Global Energy Forum

The ninth Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum will be held June 17 and 18 in Washington, DC. Please check back regularly for updates on our programming.

As the 2025 Global Energy Forum convened on Tuesday in Washington, DC, just blocks away at the White House, national security officials were mulling over the US response to the war between Israel and Iran.  

“Right now, Iran has a choice,” Brett McGurk, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former White House coordinator for the Middle East region, said at the Forum.  

“The White House offered a deal to Iran about six weeks ago . . . Iran not only did not really respond to that; it actually escalated its nuclear program in the face of this,” McGurk said, pointing to activities at the Fordow nuclear site. 

For McGurk, if Iran accepts the nuclear deal, “this crisis would be over.” But if it doesn’t, it would be “looking at the possibility of a US strike on Fordow.”

When it comes to escalation in the Middle East, Helima Croft—global head of commodity strategy and MENA research at RBC Capital and a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors—said that “the risk of this spilling over into energy is low. But it’s not zero.”  

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by William F. Wechsler, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council, where Croft and McGurk also talked about the United States’ response options and the region’s future.

The objectives 

• McGurk said that if he were in the Situation Room, he would list three objectives for the commander in chief: The first is to protect Americans and defend Israel—which would involve “surging defense interceptors.” The second is to “contain this to Israel and Iran” and “avoid a broader regional escalation.” The third, McGurk explained, is to work with Israel on succeeding in their objectives: “dismantlement of the nuclear program and the missile program.” 

• McGurk said that what happens in the next week “is potentially quite decisive,” because it could weaken Iran’s influence in the region. That, he said, would set “conditions for a much more peaceful, integrated Middle East that we all want.” 

• “You talk about a decisive historical period: We’re living in it,” he said. 

The options

• McGurk said that a military response has previously had “massive risk” associated with it, but “Iran has made a series of fateful strategic miscalculations” since October 7, 2023, reducing those risks. 

• One such risk was the possibility of retaliation from an Iranian proxy group, such as Hezbollah; but that is “no longer a threat,” McGurk said, with Hezbollah indicating that it does not want to be involved in this latest exchange of strikes. 

• Another risk was Iran’s air defense, including its use of Russian air defense systems, but that risk has faded as “Israel has complete air supremacy” over Iran. “So the window of availability for a military option is now very open,” McGurk said. 

• He added that he could see the US administration using the threat of this military option to “try to get a deal.” But if that deal does not come to fruition, “then we have to be prepared to actually do the strike,” McGurk added. “And I think you do have to back it up.” 

• “The worst case here would be to leave Iran with that Fordow [site] and ten cascades [of advanced centrifuges] intact,” McGurk said. “So it’s a deal or it’s a military strike.”

The impact

• Croft said that the market is “very sanguine” about the energy risks associated with the conflict. “We have ample supply on the market right now,” she noted.  

• If the United States decides to launch an attack on Fordow, Croft said, there would be “a little pop” in prices. But the bigger concern among market players is whether Iran plans to “internationalize” the costs of this war, such as by rallying its proxy groups in targeting tankers and shipping corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz. 

• That could yield some temporary disruption. “I don’t think the market would be prepared for the export infrastructure being struck,” she said. 

• She added that there is also concern “about risks to other countries’ energy facilities where they may not have taken the necessary steps to fortify those facilities.” 

• Until the war inflicts a massive impact on oil supply, Croft said she would not expect a “preemptive surge” of barrels from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). “They are already unwinding a voluntary cut,” she said. “OPEC has made it pretty clear: They’re not going to fill a gap in the market until one emerges.” 

• Croft added that there is much at stake in achieving a stable, prosperous Middle East region, as governments continue to build more resilient societies and to diversify their economies. “Having a stable security environment is so important for the millions of young people in the region whose futures really rest on everything that these governments are trying to undertake,” she said. 

Katherine Golden is an associate director on the Atlantic Council’s editorial team. 

Editor’s note: RBC Capital Markets is a sponsor of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. More information on Forum sponsors can be found here. 

The post What comes next in the Iran-Israel war, from a US response to energy impacts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Global Energy Forum

The ninth Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum will be held June 17 and 18 in Washington, DC. Please check back regularly for updates on our programming.

Speakers

Helima Croft
Board Director, Atlantic Council; Managing Director and Global Head of Commodity Strategy and MENA Research, RBC Capital Markets

Brett McGurk
Distinguished Fellow, N7 Initiative, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs, Atlantic Council

Moderator

William F. Wechsler
Senior Director, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you for—once again, for everyone being here, being part of this discussion. It’s quite important. And it comes at, of course, an absolutely critical moment for those of us who’ve spent our lives caring about the geopolitics and stability/security of the Middle East.

So we’re going to have a thirty-minute discussion here with two of the most well-positioned people to give us their views on what’s going on now and what we should expect.

From my own point of view, I just want to lead off by saying I see four real scenarios going forward: a great scenario, a good scenario, a bad scenario, and a terrible scenario. The great one is that the military objectives in the current campaign are met and the Iranian regime is not able to pose the kind of existential threat to the region that it—of the Iranian people taking matters into their own hands. A good scenario is that the Iranian regime comes back to the Trump administration and wants to do a deal on eliminating their enrichment of their nuclear program. A bad scenario is the military objectives are not met and Iran goes nuclear. And a terrible one is that the region is in war, which could involve the United States.

So the two people that I have here discuss are Brett McGurk, who has joined the Atlantic Council recently as a distinguished fellow working our Middle East Programs and our N7 Initiative, a joint partnership of the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation; and Helima Croft, the head of commodities at RBC Global and the head of the Middle East there as well.

We’re going to talk about security and energy issues here today. Let me start with you, Brett. Tell us what—you know, as we sit here the people in the Trump administration are gathering at some point today in the Situation Room to talk about what the options are for the United States to advance the good scenarios I talked about and minimize the risk of the lower scenarios. You’ve spent more time in that Situation Room than anybody I know talking about these issues. What would you be telling the president today?

BRETT MCGURK: Well—is this working? OK. Well, thank you, and congratulations, Atlantic Council, Landon, and everyone setting this up, and it’s great to hear from Dr. Sultan this morning. And, Fred, great to see you.

I caveat comments on what’s happening to say if anyone tells you they know exactly where this is heading or making kind of bold predictions they don’t know what they’re talking about. This is truly a completely unprecedented situation.

It flows out of the events of October 7th. I’m happy to kind of talk about the broader strategic context but you asked a specific question so let me get to it. If I was in the Situation Room right now I think, from the White House perspective, we have three immediate objectives.

Number one, obviously, we want to protect Americans and we want to help defend Israel. That is, like, first priority. So making sure we’re surging defense interceptors, everything. I’ve dealt with that an awful lot in the last year when I was in the White House. That’s number one.

Number two, try to contain this to Israel and Iran. Avoid a broader regional escalation. I think that’s actually a very achievable objective. So far I think that’s going fairly well—something we dealt with every day, every hour, from October 7th on.

I don’t know how many predictions of uncontrollable regional war there have been since October 7th. There has not been an uncontrollable regional war because of what the United States has done, frankly, consistently day by day, hour by hour, month by month.

Number three, I think you want to be working with the Israelis to ensure a focus on their declared objectives and avoid a mission creep scenario. Their declared objectives are dismantlement of the nuclear program and the missile program.

So those are kind of the three immediate objectives. But on the third one it’s very important because we know an awful lot about this. The Iran nuclear program has been a vexing challenge across administrations and the Rubicon here has been crossed, and I think we’ll mention that one of the worst outcomes would be this kind of ends with the main enrichment facility in Fordow intact.

And let me say a little bit about that because there’s a lot of focus about what is Israel doing, why. But Iran has made a series of fateful strategic miscalculations from October 7th on. It decided after October 7th to basically support a multifront war against Israel, and I lived through this and watched the whole thing.

They turned on Hezbollah to open a northern front. They turned on the Houthis to open a southern front. They supplied the militias in Iraq and Syria to open additional fronts. They directly attacked Israel twice in April and October. That is—October 7th miscalculations.

What happened? Hezbollah was basically knocked out. You have a new government in Lebanon. The Assad regime collapsed. You have a new government in Syria. We had a ceasefire in Gaza and hostages coming out. I’m hopeful we can still get back to a ceasefire there. You had the militias in Iraq declaring a ceasefire, relations in the Gulf very strong, and Iran in its weakest position since October 7th. So that’s kind of where things were left.

On the nuclear side, Iran continued to escalate its program. And just last week the IAEA came out with its comprehensive report that was asked for last year and found flagrant—what was their word?—egregious failure of Iran to live up to its nuclear commitments and focused a lot on Fordow.

In Fordow right now, buried into a mountain, there are ten cascades of very advanced IR-6 centrifuges. That cannot be left intact. And I think the way the White House sees this, and the policy right now as I read it, is the White House offered a deal to Iran about six weeks ago. I don’t know every detail. It’s described as a very fair deal. But that would basically give the world confidence that Iran is not and will not ever move towards a nuclear weapon.

And Iran not only did not really respond to that. It actually escalated its nuclear program in the face of this, including just last week saying they’re going to feed fuel into the cascades in Fordow and actually open a new underground enrichment facility. So Iran has just made these series of miscalculations. And I used to lead this channel in Oman with the Iranians and told them repeatedly, if you keep this up, it’s inevitable, inevitable, somebody will take care of this problem. And that’s kind of where we are.

So right now Iran has a choice. I mean, Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister of Iran, can call Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s envoy, and say, you know, I kind of—I looked at the offer you put down six weeks ago. Actually, it’s pretty good. I think we’re going to take it. And I think this crisis would be over. Or they could not do that, looking at the possibility of a US strike on Fordow. I’m just saying that as an analyst.

But in any case, to Will’s four scenarios, this has to end without Iran’s nuclear-enrichment program intact. And hopefully that can end diplomatically. That option is still available. There’s still an off-ramp. Or the military campaign is now joined. The Israelis have a lot of options. And the US has a big option when it comes to Fordow.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much for that, Brett.

Helima, I want to talk—to turn to the energy markets. The energy markets have—don’t seem to have built in the risk that—of some of the scenarios that—of some of the scenarios that I and Brett were talking about. Can you help us understand why that is, what Iran could do that would change the markets’ views, and then how OPEC and others would react and the United States would react to that?

HELIMA CROFT: Great. Thank you so much. And Fred, thank you so much for convening us again. And Dr. Sultan, what an extraordinary open to the conference today.

As you mentioned, Will, I think the market is very sanguine about the risks entailed in any type of escalation in the Middle East at this moment. I think a lot of it goes back to the Russia-Ukraine war. There had been this expectation right away—remember what oil prices did right after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We shot up. We were running to $130. Analysts were talking about potentially $200-a-barrel price of oil. There was an expectation that we could see three million barrels of Russian oil off the market.

And when that did not materialize, I think a lot of market participants were like, we have overplayed this risk. A number of prominent investors were burned betting on a Russian supply disruption. And they were like, I’m no longer going to price in risk of disruption. You can tell me about it, but I want to see it before I start pricing this in. And we have a situation right now in the market where we are well-supplied. You know, US production has been strong. Production out of countries like the United Arab Emirates, the investments that ADNOC has made in expanding spare capacity, means that we have ample supply on the market right now.

But the question is, Will, and we talked about this, if we were to see even a repeat of what we saw in 2019, if we saw attacks on tankers—remember, in 2019, after we reimposed maximum-pressure sanctions in May, we did have tankers hit off the coast of Fujairah. They were not sunk, but they were damaged. We had drone attacks on key pipelines over that summer, including the east-west pipeline. And then in September we had the attack on Abqaiq, the world’s largest oil-processing facility.

And to some extent because that did not yield sustained disruption—and, well, we talked about that. You know, was this a ceiling of Iran’s disruptive capabilities in 2019? Could they have done far more damage to Abqaiq if they had chosen to do so? But a lot of market participants were, like, we’ve seen the worst out of this. And if it did not yield a sustained disruption in 2019 when Abqaiq was hit, I really don’t need to be worried about it now unless it actually happens.

Now, people would say, the risk is potentially low. I’ve heard many experts say the risk of this spilling over into energy is low. But it’s not zero. And if you did have a situation—even last night—where’s my friend Amena Bakr? We were back and forth, you know, on our, you know, texts last night, because we had two tankers or three tankers on fire last night. And our immediate concern was, is this a repeat of 2019? Have those tankers been struck. Is Iran seeking to internationalize the cost of this conflict? Now it turns out there was a collision. It does not look like they were actually struck by a missile or a mine. But the concern was there right away.

So if we were to see some type of incident—we’ve already seen domestic energy infrastructure targeted. We’ve already seen South Pars struck. We’ve seen attacks on the important Haifa Refinery in Israel. We’ve had oil depots struck in Iran. All domestic. All kind of warning shots. But, again, I don’t think the market would be prepared for the export infrastructure being struck. And, again, that may never happen. And the Iranians may judge that the cost of doing so is too high. The Israelis may decide not in their interest to defund Iran by attacking Kharg Island, which would take off 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports.

But, again, the risk isn’t zero. And if you were to have something—even though we’re sitting at seventy-five dollars today—if you were to have just a repeat of anything we saw in 2019, we would move materially higher. Now, the question about OPEC, I don’t think OPEC is looking to add barrels to the market this time because of this situation. They are already unwinding a voluntary cut. We expect more rolling OPEC barrels on the market. But OPEC has made it pretty clear, they’re not going to fill a gap in the market until one emerges. So I would not expect, for example, a preemptive surge of a million-plus barrels, unless we see clear evidence of a supply disruption.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much. So the implications of that is, because the risk isn’t built into the markets today, if we do have this, the market impact would be much larger than it would be. And it would be a—would be a shock.

HELIMA CROFT: I think the market is taking it as a—I think energy markets—based on everything Brett said, like, you know, we’ve had this war in the Middle East that has not disrupted energy supplies to date. Again, the clearest one was what happened with Russia [and] Ukraine, where people were really thinking, are we going to do to Russia what we did to Iran in terms of secondary sanctions? I mean, we did a lot of work, though, to prevent a Russian disruption. Again, massive releases from the SPR, carveouts in terms of energy sanctions. We did price caps after the Europeans went forward with the sixth package of sanctions, which banned the import of seaborne oil into Europe and did a services ban. There was an active effort by the White House to ensure that the market would be well supplied. So—but I think the message or the takeaway, from many market participants is, call me when there is a disruption. You tell me there’s a lot of risk, but I’m waiting to see it materialize.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much for that.

Brett, I want to come back to you. You know, the issue, as you alluded to, Fordow, Fordow, Fordow. That’s the question. That is—that’s what’s going to be on the mind of President Trump. You served President Trump in his—in his first term. You’ve been in the Oval Office with him. He’s made absolutely clear over a long period of time that he doesn’t want a war with Iran. What’s different now? What would cause him, in your mind, to make that decision? And what are ways that events could unfold that would make it more likely?

BRETT MCGURK: I’d say, first, look, nobody wants—I think no president wants to order a military strike anywhere, frankly. I mean, I’ve been around four presidents. It’s, like, the most difficult decision. And anybody with the experience over the last twenty years, and if you spend time in Iraq like I did and others, like, you better go at such a decision with heady analysis, prudence, calculation, thinking through every unintended consequence.

The issue with Fordow—and I’m just going to—a lot of you know this. But it was a secret underground facility found by intelligence, announced to the world in 2009. The JCPOA had a lot of problems. It did say no enrichment at Fordow until 2030. After the JCPOA—US left the JCPOA, Iran started installing centrifuges in Fordow. And they eventually put in ten cascades of the IR-6s, which are the most advanced. And they started enriching to 60 percent uranium grade, which can spin up very fast to weapons grade. And you just read the IAEA report from last week.

This is a huge national security challenge. And I think the hope was that it could be dealt with through a deal. I mean, frankly, we in the—in the Biden administration had worked on this knowing that this year, 2025, is the year to deal with this problem, because there’s a deadline. The deadline, again, under the JCPOA, a provision its critics like is called snapback. Snapback means any member of that deal who’s still a member, basically France and the UK, can go to the UN Security Council and say, all international sanctions on Iran snapback. And they can do that until October of this year, when that expires under the JCPOA. So this is always the year to deal with this problem. And the hope, again, still, is that it can be dealt with diplomatically.

Now, the military option has had massive risk to it. Some of them—and being around this issue over the years I’m not revealing anything that’s not known—Hezbollah. Hezbollah had 150,000 to 200,000 missiles and rockets hanging over Israel. Any military strike into Iran, you risk Hezbollah unleashing those missiles on Israel. No longer a threat. Very significant. Hezbollah, even after the start of Israel’s military operation, has said: We want nothing to do with this. Second, air defense. Iran has pretty good air defense. Russian air defense systems, S-300s. There’s the risk of a pilot being taken down. That’s a big risk. That’s no longer there. Israel has complete air supremacy over Iran, which is an extraordinary thing. And that changes the entire calculation. Third, Iran has what it has. It has proxies. It has terrorism. It has missiles and rockets. And we know all that.

So the window of availability for a military option is now very open. And then how do you use that? Do you use that to try to get a deal, which I can actually see the administration doing? And if you say, if that—if that negotiation fails, then we have to be prepared to actually do the strike. And I think you do have to back it up. And around town if you say that, it’s, like, well, that means you’re going to lead. Look what happened in the Iraq War. This is not an Iraq War scenario. We invaded Iraq in 2003 with 130,000 troops, very small force, to overthrow a government and install an entirely new system.

I mean, that—talk about ends and means gap and unintended consequences? This is—and I’m not discounting the seriousness of this—but this is a military operation that has been planned, trained on, for, like, going back ten or fifteen years. And so it is available to the president. And the Pentagon’s job is to make it available and discuss it, if the president chooses to do it. And right now, it’s available as a backstop to diplomacy. And, again, anyone talking to Abbas Araghchi, he should call Steve Witkoff tomorrow, or right now, and say, you know what? I re-looked at the deal you put down. It’s pretty good. Let’s actually get together and do it. That’s the way out of this.

And being through the crisis since October 7th, I mean, this—sometimes it’s—I can get—frustrated is not the right word. But there are ways out of these problems. And right now, there could be a—we want a ceasefire in Gaza. Ceasefire in Gaza, if Hamas releases ten hostages, you have a sixty-day ceasefire in Gaza. Israel signed up to that. The US has signed up to it. It’s there. Iran right now—this crisis can end if Iran accepts the deal on the table. Or, I think, the military option becomes very viable.

And given where we are, the worst case here would be to leave Iran with that Fordow and ten cascades intact. So it’s a deal or it’s a military strike. I mean, I just—I think that is where we’re heading, and the events over the last twenty-four hours, I think, made that pretty clear. And that’s probably being discussed right down the street right now.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: You know, I’ve been briefed that we got about—that Iran at the current op tempo and the current projections of Israeli taking launchers off the battlefield that there’s about a—about a week, at least, more runway of these current level of operations continue. Of course, Iran also has by my count about three thousand short-range weapons that don’t threaten Israel but threaten our friends in the Gulf if things get—things get a lot worse.

My question to you, Helima, is in the scenario that Brett was just talking about, about the United States taking a strike on the—on the nuclear facility in Fordow, what’s that implication to the energy markets? And then what does the US do if the energy markets go a little haywire?

HELIMA CROFT: Well, I mean, certainly I think that, you know, US action against Fordow you would see, you know, a little pop in prices. But again, I think given the sort of bias of the market—I would say the recency bias of the market to say if it’s not an energy facility let’s take a pause, I think the real question would be in an endgame scenario for the Iranian government, again, A, what would come after—we talk about regime change, but who’s going to emerge to run that country? But the concern would be, I think, from the people who watch energy markets, who have spent time in the Middle East, who have been to places right after attacks have happened is, would you see proxy groups?

Like, would you see potentially risk to—we’ve talked about Straits of Hormuz, but I always think about, like, risks to Basra. I think about the risk to Iraq’s four-million-plus production because of Iranian-backed militias that operate very close to those facilities. So we would be watching, you know, what would happen in terms of, obviously, tankers. We would look to what would happen to—who are—where is the sort of soft security underbelly in terms of the energy system in the Middle East? And again, I would be concerned about risks to Iraq. I’d be concerned about risks to other countries’ energy facilities where they may not have taken the necessary steps to fortify those facilities.

So I don’t think the risk is—I do not think it is tail risk in a regime that feels its days are numbered, that they are not going to at least try to impose economic cost on the West and the rest of the world.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Well, thank you very much.

In just the brief amount of time that we have left, let me—let me ask each of you to leave us with a thought that we haven’t talked about and, frankly, if it’s possible, that you think most people aren’t talking about enough. Like, what should we be thinking about that most people aren’t? Let me start with you, Brett.

BRETT MCGURK: Man. Right now I think what we’re all thinking about is what we should be thinking about, which is what is going to happen in the next week. And it is—you talk about a decisive historical period; we’ve living in it. We’re living in it.

And I—and I think the potential for a Middle East—I’m looking at a lot of friends here in the audience—the potential for this region is just enormous. It is enormous. I though the president’s trip was the right thing to do, very successful. What’s happening in UAE is extraordinary, Saudi Arabia, throughout the Gulf—everything that was just talked about in this panel.

And Iran has been a huge problem in this region for decades. And what has happened to Hezbollah and Iranian networks and Iran since October 7th sets conditions for a much more peaceful, integrated Middle East that we all want. And Iran is a spoiler to that; there’s just no question about it. So what’s going to happen here in the next week, I think, or so is potentially quite decisive.

And if we were here two years ago, and the question was hypothetically what if Israel launches a massive air attack on Iran, like, tomorrow—what would happen—I think Helima would have said it’s going to be all-out Middle East war, and energy markets, and everything else you can imagine. And actually, it’s happening right now. Israel controls the skies of Iran.

I mean, this is like—you know, and I just have to say I am proud of what the United States of America has done since October 7th, not without controversy. And these are hard calls, and they should be scrutinized. But I am proud of what we have done to reduce the risks of an all-out Middle East conflict, to significantly weaken Iran and all of these networks that threaten so many people, and to set the conditions for a far more peaceful, prosperous, integrated Middle East region.

With that said, there are going to be spoilers around and terrorist groups around and extremists around, many of them funded and supported by Iran. But an Iran without the sword of Damocles of a nuclear-threshold state is a much different problem. And here we are with potential to actually resolve that, at least for a significant period of time.

And I will just finish. I hope—I hope Iran finds a way to take a deal, the deal that the US has put on the table. And if not, I think there’s no other way.

So I have to answer that question, Will, by what should we be thinking about? It’s what’s happening right now. I don’t know what else—at least that’s what I’m thinking about.

HELIMA CROFT: I will be super fast.

To echo what you pointed out about the enormous progress that we’ve seen in the Middle East—I mean, it started by the UAE with the incredible economic transformation and diversification program. I mean, Dr. Sultan, I think your portfolio speaks to everything you do in that country, just even beyond energy. And you look at the other countries, Saudi Arabia. You think about what Kuwait is trying to do, taking enormous steps to diversify their economies, to future-proof their societies. And it’s predicated on a stable security environment.

And so I do think that we should be sanguine about what’s at stake if we do not find a solution that enables, you know, a stable, prosperous Middle East. And having a stable security environment is so important for the millions of young people in the region whose futures really rest on everything that these governments are trying to undertake.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much. I think you actually hit on what I was hoping you would hit on, which is not only the risks of the region but the potential of the region is what we also need to be thinking about deeply right now.

With that, I want to say thank you very much to our panelists here for a really fascinating discussion on the issues of the day. Thank you all for listening to us.

Watch the full event

The post The energy risks of escalation in the Middle East, according to Brett McGurk and Helima Croft appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s causing a big reaction. On Wednesday, World Bank President Ajay Banga announced that the development bank’s board has lifted its longstanding ban on funding nuclear energy projects. The decision could surge funding for the emissions-free power plants in developing countries, and it comes amid a broader shift in attitudes toward atomic energy around the world. Below, the Atlantic Council’s top nuclear energy policy experts get to the core of the matter.

• Jennifer Gordon: Director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.
• Lauren Hughes: Deputy director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative.

The decision

• “This is not the bank’s first foray into nuclear power as a means of promoting sustainable economic growth and shared prosperity,” says Lauren. In 1959, the bank issued a forty-million-dollar loan to help finance construction of Italy’s first nuclear reactor. 
• The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident contributed to the World Bank enacting a de facto ban on funding for nuclear power, Lauren explains. This ban was then reiterated in 2013, when the bank said that “safety of nuclear facilities and non-proliferation are not in the [World Bank Group’s] areas of expertise.” 
• This week’s reversal “follows a number of other similar decisions on nuclear energy,” Jennifer tells us, including the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy that more than twenty countries signed in December 2023, as well as recent decisions by the European Investment Bank, Germany, and Canada to boost nuclear power. Taken together, these decisions “indicate that nuclear is coming back into favor and being recognized for its ability to provide reliable baseload power.” 

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The impact

• “Many emerging-market countries are interested in developing nuclear energy projects that could be prohibitively difficult to realize without financing,” Lauren explains, noting that upfront costs to build a power plant can run into the billions of dollars  
• Lauren calls the bank’s decision a “pragmatic approach toward nuclear energy,” which recognizes “that the demand for reliable, affordable, clean energy will only increase in the coming decades” as populations grow in Sub-Saharan Africa, India, and Southeast Asia.  

The frontier

• For the United States, the World Bank’s move “may indicate an eagerness to engage with the Trump administration on policy issues that the administration has indicated are at the top of its agenda,” Jennifer says. In late May, for example, the White House unveiled new executive orders on deploying advanced reactor technologies. 
• Lauren adds that World Bank financing could help the United States “be more competitive against state-backed financing offers, especially from Russia and China.” By extension, the World Bank could reinforce the efforts of agencies such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the US International Development Finance Corporation, and the US Trade and Development Agency that are involved in nuclear projects in developing countries, she notes.
• For Jennifer, the bank overturning its ban should be “viewed as the next frontier in unlocking funding to support new nuclear builds and leveling the playing field with Russia and China.” However, she adds, it’s “not the final frontier, because it could send a signal to other international financial institutions that they should follow suit and also support nuclear projects.” 

Global Energy Forum

June 17-18, 2025

The 9th Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum will take place in Washington, DC under the theme Collaboration, Competition, and Security: A new era of leadership shaping the future of the global energy system.

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The post Why the World Bank just gave nuclear power a surprising boost appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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An essential tool in the development toolkit

Developing countries’ energy demand is rising, requiring more firm power generation. Nuclear energy offers a reliable baseload critical for economies industrializing with energy-intensive sectors such as manufacturing and data centers. A 900-MW nuclear reactor can produce—with a much smaller footprint—the same power as 8.5 million solar panels or 800 wind turbines. And, unlike hydropower and geothermal energy, nuclear power is much less geographically constrained, enabling it to be sited in many locations.

Major economies are exporting their nuclear aversion

Currently, most MDBs do not fund nuclear energy projects. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) refuses to finance nuclear energy projects due to issues such as waste management and high investment costs. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) prioritizes its energy strategy for “scaling up renewables,” supporting nuclear projects solely in areas of safety like decommissioning, with no involvement in construction. EBRD states it is neither in favor of or opposed to nuclear energy; it is simply operating within the mandate determined by its shareholders. The World Bank—the largest and arguably most influential MDB—cites a lack of expertise as its reason for not funding nuclear energy projects, although it frequently relies on external contractors for expertise in other sectors.

However, the World Bank’s president, Ajay Banga, recently signaled a potential shift by pushing the board to reconsider its stance on funding nuclear energy projects. In reality, the World Bank’s voting structure, which allocates voting power according to how much funding a country provides, grants its biggest funders with veto power. Germany serves as a key example: it shut down its nuclear reactors and opposed the inclusion of nuclear power in the European Union’s green investment taxonomy. The World Bank is held hostage by this tunnel vision, which supports only renewable projects, even though these technologies alone cannot meet the growing energy demands of developing nations.

MDBs’ refusal to fund nuclear power projects exacerbates the geopolitical divide between developing economies and the developed nations. This results in missed opportunities to expand energy access in poorer nations based on the prejudices of wealthier nations.

Lenders of last resort

MDBs’ current failure to finance nuclear projects cedes opportunities to other lenders. Western banks, including Goldman Sachs and Barclays, recently announced their support for nuclear energy, but this long-term commitment is questionable given private lenders’ risk-averse nature. Prolonged construction timelines and high capital costs for nuclear energy projects in countries like the United States may eventually deter commercial banks from maintaining their support for the technology.

Russia and China could fill the gap if the West leaves nuclear financing to others. Russia leads global nuclear power plant construction, accounting for about 60 percent of reactor exports, with ongoing projects in nations like Turkey, Bangladesh, and Egypt. Similarly, China is rapidly building out its domestic nuclear capacity—targeting over 100 new reactors by 2035—and leveraging the technology as a geopolitical tool under its Belt and Road Initiative, establishing projects in nations such as Pakistan and Argentina.

The MDBs’ absence in nuclear financing starkly contrasts with the generous loans offered by Russia and China. By leveraging state funding, Russia offers highly attractive terms, covering up to 85 percent of total project costs, as seen in Egypt’s loan, with lower interest rates and longer repayment periods than those required by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for its members—an organization that does not include Russia or China. Russia is also expanding its equity stakes in international nuclear projects, such as Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant, where it holds a majority stake, fostering closer geopolitical ties and exerting influence over critical energy infrastructure.

Similarly, China extends significant financial support, covering 85 percent of construction costs for Pakistan’s Chasma 5 reactor along with a $100 million discount on the total project cost. China has also offered to cover 85 percent of costs in loans for Argentina’s Atucha III reactor.

By refusing to finance nuclear projects, MDBs force developing nations to rely on Russian and Chinese nuclear exports. Both nations’ dominance in nuclear energy exports risks creating significant geopolitical imbalances, expanding their grip on critical energy sources while weakening Western influence over international energy security. The MDBs must rectify this problem to ensure a more geopolitically diverse financing model for nuclear power construction and operation in developing nations.

Breaking the logjam

MDBs must consider structural changes to bypass the veto power of its major players and begin funding nuclear energy projects. One option is to create a consortium of pro-nuclear states within the MDBs. These nations could create a separate fund for nuclear energy financing, independent of contributions from anti-nuclear nations. This would not be a complete fix—the bank’s broader policy against nuclear finance would remain unaffected—but it’s a crucial step in the right direction.

Outside of direct financial support, development banks do have other options. They can establish pathways for technical assistance for nuclear projects, similar to the Energy for Growth Hub’s nuclear trust fund proposal for the World Bank. This can include enlisting expert contractors as advisors to governments building nuclear power plants and fostering open dialogues on nuclear energy. By taking these steps, development banks can empower developing nations to harness nuclear power and create a more equitable energy future.     

Don’t hand adversaries a nuclear victory

The increasing dominance of Moscow and Beijing in global nuclear energy finance risks reshaping future energy affairs. It is time for MDBs to acknowledge nuclear energy as an essential tool to expand energy access. The World Bank and other multilateral organizations must reform their antiquated policies to support nuclear energy deployment and allow developing countries to more readily achieve economic growth. If they don’t, autocratic regimes willing to weaponize their energy dominance will eagerly fill the void.

Juzel Lloyd is an energy/environmental technology researcher at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and a former Atlantic Council Global Energy Center Women Leaders in Energy and Climate fellow.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Juzel Lloyd

Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow

Global Energy Center

Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist May 25, 2025

What Trump’s new executive orders mean for the US nuclear energy industry

By Jennifer T. Gordon

The US president signed four executive orders on May 23 intended to usher in an “American nuclear renaissance.”

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

EnergySource Mar 7, 2025

The US can reduce Russia’s nuclear energy—and geopolitical—influence

By Marina Lorenzini

As the Trump administration outlines its energy priorities, strengthening the US nuclear industry remains a point of bipartisan agreement. Revitalizing this sector will lead not only to domestic economic growth, but also a reduction in Russia’s dominance in global nuclear markets and its geopolitical leverage.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Jan 15, 2025

Tripling global nuclear energy capacity is in reach—if the world seizes the moment

By Amy Drake

At COP28, nations and corporations committed to tripling global nuclear energy capacity by 2050, underscoring its essential role in achieving net-zero emissions. Looking ahead to COP30, global leaders must strengthen multilateral collaboration, engage the financial sector, and provide support for new partnerships with the nuclear industry to meet this goal.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post MDBs must finance nuclear power—or Russia and China will appeared first on Atlantic Council.

New reactors and national security

“Deploying Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security” is the most comprehensive of the four. It aims to speed the deployment of advanced reactors at Department of Defense facilities, in order to provide power for military installations and for operational energy. The executive order notes that the regulatory pathway will be through the United States Army and ambitiously calls for one reactor to be operational at a “domestic military base or installation no later than September 30, 2028.” It also calls for the deployment of advanced reactors at Department of Energy facilities, and it directs the US secretary of energy to designate artificial intelligence (AI) data centers that “are located at or operated in coordination with Department of Energy facilities . . . as critical defense facilities, where appropriate.” 

In a departure from what has been the US government’s de facto stance toward commercial nuclear fuel recycling in the United States (assuming that it refers to commercial reactors), this order calls for the US secretary of energy to “identify all useful uranium and plutonium material within the Department of Energy’s inventories that may be recycled or processed into nuclear fuel for reactors in the United States.” There are currently no domestic commercial fuel recycling facilities in the United States, and the partnership outlined in this order between the Department of Energy and industry will likely be a boon to US reactor companies looking to use recycled fuel, especially as competitor countries stand up their own recycling capabilities. The order then goes on to direct the Department of Energy to provide high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for commercial reactors that are authorized to deploy at the department’s sites. This will add to the demand signal for HALEU fuel and strengthen the domestic nuclear fuel supply chain.

Importantly, the order excludes the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for construction of advanced reactors on some federal sites. It also notes that there may be additional categories that will be excluded from adhering to NEPA. The Department of the Interior already has a number of categorical exclusions for NEPA (for example, for geothermal exploration) but does not yet have any listed for nuclear reactors. The rest of this order touches on interagency coordination, civil nuclear exports, and employee clearances.

Changes to the NRC

At first glance, the next executive order, “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” appears more measured than news reports had predicted over the past few weeks. It mentions a reduction in force for the commission, but it notes that “certain functions may increase in size consistent with the policies in this order, including those devoted to new reactor licensing.” At the same time, the order directs the NRC to finalize a revision of its regulations and guidance documents, and this revision must be concluded within eighteen months. It also directs an eighteen-month deadline for final decisions on construction and operation applications for any type of nuclear reactor. It is difficult to see how an understaffed agency will be able to complete more work in less time.

Although the new executive order does not explicitly mention White House oversight of the NRC, it does note the involvement of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and especially the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in reorganizing the NRC. These measures, combined with the February 18 executive order “Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies”—which already decreased the independence of the NRC—could likely reduce the NRC’s workforce and lessen its standing among global nuclear regulatory authorities. This could happen even as the White House directs it to hasten its regulatory processes to expedite the licensing and deployment of next-generation nuclear technologies.

The question of new testing

A third order, “Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy,” directs the national laboratory system to reform its process for ensuring that reactor developers are able to test their reactors quickly and effectively. However, the document does not explicitly direct the national laboratory system to construct new test reactor facilities. The first Trump administration signed into law the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Capabilities Act in 2017, which addressed the need for a fast-neutron test reactor and resulted in the start of the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) project at Idaho National Laboratory.* But Congress later defunded this project. Although the new order does not explicitly call for the construction of a new testing facility, its direction to increase capacity for testing new reactors may lead Congress to look again at the VTR project.

The broader nuclear base

Finally, “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base” addresses well-trodden issues, such as workforce development and the restarting, completion, uprating, or construction of nuclear power plants. It also calls for a new report to address the fuel cycle, especially regarding high-level waste management, fuel recycling (including commercial recycling), isotopes, and enrichment and conversion. This new report would follow the Nuclear Fuel Working Group’s 2020 report “Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership,” which focused on the front-end of the fuel cycle as well as civil nuclear exports. The order also notes that the US secretary of energy shall update the department’s “excess uranium management policy to align with the policy objectives of this order and the Nuclear Fuel Security Act” of 2023, which was signed into law by US President Joe Biden. 

Based on these new executive orders and earlier announcements, the second Trump administration’s policies toward nuclear energy seem largely aligned with the policies of the Biden administration and the first Trump administration. The major shift that is reflected in this set of executive orders is the desire to conduct a reduction in force across government agencies and to weaken the independence of regulatory authorities, including the NRC. In the new orders, the Trump administration has articulated ambitious goals for rapid deployment of next-generation nuclear technologies; however, reducing personnel and funding for the NRC and the Department of Energy, along with weakening the NRC’s independence and global credibility, will make it challenging to realize the full potential of the US nuclear energy industry. 

Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Note: The Idaho National Laboratory is a donor to the Atlantic Council’s Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative.

The post What Trump’s new executive orders mean for the US nuclear energy industry appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building on the Atlantic Council’s previous report on the nuclear innovation ecosystem, this new report by Kemal Pasamehmetoglu explores the role of the United States in establishing a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle.  

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Kemal Pasamehmetoglu

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

Global Energy Center

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

Report Feb 24, 2025

Atoms for Appalachia: The role of nuclear energy in economic development

By Lauren Hughes

Advanced nuclear technologies can drive economic security and energy security within Appalachian states.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource Mar 7, 2025

The US can reduce Russia’s nuclear energy—and geopolitical—influence

By Marina Lorenzini

As the Trump administration outlines its energy priorities, strengthening the US nuclear industry remains a point of bipartisan agreement. Revitalizing this sector will lead not only to domestic economic growth, but also a reduction in Russia’s dominance in global nuclear markets and its geopolitical leverage.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Issue Brief Apr 4, 2025

Building a path toward global deployment of fusion: Nonproliferation and export considerations

By Sachin Desai, Michael Hua, Amy Roma, Jessica Bufford, Jacqueline Siebens, Andrew Proffitt

With commercial fusion on the horizon, questions around the process for regulating fusion power plants have arisen.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

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The post The United States’ role in managing the nuclear fuel cycle appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sign up for PowerPlay, the Atlantic Council’s bimonthly newsletter keeping you up to date on all facets of the energy transition.

1. Investment in US energy and manufacturing

Last month, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) committed to investing $1.4 trillion in the United States over the next decade. Some of the investments in the package have already been announced, including a recent commitment by Emirates Global Aluminum to fund the construction of a smelter in the United States. If built, it would be the country’s first new aluminum smelter in thirty-five years and could potentially double US production. Trump will likely push the UAE to announce additional plans to invest in US manufacturing, infrastructure, and energy production, with petrochemicals, steel, and battery production likely targets.

Trump is expected to press Saudi Arabia to announce where it intends to invest the $600 billion that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman committed to during a post-inauguration call in January. Just like during his first term, Trump said that if Saudi Arabia agreed to large purchases of US products, he would make the country his first foreign visit. Now, he will look to hammer out the specifics, which will likely include purchases of military equipment in addition to investments in infrastructure, technology, and mining.

2. Nuclear energy cooperation

Saudi Arabia has tried to start a domestic nuclear power program since 2006. It has signed multiple agreements with various contractors and consultants—but with very little progress other than a small research reactor in Riyadh due to come online soon. Saudi Arabia has engaged with Chinese companies to explore domestic uranium mining and enrichment—a potentially problematic move from the perspective of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because it can easily lead to weapons production.

However, there are signs that Saudi Arabia is now interested in complying with IAEA standards. Last August, Riyadh agreed to IAEA spot inspections designed to ensure that weapons are not being developed, potentially paving a pathway for cooperation with the United States. Last week, the Trump administration announced that it was dropping the Biden administration’s demand that Saudi Arabia normalize relations with Israel as a condition for civil nuclear cooperation negations, putting Saudi nuclear power back on the table. At stake may be commitments from Saudi Arabia to use US companies and American-made materials to build future reactors, as well as deals to supply Saudi-produced critical minerals to US customers.

3. Pumping more oil

Trump has been extremely vocal about his desire to lower oil prices. While US producers don’t want to see prices fall below the sixty dollars per barrel range (breakeven prices in the most productive shale basins are currently in the low to mid sixty dollars per barrel range), consumers would welcome lower gasoline prices this summer. Middle East producers seem eager to help, as OPEC+ recently committed to increase production by 411,000 barrels per day in June and is expected to recommit to gradually put more oil on the market at its ministerial meeting at the end of May. It is unlikely that Trump will press the Gulf countries to make additional commitments, but he will expect them to follow through—and will likely say so to the press.

4. LNG purchases

Trump is likely to push Gulf countries to expand their orders for US liquefied natural gas (LNG). Kuwait and Iraq already import US LNG and Bahrain just received its first cargo last month. Both Kuwait and Bahrain want to buy more LNG to meet high domestic electricity demand over the summer while natural gas outputs decline. Trump should push them to sign long-term offtake agreements with US LNG companies rather than rely on spot market purchases. This will ensure that these countries continue buying US gas even when more LNG become available from nearby Qatar, which is expanding its production.

This should be an easy sell to Kuwait, which is already in talks with the Australian company Woodside to buy a 40 percent stake in its Louisiana LNG terminal. Kuwait is aiming to secure LNG supplies from this project, but even with assistance from the Trump administration, it won’t be fully operational until the early 2030s. Trump should push Kuwait to sign additional offtake agreements, with the idea that if Kuwait does find itself oversupplied with LNG in the future, it can always resell cargos on the spot market.

Strategically, announcing at least two new LNG agreements with Middle Eastern countries will help the Trump administration’s position as it presses Europe to move forward with long-term offtake agreements for US LNG. Europe has been dragging its feet over concerns about emissions reporting, even though Europe needs US gas to replace the Russian LNG it currently buys. Trump can use LNG deals with Middle Eastern consumers to pressure Europe to commit to US purchases before winding down imports of Russian LNG. This would also help Trump pressure Russia to negotiate on Ukraine, as it would further squeeze Moscow’s income.

It isn’t just business

The focus of Trump’s visit to the Middle East may be on strengthening economic ties, but it is tough to ignore the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, particularly regarding Israel, Iran, and the Houthis. Business, trade, and energy markets are important to both the president and the leaders of the Gulf countries he will be meeting, but so are security and diplomacy. In Trump’s mind, business and geopolitics operate in tandem and everything is up for negotiation.  It should not come as a surprise to see energy deals, trade negotiations, sanctions enforcement and even weapons sales materialize in concert.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Ellen Wald

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global Energy Center

Energy & Environment Oil and Gas

New Atlanticist Apr 17, 2025

How the National Energy Dominance Council can set the US on the path to energy security

By Ellen Wald

The National Energy Dominance Council must act quickly to restore stability to the energy industry amid geopolitical uncertainty.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Mar 7, 2025

The US can reduce Russia’s nuclear energy—and geopolitical—influence

By Marina Lorenzini

As the Trump administration outlines its energy priorities, strengthening the US nuclear industry remains a point of bipartisan agreement. Revitalizing this sector will lead not only to domestic economic growth, but also a reduction in Russia’s dominance in global nuclear markets and its geopolitical leverage.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Feb 24, 2025

US energy dominance is Putin’s worst nightmare as Russia enters its fourth year of war crimes

By Olga Khakova, Haley Nelson

Three years of Russia’s senseless aggression in Ukraine have caused monumental, unnecessary human suffering but also an irreversible impact on Russia’s energy sector. Sanctioning Russian LNG at the source is the most effective way to prevent future supply blackmail from Moscow.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Four energy deals Trump will look to make on his Middle East trip  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The answer, according to Kazakh officials, is a cautious yes. In September 2024, Gumar Sergazin, the then head of the Department of Nuclear Energy and Industry, said that SMRs could be built in the cities of Aktau and Kurchatov after 2030. In December, Almasadam Sätqaliev, the then minister of energy who has since been appointed to lead the new atomic energy agency, announced that the government was in discussions with two US companies—NuScale and GE-Hitachi—about the potential construction of SMRs, albeit in the distant future.

Both companies have been on Kazakhstan’s radar for several years. In 2021, NuScale signed a memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants, the designated owner and operator of future nuclear power facilities in the country and a subsidiary of the government’s Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund. The agreement aimed to explore the deployment of NuScale’s SMR VOYGR technology in Kazakhstan. The next year, Bela Ferenczi, General Electric’s president for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, signaled the company’s readiness to offer SMR technology, including the GE Hitachi BWRX-300, for Kazakhstan’s nuclear development. However, in late June 2022, the Kazakh Ministry of Energy removed both vendors from the shortlist for its first nuclear power plant project, citing the lack of a proven track record in constructing and operating these technologies worldwide.

While Kazakhstan’s immediate nuclear focus remains on a large-scale power plant, SMRs could offer several advantages. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), SMRs—typically with a maximum power capacity of about one-third that of traditional reactors—could provide cost savings in capital investment and shorter construction times. They could also be deployed off-grid and scaled incrementally to match growing demand. Additionally, SMRs are expected to require less frequent refueling and are considered by many nuclear experts to be safer, as they can be built underground, making them less vulnerable to earthquakes and extreme weather events.

SMRs can also be placed on or near the sites of retired coal-fired plants. This could potentially reduce costs by avoiding the need for acquiring new land and by utilizing existing infrastructure, such as grid connections, water access, and transportation networks. The cost savings of replacing coal plants with SMRs depend in part on the characteristics of the coal plant. However, recent studies of plants in Poland and China estimated upfront savings in the range of 15 percent to 35 percent. In addition, nuclear energy is well positioned to repurpose the skills of legacy fossil-based energy sector workers. In Kazakhstan, where 66 percent of electricity is generated by coal-fired power plants and the coal industry employs approximately 32,000 people, a coal-to-nuclear transition could significantly support decarbonization and just transition efforts.

Yet, for all their appeal, SMRs are not without drawbacks. Research shows that some advanced SMRs may generate more voluminous and chemically and physically reactive waste than traditional light-water reactors. Moreover, their per-kilowatt costs may prove higher due to the loss of economies of scale, and they could suffer cost overruns during construction. 

Overcoming these challenges would require government support, innovation, and new business models, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports. Should that happen quickly enough, the IEA estimates that SMRs could account for 10 percent of all nuclear capacity globally by 2040. The United States, a leading SMR innovator but overall laggard on new nuclear plant construction, is projected to contribute 20 percent of this growth. Some investors have expressed optimism about a nuclear energy “renaissance” under the Trump administration, as US Energy Secretary Chris Wright has said that nuclear energy is a priority. However, in advanced economies such as the United States, the regulatory approval process is often slow, and the first SMRs are unlikely to be deployed there until the 2030s at the earliest. Currently, only China and Russia have operational SMRs.

Kazakhstan’s cautious approach to SMRs, therefore, reflects a broader reality: SMR technology remains in the early stages of commercial licensing and deployment. Nuclear and political experts I have spoken with generally agree that Astana is unlikely to invest in SMRs without first seeing successful reference cases elsewhere.

Across the border, Uzbekistan has taken a different approach. In 2024, Russian state corporation Rosatom signed its first-ever export contract for a six-unit SMR plant in Uzbekistan’s Jizzakh region. Each reactor will have a capacity of 55 megawatts, bringing the total to 330 megawatts once completed. The project will use the RITM-200N water-cooled reactor, an evolution of the model deployed in Russia’s floating Akademik Lomonosov power station. Notably, no land-based nuclear plants currently use this reactor, although a two-unit project is planned in Yakutia, Russia. Uzbekistan’s nuclear initiative will involve international subcontractors from China and Europe for non-nuclear components. If all goes as planned, the first unit will be operational by 2029, with the entire plant coming online by 2033.

Kyrgyzstan is considering using the same technology to address its need for more energy. In 2023, Rosatom and the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy agreed on a roadmap for a two-unit power plant. Given the country’s mountainous terrain and small grid, SMRs present an attractive alternative to large-scale nuclear power.

As both neighbors develop their SMR potential, Kazakhstan might have more reference cases to draw from. By the time Astana completes its first nuclear power plant, advancements in research and development, an increasing number of reference projects, and reduced costs might indeed make SMRs a more viable option. 

Aruzhan Meirkhanova is a policy analyst and senior researcher at the National Analytical Center, a think tank based at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan.

The post Are small modular reactors in Kazakhstan’s nuclear energy future? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this Atlantic Council issue brief, authors Sachin S. Desai, Michael Y. Hua, Amy C. Roma, Jessica A. Bufford, Jacqueline E. Siebens, and J. Andrew Proffitt explore pathways to address regulation, nonproliferation, and export considerations for fusion technologies. They argue that fusion power plants should be regulated in a pathway that is separate from the regulatory pathways established for fission reactors, especially since the materials and processes involved in fusion power plants are significantly different from fission reactors.

Report Feb 24, 2025

Atoms for Appalachia: The role of nuclear energy in economic development

By Lauren Hughes

Advanced nuclear technologies can drive economic security and energy security within Appalachian states.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource Jan 15, 2025

Tripling global nuclear energy capacity is in reach—if the world seizes the moment

By Amy Drake

At COP28, nations and corporations committed to tripling global nuclear energy capacity by 2050, underscoring its essential role in achieving net-zero emissions. Looking ahead to COP30, global leaders must strengthen multilateral collaboration, engage the financial sector, and provide support for new partnerships with the nuclear industry to meet this goal.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

Global Energy Agenda Feb 20, 2025

The small reactor revolution can transform African energy systems 

By Lassina Zerbo

Africa faces a dual challenge of ensuring reliable access to energy while contributing to global net-zero goals. Nuclear energy—and in particular small modular and micro reactors—can revolutionize the African energy landscape and promote sustainable development.

Africa Energy & Environment

Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

The Atlantic Council’s dedicated home for the exploration of nuclear energy’s future.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Building a path toward global deployment of fusion: Nonproliferation and export considerations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Canada is facing economic threats from China and Russia targeting its critical industries and infrastructure. The Business Council of Canada, which consists of CEOs of top Canadian companies, identified cyberattacks, theft of intellectual property, Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector, and trade weaponization by China among the top economic threats to Canada.

More recently, a new and unexpected threat emerged from the United States, when Washington announced 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy. To address threats from Russia and China and reduce trade overdependence on the United States, Canada’s federal government will need to consolidate economic power and devise an economic statecraft strategy that will leverage Canada’s economic tools to mitigate these economic threats and vulnerabilities. This paper covers the following topics and offers recommendations:

• Economic threats to Canada’s national security 
• An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States
• Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government
• Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems: Sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening

Economic threats to Canada’s national security

Cyberattacks on Canada’s critical infrastructure 

Canada’s critical infrastructure has become a target of state-sponsored cyberattacks. In 2023, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE)—a signals intelligence agency—said that Russia-backed hackers were seeking to disrupt Canada’s energy sector. Apart from accounting for 5 percent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), the energy sector also keeps the rest of Canada’s critical infrastructure functioning. CSE warned that the threat to Canada’s pipelines and physical infrastructure would persist until the end of the war in Ukraine and that the objective was to weaken Canada’s support for Ukraine. 

Beyond critical infrastructure, Canadian companies lost about $4.3 billion due to ransomware attacks in 2021. More recently in February 2025, Russian hacking group Seashell Blizzard was reported to have targeted energy and defense sectors in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Russia and other adversarial states will likely continue targeting Canada’s critical infrastructure and extorting ransom payments from Canadian companies. 

Theft of intellectual property

Canadian companies have become targets of Chinese state-sponsored intellectual theft operations. In 2014, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor stole more than 40,000 files from the National Research Council’s private-sector partners. The National Research Council is a primary government agency dedicated to research and development in science and technology. Apart from undermining Canadian companies, theft of Canada’s intellectual property, especially research on sensitive technologies, poses a threat to Canada’s national security. 

Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector 

Adversarial states have taken advantage of Canada’s academic sector to advance their own strategic and military capabilities. For example, from 2018 to 2023, Canada’s top universities published more than 240 joint papers on quantum cryptography, space science, and other advanced research topics along with Chinese scientists working for China’s top military institutions. In January 2024, Canada’s federal government named more than one hundred institutions in China, Russia, and Iran that pose a threat to Canada’s national security. Apart from calling out specific institutions, the federal government also identified “sensitive research areas.” Universities or researchers who decide to work with the listed institutions on listed sensitive topics will not be eligible for federal grants. 

Trade weaponization by China

Trade weaponization by China has undermined the economic welfare of Canadians and posed a threat to the secure functioning of Canada’s critical infrastructure. For example, between 2019 and 2020, China targeted Canada’s canola sector with 100 percent tariffs, restricting these imports and costing Canadian farmers more than $2.35 billion in lost exports and price pressure. In Canada’s 2024 Fall Economic Statement, which outlined key measures to enhance Canadian economic security, the Ministry of Finance announced its plans to impose additional tariffs on Chinese imports to combat China’s unfair trade practices. These included tariffs on solar products and critical minerals in early 2025, and on permanent magnets, natural graphite, and semiconductors in 2026. 

However, the imposition of 25 percent tariffs by Washington on both Canada and China could result in deepening trade ties between the two. Canada exported a record $2 billion in crude oil to China in 2024, accounting for half of all oil exports through the newly expanded Trans Mountain pipeline. Increased trade with China would increase Canada’s exposure to China’s coercive practices, and would be a direct consequence of US tariffs on Canada. 

An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States

A new and unexpected threat to Canada’s economic security emerged from the United States when the Trump administration threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods (except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy imports). The United States is Canada’s largest export market, receiving a staggering 76 percent of Canada’s exports in 2024. Canada relies on the United States particularly in the context of its crude oil trade, shipping 97.4 percent of its crude oil to the United States. 

Canada had already started working on expansion to global markets through pipeline development even before Washington announced tariffs. It has succeeded in the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline in May 2024, which has enabled the export of Canadian oil to Asia. Canada is reviving talks on the canceled Energy East and Northern Gateway pipelines—the former would move oil from Alberta to Eastern Canada, and the latter would transport oil from Alberta to British Columbia for export to Asian markets. 

In addition to oil trade, another area where Canada is highly dependent on the United States is in auto manufacturing. Behind oil exports, motor vehicles account for the largest share of Canadian exports to the United States, resulting in exports valued at $50.76 billion (C$72.7 billion Canadian dollars) in 2024. With 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods, the automotive industry is expected to take a hit, especially as components cross the border six to eight times before final assembly.

Figure 1

The United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs on Canada with the stated objective to curb fentanyl flows to the United States. The measure has plunged US-Canada relations into chaos and could result in a trade war between the two long-standing allies. In response, Canada might reroute oil shipments to China through existing pipelines and increase trade with China in general. Further economic integration with China would increase Canada’s exposure to economic threats emanating from China, including trade weaponization and anti-competitive practices. 

Because of US tariffs, Canada could also face challenges in strengthening the resilience of its nuclear fuel and critical mineral supply chains. In the 2024 Fall Economic Statement, Canada outlined key measures for its economic security that heavily incorporated US cooperation. This included plans to strengthen nuclear fuel supply chain resiliency away from Russian influence, with up to $500 million set aside for enriched nuclear fuel purchase contracts from the United States. Canada also aims to strengthen supply chains for responsibly produced critical minerals, following a $3.8 billion investment in its Critical Minerals Strategy, which relies on the United States as a key partner. Given the tariffs, Canada will need to diversify its partners and supply sources quickly if it wishes to maintain these economic security goals. 

Figure 2: US-Canada overlapping memberships in security organizations and alliances

Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government

Canada has a range of economic tools and sources of economic power to respond to emerging economic threats and mitigate vulnerabilities; however, it currently lacks economic power consolidation. Unlike the United States, where the federal government can regulate nearly all economic activity, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867 grants provinces control over their “property and civil rights,” including natural resources. Section 92A, which was added to the constitution in 1982, further reinforced the provinces’ control over their natural resources. Meanwhile, the federal government has control over matters of international trade including trade controls. However, when international trade issues concern the natural resources of provinces, tensions and disagreements often arise between provinces and the federal government, and the lack of economic power consolidation by the federal government becomes obvious.

This issue manifested when the United States announced 25 percent tariffs on Canada in March 2025 as Canada’s federal government and the Alberta province had different reactions. Canada’s main leverage over the United States is oil exports. Refineries in the United States, particularly those in the Midwest, run exclusively on Canadian crude oil, having tailored their refineries to primarily process the heavy Canadian crude. Since 2010, Canadian oil accounted for virtually 100 percent of the oil imported by the Midwest. Threatening to hike levies on crude oil exports could have been Canada’s way of leveraging energy interdependence to respond to US tariffs. However, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith stated that Alberta, which is Canada’s largest oil producer and top exporter of crude oil to the United States, would not hike levies on oil and gas exports to the United States. Being unable to speak in one voice as a country even during a crisis is a direct consequence of Canada’s regional factionalism, characterized by each province looking out for their own interests. 

The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement, which entered into force during the first Trump administration in July 2020, may have also contributed to diminishing the economic power of Canada’s federal government. Article 32.10 of USMCA requires each member of the agreement to notify other countries if it plans to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with a nonmarket economy. Thus, if Canada were to sign an FTA with China, the United States and Mexico could review the agreement and withdraw from USMCA with six months’ notice. After the USMCA was signed, Canadian scholars wrote that this clause would effectively turn Canada into a vassal state of the United States, with the authority to make decisions on internal affairs but having to rely on the larger power for foreign and security policy decisions. Five years later, it looks like the USMCA has put Canada in a difficult position, being targeted by US tariffs and not having advanced trading relations with other countries. 

Figure 3: US-Canada overlapping memberships in economic organizations and alliances

Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems

To secure Canada’s critical infrastructure and leverage its natural resources to shape favorable foreign policy outcomes, Canada’s federal government has a range of economic tools and the ability to design new ones when appropriate. Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit is similar to those of the United States and the European Union and includes sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening. Canada has imposed financial sanctions and export controls against Russia along with its Group of Seven (G7) allies. It has levied tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, in line with US policy, and recently created investment screening authorities to address concerns about adversarial capital. 

Financial sanctions 

Similar to the United States, Canada maintains sanctions programs covering specific countries such as Russia and Iran, as well as thematic sanctions regimes such as terrorism. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), which is Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, administers sanctions and maintains the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. Canada’s Finance Ministry, the Department of Finance, is not involved in sanctions designations, implementation, or enforcement, unlike in the United States, where the Department of the Treasury is the primary administrator of sanctions. 

The Parliament of Canada has enacted legislation authorizing the imposition of sanctions through three acts: the United Nations Act; the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA); and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA). 

The United Nations Act enables GAC to implement sanctions against entities or individuals sanctioned by the UN Security Council. When an act of aggression or a grave breach of international peace occurs and the UN Security Council is unable to pass a resolution, Canada implements autonomous sanctions under SEMA; this act is Canada’s primary law for imposing autonomous sanctions and includes country-based sanctions programs. It is also used to align Canada’s sanctions with those of allies. For example, GAC derived its powers from SEMA to designate Russian entities and individuals in alignment with Canada’s Western allies in 2022. Meanwhile, the JVCFOA allows GAC to impose sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations and significant acts of corruption, similar to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act in the United States, with sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

Once GAC adds entities and individuals to the lists of sanctions, Canadian financial institutions comply by freezing the designated party’s assets and suspending transactions. GAC coordinates with several government agencies to enforce and enable private-sector compliance with sanctions: 

• FINTRAC: Canada’s financial intelligence unit (FIU)—Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)—is responsible for monitoring suspicious financial activities and collecting reporting from financial institutions on transactions that may be linked to sanctions evasion. FINTRAC is an independent agency that reports to the Minister of Finance. FINTRAC works closely with the US financial intelligence unit—Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—on illicit finance investigations and when sanctions evasion includes the US financial system. For example, FinCEN and FINTRAC both monitor and share financial information related to Russian sanctions evasion and publish advisories and red flags for the financial sector in coordination with other like-minded partner FIUs. 

• OSFI: The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is a banking regulator that issues directives to financial institutions regarding compliance and instructs banks to freeze assets belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities. FINTRAC also shares financial intelligence with OSFI on sanctions evasion activity under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). OSFI shares intelligence with Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the national police service of Canada, if there is evidence of sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. 

• RCMP: Once OSFI notifies RCMP about suspicious activity, RCMP investigates whether the funds are linked to sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. If it finds evidence of a violation of sanctions or criminal activity, RCMP obtains a court order to seize assets under the Criminal Code and the PCMLTFA.

• CBSA: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for blocking sanctioned individuals from entering Canada. CBSA also notifies OSFI if sanctioned individuals attempt to move cash or gold through border crossings. 

All four agencies work with GAC and with one another on sanctions enforcement. GAC sets sanctions policy, FINTRAC analyzes financial intelligence and shares suspicious activity reports to inform law enforcement investigations, OSFI enforces compliance in banks, RCMP investigates crimes and seizes assets, and CBSA prevents sanctioned individuals from entering Canada and moving assets across borders. 

While financial sanctions are part of Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit, Canadian sanctions power does not have the same reach as US sanctions. The preeminence of the US dollar and the omnipresence of major US banks allows the United States to effectively cut off sanctioned individuals and entities from the global financial system. Canadian sanctions are limited to Canadian jurisdiction and affect individuals and entities with financial ties to Canada, but they do not have the same reach as US financial sanctions. 

Nevertheless, Canadian authorities have been able to leverage financial sanctions to support the G7 allies in sanctioning Russia. For example, in December 2022, under SEMA, Canadian authorities ordered Citco Bank Canada, a subsidiary of a global hedge fund headquartered in the Cayman Islands, to freeze $26 million owned directly or indirectly by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, who has been sanctioned by Canada and other G7 allies. In June 2023, Canadian authorities seized a Russian cargo jet at Toronto’s Pearson Airport pursuant to SEMA. 

Figure 4

Export controls

Canada participates in several multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group. When multilateral regimes fall short in addressing Canada’s foreign policy needs, Canada leverages its autonomous export control list, which is administered by GAC under the Export and Import Permits Act. The Trade Controls Bureau under GAC is responsible for issuing permits and certificates for the items included on the Export Control List (ECL).

Canada Border Services Agency plays a crucial role in the enforcement of export controls. CBSA verifies that shipments match the export permit issued by GAC. It can seize or refuse exports that violate GAC export permits through ports, airports, and land borders. CBSA refers cases to the Royal Canada Mounted Police (CRMP) for prosecution if exporters attempt to bypass regulations. 

Separately, FINTRAC monitors financial transactions that might be connected to the exports of controlled goods and technologies. If FINTRAC detects suspicious transactions, it shares intelligence with GAC and other relevant authorities. Canada’s method of leveraging financial intelligence for enforcing export controls is similar to that of the United States, where FinCEN has teamed up with the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to detect export control evasion through financial transactions. 

While in the United States the export controls authority lies within the Commerce Department, Canada’s equivalent, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), does not participate in administering export controls. That responsibility is fully absorbed by GAC. 

While Canada has mainly used its export control authority in the context of sensitive technologies, Canadian politiciansand experts have recently been calling on the federal government to impose restrictions on mineral exports to the United States in response to US tariffs. The United States highly depends on Canada’s minerals, including uranium, aluminum, and nickel. Canada was the United States’ top supplier of metals and minerals in 2023 ($46.97 billion in US imports), followed by China ($28.32 billion) and Mexico ($28.18 billion). Notably, President Trump’s recent executive order called Unleashing American Energy instructed the director of the US Geological Survey to add uranium to the critical minerals list. Canada provides 25 percent of uranium to the United States. If Canada were to impose export controls on uranium, the US objective of building a resilient enriched uranium supply chain would be jeopardized. 

However, Canada could not impose export controls on the United States without experiencing significant blowback. Export control is a powerful tool. While US tariffs would increase the price of imported Canadian goods by at least 25 percent, Canada’s export controls would completely cut off the flow of certain Canadian goods to the United States. It would be destructive for both economies, so Canada will likely reserve this tool as a last resort and perhaps work on finding alternative export destinations before pulling such a trigger. 

Figure 5

Tariffs

Canada’s approach to tariffs is governed primarily by the Customs Act, which outlines the procedures for assessing and collecting tariffs on imported goods, as well as the Customs Tariff legislation that sets the duty rates for specific imports (generally based on the “Harmonized System,” an internationally standardized system for classifying traded products). The Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for administering these tariffs. Additionally, the Special Import Measures Act enables Canada to protect industries from harm caused by unfair trade practices like dumping or subsidizing of imported goods, with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal determining injury and the CBSA imposing necessary duties. The minister of finance, in consultation with the minister of foreign affairs, plays a key role in proposing tariff changes or retaliatory tariffs, ensuring Canada’s trade policies align with its broader economic and diplomatic objectives. 

Canada has frequently aligned with its allies on tariff issues, as demonstrated in 2024 when, following the US and EU tariffs, it imposed a 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles to protect domestic industries. However, Canada has also been proactive in responding to US tariffs, employing a combination of diplomatic negotiations, retaliatory tariffs, and reliance on dispute resolution mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization and USMCA. In the past Canada was also quick to align itself with allies such as the EU and Mexico, seeking a coordinated international response, as was the case in 2018 when the United States imposed a broad tariff on steel and aluminum.

Similar to the United States, Canada offers remission allowances to help businesses adjust to tariffs by granting relief under specific circumstances, such as the inability to source goods from nontariffed countries or preexisting contractual obligations. The Department of Finance regularly seeks input from stakeholders before introducing new tariffs. In 2024, a thirty-day consultation was launched about possible tariffs on Chinese batteries, battery parts, semiconductors, critical minerals, metals, and solar panels, though it has yet to result in any new tariffs. 

Canada’s primary weakness regarding tariffs is its lack of trade diversification. The United States accounts for half of Canada’s imports and 76 percent of its exports. This dependency severely limits Canada’s ability to impose tariffs on the United States without facing significant economic repercussions. Canada’s relatively limited economic leverage on the global stage also complicates efforts to coordinate multilateral tariff responses or to negotiate favorable trade agreements. Furthermore, Canada’s lengthy public consultations and regulatory processes for implementing tariffs hinder its ability to leverage tariffs as a swift response to changing geopolitical or economic circumstances. 

Figure 6

Investment screening

Canada’s investment screening is governed by the Investment Canada Act (ICA), which ensures that foreign investments do not harm national security while promoting economic prosperity. The ICA includes net benefit reviews for large investments and national security reviews for any foreign investments which pose potential security risks, such as foreign control over critical sectors like technology or infrastructure.

The review process is administered by ISED, with the minister of innovation, science, and industry overseeing the reviews in consultation with Public Safety Canada. For national security concerns, multiple agencies assess potential risks, and the Governor-in-Council (GIC) has the authority to block investments or demand divestitures.

Criticism of the ICA includes lack of transparency and consistency, particularly in national security reviews, where decisions may be influenced by political or diplomatic considerations. To better mitigate risks to security, critical infrastructure, and the transfer of sensitive technologies, experts have argued that the ICA should more effectively target malicious foreign investments by incorporating into the review process the perspectives of Canadian companies on emerging national security threats. In response to these concerns, Bill C-34 introduced key updates in 2024, including preclosing filing requirements for sensitive sectors, the possibility of interim conditions during national security reviews, broader scope covering state-owned enterprises and asset sales, consideration for intellectual property and personal data protection, and increased penalties for noncompliance. In March 2025, further amendments were made to the ICA, expanding its scope to review “opportunistic or predatory” foreign investments. These changes were introduced in response to the United States’ imposition of blanket tariffs on Canadian goods.

Figure 7

Positive economic statecraft

Apart from coercive/protective tools, Canada maintains positive economic statecraft (PES) tools such as development assistance to build economic alliances beyond North America. For example, Canada is one of the largest providers of international development assistance to African countries. After Ukraine, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the top recipients of Canada’s international assistance. Canada’s PES tools lay the ground for the federal governments to have productive cooperation when needs arise. Canadian authorities should leverage PES tools to enhance the country’s international standing and increase economic connectivity with other regions of the world. This is especially important amid the US pause on nearly all US foreign assistance. Canada could step up to help fill the vacuum in the developing world created by the Trump administration’s radical departure from a long-standing US role in foreign aid. 

Canadian authorities have already taken steps in this direction. On March 9, Canadian Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen announced that Canada would be providing $272.1 million for foreign aid projects in Bangladesh and the Indo-Pacific region. The projects will focus on climate adaptation, empowering women in the nursing sector, advancing decent work and inclusive education and training. Earlier, on March 6, Global Affairs Canada launched its first Global Africa Strategy with the goal of deepening trade and investment relations with Africa, partnering on peace and security challenges, and advancing shared priorities on the international stage including climate change. Through this partnership, Canada plans to strengthen economic and national security by enhancing supply chain resilience and maintaining corridors for critical goods. 

Conclusion

Canada’s federal government maintains a range of economic statecraft tools and authorities to address economic and national security threats. While regional factionalism and provincial equities can hinder the federal government’s ability to leverage the full force of Canada’s economic power, threats to Canada’s economic security, including tariffs from the United States, may prove to further unite and align the provinces. The federal government and provincial premiers should work together to meet this challenging moment, consolidating Canada’s sources of economic power and moving forward with a cohesive economic statecraft strategy to protect the country’s national security and economic security interests.

Canada’s leadership and engagement in international fora including the G7, NATO, Wassenaar Agreement, among others, as well as its bilateral relationships, make it well-placed to coordinate and collaborate with Western partners on economic statecraft. Information sharing, joint investigations, multilateral sanctions, and multilateral development and investment can extend the reach of Canada’s economic power while strengthening Western efforts to leverage economic statecraft to advance global security objectives and ensure the integrity of the global financial system. Canada also has a solid foundation for building economic partnerships beyond the West through development assistance and other positive economic statecraft tools. 

Staff

Kimberly Donovan

Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Economic Sanctions

Staff

Maia Nikoladze

Associate Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Eastern Europe

Staff

Lize de Kruijf

Program Assistant, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Dutch Economic Sanctions

The authors would like to thank Nazima Tursun, a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, for research support.

The report is part of a year-long series on economic statecraft across the G7 and China supported in part by a grant from MITRE.

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For the past two decades, Russia has wielded its nuclear energy technologies—through its state-owned conglomerate Rosatom—as a strategic export to exert geopolitical leverage. Rosatom has been a dependable, cost-effective, and technically competent partner for stakeholders around the world, enabling its dominant market position.

Substantial up-front project finance and loans have contributed to Rosatom’s international success. Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Hungary, and Turkey have benefitted from multibillion-dollar loans from Russia’s State Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank). State sponsorship allows Rosatom to offer favorable loan terms—such as a 3 percent interest rate—that competitors cannot match. Meanwhile, any analogous form of concessional loans for infrastructure projects has not been a part of the development strategy among Rosatom’s competitors.

However, some countries that previously embraced the vision of energy integration with Russia continue to shift investments away from Russian partners. Countries tied to Rosatom for their nuclear supplies are keen to diversify—if not extract themselves entirely—from energy dependence on Russia. Additionally, Vnesheconombank‘s SWIFT ban and US sanctions designation increases risks for loan recipients.

The United States—and allies with nuclear industries such as France and South Korea—could further convert the commercial interest for non-Russian products into strategic wins by focusing on countries with Soviet-era reactors. Countries and utilities often cite project finance as the primary barrier for building, but the new political momentum in the United States could galvanize both sufficient funds and new models across the public and private sectors.

Bulgaria seeks two new reactors at Soviet-era site

Bulgaria’s Kozloduy nuclear power plant operates two Soviet-era VVER-1000 reactors which supply one third of the country’s electricity. But in February 2024, Bulgaria signed an intergovernmental agreement with the United States to contribute to Bulgaria’s civil nuclear program, including the design, construction, and commissioning of two Westinghouse AP-1000 reactors at Kozloduy at a cost of $14 billion. Bulgaria’s energy minister said that the two reactors will be built entirely with public funds: either the Bulgarian treasury or the state plant owner will finance up to 30 percent of the project costs, and a loan will cover the remaining costs.

In early February, the Bulgarian energy minister met with officials from the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM) to advance a $8.6 billion (more than 60 percent of the estimated cost) letter of interest for the two new reactors. For the remaining amount, the Bulgarian treasury or Kozloduy’s owner has several options. Bulgaria may also have access to debt or equity financing from the world’s largest multilateral development lender, the European Investment Bank. Additionally, as the World Bank considers how to incorporate nuclear power into their offerings, any steps toward engagement would encourage other lenders to do the same. If further capital is required, Bulgaria—with its relatively healthy domestic economy—could issue dollar-denominated bonds to raise funds, or the Kozloduy owner could issue green bonds similar to Canada’s Bruce Power.

Bulgaria’s ability—and that of any potential lenders—to overcome financing hurdles will determine the success of such agreements. But if the agreement leads to new nuclear power generation, it bodes well for similar economies to undertake new reactor builds.

Soviet reactor reaches end of life in Armenia

Russia dominates Armenia’s energy system, but Armenian foreign policy has shifted dramatically away from Moscow in the past year, in part due to the lack of Russian military assistance to Armenia when Azerbaijan seized Nagorno-Karabakh.

The policy change will not immediately impact Armenia’s Soviet-era VVER-440 nuclear reactor at Metsamor, which has received several upgrades and lifetime extensions—the latest, with Rosatom’s support, will sustain the remaining operational reactor until 2036. However, preparations must be made in the coming years to: extend the operational lifetime (a highly unlikely outcome due to the reactor’s age); build new light-water reactors (whether from China, Russia, South Korea, or the United States); or invest in small modular reactors (SMRs). Armenia may seek to build an SMR rather than a traditional reactor due to limited financing options and low power consumption.

To build a new reactor, Armenia might want to follow Romania’s blended model for financing its SMR deal with NuScale. The EXIM and US International Development Finance Corporation offered Romania tentative financial support totaling $4 billion. Public and private partners then formed a coalition of stakeholders from Japan, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States to finance the SMR project up to $275 million. If further capital is needed, private financial institutions have also recently announced their plans to support the nuclear industry. Whether and when construction begins for the reactor in Romania will demonstrate feasibility, but so far, the financial structure has shown promise.

A great nuclear power balance

In partnership with allies, the United States should advance financial and commercial solutions to help countries dependent on Russian nuclear energy diversify their domestic power programs. The United States is well positioned to do so. Trump, and Biden before him, have supported nuclear energy domestically, which, in turn, can result in the export of US technologies and expertise. Strong bipartisan appropriations from multiple administrations will reinforce Trump’s vision and the domestic nuclear energy industry. In 2019, during Trump’s first administration, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act became law, paving the way for a streamlined advanced reactor licensing process. Under the Biden administration, the multibillion-dollar appropriations from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act bolstered the US nuclear energy industry. Further, the 2023 Nuclear Fuel Security Act and the 2024 ADVANCE Act enjoyed bipartisan support on Capitol Hill.

Building on these domestic advances, Trump’s embrace of financial vehicles, such as the EXIM Bank or DFC, that bridge public and private sectors, will facilitate investments in multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects outside of the United States and bolster US energy-related exports, including from its domestic nuclear energy industry. These factors bode well for the United States to substantially weaken Russia’s share of global nuclear markets and its geopolitical influence.

Marina Lorenzini is the research program coordinator at the Middle East Initiative at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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After having withdrawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term, Trump has since expressed an interest in a negotiated settlement with Tehran. But with all deals, the details matter. And while it is true that the Trump administration has not yet given its blessing to Israel for military strikes against Iran—as US intelligence reportedly portends—it was unrealistic to expect such a move from Trump as the opening act of his presidency. Trump needed time to build his team, formulate a policy, and secure international legitimacy and support for military action should it become necessary. The third task requires leaving open a lane for diplomacy to make it possible to blame Tehran should negotiations fail and to secure political support from US allies and partners.

Right now, signs indicate that the United States and Iran are headed towards confrontation, not a successful diplomatic outcome.

The Islamic Republic has not yet softened its position on the nuclear file, even after being weakened by a series of killings of leaders across its proxy network and by the degrading of a chunk of its air defenses and missile capacities. While Iranian decisionmakers have recognized the reality that the 2015 text of the JCPOA is long dead, they have clung to the vision of resurrecting a new deal premised on the basic bargain of temporary nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, using the JCPOA as a reference point or framework. 

Some Iranian officials have taken to the airwaves to hint that there may be willingness to discuss nonnuclear concerns, but those who are the real decisionmakers on these issues—the supreme leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have shunned talks over its missile and drone programs and other regional files. Their stances speak louder than the propagandists trying to give an impression to Western constituencies and others that such fundamental change is possible. History has shown that it is not.

In February, the supreme leader himself delivered public remarks warning against negotiations with the Trump administration: “One shall not negotiate with a government like this,” he said. “Negotiating is unwise, unintelligent, not honorable.” Already this has triggered hardened rhetoric from Iranian officials, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had previously made more conciliatory comments towards the Trump administration. Since Khamenei’s speech, the Pezeshkian administration has experienced further headwinds with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as well as the resignation of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, who has long been seen as the face of the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the United States.

But Khamenei’s warning last month was not the sweeping ban he laid down in September 2019, when he said, “the policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian nation is of little importance, and all the officials in the Islamic Republic unanimously believe that there will be no negotiations at any level with the United States.” The Islamic Republic under Khamenei will likely never truly walk away completely from the negotiating table, as its political weaponization is a valuable tool to buy time for the regime and divide the United States from within and from its allies. This does not necessarily mean there will be direct and public diplomacy with the Trump administration at this juncture. However, Khamenei’s latest comments seem to leave some room for diplomacy in that they do not necessarily rule out indirect discussions. Such discussions could take place through various channels of communication that Tehran has long maintained with Washington, including through Arab regional interlocutors and European governments. Russia has also reportedly agreed to serve as an intermediary. Still, the obstacles are significant.

For now, on substance, Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But US officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran as long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program. The US secretary of state hinted at a similar demand, noting that in the past, “efforts that Iran has undertaken diplomatically have been only about how to extend the time frame” for its nuclear program and to continue to enrich, sponsor terrorism, build long-range weapons, and “sow instability throughout the region.” 

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) included related pledges, vowing to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” NSPM-2 also employed mandatory language stating that the US ambassador to the United Nations will “work with key allies to complete the snapback”—or restoration—”of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” This language evokes past US demands for zero enrichment or reprocessing in Iran, which the first Trump administration endorsed. Triggering snapback would also restore previous UN Security Council resolutions, inked before the 2015 JCPOA, which included demands for Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities . . . and work on all heavy-water related projects.”

NSPM-2 likewise declared that it is US policy that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles,” among other measures to counter Iran’s malign behavior beyond its nuclear program. These US positions are reminiscent of the 2003 Libya disarmament deal, in which the country pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear, and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, this is a fundamentally different paradigm from the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent purity and did not touch its missile program.

In fact, Iran’s supreme leader has warned that US officials “intend to systematically reduce Iran’s nuclear facilities, similar to how they did with a North African country”—a hint at Libya—”ultimately leading to the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry.” In 2011, Khamenei (referring to Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi) said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’” He added, “Look where we are, and in what position they are now.” In 2023, after talks about reviving the JCPOA stalled, Khamenei reiterated that “there is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” 

Despite forty-six years of failed diplomacy, outside observers have been insisting Iran is ripe for a durable diplomatic arrangement with the United States. Some supporters of negotiations with Iran have also been wishcasting that Trump suddenly adopted the Obama administration’s Iran policy based on an overreading of the new president’s rhetoric and the absence of certain officials, such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who took a hardline stance, from the policymaking process. But this is a false narrative, one that even some Islamic Republic officials like to promote while arguing that Trump was suckered into an Iran policy that was not his own, despite him expressing disapproval of the JCPOA during his first presidential campaign, well before his national security team was assembled.

There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics and Iran’s military and security apparatus. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

The post The stage is set for a US-Iran showdown—not a deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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It is imperative that discussions of opportunities and costs of a potential new nuclear project consider local wants and needs. An integrated, localized approach to nuclear development will enable economic opportunities for first-mover states as well as an honest assessment of the challenges to advancing nuclear deployment. States that deploy advanced nuclear technologies will face common challenges, like projecting workforce needs and attracting talent to the energy workforce; these challenges present opportunities for interstate collaboration.

In this report, “Atoms for Appalachia: The role of advanced nuclear technologies in economic development,” Lauren Hughes discusses common throughlines between the state-centric discussions and examines the role of advanced nuclear technologies in facilitating clean manufacturing and stimulating local and regional economic opportunities.

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Tripling global nuclear energy capacity is in reach—if the world seizes the moment

By Amy Drake

At COP28, nations and corporations committed to tripling global nuclear energy capacity by 2050, underscoring its essential role in achieving net-zero emissions. Looking ahead to COP30, global leaders must strengthen multilateral collaboration, engage the financial sector, and provide support for new partnerships with the nuclear industry to meet this goal.

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A new generation of nuclear reactors is poised to set the United States—and the world—on the path to net zero

By John Wagner

Over the next decade, more than a dozen advanced reactor concepts will be demonstrated in the United States. Ensuring the advancement of this nuclear energy will be critical to securing security, prosperity, and environmental sustainability for future generations.

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Japan’s economic revitalization requires nuclear energy

By Lauren Hughes, Maia Sparkman

Japan’s economy is recovering, with government efforts to boost population growth and expand energy-intensive industries like AI and semiconductors. However, current energy policies may not meet rising demand. Restarting nuclear reactors under enhanced safety measures is key to Japan’s energy security and climate goals. To sustain growth, Japan must continue restarting its nuclear fleet and invest in next-generation reactors, addressing workforce and supply chain challenges.

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The Frontiers Project efforts are dedicated to helping catalyze the industry, academic, and government partnerships in advanced nuclear energy first-mover states to secure United States leadership in the new frontier of global economic competition.

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The post Atoms for Appalachia: The role of nuclear energy in economic development appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lassina Zerbo is the chairperson of the Rwanda Atomic Energy Board, former prime minister of Burkina Faso, and executive secretary emeritus of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. This essay is part of the Global Energy Agenda.

Africa is at a decisive point in its energy journey. With a rapidly growing population and a persistent energy deficit, the continent faces a dual challenge of ensuring reliable access to energy while contributing to global carbon-neutrality goals. Nuclear energy—and in particular small modular and micro reactors (SMRs)—can revolutionize the African energy landscape and promote sustainable development. 

Currently, over 600 million Africans lack access to electricity, a situation exacerbated by weak electrical infrastructure and heavy dependence on biomass. This energy deficit hampers economic growth and contributes to widening social inequalities. 

Although promising, renewable energy sources are often limited by their intermittent nature. So far, solar and wind power have not provided the stable baseload power that is essential for industrialization and urbanization. Africa needs an energy-intensive low-carbon alternative that complements renewable energy to sustainably meet its energy needs. 

The potential of nuclear power in Africa is immense. It provides stable, carbon-free energy with the best return on investment among current technologies. However, traditional nuclear reactors require large initial investments and extensive existing infrastructure, which can be prohibitive for many African countries. This is where micro reactors and SMRs offer a breakthrough solution. 

SMRs, characterized by their compact size and modular design, typically generate up to 300 megawatts per unit. Unlike conventional reactors, SMRs are factory built, reducing construction costs and lead times. They can be deployed in remote areas with limited grid capacity, making them ideal for Africa’s diverse landscape. In addition, SMRs feature enhanced safety mechanisms, such as passive cooling systems, which minimize the risk of accidents. 

SMRs offer a combination of economic and environmental advantages that make them well suited to Africa’s energy needs. The fact that their initial investment cost is generally lower than that of large reactors, coupled with the possibility of setting up innovative financing models, makes their adoption more accessible. Their modularity enables flexible deployment, ideal for electrifying rural areas and supporting industrial development without the need for heavy electrical infrastructure.  

On the environmental front, SMRs have a reduced carbon footprint, in line with global climate objectives. Their integration into the energy mix complements intermittent renewable energy sources, ensuring a stable electricity supply while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, the development of this technology encourages the transfer of skills and strengthening of local capacities, laying the foundations for long-term technological autonomy. 

To attract investors and ensure public support, African governments need to put in place favorable policies, notably by strengthening their regulatory frameworks and conducting information campaigns to allay any public concerns. 

Skills development is also an important pillar for the successful integration of nuclear power in Africa. Implementing this technology requires a skilled and experienced workforce. Ambitious training programs, supported by international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, are helping to train the sector’s future experts. Countries such as Rwanda have already shown the way by investing heavily in the training of nuclear scientists and engineers, demonstrating the feasibility of such projects. 

International partnerships are also important to accelerate the deployment of nuclear power in Africa. The West African Economic and Monetary Union is opening up new prospects for energy cooperation by launching a study on the feasibility of installing nuclear power plants in its member countries. The technical and financial complexity of these projects also require close collaboration between African countries and international players. Public-private partnerships, as well as the support of financial institutions like the African Development Bank, the West African Development Bank, and the Economic Commission for Africa, are key to mobilizing the necessary investments.  

But the deployment of nuclear energy in Africa faces a number of challenges. Public distrust, often fueled by misinformation about the risks involved, is a major obstacle. In addition, existing energy infrastructure is often insufficient, necessitating major investment and enhanced regional cooperation, as shown by the example of the West African Power Pool, an association of public and private power entities. Finally, political stability and continuity of energy policies are essential to ensure the long-term success of such projects.  

Small modular and micro reactors offer Africa a real opportunity to transform its energy landscape. With enhanced international cooperation, the continent can build a safer, cleaner energy future, while improving the quality of life for millions of Africans. 

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post The small reactor revolution can transform African energy systems  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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One critical challenge for the United States in the energy security space is the sourcing of enriched uranium that fuels nuclear reactors across the country, vital for the energy transition away from fossil fuels. The United States has consistently depended on Russia for enrichment services. At the same time, the US enrichment capacity, once thriving, has dwindled, giving way to foreign imports. Nearly seventy-three percent of enriched uranium in 2023 originated abroad. Such reliance on a handful of foreign sources, and especially adversarial countries, introduces severe supply vulnerabilities. With the global demand for enriched uranium expected to rise, the United States should regain its status as a large uranium enricher capable of satisfying its domestic demand.

Russia has a consistent track record of weaponizing energy dependence to coerce other countries. Approximately twenty-seven percent of the enriched uranium used in the United States comes from Russia, which is responsible for around forty-four percent of global enrichment capacity. Although the Biden administration banned Russian uranium imports by signing the H.R.1042, Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act into law, effective August 2024, the Act permits US firms to procure nuclear fuel from Russia’s state-run nuclear energy firm, Rosatom, under a waiver program until alternative suppliers are secured. These waivers, however, can only be granted until 2028 and are designed to give US energy providers sufficient time to adjust to the new conditions.

In response, in November 2024, Moscow announced “tit-for-tat” restrictions on uranium exports to the United States. According to the new rules, exemptions might be made under one-off licenses issued by the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control. While it is unclear whether such licenses will be granted, this move yet again showcases the risks of relying on external fuel sources.

The pursuit of indigenous enrichment capacity is not motivated by market dynamics or elevated prices. The current price of enrichment services (measured in separative work units) is significantly lower than at any point between 2006 and 2019. Instead, the drive stems from vulnerabilities associated with overreliance on a handful of suppliers. Such concentration of supply may become vulnerable to disruptions caused by malign actors or market shocks.

Building resilient enriched uranium supply chains is a critical policy to prevent future weaponization and disruptions by malign actors. It requires more than simply halting imports from Russia. The United States should pursue a strategic policy to meet its own nuclear fuel needs while helping establish resilient and transparent supply chains to other nations. The Sapporo 5—a coalition of like-minded countries comprising Canada, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—has pledged to collaborate on securing a reliable nuclear fuel supply chain. Achieving this objective will require a sustained increase in allied financing across all stages of the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment.

A growing bipartisan consensus in the United States supports strengthening domestic uranium enrichment programs, even if allies and partners temporarily fill the gaps. Until recently, the United States lacked domestically owned uranium enrichment facilities. To address this, around $3.4 billion has been mobilized to jumpstart domestic enrichment efforts. These funds will benefit domestic enrichers and support firms at other fuel cycle stages, including mining.

The goal of building domestic uranium enrichment capacity to safeguard from disruptions should remain a priority. Despite the optimistic outlook, the jury is still out on whether these efforts are sustained in the long run. Such investments cannot have immediate results and require a strategic vision. Additionally, the nuclear fuel cycle, by design, is hard to sustain competitively without close public-private collaboration. Public-private partnerships and long-term demand signals to service providers are essential to building a resilient enriched uranium supply chain.

Mikael Pir-Budagyan was a Young Global Professional with the Economic Statecraft Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

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The post Securing energy independence: The US path to resilient enriched uranium supply chain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Thu, February 6, 2025 • 10:00 am ET

A new era for nuclear energy with the International Energy Agency’s Fatih Birol

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT— Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency, discusses the role of nuclear energy in the future energy landscape.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

“Today I can confirm that nuclear is making a comeback,” said Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA) at an Atlantic Council event on Thursday. Birol, who is also an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member, spoke about his organization’s first-ever report dedicated solely to nuclear energy and what its findings could mean for the future of global energy security. 

“More than forty countries have concrete plans and projects in place to build or expand their nuclear capacity,” said Birol. “We have never seen this before.”

The IEA, an independent intergovernmental organization based in Paris, commissioned its report on nuclear energy in June 2024 amid growing global interest in nuclear power and increased electricity demand. Birol discussed the reasons for the recent resurgence, the challenges hindering the nuclear industries in the United States and Europe, and what he believes Western policymakers will need to do to ensure that nuclear power helps provide energy security. 

“From the IEA’s point of view, energy security is the full spectrum of the traditional energy security risks plus the emerging energy security risks, such as critical mineral supply chains,” said Birol.

Read below for more highlights from the discussion with Birol on the state of nuclear energy, which was moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe. 

A growing global interest in nuclear power

• Birol said increased demand for electricity is a major factor in the push for nuclear energy, including growing demand for air conditioning and artificial intelligence data centers. “In the age of strong electricity demand growth,” he said, “countries are moving forward to make nuclear part of the power generation mix again.”
• “We have never seen such a big amount of the construction of nuclear power plants in the last three decades,” Birol said. He mentioned Italy, Japan, Sweden, and other countries that are showing renewed interest in nuclear energy after previous opposition. He also noted “strong momentum” from countries such as Poland and Turkey, which have demonstrated interest in launching their first nuclear energy projects. 
• Birol also highlighted the growing interest in developing small modular reactors, which he said are “easier to finance,” “more flexible, less complex projects to implement,” and “faster to build” compared to traditional large-scale nuclear power plants.

Difficulties ahead

• Despite the increased enthusiasm for nuclear projects, including in the West, the IEA found that there are significant challenges to project implementation and increasingly stiff competition from China. “In the last five years, more than 80 percent of the new nuclear capacity came from China,” Birol said. He added that “China, with the current policies, before the end of this decade will overtake the United States and will be the number one nuclear power in the world.”
• One of the reasons China has made such strides, Birol said, is that in the United States and Europe, “it is rare that a project finishes on time and on budget.” He added that, on average, US and European nuclear projects face eight years of delay and cost more than two-and-a-half times the planned budget. 
• Birol also highlighted the need for countries to develop greater enrichment capacity. Russia alone currently holds more than 40 percent of the world’s uranium enrichment capacity, according to the IEA’s analysis. “In Europe, we have experienced the bitter consequence of over-reliance on one single country” for energy, Birol said. “Diversification is the magic word.”

Nuclear priorities for the US and Europe

• Birol outlined potential areas of cooperation between the IEA and the new US administration, including “pushing the innovation button” to bring down the costs of developing small modular reactors, as well as collaboration on geothermal energy and carbon capture and storage. 
• Birol also spoke about how Western nations can become the partners of choice for countries seeking to develop their first nuclear power plants. To win partners for future nuclear projects, he stressed the importance of making long-term commitments to advancing nuclear energy initiatives and avoiding an inconsistent “stop-and-go” approach.
• “We need governments to be creative” when it comes to funding nuclear energy projects, Birol said, since it can take a long time for private funders to reap their returns on investment. He suggested that governments could “provide instruments to the investments and guarantee some of the revenues” to get more buy-in from private capital.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Online Event Thu, February 6, 2025 • 10:00 am ET

A new era for nuclear energy with the International Energy Agency’s Fatih Birol

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT— Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency, discusses the role of nuclear energy in the future energy landscape.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

Speaker

Fatih Birol
Executive Director, International Energy Agency

Moderator

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: I’m Fred Kempe. I’m president and CEO of the Atlantic Council. And I’m talking to you from our new global headquarters in Washington, DC.

Nuclear energy has been providing power in the United States and many other nations around the world for decades. As more countries look to nuclear to address their energy security concerns and meet growing power demands, the industry faces an inflection point. We have companies coming to us that never thought much about energy before, with needs for data centers, with needs driven by artificial intelligence, that are now talking about energy and talking about nuclear energy in a way they just didn’t even a couple of years ago.

Nuclear also has received rising levels of public support and has experienced remarkable innovation. But it’s going to take coordinated leadership and investment to turn this current momentum into lasting progress. In the United States last year bipartisan legislation, such as the ADVANCE Act, was key to strengthening the domestic nuclear energy industry. The industry also received a first-of-its-kind public support from major technology companies and financial institutions. And on a global level, the United States continued to strengthen its civil-nuclear relationships through close bilateral and multilateral cooperation. These actions reflect the commitment of the United States to establish US and global energy security. And the incoming Trump administration has made very clear that this is going to be a priority for them.

With all of this going on, I can’t think of a better person to shed some light on this set of issues than Dr. Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency. So Fatih, it’s just wonderful to have you with us. We’re proud that Fatih is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s International Advisory Board. And I’ve been proud to call him a friend for many years. Recently we were catching up at the World Economic Forum in Davos and he mentioned the International Energy Agency’s latest report on nuclear energy. And I’m so delighted that he is here to address issues that were raised in that report. Just last week, Fatih was presented with the prestigious Order of Merit of the Italian Republic, the country’s highest civilian honor, for his outstanding contributions to addressing global energy challenges.

In his remarks at the ceremony, Italian Ambassador Sabbatucci noted the IEA’s extraordinary contribution to Italy’s G7 presidency last year. The Atlantic Council was fortunate to host Dr. Birol at a sidelines event at that G7 energy ministerial. And we commend him for his leadership in helping to secure a brighter global future on the energy stage. At our Global Energy—annual Global Energy Forum over the years Fatih has been often a keynote. And he always plays to packed audiences for his insights in the global energy picture. For those of you tuning in, this year we’re going to be doing the Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum on June 17 and 18 in Washington, DC. Moving it here because of the high level of interest in how US energy policy will evolve and who will be leading energy questions in the United States.

Fatih has worked at the heart of global dialog on energy since I’ve known him and I look forward to hearing his insights today. I also want to thank our Global Energy Center’s Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative for hosting this conversation. Jennifer Gordon has just been a magnificent leader—a leader of that initiative and really has positioned ourselves, I think, right at the forefront of this thinking on the future of nuclear energy. For everyone watching, submit your questions by going to AskAC.org—AskAC.org. And I’ll get to them a little bit later in the discussion. So, Fatih, let’s dive right in.

You may want to make a couple opening comments or so, but I always like starting off by hearing how you’re looking at your overall set of priorities at this fascinating moment for global energy, in 2025, and how nuclear has fit into that, and why the IEA has decided to put out a report on nuclear power now. So over to you.

FATIH BIROL: So thank you very much, Fred. Greetings from IEA headquarters in Paris to your new headquarters in Washington, DC. I am very much looking forward to visit your new headquarters as a friend and as a board member of the Atlantic Council. Looking forward to having a cup of tea or cup of coffee in your wonderful office. Thank you very much, Fred. It was very nice to see you also in Davos. As it happens almost all the time in the last several years, over a decade, in Davos you are one of the key figures, of course, in Davos, in the World Economic Forum. Especially given the developments in the United States and in the world, people want to hear Atlantic Council’s views, your views closely.

So, coming back to IEA, I mean, our main job is, if I can summarize, Fred, to provide everybody in the world with affordable, secure, and clean energy. So therefore, what we do is we look at the data. We are a data organization. And I tell my colleagues, data always wins. We are a data organization. And we look at all fuels, all technologies, and provide analysis, policy recommendations to governments, industry, citizens, academia, and others.

So why we made a report on nuclear power? I commissioned this report last June—June 2024—and in a short period of time, about seven, eight months, my colleagues put together this, in my view, the major report at a very important time. There are two reasons, in fact, why we did this report. The first one is when we look at the electricity demand globally it is growing very, very fast. In addition to the usual drivers of electricity demand growth such as industrial sector, household sector, there are new ones coming in the picture.

For example, air conditioning is today number-one driver of global electricity demand. If I can put it in context, Fred, in United States or in Japan and Korea, 90 percent of households they have an air conditioner but in Nigeria it is 5 percent, India 18 percent, Indonesia 20 percent. With the increase in income levels people buy air conditioners, which in turn increase the global electricity demand growth.

Another driver—a new driver is the data centers for artificial intelligence. They are—they do require permanent and clean electricity sources 24/7. So when we look at the options here, how we are going to meet that electricity demand growth with which technologies, nuclear comes as one of the key options.

This is the second reason. When we look at the nuclear power, you have mentioned in your opening remarks there was always interest in nuclear power but after the Fukushima accident in Japan 2011 the appetite fell down.

But recently, I mean, almost three years ago—I dare to say three years ago we may see nuclear making a comeback and today I can confirm that nuclear is making a comeback, a strong comeback, and when we look at the numbers we see this happening, Fred.

I’ll just give you a couple of—maybe three things. One, this year, 2025, we expect global nuclear electricity generation will be the highest in history. The biggest nuclear show—nuclear generation show a lot of zigzags but 2025 will be the highest in history.

Second, as we speak now seventy gigawatts of nuclear power plants in more than fifteen countries are under construction. We have never seen such a big amount of the construction of nuclear power plants in the last three decades.

And, third, maybe the small modular reactors are making inroads in many countries.

Putting these things together, we thought it is now time to put a framework for the governments, for the industry, and the others what is the state of play in nuclear power, what are the challenges in front of us and who is doing what here, and, therefore, we made this report and I am very happy to see that there is a lot of interest.

Just a few hours ago—I mean, you mentioned Italy. I am thankful to Prime Minister Meloni for this recognition for our work. But I am going to Italy, a country that has rejected nuclear power twice or three times by referendum. Now Italy is looking at the nuclear power being a part of energy mix.

Or Sweden stopped and coming back. Japan restarting. France, again, pushing strongly. Korea, many of the countries. And there are several countries for the first time, such as Poland, such as Turkey and others, are coming in the picture.

So we see a strong momentum and we will see if this—how much of this momentum will be translated into real gigawatts in the world. So I stop here maybe.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Fatih, thank you so much for that.

I’m going to go back and forth. When I see a question come up on my screen from the audience that I think fits into the moment that you’ve just talked about I’ll pick from that as well, and let me remind people again AskAC.org is where you can send your questions.

I have a question from Theo Randazzo. And it’s—and you’ve sort of answered it, so let me read the question but let me go further on it. So, are other countries around the globe taking a closer look at incorporating nuclear power in their energy production as in the US? And you cited Sweden and you cited Japan, France, Korea, Poland, Turkey. What’s prompting which countries to turn to nuclear? Is there something that differentiates one that goes in, one that doesn’t go that way? And particularly when it comes to AI and data centers, I think it’s going to be a particular country that’s going to have the source of energy and the capability to set up a data center. It’s not going to be for every country in the world, I would imagine.

FATIH BIROL: So, in fact before going to answer this question, let me mention one other country. I mentioned some new countries are coming in . . . There is one country which is playing a key role in recently nuclear power, which is China. When you look at it, Fred, in the last five years, more than 80 percent of the new nuclear capacity came from China only. So China is playing an important role. And think about this—how the nuclear industry has started to operate. So almost fifty years ago we have seen the new nuclear power plants built as a response to the oil crisis in the 1970s in US, Europe, and others. But now US and Europe—in fact US by far—was the highest nuclear power capacity in the world. But China, with the current policies, before the end of this decade will overtake United States and will be the number one nuclear power in the world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: True.

FATIH BIROL: So this is something that, put aside, I think is important to note.

Now, second, what drives the countries to push the nuclear industry? First of all, electricity security. With a nuclear power plant, you push the button—24/7, you have your electricity system run. And second, the demand is growing so much that in addition to others such as solar, such as wind, such as hydropower, such as geothermal energy, such as natural gas, you need additional power, and nuclear counts here. And third, nuclear power generates electricity but doesn’t emit emissions. So this is also good from an emission-reduction point of view.

So there are different reasons, but in the age of strong electricity demand quote, I see that the countries are moving forward to put nuclear in part of their power generation mix. And again, today—again, an indication of the great momentum of nuclear power, we have counted more than forty countries have concrete plans to build or expand their nuclear capacity. We have never seen this before.

So to repeat, more than forty countries have plans—concrete plans and projects in place to build or expand their nuclear capacity, and this is another, in my view, indication of the comeback of nuclear in a strong way.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So, the—of the new—these forty countries, the forty that have plans—that’s really extraordinary, the boom of planning of this that you’re talking about. There’s all sorts of—as you talked about small modular reactors, there’s different kinds of nuclear fuels, different kinds of business models, new types of reactors—what’s driving the new—what kind of reactors is driving this new exploration? Is it a mixture of both the conventional and the small modular reactors? Where are the—you know, where are the trends going?

FATIH BIROL: Today it is mostly the traditional, large-scale nuclear power plants, but there is a growing interest in small modular reactors. And that is for obvious reasons—the growing interest for small modular reactors. First, they are easier to finance. They are much more flexible, less complex projects to implement. And it takes less time, faster to build those power plants. And in terms of waste management, it is easier to handle the small modular reactor. So, from that point of view, SMR—small modular reactors—get a lot of interest.

Plus, you mentioned the data centers, artificial intelligence. They are making a contracts arrangement with the SMR companies in order to secure the electricity supplies. And the since these technology companies, datacenters, artificial intelligence companies, have good credit ratings it is easier to finance these SMRs compared to large-scale plans to fund financing, because they have good credit ratings.

And if I have to mention one more thing with the large scale reactors, Fred, which is one of the reasons why, for example, China is moving fast, or faster, than the US or European companies. In US and in Europe, when we look at the recent projects, it is rare that a project finishes on time and on budget. We have—we have looked all of them—my colleagues, we have a big team here. I have excellent experts. They look at all the projects. And recently on average in US and in Europe a nuclear project is at eight years of a delay—eight years of a delay. And the cost is two times, two-and-a-half times than the cost originally planned. So two-and-a-half times higher.

So it is not on budget and it is much more expensive it was thought. It is, of course, a major, major challenge for the—for the governments, for the investors, and others. There are some good examples. For example, Korea did a good job in several cases. And China is doing a better job as well. So if we were to see nuclear making a strong comeback, there is a big job for the nuclear industry in the advanced economies to deliver on time and on budget as well.

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s really—that’s really interesting. So let’s stick with the AI boom a little bit longer. One question that’s come in says, as the AI boom expands even further, will we witness a reliance on nuclear source for energy or is wind/solar a more viable option? Let me add to that. What I’ve been hearing in the United States is that the SMRs won’t come online quickly enough to handle this situation for datacenters, so that actually gas—natural gas may be the bridge fuel—may be the fuel that gets us there faster. It was interesting that you were talking about air conditioning. I didn’t think about the impact of air conditioning on all of this, but that’s fascinating as well. But let’s stick with AI right now. How much of this boom in datacenters will be electrified by nuclear? And how much is going to come from other sources?

FATIH BIROL: For this study, Fred, nuclear study, we carried out—by the way, our study is freely—it is free downloadable in our website. For this study, we talk with almost all key AI companies, with SMR companies. We check critically their projects, their assumptions. We think the SMRs commercially can hit the markets around 2030s. So there’s a lot of time between now and then, the first commercial large-scale SMR hitting the market. And I believe between now and then they will use natural gas to feed the—to meet the demand growth, and also partly renewables.

And I want to mention one renewable source, it is one of the recent reports we make, is geothermal energy. We talk about solar and wind a lot, but geothermal energy, which has been with us decades and decades, Fred. But as a result of applying the hydraulic fracturing, the horizontal drilling which we used for the oil and gas—shale oil and gas in the United States—we can go deeper and bring more geothermal energy to the market. And this can be a gamechanger as well. And this can is—is also a potential to meet the AI demand. So to sum up, we will see natural gas in the—maybe in the next few years to come, to start. But I believe SMRs, geothermal, and others will contribute as well.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So as this goes on—we have a question here from Maxim Dray: Are uranium stocks likely to benefit from the Trump presidency? How are tariffs likely to impact the sector?

Let me add to that my own question of how worried you are, if you’re worried at all, about the concentration of uranium supply and enrichment services, and is there a way to overcome that challenge?

FATIH BIROL: Yeah. I think the—when we look around the world, the efforts and a lot of interest in building new nuclear power plants in Americas, in Europe, in Asia. Africa, Middle East we see that there will be a boost for the uranium and nuclear industry in general. However, while I said the nuclear is very good for electricity security, generating electricity at home in any country, when I look at the enrichment—global enrichment capacity, I see a serious concentration. Our analysis show that about 40 percent—in fact, more than 40 percent of global uranium enrichment capacity is in one country, which is Russia. So therefore, there is a need to diversify the uranium enrichment capacity.

If the countries are serious—it can be US, it can be Canada, it can be a Europe, Japan, Korea, Middle East countries, other Asian countries. They have to pay attention not only building the new nuclear power plants, large-scale SMR, but they have to also look at the enrichment capacity and to build the enrichment capacity. I know that there are some steps taken in United States and in Europe. There are some projects underway to elevate this concentration away from one single country. But there is a need to definitely diversify it.

Fred for me, in the energy world it is oil, gas, renewables, nuclear. Magic word is diversification. We have—in Europe we have experienced the bitter consequence of overreliance on one single country of energy, which was Russia. And we pay a lot of costs of it by cutting it off, the Russian energy with high energy costs. So therefore, in fact, it’s an area that IEA has since decades warned the governments here. But we should learn from that. Diversification of the energy. Diversification of import sources. Diversification of the trade, which are always good for energy security. Not put all the eggs in the same basket.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So this is still—it’s still a challenge we have to overcome, without a great plan yet for how to overcome it?

FATIH BIROL: Exactly. This is serious challenge. Forty percent of the global uranium enrichment capacity comes from one single country, which is Russia today.

FREDERICK KEMPE: And since we’re talking about challenges, let’s go to nuclear waste. Gerardo Merina asks: Have there been advances in nuclear waste disposal? And Kanako Akayama says: How are the international regulations evolving to address the increasing volume of nuclear waste, considering the growth of nuclear capacity?

FATIH BIROL: So this is one of the challenges of the nuclear industry today. What do we do with the nuclear waste? So there is definitely some progress in long-term waste disposal. Several countries in the world, in advanced economies and others, have approved plans to build them. And technologies are underway to minimize, if not nullify, the risk of nuclear waste. It is still an issue, but I believe it will not be a barrier for the development of nuclear power plants. And this will be tackled by the right policies and the innovation of technology.

There is a lot of progress in the waste disposal around the world. And still most of the waste is stored onsite, and this is a challenge, but this can be easily overcome with the innovation we are seeing in many, many countries. So this is not something that will be a showstopper for a nuclear comeback.

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s encouraging to hear.

So members of the new Trump administration have emphasized achieving energy independence. Energy security is going to be a top priority of this administration. How do you think this new administration will shape the outlook for nuclear power in the United States? And how will the IEA engage with the administration on this and other questions?

FATIH BIROL: So I think the—when I look at the new administration’s energy priorities, I see that nuclear is one of the key priorities. This is very much in line with our hope and expectations expressed in our report, which we have started last June and came out only a few months ago. And when I look at the few statements from different leaders in the new administration, I see the same narrative.

And I have followed the hearing of the Secretary Chris Wright in the—in the Senate. He made several times a strong emphasis on nuclear power. And I think this is very important the United States not only talks about nuclear power, but builds nuclear power plants both in terms of the large-scale and also, hopefully, in terms of the small modular reactors by pushing the innovation button there and bringing the cost of SMRs down.

So it will be one of the areas that we are going to work with the new administration. And I see many other areas, from geothermal to nuclear power, from the energy efficiency to carbon capture and storage, because IEA is an organization which looks all fuels, all technologies, and energy security is very important for us.

Another issue that I wanted to mention to you, Fred, is that when we say energy security, we see two different elements there. So energy security, traditional energy security risks—that is, oil or natural gas—they are there, they are with us, and we have to be very careful with the oil security and gas security. But there are also looming new emerging energy security risks, such as critical minerals, such as supply chains, because we see that both critical minerals in terms of mining but also processing and some of the supply chains are also concentrated.

So, therefore, from IEA point of view, energy security is a full spectrum of the traditional energy security risks plus the emerging energy security risks, such as the critical minerals, supply chains. And considering this together, last July the IEA and the U.K. government announced a major summit, perhaps the most important energy meeting this year, taking place in London in April, Future of Energy Security Summit, which is going to be hosted by Sir Keir Starmer. And we are expecting several global leaders around the world come together to discuss the energy security challenges of today and tomorrow, and how we can come together to address this global challenge for everybody.

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s absolutely fascinating. That sounds like an incredibly important, incredibly important conference. For a long period of time, energy security seemed to fall off the radar of high-level conversation, and that changed in 2022 with the—with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And I think what you’re saying is it’s going to become even more an area of focus.

FATIH BIROL: Exactly.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Talk to me a little bit about—we have aligned countries. This competitive picture that you’re talking about, you’re looking at the enrichment competition in the 40 percent that’s with Russia. So there is going to be a competitive area. The Chinese deployment of nuclear capability and nuclear plants for middle and low income countries. My guess is they would be looking at these as business opportunities and also, you know, diplomatic opportunities.

How should the United States address this? How should the United States and Europe address this? Could one work—this is one of the questions that’s come in—could one work with aligned countries like South Korea and Japan to compete better with Chinese deployment of nuclear in middle- and low-income countries?

FATIH BIROL: So today, when you look at the orders, the nuclear power plant construction orders, we see that the—it is mainly Chinese construction that goes there or Russian construction. The reason is very simple, because Chinese, for example, they finish their projects on time and they have been doing this while the advanced economies—US or Europe or Japan—didn’t build a lot of or, if any, significant amount of nuclear power plants.

It is called learning by doing. If you do something you learn better, and if you don’t do it you forget how to do it, whatever it is in life. So, therefore, many countries in the developing nations and elsewhere choose Chinese or the Russian contractors because there was not much activity in Europe or US or elsewhere.

So what do we do? What needs to be doing? If we see a big momentum in the United States, in Europe, in Japan and elsewhere in other countries, we will see that the reactivation of the nuclear industry in these countries will give a boost to the chances to be chosen by the countries who want to build their nuclear industry. And it may be a good idea, as the colleague who asked this question mentioned, to coordinate the development of the supply chains between, for example, US and Europe; Canada, US, and Europe, Japan, Korea together. It could also have a—in the context of large scale but also SMRs and the development of the supply chains. It could be a good way of increasing the chances to be asked for to build nuclear power plants in developing countries.

And, of course, one thing that we should avoid is the stop and go policies because nuclear power is a very long lead industry. In many countries we get excited, we go, but after a while there’s a change in the government or change in the mood. Then you stop. Then you go again.

So you should give a predictable perspective here which would open the chances for the countries or the companies in the countries you have mentioned. So avoid stop and go policies is the other issue.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that answer.

Let’s talk about one country that’s, as you know, a specific interest of my own and that’s Germany, where it was—you know, if you look at some of its companies and some of its history, it was cutting edge in a past life on nuclear capabilities and now, of course, it’s not developing plants and has decided against them.

Do you see any chance of a change of approach in Germany or is this policy going to persist?

FATIH BIROL: I think a German economy is one of the engines of the European economy, together with the French, Italian, and the others. But I see that the—if European economy today has a major competitiveness challenge, a major energy security challenge, among other reasons it is due to the fact that the European countries turned their back to nuclear power.

Fred, in the 1990s, end of—or, beginning of 2000, which was yesterday, 35 [percent]—more than one-third of the electricity in Europe came from nuclear power, but now it went down less than 25 percent. It is going down more and more, to 15 percent. From 35 [percent] to 15 [percent].

And in Germany—I respect the German government’s, German people’s decision to phase out nuclear power plant. In Germany, nuclear power plants were operating like a Swiss clock, just printing money, generating electricity without emissions, without—no problem. So that, in my view—my personal view as an expert, not as a politician, as an expert—this was a historic mistake that Germany did in terms of phasing out of existing nuclear power plants.

Now, we know that there is the elections in Germany—I’m sure you follow very closely—on 23rd of February. We don’t know what will be the result of those elections, but I am not surprised that nuclear power is one of the hottest topics in the election. And I wouldn’t be surprised, after the election, there may be a second look at the nuclear policies of Germany.

We have seen this in other countries. For example, in Sweden there is a strong comeback of nuclear power in Sweden with the new government. And also in Switzerland there is also a growing interest. In Poland, the first nuclear power plant going to be built, and in some other countries. But I imagine, especially Germany—a) it’s a country that you are interested in; and b) it is the engine of the European economy. So therefore I expect nuclear to be one of the hot topics even after the election.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Fascinating. Really, very interesting.

So obviously, you know, one has to finance all of this. It’s not cheap. With new customers for nuclear energy, where do you see the financing coming from? It seems to me that there’s going to be a need for greater investment in these technologies. What’s the role of public and private capital in financing the new nuclear projects?

FATIH BIROL: Yes. So in the matter of advanced economies where we have the markets—the market instruments are the ones who decide—which decide on any single investment, we have to be creative here because in the nuclear industry, where you make the nuclear—build the nuclear power plant, twenty years you have to wait for your return to come back. So this is not a very interesting option for the investors at first sight.

However, I believe, first of all, public funding to critical. And this means we need public funding, but also need to get private capital because public funding, government money, cannot solve all the problem.

Small model reactors could change the picture because they are working with the tech companies, which have, as I mentioned, high credit ratings which makes smaller projects investible. And we need governments to be creative and come up with some divesting investments, some of the revenues to be guaranteed of the nuclear projects.

So I see governments play a pivotal role here, both in terms of providing part of the funding maybe, but more importantly, coming up with instruments to divest investments and guarantee some of the revenues to get the private capital there.

At the end of the day, public, private—they both need to play an important role. And for governments, they should not forget that nuclear power—services should be numerated as an energy source which is secure, clean, and also makes the countries—the competitiveness even stronger vis-à-vis other economies in the world.

FREDERICK KEMPE: That’s just terrific. So thank you so much, Dr. Birol, Fatih, for joining us for this edition of Atlantic Council Front Page. I think I speak from our audiences watching from all around the world that it’s always an honor, a pleasure to listen to you, as one of the real great experts of our time on energy issues, writ large. And it’s a pleasure for me always to engage in conversations with you on this. I expect that supporting the growth of US energy production and nuclear energy production will continue to be a priority of this administration.

So thanks again, on behalf of everyone, Fatih, for sharing your insights into how government and industry leaders can play a crucial role in supporting this. I think your final answer on the financing of this points to the need for public-private in this field, probably even more than most others. So thanks again, Fatih.

FATIH BIROL: Thank you very, Fred. All the best. Thank you.

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Public Event Tue, February 4, 2025 • 5:00 pm ET

Canadian Energy Minister Jonathan Wilkinson on US-Canada energy cooperation

Jonathan Wilkinson, the Canadian minister of energy and natural resources, discusses ways to enhance cooperation on North American energy security with a new administration at the helm in Washington.

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security Trade and tariffs United States and Canada

Speaker

Jonathan Wilkinson
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Canada

Moderator

David L. Goldwyn
Nonresident Senior Fellow and Chairman, Energy Advisory Group, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome. I’m David Goldwyn. I’m chairman of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group and a nonresident senior fellow here at the Atlantic Council. Thanks for joining us in person and also virtually. We’re honored today to be joined by Jonathan Wilkinson, minister of energy and natural resources of Canada, NRCan in the Canadian parlance, to talk about tariffs and energy.

You all may have seen the extreme market reaction to President Trump’s threat to impose 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10 percent on energy trade. And that’s because the US and Canada have probably one of the most integrated energy systems in the world. In 2023 I think we did about 198 billion [dollars] in trade. It’s two-way trade. We get 60 percent of our imported oil from Canada, heavy oil which refineries the Midwest and the Gulf Coast use and which the United States doesn’t make. We have two-way trade in electricity. Almost thirty states, I think, get electricity from Canada. We send gas and oil and products to Canada. They send it back to us. We get a quarter of our uranium from Canada for our nuclear reactors. I think we’ve got seventy pipelines across the border and maybe thirty electricity interconnections.

So that’s why it got a pretty big reaction. We are really closely, closely integrated. And the electricity grid is also really important. We get most of our major components, such as transformers and switch gear, from Canada, as well as critical minerals. So that’s why we had a big reaction. And we’re really, really fortunate to have Minister Wilkinson here to talk to us about what happens next. As you saw in the news, there’s a thirty-day pause, at least thirty days, until tariffs are reimposed, when conversations will take place between our countries. So the timing couldn’t be better. And we’re going to hear from the minister, we’re going to have a little conversation about some of the issues, and go from there.

We couldn’t have a better or more qualified person. Minister Wilkinson knows of what he speaks when it comes to energy. In addition to being the minister, and formerly a minister for climate change and environment and also for oceans, he comes from the tech world. He was chief executive officer of QuestAir Technologies and also the former BioteQ. So he knows—he knows waste to heat. He was a senior vice president with Nexterra—not Next Era, but Nexterra—the waste to heat company. And he’s a pretty smart guy too. He’s a Rhodes Scholar. So he knows this field well and he’s going to be one of the point people for talking to the US government about energy. So, Minister Wilkinson, please join us here on the stage and let’s go from here.

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Thank you. Thank you very much. And, certainly, thanks to the folks here for the invitation to be with you today, and for the flexibility. I was coming from Canada’s west coast, and that’s always a dangerous thing in the winter. It took a little longer to get here than I had anticipated. So I certainly appreciate the flexibility around the timing.

It is, as I say, a pleasure to be with you today, and certainly after what have been some tumultuous and challenging days. But I would like to focus today on the enormous economic opportunities that exist for cooperation between our respective countries. I firmly believe that collaboration is what makes this continent great. And it is what will enable our conversation to move from one about tariffs, which in my mind is a lose-lose conversation, to one about prosperity and security, which offers a win-win.

We have all, I’m sure, heard many times the adage that Canada and the United States are each other’s best friend, closest ally, and most important economic partner. And beyond friendship and our economic partnership, we have long been steadfast partners on the world stage. That is ever more important right now, given the increasingly aggressive behavior of international actors like China.

Though it may feel a little bit cliché to say those words, these statements are undeniably true, despite the difficult moment we have found ourselves in over the past few days. The administration has made clear the concerns regarding border issues, particularly illegal migration and fentanyl. I think it needs to be recognized that the scale of these issues at the Canada-US border are not particularly significant. Fentanyl from Canada represents 0.2 percent of US seizures of fentanyl at the border. And, in fact, last year American border enforcement seized just forty-three pounds of fentanyl from the Canada-US border; not a lot more than the seizures that go the other way. And while illegal migration is very low, we agree that one illegal migrant is too many. That is why we have already been cracking down with 600 percent more investigations in 2024.

I want to be very clear about this. Just like the US, Canada has no interest in illegal crossings, either of people or of substances. One illegal crossing and one pound of fentanyl crossing the border is too much. In this regard, we agree very much with President Trump. That is why, further to conversations we have been having with the administration, Canada recently announced an enhanced border plan, which included an additional investment of over a billion dollars, which will be made in areas like the deployment of additional helicopters, drones, mobile surveillance towers and officers with new K-9 teams to strengthen the border.

And yesterday, after conversations with the president, we announced additional measures. Canada will be appointing a fentanyl czar and will list cartels as terrorists. Together we will launch a Canada-US joint strike force to combat organized crime, fentanyl, and money laundering, ensuring 7/24 eyes will remain on the border. And Prime Minister Trudeau also signed a new intelligence directive on organized crime and fentanyl, which was backed with an additional $200 million.

Canada has acted on these issues, and Canada remains very open to conversations about how we can jointly do more. Productive, collaborative discussions like these are a much better route than destructive economic action that drives up prices for Americans and for Canadians.

With respect to our economic partnership, the Canada-US relationship has long been the envy of the world, keeping our supply chains secure, creating good jobs, and ensuring good prices. Our respective economies are so integrated that I would say the partnership is effectively hardwired. Nearly $2.7 billion worth of goods and services crossed the border each day in 2023. Thirty-six US states rely on Canada as their number one export market. Canadian consumers and businesses purchase more goods from the United States than China, Japan and Germany combined.

This is true in the case of many sectors; for example, the auto sector, where parts will often go back and forth across the border six, seven, eight times before a product is completed. But there is no area where the integrated nature of our economies is clearer than in energy and key resources, such as critical minerals.

For example, Canada supplies significant quantities of low-cost hydroelectricity to several US states via fixed transmission lines. Canadian electricity powers the equivalent of six million American homes. That’s more than every home in the state of Ohio. Canada and the US have an integrated oil pipeline system that supplies Americans approximately four million barrels per day, creating jobs and fostering energy security.

This oil is largely heavy crude, and US firms have invested in complex refineries to process this specific type of low-cost Canadian oil. This is by far the most affordable option for American companies and consumers, and it enables the export of US light crude to countries around the world, creating additional profit for American companies but also creating additional tools to be used in the context of geopolitics.

Canada is the US’s largest supplier of potash, meeting the demand for farmers for use as fertilizer, which means affordable food. It also allows the US to avoid purchasing potash and fertilizer from unreliable countries like Russia and Belarus.

Uranium for nuclear power is also supplied in significant quantities by Canada. In fact, Canadian uranium presently powers the equivalent of almost twenty million homes in the United States. Once again, this enables the US to reduce reliance on producers such as Russia.

And Canada supplies significant quantities of critical minerals including germanium, zinc, nickel, copper, and graphite. These are the building blocks of a range of American economic sectors including defense. In the area of critical minerals typically the alternative source of supply to Canada is China.

Let me also address concerns about a trade deficit between our two countries. If you break it down and look at nonenergy-related trade, the US in fact has a surplus of over fifty billion dollars. The United States is a net exporter to Canada of manufacturing goods, particularly motor vehicles and parts.

Hampering industries with an American trade surplus with tariffs would chiefly disrupt industries where the United States already exports more to Canada. Where I noted, as I noted, parts go back and forth often seven or eight times before a car is complete and for which there are no easy alternatives. It would make these things more expensive while simply not supporting a rebalancing of the trading relationship.

And in the case of energy, the current trade balance also already provides the US advantage by leveraging Canada’s resource abundance to obtain low-cost and secure energy and minerals that the American economy requires, especially if one wants to achieve energy affordability and energy dominance, and the US obtains these products from Canada at a low cost, allowing thousands of American workers to refine and transform them and sell at a higher price to the rest of the world.

Moving past border issues and the reality of the trade balance, it is important to recognize what tariffs would actually do and why we should continue to avoid them after this thirty-day period. They would cause financial pain for Canadian families, no doubt, but they would also significantly increase the price of energy and food for American consumers.

With a tariff on Canadian oil and gas Americans would see higher prices when filling up their gas tanks and heating their homes. Groceries would become more expensive because Canadian potash that supplies American farmers would cost farmers more, and for those who might be planning to buy a new car Wells Fargo has estimated that a 25 percent tariff on Canada would add more than two thousand dollars to the price tag of a car.

Overall, tariffs on Canada, a country that shares your goals and values more than any other country in the world, could cost an average family—American family about $1,300 per year.

As a sovereign democratic nation that must protect its own national interest, the unwarranted imposition of tariffs on Canada would necessarily necessitate a response. But this kind of damage being caused to both of our economies is truly unnecessary and it is ultimately the people of our respective countries who will pay the costs.

That is why our focus is to move beyond this conversation to one about collaboration on the border, on the scourge of illegal drugs, on our economy, and certainly on energy and critical minerals.

Which brings me to my pitch to you today. Rather than going down a path that will inevitably be lose-lose I am suggesting something entirely different. I am suggesting that we should instead build upon current success by developing a US-Canada alliance in energy and minerals.

Such an alliance would enable the United States and Canada to achieve our shared vision for affordable energy bills for families, strong and secure economies, and North America as the world’s dominant energy supplier.

Just a few examples of how we can move in the near term to create mutual benefit. In the areas of critical minerals needed for energy, defense, and aerospace applications there is, for example, an opportunity to jointly invest in a project that would enable greater germanium supply which can displace germanium the United States has been purchasing from China, which China has recently cut off.

We can collaborate on rare earth processing and the augmentation of rare earth supply, once again reducing exposure to and dependence on China. Many will not know that the one large rare earths mine that exists in the United States sends a hundred percent of its product to China presently for processing because the processing technology does not exist here.

With regard to uranium there is an opportunity to work together to build a complete North American nuclear fuel cycle, which would mean relying less on Russia and enhancing continental security. That is something that will be critically important for the ultimate deployment of small modular reactors.

On energy we can enhance the flow of Canadian crude from Alberta to assist the administration’s goal of energy dominance by working together on projects such as enhancing the capacity of the existing Enbridge mainline, enabling the export of additional energy from the US to the world.

There is much opportunity here that can benefit both countries. However, none of this will be possible if we get into this destructive tit-for-tat.

Both countries have a strong interest in the same goals and outcomes, and there is indeed enormous potential if we work together to collectively onshore production and manufacturing and ensure that access to critical energy and materials exists within our collective borders, so we cannot be held hostage by unreliable countries and actors that do not share our values—in particular, China. Rather than looking to erect barriers that will impede trade flows, increase costs for citizens on both sides of the border, and make both countries less secure, let us engage a more positive conversation, a conversation that is focused on seizing enormous economic opportunities and creating additional shared value while enhancing our security—or in other words, form a true energy and minerals alliance.

I and my government are keen to engage these positive and productive conversations to ensure that we can build together a continent that will be more prosperous, more secure moving forward.

So thank you for the invitation to speak to you today, and I look forward to the discussion to come.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: Great, thank you. Thank you for that positive, positive vision.

I should say that this conversation today is public and on the record, and it’s streaming over YouTube, X, Facebook, and the Atlantic Council website.

So, Minister Wilkinson, you—you know, you posited a very positive potential pathway, but the imposition of the tariffs or the threat must have been a bit of a shock for Canadians. And we see in Mexico now increased talk of producing their own natural gas because they’re worried about continued dependence on the US. Most of Canada’s crude flows through US pipelines out to the gulf to markets. Strategically, do Canadians need to think about alternative routes to the east coast or the west coast as sort of a hedge on the US?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Well, I would say it was a shock. You know, the original free trade agreement that was signed between Canada and the United States was signed way back in 1988, and the Auto Pact that ensured the free flow of products in the auto sector goes back to the 1960s. So we have looked deep in the integration over the course of the past number of decades because it was so obvious that we were both extracting mutual benefit from the trade that existed. That’s not just in energy and minerals.

And so when all of a sudden Canada is treated more like an adversary than a partner, it did shake every Canadian. And I think you saw that in some of the patriotic expressions that came out in the aftermath of the decision to impose tariffs. Canadians don’t tend to wear their patriotism on their sleeve. We are probably less patriotic overtly than Americans, but you saw it very strongly in Canada.

I think, you know, we need to hopefully walk back from the brink and find pathways through which we can actually work together. But I do think in Canada this has caused some reflection on whether perhaps in some areas we are too dependent on infrastructure in particular that flows only through the United States. We have some things that have been developed over the last number of years, including liquid natural gas facilities on the west coast, that will give us the ability to take some of the gas to Asia. But certainly in the areas like oil, we flow almost all of it this way.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: Let’s talk about the—unpack the positive agenda a little bit. For President Trump, critical minerals seem to be important. There’s talk about Ukraine exploring critical minerals there as a condition for security support, and this Greenland talk seems to be a little bit about access to Greenland’s critical minerals. So what’s the—what’s the way that the US and Canada can cooperate in this area, either in production—you mentioned two projects earlier, but is there more there? And are you going to use the next thirty days to have this conversation with US officials?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Yeah, I mean, I think there’s a lot of things that we can do together. Some of them relate to specific projects and some of them are a big more general. One of the challenges with some of the critical minerals has been because of the concentration that exists in Chinese hands, whether it’s in China or it’s in a number of countries like Congo and elsewhere, China has been able to at times manipulate the market. So whenever you are looking to start a project that requires hundreds of millions of dollars, all of a sudden the price goes, you know, goes down significantly and the business case actually falls away. We’ve seen that with lithium. We’ve seen it more recently with nickel, where China has used its dominance to flood the market. And so there is work that can be done between Canada and the US, and probably with Australia and a few others, to actually create some kind of a mechanism around a price floor that will give the business certainty such that you can actually attract private capital for some of these kinds of projects.

There are also some very specific projects that if we made the decision to jointly invest we can pull forward. And the germanium one is one example of that. We have done some coinvesting over the last couple years with the US Department of Defense, but there is a lot more that we could do. And that would help to alleviate the strategic vulnerability, which is a huge strategic vulnerability for the United States in critical minerals, because virtually all of them right now are coming from China.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: And there’s been talk of a strategic minerals reserve, either on the US or the Canadian side, which could probably help support that price floor. One of the reasons we don’t have as many of those critical minerals produced or processed in the US is—you know, is the challenge of regulation and permitting, and also stakeholder considerations. So deregulation is a big agenda for President Trump. Is there something that can be done on the harmonization of permitting and regulatory decisions that would expedite either critical minerals or pipelines?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: I think there is. Certainly, we’ve done a lot of work to try to figure out how to optimize existing regulatory and permitting processes. As you folks—we’re both federal states—have, the complexity is also some of those reside at the federal level and some of them reside at the state level. And part of it is trying to better align the federal standards with state standards. And to the extent that you can get states to try to harmonize some of their requirements, it certainly would make that conversation easier. We have been working individually with every province to try to actually better align the federal and the provincial.

But certainly, I think there are things that we can both learn from each other. And ideally we can actually find ways to jointly streamline in similar ways, such that you can actually expedite these things. But I mean, clearly, it’s a challenge on both sides of the border. It takes a long time to get mines permitted in Canada. It needs to be much shorter than it is. And we are focused on that. In the United States—and I say this with great respect—but it’s even harder to get a mine permitted in the United States than it is in Canada. But we have been talking a lot, not just to you folks but also to the Australians, and the Chileans, and others who are also thinking exactly about these issues, so.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: North American energy cooperation used to be a staple. We sort of invented this. You all were going to host the North American Leaders Summit last year, and that got postponed. And I think these tariffs have thrown the viability that concept into a—you know, a little bit into question. Mexico, I think, is concerned as well. But there would seem to be a lot of areas that we could cooperate on, if we were to revive that process. Nuclear is an area of commonality, electricity, regional planning, because we trade so much across the border. Do you think, you know, North America, as a concept, exists? And can you talk a little bit about what you think a positive agenda for a trilateral discussion might be?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Well, I do—I mean, I think a lot of the elements of it already exist. But there certainly are areas where I think we could push the collaboration for outcomes that would actually be beneficial for both of us and, in some cases, with Mexico as well. Nuclear is a great example. The first small modular reactor—it’s a large one, it’s three hundred megawatts—will be running at an Ontario site adjacent to a very large-scale nuclear reactor in 2027/2028. It’s a GE-Hitachi design. It’s an American-Japanese collaboration that actually produced the technology.

Eventually, as we build out more of these small modular reactors—and everybody’s seen, you know, a lot of the tech firms now getting into this game of this is how they’re going to generate their own—their own electricity—you’re going to need enriched fuel. You need uranium from Canada. You need the conversion of that, but you actually need the enrichment. And United States has enrichment. Canada doesn’t have enrichment. And doesn’t really want to do enrichment because of nonproliferation kinds of issues. But there’s a perfect marriage that we could actually work on together to ensure that we actually can enable the development and the deployment of these technologies as expeditiously as possible.

And Mexico. We saw the handshake, you know, sort of, you know, between the Mexican president and Prime Minister Trudeau. So is there—how do we bring Mexico into that—into that discussion?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Well, I mean, look, Mexico is blessed with the same—similar resources to what the United States and Canada have, right? Lots of oil. They do have an ability to go after the gas. They have deployed renewables on a relatively large-scale basis. There have been some issues there in terms of Canadian companies and American companies investing, and how that was treated. But I think, you know, there’s lots of learnings. And even on the regulatory and permitting side there’s lots of learnings about what it is that different groups are doing that can actually enable you to go faster.

So I do think, you know, between the three of us we have more than what we need to both build and to power the economy. And we have the ability to actually produce much of what the world needs. And that has value in a world that is going to need more energy—energy of all kinds. You know, and I think, you know, whether you call it energy dominance, or you call it something else, there is an opportunity to use that in a constructive way in a world where, you know, some actors, like Russia, have been using it in a less-than-constructive way.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: Very helpful. I know you’re not the trade minister, but we’ve got the conversations on USMCA, or whichever national acronym people want to use, coming up. So there will be a conversation. Just in terms of the energy piece, of which the tariffs would be a violation, I guess, of this agreement. But putting that aside, what’s your perspective on Canada’s position on energy and USMCA? Is it sort of, it’s not broke, don’t fix it? Or is there more to be done that would deepen the energy cooperation between the three countries?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Yeah. I mean, I do think that there’s more that can be done. It needs to be part of an overall agreement around—that the tariffs aren’t coming back, right? You know, at the end of the day we need to actually have a pathway that allows us to deepen the collaboration, if we agree that that’s a good thing, without thinking six months from now we’re back into the same conversation that we were in the last few days. But I do. Some of the projects that I talked about there are things that would actually help to deepen the collaboration.

Like, why does the United States purchase so much uranium and potash from Russia? You don’t need to. If we actually work together, you can be completely secure. Why are so many critical minerals being purchased from China? You don’t need to. If we work together and we actually pull forward some of these projects—you know, the same thing is true, as I said, with oil and gas. So I do think that there’s lots that we can do. Starting with some very specific projects but looking more generally down the road, creating joint tools that can allow us to actually make joint investments. I do think that there is a real scope for those kinds of conversations. But it starts with—it starts with, you know, us agreeing that collaboration and deepening that relationship is the right way to go.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: Let me ask you a question about Liberal Party politics, if I can. You all are facing an interesting political season in Canada.

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Yeah.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: You’ve got two candidates now up for consideration, Chrystia Freeland and Mark Carney, who are well known around the world, and they’ve talked—both talked about pulling back the carbon tax on consumers, leaving the carbon tax on the industrial sector in place. Can you just paint us—what’s the future of sort of energy and climate policy for the Liberal Party going forward?

JONATHAN WILKINSON: Well, you’re asking somebody who got into politics because of climate change. And I had the great privilege of serving as Canada’s environment and climate change minister for three of four years and brought into place the first climate plan Canada’s ever had that showed how we would not only beat a target, but we would raise the target because we would exceed that. So I am committed to the fight against climate change. It’s a science issue. It shouldn’t be a partisan issue. It is a science issue.

But we need to do that in a manner that is thoughtful, that addresses concerns—legitimate concerns people have about affordability, and does so in a manner that actually ideally enhances our own energy security. This government, whether it’s Mr. Carney or Ms. Freeland who ultimately lead the Liberal Party and become the next prime minister of Canada, are committed to the fight against climate change, but they want to do so in a manner that actually also is going to help us to build a strong and prosperous economy. I don’t think you are going to see a lot of fundamental changes.

The consumer carbon price, I mean, 80 percent of the value of carbon pricing comes from the industrial price, where you’re actually going after the large emitters. Twenty percent comes from the consumer carbon price. I’m still a believer in the consumer carbon price in the sense that it is the most economically efficient way to actually reduce emissions, that incents innovation. And 99.9 percent of economists will tell you the same thing. It’s a market mechanism. But it became very divisive in Canada, especially regionally, and both of the candidates have made the decision that they will remove the consumer part of the carbon price, not the industrial price.

And the other thing that they have been very clear on is that they will find the megatons that would have been found through the consumer price in a different way. They are not abandoning the fight on climate change.

DAVID L. GOLDWYN: That’s great. Thank you.

Well, unfortunately, our time today has come to a close. Thank you, Minister Wilkinson, for your candor and for painting this positive vision of US-Canadian energy—of the energy relationship.

As a reminder, the recording of the event will be available on the Atlantic Council website and on our YouTube page, and we hope you’ll join us for future events. Thank you.

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1. What impact will Trump’s first-day executive orders likely have on energy?

As expected, Trump’s return to the Oval Office quickly underscored that enabling energy production is a central pillar of his mandate to manage inflation and advance US national security priorities via energy markets.

For now, Trump’s plan to “drill, baby, drill” is still in its nascency. An executive order declaring a national energy emergency sets the stage to fast-track energy permitting and infrastructure, but not before a period of study and scoping from the relevant agency authorities. Once this period is complete, how the oil and gas sector balances a more permissive policy environment with its commitments to capital returns, which have been a dominant thread in the shale patch for the past several years, will bear significantly on the pathway to energy dominance. As a result, it’s possible that the immediate impact of the executive order will be seen in expanded exploration rather than a boom in production. Similarly, Trump’s decision to lift the Department of Energy’s pause on liquefied natural gas (LNG) export license approvals has been received with enthusiasm from international partners such as Japan, but it will take time to produce tangible results in the market.

The most important space to watch remains how these efforts intersect with wider foreign policy and trade initiatives yet to be solidified by the Trump administration. The widely anticipated rollout of tariffs against key US trading partners, including Canada, Mexico, China, and the European Union, has been given some room to breathe (possibly until February 1), as opposed to the “day one” tariffs that were promised on the campaign trail. The final makeup of these policies could have a strong effect on Trump’s energy agenda, from securing supply chains and growing domestic manufacturing to expanding energy exports. How the Trump administration chooses to approach sanctions against Iran, Russia, and Venezuela will also shape the global energy market.

But even with these other currently unknown factors, Trump’s first day in office made clear a commitment to maximize energy policy’s contributions to US economic and national security priorities. Trump’s initial steps toward energy dominance should be taken seriously by US partners, allies, and rivals insomuch as they intersect with the rest of the president’s agenda. By the same token, as a president who only has four years left in the White House, the most unpredictable variables may be his patience to see a return on these policy investments and whether a doubling down is on the horizon.

—Reed Blakemore is a director with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

2. Is the US experiencing a national energy emergency? What does that mean?

The declaration of a national energy emergency, and the lengthy executive order implementing it, are a powerful statement of the Trump administration’s intentions to promote fossil energy and mineral development, as well as to punish renewable energy and climate mitigation initiatives to the maximum extent possible. It is important, however, to understand this declaration as intention not action. The process of revising or rescinding regulations will take time and be subject to legal challenge. The desire to increase investment in oil and gas production will be driven by demand and potential returns on new investment, which will in turn be challenged by the economic growth of the United States’ primary markets and threatened new tariffs.

Decisions on investment and renewable energy will be driven by state-level policy, utility economics, and consumer expectations. US foreign policy—from the expected maximum pressure sanctions on Iran, to the fate of the current licensing system for Venezuela, to the implementation of sanctions on Russia—will play an outsize role in the price formation for gasoline for US consumers. The new administration’s expected policies have driven those prices up, not down. These are early days and only a handful of the officials responsible for developing and implementing the executive orders’ aspirations are in their seats. Headlines come fast, but change comes more slowly.

—David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group.

***

This week, the Trump administration declared a national energy emergency, showcasing its emphasis on “energy dominance” as core to its domestic and foreign policy. The declaration is grounded in three assertions: that high energy prices impair national security, that US allies benefit from exports of abundant US energy, and that “[e]nergy security is an increasingly crucial theater of global competition.” Each of these assertions is valid, although the appropriate policy implications may be in the eye of the beholder. The Trump administration seeks to eliminate as much permitting red tape at the federal level as possible and reduce restrictions for both on- and offshore energy production. Notably, though, the administration removed most renewable energies from its official “energy” definitions, prioritizing conventional fuels such as oil and gas.

It is unclear, however, whether these specific actions will address the “emergency” at hand. The federal government has historically been able to do little to expedite permitting without legislative action from Congress. Likewise, state governments and local stakeholders retain vast powers under the US Constitution and existing laws to set their own energy agendas. While analysts may argue over whether the United States is in an energy emergency, the Trump administration’s available toolset to address one remains limited with or without an official declaration.

—Andrea Clabough is an associate at Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC, and a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

3. What does Trump’s energy agenda mean for competition with China?

Trump’s legacy will likely be defined by geopolitical competition with China, with energy playing a key role. Three issues stand out: US energy exports, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced batteries. 

Trump seeks to gain geopolitical leverage by boosting oil and gas exports, enabling higher US economic growth and strengthening the energy security of key US allies and partners. Trump’s policies seem focused on raising domestic hydrocarbon production rather than curbing demand—although both steps taken in tandem would more powerfully grow exports. Nearly doubling US LNG export capacity by 2028 will complicate the already-complex relationship with China, the world’s largest LNG importer. 

AI, which holds massive economic, strategic, and military potential, may prove to be the most consequential factor shaping the US-China competition. AI requires electricity-intensive data centers, but the aging US grid is strained by surging demand even as permitting red tape constrains new supply. Trump’s ability to reform transmission policy and ensure a diverse, low-cost energy mix may determine if the United States has sufficient electricity to outcompete China in AI.

Finally, advanced batteries are not only commercially important—they also have substantial (if underappreciated) military applications across unmanned systems, submarines, and electronic warfare systems. For instance, the Department of Defense recently designated Chinese battery maker CATL as a Chinese military company, possibly because of potential collaboration with the Chinese navy on lithium-ion battery-powered submarines. Trump’s energy legacy will be determined, in part, by the United States’ ability to outcompete China on advanced batteries, a technology with profound commercial and military applications.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

4. What are the likely implications of Trump’s orders to boost oil and gas production and end the pause on LNG terminal approvals?

Former US President Joe Biden’s halting of new export permits caused significant damage to the United States’ reputation as a reliable energy supplier. This greatly affected the planned access to gas of US allies, especially in Asia and Germany. In response, Japan sought to increase LNG imports from Qatar and other Middle Eastern producers. Gas importers look for long-term reliable supplies, and the flip-flopping of US energy policies with each election cycle projects undependability. Thus, Trump’s cancellation of this halt is not enough to restore confidence in gas buyers that future exports won’t just be halted again by a different administration. 

Trump’s planned canceling of special taxes on methane and removal of layers of bureaucracy that were imposed on natural gas production will lead to increased investments in natural gas. The two main factors in inflation are government spending and energy costs (which reverberate onto the cost of every good). Increased natural gas production is essential to Trump’s plan to lower US inflation, since it will lower the price of natural gas, electricity, and almost every produced good.

—Brenda Shaffer is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

***

It will take some time for global energy markets to experience the effects of the energy-related executive orders Trump signed on his first day in office. The LNG industry and its investors are enthused by the directive to resume the permitting process for new LNG facilities, but because of the time lag in permitting and construction, markets won’t feel the impact for several years. The US automotive industry is most directly impacted by Trump’s decision to scrap the Environmental Protection Agency’s new tailpipe emission regulations that would have effectively imposed electric vehicle (EV) mandates on new car sales in the future. Automakers that were in the process of shifting to EVs and retiring internal combustion engine models will need to reconsider these plans in light of consumer preference since government regulations effectively mandating EV sales cannot be depended on to push demand. 

Ultimately, the most influential executive orders will likely be those speeding the permitting process for pipelines, power plants, and energy transmission. We need more pipelines to bring natural gas to areas of the country experiencing growth in power demand, more power plants to convert fuel to energy, and better ways to transmit electricity across distances. More and better infrastructure will spur fuel production, help bring down prices for consumers, and power economic growth. While US oil and gas production is not likely to change dramatically this year as a result of Trump’s recent executive orders, domestic and global markets will feel the impacts in the years to come, especially if these changes are cemented through legislation. Executive orders are rescinded as easily as they are issued, and most energy and infrastructure projects take longer than a four-year presidential administration to come to fruition. If the Trump administration is truly committed to its energy agenda, it must find a way to make these regulatory policies last longer than Trump’s tenure in office. 

—Ellen R. Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.

5. What should we expect from Trump on nuclear energy?

The Trump administration is likely to be bullish on nuclear energy, viewing it as a tool to unleash US energy dominance. Trump will most likely wish to compete in the global market against Russian and Chinese civil nuclear exports, and the new administration will probably wish to meet demand from like-minded countries for US nuclear energy technologies, including large light-water reactors and next generation technologies such as small modular reactors and micro reactors. 

Trump has already named several nuclear energy supporters to key roles: Chris Wright, Trump’s choice for US secretary of energy, is best known for his role as chief executive officer of Liberty Energy, a natural gas company, but he has also served on the board of advanced reactor company Oklo and, in 2023, Wright signed a letter supporting nuclear energy. 

Other administration picks include Wells Griffith for under secretary of energy at the Department of Energy. During Trump’s first administration, Griffith served as senior advisor to the chief executive officer of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), where he played a role in lifting the DFC’s ban on nuclear project finance. Trump has selected former Congressman Brandon Williams to be the administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; Williams began his career by serving in the nuclear Navy, and he introduced nuclear energy legislation during his time in Congress. 

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

6. What could be the domestic and global impact of the United States rolling back clean energy initiatives?

During Trump’s first two days in office, he quickly began his attack on climate policies and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act (BIA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), passed during the Biden administration. He has shifted the focus of US energy policy from renewable development to increasing oil and gas exploration, production, and export, declaring a national energy emergency. In addition to withdrawing (again) from the Paris Climate Agreement, Trump is aiming to scrap programs that advance EVs and offshore wind development. 

In promoting investments in AI and recognizing the surge in demand resulting from data centers, he has indicated the need to increase electricity generation; but utilities have been looking to renewable energy with storage, as well as gas and nuclear power to meet this demand growth. The full dimensions of Trump’s efforts, and their impact on government funding, tax credits, and regulations for specific energy technology areas, will emerge in time and will no doubt be subject to many legal challenges. By executive order, he has put a pause on disbursements under both the BIA and the IRA and required federal agencies to report to the National Economic Council on priorities within ninety days. 

Even these early actions send a signal to the rest of the world that the US government’s commitment to cooperation in the global clean energy transition is changing and likely weakening. Actions to impose tariffs are likely to follow and will further increase strains in relations. In November, nations agreed at the 2024 United Nations Climate Conference, also known as COP29, to boost support for developing countries in their climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. But this week, Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio put a ninety-day freeze on the disbursement of US assistance funds, which include significant support for the clean energy transition (i.e., about $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2023), not to mention for Ukraine and other strategically important nations. Even this temporary pause will open more space for China to assert leadership in responding to nations’ interest in climate and clean energy development and reduce US government support for US private industry in-country clean energy investment and trade efforts. 

—Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center where he is authoring a policy series on power sector transformation in developing countries and supporting the Council’s work on US nuclear leadership and US national security.

***

The Trump administration’s rollback of clean energy initiatives marks a significant shift that could reshape global energy dynamics and climate action. By prioritizing fossil fuel expansion through policies like expedited drilling permits and LNG export approvals, the United States is poised to become an even more dominant oil and gas producer. While this shift may boost domestic energy production and exports, enhancing energy security—particularly for Europe—it comes at a critical juncture and could be costly to the United States’ clean technology leadership.

Pausing wind energy development, revoking EV targets, and freezing climate law funding will likely stall US progress in developing domestic clean energy supply chains and manufacturing capacity. This opens the door for China to further cement its dominance in clean technology manufacturing and critical minerals processing. The United States risks ceding ground in emerging industries such as green hydrogen, carbon capture, and advanced batteries, which are crucial for a decarbonized global economy.

While state and corporate climate initiatives may help maintain some momentum, reduced US leadership threatens to slow global decarbonization. Ultimately, the lack of coordinated federal action is likely to undermine international cooperation and technology transfer, vital for building climate resilience both at home and abroad. With extreme weather events already reaching century-high costs nationwide, the Trump administration may need to include solutions to address escalating physical risks in its toolkit to “make America great again.”

—Liliana Diaz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor of energy, climate policy, and markets in the Americas at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

7. Can the United States under Trump continue to lead on clean energy initiatives?

US clean energy initiatives—many of them conceived with strong bipartisan support—are one avenue for US leadership as a dominant energy supplier. The US government, across many administrations, has been pioneering supply-side incentives that encourage the private sector to make investments at massive scale. We have already seen improved clean energy technology, innovations in business models and project development, and increased investment in the sector. 

With regard to those tax credits that have been already implemented, the industry has designed projects to be compliant with those credits and is already moving forward—on tight timelines—on a range of advanced clean energy technologies. To reach final investment decisions on at-scale projects, the industry needs certainty and political continuity. While the president has issued an executive order (titled Unleashing American Energy) focusing on evaluating appropriations resulting from the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, the tax credits already implemented remain unaffected. 

With the United States seeking a global leadership role in energy innovation and exports, policymakers should carefully engage with industry to improve regulatory details to unlock cost reductions, encourage further private sector investments, and strengthen global competitiveness, especially vis-à-vis fast and effectively moving actors like China. Going forward, the government’s focus should remain on safeguarding investment certainty so projects already in planning can continue to progress.

—Lee Beck is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and SVP, Global Policy and Commercial Strategy, at HIF Global.

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With other sources of power at far greater risk of Russian attack, expanding the country’s nuclear power generation capacity is seen by many in the Ukrainian energy sector as a priority. However, the only suitable components to complete reactors three and four at the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Khmelnytsky are currently sitting in Bulgaria gathering dust and waiting for the green light from Kyiv.

Since Ukraine’s nuclear power plants date back to the USSR, the country finds itself forced rely on reactors built with Soviet technology. Bulgaria has offered to sell Ukraine reactor components originally intended for the country’s Belene Nuclear Power Plant project. This would make it possible to complete construction of two additional reactors at the Khmelnytsky plant, which would bring the total number of reactors in service to four. Two further reactors are also planned at the plant using Western technologies, but this is expected to be a longer process.

Backers of the potential agreement with Sofia note that it would strengthen bilateral ties between Ukraine and Bulgaria, which has long been a target of Russian subversion. With the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine set to enter a fourth year next month and with Moscow working hard to undermine support for Kyiv within the EU, this geopolitical context is an additional factor when assessing the suitability of the proposed reactor deal.

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Ukraine’s potential nuclear reactor purchase from Bulgaria has received backing from within the US nuclear industry. “As the Ukrainian parliament considers legislation to authorize completion of the Khmelnytsky Nuclear Plant, NEI supports Ukraine’s efforts to complete the facility,” commented the Washington DC-based Nuclear Energy Institute. This makes sense. US nuclear energy company Westinghouse has already signed a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine’s Energoatom to install its AP1000 reactors in Ukraine, but these US reactors will take several years to build.

In light of the extended waiting period before new nuclear reactors can realistically be installed, Ukraine and its Western partners must find ways to keep infrastructure running and expand the country’s nuclear electricity generation as quickly as possible. Under the circumstances, supporters of the Bulgarian deal argue that it would be a wasted opportunity to leave units three and four at the Khmelnytsky plant partially completed when the parts needed to finish the job and provide electricity are available.

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As Ukraine debates the potential delivery of Bulgarian reactors to expand one of the country’s Soviet-era nuclear plants, EU officials have reportedly ruled out contributing to the purchase. Opposition has also come from some segments of civil society and within parliament, with critics questioning the transparency of the proposed reactor deal and claiming Ukraine’s energy priority should be decentralization.

In a step toward greater transparency within the country’s nuclear energy industry, Energoatom agreed in January to bring its supervisory board into compliance with OECD guidelines. The process will take place under new supervisory board chairman Jarek Niewierowicz, Lithuania’s former energy minister and chief adviser to the Lithuanian president on environmental and infrastructure issues.

Helping Ukraine to rebuild and recover is recognized as a strategic priority by both the European Union and the United States, but supporting the resilience of the Ukrainian energy sector is not just a matter of standing in solidarity with Ukraine against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Given Ukraine’s considerable economic potential, it could serve as an attractive investment opportunity for the United States and EU nuclear power industries. Once the shooting stops and with better integration, Ukraine could even become a net exporter of electricity to the European Union. In the present wartime conditions, Ukraine already exports electricity when circumstances allow to neighboring countries including Moldova.

As Ukrainian MPs prepare to vote on the proposed Bulgarian purchase, longstanding efforts continue elsewhere in the energy sector to increase security, improve connectivity, and enhance integration between the Ukrainian and EU networks. While Soviet technology is certainly not a long-term solution to achieve the right energy balance in Ukraine, supporters of the Bulgarian reactor deal remain convinced that there are currently no practical alternatives until Western technologies can fully power the country’s strategically crucial nuclear plants.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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In the first global stocktake of progress towards the 2015 Paris Agreement, the 198 signatory countries called for accelerating deployment of low-emission technologies—including nuclear energy—to meet climate goals. The stocktake marked the first formal recognition of nuclear energy as a solution to reduce emissions in a COP agreement, reflecting a recent paradigm shift in how nuclear power is viewed among climate negotiators.

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Acknowledging the emissions-reducing role of nuclear energy enables government and private sector leaders to leverage it as a decarbonization tool; it also helps unlock investment for countries embarking on nuclear energy projects.

During New York Climate Week in September 2024, fourteen global banks and financial institutions pledged to support the COP28 goal of tripling nuclear energy capacity. This public backing from the financial sector was the first of its kind and is a critical step in driving investor confidence in this revitalized market.

The pledge marks a timely shift in attitudes toward financing nuclear energy projects. The average annual global investment in nuclear power in the 2010s was just $30 billion. From 2017-23, this rose to $50 billion. Tripling nuclear energy capacity would require upwards of $150 billion in annual global investment by 2050.

Private investment—in addition to government-backed initiatives—is critical to accelerate nuclear energy deployment at scale. Leaders in the nuclear energy industry must continue to engage with banks and financial institutions to mobilize capital to support anticipated levels of growth.  

Customers ready to purchase nuclear electricity are required for new projects to be bankable. As the only zero-emission baseload power source with the potential to be scalable in many regions, nuclear energy is an attractive option for industries which require reliable, 24/7 power—like data centers.

Global power demand from data centers is expected to grow 160 percent by 2030, with US demand rising from 25 gigawatts (GW) in 2024 to more than 80 GW by 2030 to accommodate increased computing capacities. Customers are already experiencing higher electric bills as a result of data centers’ sudden and unprecedented strain on the grid.

Driven by their extraordinary demand for reliable power, US tech companies comprise some of the earliest end-users driving the large-scale deployment of commercial nuclear energy. Last year, some of the world’s largest tech firms announced big commitments to invest in nuclear energy projects, including agreements between Google and Kairos Power, Amazon and X-energy, and Microsoft and Constellation Energy.

Partnerships between Big Tech and reactor companies marked some of the most promising developments towards establishing demand at scale, or an “orderbook,” for the US industry last year. The partnerships illustrate the potential for financial mechanisms, such as power purchase agreements, to de-risk investments in novel projects. Using these developments as a blueprint, nuclear energy providers should work closely with other energy-intensive sectors, such as heavy manufacturing, as demand for clean electricity surges worldwide.

In November, COP29 in Azerbaijan delivered additional support for the industry. The Biden administration set a first-of-its-kind target to deploy 200 GW of new nuclear by 2050, which would more than triple current US capacity. The United States launched three project partnerships with Ukraine under the Foundational Infrastructure for the Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program to dedicate $30 million to explore the potential of nuclear energy to help the country meet its energy security goals. The United States also signed a civil nuclear collaboration agreement with the United Kingdom to pool research and development funding and exclude Russia from future collaborations.

With Brazil holding the COP30 presidency, the country’s nuclear power ambitions may help to secure nuclear energy’s place at the center of the COP agenda. Latin America’s leader in installed nuclear capacity and home to the world’s eighth-largest uranium reserves, Brazil has expressed intentions to add 10 GW over the next thirty years and revive domestic uranium production.

Deploying new nuclear energy projects at scale will require global leaders to translate pledges into action. Multilateral engagement, backing from the financial sector, and buy-in from new customers could deliver major wins for nuclear energy. The industry must now mobilize around these converging trends to secure a robust nuclear energy ecosystem for the decades ahead.

Amy Drake is an assistant director at the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Staff

Amy Drake

Assistant Director

Global Energy Center Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

New Atlanticist Oct 29, 2024

Tech companies are showing a new, strong interest in nuclear power. Here’s why.

By Jennifer T. Gordon, Lauren Hughes

Recent announcements by Google and Amazon demonstrate a willingness to finance the development and deployment of advanced reactors for their own energy requirements.

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

EnergySource Aug 11, 2024

Japan’s economic revitalization requires nuclear energy

By Lauren Hughes, Maia Sparkman

Japan’s economy is recovering, with government efforts to boost population growth and expand energy-intensive industries like AI and semiconductors. However, current energy policies may not meet rising demand. Restarting nuclear reactors under enhanced safety measures is key to Japan’s energy security and climate goals. To sustain growth, Japan must continue restarting its nuclear fleet and invest in next-generation reactors, addressing workforce and supply chain challenges.

Japan Nuclear Energy

EnergySource Dec 15, 2023

COP28’s legacy will be measured by emissions reduction, not ‘historic’ text

By Landon Derentz

The COP28 final declaration is transformational in its reflections on fossil energy’s role in climate change. The conference’s real legacy, however, will be the efforts undertaken to foster the inclusive platform necessary to promote private and public actions and reduce global emissions.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Tripling global nuclear energy capacity is in reach—if the world seizes the moment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Shaffer in Real Clear Energy: Europe’s Nuclear Energy and Central Asian Uranium appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Next year is going to be decisive for the Iranian nuclear program for a variety of reasons, some of which are related to the JCPOA and some of which are associated with tensions in Iran and even regionally and internationally as a direct result of the campaign between Israel and members of the Axis of Resistance (specifically Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Shia militias in Iraq) that began on October 7, 2023. These events and developments will bring the Iranian nuclear program to a strategic junction in the coming year, affecting not only the nuclear file but also the Islamic Republic’s broad security strategy and its relations with the international community and the region. Iran will be forced to make a historic decision.

Since Tehran departed from the JCPOA limit of 3.67 percent uranium enrichment, Iran has learned to develop advanced centrifuges and enrich at 60 percent. In addition, Iran has expanded its enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow, is preparing for the operation of another enrichment facility near Natanz, and is continuing to return significant amounts of enriched material to the stockpiles at various levels. Despite this, Iran continues its relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—but it still needs to implement the action plan established with the agency.

In the military context, according to the latest assessment published by the US intelligence community, Tehran has not yet made a strategic decision to move toward nuclear weapons. But even if Iran’s leadership doesn’t indicate a desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, technological work is underway that goes beyond the lines of a civilian program. With no accord in place, the international community seems to be in a deep freeze in the face of these updates. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s recent visit to Tehran highlights these problems. Tehran appears willing to cooperate with the IAEA only to prevent any harsh decision against by the organization’s Board of Governors—it has no real intention of working with the IAEA. 

However, recent Board of Governors meetings have seen a hardening of the statements issued by the E3—Britain, France, and Germany—and the United States regarding progress of Iran’s nuclear program, especially about its unwillingness to cooperate with the IAEA’s road map. But at the same time, the Board of Governors—who are meeting this week in Vienna—have not taken a dramatic step against Iran, apparently due to the fear of pushing it into a corner, leaving Tehran no choice but to carry out threatened actions that cannot be rolled back. And so, an equilibrium was created in which Iran continues to expand its program without going beyond the red lines of enrichment and weapons. On the other hand, the West—led by the E3 and the United States—maintains the sanctions regime but does not take any dramatic steps against Iran for its progress in this program. In general, it seems that the Western powers, especially with Tehran’s involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine, have preferred to focus on other issues and practically abandoned dealing with the country’s nuclear program.

But this reality will inevitably change in the coming year. First and foremost, the snapback issue forces the parties to the original deal to formulate a strategy regarding whether or not to activate it. Any decision will have far-reaching consequences for Iran’s conduct in regard to its nuclear program. October 18, 2025 will be the last opportunity for world powers to initiate the snapback mechanism, returning all the sanctions that were lifted in the JCPOA agreement (except those already expired). Iran is already threatening that activating the exact mechanism will inevitably lead Tehran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), making this decision crucial for the future of the Iranian nuclear program. But even if the world powers give up the option to activate the snapback mechanism, this will have profound consequences for Iran and send a message that it has an open ticket to move forward with its program without any real limits.  

That raises the question of returning to the JCPOA or drafting a new nuclear agreement. It seems that the current Iranian leadership, especially after the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, understands that the path to economic relief in Iran lies only in reaching an agreement with the West that will limit the nuclear program. On the other hand, those Western countries, including the United States (soon to be led by President-elect Donald Trump), will also want to move forward in principle.

The international community and Iran are converging on a crossroads. Either they can reach a new nuclear agreement or return to the JCPOA (which would lead to the rolling back of the nuclear program in exchange for significant economic relief) or Western countries could activate the snapback mechanism (which would lead to unprecedented moves on the part of Iran, and a clash between the powers—and probably Israel—and Iran). It is important to note that rolling back the Iranian nuclear program does not erase the Iranian scientists’ extensive knowledge. In addition, the United States left the JCPOA, making it very hard to reach an agreement that will significantly roll back the Iranian nuclear program. 

Furthermore, the probability of keeping the current enrichment level below the 90 percent threshold is eroded, as evidenced by the fact that Iran, by mistake or not, has already enriched very close to the 90 percent threshold. Given the vast number of centrifuges and the high level of enrichment, plus the progress of Iranian scientists in weapons research, the likelihood that red lines will be crossed simply due to the nature of the nuclear program increases with every day that passes without an agreement—regardless of whether the leadership has made an affirmative decision to seek nuclear weapons.

This reality is also related to the Israel-Iran conflict, specifically Israel’s fear of attacking Iran. In the past, the thinking was that Israel would be conscientious not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities without US backing for fear of a regional war in which Hezbollah could cause severe damage to Israel. The developments since October 7, 2023—specifically Hezbollah’s military setbacks and the severe damage caused to Iran’s air-defense capability as a result of the most recent attack by Israel—may increase Israel’s appetite.

These regional changes have led to many statements from officials in Iran that mention the possibility of Iran changing its nuclear strategy and moving toward the construction of a nuclear bomb. Now that Iran is more exposed to Israeli and even US attacks (as a result of damage to Iranian air-defense systems), and in light of Iran’s difficulties in expanding its ballistic missile stockpile, the likelihood of Iran making a strategic reexamination rises dramatically. The Iranian temptation to use the program as a deterrent to Israel and perhaps the United States following the election of Trump is increasing significantly, and the relative proximity to military enrichment and maybe even a bomb allows—and will spur—the leadership in Iran to advance to that stage of development after years of no change in Tehran’s nuclear strategy. 

The constraints and opportunities that push Tehran, the connection of proven Israeli military capability in Iran, and the growing suspicion that Tehran will not hesitate to move in this direction also increase the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. 

After years of stagnation with the nuclear program and Iran’s creeping progress in its program without overstepping lines, regional and international developments—but especially the snapback deadline issue—are leading Iran’s nuclear program to an unavoidable junction. The decision point of deal or no deal—with the accompanying ripple effects in either direction—is approaching, but it is already clear that in 2025, Iran’s nuclear program will be on a different path. 

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

The post 2025 will be a decisive year for Iran’s nuclear program appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since March 2024, Russia has decimated Ukraine’s thermal and hydro power plants. As a result, Ukraine is now reliant on the country’s nuclear industry to provide over 70 percent of its electricity needs. It is therefore vital for Ukraine to protect, sustain, and expand its nuclear power generation. Given the Soviet origin of Ukraine’s nuclear power industry, this will not be straightforward.

Obtaining parts to keep old reactors in operation while Kyiv transitions to Western nuclear technologies and expands energy production in other sectors, such as renewables, is essential. An opportunity to overcome the scarcity of parts now presents itself and must be seized to help Ukraine keep its infrastructure running and expand the country’s nuclear electricity generation as quickly as possible.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As part of efforts to fill gaps in energy generation created by Russia’s targeted attacks, Ukraine and Bulgaria are currently pursuing a deal to transfer excess nuclear equipment intended for Bulgaria’s Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to Ukraine’s Khmelnytsky NPP. This will make it possible to complete construction of reactors three and four at the Ukrainian plant.

Once Bulgaria had ruled out beginning the process of installing Russian-produced equipment at its Belene NPP, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company, Energoatom, quickly recognized an opportunity. They saw that Bulgaria was now the only country in the world with the type of excess Russian nuclear equipment needed to complete the unfinished units at Khmelnytsky NPP.

Given that Ukraine started building the two incomplete units some years ago using Russian technology, it faced two options: Abandon the units and their power generation entirely, or access the equipment possessed by Bulgaria to safely install those components in cooperation with Energoatom’s Western nuclear industry partners to increase electricity production in Ukraine. In the process, this could lead to new shared expertise that will help countries around the world reduce and ultimately end their dependence on Russia’s Rosatom.

Eurasia Center events

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Ongoing negotiations between Ukraine and Bulgaria highlight Russia’s declining energy clout in the Balkans, but this does not mean that the initiative is without challenges. On the contrary, a number of major obstacles are holding up completion of this vital deal. One is Russia’s long-standing influence in Bulgaria. This includes the activities of Kremlin proxies in Bulgaria who are working to sabotage the transfer of Bulgaria’s nuclear equipment to Ukraine. The second barrier is the financing of the potential equipment transfer.

For decades, Russia has exercised considerable influence in the Bulgarian energy, media, and political spheres. Moscow is not relinquishing its position without a fight, and is doing everything possible to maintain its standing as a decisive player in Bulgarian affairs.

A key component of Moscow’s strategy in Bulgaria is the systematic organization of a campaign, closely resembling efforts elsewhere including in Moldova and Serbia, to quash the deal with Ukraine, thereby preventing additional power generation in Ukraine and further eroding Ukraine’s efforts to end its dependence on Russia in the nuclear sphere. Earlier this year, when Ukrainian nuclear experts traveled to Bulgaria to inspect the equipment, supporters of Bulgaria’s pro-Russian Vazrazhdane (Revival) party clashed with the Ukrainian delegation and sought to prevent it from accessing the equipment.

The second key issue is financing, with talks already underway for almost two years. Bulgaria’s parliament is pressing the government to conclude the deal at a price of at least €600 million, the same price the Bulgarian National Electricity Company paid to Russia’s Atomstroyexport. Progress could be made if international partners provide Bulgaria with funding to invest in the expansion of its Kozloduy NPP, where Westinghouse will build reactors. The fact that Westinghouse is engaged in fuel production and reactor building in both Ukraine and Bulgaria is a potentially important point of intersection for the two countries and reflects why the United States in particular has an interest in the successful transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine.

Given that the purchase and transfer of the equipment would benefit Europe’s long-term energy security, there are European funds that could be used, including those available via the European Commission’s Ukraine Facility, which has a mandate to rebuild infrastructure and support the continuity of critical services such as energy transmission. The US could support the Europeans in this endeavor, including by allocating funding from its aid to Ukraine. However, Kyiv is likely to face significant transparency concerns and will need to instill stakeholder confidence.

The transfer of Bulgaria’s excess nuclear equipment to Ukraine would help address Kyiv’s electricity generation needs while also representing a major setback for Russia’s strategy in both Ukraine and the Balkans. Boosting Ukraine’s nuclear power capabilities would enhance the country’s economic outlook and position Ukraine to eventually replace Russia as a principal energy supplier to Europe in the postwar period. This makes Ukraine’s acquisition of Bulgarian nuclear power plant equipment a significant opportunity for the West that must not be missed.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Ukrainians brace for blackouts ahead of Russian winter air offensive

By Aura Sabadus

A recent lull in Russian missile attacks has led many Ukrainians to conclude that the Kremlin is stockpiling ahead of a major winter air offensive targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure, writes Aura Sabadus.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Putin’s North Korean escalation is a direct result of Western weakness

By Peter Dickinson

The arrival of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe is the result of more than a decade of weak Western responses to escalating Russian aggression in Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Russia’s economy is overheating but Putin cannot change course

By Alexander Mertens

Russia’s wartime economy is in danger of overheating due to a combination of record military spending, sanctions pressures, and runaway inflation, but Vladimir Putin dare not change course, writes Alexander Mertens.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine needs Western support to boost its nuclear energy potential appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For now, however, reports of bilateral talks remain unconfirmed and have been denied by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Even if some kind of deal could be reached, few in Ukraine would be prepared to count on Russia keeping its word. Instead, millions of Ukrainians are currently preparing for what most believe will be the toughest winter of the war amid expectations of fresh Russian attacks on the country’s battered power grid.

Russia has been conducting a bombing campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Attacks intensified in spring 2024, with Russia unleashing waves of devastating missile and drone strikes that wiped out nearly all of Ukraine’s generation capacity fueled by coal or water.

This damage added to the widespread destruction already inflicted by earlier Russian air offensives, particularly during the first winter of the war. Ukraine’s power generating potential has also been weakened by the loss of renewable energy infrastructure in areas of the country close to the front lines of the conflict or under Russian occupation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine is now approaching a third consecutive wartime winter with the country’s energy outlook more precarious than ever. With over half of Ukraine’s prewar energy sources already lost, the civilian population will be heavily dependent on three remaining nuclear power plants to make it through the cold season. This reliance makes Ukraine’s nuclear plants an obvious target for the Kremlin. In September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the UN General Assembly that Russia is preparing to attack the country’s nuclear plants.

Ukrainians are currently being warned that rolling blackouts are likely throughout the winter months, with electricity potentially limited to just a few hours per day. Any further loss in capacity could also create operational risks at Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, which require a steady supply of electricity to function. An October 2024 report by Greenpeace Ukraine highlighted the potential threat to nuclear safety. The report detailed how further Russian attacks on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure could jeopardize the functioning of the country’s nuclear plants, with potentially dire consequences for Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

The international community has taken a number of steps to help Ukraine prepare for the winter season. In a significant move, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE), an organisation supervising the interconnection of Europe’s electricity transmission grids, recently announced an increase in export capacity to Ukraine starting in December from the current 1.7 GW to 2.1 GW. Although additional energy importing capacity is certainly welcome, Ukraine may still face a supply deficit, particularly in case of an extended cold spell. Ukrainian engineers are currently racing against the clock to repair damaged power plants and transmission infrastructure to ensure their prompt return to the grid ahead of the winter heating season.

The Ukraine Energy Support Fund, which is managed by the EU-affiliated Energy Community, has disbursed around half a billion euros from Ukraine’s Western partners since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. These funds are being used to help finance repairs as well as secure critical pieces of equipment such as transformers and gas turbines. Further funding is expected to come as part of the latest EU support package. Brussels has also secured around ten thousand electricity generators to help cover the energy needs of Ukraine’s civilian population. Meanwhile, individual EU member states such as Lithuania and Estonia have promised to dismantle old Soviet power plants and send spare parts to Ukraine.

Despite these steps, there are still widespread concerns that further damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the coming weeks may leave millions of people without heating and power for extended periods amid subzero temperatures. Prolonged blackouts could spark a humanitarian crisis, leading to new waves of Ukrainian refugees crossing into the EU.

The most effective measure to safeguard Ukraine’s energy infrastructure remains enhanced air defenses. With the winter heating season now officially underway, Ukraine is still waiting to receive some of the air defense systems promised by the country’s partners. The past few months have seen a relative lull in Russian missile attacks, leading many to conclude that the Kremlin is currently stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles in order to launch mass missile strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure once temperatures begin to plummet.

At present, Ukraine does not have sufficient coverage to fully protect its power grid against a new Russian air offensive. While reports of a possible deal with Russia to halt energy infrastructure attacks are encouraging, most Ukrainians would much rather see their international allies take concrete steps to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Putin’s North Korean escalation is a direct result of Western weakness

By Peter Dickinson

The arrival of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe is the result of more than a decade of weak Western responses to escalating Russian aggression in Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 5, 2024

Too many still view Ukraine through the prism of Russian imperialism

By Olesya Khromeychuk

Far too many Western newspaper editors, academics, and cultural commentators continue to view Ukraine through the distorting lens of Russian imperialism, writes Olesya Khromeychuk.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Oct 15, 2024

As the US election nears, anxiety is mounting in Ukraine

By Kate Spencer

Few countries have more at stake in the coming US presidential election than Ukraine, which is heavily dependent on US aid to sustain its fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion, writes Kate Spencer.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukrainians brace for blackouts ahead of Russian winter air offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On October 16, AWS announced its participation in $500 million of Series C-1 financing for advanced reactor developer X-energy and several partnerships with utility companies to construct five gigawatts of new nuclear projects by 2039. That amount of generation capacity could power the city of Chicago for a year, with electricity to spare. AWS will also cooperate with Energy Northwest to construct a four-unit 320 megawatt plant in Washington, and it is partnering with Dominion Energy to explore advanced reactor development at North Anna Power Station in Virginia. Also on October 16, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced a $900 million solicitation for initial deployments of Generation III+ Small Modular Reactors, with a tier of funding available for teams of first movers. And finally, the same week Google announced a partnership with Kairos Power, another reactor developer, for 500 megawatts of power at “a series of advanced reactor sites . . . in relevant service territories to supply clean electricity to Google data centers, with the first deployment by 2030.” The investments announced by these tech companies could catalyze the next generation of domestic reactor deployments.

One of the biggest challenges for advanced nuclear energy is the financing of new nuclear projects and, by extension, building an order book to sustain a US supply chain and workforce pipeline to construct new reactors on time and on budget. In the updated DOE’s Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Advanced Nuclear report, the authors emphasize that “a committed orderbook of 5-10 deployments of at least one reactor design is the first essential step for catalyzing commercial liftoff.” Data center providers and generative artificial intelligence companies are driving a surge in electricity demand that is only expected to increase. Tech companies have ravenous electricity appetites and require clean, consistent power at the highest levels of reliability for 24/7 operations of their servers and critical cooling equipment. Nuclear energy has attributes uniquely suited to meet these demands, and tech companies are new customers that could build the order book that is required for new reactors to be deployed. Advanced nuclear companies are designing reactors that are intended to be highly efficient and that could simplify construction using prefabricated, modularized components. The next generation of reactors—many of which range from five to three hundred megawatts—may be operated flexibly or in remote locations because their installed capacities are smaller. 

But tech companies are not just interested in next generation technologies. Energy-intensive companies are also recognizing that the existing nuclear fleet offers an unparalleled source of stable, reliable, and clean electricity. As a result, companies across different sectors have chosen to site their facilities close to existing nuclear power plants. Companies require power today but recognize the potential for nuclear energy to meet medium- to long-term energy demands. And tech companies are investing substantial amounts of capital into data centers and clean energy procurement. For example, Microsoft signed a twenty-year agreement with Constellation to purchase power at an energy security premium. On September 20, Constellation Energy announced a twenty-year power purchase agreement with Microsoft to restart Three Mile Island Unit 1 in Pennsylvania. In Virginia, Green Energy Partners intends to build a data center campus adjacent to Dominion Energy’s Surry Nuclear Power Plant. Tech companies are leveraging the existing fleet of gigawatt-scale nuclear reactors to satisfy energy needs and advance their decarbonization goals. On May 29, at the White House Summit on Domestic Nuclear Deployment, Google, Microsoft, and Nucor announced memorandums of understanding with Duke Energy to enable investments in advanced nuclear energy in North Carolina through Accelerating Clean Energy tariffs.

The implications extend beyond energy-hungry data centers. The next generation of nuclear energy technologies under development—many of which have relatively smaller generation capacities than traditional reactors in operation—hold promise for on- and off-grid applications. Manufacturers, such as Nucor, are also investing in advanced reactors to generate carbon-free electricity and that could be used for desalination, hydrogen production, and process heat. In Texas, X-energy is constructing its first plant at Dow’s Seadrift Operations industrial site with support from the DOE Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program. Demonstrating technologies through such projects fosters confidence that advanced reactors can be deployed at other industrial facilities—chemical production, mines, or upstream oil and gas fields—or remote communities that want affordable, clean power access.

The recent announcements by Google and Amazon demonstrate a willingness to finance the development and deployment of advanced reactors for their own energy requirements and climate targets, at a scale that could rapidly drive down capital costs for future new builds and advance the clean energy transition nationwide. Partnerships can manage risk and surmount the financial barriers to deployment, bridging the gap between technological innovation and concrete deployments of advanced reactors to enable a bright future for nuclear energy for decades to come.

Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Lauren Hughes serves as the deputy director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Note: Amazon Web Services, Constellation, and the Department of Energy are donors to the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. This article, which did not involve the donors, reflects the authors’ views.

The post Tech companies are showing a new, strong interest in nuclear power. Here’s why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event

Atlantic Council Regional Conference on Clean and Secure Energy

The regional conference on clean and secure energy gathers top government, business, and thought leaders to discuss the next steps in the clean energy transition.

Central Asia Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Speakers

Matthew Baldwin
Deputy Director-General, Directorate General for Energy, European Commission

Sanja Bozinovska
Minister of Energy, Mining and Mineral Resources, North Macedonia

Ahmet Berat Çonkar
Deputy Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Republic of Türkiye

George-Sergiu Niculescu
President, Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority

Moderator

Matthew Bryza
Managing Director, Straife; Former US Ambassador to Azerbaijan

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

MATTHEW BRYZA: Thanks. Thanks so much. Thanks so much to you, Fred, to Defne, to Grady, to Alp, to Zeynep for this really amazing conference that has been rich with fresh ideas and really a new tone on energy security and clean energy.

It’s an honor to be up on the stage right after Assistant Secretary Pyatt and after Deputy Minister Ekinci. I want to—we’ll call up our panel right now, but just congratulate you, Berris, on your appointment as deputy minister. We’re going into our third decade of collaborating together to try to develop the type of infrastructure we’re going to talk about now, and especially natural gas as a transition fuel. Congratulations.

So, please, may our panel join me up here? We have together with us Matthew Baldwin, who’s deputy director-general of the Directorate General for Energy of the European Commission. Matthew, thank you. We have—we have the Honorable Sanja Bozinovska, who is minister of energy of North Macedonia; Deputy Minister of Energy for Turkey Ahmet Berat Çonkar; and George-Sergiu Niculescu, who’s president of the Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority. Thank you.

According to the European Council, the share of Russia’s pipeline gas in the—in the EU, as Assistant Secretary Pyatt was talking about, dropped from around 45 percent in 2021 to about maybe 8 percent in 2023. And for pipeline gas and LNG combined, Russia accounted for less than 15 percent of total EU imports. This drop was possible largely thanks to a sharp increase in LNG imports, especially from the United States, which were enabled by investments in regasification terminals especially in Germany, which I think surprised everybody by how quickly it was able to pivot and deploy commercially viable projects that were supported, of course, by the government and by the European Commission.

Also, we saw a reduction in natural gas consumption in the EU by, I guess, around 15 percent, with a target to continue reducing that consumption by another 15 percent this year. And before that—in the decades before, I think it’s fair to argue the European Union worked very hard, especially the Commission, to stimulate investment in pipeline interconnections that also Assistant Secretary Pyatt discussed, which allow natural gas molecules to reach the buyers, the consumers, according to market mechanisms—supply and demand—rather than monopolistic power. So these are really impressive achievements that a lot of people in this room have worked together on for decades.

However, Southeast Europe is now flooded by Russian natural gas. It’s coming in via the TurkSteam pipeline, via the Russia-Ukraine pipelines. And in recent weeks, in my own experience, natural gas traders and investors in regasification terminals, especially in Greece, have told me that the LNG import terminal at Revithoussa is operating at only 20 percent capacity. And as I mentioned yesterday, I’m on the board of advisors of the largest natural gas distribution company in Bulgaria, which has booked five slots, doesn’t know how we’re going to use them. And at this point, it’s very difficult to reach a commercially viable contract right now for LNG that can outcompete the pipeline gas.

So looking ahead also, the European Commission and Azerbaijan have agreed in their Strategic Energy Partnership of July 2022 to double by 2027 imports of natural gas into the EU via the Southern Corridor. However, as we discussed yesterday, that goal conflicts with the EU’s objective of phasing out all natural gas usage by 2035, so in eleven years.

So I’d like to turn to Deputy Director-General Baldwin first and maybe focus on that last issue. How can we reconcile the need for longer-term natural gas sales and purchase agreements to allow this expanded infrastructure for natural gas to be financed with the ambition to phase our natural gas within eleven years?

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Well, thank you, Matt. And let me join the raucous applause to the Atlantic Council for putting on such another great event. And indeed, as Ambassador Pyatt said, it’s wonderful it’s in Istanbul—I mean, a pivotal city for the region in all of the things we’re talking about.

Thanks for the question. A bit of context, of course, to remind us how we got here. We are committed to be the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. We’ve done a lot of the heavy lifting in terms of developing what we call the European Green Deal, commitments to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent by 2030. We’re also looking at additional work to focus on 2040, which I think is meaningful in terms of generating necessary investments, focusing on a reduction around 90 percent by 2040.

And let’s also remind ourselves it’s not just the plucky European Union. We’ve heard from deputy foreign minister that Turkey itself is driving strongly in this direction. And the last COP took a really quite momentous decision to phase out fossil fuels with, yes, some important guardrail language, but that’s the direction of travel.

And of course, that’s the context in which we’ve had to manage the crisis in the last couple of years. And it has been—it’s been severe and it’s been difficult. I’m sure we’ll come back onto the specific aspects in the region.

But to try to answer your question, we’ve never pretended even before the crisis, when we needed gas in the worst way in the shortest possible timeframe, we never said that gas is not a transition fuel. We’re going to need gas in our pipes all the way through 2049. When countries are getting out of coal and into gas power generation, that’s a plus.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yes.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: We know we’re going to need that. And if we can deliver on the burgeoning CCUS framework, I think that also provides a perfectly plausible outlet for companies to be buying gas now with a view to use it even beyond 2050. And by the way, there will be a number of countries that aren’t meeting that timescale, and therefore, you know, to be—to be ruthless about it, these companies will still have a market for their gas.

We are sometimes asked, therefore, you know, against the twenty-five-year or whatever planning profile that FIDs need for triggering LNG projects in the—in the US, how does that all fit? And I think if you—if you look in that framework that we’re going to need a continued supply of gas, we are not, I would stress, in the Commission, in the long-term contract business. I don’t have terminals in my office. I’m not calling gas traders in the middle of the night. But we’re totally fine with our gas purchasing companies making such arrangements to provide those commitments. We on the record are saying that. And I think if you look at the trends in terms of long-term contracting—and you probably follow this as closely as I do—it’s the portfolio players who have actually taken up the biggest slack. And if you think of the logic in that with the turmoil in the European gas markets and elsewhere, it’s about acquiring these long-term contracts which I think have done—have been effective in triggering FID, and then parceling out smaller contracts often for gas purchasing companies.

But I really want to stress, if European gas purchasing companies want to do those long-term contracts, and if they think that contributes to the security of supply, that’s absolutely great. Not a magic solution. These are also indexed. A lot of people said, looking at our gas price spikes in 2022, oh, if only—if only we had long-term contracts and we weren’t just on the spot market—which we weren’t, by the way—then everything would be fine. But that’s not the case. And a lot of those contracts, of course, are indexed to the—to the TTF.

If I may just make one last point on this issue, because I think it’s relevant in terms of our move towards climate neutrality, and that’s methane. And you know, it’s probably overtalked about now, but the great coming LNG glut in the second half of this decade—we know it’s coming from the US and from Qatar—as that market starts to loosen, big gas-consuming places like the EU and like Japan and Southeast Asia increasingly will be able to choose a bit between. And I think we need to use the current work that’s going on, the work we’re doing with Brad Crabtree and the MMRV Group to find a really global way of homing in on measuring and monitoring of emissions; and the work to reduce methane-reduction pathways, which we’ll be announcing in the COP, to enable that sort of choice as to where we’re getting the gas in the future. And I think that’s a big new trend.

Last point—of course, and I’m sure we’ll come back to it—in all of this, the regional collaboration that Ambassador Pyatt mentioned that we were doing in Greece, and as we—and I’d like to come back to the Russian gas question in a moment—you know, it is going to be so pivotal in all of this work.

So thank you. Sorry to be a bit long.

MATTHEW BRYZA: No, thanks, Matthew. Beautifully comprehensive and thoughtful. Really important clarification about the Commission’s view on longer-term natural gas sales.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Hopefully wasn’t new, but, yeah.

MATTHEW BRYZA: It just—it doesn’t—there’s a lot of static in the system and that message doesn’t always come through, especially in places like Baku, where they really are worried about not being able to fund their upstream investment, which we’ll come to.

But one of your underlying points, of course, is natural gas, as Deputy Minister Ekinci was saying, as a transition fuel. So I’d like to turn, then, to Minister Bozinovska about North Macedonia’s plans. I mean, my understanding is North Macedonia is still dependent on about—on lignite for about 55 percent of its primary energy, so to generate electricity. So what’s the status of your gas interconnection planning with Greece and with Bulgaria? And also, what are your plans to develop a domestic natural gas distribution network, if any? Thank you.

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: First of all, thank you for the invitation.

As you said North Macedonia is mostly dependent on coal. We are working on a program. We just submitted our growth plans to the European Union, so we are waiting for an answer in the next—in the following months. The estimation is it will cost around three billion, which for our country is a significant amount of money.

We also established a just transition. And it’s led—I’m in the steering committee together with the Ministry of Environment. And we are discussing with EBRD, with EIB, and with the World Bank regarding the financing.

Regarding the gas in North Macedonia, there is only at the moment one connection; it’s from Bulgaria. And we had one tender with Greece; unfortunately, it was—there were objections from the European Investment Bank, and now we are doing our best to re-tender. We have secured all the finance. It’s around 86 million. And EBRD clearly state it’s the last financing that they have, so it will be their last financing into gas connector. We hope in the next two weeks that we will have the tender ongoing, and by the end of the year or January this work should start.

We heard that Alexandroupoli started from the 1st of October. Some projection about the work is around two years, but we hope that it can be finished a year and a half so it will be another diversification of the gas so it can come from Greece to North Macedonia. On Monday, we signed with Serbia the memo of understanding for also the gas connection, because from North Macedonia it’s only twenty-five kilometers that needs to be built. So in the near future, we plan to have Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, and then it can go to Southeast Europe since this is also an important region to be valued. So this is the exact situation.

And regarding the 55 percent, we are doing a new energy law and we plan also to have more renewables. We have around in the last three years built seven hundred megawatts of solar and we need financing regarding the green infrastructure. And we also plan to include battery storage, which is a hot topic now in this region. We plan to have also construct for differences in order to, let’s say, have more renewables. So we are working on this. We are a new ministry, just three months established. But I hope by end of the year we will have more things in the law.

And we are working also with the energy community in Vienna and, yeah, in Brussels. I’m going in December, so we will discuss which issues are still a challenge and what needs to be done.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Wow, quite impressive vision, and not just vision but implementation. It sounds like you’re doing specific, concrete investment planning; I mean, I know you are. And this is a really important strategic issue, as well, going back to the Vertical Corridor that Assistant Secretary Pyatt talked about. And I want to come back to that issue in the next round, if that’s OK. But you’re not just talking about, as my old boss President Bush would say, strategery—you’re talking about the practicality of how to make the investments work.

So then I’d like to move to Deputy Minister Çonkar on this issue of making practical investments work. And Turkey has been a driving force of the diversification of sources of natural gas supply into the EU thanks to the Southern Corridor, but thanks to the investments that, again, many of us all worked together on to make possible in the upstream in Azerbaijan decades ago. And I mentioned in my opening remarks the ambition to double the flow of natural gas from—well, through the Southern Corridor into the EU.

So, from your perspective and Turkey’s perspective, where are those supplies of gas going to come from? Azerbaijan, as I’ll talk about in the next round, is not getting enough upstream investment to have those molecules coming out of the ground in time, but there’s a possibility of swaps from Turkmenistan which would have to go across Iran. Or is it cross-Caspian infrastructure, maybe, that we’re looking at? What could be the sources of supply?

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: Thank you very much, Matthew. First of all, thank you very much for this opportunity.

First of all, I would like to give some information about our gas infrastructure. As mentioned, Türkiye is the fourth-largest gas market in Europe, with an annual consumption of approximately fifty billion cubic meters of natural gas. For many years, Türkiye was importing almost all of this gas, total number was imported. After the discovery of natural gas in the Black Sea in August 2020, we started production only in three years’ time. Within three years’ time, we were able to start production. As of today, we are producing 6.2 million cubic meters of natural gas from our Black Sea fields, and we have additional one million from other fields. So Türkiye right now produces about 7.5 million cubic meters of natural gas from its own sources.

This means that we are able to meet about 2.6 million households’ needs from our own resources, so this is an important development for us. We are hoping to increase this production to ten million cubic meters in the first quarter of 2025.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Sorry, ten billion—ten billion per year?

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: Ten million per day.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Oh, ten million per day.

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: Per day. And as Minister Bayraktar mentioned, our aim is to double this to twenty million per day, which comes to almost 7.5 billion cubic meters per year, by the end of 2026 with our new floating production unit that will be operational at the end of 2026.

So, also we have made infrastructure investments to receive gas both through pipelines and LNG. Beyond that, we have made a lot of storage investments as well. So, you know, one of these storage facilities is Silivri natural gas storage project, which is the first natural gas storage of Türkiye. And it has critical importance in the energy supply security of our country. And as a result of the capacity increase were carried out in this facility, a storage capacity of 4.6 billion cubic meters has already been reached in Silivri. With this capacity, Silivri natural gas storage facility is the largest marine storage facility in Europe and is of critical importance for providing uninterrupted energy to our country.

Also, another project I want to mention in this area is the Salt Lake natural gas storage project. By the end of 2021 the first phase of this project was completed, and expansion works are continuing here as well. As of now, 1.2 billion cubic meters operating gas capacity and forty million cubic meters daily back production capacity has been reached in this pursuit as well. Also, we have increased our regasification capacity by almost fivefold. So our whole supply portfolio is changing and transforming in gas. With these infrastructure investments, we offer more competitive solutions for the markets.

Türkiye plays a pivotal role in realizing the goal of Southern Gas Corridor. As you mentioned, it’s a very important project. However, alongside the opportunities that this presents for Türkiye and the wider region, there are significant challenges that must be overcome to ensure that the expansion of this corridor is successful, timely, and sustainable. Türkiye’s role in the Southern Gas Corridor strengthens its position as a regional energy hub, and enhances its leverage in diplomatic and trade negotiations with both supply and consumer countries. I think it’s very important for this conjuncture.

Expanding the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor offers us substantial economic benefits. Increased natural gas flows will likely lead to additional transit revenues for us and bolstering our economy. Moreover, the project could drive foreign investment into our energy infrastructure and related industries, creating jobs and stimulating economic growth.

Despite these opportunities, there are several key challenges in this area, as I mentioned. One of the most imminent challenges is the infrastructure investment required to expand the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor. Türkiye’s strategy focuses on maintaining a diverse supply base here, ensuring a balanced energy market that is both flexible and secure.

Additionally, we continue to support international cooperation in expanding our resource base. We have signed long-term LNG supply agreements with major global companies, as mentioned in the morning. We also want to increase our cooperation with the countries in the region on a win-win basis and add resources in this region to the system. Türkiye continues to serve as a key facilitator for the energy projects in our Caspian region, Central Asia, and the Middle Eastern region with its unique location. As you also mentioned, Turkmenistan’s gas and the Caspian resources, there are a lot of untapped potential in these areas, so we need to work hard in integrating this to the system. As mentioned, collaboration and cooperation are the unique tools we can use to strengthen our energy supply security.

Finally, the successful expansion of this Southern Gas Corridor will require close regulatory and political coordination among multiple countries and stakeholders. So we need a very, very close and coordinated work in order to achieve this objective.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Excellent. Thank you, Deputy Minister Çonkar.

Deputy Minister, that was an absolutely comprehensive vision you’ve outlined that is taking the idea that was for years rhetoric and turning into reality that Turkey is a natural gas hub. It already is, and it will be for trading soon. Eventually, there will be a Turkish benchmark, I guess, for trading. We’ll get back into the mix of molecules in a second, but it’s a remarkable set of achievements that—not only are they enhancing Turkey’s strategic importance and helping the EU diversify its sources of supply, but I think of the air in Ankara, how—when I first visited there in 1998 how dirty it was and brown from all the coal, the lignite being burned. And now it’s so clean because of this transition to natural gas as a primary fuel for power generation.

But you also mentioned at the—at the end the importance of cooperation and regulatory cooperation. So let’s hear from a regulator. I’d like to turn now to Mr. George-Sergiu Niculescu, who’s the president of the Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority.

Romania sits at a geoeconomic/geostrategic confluence of the European Union on the one hand, and Moldova and Ukraine on the other hand. But in addition to that place on the map, you also have interconnectivity on electricity into the EU, which is an important market incentive for investments in a range of power generation and transmission projects. And also, it is stimulus for investment in natural gas transit as well. So, from your regulatory perspective, how are you working to attract those investments, and how’s it going?

GEORGE-SERGIU NICULESCU: Thank you very much for the question. Good morning, everyone.

Romania is deploying a lot of efforts in order to boost investments in the energy sector, both in generating new capacities, transport, and distribution as well, because it is very important that these two goes head to head. We cannot have investments only in producing electricity; we also need to enforce and enhance the grids in order to take in this new energy and deliver it to the consumers.

As Assistant Secretary Pyatt said, a common letter from Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece have been submitted to the European Commission regarding the need of investments in more interconnecting the grids. We saw that we have a gap between this part of Europe’s markets regarding the price of electricity and the western countries, because not all the countries have made investments in interconnectors. So the energy should flow freely from where it’s produced to where it’s consumed without any bottlenecks, without any borders.

Let me tell you that Romania has a total interconnecting capacity of 3.3 gigawatts, and this is for a consumption of around eight gigawatts, so more than 30 percent we have interconnecting capacities. I believe that Romania did this job, investing in interconnected. We are interconnected with every neighboring countries, and still we are looking to develop this.

We stimulate investments in the grids by throwing in support schemes. Ministry of Energy has called for projects for 1.3 billion euro dedicated only to distribution companies that want to invest in enforcing the grid. So the money’s on the table; they just need to deploy projects and sign the contracts and cash in the money, and then develop the projects.

For our TSO, also the Ministry of Energy has a dedicated call for projects for half-a-billion euro. This is on top of the reinvestments programs, yes, so more or less two billion euros for grid enforcements. And our authority, ANRE, has in the middle of this summer proved the new methodology for the next five years, which means that the revenues are regulated by us, and we have signed the methodology that stimulates investments. We have a methodology that generated good work, in our opinion, a return which—average cost for investment, which is around 7 percent. And on top of that, we have placed some KPIs in order for them to be able to provide better service for the consumers. I’m talking about the distributors, the companies that distribute the electricity. So this—if they reach out to these targets, they can go around 8 percent, 8.5 percent per year… This is a generous way to stimulate them to throw in huge volumes of money in order to enforce the grids, because the transition already started in Romania. It is no turning back from these targets that we imposed. And the transition needs better grids.

On top of that, we are not overlooking our natural gas resources. Because you talked about natural gas, the Black Sea offers us a lot of potentials.

On top of hydrocarbons, natural gas, also a good wind opportunity. Romania is the first country in the Black Sea region that has developed an offshore wind law, so we are pioneers in this regard with the help of the Department of State and the Department of Interior in the US government. We have from June this year a law that regulates all the aspects regarding the offshore wind.

Natural gas, coming back, I believe—I strongly believe that in the first part of 2027 we will see the first molecules of natural gas extracted from the Neptun Deep that will go into our transport system. Transgaz, our TSO, is making huge investments in order to overtake this new volumes of natural gas, and we have plans to use the natural gas in Romania by increasing our gas-fired turbines instead of coal-fired turbines, replacing them. And one example is the 1.7 gigawatts installed capacity in Mintia that will generate electricity. So using the gas in Romania, mostly, and of course acting as a—as an exporter, original exporter, for additional volumes for Republic of Moldova, as well as Hungary and other countries.

So ambitious projects, keeping on our targets and ambitions regarding the transition, of course having in mind the resources that Black Sea and our country has in terms of natural gas. So it’s, as I like to say, a tailor-made solution for the Romanian energy system.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah, wow, tailor made and really comprehensive in terms of you’ve got the entire value chain that you’re focusing on, not just generation. And we’ll come back to generation and SMRs, by the way, in the next round. But from generation to the grid, I think very often people overlook the critical need for investments in upgrading the grid and don’t include that in the levelized cost of energy, so sometimes you get a distorted vision that—one that I was talking about yesterday, how much more cost-effective onshore wind can be, but you have to take into account those grid investments. And you are, and you’ve got the investment incentives.

Yeah, Matthew?

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Just to throw in a figure, our estimation of the grid infrastructure investment needs in the coming period is something of the order of magnitude—I think it’s 580 billion euros is the figure we’re looking at.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Wow. Wow.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: And of course—

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: But for where? Which countries?

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Sorry?

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: Which region?

MATTHEW BRYZA: For the EU.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: For Europe as a whole.

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: Europe whole.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: For Europe as a whole. I mean, and that’s because of grid, grid integration. I mean, that’s the biggest thing. There’s almost more renewables than the grid can currently handle, and so this is—this is a huge challenge.

Broader investment in infrastructure and energy needs more than 600 billion a year for the coming period.

MATTHEW BRYZA: A year? Wow.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: So checkbooks out, please, ladies and gentlemen.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Wow. Well, let’s stick with you for a second, Matthew, if we may.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Sorry, yeah. Mmm hmm.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah. And go back just for a moment to natural gas, and the fact that I mentioned before that right now—right now—Southeast Europe is awash, if that’s not a mixed metaphor, with Russian molecules. 2027 is the ambition for the EU to cut out, as you were saying, all fossil fuels from Russia. And what’s happening, I think, often now is that Russian LNG is being landed in other parts of the region, in Europe, and being rebranded as Belgian or Spanish or whatever it is. How do you get at that problem? And will tackling that, the—sort of the identity of molecules, be part of this phasing out of Russian natural gas in 2027, or does it even matter? Does everything kind of work out in the end through some sort of financial transaction?

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Well, we think it matters. I mean, just—it was good of Ambassador Pyatt to be so strong in support of what we’re trying to achieve. It’s worth—I looked up the language the other day we used in the Versailles Declaration in the immediate aftermath of the war. It was very unequivocal. This is twenty-seven heads of state and government, calmly they’re saying the mess that was launched by the invasion—saying we must phase out our dependency on oil, and gas, and coal, as soon as possible. And it’s interesting to look back on what we’ve achieved because—I’ll come to gas in a moment—on coal, it’s over.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah, Russian, specifically.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Russian coal is over. And coal, by the way, on its way to being over. Oil is down to 3 percent European-wide. That’s concentrated heavily in three member states: Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia. And they are, you know, on the process of coming out. But the sanctions, again, have been—have been effective.

Gas, I think we’ve given the numbers—45 percent down to 15 percent, 8 percent pipeline—but going up again. There’s some particularly local reasons as to why that is. US production dropped off a little bit. There was the outage in Freeport. We saw higher spot market prices in Asia, which drove up demand. But we’re not hiding from the fact that this is stubborn and difficult.

Throw into the mix that we have the transit contract across Ukraine which comes to an end at the end of 2024. We’ve been working intensively with our member states and our partners in European Community countries as well to model the impact of this, and the good news is we think it’s manageable. We don’t see any reason for this to have security of supply or, indeed, price impacts. There’s a global situation, 550 billion cubic meters of LNG, not all necessarily to the region. But given this and our estimations for the forthcoming LNG supply in 2025 to 2028, we think it’s going to be OK.

So what—how do we manage this situation in the future? LNG imports are part of that increase. Year on year, we think it’ll be an additional 2 bcm of Russian LNG coming into the system. And you know, you talk about it being rebranded, but it’s Russian LNG and I don’t think anyone’s pretending otherwise. It’s coming into countries in Northern Europe. It’s coming into countries in Southern Europe. And I don’t know, I have no insight into Gazprom or Kremlin pricing strategies, but it does seem that things are being priced to disrupt investment in things like—to disrupt projects like the Vertical Corridor. It would seem to be the case.

And I—you know, we—encouraging for me as a bureaucrat who’s very committed to this area is what President von der Leyen said in July. You know, she’s had five years or three years battering away on this issue, and she has tied her colors to the mast once again for the next commission, and I quote: “We will ensure that the era of dependency on Russian fossil fuel imports is over once and for all.”

MATTHEW BRYZA: Wow.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: To tumultuous applause in the European Parliament. There’s no backing off of this target.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah, no equivocation. Yeah.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: So we’ve done, if you like, the—some of the easy bits. The last mile will be difficult. We’ve been asked to look at options. Our new incoming commissioner, who’s going to go through his hearings next week, he’s also been charged with this in his so-called mission letter. So watch this space is my—is my cheeky conclusion.

It is very difficult. A molecule is a molecule, as implied in your question. But I’m not convinced, personally, that the traceability issues are going to be so serious. There seems to be less evidence of LNG being transferred in tankers. It’s a technically more complex business than we’ve seen on the oil side. So we are on this issue and we very much need to address it—and we need to address it, again, in partnership and cooperation with other countries in the region. A lot of the gas is coming in—and no blame attached—through Turkey, and we’re looking forward to considering that and discussing it.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Thank you very much. That’s unequivocal. And, yeah, we should in no way underestimate the dramatic progress the European Union has made in these—in these short few tragic years of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

And so, in that mood of geostategy, then, I’d like to turn again to Minister Bozinovska and ask how—now that the name issue is, thank goodness, finally resolved, the name of North Macedonia and that dispute with Greece that lingered way too long is gone—the Vertical Corridor provides a way to—to really to bind North Macedonia and Greece together. You talked about the interconnection that made a little bit of a blip in terms of the European Investment Bank. But from a—from a more geostrategic perspective, how are you envisioning that sort of cooperation with Greece and beyond in terms of the Vertical Corridor that Ambassador Pyatt talked about?

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: So regarding politics is one thing, and then the stability—

MATTHEW BRYZA: Exactly.

SANJA BOZINOVSKA:—and benefits of the citizens, it’s another thing. So we have excellent communication with the Greeks. I just was in—before going to Washington I was in Greece, and we had also very successful meetings with the Greek regulator. And we are also working on market coupling with Greece.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Oh, nice.

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: Yes.

So, regarding the electricity, one, since we are—we want to be in EU, we want—we need to be coupled with one EU member, so we chose Greece. So with energy, we are perfect neighbors, so we are working on the market coupling.

And regarding the infrastructure, it’s very important we are aware and we are—regarding electricity, we are not connected, unfortunately, with all the neighbors. We are missing Albania. So we want to be connected east-west. We have the Bulgaria and North Macedonia. And when we build the transmission line, it will be North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and then there is the underwater cable with Italy. So we also want to be connected both northwest and—north-south, and east-west. So we are planning on this regarding the connectivity.

And regarding the vertical, yes, we are planning, as I said, also to continue with talks with Serbia. And we need just to work on the financing here, since this is just now—we just started. They have—I think they have other sources, but we need to work on the sources, because now gas is not anymore the perfect green solution. However, we need just to secure finance. It’s not a big deal. It’s only twenty-five kilometers. I think we will be successful. So the vertical integration, I think it’s good. And we have support from EU and also from the United States.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Thank you. It’s so refreshing to go from a geopolitical theoretical question right back to the practical, in how do you get it done? And in our time working together with Turkey and Georgia and Azerbaijan, way back when two and a half decades ago, to start talking about what became the southern corridor Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, we always had it in our minds that nothing was going to happen if the projects weren’t commercially—not only commercially viable, but attractive, with the competitive pull on capital, right, for other investments. And that’s what you’re describing, so—

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: And, just not to forget, regarding the cooperation, in June there was one blackout. And it was Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia, and Albania. So four countries were a couple of hours without electricity. And it is very important to cooperate also on a regional level. And the question is now in ENTSO, in Brussels. And they’re still investigating. It was in June. They said by December they will have the outcome. And we had once also a couple of years ago, and it was in Greece couple of hours. So we just need to be more connected, and we need to communicate more as countries on a regional level, so we prevent this from happening.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah, imagine—

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Just briefly to come in, it’s amazing to hear a minister—we really pay tribute to all the great things you’re doing. But it’s part of a process that we took a decision to start on ages ago, called the enlargement of the European Union, and delighted that North Macedonia is one of the enlargement candidates. And we have a process through what’s called the Energy Community.

It sounds like a commonplace thing, but it’s actually a fairly amazing organization because it’s been working with member states—excuse me—states like soon-to-be member states, like North Macedonia, to go through the painful business of the necessary reforms to meet the acquis, but most importantly to develop this regional cooperation, which you described, which is absolutely central to how the energy single market works. And, for example, why we have an incredibly efficient electricity single market. But it is, as you say, so nice to move from the theory, you know, North Macedonia becoming part of the European Union, to the practical benefits it delivers on the ground. It’s fantastic.

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: There are political issues in this also.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Oh, no kidding. Yeah.

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: But we try to do the energy—

MATTHEW BALDWIN: If it was easy, we would have already done it, right?

SANJA BOZINOVSKA: Yeah.

MATTHEW BRYZA: That’s right. Exactly. Well, sticking with that theme then, of practicality of investments to power, no pun intended, the energy transition, Deputy Minister Çonkar, as Minister Bayraktar told us yesterday, Turkey now ranks fifth in Europe in installed renewable generation capacity, eleventh in the world as well. Which is amazing, how quickly that’s happened. And these investments are accelerating, and in pursuit of net zero target at the six hundredth anniversary, I guess, of Mehmed Fatih in 2053. So can you—can you describe for us some of the frameworks for stimulating investment in this sector?

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: Yeah. As you mentioned, Türkiye ranks fifth in Europe and eleventh globally in terms of installed capacity in renewable energy. The achievement reflects a firm commitment to a cleaner and more sustainable energy future by Türkiye. But it also highlights the scale of the challenges we must overcome to reach net zero emissions. The deployment of renewable energy is one of the key areas of our long-term energy strategy. We have set ambitious targets to increase the share of clean energy in the national energy mix, while reducing the carbon emissions in Türkiye. Renewable energy accounts more than 56 percent of our total installed capacity as of today, and it’s increasing day by day with new renewable energy investments.

As Mr. Bayraktar mentioned yesterday, we aim to add an additional sixty gigawatts of solar and wind capacity within ten years’ time. So it’s a quite challenging objective. And also, we would like to do this in both smaller distributed gigawatt-scale projects. So this is also another challenge for us. For this purpose, we need to commission 3.5 gigawatts solar and 1.5 gigawatts of wind power each and every year. In addition, we aim to reach five gigawatts of offshore wind installed capacity in the coming period. In order to achieve this right now, we are working on some legislation to speed up the investment processes. And it will be soon in the parliament. We are working on it closely right now.

Of course, the transition will not be easy, as it will affect many sectors and will bring many challenges to all. Electricity is a very sensitive issue for all countries. And people are directly affected by the prices, as we think about the inflationary environment also. This is also another aspect. So since transition costs will be reflected in the pricing, all governments will be affected by this issue. So we need to do very good planning in this area. While changing the energy generation portfolio, we also need to change the transmission system. When we reach the maximum renewable capacity, the traditional transmission systems need to change as well.

Since renewable resources can be intermittent, renewable energy, capacity needs to be managed very diligently. There are additional needs, such as a smart grid, digitalization, better management of the demand, and also the storage capacity. Our transmission systems needs to be increased for renewable energy, as I mentioned. We are right now also continuing our discussions on the Mega Grid Project, so that we can increase the transmission capacity with neighboring countries. Another pillar of the electricity sector in terms of renewable energy transformation is the nuclear energy, as mentioned earlier. Türkiye has different nuclear energy projects right now. The first one is under construction in Akkuyu, and the other two are in the negotiation phase with different countries.

We need to add nuclear to energy—our energy mix to reduce the carbon emissions. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant will be commissioned next year. It will start commercial production and reach a total capacity of almost five gigawatts within three years’ time, when the four reactors start producing electricity. And afterwards, we would like to quickly start the other two nuclear projects, one in Sinop, one in Tekirdağ. We plan to reach nuclear energy capacity of about twenty gigawatts by the year 2053. We are also following closely SMRs, the small modular reactors, as baseload energy. We plan to add about five gigawatts of capacity, nuclear capacity, in this area to our energy portfolio as well. And also until 2035, we are also planning to invest in hydrogen storage, as I mentioned earlier. And also our Minister Bayraktar, mentioned the importance of the energy efficiency. So we have also a very ambitious plan to develop the energy efficiency in Türkiye.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Thank you. Just to put those numbers in perspective for a second, I mean, so to get up to twenty gigawatts of nuclear power generation, I mean, that’s a huge achievement, right? That’s gigantic. But renewables—I mean, wind and solar—as you said, you’re already at thirty gigawatts. And you’re going to increase by 200 percent before the end of the decade.

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: Yes. Sixty gigawatts is in our plans. And this year we are even exceeding this goal.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Wow.

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: It’s going to be over five gigawatts this year.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Amazing.

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: So hopefully it continues that way.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Really amazing stuff.

AHMET BERAT ÇONKAR: With the new legislation and with the acceleration of the investments, I think we can achieve this.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah, similar, like Minister Bozinovska’s vision too, you’ve got everything, the entire value chain, all taken into account. In a way, I have to say that—having lived here for a while and worked on Turkish energy for, I don’t know, twenty-five years, I’ve never heard until around now such a comprehensive picture.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: It’s very, very impressive, really.

MATTHEW BRYZA: And with SMRs, part of it, let’s ask Mr. Niculescu then about the SMR project in Romania. We heard a bit about it yesterday. It’s such an innovative approach. You’re taking a moribund coal-fired plant, right, a brownfield project, and turning it into an SMR. So, to generate clean electricity. And also I know, because it’s, you know, NuScale you’re working with, an American company, the US Department of Energy is strongly supportive and looking at forming—or, we’ve already formed a strategic partnership between Romania and the US on energy with this NuScale SMR kind of as a centerpiece. So could you let us know the status of that project? And how significant is the SMR project in the overall mix of all those things you’re trying to make happen in Romania’s energy sector?

GEORGE-SERGIU NICULESCU: It’s not an easy job at all. It’s very provocative. It’s very complex. Because we assume the role of being, again, pioneers in this sector. First country in the—in Europe to deploy this type of technology.

MATTHEW BRYZA: And really, the first project in the world, really.

GEORGE-SERGIU NICULESCU: Yes, yes, yes, commercial project, yes. We strongly believe in this project. And I should give you a little bit of context. Romania has huge experience in operating nuclear power plants. We have two reactors in Cernavodă. Both have 1,400 megawatt installed power capacity. And we are planning to double up the size in Cernavodă by adding two more units. You should know the fact that Romania is the single country in the region that is not relying on a Russian, Soviet technology.

We have built these two reactors with Western technology CANDU from Canada. And we are following this tradition in looking into Western technology when deploying also small modular reactors. This is why NuScale was selected. So we have cut off any links with Soviet Union and Russia long time ago. I like to say that nowadays we have saw a divorce between Russian gas and EU economies. We started this nondomestic divorce with resources from Russia a long time ago. In natural gas we produce 85 percent of our needs, so just only 10-15 percent importing.

Coming back to small modular reactors, yes, we are deploying this technology on the land where it used to be a coal-fired power plant. So this is also one step ahead of the transition. The project is doing well. The company—the Romanian company involved in this project told me that engineers are on the site. We heard the extraordinary news from US Ex-Im Bank that they are—they approved finance of around $100 million, again for this project. Very optimistic about reaching the timeline and keeping the project into the timeline that was proposed. From a governmental point of view, huge political backup for this—for this project, in terms of regulator authority, of course, sustaining this project with all that it needs. Also, not only this project, but the full nuclear program that Romania has.

MATTHEW BRYZA: You know, impressive. You really are the pioneers globally on this project. Cosmin Ghita is an old friend of mine. I’ve been following this year, after year, after year. And you’re there. You’re on the edge of actually getting the investment. And just one more point to highlight that you made is how important it is to have the personnel who know how to operate nuclear generation, right?

GEORGE-SERGIU NICULESCU: Of course. Of course.

MATTHEW BRYZA: There’s not many countries that can do that. And those sorts of experts are in really short supply, so.

GEORGE-SERGIU NICULESCU: Yeah, well, we have good universities. We have people that were trained with skills. Of course, the workforce is essential in all the energy sector. And we are making a lot of efforts to stimulate students to follow up these career programs. Cosmin has a lot of programs in which he’s gathering students and guiding them towards this career. And he’s doing a good job.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Yeah. Great to hear. Great to hear. You mentioned timeline. We’re right on time. We have time for some questions, if there are some in the audience, and then there’ll be a coffee break for fifteen minutes, plus whatever time is left over from the questions. So I can’t see so well. Is any—oh, there’s one. Yeah. Is that John?

Q: It is indeed.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Hey, John. Good morning.

Q: Yeah, I know this problem. John Roberts, with the Atlantic Council and with the Institute of Energy in South-East Europe.

Question for Matthew Baldwin. I’ve just been in Azerbaijan several times researching a paper on Azerbaijan’s energy transition. And there’s one clear point that comes through from everybody, from the president down the ministry of energy, both foreign and domestic energy producing companies. Which is, they need investment to develop the gas required to meet the MOU of July 2022 for doubling Azerbaijani exports to the European Union. And, of course, to pay for the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor that that entails.

And they say that needs long-term agreements which, in effect, means long-term contracts. But that all they get, as one corporate source put it, from the European Union was offers of three to five years, which is not enough to secure the kind of investment they need for the billions of dollars required for production and transportation expansion. Can you tell us what is the EU’s attitude to what is necessary to secure that kind of investment, and therefore the kind of imports that you would be looking to receive from Azerbaijan over the next three to five years?

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Well, again, you’re talking, John, I think about, here, what they’re hearing from companies in terms of commitments to contracts, right? Yeah. I mean, again, it’s one of the most jealously guarded commercial things. Companies do their contracts. I’m not party to them. Member states, governments, are not party to those contracts. So I can’t speak to that.

I would actually refer to the remarks of the Turkish deputy minister, that we need to work closely together, all partners, to secure this very important doubling of the expansion of the SGC. And I would just—you know, Matt, you felt I was making news, which slightly worries me. I don’t think I am making news. The European Union is not a barrier to companies taking longer-term contractual arrangements. Again, and I would observe that it is often the portfolio players, sometimes the big midstream companies, for a reason. They’re absorbing the big commercial risk in taking on—and this applies every bit as much to the Southern Gas Corridor as it is to US LNG projects and elsewhere.

It’s a difficult project. I think everyone’s always acknowledged that. We are working very hard with our partners in Azerbaijan. I know that the companies are working extremely hard too. And I’m encouraged here today to hear the strong commitments from the Turkish side, which it’s a no brainer, but I’m very glad that you’re also working hard on it. So I’m sorry that’s kind of a non-answer, John, to a good question. But that’s all I got.

MATTHEW BRYZA: No, it’s not a non-answer, actually. It’s a good answer, because you make the point that the big portfolio buyers of natural gas are able to balance out their portfolios, yeah. And my point was not that there’s any discouragement by the European institutions of LNG investment or natural gas investment, but it’s just that there’s a political fear that there would some change.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: There will be less gas over time, but there will still be considerable volumes under the—under all of our modeling. And someone was talking what’s the difference in a scenario, and a forecast, and a target? I’m not getting into that. But in all our scenario modeling, you know, there’s a lot of gas to be contracted and used in the European Union through 2049.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Great. Former Minister Palacio. And I think this will probably be the last question, because we’re just—

Q: I have two questions, one for the European Commission and one for the Romanian regulator. For the European commissioner, it’s a follow-up, in fact, to this question. We have had two great reports, one by former Prime Minister Letta, and one by former Prime Minister Draghi—the two Italians. There are other countries—

MATTHEW BALDWIN: They have a monopoly on reports, yeah.

Q: Yeah, on the report. Both of them highlight the need for the European Union to have the energy union. We have been—you have been speaking about just an electricity internal market. We are not there, and frankly we are far.

My question to the European Commission, the origin of that is not other that the treaty keeps the energy mix to each member state does with the energy mix whatever the member state wants. But on terms of environment, climate, this is the—this is—the European Commission decides. How are you going to overcome, convince? What are you going to do to have the member states coming together to have an energy mix? Because you speak about in the European Union gas. I mean, the European Union, gas, each one does whatever each member state wants, for the moment.

My question to you is linked to that. You have highlighted that you have looked successfully for some financing from the Export-Import Bank for your nuclear projects. Have you found any financing from the European Union Next Generation, from the European Investment Bank, or other European sources? And if not, tell us what was your—I mean, I’m giving the answer. Excuse me.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Thanks. We got a minute for each of you. Yeah, please.

MATTHEW BALDWIN: Oh, no question from Ana can we answered in a minute, but I’ll do my best. There’s a tendency now in Brussels, for every sentence to begin: As Mario Draghi says, comma. But he’s put his finger on a true point, as you’ve identified, which is the price of energy is elemental to the competitors of the European Union. It’s elemental in the short term, and, of course, it’s elemental in the long term, which is really one of the key things behind the famous energy trilemma.

We have—the incoming Commission has pledged itself to go further with the energy union—a true energy union is the phrase that’s been used. And part of that is about the governance. And this, I think, gets to your point. There’s going to be no competence grab, as we call it, in the European Union, where we say, right, member states, we will decide on your energy mix. That’s absolutely going to remain for them. But where this meets is in a bureaucratic thing called national energy and climate plans—I think North Macedonia, you’re doing this now—where you identify, each member state, how you’re going to meet the energy needs from energy security perspective and, of course, the mix that’s required to deliver on the ambitious decarbonization targets.

So, I mean, that’s not going to change. We have to work to deliver on this much more closely with every member state. These NECPs, as we call them, have to become investment plans. Back to my point, about the—yes, I’m sorry. But we also have to work with all levels of society—with regions, with cities—to deliver on this. Thank you. Sorry for eating up so much time.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Thank you. Perfect time. Mr. Niculescu—

GEORGE-SERGIU NICULESCU: Regarding financing the SMRs and the Doiceşti project, I’m well aware that—you know by now that this is a pioneer project. It needs a lot of backup, political, governmental backup. And I’m sure that after the project gets mature, a lot of financial institution, banks, international banks, will jump into this project and deliver finance. Until now, it is good that we have Ex-Im Bank on board with this project.

MATTHEW BRYZA: Great. Thank you. Thank you for your succinct, clear, and informative reply. So that’s the end of our panel. We now have a fifteen-minute coffee break before the next session, which is Disruption of Energy Security in Uncertain Times, moderated by our dear friend Mehmet Oğutçu. But before you go, I really want to thank these brilliant, strategic, clear, candid, and practical colleagues here on the panel for a discussion that, I think, enlightened everybody. Thank you very, very much.

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However, Japan is taking positive steps in restarting its nuclear reactors under new security and safety measures established after the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. The government recognizes nuclear energy as an important source of baseload electricity generation that can help achieve Japan’s climate targets and bolster energy security to hedge against the volatility of global fossil fuel import markets. To power its economic growth and competitiveness, Japan must continue restarting its existing fleet and commit to the eventual construction of next-generation advanced reactors.  

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Japan’s climate and energy security strategy

Japan’s energy system is transforming to decarbonize and ensure energy security. The government’s “S Plus 3E” strategy is based on the four pillars of safety, energy security, economic efficiency, and the environment. To advance these objectives, the government is targeting an electricity mix in which nuclear constitutes 20-22 percent of generation by 2030, alongside a 36-38 percent share for renewables, 20 percent liquefied natural gas, 19 percent coal, and 2 percent oil.  

Japan has some offshore wind capacity—currently 0.25 gigawatts (GW)—and ambitious goals of achieving 10 GW by 2030 and 30-40 GW by 2050 under its feed-in-tariff (FIT) scheme. The 2012 FIT significantly boosted solar generation, increasing installed capacity from 5.6 GW before 2012 to 70 GW by May 2023. However, solar deployment has slowed recently due to a shortage of land and grid congestion. 

In February 2023, the government announced its Basic Policy for the Realization of GX (Green Transformation), Japan’s vision for a virtuous cycle of emissions reductions and economic growth. The GX Promotion Strategy, adopted in July 2023, identifies support for nuclear power as one of several necessary policies to provide a steady supply of energy. Public approval of nuclear energy has steadily increased since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, a majority in Japan favored restarting the existing reactor fleet. 

New momentum for nuclear

As of fiscal year (FY) 2022, nuclear energy constituted 5.6 percent of Japan’s electricity production, a significant decrease from 25 percent in FY 2010, the year before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In the last few years, nuclear generation has recovered steadily, despite remaining well below pre-2011 levels. Nuclear also holds great promise for repowering retired coal-fired power plants, providing firm generation for data centers and semiconductor facilities, producing industrial heat and hydrogen, and powering Japanese industries participating in a growing export market.   

Japan operated over fifty nuclear reactors before the accident; as of May 2024, thirty-three reactors are classed as operable. However, only twelve reactors—of the twenty-seven that have applied—have met new regulatory requirements and received approval from the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) to restart. Ten remain under the authority’s review and must obtain local government consent before restarting. Notably, Tsuruga Unit 2 could be the first to be denied restart approval under post-Fukushima regulations, due to its proximity to fault lines and failure to meet new seismic regulatory requirements. 

Two notable plants being queued for restart are at Onagawa and Shimane. The Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, which utilizes boiling-water reactors (BWRs), will likely be the first BWR to resume operation in Japan since the 2011 earthquake. This restart is a powerful step toward advancing Japan’s S Plus 3E objectives.  

Safety improvements learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, such as tsunami walls and earthquake reinforcements, have been implemented for the existing fleet. The restart process has taken over a decade, with continuous reviews and updates required by the NRA. Japan should glean lessons from Onagawa Unit 2’s upcoming reconnection process to refine technical, operational, and regulatory efficiencies for other pending BWR restarts. Improving the clarity and predictability of the regulator’s heightened post-Fukushima safety requirements will also be essential. 

Increasing or decreasing demand?

Japan’s government currently projects that energy demand will decrease as a result of a declining population and successful energy efficiency measures. However, these projections have yet to reflect the government’s plans to boost energy-intensive industries and reverse Japan’s population decline. 

Japan’s birth rate has been declining since the 1970s, reaching an all-time low in 2023 with only 727,277 births for a population of 125 million. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has committed to doubling government spending on child-related programs and established the Children and Families Agency in an attempt to reverse this trend. If successful, the government will need to revise its expectations that falling birth rates will contribute to plummeting energy demand. 

Economic growth is also challenging those assumptions. The domestic semiconductor industry is growing, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) investing $20 billion for two plants in southwest Japan, one of which opened in February 2024. Micron Technology intends to build a manufacturing facility in Hiroshima, and Tokyo-based Rapidus aims to build a facility in northern Japan, an effort reinforced by $6 billion in government support. 

Rapid adoption of new AI tools is boosting Japan’s economy and tech sector. Digitalization gained momentum during the pandemic, and tech giants like Microsoft—which is investing $2.9 billion in AI data centers over the next two years—and Oracle—which is planning to invest over $8 billion in cloud computing and AI within the next decade—underscore this AI boom. 

These factors are expected to increase power demand significantly. The International Energy Agency forecasts that data centers and data transmission services—and their insatiable appetite for electricity—could double their power consumption between 2022-26. This level of growth is already being seen in some markets. In the United States, a recent Energy Information Administration survey found that, because of large-scale computing facilities, commercial demand for electricity generation surged by 27 billion kilowatt-hours in Texas and Virginia from 2019-23, and increased by 40 percent in North Dakota over the same period.  

As a result, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is supporting the restart of nuclear power plants to meet growing energy needs, particularly to backstop load growth from its expanding tech and AI industries. METI’s Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy will no doubt capture these emerging dynamics in its forthcoming seventh Strategic Energy Plan, currently under discussion and expected later this year.  

Moving forward with nuclear energy

In August 2022, Kishida proclaimed that restarting idled nuclear power plants is a strategic imperative to avert crisis and secure Japan’s electricity supply, urging additional units approved by the NRA be brought online.  

Echoing this sentiment at the March 2024 Nuclear Energy Summit in Brussels, Kishida said, “Japan will work to push forward the restart of nuclear power plants, extend their operational periods, and foster the development and construction of next-generation advanced reactors.” 

Japan has moved to utilize its existing nuclear power units and restarted twelve reactors. It is imperative, however, to look to the future when the existing fleet will need to be replaced and new reactors built. To create a favorable business environment and enable utilities to construct next-generation advanced reactors, policies that promote large initial capital investments and improved business predictability are crucial. Additionally, the nuclear industry struggles with an aging workforce and an illiquid market for skilled labor, necessitating sustained investments in human capital and a strengthened talent pipeline. Japan must also work to bolster supply chains needed for eventual plant construction and operation. Moreover, if Japan is to compete in the global market—and team up with the United States and other like-minded countries on reactor export tenders—efforts such as the Nuclear Supply Chain Platform are essential and will enable the Japanese nuclear workforce to maintain expertise.  

To overcome these challenges, Japan must maintain positive momentum and implement robust measures to support the nuclear sector, ensuring it can meet growing electricity demand and secure its energy future. Nuclear power plants are not solely physical components of critical electrical infrastructure; they are long-term strategic assets that generate clean, firm power and can strengthen green growth strategies, as articulated in Japan’s GX policy. Japan can harness its existing fleet and leverage its technical prowess to secure and invest in a brighter economic future.  

Note: This blog post is based on the authors’ recent trip to Japan, having attended a workshop on advanced reactor technologies at Tohoku University in Sendai. The authors wish to thank Tohoku Electric Power Company for hosting a tour of Onagawa Nuclear Power Station in May 2024.

Lauren Hughes is the deputy director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Maia Sparkman is the former associate director for climate diplomacy at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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The legislation had been a long time coming. It was first introduced in the US House of Representatives in February 2023, with US lawmakers caught between the need to cut off a significant source of revenue for Russia on the one hand, and demand for enriched nuclear fuel to keep the US reactor fleet running on the other.

The United States can import the uranium that is required for nuclear fuel from several countries other than Russia. The top two exporters of uranium to the United States, for instance, are Canada and Kazakhstan, with the United States importing 27 percent of its uranium purchases from Canada and 25 percent from Kazakstan. However, Russia, which was in third place at 12 percent of US purchases in 2022, plays a crucial role in the nuclear fuel supply chain, both through conversion and enrichment of uranium. Russia supplies about 20 percent of the US reactor fleet’s nuclear fuel, at a cost of about one billion dollars each year. This is why the new legislation allows for waivers to import from Russia through 2027 if the Department of Energy determines that no alternative source of fuel for a US reactor is available.

One of the big questions that the US nuclear energy industry has grappled with is whether it can enrich enough uranium (or procure enough enriched uranium from other sources) on its own to compensate for the loss of Russian-enriched uranium. Earlier this year, three uranium mines began production in the United States, the first domestic uranium mines to operate in eight years. But uranium extraction and uranium enrichment are two separate issues, and—until recently—the only enrichment capability in the United States had existed at a facility in New Mexico owned by Urenco, a multinational company owned in equal parts by the British government, the Dutch government, and German utilities. Outside of Russia, the commercially relevant sources of enrichment are European facilities owned by Urenco and Orano, a French company. China also operates enrichment capacity, which has historically been used to fuel Chinese reactors. Together, the Urenco and Orano capacity is not sufficient to fuel all the reactors outside Russia and China.

Last October, Centrus—a US-owned nuclear fuel company—began enrichment operations in Piketon, Ohio. However, production at this facility is small and is geared toward the high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel required by new advanced reactors expected to become operational in the next several years. That means the fuel cannot be used in many of the older reactors currently operating.

Crucially, the new legislation unlocks $2.7 billion to support domestic enrichment. That money had been included in previous legislation, but it was contingent on passing sanctions against Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom. These funds will be required as the US nuclear energy industry moves away from dependence on Russian fuel supply. The money will be available through competitive processes to support fuel production for both existing and future advanced reactor designs. These steps are part of the United States’ commitments as part of the Sapporo 5, a partnership with Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom founded in April 2023 to secure a reliable nuclear fuel supply chain.

The US Congress has taken what many see as a crucial step in sanctioning Russia and moving away from dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. However, a strong commitment—on the part of the US government and industry—to domestic enrichment is necessary in order to ensure that the US domestic fleet continues to operate and to ensure that the next generation of nuclear reactors can be demonstrated and deployed.

Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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The cost of rebuilding Ukraine is currently estimated by the World Bank at $486 billion. Some of this, hopefully, will be paid for by Western governments and with seized Russian assets, but private investment and Ukrainian ingenuity will have to foot a large portion of the bill. However, with no end in sight to hostilities, global investors are more likely to put their money into longer term projects, of which large energy infrastructure is a prime example. Nuclear power is among the most promising options.

Ukraine has been a nuclear energy country since 1977. With the very high-profile exception of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster, which was much more a failure of Soviet bureaucracy and politics than of Ukrainian nuclear energy management, the country actually boasts a strong record of nuclear power success. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion forced the shutdown of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in 2022, Ukraine had 15 reactors running, constituting approximately 54% of its baseload power generation.

Ukraine has a well developed nuclear energy industry including a national regulator and a large nuclear workforce. It also has a bilateral civilian nuclear power agreement with the US, known as a 123 Agreement, which means it is authorized to receive most US civilian nuclear technology. With US and European nuclear ambitions bogged down by over-regulation, spiraling construction and commodity costs, a limited nuclear labor force, underdeveloped supply chains, and a near irrational fear of nuclear accidents, Ukraine’s nuclear sector has a number of clear advantages.

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Ukraine’s nuclear agility is unparalleled. Now that it is a fully integrated member of ENTSO-E, the potential for the country to export nuclear-generated clean power to Europe is huge. While building new nuclear power plants in Ukraine is hardly a quick option, once full commercial power exports are authorized, Ukraine could make many billions per year on electricity sales to the rest of Europe.

With its preexisting nuclear industry, Ukraine could also potentially expand its nuclear capacity much faster than any newcomer to nuclear power generation. In the West, nuclear power plants can take 8-15 years to build, depending on regulatory approval times. They can cost approximately $2-3 billion for a single small modular reactor and as much as $15 billion for a large plant. In the past, Ukraine has been able to build nuclear power plants with significantly lower costs and in shorter time frames.

By purchasing Ukrainian power, Europe could save billions and reinforce its energy security. The EU’s energy transition plan is mostly focused on renewables, but a baseload is required to make renewable power sources usable as peak load. With war in the Middle East shutting down the Red Sea and Suez Canal shipping routes, new EU sanctions under consideration targeting Russian liquified natural gas (LNG), Russia bombing Ukrainian gas storage facilities holding European gas supplies, and the end of the Gazprom-Naftogaz transit contract in December 2024, nuclear power is the only scalable baseload available that is secure and zero emission.

Ukraine can also offer much cheaper power than other European countries. Although current Ukrainian prices are regulated according to wartime restrictions, and while Russian devastation of Ukrainian power generation capacity in March and April 2024 has affected markets, Ukraine will remain extremely competitive with the rest of Europe even once controls are lifted.

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The path forward will not be straightforward. In addition to the obvious challenges presented by Russia’s ongoing invasion, the biggest obstacles Ukraine faces in expanding its nuclear power capacity are investor fears and the need for reform at the country’s state-owned nuclear power company, Energoatom.

The possibility of private nuclear power plants is a huge opportunity for Ukraine’s economy and thus reconstruction, because the private sector almost invariably moves faster and more efficiently than the public sector. Many countries have privately owned and operated nuclear power plants, including the US and UK. This model makes it possible to raise funds quickly. It also brings security and rule of law benefits, along with operational benefits and the anti-corruption protections of Western business standards. Moreover, private companies can get started now, potentially years before state-owned entities.

As to public nuclear development, meaning with and through Energoatom, success will depend on achieving de-monopolization and reform of the state-owned company. Despite its nuclear power prowess and ownership and operation of all four of Ukraine’s nuclear plants, Energoatom is hampered in its nuclear expansion plans by a legacy Soviet corporate culture based on monopoly status. Its monopoly position in Ukraine has eliminated any internal incentive to adopt Western corporate standards, including anti-corruption norms.

In recognition of this, Ukraine’s parliament enacted a law in February 2023 requiring the corporatization of Energoatom in order to “open up additional opportunities for attracting significant investments in the industry and development of domestic nuclear energy, which is the key generation in the country,” according to Ukraine’s Minister of Energy German Galushchenko. This corporatization process is currently underway.

Intended to bring the nuclear behemoth into line with international corporate governance and structure standards, the reform of Energoatom requires the selection of an independent international supervisory board and the implementation of numerous internal policies and standards. It is seen as so important that its completion is a requirement for Ukraine to receive up to $100 million in financial support from the US under the recently signed Ukraine-US Memorandum of Understanding regarding Collaboration on Ukrainian Energy System Resilience.

Once the reform of Energoatom advances and possibilities for private nuclear power open up, Ukraine could lead the rest of Europe in constructing new nuclear power plants. Energy is one of Ukraine’s great strengths, as are an educated labor force and technological skills. Taken together, these assets can help fuel Ukraine’s reconstruction and power Europe’s energy transition through new nuclear development.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Common pillars for clean hydrogen—with different rules

In December 2023, the United States published draft guidance on hydrogen standards, used to determine eligibility for tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The guidance, called 45V, is built around what is termed the “the three pillars” of hydrogen: temporal matching, additionality, and deliverability. These three general requirements are also tacked in the EU Delegated Act, which defines renewable hydrogen for compliance with EU targets as renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBOs). While in the US framework, tax credits go toward clean hydrogen that is produced using any clean electricity source, including nuclear energy, and in the EU, compliance with EU RFNBO targets requires that hydrogen be generated with renewables only, the three pillars can be generally understood as: 

• Temporal matching: These rules aim to ensure hydrogen is produced when clean electricity is available. This means that any amount of electricity used in hydrogen production must be matched with the same amount of zero-carbon electricity produced within a given time period. Shorter time intervals reduce electrolyzer capacity factors, increasing the levelized cost of hydrogen but achieving greater emissions reductions. Temporal matching periods are typically conducted on an hourly, daily, monthly, or annual basis.

• Additionality/incrementality: Rules around this pillar aim to ensure hydrogen production goes hand in hand with new clean electricity generation capacity, making hydrogen producers add renewable electricity to the grid, rather than repurpose existing clean energy already on the grid.

• Deliverability: This set of rules aims to ensure hydrogen is produced using clean electricity in the same region where that electricity is produced. There must be a direct physical interconnection between the clean energy source and the electrolyzers producing green hydrogen.

The chart below features a comparison between the EU and the US approaches to hydrogen across the three pillars, as well as other key areas of clean hydrogen policy. While US regulations are a proposed draft, the EU framework is considered final despite tweaks that may take place during its scheduled revision period in 2028.

Table 1. US and EU approaches to green hydrogen

While certain elements of the US rules might suggest they are stricter than the EU approach, this would be an oversimplification, as each contains elements that could be considered stricter—or looser—than the other in certain areas. While both approaches ultimately mandate hourly temporal correlation and strict additionality rules, the EU does not switch to hourly correlation until 2030—whereas the United States switches in 2028. Also, the EU allows for grandfathering of additionality, which is not permitted in the US proposed guidelines. Nonetheless, the draft US framework allows for the use of subsidized clean electricity for hydrogen production, takes a technology-neutral approach to clean electricity, and accepts energy attribute certificates to comply with hydrogen rules, diverging from the EU framework and allowing for greater flexibility for hydrogen producers. Importantly, differences in approach mean qualifying for the US 45V credit does not automatically qualify a facility as producing EU RFNBO-compliant renewable hydrogen.

Beyond these significant technical variations, US and EU strategies for developing clean hydrogen markets differ in their economic approach: the United States follows a supply-incentive model, while the EU is predominantly relying on a market-pull mechanism. The United States incentivizes production of hydrogen with uncapped tax credits that give lower or higher support depending on emissions thresholds but does not mandate clean molecule uptake. In this sense, it rewards greater wholesale emissions reductions without requiring it. In contrast, the EU employs a demand-side mechanism: regulation imposes the consumption of renewable hydrogen (i.e., 42 percent of hydrogen used in industry must be renewable by 2030), and strictly defines which hydrogen (RFNBOs) is available to meet legally binding targets. This mechanism prioritizes the use, rather than production, of hydrogen, and thus the decarbonization of end users. While the EU has put in place a Hydrogen Bank to support production, support is capped and auction based, whereas the United States’ effort is uncapped and direct. The Hydrogen Bank’s results are yet to be seen.

To maximize clean hydrogen’s potential to contribute to energy security and decarbonization, the EU and the United States will need to balance environmental, economic, and security concerns—and they must coordinate these efforts together. While the two markets have different resource endowments, legal regimes, and more, the EU and the United States should ensure the maximal harmonization and interoperability of hydrogen regulatory frameworks, as this will simplify investment and trade. The two sides should also plan carefully to ensure that their respective approaches to hydrogen development reduce carbon emissions. The next Trade and Technology Council in Belgium is an opportunity for both sides to learn from each other’s best practices and develop common approaches to hydrogen development.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Pau Ruiz Guix is Officer on Trade and International Relations at Hydrogen Europe.

This article reflects their own personal opinions.

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With the increase in size, COP’s center of gravity shifted away from the formal management structure of the convention. Instead, the focus was on disparate and scattered initiatives in which nonstate actors—including from the private sector—play a prominent role. There are several ways to interpret this conference: a holy pilgrimage for those who are devoutly green, a new Davos attended by executives of the same corporate giants who frequent the World Economic Forum gathering in Switzerland, a photocall of politicians from around the world, a theater with armies of lobbyists, a mix of consultants and media. “Inclusion” was an oft-repeated theme this year. And although it may seem provocative, the meeting’s most notable decision may have been to include the oil and gas sector, which had been previously sidelined—a decision that spotlighted a larger confrontation at COP28 between ideology and pragmatism.

A new energy era

Strategic ambitions have historically revolved around energy, a substantive battle in international relations. The nineteenth century can be understood as the era of coal, driving the development of the manufacturing industry and rail transportation. World War I marked the beginning of the era of oil. (Controversy surrounded Winston Churchill’s decision, as the civilian head of the British Royal Navy, to switch the fleet to this fuel in 1913.) The current century will witness an “energy transition” intended to move the world toward a sustainable future. However, as “green” ideologies have come to dominate public discourse, the concept of a “transition” is too often lost: specifically, the idea that it will extend over time and require overlap. Countries must invest in renewables while continuing to rely on fossil fuels, which currently represent around 80 percent of the global energy mix (a figure that has stubbornly persisted since the world began to monitor the consequences of anthropogenic greenhouse gases).

The expectation of continued growth in demand through 2050 further complicates the global trilemma—ensuring a reliable energy supply at an affordable price while also accounting for the environmental dimension. Considering today’s technological framework, any solution to the equation likely involves replacing coal with gas—along with the return of nuclear—which is the most effective way to reduce emissions in situations where alternative sources are not conducive. Provided, of course, that “inclusive” and “equitable” are not just formulaic terms, and that “leaving no one behind” is more than a stylistic clause. In other words, Europe and other wealthy countries can afford to do away with coal or nuclear, or even to bet completely on renewables. But in the rest of the world, if a choice needs to be made between prosperity and the environment, the former will likely win out.

Today there is growing awareness of the urgency of the climate crisis. Far from being a technical dialogue among scholars, the climate conversation has permeated society; ordinary citizens around the world feel involved. Education has become not only positive but essential. Given that development, it is necessary to review the messages being sent; to reconsider the apparent dichotomy between renewable energies (presented as unquestionably good) and coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear. These have been collectively condemned without considering their different contributions to what should be our only goal: combating the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The challenge ahead

The historic language enshrined in the final—although nonbinding—deal of the summit urging countries toward “transitioning away from fossil fuels” reflects a collective commitment to the energy transition that is taking shape. At the same time, there was progress in efforts to align hydrocarbons, and particularly gas, with sustainability goals, in recognition of their continued importance. Two initiatives stand out: a push to abate methane emissions, in particular from venting, flaring, and leaks; and a sharpening focus on the capture, storage, and eventual use of carbon dioxide throughout the gas value chain, starting with extraction. 

Equally transformative is the return of interest in nuclear power, following a long period of rejection that occurred despite it being one of the most efficient and reliable energy sources (even with the challenge of waste from current reactors). The deal reached two weeks ago has opened a horizon that, a year ago, would have been unimaginable: Twenty-two countries have committed to tripling their nuclear capacity by 2050. US climate envoy John Kerry has even emphasized that the world cannot achieve net zero by 2050 without some nuclear energy.

An initiative announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is also worth mentioning: More than a hundred countries have joined the Global Commitment on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. It sets two goals: tripling installed renewable capacity and doubling the rate of improvements in energy efficiency, both by 2030. This effort must be accompanied by widespread electrification, a transformation that will require the rare earths and other critical minerals that have become indispensable in new energy technologies. Their concentration in certain areas presents a series of challenges, as does the almost monopolistic control of China over their extraction and processing. Currently, there is an effort to replace these minerals with more common, more abundant elements—although the necessary technology is still being developed.

The challenge coming out of COP28 is to consolidate a pragmatic vision, a global objective that values all three components of the energy trilemma. The vision must take into account the heightened energy demand that will accompany the global population growth expected in the next thirty years—an anticipated increase of two billion people—and must understand that for now fossil fuels inevitably will continue to play a significant role in meeting that demand.

The most pressing challenges of our century are clear: The world needs to multiply installed renewable capacity and advance electrification, along with its corollary of a constant supply of necessary critical minerals and rare earths. What’s also needed are efforts to develop a natural gas that is increasingly less polluting. And finally, nuclear skeptics need to make peace with nuclear energy.

A version of this article originally appeared in El Mundo. It has been translated from Spanish by the staff of Palacio y Asociados and is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a visiting professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors.

The post The takeaway from COP28: Gas and nuclear are part of the energy transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“The stark contrast to me is that energy companies are actually here, and two COPs ago at Glasgow, there were CEOs of oil companies who were told they were not permitted to attend,” said HIF Global Executive Director Meg Gentle, adding that energy company executives’ voices are sorely needed in these conversations about fighting climate change.

“It’s getting better, but policymakers don’t really listen to industry leaders,” said Gentle, whose company makes synthetic fuels from renewable energy. “And they underestimate how long it takes to build these projects. We’re futzing around with getting things perfect, rather than getting things moving.”

That urgency was felt across the panel. Gentle was joined by Jon Mitchell, chief sustainability officer at Canadian energy company Suncor; Naser Al Hajri, deputy chief operating officer of Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala Energy; and Fareed Yasseen, climate envoy and advisor to the prime minister of the Republic of Iraq.

See more highlights below from their discussion, which was moderated by Cody Combs, future editor for the National.

Energy innovation at work

• Gentle said that e-fuels, which are made from green fuel and recycled molecules of carbon dioxide, already have significant promise in addressing the climate challenge. While they are still more expensive than producing fossil fuels, they are chemically identical to what’s being put in car and jet fuel: “What we need to do is create the policy and the market mechanisms that can extend and accept e-fuels into the market and use it in existing infrastructure,” she said, describing it as a public policy and economic challenge more than a technological one.
  
• In Chile, HIF Global is producing an e-methanol that can be used for the shipping sector and synthesized into gasoline. Chile can start reducing fossil fuel dependence by blending that e-methanol with other fuels, which adds only “a couple cents’ increase in the cost,” Gentle said, proving that the world can start creating “different market mechanisms where pricing can be spread over large markets.”

• Mitchell said that Suncor has started taking more of a focus on the demand side of the energy technology equation. “We’re in a situation where we need significantly more energy with significantly less emissions. And so how are we going to do that?” Mitchell said. “Demand’s been a bit absent from the conversation. And I think we need to spend a little bit more time on that.”
  
• There are numerous questions about whether noncombustible uses of fossil fuels and hydrocarbons can provide an alternative product mix for energy companies. Al Hajri gave the example of a geothermal project that Mubadala Energy recently conducted with Chevron to provide sustainable energy to a town in Indonesia. “All forms of energy will be required,” he said.
  
• Yasseen argued that nuclear technology needs to get more attention. “We can’t have just one arrow in our quiver. We really have to broaden what we do,” he said. “There are significant developments that make nuclear reasonable and achievable and safe within our lifetimes,” he added. Those developments include novel ways to yield nuclear ashes with one hundred-year lifetimes instead of one thousand-year ones, making it possible to solve the challenge of nuclear waste, and fusion advances that have made commercial solutions a possibility by 2035 or 2040.

Changing the clean energy conversation

• Many on the panel observed a marked shift in the conversations at COP28 compared to past years. “For years we’ve been pushing a rock up a hill trying to get people to understand, notice, pay attention to this issue,” Mitchell said. “It feels to me like we’ve crested that hill. The rock is now rolling down the other side, and now we have to harness the momentum on where we want to take it,” he said, noting that there were almost one hundred thousand people in attendance this year, more than double last year’s attendance. “I think COP28 can do, for the energy sector, what Glasgow did for the financial sector,” he said.
  
• In order to reach 2030 sustainable development goals, the multi-year projects required to build novel energy technology facilities need to get started now, Naser argued. “In my industry, it can take five, six, seven years sometimes to get the projects ongoing,” he said. “Everyone is talking about the long target, but I think what we need is a short-term and medium target.”
  
• Gentle described an e-fuels facility HIF Global is building in Texas, where the construction process will take at least four years.“ So the longer we wait on policy to allow these projects to start,” she said, “the lower probability we have of delivering solutions before 2030.”

New technologies confront new realities

• Yasseen said that taking action should put ethics first. “The driver to everything that we do should be equity,” he said. “You can’t, for example, force people to switch to new technologies if it’s very costly to them. You have to take circumstances into account,” he said. “So the focus now, for example, in Iraq, is not on carbon capture and storage, but on stopping flaring.” It’s not about hydrogen, he said, “but it’s about taking account of methane.”
  
• Asked about whether Iraq had the political will to resolve some of these issues, Yasseen said that the prime minister recently told a friend in a private conversation that the biggest thing that kept him up at night was flaring. “In Iraq, it is a health hazard to people,” he said. “Frankly, it’s money that we’re wasting, huge amounts. And it’s bad for the planet.”
  
• The Global Methane Pledge, Al Hajri said, will “provide us a dynamic to work with vendors, to work with partners, operators, different sectors, and to try to see what kind of technology that we can implement in our facilities.” Globally, there are lots of opportunities to use existing facilities to help in the long term too, Mitchell added, noting that the same storage infrastructure used to decarbonize oil production can be used to store carbon dioxide with carbon capture and storage technologies as they advance.

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of journalism experience around the globe.

Note: Mubadala Energy and HIF Global are sponsors of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. More information on Forum sponsors can be found here.

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The eighth Forum will be held in Dubai as energy and climate decision-makers converge for COP28.

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US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry on Tuesday announced a new strategy for international cooperation on the development of nuclear fusion, which he said would be—alongside other energy sources, such as wind, solar, and nuclear fission—”a critical piece of our energy future.” The strategy, Kerry explained at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum at COP28, focuses on research and development, supply-chain improvements, regulation, workforce development, and education.

If “all of our countries are threatened, and they are, [and if] all life is threatened, and it is, then we need to pull ourselves together with every strength we have,” Kerry said. “We cannot realize this grand ambition—perhaps not at all, but certainly not at the pace we need to—doing it alone.”

The need for alternative fuels such as fusion is apparent because “science clearly tells us, without any question whatsoever, that the cause of this crisis… [is] emissions. It’s the way we burn fossil fuels,” Kerry said.

Kerry noted that “we’ve had a little debate in the last few days about what the evidence shows or doesn’t show,” a reference to controversies during the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai over what role oil and gas will play in the global energy future.

“We have two options,” Kerry explained. “Either capture the emissions or don’t burn [fossil fuels].”

Kerry explained that the evidence of warming across the planet makes it “clear” that the world needs to “move faster” to limit global temperature rise. “We need to figure out what we’re going to do at a critical pace,” Kerry warned.

Below are more highlights from Kerry’s remarks and the panel that followed, which touched upon the role fusion can play and how best to foster international collaboration on it.

The huge potential

• Kerry recounted having heard, as a senator for Massachusetts, that nuclear fusion—which joins two atoms together, producing energy—would be thirty years away, only to talk with scientists a decade later and be told that it was still thirty years away. But “the cadence of new and exciting fusion announcements has obviously increased over time,” he added.

• Now, he said, “there is potential in fusion to revolutionize our world and to change all of the options that are in front of us” for providing abundant clean energy to the world.

• Former US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, who moderated the panel that followed Kerry’s remarks, said that “in this decade, there is a very high probability that… the conditions for sustained fusion will be demonstrated.” This, he added, “is truly a game changer—assuming this all comes to pass.”

• Designer Gabriela Hearst, former creative director of fashion house Chloé, noted the environmental impact caused by the garment industry. “We really need to focus on moving away from the fossil fuel addiction that we have,” she said. At Chloé, she explained, she had designed a collection inspired by visits to fusion labs. Fusion, she said, could help “the survival of our species.”

The accelerating pace

• Several speakers pointed out how new technologies and materials are helping realize the commercialization of fusion at a faster pace than expected. Bob Mumgaard, chief executive officer of the commercial startup Commonwealth Fusion Systems, explained that new technologies are “accelerating innovation.”

• “It’s just going faster and faster” with the help of technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, Mumgaard explained. “In the last five years, it’s unrecognizable.”

• Six decades of government research and development has helped too, explained the White House’s Costa Samaras. “Now,” he added, “the challenge here is [that] energy technologies have long taken decades to get from the starting place to the market; and we do not have decades.”

• “International collaboration,” Samaras argued, will “supercharge” fusion energy development and quicken the pace toward establishing a commercial fusion plant. “That enables the advancement of fusion power… along the timeline that we need to deal with climate change.”

The remaining challenges

• Michelle Patron, senior director of global sustainability policy at Microsoft, noted that in order to meet growing energy demand, and to do it in a decarbonized way, “we need a multi-technology approach” that includes fusion and other renewable energy sources, including wind, solar, and geothermal. She added that electricity grids are local, so the mix of energy sources that countries deploy will depend on local political, economic, and social circumstances.

• Youth Survival Organization Chairman Humphrey Mrema, who is from Tanzania, said that if he were an African leader approached about supporting fusion development, he would “say no.” That’s because fusion is “hard to start” and “difficult to maintain” with the financial architecture across the continent, which has invested heavily in fossil fuels, he explained.

• In Africa, “we have to change the investment and channel it to renewables,” Mrema said. In addition, for Africa to pursue fusion, he explained, it will need technology, capacity building, and more financial resources.

• For Hearst, part of the challenge is awareness. “We live in a silo community,” she explained. “The science community has this information” about fusion’s potential, “but not the fashion community or other communities. So it’s time to cross-pollinate information to bring more hope.”

Katherine Walla is an assistant director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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The post John Kerry unveils a ‘critical’ new US strategy to expand fusion energy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

John Wagner is the director of Idaho National Laboratory, the US Department of Energy’s center for nuclear-energy research and development. This essay is part of the Global Energy Agenda.

Nearly seventy-five years ago, the US Atomic Energy Commission set out to prove that nuclear power could be harnessed to produce electricity for peaceful applications. To do so, it created the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. The station, now known as Idaho National Laboratory (INL), fulfilled the commission’s promise. With public and private sector partners, the initiative achieved many firsts, including the first nuclear electricity, the first city powered by nuclear, the first demonstration of the principle of breeding (producing more fuel than is consumed in a reactor), the first submarine reactor, and the first mobile nuclear power plant. Fifty-two unique test reactors were designed, built, and operated, giving birth to the US Nuclear Navy and the global, commercial nuclear energy industry. This rich legacy of achievement has made the world safer, cleaner, more prosperous, secure, and resilient.

And yet, it might surprise some to learn that although there are four remaining test reactors operating at INL, the US Department of Energy’s laboratory for nuclear energy research and development, it has been fifty years since a new, unique reactor began operations on the site. That’s about to change.

Over the next decade, more than a dozen advanced reactor concepts will be demonstrated in the United States, including microreactors, small modular reactors, and university test reactors. 

Ten years ago, this timeline would have been unthinkable. What has changed is a growing awareness about climate change and the imperative to combat its devastating impacts by producing clean, secure, flexible, and resilient energy.

This requires more nuclear energy—a lot more. Earlier this year, a DOE “Liftoff” report identified the potential for nuclear to scale to 300 gigawatts (GW) by 2050 to address the broader need in the United States for approximately 550–770 GW of additional clean, firm capacity to reach net-zero emissions.

Over the next decade, more than a dozen advanced reactor concepts will be demonstrated in the United States, including microreactors, small modular reactors, and university test reactors.

This is consistent with what the US-based Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) found when it polled member utilities. NEI utilities see a role for nearly 100 GW of new nuclear electricity by 2050 to support their decarbonization goals—more than double the current US nuclear electricity capacity. Analyses from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change points toward the need to materially increase global nuclear capacity by 2050.

This represents a profound challenge, but also an opportunity for nuclear power to address the global need for clean, firm, secure, and flexible energy in the next few decades. 

INL’s strategy—coordinated with numerous partners—is to start small. This means making systems that are simple and inexpensive as compared to current generation power reactors. To do this and to enable the successful scale-up in size, complexity, and capacity of nuclear power, the United States needs to do the following: build supply chains for advanced nuclear technologies, including a domestic supply of fuel; develop a knowledgeable and capable workforce; and revamp its regulatory system to enable timely deployment of advanced technologies.

At INL, that strategy (see figure below) begins with MARVEL, an 85-kilowatt thermal DOE test reactor that will provide a research-and-development platform for researchers and industry to understand the use of microreactors for a wide variety of potential applications, while providing information to support licensing, environmental assessments, improved performance, and deployment.  MARVEL will also advance US capabilities to support subsequent reactor projects. 

Next up will be Project Pele, a partnership between DOE, INL, the US Department of Defense, and BWXT that will help US armed forces reduce their dependence on diesel fuel. Pele will pave the way for small, advanced reactors for other military applications, as well as private sector applications.

Following Pele, INL, working with Southern Company and TerraPower, will conduct the Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE), which will be the world’s first fast-spectrum salt system to achieve criticality—meaning it will be able to sustain a fission chain reaction. Additionally, the Oklo Aurora microreactor could be demonstrated on the INL site as early as 2027. 

A key aspect of INL’s strategy is to use decommissioned reactor facilities as test beds, via the National Reactor Innovation Center. The decommissioned Experimental Breeder Reactor-II, which is being repurposed for Demonstration and Operation of Microreactor Experiments (DOME), is scheduled to be completed by 2025. Another test bed, LOTUS, which will host MCRE, is scheduled to be operational by 2027. These test beds will streamline testing of advanced reactor technologies, strengthening the relationship between the national labs and the private sector, and supporting the ultimate objective of deploying advanced reactors into the global market.

As shown in the figure, many reactor projects are planned to follow, demonstrating technologies for a variety of applications. These include the TerraPower Natrium reactor in Wyoming, which will repower a coal generation site and the X-Energy reactor in Texas, which will support decarbonization of the energy-intensive industrial sector. Note that the figure is not all-inclusive, as the situation is dynamic and numerous additional reactor demonstration projects in the United States and beyond are working toward demonstration.

Over seven decades, the nation has made incredible progress advancing nuclear energy to its current state. It’s time to take the next step. With the combined efforts of government, industry, and academic partners, it’s time for the United States to honor its rich legacy of achievement by providing the research foundation to deploy the advanced nuclear technologies the world desperately needs to power a clean and prosperous future.

At INL, we approach each day as though the world depends on our success. Failure is not an option. Not this time. Not if we want to offer our children, grandchildren, and future generations their best opportunity for security, prosperity, and environmental sustainability.

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The world currently has sixty nuclear reactors under construction, of which more than one-third are Russian-designed. Combined with projects under planning or negotiation, Russia currently enjoys more than 40 percent of the global nuclear reactor export market in various forms, including power plant construction, investments, provision of enriched uranium, and disposal of spent fuel. Russia has also weaponized nuclear power by occupying and refusing to operate the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine and is jeopardizing global security by threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons, in spite of its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and founding member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Russia’s actions compel a thorough review of the geopolitics of nuclear energy. The United States must play a forceful role in ensuring that nuclear technologies contribute to the global order rather than be weaponized against it. In that endeavor, Japan can be an invaluable ally. Facing new challenges for peaceful use of atomic energy against the backdrop of Russian and Chinese-induced geopolitical instability, Tokyo and Washington should redouble their commitment to competing in the international nuclear energy market.

For Russia, nuclear power represents another geopolitical weapon, similar to oil and gas. Its state nuclear company, Rosatom, works analogously to Gazprom in leveraging energy trade for political ends. Rosatom has provided loans for strategic nuclear power projects abroad, including Astravyets in Belarus, Akkuyu in Turkey, El Dabaa in Egypt, and Rooppur in Bangladesh.

China has also identified the nuclear industry as a strategic sector and is gathering market share with its relatively cheap nuclear reactors, including the introduction of its Hualong One reactors in Pakistan and Argentina. Saudi Arabia is also reportedly interested in the Chinese reactor design.

A nuclear reactor race has begun between democracies and authoritarian states, and the latter are currently ahead.

Nuclear projects are capital-intensive with lengthy time horizons, and authoritarian powers’ intention to distribute nuclear reactors in developing countries is motivated by more than commerce. Russian and Chinese state-backed nuclear entities accrue geopolitical influence beyond mere commercial interests. The risk is that a short-sighted approach may inexorably lead to a diminished role for democracies in the growing international nuclear industry.

By contrast, nuclear vendors from democratic states, including the United States and Japan, have engaged the civilian nuclear market with business principles as opposed to geopolitical influence. That approach risks pushing the NPT regime toward collapse if the nuclear industry of the democratic world forfeits market share to authoritarian rivals.

With its hostage-taking of the Zaporizhzhia plant, Russia has eschewed strict compliance with the NPT principle of peaceful atomic energy use. Given such recklessness, it cannot be ruled out that Moscow is helping non-democratic states develop reactors in contravention of internationally accepted rules regarding management of nuclear fuels, related technologies, and fissile materials. Meanwhile, amid tensions with the West, China is leaning on Russia’s increasing provision of highly enriched uranium to scale up its military and civilian nuclear aspirations.

The United States and Japan should counter these actions in support of a norms-based nuclear energy trade. The United States is the world’s single-largest operator of nuclear reactors with a fleet of ninety-three in operation. Japan—with whom the United States has consolidated one of the strongest bilateral civilian nuclear partnerships—has the fifth-largest fleet in the world with thirty-three reactors.

Such experience and expertise in operating atomic energy assets should be put to use internationally as the global nuclear energy market expands in response to energy security and climate challenges.

Over the past six decades, Japan has become a key US partner with regard to the development of nuclear technologies and facilities. A nuclear partnership between the United States and Japan that promotes research and development and accelerates commercialization of next-generation nuclear reactor innovations—including small modular reactors (SMRs)—could address energy insecurity globally and spread best practices in nuclear safety.

The US-Japan strategic collaboration on supporting deployment of SMRs in Ghana, announced in October 2022, is an example of such a partnership. Following this example, the two allies should pursue commitments to the other countries in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s standards of nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation for the sake of sustaining the NPT regime.

Re-establishing a visionary nuclear energy strategy should be an economic and geopolitical priority for the democratic world. The US-Japan alliance should assume the leadership in peaceful atomic energy collaboration, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency, lest deeper Russian and Chinese penetration of the global nuclear market erode NPT safeguards.

Shoichi Itoh is a senior fellow at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ)

Dr. Julia Nesheiwat is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

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The post Atoms for Peace 2.0: The case for a stronger US-Japan nuclear power alliance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary
Introduction
The war in Ukraine: A new dimension to the nuclear debate in Europe
What does a peace pact on nuclear energy look like?
Conclusion

Executive summary

Nuclear energy was once a source of European integration beginning with the creation of Euratom, the European Atomic Energy Community, in 1958. However, it has become in the contemporary European Union a source of division, with France and Germany leading rival blocs regarding its future. As a result the EU does not meaningfully fund nuclear energy and member states have engaged in political interference trying to block other member states’ attempts to launch nuclear projects. Nuclear energy is today a source of European disunion. This acrimony has come at a terrible time for the EU, when it urgently needs to decouple from weaponized Russian energy supplies and decarbonize due to the worsening climate emergency. This paper proposes that the EU reduce Russia’s presence in European nuclear markets and sign a “peace pact” allowing each country to pursue its own energy mix without political interference as part of a grand bargain. This bargain would recognize that nuclear energy is a crucial part of Europe’s energy mix, ensure the EU adoptsa technology-neutral approach in the Green Deal Industrial Plan and Net Zero Industrial Act while ramping up support for nuclear skills, research, and development, in exchange for further integration of electricity markets and agreement on its reform, higher renewable targets and renewed work and research on the management of nuclear waste. Only such a peace pact recapturing the spirit of technological optimism and geopolitical commitment behind the launch of Euratom can help Europe overcome the deep nuclear divisions which are holding it back. 

Introduction

The history of European nuclear energy: From integrative to divisive force

Once upon a time, nuclear energy united postwar Europe in excitement. About eight kilometers from the center of Brussels, Belgium, sits an eye-catching tourist attraction that garners almost 600,000 visitors per year. The 335-foot tall Atomium, described on the eponymous website as “a monumental structure halfway between sculpture and architecture and where the cube flirts with the sphere,” is a sight to see. Unveiled as the flagship construction for the 1958 Brussels World Fair, the Atomium was meant to represent the faith people put in science—especially nuclear science—and what that could mean for human progress. To this day, the nine glimmering spherical atoms that make up the Atomium are a physical representation that nuclear energy has not always been seen as a source of European division.

Today, political Brussels faces an unprecedented energy puzzle. European policymakers, still grappling with the consequences of the energy crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have scrambled to reaffirm the continent’s position as a global climate leader. The bloc must adapt to the Russian gas supply shock, all while accelerating an energy transition that provides sufficient and cost-competitive energy in a way that does not transfer Europe’s dependency from Russian gas to Chinese-controlled critical raw materials. At the same time, the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which provides generous incentives for green industries to localize production in the United States, could threaten the viability of industries in Europe, all while the transatlantic community pushes to move green supply chains away from China. In this context, European policymakers are fiercely deliberating the future of nuclear energy: is it a critical enabler of Europe’s energy transformation, as a stable source of low-carbon energy, or a dangerous blocking point that diverts funding from renewable energy deployment? This has drawn sharp divisions between France and Germany. And in stark contrast to the optimistic days of the Atomium, nuclear energy is now far from being at the center of European integration: when the European Commission first presented the RePowerEU plan in March 2022 with the aim of reducing EU reliance on Russian gas, nuclear power was not even mentioned. It has become a source of European disunion. 

France-Germany divide: From pro-nuclear geopolitics to anti-nuclear protests

The Atomium is testament to the fact nuclear energy was not always a toxic subject in Brussels. To understand the nuclear debate in Europe today, one must go back almost seventy years to see how Europe approached energy access and economic integration in parallel with post-WWII reconstruction. Nuclear energy, now the most divisive topic in Europe’s energy transition, was once a central pillar of European integration. That is not to say the path there was clear cut or simple. After World War II, European leaders knew that successful reconstruction would require secure and reliable access to electricity and that overdependence on foreign energy sources could create major problems with reconstruction efforts.¹ This is why the bloc began, essentially, with energy. In 1951, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to the European Economic Community (ECC) and eventually the European Union. The primary role of the ECSC was to develop a common market of coal and steel within Western Europe, ensuring that Western Europe would have guaranteed access to these materials.“² According to Robert Schuman, one of the fathers of European integration, the point of this common market was to make another war between France and Germany “materially impossible,” as coal and steel were the primary resources required to build armaments at an industrial scale up until the Second World War.“³

Looking to further deepen cooperation, the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC states gathered for the Messina Conference in 1955. Among other developments, the ministers agreed upon both the need to further develop the technology for nuclear energy generation and the establishment of a common European institution that would oversee this development. This decision eventually led to the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom. The Suez Crisis in 1956 starkly highlighted Europe’s problem with importing most of its energy sources, and the ECSC’s foreign ministers decided to appoint “three wise men”⁴ to set targets for European nuclear energy. At the height of the Suez Crisis, it was decided that European coal, water, and natural gas would be unlikely to meet more than a third of projected increase in electricity demand: another major argument in favor of nuclear energy.

It was in this spirit that the idea of pan-European nuclear energy efforts really began to gain traction. And finally, in 1958—the year the Atomium opened in Brussels—the six original members of the ECSC signed the Euratom Treaty. The treaty pooled core aspects of the nuclear industries of member states, ensured standards for nuclear safety and security, and promoted cooperation in research and development into nuclear energy. R&D was critical: at the time, American players dominated nuclear technology, which they licensed out to European energy providers. Building out European nuclear capacity was, beyond a project to work together toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy, also seen as an instrument for Europe to eventually achieve energy independence. Nuclear energy was seen as key to European integration—not division. 

During this time, a set of narratives predominated in Europe that helped leaders gain support and acceptance from the public to develop nuclear energy capabilities: there were huge reconstruction needs, notably in steel (and correspondingly in coal); a desire for peaceful cooperation with neighbors; a recognition that Europe was still excessively dependent on nonindigenous energy sources, especially oil from the Middle East; concerns that coal would eventually run out; and the threat that high energy prices would pose to economic recovery and growth. This brought the six together into Euratom in a spirit of geopolitical purpose and technological optimism symbolized by the Atomium at the 1958 World’s Fair.

Nuclear power continued to gain traction over the following decade. After France’s failure to maintain control over colonial Algeria, there was a deep desire in Paris to reduce reliance on energy imports from the Arab League. However, it was the 1973 energy crisis that again highlighted Europe’s collective continued vulnerability on foreign sources of energy and propelled Europe into becoming the most nuclearized region in the world. That year, Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an embargo on the United States and allies that supported Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. At the time, Western Europe and Japan relied on OPEC states for between 45 percent and 50 percent of their oil, and when market prices climbed by 300 percent as a result of the embargo, import-dependent countries became acutely aware of their vulnerability.⁵ Could nuclear power potentially reduce those vulnerabilities? Given its longstanding geopolitical concerns—post-Algerian independence in 1962—and concerns about Arab-energy supplies, France led the charge across Europe, via the “Messmer Plan,” to invest in nuclear and to affirm the power source as it is relied upon today.⁶ In fact, plants built or planned immediately following the 1973 oil shock still represent 40 percent of today’s nuclear capacity worldwide.⁷

Political suspicions and ambitions shaped this first nuclear age. France has always been the most advanced country in Europe when it comes to nuclear energy. It created the CEA (national atomic agency) in 1945, which had 1 percent of the total government budget by 1955 and dwarfed all other European nuclear energy budgets at the time. This meant seeking technological alliances overseas. Framatome, a French-led nuclear company, was formed in 1958, under President de Gaulle to acquire the license of the US company Westinghouse’s pressurized water reactor designs for use in France. This acute dependence meant France was nervous about US domination of the nuclear energy space and was in favor of deeper European integration from the get-go to counterbalance it. This spirit was summed up by the French National Assembly in 1956 by Louis Armand, one of the “wise men” and first president of Euratom: “Everything moves so fast that if we do not speed things up, we will never catch up. Without Euratom, it’s simple: all European countries will have to turn to the [nuclear] giants,” referring primarily to the United States and Russia. Armand was indeed worried about European states building century-long dependencies on the two superpowers for nuclear material and technology.

However, over the Rhine, there was as much suspicion of France as with the United States. Initially, West Germany lacked nuclear expertise, but had expertise in chemical and other industrial sectors, and wanted to import cheap supplies of enriched uranium from the United States to underpin a reviving and export-led national industry. In short, many in Germany viewed France’s offer of cooperation as a ploy to control this new industry. These differences also played out when trying to negotiate the Euratom Treaty: France wanted a strong dirigiste framework, whereas West Germany’s approach was more business-friendly.

However, these early optimistic narratives surrounding nuclear energy soon flipped. Excitement for secure and reliable nuclear power gave way to disenchantment and concern for the potential immense destruction caused by disaster and improper waste management. Following the 1979 Three Mile Island incident, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, and social justice impacts of improper waste management and uranium mining, public perception of nuclear energy quickly deteriorated throughout Europe.⁸ Through public pressure campaigns, governments soon scaled back investment in new reactors. Crucially for the future of Europe’s collective approach to nuclear energy, France’s first nuclear reactor at Fessenheim on the Rhine, the country’s border with Germany, proved a catalyst for the emergence of the anti-nuclear protest movements in that country and a deep sore in relations between both partners, despite it being at the onset a Franco-German project.⁹ These accidents, crises, and protests built up the fault lines between Germany and France on nuclear energy that continue to this day.

These eventually stark differences between Germany and France over their respective nuclear energy policies can be traced to the late 1970s. The rise of the Green Party in Germany became synonymous with the push for environmental protections, and, alongside it, the desire to phase out nuclear energy.¹⁰

This led to very different political contexts in France and Germany by the early twenty-first century. Across the Rhine, the Greens succeeded in their anti-nuclear pressure so dramatically that no new nuclear reactors have been built in the country since 1989. This was just the beginning. Furthermore, following the Fukushima accident in 2011, Angela Merkel’s government (a coalition between the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and the Free Democratic Party) introduced the Energiewende policy, which aimed to shut down Germany’s seventeen nuclear power stations by 2022 and phase out coal power by 2038 (now 2030) through aggressive renewable energy expansion, industrial decarbonization, and efficiency targets. France, as a gesture to Germany following the Fukushima disaster, agreed to close the plant in Fessenheim on the Rhine.¹¹ This is the political environment that led to Germany shutting down its last three nuclear plants in April 2023—despite widespread international criticism given Europe’s energy needs in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, it is crucial to understand Europe’s current predicament that Germany’s Energiewende should not be mistaken for leading to uniquely green results. As a result of pushing for denuclearization, Germany and other EU states became increasingly reliant on cheap imported fossil fuels from Russia—especially natural gas. These fundamental differences between France and Germany form the heart of the divided approach that Europe takes to nuclear energy today. What is more important: a nonnuclear approach to energy tomorrow or a decarbonized approach to energy today?  

Nuclear energy today: A critical but divisive source of energy for Europe

Notwithstanding these political differences, nuclear energy is critically important to Europe. Today, more than one hundred nuclear power plants produce about a quarter of electricity generation in the European Union and nearly half of all carbon-free electricity in the EU.¹² Nuclear electricity generation almost perfectly splits the European Union in two. France’s fifty-six reactors (the second largest fleet in the world, behind the United States) produce almost half of Europe’s nuclear electricity. Spain, Sweden, Belgium, and eight other EU countries (Czechia, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Netherlands) make up the rest. 

While some member states, such as Belgium, have sharply decreased their nuclear production over the past few years, others have progressively ramped up, as in Romania, whose nuclear power plants came online as recently as 1996, or Hungary, which is expanding its Paks nuclear power plant. At least twenty-five new nuclear reactors are planned in other member states, including six in Poland and two in the Netherlands. Italy, which shut its nuclear reactors down after Chernobyl, making it the only G8 country without its own nuclear power plants up until Germany’s own closures, has now launched a new government initiative to contemplate reintroducing nuclear power.¹³

Figure 1. Stances on nuclear energy in the EU

The European Union can therefore be divided into six groups: decommissioners, expanders, extenders, entrants, status-quo players, and nonnuclear energy players. Decommissioners, such as Spain, currently operate reactors but have active plans to phase them out. Expanders, like France and Slovakia, currently have existing power plants and plans to build new ones. Extenders, like Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, have plans to build new reactors or other measures to extend the operational lifespan of existing reactors. Entrants, like Poland, are countries that have never developed nuclear energy before but wish to do so. Those at a standstill, like Sweden, are countries that have operational power plants but lack official plans to either build more plants and/or units, or decommission existing plants. Finally, nonnuclear members, such as Germany, Denmark, and Austria, are states that have either fully decommissioned or never adopted the use of nuclear energy.¹⁴ Prior to Brexit, the United Kingdom and its nine nuclear reactors tipped the political balance in favor of the pro-nuclear camp. With the British exit from the European Union, the pro-nuclear camp lost one critical ally. This sense of flux and indeterminacy has been a driver of such bitter disputes over the EU nuclear future.

Figure 2. Share of nuclear in domestic electricity production (Europe, 2021)

Not only the question of nuclear power per se but also the question of Russia and the uranium that enables it divides Europeans. To power its nuclear power plants, the EU sources uranium from a limited set of partners, notably Russia, but also Niger, Kazakhstan, Australia and Canada. But the ties between Europe’s nuclear industry and Russia extend beyond uranium. Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear power company, has built reactors in five European countries (Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia), and is currently building two in Slovakia and two in Hungary. What’s more, Rosatom has deep ties with the French nuclear industry, both as a client and as a partner: as late as 2021, EDF (a French state-owned electric utility company) and Rosatom signed a strategic cooperation agreement and a joint declaration on research.¹⁵ This is not simply a French matter as Germany’s Siemens also remains a partner of Rosatom.¹⁶ Unsurprisingly, France has come under increasing pressure, especially from Ukraine, to cut ties with Rosatom. As of yet, the European Union has not sanctioned Rosatom or any associated personnel and companies, unlike the United Kingdom and United States.¹⁷ However, the latter still receives imports of Russian uranium.¹⁸ In fact, Ukraine wants every European country with ties to Russia’s nuclear industry to cut them. The pressure seems to be working: efforts are underway in various European capitals to wean European nuclear industries from Russian dependence: Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria have all recently signed agreements with Western players (notably Westinghouse and EDF). 

Uranium imports free of Kremlin-influence pose a challenge for all Western countries. Meanwhile, France in particular has concerns given the recent coup d’état in Niger, which may lead to the state falling under Russian influence; as of 2020, 34.7 percent of French uranium imports came from the country. This is alongside 28.9 percent from Kazakhstan and 26.4 percent from Uzbekistan, two other states where Russia has limited influence.¹⁹ The United States, meanwhile, imported 35 percent of its uranium from Kazakhstan and 15 percent from Russia directly as of 2021.²⁰ This is a collective problem for Western allies, though not an unsolvable one, should the situation degrade, given the extensive uranium deposits in allies such as Australia and Canada. So far, uranium, unlike oil and gas, has not been weaponized by Russia. Again, European countries are divided on what is more important: decoupling from Russian resources totally, as the first priority, or only decoupling from weaponized Russian hydrocarbons.  

Nuclear as part of the Green Energy Transition

Many of Europe’s green politicians may suggest otherwise, but any fair analysis of the continent’s energy situation and trajectory shows that Europe will not be able to achieve its net-zero goals without nuclear energy being part of the mix. Long before the urgency injected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was already evident that nuclear energy in Europe is critical when it comes to providing the three-pronged benefits of energy security, sovereignty, and a reduction in emissions as part of a wider net-zero strategy. With EU member states now needing to find alternate energy sources even faster, nuclear energy will have to continue to play a critical role, albeit one that might look very different than in the past.  

Nuclear energy as a key enabler of Europe’s decarbonization goals

Nuclear energy is crucial in helping to meet ambitious emissions targets that are likely out of reach at the current pace of transition.²¹ This is especially true in Eastern Europe, which is still overly reliant on coal, and lacks coastlines for offshore wind and appropriate solar resources.²²Nuclear reactors already provide about half of the low-carbon electricity generation in the EU, and the countries with the lowest carbon intensity of total electricity production in 2021—Sweden and France—achieved this by utilizing both nuclear and renewable energy production.²³

Beyond the low-carbon electricity that nuclear technology already provides, this energy source can accompany and enable the deployment of renewable energy. Rather than being seen as antagonistic, the two should be seen as complementary. The ability of nuclear energy to supply secure and reliable low-carbon power—that can be ramped up and down to meet needs—at a competitive price provides solutions to a suite of shortcomings that result from large-scale renewable energy deployment. 

Renewable energy generation is uncertain across hours, days, and seasons and balancing supply and demand becomes increasingly difficult as the grid is characterized by a larger share of renewables. Solutions like battery storage and demand management can help grid operators balance supply and demand across hours or days, but variation across weeks or months requires different solutions. For example, multiweek periods of almost no wind and limited solar power can occur in the winter in Germany—stretches of time that are nicknamed Dunkelflaute, or dark doldrums.²⁴The lull in generation is currently met by burning fossil fuels, but meeting gaps like these in Germany or elsewhere with nuclear power would be emissions-free. Nuclear energy is already seen as a “baseload” supply (the minimum amount of electricity needed to meet the constant and essential demand) that can be relied upon in the face of variable generation, and is largely used for this purpose.²⁵

Nuclear energy can also help maintain grid stability, a service that can be even more valuable than power generation. Healthy electric grids must balance supply and demand, but also maintain safe frequency to avoid failures or accidents. This becomes more complex with renewable energy generation, in which renewables utilize inverters instead of turbines to convert energy into electricity; turbines maintain frequency free of charge.²⁶ Nuclear electricity utilizes turbines and can thus deliver “ancillary services,” (balance frequency) across a renewable-dominant grid. For example, an analysis of a carbon neutral power system in China projected that in 2060, nuclear energy would supply only 10 percent of total electricity production, but almost half of the ancillary services.²⁷

Finally, an effective energy transition may simply be unrealistic without nuclear energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that the EU will fall short of its ambitious renewable energy targets, and recent research makes it clear that the coal phaseout is not happening fast enough.²⁸ In Austria, an outspoken nuclear opponent in the European Union, a recent internal government report highlights that the country is not currently on track to reach its climate targets.²⁹ Additionally, the 2022 energy crisis has caused Germany, Poland, and a handful of other European countries to consider delaying plans for coal phaseouts. 

It’s worth digging a bit deeper into Germany specifically: combined with gas shortages, the decision to follow through with its plans to phaseout nuclear power has actually increased reliance on coal and other fossil fuels in the short term.³⁰ Unsurprisingly, the decision to follow through with these phaseout plans has drawn increasing controversy and shows that the Greens’ vision for the energy future may no longer be a shared one.³¹ A recent survey by YouGov in Germany revealed that only 26 percent of Germans fully support a complete phaseout of nuclear power today, with clear divisions across political and regional lines.³²  In Bavaria, Minister-President Marcus Söder recently appealed to keep regional nuclear plants on despite the federal phaseout plans.³³ His pleas were ultimately rejected—despite the clear climatic and security benefits of keeping the plants running. 

A cost-competitive solution to the energy transition

Economic necessity means nuclear energy is not something that Europe can continue to remain divided over. Simply put, including nuclear power in the EU energy supply will bring down the costs of the green energy transition. It will continue to be the least costly low-carbon technology that is dispatchable (meaning readily adjustable to meet fluctuating demand) after hydropower through at least 2025, according to the IEA.³⁴ Achieving net-zero targets globally without investing in nuclear energy would require $500 billion more investment and raise consumer electricity bills on average by $20 billion a year by 2050, the IEA found.³⁵

That storyline exists within France. RTE’s landmark study, Energy Pathways to 2050, found that the most cost-effective pathways to a carbon-neutral French grid by 2050 require both extending existing reactor life and investing in new reactors alongside renewable energy development.³⁶ Crucially, the IEA has found that the ability to invest in and extend nuclear reactor life well past initial lifetimes, or long-term operation (LTO), is even competitive with renewable energy generation, which now enjoys famously low costs.³⁷ Ambitious targets for emissions reduction in 2030 and carbon-neutral electricity generation in 2050 may already be unrealistic.³⁸ Phasing out nuclear and meeting those targets will be prohibitively expensive, if not impossible, in nuclear-dependent member states. The evidence is clear: there is no path to net-zero for the European Union without a prominent role for nuclear energy. 

Advanced reactor designs show potential for new applications

Given the push to renewable sources of energy and the benefits nuclear power plants provide, nuclear energy is likely to be an important component of the net-zero transitions in Europe and abroad. But nuclear in the net-zero age could look somewhat different from the late twentieth century. This gives reason to think that its politics—characterized by division—can change too. 

While some countries are hesitant to invest in conventional large-scale reactors for the transition, they are enthusiastic about the potential of advanced reactor designs to enable decarbonization. Belgium and Italy have joined the pro-nuclear alliance as observers due to their intent to only pursue advanced reactor designs, and the Netherlands’ new climate budget pushes for the construction of smaller nuclear reactors.³⁹

There are, however, reasons for skepticism. This is not an approach shared by all: Poland, for instance, currently plans to build large reactors, while other countries (e.g., Romania) are refurbishing and investing in existing reactors. Further, countries that are investing in large-scale nuclear, including France and the United States, have made sure to earmark funds for advanced reactor designs, such as evolutions of existing designs of small modular reactors (SMRs).⁴⁰

Despite the many benefits of such SMRs, they have not yet been commercialized to replace large reactors in the power mix. For one, designs are in various stages of development and license applications, and commercial viability remains uncertain. And while they address cost concerns, commercial SMRs as conceived of today might, according to one study, end up producing twofold to thirtyfold more waste than conventional atomic power plants in operation.⁴¹ Additionally, existing infrastructure and regulation has been designed for large reactors and adapting for SMRs will require grid investments and policy changes. 

Overall, SMRs and advanced reactor designs have potential and require additional research and development. Investment should continue to address shortcomings, and designers/policymakers should think critically about how to take advantage of the benefits of nuclear power in the decarbonized energy mix. We should expect such reactors to play a different but important role in the energy transition, as there will be specific applications where the use case for large reactors is less clear. This might be the case for industrial sectors with hard-to-abate emissions, including hydrogen production, mineral extraction necessary for the clean transition, and other industrial processes. These reactors will not, however, replace the need for large-scale reactors—and they won’t short-circuit the politics and long-standing opposition to nuclear power. 

The war in Ukraine: A new dimension to the nuclear debate in Europe

Nuclear has divided Europe at a time when unity is required

Just as in the crises of 1956 and 1973, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 once again exposed Europe’s heavy reliance on imported fossil fuel supplies. It also forced policymakers to reassess their understanding of both energy security and energy independence. In the span of a decade, Europe witnessed Libya, a key oil supplier to its south, engulfed in a devastating civil war, and more recently, Russia, once perceived as a reliable gas supplier to the East, invading Ukraine and shutting down gas supplies. Whereas the nuclear-versus-renewables debate hinged on its environmental impacts, the war in Europe has placed energy sovereignty as the number one priority, shifting the terms of the debate.

Figure 3. Share of gas supply from Russia in Europe (2021)

For member states that first invested in nuclear energy to provide energy security, the war in Ukraine has validated the need to invest in a new age of nuclear energy. Proponents argue that nuclear power has clear benefits to deliver security and independence, along with the decarbonization benefits described above. Nuclear energy can provide locally produced electricity and heat, with relatively few inputs, anywhere in Europe.⁴⁴ Nuclear fuel is extremely energy dense—one uranium pellet, which is around one inch tall, is equivalent to one ton of coal or 120 gallons of oil.⁴⁵ As a result, reactors have a relatively small geographic footprint and waste is minimal relative to power output. Uranium—the most common fuel used for nuclear power—is abundant and geographically diverse, even though Russia remains one of Europe’s largest suppliers of enriched uranium.⁴⁶ Operating costs remain low once reactors are built and the levelized costs of energy (LCOE) are consistently lower than fossil fuel alternatives—especially where supply is scarce.⁴⁷

Instead of a joint European approach, a new division has embedded itself between pro- and anti- nuclear camps: the question becomes, does Europe leave nuclear behind and seek other options for secure, low-carbon dispatchable energy, or reinvest in established and new nuclear technologies and fully recognize the role they can play in the green energy transition?

Figure 4. EU electricity generation by fuel (2021)

Europe’s politics surrounding nuclear energy are now so acrimonious that there was no mention of nuclear energy in the bloc’s RePowerEU plan to decouple from Russian energy sources, as previously mentioned. Germany has also been engaging in political interference to block other member states from developing nuclear energy. In February 2022, Germany’s energy minister, Steffi Lemke, of the Green Party, visited Poland and claimed that Germany would use “the appropriate legal instruments at the European level” to prevent Poland from launching a nuclear program.⁴⁸ Political acrimony between France and Germany over Berlin’s refusal to allow meaningful EU funds to be allowed to support nuclear energy has led to a suspicion in the French cabinet that Germany’s policy may not in fact be ideological but commercial, with a desire to undercut a French energy advantage.⁴⁹

Divisions have calcified. At a meeting in Stockholm in February 2023, eleven member states agreed to deepen cooperation on nuclear energy. This pro-nuclear alliance, with France at its helm, includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, with Belgium and Italy joining as observers. At the core, these member states envision the electricity source as central to the energy transition and want it placed “on an equal footing” with renewables as a low-carbon source of energy. In October, they submitted a proposal to the European Commission to ensure plans for electricity market reforms do no harm to their existing nuclear fleet. ⁵⁰  On the other side of the table, a group dubbed the Friends of Renewables was formed in response to oppose measures to accommodate nuclear power and is “ready to fight” against future concessions. Austria has formed the opposition with Estonia, Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, and Germany.⁵¹

The formation of these two blocs impedes consensus building in Europe on crucial energy policy initiatives now and in the future. The two increasingly entrenched sides lobby hard to gain allies for their cause, and the consequences of this extend beyond the legislatives efforts themselves. The nuclear debate has, in the words of an attendee of the Atlantic Council’s decarbonization Paris policy workshop in March, escalated the energy crisis into “a political crisis, a crisis of trust” that has “wasted political capital” and threatens the conventional consensus-building process for EU energy policy“⁵² In this vein, the French National Assembly recently published a report on “the loss of French sovereignty in energy,”⁵³ pointing to European energy rules and its impacts on the French nuclear industry over the past twenty years as the main culprit. Nuclear energy has become—at the worst possible time—a source of European disunion. 

Making matters worse is the poor state of the French nuclear industry. The French Senate recently published a report on French nuclear energy, noting that, “due to a lack of coherent policy and investment this energy is in structural decline.”⁵⁴ By late 2022, a record twenty-six of its fifty-six reactors were offline for maintenance or repairs after the worrying discovery of cracks and corrosion in some pipes used to cool reactor cores.⁵⁵ This crisis sent French nuclear generation to a thirty year low turning the country into a net energy importer for 2022, importing even from Germany. Lack of skills and capacity domestically meant France was required to bring in American and Canadian experts and contractors. This is part of a series of deep problems that have faced EDF, which the French government fully nationalized in 2022. Therefore, despite strategic and climatic vitality, European nuclear power faces a double bind: that of supranational German-led political opposition and French-led domestic underperformance. To truly unlock nuclear energy’s potential, both will have to eventually be overcome at the EU level: removing German hostility to countries wishing to develop their own industries and providing support to overcome French failures.

Nuclear divisions hinder Europe’s efforts to build a truly climate-neutral economy

This row is impacting core EU policymaking. The nuclear debate inevitably emerges in every energy-related discussion in Brussels, including the negotiations for the Renewable Energy Directive and related emissions reductions targets, discussions around standards for hydrogen production, decisions surrounding funding guidelines for that production, and plans for electricity market reforms. Ongoing clashes between EU member states therefore significantly delay agreements at a time when Europe needs to present a unified agenda and accelerate its efforts if it is to meet its climate neutrality goals. The worse the Franco-German “motor,” the worse the functioning of the EU.

Disagreements on nuclear energy also bog down efforts to invest in the infrastructure required for a net-zero European economy. France, Spain, and Germany are unable to find consensus on how to allocate EU financial resources toward the integration of European energy infrastructure like hydrogen pipelines. This dispute has already had political consequences, such as when President Emmanuel  Macron threatened to delay the construction of BarMar, a hydrogen pipeline that would run from Spain through France to Germany.

The nuclear dispute also impacts Europe’s green industrial strategy. Ambiguous language in the recent Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) proposal from the Commission is aimed more at quieting both factions than bridging the gaps between them.⁵⁶. The NZIA, the bloc’s response to the US IRA, is part of the EU’s broader Green Industrial Plan, which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared is meant to “to scale up manufacturing of clean technologies in the EU and make sure the Union is well-equipped for the clean-energy transition.”⁵⁷ It defines which net-zero technologies are strategic for both Europe’s industry and decarbonization, which, in turn, determines which technologies will get access to a wide range of benefits, potentially including fast-tracked permitting, simplified regulatory oversight, and European funding. The main body of the act includes “advanced technologies to produce energy from nuclear processes with minimal waste from the fuel cycle” and “small modular reactors” as two of the technologies that will benefit from the policy initiatives—but this excludes the current reactors essential to Europe’s energy mix and technologies such as the second-generation pressurized water reactors that France plans to develop.⁵⁸

Additionally, the annex to the policy defining those technologies, which “will receive particular support” and are subject to the “40 percent domestic production benchmark,” does not mention any type of nuclear technology, nor does a separate document identifying investment needs and funding availability.⁵⁹President von der Leyen has said that “nuclear can play a role in our decarbonization effort,” but is not deemed “strategic for the future.”⁶⁰ Similarly, the Commission working paper on “strategic” green industries does not once mention nuclear power.⁶¹

The European Union does not meaningfully fund nuclear energy 

The EU does not meaningfully fund nuclear energy despite its strategic and climatic importance and core importance to multiple member states. While there are already funding initiatives for nuclear energy in the EU, the majority of these relatively small resources are set aside for safety and decommissioning programs aimed at “improving the safety standards of nuclear power stations and ensuring that nuclear waste is safely handled and disposed of,” while leaving it up to member states to “choose whether to include nuclear power in their energy mix.”⁶² This leaves a gap in the securing of resources needed for nuclear fuel (primarily uranium), as well as deficits in vital investments in technical skills training for the development and operation of nuclear energy equipment and encouraging technological innovation in the field. 

The current energy crisis, political disputes, and the new wave of industrial economic initiatives further prove that this approach needs updating. For perspective, the €132 million package announced in March that directs funding from Horizon Europe (see Table 1) for research in small modular reactors is a drop in the ocean compared to recent measures in the United States.⁶³ The $6.85 billion in direct funding and additional generous US tax credits are clearly aimed at continuing and enhancing the domestic nuclear industry through support to existing reactors, supply chain enhancement, and technology-agnostic funding for research and development. There is a clear opportunity to reframe the NZIA and additional EU policy initiatives in a way that finds a reasonable middle ground for nuclear energy’s role in the transition. 

Nuclear disputes stand in the way of deepening European electricity markets via infrastructure and reform

There is a further issue holding back Europe. The EU is already the world’s largest interconnected electricity market, ensuring that power flows from where it is produced to where it is needed. But the energy crisis and the challenges posed by increasing shares of renewables calls for more integration, an objective that Europe has so far failed to meet. In January 2023, the European Court of Auditor released a report pointing to the lack of progress made in recent years, notably on interconnectors.⁶⁴ In 2002, the European Council had set a target of 10 percent of electricity interconnection as a proportion of generation capacity for each member state. The target has yet to be reached, three years past the 2020 deadline. 

France’s geography places it at the heart of European energy systems—between Northern wind and southern sunshine. And yet, French policymakers have been slow to build out interconnectors, to the dismay of their Spanish neighbor.⁶⁵The last high voltage interconnector to come online across the Pyrenees was in 2015, despite the rapid deployment of renewable generation capacity in Spain.⁶⁶ More recently, the BarMar spat was the latest iteration of French obstruction.  

Many factors could explain France’s reluctance to become a European energy platform: the pressure it would place on France’s domestic grid,⁶⁷ or shielding its nuclear electricity exports to Germany and Italy from Spanish competition.⁶⁸ But France also heavily subsidizes its nuclear industry, making French nuclear electricity historically among the cheapest sources of energy across the EU.⁶⁹ These subsidies led EDF to the brink of default and subsequent nationalization by the French government last year.⁷⁰  In this context, this reason explains French policymakers’ reluctance to build out more connections: France cannot afford to subsidize nuclear-derived electricity for Europe at large. This is how France and not only Germany contributes to the blockage at the heart of European nuclear energy politics. 

No wonder then, that Europeans have struggled to agree on electricity market reforms this year. In March 2023, the European Commission proposed various revisions to regulations governing Europe’s electricity market design. While leaving market fundamentals unchanged, the Commission’s proposals included consumer protection measures, supporting long-term power purchase agreements and, more controversially, two way contracts for differences (CfDs), whereby governments top up energy producers when prices drop below a minimum threshold, and vice versa when a maximum threshold is reached.⁷¹

This last point sparked intense debate between the pro and anti-nuclear camps.⁷² France wants CfDs to cover existing assets, namely its nuclear fleet, while Germany views this as unfair support that would distort markets. In late July and ahead of summer recess, the European Parliament voted on a watered-down version of the Commission’s proposal, making only newly-built plants eligible for CfD funding.⁷³ Negotiations between the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission will accelerate towards the end of the year, under the supervision of the Spanish Council presidency. 

Sven Giegold, German state secretary for economy and climate, recently told the Financial Times that France and Germany needed a “grand bargain” on energy.⁷⁴ Indeed, the need for a political grand bargain on nuclear energy in the EU is clear: to resolve divisive disputes and reestablish trust in the consensus-building process, to streamline broader energy policy that depends on nuclear strategy, and to meet the objective of supporting low-carbon technology essential to the European economy. Given the centrality of energy it remains—as it was in 1958 with the launch of Euroatom—a geopolitical necessity. Otherwise, a deep source of disunion will continue to drive European member states apart. Above all else, ambitious targets for EU-wide decarbonization are simply unrealistic without nuclear energy—but its use must be defined by a new strategy that would guarantee Europe’s energy security and resilience against energy-based extortion from foreign producers.

What does a peace pact on nuclear energy look like? 

 It is time to resolve divisive disputes on nuclear energy and find a compromise that defines the role of the power source in the energy transition. This will require a political—not a technocratic or a technical —decision. As a quarter of all electricity supply and about half of the low-carbon generation in the EU, nuclear energy is essential, strategic, and will complement the deployment of renewables and ensure energy security and independence.⁷⁵ Member states, principally Germany, should respect individual decisions to develop their energy mix as they see fit, as long as emission reductions are reached. Member states, principally France, also need to drop their hostility to the deeper integration of European electricity markets. Together they should look to a long-term solution on electricity pricing that can square the various circles holding Europe back. The EU should do this in ways which can help the strategically important sector overcome the politics of both German-led supranational opposition and French-led domestic underperformance. 

First, European member states, in particular France and Germany, should sign a peace pact on nuclear energy. This should take the form of a political neutrality agreement on the topic of nuclear energy that affirms that each state is free to choose its own energy mix, as is defined by the treaties, stops interference in these policies, and affirms there is no right to block member states wishing to launch, expand, or simply conserve their nuclear capacity. Both sides should acknowledge that nuclear and renewable energy will both play a vital role in reaching emission reduction targets. As a continent facing a rapid rise in temperatures, Europe has no time to lose to decarbonize its energy mix. But as a compromise this pact would recognize that nuclear energy generation is a complement, not a substitute, to renewable energy targets. Therefore, nuclear generating countries should commit—in exchange for the peace pact—to deeper integration of European electricity markets, new targets for the deployment of renewables, while supporting reforms to simplify and accelerate permitting, and investing in additional cross-border grid connections, with the support of EU money, via existing funding instruments and the European Investment Bank, whilst looking for a long term solution on electricity pricing. In practice, this means that France must abandon plans to subsidize all of its nuclear electricity production, including its requirement that CfDs cover existing assets. Not only would this contribute to a subsidies race on both sides of the Rhine, it would fundamentally undermine the workings of an integrated European electricity market, notably by making it impossible for France to agree to build the interconnectors Europe needs. Indeed, France would then be subsidizing electricity prices for all of its neighbors. 

Second, the Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) and the Net Zero Industrial Act must be revamped.   The European Commission should adopt a technology-neutral approach, focusing on emission reduction targets rather than defining a list of strategic sectors. This approach would include placing renewable energy and nuclear energy on the same footing. This method, recently pushed by the Bruegel think tank, is more in line with the treaties enshrining the right of member states to design their energy mix.⁷⁶ This means that the nuclear industry should not be discriminated against, whether in access to European funding for research & development, nuclear waste treatment, or for nuclear-derived hydrogen.

Third, the benefits of nuclear energy are only fully reaped when strong supply chains exist, supported by skilled workers. The European Commission should ramp up efforts to support nuclear skill development, as well as research and development efforts. Europe, as recent problems in the French nuclear sector show, lacks crucial skills. Pursuing nuclear energy independence only works if a strong domestic industry can support and share markets for labor and materials that are not overly reliant on Russia. A critical policy objective should be to improve access to training and enhancing existing skills for operating nuclear energy equipment. Investing in skilled labor and materials across the nuclear supply chains will reduce capital and operating costs, address construction delays, and reestablish efficiency across the value chain. Fostering technological innovation should be another goal of EU energy policy. The majority of large European nuclear power plants are regarded as nearing the end of their operational lives, need better fuel efficiency, and face issues with water shortages. Member states will need to identify opportunities to address these deficiencies as part of their overall decarbonization strategies. Currently, there is an acute lack of resources across the board, as France’s problems illustrate. 

Fourth, the concerns of the anti-nuclear camp must be addressed with a focus on nuclear waste. While the benefits are clear, critiques against nuclear energy use—as voiced by Germany and its anti-nuclear allies—must be addressed. Even though safety precautions with nuclear power plants have dramatically increased since the Chernobyl disaster, the more-recent Fukushima incident convinced many—including the Green Party, which holds the crucial economic affairs and climate action portfolios in Germany’s cabinet—that the risks of nuclear power are too high. This must be addressed with a new focus on research into waste, safety, and nuclear management in any grand bargain.

Finally, in the same way that Europe has made drastic (and successful) efforts to reduce Russian gas dependencies, the European Union should be reducing the Russian presence in European nuclear markets, notably for Russian uranium.⁷⁷ This will require the continued authorization of new fuel sources to replace Russia’s supply, which has already begun. One recent case: Orano Mining, which is partially owned by the French state, concluded a memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan to help the EU recognize the potential of the world’s largest uranium exporter.⁷⁸ On this point, France will need to pay heed to other member states’ concerns on the outsized influence that Rosatom has, especially in terms of enrichment capacities. This is an area where deepened cooperation between Europe and its Western allies can bring significant benefits. Indeed, spare capacity exists, notably in France, Canada, and the United States, across the different steps of the nuclear fuel value chain: from mining to conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.⁷⁹

Conclusion 

The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine exposed the fragility of Europe’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons for its energy needs. EU policymakers have acted impressively to mitigate the effects of short-term energy shocks, but measures for long-term resilience are losing momentum and are threatened by unresolved conflict around the role of nuclear energy in the energy transition, as demonstrated by the failure to even mention nuclear energy in the RePowerEU response plan. Failing to reach a European consensus on nuclear energy will further degrade political capital and trust, and additionally jeopardize ambitious targets for decarbonization that already seem out of sight. Nuclear energy, with its low-carbon and reliable electricity generation, can play a significant role in ensuring energy security and meeting decarbonization targets. However, it is currently stymied by both the politics of German-led supranational obstruction and French-led domestic underperformance. A “peace pact” on nuclear energy in Europe and a package to allow the nuclear energy sector to compete has the potential to accelerate broader energy transition policies, restore trust in consensus building, and reestablish the EU as a climate leader. This will be a political—not a technocratic or a technical—decision and requires European leaders to recapture the spirit of technological optimism and geopolitical purpose that first birthed Euroatom. In short, the spirit of the Atomium.  

Policy recommendations

• To resolve deep divisions, EU members should sign a peace pact on nuclear energy. This should take the form of a political neutrality agreement on the topic of nuclear energy that affirms that each state is free to choose its own energy mix, stops interference in these policies, and also affirms there is no right to block member states wishing to launch, expand, or simply conserve their nuclear capacity.
• To do so, subsidy schemes targeted at existing nuclear assets should be dropped, as they undermine the functioning of European electricity markets and its further integration via interconnectors.  
• To make this viable,EU members should agree to place renewable and nuclear sources of power on the same footing under the GDIP and NZIA. This would implement a technology-neutral approach to lowering carbon emissions.
• In exchange, nuclear generating EU members should commit to deeper integration of European electricity markets, new targets for the deployment of renewables, while supporting reforms to simplify and accelerate permitting, and investing in additional cross-border grid connections, with the support of EU money, via existing funding instruments and the European Investment Bank, whilst looking for a long term solution on electricity pricing.
• To strengthen such an effort, the European Commission should support nuclear engineering skills development, along with research and development capabilities.
• To address concerns, EU members should redouble efforts to research, address, and manage nuclear waste disposal. 
• Finally, EU members with Western allies should reduce their reliance on Russian sources of uranium. While fully decoupling from Russian uranium imports will likely be infeasible in the short to medium term, the EU should diversify its sources of uranium to avoid having the Kremlin keep its existing advantageous position in the EU uranium supply.

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About the authors

Ben Judah is director of the Transform Europe Initiative and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is the author most recently of This Is Europe and his research interests focus on the geopolitics of decarbonization, Britain and the European Union.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security and the transatlantic relationship.

Théophile Pouget-Abadie is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transform Europe Initiative and policy fellow at the Jain Family Institute.

Jonah Allen is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a research fellow at the Jain Family Institute.

Francis Shin is a research assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Gordon, Dr. Matthew Bowen, Shahin Vallée and Cécile Maisonneuve for their invaluable insights and feedback in the writing of this report.

The post How to strike a grand bargain on EU nuclear energy policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU)—which together account for 22 percent of global energy-related carbon emissions—have sought to stay on the path to net-zero emissions by 2050 as their economies feel the strain of both energy inflation and climate impact. This two-front war—against Russia’s disruption of energy supplies on the one hand and climate change on the other—are increasingly intertwined.

Electrification remains a powerful weapon in these battles, one in which the United States and European Union need to work together. To improve overall system reliability and resilience, both partners must decarbonize, meet new consumer and industrial demands, and expand transmission capacity.

The challenges are significant, with electricity-related emissions rising in 2022 and fossil fuels’ share of electricity generation remaining stubbornly high at 60 percent in the United States and 40 percent in the EU. The launch of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the United States and REPowerEU in the European Union represent historic government initiatives to spur clean electricity development and advance progress toward lofty targets of 100 percent carbon-free electricity by 2035 in the United States and reducing emissions 55 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 in the EU. Now these initiatives must be implemented with the utmost urgency.

Electricity sector developments in 2022

Last year, the United States and European Union continued their recoveries from the pandemic, albeit at slower rates of economic growth than in 2021. US end-use electricity consumption grew by 2.6 percent in 2022 to reach an all-time high of 4.05 trillion kilowatt-hours. In the EU, high electricity prices led to a decline of 3 percent in electricity consumption.

Strong growth in renewables was common to both sides of the Atlantic. Despite lower hydroelectric output, renewables accounted for the largest share of EU electricity generation at 39.4 percent, and solar and wind growth offset emergency increases in coal generation due to gas shortages. EU solar generation grew by 29 percent, with 20 member states achieving record shares.

In the United States, natural gas remained the largest source of utility-generated electricity at 39.8 percent, with an increase of 7 percent in 2022 due to hot weather and lower coal output. However, renewable generation grew faster, increasing by 12.6 percent. The share of renewables (21.5 percent) exceeded coal (19.5 percent) for the first time, courtesy of a doubling of solar capacity.  

Despite growing renewable generation, electricity-related emissions increased in both the United States and the EU. US emissions from electricity grew slightly from 2021 but remain almost 40 percent down from their 2007 peak. The electricity sector contributed 31 percent of total US energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. Coal was the largest source of power sector emissions, comprising 55 percent.

While the share of fossil fuel generation declined by 1 percent in the United States due to falling coal use, it increased by 3 percent in the EU due to increased coal consumption, notably in Germany. Higher gas generation, especially in France, Italy, and Spain, also increased power-sector emissions.   

The role of natural gas in supporting the electricity system remains contentious as the EU seeks to phase out of Russian gas by 2027, in part through imports of US LNG. For its part, US natural gas generation is expected to increase, but its share in the overall power mix will decline as renewable energy surges.

The essential role of nuclear power

The energy security and climate crises have changed attitudes toward nuclear power, as the essential role this zero-carbon source has to play in meeting future baseload electricity and heating needs becomes increasingly evident. Nuclear power contributed 46.3 percent and 37.7 percent of carbon-free power in the United States and the EU in 2022.

The closure of the Palisades plant in Michigan decreased US nuclear generation slightly in 2022 in both absolute and relative terms. Meanwhile in Europe, technical problems in France and closures in Germany led to falling output in 2022.

Despite last year’s dip, the prospect for a nuclear energy resurgence appears promising. One of two new Vogtle AP-1000 units in Georgia has finally entered operation. New third generation light-water reactors and advanced nuclear reactor projects are underway in both the United States and the EU. The US Congress has approved with bipartisan support billions of dollars in funding for maintaining existing plants and providing investment and production credits for new builds and commercial demonstrations.

Both utilities and industry are showing strong interest in small modular reactors (SMRs), which boast improved passive safety, standardized manufacturing, and operational flexibility. SMRs hold significant potential for producing electricity, high-temperature industrial heat, and clean hydrogen.

Most of these initial SMR projects will not be coming online before 2030 and their cost-competitiveness remains unclear. But just as the scale-up of solar photovoltaics has rapidly reduced costs and revolutionized the electricity industry, the potential for advanced manufacturing of small nuclear reactors to drive down prices, reduce construction times, and expand the scope of both centralized and distributed applications is substantial.

Infrastructure investment requirements

Renewable energy will continue to dominate new capacity additions as the United States and the EU implement ambitious clean energy programs. The impact of these initiatives is already apparent. US solar capacity is expected to grow by 32 gigawatts (GW) in 2023 and 31GW in 2024, overtaking US wind capacity around 2030. In Europe, solar capacity is expected to double by 2026 in line with REPowerEU’s target of 400GW by 2025. Both areas envision large expansion of offshore wind generation, with the US Department of Energy aiming for 20GW by 2030 and European leaders targeting 120GW in the North Sea by 2030.

To support this new renewable capacity, major investments are needed in transmission, distribution, and storage. Moreover, accommodating increased intermittency in the system while integrating electric vehicles, heat pumps, data centers, and microgrids will require measures to improve reliability and resilience.

As much as $90 billion in investment is needed in the United States by 2030 to support transmission.  The $2.5 billion Transmission Investment Loan Fund and other measures included in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the IRA will help, but utilities must also ramp up their own investments. Eurelectric, an industry group, suggests up to €425 billion may be needed for distribution alone in the EU by 2030, concluding that 70 percent of renewables are likely to be directly connected to distribution networks.

The financing requirements of the transition in the US and EU electricity sectors are substantial. Yet the costs of severe climate events are increasing daily. Over the past eight years, the United States has experienced ten climate events that have each caused $10 billion or more in damage. Costs from storm damage are estimated at $165 billion in 2022 alone, and over $1.1 trillion over the past decade. These impacts are becoming worse; even with 2023 not yet over, the United States through September 11 has experienced 23 extreme weather events costing over $1 billion each.

Looking ahead

Last year marked an important milestone in the energy transition in the United States and European Union with the passage of landmark energy and climate legislation. The focus now should be to implement these policies effectively and equitably to preserve momentum. Both the United States and the European Union face major political and economic challenges in achieving these goals.

The war in Ukraine and its energy implications will test Western resolve and require a continued focus on helping allies diversify energy supplies. The election season and confrontations over budgets and policy directions will preoccupy US decisionmakers and likely affect energy programs and project support.

Nevertheless, industry and financial institutions in both regions are embracing the clean energy transition.  But workforce constraints are proving to be a considerable impediment to implementation, and an internal industrial policy focus on US and European markets may limit pursuing global clean energy opportunities.

Governments and the private sector in the United States and Europe must realize the importance of global sustainable development and climate mitigation efforts, especially in coal-dependent Asia. As US special presidential envoy for climate John Kerry and executive director of the International Energy Agency Fatih Birol recently warned in a Washington Post editorial, efforts to triple renewable electricity generation must be accompanied by a shared, intense commitment to stop the growth of unabated coal use.

Finally, the extreme global heat and flooding experienced in 2022 and 2023 demand greater global investment in clean energy alternatives. The upcoming COP28 climate summit in Dubai presents another opportunity to galvanize and mobilize global action and resources. The United States and Europe must seize this opportunity to persist in their twin struggles against climate change and the weaponization of energy supply.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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On August 29, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in South China Morning Post. He discusses the delicate political challenges of Japan’s recent decision to discharge wastewater from its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, arguing that “going forward, Japan has to ensure that it upholds the transparency that it is showing.”

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Distinguished speakers at the workshop included H.E. Peter Dovhun, minister of economy of the Slovak Republic; Ms. Ditte Juul Jørgensen, director-general for energy of the European Commission; and Dr. Julije Domac, special advisor on energy and climate of the Republic of Croatia, among others.

Participants acknowledged the importance of solidarity and cooperation in the success of the REPowerEU plan, which aims to reduce reliance on Russian energy sources—especially gas—and has been credited with lowering Europe’s Russian gas dependence by cutting imports from Russia by two-thirds by the end of 2022. The European gas supply needs to be diversified. In this context, tripling the LNG supplies from the US is a positive development.

Similarities and differences between IRA and the Green Deal were discussed. Both the EU and the US have common objectives – to invest more in clean energy supply chains, technologies, and innovation. At the same time, a positive development is that the differences are being addressed not by retaliatory measures but through direct dialogue to find solutions.

Like much of Central Europe, Slovakia is heavily reliant on Russian oil and gas for its energy supply and has faced difficulties with diversification following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To that end, as it continues to support Ukraine with military and humanitarian aid, Slovakia and other Central European member states are key contributors to EU efforts to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels and reduce carbon emissions.  

Slovakia is seeking to rapidly electrify its economy to address its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The government describes its efforts as focused on solving the “energy trilemma” – maintaining the balance between the security of supply, sustainability, and affordability. Another priority of the current government is addressing energy security and affordability ahead of the 2023 election.

Panelists praised Slovakia’s move towards building a gas interconnector with Poland, in addition to prioritizing ongoing gas supply talks with Lithuania, Germany, and Italy.

While Russia has weaponized the European Union’s dependence on Russian energy, the EU showed that its systems are more resilient than the Kremlin expected. However, the EU needs to avoid creating new dependencies while cutting the old ones. Panelists argued that EU member states need to seriously engage in implementing the REPowerEU plan’s objectives to reinforce Europe’s energy sovereignty in addition to ensuring decarbonization occurs at an expedited rate. The participants agreed that outlining EU aid plans to states previously more reliant on Russian hydrocarbons would be vital to get the implementation of REPowerEU objectives back on track.

Participants also discussed how nuclear power could help in reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas while lowering emissions. Discussants emphasized the need to consolidate and harmonize the regulatory frameworks and safety standards needed to support the use of nuclear energy. The consensus that emerged among participants was that, in addition to Europe’s ongoing search to secure critical minerals abroad, Europe needs to reduce its dependence on Russian uranium if nuclear energy is to play a role in Europe’s decarbonization and diversification. The potential for small modular reactors (SMRs) and the high capital costs associated with nuclear energy were also a subject of the debate. The overall conclusion was that bringing SMRs to market at scale needs to be a central part of a transatlantic energy and climate partnership.

Nevertheless, participants noted the potential importance of nuclear energy as a long-term measure towards decarbonization. Some senior policymakers present argued that nuclear energy should be seen as a carbon neutral and sustainable form of electricity production, and that EU member states that have prioritized nuclear energy technology development should consider developing partnerships with likeminded EU countries on the matter as well. 

Therefore, the overall picture that emerged from the workshop was of enduring European solidarity on achieving decarbonization. EU member states have largely retained their commitment towards decarbonization despite pressure from the Kremlin, albeit not on track to reach the targets set by REPowerEU. Participants further emphasized that US and European policymakers should be less concerned about the impact of “Ukraine fatigue,” the alleged decline in support for aiding Ukraine, and more on ensuring that EU members accelerate their efforts towards diversifying their energy supplies away from Russia. Finally, while nuclear energy remains a hotly debated topic among European policymakers, disagreements were more on the lack of construction, manufacturing, design, and operational expertise capabilities present in Europe as a whole.

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The post Workshop on the role of Central and Eastern Europe in European decarbonization  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Both preserving the existing fleet of reactors and building new advanced nuclear power plants could play a role in achieving deep decarbonization of electricity supply systems by mid-century. Public support, designs with greater inherent safety, licensing advanced reactors, and reasonable costs and schedules will be integral parts of this strategy. Nuclear power’s future would also benefit from national governments putting renewed emphasis on spent nuclear fuel disposition.

This report by Matt Bowen discusses a number of actions that the United States, Japan, and other civil nuclear allies could pursue so that nuclear energy can play a larger role in overcoming the challenges related to energy demand, energy security, and associated environmental and public health risks.

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Security

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

Tracking narratives

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Media policy

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

Russian missile strike in Lviv kills ten civilians, injures dozens

At least ten people were killed and thirty-seven injured in Russia’s July 6 attack on Lviv, in western Ukraine. Regional Governor Maksym Kozytskyy said that a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, destroying more than fifty apartments. 

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to launch offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian forces reported thirty-eight combat engagements against Russian troops near Novoselivske, Novohryhorivka, Berkhivka, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. In the direction of Lyman, Russian forces shelled Nevske, Bilohorivka, Torske, Verkhnokamyanske, and Rozdolivka in Donetsk. Russian aviation conducted an airstrike in Bilohorivka. Russia also attacked villages in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, including Levadne, Olhivske, Malynivka, Huliaipole, and Bilohirka. On July 6, Russian troops shelled Chervonohryhorivka and Nikopol, damaging civilian infrastructure.  

On July 5, reports from Russian military bloggers suggested that Ukrainian forces had advanced southwest of Berkhivka, west of Yahidne, and southwest of Bakhmut. The Ukrainian army said it conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut and is moving on Bakhmut’s southern flank. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Ukrainian army conducted offensive operations near Lyman, Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka front, on the border between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and in western Zaporizhzhia. 

The Ukrainian army appears to have launched a coordinated attack on Russian army logistical and communications hubs. On July 4, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an ammunition depot in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk. Russian sources claimed without evidence that Ukraine had struck a hospital. Former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov, also known as Igor Girkin, said the attack demonstrates how Ukraine regularly launches missile strikes against Russian rear targets. Other unconfirmed reports from July 5 indicate Ukraine may have struck Russian positions near Debaltseve. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces hit Russian positions near Yakymivka in the Melitopol area and attempted to strike Berdyansk in the Zaporizhzhia region.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

New narrative accuses US and Ukraine of planning false flag attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

Ahead of next week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, allegations that the United States and Ukraine will launch a false flag operation on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant are spreading on various platforms, including Twitter, 4chan, and Instagram. The allegations seemingly aim to create panic and, in the event of a future attack on the plant, establish a narrative the West and Ukraine are to blame. 

On July 3, a post appeared on 4chan from an anonymous user who introduced himself as a US Marine Corps veteran now working for the government in electronic espionage. The user claimed that the Ukrainian and US governments are working together to bomb the Zaporizhzhia power plant. According to the conspiracy theory, after the false flag operation, the United States will be able to use “nuclear warheads” against Russia. At the time of writing, the post had been deleted from 4chan. However, similar posts remain on the platform.

However, the false flag claims did not originate on 4chan. Russian Twitter accounts posted similar claims building the false flag narrative. After the 4chan post, the claim circulated again on Twitter.  

A similar narrative was also shared by Renat Karchaa, an adviser to Rosenergoatom, a subsidiary of the Russian state nuclear agency Rosatom. Karchaa claimed on Russian state television channel Russia-24 that on the night of July 5, the Ukrainian army would attempt an attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant. Without evidence, he accused the United States and the West of planning a false flag incident to damage Russia’s reputation. The claims were further amplified by Russian state media outlets.  

The allegations escalated on social media after July 4, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeated Ukraine’s concerns about the status of the nuclear power plant. In an address, Zelenskyy restated that Russia plans to attack the plant and that Russian troops have placed explosive-like objects on the building’s roof. In June, Ukrainian military intelligence made similar claims when it reported that the plant’s cooling pond had been mined by Russian troops.  

On July 5, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that it was aware of reports that mines and other explosives had been placed around the plant. The IAEA said their experts inspected parts of the facility and did not observe any visible indications of mines or explosives. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi added, “The IAEA experts requested additional access that is necessary to confirm the absence of mines or explosives at the site.” On July 7, the IAEA announced that Russia had granted its experts further access, “without – so far – observing any visible indications of mines or explosives.”  

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Former employees share details about Prigozhin’s media group and troll farms

Several independent Russian media outlets published stories this week interviewing former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which dissolved on June 30.  

In a video published on Telegram, Yevgeny Zubarev, director of Patriot Media Group’s RIA FAN, said the goal was to “work against the opposition, such as Alexei Navalny and others who wanted to destroy our country.” Zubarev confirmed key details previously reported by independent Russian journalists at Novaya Gazeta in 2013 and the now-Kremlin-controlled RBC in 2017 about the existence of paid commentators and the creation of Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets. Zubarev added that, after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 re-election, the group hired “foreign affairs observers.” The timing corresponds with attempts by Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency to meddle in the 2020 US presidential election. 

Further, independent Russian media outlets Sever.Realii, Bumaga, and Novaya Gazeta interviewed former employees of Prigozhin’s media group. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the former employees confirmed that Prigozhin’s “troll factory” and “media factory” conducted coordinated information attacks on opposition leaders, published fabricated or purchased news “exclusives,” praised Putin, and deliberately ignored particular individuals who criticized Wagner Group. Bumaga and Sever.Realii described a smear campaign against Saint Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. In 2019, Prigozhin’s media group supported and promoted Beglov, but in 2021, Prigozhin reportedly launched a smear campaign, as Beglov allegedly prevented him from developing a waste collection business in the city. Novaya Gazeta’s report also provided evidence that Prigozhin’s troll farm activities extended beyond Russia, with employees portraying skinheads and fascists in the Baltic region, specifically in Lithuania. 

In recent years, additional revelations about Prigozhin’s media group have come to light. For example, Bumaga reported that prospective hires had to pass a “lie detector test” in which “security service specialists” asked candidates about their attitudes toward the opposition and Alexei Navalny in particular. Once hired, employees were closely surveilled. One former employee Bumaga interviewed characterized the atmosphere as being in a “closed military company.” Both Bumaga and Novaya Gazeta’s interviewees said that most of the employees did not believe in the mission. In one example, an employee left after refusing to launch a smear campaign against Ivan Golunov, a journalist at the independent news outlet Meduza who was detained in 2019 under false pretenses. Bumaga, citing an unnamed former employee, also reported that at one point an employee had hacked the system, erased a database, and fled to Poland. The same interviewee claimed they employed two Telegram administrators who also administered pro-Ukraine channels.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin-owned RT offers jobs to former employees of Prigozhin’s troll factory

RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan offered to hire employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group, which reportedly housed his troll factories. In the latest episode of the program Keosayan Daily, Simonyan praised the work of “Wagner’s media empire.” She said their work “was super professional” and that anyone left without a job can join “them,” referring to Russian propaganda outlets. She added, “We know you as professional colleagues of ours.” 

The fate of Patriot’s former employees is being actively discussed in Russia. According to Russian outlet Novie Izverstia, Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of the pro-Kremlin outlet MK.ru, volunteered to help find jobs for former employees of Patriot. In addition, the chairman of the Saint Petersburg branch of the Union of Journalists of Russia stated that the union would contact the heads of media outlets to help find opportunities for dismissed employees and would provide additional informational support.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russian conspiracy alleges false flag at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has recently warned that Moscow may intend to blow up the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden acknowledged on June 19 that the threat of Putin using nuclear weapons is “real.” Days later, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov accused Russia of mining the cooling pond used to control temperatures at the Zaporizhzhia plant’s reactors. Clearly, an occupied nuclear plant that is blown up becomes a nuclear weapon.

Preventing this from happening should be an international priority. The fallout from a detonation at the plant would spread across many countries in a matter of hours. In addition to Ukraine itself, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Russia would all be at serious risk, according to analysis by Ukraine’s Hydrometerological Institute.

Russia has occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant since the first weeks of the invasion. Last summer, the Kremlin allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its operational safety remotely. But in April 2023, IAEA officials began warning of growing risks and calling for additional measures to protect the plant. With Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive now underway, alarm is mounting.  

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Zelenskyy’s claims that the Kremlin is planning to orchestrate a nuclear disaster in Ukraine are not at all far-fetched, given how Putin’s forces have been purposely laying waste to the country for the past sixteen months. The invading Russian army has planted landmines across an area the size of Switzerland, displaced more than ten million people, and destroyed dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities. Countless residential apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals have been reduced to ruins. A comprehensive and methodical nationwide bombing campaign has targeted the country’s civilian infrastructure. 

In recent weeks, Russia is suspected of having blown up the Khakovka dam in southern Ukraine, causing an ecological catastrophe. However, even this unprecedented act of ecocide failed to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. With Russia’s military predicament expected to become increasingly grim in the weeks and months ahead, the likelihood of further extreme measures will grow. “They constantly need destabilization here. They want the world to put pressure on Ukraine to stop the war,” commented Zelenskyy.

Putin has been making nuclear threats since the very first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, he very publicly placed his nuclear forces on high alert. With the invasion in danger of unravelling in September 2022, he again hinted at a possible nuclear response while warning, “I’m not bluffing.”

Not everyone is convinced. Former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, who resigned after last year’s invasion, told Newsweek in early 2023: “today [Putin is] bluffing and we know that he has bluffed about nuclear threats. Ukrainians recovered some parts of their territory, and there was no nuclear retaliation. If you’re afraid of Putin using nukes, then you already lose the war against him and he wins.”

Others warn against possible complacency. The recent destruction of Kakhovka dam has caused many observers to reassess their earlier skepticism over Russia’s readiness to go nuclear in Ukraine. Putin has also crossed another red line by vowing to place nukes in Belarus. The Russian dictator is currently holding all Europeans hostage with the threat of a deadly explosion at the continent’s largest nuclear plant, and is moving nuclear weapons closer to the heart of Europe.

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The world must heed Ukraine’s warnings before it is too late. Zelenskyy first raised the alarm about the Kakhovka dam in October 2022 but the international community failed to react. Since the destruction of the dam, the relatively weak and ineffective international response has fuelled fears that Russia will read this as a green light to go further.   

For now, most international attention appears to be focused on Putin’s placement of nukes in Belarus. “I absolutely believe that moving weapons to Belarus demands an unequivocal response from NATO,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said recently before meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Significantly, Russia’s decision to deploy nukes to Belarus even drew a critical response from Chinese officials, who renewed calls for de-escalation and reminded Russia that its leaders had reaffirmed their opposition to nuclear war at their March 2023 summit with China in Moscow.

Ultimately, there is no way of knowing whether Russia’s nuclear threats are genuine or not, but Western leaders cannot afford to let Putin’s nuclear blackmail tactics succeed. If the Russian dictator’s nuclear saber-rattling enables him to rescue the faltering invasion of Ukraine, he will do it again and others will follow. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the West must respond forcefully by escalating support for Ukraine militarily, diplomatically, and economically. The only sensible answer to Russia’s reckless nuclear intimidation is a heightened international commitment to Ukrainian victory.  

In parallel to increased support for Ukraine, international watchdogs must be dispatched to monitor the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other Ukrainian infrastructure sites that Russia could potentially target. Strong pressure must also be placed on China and India to condemn Russia’s nuclear threats. The invasion of Ukraine has already transformed the international security climate; Putin must not be allowed to normalize nuclear blackmail.  

Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, editor-at-large with the National Post in Canada, author of ten books, and author of a newsletter on America.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2023

Beyond the counteroffensive: 84% of Ukrainians are ready for a long war

By Peter Dickinson

84% of Ukrainians reject any compromise with Russia and are ready for a long war if necessary in order to fully de-occupy their country. Most simply see no middle ground between genocide and national survival, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a great chance of succeeding due to a number of factors including superior leadership, equipment upgrades, and strong morale, writes Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Jun 11, 2023

Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely create new reintegration challenges

By Lesia Dubenko

If Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is successful, Kyiv will be faced with the significant challenge of reintegrating communities that have lived under Russian occupation for extended periods, writes Lesia Dubenko.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin’s nuclear threats will escalate as Ukraine’s counteroffensive unfolds appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The sheer scale of the disaster in southern Ukraine remains difficult to grasp. Floodwaters have already displaced thousands of people. Many more are trapped or at risk, including elderly or ill residents who were unable to leave the area earlier on in the war. Initial reports indicate that the authorities in areas under Russian occupation have restricted access to emergency services while preventing residents from leaving. There have also been widespread reports of the Russian military shelling evacuees and rescuers.

Dozens of towns, cities, and farms have been or will be destroyed as the waters continue to rise and move downstream, while large numbers of people throughout a vast area face a lack of access to clean drinking water and essential services. Much of the surrounding farmland is now unusable, which will impact the livelihoods of thousands of Ukrainians and potentially undermine global food security.

There are additional concerns over a potential nuclear disaster as the reservoir behind the collapsed dam supplies the cooling water for the nearby Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Floodwaters are also thought to have dislodged significant numbers of mines, creating further potential for civilian casualties.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

While the Kremlin has denied blowing up the dam and has instead accused Ukraine, initial analysis strongly suggests Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused it to collapse.” Only Russian forces could have carried out such an explosion.

Many have also questioned the credibility of Moscow’s counterclaims suggesting the dam was destroyed by Ukrainian missile or artillery fire. Independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

Russia also has a clear military motive and a long record of attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. At the time of the dam collapse, Russian forces were preparing to face a long anticipated Ukrainian summer counteroffensive. The widespread flooding produced by the disaster effectively ruled out the possibility of Ukrainian troops attempting a river crossing along an entire section of the 1000-kilometer front. Meanwhile, Russia spent much of the winter and spring seasons conducting a methodical nationwide bombing campaign designed to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and freeze the country into submission. While the destruction of a major dam would mark an escalation in this campaign, it would clearly not be unprecedented.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Despite the likelihood that Russia is responsible for the dam collapse, in legal terms it is still too early to hold anyone directly accountable. First, there would need to be incontrovertible proof that this was actually an attack rather than some kind of horrible accident, miscommunication, or mistake made amid the “fog of war.” Then, the issue of attribution would have to be dealt with. This means that Russia’s responsibility for the attack would need to proven beyond doubt.

If it can be established that Russia intentionally carried out an attack on the dam, there are many potential pathways to justice. For example, Ukraine could pursue accountability through its own domestic courts; international actors could establish a regional tribunal; the International Criminal Court could investigate and potentially indict a responsible individual; or countries could choose to exercise universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute Russia for its actions.

Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to overcome in pursuing accountability through these mechanisms. History has shown that the wheels of justice are excruciatingly slow in international war crimes cases. Prosecutors and Ukrainians alike would have to show extraordinary patience in waiting for these approaches to pay dividends. It would also be difficult to prove who ordered the attack and get that person in the dock, barring unlikely regime change within Russia itself. These are neither fair nor easy circumstances for Ukrainians to accept in the face of such trauma.

Furthermore, there are still huge information gaps. There would need to be a committed fact-finding effort, starting in the immediate present, to fill these gaps for a case that might not be prosecuted for many years or even decades. Ukrainians have shown an unprecedented ability to document abuses in real time throughout the current war. The onus would be on them to identify the individual Russian units and commanders responsible for blowing up the dam.

The challenges are even greater if Ukraine or the international community wants to pursue specific accountability for ecocide. Although there has been a lot of momentum in this direction, ecocide is not yet codified as a crime under international law (although it is under Ukrainian law). Even if this were to be accomplished in the near future and ecocide came to fall under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, there would still be enough ambiguity and lack of legal precedent to potentially deter prosecutors from pursuing the charge of ecocide in the Kakhovka dam case. There would also need to be an extensive investigation, which would not be easy given bureaucratic and financial barriers along with the fact that many affected areas remain under Russian control or are heavily mined.

In light of these obstacles, what can be done in the short-term to help hold Russia accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and its devastating consequences? First, the international community needs to broaden its view of what might constitute justice beyond the courtroom. This means listening to and supporting local civil society in Ukraine. It also means investing in Ukraine not only in the short-term, but in sustainable ways that bolster the country’s longer-term recovery and reconstruction, quite possibly by using frozen Russian assets to finance it. This requires helping the Ukrainian authorities combat corruption and build the capacity of the country’s own judicial system to pursue accountability.

In the pursuit of justice for Ukraine, the most meaningful steps are those that ensure Russia’s decisive defeat. Accountability will be much more difficult to achieve if the conflict becomes protracted or frozen. In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone will ever face prosecution over the destruction of Kakhovka dam. Ultimately, the only way to achieve a just and durable peace is through Ukrainian victory.

Danielle Johnson holds a PhD in Politics from Oxford University and is currently a Senior Ukraine Analyst at ACAPS.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 7, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive will aim to keep the Russians guessing

By Peter Dickinson

Speculation is mounting that Ukraine’s hotly anticipated summer counteroffensive may be underway but initial stages are likely to feature probes and diversionary attacks rather than a big push, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

By Tennyson Dearing

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is an important moment in the war with Russia but it is critical to maintain a sense of perspective and underline the need for long-term Western backing, writes Tennyson Dearing.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a great chance of succeeding due to a number of factors including superior leadership, equipment upgrades, and strong morale, writes Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Could Russia be held accountable for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nuclear power plants work by splitting atoms to create tremendous heat, which turns turbines to generate electricity. The heat created is so extreme that advanced cooling systems are required to keep temperature levels under control and prevent a meltdown. The Fukushima disaster was the result of a cooling system failure when a tsunami caused by a major earthquake disabled the Japanese nuclear power plant’s cooling system and three reactors melted down from their own heat. By contrast, the 1986 Chornobyl disaster in Soviet Ukraine was due to human error that caused the graphite reactor cores to burn.

The Zaporizhzhia plant features VVER-1000 pressurized light water reactors. This means that a Chornobyl-style meltdown is not possible as there is no graphite to burn, but the risk of a cooling system failure is a grave concern. The plant has been carefully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since it was first captured by Russian troops in March 2022 during the early weeks of the full-scale Russian invasion.

Since then, Russia has repeatedly struck the transmission lines that power the plant’s cooling systems, necessitating the use of back-up generators to keep the cooling system operational. Despite regular alarms over the close proximity of combat operations and the deployment of Russian troops at the plant, the risk of a nuclear disaster has been seen as present but never pressing due to numerous residual safety features. For example, the plant can run on its own power for short periods of time if power grid access and generators simultaneously fail. So far, this hasn’t happened.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Kakhovka dam collapse has now increased the risk of disaster. In addition to electricity, the plant needs large quantities of water to run its cooling system. The plant was built in the 1980s, decades after the Kakhovka dam was constructed, and features a design that relies on reservoir water for its cooling system. And although the plant’s six reactors have been turned off for more than eight months to reduce the likelihood of wartime nuclear accidents, it will still be a decade before the reactor fuel rods are cool enough to be moved into dry storage.

Water levels in the reservoir have plummeted since the blast on Tuesday morning. At this stage, nobody can say with any certainty how far the water levels will eventually drop before leveling out. The IAEA commented on June 7 that if water levels fall below 12.7 meters, the lowest level at which water can be pumped upstream to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, there are alternative options that can be used to source cooling system water. One day later, this point was reportedly reached. With the Kakhovka dam beyond repair and no clear way to stop it hemorrhaging water from the reservoir, it seems likely that external water sources will be necessary.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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At present, IAEA officials say there is “no immediate risk” to the plant, while officials from Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom have stated that water supplies stored close to the facility are sufficient for the next few months. However, others have noted that summer heat could speed evaporation and exhaust existing reserves far sooner.

The destruction of Kakhovka dam is widely viewed as the latest and most reckless in a series of attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure carried out by Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost sixteen months ago. While Moscow has officially denied destroying the dam, initial analysis points to Russian responsibility. A New York Times article citing engineering and munitions experts concluded that a “deliberate explosion” inside the Russian-controlled dam “most likely caused its collapse.” Meanwhile, independent experts have confirmed that the Cold War era dam, which was built to withstand a nuclear attack, would be extremely difficult to destroy via external bombardment, according to The Times.

In addition to the heightened risk to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the destruction of the dam has also unleashed an ecological disaster throughout the region. Tens of thousands of local residents whose homes have been flooded are in urgent need of care and shelter. Significant quantities of oil and chemicals have poured into the Dnipro River and must be contained, along with munitions. These are the most immediate challenges facing the Ukrainian authorities.

The risks posed to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant by the loss of access to reservoir water must also be addressed without delay before the situation becomes critical. Beyond this pressing logistical issue, the blowing up of the Kakhovka dam is also fueling speculation over whether Russia may be prepared to adopt similarly drastic measures at the Zaporizhzhia plant itself. With this in mind, the international community must send a clear message to Moscow that it will be held accountable for any further attempts to intimidate the world with the threat of nuclear disaster.

Suriya Jayanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 6, 2023

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is a key moment but long-term resolve remains crucial

By Tennyson Dearing

Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive is an important moment in the war with Russia but it is critical to maintain a sense of perspective and underline the need for long-term Western backing, writes Tennyson Dearing.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

Fast Thinking Jun 7, 2023

Has Ukraine’s counteroffensive really begun?

By Atlantic Council

Atlantic Council experts share their insights on the intensifying war in Ukraine.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

UkraineAlert May 23, 2023

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a good chance of succeeding

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive has a great chance of succeeding due to a number of factors including superior leadership, equipment upgrades, and strong morale, writes Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Conflict Defense Technologies

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The post Kakhovka dam collapse threatens Europe’s largest nuclear plant appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Early Tuesday, large sections of the Nova Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power plant in southern Ukraine gave way. Since 1956, the dam has pinched the Dnipro River, creating a massive reservoir upstream as far as Zaporizhzhia and, downstream, a succession of towns and villages along the river terminating in Kherson, all of which could now be flooded. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Russian forces of blowing up the dam–a claim US intelligence reportedly appears to support. The Kremlin, which currently controls the area around the dam, has blamed Ukrainian forces. 

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer our most pressing questions about what the damaged dam means for the ongoing war.

1. If Russia is behind the dam collapse, what would it reveal about Russian strategy and tactics at this stage in the war?

That they have no red lines that can’t be crossed and that they have no regard for human lives or ecology. I’m afraid that if the Russians are capable of blowing up such a large piece of critical infrastructure, they’re also capable of striking at the occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant—the consequences of which would be horrific. There is little left in the West’s toolbox to restrain Russia, but a tightening of the noose of sanctions and providing Kyiv with all the fighting kit it is asking for would be a logical starting point.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a Ukraine-based nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

It would reveal nothing new compared with what we have already known about Vladimir Putin’s Russia and its efforts to destroy the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. Putin’s regime has already systematically committed crimes against humanity and pursues a policy of genocide, showing total disregard for human lives. Destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam appears to be one more piece of evidence of the dark nature of Putin’s regime—a terrible and extremely dangerous act aimed at inflicting maximum suffering on people and maximum damage on the environment. Putin is still trying to escalate and terrorize Ukraine and its partners. It’s long overdue that we deny him this possibility.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.

2. What are the implications for the environment and other parts of Ukraine such as Kherson and Crimea?

Ukrainian officials are already reporting the deaths of zoo animals near the dam. Some eighty settlements are at risk of substantial flooding and countless hectares of land are in the path of floodwaters. What is more, the flooding could trigger another wave of displaced people or asylum seekers. If people in the West feel they won’t be impacted, they should think again and brace themselves for higher food prices and a fresh wave of refugees.

—​​Michael Bociurkiw

Since last fall, Ukraine has implored the international community to prevent a Russian terrorist attack on the Nova Kakhovka dam. The immeasurable suffering today should be a wakeup call regarding how Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure must be protected in the future and the importance of trusting Ukraine’s experts on risk assessment and mitigation strategies, in particular regarding nuclear power plants. While there are no evident immediate risks to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, which relies on water from the reservoir for cooling and operations, its continued safety is anything but guaranteed. The international community should be treating Russia’s apparent escalation as a ramp-up for broader genocide and ecocide in Ukraine. Western allies, including multilateral bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, cannot entrust Zaporizhzhia’s safety and that of other massive energy installations to the Russians.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The destruction of Ukraine’s Nova Kakhovka dam will result in short- and long-term environmental, humanitarian, military, and economic consequences. Given the global impacts, especially for Global South food security, Russia, if it was behind the destruction, has cemented its reputation as one of the world’s largest orchestrators of civilian suffering. 

Damage is still unfolding, but there are fears that hundreds of thousands among Ukraine’s already-battered civilian population may be left without their homes, water, electricity, or other access to vital infrastructure in the Kherson region, Crimea, and beyond. Known disaster-related flood risks—like mold-caused health impacts and downed power lines in the water—are exacerbated by reports of Russian troops shelling evacuations, floating mines, and more than a hundred tons of engine oil polluting the Dnipro River.

Europe’s largest steppe, Askania Nova, is endangered, along with the native zebras, buffaloes, and wildebeests that call the steppe their home. Untold ecosystem damage may unfold. Springtime births make animal populations and the ecosystems they support especially vulnerable. In light of the economic damage to Ukraine’s agribusiness and metallurgy industries, which require extensive water supplies, Western governments will need to take decisive action to redirect frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s recovery. Concerns about the long-term cooling of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant will rise. 

—Kristina Hook is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center specializing in genocide and mass atrocity prevention, emerging technologies, and post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Could the dam destruction constitute a war crime?

​​As more details are clarified, the legal implications potentially could be vast, with prohibitions of attacks on such facilities inscribed in the Geneva Conventions. Concrete steps on accountability for war crimes are needed, and global humanitarian aid must surge. None of the ecological crimes unfolding over the past sixteen months were inevitable, given Ukraine’s robust environmental management and monitoring prior to 2014. All trace back to Russia’s nearly decade-long war against Ukraine. The ensuing damage to Ukraine and the global economy lies squarely at Russia’s feet. 

Given months of Ukrainian and international warnings about the possibility of Russia attacking the dam, global condemnation is not sufficient. Anything less than a tangible response alerts the Kremlin that it can get away with the environmental equivalent of a weapon of mass destruction, encouraging Russia to climb further up an escalation ladder aimed directly at Ukraine’s civilians. This day offers a painful snapshot of Ukrainian life under Russia’s terror: nine months of violent occupation in Kherson, with torture camps, rape, and summary executions, followed by relentless shelling, and now, apparently, flooding—losing everything in a day. 

—Kristina Hook

Destruction of the dam absolutely violates the Geneva Conventions and fits the definition of a crime against humanity as described in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. So it should be recognized as such and its perpetrators should be held accountable. We’re seeing a developing humanitarian disaster, primarily due to the massive displacement of the population of flooded areas and a sharp drop in the supply of drinking water. If Russia committed the destruction, it would be one more reason to see Putin and company in The Hague, hopefully in the near future.

—Oleh Shamshur

The post Three questions (and expert answers) about the dam collapse in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2018, Congress passed legislation with bipartisan support to investigate the need for a domestic fast neutron irradiation testing capability, based on the argument that the existing test reactors in the United States would be insufficient to meet new demand for materials and fuels testing from the next generation of advanced reactors. However, in 2021, Congress zeroed out the budget for the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR), leaving the United States without plans to build a domestic advanced test reactor.

In this report, “The Imperative of the Versatile Test Reactor for Nuclear Innovation,” authors Jackie Toth and Khalil Ryan argue that the United States will lose its competitive edge against adversaries (especially Russia) if it lacks a fully realized nuclear energy innovation ecosystem, of which the VTR is a crucial component.