a favorite here. And if I forget the words—please help me out.

This is Daniel. Give him a warm welcome.

JUDY COLLINS: I love you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Daniel.

CONDOLEEZZA RICE: Good evening. And thank you for letting me join you to honor my great friend, Steve Hadley. Steve Hadley is such a patriot, such a wonderful person. You know all of that about him. And I’m so delighted that he’s getting this Distinguished Service Award, an award that I understand the Atlantic Council doesn’t give very often. And so, Steve, you’re in pretty rare company with our good friends the late Henry Kissinger and the late Brent Scowcroft. And it just says what people think of you and believe about you. And I’m right there with them. In many ways, I think those are the people that I think most of when I think about you.

You were an exceptional national security advisor. Before that, I had a chance to be with you as I was national security advisor. I always said you were much better at the job than I was. But when I was also secretary of state, it was so great to have you at the White House.

I know that you know that we went through a lot together. Those were post-9/11 years. Those were years of wars and terrorism and a lot of tensions but your steady hand, your complete commitment to American values, to America’s role abroad, to making certain that the policies of President Bush were carried out with principle and with values at the center of them, I can’t think of a person who I have had a better relationship with throughout my career than you, Steve.

We continue to work together in all kinds of ways, but I just want you to know that I think of you as not just one of the greatest colleagues that I’ve ever had but one of the best friends.

I also suspect that Ann is there with you, and I just want to say that the Hadley family has always been really important to me, too—Ann and Kate, and Caroline—and so you’re a great father and a great figure in that regard, too.

So, Steve, congratulations on receiving this great and much-deserved award. Thank you for all the years of leadership and patriotism and commitment through very hard times for our country, and the great news is that you’re just going to keep going.

So thanks to you, thanks to the Atlantic Council, for letting me be a part of this. Even if virtually, I’m with you in spirit.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, the late Senator Simpson of Wyoming he once wisely noted that if you have character nothing else matters and if you don’t have character nothing else matters, and we are here tonight because it is a very important moment because Steve Hadley stands as a remarkable testament to the essence of unshakable character with a profound integrity that radiates from every interaction.

He embodies the principles of honesty and of loyalty and respect, earning the trust of all who cross his path. His experience in the realm of statecraft is vast and it’s akin to an expansive library that’s filled with lessons from history and the complexity of human affairs.

His patience is like the depths of the ocean. It’s calm, steady, and unwavering even in turbulent times, and this extraordinary quality allows him to approach challenges with a measured perspective and fostering an environment where creative solutions can actually flourish.

And, moreover, his discernment is unparalleled. Whether navigating intricate diplomatic discussions or mentoring the next generation of leaders his insights elevate the discourse.

In honoring Steve, we recognize not just a leader of distinction but a person of tremendous character, a true beacon of virtue and of wisdom whose contributions to statecraft will resonate for years to come.

So, ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Steve Hadley.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: So, ladies and gentlemen, we thought we’d do something a little different here tonight. We thought we’d just have a conversation and I’d get the opportunity to ask my colleague here a few questions. So if you just would indulge us here for a moment…

But, Steve, let me just start, with I mentioned the library of your lessons. So what are the lessons, actually, that you’ve learned after observing American statecraft over so many different presidential administrations?

STEPHEN J. HADLEY: Well, thank you very much. I want to thank the Atlantic Council for this wonderful award. I must say, the great honor is to be able to work with the leadership and staff the Atlantic Council, day-in and day-out, with the great work that they do. It’s a wonderful organization, wonderful people. And they do great work for our country. Thank you so much.

I think there are five things that strike me looking back over a number of administrations, I think they’ll strike you a little bit as sort of self-evident. But sometimes the self-evident gets lost in the hurly burly of the day-to-day. The first is the importance of American leadership. There’s a lot of talk today about multilateralism, American disengagement from the world. And the truth is, nothing good happens to the world without American leadership. That is still true.

Who is in a position to broker peace between Ukraine and Russia other than the United States? … The problems of the Middle East? Who’s going to broker a peace so that Pakistan and India don’t go to war with one another? As my friend Condi Rice once said, when the United States does not lead, either nothing happens or bad things happen. And this is a lesson, I think, that has been lost on the American people. And one of the missions of the Atlantic Council, I think, is to restore Americans’ faith in the importance of American leadership.

The second thing I think we have to focus on is the importance of strategy and strategic thinking. This isn’t complicated stuff. Strategy, strategic thinking is defining what you want and, in simple terms, how to get there. My friend Bob Blackwill used to say, the first thing that gets lost in any interagency meeting of more than two people is what are you trying to accomplish. And I think that is too often the case. So if you want to really advance the peace, prosperity, safety, and security of the American people, you need a strategy. You need to define what you want, and how you’re going to get there. Otherwise, you’re going to flounder.

The third thing, that’s related to that, is you need process. You need an interagency process. My friend Bob Gates is wont to say that the federal government is like a dinosaur. It’s really big. It has a small brain. And it has no small motor skills. And that is true. The US government is very big. There’s lots of government agencies and departments that play in foreign policy. And if you cannot pull them together and get them pulling in the same direction, you’re never going to accomplish anything in terms of meeting the strategies that you’ve laid out. Good process does not dictate good policy, but good policy is harder to achieve without good process. You’ll find without good process departments and agencies working at cross purposes, dissipating their efforts. You won’t achieve your objectives. And you’ll be constantly surprised by the unintended consequences of what you’ve been doing.

A third thing I think—a fourth thing I think that’s important is bipartisanship. We’ve fallen into a pattern in this country of one party gets elected, passes its agenda only with its own partisan votes, leaving the opposition party out in the cold. And the consequence of that is very predictable. When the opposition party wins the next election, they come in, vote out the program of their predecessor, put their own in, with their own partisan votes, no bipartisan help whatsoever. And the consequence of this is two steps forward and two steps back. This is running in place. This is not progress. You need to take the time to build a bipartisan support for foreign policy and issues so that they can span and last cross administrations, and so they can stay in place long enough to produce the results that they’re intended to produce.

The last thing I would say—there’s a big debate out there: Should America pursue its values or should America pursue its interests, and I think this is a false choice. It is true that the United States has other interests besides advancing democracy, freedom, human rights, and rule of law. And sometimes there are tradeoffs between those interests and other interests like fighting terrorism, nonproliferation, and the like. But at the broadest level, advancing our values in the world makes a world that is more congenial to American interests, and is more congenial to the prosperity, security, and safety of the American people.

So those are five things I think I’ve learned—American leadership, strategy, process, bipartisanship, and pursuing both our values and our interests at the same time.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Well, Steve, let me ask you, is that relevant anymore today? Is that relevant in this world?

STEPHEN J. HADLEY: Look, it’s a changed world. I think about China. I think about the China we faced in the Bush administration. It bears no relation to the China we face now. There’s a lot of change. There have been a lot of policy mistakes. We have to acknowledge that.

But the problem in a period of disruption and change, as we are now, is a tendency to hold to closely to the status quo. And I think what we—there is no institution, process, or policy that cannot improve with a little examination and effort. So the trick in a period of disruption and change is to use that disruption as an opportunity to revise existing policies, processes, and institutions, and to develop new institutions, policies, and processes that fit the moment. That’s what we need to do. That’s what the Atlantic Council is well positioned to do, and I really think that’s our mission going forward in this time of change.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Well, just to conclude our conversation here, you’ve worked or observed a number of presidents quite directly since Lyndon Johnson. So if you look at the system that’s been built out of all those experiences of the second half of the war, tell us about what you think the future is going to look like.

STEPHEN J. HADLEY: You know, there’s a lot of emphasis now on transactions, on interests, on America first. I must say, all those presidents I observed or worked with, they thought they were putting America first. They thought they were doing what would advance the prosperity, security, and safety of the American people. I firmly believe that.

They also shared an enlightened vision of what American interests were. They believed that American global leadership actually contributed to the security and prosperity of the American people. They believed that you had to work with allies. They believed that if you strengthened allies—politically, economically—and strengthened their democracies, it made America stronger. They believed in a rules-based economic system that not only lifted millions out of poverty but also made America prosperous. And they believed that you needed to confront tyranny and aggression, stand up for sovereignty and independence, or you were going to have a world that degenerates into might-makes-right and the kind of spheres of influence that gave rise to World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.

So this is the world that they grew up in, and it resulted in eighty years of relative peace, prosperity for not just Americans but the world as a whole.

Now, there’s a lot of talk about the importance of transactions and a more narrow definition of our interests, and there is a place for a transactional approach. And to the extent it produces good results for the American people, we ought to praise that, and we ought to applaud the folks that bring that for us.

But I would say to those people who believe in a more transactional, short-term interest: Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity. There’s a lot still relevant here today.

And those principles, of course, are the principles on which the Atlantic Council was founded, which the Atlantic Council has worked to advance and promote for the decades since. They are still relevant today, and the mission of the Atlantic Council is to promote and advance those values and ideals could never be more important.

JOHN F.W. ROGERS: Ladies and gentlemen, our Distinguished Service awardee.

ANDRÉS PASTRANA ARANGO: Good night. Distinguished leadership of the Atlantic Council, honorable awardees, ladies and gentlemen—Andrej Plenković.

It is a pleasure to join you this evening as we honor exceptional individuals for their achievements and legacy. It is my privilege to introduce a close friend, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, as he receives the Distinguished International Leadership Award.

This recognition is greatly deserved for both his achievements and the legacy he continues to shape. Already the longest-serving prime minister in Croatia’s modern history, he has earned the trust of Croatian citizens across three consecutive mandates—a rare [accomplishment] in [today’s] politics.

In a time often marked by uncertainty, Prime Minister Plenković has delivered continuity, stability, and a clear strategic vision, qualities behind Croatia key milestones since independence. Under his leadership, Croatia joined the eurozone and Schengen Area and achieved the second-highest economic growth in the EU, a testament to sound governance.

On the global stage, Croatia now speaks with confidence and credibility. His government modernized the Croatian armed forces in close cooperation with the United States and the European allies. He fulfilled a generational dream by completing the Pelješac Bridge, uniting the country. He also built a strategic LNG terminal on the island of Krk, positioning Croatia as a regional energy hub. Through all this, his leadership has moved the country forward in every respect. In crisis, he has shown both resolve and compassion, from managing the COVID pandemic, to supporting Ukraine, protecting households during the energy shock, and leading recovery after two major earthquakes. Across these challenges, his leadership has been steady and effective, earning trust at home and respect abroad.

At home, he is a champion of social solidarity. Abroad, a promoter of European unity, a strong believer in the transatlantic bond, and a respected advocate for democratic values. His leadership extends beyond Croatia, through his roles in the European People’s Party and as vice president of the Centrist Democrat International, where he brings experience and conviction. He is, in every sense, a modern leader, guiding a forward-looking European nation. Croatia is not only catching up with its partners. In many areas, it is surpassing a growing number of them. And we should never forget how far the country has come. A nation that emerged from war, not from a peaceful transition, a country that rebuilt before it could grow, its people who waited while others integrated, and yet refused to be left behind. Croatia lost a decade, but it caught it up. And it did so, above all, thanks to Andrej’s vision and leadership.

Today, Croatia stands as a beacon for those still fighting for sovereignty, freedom, and the promise of the European integration. Throughout the years, I have been a witness of my namesake’s exceptional character. I have never seen him lose his temper at complex international gatherings. And his fellow leaders respect both his firmness and his gentle touch on delicate manners. He is a natural-born diplomat, trusted even when defending tough positions for his country, Croatia. It is fitting that tonight, here in Washington, he joins the rank of global leader, many from far larger nations and institutions. His achievements have earned Croatia a place on the world stage. And his legacy is far from completed.

Now I want to invite the great singer, Tajči, for her musical performance.

TAJČI: Good evening. What an honor it is to be here. And congratulations, Mr. Prime Minister… Thank you for all that you do. The greatest gift is to learn how to love and share that love with all.

ANDRÉS PASTRANA ARANGO: Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Prime Minister Plenković to the stage.

ANDREJ PLENKOVIĆ: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, let me pay a token of gratitude to Tatjana Matejaš Cameron Tajči, the famous Croatian singer that just performed a Whitney Houston song.

She was the winner of the Croatian Euro Song Contest back in—you wouldn’t believe it, but it was back in 1989, so she’s been a champion for a while. Thank you, Tatjana.

Dear John, dear friend, distinguished leadership and members of the Atlantic Council, fellow awardees, dear American and international friends, ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to the Atlantic Council for hosting us this evening and for this extraordinary honor.

I’m truly humbled to stand here alongside such distinguished fellow awardees. I warmly congratulate each of them on their well-deserved recognition and their outstanding contributions to global security, humanitarian efforts, and cultural inspiration.

I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to President Andrés Pastrana, former president of Colombia, for his presence this evening and for his generous words of introduction.

Dear friends, for the past nine years, it has been both my highest honor and deepest responsibility to serve as prime minister of Croatia. As President Pastrana noted, these have been years shaped by a growing number of global crises. In many ways, governing today is no longer a matter of routine decision-making; it is an ongoing exercise in resilience and crisis management.

But through every challenge, I have sought to steer a steady course for Croatia, always guided by a simple but fundamental goal: to improve the lives of our citizens because, ultimately, that is the essence of public service and good governance.

Our vision has been to see Croatia take its place among the most advanced, stable, and prosperous nations in Europe and the world. That path has not been easy. We started our journey in the early 1990s from the ashes of war and destruction. Our task was harder because of that very past, but our determination was forged in it.

The will of the Croatian people to win and defend their freedom is what has made every success since then possible, and tonight I’m proud to say the story of Croatia is a story of success, one that is still being written. That success being recognized here in Washington holds special meaning because the United States has long been one of Croatia’s most valued strategic partners and closest allies.

From the days of war to today’s deep and growing cooperation across administrations and across generations, America has stood with Croatia, and Croatia, as a committed transatlantic ally, will continue to stand with America.

The deep ties between our nations are reflected not only in our shared values but in the lives of countless Croats who helped shape America, from Peter Tomich, who gave his life at Pearl Harbor to save his crew and receive the Medal of Honor, to Mike Grgich, whose wine put California on the global map, to Anthony Lucas Lučić whose drilling innovation sparked the Texas oil boom, to Ivan Meštrović whose sculptures grace Chicago, and to Nikola Tesla, whose genius lit up America and revolutionized the modern world.

These are just a few among many who built lasting bridges between our peoples. Together, we remain committed to preserving the transatlantic bond as the cornerstone of a free and democratic world. Anything less would weaken both Europe and the United States, and only embolden those who challenge our shared values.

This truth holds in Ukraine today, as it did in Croatia in the 1990s and wherever freedom is under threat. America has always stood for liberty, and I’m confident it always will. As a loyal friend and ally, so will Croatia.

Distinguished guests, as proud as we are of our partnership with the United States, we are equally proud to be a member of the European Union. Two principles have guided my political vision: modern sovereignism abroad and social cohesion at home.

Internationally, by joining the most integrated circles of European cooperation, Croatia has amplified its sovereign voice. We are stronger and more influential for it, and we give now our share in shaping the future of Europe.

At home, we have worked tirelessly to raise living standards while ensuring that no one is left behind. We can show—we have shown that building a competitive economy is fully compatible with extending solidarity, especially in times of crisis, and especially to those most in need.

A stronger Croatia abroad and a more just and prosperous Croatia at home will remain the compass of our work ahead.

As I accept this award tonight, I do so with deep gratitude for the trust the Croatian people continue to place in me. I dedicate this honor to them for their perseverance, resilience, and ability to overcome adversity. Because in Croatia, as our athletes so often demonstrate in sports, we may not be the biggest country, but we consistently punch above our weight. And I can assure you, we intend to keep doing so.

Thank you once again to the Atlantic Council, and thank you all for your presence and your support.

[Dinner break]

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you all.

First and foremost, a big round of applause for the remarkable Judy Collins and that incredible beginning of our evening. Another round of applause to our chairman, John Rogers, and to Steve Hadley, who has accepted the Distinguished Service Award tonight. Please, a round of applause for them as well. As John Rogers said, this award is rarely given. It’s not actually the Distinguished Leadership Award. It’s given for service to the Atlantic Council.

It’s been given to Henry Kissinger. It’s been given to Brent Scowcroft. Now to Steve Hadley. The other three people who it’s been given to are here in the room, and I want to salute them as well—General Jim Jones, Adrienne Arsht, and Bahaa Hariri. So congratulations to all of you. These are the only recipients of that award. And then to the remarkable prime minister of Croatia, Prime Minister Plenković, please a round of applause for that as well.

Eighty years ago today, eighty years ago today, on May 8th, 1945, Nazi Germany surrendered to allied forces. And eighty years ago today, the world emerged from the shadow of fascist tyranny through unity, sacrifice, and courageous leadership among wartime allies. Speaking of the fallen allied soldiers, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said on that day, “No monument of stone, no memorial of whatever magnitude, could so well express our respect and veneration of their sacrifice as would the perpetuation of the spirit of comradeship in which they died.”

The Atlantic Council is all about the perpetuation of that spirit of allied comradeship. Not just across the Atlantic, but around the world. And not by clinging to the status quo, as Steve Hadley said, but through preparing and planning for future and current challenges. It’s not hard to think about Ukraine’s current struggle against Russia’s murderous aggression in that spirit. Eisenhower, who was then the supreme commander of allied expeditionary forces, said, “As we celebrate,”—by the way, we have a supreme commander here, General Jim Jones, in the history of Eisenhower. And another one, General Scaparrotti, and another one, Wes Clark. So we’ve got a bunch here. I’ve always thought “supreme” would be a great title.

Eisenhower said, “As we celebrate victory in Europe, let us remind ourselves that our common problems of the immediate and the distant future can best be solved in the same conception of cooperation and devotion to the cause of human freedom.” In the decades that followed, the United States engaged with partners and allies to produce one of the greatest periods of prosperity and peace among great powers that the world has ever known. A credit to the visionary luminaries who founded the Atlantic Council in 1961, Dean Acheson—among them were Dean Acheson, Henry Cabot Lodge, Lucius Clay, Mary Pillsbury Lord. It was an incredible group of people who came together at the time.

That period involved the creation of what became known as the rules-based order, including institutions like NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and many others. With all its flaws, and no era of history is without them, this extended period of eighty years since World War II has resulted in enormous benefits and prosperity for the American people. It’s helped lift billions of people around the world from poverty, and it’s helped prevent the outbreak of war among nuclear-armed great powers.

In 1961, the Atlantic Council was born to promote and sustain that brand of constructive US leadership alongside partners and allies to shape a better future. We do this through the people we convene—all of you—through the reports we publish, and through the policies we promote, and as you’ve seen tonight, we do really serious work, but we also like to have a lot of fun.

As a nonpartisan organization, the Atlantic Council has always steered clear of party politics, and we’ve always supported whomever the American people elect for president of the United States because that’s what we do.

We’ve never been shy about advocating for enduring US values and principles such as strong national defense, strong alliances, respect for individual rights, free and fair markets and economies and rule of law, as John Rogers said earlier tonight.

We equip policymakers, business decision-makers, civil society leaders, and the media with insights and analysis necessary to make informed decisions in an increasingly global and increasingly complex global environment.

We’ve carried out this work for more than six decades through changes in presidential administrations, through wars, through impeachments, a pandemic, civil strife. This is who we are. While our mission and principles are unchanged, we remain nimble, dynamic, and robust by responding when the context changes around us.

We face war in Europe, conflict in the Middle East, tensions between the United States and China, a contest over a technological change that’s intensifying. At the same time, we confront a coalition of aggressors—China, Russia, North Korea, Iran—that have made clear that they are working in common cause against US and allied interests.

Americans themselves, many of whom are struggling economically and many of whom are uncertain about their future, question the benefit and costs of continued US global engagement, and they’re right to question that.

Steve Hadley, who we are honoring tonight, as you know, with our Distinguished Service Award, argued correctly in his conversation with our chairman, John Rogers, that deciding between our values and interests is a false choice because we need to find ways to serve both.

That is the purpose. That is the common cause of the Atlantic Council, and that’s why we’re here this evening celebrating remarkable individuals who represent the leadership our complex times demand.

By honoring them, we hope to inspire others. A little later this evening, before we close, we’ll also salute Ukrainian heroes, nine of whom are with us here tonight in uniform. They’re quite literally at the front lines of the same fight for freedom that we recognize on this anniversary of VE Day.

Our nonpartisan ethos—values-oriented consistent ethos over more than sixty years has sustained our work and our purpose through significant geopolitical, economic, and social changes. So, too, have many of you in this room tonight, particularly our Distinguished Leadership Awards dinner co-chairs.

So we’ve read out all of your names from the stage on many occasions before. There’s just too many of you here tonight to do that. You’ve seen their names on the screen during tonight’s service. On your programs, you’ll see their names on page two and three, so right in the front of the program.

But if I could ask tonight’s dinner co-chairs to rise so that you can applaud them and thank them for their service at the Atlantic Council.

Finally, before we transition to the next segment of our program, I want to express my deepest gratitude to so many in the audience from our board of directors, our international advisory board, our global partners, and our remarkable staff. I am so honored to work with such a committed, resourceful, creative, hardworking team, who together make our work possible.

WILLIAM “MAC” THORNBERRY: Well, good evening.

Two quotes highlight how fitting it is to honor our next distinguished leader. One is from “The Prince,” where Machiavelli writes, “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.”

The other quote I’ll paraphrase from Captain James T. Kirk of the Starship Enterprise: Space, the final frontier. Boldly going where no man has gone before. Well, space may be the final frontier, but it’s already integral to national security and to the economy, touching our daily lives in ways that most of us probably don’t fully appreciate.

In December 2019, after years of argument and opposition, Congress and the president created a new military service to protect our nation in and from this vital domain. The United States Space Force was born. And to boldly go where no one has gone before, to take the lead in establishing a new order of things with all the difficulties that entails, General Jay Ramond was chosen. He comes from an incredible heritage of Army soldiers that goes—that includes West Point graduates going back to 1865. Taking a different path even then, Jay graduated from Clemson University and entered the United States Air Force, where he served thirty-five years before becoming the very first member of the new military service, a Guardian.

As the first chief of space operations, he set the precedent with every decision he made. And make no mistake, every decision was scrutinized, from the choice of the service song and the uniform to complex training and warfighting doctrine. Few of us have the opportunity to lay foundations so important for future generations, but in this case, the nation was indeed fortunate. General Raymond set the new service on a path that grows more crucial and also more contested every moment.

Throughout his career, Jay Raymond has exemplified the qualities that Americans so much admire in those who serve our nation in the military—qualities like courage, not just physical courage but also moral courage; integrity; humility; and especially service above self. And, as the first-ever first lady of the Space Force, Jay’s wife, Mollie, also set precedents, helping shape the culture of the new service. Then and now, she mentors the real heroes of our armed services, military spouses.

The bottom line is that because of their service—because of their service, our nation and our allies are stronger, safer, and more ready to take on the challenges and opportunities associated with the final frontier. It is leadership of the highest caliber. Please join me in expressing our admiration and our gratitude to General “Jay” Raymond.

JOHN W. “JAY” RAYMOND: Good evening. What a wonderful night. I am truly, absolutely humbled to receive such a distinguished award. And when I look at all the other award winners, it reminds me of the old Sesame Street adage, you know, one of these things isn’t quite like the other. And that’s me. But it’s just a wonderful evening.

The only way I can accept this award is to do so in recognition of the nearly sixteen thousand civilian and military guardians and their families who come to work every day to make the space domain safer and to make our nation safer. Based on their service, our nation, our allies are better postured today to meet the incredibly complex strategic environment that we face.

Thank you to Chairman Rogers and President and CEO Fred Kempe for your day-to-day leadership of such an important organization. And I’d like to take a minute to highlight your incredible staff, your incredible team. They have been just remarkable at putting an event on like this. It’s not easy, and you make it look easy. Thank you.

Chairman Thornberry, thank you, sir, for the kind introduction this evening. But more importantly, thank you for your leadership, your friendship, and your wise counsel over the years. Mollie and I are so grateful to you and Sally. And it means so much to me, to us, to have you both here with us tonight. My sincere thanks.

You know, for over thirty years our nation has debated what’s the proper organizational structure for national security in space. However, in 2019, after several years of intense and thoughtful debate, the House Armed Services Committee, led by Chairman Thornberry, helped lead the drafting of the National Defense Authorization Act that formally established the Space Force. Without Chairman Thornberry’s strong leadership, vision, and fortitude, in the wake of pretty significant bureaucratic resistance, the Space Force would still be sitting on the launch pad, rather than delivering national advantage. Our nation owes you, your committee, and the whole of Congress a great deal of gratitude.

When President Trump signed the law on 20 December 2019 establishing this new service and elevating space to a level equal to its importance to our nation, we quickly found there wasn’t a checklist to be followed on how do you go about standing up this service. The nation hadn’t done this since 1947, when the Air Force separated from the United States Army. But what we did have was a very strong sense of purpose. We stood up the Space Force not just to respond to the threats of today, but to ensure that space, a vital global domain, remains secure, stable, and accessible for generations to come.

The Atlantic Council’s mission of shaping the global future together is in tight alignment with the ethos of the Space Force. Your work to galvanize leadership, strengthen alliances, and shape a more secure and prosperous world must extend into space.

The Space Force was founded to protect the shared domain of space through partnerships, deterrence, and responsible stewardship. We seek not only to defend freedom but to extend that promise into the space domain, where the future of global security increasingly resides.

To effectively operate in the space domain, we must have global partners. These partnerships span across governmental agencies, allied and partner nations, academia, and commercial industry. On all fronts, the Space Force has worked tirelessly to strengthen existing or to develop new partnerships, and our partnerships have never been stronger.

As examples, we became the eighteenth member of the intelligence community, ensuring more robust integration, interagency coordination. We’ve expanded our combined space operations to now include not only our Five Eyes partners, but plus France, Germany, Japan, Norway, and Italy, and strengthened our relationship with NATO. We established the University Partnership Program with sixteen different universities focused on advancing research and professionally developing future space leaders. And finally, we have worked to build a more fused relationship with commercial industry to harness a new business model, to help us redefine risk, and to move at the speed of innovation and the speed of tactical need. Our commercial space industry provides us and our allies and partners great advantage, and we must leverage that advantage to full effect.

Although space is a warfighting domain just like land, sea, and air, we do not want to get into a conflict that begins or extends into space. We want to deter that from happening. And if deterrence were to fail, we must prevail.

Space is a significant force multiplier. Our joint force structure and our nation’s war plans are all sized assuming we have access to space. Without space, they don’t close.

Unfortunately, with the current threats that we are seeing being developed by our adversaries or competitors, this is a flawed assumption. We no longer have the luxury of taking space for granted.

The only way I know how to compete, deter, and to win is to do so from a position of strength. Space capabilities can amplify the traditional deterrence calculus of denying benefits and opposing costs. I am convinced that if we can successfully deter conflict from beginning or extending into space, then we have a chance of deterring conflict from spilling over into other domains. The space domain, in my opinion, represents our best hope.

Finally, as I stated upfront, I can only accept this award knowing that it recognizes the great work of Guardians and their families. I’m lucky to have my family here with me tonight. My wife, Mollie, remains a strong military spouse advocate and the source of—and the success—the source of any success that I may have had. I don’t think I would have made captain if it wasn’t for Mollie. Our daughter Amy and our son Gary are here with us tonight. There’s a little joke in our family: None of us can sing, but since everybody else had singers up here, I think I’m going to invite my kids up to lead us in a song. They’re all hiding underneath the table now. Our daughter, Christina, is on an airplane flying back from a business trip and couldn’t be here, but her husband, Nick, is with us tonight as well.

To all the family members of currently serving members or veterans of our armed services that are in attendance this evening, thank you. You serve as well.

Again, to the Atlantic Council—again, to the Atlantic Council, thank you very much for such an unbelievable honor. I’m deeply humbled by it, and I really appreciate the opportunity to be here and spend time with each and every one of you. Thank you very much.

DAVID M. RUBENSTEIN: I just came from an event where it said no black tie allowed. So that’s why I’m not wearing a black tie. I apologize to all of you. This has been a difficult time for me recently. I was fired as the chairman of the Kennedy Center. My stock is down at Carlyle 20 percent this year. The Orioles are in last place in the American League East. I invested in a lot of money in companies that export things from China to the United States. And earlier today, I had my first root canal.

But I did get some good news not long ago. And it made all those things that I just mentioned not so painful. And it was that the Atlantic Council decided to honor Victor Pinchuk. That was an enlightened decision. And we can certainly use more enlightened decisions in Washington. It’s a brilliant decision, in my view. And I want to just tell you why.

I’ve known Victor for many, many years, and I’ve admired him for many, many years as well. Victor is truly the Renaissance man of Ukraine. And let me try to explain what I mean. Victor was born in Ukraine. And he got his education there. He went to a metallurgical institute, was near the top of his class, and ultimately got a PhD. And he started a company not long after that in the steel piping area, and it became extremely successful. In fact, the patents that he developed became used throughout Ukraine and also in the Soviet Union, at the time.

He also became a very, very successful CEO of this company, and ultimately made enough money doing it that he could decide to do other things with his life. And what he did is, among other things, he got involved in politics for a while. And what he did was got elected to the Ukrainian parliament and served with great distinction for eight years there. And probably, had he stayed in politics, he might well have become president of Ukraine. But he decided to devote his life to some other things, principally philanthropy.

And what he decided to do was set up a foundation that became the largest foundation, private foundation, in Ukraine, doing many great things for Ukraine in terms of art, culture, children’s welfare, and nutrition, and many other things that Ukraine needed desperately. And in addition to that, he became the first person in Ukraine, and the only person in Ukraine, to sign the giving pledge, which shows his commitment to give away at least half of his net worth. Beyond that, though, he’s done many other things to get people to know more about Ukraine.

Now today, of course, people know more about it, but many years ago, people didn’t know as much about Ukraine. And so what he decided to do was start a conference in Kyiv where people from all over the world would come to learn more about Ukraine, to talk about public policy, and also to things that might help Ukraine. The Yes Conference, which is held every September, many of you have probably been there, I’ve been there many times, really brings together the best minds in the world to talk about public policy, talk about philanthropy, and to talk about things that can do—that can be done to help Ukraine.

And this has been true for Victor so much so that, had the war in Ukraine never occurred, Victor would deserve this award. Because what he’s done before the war in Ukraine by itself would deserve this award. But since the war in Ukraine, what he’s done is even made it even more desirable that he gets this award. Let me tell you why. As soon as the war broke out, Victor decided he was going to stay in Ukraine and fight whatever he could do to help his country. And among other things, he created, through his foundation, a project called [RETURNING], which helped soldiers who were wounded in combat get recovery, and about 25,000 soldiers to date have been helped by Victor’s efforts. Twenty-five thousand soldiers.

And he’s creating a new foundation called—which is called [RETURNING], where about a hundred thousand soldiers will be coming back through this process to get mental health help because, obviously, if you go through combat of the type that they have had in Ukraine you have a lot of challenges mentally afterwards, and he is now in the process of building that returning effort so that people who have been through combat come back to Ukraine, are able to recover from the mental challenges they’ve had.

Beyond that, he’s done many things to make sure people know what’s going on in Ukraine and so every year he holds a conference or a big meeting in Davos and it’s the most highly sought after ticket in Davos because what Victor does is he gets the president of Ukraine, who he’s an ardent supporter of. He gets many soldiers who fought in combat in Ukraine.

He gets many global, political, and business leaders to come to this breakfast, and they talk about Ukraine and what more they can do, and people pledge to give help to Ukraine. And Victor is solely responsible for this breakfast and this gathering and has done more than anybody else I know who is not a government official to let people know about the horrors of the war and to do more things than anybody else I know not in government to rally people to the cause of Ukraine.

And all of this Victor has done this without seeking publicity. He’s done it putting enormous amounts of his own money up, and he’s done this because he’s a great humanitarian. Victor is somebody that I’ve gotten to know over the years and he’s always interested in other people, not in himself, and he’s a person that I think that the more and more people get to know him the more and more people will realize this man is a unique Renaissance man—Ukraine’s greatest Renaissance man.

He’s also interested in the problems of anti-Semitism. Like many people who are Jewish in this country, my ancestors came from Ukraine, and Victor has done many things to help before the war in Russia, even the war with Russia even started. He’s done things to let people know about the anti-Semitism that has still—that has existed in Ukraine and that has existed in Russia as well.

But he’s spent a lot of time trying to raise money for and give money to a fitting memorial for what happened in Babi Yar. What happened there in 1941 was 33,000 Jews were senselessly slaughtered from the machine gun and buried in a ditch and they’ve never been properly memorialized, and Victor has led an effort to make sure people realize what happened in that terrible, terrible period of time under the Nazis.

And so all of these things Victor has done, he’s done these with great humor, style, character, and always a commitment to helping other people, and so I have regarded Victor as an incredible person, a person I regard as a friend and somebody that I think has the kind of skills that I think everybody should want to have.

He’s intelligent, philanthropic, humanitarian, and a person who has all those skills often isn’t a nice person, but he’s a nice person, too. Very often people have gigantic accomplishments, and sometimes their egos get out of control. That’s not the case with Victor.

Victor is down-to-earth and the kind of person everybody here, I think, would be lucky to have him as a friend. I regard him as a friend, and it’s my honor to be here tonight to talk about my friend Victor Pinchuk.

VICTOR PINCHUK: Thank you very much, David.

For many years, you are, for me, a role model as businessman but, first of all, as philanthropist, and particularly I remember very special moment. I think it was in 2019. It was in Kyiv during your participation in our annual Yalta European Strategy Conference, and you said something really very powerful and beautiful. You said, when you became a businessman, successful businessman, you started to make big money, but your mother never congratulated you, never told you that she’s proud of you. And only when you became a philanthropist, when you started to give money back, only then your mother congratulated you and she started to tell you that she is really proud of you. And for me it was, and for many people in the room it was so inspirational. And thank you very much to you, and first of all, of course, to your mother for this wisdom. Thank you very much, David.

Good evening, Atlantic Council board members, members of the administration, distinguished guests, and dear friends. Once Fred Kempe called to inform me the selection committee voted to award me with this prize, my first reaction was this is the wrong time for Ukrainian businessman to get an award because the suffering and war in our beloved country, Ukraine, continues, and any award must go to the Ukrainian heroes who give their lives and health, only to them.

But then I thought there is a sense in it, because if I go to Washington I can be useful. First, I can speak about Ukrainian heroes and Ukraine. Second, I can express our deep gratitude to the United States. And third, another reason to come to Washington which I will address later.

Allow me to first talk about our heroes, Ukrainians who risked their lives to defend our country and its borders, to defend their families against killers; our workers who produce every day under rocket attacks and shelling; our medics who save lives. Some of them are here in the room. I will present just two of them.

Dmytro Finashyn is a young man. In combat, he lost his arm, but he returned to service as an intelligence officer. Today, he advises the minister of the interior on work with veterans. He was awarded by the president of Ukraine as Hero of Ukraine. This is our equivalent to the Medal of Honor.

And Liudmyla Meniuk. She lost her son in the war, then she herself joined the army at the age of fifty-two. She is the first woman to lead an armored unit. She was injured many times defending Bakhmut. She was heavily wounded. Since then, she helps soldiers as a psychologist.

Liudmyla and Dmytro are two of our nine heroes in the room with us tonight. They are—thank you very much. They are nine out of several millions of heroes. I bow low to you. I have no words to express my endless respect and boundless gratitude. This award belongs to you and others like you.

For my wife, Olena, and I to support Ukrainian heroes is a true honor of our lives. Philanthropy for Ukrainian businessman now is participation in the war for independence. All the philanthropy we built over more than twenty years was just preparation for what we do now.

For example, our experience in health care we use now to create rehabilitation centers for our soldiers, a nationwide network of state-of-the-art centers with a total capacity of 26,000 wounded heroes per year. And just today—I mean, literally today—we open a center with over one hundred beds, and heroes are going there. I will see them when I come back from Washington to Ukraine. And I want to tell our heroes how they are respected in Washington. Olena and I never did anything so important. Thank you.

Now my second point, why I decided to accept. This is my opportunity to say a huge thank you to the great people of the United States of America. The United States have been with Ukraine from the first days, frankly speaking, from the first minutes of the war. Thank you for your invaluable, consistent, real friendship, and partnership. Ukrainians will never forget this. And one more important point why I decided to accept. Let me ask you, why do people go to Paris? To see Eiffel Tower. To London, for Buckingham Palace. To Rome, to see the Coliseum, St. Peter’s Basilica, and the pope—now American pope. Congratulations.

And why do people go to Washington? Today, people go to say something to President Trump. OK, not all get invited to the White House and Oval Office, and if they invited us, I have learned, it’s not guaranteed to be always useful. So I’m grateful for the opportunity here to say thank you to the president of the United States. President Trump was the first to give arms to Ukraine in 2017. This was hugely, hugely important. Thank you. Thank you also for authorizing the weapons sale recently. It also is extremely important. And the minerals agreement created under the leadership of President Trump that was signed recently is momentous. I personally call it the minerals for peace accord. And I am happy to tell you, just today the Ukrainian parliament voted and approved the agreement.

And looks like today is really a great and very special day. New pope, new agreement, new rehabilitation center, and new very productive conversation between President Trump and President Zelensky, and new awards. And because I get a humanitarian award, I want to also say I find, Mr. President, your humanitarian approach to the war very right. President Trump says, and I believe this really a mission for him, that he wants to stop the dying. This is a humanitarian approach.

Yeah, please understand me correctly, I don’t want to suggest to share today’s humanitarian award between our heroes and President Trump. But if President Trump will achieve his humanitarian goal to end the war, to achieve a sustainable peace, and will pray for that, he will deserve another prize. And nobody in the world wishes him this prize more than Ukrainians, including our president. Because nobody wants peace more than Ukrainians. Now let me say something that I, as Ukrainian, find vitally important.

Ukrainians understand an end to the war now is possible only in a not perfect way. Everyone will have to get up from the table not satisfied. Some goals maybe will take many years to achieve. Understood. But one vital truth Ukrainians also understand perfectly, our enemy says they want to address the root cause of this war. Ukrainians know what is the root cause of this war for our enemy. Please listen. The root cause our enemy wants to eliminate is the existence of Ukraine, a Slavic post-Soviet, post-communist, mainly Orthodox country, whose people live in liberty, and democracy, and in a market economy based on the rule of law. This is an existential threat for the enemy’s authoritarian regime and empire. It’s the mistake of the existence of Ukraine that our enemy wants to address, which means remove, delete, annihilate.

Here I want to appeal, Mr. President, to your wisdom, experience, intuition, and instincts. We understand, Crimea was taken before you were in office. The full-scale invasion happened after you were in office. We trust you will now get the enemy to agree to peace. But what do we do when you will not be in the office anymore? One day it will happen. That’s why security guarantees are vital. And nobody in the world can imagine such a guarantee without some participation of the great country of the United States of America. (Applause.) Yeah.

So, dear friends, I congratulate you on a Victory Day for World War II, which President Trump declared recently as an American commemoration. Ukrainians also hold our commemoration on May 8th, the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism. My great hope is that soon the president of Ukraine also can introduce an additional annual commemoration to commemorate the day when the war is over, when Ukraine is secure, and member of the European Union, and reconstruction has begun. By the way, the minerals agreement will be an important part of this reconstruction.

I thank all of you for your attention. Thank you to Atlantic Council for this award. Thank you, heroes of Ukraine. This award goes to you. Glory to the great American people and Slava Ukraini.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So stay here for a second, Victor. So we have a final segment of our program, a salute to heroes and some music. Please look at the video to see everything that Victor was just talking about.

So, Victor, thank you again for your leadership, your extensive efforts to aid Ukraine’s defense, including support of the nation’s armed service members, veterans, and civilians resisting Russian aggression.

Tonight we’re gathered not only to celebrate global leaders, but to honor extraordinary courage, the kind that changes the course of history and reminds us all true meaning of bravery and service. We have nine individuals here in uniform who have sacrificed deeply; not the ultimate sacrifice that they’ve seen many of their colleagues engage in. So it’s my honor to introduce a group of individuals, many of whom you just saw in this video, who embody this heroic resolve. These men and women have faced unimaginable trials in defense of their nation’s sovereignty, freedom, and future. On the eightieth anniversary of VE Day, they are today’s heroes.

So now I’ll pass to the delegation of Ukrainian war heroes and veterans whose heroic efforts have been echoed far beyond frontlines. Daniel Salem, the floor is yours.

DANIEL SALEM: Thank you so much. Actually, we heard there’s an audition for a new Avengers movie; that’s why we came.

A man gives an award. God gives a reward. And this is so true, Mr. Pinchuk.

And also, it’s true for you, Atlantic Council and the United States. The crucial support that you have been giving Ukraine and the Ukrainian people helps us to defend the peace and security, and most important the humanity, because the cancer—the second name for war—spreads beyond the Russian-Ukrainian war. It spreads all over the world. It does.

And the reward for your support will apply in eternal life, because what you do for saving the lives from terror and death will not be forgotten. For that, I thank you. We thank you. And the comrades that are right now in the trenches defending our country on behalf of our name, thank you.

The people that you see in front of you are representative of a strong nation like yours, honorable nation like yours—people with dreams, as you do have dreams. And we all know that on the way of achieving our dreams you must apply discipline, commitment, consistency, because without commitment, we don’t know how to start, and without consistency, we’ll never know how to finish.

And what I wanted to tell you, that we are—and we show that we are loyal friends. We can be loyal partners. And there’s also one thing that we have in common: We also proved that we are the home of the brave.

There’s one thing left to do. Of course, with your help, we want to state that we are the land—that our land is the land of the free. Slava Ukraini! God bless America.

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The 2025 Distinguished Leadership Awards: Honoring leaders who demonstrate ‘the true meaning of bravery and service’

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 May 2025 03:12:51 +0000

“Tonight, we are gathered not only to celebrate global leadership, but to honor extraordinary courage,” said Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Distinguished Leadership Awards in Washington, DC, on Thursday. “The kind that changes the course of history and reminds us all of the true meaning of bravery and service.”

Before a crowd of high-level attendees from government, business, the military, civil society, and the media, the Atlantic Council honored six leaders who have shown such courage through their service, leadership, and activism.

Stephen Hadley, a former US national security advisor and an executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors, was honored for his decades of public service across three US administrations. 

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković was recognized for his efforts to advance Croatia’s economic development and his role in advancing the country’s accession to the European Union.

General (ret.) John W. “Jay” Raymond was honored for his pioneering role as the first chief of space operations for the US Space Force.

Victor Pinchuk, a Ukrainian businessman and philanthropist who founded EastOne, YES, and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation, was awarded for his support for Ukrainian soldiers and civil society since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Judy Collins, a Grammy Award-winning and Academy Award-nominated singer and songwriter, was honored for her work promoting mental health awareness, civil rights, and environmental conservation. 

The final honorees of the evening were Ukrainian war heroes and veterans who have risked their lives to defend their country’s sovereignty and freedom from Russian aggression.

“Seldom has so much been at stake for the liberties and the collective interests of people and cultures and countries everywhere,” said Atlantic Council Chairman John F.W. Rogers. “Against this backdrop, the Atlantic Council continues its commitment to meet these challenges of the moment and to help chart a path forward.”

Below are more highlights from the ceremony. 

Judy Collins: “Music is, I think, the heart of most things in life”

Introducing Collins, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht said that in addition to her decades-spanning career as a singer and songwriter, “her artistry extends far beyond the stage and the recording studio,” citing her mental health awareness and environmental advocacy.

Arsht said that Collins was “an outstanding humanitarian” defined not only by her “unmistakable voice,” but also her “unwavering compassion.”

“In this room,” Collins said, “there is so much energy, and so much intelligence, and so much vision. And I’m sure we can solve these things that are going on in the world.”

“Music, is, I think the heart of most things in life,” said Collins. “We have work to do, we have celebrations to make, and music helps us to do it.”

After accepting the Distinguished Artistic Leadership Award, she performed the Stephen Sondheim song “Send in the Clowns,” which was a Billboard-charting hit for Collins in 1975.

Stephen J. Hadley: “Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity.”

“When the United States does not lead, either nothing happens or bad things happen,” said Hadley in a discussion with Rogers on the United States’ role in the world after accepting the Distinguished Service Award. “And I think this is a lesson that’s been lost on the American people.”

“If you want to really advance the peace, prosperity, safety, and security of the American people,” said Hadley, “you need a strategy. You need to define what you want, how you’re going to get there. Otherwise, you’re going to flounder.”

Noting that there are many US government agencies and departments that work on foreign policy, Hadley emphasized the importance of getting them to coordinate and cooperate toward the same objectives. “Good process does not dictate good policy,” he said, “but good policy is harder to achieve without good process.”

“You need to take the time to build a bipartisan support for foreign policy initiatives,” Hadley said, to ensure that they “last across administrations and so they can stay in place long enough to produce the results that they’re intended to produce.”

Hadley called the debate over whether the United States should pursue its values or its interests abroad “a false choice.” Advancing US values, he said “makes a world that is more congenial to American interests and is more congenial to the prosperity, security, and safety of the American people.”

Addressing policymakers who take a more transactional and less values-based view of US foreign policy interests, Hadley said: “Don’t turn your back on those principles that gave us eighty years of peace and prosperity. There’s a lot still relevant here today.”

In a pre-recorded video message, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who served with Hadley during the George W. Bush administration, praised Hadley for serving with a “steady hand” and a “complete commitment” to the United States’ role abroad, as well as for carrying out US policies with “principle and with values at the center of them.”

Andrej Plenković: “We remain committed to preserving the transatlantic bond”

Plenković, receiving the Distinguished International Leadership Award, said his nine years in office have been “shaped by a growing number of global crises,” as “governing today is no longer a matter of routine decision-making—it is an ongoing exercise in resilience and crisis management.”

Plenković described his government’s “vision” as making Croatia stand among the “most advanced, stable, and prosperous nations,” but noted that the country’s path to this goal “has not been easy.”

Croatia began this journey “from the ashes of war and destruction” in the early 1990s, he said, but the country’s “determination was forged” in this difficult past.

“Croatia, as a committed transatlantic ally, will continue to stand with America,” Plenković said. He told of influential Croats who made their mark in the United States, including Medal of Honor recipient Peter Tomich, winemaker Mike Grgich, oil explorer Anthony Lucas, sculptor Ivan Meštrović, and inventor Nikola Tesla.

Together, he said, the United States and Croatia are “committed to preserving the transatlantic bond as the cornerstone of a free and democratic world.”

“Anything less,” said Plenković, would “weaken both Europe and the United States and only embolden those who challenge our shared values. This truth holds in Ukraine today, as it did in Croatia in the ‘90s, and wherever freedom is under threat.”

In his introductory remarks, former Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango praised Plenković for bringing “continuity, stability, and a clear strategic vision” to Croatia, citing the country’s recent accession to the Schengen Area and strong economic growth.

John W. Raymond: “To effectively operate in the space domain we must have global partners”

In accepting the Distinguished Military Leadership Award, Raymond said that it was in recognition of “the nearly sixteen thousand civilian and military guardians” who volunteered to join the US Space Force after it was established in 2019, adding that because of their service “our nation and our allies are better postured to meet the incredibly complex strategic environment that we face.”

“To effectively operate in the space domain, we must have global partners,” said Raymond, noting that the Space Force expanded Combined Space Operations to include Five Eyes members as well as other allies and partners and has strengthened its ties with NATO.

The force has also partnered with the US commercial space industry, which Raymond said “provides us and our allies and partners great advantage.”

Noting that US war plans “are all sized assuming we have access to space,” Raymond warned that given the threats being developed by US adversaries, “this is a flawed assumption. We no longer have the luxury of taking space for granted.”

Amid these growing threats, Raymond said that space capabilities can enhance overall deterrence and that “if we can successfully deter conflict from beginning or extending into space, then we have a chance of deterring conflict from spilling over into other domains.” The space domain, he said, “represents our best hope.”

Raymond was introduced by former House Armed Services Committee Chairman William “Mac” Thornberry, a major advocate for the Space Force’s establishment. Thornberry said Raymond’s early precedent-setting moves for the Space Force “set the new service on a path that grows more crucial and also more contested every moment.”

Victor Pinchuk: “Security guarantees are vital”

Pinchuk said that on first learning he would be honored with the Distinguished Humanitarian Leadership Award, he thought to himself that “this is the wrong time for a Ukrainian businessman to get an award” given the continued suffering of the Ukrainian people during wartime.

However, he concluded that “if I go to Washington, I can be useful,” as this would allow him to speak to a US audience about “Ukrainian heroes” fighting against Russia, “express our deep gratitude to the United States” for military assistance, and emphasize the importance of a security guarantee for a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Pinchuk highlighted the bravery of two Ukrainian veterans in the audience. Dmytro Finashyn, he noted, lost his arm in combat but returned to service first as an intelligence officer and then as an adviser to the interior minister on veterans’ affairs. Liudmyla Meniuk, Pinchuk told the audience, joined the army at age fifty-two after her son was killed in the war, later becoming the first Ukrainian woman to lead an armored unit.

Pinchuk said he was grateful to the United States for its support for Kyiv and thanked US President Donald Trump for recently authorizing a weapons sale to Ukraine. He called the US-Ukraine minerals deal “momentous,” adding that he called it the “Minerals for Peace Accord.”

“Ukrainians understand, an end to the war now is possible only in a not perfect way,” he said, adding that no one would be completely satisfied with the peace settlement and that “some goals maybe will take many years to achieve.”

However, Pinchuk emphasized that when Russian leaders speak of addressing the “root cause” of the war in negotiations, what they mean is “the existence of Ukraine” as a free and democratic country with the rule of law. “It is the ‘mistake’ of the existence of Ukraine that our enemy wants to ‘address,’ which means—remove, delete, annihilate.”

“This is why security guarantees are vital,” said Pinchuk. “And nobody in the world can imagine such guarantees” without the participation of the United States, he said.

“Victor is truly Ukraine’s renaissance man,” said David M. Rubenstein, co-founder and co-chairman of the Carlyle Group, while introducing Pinchuk. Rubenstein commended him for his philanthropic work helping Ukraine, which since Russia’s full-scale invasion has included the creation of programs that operate rehabilitation centers for wounded Ukrainian veterans and provide mental health services to returning soldiers.

Ukrainian war heroes and veterans

Speaking on behalf of the delegation of nine Ukrainian soldiers and veterans being honored for their service, Daniel Salem thanked the United States for its “crucial support” for his country’s war effort.
“The cancer—the second name for war—spreads beyond the Russian-Ukraine war,” Salem said. “It spreads all over the world.”
“The people that you see in front of you are representative of a strong nation, like yours,” Salem told the audience. “An honorable nation, like yours. People with dreams, as you do have dreams. And we all know that in the way of achieving your dreams you must apply discipline, commitment, consistency. Because without commitment, you don’t know how to start, and without consistency we won’t know how to finish.”
Ukraine, Salem said, had already proven “that we are the home of the brave.” With US help, he added, Ukraine will be able to say it is “the land of the free.”

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From rubble to rebirth: A model for Syria’s reconstruction

Mahmood Alhosain — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:53:47 +0000

Almost six months have passed since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria. The most notable event of this transitional phase was the establishment of a new Syrian government in late March 2025, consisting of twenty-three ministers from different backgrounds.

The new government has inherited the aftermath of more than five decades of authoritarian rule, compounded by the devastating consequences of nearly fourteen years of armed conflict. In addition, Syria continues to grapple with the impact of harsh international sanctions, which were imposed in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread human rights violations. These challenges have rendered Syria a fragile state, with its institutions on the verge of total collapse.

However, the fall of the dictatorial regime and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to begin rebuilding state institutions. Whether this new Damascus can seize this opportunity relies on four key pillars: achieving security and political stability, fostering inclusive political participation, establishing justice as a precondition for sustainable peace, and lifting sanctions to prevent the resurgence of violence.

The first pillar: Security and political stability

A deeply fragile security landscape, shaped by two major challenges, hinders Syria’s progress toward stability.

The first challenge is that the regions outside of the new Syrian government’s control, particularly the Jazira region of Eastern Syria—the provinces of Hasakah, Raqqa, and the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor—are currently under the authority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In March 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement outlining the integration of the SDF into the institutions of the newly formed Syrian state. However, the agreement remains vague in its provisions and lacks a concrete timeline for implementation.

Subsequently, it is imperative that the international coalition—led by the United States, which still maintains military presence in Syria—plays a proactive role in facilitating the agreement’s execution. This involves applying political pressure and actively sponsoring dialogue between the parties to foster mutual understanding and avoid any potential military confrontation.

Nevertheless, spoilers are working to derail any potential agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF. Among them is the hardline faction within the SDF, primarily composed of foreign cadres affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They oppose the agreement because its implementation would significantly diminish their influence, including restoring Damascus’s authority over oil and gas sites currently under SDF control. The shift would also undermine the influence of prominent SDF warlords, many of whom are PKK affiliates wielding unchecked authority.

Consequently, they have sought to escalate tensions and resist cooperating with the new administration, as seen with the SDF’s recent crackdown on civilians who displayed the new Syrian national flag. Moreover, according to human rights organizations, the SDF arrested 93 civilians in March 2025, including seven children.

The second challenge is Israel’s incessant military operations, which pose grave risks for Syria, the region, and Israel itself.

Fragmentation of the Syrian state could invite renewed foreign interference, particularly from Iran, which may view Syria’s weakened and divided state as a strategic opportunity to expand its influence.

But for Israel, the military campaign in Syria serves an objective of systematic destruction of Syrian military infrastructure to prevent the rebuilding of a functional defense apparatus. This also assists Israel in implementing a new regional security landscape, aimed at obstructing stabilization efforts through continued airstrikes and ground incursions.

Change in this calculus must come through pressure. The international community—particularly the European Union, Arab states, and the United States—must exert more meaningful and sustained diplomatic efforts to halt Israel’s military actions if they want to achieve sustainable peace in Syria.

The second pillar: Inclusive political participation

In Syria, decades of exclusion and sectarian domination under the al-Assad regime dismantled social cohesion and eroded political trust. It will be crucial to establish a political system that ensures genuine participation for all societal components—political, sectarian, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations. Such a system must provide for the equitable distribution of political and administrative influence through effective participatory mechanisms.

While the new Syrian administration has launched a national dialogue and appointed a qualified government, political participation must go beyond surface-level representation. Participatory governance must be the foundation for rebuilding state institutions. Any political exclusion or power monopolization risks driving certain groups toward disengagement or opposition, transforming them from constructive participants into potential nemeses of the political process.

Achieving this requires pursuing two complementary paths: both a top-down and a bottom-up approach.

The top-down model necessitates that the government lead by initiating structured and transparent programs that facilitate political inclusion. This includes continuing the national dialogue on foundational issues like transitional justice, constitutional reform, state structure, the political system, and foreign relations. These dialogues must be inclusive and truly representative of Syria’s diverse fabric.
Notably, Syrian public opinion demonstrates clear rejection of sectarian-based systems, favoring instead frameworks rooted in civil representation and citizenship. The new Syrian government must treat all Syrians as individual citizens, rather than as members of religious or ethnic groups, and anchoring national discourse in the concept of citizenship is fundamental.

Equally vital is the bottom-up role of civil society in advancing political transition and decision-making. Civil society should be granted the necessary space to operate freely, reflecting Syrian societal dynamics and avoiding inflaming social sensitivities. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of exiled Syrian civil actors, who—during the war—demonstrated a clear willingness to engage politically. According to the literature, these initiatives reveal strong potential for grassroots engagement. Building on these experiences is crucial for forming a cohesive, credible civil society capable of playing a constructive role in stabilization and institutional rebuilding.

The third pillar: Transitional justice

Transitional justice is pivotal for achieving sustainable peace in Syria. After more than a decade of violent conflict—fueled by an authoritarian regime responsible for killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions—there is growing consensus that any political settlement that neglects Syrians’ demands for accountability will neither end the violence, nor enable legitimate and stable state building.

Lack of transitional justice fosters a culture of impunity and fuels the risk of renewed violence, driven by cycles of personal and collective vengeance. As numerous studies have shown, accountability goes beyond a legal or ethical imperative—it is a structural requirement for achieving long-term stability and peace.

It also includes a social and moral process that must begin with public acknowledgment of the suffering endured by victims and their families throughout the 14-year war. Such acknowledgment lays the groundwork for reparations and paves the way for meaningful national reconciliation, helping to move beyond nearly half a century of repression and violence.

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The literature on conflict and transitional justice highlights the importance of context-specific approaches. In Syria, this means that transitional justice must be rooted in the aspirations of Syrians, particularly survivors of violence, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Empirical research on Syrian refugee communities abroad confirms that many see justice as essential to achieving sustainable peace.

Therefore, the new government needs to initiate a transparent and credible transitional justice process supported by the international community. This process must include well-defined implementation mechanisms aligned with international legal standards and grounded in justice and human rights principles. Moreover, it should avoid transplanting external justice models, as approaches that are not adapted to Syria’s social and political context may reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions rather than heal them.

This effort demands sincere political will, robust institutional frameworks, and the active participation of a broad range of actors, including human rights and legal organizations, civil society groups, and local communities. Furthermore, sustained support from international institutions, particularly the United Nations, is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the transitional justice process.

The fourth pillar: Lifting sanctions

In the wake of the regime’s collapse, lifting sanctions has become paramount to achieving two core objectives. First, enabling the reconstruction of state institutions. And second, alleviating the profound economic suffering endured by the Syrian civilian population.

The continuation of sanctions severely impedes stabilization and early recovery efforts. Without access to financial and material resources, the state remains incapable of delivering basic services, perpetuating Syria’s status as a fragile state. This vacuum risks fostering environments conducive to radicalization and renewed violence, which could destabilize Syria and the broader region.

Years of economic isolation have induced severe shortages in basic goods, rampant inflation, record unemployment, and a dramatic depreciation of the Syrian pound. These conditions have exacerbated poverty and social disintegration, undermining any prospect for national reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Economic sanctions against Syria are exceedingly complex. Following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread violence against civilians.

US sanctions have proven to be the most stringent, as they are open-ended with no built-in expiration, unlike EU sanctions, which are subject to annual renewal. Additionally, US sanctions on Syria predate the 2011 uprising, tracing back to 1979 when Washington designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The most expansive US sanctions to date were imposed after 2011, culminating in the Caesar Act, which significantly intensified financial and economic restrictions on the regime and its affiliates.

While reports have surfaced indicating that the United States has outlined certain conditions for sanction relief—such as addressing the issue of foreign fighters—it is imperative that the new Syrian administration prioritize meaningful internal reforms. These reforms should include guaranteeing fundamental rights, refraining from suppressing individual freedoms, enhancing transparency, and reinforcing the rule of law. Commitment to these principles will likely prove more effective in building international confidence than focusing solely on foreign policy overtures.

Rebuilding Syrian state institutions in the post-Assad era requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach integrating security and political stability, inclusive political participation, transitional justice, and sustained efforts to lift economic sanctions. Achieving this requires the support of both international actors and local stakeholders to ensure sustainable peace and stability.

Mahmood Alhosain is a PhD candidate in Conflict and Peace Studies in the political science department at Radboud University. His areas of interest focus on: Post-conflict studies, development, and deconstruction.

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Putin’s parade cynically exploits WWII to justify his own criminal invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 May 2025 02:13:09 +0000

Dozens of foreign leaders are expected in Moscow on May 9 for the largest international event in the Russian capital since Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than three years ago. Officially, they are gathering for a military parade to mark eighty years since the World War II victory over Nazi Germany, but it is already apparent that the shadow of Russia’s current war in Ukraine will loom large over the entire spectacle.

The guest list for Friday’s Victory Day parade on Red Square reflects the dramatic geopolitical realignments that have taken place since 2022, and underlines the widening rift between Putin’s Russia and the democratic world. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s showpiece annual parade had been attended by many Western leaders including US President George W. Bush. This year, however, the guest of honor will be Chinese President Xi Jinping. He will be joined by the Brazilian president along with a host of Central Asian and African leaders. The sole representative from the European Union will be Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Visiting dignitaries will be treated to a bold demonstration of modern Russia’s military might. The mood is expected to be far detached from the kind of somber tones more typically associated with World War II memorials elsewhere. Friday’s parade has been been carefully choreographed to emphasize Russian strength while projecting Putin’s supreme confidence in eventual victory over Ukraine.

The link to today’s war will be hammered home by the participation of numerous Russian military units accused of committing war crimes in Ukraine. Putin may also choose to surround himself with alleged war criminals from the ranks of his invading army, as he did last year. In his official address, it will be genuinely shocking if Putin does not attempt to draw direct parallels between the struggle against Nazi Germany and his own ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine.

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Even without the involvement of Russian troops fresh from the front lines of the current war, it would be virtually impossible to separate Putin’s parade from the Kremlin propaganda justifying the invasion of Ukraine. Ever since Russia first set out to subjugate Ukraine more than ten years ago, the Kremlin has portrayed its escalating invasion as a continuation of the World War II fight against Germany, with Ukrainians cast in the role of modern-day successors to the Nazis. Despite an almost complete lack of evidence to support these absurd and obscene claims, the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative continues to resonate among a Russia population that has been utterly saturated in an extreme form of World War II mythology that often borders on religious fanaticism.

From the very first years of his reign, Putin has sought to place the Soviet Union’s World War II experience at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. For the Kremlin, this emphasis on the immense suffering and ultimate triumph of the Soviet war effort has served as the ideal ideological antidote to the horrors of Stalinism and the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. It has proved a highly effective strategy, helping to rebuild Russia’s battered national pride and giving new meaning to the country’s twentieth century totalitarian trauma.

Putin’s war cult has centered around Victory Day, which has emerged over the past 25 years as by far the most important holiday on the Russian calendar. Many outside observers assume Victory Day always enjoyed similar prominence, but that is not the case. In fact, Stalin himself discouraged commemorations and made May 9 a working day in 1947. It remained so until the mid-1960s, when Victory Day was declared a public holiday. Nevertheless, there was none of the pomp and fanfare currently associated with the anniversary of the Nazi surrender. In the 46 years between the end of World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow hosted a grand total of just four Victory Day parades.

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Putin’s cynical exploitation of World War II has also shaped Russian rhetoric on the international stage. This has been most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine, which Kremlin propaganda has consistently portrayed as a Nazi state. Russia’s lurid claims have proved remarkably resistant to reality, with even the 2019 election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president of Ukraine failing to force a change in tactics. Instead, Putin and other leading Kremlin officials have resorted to ever more ridiculous mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi country could elect a Jewish leader. In one particularly notorious incident during the first months of the invasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots by declaring that Adolf Hitler also had “Jewish blood.”

When Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the fateful morning of February 24, 2022, it came as no surprise that he identified “denazification” as one his two key war aims. The true meaning of this chilling phrase has since become abundantly clear; “denazification” is actually Kremlin code for “de-Ukrainianization,” and reflects Putin’s end goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

In areas of Ukraine that have fallen under Kremlin control since the start of the invasion, the occupation authorities are systematically wiping out all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, and national identity. Thousands of children have been abducted and subjected to indoctrination in a bid to rob them of their Ukrainian nationality, while anyone seen as potentially loyal to Ukraine has been detained and dispatched to a vast network of prisons where torture is reportedly routine. Europe has not witnessed atrocities on this scale since World War II.

For decades, most European countries have marked the end of World War II with solemn memorial services while collectively vowing “never again.” Under Putin, Russians have come to embrace an altogether more menacing form of militant remembrance accompanied by the unofficial slogan “we can repeat it.”

Putin has already succeeded in weaponizing the memory of World War II to consolidate his grip on power, garner domestic support for his expansionist foreign policy, and dehumanize his enemies. He is now poised to use this week’s Victory Day parade in Moscow to legitimize the criminal invasion of Ukraine among his foreign guests and place it in the same context as the fight against Hitler. This is staggeringly disrespectful. It is also historically illiterate. If anyone today is guilty of echoing the crimes of the Nazis, it is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:50:09 +0000

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Abercrombie-Winstanley joins NPR to discuss Trump signing executive orders revoking federal DEI guidelines

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:49:56 +0000

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The shadow of 1930s appeasement hangs over US-led peace talks

Oleksandr Merezhko — Tue, 06 May 2025 13:10:47 +0000

As the world prepares to mark the eightieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, the shadow of events leading up to World War II hangs over efforts to end Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine. In order to avoid the horrors of another global conflict, Western leaders must apply the lessons learned from the struggle against twentieth century totalitarianism.

US President Donald Trump’s efforts to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine reflect a commendable desire to end the war. Nevertheless, after more than three months of Russian stalling tactics and empty promises, it should now be abundantly clear that attempting to negotiate a meaningful compromise with Vladimir Putin was a mistake.

Since the current peace process began in early February, the Russian ruler has refused to join Ukraine in backing a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire. Instead, Putin continues to insist on maximalist goals that reflect his undiminished determination to erase Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people.

Putin’s demands include the comprehensive disarmament of the Ukrainian military and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of Ukrainian public life (euphemistically called “denazification” by the Kremlin), along with official international recognition for Russia’s territorial gains and an end to all military support for Kyiv. If implemented, Putin’s terms would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. This is not a negotiating position; it is a call for Kyiv’s capitulation.

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While Russia’s ultimate objectives remain unchanged, there is a very real danger that Putin may seek to exploit Trump’s evident ambition to settle the Ukraine issue as soon as possible. He could do so by agreeing to a temporary ceasefire that would lead to a pause in hostilities, while creating the conditions to complete the conquest of Ukraine following the end of Trump’s presidency. This would allow Putin to lift sanctions, rebuild the Russian army, and destabilize Ukraine from within.

In order to secure Kremlin backing, a ceasefire deal would need to hand Putin the semblance of victory while denying Ukraine any genuine and reliable security guarantees. Alarmingly, reports indicate that current US peace proposals go a long way toward meeting these conditions.

Crucially, the United States is reportedly prepared to officially recognize the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This has led to inevitable comparisons with the 1938 Munich Agreement, which saw Britain and France hand Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland over to Nazi Germany in the hope that this would satisfy Adolf Hitler. Instead, the shameful deal struck in Munich encouraged the Nazi dictator to escalate his territorial demands. Less than a year later, World War II began.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have long been condemned for enabling the rise of Hitler. Attempts to appease Putin have produced strikingly similar results. After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Western efforts to downplay the war and resume “business as usual” only served to embolden the Kremlin. When Russia’s 2014 invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine again failed to produce a resolute Western response, Putin interpreted this as a tactic green light to go further. This paved the way for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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It should now be obvious to any objective observer that the continued appeasement of Putin will further fuel his imperial ambitions. This would be potentially fatal for Ukraine itself. It would also be disastrous for the future of international security.

Putin’s revisionist agenda is not limited to Ukraine. He openly speaks of establishing a new world order and frequently laments the fall of the Russian Empire, which at its peak included more than a dozen currently independent nations beyond Ukraine, from Finland and Poland in the west to the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, it is delusional to think he will simply stop. On the contrary, abandoning Ukraine to Russia would dramatically increase the chances of a far larger conflict in the coming years.

In order to prevent this nightmare scenario from materializing, the West must demonstrate maximum unity and an uncompromising commitment to Ukraine’s survival as an independent state. Putin interprets any talk of compromise as a sign of weakness. The only language he truly understands is the language of strength.

The most effective deterrent remains Ukrainian membership of NATO. Unsurprisingly, Putin has worked hard to prevent this from happening. He has employed nuclear blackmail to intimidate the West, and has spent years spreading false narratives about an alleged NATO security threat to Russia itself.

Putin’s objections to Ukrainian NATO membership do not stand up to scrutiny. Notably, he has been unable to explain why he went to war over Ukraine’s distant hopes of joining NATO but did nothing to oppose Finland’s recent NATO accession, despite the fact that Finnish membership of the alliance more than doubled Russia’s NATO borders overnight. Indeed, Russia already shares borders with six NATO member states and leaves these frontiers largely unguarded. Putin’s real problem is evidently with Ukrainian independence and not NATO enlargement.

Bringing Ukraine into NATO would serve as a powerful barrier to future Russian invasions and would dramatically reduce the likelihood of a major European war without undermining Russian national security. However, this would require a degree of political will on the part of the United States and major European powers including Britain, France, and Germany that is currently absent. Unless that changes, Western leaders must come up with a credible alternative to NATO membership that will guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainian people. But Ukrainians also recognize that well-meaning efforts to compromise with the Putin regime will only encourage further Russian aggression. Similar policies aiming to accommodate and appease Hitler led directly to World War II. If Western leaders wish to prevent a repeat of this catastrophic outcome, they must stop offering the Kremlin concessions and demonstrate the kind of resolve that Russia respects.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

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Tahir in MSNBC on the revocation of temporary protected status for Afghans who aided the United States

acwalina — Sat, 03 May 2025 18:21:48 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On May 3, Muhammad Tahir, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former RFE/RL Central and South Asia liaison in Washington, DC, was published in MSNBC on the revocation of temporary protected status for Afghans who aided the United States during its war in Afghanistan.

The Afghans who aided the U.S. during its war in Afghanistan weren’t just interpreters or cultural advisers — they were bridge builders in every sense.

Muhammad Tahir

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Muhammad Tahir

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The Trump-Meloni challenge: How to make both the US and the West great again

Ira Straus — Fri, 02 May 2025 20:20:08 +0000

US President Donald Trump has revived the discussion of “greatness,” after decades when the very word was deplored as imperialist. What is it that has made the United States and the West great, and what is needed to renew its greatness now?

Recently, Giorgia Meloni, the Italian prime minister, has become a co-leader on this revival. At her meeting with Trump on April 18, she explained that making America great again is complemented and reinforced by “making the West great again.” In response, Trump agreed that they can together make the West great again. Six months earlier, she had told the Atlantic Council that a joint Western nationalism, or “civilizational nationalism,” is needed. This is something, it is worth noting, that would exist alongside the individual nationalisms of each Western nation, and it would reinforce and stabilize them all.

She is right. Pride in the civilization reinforces pride in the nation and stabilizes it. US identity has long been bound up in the shared identity of the West. Similarly, on the practical level, US greatness is inextricably tied to the unity and success of the transatlantic Western community. Westerners are bound by shared historical and civilizational roots, intermixed populations, intertwined development of their systems of government, deep economic links, and enduring shared strategic interests.

American Greatness itself has multiple levels. It did since the start, as the greatness of the states depended on the greatness of the union. This has been taken for granted for so long that it is often forgotten.

Today, American Greatness in the world consists of at least three concentric spheres:

Great America: the fifty states that make up the United States.
Greater America: the special arrangements and concessions that the United States gained in the late 1800s and early 1900s in its larger neighborhood. This included territories such as Guam and, before they became states, Alaska and Hawaii. It also included US control of the Panama Canal Zone.
Greatest America, which is also the Greater West. This is the vast intercontinental alliance system that the United States helped develop during the two world wars and organized permanently under US leadership after 1945. This includes much of Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan.

Greatest America is by far the greatest power in the world. It has double the gross domestic product of its inner US core alone, triple the population, and four times the strategic area and resources. And, uniquely, it keeps growing. This is the West that Meloni spoke about. Its organizers in the 1940s did not shy away from greatness. They built a new, supplementary level for it. And they fostered a budding joint patriotism for this greater whole.

America’s larger greatness had begun, paradoxically, before the United States existed—when Europe expanded across the Atlantic after 1492. It thereby formed a Greater Europe—a Greater West than ever existed before. When America extended its power back across Europe after 1900, it upgraded this Greater West in a new form. For the first time since the Roman Empire, this began to produce a unified West.

The formal organization of the West after 1945 made it more powerful still. It ended the internecine wars with which the West had undermined itself for centuries. And it enabled the West to expand beyond its traditional geography: It brought Japan and its neighbors into the system.

This achievement deserves more attention. It is what has enabled the European and American powers to establish a positive sum sphere of mutual greatness, with the United States as its essential inspiration and organizing force.

For decades, this arrangement has kept Westerners relatively safe—safer than any time since 1900, when the British Navy was still informally protecting the United States. In recent years, however, too many people have begun to take this greatness for granted.

Since the combined West isn’t nearly as effectively organized as the fifty US states, Trump has raised the issue of relying more on the latter kind of reliability. He has evoked the territorial expansions of the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s, raising the issue of adding today control of Greenland and Canada, and a renewed control of Panama. In taking this approach, Trump would be reinforcing the middle layer of Greater America after a century of focus on the outer layer, the intercontinental Greatest America.

This has aroused strong nationalistic reactions from the target areas, making it harder to achieve the desired practical accommodations with them. This was just seen in the Canadian elections, where Trump’s approach induced a nationalist reaction against the United States so intense that it reversed the expected outcome. In retrospect, given international laws and long-entrenched nationalisms, a better approach would be to seek supplements and reinforcements within the outer intercontinental layer of American greatness. This can still be done for Panama and Greenland, and probably in the larger Atlantic-Pacific spaces as well.

While these issues seem new at this moment, they are not. There were the same angry arguments in the course of the earlier expansions of the inner United States, the Greater America, and the Greatest America/Greater West. Collapse of the united Great America was regularly predicted for ninety years after its founding, until around 1865. Collapse of the united Greatest America/Greater West has also been regularly predicted for the past seventy years now. But, even after the worst spats, the Greater West has always come out even bigger and stronger.

Today, the prophets of doom for the West are chiming in again. They always do. In the 1890s, many people treated the United States’ trans-Pacific power and expansion as a turn away from its transatlantic connections. Some commentators are repeating this mistake today. But the United States’ truly great nationalists, US President Theodore Roosevelt and US naval historian Alfred Mahan, saw the United States’ trans-Pacific extensions as enabling its transatlantic reconnection with the British Empire and the other northwestern European empires. They proved right.

The prophecies of doom have always failed. Americans and their allies in the Greater West have too much in common to break up—and too much to gain by continuing to grow together. Most of them know this and are determined to stay united.

Today, there are tensions with change, as always; but the likely outcome, ultimately, is a reinforcement of American and Western greatness in all its layers. There are already reparative and further expansive forces at work. The Trump-Meloni challenge wakes us up to get past our recent inertia and make sure it happens.

Ira Straus is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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To redefine US-Africa engagement, Washington must recognize the power of the African diaspora

Kirstie Kwarteng — Fri, 02 May 2025 13:44:28 +0000

The United States needs to pay more attention to the digital identity economy.

In my work researching how African diaspora communities in the United States maintain their connections to their homelands, I have found that long-standing experiences involving racism, combined with growing anti-immigrant sentiments, have led many members of the African diaspora to strengthen their ties to the continent.

Such diasporans, especially second-generation diasporans (that is, the children of immigrants), have connected with their African identities by turning to the digital space, which has enabled them to follow Africa-related news and cultural trends, connect with diaspora organizations, and keep in touch with family and friends. Digital platforms reduce the distance between home and abroad, accelerating the movement of people, capital, and ideas.

Second-generation diasporans have also turned to digital platforms to engage in cultural commerce. This digitized and culturally rooted economic engagement—which includes business development, trade, and investment—is what I call the digital identity economy. And this type of diaspora engagement offers new opportunities for reshaping US relations with the African continent.

Diaspora engagement is nothing new; African diaspora communities have long maintained economic, cultural, and social connections to their countries of origin. African immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s maintained homeland ties by opening cultural shops for food products, sending remittances, forming associations and religious institutions, and visiting home.

But the digital identity economy has created space for second-generation diasporans to channel their shared desire to connect with their homelands, offering products and services that meet their cultural needs while addressing the distinct challenges they face in reconnecting with home, challenges that first-generation immigrants may not experience in the same way. For example, one app called Nkenne, created by a second-generation Nigerian-American, helps diasporans learn African languages and addresses declining heritage-language fluency, a common issue for second-generation diasporans. The app provides cultural education about customs in African countries that younger diasporans may not be familiar with, helping them feel more connected to their culture and their identity from afar.

Digital platforms such as Spotify and YouTube enable young diasporans to engage with African music, stream artists’ work, and share their content. The popularity of Afrobeats music has given rise to businesses and events centered around the genre, including parties and popular music festivals—such as Afrofuture and Afronation—which take place not only in African countries but also in diaspora communities. While some may view these events solely as entertainment, they reflect deep cultural connections that create economic activity.

The digital identity economy has created economic opportunities in tourism for second-generation diasporans. For example, acclaimed second-generation Ghanaian-American chef Eric Adjepong offers a Ghanaian culinary tour, using digital platforms for promotion and booking. And the digital identity economy has enabled second-generation diasporans to use fashion to express their cultural pride and identity. The brand Ashanti Beads, which creates apparel featuring the Akan Adinkra symbol Gye Nyame, is an example of this. Its tagline, “Bridging the gap in the African diaspora through fashion,” speaks to the growing demand for culturally rooted apparel. Ashanti Beads uses digital platforms to engage its audience, market its brand, and sell its products.

These culturally rooted economic activities reflect the financial engagement patterns of second-generation African diaspora members. In speaking with second-generation Ghanaians in the United States and United Kingdom, I found that they are not sending traditional remittances at the same rate as the first generation and are also less likely to send remittances in the future. Reasons for this included not wanting to be taken advantage of financially, not having anyone to send money to, and fears around creating a cycle of dependency. They preferred practices that would promote widespread economic improvement, such as business development, investing, and collective remittances.

Some view the lack of interest in sending remittances among young African diasporans to be a challenge, especially with cuts to foreign aid, tariffs threatening the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the end of Prosper Africa. While some have argued that remittances could fill that funding gap (in 2023, the African continent received over ninety billion dollars in remittances, significantly surpassing foreign aid and foreign direct investment), this is not realistic. Remittances are primarily used for consumption, immigrants face increasing financial difficulty in part due to restrictive immigration policies, and younger diasporans are less likely to send such funds.

These shifts are seen by some as a threat to Africa’s development, but they really present an opportunity to reimagine US-Africa engagement. Washington can introduce new policies and initiatives that support diaspora investment, trade, and business development as an alternative to development aid. And it is in the United States’ interest to do so: Supporting the digital identity economy would yield growth for diaspora businesses and communities in the country.

One way to do that is by strengthening ties through American Chambers of Commerce. American Chambers of Commerce on the African continent can serve as connectors and champions for a new era of diaspora-driven trade. By supporting business matchmaking, policy reform, and transnational partnerships, they offer a ready-made infrastructure for unlocking the potential of the digital identity economy.

Another is by creating a post-AGOA US-Africa trade policy. A policy that centers on diaspora businesses and entrepreneurs—by offering concessions and incentives that reward investment in the continent’s creative, cultural, and digital sectors—would support the growth of African economies and diaspora businesses.

A third initiative could include redefining foreign direct investment (FDI) to include diaspora investment. US diaspora businesses investing in Africa should be recognized as a form of FDI. While diaspora direct investment may be harder to track than remittances or traditional FDI, it still offers a dual benefit by supporting Africa’s growth while strengthening diaspora businesses in the United States. Redefining FDI to include diaspora direct investment would provide a more accurate depiction of capital outflows and the actors driving them. It can also broaden how the United States views diaspora financial contributions, moving beyond a focus on remittances to acknowledge the businesses, services, and networks they provide.

By embracing the digital identity economy, fostering diaspora investment, and rethinking trade policies, the United States can adopt a collaborative approach that supports African economic empowerment while strengthening connections across the diaspora, encouraging mutual growth.

Kirstie Kwarteng is a postdoctoral research associate at SOAS University of London and founder of The Nana Project.

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Kyiv accuses China of deepening involvement in Russia’s Ukraine war

Katherine Spencer — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:43:29 +0000

As US-led efforts continue to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv has recently accused China of deepening its involvement in Moscow’s invasion. The claims leveled at Beijing are not the first of their kind since the start of the full-scale invasion and add an extra dimension of geopolitical complexity to the ongoing negotiations.

In early April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that two Chinese nationals had been captured while fighting alongside the Russian military in eastern Ukraine. Although the presence of foreign fighters within the ranks of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invading army is not new, officials in Kyiv claim that more than 150 Chinese mercenaries have been recruited by Russia. China has called the allegations “totally unfounded.”

While there is no evidence linking Russia’s Chinese troops to Beijing, many have suggested the Chinese authorities must be aware that their nationals are participating in a foreign war. Some have pointed to widespread Russian military recruitment adverts circulating across China’s heavily censored social media space, and have suggested that the presence of these videos indicates a degree of tacit official approval, at the very least.

US officials do not believe the recently captured fighters have direct ties to the Chinese government, Reuters reports. However, there are mounting concerns in Washington and other Western capitals over reports that Beijing is sending army officers to observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a bid to learn tactical lessons from the war. This could provide the Chinese military with important insights into drone warfare and the rapidly changing nature of the modern battlefield.

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In a further indication of growing frustration in Kyiv over China’s alleged support for Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy recently accused Chinese citizens of working at a Russian manufacturing plant producing drones for the war in Ukraine. In the past month, the Ukrainian authorities have also imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies for alleged involvement in the production of Iskander ballistic missiles, which Russia often uses in the war against Ukraine.

The most serious Ukrainian allegations came in the middle of April, when Zelenskyy claimed that China was now supplying weapons and gunpowder to Russia. This was the first time the Ukrainian leader had openly accused Beijing of providing Moscow with direct military assistance. Although, last fall US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell had also suggested that China was providing Russia with technology that was “not dual-use capabilities,” contributing directly to Russia’s war production.

Claims of expanding Chinese involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine do not come as a complete surprise. After all, China has long been seen as one of the Kremlin’s key allies and has emerged over the past decade as Moscow’s most important economic partner.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. Over the past three years, the two countries have repeatedly underlined their shared geopolitical vision, which includes a commitment to ending the era of US dominance and ushering in a new multipolar world order. These strengthening ties have been further highlighted by a number of bilateral summit meetings between the Russian and Chinese leaders.

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Despite its close relations with Moscow, China has officially adopted a neutral stance toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has included refraining from any overt gestures of support and publicly backing calls for peace. Nevertheless, Beijing has faced accusations of enabling the Russian war effort in important ways through the provision of restricted items including sanctioned components and dual-use technologies used in the production of missiles, tanks, and aircraft. By providing the vast majority of these exports to Russia, US officials believe that China has helped Russia greatly boost its arsenal and ramp up military production.

US officials have also alleged that China is providing Russia with geospatial intelligence to aid the invasion of Ukraine.

Claims of growing Chinese involvement are fueling speculation that this could lead to a possible international escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. There is also alarm over what Russia may be providing in exchange for Chinese support. US officials have alleged that China is receiving unprecedented access to highly sophisticated Russian defense technologies. The US Congress has also suggested that the Kremlin could be providing China with critical knowledge about the vulnerabilities of Western weapons systems based on combat experience acquired in Ukraine.

While Beijing has denied providing any material support for Moscow’s war, there is no question that the geopolitical partnership between China and Russia has reached new levels against the backdrop of the conflict.

With the United States now looking to reduce its involvement in European security, opportunities may soon emerge for China to play a greater role in peace efforts to end the war. However, Beijing would first need to align its actions with its words to convince Kyiv that it is a plausible peacemaker rather than a Russian ally.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on April 30, 2025, to clarify that reports of Chinese support for Russia’s war effort have been persistent before Kyiv’s recent accusations.

In a normalization agreement with Israel, Saudi Arabia should settle for nothing less than Palestinian statehood

Amir Asmar — Sat, 26 Apr 2025 14:19:29 +0000

Since the second Trump administration took office, Middle East policy experts and commentators have renewed discussion of a potential US-brokered Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization deal. The broad parameters of such a deal, which had been under discussion during US President Donald Trump’s first term and during the Biden administration, are generally known. Riyadh would agree to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for US security guarantees, preferably in the form of a treaty; US assistance with the kingdom’s nuclear program; cooperation on technology, including artificial intelligence; and progress on Palestinian statehood—although precisely how much progress would be required remained unclear. The term “pathway” to a Palestinian state—sometimes qualified as “credible” or “irreversible”—was the most consistently used formulation.

With Trump now scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next month, the issue of normalization is certain to be on the agenda. There are three reasons why Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s principal decisionmaker, should make full Palestinian statehood part of the asking price for normalizing relations with Israel. First, many Saudis and other Arabs throughout the region may look askance at bin Salman if he were to be seen as ignoring the Palestinians’ plight. Second, if he pulls it off, he will have succeeded where other, more celebrated Arab leaders failed. And finally, the longer the issue remains unresolved, the more it will continue to impede progress on Saudi and regional priorities.

Then and now

Before the Gaza war began in October 2023, Riyadh may have been close to an agreement on official diplomatic relations with Israel without the precondition of a Palestinian state. But Israel’s punishing assault on the Gaza Strip, after Hamas’s rampage through southern Israel on October 7, 2023, seems to have changed Saudi thinking. Speaking at an Arab League summit last year, bin Salman called the Israeli military campaign in Gaza “genocide.” And in a speech in September, he indicated that Saudi Arabia would not establish relations with Israel without the creation of a Palestinian state.

Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in an effort to develop contacts across the Muslim world, he remains staunchly opposed to a Palestinian state. In 2021, Netanyahu described the Abraham Accords—Israel’s normalization agreements with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sudan, and Morocco—as enabling Israel to replace “the old and dangerous doctrine of territories in exchange for peace and brought peace in exchange for peace, without giving up a single inch.”

Past failures

The term “pathway” to Palestinian statehood joins a variety of other phrases from past peace plans that included an unfulfilled Palestinian component. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed that he had secured “autonomy” for the Palestinians when he signed Cairo’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat believed he was gaining Palestinian “self-government” when he signed the 1993 Declaration of Principles. Jordanian King Hussein bin Talal agreed to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty only after he was convinced the Palestinians had gained a “political horizon”—the derisory catchphrase of the Oslo process.

However, Palestinians’ autonomy, self-government, political horizon, independence, or peace with Israel never materialized; extremists on both sides undermined the deeply flawed Oslo process and subsequent negotiations. After 1994, further Israeli treaties with Arab countries did not materialize until the 2020 Abraham Accords, purchased for Israel by US concessions to the Arab signatories and conspicuously silent on the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Arab participants saw the Abraham Accords as a means to receive concrete US commitments.

When the UAE signed the first Abraham Accord in September 2020, it was primarily to gain participation in the US F-35 fighter program and access to US armed Reaper drones, over Israeli objections, as well as the understanding that Washington would prevent Israel from annexing portions of the West Bank, which Jerusalem was about to do. In exchange for their respective normalization deals with Israel, the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Saudi considerations

Saudi Arabia is now setting its own price for an agreement. However, bin Salman should take note of two features of past Arab agreements with Israel. First, Israel has never entered into any agreement that explicitly called for Palestinian statehood. In fact, some pro-Israel observers in Washington are trying to identify a “rhetorical formula” that would satisfy Saudi demands without committing Israel to a Palestinian state. Second, the United States, despite its stated desire for a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, has never pressured Israel on Palestinian statehood, limiting itself to hollow rhetoric about supporting a two-state outcome.

Bin Salman reportedly told US leaders that he cares little for the Palestinians and does not want the issue to impede plans to diversify the Saudi economy or to discourage Iranian threats to his realm. However, the Gaza war—which has left over fifty thousand Palestinians dead, including tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, televised in bloody detail by Al Jazeera, may have forced a change in bin Salman’s calculus about what is politically realistic. “Seventy percent of my population is younger than me,” the thirty-nine-year old crown prince reportedly told then US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2024. “For most of them, they never really knew much about the Palestinian issue. And so they’re being introduced to it for the first time through this conflict.” An Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) poll conducted in Saudi Arabia and published in February 2024 indicates that the share of the Saudi population opposed to normalization with Israel grew from 38 percent in 2022 to 68 percent in 2024.

The Trump administration may insist that Saudi Arabia relax its demand for a Palestinian state prior to a normalization deal, possibly by emphasizing other benefits bin Salman can expect. Also, the administration may, as Trump attempted in his first term, designate Palestinian municipal control of islands of Palestinian communities on the West Bank as a “state” and demand that bin Salman accept it as such.

But if bin Salman makes peace with Israel without a Palestinian state that most of his citizens believe to be credible, any Israeli action against the Palestinians, or other Arabs, will be his to justify. For example, in Gaza, apart from the high casualty numbers, massive infrastructure destruction, and the dislocation of 90 percent of the strip’s population, a United Nations Human Rights Commission report published last month states that sexual violence has become “standard operating procedure toward Palestinians” in the Gaza conflict and is “committed either under explicit orders or with implicit encouragement by Israel’s top civilian and military leadership.” This is the very leadership with which bin Salman would be reaching a normalization agreement.

Additionally, Israeli violence directed at West Bank Palestinians is growing. This has included assaults from Israeli settlers, the destruction of property, and expulsions, not to mention Israeli military offensives, in which Palestinian civilians are the inevitable victims. Bin Salman would also have to contend with Saudi public opinion regarding Israel’s capture of more Syrian territory, its strikes against Lebanese territory after a cease-fire has been concluded, and the increasing discussion of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.

At present, bin Salman can comfortably join his people, regional Arabs, and the international community in condemning reported Israeli violations of the norms of war and peace. While other Arab regimes have survived peace with Israel, they did so despite the wishes of their populations, not because they made a convincing case for peace. The political risks of normalization are also exemplified by the assassination of Sadat by Islamic extremists, in part because of his perceived betrayal of Arab and Islamic causes in signing a peace agreement with Israel.

In last year’s ACRPS poll, the majority of respondents from countries whose governments have already signed agreements with Israel—including Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan—oppose their countries’ normalization with Israel. Other Arab countries such as Oman and Qatar, which have informal ties to Israel, continue to refuse normalization until Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian territories.

Bin Salman may be drawn to the idea that he can achieve something that past regional leaders like Sadat, Hussein, and Arafat, as well as current Arab leaders such as Muhammad bin Zayed of the UAE failed to accomplish. Demanding a Palestinian state may also be a means to distinguish himself from the Arab signatories of the other Abraham Accords, all of whom prioritized their respective national ambitions and did not press for progress on the Palestinian issue. Bin Salman must also consider the ability of regional malefactors such as Iran and radical Islamists to exploit the unresolved Palestinian issue to impede political, security, and economic progress for Saudi Arabia and the region. The ongoing Houthi campaign of attacks against Red Sea shipping, for example, would not be happening without the Gaza war, itself an extension of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Costs and benefits

While Israel has legitimate security concerns, its continued occupation of Palestinian territories, its war in Gaza, and growing violence in the West Bank are creating a pronounced line in the sand between nations that have peace treaties with Israel and those withholding formal relations. While there are Arab governments on both sides of this line, their publics, including the Saudi people, are overwhelmingly opposed to normalization with Israel.

Bin Salman needs to weigh popular Saudi and other Arab views, as well as the regional instability that the continued Palestinian-Israeli conflict engenders, against any benefits he anticipates from a formal peace with Israel. Then, he needs to decide on which side the kingdom benefits most. If he were to settle for equivocal language about a “pathway,” as opposed to an actual state, the history of Arab-Israeli peacemaking suggests bin Salman would join Sadat, Arafat, Hussein, and others who failed to use their diplomatic leverage to press for Palestinian statehood.

Amir Asmar is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Will Pope Francis’s Middle East legacy endure?

Karim Mezran — Fri, 25 Apr 2025 17:25:16 +0000

The word catholic, derived from the Greek katholikos for “universal,” felt profoundly relevant this week with the passing of Pope Francis after twelve years as the Roman pontiff. Indeed, his death at the age of 88 has united Christians and non-Christians across the world in grief after a consequential pontificate that saw a liberal pastoral approach, moderate liturgical reforms, and a commitment to peace and the poor.

The Middle East holds particular importance in that legacy—the region is at the center of Pope Jorge Mario Bergoglio’s final and most public sermons and pastoral acts.

Understandably, many have focused on his policy and posture toward the state of Israel.

His final address on Easter Sunday was a capstone in a track record of advocacy for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, including strong and direct statements. “Dramatic and deplorable” is how he described the living conditions in Gaza. The brutal massacre of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces, which came almost at the conclusion of his Pontificate, had quite publicly saddened and pained him in a deep way.

Pundits and commentators have been quick in pointing out the silence coming from the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since his death. President Isaac Herzog delivered a few comments, nice and positive, even if not particularly warm. The relationship between the first modern non-European Pope and the state of Israel has been contentious indeed.

The vocal standing behind the Palestinian plight—including multiple sermons on Gaza and near-daily calls with Gaza’s Christian leaders through the war—was the success of Franciscan values over a part of the Catholic Church which would have preferred a more nuanced, if not entirely favorable, position towards Israel.

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Further, influential personalities like Monsignor Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the patriarch of Jerusalem, who offered himself in exchange for Hamas’s Israeli hostages in the aftermath of October 7, are a living testament to Pope Francis’ posture of opposition to the occupation of the Arab lands in Palestine.

But his legacy in the Middle East extends beyond Palestine. Bergoglio exerted influence in quite a few areas across the region.

Pope Francis exercised pressure on the European powers regarding the tragedy of the civil war in Syria and the horrors unleashed by the Islamic State. The concurrent efforts by the Church to protect and save as many members of the Church of the Levant as possible are noticeable and much appreciated—albeit not always successful.

In the wider Levant, his stance was coherently against the extremists of the Islamic State, the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and other similar organizations—whom he always saw as a danger to his vision of brotherly intent to take care of the world’s marginalized.

He was widely liked in the Emirates, with whom Pope Bergoglio understood the importance of positive relationships despite the abysmal record of the small emirates confederation in human rights and respect for pluralism. He understood the potential for success in diplomacy, negotiation, and public support that could arise for the Church if it sided with the Emiratis and their projection of growing global influence.

To summarize, Pope Francis’ policy in the Middle East and North Africa has been characterized by a wise combination of value-based policies and convenient stances, in line with the scope of the objectives the Pope set for his pastoral mission.

However, the region is very diverse: ethnically, socially, culturally, and, obviously, religiously. This diversity—despite the frequent skirmishes and conflicts it has played a hand in sowing—has always been understood as the wealth of the region. Trying to find a common denominator in reactions to Pope Francis’s policies, let alone the expectations of the new Pontiff, is difficult to define without risk of distorting the varied perspectives from the diverse threads of the region’s canopy.

It is possible to say that, at the popular level, the importance of the Catholic Pope is not as significant as in other parts of the world. After all, there are very few Catholics left in the Middle East.

Moving forward, answering the question of who constitutes the ruling elites of the Middle East—namely, those who hold political power and, in some cases, represent religious authority—is crucial to understanding regional expectations of the new Pope.

For the region’s ruling elites, the Church’s spiritual component matters less, and its influence holds significance only as a political force. In this respect, the Church and its 2.2 billion followers become a heavyweight geopolitical actor, and as such, they treat it.

And there are indeed secular movements at play, particularly with respect to a growing conservatism among Catholics in Western world powers like the United States.

In the West, there is an ascent of right-wing movements that Pope Francis fiercely fought against, including populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. But these emerging movements may be more in line with some of the region’s ruling powers.

Regional leaders, building on alliances with the new administration in Washington, for example, may indeed hope for the election of a conservative Pope, who could become an ally in maintaining and defending the values that Middle Eastern elites share with conservatives in the West.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa.

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Defending Taiwan means mobilizing society, not just the military

Marvin J. Park — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 18:00:00 +0000

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Taiwan is under unprecedented pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), facing coordinated threats on multiple fronts. The PRC employs a comprehensive strategy to strangle Taiwan’s dwindling diplomatic space, pollute its public discourse with disinformation and misinformation, and apply pressure using both military and civilian means. It also wields its vast economic power to punish the island nation—as well as countries, companies, and individuals that support Taiwan.

Under the former Tsai Ing-Wen administration and the current Lai Ching-Te administration, Taiwan has taken significant steps toward ensuring that it remains a free and vibrant democracy. Last June, Lai announced the establishment of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee at the Presidential Office to ensure that both the government and society would be able to maintain normal operations in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The committee gathers senior leaders and representatives across a wide swath of Taiwan’s government, civil society, business, nongovernmental organizations, and academia to formulate strategy and provide recommendations in five key areas: civilian force training and utilization; strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution; energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance; social welfare, medical care, evacuation facility readiness, information, and transportation; and financial network protection.

In July 2024, the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security published “Toward resilience: An action plan for Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression.” The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) followed with its “Strengthening Resilience in Taiwan” report in December 2024. These two reports provide an accurate assessment of the challenges of creating societal resilience and share policy recommendations for the Taiwan Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. However, additional perspectives—especially across social, technological, and economic dimensions—can help expand Taiwan’s approach to societal resilience.

Preparing for crisis—without spreading fear

Organizing the necessary stakeholders around a shared framework with a clearly defined and understood vision was the easy part. However, as with all large bureaucracies, Taiwan’s resilience committee faces significant challenges in getting both the government and other actors to accept and implement difficult trade-offs. These trade-offs require people, departments, and various parts of Taiwanese society to give up money, power, or influence in order to achieve the necessary reforms and make them sustainable for the long term.

A key pitfall for Taiwan was failing to persuade its people, in plain language, why it needed to create the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in the first place. Taiwan’s resilience ultimately hinges on the public understanding that the PRC can, and might, use its full suite of tools and capabilities against the island, should Xi Jinping conclude that a takeover is otherwise unattainable. The government needs to explain how everyday citizens can prepare in the event of that type of crisis. As demonstrated by Taiwan’s response to multiple natural disasters, its government is a global leader in terms of orienting local and national efforts to recover and quickly return to a pre-disaster state. However, the resilience committee has the challenging task of learning how to balance preparing Taiwan for manmade emergencies, such as a maritime blockade or military invasion, without unnecessarily creating a sense of panic.

This May, a television miniseries titled Zero Day is set to air in Taiwan, depicting a “fictional” scenario of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of the island. The entertainment industry has always been most effective in helping people visualize a possibility that resonates with them in a way that the most well-written and brilliant policy papers cannot. As the old saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words; a more modern version could say a viral video is worth a thousand tweets and re-tweets. The Zero Day trailer has already increased awareness and captured people’s imaginations in a way that official government messaging efforts are unlikely to achieve. The goal is not for people to conclude there’s no point in resistance, but to spur action toward resilience efforts now.

Taiwan should capitalize on the moment and create communications channels for local and provincial townships, facilitated by a fireside chat-style format, to have a greater voice on what is effective and resonates. The national government must be prepared to provide tailored support across the five key areas, even when such support is redundant and expensive at first. It must create an environment for any local government to communicate, improve infrastructure, increase civil preparedness, and support its constituents across a range of emergencies and disasters. Some will use whole-of-society resilience as another means to get funding, but the reality is that there will be improvements that meet resilience goals. This will gain long-term support for resilience efforts if everyday people understand what could happen and see their feedback result in tangible benefits.

From technological edge to strategic advantage

On a recent Bloomberg Odd Lots podcast, Shyam Sankar, the chief technology officer (CTO) of US software giant Palantir, described what his company’s product is and what it delivers to customers. In plain, non-technical language, Sankar said the product is an artificial intelligence (AI) decision-making platform to inform better and faster decisions.

Few countries already possess the technology foundation and expertise to rapidly create and scale the types of advanced technology cited by Sankar. Whether Taiwan develops its own version of Palantir or adopts existing technology, the Taiwan resilience committee should consider taking the calculated risk of trusting AI-driven platforms. Doing so could significantly enhance its decision-making processes, thereby maximizing the efficient use of its limited people, assets, and resources in countering the full spectrum of China’s coercive tools.

It is difficult to truly replicate quality in-person training or support for social welfare and medical care. But imagine being able to wear a headset or set up another interface for increasingly sophisticated virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) systems to provide civilians, first responders, and military personnel with more effective training programs and with more realistic scenarios. These systems could also help people stay connected to the government during a crisis and provide immediate medical information in potentially demanding situations in which physical care might not be possible. VR and AR systems offer an additional benefit in their ability to connect anyone around the world and to leverage the latest training and information without the limitations of budget, policy, and travel restrictions.

Three-dimensional (3D) printing could be equally important in supporting Taiwan’s resilience efforts. The ability to print critical parts and components could alleviate the need for large storage locations, which must be maintained and can become easy targets for sabotage or kinetic attacks. Because Taiwan has a unique and harsh climate that makes food production and storage difficult even in normal conditions, it should consider developing food stockpiles that are resilient to humidity and heat and can sustain the population for longer periods. Other critical areas for advanced technology development are portable and modular water-purification systems, which could provide water security in the event that critical infrastructure is damaged or disrupted. Lastly, Taiwan is already making progress toward redundant and resilient off-island communications. Still, much more needs to be developed to survive sophisticated jamming of all communications.

How Taiwan’s tech giants could help deter China

Most economists and financial analysts would agree that the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the flagship company driving the global technology sector. Building on this foundation, Taiwan should leverage its world-class strengths in manufacturing, supply chain management, and technological innovation to directly support the efforts of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee.

The idea of commercial companies supporting governmental demands and requirements is not new. In the same podcast mentioned earlier, Sankar shared that well-known commercial US companies such as Chrysler and General Mills used to be dual-purpose companies that produced military hardware. Due to its expertise in production-line milling equipment, General Mills manufactured torpedoes. Sankar further noted that Chinese prime contractors today derive only 27 percent of their revenue from the PLA, with the remainder coming from commercial sales. To strengthen its resilience, the Taiwanese government should consider additional tax incentives and subsidies to encourage tech giants like Foxconn to manufacture advanced technologies—supporting both national security efforts and positioning these companies for dual commercial and government purposes.

On June 13, 2024, New York Times (NYT) columnist Ross Douthat interviewed Vice President J. D. Vance for an opinion piece titled “What J. D. Vance Believes.” In the interview, Vance referred to “the most important lesson of World War II, that we seem to have forgotten: that military power is downstream of industrial power. We are still, right now, the world’s military superpower, largely because of our industrial might from the ’80s and ’90s. But China is a more powerful country industrially than we are, which means they will have a more powerful military in 20 years.” Against this background, Taiwanese technology companies—working in concert with Korean and Japanese companies—could provide a trusted partner network for global supply chain demands and facilitate decoupling from China, especially for highly specialized components such as drone camera lenses, batteries, and control boards. Taiwan should aim to replicate the strategic dominance achieved by TSMC in semiconductors—this time by becoming indispensable for global supply chain demands. Such an effort would unlock the full potential of Taiwan’s economic power and directly contribute to the deterrence it hopes to achieve with its resilience and defense reforms.

A Herculean feat

Tsai and Lai should be commended for their whole-of-government efforts to bolster Taiwan’s societal resilience against the onslaught of Chinese coercion. Creating new government structures, managing internal power and budgetary struggles, balancing responsibilities across various branches of government, and navigating opposition politics is a Herculean feat—and those are only the domestic challenges. None of these efforts will be effective or sustainable if everyday Taiwanese citizens do not believe they are necessary or that the scenarios being prepared for are a real possibility. Adopting a bottom-up approach—not the preferred method in Asia—may be the key to building momentum for Taiwan’s resilience effort. Asking any government bureaucracy to trust advanced technology such as AI is a significant leap of faith, but the potential benefits of integrating these systems could give Taiwan the elusive asymmetric edge needed to deter and delay China’s party-driven decision-making. Lastly, Taiwan is extremely proud of its world-class technology industries that drive the global economy today—but that success was built on decades of government support. Now, Taiwan’s industries must help support their government’s resilience efforts by expanding beyond commercial purposes. They should evolve into dual-purpose companies, serving both civilian and defense needs, and become trusted partners in securing global supply chains, especially for the US defense and technology sector. A renewed focus on its people, advanced technology, and economic strategy could help Taiwan deter Chinese coercion—something that military and defense reforms alone have been unable to achieve.

About the author

Marvin J. Park is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a national security professional with experience in national-level policymaking, intelligence matters, and military operations throughout the Asia Pacific, especially Taiwan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Park served on the National Security Council as the director for Taiwan affairs from 2023 to 2024. He retired in 2025 as a US Navy captain with over twenty-five years of experience.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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US-led peace talks hampered by Trump’s reluctance to pressure Putin

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:20:14 +0000

During the 2024 election campaign, US President Donald Trump famously vowed to end the Russian war on Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Three months into his presidency, the US leader now appears to be rapidly losing patience with a faltering peace process that is showing few signs of progress. Trump stated on April 18 that he wanted a ceasefire agreement in place quickly and would “take a pass” if Moscow or Kyiv “make it very difficult” to reach a peace deal.

Trump’s latest comments reflect mounting US frustration. Speaking on the same day in Paris, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US may soon “move on” from efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if there is no progress in the coming days. “We are now reaching a point where we need to decide whether this is even possible or not,” Rubio told reporters.

It is not difficult to see why the Trump White House is feeling discouraged. While Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire on March 11, Russia has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has offered a long list of excuses and additional conditions. This has led to accusations that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no real interest in peace and is deliberately engaging in stalling tactics in a bid to drag out negotiations and continue the war until he has political control of Ukraine.

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Critics of Trump say he has been too reluctant to pressure Putin and has done little to convince the Kremlin dictator that the time has come to abandon his invasion. They claim Trump has consistently signaled his readiness to offer Russia concessions while adopting a noticeably tougher stance toward Ukraine. This has included multiple statements blaming Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

Since the very early stages of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has ruled out the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO. This was recently underlined by US envoy General Keith Kellogg, who confirmed that NATO membership for Ukraine was “off the table.” Kellogg’s comments were welcomed by the Kremlin. “Of course, this is something that causes us satisfaction and coincides with our position,” noted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

The US has also made clear that it expects Europe to play a leading role in any peace settlement, including the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent any future repeat of Russia’s current invasion. This is part of a broader foreign policy transition that looks set to see the United States reduce its historic commitment to European security in order to focus more on Asia.

After taking office in January, Trump threatened to target Putin’s energy sector and extended some existing sanctions, but he has so far chosen not to impose any additional economic measures against Moscow. When Trump unveiled landmark new tariffs in early April, Russia was one of the few major economies not on the list.

US officials said the decision not to impose tariffs was because bilateral trade had already effectively stopped due to sanctions imposed following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, trade with Russia is greater than trade with a number of countries subject to the new tariffs. Meanwhile, Trump and other US officials have frequently talked up the prospect for greater economic cooperation between Russia and the United States.

In the diplomatic arena, the Trump White House has sought to avoid direct criticism of Russia in favor of more neutral messaging that prioritizes the need for peace. This approach has seen the United States siding with Moscow at the United Nations and voting against UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. US officials also reportedly refused to back a statement by the G7 group of nations condemning Russia’s recent Palm Sunday attack on the Ukrainian city of Sumy, which killed dozens of civilians.

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The Kremlin has responded approvingly to the dramatic recent shift in the United States approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In early March, Russian officials noted that US foreign policy now “largely coincides with our vision.” However, while Putin has good reason to welcome the Trump administration’s stance on Ukraine, he has so far shown little interest in reciprocating by offering any concessions of his own. Far from it, in fact. Since the start of bilateral talks with the United States in February, the Russian military has significantly increased its bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. In recent weeks, Russian forces have launched a major new spring offensive in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s negotiating position in ongoing US-led talks is similarly hard line and reflects Russia’s continued commitment to ending Ukrainian independence. Moscow’s demands include official recognition of Russian control over four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, a complete end to all Western military support for Kyiv, and the drastic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force, apparently with the intention of leaving Ukraine defenseless against a future phase of Russia’s invasion.

Russia’s uncompromising current approach reflects Putin’s conviction that he can eventually outlast the West in Ukraine, and that by saying no, he will push Trump to offer more concessions. So far, Putin’s logic appears to be working. Trump’s efforts to win over the Kremlin seem to have convinced many in Moscow that they are now firmly on track to secure an historic victory and have no reason to offer any meaningful concessions. If Trump is serious about achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine, he must demonstrate that he is prepared to turn up the pressure on Putin and increase the costs of continuing the invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

US funding cuts create openings for Russian disinformation in Ukraine

Muhammad Tahir — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 21:14:02 +0000

Cut the cameras. Slash the salaries. Cancel the investigations. That’s the reality facing Ukraine’s independent media, which serves as a vital firewall against Kremlin disinformation, as the US freezes nearly all support.

Since January 2025, the United States has quietly suspended 90 percent of its development funding for Ukraine, including the grants that kept most of the country’s independent newsrooms alive. Whether channeled directly through USAID or via partners, that funding has disappeared. The move to cut financial support comes as Moscow is intensifying its disinformation efforts.

In Mykolaiv, a strategic port city in Ukraine’s south, NikVesti is on the brink. With 4.5 million visits in 2024, it has been a cornerstone of independent local wartime reporting. Now, after losing a fifth of its budget through the loss of US funding, the newsroom is running on fumes. “We’re burning through our final reserves,” co-founder Oleh Dereniuha commented. “If funding doesn’t return, it will be difficult to make it past April.”

Further south in Kherson, Vgoru, one of only three independent outlets still operating in the region, has lost 80% of its US funding. Freelancers are gone and investigative projects have been shelved. “No one else is reporting from here,” said editor Ilona Korotitsyna. “Without us, they’ll only hear Russia.”

In Sumy, a northeastern Ukrainian city facing relentless Russian bombardment from across the nearby border, independent outlet Cykr is barely hanging on. “Sixty percent of our budget came from USAID,” said editor Dmytro Tyschenko. The site has enough funding to last a month. “After that,” he warned, “we’re bracing for a flood of unchecked Russian propaganda to fill the vacuum.”

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Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022, the US has delivered more than $37 billion in development aid to Ukraine. With the domestic Ukrainian media market in a state of wartime collapse, the vast majority of outlets have survived almost entirely on international grants, most of them from the US.

Outlets like NikVesti, Vgoru, and Cykr are among the 90 percent of independent Ukrainian media that relied on this funding to report the facts under extraordinary conditions of bombardment, blackouts, and occupation. Beyond exposing Russian disinformation, journalists working for these outlets have investigated corruption, documented Russian strikes and their aftermath, and held the Ukrainian authorities to account, often at considerable personal risk.

There are now mounting concerns that Russia will seek to exploit emerging gaps in Ukraine’s information space created by US funding cuts. With far fewer credible sources able to report on local news stories across Ukraine, Kremlin disinformation will become much harder to counter.

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A recent disinformation operation in the Sumy region offered a glimpse of the kinds of tactics Moscow is likely to employ. In early April, Russian-linked Telegram channels began promoting fake messaging attributed to the Sumy City Council’s Health Department claiming that a mysterious disease had broken out among Ukrainian soldiers. They warned civilians to avoid contact with troops returning from the front.

This is a typical Russian disinformation operation, with fake news wrapped in official-looking packaging and seeded online in order to sow panic. The goal isn’t just to mislead, however. Russia also aims to undermine faith in the information space altogether. And with credible independent Ukrainian media outlets unable to operate, that task becomes significantly easier.

Allowing Ukraine’s independent media to fall silent in the middle of a war would have serious strategic consequences. Without independent journalism, Ukraine not only loses its first line of defense against Russian disinformation. It also loses the transparency and accountability that are vital for the future of the country’s democracy.

The Ukrainian outlets and journalists hit by recent US funding cuts are not just waiting for a bailout. They are launching membership programs, pitching donors, trimming operations, and testing new formats. Some are turning to diaspora networks. Others are banking on European funding. So far, these efforts are proving slow and insufficient.

“We’re doing everything we can. In a region where the local business market is nonexistent, we’re reaching out to European partners, applying for every grant we can find,” said Vgoru’s Korotitsyna. “But EU funding is slow, and the competition is fierce. We need support now, not six months down the line, or we won’t be around to receive it.”

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former journalist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He has reported extensively across the CIS, South Asia, and the Middle East.

Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian civilians cast shadow over peace talks

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 20:36:03 +0000

As Ukrainians made their way to church on the morning of April 13 to attend Palm Sunday services, two Russian ballistic missiles struck the city center in Sumy, killing at least 35 people and wounding more than 100. This Palm Sunday bombardment was the deadliest Russian attack so far this year. It was part of an escalating recent trend of Russian airstrikes targeting Ukrainian civilians that is casting doubt over the viability of US-led peace talks initiated by President Trump.

The attack in Sumy came just over a week after a similarly devastating strike on a residential district in the southern Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih that killed 19 people including nine children. The missile struck close to a playground in the early evening when the area was busy with children and families. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the attack was “the deadliest single strike harming children which the Office has verified since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.”

The Russian missile strikes on Kryvyi Rih and Sumy share a number of characteristics. Both attacks targeted civilian areas of major Ukrainian cities and took place at times when large numbers of people were likely to be present. Both reportedly involved the use of cluster ammunition designed to maximize casualties. “The use of an explosive weapon with wide area effects by the Russian Federation in a densely populated area, and without any apparent military presence, demonstrates a reckless disregard for civilian life,” commented UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk following the Kryvyi Rih attack.

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In addition to these ballistic missile strikes on heavily populated civilian areas, Russia has also recently escalated drone attacks across Ukraine. In the month following the first meeting between Kremlin and White House officials in Saudi Arabia, the number of Russian drones targeting Ukraine surged by more than 50 percent. Analysis by Britain’s Telegraph newspaper found that Russia launched an average of 101 drones per day in the period prior to the initial February talks in Riyadh, compared to 154 afterward.

Russia’s increased bombardment of Ukraine and deadly missile attacks on Ukrainian cities are casting a long shadow over the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Many view Russia’s actions as an indirect but unmistakable snub to Trump’s peacemaker efforts. Others have also suggested that Kryvyi Rih may have been selected as a target due to the city’s status as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, in order to send a chilling message of Russian impunity and underline Ukraine’s vulnerability to further such attacks.

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Trump has so far refused to criticize Russia directly for the recent spate of bombing attacks that have left dozens of Ukrainian civilians dead. Instead, he somehow concluded that the recent Palm Sunday strike in Sumy may have been a “mistake.”

Elsewhere in the US and across Europe, there has been widespread condemnation. “Putin’s Russia keeps bombing cities and murdering citizens. It is their strategy to wear down Ukraine. We shouldn’t agree to reward these war crimes with any Ukraine territory,” commented GOP Representative Don Bacon. Fellow Republican Michael McCaul said the Palm Sunday attack was “beyond the pale” and served as further confirmation that Russia has no intention of ending the war. “While Ukraine has accepted President Trump’s ceasefire proposal, Putin continues to show he is more interested in bloodshed than in peace,” stated McCaul.

Across the Atlantic, French President Emmanuel Macron responded to the Palm Sunday attack by emphasizing the “blatant disregard for human lives, international law, and the diplomatic efforts of President Trump.” Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni echoed Macron, condemning “this unacceptable violence, which goes against all real engagement in favor of peace.” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer slammed Russia’s “horrific attacks” and noted that while Zelenskyy had shown his commitment to peace by backing an unconditional ceasefire, “Putin must now also agree to a full and immediate ceasefire without conditions.”

Such calls are unlikely to resonate in Moscow unless the entire US approach to the peace process changes significantly. During the first few months of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has offered Russia a series of concessions, for instance the Black Sea ceasefire proposal, while very publicly applying pressure to Ukraine. So far, this appears to have hardened Putin’s conviction that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine. With existing US aid commitments to Ukraine set to run out in the coming months and no indication that the Trump administration will sanction further support, it is easy to understand why Putin is in no hurry to seek peace.

While Trump remains reluctant to condemn Putin, there are indications that he may finally be growing tired of the Kremlin dictator’s stalling tactics and will soon run out of patience. Trump has recently said he is “very angry” and “pissed off” with Putin over the lack of progress toward peace, and has called on him to “get moving” toward a ceasefire agreement. If Trump is serious about getting Putin’s attention, he will need to follow through on earlier threats and increase the economic pressure on Russia via sanctions and tariffs measures against Putin’s energy industry. Anything less will be interpreted by the Kremlin as a tacit green light to continue escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population as Putin seeks to break the country’s resistance.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Charai in Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Only Trump Can Crush the Brotherhood

Atlantic Council — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 18:01:18 +0000

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Cradle of violence: How criminal networks are winning Ecuador’s youth and threatening Latin America’s future

Erin K. McFee — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 12:18:49 +0000

Latin America’s democratic institutions face an existential threat as organized criminal groups evolve from mere trafficking operations into sophisticated providers of parallel governance. In a region long characterized by the world’s highest levels of inequality and violence, nowhere is this transformation more striking than in Guayaquil, Ecuador, where criminal networks have engineered one of the fastest security collapses in recent Latin American history. The city’s swift descent from relative stability in 2021 to the eighth most violent city globally by the end of 2024 reveals how quickly organized crime can exploit institutional weaknesses to establish alternative power structures—a pattern with profound implications for democratic governance across the region.

The first round of Ecuador’s presidential election in February revealed two competing visions for managing this unprecedented crisis. The second round on April 13 promises to crystallize these approaches.

Incumbent President Daniel Noboa champions a technocratic approach pairing economic liberalization with tough security policies—a vision that resonates with urban middle-class voters, who see his business acumen as crucial for modernizing the state’s response to organized crime. His challenger, former Assemblywoman Luisa González, advocates for a return to state-led development, combining expanded social programs with institutional reform over militarization. Her platform has found particular traction among rural and lower-income Ecuadorians, who fondly recall the era of former President Rafael Correa, who advocated for social spending and poverty-reduction initiatives. Yet beneath the electoral rhetoric, a more fundamental question looms: Can either candidate’s vision effectively counter the growing control of criminal networks over Ecuador’s youth?

A laboratory for criminal innovation

Situated between Colombia and Peru—the world’s largest cocaine producers—Ecuador has become a battleground where foreign mafias collaborate with local gangs to control strategic trafficking routes. The interplay of porous borders, entrenched corruption, economic fragility tied to converting its currency to the US dollar, and ineffective security policies has created fertile ground for these transnational criminal enterprises to expand their influence. Yet, Guayaquil’s crisis transcends its role as a trafficking hub. The city has become a laboratory for criminal innovation where organized crime groups have transformed from simple drug trafficking operations into sophisticated political actors. They provide security, economic opportunity, and social belonging to marginalized communities—services the state has failed to deliver.

The mechanisms of this transformation merit close attention from policymakers across the Americas. Criminal organizations in Guayaquil have mastered a strategy increasingly visible throughout Latin America: exploiting the corrosive combination of weak rule of law, endemic corruption, and profound socioeconomic inequality to establish parallel governance structures and weave themselves into the social fabric of everyday life. Through Guayaquil’s port infrastructure, these groups now control an estimated 80 percent of Ecuador’s illegal drug exports, concealing cocaine in expedited shipments of perishable goods such as tea and bananas.

More significantly, they have developed sophisticated recruitment networks that target children as young as eight years old. Durán, just across the river from Guayaquil, is known grimly as the “school of assassins,” where children are groomed through a ruthless drug dealer-to-assassin pipeline. The human cost of this transformation is visible in daily life. The country’s energy crisis has plunged already precarious neighborhoods into prolonged darkness over the course of the past year, with rolling blackouts stretching up to fourteen hours per day. For residents of these fragile communities, the outages have rendered their daily lives into a de facto siege, trapping them indoors as fears of assault, kidnapping, extortion, or falling victim to stray bullets loom large.

Guayaquil’s experience offers crucial lessons about the speed with which criminal organizations can fill governance vacuums. The city’s crisis also exemplifies a broader regional challenge: How can Latin American democracies rebuild state legitimacy while confronting immediate security threats? The answer may determine not just Ecuador’s future but also the trajectory of democratic governance across the region.

A generation under siege

The systematic recruitment of youth into organized crime in Ecuador is part of a disturbing trend across Latin America. Between 2019 and 2023, killings of children and adolescents in Ecuador rose by 640 percent, culminating in at least 770 deaths of minors in 2023. This trajectory mirrors broader patterns in the region, where homicide is the leading cause of death for youth aged ten to nineteen. In Rio de Janeiro, the number of children aged ten to twelve who entered drug trafficking doubled between 2006 and 2017, and an estimated six out of ten members of criminal groups in Ecuador are under the age of nineteen, highlighting an accelerating shift toward younger recruitment across criminal organizations.

The weaponization of educational spaces, a strategy perfected by criminal groups from Medellín to Ciudad Juárez, has found fertile ground in Guayaquil’s most insecure neighborhoods. Students find themselves at the epicenter of this violence, coerced into participation under threat of harm to themselves or their families—sometimes by classmates already ensnared in criminal enterprises. Teachers face constant intimidation and, in extreme cases, have been killed for challenging these incursions—a pattern documented across Latin America’s urban peripheries. In one northern community of Guayaquil, law enforcement estimates that as many as 16 percent of students are linked to gangs.

Criminal organizations across the region have refined their recruitment strategies to exploit socioeconomic vulnerabilities. In Guayaquil, as in Colombia’s Comuna 13 and Mexico’s working-class barrios, criminal groups entice youth from financially unstable families through promises of income, protection, and social status—an understandably appealing alternative to fear, isolation, and economic despair. The tactics are remarkably consistent: houses acquired through forcible eviction are handed over to adolescent members as rewards, peer networks and family members already engaged in criminal activities normalize gang affiliation, and younger children are lured with material incentives such as video games and toys. Girls face particular risks, including sexual exploitation and forced relationships with gang leaders—a gendered dimension of recruitment widely documented in Latin American countries.

Ecuador’s prison crisis—marked by persistent overcrowding and eruptions of violence—further exemplifies a broader regional pattern, in which overcrowded penitentiaries serve as command centers for criminal enterprises. Young offenders enter a prison ecosystem where gang affiliation becomes a matter of survival rather than choice and then return to their communities with strengthened criminal networks.

The crisis in education infrastructure compounds these challenges. Public schools face chronic challenges, from crumbling infrastructure to pervasive sexual violence, further eroding their role as ostensible safe spaces and sanctuaries of learning. When Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” in early 2024 and the Ministry of Education suspended in-person attendance for Ecuador’s 4.3 million students, the country joined its regional neighbors in seeing education systems buckle under security pressures. The statistics are stark across Latin America: in Honduras, 90 percent of teachers report gang targeting of their schools; in Guatemala, 60 percent of students report fearing school attendance; and criminal groups treated the COVID-19 pandemic as a recruitment windfall, directly targeting students who were forced out of the classroom.

Breaking this cycle requires solutions that address both immediate security needs and underlying structural inequities—including strengthening school infrastructure, implementing socio-emotional learning programs, and supporting youth looking for a way out of gang membership by providing viable pathways to resilience and opportunity—a challenge that has largely eluded policymakers across the region.

A crisis of trust and legitimacy

In Ecuador and many other Latin American countries, the military and police forces play an important role in taking on criminal gangs. At the same time, an overreliance on force can cause its own problems.

For example, the December 2024 murder of four Afro-Ecuadorian boys by military forces in Guayaquil crystallized for many in Ecuador how state violence and impunity can shatter community trust. When the children—aged eleven to fifteen—disappeared, authorities initially blamed gang violence. But CCTV footage later revealed military personnel forcing the boys into a patrol vehicle. One managed to call his father and reported that they had been beaten and their clothes removed; the father appealed to the police to no avail. Seventeen days later, the children’s charred remains were found in a rural swamp. Amid the outrage and grief of the citizen response, the government arrested sixteen soldiers for the forced disappearance of the boys and promised a complete and transparent investigation.

Like similar cases in Latin America, this event highlights how militarized responses to instability can exacerbate the very governance problems they aim to address. Human Rights Watch and Ecuador’s Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights describe the murders as part of “systematic disappearances” that have escalated since security forces were deployed to combat gang violence. In Guayaquil’s periphery, residents report police planting drugs on youth to meet arrest quotas, while documented cases show officers passing informants’ identities to criminal groups—leading to deadly reprisals.

In a cruel paradox, the snake begins to eat its tail: the breakdown in trust erects barriers to—and compromises the effectiveness of—the very institutions and programs attempting to rebuild public confidence, further entrenching community isolation. Residents retreat from public spaces and curtail social activities, fearing surveillance by both criminal groups and corrupt security forces. Community gatherings evaporate, parents keep children indoors, and local markets empty—accelerating the breakdown of social cohesion that once helped neighborhoods resist criminal influence.

The withdrawal of adults from community spaces then results in a mentorship vacuum. Even successful intervention programs struggle to overcome this trust deficit. International nongovernmental organizations, development agencies, and civil society organizations find their work complicated by community suspicions, while those who manage to navigate gang checkpoints often see their efforts disrupted by violence or lack of institutional support. In an environment where state institutions have lost their moral authority, it is unsurprising that many of the young people weighing their options come to view gang membership as rational self-preservation.

Yet, amid this deterioration, community-based initiatives anchored by respected local leaders have demonstrated the power of persistent engagement in leading social repair. The Guayas Community Network of Defenders, comprising eighty trained community leaders, has developed successful initiatives ranging from food-security management to human-rights education. In Guayaquil’s most vulnerable sectors, the Social Youth Movement—a coalition of more than three hundred young people from marginalized communities—has mobilized through “artivism” and political advocacy to combat structural violence while creating leadership opportunities for youth typically targeted by gangs. Their success in areas such as comprehensive sexual education reform demonstrates how organized youth movements can channel their energy toward constructive social change. Meanwhile, community groups such as the Socio Vivienda collective have successfully organized to defend housing rights and resist displacement, even in neighborhoods heavily affected by criminal violence.

While these grassroots movements remain modest in scale, their successes contrast with the ineffectiveness of short-term interventions. The main challenge is expanding these local initiatives while operating in an environment where fear and mistrust run deep. As long as Guayaquil’s authorities fail to hold themselves accountable for institutional abuses, each betrayal of public trust hands another victory to criminal groups seeking to capture youth loyalty.

A generation in the balance

The battle for Ecuador’s democratic future will ultimately be won or lost in marginalized communities where criminal networks have become de facto providers of what the state has failed to deliver—however perverse their methods. Ecuador’s precipitous descent from being hailed as an “earthly paradise” to earning the nickname “Guaya Kill”—a grim rebranding of its once-thriving port city—offers sobering lessons about the fragility of democratic institutions in an era of sophisticated transnational crime. The transformation of Guayaquil’s youth recruitment crisis—from a peripheral security concern to an existential threat to state legitimacy in just five years—reveals how quickly criminal organizations can exploit institutional weaknesses to establish parallel governance structures. As El Salvador’s iron-fist security policies gain admirers across Latin America, Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s strong public support threatens to normalize the false choice between democratic values and citizen safety.

Countering this trend demands a coordinated international response that transcends traditional security assistance.

First, multilateral development banks should prioritize funding for proven community initiatives, particularly those offering comprehensive youth services that combine education, job training, and psychosocial support.

Second, regional cooperation needs to strengthen civil society networks that can maintain consistent community engagement even during periods of political transition.

Third, international donors should establish dedicated funding streams for local organizations with demonstrated track records of youth intervention while also supporting knowledge-sharing networks across Latin America’s most affected cities.

Fourth, international support must help bridge the gap between immediate security needs and long-term institutional rebuilding. This means funding parallel tracks: robust investment in prevention and reintegration programming and careful support for security sector reform that prioritizes community trust-building over militarization. Successful regional models exist: the aftermath of Colombia’s “false positives” scandal offers valuable lessons in institutional reform. Like its Andean neighbor, Ecuador’s state-civil society rift must be healed, notwithstanding its politically fragmented terrain.

With all eyes fixed on presidential politics, the daily lived experiences of residents on the margins of Guayaquil reveal a stark truth: a hasty embrace of militarization has diverted resources from the vital social infrastructure and economic opportunities that could offer young people genuine alternatives to criminal networks. Time is running out for a holistic approach to security that balances suppression with structural transformation. As organized crime groups demonstrate an unprecedented ability to adapt and evolve their recruitment strategies, the window for corrective action narrows—and nothing short of an entire generation hangs in the balance.

Erin McFee is the founder and president of the Corioli Institute.

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Ukrainian victims of war crimes need new approaches to justice

Nadia Volkova, Eric Witte, Arie Mora — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 20:13:34 +0000

In recent months, international media coverage of Russia’s Ukraine invasion has focused primarily on the Trump administration’s efforts to end the fighting and broker a peace deal. But even as negotiations get tentatively underway, Russia continues to bomb Ukraine’s civilian population on a daily basis. Regular missile and drone attacks represent only a small portion of the crimes Russia stands accused of committing in Ukraine.

So far, efforts to hold the perpetrators legally accountable for more than a decade of crimes dating back to the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 have proved insufficient. It should now be apparent that Ukraine and the country’s partners need to seek new approaches in order to deliver meaningful justice to victims and end the cycle of Russian impunity.

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Ukraine’s domestic legal system has been overwhelmed by the scale and the gravity of the war crimes allegations against Russia. For example, since the onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022, more than 156,000 investigations into potential war crimes have been opened. As of March 2025, only around 150 verdicts had been reached, mostly in absentia.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has taken some bold steps to help secure justice for Ukraine, most notably charging Russian President Vladimir Putin for his involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While this is certainly welcome, the ICC can only be expected to handle a small number of cases involving the most senior Russian officials.

Meanwhile, recent US cuts to international assistance threaten to impact existing efforts to hold Russia responsible for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. This has underlined the need to explore alternative formats that can help Kyiv overcome existing gaps in capacity-building.

One possibility would be to broaden the mandate of a proposed special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leadership for the crime of aggression. Ukraine and its partners recently agreed to establish a tribunal in hybrid format with international and domestic components operating under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

While there is significant international support for efforts to put Russia’s military and political leaders on trial for the crime of aggression, the potentially political nature of this charge has raised some concerns. Expanding the mandate of a future tribunal to include other serious crimes could help garner more support and address any reservations regarding political legitimacy.

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Another possibility would be to expand international partnerships within Ukraine’s domestic legal system to enhance its ability to address alleged Russian war crimes. This hybrid approach would build on existing practice that has seen a number of countries providing investigators, prosecutors, forensic specialists, and other experts in recent years.

Foreign investigators and prosecutors could be formally inserted into specialized units at the investigative and prosecutorial level to work alongside their Ukrainian colleagues. This would significantly increase capacity, while also potentially improving the quality of investigative efforts. Further down the line, it may prove possible to introduce foreign judges in a similar manner.

This approach could draw on past experience and current international efforts, including those related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic (CAR). If tailored to meet the specific requirements of the Ukrainian justice system, this could serve as an improvement over the well-meaning but somewhat scattershot efforts of Ukraine’s partners to date.

Some skeptics have suggested that any new justice mechanisms for Ukraine would compete with the ICC in terms of jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Advocates counter that new mechanisms could in fact coexist with the ICC, complementing rather duplicating the work being done in The Hague.

ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has voiced support for the work of the CAR Special Criminal Court and recently endorsed the idea of a hybrid mechanism for the Democratic Republic of Congo. If applied effectively, this approach could make it possible for Ukraine to prosecute the kind of mid-level perpetrators who are beyond the mandate of the ICC.

Adopting new approaches to the issue of accountability for alleged war crimes committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine can bring hope for justice and lay the foundations for a sustainable peace. A strengthened Ukrainian justice system could also play an important role in the country’s postwar progress on the path toward EU membership and further Western integration.

Nadia Volkova is the founder and head of the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG). Eric Witte is an independent international justice consultant who has worked at the International Criminal Court and Special Court for Sierra Leone. Arie Mora is an advocacy manager at the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG).

A mission without a mandate

As its name stipulates, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara was initially established in 1991 by Security Council resolution 690 to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the mission failed to deliver on its mandate and only served to maintain a state of paralysis throughout the years. It is essential to clarify that while the MINURSO monitors the ceasefire, which still holds for nearly thirty-five years between Morocco and the Polisario Front separatists, it is in no way an active peacekeeping mission, and Morocco continues to administer de facto over 80 percent of the Western Saharan disputed territories since the Spanish exit in 1975. MINURSO staff remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020 to open trade routes with Mauritania.

Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Secretary-General envoy to Western Sahara, was set for defeat from the start. Since 2022, de Mistura has felt out of place in a fast-moving international context, shifting in favor of Morocco.

First, the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in conjunction with re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel in December 2020, knocking down the chessboard in a fragile geopolitical context where MINURSO had maintained the status quo between Morocco and Algeria.

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Then came the coup de grace by the two former colonizers of Morocco and Western Sahara, who are at the source of the current superfluous borders, when Spain sided with Morocco in 2022. France followed in 2024, and over twenty-nine countries decided to open diplomatic representations in Western Sahara as a sign of support for the Moroccan stance.

The Italian diplomat himself indicated in October 2024 his intention to step down, alluding to his inability to mediate between a Morocco emboldened by overwhelming international support and an Algeria obstinate in supporting the mirage of Sahraoui self-determination until the very end. In his latest faux pas, Staffan de Mistura proposed the partition of Western Sahara, suggesting that the envoy and the MINURSO are neocolonial instruments from the past, wasting a sixty-one million dollar annual budget, funded in majority by the United States.

Another flagrant example of MINURSO’s irrelevance is how the disputed Western Sahara borders have been, for decades, uncharted territories for terrorist activities from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and, more recently, a fertile ground for Iranian and Russian influence. Besides gathering intel and filing situation reports, the Mission has done very little to address the flourishing drug and human trafficking business in the disputed territories, leaving this task to the Moroccan and Algerian military.

The diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subject to corruption and reselling in open markets like Nouadhibou in Northern Mauritania.

The impracticality of a Sahraoui referendum

Several founding myths surround the Western Sahara file, making a referendum a preposterous and impractical solution—a reality that Western allies like the United States started grasping in recent years.

Contrary to other conflicts, where Indigenous people claim the right to self-determination based on their distinct cultural identity, the Saharaoui people are not native to North Africa. The Arab tribes of Beni Hassan, who trace their ancestry to the Yemeni tribe of Maqil, started moving westward to the Maghreb around the thirteenth century, invited by the Almohad empire of Morocco that needed to reinforce its rule by balancing the Amazigh tribe with the Arab warrior populations. If anything, the Hassani people were the ones who pushed the Indigenous Amazigh tribal confederation of Sanhaja out of the Sahara after the massacre of Char Bouba War in the seventeenth century.

The Hassani people today are transnational communities inhabiting large sections of Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara—hence the impossibility of carrying out a census of who gets to participate in a referendum. To complicate things further for the MINURSO, the Alaouite sultan Moulay Ismail had established the “Guich System”, a feudal system where these very Hassani tribes were used to counter Amazigh rebellions in exchange for land up to the nineteenth century. The descendants of these fighters still live around the capital, Rabat, Marrakech, and Sidi Kacem, and still assert their Sahraoui roots.

In the Moroccan-administered portion of the territory, the central state had additionally provided generous incentives, including double salaries and subsidized gas and essential subsistence items, since the seventies for those willing to relocate to the Sahara, and two generations at least have been in the disputed land. Even in the five refugee camps in Algeria, where about 173,600 individuals still live, it is extremely hard to determine who is a Saharaoui and who came to Tindouf as a result of a multitude of other conflicts in the Sahel. Due to all these complexities, the MINORSO has consistently failed since its establishment to come up with voter lists that would be acceptable to all parties, thereby nullifying the prospects of a referendum and the relevance of a UN Mission entrusted to organize it.

What many Sahraoui people want

In a recent field study in July 2024 to Dakhla, Laayoun, and Boujdour, I covered nearly four hundred miles and spoke to dozens of civil society activists, journalists, officials, and ordinary Sahraoui people from my own tribesmen of Oulad Dlim. Most interviewees in the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara (about 1.1 million inhabitants according to the September 2024 census) expressed extreme fatigue from five decades of conflict and a desire for normality and prosperity. They seemed more hopeful for a sustainable resolution through the Moroccan federal advanced regionalization plan proposed in 2006, which preserves their cultural identity and gives them sovereignty over local governance and natural resources under the Moroccan flag.

It was interesting to observe the shift in the Moroccan strategy toward the Sahara conflict, transcending the purely security approach under Driss al-Basri in the 1990s, beating and arresting demonstrators, to a vision focusing on regional development, a dynamic tourism sector, and the looming hope of the $1.2 billion Dakhla Atlantic harbor megaproject—the cornerstone of the kingdom’s Atlantic Initiative. This recent economic boom made some interlocutors confident in the future, although many stated that Morocco hasn’t provided any details of how the autonomy plan will work in practice and how much control they will have over their natural resources. It’s important to note that the research didn’t include Sahrawis in the camps, who may remain attached to self-determination after five decades on a different trajectory.

For the past thirty-four years, MINURSO has consistently deceived the Sahrawi people by failing to deliver on its mission, promoting a laissez-faire culture, and holding hundreds of thousands hostage to complicated geopolitical calculus. Now, the time is up, and the Sahrawi communities can no longer afford another fifty years of political stalemate. The parties to the conflict, along with US and trans-Atlantic allies, will need to defund, dismantle, and terminate it so the autonomy plan can start taking shape.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan said that “borders are not just lines on a map; they are a reflection of power dynamics,” and today’s dynamics are calling for greater accountability for UN programs like the MINURSO and for out-of-the-box decisive solutions under Trump’s leadership.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on the Western Sahara conflict. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

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Legalizing child marriage in Iraq: Stepping back from the brink

Sareta Ashraph — Tue, 08 Apr 2025 13:47:52 +0000

The first quarter of 2025 saw widespread concern that the Iraqi government was, through its amendments to the 1959 Personal Status Law, legalizing child marriage and eroding human rights protections of women and girls.

Child marriage, and specifically the marriage of young girls to adult men, remains a long-standing problem in many parts of Iraq, even when forbidden under law. Tribal and religious leaders perform marriages outside the formal legal system, making it difficult for authorities to monitor or prevent child marriages. In areas stricken with poverty, conflict, and displacement, families are pushed to marry off their daughters as a means of economic survival or protection.

The original proposed text of the new amendments permitted the marriage of girls from the age of nine in certain circumstances, depending on religious interpretations, and granted religious authorities increased power over family matters, including marriage, divorce, and child custody. Proponents of those amendments, primarily conservative Shiite lawmakers, defended the changes as better aligning the law with Islamic principles and reducing Western influence on Iraqi culture.

Iraqi women’s rights activists protested that the amendments effectively “legalise child rape”, and constitute a dramatic rollback in the rights and protections previously guaranteed to women and children under Iraqi law. Their advocacy and pressure appear to have limited the amendments’ harm by retaining provisions for the minimum age of marriage, child custody, and polygamy.

Under the final text of amendments, which entered into force in February, Muslim couples concluding a marriage contract must elect whether the contract—which specifies right and obligations as regards marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance—is to be governed under the 1959 Personal Status Law or a Personal Status Code (mudawana), the latter to be developed by the Shia Ja’afari school of Islamic jurisprudence. For marriage contracts concluded and registered before the law’s effective date, either party may submit a request to the Personal Status Court to apply rulings of the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence. If parties in a family dispute disagree on whether to apply the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school in cases of divorce, the court will apply the choice of the husband.

The amendments also stipulate that the Shiite Endowment Scientific Council, with the assistance of judges and legal experts and in coordination with the State Council, shall develop a code of personal status based on the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence, and submit it to the parliament within four months of the code’s effective date. This code must comply with existing provisions, including those of the 1959 Law, which sets the minimum age of marriage, with exceptions allowing marriage from the age of 15 with a judge’s permission and depending on the child’s “maturity and physical capacity.”

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The Iraqi government issued a statement indicating that the amendments came at the request of the citizens represented by the Shiite component in the parliament. Baghdad also clarified that, under the new law, the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school of jurisprudence apply exclusively to Shiite Iraqis and do not apply to the Sunni Muslims in Iraq.

While there have been some elements of relief that the Iraq parliament has pulled back from legalizing child marriage, the situation remains dynamic, with ongoing discussions concerning the implications of the amendments and the development of the new personal status code, applicable only to the Shia community.

Without enforcement of the law, the Iraqi government is continuing to fail in its duty to protect the rights of its most vulnerable citizens. Girl brides often have little power within their marriages and are less likely to complete their education or be employed, undermining their opportunities for personal and financial autonomy. If divorced or abandoned by their husbands, they have little to equip themselves with to escape cycles of poverty.

Many so-called early marriages constitute de facto forced marriages. Forced marriage is a violation in itself and is also the site of numerous other abuses, including sustained sexual and physical violence. For young girls, pregnancy and childbirth may come with numerous health consequences. According to the World Health Organization, pregnancy and childbirth complications are a leading cause of death among adolescent girls worldwide. Boys who are subjected to early and/or forced marriages are also harmed. Forced to become breadwinners in adolescence, boys suffer curtailed education and career prospects.

The attempts to roll back the rights of women and girls, and the Government’s empowerment of religious authorities to govern people’s personal affairs, underscore the urgent need to support Iraqi human rights activists, and women and children’s rights activists in particular. With Iraq receding from the international headlines and as US humanitarian aid cuts increase the fragility of human rights work, there is a danger that Iraq’s most vulnerable are being left behind.

Sareta Ashraph is a senior legal advisor for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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How women leaders envision Turkey navigating today’s complicated geopolitical environment

Zeynep Egeli — Fri, 04 Apr 2025 20:29:25 +0000

The initial months of 2025 have shown just how complicated geopolitics has become—and how Turkey will need to navigate this era carefully.

As Turkey navigates a shifting global order, economic transformations, and regional conflicts, considering diverse perspectives from informed, visionary leaders—including women—will be crucial.

On March 6, the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs hosted a private roundtable to honor women’s leadership in Turkey in the days leading up to International Women’s Day. The event brought together women thought leaders, diplomats, and heads of businesses in Turkey to discuss global and regional developments, focusing on effective solutions to current challenges. These powerful women spoke under Chatham House Rule about their experiences navigating an increasingly complex world, and specifically about Turkey’s relations with the United States and European Union (EU), Turkey’s role in NATO and the Middle East, and the future of the Turkish economy.

US-Turkey relations amid a changing international order

Participants agreed that US President Donald Trump’s return to office has significantly altered the international order. Given its strategic geopolitical position, Turkey plays a key role in this shifting landscape, which presents Ankara with both challenges and opportunities, the participants said. Concerns were raised regarding the United States losing its status as a diplomatic reference point due to sudden foreign policy changes. Participants emphasized Turkey’s potential to become a full-fledged regional leader but warned against indecisiveness, drawing parallels to the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, when some felt Turkey missed an opportunity to strengthen ties with the EU through its response to the migrant crisis.

Turkey’s increasing significance in the Middle East

Speakers emphasized Ankara’s evolving role in the Middle East and beyond. For example, as some participants pointed out, Turkey has managed to strengthen ties with Gulf nations while looking beyond their historical disagreements. One participant noted that Turkey has shifted from direct competition with Gulf states to a more utilitarian strategy, improving diplomatic relations across the region. Turkey’s position on Israel and regional security was also debated, with participants mentioning concerns over rising tensions since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks on Israel. Additionally, Turkey’s influence in shaping the future of Syria was a critical point of discussion. Participants agreed on the difficulty of maintaining sway over the Damascus government without jeopardizing Syria’s legitimacy as an independent state.

EU-Turkey defense relations and implications for NATO

Participants welcomed signs of a more constructive EU-Turkey relationship in light of developments in Syria, cooperation in Ukraine, and the recent discussions of joint defense initiatives. However, skepticism remained regarding whether these bilateral ties can translate into broader EU-wide support for Turkey. The conversation highlighted Turkey’s strong relationships with key European nations such as Spain and Italy and also addressed the failure to leverage these relationships for more extensive regional backing. Some criticized the EU’s reluctance to deepen ties with Turkey due to Turkey’s historical tensions with France and Greece, urging Europe to recognize Turkey as an indispensable ally due to its military, geographic, and economic significance.

One participant underscored the necessity of rethinking NATO’s framework to better integrate Turkey’s interests and security concerns while addressing broader tensions between global powers. The participant reminded the roundtable that Turkey has historically been a bridge between the East and the West, and this role has only become more significant as global tensions rise. She said that Turkey has actively engaged with both Western allies and Russia, seeking to maintain a delicate balance in its foreign policy.

Turkey’s role in the new Syria

In discussing the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey, which currently hosts 3.1 million Syrians under temporary protection, participants noted how many Syrian immigrants have had opportunities in Turkey to establish their own businesses. This echoed the stories presented to the roundtable in a screening of an excerpt from the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs’ documentary, Do Seagulls Migrate?, which explores the experiences of four Syrian women refugees in Turkey.

Some speakers noted the social tensions prevalent in refugee-dense regions such as Kilis and neighborhoods in Istanbul, where the large influx of refugees has contributed to rising rents, decreased job availability, and strains on infrastructure. The discussion acknowledged that while refugees have played a significant role in certain sectors of the economy, the rapid demographic changes have also led to challenges for local populations. The women leaders emphasized the need for holistic policies to address these challenges.

Beyond economic repercussions, participants expressed caution regarding the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, given its former ties to al-Qaeda, and acknowledged the apprehension many Syrian immigrants—especially women—feel about returning to an uncertain and potentially dangerous environment. The women leaders also raised concerns about long-term integration challenges; while many refugees have settled in Turkey and are unlikely to return to Syria, the refugees’ repatriation remains a key talking point for politicians. The discussion also highlighted the growing presence of a new generation of Syrian children raised in Turkey, underscoring the need to consider their future role and representation within Turkey’s democracy.

Trade, tariffs, and the economy

Several speakers noted that Turkey’s economic trajectory remains closely tied to Europe. One of the most critical concerns raised was the impact of US tariffs and sanctions, which can add to the pressure on Turkey’s economy. Additionally, the participants noted, new EU environmental regulations such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism could further strain Turkish exports. However, there was also a sense of cautious optimism, with some speakers pointing to the potential for increased trade volume between Turkey and the United States; in 2024, that trade volume was $32 billion. The participants argued that in the face of global economic shifts, Turkey’s ability to maintain a balanced foreign policy will be essential for safeguarding its economic stability and fostering long-term growth. Striking a careful equilibrium between the United States and Europe—and between these Western allies and regional partners—will be key in mitigating economic uncertainties and capitalizing on new trade opportunities, the participants added.

Investing in Turkey’s human capital

Speakers noted that Turkey has a strong private sector capable of cutting-edge innovation. However, they added that if Turkey wants to maintain and strengthen its relevance in an increasingly competitive global market dependent on new technologies, it should focus on developing a highly skilled workforce. Therefore, speakers at the roundtable extensively discussed the need for aligning educational initiatives with labor market demands, particularly in sectors such as digital innovation, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing. Speakers noted that university partnerships and investments in vocational training will be crucial in ensuring the continuous development of Turkish human capital. On the other hand, concerns were also raised about the impact of brain drain on Turkey’s innovation potential, with many young professionals seeking opportunities abroad. As one speaker put it, Turkey must focus on developing a highly skilled workforce to maintain its economic relevance in an increasingly competitive global market.

Photos from the roundtable

Zeynep Egeli is the project assistant of the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs.

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Western sanctions against Damascus must evolve—Just as Syria has

Sinan Hatahet — Mon, 31 Mar 2025 14:35:20 +0000

The fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime came not with a grand international declaration, but with the gradual crumbling of a system that had long outlived its foundations and a flash military operation by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Now, the opposition, which once fought for its survival against the regime, has controversially emerged as the transitional caretaker government. While his past casts a long shadow, HTS’s leader Ahmed al-Shara is no longer a warlord. He is, for the foreseeable future, the president of the Syrian Republic.

Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union were, for much of the conflict, essential tools of confrontation against Assad’s brutal regime. In many ways, they achieved what they were designed to do: Economically isolate Assad, drain his capacity to wage war, and signal moral condemnation over the use of chemical weapons, barrel bombs, and starvation sieges.

But those sanctions did more than they were intended to. They distorted the Syrian economy, fueling black markets and war profiteering. They crushed the legitimate private sector while empowering regime-linked oligarchs who knew how to maneuver in shadow economies. The regime’s marginalization pushed everyday Syrians into lives of dependency and informal labor. The very people who had resisted Assad’s rule were often the ones most deeply hurt by the West’s economic measures.

That exclusion from the global economy continues even with Assad gone, and a new fragile post-war landscape takes shape. While HTS carries the burden of its militant past, banks still refuse to process payments in the country. Traders cannot legally import goods. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) face near-impossible hurdles in transferring funds. Perhaps most crucially, Syrian entrepreneurs with the skill, ambition, and potential to rebuild the country from the bottom up are locked out of formal financial systems.

The United States and its European allies face an acute dilemma. How can one provide economic breathing space for Syrians recovering from war while entrusting HTS to lead a peaceful transition toward democracy? But ultimately, the conversation must shift. The goal of Western sanctions can no longer be regime change. That phase of the conflict is over. The new objective must be to encourage rule-based governance, strengthen institutional accountability, and support the emergence of a Syrian private sector capable of rebuilding from within.

Understanding Reality

Policymakers must first understand the landscape as it is, not as it was. HTS, for all its controversial history, is not a monolith. While some of its constituencies remain ideological, its civilian administration is professionalizing.

Despite international skepticism, the HTS is exercising its mandate. Taxes are collected, roads are repaired, schools and clinics—though under-resourced—are open. Syrians who once fled from Assad’s prisons now live under this emergent system, trying to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of catastrophe. However, they do so under the weight of a sanctions regime still calibrated to punish Damascus.

The caretaker government employs technocrats, often educated Syrians who returned from exile or emerged from the underground to take up posts in local government. Some of them were activists, teachers, and doctors. Many have no commitment or deep-seated belief in HTS’s original ideology but are instead actively claiming their right to promote inclusivity and transparency.

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These technocratic layers of governance, often shielded from international engagement by the political label attached to HTS, offer a potential entry point for the US and EU. Reimagined sanctions policy could focus on creating controlled exceptions through which vetted individuals, organizations, and financial institutions could operate without breaching counter-terrorism laws.

Critically, this approach requires distinguishing between individual and sectoral sanctions. There is a broad Western consensus that individuals involved in war crimes, terrorism, or systemic corruption should continue to face personal sanctions. These measures serve justice and set international norms. However, considering the current political vacuum, sectoral sanctions, particularly those targeting finance, energy, and trade, may need to be revisited.

Continuing to restrict the country from accessing banking systems or foreign investment does not hurt the remnants of the regime. It hurts the civilians whose resilience and determination may be Syria’s best chance at recovery. Indeed, the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has shrunk by 53 percent during the last decade, and estimates suggest an 84 percent collapse in economic activity over the same period. As a result, living standards have plummeted, with over 90 percent of Syrians now living below the poverty line, and over half the workforce is jobless. Sanctions on the finance sector stifle the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, the return of educated diaspora Syrians, and the efforts of NGOs seeking to establish long-term programming beyond emergency aid.

Some European states are already exploring more flexible models. Positive engagement has already begun around sanctions waivers tied to specific humanitarian or reconstruction benchmarks. The United States, however, has been more cautious. Washington’s legal frameworks around terrorism designations make it extremely difficult to authorize even limited engagement with any form of administration. Nevertheless, the United States must recognize that a blanket refusal to adapt will not prevent extremism. On the contrary, it may reinforce it by deepening isolation, empowering illicit actors, and leaving local populations with no stake in peaceful recovery.

Recalibrating Sanctions

To understand what a recalibrated sanctions regime might look like, one must begin with the Syrian economy itself: fragmented, fragile, and highly informal. Years of conflict, corruption, and isolation have left Syria’s financial infrastructure in ruins. Even simple transactions such as importing medical supplies, purchasing raw materials, or sending remittances are plagued by complexity and risk. Families rely on hawala networks and informal money changers, which operate without oversight and often without transparency. This opacity is not just a logistical problem; it is a political and a security one. It allows the rise of shadow actors who profit from black-market transactions and exert quiet but corrosive influence over the country’s economic life.

In this environment, sanctions do more than isolate governments. They reshape incentives. When access to legitimate finance is blocked, the most adaptable actors are often less committed to transparency or reform.

What if that could change? The answer lies in creating controlled, conditional pathways for financial engagement—ones that reward compliance with international standards rather than the ability to evade oversight. Such a model would not be without precedent. For instance, after the United States-led invasion of Iraq, the international community worked with the new government to build financial compliance institutions from scratch. In Afghanistan, similar efforts were made—albeit with mixed results—to create banking systems that could handle foreign aid and attract private investment.

In Syria, rather than attempting to rebuild a national financial system in one sweep, policymakers can begin with targeted engagement with existing national banks by granting them conditional access to correspondent banking relationships, provided they submit to third-party auditing, implement robust anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) controls, and maintain clear separation from sanctioned individuals or entities.

With the proper technical, legal, and political support, Syrian banks could quickly evolve into compliant, transparent vehicles for economic recovery. They could receive remittances from the Syrian diaspora, finance small business growth, and facilitate humanitarian payments in ways that reduce dependence on unregulated cash networks.

Regaining Autonomy

The same principle applies to the private sector more broadly. One of the tragedies of the Syrian war has been the hollowing out of the country’s entrepreneurial class. Once the lifeblood of cities like Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, Syria’s small and medium-sized enterprises have either been destroyed, driven into exile, or absorbed by corrupt networks. Those who remained suffered from a lack of capital and the risk of being sanctioned.

Yet, it is precisely this group that holds the key to long-term stability. They provide jobs, generate tax revenue, support social cohesion, and offer an alternative to armed factions and foreign aid dependency. If given a chance, they can rebuild Syria from the ground up. However, they cannot do so under the current sanctions regime.

Creating space for private sector revival does not mean lifting all restrictions. It means introducing flexibility and nuance. For example, European or regional institutions could establish special economic licensing schemes for Syrian diaspora investors seeking to support family businesses in the country. Risk insurance and credit guarantees could be offered to entrepreneurs operating in designated zones, provided they register with vetted local chambers of commerce and adhere to basic financial disclosure standards. Donor governments could fund business incubators and vocational training centers, ensuring they remain independent of political interference. In each case, engagement would be conditional, monitored, and reversible, but it would still exist. And that alone would mark a profound shift in Syria’s post-war economic landscape.

Moving Forward

Western policymakers must be clear: engagement is not a reward. It steers a fragile, fractured post-conflict society toward rules, norms, and institutions that serve its people rather than its rulers. Sanctions must remain part of this toolkit but must evolve, just as Syria has.

If the international community is serious about fostering peace and stability in Syria after Assad, then it must resist the temptation to rely on inaction. Sanctions, for all their symbolic power, were never designed to manage a fragile post-conflict transition. For the United States and Europe, the time has come to draft a sanctions strategy that responds to the realities on the ground rather than the ghosts of the past. This does not mean abandoning accountability or engaging unquestioningly with a controversial authority like HTS. It means stepping out of the binary mindset that has long shaped Syria policy, in which sanctions were maintained as part of an elusive grand bargain.

The United States, with its more profound financial influence and global reach, has a particular responsibility to lead with nuance. Syria is no longer a primary theater of strategic interest for Washington, but the consequences of failure there—radicalization, renewed displacement, and regional destabilization—remain very real. The US can play a pivotal role in shaping the next chapter of Syria’s recovery by shifting its approach from maximum pressure to calibrated influence.

After half a century of Assad rule and over a decade of civil war, Syrians need space to breathe, build, and imagine futures not dictated by ideology or fear. This space will not be created by withdrawing international pressure but by redirecting it toward the building blocks of governance, the pillars of economic life, and the local actors who have kept communities alive even as the world turned away.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. As a French Syrian researcher, he specializes in political and war economy, particularly in the context of Syria.

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UN report: Russia is guilty of crimes against humanity in occupied Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 21:46:38 +0000

A United Nations probe has concluded that Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in the occupied regions of Ukraine. The investigation focused on the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainian civilians living under Russian occupation, and confirms earlier reports regarding the terror tactics being employed by Putin’s invasion force.

The March 19 report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that “the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity.” The report details a climate of lawlessness throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, with anyone viewed as a potential threat to the occupation authorities liable to be detained before disappearing into a network of detention facilities in the occupied regions or deported to the Russian Federation.

Similar evidence of mass detentions was uncovered throughout all the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, indicating what UN officials referred to as a “systematic attack against the civilian population.” Victims included local officials, journalists, civic activists, military veterans, and religious leaders. While exact figures are unknown, the UN report states that large numbers of Ukrainian civilians have been targeted in a “widespread and systematic manner.”

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The war crimes accusations leveled against the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine extend far beyond the detentions highlighted by UN investigators. The most widely publicized charges relate to the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of vulnerable Ukrainian children. Russia is believed to have kidnapped tens of thousands of young Ukrainians and placed them in camps or foster homes, where they are often subjected to brainwashing programs designed to rob them of their Ukrainian identity and transform them into Russians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his role in these mass abductions.

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, the authorities are working methodically to remove all symbols of Ukrainian statehood and erase any traces of Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian language has been suppressed along with Ukrainian literature, history, and cultural heritage. Schools now teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that glorifies Russian imperialism while demonizing Ukraine. Any parents who attempt to resist the indoctrination of their children risk losing custody.

Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are being pressured into accepting Russian citizenship. Those who refuse to take Russian passports are denied access to basic services such as healthcare and pensions, and are unable to register their property with the occupation authorities. This so-called passportization campaign recently entered a new phase, with the Kremlin announcing that anyone who fails to acquire Russian citizenship within the next six months will be subject to potential deportation from their own homes.

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Fears over the future fate of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country were heightened recently by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s apparent endorsement of sham referendums staged by the Kremlin in 2022 to justify the seizure of Ukrainian lands. “There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule,” he told Tucker Carlson in an interview that set off alarm bells across Europe.

The furor over Witkoff’s comments was hardly surprising. Russia’s fig leaf referendums in occupied Ukraine had been roundly rejected at the time by the vast majority of the international community, including many of Russia’s traditional supporters. “The United States will never recognize these illegal attempts to seize territory that does not belong to Russia,” the US State Department declared.

The September 2022 ballots lacked even a basic semblance of legitimacy, with voting taking place at gunpoint. Indeed, in many instances, the captive population were visited in their homes by election officials accompanied by armed soldiers. Such Kafkaesque scenes are nothing new for the Kremlin, which has been staging similarly farcical “referendums” to justify acts of international aggression since the Stalin era. Prior to Witkoff, however, no senior Western official had attempted to offer their stamp of approval.

The new UN report detailing Russian crimes against humanity in occupied Ukraine is particularly timely. Peace talks initiated by US President Donald Trump in recent weeks have focused largely on the possible partition of Ukraine, with negotiating teams working to determine potential boundaries. But while Trump talks of “dividing up the lands,” millions of lives are also at stake. It is therefore crucial to highlight the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine and the crimes being committed by the Kremlin. While it may not be militarily feasible to liberate these regions at present, safeguarding the basic human rights of Ukrainian residents living under Russian occupation should be an important aspect of any negotiated settlement.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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In the scramble for Africa’s critical minerals, the West must not abandon the ESG agenda

Zainab Usman and Rama Yade — Fri, 21 Mar 2025 16:41:39 +0000

The race for minerals and metals crucial for the global energy transition is intensifying—and is increasing pressure on producing countries, including those in Africa.

The International Energy Agency expects between $180 billion and $220 billion to be invested in the mining of critical minerals between 2022 and 2030, with about 10 percent of this investment slated for Africa. Countries including the United States, Europe, China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are prioritizing supply-chain security with regard to the minerals and metals needed for the global energy transition and for defense industrial applications. The African continent is an important supplier of these commodities.

As this race for minerals and metals critical for the energy transition heats up amid a turbulent geopolitical environment, both companies and governments must not abandon environmental, social, and governance principles (ESG) with respect to Africa.

African countries are increasingly demanding that mining operations deliver more benefits for government revenues and local populations. Toward that aim, countries have adopted mining codes that assert national sovereignty over these minerals, implemented export bans on unprocessed minerals, and unveiled policy strategies to support domestic value-adding processes. In particular, African countries—including Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia, Botswana, Mali, Guinea, and Niger—are increasingly implementing policies of national preference in the mining sector, with the aim of increasing the share of local participation. Others, such as Tanzania, have banned the export of non-value-added minerals. In 2021, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) launched a review of the mining contracts signed by previous leadership with Chinese investors based on concerns that Chinese promises to build roads, hospitals, universities, and housing had not been fully realized.

However, significant portions of the mining industry are still unregulated. For example, the perspectives and interests of artisanal miners are not always fully captured in mining codes, which often have weak provisions on workers’ rights, equal working conditions, and wages.

International mining companies, per an EY survey, considered environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors to be the top risk to their business in 2024. They placed ESG as a top risk ahead of capital constraints, conflict, or even cyberattacks.

Mining companies usually face risk (even in the West, but particularly in fragile contexts) due to long lead times, volatility in commodity prices, policy uncertainty, and security challenges. However, the global map of minerals that hold strategic importance shows that mining activities for these commodities usually take place in countries where ESG remains a challenge, such as China, Russia, the DRC, Peru, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Turkey, and India. For example, the DRC is home to about half of the world’s cobalt reserves; meanwhile, more than three-quarters of the world’s platinum reserves are located in South Africa. Many rare earths, including lithium, nickel, and cobalt, are refined in China. For countries that mine and export minerals, especially the ones in Africa, such activities have not generally translated into sustained economic growth and broader improvements in human well-being. Instead, host communities of mining projects have often had to deal with environmental pollution, health challenges, and stagnant incomes.

Corporations increasingly turned to impact investment, especially soon following the launches of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals in 2000 and the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. And over time, governments, institutional investors, and asset managers have set up various systems through which companies report their impact on the environment and on societies. For example, the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive requires companies to explain the impacts of their business strategies. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires publicly listed companies to report climate-related information. Last year, the Global Reporting Initiative, founded in 1997 in order to promote standardized ESG reporting, launched a new mining-sector reporting standard.

But recently, the momentum for recognizing and adopting ESG principles at a global level has slowed down. Reports now abound of companies, investment banks, and other private-sector actors setting aside their ESG commitments in the face of economic recession or political instability. Some are discontinuing or disbanding their ESG divisions altogether. Governments too are abandoning commitments to social and environmental sustainability principles. While these are setbacks to the wider global ESG agenda, this is a worrying trend and could be detrimental if it were to extend deeply into the mining industry.

There have certainly been shifts in how stakeholders in the mining industry have approached ESG. According to the mining companies surveyed by EY last year, the three ESG risks to which investors paid the most attention were local community impact (64 percent), waste management (55 percent), and water stewardship (51 percent). In 2025, EY notes, miners have turned their focus more toward the environmental stewardship component of ESG, reporting that waste management (44 percent), water stewardship (31 percent), and climate change (31 percent) would attract the most scrutiny from investors. The category that includes local community impact dropped from the third top risk to the fifth. And it seems there was a deprioritization of the governance component of ESG among mining companies and leaders, which EY says raises “alarm bells.”

Nevertheless, there are mining companies bucking the trend in the sense that they still prioritize and recognize ESG; that is commendable. It will be important for them to continue to stay the course knowing how much work has gone into securing the social license to operate in difficult jurisdictions. The progress made over the past decades cannot be jettisoned. If mining companies resist the global trend that is turning away from ESG, they can even help nudge their home governments to commit more deeply to ESG principles.

To ensure that mistakes of the past are avoided, and Africa’s development is supported in this intensifying scramble for minerals critical to the energy transition, the West—both its governments and corporations—cannot afford to abandon ESG.

Zainab Usman is the director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Putin is ruthlessly erasing Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 21:27:42 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered Ukrainians living under Russian occupation to “legalize” their status by September 10 or face deportation. In other words, those who have not yet done so must apply for Russian passports or risk being expelled from their homes as foreigners. This March 20 presidential decree is the latest step in a campaign to pressure Ukrainians into accepting Russian citizenship as the Kremlin seeks to strengthen its grip over areas of Ukraine currently under Russian control.

Kremlin officials say they have distributed around 3.5 million Russian passports in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine since the onset of the full-scale invasion just over three years ago. Residents are reportedly being forced to apply for Russian passports in order to access basic services such as healthcare and state pensions, while those without Russian documentation face the possibility of harassment and detention.

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The enforced adoption of Russian citizenship is just one of the many tools being employed by the Kremlin to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. Wherever Russian troops advance, local populations are subjected to mass arrests designed to root out any potential dissenters. Those targeted typically include elected officials, military veterans, religious leaders, civil society activists, teachers, journalists, and patriots. Thousands have been abducted in this manner since 2022 and remain unaccounted for, with many thought to be languishing in a network of prisons in Russian-occupied Ukraine and Russia itself.

Those who remain are subjected to terror tactics in conditions that Britain’s The Economist has described as a “totalitarian hell.” All public symbols of Ukrainian statehood and cultural identity are being systematically dismantled. The Ukrainian language is suppressed, while any Christian denominations other than the Russian Orthodox Church face persecution or worse.

Moscow’s efforts to erase Ukrainian identity begin in the classroom. In schools throughout the occupied regions, Ukrainian children are being taught a new Kremlin-approved curriculum that praises Russian imperialism and glorifies the ongoing invasion of Ukraine while demonizing the entire concept of a separate and independent Ukrainian state. Any parents who dare to resist risk losing custody of their children.

The Kremlin is also accused of kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from occupied regions and deporting them to Russia, where they are subjected to ideological indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian roots and impose an imperial Russian identity. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin due his personal involvement in these mass abductions of Ukrainian children.

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The actions of the Russian occupation authorities are entirely in line with the vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric coming from Putin himself and other officials in Moscow. Putin has long insisted that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Six months prior to the full-scale invasion, he took the highly unusual step of publishing a lengthy history essay that read like a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood.

As Russian troops prepared to invade in February 2022, Putin sought to justify this act of international aggression by describing Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has declared occupied Ukrainian territory to be “Russian forever.”

The Russian establishment has enthusiastically followed Putin’s lead. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has stated that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” Meanwhile, poisonous anti-Ukrainian language has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.”

This week’s presidential decree threatening to deport Ukrainians from their own homes is the latest reminder that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no mere border dispute or attempt to address legitimate security concerns. It is a colonial war of the most brutal kind that aims to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation. In the heart of Europe and before the watching world, Putin is openly pursuing policies that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide.

The grim reality of Russia’s invasion should weigh heavily on the US officials who are currently charged with drawing lines on maps and attempting to create a realistic framework for a possible ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. While diplomatic compromises and temporary territorial concessions are now clearly inevitable, any future peace deal must also take into account the fate of the millions of Ukrainians who are likely to be left under Russian occupation.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Silencing Voice of America will only strengthen autocrats around the world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 18:53:47 +0000

United States President Donald Trump has moved to shut down a series of prominent US-funded international media outlets including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as he continues efforts to cut government spending and reshape US foreign policy. In a March 15 statement, the White House said the decision “will ensure that taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”

Critics fear the move will strengthen the position of authoritarian regimes around the world while leaving millions of people in closed societies without access to independent information. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus called the step “a massive gift to America’s enemies.” He warned that the shutdown would make the United States weaker and would be celebrated by “the Iranian Ayatollahs, Chinese communist leaders, and autocrats in Moscow and Minsk.”

Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of numerous activists from the front lines of the fight against resurgent authoritarianism to voice their alarm over the closures. For many people living in authoritarian societies, outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have provided an objective and trustworthy alternative to what is often a heavily censored domestic information space. Kara-Murza suggested the demise of these outlets would be toasted in Moscow and beyond. “One more champagne bottle opened in the Kremlin,” he quipped.

As expected, the shutdown of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America was enthusiastically welcomed on prime time Russian state TV. Margarita Simonyan, who heads Russia’s flagship international media platform RT and state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, called the news an “awesome decision by Trump.” Meanwhile, fellow Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov took time out from fantasizing about a nuclear attack on Britain to mock the more than one thousand journalists now facing an uncertain future. “You are nasty, lying, deplorable traitors to the motherland. Go and die in a ditch,” he commented.

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For decades, authoritarian regimes ranging from Nazi Germany to Communist China have griped against the influence of US-funded independent media outlets, and have adopted various measures to try and block them. Voice of America was first set up in 1942 at the height of World War II, while Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was established in 1950 during the early years of the Cold War to provide uncensored information to people living behind the Iron Curtain.

Initially focused on radio broadcasts, these outlets and their numerous affiliates have evolved over time to become multimedia platforms reaching hundreds of millions of people every week. This has never been a purely altruistic endeavor; advocates maintain that providing access to objective information abroad strengthens the US position internationally.

Until their dramatic recent shutdown, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and many other regional pro-democracy platforms such as Radio Free Asia were all overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM). While often the subject of debate in the United States due to allegations of political bias and doubts over their continued effectiveness, recent studies have indicated that they remained widely recognized by international audiences as important sources of unfiltered information.

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Despite being funded by the US government, the network adhered to a code of journalistic integrity and objectivity similar to the charters governing the work of other state-funded media such as the BBC. This independence from governmental editorial oversight had on occasion led to issues with United States officials. Some within the Trump White House attempted to justify the decision to cut funding by claiming that these state-funded broadcasters had become overly politicized and were no longer representative of the values the new administration wished to project.

The international impact of the USAGM stable of media outlets is perhaps most immediately apparent in the number of journalists jailed or otherwise targeted by authoritarian regimes for their professional activities. At present, ten journalists and staff members from USAGM-affiliated outlets are being held in countries including Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Myanmar. Following news of the shutdowns, Ukrainian journalist Stanislav Aseyev posted that while imprisoned by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, he was subjected to electric shock torture specifically because he had previously worked for Radio Liberty.

The timing of Trump’s decision to shut down the United States international broadcasting network could hardly be worse. In today’s increasingly multipolar world, the information space is an critical front in the escalating global struggle between rival democratic and authoritarian camps. This has long been recognized by China and Russia, with both countries committing vast annual budgets to support sophisticated international media activities in a variety of guises. The US was previously seen as the world leader in this soft power contest, but that is suddenly no longer the case. Generations of autocratic regimes never did manage to silence Voice of America, but the Trump administration has now done so themselves.

Mercedes Sapuppo is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A light in the darkness: Why RFE/RL matters now more than ever

Muhammad Tahir — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:34:50 +0000

It was in the middle of a bitterly cold night in 2014 when my phone rang. At first, I ignored it. Then came a second call, and a third. The persistent buzzing was enough to jolt me awake. When I finally answered, a distressed female voice met me on the other end.

“They’re kicking me out of my home. I have two kids. Nowhere to go. I live in Mikrorayon,” she said, her voice breaking under desperation. She was referring to one of countless Cold War–era housing blocks built by successive regimes across the Soviet nations. Behind her, frantic voices clashed.

I knew that sound well. It was the sound of fear.

This was not unusual. As the director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen Service, locally known as Azatlyk, I often received such calls—cries for help in a country where independent journalism is considered a threat.

Turkmenistan, like many of the authoritarian regimes RFE/RL has covered, was built on the iron grip of a single ruler. Dissent was crushed, voices silenced, and truth distorted. RFE/RL was for many the only major source of news free from government manipulation.

The woman on the phone, whom I will call Maya, was a young widow with two children, the youngest just six months old. That night, city officials had come to demolish her home under the national leader’s so-called “beautification” campaign in the capital city Ashgabat.

When she saw the municipal workers approaching her home, she slammed the door shut, pressed her back against it, and, in that moment of desperation, reached for the only thing she believed could bring hope and protection: RFE/RL.

After gathering details, we did the only thing we could: We made a call to the local municipality. It was a simple act of journalism. We asked why a young widow with children was being thrown onto the streets in freezing temperatures.

That call was enough. The officials withdrew—not out of mercy, but out of fear. It was fear that the leader of the nation might catch wind of the story—that, as in many similar cases, he might view it as a stain on his image and make those responsible pay the price.

This is the power of RFE/RL. It is not just a news organization, but a shield for those whose own governments have abandoned them. In Turkmenistan, as in many of the places the organization serves, there are no fair and impartial courts to turn to, no free press to expose wrongdoing, no way for many citizens to hold power accountable. Without RFE/RL, Maya’s story would never have been heard. And she would have been just another forgotten casualty of authoritarian rule.

In recent days, however, the Trump administration has raised the specter of a world without RFE/RL. On March 15, the US Agency for Global Media terminated the funding grant for RFE/RL, endangering the organization’s ability to provide journalism for millions of people who would struggle otherwise to get access to news that is not controlled by an authoritarian government.

What’s the price of truth?

The recent decision to cut funding for RFE/RL along with its sister networks—Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting—is not just a financial cutback. It is a major blow to the millions who rely on it.

For decades, these networks have signaled that the United States has not turned its back on those living under the rule of autocrats and radical extremists. They have served as a voice for the silenced, a bridge connecting the oppressed to the world beyond their borders.

RFE/RL’s annual budget was $142 million in fiscal year 2024. That is slightly less than the cost of three Apache helicopters, the same type of aircraft that was lost in large numbers over two decades of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with little lasting progress to show for it.

With that single investment, RFE/RL reaches nearly 47 million people each week, broadcasting in twenty-seven local languages across regions spanning from Russia to the Balkans, from Iran to Central Asia, and all the countries in between.

In the tribal regions of Pakistan, where the Taliban’s grip remains strong, the alternative to RFE/RL’s Pashto-language Mashaal Radio is what locals call “Mullah Radio”—an extremist-run broadcast spewing radical propaganda.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service exposed war crimes while Russian state media flooded the airwaves with propaganda. Now, as Russia tightens its grip on Central Asia and China expands its influence in the region, RFE/RL remains an important line of defense against a rising tide of disinformation.

Hope, even in darkness

When I first joined RFE/RL in 2003, it had already been the lifeline for millions behind the Iron Curtain for over half a century. I remember when former Czech President Václav Havel visited RFE/RL headquarters. He spoke of growing up under communism, of listening to RFE/RL in secret, and of how those broadcasts carried the hope that one day freedom would come.

Havel wasn’t alone. Generations of dissidents, reformers, and ordinary citizens across Eastern Europe and Central Asia have similar stories. They drew strength from the words they heard in the media outlet’s broadcasts.. And when the Iron Curtain finally fell, they didn’t just see journalists at RFE/RL—they saw the voices that had never abandoned them.

Now, if the voice of RFE/RL and its sister networks is silenced, then what will fill the void? Chinese state media? Russian disinformation? The Taliban’s “Mullah Radio?” These forces have long pursued this outcome—weaponizing intimidation, censorship, harassment, and violence. Yet so far they have failed. The leaders of Iran, China, Russia, and Belarus are likely cheering the position in which these channels now find themselves. With no counterbalance, the propaganda of these regimes could go unchecked.

This outcome also would contradict the Trump administration’s own stated commitment to free speech, depriving millions of access to independent journalism. In many of its broadcast regions, RFE/RL remains one of the last sources, if not the only source, of truth.

History has shown that when free media disappears, oppression often takes its place.

For Maya, and for the millions like her, RFE/RL must endure.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former RFE/RL executive who dedicated eighteen years to advancing independent journalism and press freedom in some of the world’s most restrictive environments.

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Inside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s diplomatic offensive with Syria’s Christians and Ismailis

Gregory Waters — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:48:44 +0000

Shortly after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) drove Bashar al-Assad out of Syria last year, the group pledged to respect the rights of minorities. Yet, since HTS took control over much of the country, some across the international community have raised fears that Syria’s new leaders—with their jihadist backgrounds—might erode minority rights or exclude these communities from the political transition process. These fears have been newly flamed by the massive, targeted violence against Alawites on Syria’s coast during the second week of March. Nevertheless, there have been some signs for optimism about the inclusion of at least some minorities in post-Assad Syria.

This analysis draws on my conversations with members of these groups as well as HTS leadership over the past several years as a consultant with the International Crisis Group and an independent researcher. The people I spoke with were granted anonymity given the tenuous security situation in the country and their ongoing political work.

There are legitimate reasons for worry, specifically about the future of the Alawite community. In March, Alawite insurgents linked to the former regime launched a coordinated attack against security forces. Government forces, independent armed factions, and Sunni vigilantes mobilized in response, engaging in nearly four days of mass executions, killing more than six hundred Alawite civilians and detained insurgents. The insurgency by ex-regime elements is still ongoing.

This violence and the state’s inability to control both its own forces and the independent forces has reignited fears over minorities’ safety, but these devastating events should not be viewed as indicative of the fate of other minorities. The violence is rooted in the fact that, over Syria’s brutal civil war, Alawite men formed the core of the regime’s fighting forces and intelligence apparatus and that the Alawite sect has come to be linked to the regime via both Assad’s policies and Sunni extremist narratives. These political and social dynamics do not apply to other minority groups.

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For the other minority groups, there are positive indications that they will be included in post-Assad Syria. Even before entering Damascus, HTS had been reaching out to Syria’s minorities in Idlib for sensitive, but successful, diplomatic engagement for five years. Christian leaders in Idlib told me in a meeting in 2022 that HTS had consistently reached out to them, first through senior religious figures and then through dedicated political attachés. HTS appointed these individuals—and thus engaged with these communities—directly, rather than through the Syrian Salvation Government that HTS and other opposition groups had formed to administer Idlib. These political attachés came to serve as advocates for the local communities, representing their demands to the Salvation Government and HTS security forces.

Through this, Christians in rural Idlib gradually regained control over their homes and farms and restarted public prayers. Additionally, security forces halted attacks on Christian communities. The engagement process was long and arduous, and, as HTS leaders told me in 2022, early on they were fearful that they’d face backlash from hardliners and populists in Idlib. However, as the years passed and the Christian community grew ever more integrated into Idlib’s society and the local government, HTS’s fears gradually ebbed.

Growing from this experience, HTS engaged with Syrian community and diaspora leaders just days into its final military offensive in late 2024. This diplomatic offensive helped ensure that HTS could sweep through Syria without taking many minority regions by force. The discussions, which took place primarily during the first week of December last year, resulted in a particularly strong relationship between HTS and Syria’s Christian and Ismaili minorities and also ushered in a new era of relations with groups previously seen as close to the regime.

A diplomatic offensive, from Nubl and Zahraa . . .

For example, the collapse of the regime in Aleppo in November last year spread panic through the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa—once lynchpins of the regime’s defensive lines. Local Facebook pages claimed that two thousand Shia civilians had fled their homes, seeking shelter first in Aleppo and then in the town of Safira, where Hezbollah and Iran had built a strong militia network. By December 1, Safira came under at least partial opposition control, and regime forces abandoned the displaced people, resulting in widespread panic on Facebook over the fate of the civilians. On December 2, negotiations officially began between HTS and leaders from the displaced community to return them to their homes in Nubl and Zahraa, according to what an individual who facilitated the talks told me.

The negotiations began after members of the displaced community were able to reach one political activist living abroad, who told me that he helped establish a line to HTS’s political bureau and helped mediate. This initial experience quickly evolved into a small, multi-sect organization of activists representing a range of communities still under Assad’s rule—particularly the Ismaili-dominated cities of Masyaf and Salamiyah—all eager to assist in the peaceful handing over of their communities.

. . . to eastern Hama

This diplomatic approach expanded as HTS advanced on northern Hama. The city of Salamiyah, lying east of Hama, played a crucial role in the regime’s defense as it hosted the headquarters of several important regime militias operating in the countryside. But it also had a vibrant revolutionary movement dating back to the 1980s, particularly led by its Ismaili majority. “Ismailis have always opposed the regime,” one Ismaili activist told me, “but we work through political and civil means, not arms.” Salamiyah is also home to the Syrian National Ismaili Council, which supports and guides the Ismaili community across Syria. These factors opened the door to negotiations with HTS.

I spent several days in Salamiyah in early February, meeting with National Ismaili Council leader Rania Qasim and other security and civil society officials in discussions about the negotiations and resulting relations with HTS. According to Qasim, on December 2, HTS’s political bureau contacted her to initiate talks. The talks were led by Qasim and a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation, an international Ismaili humanitarian organization. The negotiations also included a coordination committee formed by the Ismaili Council’s Emergency Operations Center. Qasim told me that she and the other leaders of the negotiations saw themselves as participating in such talks on behalf of all communities across the Salamiyah region, not just Ismailis.

According to Qasim, the discussion focused on the fate of regime fighters in the region and on how HTS would enter the city of Salamiyah. The council, according to the people I spoke with, refused to provide cover for any criminals in the city, agreeing instead to HTS’s general taswiya (settlement) policy—employed nationally after the fall of Assad—that saw a grace period for all armed men to turn in their weapons and receive temporary civilian identification documents, but it did not provide them with blanket amnesty. In return, it was agreed that pro-regime fighters would lay down their weapons while HTS units simply drove through the main street on their way south to Homs. The coordination committee also agreed it would send a delegation to the outskirts of Salamiyah to meet the HTS convoy and escort them through the city.

These negotiations marked a significant first step in HTS’s relationship with the Ismaili community in Salamiyah. According to Qasim, the council spent the three-day negotiation repeatedly announcing to Salamiyah residents, “the council and the community will not fight; if you want to fight, it will be your own decision.” This message was carried even to some of the most infamous Alawite villages, such as Sabburah, where two pro-revolution Alawite ex-political detainees then worked within their village to ensure the local fighters agreed to lay down their weapons. Yet the Ismaili Council itself has never been affiliated with any armed faction and had no communication with regime military leaders; Qasim emphasized that at no point did they negotiate with or on behalf of any armed regime faction.

Instead, HTS leaders had to trust that the Ismaili Council had the influence needed to pacify the regime militias and ensure HTS’s safe entry into the city and surrounding villages. In fact, there was only one small skirmish—in the village of Tal Khaznah, on the road south to Homs—but otherwise, the handover of eastern Hama on December 4 was peaceful, local security officials and members of the Ismaili Council told me. According to Ismaili leaders in Salamiyah and Tartous, the Assad regime responded to these rapid negotiations by sending security officials to the Ismaili Council in Tartous and threatening them, telling them that their relatives in Salamiyah were “traitors.” However, the regime collapsed before these officials could follow through on any threats.

I was told that throughout this three-day negotiation period, other negotiations also took place on a more individual basis. Opposition fighters from both HTS and other factions who were from Salamiyah had begun reaching out to friends and families in their villages. One young commander remembered calling his family as his unit approached eastern Hama and asking them to connect him with the village’s mukhtar, telling me, “why would I want to risk fighting my father or brother?” He now leads a general security detachment in the countryside around his mixed-sect village, where he sees himself as bound to protect all locals no matter their sect.

The handover of the Salamiyah region was only the beginning of talks between HTS and the Ismaili Council, according to the Ismaili leaders I spoke with. The national council oversees seven regional branches, including ones in Tartous and Masyaf. With the regime still in control of western Syria, the Ismaili Council began negotiating on behalf of communities there. For its part, HTS ended its operations on the Masyaf front the same day it liberated Hama city, pausing its westward advance at the edge of the Ismaili- and Alawite-inhabited foothills. Ismaili leaders also told me that they began to share their positive experiences engaging with HTS with their contacts in the heavily pro-regime Christian towns of Muhradeh and Suqaylabiyah, which had ceased fighting but remained besieged by HTS. Those towns quickly concluded their own negotiations, which saw the peaceful entry of HTS units.

A foundation for a new Syria

The initial negotiations appear to have laid a strong foundation of trust that has extended beyond Salamiyah. According to the head of the Tartous Ismaili Council, HTS’s local military official met with the council the day after entering Tartous. The council was then invited to a general meeting between local representatives and HTS officials, was given a new line of communication with HTS’s political representative, and finally was welcomed to meetings with the new administrator of Tartous governorate. All of this evolved over just ten days. As one Ismaili official in Tartous described it to me, “It seems that the new government truly respects and has a special relationship with the Ismaili community. This came as a huge shock because we had never spoken with them before and had the same fears as the Alawites until December.”

HTS’s diplomatic offensive demonstrates the leadership’s political approach, which evolved over years of engaging with the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. HTS leaders had justified these new policies to me years ago as a political necessity for one day governing a country as diverse as Syria and for legitimizing the movement among minority communities who only knew of the organization from its days as an al-Qaeda affiliate, then called Nusra Front. This understanding that Syria cannot be ruled as an Islamist Sunni country (but instead must be led as a country of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds) has begun to shape the post-Assad era—at least at a local administration and security level.

The initial Salamiyah negotiations laid a strong foundation of cooperation that has continued to grow, ensuring the Ismailis across Syria “feel confident we will be fully represented in the constitutional process,” as a leader from the Tartous office told me. In Salamiyah, the Ismaili Council now plays a central role in the region’s administration, facilitating civil-political engagement, running a volunteer security force to assist local police, and hosting a security committee consisting of both civilian and military representatives to address security gaps and any violations committed by government forces.

Such relations have grown even stronger in the coastal city of Qadmus. According to two local Ismaili activists I spoke with, a small Ismaili volunteer force has been supporting the undermanned government police forces in Qadmus since December. Government forces have even provided these volunteers with small arms, while a new Ismaili-run local council has worked closely with the regime-era mukhtar—also an Ismaili—to coordinate services and administration with the HTS-appointed regional director. The council has also engaged in outreach with the Alawite villages around Qadmus, serving as a bridge between the new local administration and the Alawites.

Despite these efforts, their close relationship with the new government has made the Ismailis in Qadmus a prime target for pro-Assad Alawites, who killed two Ismaili security volunteers in late February and an Ismaili Council member and two government police officers on March 6. When the March uprising began, the Ismailis tried to protect the government forces in the town, eventually negotiating for their safe exit from the area after being besieged by insurgents. However, as a result, they faced widespread threats—by Alawites both in person and over WhatsApp—for “siding with the government,” local residents told me. Security forces eventually peacefully reentered Qadmus, and according to the locals I spoke with, the experience has only strengthened their ties with Damascus. Many Ismaili men have now volunteered to support government security forces, with at least some applying to become official security officers. Meanwhile, local security officials are discussing extending salaries to the entire volunteer force. Despite the events of the past week, the city’s local council continues to serve as an intermediary between local security forces and the Alawite villages, as the former works to negotiate the handover of weapons and wanted criminals.

Meanwhile, Christian civil society leaders in Syria’s tense coastal region also described a strong working relationship with local HTS-appointed administrators and security officials. Although they still have concerns centered on basic services, the economy, and the constitutional process, several activists and local Christian leaders told me in February that they did not fear direct attacks from the new government but rather worried about being caught in the growing violence between Alawites and government forces. Christian leaders across Syria were among the first men engaged by pro-opposition security forces in the days after Assad’s fall, with Facebook pages publishing pictures of meetings between military and political leaders and religious figures in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. As the violence on the coast escalated in March, the head of Aleppo’s Catholic community, Bishop Hanna Jallouf, reiterated the importance of a united Syria, affirmed the good treatment of Christians across the country, and called for a continuation of efforts to fully integrate all minorities into the political process.

These new interfaith and civil-centric networks and relationships will play a central role in shaping post-Assad Syria. However, the new government should do more to engage and empower groups such as the Ismaili and the Christian communities. It should do so both on a local and an international level, by working with groups such as the Aga Khan Foundation (to give Ismailis assurances) and even the Vatican (to do the same with Christians). Such efforts would help expand the local trust built with these groups into genuine representation in Damascus and would give real reason for optimism about the future of Syria’s minorities.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project.

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Nia joins Voice of America to discuss Iran’s human rights violations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:36 +0000

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Rayes in British Medical Journal: quantifying the effects of attacks on health facilities on health service use in Northwest Syria: a case time series study from 2017 to 2019

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:31 +0000

original soure

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Özkizilcik in Dirilis Postasi: are the Druze Israel’s new excuse?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:30 +0000

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Alyemany mentioned in American Enterprise Institute about his new book

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:43:18 +0000

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Dijkstal quoted in Middle East Eye on the treatment of Ahmed al-Doush

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:42:38 +0000

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Pavia joins i24 News to discuss Tunisia’s crackdown on opposition figures and political opponents

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:43 +0000

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Asat quoted in ABC News on the deportation of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand to China

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:42 +0000

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Asat quoted in Breitbart on Thailand’s deportation of 40 Uyghurs

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:41 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in The Jerusalem Post on the responsibility of Palestinian leaders to their people

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 15:36:38 +0000

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Changing the conversation about religious freedom: An integral human development approach

Fabio Petito, Scott Appleby, Silvio Ferrari, and Michael Driessen — Mon, 17 Mar 2025 22:32:08 +0000

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Freedom of religion or belief is not a niche issue—it lies at the core of what it means to be human and how societies flourish. In that sense, persecution of religion and religious minorities is an injustice that hampers sustainable development and weakens political stability. Such discrimination not only infringes on the rights of millions to practice their faith but it also imposes severe socio-economic restrictions on religious minorities. It can limit access to healthcare (SDG 3), education (SDG 4), food (SDG 2) as well as clean water and sanitation (SDG 6). When religious minorities are forced into unsafe and low-paid economic sectors, their right to decent work is jeopardized (SDG 8), pushing many into poverty (SDG 1).

Unfortunately, global efforts to protect and advocate for religious freedom remain largely ineffective. In some circles, the campaign for religious freedom is perceived as a partisan political tool, favoring certain groups while sidelining others. It is time to change the conversation.

Integral human development—a holistic model of human flourishing rooted in the inherent dignity of each person and every person—offers a vision that resonates across many of the world’s religious, philosophical, and cultural traditions. It provides a strong conceptual foundations for building a global, religiously literate platform to re-engage religious and policy leaders on this critical policy issue.

Seen through the lens of integral human development, religious freedom appears not merely as “freedom from” persecution or discrimination but also as “freedom to” realize the common good of the society by giving voice to all of its members. This framework promotes interreligious and cross-cultural dialogue, placing efforts to combat persecution within a broader, multi-level collaboration between religious and secular actors. To develop effective policies against religious discrimination and persecution, this kind of comprehensive, inclusive approach that can foster true human flourishing is greatly needed.

About the authors

Fabio Petito is a professor of religion and international affairs at the University of Sussex and nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Scott Appleby is the Keough-Hesburgh Professor of Global Affairs at the Keough School of Global Affairs and research fellow of the Ansari Institute for Global Engagement with Religion at the University of Notre Dame.

Silvio Ferrari is professor emeritus of law and religion at the University of Milan and honorary president of the International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies.

Michael Driessen is professor of political science and international affairs at John Cabot University and director of the Rome Summer Seminars on Religion and Global Politics

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The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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This Women’s History Month, focus on African women’s achievements, not just their challenges

Rama Yade — Mon, 17 Mar 2025 18:15:04 +0000

In Africa, feminism has never been a foreign concept. Women’s contributions to African societies have been exceptional throughout the continent’s history. Matrilineal societies spread across Africa, including among the Akans, the Zandes, the Baïnouks, and the Bushmen. The ordination of women was authorized in ancient Egypt while Europe is still debating it today. In Nubia (in Sudan today), the Candaces, who wielded the sword and were buried in the pyramids, built more pyramids in seven hundred years than the pharaohs did in three thousand years. They had the right to choose their husbands and even when they would get married. The Kingdom of Dahomey in present-day Benin had a formidable all-female military regiment from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. In Senegal, the brave women of Nder embodied the resistance to Moorish slavery in the nineteenth century. From Aline Sitoe Diatta of Senegal to the Nigerien queen Sarraounia Mangou and Kimpa Vita of Kongo, there are countless women heroes in Africa’s history who helped guide the continent on the path to independence and freedom.

As we celebrate Women’s History Month in 2025, much of this history of African women has been strangely forgotten. Instead, the international community often treats African woman as an object for study and, frequently, misinterpretation.

On the one hand, she is perceived as the demographic symbol of the African continent whose population is doubling every thirty years and must be contained. On the other hand, she is the one who keeps communities together and, outside the house, tends to be the world champion of entrepreneurship. She is also the primary victim of African conflicts. To paraphrase the French dramatist Jean-Baptiste Racine, the African woman deserves neither this excess of honor nor this indignity.

In fact, the African woman carries within her both a universal dimension that makes her a woman like any other and a singularity that makes her exemplary. Through data from multilateral organizations, however, each dimension of her existence seems to be under scrutiny.

Marriage. While only 2 percent of the world’s population lives in polygamous households, it is in sub-Saharan Africa that polygamy is most practiced (11 percent of the population), with all the rivalries, suffering, and conflict that can often be caused by families composed of several co-wives. As the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights concluded in a 2019 report, polygamy is first and foremost discrimination against women. The practice also feeds into the wider problem of gender-based violence, which impacts 42 percent of women in eastern and southern Africa.

Pregnancy. African women are 130 times more likely to die from pregnancy-related complications than women in Europe and North America, according to a 2024 report by the UN Population Fund. When they survive childbirth, their child is likely to enter the risk zone: according to the World Health Organization, the infant mortality rate indicates seventy-two deaths per one thousand successful births in Africa, the highest rate in the world.

At work. When women in sub-Saharan Africa work, it is, according to a 2018 report by UN Women, mostly (89 percent) in informal employment. Although the African informal sector is not always a curse (behind this economic practice, there is a valuable sense of solidarity within the communities and many advantages foreign organizations don’t see), most international organizations consider informal employment to be problematic, citing “low pay, long hours, no sick or maternity pay, unsafe workplaces.”

During war. In conflict zones such as the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sudan, women are prime targets for rape as a weapon of war. They are also the most efficient actors when it comes to rebuilding communities torn apart by war, to the point of inspiring the landmark UN Resolution 1325 on women’s participation in peace processes.

As elderly persons. Despite all this, African women live longer than African men. However, among the world’s women, they have the lowest life expectancy (sixty-five years compared to more than eighty years in Europe and North America), according to 2023 data.

These terrific data have led development agencies and international financial institutions to praise the resilience of African women. Would this type of language be used for women from Norway or the United States? Yet, this reality is accepted when it comes to African women.

The celebration of the resilience of African women belies the fact that they still do not get enough support in facing their exhausting daily lives. It echoes the racist bias that Black people—and Black women in particular—are more tolerant of pain, a belief rooted in stereotypes in the medical community about Black people’s supposed physical attributes. These and other prejudices are likely at the root of the fact that pregnant Black women are significantly less likely to have labor induced and more likely to have caesarian sections than white women. Among American women, Black women are three times more likely to die in childbirth than white women. Higher incomes and educational attainment do not spare Black women from the effects of these health outcome disparities. A 2023 UN Population Fund report finds that maternal deaths among African-American college graduates remain 1.6 times higher than among white women without a degree.

But while these statistics can help policymakers understand the work that remains to improve the lives of women in Africa, as well as in the diaspora, they neglect to say anything about the often-overlooked achievements of African feminism. Here are some less well-known statistics and facts that are no less important to understanding the lives of African women in 2025.

First, there’s women’s participation in national legislatures. While women heads of state and government are more often found in Western countries, it is in the Southern Hemisphere that the highest proportion of women parliamentarians are found. Rwanda tops the list, as 61 percent of the country’s members of Parliament are women.

Next, African women lead some of the most far-reaching and impactful multilateral organizations in the world. These include Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the director-general of the World Trade Organization; Rwanda’s Louise Mushikiwabo, the secretary general of Organisation internationale de la Francophonie; and Uganda’s Winnie Byanyima, the executive director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

And finally, some African nations have made significant strides on labor market equality. According to a 2024 World Economic Forum report measuring gender parity in labor market outcomes, Namibia ranked eighth in the world, higher than Spain (tenth), Belgium (twelfth), and Great Britain (fourteenth). South Africa ranked eighteenth, placing it above Switzerland (twentieth), France (twenty-second) and the United States (forty-third).

So this Women’s History Month, let us turn our attention not just to the litany of statistics cataloguing the challenges African women endure, but also their overlooked feminist breakthroughs. African women deserve recognition not just for the indignities they face, but for the heights they achieve.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Ukraine’s innovative defense tech sector is the country’s trump card

David Kirichenko — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 21:50:27 +0000

As tempers flared last month during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disastrous Oval Office confrontation with US President Donald Trump and Vice-President JD Vance, Trump offered a blunt assessment of Ukraine’s limited leverage in any future negotiations with Russia. “You don’t have the cards,” he told Zelenskyy. It is a message the US leader has repeated on multiple occasions as he seeks to broker a peace deal and end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Trump’s logic is easy enough to understand. After all, Ukraine is currently locked into a brutal war of attrition against a far larger and wealthier enemy. For over a year, the Russian army has been slowly but steadily advancing as Ukraine struggles to address mounting troop shortages and encounters regular issues with the flow of military assistance from the country’s Western allies. If this continues, most observers believe Moscow’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and funding make eventual Russian victory virtually inevitable.

The Ukrainians are acutely aware that the odds are stacked against them. However, they also understand that Russia’s invasion represents an existential threat to their nation. This helps to explain the remarkable resilience displayed by Ukraine’s army and Ukrainian society as a whole. Faced with a fight for survival against a military superpower, Ukrainians recognize that they cannot realistically expect to match Russia in terms of conventional military strength. Instead, their country’s trump card in this uneven struggle is the innovative and rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense tech sector.

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Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion just over three years ago, an improvised industry of defense tech startups has mushroomed in garages, workshops, and warehouses across Ukraine. This trend has benefited from the country’s vibrant prewar IT industry, with many existing IT businesses and tech entrepreneurs switching their focus in 2022 to support the Ukrainian army.

This has led to dramatic increases in the domestic production of key items such as surveillance and attack drones, with Ukrainian developers engaged in a relentless daily race to stay ahead of their Russian adversaries. Hundreds of Ukrainian companies are now engaged in drone manufacturing, compared to a mere handful in 2021. The Ukrainian government recently unveiled plans to purchase around 4.5 million first person view drones in 2025, more than doubling last year’s number. This is enhancing Ukraine’s reputation as a global defense tech hub and boosting the country’s efforts to reduce its reliance on military aid from the West.

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Ukrainian drones are playing a key role in transforming the modern battlefield and are now responsible for around two-thirds of Russian losses, according to a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute. Ukraine’s progress has been so groundbreaking that leading Western defense companies are increasingly looking to learn from the country. For example, Silicon Valley companies are tapping into the know-how of Ukrainian drone makers, the Wall Street Journal reports.

The impact of Ukraine’s defense tech prowess is perhaps most evident in the Black Sea. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s navy was virtually nonexistent, while the dominance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was taken for granted. Three years on, Ukraine has successfully leveraged low-cost, high-impact naval drones to offset Russia’s initial advantages and break the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports.

Ukraine’s maritime drones have repeatedly proved their effectiveness, sinking or damaging numerous Russian warships and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet from Crimea to the safety of Russia itself. Despite the distances involved, Ukrainian naval drones are able to pose a threat to Russian shipping far from Crimea. In summer 2023, Ukraine launched a long-range drone attack that reportedly damaged a warship close the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, around six hundred kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian naval bases in the Odesa region.

Ukraine’s naval drone fleet continues to evolve at a rapid pace. In recent months, a new model equipped with missiles reportedly shot down a Russian helicopter over the Black Sea. Marine drones have also been developed as launch craft for aerial drones. Ukrainian officials claim these “miniature aircraft carriers” have already been used to hit Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine. Looking ahead, the use of naval drones as platforms for aerial attacks could create opportunities for Ukraine to bypass Russian front line defenses and launch strikes from unexpected angles.

As Ukraine enters a fourth year of full-scale war against one of the world’s leading military powers, the need for continuous innovation on the battlefield and at sea remains critical. Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle for the Black Sea is an indication of what can be achieved when the Ukrainian military makes the most of the country’s innovative defense tech industry. Kyiv’s partners should take note of the key role being played by Ukrainian defense tech innovators and maximize their support for this strategically crucial sector.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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The Trump White House is not the first to misjudge the extent of Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine. On multiple occasions, the preceding Biden administration declared Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “strategic failure” while pointing to the extremely high cost paid by the Kremlin in terms of military casualties and economic damage. This practical assessment of the invasion assumes that Putin is guided and constrained by the same logic as his Western contemporaries. In reality, however, he is not.

While democratic leaders must worry about approval ratings and economic indicators, Putin has removed virtually all possible sources of domestic opposition and is free to focus on securing his place in Russian history. Since the early years of his reign, he has made no secret of the fact that he views the collapse of the USSR as a tragedy, and regards the post-Cold War world order as an injustice. Crucially, Ukraine has come to embody both of these grievances. Putin firmly believes he cannot hope to achieve his historic mission of reversing the verdict of 1991 and reviving the Russian Empire without first extinguishing Ukrainian independence.

Putin’s obsession with Ukraine has become increasingly apparent over the past two decades as his campaign to subjugate the country has escalated from political interference to military intervention. In 2004, his efforts to rig Ukraine’s presidential election and install a Kremlin-friendly candidate backfired disastrously and helped spark the Orange Revolution. Ten years later, he responded to another Ukrainian pro-democracy revolution by seizing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine.

In the years following the onset of Russia’s military aggression, it gradually became more and more obvious that the limited invasion of 2014 was not delivering the desired outcome of a pro-Russian Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia’s attack was only strengthening Ukraine’s commitment to turn westward and pursue a Euro-Atlantic future. Rather than acknowledging the counter-productive consequences of his military campaign, Putin chose to raise the stakes even further by launching the largest European invasion since World War II.

Over the past three years, Putin has become increasingly open about his intention to erase Ukraine altogether. He has declared occupied Ukrainian regions to be “Russian forever,” and has compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great. Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so normalized in the Russian state media that UN officials believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, throughout areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, Russia is systematically suppressing all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Despite the horror and trauma of the Russian invasion, Ukrainians have so far refused to back down. This defiance is a personal humiliation for Putin. It directly undermines his carefully crafted strongman persona, and makes a complete mockery of his insistence that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” Rather than securing his place among the most celebrated rulers in Russian history, Putin is now at risk of being remembered as the man who lost Ukraine.

Losing Ukraine is Putin’s worst nightmare. Ever since witnessing the collapse of Soviet power while serving as a young KGB officer in East Germany, he has been haunted by visions of people power movements overthrowing empires. This helps explain his increasingly violent opposition to the robust and often unruly democratic culture that has taken root in post-Soviet Ukraine. Since the 2004 Orange Revolution, he has viewed the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy as an existential threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s retreat from empire.

Putin knows that the invasion of Ukraine will define his entire reign and decide the future fate of the Russian Federation. While he may be prepared to discuss a strategic pause in hostilities if ceasefire terms can be made to favor Moscow, he will never accept the existence of a separate and genuinely independent Ukrainian state on Russia’s border. This does not mean that current US-led peace efforts are entirely futile, but it is vital to recognize that freezing the conflict along the current front lines will not be enough to end the war.

For decades, Western leaders have made the mistake of viewing Putin through the prism of their own political pragmatism, while underestimating the importance of his revisionist imperial ideology. After three years of total war in the heart of Europe, there is no longer any excuse for such wishful thinking. Putin has bet everything on the destruction of Ukraine and is confident he will be judged favorably by the tribunal of history. Unless he is deterred by the overwhelming might of the collective West, he will continue to wage war against Ukraine until he achieves his chilling goal.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Present without impact? How the Middle East perceives China’s diplomatic engagement

Jonathan Fulton — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 19:00:00 +0000

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In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “Present without impact? How the Middle East perceives China’s diplomatic engagement,” Jonathan Fulton argues that despite economic advancements and high-profile diplomatic engagements, China’s influence remains largely economic rather than political. Middle Eastern perceptions of China vary; it is seen as a cautious, transactional actor with limited capacity for addressing key regional conflicts and security concerns. Fulton adds that while Iran views China as a crucial partner, Gulf states leverage their ties with Beijing to maintain strategic flexibility.

Fulton conducted extensive interviews with regional experts, which highlighted skepticism regarding China’s willingness and ability to assume a more influential political role. Fulton argues that economic pragmatism drives ongoing partnerships, but China is not yet considered a key regional political or security player.

Fulton argues that China is viewed more favorably in Middle Eastern countries than in Western countries. That said, it was not described as a benevolent regional actor in any of the conversations conducted for this issue brief. Most analysts believe China’s political and security role will remain minimal in the near term, although its economic importance will continue to grow, driven by infrastructure investments and trade partnerships. This underscores the widespread view of China as a limited regional actor.

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Jonathan Fulton

Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

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The Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (SMESI) provides policymakers fresh insights into core US national security interests by leveraging its expertise, networks, and on-the-ground programs to develop unique and holistic assessments on the future of the most pressing strategic, political, and security challenges and opportunities in the Middle East.

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What is the future of Russian immigration to Serbia? | A Debrief with Srdjan Cvijić and Maxim Samorukov

sjones — Wed, 12 Mar 2025 14:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, over 100,000 Russians have sought refuge in Serbia, drawn by historical ties, visa-free entry, and the complex geopolitical landscape. But who are these Russians, and what are their beliefs? What do they envision for their future in Serbia, a country at the crossroads of the East and West?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, delves into the growing Russian community in Serbia—a topic that has sparked significant discussion across the Western Balkans. Joining her are Srdjan Cvijić, President of the International Advisory Board of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Maxim Samorukov, Fellow at the Carnegie Russia-Eurasia Center.

Their latest research offers a fresh perspective on the Russian community in Serbia, revealing their non-malign influence and shedding light on their social, political, and economic integration.

In this episode, we explore:

– The scope and size of Russia’s migration to Serbia—are we witnessing a cultural shift or a temporary wave?

– Who are the migrants arriving—political dissidents, tech workers, or others—and what are their motivations?

– Are these immigrants looking for safety, or do they see themselves as agents of change?

– How do they view Vladimir Putin and Serbian President Vučić?

– And what does their growing presence mean for Serbia’s future as it balances ties between the East and West?

Don’t miss this insightful conversation on the evolving role of Russian immigrants in Serbia’s political, social, and economic landscape.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Damon quoted in News Nation on Gazans’ reactions to Trump’s threat for full hostage release

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:41:04 +0000

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Warrick joins Al-Jazeera to discuss Hamas’ refusal to turn over Israeli hostages

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:52 +0000

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Pillai in OpinioJuris: Symposium by GQUAL on CEDAW’s GR40: an opportunity for Asia-Pacific – build on the momentum of GR 40

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:50 +0000

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Syria’s women face a new chapter. Here’s how to amplify their voices.

Diana Rayes , Hind Kabawat — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 15:41:44 +0000

This International Women’s Day, groups worldwide issued a call to accelerate action for gender equality. As post-Assad Syria takes shape, the country has a rare opportunity to achieve major gains in gender equality. But time is limited: The stakeholders involved in mapping Syria’s future must harness this opportunity early, while the country is freshly emerging from the conflict.

What women have faced in Syria

Women’s rights in Syria have been neglected for decades. Before the Syrian revolution in 2011, any legal frameworks that offered women rights, privileges, and titles were symbolic and did not translate into meaningful social or political empowerment. These laws and policies were largely superficial, serving more as “window dressing” to give the appearance of progress while women’s actual roles and opportunities were limited in practice. Bashar al-Assad rose to power and led a regime that excluded and discriminated against women.

As the conflict ensued, women in Syria faced increasingly dire conditions. Over 90 percent of Syrians are estimated to be living under the poverty line, and women bear the brunt of this economic crisis. Mariam Jalabi, one of the founders of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement (which advocates for the participation of women in decision-making bodies) told us: “We cannot talk about women’s rights without first talking about human rights . . . A Syrian woman does not have food on her table, her children are not in school, she doesn’t have access to proper healthcare.” These issues are compounded by Syria’s economic collapse, which has increased gender-based violence, child marriage, child labor, and sexual exploitation.

The conflict’s gendered impact is evident in the experiences of female heads of households—the widows and wives of the hundreds of thousands killed, disappeared, or missing in Syria—many of whom are still seeking justice. The patriarchal nature of Syrian society and the Assad regime’s failure to make meaningful legal reforms (specifically regarding citizenship, personal status, property, and the penal code) put women at a disadvantage in providing for their families or making key decisions.

The window of opportunity is limited

Post-conflict contexts provide a unique opportunity for women to take on greater roles in political, economic, and social spheres as existing gender hierarchies get upended. As one study notes, peace processes pave the way for institutional reform and new strategies that promote gender equality. However, as this study also points out, these opportunities for meaningful advancements in women’s empowerment are often time-limited, and substantial effort may be needed to maintain commitment to furthering these advancements.

Syria’s civil society, both inside the country and in the diaspora, has grown stronger and has collected wisdom over years of operating under oppressive, authoritarian rule. Despite hardship, this resilient civil society has continued to adapt, organize, and advocate for a better future and has the potential to steer Syria, including its new leadership, toward a more inclusive, democratic future. This has set a foundation for swift action to promote gender equality during this pivotal but fleeting period.

But still, if matters related to gender parity are continuously postponed—whether until a constitution is solidified or lasting peace is secured—opportunities for equality may be lost.

The women shaping Syria’s future

The Syrian interim government has made some progress. It appointed several women to high-level positions, including Maysaa Sabreen, head of Syria’s Central Bank (the first woman to ever serve the role); Aisha al-Dibs, head of the newly established Women’s Affairs Office; and Muhsina al-Mahithawi, the first female governor of Suwaida.

These women have an opportunity to assert the legitimacy of women as valuable actors in social and political spaces. Their appointments also serve as key indicators of progress, which is being monitored closely by international governments and organizations, including the United States, European Union, and United Nations (UN), in advance of fully lifting sanctions, among other steps towards stabilization in Syria.

While these appointments are significant, questions remain about whether they are genuine efforts or symbolic gestures. For example, statements from officials (including al-Dibs and government spokesperson Obaida Arnaout) and the appointment of Minister of Justice Shadi al-Waisi, who has a controversial track record with respect to women, have been perceived as dismissive of the demands of Syrian women across the country. Syrians were quick to condemn these statements and say they did not reflect priorities for Syria’s future.

But in another sign of progress, ahead of the February Syrian National Dialogue Conference on the country’s political future, the interim government appointed a preparatory committee to set standards for the talks. The committee of seven included two women: Hind Kabawat (one of the authors of this piece) and Houda Attasi.

Kabawat and Attasi led the mediation team and organized thematic sessions within the broader dialogue, with a clear focus on securing the participation of women from across Syrian society, including professionals such as judges, lawyers, and politicians; artists such as writers and actresses; civil-society leaders; women living in displacement camps; mothers of detainees; and others. This included efforts to ensure that there were minimum quotas for women’s participation, set at 30 percent, for each defined category of participant (i.e. politicians, civil society representatives, human-rights activists, and intellectuals). In reality, this quota was not met (it was closer to 25 percent), in part because various religious groups and tribes have little to no female representation in their leadership.

Some attendees expressed concerns about the conference’s inclusivity, particularly of minority women. While invitations were sent out to members of the Yazidi and Kurdish minorities ahead of the conference—and Druze, Kurdish, and Christian men and women participated—there was indeed not a lot of time for Syrians, particularly those in the diaspora, to travel to Damascus to attend in person. In addition, some women participants also expressed concern about a lack of clarity from the interim government on how it would guarantee that the conference’s recommendations would be carried out after the talks; these women called for the implementation of an accountability mechanism.

Nevertheless, the Syrian National Dialogue Conference still marked a significant moment, seeing as over two hundred women participated in the National Dialogue Conference following decades of low women’s participation in Syrian governance and politics. In addition, over ten thousand Syrians from around the world contributed through an online questionnaire, 40 percent of whom were women. The conference’s final statement, which was presented by Attasi, included calls for transitional justice, peace, and respecting women’s rights and role in Syria’s future. These calls were inspired by the requests of women attendees and organizations such as the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, the Syrian Feminist Lobby, and TASTAKEL, who participated in the dialogue.

Jalabi, who was formerly the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s representative to the UN, reflected on some of the criticisms currently facing the interim government: “Part of our job as active citizens is engaging actively with the current government. As Syrians, we can always expect better from our government. Syrian women . . . we want to be a part of high-level decision making, and not just in the abstract.”

What to do now

It is critical for women to be involved in transitional justice and constitutional reform processes in Syria. This can be enabled by several actors, including the interim government, international stakeholders, and, primarily, Syrian women themselves.

The international community, particularly the United States and the European Union, should accelerate sanctions relief for Syria. Doing so will help the Syrian government improve women’s rights and revitalize the country’s ailing economy, which has been greatly affected by sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Sanctions relief would allow women and their families to achieve a “normal” life and secure the resources needed to rebuild the country. Bottom line: If the international community wants to support the women of Syria, the priority should be sanctions relief.

Additionally, the international community should firmly call for Syria to shape a system of governance that includes women. There is precedent for this: For example, UN Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2467 (2019) call on countries to prioritize the participation of women and the incorporation of gender perspectives in peace and justice processes.

The Syrian interim government must take proactive measures to ensure that women, particularly from minority communities, are represented in future National Dialogue Conferences and all high-level political dialogues. The interim government must ensure that at least 30 percent of representatives in decision-making bodies are women, as was achieved by the UN-facilitated Syrian Constitutional Committee in 2019. Establishing a new Women’s Affairs Office, while important, should not allow the isolation of women’s issues from broader governance. Instead, the office should ensure that such issues are considered in national policies. In essence, Syrian women need to be represented in all levels of government.

Syrian organizations that advocate for women’s participation in decision making should continue to cultivate strategic alliances and broad coalitions, including with regional and international actors, to promote gender equality and peacebuilding.

Furthermore, these organizations should work to further establish solidarity among women. That is essential for the long-term success of any effort to build a more inclusive and democratic Syria. Women working collectively, and without competition, with close alignment in visions and values, can drive efforts to bridge divides (across classes, locations, and sects) that have previously hindered Syria’s sociopolitical progress.

Syrian women’s organizations must work to reframe the debate on gender equality, highlighting that it is not just a fundamental right but also a critical component of a more inclusive and just society. In appealing to the interim government, Syrian women can show how progress in achieving gender equality can enhance the government’s image and reputation. This approach can help mitigate the backlash that has been seen in other post-conflict transitions.

Both women’s organizations and the interim government should together incentivize higher levels of representation by women in Syria’s decision-making bodies and processes. They should work together to ensure the quality and effectiveness of women’s roles, not just the quantity of those roles, in order to ultimately erase deeply ingrained gender stereotypes that undermine the legitimacy of women’s political participation.

While some progress has been made, the Syrian interim government, with support from the international community, must follow with concrete actions to advance women’s rights in Syria. Empowering women will not only benefit Syria in the short term but also set the country on a trajectory toward an inclusive and sustainable future.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Hind Kabawat is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the director of interfaith peacebuilding at the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution at the George Mason University Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

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US peace initiative can help bring Ukraine’s abducted children home

Kristina Hook, Iuliia Hoban — Thu, 06 Mar 2025 21:50:14 +0000

Among the many crimes Russia is accused of committing in Ukraine, few are as shocking as the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Ukraine has identified around 20,000 children subjected to forced deportations since the full-scale invasion began three years ago, but officials believe the true number of victims may be far higher. These allegations are so grave that the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arrest in March 2023 on war crimes charges.

Securing the return of Ukraine’s kidnapped children must play a part in the peace efforts recently initiated by US President Donald Trump. Speaking in February, Trump acknowledged that he was aware of the situation and said he could potentially persuade Putin to release the children as part of a negotiated settlement to end the war. “I believe I could, yes,” he told Fox News Radio host Brian Kilmeade.

Efforts to rescue the thousands of Ukrainian children held in Russia would likely receive strong public backing in the United States, including from Trump’s support base. Reverend Jason Charron, who prayed over Trump moments before his near-assassination in Pennsylvania during the 2024 election campaign, recently wrote to the US leader calling on him “to be a shield for the Ukrainian people and for the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.”

The Kremlin’s illegal deportations have also sparked strong bipartisan condemnation in the US political arena. Less than a year ago, a resolution slamming Russia’s “illegal abductions” as a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention was passed in the US House of Representatives by an overwhelming margin, with support coming from leading Republicans including Speaker Mike Johnson.

Meanwhile, research backed by the US Department of State has provided grim details of Russia’s deportation operations and linked them directly to Putin. According to a report by Yale’s School of Public Health released in December 2024, Russian presidential aircraft and funds were used in a program to take children from occupied Ukrainian territories, strip them of Ukrainian identity, and place them with Russian families.

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Russia stands accused of instigating a large-scale, coordinated, and systematic policy designed to remove thousands of Ukrainian children from their homes and rob them of their Ukrainian roots via a network of camps and foster homes, where they are subjected to indoctrination and in many cases assigned new Russian names. Kremlin officials have attempted to justify the deportations by claiming to be motivated by wartime safety concerns, yet their actions still constitute violations of international law. Nor has there been any attempt to explain why children are subsequently brainwashed and forced to adopt Russian identities.

The abductions are causing profound harm to the victims, their families, and wider communities. The relatively few children who have so far returned to Ukraine have provided harrowing testimonies of their experience in Russia. Many have recounted being physically and mentally abused for their Ukrainian identity, or told that their family and country had abandoned them.

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Presently, no international legal mechanism exists to facilitate the safe return of abducted Ukrainian children. However, the United States has many cards it can play in order to achieve this goal. US sanctions against Russia are not primarily linked to individual aspects of the invasion. Instead, they are focused on the illegal act of the invasion itself, which is in violation of the United Nations Charter. US negotiators can make it clear to their Kremlin counterparts that without the safe return of all abducted Ukrainian children, the Russian invasion cannot be considered over and sanctions cannot be lifted.

Sanctions could also be used to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to continue the abductions. The United States could follow the example of the British, who imposed targeted sanctions in late 2024 against individuals identified as “perpetrators of Russia’s forced deportation and brainwashing of Ukrainian children.” UK officials described the abductions as “a systematic attempt to erase Ukrainian cultural and national identity.”

By focusing on the distressing plight of the abducted Ukrainian children, Trump could generate much-needed international confidence in his peacemaking efforts. Meanwhile, given his close personal association with the mass abductions, Putin has the ability to stop this policy and order the return of Ukrainian children. With few public signs that Russia is committed to long-term peace, initiatives aimed at identifying victims and ensuring their return to Ukraine could serve as a key US demand to test this willingness.

Before sanctions are even partially lifted, the United States should insist on concrete steps from the Russian side to end the abductions and enable Ukraine to bring all the victims home. It should be made clear that this must be verified by independent monitoring mechanisms. If progress proves possible, this could serve as a first step toward addressing other grave human rights concerns such as the widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in Russian captivity.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Iuliia Hoban, Ph.D. is an expert on children and childhoods in peace and security studies and the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War for vulnerable populations.

Since February 24, 2022, reserves of the Russian Central Bank have represented the largest frozen pool of Russian sovereign assets. Kyiv has consistently called for their full transfer to fund the Ukrainian war effort and compensate for war damage inflicted by Russia. G7 countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their stance that the frozen assets will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it has caused in Ukraine.

This position has effectively placed responsibility on Ukraine and Russia to negotiate a political settlement including war reparations. Over the past three years, significant work has been undertaken to elaborate legal grounds for the confiscation of the frozen Russian assets in Ukraine’s favor, but no decisive action has been taken to seize them outright.

Instead, as a temporary measure, Ukraine has received interest accrued on these funds, which were placed in deposit accounts in 2024. Additionally, G7 leaders agreed to provide a $50 billion loan to be repaid in the coming years using proceeds from the frozen reserves. This arrangement represents a substantial achievement. It has also fueled speculation that the Russian assets will remain untouched until the loan is fully repaid, which could take 10 to 15 years.

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The start of peace talks in Saudi Arabia, spearheaded by the United States, has shifted the political calculus surrounding the use of the frozen Russian funds. Potential proposals to channel them into Ukraine’s reconstruction, including reconstruction projects in Russian-occupied territories, would mark a striking departure from previous policy. While this would no doubt be framed as a pragmatic step toward resolving the conflict, many would see it as a major concession to Moscow.

At first glance, this approach may appear designed to set a balance between competing interests. In reality, it risks undermining the very principles on which the international response to Russia’s aggression has been built.

Since 2022, there has been broad consensus that Russia, as the aggressor state, bears full responsibility for the consequences of the war, including the obligation to compensate for all damages, irrespective of the circumstances under which they occurred. This has been reaffirmed in a UN General Assembly resolution, one of Ukraine’s key diplomatic achievements at the United Nations.

Any compromise that allows Russia access to its frozen reserves, even indirectly, would set a dangerous precedent for the division of responsibility over war-related damages. While some might argue that the money ultimately belongs to Russia and that partial access does not amount to a strategic loss for Ukraine, this perspective ignores a fundamental reality: These frozen assets were supposed to serve as leverage to compel Russia to accept its legal obligations, including reparations. Allowing Moscow to regain control over even a fraction of the frozen assets would weaken that leverage and allow the aggressor to benefit at the expense of its victims.

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The core issue remains clear. Any model for unlocking Russian sovereign assets must prioritize justice for Ukraine and the victims of Russian aggression. Allocating these funds to be used by the aggressor state without a formal reparations agreement would contradict the principles of accountability.

Since May 2022, Ukraine has consistently advocated for the creation of an international compensation mechanism based on the vision that victims of aggression must be the primary beneficiaries. The fate of the frozen Russian $300 billion has always been at the center of this process, as these funds were considered the main source for financing reparations. Under a framework led by the Council of Europe and supported by a coalition of international partners including the United States, a Compensation Fund could serve as the primary instrument for distributing these assets to those who have suffered direct harm from Russia’s aggression.

While the mechanism requires further refinement, supporters believe this format is the best path toward ensuring meaningful redress. The recently established Register of Damage for Ukraine, which is tasked with registering all eligible claims to be paid out through a Compensation Fund, is an initial step in this direction, demonstrating a tangible commitment to prioritizing victim compensation.

Transferring Russia’s frozen reserves to a future Compensation Fund appears the most logical and legally sound course of action. Moreover, the European Union, which administers $210 billion of the $300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank reserves, reportedly backs the move. Without this transfer of assets, the entire idea of a reparations mechanism for Ukraine would be undermined.

While the operational details of any future decisions can be refined through multilateral negotiations with the participation of Ukraine and the EU, the guiding principles appear clear. These should include the use of frozen Russian assets to serve the interests of Ukraine as the victim of aggression. The primary purpose of these funds should be direct compensation for war damages suffered by Ukrainian individuals, businesses, and institutions. Meanwhile, any decision on their use must be grounded in principles of justice, ensuring that responsibility for war-related damages is not shifted onto Ukraine, and that a victim-centered approach remains at the core of the process.

Ivan Horodyskyy is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and director of the Dnistryanskyi Center for Politics and Law.

Creamer published in the Small Wars Journal on US and allied readiness in a “multi-theater general war”

bgalicia — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 14:49:00 +0000

On March 5, Shawn Creamer, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, was published in the Small Wars Journal on US under preparedness for large-scale conflict and the steps needed to strengthen defense and societal resilience. He argues that, as our adversaries are acting in a coordinated manner to build up capabilities, the US and its allies are failing to keep pace.

Peace is not the natural state of affairs, but it can be maintained through strength and preparedness.

Shawn Creamer

Fellow

Shawn Creamer

GeoStrategy Initiative Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Security & Defense East Asia

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Ukrainians unite behind Zelenskyy after disastrous Oval Office meeting

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 03 Mar 2025 15:48:34 +0000

Ukraine’s roller coaster relationship with the Trump administration entered a new downward spiral on February 28 when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s White House visit ended abruptly after a televised meeting escalated into a very public spat with US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance.

Trump and Zelenskyy had been due to sign off on a landmark minerals partnership agreement that was intended to strengthen ties between Kyiv and Washington, DC, but the two leaders instead became embroiled in an increasingly angry exchange in front of the cameras over the terms of a potential peace deal with Russia. The Ukrainian delegation left the White House with the document still unsigned, leaving the future direction of bilateral relations in question.

The shocking scenes in the Oval Office rapidly went viral, sparking considerable international unease. The sense of disquiet was strongest in Europe, with numerous officials and commentators across the continent concluding that the rift confirmed their worst fears over Trump’s shifting foreign policy priorities and his commitment to European security.

In Ukraine, millions watched video footage of the White House argument in disbelief. Ukrainians were hoping the meeting would mark a welcome change in tone following weeks of mounting tensions that had seen their president branded a “dictator” by Trump and excluded from talks between the United States and Russia. Instead, they were faced with what appeared to be a complete breakdown in communication with their country’s most important ally and main supplier of critical military assistance.

Many Ukrainians were angered and dismayed by what they saw as Trump and Vance’s confrontational stance toward Zelenskyy. At various points in the heated exchange, the two US leaders appeared to question Ukraine’s war effort and suggest the country was in no position to be making demands, while also accusing Zelenskyy of being insufficiently grateful for US support.

Strikingly, neither man voiced any criticism of Russian ruler Vladimir Putin for launching the largest European invasion since World War II. On the contrary, Trump indicated that he did not welcome Zelenskyy’s hostility toward the Kremlin dictator. “You see the hatred he’s got for Putin,” Trump told the assembled press during the Zelenskyy meeting. “It’s very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate. He’s got tremendous hatred. And I understand that. But I can tell you the other side’s not exactly in love with him either.”

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As news of the disastrous Oval Office meeting spread across Ukraine, there was a clear effort to demonstrate a united front and rally around the flag. This response was hardly surprising. After all, Ukrainians have been fighting for national survival ever since Russia’s attack began eleven years ago with the seizure of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since 2014, they have become familiar with the significant challenges their country faces as Ukrainian officials seek to maintain support in Washington and other Western capitals.

Zelenskyy’s main political rival Petro Poroshenko led the way, vowing to refrain from any criticism and saying that Ukraine needed to respond to events in the US by demonstrating unity. Other politicians followed suit. “Under no circumstances should we agree to calls for the president to resign, and I’m saying that as an opposition Member of Parliament. That defies the very idea of democracy,” said Inna Sovsun.

Many Ukrainians expressed their pride in Zelenskyy for what they saw as his refusal to be intimidated and his insistence on pressing the issue of security guarantees. “If we are for real, we haven’t spoken with such dignity since writing to the sultan,” commented Ukrainian political activist Anastasiya Paraskevova, referencing a celebrated but likely apocryphal series of seventeenth century letters sent by the Ukrainian Cossacks to the Ottoman Sultan and immortalized in a painting by Ilya Repin. “This is the sentiment right now. Trump has actually made Zelenskyy even more popular in Ukraine.”

There were also widespread suggestions that the White House had deliberately provoked a confrontation in order to discredit Zelenskyy and undermine US support for Ukraine. “Zelenskyy could have just sat there in silence for 40 minutes without saying a word. The problem is, they would have found a reason to get offended and start a brawl anyway,” argued Ukrainian journalist and commentator Ilia Ponomorenko. “You simply can’t win with people who don’t actually want a standard, successful meeting.”

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While the overall mood in Ukraine was one of defiance, Zelenskyy’s handling of the Oval Office clash also came in for significant criticism. Ukrainian Member of Parliament Oleksiy Goncharenko, a member of the opposition European Solidarity Party, called the meeting “catastrophic for Ukraine” and noted that the only winner was Putin. Commenting on Zelenskyy’s role in Friday’s confrontation, Goncharenko told CNN that the Ukrainian leader needed to be “much more diplomatic” and “constructive” in his future dealings with the country’s US partners. “Mr. Trump will be president of the United States for the next four years. We need to work with him, not argue with him,” Goncharenko commented.

A common complaint among Ukrainians was that while they are being asked by the Trump administration to make concession after concession, Russia faces no such pressure. The tone of the White House meeting certainly seemed to underline Ukraine’s limited leverage as it attempts to secure the backing of the United States for a sustainable peace settlement that can prevent further Russian aggression. “You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out, and if we’re out, you’ll fight it out,” Trump told Zelenskyy at one point as tempers frayed.

Mariia Zolkina of Ukraine’s Democratic Initiatives Foundation think tank commented to the BBC that the war of words in Washington would add to a growing sense of injustice within Ukrainian society over the Trump administration’s strategy for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. She accused the US leader of seeking to grant Putin almost all of the objectives he has sought but failed to achieve on the battlefield during three years of full-scale war, and warned that this one-sided approach would only strengthen Ukraine’s will to resist. “Trump does not understand that millions of Ukrainians are united by a shared sense of zero tolerance toward injustice. This is what led to the revolutions of 2004 and 2014,” she noted, referencing independent Ukraine’s two pro-democracy revolutions.

While most Ukrainians were clearly shaken by the spectacle of their president arguing so publicly with Trump and Vance, the sense of shock was not shared by everyone. Some viewed the Oval Office clash as yet another reality check in a long and painful national journey that has seen Ukraine navigate more than a decade of Russian aggression while adjusting to the limitations of international assistance. “Zelenskyy was brave, but we are supplicants now,” wrote Ukrainian author Andrey Kurkov in Britain’s Guardian newspaper. “Trump and the Kremlin have made it abundantly clear that Ukraine’s participation in these negotiations between the US and Russia is not necessary or desirable.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Abdullah’s rejection of Trump’s plan won overwhelming domestic approval. Tens of thousands of Jordanians lined the Amman streets on February 13, welcoming the king home and backing his Gaza stance. Citizens carried large banners with pictures of Abdullah and slogans opposing the displacement of Palestinians. Amer Shobaki, a Jordanian analyst and staunch supporter of Palestinian rights, thanked the king for his “firm and courageous stance in preserving Jordan’s stability.”

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The Jordanian support for Abdullah’s stance transcended the lines that frequently divide the kingdom. Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who make up an estimated 50 to 60 percent of the country’s population, appreciated that the king would not participate in a plan that would empty Gaza’s population and weaken the Palestinian national movement. East Bankers—Jordanians whose roots descend from the eastern side of the Jordan River—have no interest in the Hashemite kingdom absorbing an additional wave of Palestinians and further diluting their political power.

Abdullah’s rejection of Trump’s plan harkens back to populist moves by the late King Hussein. In 1991, Hussein assailed the Gulf War and took a pro-Iraq stance—despite an appeal by US President George H.W. Bush for a statement from the Jordanian leader conveying understanding of the US position. The move won widespread support among Jordanians for defending a fellow Arab state against Western powers. Thirty-five years earlier, Hussein expelled British Lieutenant General John Glubb (who at the time led the Arab Legion) to limit foreign influence over the kingdom, which many Jordanians applauded. Like his beloved father, Abdullah benefited domestically from standing up to a Western power in defense of Arab interests.

Trump’s Gaza plan has offered Abdullah an opportunity to more vocally support the Palestinian cause, a challenge for the sixty-three-year-old leader since the Gaza war erupted. Amnesty International reported that Jordanian security forces arrested over one thousand individuals at pro-Gaza protests in late 2023. In April 2024, Jordan’s Air Force shot down Iranian drones fired at Israel, with Amman insisting it was defending the security of Jordanians. Despite Hamas military spokesman Abu Obadiah’s calls for “resistance” from Jordan against Israel, Abdullah refused to open an additional front against the Jewish state, likely in part as an effort to prevent Israeli strikes against the Hashemite kingdom.

Even after Abdullah ruled out the absorption of hundreds of thousands of Gazans, Trump still praised the Hashemite leader. “King Abdullah is one of the true great leaders of the world,” Trump announced in a February 12 message to the Jordanian public. “He’s got a wonderful heart. He loves you so much.” While Trump had warned on February 10 that the fate of Jordan’s nearly $1.5 billion annual assistance package may be linked to the kingdom’s absorption of Gazans, after Abdullah’s White House visit, Trump suggested that he would no longer use aid as a threat.

The Jordanian ruler’s diplomatic approach to tensions with the White House helped his cause. In contrast to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas—who called Trump a “dog” in 2020 after Washington unveiled a peace proposal favorable to Israel—Abdullah avoided such insults following Trump’s threatening initiative. On February 11, the king called Trump a “man of peace” and lauded his role in securing a Gaza cease-fire, understanding the president’s appreciation for public praise.

Jordan faces numerous challenges. The Hashemite kingdom’s economy remains dismal. The United States may still permanently sever assistance to Amman after Washington completes the ninety-day review of US foreign aid worldwide. Such a move would add stress to the cash-strapped country. Yet, Abdullah enjoying a surge of popularity is no insignificant development. It may provide the Hashemite ruler with additional flexibility as he navigates a tense period in US-Jordan relations.

Aaron Magid hosts the podcast On Jordan and is the author of an upcoming biography on King Abdullah. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles on the Hashemite kingdom have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

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Canada’s G7 presidency should prioritize health innovation

Carl Meacham — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 21:03:07 +0000

The COVID-19 pandemic reminded the world just how tightly health and economic stability are linked. Yet beyond the immediate impacts of the pandemic, the growing burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs)—such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular conditions—represents an escalating crisis in 2025. This burden, already significant, continues to increase with aging populations and lifestyle changes, threatening to overwhelm healthcare systems and impede economic growth. Investing in health innovation is essential to ensuring sustainable societies and economies.

Despite an eventful start to the year—marked by the resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the looming threat of tariffs that could disrupt key industries—Canada now has a unique opportunity to chart a new course. With a change in leadership coming this year and the 2025 Group of Seven (G7) presidency, Canada can seize this moment to reaffirm its commitment to fostering “economies that benefit everyone,” one of its 2025 G7 goals. Canada should use its G7 presidency, which it has held since January 1, to reaffirm its commitment to fostering such economies by placing advancements in health innovation high on the organization’s agenda. Ottawa should prioritize communicating the importance of health innovation for economic growth and societal well-being, expanding access to early screenings for NCDs, and building sustainable financing and funding models for investing in health technologies.

Why health innovation matters

Healthcare plays a central role in the social contract, fostering trust, cohesion, and resilience by ensuring that individuals can lead healthier, more productive lives. But advances in health innovation and improved health outcomes can also create immense economic value. Improving global health could boost the global economy by up to twelve trillion dollars by 2040, according to a 2020 report by McKinsey. More granular data highlights the socioeconomic costs of failing to address diseases like cancer. A recent study estimated the global economic cost of cancers from 2020 to 2050 to be $25.2 trillion (in 2017 US dollars), essentially an annual 0.55 percent tax on global gross domestic product.

The economic case for health innovation becomes even clearer when considering the economic benefits of optimal research and development spending on treatments and vaccines for known diseases. A 2024 study by the National Institutes of Health showed that the economic benefits of spending for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments ranged from $2 trillion to $60 trillion, with rates of return of 12 percent to 23 percent. Furthermore, innovative treatments for multiple sclerosis, for instance, are expected to make significant improvements over the next decade, which can reduce relapse rates and slow disease progression, leading to enhanced productivity.

Health innovation also provides exceptional returns on investment. According to a McKinsey study, every dollar invested in health innovation yields two to four dollars in economic benefits. Beyond immediate savings, healthier populations are more active in the workforce, have lower rates of absenteeism (for both patients and their caregivers), and demand less from healthcare systems, all of which enhances overall productivity. In addition, addressing NCDs early and efficiently ensures that aging populations remain economically active for longer, offsetting the demographic headwinds many G7 economies currently face.

Prioritizing health innovation in G7 fiscal budgets

G7 countries must make health innovation a fiscal priority. The rising prevalence of chronic diseases and the associated economic costs demand immediate action. For example, integrating early screening and advanced treatment technologies can significantly reduce disease progression, ultimately lowering long-term healthcare costs. Mature economies like Japan and those in the European Union, where aging populations exacerbate healthcare challenges, must proactively allocate budgets toward sustainable health innovation. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has emphasized that health is not just a cost—it is a driver of wealth. Public-private partnerships are a powerful mechanism to ensure that healthcare spending is efficient and impactful. For instance, public-private partnerships enable collaboration between governments and private companies to share costs, accelerate the deployment of cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence (AI)-based diagnostics, and improve infrastructure management, ensuring that resources are directed where they generate the highest value.

Countries like Finland offer a blueprint for success. Finland’s investments in digital health technologies have not only fostered public trust but also built economic resilience. Drawing from such examples, G7 countries should make health innovation a cornerstone of their fiscal strategies, addressing immediate healthcare needs while preparing for future economic and demographic challenges.

Canada’s opportunity to lead on health innovation

With Canada leading the G7 this year, it has a unique opportunity to place health innovation at the forefront of the global agenda. While Canada’s presidency will face competing priorities—geopolitical conflicts, inflation, and economic instability—health should remain a central focus because of its foundational role in addressing these challenges. Robust health systems enhance resilience against crises, support economic stability, and strengthen societal trust.

Canada can lead by encouraging the G7 to embrace four key priorities:

Recognize the economic and societal value of health innovation. Health innovation offers benefits far beyond clinical outcomes. Canada should advocate for greater recognition of how investments in healthcare drive economic growth, improve workforce participation, and enhance societal well-being. This can be done by pushing for G7 targets on reducing the economic burden of specific diseases.
Adopt early screening and diagnosis. Prioritizing early detection of diseases can significantly reduce long-term healthcare costs while improving patient outcomes. Canada can push for collaborative efforts across the G7 to standardize and expand access to early screening technologies.
Promote sustainable funding and financing models. Canada should champion innovative financing solutions that blend public and private funding. These models can ensure that health systems are resilient, adaptable, and capable of addressing rising costs without compromising accessibility or quality of care.
Emphasize the role of digital health technologies in driving efficiency and innovation. Interoperable data systems, for example, enable better coordination of care, earlier diagnosis, and more personalized treatment plans—all critical to managing the growing burden of NCDs.

Building a health-driven economy

By adopting a comprehensive health agenda, G7 nations can unlock immense economic and social rewards. Health improvements alone could increase global employment growth by 0.3 percent by 2040, which would help reduce labor shortages and enhance economic resilience. These benefits extend beyond high-income countries; investments in health innovation can strengthen global partnerships, reduce health inequities, and promote shared growth.

Health innovation is not merely a policy choice; it is an economic imperative. Under Canada’s leadership, the G7 can set a bold agenda that recognizes the broader value of health, prioritizes innovation, and builds resilient economies. By acting now, G7 nations can secure a healthier, more prosperous future for their citizens and the world.

Carl Meacham is a consultant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He served as deputy vice president at PhRMA and as senior staffer in the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

This article was written as part of the Atlantic Council’s partnership with Roche.

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Building balanced institutions for prosperity

Ignacio Campomanes, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee, Joseph Lemoine — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 19:41:22 +0000

The many different paths to freedom

The interconnections among dimensions of freedom

Looking for answers around the world

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There is no doubt that the global geopolitical context became more unstable in 2024. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East seem to have brought the world closer to large-scale open conflict. Other ongoing conflicts around the world, including the civil wars in Sudan, Myanmar, and Yemen, rarely make the daily news, at least in Western media.

The “super-election year” has led to important political changes in several nations. Among developed countries, we have seen a notable trend of incumbents struggling or losing elections. In the United States, Donald Trump made a historical political comeback to the presidency. In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party regained power after fourteen years and five different Conservative prime ministers. Among many, incumbents in France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all lost ground in elections held in 2024. In the developing world, some countries have experienced dramatic transformations, such as Bangladesh (covered in detail in this volume), while in others the electoral results have debilitated the incumbent government’s majority (India and South Africa among many others).

Global instability is combined today with a series of concerning governance trends incubated in the last decade. The most worrying is the global decline of political freedom since 2013. This process has been well documented in the academic literature, and has recently been the prominent focus of research for policy-oriented international organizations and think tanks around the world. The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes produced by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center, which serve as the quantitative background of the country cases analyzed in this volume, clearly illustrate the generalized tendency toward autocratization that affects all regions. As portrayed in Figure 1, the global average of the political subindex has suffered constant erosion since 2013, and is today at a twenty-four-year low. All of its constitutive components have decreased in recent times, but most severely political rights and civil liberties.

Figure 1. Erosion of political freedom since 2012 (global average)

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

In this turbulent context, the fight for freedom and democracy is crucial and must be waged on every front. This battle is always costly and uncertain. Historical cases, but also very recent episodes covered in this volume, such as those in Bangladesh and Venezuela, show us that national populations bear the largest burden, but external factors are also instrumental. In addition to international pressure and support to domestic agents of change, rigorous analysis and research based on objective data, showing the beneficial effects of liberty in the long run, are crucial instruments.

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center wants to serve as a catalyst of such endeavors, particularly through its annual Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World, of which the present volume is the second edition. This 2025 Atlas features sixteen country studies, offering insights from renowned scholars and practitioners on their nations’ journeys toward freedom and prosperity. It includes timely analyses of countries experiencing dramatic events that may become pivotal in their histories, such as Bangladesh, Georgia, and Venezuela.

The chapters clearly support the conclusion reached in cross-country studies of a causal positive relation between freedom and prosperity. At the same time, the chapters also highlight the specificities and particular characteristics of each country’s institutional evolution. The Freedom Index’s comprehensive approach allows for a disaggregated analysis of different dimensions (political, economic, and legal subindexes) and components (political rights, trade openness, corruption, etc.) of the institutional architecture of a country, which has proven extremely useful to understand the interlinkages, mechanisms, and complementarities between them in the context of each country covered in this volume. This introductory chapter tries to situate these country-specific insights in the broader economics and political science academic literature on the relationship between distinct institutional dimensions and economic development.

Countries around the world differ substantially in terms of institutional attributes. Using the conceptual framework of the Freedom Index, which differentiates between three institutional dimensions—political freedom, economic freedom, and the rule of law—we show that there exists a high level of heterogeneity across countries in terms of their progress in each of these. And looking at the historical evolution of these institutional dimensions, we observe that not all countries have followed the same path.

Knowing that these dimensions are not perfectly correlated, we examine the relationships and interactions between them. Do these institutional dimensions substitute for or complement each other? Is any one of them a necessary condition for the others? Is a particular chronology of institutional development more likely to produce fast-growing prosperity?

In this chapter we focus on four hypotheses proposed in the academic literature: (1) the claim that the rule of law may be a necessary condition for economic and political freedom; (2) the debate on the primacy of democratization or stateness; (3) the discussion on whether democracy fosters or hampers economic freedom; and (4) the hypothesis that economic freedom may be a necessary condition for political freedom.

To end this overview, we provide a brief summary of each chapter included in this volume, focusing on how the mechanisms explained here have operated in the politico-economic evolution of each country. The chapters highlight the need for a deeper understanding of the specific channels through which free institutions foster integral and sustained development and, eventually, prosperity. In the words of 2024 winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Simon Johnson, further research should be carried out on “how democracy alters economic incentives and organizations and to pinpoint what aspects of democratic institutions are more conducive to economic success.”

The many different paths to freedom

Douglass North defined institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions.” Modern societies rely on a complex mix of these institutions—like democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and property rights—which often overlap and can be difficult to clearly define. They are debated and interpreted in different ways, and there is no universal agreement on their precise definition.¹

To better understand how institutions influence development, we take a functional approach. Rather than getting stuck in theoretical debates, we use a flexible framework to explore how different sets of institutions function in real-world contexts.

The Freedom Index created by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center is a novel attempt in this direction. The Freedom Index is based on the idea that a country’s institutional architecture rests on three pillars: political, legal, and economic. The set of institutions forming each of these can be assessed based on the level of freedom they grant to individuals. We break the Index down into three subindexes—political, economic, and legal—which relate to the ideas of democracy, market economy, and the rule of law.

The political subindex reflects a country’s institutional framework for the selection of those holding executive political power and the limits and controls imposed on the exercise of power. The legal subindex is based on how far citizens and government officials are bound and abide by the law. The economic subindex captures the degree to which scarce resources are allocated by personal choices coordinated by markets rather than centralized planning directed by the political process.

Each subindex is formed by several components. The underlying theoretical conceptualizations and the measures used to quantify them are grounded in the academic literature in political science, law, and economics, as discussed in previous reports. Using this framework, the Freedom Index provides a rigorous quantitative assessment of each dimension and its constituent components for 164 countries, from 1995 to 2023, and allows us to address the question of their interlinkages and relations.

Looking at the scores for the most recent year in the sample (2023), the simple correlations between dimensions for all countries covered by the indexes is relatively high, ranging between 0.68 and 0.8, as shown in the first column of Table 1 below. Nonetheless, this result is heavily influenced by the most institutionally developed countries, which receive very high scores in all threesubindexes.

If we limit our analysis to non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, as in column 2, the correlations fall significantly, as low as 0.52 for the correlation between political and economic subindexes. Other subgroups, such as the Sub-Saharan African region (column 3), or the countries with relatively less political freedom (column 4), also present far from perfect correlations between the three subindexes.

These basic results evidence that countries do not necessarily have similar scores in all three sub- indexes, and that these can be fairly uneven. This perception is reinforced when we descend to the component level of the Freedom Index. The correlations between the components of different subindexes are many times below 0.5. Figure 2 shows the scatter plot between political rights versus bureaucracy and corruption for 126 non-OECD countries. As is clearly shown, we can find very different combinations of these two components across countries. The political rights score barely explains 7.6 percent of the variation in the bureaucracy and corruption score. This means that the remaining 92.4 percent of the variation is due to other factors. Some notable cases of great disparities between the scores include United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Singapore.

Table 1. Correlations between dimensions of freedom

Notes: Pearson’s correlation. Number of countries included in each column is shown in parentheses.
Low political freedom refers to countries with a score in the political subindex in 2023 below the median.

Figure 2. Political rights vs bureaucracy and corruption (Non-OECD Countries)

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

We can further theorize about the evolution of the three dimensions of freedom by looking at how these have changed across time within countries. An in-depth analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this essay, but we can gain insights with the example of two Sub-Saharan African countries.

Rwanda and Nigeria had almost identical scores in the Freedom Index in 1995: thirty-nine and forty respectively. Both have experienced substantial increases, reaching a very similar level by 2023 (53.1 and 53.9). Yet the evolution of the three subindexes shows stark differences between the two countries. Progress in the former has been driven by sustained increases in the economic and legal subindexes, while political freedom barely changed. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s improvement is single-handedly explained by a sharp increase in the political subindex in 1999, capturing the country’s democratic transition, whereas the legal and economic subindexes have fluctuated and do not show significant improvement.

Rwanda and Nigeria exemplify two very different paths of institutional progress that reflect the historical experience of several other countries. Rwanda’s path, based on law and order and economic freedom but limited political freedom, reminds us of South Korea and Spain before their respective democratic transitions. Nigeria’s “democratization first” path is similar to that taken by many Latin American countries in the second half of the last century, which led the third wave of democratization, despite low levels of state capacity and not fully open and developed market economies.

Figure 3. Evolution of freedom dimensions, Rwanda and Nigeria

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

The interconnections among dimensions of freedom

The evidence shows that the three dimensions of freedom develop unevenly over time and in different parts of the world. This highlights the importance of understanding how these dimensions are connected, whether they support each other or can replace one another, and how they work together to influence overall prosperity.

Most quantitative measures of institutions implicitly assume that the different components can simply substitute for each other.² However, there are several potential complementarities between institutions.³ Understanding how these complementarities function is crucial, especially when assessing the impact of free institutions on economic performance and overall prosperity. Here we raise four questions about these connections. Empirical testing of these questions will follow in future research.

Is the rule of law a necessary condition for political and economic freedom?

The legal subindex measures the rule of law in formal terms, in line with scholars such as L. Fuller or J. Raz. If operating perfectly, the rule of law guarantees that political and economic freedom are effectively upheld, and can thus exert their effects on economic variables. Intuitively, the rule of law is then seen as a container into which substantive freedoms and rights are poured. Severe defects in the establishment of the rule of law, such as widespread corruption, inefficient bureaucracies, or a judiciary that does not ensure that executive power complies with the law, then represent holes and cracks in the receptacle that allow freedom to leak away.

The idea expresses the distinction between de jure and de facto recognition of rights and freedoms. The enshrinement of individual civil or political rights in a written Constitution—such as freedom of expression, voting rights, and equality before the law—has little value if these are not effectively enforced and respected by the general population and, most importantly, by those in public office. Similarly, if the law recognizes property rights and generally allows private economic transactions and free competition, but the state apparatus does not adequately limit theft or demands bribes, the potential for economic freedom is limited. Additionally, if the state routinely expropriates property without proper compensation, it will hinder the development of a competitive market environment and its associated economic efficiency gains.

What comes first, stateness or democratization?

There are different theories on the temporal sequence in which different institutions are built within a country, and whether the order matters for economic outcomes. A prominent one is the “stateness first” argument, which claims that developing state capacity before democratization produces better long-term economic results than democratization processes in weak capacity environments.⁴ Here, state capacity means a formal notion of the rule of law in which a country is able to establish an efficient state apparatus in the Weberian sense,⁵ capable of enforcing and implementing policies and regulations within the territory through an impartial and effective bureaucracy.

In this view, premature democratization is likely to produce clientelistic and patronage dynamics, generating inefficient allocations of resources, reduced productivity, lower quality of public services, increased uncertainty, and overall diminished economic activity. In the worst case, it may be a recipe for internal conflict and violence. Only until a state has solved its problem of credible enforcement, in the terminology of D’Arcy and Nistotskaya, can the benefits of democratization be fully realized.

Despite its prevalence, especially in policy circles, the stateness first argument is not free of critique. On theoretical grounds, it is not clear whether autocratic or democratic governments face better incentives to invest in state capacity. Democracies, by providing a higher degree of legitimacy to political power and the legal system it enacts, can facilitate legal enforcement and compliance by the general population. Moreover, democratic accountability can incentivize leaders to invest in an administrative apparatus that ensures the efficient delivery and provision of public goods. Autocratic leaders, to the contrary, may prefer to underinvest in state capacity in order to secure personal control of public resources and limit the contestation capacity of the population.

Recent evidence shows little support for the idea that countries with high state capacity perform better upon democratization than those that democratize under low capacity levels. Additionally, there is evidence of a positive and significant relation between democracy and growth in the context of weak capacity states in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Does democracy hamper or foster economic freedom?

The question of whether democracies or autocracies are more conducive to liberalization and the promotion of economic freedom has received different answers. The arguments pivot around three main ideas. First, some have argued that democratic building blocks such as separation of powers and the system of checks and balances limit the opportunities of political power to expropriate private resources, and thus better secure property. In this sense, the same democratic institutions that protect individual civil and political rights also serve as a safeguard of property and contract enforcement. In contrast, an autocratic ruler, not bound by any constraints on his or her authority, represents a permanent threat to private property.

The second idea relates to the time horizon of policies in democracies versus autocracies. Liberalization, especially openness to trade and financial flows, can produce intense labor and production reallocations in the short run, which can entail layoffs and other costs before the benefits of such policies are materialized. Whether democracies are better equipped than autocracies to bear the short-run costs of liberalization is not clear. On the one hand, democratic leaders have the legitimacy provided by popular support to implement their proposed policies. But on the other hand, incentives to ensure their reelection may deter them from inflicting short-run costs on the elector- ate. For non-democratic leaders, the length of time they expect to stay in power determines the level of incentives to promote economic liberalization. In unstable autocracies, the ruler is likely to try to seize resources in the short run, before he or she loses power. Instead, stable autocracies may favor economic liberalization in order to increase aggregate output and thus the base of potential taxation rents in the future.

Finally, it has been argued that the relation between regime type and economic freedom depends on mediating factors, especially the distribution of income or wealth. The proposition seems particularly related to the dimension of economic freedom that deals with the size of government in terms of taxation and spending. In highly unequal countries, democratization is likely to generate increasing levels of redistributive taxation and thus harm measures of economic freedom. Similarly, high levels of inequality in wealth and capital may induce voters to favor stricter labor regulations or restrict capital mobility. Recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that, in democracies, economic freedom tends to decrease when the level of inequality is high.⁶

Is economic freedom necessary for political freedom?

Nobel laureates Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman posited that politically free societies must also be economically free, so economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom and democracy. Hayek warned that Western democracies faced a potential slippery slope toward authoritarianism after World War II, if the central governmental management of the economy required by the war effort were to be maintained or expanded. Once the state is given power over economic decisions, Hayek said, it is only a matter of time before the centrally decided plan differs from the preferences of at least some individuals. The government will need to use its coercive power to limit individual choices and rights. It may also constrain freedom of speech if used to confront or oppose governmental action. Additionally, the government might force individuals into certain occupations or locations, ultimately leading to a totalitarian state. Therefore, he concludes that only within a capitalist system is democracy possible. Friedman asserted that there was no historical example of a society that has enjoyed a high level of political freedom without something close to a market economy.

Neither Hayek nor Friedman argued that economic freedom always sustains political freedom. They saw the former as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the latter. The hypothesis seems to be supported by empirical evidence. Yet, the claim that heavy government intervention in economic affairs inevitably leads to political servitude is contradicted by the experience of some Western countries. This is particularly evident in the Nordic European countries during the second half of the twentieth century. The combination of high levels of political freedom with large government intervention in the economy has proved not only possible, but has led this group to become some of the most prosperous societies of the world today.

A possible explanation may relate to the discussion about the size of government and economic performance. Government taxation and spending arguably reduce economic freedom, but can nonetheless generate positive aggregate economic effects if social benefits exceed the unavoidable distortionary costs. Political freedom, by favoring free public debate and discussion, may thus help identify those public policies with positive net payoffs, and discard those that generate aggregate inefficiencies, allowing for a stable association of democracy and significant government economic involvement.

Looking for answers around the world

Having reviewed some potential relationships between the three dimensions of freedom, the final section of this overview provides a brief summary of each country chapter, with a focus on whether such mechanisms have operated in each country’s institutional evolution in the last three decades or are likely to do so in the foreseeable future.

Some common ideas emerge. First, there is substantial divergence between written norms and implementation of those norms, especially in the developing and least developed countries. This limits the potential effects of institutional reform on economic growth and overall prosperity. Second, democratic erosion and instability are often the consequence of severe defects in the rule of law, in particular political corruption and inefficient bureaucracies. Third, for most authors, the most urgent area for reform in their countries is the one with the weakest performance—their “weakest link.” This highlights the significant complementarities between institutional dimensions, suggesting that balanced development across all areas is essential for prosperity.

Country Chapters

Bangladesh

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak provides a timely anal- ysis of Bangladesh, covering the student-led “Monsoon Revolution” during the summer of 2024 that ended with Sheikh Hasina’s loss of power. Mobarak traces the beginning of the democratic erosion of Bangladesh to increasing corruption by the two major political parties since the early 2000s, which led to political instability. Hasina and the Awami League won a supermajority in the 2008 elections, but squandered the opportunity for improving governance, and instead initiated a clear autocratic path. Elections followed the regular schedule, but it is difficult to see them as mean- ingful. Boycotts by the opposition, the atmosphere of political violence, and deep erosion of individual rights dramatically limited the level of contestation in the electoral process. In addition, the autocratic government devoted major efforts to controlling the judiciary, to safeguard its hold on power and to use it as a weapon to persecute the opposition.

The 2024 revolution was diffuse and decentralized—with organic student protests that quickly spread throughout the country. As a result, the post-revolution political leadership and the way forward remain unclear. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, took charge as “chief adviser to the caretaker government” at the behest of students. His international name recognition and stature make him a credible leader, and temporarily stabilized the political uncertainty, but the country’s political future remains unclear. There is a lot of hope among average citizens that ousting a powerful autocratic government was a major achievement, and that the architects of that uprising can ensure better governance going forward by instituting some fundamental reforms and not repeating the mistakes of the past. Given that fundamental reforms are needed, including a reexamination of several aspects of the country’s Constitution, the path ahead is likely neither linear nor straightforward.

Cameroon

Political power is mostly centralized in Cameroon, and as a result there is no effective system of separation of legal powers, with both legislative and judicial branches being dependent on the executive power, as Vera Songwe explains. There are spillovers from political liberty to other aspects of the institutional framework, as evidenced by the country’s poor performance in terms of economic and legal subindexes. The drag imposed by limited political freedom is most notably evident in the very low level of gender equality in the economic sphere, reflecting how lack of representation of significant shares of the population in the political process undeniably harms their interests.

Going forward, the government of Cameroon should focus on two main areas: education and environment. Education remains the fastest way to economic empowerment of populations, and women in particular. In the long run, it can help reduce costs of healthcare as educated women tend to adopt more preventive approaches for themselves and their children. To this end, a policy of free primary education must be complemented by strong indicators of teacher performance to ensure that children are actively learning. Regarding the environment, Cameroon’s environmental resources, if well managed, could be an important source of revenue. Reforestation in particular should be a primary policy focus.

Canada

Randall Morck notes that Canada has kept its place among the freest countries in the world for sev- eral decades. However, he also identifies some worrying recent trends that are affecting several building blocks of the liberal democratic system. Civil liberties show a decreasing trend that has continued well after all measures imposed to fight the COVID-19 pandemic were lifted, driven by a somewhat freedom-restrictive understanding of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies. Recent corruption scandals have involved the current government’s party. Judicial independence is also under stress, and particular Supreme Court rulings have generated some degree of legal uncertainty, specifically in relation to the requirement to consult First Nations about major infrastructure projects, which has produced visible negative effects on the construction sector.

The institutional challenges Canada faces will likely be exacerbated if the country is not able to recover strong economic growth in the medium term. In order to do so, enhancing productivity growth must be a priority, through increasing corporate research and development investment. Canada’s traditional openness to trade and capital will be challenged by the announced intention of the new Trump administration to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as the rising concerns about national security that will likely produce new trade legislation affecting Canada’s relations with China and other trade powers. In addition to economic risks, several social issues will require especial attention in the coming decade, including immigration policy, the evolution of the territorial tensions between Québec and the rest of the regions, and the successful integration of First Nations.

Ethiopia

The recent situation in Ethiopia is a paradigmatic example of a case where a government’s incapacity to provide basic civil stability and peace can put an abrupt halt on development. Abbi Kedir argues that the remarkable economic growth of the 2000–20 period, driven by public investment in infrastructure and industrial expansion, was interrupted by the proliferation of internal conflicts and fighting between the federal government and various groups in regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, which disrupted production and trade.

The armed conflicts around the country are the biggest impediment to movement of labor and traded goods, and the carrying out of productive activities. If peace and security are not restored in all regions of the country, the socioeconomic situation will deteriorate further. Agricultural and industrial production, and other employment-generating economic activities such as trade and investment, will continue to suffer. Besides the most pressing issue of security, another big challenge that Ethiopia faces is the alarming demographic trend. Each year, two to three million young Ethiopians enter the labor force, and it is clear that the labor market cannot absorb such a huge number of workers. Any hope of transforming the economy—or even of gaining a meaningful grip on it—is an elusive dream in a country where there are high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality, destitution, internal conflicts, food insecurity, and an ever-growing and underskilled youth population.

Georgia

The waves of reform Georgia went through between 1995 and 2018 led to a parallel improvement in all three dimensions of freedom, although the establishment of the rule of law persistently lagged behind economic and political liberalization, as noted by Tinatin Khidasheli. Most notably, the country failed to undertake a profound reform of the judicial system, which showed major deficiencies due to a non-transparent and entirely arbitrary selection process, which allowed this crucial pillar of the state to be administered by a small elite of judges for almost two decades. Since 2018, the country has been experiencing a dramatic institutional regression, clearly accentuated in the last months. The data do not yet reflect the passing of recent laws on foreign agents and LGBTQ+ rights, nor the several amendments passed to electoral legislation, reducing the opposition’s and civil society’s capacity to monitor and contest the government. The 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia produced an even more hostile and polarized environment, with all major opposition parties, civil society monitoring organizations, and international observers claiming major fraud.

Georgia stands today at a critical crossroads. One of the most significant risks the country faces is the ongoing influence of Russia, which exerts considerable power through economic, political, and military channels. The major counterbalanceing force needs to come from civil society, and its wish to look west toward the European Union (EU). A majority of the population are predominantly asking for practical steps to bring Georgia closer to the EU and eventual membership, which serves as a primary catalyst for change. Important milestones, like visa-free travel within the EU for Georgians and free trade agreements, represent advancement and inspire citizens’ hopes for EU membership. Georgia’s future freedom and prosperity depend on leveraging European integration. By fostering resilience, diversifying its economy, and ensuring political stability, Georgia can achieve stability, growth, and greater freedom.

Greece

Elias Papaioannou explains how, at the onset of the financial crisis of 2008, Greece was significantly more prosperous than its institutional quality would have suggested. Given the strength of the institutions-development nexus, this paradox was unlikely to last indefinitely. Sadly, it was income and prosperity that fell away, and dramatically so, as Greece lost a quarter of its output, unemployment tripled, hundreds of thousands of talented Greeks emigrated, the welfare state collapsed, and poverty became increasingly evident. The economic adjustment programs led by “the troika” forced a series of much-needed reforms in areas like pensions, labor, and product and capital markets. Unfortunately, neither the Syriza/Anel coalition (2015–19) nor the New Democracy administration (2019–present) implemented genuine institutional reform, including making markets more competitive, strengthening investor protection, speeding the judicial process, and safeguarding the independence of public agencies.

In the next decade, Greece needs to significantly reinforce all aspects of its institutional framework. Strengthening the judiciary, enhancing checks and balances on the executive, and investing seriously in the rule of law are essential, not only to restore confidence in democracy but also to promote much-needed economic growth. The priorities should be to enhance institutions, tackle corruption, promote economic freedom (by bringing down cartels and freeing product markets), and seriously invest in public administration and independent agencies (e.g., a competition authority). This is easier said than done, and at the time of writing this list does not seem to be the priority.

Japan

Political freedom and the rule of law in Japan have been significantly above the OECD average and experienced only minor fluctuations for the last three decades. Economic freedom, however, is slightly lower, especially in terms of women’s economic opportunities. Kotaro Shiojiri points out that the democratic political debate has directed political agents to focus on those policies demanded by citizens, although the process is sometimes slow. One good example of Japan’s poor performance on women’s economic freedom is the so-called “M-curve,” whereby women in their thirties have much lower labor force participation rates than younger and older age groups. The most recent data show a substantial improve- ment on this issue, but it is still not fully solved even though “womenomics” was a major theme of former Prime Minister Abe’s premiership from 2012–20 and has remained a priority in subsequent administrations.

Japan faces a series of challenges for the next decade. The demographic situation is certainly worrying, as Japan is one of the most rapidly aging societies in the world, and neither policies directed to increase fertility nor immigration is an easy solution to this challenge. A second imperative for the country’s future is to regain solid economic growth. Japan’s labor market lacks flexibility and maintains significant structural rigidities when compared with most developed Western economies. There are pros and cons to this situation that any future reform should weigh up. As Japanese companies look to build job-type employment structures, they have an opportunity to square this circle, maintaining the low levels of inequality for which Japan is rightly praised while also providing more opportunities for flexible and dynamic career paths that will promote economy-wide productivity gains.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is a good case study for the argument that autocratic regimes are better focused on long-run economic policies. Nargis Kassenova explains that the country has maintained a positive trend of liberalization in the last three decades, reflect- ing the goal to integrate into the global economic community. Yet significant fluctuations and inconsistencies have plagued the process, especially since oil revenues started to increase in the early 2000s and the government was clearly tempted to use the windfall to pursue interventionist and protectionist economic policies.

The unexpected resignation of Nazarbayev in 2019, and the “Bloody January” events in 2022, produced a critical juncture for the country. At present, President Tokayev’s reform agenda points to further liberalization of the system, but progress is by no means guaranteed. Besides very significant geopolitical risks that may heavily influence Kazakhstan’s future, in particular a potential Russian military threat, a crucial milestone will take place when Tokayev’s term ends in 2029. If at that point a peaceful transfer of power takes place, it will be a sign of a successful culmination of the democratic transition. Nonetheless, civil society needs to continue exerting pressure to avoid a halt in the reform process in favor of professional state and socioeconomic goals, which could turn the government’s aspiration into becoming simply a functional authoritarian state.

Kuwait

Kuwait’s political regime presents noticeable specificities that make it difficult to compare to the liberal democracies of the Western world, states Rabah Arezki. Relatively fair and free elections coexist with a ban on political parties, and the inviolability of the Emir is combined with strong control of his government by parliament. While Kuwait’s democratic experience has been positive and serves as an example for other countries in the region, the system does not yet represent the interests of all segments of society equally, producing large differences in the situation of women and low-skilled expatriates.

Kuwait’s evolution in the near future is highly uncertain. The new Emir of Kuwait, Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who came to power at the end of 2023, decided to dissolve parliament and take over some of its prerogative after a parliamentary election won by the opposition, and it is not clear when new elections will be held. The Emir and parliament have to resolve their differences if Kuwait is to remain an important beacon of democracy in the region, continue to build on its track record on civil liberties, and fully embark on a process of economic transformation that can deal with the approaching end of the oil era.

Morocco

Rabah Arezki argues that Morocco has substantially improved in all institutional dimensions during the last three decades, but there are many areas in which the country needs to continue its reform effort toward fully free and open institutions. On the economic front, the most positive progress is found in women’s economic freedom, with the implementation of a new Family Code, known as Moudawana, in 2004. This piece of legislation is seen as one of the most progressive of the region, expanding women’s rights and protections in relation to civil liberties as well as labor and economic aspects. The political environment in Morocco is freer than in most other countries in the region, but again it is still far from the most advanced countries of the world.

The danger for Morocco is to remain stuck in a so-called middle-income trap with low growth and high poverty, which could further ignite social tensions. To reignite growth and transform its economy, Morocco must level the playing field. To do so, issues of market structure and competition must take on greater importance. Additionally, further efforts are needed to balance its economic development, as poverty remains pervasive, especially in rural areas. An important limitation is the relatively high level of debt, which constrains government spending to reduce spatial disparities and support poorer households.

Nigeria

The case of Nigeria illustrates how the challenges of democratization in weak capacity states are exacerbated in resource-rich countries. Zainab Usman explains how the democratic transition of 1999 has been followed by volatile institutional progress, by no means free of inconsistencies. On the economic side, the relevance of the oil industry in generating government revenue and foreign reserves motivates important movements in the legal environment and overall economic policy decisions, and has many times led the government and central bank to heavily intervene in the exchange rate market.

Regarding the rule of law, Nigeria desperately needs a total overhaul of its civil service to tackle corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. The security situation is also delicate, with ongoing violent conflicts (with Islamists Boko Haram in the north- east, and the separatist movement Indigenous People of Biafra in the southeast) and rising levels of violent crime, including kidnapping for ransom, in various parts of the country. The next few years will tell if the democratic mechanisms that are strong in Nigeria, like legislative control of the executive and freedom of the press, can help push forward efficiency-enhancing reforms that can lead to more balanced institutional development, ensuring increased prosperity for all Nigerians.

Peru

Liliana Rojas-Suarez argues that Peru is probably one of the clearest examples of the potential gap between written laws and their actual implementation and enforcement. In terms of the former, the country is comparable to the most advanced democracies of the world, but the degree of implementation and enforcement is far from such standards. As a result, deficiencies in the state’s capacity to deliver public goods and services, including ensuring security and the enforcement of law, significantly constrain the country’s potential for regaining economic growth and overall prosperity. The weakness of institutions and governance, reflected in excessive bureaucracy, corruption, and a weak and inefficient judiciary, hampers domestic and foreign private sector investment. While maintaining a stable macroeconomic framework is key, it is not sufficient to provide the certainty and security that investors need for long-term and productive investments.

Increasing institutional quality is thus a precondition for the economic reforms required to ensure long-run improvements in prosperity for all Peruvians. The country has an exceptional opportunity for growth in the green transition, given its abundance of crucial raw materials. Nonetheless, if Peru wants to position itself as a world leader in this area, some major reforms must be addressed first. Most importantly, the public sector needs to be able to execute large infrastructure investments and develop value chains related to green manufacturing, renewable energy, and eco-tourism; the country must address the issues of informality and low human capital of the workforce.

Poland

Poland stands as one of history’s most remarkable examples of how embracing democratic institutions and a free-market economy can radically transform a nation and propel it onto a trajectory of rapid development. Nonetheless, Leszek Balcerowicz outlines how the country has undergone a very serious challenge to its institutions in the last decade, with the “bad transition” represented by the accession of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) to power in 2015. On obtaining an ample majority in a free and fair election, the party led by Jarosław Kaczyński quickly revealed its authoritarian ten- dencies, beginning a period of institutional erosion. The most dangerous attack came against the judiciary. Legislative changes in 2016 merged the roles of prosecutor-general and minister of justice, granting a political appointee sweeping powers over the judicial system. Judicial independence similarly eroded under politicized appointment processes. Poland’s judicial system survived this assault primarily due to the vigorous defense mounted by civil society and advocacy groups, together with international pressure, especially by the European institutions.

The positive side of the turbulent tenure of the PiS government is that support for democracy and the rule of law has strengthened in Poland, so there is little concern about the institutional stability of the country after the executive change of 2023. Instead, the more pressing issue lies in sustaining economic growth. One main priority should be a carefully planned privatization schedule that can complete the process initiated in the 1990s, enhancing competition in sectors like energy and oil processing. Another major challenge is excessive fiscal spending, largely driven by social welfare programs. Finally, Poland shares demographic challenges with other developed nations, particularly the rapid aging of its population. Without substantial reforms, economic growth is likely to slow further, and fiscal pressures will intensify.

Spain

Toni Roldán Monés explains how Spain experienced an enormous transformation since the democratic transition of 1975–78, not only in political terms but also on the economic front, completing a successful integration into the European single market and the European Economic and Monetary Union. Nonetheless, the last three decades have not been free of challenges. The two biggest have been the dramatic economic effects of the bursting of the real estate bubble in 2008, with the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, and the Catalan independence attempt in 2017. The former led to an extremely difficult social situation, with unemployment reaching 27 percent, and the imposition of severe austerity measures. However, the crisis also generated significant impetus for reform, which seems to have halted in the last decade. The secessionist challenge showed the strength of the democratic institutions in Spain, especially the judiciary, which was able to resolve the crisis with a firm and strong response according to the legal provisions and constitutional powers granted to the different branches of power.

Looking ahead, a main source of concern is whether the windfall represented by the NextGenerationEU funds—of which Spain, together with Italy, is the largest beneficiary—may translate into insufficient structural reform. The relaxation of political constraints thanks to the apparently easy availability of resources, both external and internal, could lead to a complacency trap, hampering the impetus for reform.

The most pressing challenges Spain faces include: ensuring fiscal sustainability, especially regarding the pension system; a profound over- haul of the education system with the clear aim of improving its quality at all levels; and reform of the federal system, setting up clearer rules regarding the relative powers of the regions and the central government, and the establishment of the necessary coordination mechanisms to ensure the efficient collaboration of all levels of government.

Unfortunately, the political climate of polarization and fragmentation, together with incipient signs of institutional erosion, is not the best environment to carry out such an ambitious set of structural reforms. Regaining the capacity to reach agreements among those with different political views, which Spain exemplified during the demo- cratic transition, will be a necessary condition.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s story in the last three decades is a good example of how democracy can serve as a catalyst for improvements in the other two institutional dimensions. Shelley Rigger argues that the completion of the long, incremental process of democratization led, by the end of the 1990s, to a substantial increase in the accountability of political leaders and public officials at large, improving the overall capacity and efficiency of the public sector to enforce and abide by the law. Similarly, Taiwan’s strong performance in terms of investment and trade freedom was complemented by an extraordinary improvement in gender equality in economic matters, likely explained by the increasing political representation of women.

Unfortunately, the future of freedom on the island does not depend on the Taiwanese people alone. The relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is by far the largest risk, and will likely determine the evolution of political and economic freedom, as well as Taiwan’s prosperity in the next decade. The PRC opposes both Taiwan’s continued self-government and its democratic system. It is impossible to predict how the geo- political situation may evolve, but the PRC seems determined to bring Taiwan to heel, peacefully if possible, but by force if necessary. So far, the two sides have managed to avoid conflict, in part because the costs and risks of forcible unification are high, and in part because Beijing believes it can prevail without force eventually. It is likely that this stalemate will continue in the near future. If it does continue for the next five to ten years, the situation may evolve to a point where a mutually acceptable arrangement is possible. Or it may not, in which case Taiwan’s democracy will continue to exist under constant threat.

Venezuela

Venezuela seems to exemplify the Hayek-Friedman hypothesis that democracy is incompatible with a socialist economic system. As Sary Levy- Carciente argues, Venezuela’s poor performance in the twenty-first century can be attributed to the political and ideological project known as “socialism of the twenty-first century,” an economic model marked by excessive populism and state intervention, where economic activity and entrepreneurship are severely hampered by wide- spread government interference, inconsistent regulatory enforcement, and a heavy bureaucratic burden. Plummeting economic freedom has been accompanied by a dramatic erosion of political and legal freedoms in Venezuela, driven by the consolidation of executive supremacy, the increasing role of the military in controlling and implementing government policies, and the rise in corruption and lack of transparency, bypassing legal accountability standards.

The sustained deterioration of Venezuela’s political system was epitomized by the crisis following the presidential elections of July 2024, leaving no doubt regarding the autocratic nature of President Nicolás Maduro’s current political regime. As a result, Venezuela finds itself at a crossroads. Two future scenarios can be envisioned: one in which the current regime eliminates any sign of a liberal democracy, resulting in further increases in oppression and poverty; or a diametrically opposed one in which the reestablishment of Venezuela as a liberal democratic republic, anchored in Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and prosperity, leads the country to reclaim its stabilizing role in the Western Hemisphere.

Ignacio P. Campomanes is a nonresident fellow at the Navarra Center for International Development (University of Navarra, Spain) and a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Campomanes holds a BA in economics and a BA in law from Carlos III University in Spain, MA degrees in economics from Complutense University of Madrid and the University of Minnesota, and a PhD in economics from the University of Minnesota.

Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, Lee served as a research assistant at Academia Sinica, Taiwan’s national research institute, where she focused on US policy toward Taiwan and China. Her work has been featured by the American Political Science Association, the US-China Perception Monitor, the Carter Center, and the Atlantic Council. She holds a BA in diplomacy from National Chengchi University in Taiwan.

Joseph Lemoine is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank. Lemoine has advised governments on policy reforms that help boost entrepreneurship and shared prosperity, primarily in Africa and the Middle East.

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1 On the conceptualizations of democracy, see for example Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2011). For an overview of rule of law definitions, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

2 Indexes such as the Freedom House Freedom in the World report, the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom, and the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, among others, all use the simple addition or arithmetic mean of their different areas/components to arrive at the overall score. This implies perfect substitutability.

3 See for example Vanessa A. Boese-Schlosser and Markus Eberhardt, Which Institutions Rule? Unbundling the Democracy-Growth Nexus (Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute, 2022); Sharun W. Mukand and Dani Rodrik, “The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy,” The Economic Journal (2020), 130:627.

4 A classic reference is Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). A recent example is Michelle D’Arcy and Marina Nistotskaya “State First, then Democracy: Using Cadastral Records to Explain Governmental Performance in Public Goods Provision,” Governance (2017), 30:2

5 Max Weber defined the state as an entity that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. The state apparatus encompasses the institutions and structures through which the state enforces laws, maintains order, and implements policy, including the bureaucracy, military, and legal system. Max Weber, “Economy and Society” (1922) in Economy and Society, Vol. 1, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2023)

6 See Rainer Kotschy and Uwe Sunde, “Democracy, Inequality, and Institutional Quality,” European Economic Review (2017), 91; or Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, “Political capitalism: The Interaction between Income Inequality, Economic Freedom and Democracy,” European Journal of Political Economy (2016), 45

The post Building balanced institutions for prosperity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Egyptian senator: The mass displacement of Gazans will only fuel Hamas’s extremist ideology

Mohamed Farid — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:51:46 +0000

As negotiations for the second phase of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas approach, significant challenges are emerging mere days before the first phase’s March 1 deadline.

Despite the significant weakening of Hamas’s military capabilities after fifteen months of conflict, the group’s political control over Gaza remains intact, complicating any roadmap for postwar recovery. This deadlock largely stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extended military campaign in Gaza and his government’s lack of any clear strategy for the strip’s day after. Netanyahu has failed to pursue a sustainable political path that could bring stability to Gaza and ensure Israel’s long-term security. Instead, recent rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government seems to have doubled down on the Trump administration’s proposal of displacing the entire Palestinian population of Gaza as a potential avenue to address the crisis. Any Israeli move in this direction would escalate the conflict, not resolve it.

Moving forward with the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza would only fuel support for Hamas’s extremist ideology and exacerbate tensions throughout the region. For a sustainable peace, the Israeli government must agree to a postwar governance framework for Gaza that provides an alternative to Hamas and allows Palestinians to govern themselves.

The absence of a postwar plan for Gaza

Since the war began, Israel’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. While Israel has successfully degraded Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated some of its top leaders, the group continues to wield control over Gaza, raising questions about the effectiveness of Israel’s approach.

The main Israeli failure lies in the absence of a credible governance alternative for Gaza. Netanyahu’s rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza has created a power vacuum that Hamas continues to exploit. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, the Israeli military effort alone cannot achieve long-term stability for the enclave or for Israel. US, Israeli, and regional leaders have all made clear that they view Hamas rule over Gaza in the war’s aftermath as unacceptable. This month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Hamas “pure evil” and said it must never govern Gaza again. Last year, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry described Hamas as “a faction outside the Palestinian consensus.” Yet despite this rhetoric, the failure to establish a viable alternative governing structure for Gaza risks prolonging Hamas’s control by default.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Instead of removing Palestinian civilians, remove Hamas

By Daniel B. Shapiro

Drawing inspiration from an approach that worked in 1982, US President Donald Trump should put forward a landmark plan to rid Gaza of the terrorist organization.

Conflict Israel

Netanyahu’s political calculations

With the fragile cease-fire hanging by a thread and mounting pressure from the families of Israeli hostages, Netanyahu appears to be prioritizing his own political survival over a sustainable peace settlement. Indeed, at various points during the current phase of the cease-fire, he has both threatened a renewed military offensive—despite the Israeli military’s claims in September that Hamas’s military wing had been defeated—and embraced Trump’s proposal for the mass displacement of Gaza’s population.

Further, Netanyahu appointed his close political ally, Ron Dermer, as the lead negotiator for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire, replacing Mossad head David Barnea. This decision centralized authority over the cease-fire talks within Netanyahu’s inner circle, giving him greater oversight and influence over the negotiation process and the flexibility to shape the narrative and outcomes of the cease-fire in a way that aligns with his political agenda.

Netanyahu’s direct involvement is particularly significant given his track record of altering cease-fire terms to serve his political interests, which has repeatedly led to the breakdown of prior rounds of negotiations. Prolonging the war in this manner has jeopardized the hostages, whose lives are further endangered every additional day they spend in Hamas captivity. This was made painfully evident by tragic incidents such as Hamas’s execution of six hostages, including American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in September, just days before Israeli forces arrived and discovered the victims’ remains.

Moving ahead with the plan for the mass displacement of Gazans would align with the hardline stance of prominent members of Israel’s far-right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, a member of the Knesset who resigned as national security minister in protest of the January cease-fire agreement. Both figures hold significant sway over the stability of Netanyahu’s fragile governing coalition.

However, forcing civilians out of Gaza would neither weaken Hamas nor bring security to Israel. On the contrary, it risks intensifying radicalization and reinforcing extremist narratives, potentially destabilizing the broader region. By intertwining his own political survival with a dubious military strategy, Netanyahu’s approach threatens to further escalate regional tensions, making a sustainable resolution even more elusive.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Reconstruction will fail unless these two challenges are addressed

By Ahmed F. Alkhatib

Gaza’s reconstruction will require creativity and an understanding that there is no simple US real-estate solution for the strip.

Israel Middle East

How mass displacement would fuel radicalization

The argument for mass displacement is fundamentally flawed because it blames Palestinian civilians for Hamas’s actions. In reality, Gazans have suffered under Hamas’s authoritarian rule, where dissent is crushed and civilians are used as human shields.

The idea that Palestinians are a homogeneous block that supports Hamas is simply not accurate. The only Palestinian legislative election in which Hamas participated, in 2006, showed a divided electorate, with Hamas winning 44.45 percent of the vote and Fatah garnering 41.43 percent. Since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza by brute force and coercion after taking over the enclave militarily in 2007. More recently, an Arab Barometer poll that was conducted just before the October 7 terrorist attacks indicated that 72 percent of Gazans believed Hamas was corrupt while 44 percent expressed no trust in the group. Considering how brutally Hamas suppresses dissent, one can only imagine how low support for the group in Gaza really is. Further, nearly half of Gaza’s population is under eighteen, meaning Hamas is the only government many Palestinians have ever known.

Therefore, blaming the whole population of Gaza for Hamas’s actions is not just a moral failure. It is also a strategic mistake. It shifts the focus away from the real issue: Hamas’s reign of terror. Treating civilians as perpetrators rather than victims feeds extremist narratives, fueling radicalization and hatred. If the goal is to eradicate extremism, foster stability, and achieve long-term security for Israel, then the focus should be on freeing Gazans from Hamas’s oppression, not displacing them.

Displacement would spread Hamas’s influence across the region, solidifying its image as a “resistance movement” rather than exposing it as a failed terrorist entity. This move would inflame tensions across the Middle East, destabilize neighboring countries, and fuel anti-Israel sentiment around the world.

History shows that forced displacement breeds extremism. The Nakba of 1948 created generations of refugees who would became the backbone of militant movements. This includes the late high-ranking Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom were born in refugee camps in Gaza after their families were displaced during the Nakba. A similar mass expulsion today would reinforce the idea that violence is the only way to reclaim lost land, further entrenching cycles of radicalization.

Breaking Hamas’s grip

Defeating Hamas militarily is not enough. To truly end its control over Gaza, Hamas must be defeated strategically by degrading its legitimacy and freeing Gazans from Islamist authoritarianism. This cannot be achieved by weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance” alone, but only by breaking Hamas’s grip on power.

Gaza’s reconstruction is impossible as long as Hamas controls the strip. The group has repeatedly manipulated international aid to build its military capabilities, fueling radicalization and extremism. Without a postwar governance framework liberating Gaza from Hamas’s influence, Gazans will continue to suffer under a humanitarian catastrophe.

This cannot be achieved through forced displacement or by obstructing efforts to establish a legitimate and credible alternative to Hamas. For long-term stability to be achieved, international actors must support the development of Palestinian institutions capable of effective governance. This requires fostering an Arab-led, Palestinian-owned transitional process with a nonpartisan, technocratic government that can implement the rule of law and carry out structural reforms in education, law enforcement, and media. Economic development initiatives must also be prioritized to reduce extremism by creating real employment opportunities.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be designed to empower civilians, not Hamas or its backers. The only way to defeat extremism is by offering Gazans hope, opportunity, and the means to govern themselves responsibly.

Netanyahu’s failure to agree on a clear day after plan for Gaza has prolonged Hamas’s rule and exacerbated the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. By embracing mass displacement, he is not solving the crisis but escalating it. This strategy threatens to radicalize a new generation of Palestinians, solidifying Hamas’s narrative of resistance and fueling long-term instability.

Achieving security and stability requires a strategic shift from military dominance and displacement to cooperation with Arab countries, empowering Gazans through governance reform and economic opportunity. A credible political alternative to Hamas is essential for lasting peace.

Ignoring this will only perpetuate cycles of violence, deepen regional instability, and ultimately undermine Israel’s security. The future of Gaza lies not in forced migration but in breaking Hamas’s grip on power and creating opportunities for Gazans to build a better future.

Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate.

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Putin uses NATO as an excuse for his war against Ukrainian statehood

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:15:19 +0000

As speculation swirls over the possible terms of a US-brokered peace deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Kremlin is insisting that above all else, the future Ukraine must be neutral and demilitarized. This is nothing new. Vladimir Putin has been citing Ukraine’s demilitarization as his key war aim since the very first morning of the invasion. Demilitarization also featured prominently in abortive peace talks held during the initial weeks of the war, with Russian representatives demanding an approximately 95 percent reduction in the size of Ukraine’s army, which was to become a skeleton force of just fifty thousand troops.

Calls for a demilitarized Ukraine have remained a central feature of Russian rhetoric throughout the past three years of the invasion, and have been accompanied by demands that Kyiv accept permanent neutrality and rule out the prospect of joining NATO or concluding military alliances with any Western powers. Russian officials have also consistently stated that postwar Ukraine must be banned from receiving weapons or training from the West. Most recently, the Kremlin has rejected the idea of deploying Western troops in Ukraine as peacekeepers to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement. In other words, Putin’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community.

Putin may currently find it advantageous to entertain talk of peace, but his insistence on Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament reveals what he really has in mind for the country. The Russian dictator is obviously preparing the ground for the eventual resumption of his current invasion, which he fully intends to continue as soon as he has rearmed and circumstances allow. Why else would the demilitarization of Ukraine be seen in Moscow as such a priority?

No serious military analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible security threat to Russia itself. Likewise, no Ukrainian politician or public figure has ever harbored any territorial ambitions against their country’s far larger and wealthier neighbor. On the contrary, the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to defend the country against Russian attack. The Kremlin’s emphasis on disarming Ukraine should therefore be seen as a massive red flag for the Trump White House and the wider international community that signals Putin’s determination to complete his conquest and extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

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There are worrying signs that this is not yet fully understood in Western capitals. Instead, US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration have recently begun shifting responsibility for the war away from Russia and echoing the Kremlin’s own longstanding efforts to blame the invasion on NATO expansion. Predictably, Russian officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have welcomed this dramatic change in the US position regarding the causes of the war. However, Russia’s whole NATO narrative suffers from a number of obvious flaws that should spark skepticism among even the most credulous consumers of Kremlin propaganda.

According to Putin, Ukraine’s deepening ties with NATO forced him to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022. In reality, Ukraine’s prospects of joining the alliance were virtually nonexistent at the time, and had not significantly improved since Kyiv was first fobbed off with platitudes at a landmark NATO summit way back in 2008. Even the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 failed to produce any change of heart among alliance members, with key NATO countries including the United States and Germany openly expressing their opposition to Ukrainian accession. Indeed, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assured Putin that Ukrainian NATO membership was out of the question for at least the next 30 years. This makes it difficult to accept Moscow’s claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations represented some kind of immediate danger to Russia.

There are also good reasons to question whether the Kremlin genuinely views NATO as a threat to Russian national security. Thanks to founding member Norway, the alliance has shared a border with Russia ever since its establishment in 1949. More recently, the accession of Poland and the Baltic states at the turn of the millennium dramatically expanded Russia’s shared border with NATO and placed the alliance a few hundred kilometers away from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This close proximity to Russia’s two biggest cities did not lead to any discernible rise in border tensions.

The most revealing evidence of Russia’s true attitude toward NATO came in 2022 when Finland and Sweden reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by ending decades of neutrality and announcing plans to join the alliance. Putin responded to this landmark decision by declaring that Russia had “no problem” with the accession of the two Nordic nations, despite the fact that Finnish membership would more than double Russia’s border with NATO, while Swedish membership would turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Putin has since underlined his indifference to this expanded NATO presence on his doorstep by withdrawing most Russian troops from the Finnish frontier and leaving this supposedly vulnerable border zone largely undefended.

So far, nobody has been able to adequately explain the glaring inconsistency in Putin’s logic. He appears to be unfazed by the presence of NATO troops along the Russian border in Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. And yet at the same time, he expects us to believe that the faint prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance at some point in the distant future is sufficiently alarming to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. Militarily, this makes no sense. The only reasonable conclusion is that Putin’s objections relate specifically to Ukraine and not to NATO in general. He knows perfectly well that the alliance poses no security threat to Russia itself, but does not want to risk a growing NATO presence that might prevent him from achieving his expansionist objective of subjugating Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

While Putin moans to foreign leaders about the inequities of NATO expansion, when speaking to domestic audiences he is typically far more candid about the imperial ambitions that shaped his decision to invade Ukraine. For much of his reign, Putin has insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly accused modern Ukraine of being a invented nation occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay that many likened to a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. During the first summer of the war, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Putin’s frequent denials of Ukraine’s right to exist have set the tone throughout Russian society. Poisonous anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, senior Kremlin officials have sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin by echoing his vicious attacks on Ukraine. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has declared that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” These are not the words of rational politicians addressing legitimate national security concerns.

This genocidal rhetoric is being more than matched by the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin has been able to establish control, Russian troops have systematically detained local officials, military veterans, journalists, religious leaders, civic activists, Ukrainian patriots, and anyone else deemed to be a potential threat. Thousands have disappeared into a vast network of prisons amid a climate of fear that has been described by Britain’s The Economist as a “totalitarian hell.” Many more, including thousands of children, have been subjected to forced deportation and sent to Russia. Those who remain are being pressured to accept Russian citizenship, while all reminders of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and national identity are being methodically removed. Needless to say, anyone who dares speak the Ukrainian language risks severe punishment.

These horrors make a complete mockery of attempts to appease the Russians with limited territorial concessions. US negotiators need to recognize that Putin is not fighting for land. He views the current invasion in far broader terms as an historic mission to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe. In Putin’s chilling worldview, extinguishing Ukrainian statehood is a vital step toward the reversal of the Soviet collapse and the revival of the Russian Empire. He has pursued this messianic vision with increasing violence ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and is now closer than ever to realizing his goal.

This is why peace negotiations with Russia must focus primarily on establishing long-term security guarantees that are sufficiently credible to convince the Kremlin. Anything less will be viewed in Moscow as yet more proof of Western weakness and interpreted as a tacit invitation to go further. After all, that has been the pattern ever since the Russian invasion first began in 2014. Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine has been gradually unfolding in plain sight for over a decade and already ranks among the worst crimes of the twenty-first century. If Western leaders choose to ignore this and push ahead with a bad peace while leaving Ukraine without the support and security it needs to survive, they will be complicit in all that follows.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

AlKhatib in The Atlantic: There is no real-estate solution for Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:16:07 +0000

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AlKhatib in Foreign Policy: What Trump really wants in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:16:06 +0000

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Zaaimi quoted in World Politics Review on displaced Syrian women

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:40 +0000

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Damon quoted in Fars News on the process of medical evacuation of Palestinian children

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:33 +0000

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Abercrombie-Winstanley joins Channel 4 News to discuss Trump’s response to the D.C. plane crash

itorre — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:28 +0000

The post Abercrombie-Winstanley joins Channel 4 News to discuss Trump’s response to the D.C. plane crash appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Chamlou joins BBC Persian to discuss the tariff war and the new Ismaili leader

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:27 +0000